April 16, 2005 - April 16, 2009

BREAKTHROUGH

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BREAKTHROUGHThousands of Paths toward Resolution

Advisor : Kuntoro Mangkusubroto

Author : Eddy Purwanto

Editor : Cendrawati Suhartono (Coordinator) Gita Widya Laksmini Soerjoatmodjo Margaret Agusta (Chief )

Copy Editor : Ihsan Abdul Salam

Writer : Eddie Darajat Erwin Fahmi Intan Kencana Dewi Ita Fatia Nadia Jamil Gunawan Nur Aishyah Usman Raden Pamekas Saifullah Abdulgani Syafiq Hasyim Vika Oktavia Yacob Ishadamy

English Translation

Editor : Linda Hollands

Copy Editor : Margaret Agusta

Translator : T. Ferdiansyah Thajib Oei Eng Goan

THE EXECUTING AGENCY OF REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR ACEH AND NIAS (BRR NAD–NIAS)

April 16, 2005 - April 16, 2009

Head OfficeJl. Ir. Muhammad Thaher No. 20 Lueng Bata, Banda Aceh Indonesia, 23247 Telp. +62‑651‑636666 Fax. +62‑651‑637777

Nias Representative Office Jl. Pelud Binaka KM. 6,6Ds. Fodo, Kec. GunungsitoliNias, Indonesia, 22815Telp. +62‑639‑22848Fax. +62‑639‑22035

www.e‑aceh‑nias.orgknow.brr.go.id

Jakarta Representative Office Jl. Galuh ll No. 4, Kabayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia, 12110 Telp. +62‑21‑7254750 Fax. +62‑21‑7221570

Development of the BRR Book Series is supported by Multi Donor Fund (MDF)through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Technical Assistance to BRR Project

ISBN 978‑602‑8199‑49‑0

Photography : Arif Ariadi Bodi Chandra

Graphic Design : Bobby Haryanto (Chief ) Edi Wahyono Priscilla Astrini WasitoFinal Reviewer : Aichida Ul‑Aflaha Heru Prasetyo Maggy Horhoruw Ratna Pawitra Trihadji Ricky Sugiarto (Chief) Teuku Roli Ilhamsyah Waladi Nur Akbar

With this BRR Book Series, the Indonesian government, its people, and BRR wish to express their deep gratitude for the many kind helping hands extended from all over the world following the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and the March 28, 2005 earthquake in the islands of Nias.

Four years on, the once devastated landscapes are again vibrant with the sporadic rhythm of human life. This achievement is the result of a steadfast commitment of the local, national and international community, combined with the resilience of the people who lost so much.

The dynamics and challenges encountered during the massive undertaking of rebuilding homes, hospitals, schools and other infrastructure, while striving to empower those who survived to reshape their future and redevelop their way of life, provide an important understanding of the disaster-recovery process in Aceh and Nias.

In light of this, within the pages of this book, BRR would like to share those experiences and the lessons learned as a small contribution to return the favor to the world for the invaluable support it contributed to building Aceh and Nias back better and safer; as a history of the humanitarian journey of a united world.

I am proud,that we can share the experiences, knowledge, and lessons

with our fellow countries. I do hope that what we have done can be a standard, a benchmark, for similar efforts

at the national and international levels.

Speech of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonoat the Official Closing Ceremony of BRR at the State Palace, April 17, 2009

about the BRR’s trip to the Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Conferenceat the United Nations Headquarters in New York, April 24, 2009

Two excavators continue working through the evening on the construction of coastal protection barriers at a site in Gampong Jawa, Banda Aceh, August 29, 2005. The construction of the barriers was completed in 2008 with an overall achievement exceeding initial targets. Photo: BRR/Bodi CH

ContentsIntroduction xChapter 1. Passing the Normal Threshold 1Chapter 2. The Starting Line 9

It All Began as a Breakthrough 9BRR Organizational Uniqueness: Seasons Changed, So Did the Organization 16

Chapter 3. Collage of Data and Activities 23PCN and RANdatabase –Super Express Line for Project Approval and Support Information 23One Face for the Entire Units of UN in Aceh 33Reconstruction Based on the Geospatial and Territorial Approach: the Most Complete Map is in Aceh 37Geospatial Data on Construction – from Housing Support to Overall Assets: Indisputable Facts 41

Chapter 4. Donation Purse and State Expenditure for Aceh and Nias 47Donor Harmonization for Aceh-Nias Recovery 47Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF): Mediating Mandate, Accelerating Benefit 53BRR Multi-Year Contract and State Budget Carryover Funds 59

Chapter 5. Operational Preparations 65Goods and Services Procurement for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias 66Three Secret Formulas in Environmental Monitoring: Washing Up, Empowerment and Vigilance 72Special Office for State Services and Treasury (KPPN-K) 83

Chapter 6. Coordination and Management of Project Implementation 89Integrated Team (Tim Terpadu): Public Service under One Roof 90Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR): The Magical Triangle Framework to Overcome Disaster 94Regionalized and Decentralized Decisions, the Key to BRR’s Success 98Major Implementing Partner Relations 102Developing Large-scale Integrated Infrastructure: Fishing for a Difficult Fish with a Huge Bait 104Immediate Action Program – Quick Action; “Half a Loaf of Bread is Better than None” 107Quick Infrastructure Construction to Respond to Urgent Needs: Building a Seaport in One Day 110

Chapter 7. Unique and Exemplary Projects and Policies 115Village Mapping and Village Planning: Application of Participative Planning System 115Sub-District (Kecamatan) Spatial Planning Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP) 122Lambung Village 125Development of a Satellite City: Beuramoe New Town 127Alternative Energy for the Interior Region: A Taste of Development while Preserving the Forests 131Developing Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Post-Disaster Aceh and Nias 134Internet Network for Aceh – Nias: Developing Community Information Delivery 137Regionalization of Water Treatment and Sanitation: Economic Scale and Sharing of Natural Resources 140

Chapter 8. Supervision, Observation and Evaluation 145Beware … Be Very Aware … 145Quality Control of BRR Project Construction 155Monitoring and Evaluating Project Implementation 158

Chapter 9. Conclusion 163Notes 166Glossary of Abbreviations 168

FOR a period of three days, beginning on December 27, 2004, the Indonesian flag was drawn to half mast, and a nation was in mourning. A national disaster was declared and the world watched in disbelief. An earthquake, followed by a series of tsunamis, struck the western-end of Indonesia, causing an unprecedented loss of life and the obliteration of whole communities. For those who survived, their homes, livelihoods, and prospects for the future were swept out to sea.

The earthquake, one of the largest in recent history measuring 9.1 on the Richter scale, was the result of a convergence between two tectonic plates beneath the ocean floor. Although dormant for over 1,000 years, with the buildup of pressure caused by one plate slowly sliding under the other at an estimated rate of 50 mm per year, on December 26, 2004, these two tectonic plates ruptured along a 1,600 km length of what is known as the Sunda mega-thrust.

The epicenter of this earthquake was located 250 km south-west of the Indonesian province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Its rupture - a slippage of up to 10 meters, resulted in the ocean floor being (permanently) lifted and dropped, pushing the entire water column up and down, and generating a series of powerful waves. Tsunamis swept violently up to 6 km inland over the shorelines of Aceh and surrounding islands, beginning less than half-an-hour after the earthquake. A total of 126,741 lives were lost and, in the wake of the disaster, an additional 93,285 people declared missing. Some 500,000 survivors lost their homes, while as many as 750,000 people lost their livelihoods.

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In the private sector, which constituted 78 percent of the destruction wrought by the earthquake and tsunamis, up to 139,195 homes were destroyed or severely damaged, along with 73,869 ha of land with varying degrees of productivity. A total of 13,828 fishing boats vanished, up to 27,593 ha of brackish fish ponds disappeared, and 104,500 small-to-medium businesses ceased to exist. In the public sector, 669 government buildings, 517 health facilities, and hundreds of educational facilities were either destroyed or rendered non-functional. The loss to the environment included 16,775 ha of coastal forests and mangroves, and 29,175 ha of reefs.

The loss and damage of these regions did not end there and, on March 28, 2005, another major earthquake measuring 8.7 on the Richter scale struck the nearby islands of Nias in the Indonesian province of North Sumatera. This second natural disaster resulted in the death of 979 people and the displacement of 47,055 survivors. The proximity of this earthquake, a result also of two tectonic plates rupturing, slipping a length of 350 km, directly beneath the Simeulue and Nias islands, resulted in massive damage to the islands’ infrastructure.

The eyes of the world once again watched in disbelief as the devastation of these regions unfolded, and helping hands began arriving from all corners of the globe to assist in the rescue and relief operations. Individuals of every race, religion, culture and political persuasion across each and every continent worldwide, along with governments, the private sector, non-government organizations and other national and international bodies, reacted in an unprecedented show of human concern and compassion.

From the scale of the devastation wrought by both disasters, it was clear that it would not be enough to simply replace the homes, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure. The rehabilitation and reconstruction program would need to embrace the rebuilding of the social structures that once thrived along the shores of Aceh and within the hinterlands of Nias. The trauma of losing friends, family and a means to support those who survived required that the recovery program focused not only on physical, but also non-physical, development, and on rebuilding an economy to a level that would ensure a firm foundation for future (re)development and growth.

On April 16, 2005, the Government of Indonesia, through the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2005, established the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, BRR) to coordinate and jointly implement a community-driven recovery program for Aceh and Nias. BRR’s mandate was to design policies, strategies and action plans, within an atmosphere of transparency and

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accountability, and to implement them through effective leadership and coordination of the combined domestic and international effort to rebuild Aceh and Nias back better and safer.

The rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias have constituted a challenge not only for the people and Government of Indonesia but for the entire international community. That this challenge was overcome successfully is reflected in the conclusions drawn in evaluations concerning the recovery program. In the final months of the program, the World Bank among others concluded that the recovery was an unprecedented success story and a model for international partnership - outcomes which were realized through effective government leadership.

The nation’s management of the recovery program gained the confidence of donors, both institutions and individuals, and through BRR’s anti-corruption policies and processes, the trust of the international community. And without the cooperation of the international community, the post-disaster situation in Aceh and Nias - the unparalleled devastation - could never have been reversed.

In recording this humanitarian achievement, BRR has produced the BRR Book Series containing 15 volumes that detail the processes, challenges, solutions, achievements and lessons learned during the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh and Nias. It is hoped that these books will function to capture and preserve the experience of the recovery, and to establish guidelines for future disaster-recovery programs across the world.

This book titled Thousands of Paths toward Resolution presents a number of ways taken by the Government of Indonesia in response to obstacles and hindrances encountered in the field. It may be in the form of conceptual innovations or system implementation. It has a wide range of coverage, from the high level to the practical dimensions. Achieved targets are in fact more effective and efficient, with uncompromised, even improved, quality. In the end, the existence of these breakthroughs became even more crucial as the impact and lessons learned hold great potential for replications in another contexts.

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4-Year AchievementRehabilitation and Reconstruction

104,500small-medium enterprises (SME) destroyed

155,182laborers trained

195,726SMEs received assistance

635,384people displaced

127,720people killed and 93,285 missing

139,195 houses destroyed

73,869 hectares of agricultural lands destroyed

1,927 teachers killed

13,828 fishing boats destroyed

1,089 religious facilities destroyed

2,618 kilometers of road destroyed

3,415schools destroyed

517 health facilities destroyed

669 government buildings destroyed

119 bridges destroyed

22 ports destroyed

8 airports or airstrips destroyed

140,304permanent houses built

69,979hectares of agricultural land reclaimed

39,663teachers trained

7,109fishing boats built or provided

3,781religious facilities built or repaired

3,696kilometers of road constructed

1,759schools built

1,115health facilities constructed

996government buildings constructed

363birdges constructed

23ports constructed

13airports or airstrips constructed

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NOTHING was normal in Aceh and Nias after the tsunami hit the area’s 800 km of coastline. Starting from the massive earthquake that struck on the morning of December 26, 2004, the intensity of the tsunami that caused widespread damage, the paralyzed communication and activities in the aftermath, and the overwhelming number of victims, to the scope of relief flowing in for the recovery process. None of it was normal. Nevertheless, the number of survivors exceeded the fatalities and so there needed to be a mechanism to sustain the living. It was, however, impossible to deal with these impacts using normal procedures and practices.

Specifically concerning the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, BRR) of Aceh-Nias’ achievements, the breakthroughs were conceptual innovations and working system implementations that enabled BBR as a governmental agency to perform faster and better. The improved features were indicated by the manner in which they were faster and of higher quality, lower cost and better accuracy. As mentioned, breakthroughs were made not only by BRR. Even the establishment of BRR was in itself a breakthrough for the Indonesian government. This issue will also be further explored as one of the breakthroughs.

Passing the Normal Threshold

The scene at Ulee Lheue coast, Banda Aceh, which was wrecked by the tsunami, May 14, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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The working mechanism and implementation during BRR’s term that received acknowledgements from national and international agencies are also documented in this book as a compilation of BRR breakthroughs. This book is Indonesia’s collection of experiences in handling a disaster and implementing post-disaster reconstruction under complex social circumstances, which can provide insights for other countries when dealing with similar incidents.

International recognition of Indonesia’s performance in responding to the disaster and forming an ad-hoc organization called BRR and BRR’s activities during its term do not necessarily require a tangible token of appreciation such as a monument. An invitation to present the working process can be another form of appreciation for the performance of BRR’s work in rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh and Nias.

BRR frequently held teleconferences with Chinese officials and humanitarian volunteers in Sichuan – a city in China struck by an earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale that claimed more than 12,000 lives – to share its experience with China’s Humanitarian Taskforce. The experiences shared included those involving the adoption of emergency response strategies, post-disaster economic development and coordination with humanitarian organizations working to assist victims.

Not long after Myanmar was hit by Cyclone Nargis in early May 2008, BRR’s experience and networking were made good use of by Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) countries in their subtle attempts to support the people and the state of Myanmar. The attempts had to be subtle owing to the diplomatic tensions between the government of Myanmar and external parties offering support that were results of major disagreement concerning good governance. Requests for BRR involvement also came from United Nations (UN) agencies, donor countries and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as those who were involved and had experience in working with BRR in Aceh and Nias. Implicitly, these requests strongly indicated that BBR’s operations in Aceh and Nias were considered effective by those working under BRR coordination. BRR was eager to help and after going through a long process of multilateral diplomacy, ASEAN Secretary-General deliberated and approved the technical prerequisites to implement recovery efforts in Myanmar with the support of the BRR system and experiences.

Apart from this, there has also been a domestic request that BRR has not yet fulfilled. Papua Governor Barnabas Suebu, who administers a Rp 16 trillion budget per annum, has expressed his wish to adopt BRR’s human resources management system, planning and programming systems, development supervision strategy, information and geospatial systems, quality management and the budget reporting accountability system. In the eyes of the Papua Governor, BRR is a model for better development. He even stated his wish to adopt BBR’s style of management for Aceh-Nias 100 percent to build a better Papua. This is a form of appreciation coming from a fellow Indonesian, which is principally

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Junius Saringar Ulibasa Hutabarat (Deputy for Planning and Programming) and Eddy Purwanto (Deputy for Housing, Infrastructure and Coordination of Spatial Planning), discuss with a number of foreign aid workers assisting the recovery efforts in Aceh, May 13, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

a similar but different implementation modality compared to the various forms of international recognition.

The acknowledgment of BRR’s effectiveness is inseparable from BRR’s achievements. BRR’s heavy mission was aggravated by the psychological burden. Not only did Aceh and Nias have to cope with the aftermath of the 9.1 magnitude earthquake and the ensuing catastrophic tsunami, but at the time the Indonesian government had only recently lifted martial law in Aceh, which had been rocked by armed conflict, and replaced it with a state of civil emergency. Public trust in the central government’s intention to improve people’s welfare was very low. After the disaster, the government formed a special taskforce (rehabilitation and reconstruction) and named a person who they considered part of the ‘enemy’ regime as its leader.

Rejection and pressure undermined BRR’s early operations. BRR emerged amid a society that had experienced multi-dimensional crises, a society that had experienced 30 years of armed conflict and a horrible disaster. Theirs were a dense sentiment of distrust toward the government. Their trust toward each other even had evaporated, and it was only natural that their distrust would be greater for an institution formed by the central government, whose realization of peace appeared to be partial. Every statement and explanation issued by BRR was viewed with suspicion and criticism. People tended to feel they could trust nothing attempted by BRR.

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This skeptical stance was not only ubiquitous among laypersons but also among the elite, who seemed to have an even deeper distrust. However, BRR dealt with the unfortunate prejudice in a professional manner. Accusations of deception involving house construction were countered with the presentation of solid data. Efforts were made to overcome the skepticism. As a result, the people of Aceh and Nias learned about the housing geospatial information system, which was developed as one of the most sophisticated asset management systems in Indonesia.

Aside from the achievement in housing data verification, BRR also succeeded in making a financing breakthrough in the infrastructural construction sector with its Immediate Action Plan, which was devised to counter heavy criticism of slow performance and field impediments voiced by local inhabitants who had difficulty in believing that they would eventually receive the benefits. There were many more breakthroughs made during BRR’s mission that will be further discussed here.

Evidently, a heavy responsibility often culminates in one of two outcomes: acute frustration or creativity and innovation. The level of sincerity, motivation, perseverance and intellectuality of the human resources determine which outcome will emerge. The development is reflected in conduct and behavior, including organizational behavior.

A return visit by BRR staff members to the Papua Provincial Government

to share their experience in asset management, Papua, January 12,

2009. Photo: Tomy Mulya Hasan

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This book elaborates the numerous innovations, called BRR breakthroughs. Paradoxically, such as earlier illustrated, innovation is often prompted by negative situations. Irritation and anxiety toward the system, procedures and situations in the rehabilitation and reconstruction became the trigger that kindled the creative ideas that constitute BRR breakthroughs, which this book tries to capture.

Each innovation grew and thrived along the organizational evolution of BRR, which carried out multi-function tasks, to accommodate circumstantial demand without deemphasizing the main goals of the Aceh-Nias rehabilitation and reconstruction. The breakthroughs are categorized as:

Conceptual breakthrough.1.

This is an original innovation in the operational and supervisory system that was brand new and had never been implemented before.

Breakthrough in implementation 2.

In this category, the main idea or system concept being addressed was not totally new, but BRR succeeded in making some innovations during the concept implementation and perfected its system so that better field performance was achieved. In this section, the issues discussed are actions taken that made an implementation a breakthrough.

The conceptual and practical innovations selected for this book are those that were proven to be effective in the context of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. Indeed, there were also several innovations attempted in Aceh and Nias of which the results were not always as expected. One example was the establishment of the Village Committee for Housing and Settlement Development Acceleration (Komite Percepatan Pembangunan Perumahan dan Permukiman Desa, KP4D) that was not overly successful in Aceh but worked quite well in Nias. These particular topics are not explained here but are explored in detail in other books in this series, since this book involves more lessons learned in various sectors.

Some of the issued regulations during BRR’s term to ensure the effectiveness of Aceh and Nias rehabilitation and reconstruction are inseparable from the roles played by BRR personnel, such as Presidential Regulation No. 69/2005 on Participation of Foreign Institutions/Individuals in Grant Provision for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Regions and Community of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias Island in North Sumatra Province by the Head of BRR Executing Agency; Presidential Decree Amendment No. 80/2003 on Goods and Services Provision; on the employee system in BRR; bylaw on Banda Aceh City Layout Planning and many more. The underscored innovation here is not placed on the regulations’ substances but on the process of the regulation arrangements that involved BRR from the legal drafting to the issuance of a particular regulation.

Such breakthroughs were also more related to the involvement of BRR personnel, and the final results were not specific products of BRR and therefore will not be explained

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here in detail. This book focuses on 30 breakthroughs, both in conceptual or implemental terms, which succeeded in resolving problems and expediting rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Aceh and Nias.

The breakthroughs began with the formation of BRR with its inherent uniqueness within the governance system of the Republic of Indonesia. Although BRR was often compared to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional, BPPN), BPPN’s authority and mechanism were not as extensive or as flexible as those of BRR, plus agencies like BPPN can be commonly found across the world. In a broader context, BRR was also a learning experience for international circles in emergency response in a post-disaster and post-conflict setting. With the given authority and mechanism, rehabilitation and reconstruction can be effectively and promptly completed.

It is this sort of breakthrough that is discussed in this book along with those categorized as innovations in implementation. Examples of implemental breakthroughs are the

Goods and services procurementAdmin lingkungan

KPPN-K

Sample Project/ Policy

VM/VPKSF-AP

LambungBeuramoe

PLTMHGender Policy

ICTRegional Watsan

PCN and RAN database

UNORCAGDC

MDFRANTF

Multi-years contract

BRR FormationBRR Work System

Integrated TeamPRBRegionalizationHMKUIREP/IRFFIAPMalahayati and Meulaboh

Deputy for SupervisionSupervisory BoardIntegrity PactP4WPPMKSAK

Figure 1.1 BRR Cycle of Activities

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Project Concept Note (PCN), the Recovery Aceh Nias database (RANdatabase) and the Integrated Team (Tim Terpadu). The basic concept of the three operational innovations are perhaps common in Indonesia and in other parts of the world, but adoption of the systems enabled better implementation that supported rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Aceh and Nias.

One example is in the regular development mechanism, in which the coordinating activities of local programs and projects that extended from the village to the national level would normally take three months. The process was known as the Planning Development Forum, which was conducted annually. However, due to the integration of PCN and RANdatabase concepts, the coordination process for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities could be completed in two weeks or less.

It was similar with the Integrated Team. For a developed country like Singapore, a one-stop policy mechanism is common, but Indonesia’s bureaucratic system was not familiar with one-stop policy principles in its customs and duty department, not to mention with decision-making in the capital, Jakarta. That was the breakthrough of the forming of the Integrated Team for Aceh and Nias.

A breakthrough, whether it is an original or operational success, is ultimately measured by its ability to overcome chaos. What was initially without order and inoperative in Aceh and Nias, were given the attempts to resolve it, and succeeded; this is also considered a breakthrough.

The rehabilitation and reconstruction activities were similar to the stages of a project cycle. The activity cycle illustrated in the following diagram is a common tool used in project implementation. The breakthroughs achieved by BRR were attempts to strengthen its performance and services based on the challenges as well as experiences in implementing the work cycle from one year to the next. It is this cycle that is the main thread connecting the stories of BRR breakthroughs presented in this book.

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THE course of a project begins with general planning, as was the case with the formation of BRR. Ever since the idea of forming an ad-hoc executing agency and rehabilitation and reconstruction coordinator was mooted, BRR had been a conceptual breakthrough in itself. From the organization’s formation, through its stages of evolution and toward the end of its mandate, there were many breakthroughs that made rehabilitation and reconstruction activities more accurate, faster and prudent in terms of financing. There are two breakthroughs worth noting in the general planning: the formation of BRR and its unique internal structure.

It All Began as a Breakthrough It could be said that the formation of BRR was percipient. What would anyone do when

dealing with a disaster so great and occurring at the other end of a vast country where the local government had been paralyzed by the disaster? The most direct and simple answer would be: send in the army!

But the problem was far more complex than that, since the area had long been plagued by armed conflict and deploying the military would have posed another problem. Moreover, what needed to be done was far more extensive than anything a normal

The Starting Line

Tents in Deah Baro Village, Meuraksa sub-district, Banda Aceh, were one of the efforts undertaken in the first phase of emergency relief. Refugees lived in these tents before moving into barracks then finally into their permanent homes, May 14, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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military assignment could have accomplished. Therefore, even though dispatching the army may be a necessary step during an emergency relief phase, a special civil assignment with a far-reaching scope within the limited time available was inevitable.

This was also a logical consequence of the breakthrough that occurred some 110 days before BRR was formed. Soon after the disaster struck, the government recognized the need to restore social conditions and gain momentum for peace, and made a courageous political breakthrough: to open all relief access to Aceh. Whether or not it was realized, the early breakthrough and its immediate impact became a defining point that could no longer hold back the formation of a specialized agency such as BRR.

The initial breakthrough exceeded the paradigm shaped by assumptions about Indonesian sovereignty and its stance on it, the secrecy behind the armed conflict, the impact of transparency on international perception of local governance and central government accessibility in managing the situation from afar. This paradigm was overturned when humanitarian interest was accepted as the strongest motivation for post-disaster recovery management. Imagine the impact of the massive breakthrough on the perceptions about the Indonesian government: 10 days after the disaster the Special ASEAN Laders Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquakes and Tsunamis was held in Jakarta and attended by the UN Secretary-General and leaders of member countries, 24 days following the disaster the UN Flash Appeal was initiated at a meeting in Geneva attended by State Minister for National Development Planning at the time, Sri Mulyani, the day after that the UN Tsunami Resolution was ratified in New York under Indonesia’s leadership. In the local Aceh context, military forces from 34 countries arrived to assist under the command of Indonesian Brigadier General Bambang Darmono, as part of the massive emergency relief program that was led by civilians, under the coordination of the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, Alwi Shihab. For the first time, a military command controlled 88 modern helicopters the biggest unarmed military operation after World War II.

Like an active volcano, relief erupted from across the globe to quickly fill the void. Indonesia’s announcement that Aceh, the area most devastated by the disaster, would be opened up spurred not only the spirit to assist but also the amount, type and distributional means of relief. The UN noted that the emergency relief effort was worth US$13.7 billion, which was a first in humanitarian efforts. Starting from the instant noodles to the aircraft carriers sent to provide assistance to people and areas affected by the disaster. There was also the relief distributed through various supply chains to areas that appeared to some as mere dots on the map. Citizens of 34 countries representing 700 organizations arrived – some of whom knew exactly what to do and others who were prepared to do whatever was needed; thousands of cargo containers, some without clear destination, flooded the gates of a republic that was greatly unprepared. Chaotic management systems began to form in the urgency. There was a myriad of imperfections, but important lessons were produced.

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At the same time, based on UN’s resourceful experience in facing disaster, a method devised in 1973 to analyze the impact of tropical storms was applied. The Damage and Loss Assessment (DLA) method developed by the United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) was proposed by the World Bank and conducted under the coordination of the National Development Planning Agency (Badan Pembangunan dan Perencanaan Nasional, Bappenas). This method demands the participation of at least two experts in each sector for analysis (comprehensively in each sector, starting from consultants in construction to fish breeding, from education to early warning systems and ecology), and as such at least 150 experts and analysts were mobilized.

This was no child’s play! Data was analyzed, including existing data from governmental agencies, the Central Statistics Bureau (Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS) and others as well as from observation and reports of teams working in the field. The results were used to draft the Master Plan, which was then propagated for public input. When the input was gathered, the assumptions were modified. However, there was little opportunity for in-depth analysis of the impact of the earthquake that shook Nias on March 28, 2005, and therefore the Master Plan became ineffective for Nias and was deemed weak in early April.

Despite of still being in the emergency phase, the Indonesian National Army combs through Lhoong, Lhkngo, Aceh Besar District, an area considered the “red zone” for Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) activities, February 20, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Figure 2.1 – The Extent of Work by the Recovery Partners on Aceh’s West Coast

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The Master Plan, often called the Blue Print, was a masterpiece of a prominent institution such as Bappenas. New methodology, experts from a variety of sectors, the complicated field situation and unsubstantiated information from various sources enabled the Master Plan to be compiled within three months, encompassing a four-year program worth US$7.2 billion.

Was it a breakthrough? Perhaps not entirely, but the experience attained from the application of DLA led to new information that would prove useful in the future to improve the analysis for the earthquakes in Yogyakarta and Bengkulu that followed.

The operational reality in the field was an instant lesson to the country and it was at this time after a relatively comprehensive Master Plan had been laid on the table that the government moved to formulate an organization that would oversee rehabilitation and reconstruction. Here was an important breakthrough in organization formation. This was not because the organization had to work across various sectors as stipulated in the Master Plan, nor because it had to interact with state and international organizations without Foreign Ministry mediation, since all of them were already involved in the field, but because of the delegation of authority.

The most important breakthrough in the formation of BRR was the willingness of the central government to delegate tremendous authority to an ad-hoc organization that had been formed in such a short time, to realize a humanitarian mission, both in domestic as well as foreign affairs. The headquarters of the organization was also not located in Jakarta.

It can be said that the breakthrough in BRR’s formation was the result of a strategic partnership between the President, the State Minister for National Development Planning/Head of Bappenas, several key donors, ambassadors, such as of the United States, Japan and Singapore, the World Bank Director and the main candidate for the Head of BRR Executing Agency, Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. This breakthrough was a complete delegation of authority to execute a task that was tremendously heavy, in the most effective and quickest fashion. BRR was given the authority to independently form a structure, recruit and terminate staff by necessity, determine the salary structure and ranking outside the government system, the authority to regulate grant funding with donors (usually this was strictly coordinated with Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance and other relevant ministries), the authority to implement activities without having to comply with normal patterns and the authority to manage activities in general.

The professionalism, integrity, transparency, leadership skills and the capacity to make decisions under difficult circumstances possessed by Kuntoro seems to be decisive in the realization of this breakthrough. The strong support of donors as well as the anticorruption stance of Kuntoro reinforced the decision for this breakthrough. Although everything was laid out in Government Regulation No. 2/2005, which was validated through Law No. 10/2005, the process toward it experienced various challenges, including

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limiting the authority of the State Secretariat, for example. This is understandable since in the wrong hands such enormous power could be catastrophic for the State and Nation.

Even though the Master Plan was made official through Presidential Regulation No. 30/2005, the damage caused by the aftershocks could not be overlooked, nor things that were unrecorded or even exaggerated in the damage estimations recorded in the Master Plan. In other words, the actual damage could only be evaluated during the rehabilitation and reconstruction process, in line with the fluctuating dynamics of the post-disaster/post-conflict area. Thus, some of the performance criteria stated in the Master Plan were evaluated halfway through rehabilitation and reconstruction implementation, in July 2007. The evaluation was referred to as the Mid-Term Review (MTR), which later became the basis for significant revision of the Master Plan and made official in Presidential Regulation No. 47/2008.

Another breakthrough related to BRR’s formation was the series of policies made by the Head of BRR Executing Agency. Human resources recruitment came from a variety of sectors – the civil service, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, including former members of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) after the August 15, 2005 Aceh peace agreement- and other innovative approaches will be discussed subsequently.

Lessons Learned from BRR’s FormationSoon after the peace agreement was signed by the Indonesian government and

GAM in Helsinki, Finland, there emerged new local leaders from different backgrounds. Dealing with a bureaucratic system was their first test. There were apprehensions about the motivation to build a better Aceh after the conflict and the tsunami. One interesting example was when the East Aceh district chief proposed an Assistance Team from BRR and other district chiefs followed suit even though this was not necessarily an urgent matter.

BRR existed as a temporary entity for the paralyzed local government and gradually positioned itself as a partner. Correct institutional development during rehabilitation and reconstruction had positive impacts on the culture of governance in Aceh as well as on Nias Island, North Sumatra Province. In mid-2007, 80 percent of BRR’s employees were local residents of Aceh and Nias, both with civil service backgrounds and without.

One example of the governance culture being influenced was how the arbitrary custom of appointing regional leaders was replaced by candidate screening. The screening mechanism initiated in Aceh Jaya was followed by other districts, as well as by Governor Irwandi Yusuf when he appointed Aceh government officials in 2008.

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Potential for ReplicationThe formation of an ad-hoc agency such as this one is possible if the governing or

authorized institution is paralyzed. The tsunami and earthquake in Aceh and Nias resulted in various government offices losing a majority of their employees. Apart from the loss of human resources that were killed or went missing, various equipment and hardware was swept away, communication and telecommunication systems were severed and distribution channels were cut. The entire region of Aceh and Nias ceased to function.

This type of agency can be formed as an assisting entity for an institution or government to rebuild a system that is weakened due to disaster or extraordinary circumstances. An organization with a flexible and fast-moving operational system could be useful for areas that are subject to disaster, underdeveloped or isolated. Under such circumstances, this type of agency has the potential to become a reliable strategy-maker, initiator, as well as development assistant to the main institution. The organizational system, recruitment scheme and operational mechanism of this agency are supporting factors for the aforementioned potential achievements.

Signing the Peace Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM), in Helsinki, Finland, August 15, 2005. Photo: Crisis Management Initiative/ Jenni Justiina Niemi

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BRR Organizational Uniqueness: Seasons Changed, So Did the Organization

Unlike other government organization, BRR was more informal but solid. Its personnel were from various sources, it had a different remuneration system and more dynamic structure, faced tougher challenges in good governance and a working bureaucracy that strived for professionalism instead of relying on rank and seniority.

BackgroundThe institutional conditions of Aceh governance, as well as Nias and South Nias districts

after the disaster needed to be considered. When the tsunami hit Aceh, three district chiefs perished. The corpse of the Banda Aceh Mayor was found after 20 days of searching among the mud and ruins caused by the tsunami. At the time, Aceh Governor Abdullah Puteh had been imprisoned for corruption and his authority transferred to Vice Governor Azwar Abubakar. This consideration become one of the bases for BRR’s foundation: that the lives of numerous local leaders had been claimed by the tsunami and government services were totally paralyzed.

It is a common perception in Indonesia that coordination with ministries and government agencies is time consuming due to bureaucratic red tape. Thus, there were concerns that the central government located in Jakarta may be less than expedient in any decision-making concerning Aceh. Hence, BRR was given the same standing as a ministry or state agency so that decisions could be made without approval from the corresponding ministry in Jakarta. In addition, the BRR main office had to be located in Banda Aceh. Its vision, planning and implementation of programs had to be close to the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction is highly complex because it encompasses the recovery of physical and infrastructural conditions as well as all aspects of socioeconomic conditions. Thus, although BRR was a governmental agency, the task implementation would require competencies that most civil servants did not have. The BRR deputies for the various sectors needed to be appointed through a presidential decree and did not have to be state officials. BRR required professionals at the deputy level, as the second layer after the Head of Executing Agency.

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Amount ofDIPA budgetdisbursed(Rp trillion)

Number ofemployees

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

12 100 1,300 1,700 1,200 400 100200 400 (people)

Figure 2.2 BRR’s Organizational Dynamic

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The remuneration system for BRR employees was also distinct from the Standard Unit Price (Harga Satuan Unit, HSU) in Indonesia so that the employees could work more efficiently without having to look for side jobs for extra income. The salary rate was set professionally, and was almost equal to expatriate salaries in Indonesia.

BRR’s human resources were recruited from many sources, such as the civil service, university circles, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. There were also expatriates (especially during the early phase) and former members of GAM, particularly after the Helsinki peace agreement was signed. This was in order that tasks would be carried out professionally, be completed on time and be of high quality.

Considering the conditions in Aceh and Nias in the disaster and conflict aftermath, the working requirements were highly irregular. To promptly accommodate the shifting tasks, the organizational structure of the BRR Executing Agency was also dynamic, and in reality changed every six months.

In the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, it was important to build trust within society, donors, NGOs and community members who contributed assistance at their own expense. Therefore, BRR personnel had to be clean from corruption and work professionally. One of BRR’s steps to maintain a professional reputation that was untainted

BRR Deputy Meeting discusses Mid-Term Review of the rehabilitation and reconstruction work in Aceh

and Nias. Banda Aceh, April 3, 2007. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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by corruption was to pay its employees salaries that were equivalent to that of private sector employees so that they could fully concentrate on completing their tasks and would be disinclined to seek extra earnings through corruption.

BRR Internal Working Mechanism – Navigating Bureaucracy Positions within BRR were not strictly based on the rank structure of the civil service,

nor on tribal affiliation, race or societal group. Professionalism was the main consideration in position placement and was determined according to task requirement. Performance appraisal was based on work output or result. Assignment in BRR was therefore impermanent and based on contracts spanning three, six or 12 months that were extended if needed. Recruiting high-ranking employees would have necessitated the issuance of laws and a presidential decree.

The professionalism and sincerity in conducting the humanitarian program became the reason an attendance time clock was not used at the BRR offices, neither at the main office nor at the district offices. Many BRR employees worked late, and some well into the morning. There was no resentment toward those who went home earlier despite the equal pay.

The informal working conditions were also clearly reflected and exemplified by the Head of Executing Agency. There were no hierarchical barriers to impede the speed of problem-solving or decision-making. All employees, including those at the lowest level, could directly meet with the Head of BRR Executing Agency without too much difficulty. Professionalism and independence enabled employees to arrange a meeting with their superior or a forum with problem-solving alternatives. Coordination and decision-making could be conducted through various communication channels (direct contact, via telephone or text message) other than executive meetings.

Within a limited mandate period, BRR was obliged to participate in developing the capacity of the local government to ensure program sustainability. Training/empowerment was provided to local government employees through various programs. This had been designed since the initial phase by the Head of BRR Executing Agency. Hence, the development of capacity and good governance could be better guaranteed.

Other than special training, empowerment and capacity-building for government employees and local communities, there was also the recruitment of numerous local government workers, local university staff and NGOs as well as local private individuals. By the end of 2007, 80 percent of BRR personnel were from local areas. Hence, after BRR completed its assignments, they could return to their own working unit in Aceh or Nias and strengthen the ability to introduce transparent and better development implementation.

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Meanwhile, organizational dynamics were needed to maintain a productive balance. BRR’s structural changes were adjusted to the requirements and urgency at the given time, in accordance with the recovery phase, rehabilitation and reconstruction. They were also based on the priorities of sector management according to the progress/completion of work at a particular location and deliberating fast/decentralized supporting needs or referring to the shifting role from BRR to local government or relevant ministry. The number of employees also fluctuated according to individual terms of service and the workload for a particular year. The highest increase in BRR staff was from 1,073 people in 2006 to 1,576 in 2007, and by late 2008 to the closure of BRR on April 16, 2009, only 562 staff members remained.

Lessons LearnedThe selection of professional employees paid decent salaries greatly supported the

speed and quality of performance and helped prevent corrupt practices. This in turn earned public trust and thus increased incoming relief for Aceh and Nias. Ultimately, it had the potential to benefit society as a whole.

In the four years of BRR’s operation, its overheads accounted for just four percent of total reconstruction expenditure. The rest was used for program implementation. Compare this to the expenses of other public institutions. The overheads of other institution could be much higher than the cost of program implementation, and spending could reach seven to nine percent of the total budget of a government institution/agency in Indonesia. If unnecessary expenses or fictional costs were eliminated, the funds saved could be allocated to staff salaries and thereby prevent corruption. Civil servant remuneration in Indonesia includes allowances outside the basic salary, and their low basic salary prompts them to find a means to supplement their basic salary through allowances paid for attending meetings outside of town/the country or by working extra hours to obtain overtime.

The dynamics of BRR enabled the organization to make self-adjustments with the supporting needs of implementation during certain periods. It also had to develop the productivity, competence and independence of each individual involved in order to meet the changes and create a competitive climate.

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Potential for ReplicationBasically, an organization must always be adjusted to the needs. A highly dynamic

organization is perhaps more suitable for disaster management or other more complex (multi-sectoral) work that requires operational speed. For a lengthier and more structured assignment, a dynamic organization could be established but within a limited scope of changes (not drastic).

The remuneration of civil servants could be increased to an appropriate and respectable level, although it would not have to be identical to that of the private sector as the employment duration is longer term and has retirement security. By bringing salaries in line with competence and matching them to related institutional capacity, the corruption and leakages that afflict many projects were prevented. The funds saved from such practices could thus be used to pay better salaries. There would be no more excuses for staff to commit corrupt practices or be unproductive. All this could be realized if supported by employee rationalization and selective personnel recruitment.

Andy Siswanto (left) is inaugurated as the Deputy for Housing and Settlement along with appointment of other deputies in the BRR Executing Agency, September 20, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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AFTER the organization was up and running, collection of detailed data on physical conditions and reconstruction requirements in Aceh and Nias was required to ensure the quality of project planning. In this endeavor, various breakthroughs on research methods and data provision were made, as well as in project coordination data collection. This section discusses Project Concept Note (PCN), Recovery Aceh-Nias Database (RANdatabase), United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC), Spatial Information and Mapping Center (SIM-C), Aceh Geospatial and Data Center (AGDC), and the Housing and Asset Geospatial System.

PCN and RANdatabase –Super Express Line for Project Approval and Support Information

The PCN was basically a form that functioned as an analysis tool for the proposed program on relief activities throughout Aceh and Nias. Whereas RANdatabase was a database system that was periodically upgraded by the relief activities program officer. The screening mechanism for the proposed program was called PCN Workshop. PCN Approval Workshops were regularly held in Banda Aceh to coordinate, consolidate and approve the programs and activities agreed upon to be implemented in the territorial limits of Aceh and Nias, North Sumatra.

Collage of Data and Activities

Recording houses and their respective owners using a GPS system, Alue Naga, Syiah Kuala sub-district, Banda Aceh, January 9, 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Decisions on activities made during the workshops were incorporated into RANdatabase and were upgraded periodically by the implementing program officer. The breakthrough of RANdatabase in Aceh and Nias was that it was enriched and adjusted as required to monitor more Key Performance Indicators (KPI).

The continuously updated information on RANdatabase was used as reference for the recruitment/assignment of foreign consultants, the basis for duty/tax exemption on relief goods and services, the issuance of various permits, provision of various facilities and the issuance of ID cards for staff of development agencies in Aceh and Nias. RANdatabase ensured the sophistication, clarity and transparency of information on the development and program results of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The cohesiveness of PCN, PCN workshop mechanism, and RANdatabase facilitated the progress of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. This reduced the project and activity approval process, which could take months under normal bureaucratic procedures, to three to four weeks or less. This kind of mechanism integration also reduced the possibility of an overlap in activities.

Background One of the most crucial issues in post-disaster management is the availability of accurate

data. The enormous attention from international and local institutions in designing and implementing their programs/projects in Aceh-Nias was clearly a colossal responsibility. To coordinate this required an information management system that enabled coordination, monitoring and finally evaluation of the thousands of programs/projects implemented by the dozens of organizations in almost every area of Aceh and Nias.

Figure 3.1 RANdatabase Homepage

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Reference Number: SOCI 234 LNProject Type: Off Budget

Title: ANTV Peduli Aceh "Tabahlah Indonesia" untuk bantuan korban Tsunami AcehDescription: Bantuan ANTV Peduli Aceh "Tabahlah Indonesia" dalam masa recovery untuk membantu masyarakat korban Tsunami Aceh

1st Level Implementer(s)/Funding Agency(ies):

ANTV PEDULI/PT. Cakrawala Andalas Televisi (ANTV)

Is this project related to tsunami/earthquake relief/reconstruction assistance? Yes

Is the project involved in the UN Flash Appeal? No

Start Date (dd/mm/yyyy) End Date (dd/mm/yyyy) Duration (Months) Project Implementation Status

01/02/2005 31/08/2008 43 Completed

Contact(s):

enohPliam-EnoitasinagrO)tsriF ,tsaL( emaNepyT tcatnoC

Funding Source/Donor Rambe, Isro' Ayyubi (Primary)PT. Cakrawala Andalas Televisi (ANTV)

isro.antv@gmail.com 021-30405615

Total Cost:Currency Total 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

USD 633,386 491,015 0 0 142,371 0

Indonesian Rupiah

6,003,862,671 4,654,329,858 0 0 1,349,532,813 0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

USD 0 0 0 0 0

Indonesian Rupiah

0 0 0 0 0

Sector and Sub-Sector:

%)DSU( tsoCrotceS-buSrotceS

noitacudE yramirPnoitacudE 93,577 14.77

32.58908,935efiL suoigileR fo tnemecnavdAnoigileR

Location:%)DSU( tsoCnaharuleK/aseDnatamaceKatoK/netapubaK

77.41775,39HEBUERUETOHTNAJ ATOKRASEB HECA .baK

07.7497,84ORAB ATUK - denifeD eb ot aseDORAB ATUKRASEB HECA .baK

25.77510,194MUEMILUESMUEMILUESRASEB HECA .baK

Funding - Funding Agency to 1st Level Implementer: (Commitments and disbursements)

etaDretnemelpmI leveL ts1ycnegA gnidnuF

Funding Agency

Committed (USD)

Funding Agency

Disbursed (USD)

Balance (USD)

Funding Type

tnarG510,1945002/20/10ILUDEP VTNA)VTNA( isiveleT saladnA alawarkaC .TP

tnarG510,1945002/20/10ILUDEP VTNA)VTNA( isiveleT saladnA alawarkaC .TP

tnarG173,2418002/20/10ILUDEP VTNA)VTNA( isiveleT saladnA alawarkaC .TP

tnarG173,2418002/20/10ILUDEP VTNA)VTNA( isiveleT saladnA alawarkaC .TP

Funding - 1st Level Implementer to 2nd Level Implementer (Expenditure)

Would your organisation like BRR fund matching assistance? No

Potential Additional Funding Agency (Firm commitments not yet made)

Key Performance Indicators

SectorKey Performance

IndicatorLocation

(Kabupaten/Kecamaten/Desa)Comments

Target (#)

Progress (# to date)

Education(EDUC) Number of elementary schools built/repaired

Kab. ACEH BESAR/KOTA JANTHO/TEUREUBEH

11ohtnaJ atoK 3 DS

Religion(RELIG) Number of mosques built/repaired

Kab. ACEH BESAR/KUTA BARO/Desa to be Defined - KUTA

BARO

Renovasi Mesjid Jamik Baitul Quddus Lamblang-Kuta Baro, Aceh Besar 1 1

Religion(RELIG) Number of pesantren (religious schools) built/repaired

Kab. ACEH BESAR/SEULIMEUM/SEULIMEUM

Pesantren Putri Ruhul Fatayat Seulimeum. Menampung 1000 santriwati, dan banyak menampung para anak-anak

yang menjadi korban tsunami.1 1

Factors causing delays

Number of Beneficiaries: TotalFemaleChildren

Number of Households:Thematic Marker(s):Notes / Comments:

Attached Documents:

User Activity Log:

grOemanresU)tsriF ,tsaL( emaN epyT resUnO deifidoMnoitasina

resUMA60:11 8002 51 ceDRRBaflUaflU airaM

Page 1 of 1RAN Database - Details

6/19/2009http://rand.brr.go.id/RAND/rc?sessionid=1245391613250591

Figure 3.2 Sample of PCN

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In relation to accountability and effectiveness of disaster funds, in January 2005, Head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), Jan Egeland, announced that the international community would devise an information databases system that would illustrate that “we are up to the task, not only in getting relief to the needy parties, but also in keeping track of every penny.” This referred to the principle of accountability and transparency and the anticorruption spirit as a new paradigm in recovery activities. The system that Egeland was referring to was the Development Assistance Database (DAD) system, which was first introduced in Afghanistan in 2003; the same system employed by the country that was hit by a tsunami on December 26, 2004.

In the case of Aceh, prior to April 2005, the data used was manually collected and not supported by a complex information system. Data collection was also still focused on the data of existing or working stakeholders in the emergency response period. The embryo of the RANRANdatabase system was very simple, being based on manual entry using a simple Microsoft Excel program.

Taking the lead from DAD, to meet to the requirements stipulated in Law No. 10/2005 on BRR’s foundation on October 28, 2005, BRR launched RANdatabase. The coordination process was conducted by a BRR team by requesting all stakeholders working for Aceh-Nias recovery to upload the data on the RANdatabase website to be used as indicator of progress. This system was then periodically refined, supported by other systems integrated to optimize its performance.

The web-based application at http://rand.brr.go.id functioned to coordinate between the stakeholders, such as donors, private parties, academics, the government and the media in obtaining information on the recovery progress in Aceh and Nias after the tsunami. Not only that, the RANdatabase also became a medium for implementing partners in reporting to their funding agencies across the world.

Considering the massive number of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects and activities in Aceh and Nias, as well as the involvement of various agents in the implementation, the daily fulfillment of data and information collection become an important part of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. Information was not only crucial to BRR for internal requirements but also to other stakeholders. The information on rehabilitation and reconstruction covered, among other things, the quantity and kinds of requirements that were needed (project target output), the required resources (allocation, commitment, fund disbursement), working process (program, project, activity, location) and the progress of KPIs. Apart from data on program/project activities, information on beneficiaries was also important.

Basically, data collection on rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Aceh and Nias was performed using two methods. First, as project/activity output that could be directly accessed from data input results, which were supported by the RANdatabase

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Table 3.1 The Numerous Projects and Implementing Agencies of MDF Funded Projects

Source: MDF In Depth Progress Report, as of March 2008.

application system. Second, through information obtained from surveys, which generally required greater resources/funds and were conducted in certain periods – for example annually, such as the Tsunami Recovery Indicators Package (TRIP) report that was acquired from surveys or census conducted by either government agencies such as the Statistics Center Agency (Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS), local government agencies, NGOs or private corporations such as Garansi, Surveyor Indonesia and Artistika. In addition, there were also surveys on housing needs and displaced persons/temporary housing such as those conducted by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Consortium for Assistance and Recovery toward Development in Indonesia. The two data collection approaches complemented each another.

As an example, the information on completed houses recorded by RANdatabase had to be verified by field surveys based on population. Several data collection mechanisms at

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the sub-district level were also developed by Yayasan Inovasi Pemerintahan Daerah (Local Governance Innovation Foundation), the Local Governance Support Program and the Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (Logica).

Data Collection and Implementation Coordination to Support Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Activities

The precursor of BRR data management was initiated in 2005 by the Operations Center, which facilitated the coordination of donors and NGOs through the mechanism of PCN Approval Workshops. BRR recognized the importance of transparency and accountability in carrying out its mandate, and therefore all programs and rehabilitation and reconstruction projects proposed by donors were discussed and evaluated by BRR and all relevant stakeholders through PCN Workshops. The stakeholders included local government agencies, experts and donor/NGO representatives. Project proposal analysis was conducted to prevent an overlap of activities within one area or sector.

Figure 3.3 PCN Workshop Process

ResultsProject approvedunconditionally;

conditionallyor project is not approved

(holding bay or unapproved)

WorkshopAttended by BRR deputies,

BRR technical experts,donor agencies or recovery partners,

Important informationneeded:

- Key Performance Indicators- Source of funds

- sector - sector

- Dana Allocation

Registration and PCN data entryby recovery partners and donors

Data updatingfor monitoring

reporting andevaluation

analytical purposes

Project Progress reportby recovery partners and donors

local government

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With the considerable number of project proposals to be analyzed, a simple, fast but manageable approval process was required. The first step was to make completion of the PCN form easier. Indeed, the information required in a PCN was rather detailed, covering activities, their type and scope, location, budget, timeframe schedule, work plan, supporting elements and project impact. Nevertheless, the general scope of activities could still be overviewed and forms were made simpler to fill out so that even a small implementing partner could do so. Data on activities proposed to BRR could be manually written or uploaded onto the RANdatabase website.

An uploaded PCN was classified according to assessment standards by the related BRR department. Follow-up workshops were then conducted every two weeks (by sector experts and BRR). The output of workshop deliberation was used to rate projects based on three project categories. The first category was for approved projects, which can be unconditional approval or conditional approval. The second and third categories were respectively for projects that had been put on hold and those that had been rejected. In short, the PCN was a tool for activity screening while the RANdatabase was an electronic monitoring tool of activity implementation.

The project review results were confirmed with the proposing party to be implemented or further consulted with the donor. The number of PCNs that were discussed in workshops was very high in 2005 and 2006 (early reconstruction), averaging 150 per workshop and decreasing to 20 to 40 proposals per workshop toward the end of BRR’s tenure. In early 2009, new proposals were still coming in but in smaller numbers. During the four years of BRR’s term of service, 48 batch workshops were conducted, and 1,700 proposals were approved out of some 1,800 programs/projects proposed.

By January 2009, 1,700 projects had been uploaded onto the RANdatabase website by 368 implementing partners and funded by 624 funding agencies. The total commitment for the reconstruction fund was recorded at US$3.9 billion and fund disbursement reached US$3.1 billion.

Data on project and activity implementation approved in the workshops were documented on RANdatabase. The web-based monitoring program could be easily accessed from anywhere in the world. RANdatabase was also a self-service system, meaning that data suppliers were those with direct links to a given project. The public could also access the data. Hence, the progress and results of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias could be more thoroughly and openly monitored from different parts of the world.

In the second semester of 2006, the Operations Center was divided into the Center for Data and Information (Pusat Data dan Informasi, Pusdatin) and the Center of Regional Program and Project Controlling (Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Sektoral, P4W). In the second semester of 2007, Center for Sectoral Project Control and Implementation (Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Sektoral, P4S) was formed as an independent

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unit of P4W. Subsequently, Pusdatin became a data and information center for practically everything related to the rehabilitation and reconstruction process and was in charge of managing RANdatabase and was comprised of data analysts and an Outreach Team. Whereas P4W and P4S focused on program field monitoring and control of on budget expenditure.

All parties related to activities and projects could provide updated reports by using the RANdatabase at the BRR main office in Lueng Bata, Banda Aceh as a Drop in Center, assisted by the Outreach Team. The team was formed to facilitate and increase the compliance rate of reporting progress by all implementing partners. The outreach personnel were also assigned to maintain relations with all organizations involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction. Apart from encouraging the organizations to update their project progress reports, they were also expected to play an active role in contributing input to RANdatabase if a particular organization could not do it on its own.

After a project was listed, it could be updated by the organizations in collaboration with Pusdatin. Information on progress was periodically updated on RANdatabase by the implementing agencies. Overall achievements were regularly assessed based on the updating process, by incorporating off- and on-budget data.

The results of outreach effort to monitor NGO and donor activities

in Aceh and Nias are compiled by the BRR Center for Data and

Information, Banda Aceh, July 25, 2007. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Lessons Learned The PCN Approval Workshop mechanism, with its immediate approval of project

scope and activity, was one of the reasons that numerous projects could be initiated and completed within the four years of BRR’s operation. Coordination with the local government also ran smoothly because the program involved provincial government responsibility for the sector. In addition, every proposal had to be recommended by the relevant local government agency and the local community. An implementing partner’s project proposal could be approved without delay (within three to four weeks after submission to BRR).

RANdatabase’s distinctive features also included its function as a medium for information exchange. For example, if organization A had sources of funding while organization B had the capacity to execute the activities, through RANdatabase, an exchange of resources could be performed. The database system also prevented project overlaps. For instance, if NGO A wanted to build a school in area Z, through RANdatabase it could obtain information on whether another organization was working in the area and

Figure 3.4 Homepage of www.e-aceh-nias.org

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whether the project was still relevant. Lastly, RANdatabase also acted as a means and manifestation of public transparency and accountability of all aid received.

Assistance for Aceh and Nias could be done individually. Numerous international celebrities such as Alanis Morissette, Michael Schumacher and The Body Shop founder Anita Roddick, made personal contributions that were documented in RANdatabase. With publicly accessible features, people across the globe could learn who is doing what, where activities are being carried out and the source of funding as well as information on work progress. It could be viewed in table format, as a graphic or even as thematic map. Aside from the information on donations and direct relief from various countries and individuals, information on rehabilitation and reconstruction outcome, the source of which was funds from the National Annual Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, APBN), was also consolidated in RANdatabase.

Apart from RANdatabase, information dissemination was also conducted through report publications through printed and downloadable electronic versions from www.e-aceh-nias.org. Information on activities, auctions for goods and services procurement for BRR projects, press releases and staff recruitment for various funding agencies as well as implementing partners could also be accessed from this website. The website also

Coordination meeting with NGOs and donors at the UNORC Office in Banda Aceh, February 1, 2008.

Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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facilitated a public forum in which users could give their input and comments, and receive responses from the relevant parties.

RANdatabase implementation has received the international Government Technology Award 2008 on Best Practice Information Management System from FutureGov. It was selected from 450 nominations from 15 Asia Pacific countries. This award was the first of its kind ever received by the Indonesian government. Winners under different categories include the Malaysian State Police, the Singapore Land Authority and Hong Kong’s Department of Census and Statistics.

Potential for Replication Systems like RANdatabase can be implemented beyond Aceh Province and Nias Island,

North Sumatra Province. RANdatabase can automatically be utilized to sustain relief management and provide information on assets given, since several donors/NGOs are continuing their programs after the closure of BRR in April 2009.

As a database, RANdatabase can trace relief distribution. RANdatabase can also be employed to monitor multiple projects/activities and is thus also suitable for the scope of central and local government work that generally involves hundreds of projects each year.

Having a bimonthly PCN workshop was advantageous when there were multiple proposals of projects/activities occurring simultaneously to ensure coordination and the required approval for implementation. The ideal application is in disaster areas, such as Aceh and Nias, that have garnered tremendous attention from numerous parties.

Local or departmental/central government projects that have many implementers and funding resources requiring intense intersectoral coordination could apply a system such as the PCN. Before programs and activities were included in the budgeting documents (which was inherently more of an administrational requirement for budget approval), the National Development Planning Agency, Regional Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda), and other local authorities or disaster response agencies at the central and local levels could also implement and manage such a system.

UNORC is a unique office of the UN system focused on supporting recovery and development in Aceh and Nias. It is unique because it was the first time the United Nations established a unit with authority equivalent to other UN agencies dedicated to a particular region in the world. This unit became the coordinator of all 23 UN agencies working in Aceh and Nias,

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BackgroundDuring the emergency response period, numerous UN entities worked in Aceh and

Nias. At the same time however, UN-OCHA was still fully operating as the main gateway for contact with the UN agencies operating in Aceh and Nias.

Although working under the auspices of the UN, each unit carried its own flag and had its own procedures. This complicated BRR’s coordination task since, apart from these UN agencies, there were other funding agencies, NGOs and individuals working in Aceh and Nias as implementers, implementing partners or direct donors.

The activity of UN-OCHA was minimized after the emergency phase to continue to support BRR’s mandate as the coordinator of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. UNORC was formed in 2005 with the aim of improving the overall effectiveness and coordination of international relief operations under UN entities and extend them into the recovery phase through BRR.

The end of the emergency phase saw the beginning of the implementation of a comperehensive and sustainable recovery phase for the people of Aceh and Nias. The development activities prompted UNORC to extend its coordination function through policy support for the government of Indonesia and its role in the development of planning, coordination and implementation of mid- and long-term recovery and reconstruction. With a wide range of actors still present in Aceh and Nias, the potential for duplication, inefficient resource allocation and the inadvertent undermining of each other’s efforts remained ever-present, making continued coordination crucial.

Establishment of UNORCA Memoranum of Understanding (MoU) signed by BRR and UNORC on November 30,

2005 appointed UNORC as the primary point of contact between BRR and the UN. UNORC took charge of coordinating the UN contribution in relief distribution as well as recovery and reconstruction activities. UNORC also worked with BRR to identify outstanding needs, develop policies and make strategic decisions affecting the recovery effort.

UNORC was based in Aceh’s provincial capital, Banda Aceh, and was led by the UN Coordinator for Aceh and Nias Recovery. UNORC also maintained a substantial field presence across Aceh and Nias through six field offices (Lhokseumawe, Meulaboh, Takengon, Subussalam, Nias, and Banda Aceh). In addition, 25 district facilitation teams worked at the district/municipal levels. UNORC was funded by UN-OCHA, United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and through bilateral donations from the governments of Nigeria and Norway.

UNORC emphasized a One UN approach that sought to harmonize UN contributions so as to maximize its impact in supporting the government and communities in recovery,

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reconstruction and reintegration efforts. The office coordinated all UN agencies, funds and programs to “deliver as one,” an aspiration outlined by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence (http://www.un.org/events/panel/). The work of the office was recently recognized as a good practice at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable on UN System Coherence.

Given the political developments during the recovery phase – in particular the historic peace agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM, and the following elections in Aceh to elect a governor, district regents and city mayors – this support evolved into support for tsunami and post-conflict recovery. UNORC served as a key advisor to the Head of BRR Executing Agency and the governors of Aceh and North Sumatra on a range of recovery-related policies, regulation, and programmatic issues such as assuring international partners coordinate their work with the government. Apart from that, the agency provides a range of independent analytical, statistical and strategic information to assist the government and the international recovery community in planning and monitoring humanitarian, recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration activities.

UNORC manages a website offering a range of services for all stakeholders, as well as easily accessible resources for the general public. It is periodically updated with information on development progress and UN contributions.

Lessons LearnedProducts/logos of activities carried out by UNORC

Providing Structured Platforms for Coordinated and Coherent Recovery Strategies1.

UNORC chaired a number of regular sectoral and thematic working groups that promoted coordination and coherency in recovery planning, oversight, evaluation, and operations. These included:

• Interagency Standing Committee (IASC)• United Nations Area Team (UNAT)• Public Information Working Group (PIWG)• Several sectoral working groupsManaging the Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Partners2.

The UNORC chaired the UN Area Security Management Team (ASMT) to review current security trends, situations and scenarios, as well as to assess the modalities and readiness for evacuations or other rapid response measures.Assisting the Decentralization of Recovery Coordination, Planning and Oversight3.

The District/City Recovery Forum (Forum Pemulihan Kabupaten, FPK) initiative was developed at the insistence of mayors and district heads to empower local governments/stakeholders through building their technical capacity for sustainable recovery and development. FPK was chaired by a mayor or a head of district and

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comprised representatives of civil society, the private sector, former GAM members, government agencies, and local and international partners. The FPK was guided by principles of community-driven recovery, poverty reduction, gender equality and democratic leadership in collective decision-making, problem-solving and planning.Providing Strategic Information and Analysis on Recovery4.

UNORC’s Information Analysis Section (IAS) generated, coordinated and supported the production of strategic information products to enable evidence-based recovery, development planning, and analysis at provincial, district and local levels. IAS along with Pusdatin produced the widely distributed, recognized and cited Tsunami Recovery Indicator Package (TRIP) Report — part of the Tsunami Recovery Impact Assessment and Monitoring System (TRIAMS) — as the definitive source of data, maps, statistics and analysis in post-disaster Aceh and Nias. Up to now, there were three editions of Tsunami Recovery Indicator Packages - each underwent continual improvement from the previous.

Other UNORC and BRR collaborations were surveys and data verifications regarding housing to ensure accuracy of data reported to BRR with houses built through donor supports. Besides assigning UNORC and BRR’s Pusdatin personnel to the field, these activities were implemented through supports from relevant sectors and regions.

UNORC also developed AcehInfo, a database consolidating all data related to rehabilitation and reconstruction results in Aceh and Nias completed with data from BPS and related institutions. In its daily operation, the collaboration between BRR and UNORC were inseparable.Strengthening Local Recovery and Development Capacity through Knowledge-Based 5. Learning and Sharing Forum

The Solutions Exchange is an initiative led by UNORC and approved by BRR to be implemented in Aceh and Nias and launched in 2008. The Governor, management level BRR staff, and the UN Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias served as the implementing committee. In 2007, UNORC facilitated extensive consultations and an international mission study to tailor UN good practices in the Solutions Exchange to the context and needs of Aceh and Nias.

6. Supporting and Strengthening BRR and Government Communication and Outreach Capacity

UNORC assisted in the joint BRR-Provincial Government publication of the Aceh Recovery Newsletter (ARN). This monthly newsletter was published electronically and in hard copy – both in English and Indonesian – and distributed to 1,500 recipients that included donors, local, provincial and central government, official partners and beneficiaries. UNORC pledged to support 12 editions of the publication in 2008, each of which was 24 pages covering news, updates, real-life stories and photos.

7. Ensuring UN System Transparency At the request of BRR and the Indonesian government, UNORC compiled regular

accountability reports detailing the financial and programmatic contributions of the UN system in Aceh and Nias. Reports were issued every semester since 2008, with

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the last one submitted to the Head of BRR Executing Agency and the Government of Indonesia in late February.

Potential for ReplicationCoordination is a word often used in implementation activities. In concert with the

growing number of players involved, coordination is ever more required. Not only between different organizations, even the units working under the UN tended to uphold different working principles. This is where UNORC’s role and potential can be applied elsewhere both in other parts of Indonesia and the world.

A mediating unit like UNORC is highly needed in a situation where the proposed activities are copious and various procedures are imposed on one beneficiary. In this context, BRR became the representative of the beneficiaries and local relief coordinator. UNORC’s existence as the entry point for all UN units working in Aceh and Nias optimized rehabilitation and reconstruction through facilitating communication between BRR and the UN system. BRR did not have to contact each unit but simply did it through UNORC.

Reconstruction Based on the Geospatial and Territorial Approach: the Most Complete Map is in Aceh

The most detailed map of the Republic of Indonesia’s territory should have been in the possession of the National Survey and Mapping Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional, Bakosurtanal). However, a deficiency in map provision to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias, led to the formation of the Spatial Information and Mapping Center (SIM-C), a unit that worked with the Pusdatin in the provision and management of geospatial information, specifically on Aceh and Nias. This unit worked in parallel with the Aceh Provincial Government, and approaching the end of BRR’s tenure, the unit was handed over to and became a part of the Aceh Provincial Government as a unit called the Aceh Geospatial Data Center (AGDC). To date, Aceh Province has the most comprehensive geospatial data among all the provinces in Indonesia.

BackgroundDuring the early phase of reconstruction, BRR had difficulties in planning and

organization due to the lack of geospatial data and information. When BRR coordinated with Bakosurtanal, the scale used in the available map was too large and the official procedure entailed in having a more detailed version made would have taken too long. This was exacerbated by the effects of the prolonged conflict, which had limited the efforts for data updates.

The problem was solved when the United States government provided maps with

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scales of 1:2000 and 1:5000. Armed with these maps, opportunity to conduct further updating, augmenting and integration was opened widely. One of the ways was by combining data and information compiled when the tsunami struck with that from Bakosurtanal. Aside form that, data nad information updates from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were also included.

Establishment of the SIM-C and Geospatial Data DevelopmentSoon after the tsunami, the United Nations Humanitarian Information Center (UNHIC)

started collecting data from every party. In September 2005, UNHIC changed its name to the United Nations Information Management Service (UNIMS). The data and information from UNIMS was shared with the Indonesian government in February 2006. BRR used this opportunity to establish the Spatial Information and Mapping Center (SIM-C), which coordinated humanitarian agencies and contained Geographic Information System (GIS) capacity. The center initiated the formation of the GIS Consortium Aceh-Nias, which handled the coordination and capacity-building of various actors to avoid duplications in the field.

The center also formed partnerships with numerous international institutions, such

Global Positioning System (GPS) training to upgrade staff capacity

to apply the Geospatial Information System at BRR, Banda Aceh, August

11, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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as the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to produce aerial photographs and develop the GIS system, with the Australian Government’s Overseas Aid Program (AusAID) to collect geospatial data on Aceh and Nias, and with the French government to conduct comprehensive surveys on urban areas in the entire Aceh region.

Along with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), BRR also created a GIS capacity-building program for fishermen. Through the activities conducted by the Panglima Laot organization, fishing communities were introduced to GIS technology, particularly in the application of Global Positioning System (GPS) mapping and software to locate fish populations. This involved not only fishermen but also students in implementing community-based mapping to gather required oceanographic data. This activity also presented a blessing with the discovery of several new coral reef ecosystem within Indonesian territory. Two of which –named by the local fishermen- were Meulati Coral and Bahwee (near the waters of Lamno, Aceh Jaya). Although small, aside from expanding the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia, the discovery of these coral can prevent ships from foundering or nets from ripping as often experienced by local fishermen.

GIS for Accountability and Auditing Purposes The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institution (INTOSAI) has developed

a program to monitor relief distribution in disaster situations. On February 2007, during their visti to Aceh, a number of INTOSAI Tsunami Initiative Group delegates chose BRR as the point of departure for auditing relief aid. They also surveyed the potential beefits of using GIS and GPS software as instruments for accountability of post-disaster relief aid.

SIM-C supported the INTOSAI initiative and accepted the offer to conduct “the First GIS Training for INTOSAI Auditors”. The experiences SIM-C shared with INTOSAI showed how the application of GIS for auditors could be very helpful in auditing disaster and humanitarian relief.

AGDC as a Legacy for Aceh Society With the support of BRR, AGDC was situated at the Bappeda of Aceh Province in

December 2006. The purpose of the center’s establishment was to provide fast and easy access to spatial data, promote the application and integration of spatial data in assisting policy-making, and improve understanding and use of the geospatial system and data. AGDC was the first step in realizing Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) in the entire province of Nanggroe Aceh Darusssalam, as a database for spatial information to support economic development, environmental management and policy-making in the territorial scope of Aceh Province.

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SIM-C gained international recognition for supporting the recovery program of Aceh-Nias in the aftermath of the disaster. Some of the lessons learned from SIM-C and AGDC include:

First, the integration of GIS is vital in the planning for a post-disaster territory. The system application not only assists in coordination but also in determining the distribution of program implementation. The experience of SIM-C demonstrated that integration since the preliminary phase is effective in supporting all parties in accessing geospatial data and information. The policy to integrate this system does, of course, require infrastructural support as well as support from policy-makers at the executive level in order to ensure effective implementation.

Second, in the context of Indonesia, the application of a spatial data system and information for the regional planning of such an extensive area remains inadequate. The SIM-C experience in the context of disaster recovery illustrates that the geospatial data and information that the government documented was not sufficient to become a basis on which to build a geographical information system. A basic and territorial map of a much larger scale was required to ensure data accuracy in some of the heavily damaged areas in Aceh and Nias. Bearing in mind that Indonesia is an archipelagic nation, the system’s development at the national level could support integrated development planning as the geospatial data and information could always be updated.

Third, the geospatial system needs to be continuously developed beyond the context of Aceh-Nias recovery after the tsunami to a national scale. This would enable more accuracy in development planning and prevent problems related to inter-regional and territorial coordination. Although the disaster became an entry point for the development of a geospatial system in Aceh, the strengths and benefit of this system would be most effective under normal circumstances, both for development planning and in mitigation for disaster on a wider scale.

Potential for ReplicationAs an ad-hoc institution, SIM-C trained local government staff, transferred the system

to the local government, and created and developed a collaborative SDI system. This was done by integrating the system with that of the provincial government of Aceh so that it would remain sustainable even after BRR’s exit from the region.

SIM-C achieved this by developing SDI in Aceh Province, covering data collection, software and hardware application to encode the system, development of system guidelines, application know-how, management, dissemination and spatial data exchange, data adjustment concepts and an internet-based development framework, such as through a Data Catalogue. In this context, the implementation of SDI was also supported by local bylaw (Qanun) so that Aceh Province could strengthen the system application. A similar method could be developed in other regions if necessary.

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Geospatial Data on Construction – from Housing Support to Overall Assets: Indisputable Facts

Geospatial data included maps with coordinates and detailed information on every house built in Aceh and Nias. The success in pinpointing housing sites was continued with the mapping of overall assets resulting from development in Aceh through the Asset Management Information System (Sistem Manajemen Asset, SIMAS). This was widely implemented for the first time in Indonesia in Aceh Province and some parts of North Sumatera Province, namely Nias and South Nias districts during the four year reconstruction period.

BackgroundAt the end of October 2007, there were allegations that BRR – especially the Head of

BRR Executing Agency, Kuntoro - had misled the public when he announced success in building 100,000 houses in Aceh and Nias. This allegation led to verification attempts by the Geospatial Data Unit and the Deputy for Housing and Settlement. The team performed intensive mapping of each house location while coordinating the system and collecting data on housing beneficiaries. This effort resulted in indisputable information on the actual number of houses built.

Geospatial Data Unit of Pusdatin is a derivative unit from SIM-C that was transferred to Aceh Provincial Government as BRR approached its tenure’s end. Because its function relates with data, by 2007, this unit was officially under the structure of BRR’s Pusdatin.

Geospatial Data Development for Reconstruction Reporting Accountability

Mechanism of this system started with data gathering of every house built in Aceh Province and Nias Island, whether constructed by donors under BRR coordination. Each house was identified and its GPS coordinates were determined. For the purpose of verification, every house was photographed, its form and condition recorded, the name of the institution responsible for its construction and the house owner identified, and its administrational location determined.

At the time of publication, the geospatial data of more than 109,000 houses had been documented from the 140,304 built. This number will continue to increase as the activity is still being conducted.

Hence the announcement that more than 100,000 had been built in Aceh and Nias was factual after all.

After the data were presented on several occasions in Aceh and Jakarta, to central government officials and legislators as well as to the international community, the

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Figure 3.5 Information Presented through the Geospatial Data System

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geospatial data system received very positive response. This led to a need to use the geospatial data system as a standard reporting system for asset provision, which was not limited to housing. From January to March 2009, geospatial data collection was conducted on various assets, such as infrastructure, health, educational and other public facilities in Aceh Province.

The process was based on the Asset Management Information System. This system was already utilized by BRR. The application initiated by the Finance Ministry had complete features for asset management and transfer, inventory, follow-up, handover, removal and termination. In its initial phase however, it covered textual data only and covered only APBN-supported assets.

In the case of Aceh and Nias, not only this application compiled textual data, but also completed with geospatial data. In GIS Housing, each asset was documented based on its location, photo and detailed description. Moreover, non-APBN work result asset data was also surveyed and compiled in this system. Even more detailed information on Nias can be accessed through a system called Nias Island Reconstruction Asset Management (NIRAM).

Lessons LearnedGeospatial mapping of assets or support from donors/NGOs was the first of its kind

in Indonesia as well as the in world. This system has become the new standard for accountability, especially to trace the disbursement of funds contributed by donors and individuals.

The system is not difficult to operate, especially if data collectors and operators are familiar with GIS data management. BRR developed this system by conducting a four-month survey without consultant support, thereby reducing costs.

For four years, BRR along with several donors and GIS partners/consortiums in Aceh trained 40 GIS operators in Aceh and Nias. This expertise is actually quite prevalent. In other Indonesian regions, commonly in departments or provinces in Java, many have been trained in this field.

After collection, geospatial information is uploaded onto a website and is accessible to everyone. This marks how BRR transparently ran and coordinated the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias.

Potential for Replication Institutions that saw how the system worked expressed optimism that it could be used

as a new accountability system in Indonesia. Several members of the Indonesian House of Representatives asked Bappenas to implement the system in all strategic programs to be developed and planned. The Aceh and the Papua provincial governments have requested that BBR transfer knowledge of this system to enable the two administrations to collect asset data.

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When the system was presented to the The State Ministry of People’s Housing, it was stated that the system could assist in information collection on the concentration of apartment buildings and rented houses to determine the spread of housing provision. In general, many people have stated that this system is acceptable and can be used to collect data and information on development results in Indonesia.

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AFTER the requirement of data collection is met, one of the most primary stages of planning concerns fund availability and resources. In the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh, many significant breakthroughs were made in funding and financing that could become a development model for application in many parts of the world, especially in developing countries.

Donor Harmonization for Aceh-Nias RecoveryThe application of the Multi-Donor Fund (MDF) scheme to gather and distribute relief is

indeed known in other parts of the world, such as in Sudan, Afghanistan and Vietnam. The World Bank is the administrator of aid to these countries. What is unique is that in MDF disbursement for Aceh and Nias, BRR also played a key role in determining where and to which projects the funds would go. BRR as a representative of the Indonesian government for Aceh and Nias not only took the beneficiary position like other MDF beneficiary countries but positioned itself as supervisor for fund channeling.

Donation Purse and State Expenditure for Aceh and Nias

Billions of dollars circulated Aceh-Nias during the reconstruction period. To respond in kind to the generosity of recovery partners to the Government of Indonesia, the professional management of the funds was a pivotal issue emphasized by BRR early on. This poster is part of an anti-corruption campaign, October 18, 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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BackgroundThe forming of a coordinating forum for development agencies involved in the

recovery of Aceh and Nias was one of the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed on March 2, 2005. The Paris declaration emphasizes the effectiveness of relief distribution. The Indonesian government, represented by the Head of Bappenas at the time, Sri Mulyani, signed this agreement with more than 100 countries’ representatives as well as international development organizations working at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. In compliance with the declaration, the Head of Bappenas, BRR and several donor countries’ representatives and donor organizations agreed to form a Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for Aceh and Nias, which later became known as MDF.

Initially, the World Bank offered US$25 million in relief and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) US$10 million for the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias through the MDF. This offer later developed into donor partnerships ranging from loans to logistics.

The procedure for fund distribution by each country and donor varied. MDF was founded as a medium to manage trustee funds from various countries and funding organizations with diverse procedures to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias. The proposed coordination mechanism was integrated, meaning that all grant funds were deposited in a designated account and incorporated into the Government of Indonesia’s Annual State Budget.

One Donor PurseMDF comprised 15 countries and funding organizations that had pledged to contribute

a total of US$691.92 million in relief by December 2008. The organizations and countries were, in order of their contribution, the European Commission, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Canada, World Bank, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Finland, ADB, United States of America, New Zealand and Ireland. MDF opened offices in Jakarta and Banda Aceh. MDF leadership consisted of the Head of BRR Executing Agency as the representative of the Indonesian government, the European Commission representing donor countries as the largest donor, and the World Bank as MDF manager.

The MDF Steering Committee comprised of six Indonesian government officials, two members of Aceh’s civil society nominated by the Indonesian government, one UN representative and one international NGO representative. Other committee members included representatives of each country or funding agency that donated at least US$10 million. Some development aid agencies, such as from Australia and Japan, acted as supervisors. The World Bank also played a supervisory role and assisted the Steering Committee in cooperation with the European Commission and the Indonesian government.

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The Jakarta MDF office consisted of a manager assisted by three external consultants and secretarial staff. Meanwhile, the Banda Aceh Office was run by a local staff under the direct supervision of World Bank international staff as the project coordinator in Aceh and Nias.

Distinct from other MDF fund disbursement in other countries, the BRR coordination function also determined the amount of relief that MDF allocated. In addition, through MDF, BRR also managed to garner funding agencies from various countries to issue an integrated planning policy for the area. The funds disbursed to support a program or activity needed approval by the donors, the government and the public. MDF also took part in the PCN workshops and reported project progress through RANdatabase. This process was facilitated by BRR, as it was with other stakeholders who would be or were implementing a project or activity in Aceh and Nias. This mechanism could prevent conflict risks between funding agencies as well as with the NGOs in implementing their respective programs.

Funding Commitment and Mechanism

During the recovery phase of Aceh and Nias after the tsunami, MDF provided two kinds of support to the Indonesian government. First was the financing scheme for new projects or components in project funding, including in the co-financing of new projects supported by bilateral or multilateral development agencies. Second was assistance support for programs included in rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, whether sectoral or multi-sectoral.

The two types of funding were run through a holistic financing management system and structure, involving an overall management and participation process of stakeholders. Approved regulations and procedures were effectively applied in project implementation and financing. In both cases, most program expenses were channeled through official channels of the Indonesian government through a strictly monitored account. Rapid fund channeling was also enabled to accelerate and optimize usage.

MDF was the best forum for dialogue on the recovery of Aceh and Nias by the Indonesian government and funding agencies. The European Commission became the biggest funding source in the MDF scheme, followed by Netherlands, United Kingdom

Table 4.1 MDF Member Countries and the Funds Committed for Aceh-Nias Recovery (as of December 2008)

* Based on World Bank foreign exchange rates as of December 2008

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and Canada. Based on an MDF report in December 2008, the amount of MDF funds commitments reached a total of US$691.92 million with a total allocation to projects of US$515.49 million.

In fund disbursement, MDF not only attempted to create an effective and efficient system in the recovery of Aceh and Nias, but also tried to create better conditions for both infrastructural development such as stipulated in the Master Plan of the Indonesian government and in the reduction of poverty and improved welfare of the people of Aceh and Nias.

Program Approach The program approach funded by the MDF scheme put forward program impact that

supported physical output, since the recovery of Aceh and Nias was a disaster response dealing with massive damage on a territorial scale that involved existing infrastructure. The first approach proposed was restoring community infrastructure for the economic recovery of the people. This was done by implementing a community-based approach in the recovery of Aceh and Nias.

The main objective of MDF in the development of infrastructure in Aceh and Nias was to reduce poverty impact and risk. The opening up of isolated areas and the reconstruction of economic development infrastructure became the main paradigm for the physical and non-physical programs agreed upon with the Government of Indonesia. Programs funded by MDF emphasized accountability, transparency and participation of all stakeholders, particularly the community. Bearing in mind that Aceh was formerly a conflict area, the recovery program would also affect social integration. In addition, environmental sustainability in the recovery program needed to be not only about restoring environmental conditions but also about conservation. A gender-sensitive approach was also prioritized in MDF programs, particularly in those related to community participation.

Lessons LearnedEvery program implementation and plan funding unanimously subscribed by MDF

referred to Indonesian government guidelines. As a coordination forum of donor agencies involved in Aceh and Nias recovery, MDF took part as a partner to the governmental and non-governmental agencies operating in Indonesia. In compliance with the Paris Declaration, international development agencies were bound to adopting the system used by the local organization receiving the aid, so that the principle of adjustment/equality could be achieved and the sense of belonging was nurtured among beneficiaries.

BRR as the representative of the Government of Indonesia in Aceh and Nias succeeded in changing the paradigm dominating the relations between international funding agencies and the beneficiary country. By establishing itself in the Master Plan of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction formulated by the Indonesian government, the system

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developed by MDF changed the donor-driven paradigm into a local-needs oriented program. This was also enforced by the joint-funded program of the government and the MDF through collaborative planning. The joint-funding scheme specifically focused on the infrastructure sector. The Government of Indonesia was accustomed to using funds from the state budget for this sector. Once more, it is worth noting that MDF also complied with the PCN workshop mechanism in channeling development funds, as well as in deliberating new project plans and in recommencing previous projects. This mechanism succeeded in increasing the commitment of various development agencies in the MDF scheme compared to the preliminary phase.

Villagers produce coconut shell charcoal as part of a livelihood program funded by the Multi Donor Fund. Meulaboh, May 19, 2009. Photo: MDF/Geumala Yatim

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Potential for ReplicationAccording to an MDF report in December 2008, MDF had allocated US$515.49 million

for 18 projects. Meanwhile another US$89.85 million was committed to seven other projects. MDF coordination occurred at many levels. In 2007, a series of meetings was held to discuss the role of MDF after BRR ended its term on April 16, 2009. On July 28, 2008, an agreement was made that MDF would continue its Aceh and Nias development operations until December, 31 2012. With this agreement, approved programs are to be completed and not halted midway, since some of the programs approved by the Indonesian government and MDF could not be completed by end of BRR’s term in April 2009.

Bappenas became MDF’s partner after BRR’s closure. In the implementation of MDF’s local system procedure in Aceh and Nias, the Government of Indonesia has been positioned as an equal partner in controlling donor funding for the recovery of Aceh and Nias.

Road construction funded by Multi Donor Found and carried out by ILO

in Dahana Village, Gunungsitoli, Nias Islands, North Sumatera, May 22,

2009. Photo: MDF/Geumala Yatim

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Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF): Mediating Mandate, Accelerating Benefit

The Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF) was a facility to manage relief funds overseen by BRR to manage grants from across the world, as well as corporate, social organization, and private individual funding. This facility was needed as a medium to channel grants from donors who were moved to help accelerate the recovery of Aceh after the tsunami and earthquake, but at the same time avoid time-consuming bureaucratic red tape.

BackgroundThe 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and the 2005 earthquake in Nias attracted

profound compassion from around the world. Participation and assistance from every layer of society, both domestic and international, deeply heartened the people of Aceh and Nias, who longed for the restoration of living conditions in the aftermath.

Several countries, corporations, social organizations and international agencies requested information on how to channel their donations for tsunami victims without having to go through various bureaucratic means and mediums like MDF. These included Venezuela, which wanted to donate US$2 million, China with US$1 million and PT Exxon Mobile, which were not interested in participating in the joint grant scheme.

In responding to the need to form a medium that accommodated the desires and donations coming from the various parties, the Head of the BRR Executing Agency decided to create the RANTF. The advantage of RANTF funds was the fast disbursement process, which avoided a long bureaucratic procedure and time-consuming budget revisions but still upheld the accountability principle.

RANTF: Embracing Donors and Implementing Mandate The idea of collecting donations through the special RANTF scheme was initiated

by numerous parties, especially after the emergency phase ended. The enthusiasm of donors to contribute was an opportunity not to be missed. Many donors also needed the medium to pool their funds and provide assistance to realize the delivery of their programs to the beneficiaries. In the rapidly changing conditions during the recovery, there were many unanticipated necessities, particularly on how to cope with and mediate discrepancies existing in inter-sectoral activities.

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Figure 4.1 RANTF Committee Structure

Program & DonorAssistance Unit

Coordination &Project

Management Unit

Administration &Fund

Management Unit

Budget AuthorityOfficer (KPA) Unit

Donor, Stakeholder,Partners,

Communications and Media,Tim Terpadu Relations

Sector Deputies, Program Integration,Pusdatin, Regional Office,Center of Quality Control,

Asset Management

Escrow Bank,KPA Secretariat,

Accounting

Bank Payment,KPA Secretariat,

Accounting, Supervisory Board

Head of BRRExecuting

Agency

Members:Deputy for Finance & Planning

Deputy for Economic & Bussiness DevelopmentDirector of Donor & International Relations

Executive Director of RANTF

RANTF Committee

Committee Chairman :Deputy for Operations

ExecutiveDirector of

RANTF

As the party responsible for the coordination of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh-Nias, BRR was expected to come up with a flexible and adaptable breakthrough. In accordance with the authority stipulated in Central Government Regulation No. 2/2005, some BRR exponents were encouraged to creatively and proactively interpret the articles by forming a special unit called the Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (ANTF). On January 4, 2006, the Head of BRR Executing Agency changed the name of ANTF to RANTF, which was made official by the head of the Implementing Agency through Regulation No. 1/PER/BP-BRR/I/2006. In addition, five individuals were appointed members of the RANTF Committee, which was in charge of and had the highest responsibility in determining/directing policy. The committee held tri-monthly meetings to discuss progress, achievements and strategic planning, as well as monthly meetings with donors and stakeholders to discuss progress.

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To ensure the effectiveness of RANTF fund disbursement in supporting rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias, RANTF was designed in such way that the management was oriented toward process acceleration, particularly in projects handling the emergency situation, and flexibility while still prioritizing transparency and reporting accountability. The RANTF effectiveness was based on the three pillars of Speedy Response, Flexibility, and Transparency.

Main RANTF ActivitiesDonor and Program Assistance. Together with other BRR units, RANTF served 1. numerous donors listed in the donor archives, such as partner countries, corporations, state-owned enterprises and their affiliates, foundations and NGOS. The services included coordination and assistance for programs implemented by donors and their implementing partners, starting from planning to delivery to beneficiaries.

Fund Management. The RANTF taskforce and other BRR units pooled funds from 2. abroad, corporations, foundations, NGOs and the public. The pooled funds were channeled to various programs through specified procedures, based on the characteristics of donors, beneficiaries and other stakeholders as well as field requirements. The RANTF team applied a ‘fund project matching’ mechanism encompassing:

• Open purpose program involving funds and programs for which allocation had not yet been specifically determined by donors, so that it was open to suggestions from the RANTF Committee, deputies and other BRR units.

• Flexible program involving funds and programs of which allocation was partially determined by donors, such as those in which the donors ascertained which sectors should receive funds.

• Earmarked program involving funds and programs of which allocation was specifically determined by donors and received by relevant deputies or other BRR units.

Flexibility

Transparency

Speed

EffectiveTrust

Fund

Figure 4.2 Three Essential Elements of RANTF

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Fund-ProjectMatching

Project initiation

Approval/Disapproval

Veri�cation

Project Planning,Implementation,and Supervision

Open

Flexible

Earmarked

√ Proposal√ MoU

Payment deferral

Payment con�rmation

√ Project chart√ Tender Document

√ ToR√ Contract

√ Funds Usage Form√ Project and Rating

√ Concept Note√ Budget

√ Deputy Memo

Final report

√ Bank instruction

√ Payment order

Report processingand �nal payment Project handover

Instruction ,Funds availability,

Procedur & other checks

Permit and certi�cate

Veri�cation reception and payment

instruction processing

√ Payment authorization

√ Bank instruction

√ Payment Approval Record

√ Progressing Report√ Update PCN

Payment request

RANTF Committee,BRR Deputies, BRR Representative O�ces

Project Coordinator,Project Manager,Supervision

Managed Fund Admin Unit,Budget Authority O�cer Unit

Project Coordinator,Project Manager,Supervision,Asset Management

Figure 4.3 Project Management Procedure

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RANTF cooperated with five prominent international and local banks: HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Niaga, and Standard Chartered Bank. The five banks were responsible for holding the funds as well as fund administration, including issuing periodical fund status reports.

RANTF was also supported by independent legal consultants, tax consultants, public accountants and corruption watch groups. This support gave full guarantee that all rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Aceh and Nias funded by RANTF were fully controlled, monitored, transparent, efficient and effective in accordance with regulations. RANTF issued a pre-audit financial report every six months and public accountants audited each report at the end of the year.

Lessons LearnedFirst, during the recovery phase, several mediating activities were needed to link the

projects conducted in different sectors and to anticipate disparities and urgencies. Fund disbursement not involving a long bureaucratic procedure or time-consuming budget revision but maintaining accountability was required, for which RANTF was created.

Second, to ensure that the goals and objectives of a trust fund were met, it was necessary for this type of institution to ensure reliability, transparency and accountability in implementing its tasks. Despite the dynamism in running the activities and flexibility in managing the funds and programs, transparency and accountability had to be carefully maintained.

Program

Handover

Donor

PCN

Stakeholder and Partners

Asset Management

Recovery Partners

Implementing Agency

- RANTF unit- Sector Deputies/Region - Integrated Program and Pusdatin- Integrated Team

PPMK and Supervision

Figure 4.4 Donor and BRR Program Coordination

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Third, strategic fundraising and efficient fund spending were achieved through intensifying approaches and reporting activities to donors, rendering effective assistance in program implementation as well as through the active involvement of beneficiary communities. Hence, a donor could be reassured with results that made significant contributions to the beneficiaries. In addition, pleased with the relief, the beneficiaries could also continue its maintenance and operation so that the benefit would endure.

Potential for ReplicationThe Trust Fund as a grant management facility could be replicated to accommodate funds

coming from international donors, corporations, social organizations and other elements of society. The collected funds could be used to support social and non-profit public activities. Hence, the concept could be applied in running and managing funds for the development of social facilities, scholarship grants, museum management and public activities, or even in administering a retirement fund, social insurance or a social security net.

Making the most of the riverside of Krueng Aceh river as a public park

built through the RANTF funds, Banda Aceh, September 9, 2008.

Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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BRR Multi-Year Contract and State Budget Carryover Funds

Basically, the innovative multi-year contract and carryover funds enabled an activity to be conducted over two consecutive fiscal years without the administrational delay that usually occurs at the start of each fiscal year. Unspent funds from one year’s budget could be carried over to the following year with approval from the Directorate General of the State Treasury.

BackgroundNormal procedures in state financial management require unspent funds from the

National Annual Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, APBN) at the end of every fiscal year to be returned to the State Treasury. This applied to all funds listed by the Issuance of Spending Authority (Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran, DIPA) matched against State Treasury data on disbursed funds. Normally if the funds are still required, procedure requires that a new proposal be submitted for the following fiscal year.

This procedure burdened rehabilitation and reconstruction activities as it meant ongoing projects would be halted, at least until after budget deliberation between the Finance Ministry and the House of Representatives. Based on experience, the process of deliberation could run through October in an ongoing year.

Two steps taken to overcome this delay were:

Depositing the budget into a trust fund at the Special Office for State Services and • Treasury (Kantor Pelayanan dan Perbendaharaan Negara – Khusus, KPPN-K) in Banda Aceh; and Using the unspent budget for an ongoing budget year in the following year’s budget • through the multi-year contract.

The legal basis for the application of the multi-year contract and carryover funds was legalized in November 2003 through the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on Guidelines of Government Goods/Services Procurement in order that activities funded by the APBN or the Provincial Annual Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD) could run effectively and efficiently. Article 30 of the decree defined the multi-year contract as a ‘contract on project implementation involving budget funds for more than 1 (one) fiscal year’. According to the presidential decree, individual cases were to be approved by:

The Finance Ministry for procurements funded by the state budget; • The governor for procurements funded by the provincial budget; and• The district head/mayor for procurements funded by district/municipal budgets.•

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Meanwhile, the initiative to carry over funds came about due to delays caused in DIPA issuances after the Indonesian government introduced the integrated budget system in 2005. This led to a reduction in disbursements during the ongoing budget year. According to Finance Minister Sri Mulyani, almost all projects proposed in the Second Revision of the APBN in 2005 or in the second semester of 2005 could not be implemented that year. This was because budget deliberation between the government and the newly elected House of Representatives had been completed only in October 2005. As a result, the DIPA budget implementation statement, which was required as the basis for budget disbursement for departmental projects, could not be issued until December 2005. Thus the 2005 budget was still being disbursed up until April 2006, not only to BRR but also to other governmental departments.

The main principle of carryover funds and the multi-year contract was to bypass bureaucracy so that activities could be implemented without delays due to administrational requirements at the start of the year. The goal was to accelerate the implementation of projects/activities that would take more than one fiscal year to complete.

Implementation of Multi-Year Contract and Carryover FundsIn November 2005, Presidential Regulation No. 70/2005 was issued regarding the

Third Revision of Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 to bring it in line with Government Regulation No. 2/2005 to expedite the task of BRR. Article 30, Clause (8) on multi-year contracts was revised so that contracts could be executed with the approval of the Head of BRR Executing Agency for Aceh and Nias on procurements funded by the APBN for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. This policy certainly helped increase the speed of implementation in BRR multi-year contracts.

This type of contract was devised to maintain the momentum in field activities that were at their peak. This was in line with the urgency to accelerate rehabilitation and reconstruction activities and the requirement to follow state budgeting procedure. In other words, the multi-year contract meant that the organization did not have to adhere strictly to the budget cycle, emphasizing instead the people’s demand that BRR complete tasks as soon as possible.

The contract was not intended to endorse an increase in budget disbursement, but was instead designed to maintain performance momentum in the field. However, this indirectly affected the rate of budget disbursement.

The contract was also a form of budget provision commitment, meaning that a contract’s budget availability was guaranteed in the following year’s budget implementation statement. Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 states that multi-year contracts are authorized for projects spanning more than one year. Projects/activities

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based on BRR multi-year contracts were assignments that actually could be completed in one fiscal year, but an exception was made in the BRR case. This was because under normal circumstances in which the budget cycle was January-December, project culmination usually occurred in October-November, whereas rehabilitation and reconstruction activities had to be executed simultaneously and promptly in every field. If there was a revision in planning, the DIPA could not be issued until August, hence in late December many projects were still at the initial implementation stage. The peak activities in project implementation usually took place four to five months after the issuance (unless the project was for procurement). In view of this situation, BRR sought a solution so that projects would not be halted just as they were progressing.

Project criteria for multi-year contracts were, among other things:

Planning and Detail Engineering Design (DED) to support physical infrastructure for • housing and settlement areas and other strategic programs;Activities related to the recovery of socioeconomic conditions;• Physical planning submitted the preceding year that received strong support from • the local government;

Signing of the “Budget Account Code for Recovery” between BRR and the House of Representative (DPR), Jakarta, June 4, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Projects deferred due to problems related to land issues, delayed local government • approval, absence of beneficiary data and shifting consultancy design for which funds had been allocated the previous year;Activities that were expected to be completed at the end of the year;• Availability of minimum contract value, either physical or non-physical;• Without price hikes; and• Have a recommendation for a multi-year contract. The team in charge of • recommending projects for multi-year contracts was led by the Head of Procurement Services Center. A project was then proposed to the BRR Deputy for Finance and Planning, which would disburse the allotted funds.

Lessons LearnedAuthorization of multi-year contracts and carryover funds enabled the momentum of

activities to be maintained and speed in field activities. They could be employed in large-scale, strategic or urgent projects (such as in handling disasters). Even though the process started at the beginning of the year and there were no constraints to delay project completion, some projects could not be completed in one fiscal year due to their massive scale, among other things. In cases where project implementation must be postponed, it was because there were technical/non-technical obstacles because the tender process

The center of economic life of Lampulo lies all along Krueng Aceh

river, Banda Aceh, April 3, 2009. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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had to be repeated or halted by the court because from the beginning it was known that the activites could not be completed. There would also be projects of which completion has been projected but were abandoned for reasons beyond a service provider’s control, resulting in incomplete results at the end of the fiscal year.

If projects such as the abovementioned are urgently required by the people and their termination would aggravate current conditions, employing a multi-year contract would be the solution. Of course, to prevent actors from exploiting such opportunities by not finishing their work due to minor problems and unreasonable excuses (more because of a lack of competence) more precise and rigorous criteria must be formulated as requirements for using a multi-year contract.

By employing such mechanisms and procedures, BRR could accomplish its development target within its four-year mandate. This included project implementations using international funds.

Potential for ReplicationMany projects fall under the main criteria mentioned above, especially infrastructural

and highly strategic projects and projects in disaster areas where quick results are required, as well as projects supported by international funds. It is vital to maintain the momentum of economic growth, and therefore some projects are better implemented when unrestricted by the fiscal year. If the reform of state financial management materializes and the development process improves, more public investment projects could be planned for the mid-range period (every five years) and better implemented.

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UNDER normal circumstances, a project can be implemented once all the necessary tools are ready: complete system and organization, work list, sufficient data and funding. There are two elements included in project preparation. The first is technical project preparation, which relates to goods and service procurement, commonly known as the bidding process. The second is pre-reconstruction activities. Primarily, in physical infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction, feasibility studies or environmental analyses are mandatory to fulfill construction requirements. Feasibility studies, whether for economic, social or environmental projects, are required to justify the project. Feasibility studies and environmental analyses are both part of the preparation phase. After the project is fully completed, the wrap up procedure discussed here is payment process. BRR made breakthroughs in preparation activities, including in goods and services procurement and environmental study analysis. There was also an innovation in the payment process for programs and national development activities in the establishment of special payment office. The entire project preparation and conclusion are covered in this chapter.

Operational Preparations

Prospective contractors sit and wait following the tender bidding process for physical projects at the BRR office, March 8, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Goods and Services Procurement for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias

Goods and services procurement is a common procedure applied by projects and activities funded by the APBN. In dealing with the limited human resources amid the copious rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Aceh and Nias, some major breakthroughs were made to ease the process of goods and services procurement without compromising the reliability of the system. One breakthrough was a regulation that the position of tender officer for rehabilitation and reconstruction projects can be filled by non-civil servants. The policy of direct appointment was also regulated for Aceh and Nias. Last was a breakthrough in electronic procurement for goods and services in support of e-government development for the Aceh government. This system was the first of its kind.

BackgroundGoods and services procurement is an activity to provide goods/services required

by government agencies. The most common procurement method is the tender. Procurement includes goods provision, contractor services, consultancy services and other services. In its procurement activities, BRR followed the standard state procedure regulated by Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on Guidelines of Implementation of Government Goods and Services Procurement.

The regulation’s basic assumptions are for normal circumstances, far different from the conditions in Aceh and Nias. The principles that BRR had to implement were efficiency, effectiveness, openness and competitiveness, transparency in terms of policy and information on procurement technical requirements, as well as fair and non-discriminative principles to prevent corruption, collusion and nepotism as well as state losses and applying the accountability principle both in systemic and procedural activities as well as in implementation.

Not long before BRR was established, Presidential Instruction No. 5/2004 on the Acceleration of Corruption Eradication was issued. Clause 11 of the Instruction required the Coordinating Minister of the Economy, the Minister of Finance. and the State Minister of National Development Planning/Head of Bappenas to evaluate and try out the e-procurement system to be used jointly by government agencies. Considering the huge responsibility BRR was undertaking in terms of program value and the scope of the working area, as well as potential problems and grievances if programs were delayed, BRR integrated the e-procurement system in goods and services procurement. Bidding activities to procure goods and services online (e-Proc) was a BRR breakthrough to accelerate and expedite the financial and administrative process.

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Exceptional Innovation in Goods and Services Procurement BRR had the authority to operate several programs and/or inter-sectoral activities

because it was led by a ministerial level officer. Therefore, in the context of rehabilitation and reconstruction related to goods and services procurement, the central government twice revised the regulation on the procurement of goods and services, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 to adjust to the needs and problems in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias.

The revised Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 enabled direct appointment from state institutions for particular services to implement its tasks. The content of Presidential Decree No. 61/2004 on Guidelines for Government Goods and Services Procurement as the first revision of Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 mentioned, among other things, that in a disaster context as well rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, procurement normally conducted through tender may be done through direct appointment ‘pertaining to criteria related to emergency handling for state defense, security and the people’s safety that requires a prompt response”.

Logistics procurement personnel examines bid documents submitted by companies participating in the tender for BRR NAD-Nias projects. Banda Aceh, June 14, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Another BRR breakthrough was the changes in the tender process from pre-qualification to post-qualification, thus screening for tender participants was based on expertise and project experience. This approach was significantly different from the dominant system applied in other technical departments in Indonesia. By applying this system, BRR service procurement applicants were short-listed, and without past experience one could not participate in a tender. In the second phase, after short-listing service providers based on their experience, BRR would award a tender based on the most competitive offer.

During 2005, BRR applied both pre-qualification and post qualification systems before employing e-Proc principles. BRR started to implement this principle in the 2008 financial year, two years after the preparation activities in 2006 and 2007 to set up programs, facilities as well as human resources. Considering that almost half of the staff of BRR’s regional office originated from local government circles, they were expected to maintain the sustainability of the e-Proc system after returning to their respective offices.

Table 5.1. Comparison Between Face-to-Face Procurement and e-procurement

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A small team in charge of the development and preparation of e-Proc implementation in Aceh through BRR was formed on July 19, 2006 by recruiting staff from BRR, the Aceh Provincial Government, the West Aceh District Government and the Banda Aceh City Government who joined a course for trainers facilitated by the Surabaya City Government in East Java. The small team developed the system and infrastructure of e-Proc at BRR.

The Program Training Department of the Surabaya City Government not only gave training but also assisted BRR in developing the system and software. Institutionally, BRR legitimized the existence of a taskforce handling e-Proc through the Head of BRR Executing Agency Decree No. 50/2007. Prior to e-Proc, BRR goods and services procurement was managed by the BRR Center for Procurement Services without using the internet.

Basically there is not much difference between the e-Proc system and the typical tender system. The main difference is that bidding is not done face to face in e-Proc but through the internet. The implementation of e-Proc also emphasizes convenience, speed and integration, plus the whole process is swiftly managed. None of the partners can manipulate data or information because they have to send it online in attachments. The implementer and committee of goods and services procurement can quickly and openly monitor the ongoing process online. Data input is actively done by bidding participants, thus speeding up the short-listing process.

Systematically, the bidding document model implemented in the BRR e-Proc system comprised three models: contractor services, consultancy services and goods procurement. In the implementation of e-Proc, some phases could be bypassed and accelerated, which ultimately increased the quality and speed of implementation.

BRR established an e-Proc facilities and secretariat at the governor’s office in Banda Aceh. The facilities provided were 15 bidding rooms integrated with a server and supporting hardware system, as well as a meeting room used jointly with the provincial government. The e-Proc secretariat was in charge of holding Management Assessment Meetings (Rapat Tinjauan Manajemen, RTM) to make sure that the management system and procedure, which was ISO 9001:2000 certified, ran smoothly. RTMs were held at least twice a year, but could be held outside the annual schedule should there be a crucial issue related to the quality policy or target that required rapid follow-up. This whole sequence was conducted to prepare for the transfer of the e-Proc system to the local government after BRR completed its mandate in April 2009.

As one of the attempts to strengthen local economic conditions, BRR also optimized the role of local service providers (in Aceh and Nias) to work together. However, local capacity is usually insufficient to handle matters of a larger scope and so BRR invited national-scale contractors, especially state-owned companies, to participate. This applied only to programs that could not be handled by a local contractor.

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BRR bidding implementation criteria were:

Applying the lowest bidding principle as the potential winning proposal. BRR always 1. implemented fund principles and efficiency so in general tender winners were those who proposed a larger scope of work than others. Could implement recurring bidding to optimize budget allocation in the current year 2. Physical development program implementation that complied with the Government 3. of Indonesia’s ideal standard and measurement (Indonesian National Standard, or Standar Nasional Indonesia, SNI).

Conceptually and practically, the e-Proc system was not only related to communication technology but also to the human resources running the program. In practice, the BRR e-Proc system went through several upgrades as a result of hacking tests to check the security and weaknesses of the system. This also related to internal barriers, as the system eliminated the potential of direct interaction between BRR staff and the service providers making a bid.

Since its implementation, BRR certified some 600 trained personnel to run the e-Proc system, out of the 1,200 participants in the program. BRR’s vast field of work and programmatic scope also created the need for a fast, efficient and transparent system. Consequently, the number of taskforces was high and required good coordination and communication to accelerate program implementation. E-Proc was the solution under such circumstances, plus it could minimize problems and disclaimers after procurement was realized.

Lessons Learned: Pursuing Speed, Enhancing Quality With the application of information technology and the implementation of an

integrated bidding system, the number of personnel involved was reduced. E-Proc also accelerated data and information management. Interestingly, e-Proc also indirectly increased the quality of participants of open bids. The system required participants to complete and provide required data, and they were expected to have an understanding of and be active in the entire bidding process.

The internet-based system was also integrated with the databases of different government institutions. Therefore, partners with questionable track records could be directly monitored by the bidding and tender organizing committee. Additionally, unlike the regular bidding system, by using the e-Proc system, all information and data related to the bidding process could be accessed in its entirety. Competition among companies participating in bids was more transparent and accountable, for both the participants and the implementing team. The system also eliminated face-to-face interaction between tender participants and members of the implementing team, since the whole process was conducted online and on time to reduce the possibility of manipulation and corruption. Since its implementation in 2008, three periods of e-Proc packages were conducted plus one follow-up period.

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Electronic bidding was also one way to reduce pressure from local government officials who planned to organize a bid, and eliminated physical contact with intimidating contractors and service providers. This method also enabled savings, since participants could join without the expense of traveling all the way to Banda Aceh, thus reducing bidding proposal amounts. This process also enabled the competency screening of a particular company. For instance, if the Aceh local government wanted to organize a tender for a computer and communication network system and software and a company proved to be unable to use the system to submit its bid, there would be less probability of it winning the bid as it could not demonstrate any competency in dealing with IT systems. This was an empirical experience of the Communication, Information and Transportation Agency of Aceh Province.

Potential for Replication: Building Sustainability into the Future To date, E-Proc has been implemented by several institutions and central government

departments, such as the Bappenas, the Ministry of Manpower, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Industry, the East Kalimantan and Gorontalo provincial governments, the district governments of Bogor, Lamongan and Balikpapan.

BRR applied the e-Proc system from Surabaya City Government as one of the best practices in Indonesia. To achieve sustainability, E-proc is integrated with the system of the local government, which will continue the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The first step in this was locating the e-proc secretariat at the Aceh governor’s office.

Transfer to the local government was conducted both directly and indirectly. The direct process was conducted by the BRR e-Proc secretariat through propagation among district/municipal governments. It is also supported by the secretariat’s location at the governor’s office.

While indirectly, the transfer was performed by training BRR staff, half of which were civil servants from various local governments. Once they returned to their original jobs after the end of the BRR mandate, they will have the ability and capacity to improve their colleagues’ skills. The training was not exclusively for BRR staff but also for vendors and other staff working at the local offices of the Aceh Provincial Government.

In the future, this system will be applied by the Aceh Provincial Government and all district and municipal governments in Aceh. The system will be integrated into the provincial government system to be replicated by all districts and municipalities in Aceh, much like the Spatial Information and Mapping Center system that was transferred to the Aceh Geospatial Data Center.

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Three Secret Formulas in Environmental Monitoring: Washing Up, Empowerment and Vigilance

The global environment is in a critical condition, thus no matter how urgent the situation, the environmental aspect had to be taken into consideration in the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Aceh and Nias. The first formula of Environmental Washing Up was with the Environmental Management and Monitoring Document (Dokumen Pengelolaan dan Pemantauan Lingkungan, DPPL). Through the DPPL, the administrative process of environmental documentation was expedited. A DPPL was compiled for both ongoing and completed projects.

The second formula was empowerment by conducting environmental impact analysis (Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan, Amdal) in clusters. With the cluster system, environmental analysis of ongoing projects could be done effectively and economically.

The third introduced formula in Indonesia’s bureaucratic system included the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan, LARAP, Environmental Management Efforts (Upaya Pengelolaan Lingkungan, UKL) and Environmental Monitoring Efforts (Usaha Pengendalian Lingkungan, UPL) as the vigilant system in environmental monitoring. BRR also endorsed eco-friendly attempts, ranging from broader policy context, program selection and ongoing project assistance, as well as for completed projects in which the results would be environmentally evaluated in the future. The key used to implement environmental strategy was the inter-sectoral approach.

BackgroundThe Master Plan Book1 was basically a guideline for environmentally friendly

reconstruction that was promoted by the Aceh Provincial Government through its policy of “Green Policy Reconstruction for Aceh”. The policy aimed at improving the living standards of society and individuals, while minimizing the negative impacts of environmental reconstruction as well as preserving the natural diversity in the long run and natural system productivity. The green policy then became the operational guideline in the reconstruction process conducted by BRR and NGOs/international agencies as the implementing partners.

The strategy for infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction was prompted by the demand for logistical support in building housing, health and educational facilities. In this way, the reconstruction process could be effectively executed and the socioeconomic condition of the people could be quickly restored. It is worth noting that the activities of rehabilitation and reconstruction were tied to physical, social and economic activities. For example, a community of land owners and/or users and users of access roads could be affected by project execution, as could forest cultivators whose wood may be utilized for

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construction material, etc. Such instances could entail potential conflicts of interest that could disrupt the development process.

Infrastructure reconstruction would certainly change natural forms and landscapes. Excavation activities, reshaping steep banks and re-positioning roads to construct infrastructure would distort the geographical condition. This would be exacerbated by the amount of landfill, gravel and other materials extracted from nature. To maintain environmentally friendly principles, infrastructure planning and development is regulated by Government Regulation No. 27/1999 on Amdal and an Environmental Ministry Regulation covering the implementation of Amdal, which covers the guidelines of implementation of Analysis of Environmental Impact (Analisis Dampak Lingkungan, ANDAL, a detailed and in-depth research study on the significant impacts of a proposed business or activity), the formulation of an Environmental Management Plan (Rencana Pengelolaan Lingkungan, RKL) and Environmental Monitoring Plan (Rencana Pemantauan Lingkungan, RPL), standardization of environmental quality, assessment guidelines for environmental damage, as well as other regulations. The government regulation stipulates that to anticipate critical impacts on the environment, an Amdal must be done for any reconstruction activity that would transform the natural landscape and exploit natural resources. If the impact is categorized as non-critical, it should be followed by UKL and UPL. RKL and RPL or UKL and UPL are mitigation planning documents on environmental impact that is just as important as other construction planning documents.

Therefore, there should be mitigation attempts on negative impacts caused by or related to general construction activities as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction. This mitigation must be specifically and well planned.

However, the damage caused by the tsunami was so great, the area so vast and expediency in reconstruction so vital that normal procedures could not be followed. Consequently, many of the implemented projects did not have an official document on environmental impact mitigation plans. Therefore, a special policy on Amdal execution for the rehabilitation and reconstruction process needed to be established and approved by the Environment Minister. Through the project “Bridging Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)” funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), this necessity was fulfilled by the validation of Environmental Ministry Regulation No. 308/2005 on DPPL stipulating Amdal implementation in the recovery of Aceh-Nias. The special regulation was issued by the central government to solve BRR’s problem in implementing Government Regulation No. 27/1999 (revision of Article 17, Clause (e) Law No. 10/2005) on Environmental Impact Analysis, particularly during the initial phase of BRR’s establishment.

Apart from that, the Cluster Amdal policy was applied as such a regional approach could reduce data collection expenses. Environmental data (physical, biological, social, economic, and cultural) for Amdal Guidelines were collected among one cluster. This concept helped predict the accumulative burden of negative impacts caused by, for

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instance, water, air and noise pollution, wildlife habitat encroachment, forest destruction and reconstruction impacts. The negative impacts were jointly dealt with to save the time and costs in each sector.

Implementation of DPPL In early 2007, evaluation of the status and availability of documents on environmental

planning was conducted on every rehabilitation and reconstruction project implemented between the 2005-2007 fiscal years. The results showed that many implemented projects did not have comprehensive documents on environmental planning, including Amdal, UKL and UPL. In response to this, BRR called upon the central government for technical support to help solve the problem.

Environmental Ministry provided its technical support by issuing Environmental Minister Regulation No. 308/2005 on the implementation of special Analysis of Environmental Impact, Environmental Management Efforts and Environmental Monitoring Efforts for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The regulation stated that the formulation of Amdal Guidelines in DPPL was to be conducted by a team of experts formed by the Environmental Ministry and the Aceh Environmental Impact Management Agency. The regulation enabled Amdal completion in one region to take two months, instead of the normal six to 18 months or longer. This was achieved due to the application of the cluster2 approach. Despite the flexibility this offered, standards in environmental safety still had to be maintained.

DPPL was specifically designed for projects that had commenced but lacked the documentation on environmental impact mitigation planning. DPPL became a faster and cheaper alternative compared to an environmental audit for ongoing and completed projects in Aceh and Nias. Similar to Amdal, DPPL offered recommendations on environmental impact mitigation as covered in the Environmental Management Plan and the Environmental Monitoring Plan. Impact mitigation was more directed at addressing negative impacts after infrastructure was operational.

The DPPL format was legalize by Minister of Environment Regulation No. 12/2007, with an implementation period from September 26, 2007 to September 2009. Based on the ministerial regulation, BRR formulated DPPL in 29 project clusters in Aceh and six clusters in Nias. The choice of clusters and implementation of DPPL had been approved by the Environment Minister. The duty of BRR was to complete the identification process and determine manners of addressing negative impacts before the termination of its term in Aceh and Nias.

Generally speaking, the Master Plan had been used as guidelines to formulate the Amdal terms of reference since it contained information on programs and projects being executed. The ideal situation would be to formulate the ANDAL terms of reference or a similar action plan by determining the number of Amdal or UKL and UPL documents

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Table 5.2. Clusters in Aceh and Nias where DPPL is Implemented

Cluster District/Municipality Sub-district Number of disctrict

Number of activity

ACEH1 Sabang Suka Jaya, Suka Karya 2 3192 Banda Aceh Meuraxa, Jaya Baru, Banda Raya 3 5,6343 Banda Aceh Baiturrahman, Lueng Bata, Kuta Raja 3 2,8384 Banda Aceh Ulee Kareng, Kuta Alam, Syiah Kuala 3 4,7885 Aceh Jaya Jaya, Sampoiniet, Setia Bakti 3 3,7856 Aceh Jaya Krueng Sabee, Panga, Teunom 3 3,2257 Aceh Barat Samatiga, Arongan Lambalek, Woyla Barat, Woyla Timur, Bubon, Woyla 6 2,7218 Aceh Barat Johan Pahlawan, Meureubo, Kaway Enam Belas, Pante Ceureumen, Sungai Mas 5 6,3499 Nagan Raya Kuala, Seunagan, Seunagan Timur, Beutong, Darul Makmur 5 2,753

10 Aceh Barat Daya Babah Rot, Kuala Batee, Blang Pidie, Susoh, Tangan-Tangan, Manggeng 6 864

11 Aceh Selatan, Gayo Lues Labuhan Haji, Labuhan Haji Timur, Samadua, Bakongan, Bakongan Timur, Pasie Raja, Tapaktuan, Meukek, Blangkejeren, Dabung Gelang 10 374

12 Aceh Selatan, Aceh Tenggara Kluet Selatan, Sawang, Trumon, Kluet Utara, Semadam 5 342

13 Aceh Singkil Singkil, Singkil Utara, Kuala Baru, Kota Baharu, Gunung Meriah, Simpang Kanan 6 570

14 Aceh Singkil Longkip, Rundeng, Penanggalan, Sultan Daulat, Suro Makmur, Kepulauan Banyak 5 2,938

15 Simeulue Alafan, Salang, Simeulue Barat, Simeulue Tengah 4 1,94316 Simeulue Teluk Dalam, Teupah Barat, Simeulue Timur, Teupah Selatan 4 1,984

17Aceh Utara, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Tengah, Bener Meriah

Muara Batu, Dewantara, Syamtalira Bayu, Samudera, Tanah Pasir, Seunuddon, Baktiya Barat, Muara Satu, Muara Dua, Banda Sakti, Blang Mangat, Celala, Pegasing, Kebayakan, Bintang, Silih Nara, Bandar

17 4,209

18 Aceh Timur Madat, Simpang Ulim, Julok, Pante Beudari, Nurussalam, Darul Aman, Idi Rayeuk, Banda Alam, Peureulak, Peudawa, Sungai Raya 11 840

19 Aceh Tamiang, Langsa Bendahara, Karang Baru, Seuruway, Langsa Kota, Langsa Barat, Langsa Timur 6 217

20 Aceh Besar Peukan Bada, Lhoknga, Darul Kamal, Darul Imarah, Suka Makmur, Simpang Tiga 6 5,940

21 Aceh Besar Leupung, Lhoong, Kota Cot Glie, Kota Jantho 4 4,49122 Aceh Besar Pulo Aceh 1 57723 Aceh Besar Krueng Raya, Mesjid Raya, Seulimeum, Lembah Seulawah 4 4,058

24 Aceh Besar Darussalam, Baitussalam, Ingin Jaya, Krueng Barona Jaya, Montasik, Kuta Malaka, Indrapuri 7 5,744

25 Aceh Pidie Muara Tiga, Batee, Pidie, Kota Sigli, Grong-Grong, Delima, Mila 7 2,923

26 Aceh Pidie Simpang Tiga, Kembang Tanjong, Geulumpang Tiga, Geulumpang Baroh, Tiro-Trusep, Bandar Baru, Pante Raja, Pekan Baro 8 2,862

27 Aceh Pidie Trienggadeng, Meureudu, Meurah Dua, Ulim, Jangka Buya, Mane 6 1,91428 Bireuen Samalanga, Simpang Mamplam, Pandrah, Jeunieb, Peudada, Peulimbang 6 5,523

NIAS

1 Nias (Northern part) Sitolu Ori, Tuhemberua, Lotu, Sawo, Afulu, Lahewa Timur, Lahewa, Namohalu Esiwa 8 1,112

2 Nias (central part) Alasa Tumula, Gunungsitoli Alo’oa, Gunungsitoli Utara, Alasa, Gunungsitoli, Tugala Oyo, Hiliduho, Botomuzoi, Hili Serangkai, Gunungsitoli Selatan 10 2,779

3 Nias (Western part) Mandrehe Utara, Mandrehe, Moro’o, Mandrehe Barat, Sirombu, Lahomi, Ma’u, Lolofitu Moi, Ulu Moro’o 9 840

4 Nias (Southern part) Gido, Gunungsitoli Idanoi, Samolo-Molo, Idano Gawo, Bawolato, Ulugawo 6 1,3685 Nias Selatan (Mainland) Lolomatua, Lolowau, Gomo, Lahusa, Teluk Dalam, Amandraya 6 3,0526 Nias Selatan (Islands) Hibala, Pulau-Pulau Batu 2 57

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that should be drawn up during the project planning stage, by referring to the programs listed in the Master Plan. The Environmental Ministry Regulation No.308/2005 stated that the ANDAL terms of reference will be carried out by a team of experts formed by the Environmental Ministry Office and Bppedal Aceh Province. However, the fact of the matter was that in the field, it was not always possible to use information on programs and projects listed in the Master Plan as points of reference to determine the name and location of projects that were to be complemented by Amdal, UKL or UPL. Through discussions with Head of Project Implementing Unit (PIU), including chiefs of planning at local administrative offices, it was possible to identify the number and types of required environment planning documents. The number of clusters eventually agreed upon were 53 in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and four in Nias.

On the other hand, it should be noted that some projects scheduled for execution in the 2009 fiscal year did not have their respective Amdal documents. Allocations of funds to complete Amdal documents were also impeded by the limited budget for reconstruction activities. Efforts were taken to overcome the problem by using funds from the MDF. Since full approval had been given by the Provincial Environmental Impact Management Agency and the Environmental Ministry, MDF approved the budget request of US$2.7 million as part of its Technical Assistance allocated to BRR but managed by UNDP. Projects with Amdal funded through this mechanism were for roads and bridge construction and waterworks (dams, urban drainage and coastal enforcements), involving 20 projects with the Amdal projects classified into seven clusters and one individual project.

Lingkup Amdal di lakukan pada wilayah yang lebih luas mencakup beberapa proyek keuntungan lain hal ini adalah kajian lignkugan menjadi lebih komprehensif karena luas wilayah studi tersebut – The scope of Amdal was conducted on a much larger area to cover a number of projects. One advantage of this approach is a more comprehensive assessment due to the breadth of the said coverage.

Implementation of Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP)

A number of big projects had been postponed and some had even been completely cancelled due to a string of problems that could not be overcome. For example, some projects were scheduled for implementation in 2005 but were carried out only in 2006 and some in 2007. Generally speaking, the impediments involved land preparation and permits.

Documents for the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP), RPL-RKL and UPL-UKL were usually made as early as possible to anticipate possibilities of rescheduling. RKL-RPL documents contained recommendations used by the respective consultant to draw up technical construction specifications complete with the

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implementation schedule. In the event that the environment planning mechanism was completed in parallel with technical planning, construction delays could be prevented. All projects funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) required a LARAP since both financing institutions had in the past experienced time-consuming and complicated problems that resulted in sharp criticism during the implementation. With a view to diminishing such risks, the LARAP had become a compulsory requirement in every World Bank and ADB project.

By having LARAP during the design process, issues pertaining to the environment, socioeconomic impact, land acquisition, relocation of people from a project site and other problems could be anticipated. For example, if a project’s technical requirements stipulated that the construction of a road or bridge should be complemented by UKL and UPL, known as “UKL and UPL Technical Specifications”, it was then understood that those technical specifications should always become an integrated part of the construction work contract. Regrettably, quite a number of designers, planners and contractors did not have a comprehensive understanding of the objectives of LARAP, UKL and UPL. They just followed the stipulations in the actual contract, since they knew that they would not be reimbursed if they deviated from it. It was not unusual for contractors possessing ISO-

Figure 5.1 Environmental Cluster System

A number of infrastructure reconstruction works implemented in one area will bring about connected environmental impact. For this reason, a cluster approach was applied raising effectiveness and efficiency.

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9000 (quality) certificates and 14000 (environment) to not understand the importance of having UKL and UPL technical specifications attached to their work contracts.

Lessons LearnedSimilarly to RKL and RPL documents, DPPL also contained recommendations

pertaining to mitigation of negative environmental impacts after the infrastructure became operational. Since the Environmental Ministry had already approved the condition to reduce such environmental impacts, almost all objections and inquiries from environmental activists could be responded to and the project could proceed.

However, DPPL did not yield the expected results because expectations had been too high while the allocated budget, implementation time and ability of professional manpower, among other things, were quite limited,. The cluster system of DPPL was applied to overcome this obstacle.

The drawing up an ANDAL terms of reference required a budget of Rp 300 million to Rp 400 million. The application of the cluster system as stipulated in Environmental Ministry Regulation No. 308/2005 made it possible to jointly implement several projects located within a certain area or cluster (according to the impact boundaries). The average budget required would then be Rp 100 million to Rp 150 million for each project. Furthermore, since the formulation of an ANDAL terms of reference also included field surveys and reporting, the teams of evaluation and analysis could jointly do their work for several projects and as such the whole process took just two or three weeks. UKL and UPL were drawn up by always referring to the Framework of Reference made by project’s initiators through their respective Work Units, but the appraisals of completed UKL and UPL were done by an evaluation commission of the Provincial Regional Planning Agency. Since evaluation of ANDAL terms of reference could be completed in a shorter period, assessment on UKL-UPL and even on ANDAL, RKL and RPL could also be completed in a shorter period, which was an indication that there had been an improvement in competence on the part of the evaluation commission.

Due to the two aforementioned reasons, the condition to include LARAP and UKL and UPL technical specifications, which were integral parts of the design and construction work contract, was often dubbed “LARAP, UKL and UPL Readiness Approach”. With these contract stipulations, environmental issues generally encountered in construction activities could be preempted in a timely fashion. Since the construction of roads and bridges was relatively similar to that of other physical infrastructure, the stipulation to have LARAP, UKL and UPL technical specifications in road and bridge construction work could also be applied to construction projects for irrigation, buildings and housing. The inclusion of UKL and UPL into work contracts guaranteed that the respective environmental impacts had already been determined. With this approach, environmental issues were incorporated in the design work and construction implementation.

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Besides fulfilling the necessary legal requirements when conducting its activities, BRR also implemented environment-related policies in different ways. For example, it established a disbursement system in the form of conducting environmental rescue actions, like that applied to “Susi Air”, a local air transportation company that rented out small planes in Aceh and Nias, especially during emergencies. At the time, the company had developed into a local commercial company providing air transportation services connecting different districts within Aceh. In emergency situations, Susi Air would be prepared to accept payment from BRR for its services in the form of BRR prohibiting illegal logging and promising to construct runways in Aceh and Nias.

Integrating environmental planning into the overall planning of infrastructure took quite some time. A relatively long process and great patience were needed during which officials and staff of the local administration were given ample opportunity to actively participate in the reconstruction process, the process of formulating ANDAL terms of reference, and in the implementation monitoring of RKL-RPL or UKL–UPL conducted by the designers and contractors. This proved to be an effective manner in which to improve their abilities and encourage a paradigm shift. The self-management mechanism

Imported wood ready for use to construct houses in Teunom, Aceh Jaya, March 2, 2007. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Figure 5.2 Proof of Payment for Chartering Airplanes by BRR

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implemented by BRR, German Technical Cooperation (Gesellscaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ), UNDP and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) provided several opportunities for the officials and staff of the local administration to join the work in the field, thereby acquainting themselves with the infrastructure projects and also the different local situations where the projects were being executed.

It should be mentioned that it was not easy to appraise the extent of capacity improvement and paradigm shift experienced by the officials and staff of the local administration. However, their spontaneous reactions to what took place in the field and including them in making decisions were indications that they had improved their capacities and shifted their paradigms. Following are examples of spontaneous reactions on their part that indicated a process of on-site learning had occurred:

a. “Is this all it is?” (when observing road construction activities), “This kind of construction does certainly not require an Environmental Impact Analysis, it would suffice to do a UKL and UPL or apply Standard Operating Procedure.”

b. “The shrubs on the slope surely grow fast!” (when observing that shrubs that had been previously cleared away).

c. “There has been no rain, yet there is water streaming across the road; won’t it damage the road surface?” (when observing water on a road that had just been repaired)

d. “Heavy equipment is being used, yet why isn’t it very noisy?” (when observing heavy equipment being operated and the blasting of boulders)

e. “So this is the base camp! Where are the facilities to collect oil drips, where are the signs warning to prevent environmental pollution?” (when monitoring implementation of UKL and UPL at the base camp)

f. “This is a protected forest, why is it being exploited?” (when observing logging activities in a protected forest, along which a road was being constructed)

g. “Really, this road has just been surfaced; it will certainly soon be damaged again!” (when observing a truck loaded with boulders passing a newly repaired road)

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Another indication that a paradigm shift had taken place was their response to project reports. Previously, such reports were considered merely a means to record project activities, but the tracer study drawn up by the Bapelda Aceh that kept track of environmental impacts had been used as reference material to conduct several environmental improvement activities. Some examples are:

a. The issuance of a letter prohibiting the construction of a military compound in Sabang before the required Amdal had been completed and subsequently approved by the Governor.

b. Annulment of land ownership located around Seulawah Forest Reserve that had been bought by police officers, public officials (heads of sub-districts and villages) and by private individuals.

c. The management of the Mobile Brigade in Sare was instructed by the Bapelda to dig individual and communal absorption wells.

Potential for ReplicationDrawing up a DPPL in the execution of a project can certainly be implemented in

emergency situations, such as in post-disaster reconstruction when repairs of damaged infrastructure must be conducted even before documents on environmental impact mitigation can be made. When there is ample time for preparatory activities, it would certainly be best for the construction of large-scale infrastructure or other development work (that result in considerable changes to the environment) to be conducted through normal procedure by first drawing up the Amdal and the respective RKL and RPL, which are prerequisites of proper planning as such studies diminish the impact on the environment, and minimize the scale of environmental damage and as such extend a project’s life and years of service.

The cluster approach endeavored to combine the ANDAL terms of reference of several projects within a particular area into one larger study area as it would produce better and more comprehensive study results. Furthermore, since the analysis and assessment were done simultaneously, the number of staff responsible for conducting the studies and the size of the evaluation team was also much smaller. Consequently, the main cost component of the Amdal, which was the cost of environment experts, would certainly also be much less and the time to complete the study much shorter. Conducting separate Amdal for individual projects is more appropriate for projects that are not inter-connected with other projects. However, for the implementation of several local administration projects within one area/cluster, it would be far more appropriate to conduct Amdal through a cluster approach. If such coordination among areas within a province could be arranged, the cluster approach could be replicated at the national level.

Generally speaking, although it was not easy to evaluate the capacity improvement and shift of paradigm that had taken place among the local officials and their staff, it was fairly easy to observe the signs that such improvements and shifts had taken place. One

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sign of this was their changed attitude toward project reports, which they previously looked upon as a mere means to record project activities. However, the established “tracer study” that kept track of environmental impacts became reference material to conduct several environmental improvement activities. Examples of this include: land acquisition activities to construct the ADB harbor road in Ulee Lheue, the ADB Ulee Lheue-Blang Padang road, the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS) escape road and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Banda Aceh-Meulaboh road. These cases could be made into case studies of how to deal with land acquisition problems, considering that although land acquisition in Aceh and Nias could be difficult, their dealings with the parties involved were fairly well managed and completed within the allocated time

Submission of SP2D by PPK at the Special KPPN Office in Banda Aceh on December 16, 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Special Office for State Services and Treasury (KPPN-K)

All disbursements for development activities were funded by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and implemented by the Office for State Services and Treasury (Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara, KPPN). BRR was the sole official body of the Government of Indonesia that was furnished with a Special Office for State Services and Treasury (Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara - Khusus, KPPN-K). There are only 2 KPPN-K units in Indonesia; in Jakarta and in Banda Aceh.

BackgroundThe world paid extremely great interest in Aceh and Nias after the disaster occurred,

and foreign aid streamed into the state budget. In addition, the government allocated extra funds for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias, where the number of programs and projects to be implemented was of such great volume that a special method of disbursement was necessary. Although the disbursement system remained controlled by the Government of Indonesia, on-site payments were expected to be more responsive, swifter and ready.

The establishment of the KPPN-K Banda Aceh was initiated by the Directorate General of the Treasury at the Ministry of Finance. A team was designated to make the necessary preparatory steps to establish the KPPN-K in Banda Aceh. Following the issuance of Minister of Finance Decree No. 214/KMK.01/2005 dated May 25, 2005 the office was officiated and immediately began operating. During the office’s early days, ADB played an important role by providing technical assistance in operational disbursements.

Performance and Challenges: Cash Disbursements, Monitoring of Goods

Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2/2005, Article 21 Clause 4 stipulated that disbursements of recovery funds stated in DIPA (on-budget/on-treasury) were to be implemented through the KPPN-K in Banda Aceh. The duties of this office were limited to disbursing BRR expenditures, and to note down all assets that were built through the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Aceh Province and Nias Island in North Sumatra Province, which covered an extremely wide area, especially in comparison to the number of staff and the total amount of transactions handled.

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Figure 5.3 Internet-based Service System from KPPN-K Banda Aceh

C. Public Sector

Head Office

SP2D ServerWeb Server

(Hub)

(Hub)

(Hub)

Final KPPN Server = Lokseumawe, Nias Meulaboh

(Wireless)

(Printer)

A. PHLN Section

D. – Vera Section

B. Banking Sector

INTERNET

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The office was headed by Agus Santoso, who was assisted by 26 staff comprising one head of general affairs, three section heads and 21 operational staff that included seven contract staff. The KPPN-K had three branches located in Nias, Meulaboh (serving Aceh’s west coast) and Lhokseumawe (serving the east coast). The value of transactions amounted to Rp 61 billion.

The Banda Aceh KPPN-K was actively involved in improving the rate of fund absorption and execution pertaining to Aceh-Nias recovery programs. The entire work procedure was accelerated, with the maximal length of time for each operation determined to not exceed 45 minutes, which was certainly much shorter than the national average time of eight hours. This was made possible by entrusting any office staff member, even administrative staff, to provide service. Furthermore, the entire work contract procedure was conducted electronically and a well functioning system for Payment Order Letter (Surat Perintah Membayar, SPM) and Fund Disbursement Order Letter (Surat Perintah Pencairan Dana, SP2D) was established. In applying a “one-stop service” system, the KPPN-K introduced an electronic signature specimen card, developed a contract card procedure and developed a control card for petty cash/additional petty cash flow.

The Banda Aceh KPPN-K also employed an operation support system developed internally by the KPPN-K staff with an investment of Rp 615.5 million. The operation support system involved a database and an integrated network connecting the Banda Aceh KPPN-K with its three branches. Through this system, the work of the treasury or the authority of the general treasurer in fund disbursement was greatly accelerated. The funds were derived from foreign loans and donations as well as from pure domestic sources.

By having the website www.danarraphbn.org, each transaction could be accessed in real time. Cash reconciliation and forecasting were done through email, and as such, most of the respective work unit personnel did not need to be physically present at the KPPN-K office.

Service was also accelerated at the branches in Meulaboh, Nias and Lhokseumawe. It was not necessary for personnel of BRR PIUs to go to Banda Aceh to disburse funds. The Lhokseumawe branch was opened on April 17, 2007, serving BRR Regional II and Regional III PIUs whereas the Meulaboh and Nias branches served BRR Regional I, IV, V and VI PIUs. It should be noted that at the beginning of 2008, the Regional IV PIU was closed down and parts of its area absorbed by Regional I and V PIUs.

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Lessons LearnedAt its initial operations, the KPPN-K faced several impediments in adjusting its

new budget pattern and system, resulting in delays of DIPA disbursements and the establishment of work units. The other impediment was related to BRR PIU staff, some of whom had not worked at government agencies and their knowledge and way of thinking in connection to the realm of work at the KPPN-K was rather limited. After this had been overcome, the reputation of the Banda Aceh KPPN-K emerged as an extension of the State Treasurer’s Office. It was able to guarantee government financial liquidity for more than three years during the recovery of Aceh and Nias. Its positive image was widely acknowledged and received the “Quality Service of 2006” award, personally bestowed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The average actual disbursement of the BRR budget was between 62 and 70 percent, except in 2005 when it was only 28 percent, with the highest peak in 2006 and 2007. The lower number of disbursements was due to the PIU codes being changed at the start of each budget year, although the activities of PIUs remained relatively the same. The changes presented certain difficulties to staff at the KPPN-K in finding the relevant past disbursement processes pertaining to a PIU. Moreover, the frequent change in personnel at BRR also impeded requests for payments. In addition, there were geographic impediments, as well as natural conditions and situations at several BRR work areas.

Potential for Replication: Developing System and TrustAs an institution working under the authority of the Finance Minister, the Banda Aceh

KPPN-K successfully provided special service to BRR PIUs, with the objective of assisting in accelerating proper fund disbursements pertaining to domestic financial resources as well as foreign loans and donations. The centralized system, supported by the application of information technology, did indeed improve the actual disbursement of the BRR budget.

The system developed to serve BRR was then replicated by several pilot KPPN around the country. The following vision of Banda Aceh KPPN-K: “To become a professional state treasury manager of international reputation, one that is transparent and accountable, to support the recovery of the national economy”, proved to have succeeded in generating trust and supporting efficiency in using the budget allocated for the recovery of Aceh and Nias.

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BEFORE a project could be carried out, coordination units had to be prepared to ensure that all project implementation ran well. These units were not meant as evaluators or to monitor project implementation. Coordination units act as facilitators, particularly when implementation deviated from the original plan. Every projects needs to be proceeded with flexibility and discipline accordingly.

In this case, coordination units were set up as problems arose. The Integrated Team (Tim Terpadu) for example, were established when 1,431 containers had piled up in Belawan, the main seaport in Medan, North SumatEra. Another example is, the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policy in disaster areas (especially in Aceh and Nias) implementation. Even though it was already included in the Master Plan and stipulated in Presidential Decree No. 30/2005, its application the implementation was in a constant improvement in parallel with project implementation.

Breakthroughs described in this chapter were essentially breakthroughs made within the implementation coordination system. This chapter will discuss Tim Terpadu, DRR, representative offices and Joint Secretariats, Major Implementing Partners Relations (Hubungan Mitra Kerja Utama, HMKU), Infrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Program (IREP), Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility (IRFF), emergency infrastructure plan and decision-making process in the beginning of the rehabilitation of the Meulaboh and Malahayati seaports.

Coordination and Management of Project Implementation

A row of names of NGOs and donors involved in the recovery of Aceh-Nias during the Coordination Forum for Aceh-Nias (CFAN) in Jakarta, October 4, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Integrated Team (Tim Terpadu): Public Service under One Roof

BRR Tim Terpadu was a front line service unit under one roof established to accelerate the recovery programs, especially in dealing with foreign organizations or individuals. Located in Banda Aceh, BRR Tim Terpadu provided facilities for immigration papers, consular affairs, work permits for foreigners, customs and excise, tax, industrial administration, and letters of good conduct from the police. Members of BRR’s Tim Terpadu comprised of officials from various ministries or relevant government agencies who had been given the authority to make decisions directly in Banda Aceh without having to wait for a green light from their head offices in Jakarta.

BackgroundBRR Tim Terpadu was set up following a bottleneck in distribution of humanitarian aid.

Around 1,431 containers of aid from various countries had piled up over four months since April 2005 in Belawan seaport, North Sumatera, due to a lack of coordination and ineffective regulations. Donors were unclear on the procedures of aid delivery and where aid must be delivered.

While on the one hand, aid was much needed and eagerly anticipated by the survivors. On the other, distribution of the aid was hampered by bureaucratic procedures and an absence of coordination. As a result, a lot of food and medicines had past their expiration dates by the time the goods arrived to the survivors, Indonesia had a negative reputation for its poor management of aid distribution, along with the high cost attached as well.

The bureaucratic problem was resolved through a high-level intervention from Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and joint interdepartmental agreement. Implementation in the field was entrusted to BRR. Although BRR did not have its own fund, it nevertheless had a strong mandate to request help from partners in the reconstruction work, the World Food Programme (WFP) for temporarily storing the goods, the United Nations Joint Logistic Center (UN-JLC) for handling import documents, and 240 trucks from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Atlas Logistique for distributing the aid to all areas in Aceh and Nias.

Upon observing how intervention by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs had helped expedite aid distribution to beneficiaries, Head of BRR Executing Agency then took the initiative to extend the service facilities regarding immigration permits, consular matters, work permits, tax, customs and excise issues, and police permits for foreign nationals taking part in reconstruction work in Aceh-Nias given the numerous foreign workers in the area since the emergency relief phase.

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To simplify the above procedures while maintaining the country’s existing regulations, the government then set up a legal basis for delegating interdepartmental authority to Tim Terpadu. For this, a Presidential Decree No.69/2005 was issued on November 15, 2005. Empowered by the Decree, the Head of BRR Executing Agency set up the Tim Terpadu on December 5, 2005, as stipulated in the Agency’s Decree No.02/PER/BP/-BRR/IX/2005.

Challenges during Project Implementation Working in an emergency situation with limited facilities, the Tim Terpadu had to

move its office from one place to another. Initially it had only five personnel in a poorly equipped office, with only a couple of desks and chairs in Lueng Bata. Then the office was moved to a disused train car and tent, also in Lueng Bata. Later still, the office was moved to the provincial office of the Ministry of Trade and Industry at Prada, Banda Aceh. Finally it was moved back to Lueng Bata. None of this deterred the working spirit of the Team.

Integrated Team visa and work permit service for foreign humanitarian workers in Aceh and Nias. Banda Aceh, February 1, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Since its inception, the Team worked hard to accelerate procedures needed by relief workers who had come from various countries. The short-cut procedure and one-day service could be well implemented because of the delegation of authority by a number of relevant ministries whose officials were included on the Team. The Tim Terpadu in Banda Aceh could decide whether to grant or refuse facilities requested by parties. The Team was managed by professionals who demonstrated integrity and gave prompt service. Supported by the UNORC, the Team disseminated information on its activities among local community members.

It is worth noting that, based on Article 5 of Presidential Decree No. 69/2005, international communities involved in rehabilitation programs in Aceh-Nias were required to abide by the code of ethics and guidelines of the Team. In addition, in line with the regulation, they also had to report updated achievements of their programs to BRR. The Tim Terpadu facilitated services to members of the NGOs and donor organizations, who reported their achievements to the Team. This indirectly supported the development of the RANDatabase system.

Table 6.1 Expedited Services Facilitated by Tim Terpadu

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Learning from Experience Great disasters require quick and effective relief handling while maintaining control

and supervision though good coordination, especially when dealing with the flow of goods, services and human resources, including those coming from foreign countries. The regular bureaucratic system cannot handle the problems during emergency as well reconstruction periods.

The Indonesian government’s formation of the Tim Terpadu proved to be successful in stepping up public services and in reducing red tape through the short procedure system without violating prevailing laws and regulations.

Potential for ReplicationThe team could provide various public services in one day. A number of parties

considered this a good example and it enabled the Team to become a supportive element in rehabilitating and reconstructing the disaster-hit areas in just four years. The professional services offered by Tim Terpadu raised public trust, including that of foreign donors, in the Indonesian government’s seriousness in helping them expedite their aid to the people of Aceh-Nias. Such trust was necessary to ensure that they remained committed to giving aid.

Hence, for every disaster relief handling project, in Indonesia or elsewhere in the world, there needs to be a special unit, such as the Tim Terpadu. Providing services under the same roof ensures the public of the standard of service they will get, the length of time they have to spend for the process, the fee they have to pay (which in most cases, services are given free of charge), and other requirements they have to fulfill. Such assurance will boost their performance and cooperation in disaster areas.

Such services could be provided by the provincial government of Aceh and district administrations of Nias and South Nias within the framework of economic development in their respective areas. The one-stop service could have been a decisive factor in capturing foreign investors’ attention to those regions.

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR): The Magical Triangle Framework to Overcome Disaster

All activities within the framework of comprehensive planning in disaster-prone areas are aimed at reducing losses and damage in the social, economic and environmental sectors suffered by the public and the state. The framework is known as DRR, the success of which is judged not only by the smallest number of losses in public assets but also by the least number of fatalities caused by a disaster.

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Background When the tsunami and earthquakes hit Aceh and Nias, it claimed thousands of lives

and caused extensive damage. This was because the public and the government were not prepared to face the disaster. The same was true in other countries. In rebuilding Aceh and Nias, various parties, including BRR, agreed to adopt the Hyogo Framework to reduce the disaster risk by identifying a number of problems in offering the victims relief and by formulating a global action plan.

Based on this framework, BRR encouraged public participation and made good use of the social and cultural structures of the region in handling the aftermath of the disaster, making cooperation a basic policy to rehabilitate and reconstruct the regions’ environment and natural resources. BRR was fully aware that, regardless of modern infrastructure, without public participation and understanding of their natural environment, the disaster risk would not diminish. Hence a strong institution and public awareness were needed.

Preparing DRR in Aceh and NiasInfrastructure contributed a lot to protect the regions from future possible disasters.

Coastal embankments, flood control and a good drainage system are living examples of infrastructure that can help reduce disaster risk. Besides, a scenario for evacuation needed to be considered, evacuation that was supported by escape buildings and evacuation routes and roads.

Cooperating with the Central Government and the Meteorology and Geophysics Agency (Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika, BMG), BRR installed equipment that could detect and warn of possible earthquakes known as the Early Warning System (EWS). The infrastructure and software of the equipment were designated as a pilot project in several other disaster-prone areas.

BRR, realizing it was important to raise public awareness of the danger of natural disasters, held regular round table discussions with community members. The discussions, initiated by geologists, were held once every two months. The forum was used as a medium of communication and knowledge sharing on the dynamic forces of nature. Disaster risks related to geological aspects were thoroughly studied. Geological maps were drawn up and integrated with other thematic maps. The thematic maps were used for policy analysis to determine action plans. The round table discussions were attended not only by geologists but also teachers, town planners, academics, members of local communities and NGOs, officials as well as members of the Parliaments.

Although the laws on disaster management had already been issued, they could not be immediately implemented in Indonesia. The laws needed enactment regulations, which took months to prepare. However, because BRR had been actively involved in the recovery process work in the disaster areas, the Agency applied its experience and knowledge to cope with all the problems. Hence BRR, working together with the

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Provincial Administration, donor organizations, NGOs, the Indonesian Red Cross (Palang Merah Indonesia, PMI) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), launched the DRR operation in Aceh and Nias.

A new building code, designed to ensure earthquake resistance up to a certain magnitude, was jointly drawn up with the Ministry of Public Works, a number of universities, and experts in disaster management. An institution in the Provincial Government was immediately set up without waiting for instructions from the Central Government, and the Vice Governor of Aceh was willing to accept responsibility for the project in the region.

Considering that the Provincial Government would not be able to continually adapt to the latest development of earthquake technology and expertise or conduct effective training, BRR and the Provincial Government agreed to set up a center called the Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center (TDMRC). The Center was assigned to update technology related to various natural disasters, to train local officials and community members, and to conduct joint research with competent local and foreign institutes. TDRMC is overseen by Syiah Kuala University and its building, constructed by BRR, also functions as the escape building in Ulee Lheue.

Tsunami Museum in Banda Aceh, April 3, 2009. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Initially, the idea of relocating people to safer zones was met with opposition, and so was the initial implementation of reconstruction. Hence, the construction of new houses was carried out in the new zones or areas, partly to meet the need for houses for refugees who previously owned neither land nor houses but had been tenants.

Several relocations in disaster free zones were set up. Residential areas were developed in Beuramo, Aceh Besar, and its surrounding was equipped with public facilities. In general, BRR provided ready-to-build plots and infrastructure in the residential areas. Later BRR, along with China Charity Federation, Nurani Dunia Foundation, Buddha Tzu Chi Foundation, Islamic Relief, the Australian Red Cross, ADB, and Saudi Charity Campaign, built houses in those areas.

Evacuation roads are vital facilities for residents of Meuraxa.

Banda Aceh, January 9, 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Lesson LearnedThe triangle in DRR covered:

The structural aspect dealing with the construction of infrastructure for the 1. prevention of disaster risk along with its software,The non-structural aspect dealing with culture, namely to raise public awareness in 2. facing disaster, andThe institutional aspect dealing with organizational issues and human resources.3.

SafeEnvironment

Seismic Monitoring(with seismograph

accelerograph)Sea Water Monitoring

(with buoy, tide gauge, GPS)Sirene, Route, Evacuation Building/Hill,

Evacuation TentsCoast and Coastline Protection

(sea wall,vegetation, mangrove, silvofishery)

Village Planning

Training & EducationR&D

Alternative TechnologyCommunity-based DRRCultural IdentificationEmergency Response

Evacuation Drills (Tsunami Drill)Mitigation PlanBest Practices

Provincial OrganizationsFramework Policies of DRR

Local and Master Action Plans of DRR

STRUCTURAL

POLICY(Institutional)

NONSTRUCTURAL

(Community Awareness)

Figure 6.1 The Disaster Risk Reduction Triangle Chap

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All three aspects, aimed at heightening the public’s culture of safety first, were called the magical triangle framework to reduce disaster risk.

However, all the abovementioned facilities and infrastructure were only reactive and curative in nature. According to the DRR concept, the above approach was only aimed at reducing vulnerability to disaster. Another approach was needed and must adopted later. This was known as the preventive approach and its target was to move people to places far from disaster zones.

The culture of safety could be instilled effectively only when there is common understanding and joint commitment to realize it. The culture of safety could be enhanced when the community undergoes periodical training. Several tsunami drills using infrastructure and facilities that had already been built were carried out in Aceh and Nias by the International Red Cross, IFRC, BRR, the Sea Defense Consultants, and the Banda Aceh City Government. A lot was learned from the drills, and the experience and knowledge gained from it could be shared with people living in other disaster-prone areas.

Potential for Replication A lot of infrastructure, facilities and software that had been built, provided and installed

in Aceh could be used as an exemplary model for other regions to provide training to learn about DRR. TDMRC at Syiah Kuala University had a very well trained and experienced team to handle the disaster and could become the main reference body in Indonesia.

This is because the TDMRC team, along with BRR, had set up a research and network system with the Center for Monitoring and Disaster Management at the national and international levels. An annual international workshop was held in four successive years and produced action plans that could be implemented by other regions.

Regionalized and Decentralized Decisions, the Key to BRR’s Success

BRR had six representative offices at a regional level and 21 district offices in Aceh and Nias. The initial concept for regional offices was:

Representative Office I (in Banda Aceh) overseeing districts in West and North Aceh• Representative Office II (in Lhokseumawe) overseeing districts in East Aceh• Representative Office III (in Takengon) overseeing districts in Central Aceh• Representative Office IV (in Meulaboh) overseeing districts in West and South Aceh• Representative Office V (in Singkil) overseeing districts in South Aceh• Representative Office VI (in Gunungsitoli) overseeing districts in Nias and South Nias.•

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Since 2007, the regional and district offices had their own programs and budgets, and full authority to decide which sector was to be prioritized. This was in line with the agreement reached with the provincial, district and city governments via the Joint Secretariat.

Background After operating in Banda Aceh for six months and undertaking the recovery process

work through a sector approach, BRR found that the approach was not effective due to the numerous projects it had to undertake in such a large area. If all decisions had to be made by the head office in Banda Aceh, BRR would not be able to respond promptly to the needs and demands of the public, local government, and the recovery partners operating in districts and villages far from Banda Aceh. In fact, attempts to set up Representative Office VI in Nias had been initiated two months after the establishment of BRR, because the Agency found it difficult to properly coordinate its work from Banda Aceh.

Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Building in Ulee Lheue, Aceh Besar, on February 20, 2009. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Apart from attempts to set up the Nias Representative Office, BRR’s plan and strategy to decentralize was only officially introduced in May 2006, during the Second Coordination Forum of Aceh-Nias (CFAN-II)3. The strategy was designed to ensure sustainability of rehabilitation and reconstruction works as the Provincial Government would be involvement in the planning and implementation. It was hoped that as a result the Provincial Government could take over the responsibility and asset management once BRR ended its operation.

The aims of decentralization were:

To encourage the Provincial Government and the public to be more active in • decision-making and problem-solving so that they could become partners in the recovery process work;To ensure fair distribution of wealth and transparency, since BRR coordinated closely • with the administration and the public;To ensure more efficient and effective distribution of resources as decisions regarding • measures to reduce the disparity between rich and poor as well as relocation of sources were made at the local level;To adopt a holistic approach to accommodate the aspirations of beneficiaries at the • local level;To improve beneficiaries’ access to information as their needs had been well • identified and relayed to the decision-makers.

Representative Offices and Joint SecretariatThe establishment of six BRR Representative Offices was an effort to implement

decentralization based on the principle “closer to the action”. This, in fact, was another BRR response to the demands of the people and local government.

Integrated development as such was required considering that Aceh had been left underdeveloped as a result of 30 years of armed conflict. Decentralization would pave the way to integration of the Provincial Government’s programs, peace-building process, as well as the recovery process programs.

Decentralization proved to be very successful in Representative Office VI in Nias, Representative Office I in West-North Aceh, and Representative Office II in East Aceh. The other Representative offices focused more on projects financed by BRR. Meanwhile, the Provincial Government focused on the disbursement of its own budget.

In mid 2007, BRR financed the activities of the Joint Secretariat, which functioned as the communication center for all parties taking part in the recovery of Aceh-Nias. The secretariats, centralized at the office of Aceh Regional Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda) as well as that of other districts, functioned as a place to resolve problems and to coordinate the recovery process in a district with larger areas.

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Regardless of the facilities, only a few districts could optimize on the Secretariat’s operation. The success of the Joint Secretariat depended greatly on the key figures of each district.

Lessons from Decentralization Since 2007, the Representative offices at the regional and district levels had proven

their ability to manage project activities effectively. At the end of 2008, their average performance was better than that of sector deputies in BRR. The quality of construction and buildings was also better.

Again, this was living proof that the decentralization system yielded better results. At the same time, decentralization gave higher satisfaction to those who undertook the recovery efforts and opened greater opportunities to local officials and the public to participate in the projects. This was because more than 70 percent of BRR’s staff comprised of local government officials. Their experience and work ethics while working with BRR could be shared with their colleagues so as to improve the performance of provincial government.

Improvement of local officials’ performance through direct assignments proved to be more effective than mere training in classes that tended to be passive and did not give them the opportunity to demonstrate their skills in management and construction.

Potential for ReplicationNot only would decentralization accelerate development but also open more

opportunities to local officials and the public to swiftly build their capacity, paving the way for local officials to handle the provincial budget and development programs. Prior to this, many Central Government projects were undertaken by Jakarta without giving the opportunity to the Provincial Government to take part in them.

Since 2006, BRR gave the Heads of its Representative Offices the authority to make their own decisions. The results showed that reconstruction programs had taken less time to complete and yielded better outcomes.

The Central Government needs to decentralize its agencies in the regions in undertaking their own development, such as post-disaster or underdeveloped areas like Aceh and Nias, to expedite the development process. At the same time, adequate training should be given to local officials to improve their capability in making effective decisions.

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Major Implementing Partner Relations Organizations that contributed more or less 75 percent to the Aceh-Nias reconstruction

were called major implementing partners. The greater the involvement of an organization in the efforts, the more activities, and larger amount of donation involved, the higher likelihood that they required supplemental attention. For this reason, BRR set up a special unit to function not only as its public relations center but also as a gate keeper for direct interaction with its main partners. It was called the Major Implementing Partner Relations (Hubungan Mitra kerja Utama, HMKU).

Background Despite their good intentions to help rehabilitate and reconstruct Aceh and Nias,

foreign organizations had to abide by prevailing regulations and respect the customs and traditions in the areas in which they operated. Differences of cultures and work methods, unavoidably, often sparked friction. Concentrated coordination was needed considering the numerous parties involved and the circulation of enormous fund at the reconstruction sites.

The tasks and responsibilities of each deputy in the recovery efforts were so great that unintentionally direct communication with working partners weakened. In fact there was already a unit in the Communication and Information Directorate that functioned as liaison officer/ help desk for the working partners. The unit was called Account Management Team (AMT). Because of communication problems, HMKU was established through the development of the AMT.

HMKU was formed following the issuance Decree No. 30/PER/BP/BRR/XI/2006 by the Head of the BRR Executing Agency. HMKU’s task was to ensure that the smooth flow of communication and relevant information to and from both national and international implementing partners, and to ensure that all their projects were completed properly and on time. After HMKU’s mandate ended in December 2007, its task was taken over by the representative offices.

Challenge in Implementation In general, problems in coordinating with main working partners often arose from

conflicts among stakeholders due to the absence of work guidelines and procedures within BRR. During its operation, HMKU launched a series of activities such as coordinating with and visiting the major implementing partners, publishing educative articles in local newspapers, holding workshops, resolving problems faced by the international partners, and issuing practical guidelines.

Organizations categorized as the major implementing partners were the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Oxfam International, World Vision International, CARE International, Save the Children and the Catholic Relief

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Services (CRS). HMKU actively represented BRR in a number of meetings with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Public Information Working Group (PIWC) and Communication Committee in disseminating information on BRR’s achievements in 2007 to national and international interest groups. Internally, HMKU developed communication and information lines for donors and stakeholders with BRR sectors.

Lessons LearnedThe main activity of HMKU was communication, organizing meetings and media

conferences. Hence, its output in the form of notes, summaries, articles and proceedings from the meetings were collected by the Unit and became the essential product of its existence. The output was the factual documentation of all HMKU activities. A number of lessons learned from the Unit were:

Account management/help desk constituted of personnel specifically assigned to • interact with foreign donors and NGOs in Aceh-Nias, possessed all of their data, and have a clear understanding of the working characteristics of major implementing partners. The Help Desk became the gateway to interaction with BRR, ensuring that coordination with BRR took place through one doorway.

Joint Secretariat coordination meeting at BRR Nias Representative office. Gunungsitoli, April 14, 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Routine reports to disseminate information regarding the situation and problems • of the recovery expedited problem-solving process by facilitating communication among stakeholders.

Good office, a medium created by HMKU to facilitate the settlement of problems • arising in the recovery efforts in Aceh-Nias. Its function was to mediate disputes in reconstruction through consensus, and instead of legal means. This, in fact, was the breakthrough made by the Unit. Foreign organizations are accustomed to settling disputes through legal channels, which often amplified the problem instead of resolving them.

Potential for ReplicationHMKU was more than just an ordinary communication unit for BRR. It had authority

to bridge the gap between disputing parties and to resolve problems in the recovery process. The HMKU mediation approach could well be applied by various ministries or Provincial Governments to settle project disputes, especially when outside parties are involved.

Developing Large-scale Integrated Infrastructure: Fishing for a Difficult Fish with a Huge Bait

When dealing with a large-scale infrastructure project, it is necessary to have an integrated control system. The Infrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Program (IREP) was a technical assistance program to undertake overall monitoring of the management of infrastructure projects. IREP also included the empowerment of local government officials to develop, manage and maintain the infrastructure after BRR ended its tenure. Meanwhile, the Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility (IRFF) was an investment program financed by the MDF). As consultation activities were directly managed by MDF, both IREP and IRFF made breakthroughs in applying a comprehensive control system and transparency on every infrastructure project in Aceh and Nias.

Background Besides the development of housing and settlement, the construction of infrastructure

constituted the largest investment in the recovery of Aceh-Nias. However neither donor nor NGO allocated their funds toward infrastructure. Nearly all infrastructure programs were prepared and financed by the Indonesian government through BRR. Many donors allocated their funds to programs that recovery of livelihoods and were of the opinion that infrastructure it is best if provided by the Indonesian government. The gap in delivery of infrastructure needs was great while other sectors had an over-commitment of funds. To meet the future economic challenges, however, Aceh and Nias needed more than

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just reconstructed damaged infrastructure. It was also important for the regions to have infrastructure of better construction and materials.

To meet the goals, it was necessary for the government to implement integrated large-scale infrastructure development. In order to do that, a certain strategy was required that allows donors to support BRR’s undertakings with their attention and contributions.

Luring Donors to Contribute to the Infrastructure in Aceh and Nias

The initial idea of infrastructure reconstruction was to obtain a large sum of additional funds for the well-planned and well-monitored large-scale project. As it turned out, it was difficult to convince donors to participate in the project through the first Coordination Forum of Aceh and Nias (CFAN-I) . Hence, to lure donors to participate in the project, they were asked to provide co-financing (to supplement the US$200 million of BRR funds with US$100 million later covered by MDF as a grant).

New Town Road construction funded by the Infrastructure Rehabilitation Enabling Project (IREP) in Banda Aceh, on January 25, 2009. Photo: IREP/Riza Bahagia Nasution

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Because BBR showed high-priority and ownership of the project, MDF eventually became interested in helping to co-finance it through the IRFF investment program. This was beneficial to the Indonesian government, because BBR would in any case spend some US$200 million to repair and reconstruct damaged infrastructure in Aceh and Nias, with or without supplementary funds from donor organizations. More than that, BRR had yet to spend larger funds on infrastructure programs other than IRFF that would similarly require oversight of its implementation.

Obviously such a large-scale infrastructure project needed to be monitored comprehensively. Integrated management and supervision required considerable funding and technical assistance. Hence, before implementing the IRFF program, another technical assistance program, IREP, was established. MDF financed IREP’s operations, which amounted to US$42 million.

The US$42 million in aid was used to finance the operations of five IREP main divisions. The first and second divisions covered the overall management of infrastructure development, namely Infrastructure Project Management (IPM) and Financial Management (FM). Other divisions dealt with reconstruction and development in the worst hit areas in the western part of Aceh (Planning Design Construction and Supervision – West Coast, PDCS), Nias Island (Nias-PDCS) and Strategic Area Infrastructure (Strategic Infrastructure-PDCS). The total percentage value of IREP projects was far below that of the cost of software in similar projects in other parts of Indonesia.

MDF designated the World Bank to manage the funds and oversee the implementation of the programs. The World Bank assisted BRR, from making proposals to implementing the IREP and IRFF programs. Fields financed by IRFF programs covered water supply, sanitation, coastal protection, seaports, roads and bridges. The World Bank monitored all project implementation from Washington D.C.

When BBR ended its term on April 16, 2009, several infrastructure projects had not yet been completed. Hence it was necessary to transfer the responsibilities to another implementing agency. To ensure the continuation of the projects during the transition period, such as projects carried out under the Foreign Loans or Grants (Pinjaman atau Hibah Luar Negeri, PHLN) scheme, as the programs covered infrastructure and transportation, IREP/IRFF programs were transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation with the World Bank as the partner agency. Meanwhile, BRR also undertook coordination work with Sea Defense Consultants (Netherlands), Banda Aceh Project Preparation Consultants (France), Port Development (UNDP-MDF), Water Supply and Sanitation (United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF) and Banda Aceh Drainage Urgent Works (Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA).

Lessons LearnedWhen the government has a vision, a clear plan, and technical capacity, along with a

strong sense of ownership, donors such as the MDF are willing to make a big contribution

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(as reflected by the agreement to utilize the majority of the remaining unallocated MDF funds for IRFF-2). The government should demonstrate capacity on a par with its donor partners such as MDF so this infrastructure development plans or scenario remained in the hands of the government.

Meanwhile, most of the guidelines on the use of funds from PHLN, the World Bank, ADB, Japan, Germany and the Islamic Development Bank were more appropriate for reconstruction under normal circumstances, and not in an emergency situation such as in Aceh and Nias. Hence, BRR often urged the World Bank to hasten its response.

Hence a paradigm shift was needed on donor procedures involving disaster management. Based on its experience, BRR found that donors should decentralize or delegate their authority to the lowest level (or be closer to the field) to ensure the quick implementation of the recovery process. If the government could play a more active role in program implementation, other infrastructure projects carried out under the PHLN scheme in Indonesia – most of which are between eight and nine years behind schedule from the scheduled five years – could be accelerated to meet deadlines.

Potential for Replication BRR’s experience in Aceh and Nias in building large-scale integrated infrastructure

in a relatively short time can be shared with other regions carrying out similar projects, especially when the projects potentially involve huge amounts of funds. Such means could occur with PHLN funds, wherein difficulties arise resulting in slow fund disbursement. Examples of other provinces include Papua, East Kalimantan, Aceh, Riau and Jakarta.

Immediate Action Program – Quick Action; “Half a Loaf of Bread is Better than None”

Building infrastructure during the initial post-disaster rehabilitation period was in itself a breakthrough. Comprehensive planning to repair badly damaged infrastructure took time. In addition, there was also an interval: waiting for the impact of the disaster to recede and making preparations for reconstruction. During this interval, BRR built emergency infrastructure with off-budget funds from MDF, and not from APBN funds. This program was named Immediate Action Program (IAP) and was implemented by NGOs.

Background The road linking Lamno and Calang that stretches along the West Aceh coastline was

severely damaged by the tsunami. The road disappeared becoming a pool of mud. Many vehicles were stuck on the road for three to four days. This hampered the distribution of logistics support for the recovery process. Obviously the road had to be immediately repaired to revive the social and economic life of Aceh Jaya and West Aceh communities.

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Although it had already been planned to construct a permanent road from Lamno to Calang through financing by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the road would not be fully constructed until 2010. Hence BRR took an emergency measure to repair the road, using gravel to cover the road surface making it accessible for vehicles.

The measure, however, raised criticism from the public, which denounced BRR for its delays. Further, the repairs took place during the rainy season and continued through the fasting month of Ramadan and Eid ul-Fitr. Hence planning for a massive volume of work was hastily devised and several contractors were directly appointed to undertake the repair work. As a result, the quality of the road was not optimal. It had to be maintained every week because the gravel would wash away along with the tide and be damaged by passing vehicles. Also, the wooden bridge had to be changed every month due to heavy traffic as it was the only access road for logistics. The road, later audited by the BPKP, was dubbed as a misstep in development planning and a total loss for the state.

Immediately Handling Emergency SituationsThe dilemma faced by BRR personnel while undertaking development projects under

such conditions frustrated them, because they felt that whatever they did would never be enough. Building a permanent road would have been in vain, because such a road could only be built under the long-term USAID scheme scheduled for completion in 2010.

To overcome the problem, BRR proposed that emergency infrastructure be built using off-budget funds from donors instead of APBN. The off-budget funds could be used not only to repair the Lamno-Calang road but also the drainage system in Banda Aceh, as rainwater often inundated the city and caused havoc for the many refugees living in emergency tents. The proposal, called Immediate Action Program (IAP) was proposed to MDF and was later agreed upon as a priority program.

Then arose the question of who to implement of the construction work? Use of PHLN funds would require a tender, and that would take time. BRR finally decided that the implementing agency should be NGOs working near the location with the capacity to undertake the work. This required them to have heavy equipment, construction materials and manpower. The Catholic Relief Services (CRS), who was building houses and public facilities in Calang, was willing to carry out the work.

Using a similar approach, BRR sought another NGO that was building houses near the drainage zone. As gauged by their commitment, the choice fell on Muslim Aid.

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Lessons Learned Developing something useful that was greatly needed by the public in a disaster-

hit area will not guarantee a positive appraisal by public auditors. On one hand, in undertaking such a difficult task, one had to be unencumbered by of legal penalties. On the other hand, regulations to prevent corruption and state losses were only applicable in normal development projects carried out under normal circumstances and conditions, far different from disaster areas such as Aceh-Nias.

The irony is that while natural disasters and emergency situations often occur, there are no audit regulations and procedures that can be applied to a post-disaster situation. The absence of such procedures had led to state auditors applying their conventional methods rigidly, insensitive to the local conditions. As a result, there is a negative perception on the agency’s performance, tainting the government’s image even more.

Under such an emergency situation, BRR often took the risk of being blamed for circumventing the conventional regulations as long as it brought the needs of the local communities and did not bring about state losses. In such a case, instead of playing it safe, the government must take firm measures and act as public authority to resolve the problem.

BRR was given the opportunity to make use of off-budget funds unconstrained to rigid government regulations that were not flexible in meeting the needs of emergency situations. It is advisable for the government to study the situation and issue more appropriate regulations for quick emergency response.

Potential for ReplicationEmergency situations require prompt government response. It is true that a set

of regulations have to be issued to prevent officials from abusing their power, but the regulations should by no means deter officials from carrying out emergency measures that are much needed by and beneficial to the people. BRR’s decisiveness and accountability in its undertakings could be taken as examples by other government agencies to strive for the public’s interest.

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Quick Infrastructure Construction to Respond to Urgent Needs: Building a Seaport in One Day

At the beginning of its tenure, BRR felt it was necessary to immediately undertake several main infrastructure projects. The urgency encouraged experienced professionals to promptly decide on the starting point to build a seaport in Aceh. It was a breakthrough that had never been undertaken in Indonesia, because planning and building a seaport at a particular location at a provincial level usually entailed a long and complicated bureaucratic process.

Background In May 2005, when BRR began its operations with only a handful of staff members,

the Singapore Red Cross (SRC) paid a friendly visit to Head of BRR Executing Agency, inquiring about what help it could offer to the people of Meulaboh. As the facilities for sea transportation on the province’s west coast were badly damaged by the tsunami and earthquake, BRR suggested that SRCS help rebuild the seaport in Meulaboh to expedite reconstruction work by providing the only access to West Aceh.

SRCS, which initially planned to build a hospital, eventually agreed to also finance the construction of the port. When asked about the construction cost, BRR estimated that it would amount to US$ 6 to 7 million. Once agreed upon,the Head of BRR Executing Agency indicated that port construction work could begin the following day. The financial agreement was written during the meeting.

Quick Decision to Build Meulaboh Seaport Before BRR was established, the Provincial Government had repeatedly reported to the

Ministry of Transportation to no avail that the Meulaboh Port had been damaged. Now with the opportunity at hand to develop the port with funds from Singapore, BRR in no time assigned Djoko Sasono, a staff from Ministry of Transportation who had joined BRR, to accompany the SRC team to Meulaboh the next day. BRR also asked the Ministry of Transportation to send representative to decide on the initial coordinates of the port’s construction.

A similar decision was made in early 2006 when the Dutch government helped reconstruct the wharf at Malahayati port. Despite the damage, the wharf could be used temporarily. The Dutch government, choosing its own consultants and contractors, built the wharf at a cost of US$8 million. The construction of the wharf and rehabilitation of the port buildings were well completed and only took seven months.

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Also in mid 2005, when the BRR Deputy for Housing, Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning Coordination visited Nias, the location of the temporary Gunungsitoli port was immediately decided. The decision was made based on the consideration that due to the logistical burdens, the existing port could collapse at any time. In addition, the construction of a more permanent port at a previous location would take a much longer time. The same was true when BRR rebuilt the wharf at Lahewa port. For this, BRR employed local contractors who were building schools and who had materials concessions nearby.

At several distribution points like Calang, Simelue and Nias, BRR, along with donor agencies and NGOs, also set up temporary piers by using empty containers. The containers were piled one upon another to a height suitable for loading and unloading cargo from a ship. It took only 10 days to build such an innovative pier. It was both effective and relatively cheap, costing about Rp 200 million.

Temporary road built by CRS in Lhok Kruet, Aceh Jaya, March 19, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Lessons LearnedDuring its term, BRR more often than not made very quick decisions, which under

normal circumstances would require more time. Quick actions and decisions were important not only to meet public demands but also to accelerate other reconstruction works. For example, the construction of seaports, the emergency road to West Aceh ensured the flow of materials to those areas. In concert with, the opening of these gateways , development and reconstruction continued, reviving local economic activities.

Potential for ReplicationSuch methods were not popular. To decide upon a location for a seaport usually

require a thorough study and carried out over a longer period of time. Despite all this, the Meulaboh Port has become the backbone of goods distribution to the western coastal areas of Aceh Province.

Malahayati Port after reconstruction with aid from the Dutch Government

in Krueng Raya, Aceh Besar, August 30, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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As time passed, it was proven that the quick decisions to build temporary ports at the present location truly hit the mark. Results from a feasibility study determined the permanent site of the ports were not far from the temporary locations. In future, it would be better for the government to have data on water depths in harbor areas from previous studies or through a quick assessment so as to ensure safe sailing lanes.

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AT the project implementation phase, the aforementioned breakthroughs were made in reference to core project activities. Projects classified as unique or pilot projects, as described in this chapter, pertain to the following activities: village mapping and planning; sub-district spatial framework and action plan (KSF-AP), Lambung village in Meuraxa, Banda Aceh; Beuramo housing project; micro hydropower plants (PLTMH); gender issues, Information Communication Technology (ICT); and regional water supply and sanitation.

Village Mapping and Village Planning: Application of Participative Planning System

Before the disaster, development activities in Aceh and Nias were carried out in a top-down approach. After the disaster, the community became actively involved and participated in the mapping and planning activities at the village level. Such a participative development method, involving outside funding and active involvement of end beneficiaries, was carried out for the first time in Aceh and Nias. It had a more significant impact as it was applied to a community that had just experienced a major tragedy, was suddenly being exposed to the outside world and was effectively still profoundly traumatized. It should be further noted that the implementation of such a

Unique and Exemplary Projects and Policies

Parking area for motorized rickshaws in front of the Ulee Lheue Seaport, Banda Aceh, February 19, 2009. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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participative approach was at the time a new concept in Indonesia that previously was only a subject of discourse at the village level.

BackgroundThe participative approach in village mapping and planning, especially pertaining

to Aceh, was used to achieve the following objectives. First, to respect the local people as “owners” of the area. In Acehnese tradition, ureueng po rumoh4 or holders of ethical authority, decide how houses or settlements should be developed in the future. Whereas, ureueng lingka5 are free to assist or facilitate as long as decision-making still lies with ureueng po rumoh.

Second, this approach was incorporated into the Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2/2005 and which was eventually enacted as Law No. 10/2005.6

Next to producing a product of planning that had been jointly approved, the redevelopment program was also envisaged to become a forum of trauma healing for the disaster victims. The people who participated in the planning process were coached to become spatial planners of their own settlements. As a rule, the process started by determining a vision for the village. Although many people were satisfied and happy when their houses were rebuilt, a number of people considered the discussion on the village vision, the mapping of boundaries and the finalization of planning as important foundations of the settlement where they were eventually going to live. Their active participation also served as a kind of “healing process” to overcome the trauma caused by the disaster as well as a psychological exercise for disaster victims. They were given the opportunity to visualize their dreams, to jointly discuss and decide how their settlement should be further developed. As such, the community would hopefully possess a stronger sense of belonging in the program that they had jointly planned.

Implementation: Guidelines for Matching Minimal Standards of Rural Planning

Village mapping and planning were facilitated by several donor institutions like Up-link7 and Mercy Corps, sometimes each of them using different methods and techniques but always applying the participative approach. The different methods and techniques used required common guidelines to define the minimal processes and products of a village’s planning. In June 2005, BRR published Guidelines of Village Planning and Development (BRR Guidelines No. 1/2005) that in April 2006 was enacted into Guidelines of Village Planning (BRR Guidelines No. 1/2006),8 which was of a more technical nature.

The guidelines described the planning phases that could be generated, such as the participative planning process, participative mapping, discussion on space or land-use, planning of basic community infrastructure and facilities, disaster mitigation and spatial planning. Planning was mainly focused on identifying areas that were considered ecologically vulnerable. The guidelines were then complemented by rural development

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plans, including economic (means of livelihood, utilization of local resources), and social development.

The People’s Collective Dream: Visualization of the Future ‘Gampong’

Village planning started with land mapping. The physical boundaries of individual plots, of green areas and even of the village property were mapped out. The whole process was conducted in a participative manner, involving the local people. The involvement of local people was not only technically important but also normatively important.

The product generated by mapping activities was the visualization of the initial situation of the gampong (village). Through participative mapping, conflict among the people of a village or of several villages concerning land boundaries could be prevented. In other words, participative land mapping was the initial step of social legitimization of the next process. With the generated and jointly approved village map, the process of participative village planning could be carried out.

The village plan served as the framework to construct the necessary infrastructure for decent and habitable settlements that were instrumental to creating an improved integration of economic, social, political and cultural networks. Following participative

Villagers read housing maps approved in a planning meeting in Peukan Bada, Aceh Besar, August 7, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Figure 7.1 – Village Planning Map

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mapping, the locations of basic community infrastructure and facilities were discussed as part of participative village planning activities, which also included disaster mitigation planning to minimize the impact of future disasters. Another factor that was also dealt with in the process was the participative identification of areas that were considered ecologically vulnerable.

Learning: Monitoring and Evaluation of Village Planning Implementation

There were quite a number of challenges facing participative village mapping and planning, such as insufficient professional manpower, since participative village mapping and village planning were still unknown procedures in Indonesia. Moreover, the village people as a rule did not possess enough patience to follow the whole participative planning process, especially when their basic necessities were still insufficiently provided.

Participative planning and mapping generated a common map that was meant to serve as the basis for subsequent recovery programs. Not infrequently, the local people behaved inconsistently, changing their ways of thinking and conduct, especially pertaining to joint agreements on, for example, the extent of their land to be contributed for the development of roads or schools. The mutually agreed upon joint agreements on private land sections that were to be used for common objectives were often annulled as the people demanded financial compensation for their land. Another impediment was that in villages where village planning was conducted together with the construction of houses, the respective building contractors tended to ignore the plans that had been created and were difficult to amend.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings, 647 of the total 650 villages conducted village planning activities and from the monitoring and evaluation on the implementation of village plans in 3467 of the 647 villages9 that possessed their own respective plans, it was evident that some village redevelopment activities had not been conducted according to the respective village development plans, with varying degrees of inconsistencies among the different villages. Land-use planning10 and rehabilitation of nature and the environment11 proved to play an effective role in village planning although a number of deviations did take place pertaining to the number of houses, extent of land use, social facilities, and village development plans.

Potential for ReplicationThe process of village mapping and planning in Aceh and Nias was then integrated into

the ongoing process of rehabilitation and reconstruction, which was the identification of beneficiaries of housing and village development plans as well as of the overall spatial planning; it also included securing land (particularly for relocation purposes) and the eventual issuance of the respective land titles, designing and construction of houses, and

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New land consolidation of Lambung village, Meuraxa, Banda Aceh, December 8, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

of basic infrastructure and facilities. In addition, activities were carried out to improve the economy and small-scale enterprises, which in turn contributed to the recovery of the local economic network.

Among the co-working partners, people’s participation developed in several other forms, such as community contracting initiatives carried out by UN-Habitat. Groups of villagers were involved as building material suppliers and/or contractors under the supervision of the aid providers. The benefit of such a system was that besides motivating people to render maximal quality construction work, since the dwellings would eventually belong to them or their relatives, the people were also able to rebuild the economic network that was to support them in the future.

Approaching the termination of BRR’s tenure, several discussions took place among several groups. The Governor’s Assistance Team, for example, applied the village plans as an instrument in providing and dispersing governor grants to each village in Aceh. Successfully implemented, this initiative would indeed be most effective as it would (a) shorten the cycle of project identification in the village, which previously was conducted through “village development deliberations”, (b) strengthen village autonomy while at the

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same time deter the myopic village elite from interfering with development funds. This system also has the potential of ushering village plans to their next development phase, transforming them from rehabilitation and reconstruction activities into instruments for regional development that included actions to overcome poverty.

Sub-District (Kecamatan) Spatial Planning Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP)

The majority of districts/cities in Aceh and Nias had never possessed proper spatial plans. What was left of the bureaucracy and manpower of other institutions in each district or city had never known spatial planning or acquainted themselves with how to generate such plans as stipulated in the existing laws and regulations. The Kecamatan (or sub-district) Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP) was designed to meet such a need.

BackgroundIn the efforts to accelerate the normalization of the people’s economic and social lives,

it was necessary to have the village planning process supported by more comprehensive planning at the sub-district level. This necessity generated the breakthrough of the second spatial planning at the beginning of 2006: the Kecamatan Action Plan (KAP) which eventually developed into the Kecamatan Spatial Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP).

The Law on Spatial Planning acknowledges Sub-District or Detailed Regional Spatial Planning (Rencana Detail Tata Ruang Kota, RDTRK) or District or Urban Spatial Planning (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kota, RTRWK). The problem was that both RDTRK and RTRWK were political products requiring a lengthy process in their formulation and legislation, and to some extent were full of uncertainties. In the meantime, for rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes, it was necessary to have a technical product that could guide the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction that was conducted at quite considerable speed and immediacy. It was therefore necessary to have another means that could run parallel with the normative spatial planning that was to run according to existing regulations; this was necessary to prevent the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities from being impeded or implemented without any guidelines.

Implementation of KSF-APLaw No. 10/2005 on BRR, Article 5(a) distinctively stipulated that reconstruction activities

should also include spatial planning. This meant that the rehabilitation process also had to be an effort to plan the region and town, with the objective of eventually generating orderly, livable and secure human settlements. This stipulation was in accordance with BRR’s motto of “build back better”. Even though regulations stipulate that the authority to

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conduct spatial planning lies with the local administration, the KSP-AP was implemented with the full knowledge of the respective district and urban administrations.

The KSF-AP was fully supported and financed by ADB grants, executed through ETESP programs. Technically it was more detailed than RDTRK, and was planned for one sub-district.11 The main output was the identification of strategic infrastructure projects and means of livelihood within a sub-district. In order to be operational, the identification of strategic projects was complemented with project sheets that functioned as pre-feasibility studies.

It was necessary for the KSF-AP to refer to the pre-agreed upon spatial planning or RDTRK and/or RTRWK if any, and also to village planning. Formulation of the KSF-AP was

Field Survey &

Initial Proposal

Community Consultation

Sub-district Consultation

Questionaire

Proposal Assessmentwith Sub-district Head and

Other Stakeholders

Consultation and meeting with therelevant stakeholders:UN agencies, NGOs, BRR and other governmentagenciesRevision and

Field Re-survey

Project Action PlanDraft

Distrcit Head & BAPPEDAMeeting

Core Team FunctionsField Team FunctionsCombination of Core Team and Field Team Functions

Illustration 7.2 - KSF-AP Scheme in the Indonesian Spatial Planning Constellation

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conducted in a participative manner, through public consultations at the sub-district and district levels. Consultations were carried out not only with the local people, community leaders and officials from the sub-district/district, but also with several NGOs and international institutions that worked in the respective region. It was envisaged that such a process would avoid an overlap of activities among the various parties involved.

In time, the scope of the KSF-AP developed; at the beginning of 2006 the geographical coverage was only the parts of a sub-district that were most severely damaged by the disaster, and was focused on identification of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects pertaining to infrastructure and means of livelihood that would accelerate the normalization of people’s lives.

Lessons LearnedAfter Phase I of KSF-AP was completed, it was proposed to conduct an overall

improvement in order that the recommended infrastructure development would possess strategic value for mid- and long-term regional development. By referring more closely to existing RTRWK and/or RDTRK, Phase II of KSF-AP was carried out for 28 sub-districts, under the name of KSF-AP. Overall, KSF-AP covered 63 sub-districts including Nias and South Nias sub-districts to compensate for a limited number of village plans.

Helicopter evacuation practice at the Emergency Rescue Building

(Gedung Penyelamatan) in Banda Aceh, on November 1, 2008.

Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Potential for ReplicationWithin the context of the Law on KSF-AP was a technical plan and elaboration of

RDTRK and RTRWK. In the absence of those two normative plans, or when they had not been enacted, the KSF-AP was still implemented to fill the absence of guidelines for the acceleration of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The KSF-AP could be referred to RDTRK and/or RTRWK since the draft had already been openly discussed through several phases, and hence it was envisaged that its legislation would not undergo significant changes; similarly with village planning output, if any. Besides being a public agreement that should be honored, village planning was needed to formulate technical formulation at the sub-district level.

Although it was designed to facilitate rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, not all the projects that had been identified in the KSF-AP could be realized during the rehabilitation and reconstruction period. Some projects that were mentioned in the KSF-AP, complete with their financing and feasibility reports, have not been realized; nevertheless they should be carried out as part of the long-term recovery process. Therefore, within the context of regular development activities that would be conducted by the local authority, an already formulated KSF-AP should be able to shorten the process to be conducted by local development deliberation at the sub-district level or even at the district level.

Lambung VillageLambung village in Meuraxa sub-district, Banda Aceh, has often been considered an

example of a good breakthrough in village redevelopment, particularly in Aceh. The village was, like most villages in Indonesia, not properly planned. During the process of its redevelopment, the spatial planning was better organized, which produced a much more orderly end result. People did not put too much emphasis on their original land boundaries, but were more focused on redeveloping their village according to the principles of spatial planning.

BackgroundThe village head, Zaidi M. Adan, explained that the idea to wholly re-plan the village was

the result of an agreement reached among several survivors, of which only 276 of the village’s original 1,600 inhabitants were found to be alive 10 days after the disaster. Their wish to rebuild the village into a better organized settlement was further developed by BRR.

The idea emerged to consolidate land-use, like “abolishing” previous land boundaries followed by a redrawing of boundaries and land-use pattern, which was conducted with the participation of all survivors. The new land-use pattern was carried out by professional

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rural spatial planners with the objective of improving the village environment. BRR facilitated in making the idea a reality by coordinating the people with the several donors in the reconstruction of Lambung village.

Development of Lambung VillageWitnessed by about 200 inhabitants, the groundbreaking ceremony was conducted

in May 2006. The Multi-Donor Fund began constructing a total of 309 houses through a program called Community Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (CSRRP or ReKompak). The houses were built on stilts and each cost Rp 58 million. At present, more than half of the houses - of which the detailed engineering drawing (DED) was completed by Sogreah (a France agency) - are occupied.

The settlement, which consists of about 310 households, has become a village that possesses an open green area, and all the land has been properly consolidated. With the people’s approval, roads were re-planned and built, with a minimal width of four meters. In May 2007, the roads were totally completed, with a construction cost of Rp 20 billion from BRR. The total length of sealed asphalt roads amounts to 8,425.96 meters with reinforced concrete drainage.

During the construction, all the inhabitants were persuaded to wholeheartedly participate in the activities. Some even freely relinquished land for the construction of roads or public buildings without demanding any compensation. A number of problems that previously plagued the people have now been overcome. For example, the issue of clean water facilities; previously existing water pipes were not interconnected to the arterial water mains of the local Tirta Daroy state water company. The provision of secondary feeders was funded by the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS) while the tertiary pipes and connections to individual houses were funded by BRR, costing Rp 331,390,000. The issue of education was also addressed with the construction of an integrated school compound consisting of kindergarten, elementary, junior high and senior high schools. The two-story schoolhouse stands on a 6,000-square-meter plot that is the result of donations collected from viewers of private television station RCTI, amounting to Rp 12 billion.

The construction of houses and settlements in Lambung village was conducted with full participation of the people, with the end objective to minimize disaster-generated risks, be an environmentally friendly and well-planned village. An earthquake-proof escape building has also been constructed, complete with the necessary safety trails and direction signs. JICS also constructed three three-story buildings, with each story having a floor space of 25.2 meters by 15.2 meters.

The three buildings have been designated as centers of community activities where people try to find and formulate ways to improve their means of livelihood and skills in disaster management. Immediately after the disaster, the buildings acted as evacuation

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centers, as they are earthquake- and 10-meter-high tsunami-resistant structures. Each building can accommodate 1,000 people.

Apart from that, evacuation drills were also conducted in order to train the community to be prepared for disasters. The buildings and the nearby roads (which were also constructed by JICS) are evidence that the people’s readiness to face disasters has been greatly improved; they also serve to promote the community’s economic efforts in facilitating future investment and development.

Lessons LearnedAlthough it took quite some time to apply the participative approach in Lambung, its

success in this village illustrates that it is extremely important to adopt. By participating in assuring that their future houses would be of good quality, the owners strengthened their social-communal relationships and established good governance. Village head Zaidi once remarked, “All the village inhabitants must arrive at a common agreement pertaining to redrawing the village map. It was a difficult task, but we accomplished it.”

Potential for ReplicationSpatial re-planning can in principle be conducted at any site as long as the local

inhabitants come to a common agreement. What should be taken into consideration is their temporary housing during the construction. Furthermore, the best way to increase the local’s commitment so as they feel they will benefit from the development must also be considered.

It should be emphasized that spatial re-planning and redevelopment have the objective of improving the quality of the environment and even of the people’s lives. Applied in urban areas, a better planned and organized environment results in a rise in land prices. The people should also be made aware that they will individually benefit from the exercise. If necessary, land evaluation could be done prior to and after the re-planning and redevelopment.

Development of a Satellite City: Beuramoe New Town

Beuramoe New Town is situated in Aceh Besar District, approximately 10 kilometers east of Banda Aceh city. Beuramoe is also considered a breakthrough in settlement development in that it was the first satellite town in Aceh to be furnished with all the necessary facilities. The town was built on a site where even in normal times it would be difficult to construct buildings. It was a site that attracted very few people to settle and build a life.

Previously, this new town was called Kota Baru Labuy, This name could be found in a number of assessments and brochures. On July 30, 2008, during the inauguration ceremony of the new town by the Head of BRR Executing Agency and the Aceh Besar

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Bupati, or Head of District, the latter officially declared the new town as “Kota Baru Beuramoe”. While Labuy indicates the name of one gampong in the area, the name “Beuramor” is an old name given to the entire area. As such, by using this name, resentment among locals from different, neighboring gampong is avoided.

Background: Why a New Town?Initially it was in response to the challenges posed by the rather unfortunate condition

of the approximately 140 hectares of hilly land, strewn with an abundance of boulders, situated around Labuy and Neuheun villages, in Aceh Besar District. Was it possible to develop the land? If it proved impossible, should it then just be abandoned so as not to become a burden to the local administration? To leave it unoccupied was certainly not an option because there was a great shortage of land for the relocation of people and houses from areas that were destroyed in the disaster.

The Deputy for Operations proposed using the boulder-strewn site for housing construction. In order to push through the project, the said deputy “challenged” donor agencies to develop the topographically difficult terrain. China Charity responded to the challenge, acknowledging that the most important task was to relocate the people despite not all of the available land being favorable. Furthermore, through the development activities they saw an opportunity to prove the quality of their aid.

Relocation housing complex in Beuramoe Village, Labuy, Aceh Besar, on April 3, 2009.

Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Before the disaster occurred, 900 houses had been built by the Perumnas state housing company on a nearby site. After the disaster, a number of residential areas emerged around the site, each with 25 to 900 houses. Within a radius of three kilometers, there were no fewer than 11 new and old residential areas with the number of inhabitants eventually reaching 4,051 households or 16,000 to 40,000 people. This situation led to the idea of developing the area into a new town.

The area needed to be developed with several separate residential areas as such a project would solve several problems and at the same time meet a number of objectives. First, to house people who rented homes and other refugees through a relatively affordable development budget (the price of land was relatively low and it was financially feasible to develop socio-economic facilities and infrastructure). Second, by developing an urban system, employment opportunities would be generated that would reduce the number of commuters. Third, developing infrastructure on a relatively large scale would be more efficient.

Development of Beuramoe New Town: Ideas and Achievements The Outline Plan of Kota Baru Beuramoe was drawn up in 2006 by ADB through

the Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project (ADB-ETESP). Kota Baru Beuramoe consists of two service centers, the China Charity housing area, as the main center, and the Buddha Tzu Chi/BRR housing area as the secondary center. During the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, the following projects were also developed with the objective of supporting the new town:

Residential compounds developed by a number of organizations, such as the Islamic • Relief (150 houses), ADB (286), ARC (98), UNEP (four), BRR (110), SCC (336), all located on 52.5 hectares of land situated in the Central-East areas; outside the 52.5 ha of land, other housing projects were also built by China Charity (606), Buddha Tzu Chi (780) and Nurani Dunia (75).

Economy-supporting facilities such as the Fish Auction Market, as well as trade and • storage facilities in order to encourage people to work in the town; and in addition the Siron 3 (40 liter/sec.) water plant was also constructed to complement Siron I water plant (60 liter/sec) in serving Aceh Besar District, and Siron 2 (20 liter/sec) to serve Banda Aceh; to complement the water plant, 19 kilometers of transmission pipes were laid between Siron and Beuramoe New Town and a water reservoir was also planned to be constructed at Neuheun, with a capacity of storing 1,000 cubic meters of water; the Siron 3 water plant is expected to serve up to 3,400 households, or about 80 percent of the area’s population;

Additionally, the construction of two drilled wells each with a capacity of 1.5 liter/second; the construction of roads and bridges to secure easy access to the new housing areas; along with the construction of places of worship (mosques), playgrounds, bus shelters and/or public health clinics in each housing area were carried out to support the new town.

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Villagers use electricity from micro-hydro resources in Putri Betung

Village, Gayo Luwes. December 22, 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Lessons Learned: Prospects and Challenges Kota Baru Beuramoe is an example of the development of a self-contained

satellite town in Aceh, with Banda Aceh city being the main city. The satellite town functions as a secondary support unit for the main city. The knowledge gained by the development of Kota Baru Beuramoe was that the state budget invariably tended to be insufficient to realize such ideas, and that it was necessary to seek support from private investors and from the people, which could become the main source of funding. During the rehabilitation and reconstruction period, the development of Kota Baru Beuramoe was a minor initiative that still required a number of other activities. It also became apparent that development of the administrative system within Aceh Besar District must be further improved in order to secure the provision of goods and public services (pertaining to the inhabitants welfare, community security, and issuance of building permits). It also became most important to obtain the full involvement of Banda Aceh Municipality and Provincial Administration to support the exercise.

Development of an urban economy should also be conducted in a sustainable manner, for example by facilitating private investment in a new town, through simplifying the

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procedure to obtain the necessary permits, with the ultimate objective of creating a self-contained new town. The new town should also not be too closely linked to the main city, in this case Banda Aceh, in order to prevent ribbon development, which is inefficient for optimal usage of infrastructure. A second support area should therefore be developed between the main city and the new town.

Conflicts between newcomers and established residents have been well managed, to a certain extent, through the development of an “interaction and cooperation space”, thus ensuring that the social and economic benefits derived from the development of this new town can be enjoyed by all. On a more technical level, it should be mentioned that it would be advisable to cease the exploitation of the hilly areas east of the new town as a quarry for building material, since the activities pose a great danger to the housing area below as landslides could easily occur.

Potential for ReplicationThe initiative to develop a new town like Beuramoe was eventually also proposed

and implemented in other places and on different scales, for example in Singkil, where the Pulau Sarok housing area was developed by BRR, and in Arongan (Lambalek) where housing areas were developed by CRS and BRR.

Alternative Energy for the Interior Region: A Taste of Development while Preserving the Forests

In thinly populated isolated areas, a breakthrough in the provision of electricity was also endeavored by exploiting existing resources. The micro hydropower plant is a pilot project that provides electricity by using water to produce a medium volume of electricity. Such an electricity plant can also be easily managed by the people themselves.

BackgroundThe socio-economic condition in the interior and rural areas in Aceh or in Nias, being far

from densely populated or urban areas, are generally speaking underdeveloped. Structural poverty occurs because of the isolated location, particularly because the people are not able to send their produce to nearby urban sale centers. Furthermore, it is extremely expensive to develop infrastructure in areas that are not included on the priority list. As a whole, the interior and rural areas have been increasingly left behind in terms of development activities. Their isolated location has led to a high cost of oil-based fuel.

Introduction of Alternative Energy in Aceh and NiasIn conducting reconstruction activities in Aceh, BRR firmly applied the environmentally

friendly approach and did its utmost to preserve the forests of Aceh. Areas prioritized for reconstruction activities were those that had been devastated by the tsunami and

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earthquake. The areas located in the center of the region, such as the Leuser National Park and the Ulu Masen conservation zone are not included on the list of prioritized areas. Until the second year of the rehabilitation and reconstruction period, not much attention was given to the central region. Inevitably, dissatisfaction emerged as the discrepancies grew bigger between areas that were not destroyed by the tsunami and the coastal areas and towns that were severely damaged.

The people saw opportunities to earn money in the reconstruction activities. One way was by providing the necessary wood by cutting down the trees in their vicinity, having no other means to obtain a decent living. BRR formulated a solution and proposed the micro hydropower plant project.

The power plant uses the waterfall within Leuser park and was funded by the Multi Donor Fund (MDF). With this project BRR, endeavored to give a taste of development activities to the isolated interior area, and at the same time educate the people to preserve the forest. They were taught that the forest required constantly running river water, which at the same time could turn the turbines of an electricity plant, thus providing electricity to the rural inhabitants.

Despite it proving to be a good project, at the end of 2005 MDF rejected the project since the area was not considered a disaster area. At the same time, however, the Spanish government offered a grant and a loan to the government of Indonesia and BRR proposed that the Spanish grant be used to conduct a feasibility study on developing several alternative energy projects. The proposal was accepted and a study on wind energy in Nias was conducted while in Aceh alternative water energy was chosen because of the abundant water supply in the area.

Micro hydropower plants are generally too small to be managed by the State Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, PLN), while on the other hand, the people had no experience in managing one independently. Therefore, prior to the development of the micro hydropower plant, the necessary information was disseminated and several community-enabling activities were conducted. This was done by an NGO that had the required public communication expertise. The problem was that the BRR Electricity PIU was not used to working with NGOs and conducted a project tender as if for a project funded by the APBN. Eventually the work was offered through a work contract to an ordinary contractor.

Lessons LearnedFortunately, the People Centered Business and Economic Institute (IBEKA), an NGO

that has considerable experience in Subang in West Java and in Krueng Kala, Aceh Besar, offered its services in assisting in the implementation of the project. The necessary funds for this experimental pilot project were obtained from the RANTF, which was more flexible in its operation as it was self-managed. The project also had the objective of obtaining information on implementation standards and cost to build micro hydropower plants.

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After conducting onsite studies and disseminating information to the public, a cost estimate was submitted to the RANTF. Since the manager responsible for the pilot project was also the BRR program manager, a similar micro hydroelectric power plant program was proposed for funding through the APBN, using the method of establishing work contracts with known partners.

For houses situated outside the area that were served by the state electricity company, 50 watts of electricity per house was provided free of charge through a solar power plant. In the whole of Aceh province, 3,962 houses were served by solar power and several NGOs were reportedly also building similar solar power plants in Aceh and Nias. In areas with waterfalls that had the potential to turn turbines, micro hydropower plants were developed. BRR energy pilot projects were mainly in the hilly areas around Gayo Lues, Bener Meriah and Central Aceh. There was in total seven locations, five of which were funded by the state budget and developed by BRR contractors, while the remaining two were funded by RANTF and constructed by IBEKA Foundation.

Of the two different types of implementation, it became evident that the one conducted by NGOs was better in terms of financing and acceptance by the people and as such the projects’ sustainability is more secured. IBEKA provided training in operation

Pipe network built by RANTF for micro-hydro power station fed by an Alas river tributary in Putri Betung Village. Gayo Luwes, December 22 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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and maintenance in West Java, established a referral workshop and trained the necessary technical staff in Bireuen to conduct repair work. It also chose mechanical and technical components that are readily available around Aceh and Medan.

Potential for ReplicationBoth types of alternative energy supplies are certainly the most feasible to be

implemented in other interior areas or isolated islands not yet served by the state electricity company. Considering the available local capacities and the great distance from big cities, micro hydropower plants should use components that are easily obtained, and the necessary workshops should also be developed in the nearest city. These are the keys to successful maintenance. If these conditions are properly met, many areas in Indonesia would have the potential to establish micro hydropower plants as alternative energy sources.

It has also been proven that the people are able to operate and render maintenance to micro hydropower plants producing 20 to 500 kilowatts of electricity, provided that they receive training and enabling courses before the construction of the plants. In certain cases, the oversupply of energy produced by micro hydropower plants could be sold to PLN provided there were sufficient support networks and the earnings could be use to strengthen a village’s economy. This mechanism could be further developed by providing opportunities to the rural population to start small-scale businesses using electricity, as well as providing an alternative, cheaper electricity supply for PLN.

Developing Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Post-Disaster Aceh and Nias

Introducing a policy on gender in Aceh and Nias posed its own challenges to BRR because the local people were doubtful about women’s abilities. BRR, on the other hand, did not differentiate between the genders when recruiting staff and offered equal remuneration. Besides having its own internal policies, BRR also made several breakthroughs during its mandate period. The Joint Land Titling (JLT) project, which strongly stipulated gender equality as it was a program of land titling involving a husband and wife as tsunami survivors. In Aceh, prior to the disaster, women’s right to property was not recognized. The successful accomplishment of Joint Land Titling was indeed a breakthrough in Aceh and Nias.

Background on BRR Implementation of Gender PolicyThe gender issue was acknowledged at the very beginning of the establishment of

BRR. It became a cross sector issue that was taken into consideration in all strategies and policies. It could be said that women in Aceh and Nias are considered second-class and marginal citizens compared to men. Although their rights and duties as stipulated in Islamic law are recognized, in daily life those rights and duties have become rather blurred when compared to the rights and duties of men.

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On September 26, 2006, the Head of BRR Executing Agency launched a gender policy to be applied in all BRR activities. The objective was to optimize women’s equality and enabling efforts. Indeed, BRR was strongly committed to upholding gender equality, especially considering that the displaced in Aceh and Nias were women and children. They faced the greatest impediments whether pertaining to obtaining their social and economic rights, or the provision of facilities and infrastructure, as well as to cultural matters where the issue was the strongest since theirs was a patriarchal culture.

First Strategy: Gender MainstreamingFour main policies were carried out by BRR in implementing its gender policy

throughout all sectors of activities. The first was to establish a gender quota policy in all the work programs conducted by all BRR PIUs. Second was to create and develop support tools as the main instruments to secure the application of gender commitment in the field. Third was to establish gender focal points (GFP) in all BRR work sectors and representative offices. The establishment of gender focal points made it much easier to coordinate between the various departments of BRR and its Gender Unit. Fourth was to implement the gender policy in the process of post-disaster land titling. This proved to be a most phenomenal step, particularly because it was taken for the very first time in Indonesia. In cooperation with the Council of Clerics and the Islamic Court of Law, BRR took the initiative to introduce joint land ownership.

Second Strategy: Special Programs for WomenBRR drew up the following special programs for women. First was the program to

improve women’s capacity to become leaders, which was also known as creating a “pool of women leaders”. This was BRR’s response to meet the civil and political rights of women in Aceh and Nias. Second was a program pertaining to the development of women’s institutional and organizational capacity and developing facilities and infrastructure for women in several areas. Included in this program were the establishment of 23 integrated healthcare centers for women and children (Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu Untuk Perempuan dan Anak, P2TP2A) and the development of 48 Ureng Inong (Women’s Halls) in several villages in all districts/cities in Aceh Province. Third was to render financial assistance as part of the BRR livelihood programs, by providing access to economic activities and thus improving the finances of women and children. Fourth was establishing programs that provided legal assistance to women and children. These programs were designed to be in harmony with programs of the local authorities for further development on a wider scale.

Gender Exit Strategy BRR Since its inception, BRR was known as an ad hoc institution, and hence gender

integration was emphasized in the transition process from BRR to the local authority. In order to facilitate the acceptance of gender integration by the local authority, a

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gender exit strategy was drawn up as a method and means to ascertain that the gender perspective became the focus and foundation in establishing development policies after the termination of BRR’s mandate on April 16, 2009.

Joint Land Titling (JLT)The disaster destroyed data on land ownership, and even on land boundaries in

several regions of Aceh. Through the Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS), supported by MDF, BRR established work collaboration with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN). RALAS had the objective of restoring and providing assurance of land rights, and was a program that aimed to prevent future claims from unlawful persons. It also became the legal foundation to reconstruct houses by several donors/NGOs/the government.

The considerable number of widows, victims of the tsunami who possessed no rights to the land owned by their deceased husbands, had given rise to the idea of conducting a Joint Land Titling program by which the respective legal rights could be secured through the issuance of land titles under the name of both husband and wife. Based on MDF’s In-depth Progress Report, issued December 2008, it became evident that of the total 126,106 land titles registered at the National Land Agency, 112,460 land titles were issued, with 11,500 of them being in the joint names of husband and wife.

Lessons LearnedA number of valuable lessons learned by the Gender Unit of BRR could have a strategic

impact in the future.

First, the program of enabling women and children after the end of the armed conflict and post-disaster should be conducted by completely comprehending the social and cultural structure of the local community. There is certainly no ideal program, and there are bound to be contextual differences because of the different areas where the program is implemented. Pertaining to land titling, the open-minded and democratic attitude of the people of Aceh became the entry point to underline women’s rights on land and houses. Although percent-wise it concerned only 12 percent of the population, it was still a phenomenal achievement as it was the very first time that such an endeavor had been undertaken after the end of the armed conflict and post-tsunami.

Second, in extensive or localized disasters, gender integration as a program indicator should be ensured by the government as the party responsible for post-disaster recovery.

Third, policies should be allocated in conjunction with budget allocation designated to enable women. This is because without sufficient funding, programs to enable women could not be undertaken optimally and would instead remain stagnant.

Fourth, providing access to data and information for women is of utmost importance in giving women direct access to development programs at local and national levels.

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Potential for ReplicationThe fact that BRR was able to conduct gender mainstreaming and programs for

women within the limited rehabilitation and reconstruction period indicated that such undertakings could be even better implemented in other permanent institutions with longer programs.

The feasibility to implement JLT would not only better secure women’s rights within the family, but would also enable the community to free themselves from the shackles of poverty. It is sincerely hoped that the central and local governments will in the future implement this program as a model of gender mainstreaming in land reform programs.

Internet Network for Aceh – Nias: Developing Community Information Delivery

Although the internet is a widely used tool across the globe, the successful provision of the necessary internet network in the area after the disaster was an achievement in itself, considering that the entire communication network had been destroyed, making even conventional interactions difficult. Another challenge was the dissemination of information on internet usage to every corner of an area that had never employed such technology. The provision of an Information Communication Technology (ICT) network in the Province of Aceh-Nias could well be claimed to be the biggest government telecommunication project in Indonesia located outside of Java at the time.

BackgroundAt the emergency relief phase, the internet played a most formidable role in assisting

volunteers. Initially, the facility was provided by the Air Putih Foundation and funded by several donors. Through this facility, volunteers, donors and NGOs were able to send data, photos and disaster program implementation plans to their headquarters, and at the same time receive the necessary approval for their plans and funding in Aceh.

Afterwards, considering the usefulness of such a facility in the development process, BRR then programmed the provision of the basic infrastructure ICT network for the local administration and community. The facility functioned as an alternative media to send pertinent information in the quickest time possible, and to reach areas needing such information.

ICT was also used to replace conventional the telecommunication infrastructure that had been damaged in the disaster, which required a huge amount of funds for reparation. Conventional communication was extremely expensive, whereas the need for communication was gradually increasing as the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities and improving the community needed to be accelerated.

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Implementation of ICT Development in Aceh – NiasThe involvement of the people in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process was

greatly facilitated by the establishment of the ICT infrastructure and internet access in all the cities and districts in Aceh-Nias. Public participation functioned as an interaction facility among BRR, local administration, NGOs and the outside community, and at the same time functioned as an alternative media to create a caring, participative and aspiring community culture.

The technology could simultaneously be used to conduct community development programs as a means to stimulate the acceleration of economic growth, the dissemination of science and technology as well as improve education standards. The facility also became an incentive for the development of business and investment in information technology, particularly the internet business at the local level.

With the completion of this program, Aceh became the first province in Indonesia to have an internet network covering all of its districts and cities. At the beginning there were only three Wi-Fi zones, namely government offices, schools and/or other public facilities. Then the district and urban authorities each developed new Wi-Fi spots. The Aceh Provincial Authority also supported the facility by increasing the bandwidth capacity to 8 megabytes per second and in 2009 implemented the Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WIMAX).12

Lessons LearnedAs the community came to depend more and more on the internet, the computer

business also expanded and the need for appropriate personnel also increased. The immediate impact of ICT development was the emergence of the need for human resources capable of operating the Wireless Local Loop Internet. The number of such staff that the local authority had to provide was around 125 people.

Another positive consequence was the change in people’s lifestyles. In everyday activities, more and more people began using a computer as an information and communication tool. Informal computer education and training also took great strides, particularly in cities and even in main towns in the districts. In government offices, the availability of internet systems also generated the provision of better public services and ICT-based best-practice of good governance, which played a facilitative role in political education, democracy and transparency.

However, the people also became worried as there was an inflow of information that clashed with local traditions and culture. Technically this could be prevented through filtering techniques, such as through the Community Development Program through which information dissemination and community enabling activities were conducted, thereby educating the people how to differentiate between useful and negative

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PDAM Siron water company central distribution network facility for distributing water to Aceh Besar, July 14, 2008. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

information. In order to prevent information distortion, the people were encouraged to use information technology as a tool to produce and disseminate information appropriate to the actual conditions in the community.

Potential for ReplicationDifficulties in accessing the internet could result in the local authority and the majority of

the people lacking the necessary information needed to develop their social and economic lives. Such was formerly the case when it was extremely expensive to establish fixed telephone connection, which was monopolized by two state enterprises. At present, however, the availability of the ICT network for the internet has overcome the problem in Aceh-Nias.

With competition increasing among internet service providers, the cost of internet access is no longer a problem. This development has a positive impact in developing countries like Indonesia. Such healthy competition, which is common in other places, eventually lowers costs even in a duopoly market. The increase of internet users is in line with the increase of people having telecommunication access through mobile telephones.

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Regionalization of Water Treatment and Sanitation: Economic Scale and Sharing of Natural Resources

Clean or potable water and sanitation services in Indonesia are managed by each respective local administration. On the other hand, administrative boundaries are not based on the respective geographical character that plays a determining role in planning the exploitation of environmental and natural resources, in particular pertaining to potable or clean water and waste disposal. Starting with Banda Aceh city and the district of Aceh Besar, the Aceh Province endeavored to go, for the very first time, beyond administrative boundaries in establishing cooperation in the exploitation of natural resources. Potable water management and sanitation systems in these two areas are now based on regional systems.

BackgroundGenerally speaking, the provision of potable water and sanitation services in urban

areas in Indonesia are impeded by systemic problems and bad utility service, due to the partitioning of the service unit/local company as a result of regional expansion and autonomy. In the end, the local service unit/company decreases in size, becomes

PDAM Lambaro water company central distribution network facility

for distributing water to Banda Aceh city. Aceh Besar, July 14, 2008.

Photo: BRR/Oni Imelva

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economically unviable and the situation is made worse by the struggle for power and influence because of the exploitation of the same resources.

Observing such trends, BRR proposed the establishment of joint potable water supply and sanitation services at the regional level. There were several groupings of areas that could be considered by Aceh Province in the implementation of joint river water resources exploitation, such as Banda Aceh City with Aceh Besar District, Lhokseumawe City with North Aceh District, Langsa City with Aceh Tamiang District, and Meulaboh City with Nagan Raya District. Those proposals were positively responded to by the World Bank, which then conducted several workshops and discourses about the matter, and rendered technical assistance in the formulation of the cooperation framework among the respective local authorities.

Developing a Regional Potable Water and Sanitation ServiceIn general, local companies providing potable water were not in good shape due to

mismanagement. The financial scale of their entrepreneurial management was too small and the water rates too low in relation to ever-increasing production costs. Consequently, the companies were unable to gain a profit to pay back their principal loans, which kept accumulating while debt repayments keep being hampered, making it difficult for the companies to obtain the new loans necessary for expansion and improvement of obsolete facilities.

Low revenues also forced the companies to limit maintenance activities, causing their production facilities and their output to dwindle in quantity and quality. In the end, they were unable to provide good service, and were certainly not in the position to develop their production and distribution, particularly to poor people.

The water companies were forced to charge very low water rates, even lower than production costs. The Regional House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) maintained the low water rates with the objective of protecting the poor, whose condition ironically become worse as they were forced to buy potable water from other private water suppliers at a much higher price. DPRD also argued that since the service was bad, which was evident from the amount and quality of water, it would not approve an increase in water rates. All of these policies further pushed the water companies into a bad spiral. In order to improve the revenues of water companies, BRR proposed establishing regional water companies to jointly serve nearby cities and districts.

The cleaning services responsible for maintaining public sanitation also faced considerable impediments since it was difficult for them to charge sufficiently high garbage collection fees, which in any case the people were unwilling to pay. The people had become used to irresponsibly disposing of their garbage in inappropriate places, such as in rivers or by roadsides – as long as it was not in their own yards, or Not In My Backyard (NIMBY), as the saying goes.

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The case of household waste collection is different in Java where the people collectively collect their waste and deposit it at temporary garbage disposal centers from where the municipality transfers it to the municipal dump. Working as garbage collectors is looked down upon in Aceh-Nias, making it impossible to implement the same household waste collection system as conducted in Java.

The problem pertaining to waste collection in Java is that municipality A refuses to accept waste from municipality B, even though there may be no land available in municipality A to be used as a municipal dump. In order to stop the problem from worsening, waste disposal based on wider boundaries, such as regions, has since early times been proposed for certain cities and districts.

Lessons Learned

Regionalization of potable water supply for Banda Aceh City together with Aceh Besar District eventually took place. The water companies in both places have begun to use the same water source at Lambaro/Siron, drawing water from the same river.

Reconciling the cost balance of both water companies is currently being done as the first step in merging the two companies. The problem is that there has never been uniformity in determining water rates. The water company in Aceh Besar District has already adjusted its water rates while the company in Banda Aceh has yet to start. With regionalization of water supply, all customers in the two local administration areas will receive the same service and pay the same water rates.

Managing potable water supply is generally conducted in conjunction with managing waste disposal/sanitation. The problem facing waste disposal in Banda Aceh is not confined to cleaning and waste collection but more importantly, the city has very limited space to be used as a central garbage dump. The final waste collection at Kampung Jawa in Banda Aceh, in spite of having been rehabilitated under UNDP and further enlarged by BRR with funds from MDF, can only accept garbage for the next two years.

A new and bigger site needs to be acquired and after it starts functioning, the old garbage dump in Kampung Jawa can be closed. It is recommended that the central dump for both regions be located near Sultan Iskandar Muda Airport, in Aceh Besar District. Since it concerns garbage from two different administrative regions, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been drawn up between Banda Aceh Municipality and Aceh Besar District, stipulating the collective management of the facility. Coordination approaches have already been started by Aceh Provincial Government. The MOU has been signed and preparatory action has begun. Funding will come from Aceh Province, MDF, UNDP and BRR.

The efforts to establish regionalization of waste disposal were also impeded by political issues. During each phase of the process, each regional legislative council (from Banda

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Aceh City and Aceh Besar District) often put forward its objections to the regionalization of the service. The issues that were most often mentioned were the separation of balance sheets/assets and the different amount of potential income. Both councils put greater importance on the issue of compartmentalization of authority rather than on providing the best service to the public. Their objections are actually of less importance compared to the benefit that would be derived from the saved costs and improved service to customers in both areas. In responding to the objections raised, it is necessary to show to both councils the potentials of a regionalized water supply and sanitation services. At present, the process toward regionalization is still running smoothly, but the momentum should be maintained to prevent it from breaking down.

Potential for ReplicationRegionalization of water supply is highly feasible in other places, particularly in

municipalities and districts that are located in relative proximity, especially because both the suppliers and the customers would benefit. Considering the trend of globalization and development of public administration in Indonesia, local administrations would not be able to keep on functioning independently but instead would be forced to establish collaboration and become interdependent among each other. Regionalization of public utilities would become an inevitable choice and initiatives to start consolidation should be commenced as early as possible, to reduce future problems.

By establishing joint management on a bigger scale, efficiency could be increased (there would only be one group of manpower and one management); furthermore, management transparency would also ameliorate the company. It should be noted that currently, transparent management of public utilities is still very limited, which tends to invite fraudulent actions.

It must be acknowledged that merging two or more businesses that have become large entities, with huge liabilities, would be much more complicated (especially in big cities); however, if agreements could be reached at the early stages, solutions to the impediments could be formulated jointly. The water supply company “Tirtonadi” in Medan, which is a joint enterprise of all water companies in North Sumatra, is a good example of how regionalization of potable water supply could be established. Customer satisfaction is much higher, the quality of services rendered keeps on improving and expansion through investment can done by obtaining loans from the Ministry of Finance and donor agencies, because the company’s credit rating would be positive.

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THE adage that “power corrupts” inspired the BRR Executing Agency. Having vast power and an enormous amount of funds, BRR considered it necessary to have stratified supervision and monitoring system. Supervision began with a personal commitment as stipulated in the Integrity Pact, followed by an independent unit called the Anti-Corruption Unit (Satuan Anti-Korupsi, SAK) and the Deputy for Supervision within the Executing Agency. There were also the Supervisory Board, an entity outside the Executing Agency but still a part of BRR, and other monitoring units such as the Center of Regional Program and Project Controlling (Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Wilayah, P4W) and the Center of Sectoral Project Controlling and Implementing (Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan Proyek Sektoral, P4S) and evaluate the output of each program through the Center of Construction Quality Control (Pusat Pengendalian Mutu Konstruksi, PPMK). All the strata were designed by BRR to gain trust from both the national and the international communities.

Beware … Be Very Aware …One way to reduce the possibility of corruption by all BRR staff members was through

supervision. The breakthrough in supervision of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh-Nias was in its layered approach.

Supervision, Observation and Evaluation

Trophy and award certificate from BPK for BRR’s Financial Report in 2007, receiving an Unqualified Opinion. Photo: BRR/Bodi CH

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Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency

(BRR) for Aceh and Nias

Jl. Ir. Muhammad Thaher No. 20 Banda Aceh 23247 Phone. +62-651-636666 Fax. +62-651-637777

Website: www.e-aceh-nias.org

BRR NAD IAS 2007 FINANCIAL REPORT

Banda Aceh, 30 August 2008HEAD OF THE EXECUTING AGENCY

KUNTORO MANGKUSUBROTO

1. BRR NAD-Nias’ 2007 Financial Report received “UNQUALIFIED” opinion as stated in the Indonesian Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) Report number 126/S/XVIII. BAC/08/2008 dated 11 August 20082. BRR NAD-Nias consists of the Advisory Board, Supervisory Board and Executing Agency

BUDGET REALIZATION REPORTFOR THE PERIOD ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2007 AND 2006

UPIAH

No. Description2007 2006

Budget Realization % Realization

A. Revenues

A.1 Domestic Revenues 0.00 304,512,342,842.00 0.00 4,641,593,291.00

A.1.a Non Tax Revenues 0.00 304,512,342,842.00 0.00 4,641,593,291.00

Total Revenues 0.00 304,512,342,842.00 0.00 4,641,593,291.00

B. Expenditures

B.1 State Expenditures

B.1.1 Domestic Expenditures 7,842,028,375,000.00 5,210,833,580,102.00 66.45 9,039,086,622,981.00

Employee Expenditures 590,277,970,000.00 487,882,273,606.00 82.65 373,413,936,333.00

Good Expenditures 1,003,813,795,000.00 599,683,584,777.00 59.74 1,211,359,240,927.00

Capital Expenditures 3,783,956,356,000.00 2,449,730,727,379.00 64.74 4,564,330,077,049.00

Social Expenditures 2,463,980,254,000.00 1,673,536,994,340.00 67.92 2,889,983,368,672.00

B.1.2 Loans 129,530,620,000.00 23,164,658,050.00 17.88 0.00

Employee Expenditures 213,400,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Good Expenditures 47,210,820,000.00 23,164,658,050.00 49.07 0.00

Capital Expenditures 55,826,400,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Social Expenditures 26,280,000,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

B.1.3 Grants 2,449,862,426,000.00 1,298,844,473,744.00 53.02 937,591,303,803.00

Employee Expenditures 27,303,429,000.00 18,266,102,589.00 66.90 2,074,272,530.00

Good Expenditures 421,611,610,000.00 121,893,103,425.00 28.91 115,581,409,071.00

Capital Expenditures 796,159,236,000.00 266,508,468,361.00 33.47 69,529,269,315.00

Social Expenditures 1,204,788,151,000.00 892,176,799,369.00 74.05 750,406,352,887.00

Total Expenditures 10,421,421,421,000.00 6,532,842,711,896.00 62.69 9,976,677,926,784.00

BALANCE SHEETAS OF 31 DECEMBER 2007 AND 2006

UPIAH

ACCOUNT 2007 2006

ASSETS CURRENT ASSETS

Cash in Treasurer’s Bank 3,584,330,754.00 14,114,115,312.00Trust Fund’s Cash 0.00 2,213,702,756,920.00PMU ReKOMPAK’s Cash 59,060,265,372.00 158,504,274,302.00Medical Scholarship Committee’s Cash 45,266,594,517.00 53,737,252,900.00Advance on Capital Expenditures 1,203,629,376,124.00 581,822,001,519.00Prepaid Expenditures 4,163,320,063.00 13,017,659,220.00Inventory 79,057,282,798.11 452,392,778,617.00

TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 1,394,761,169,628.11 3,487,290,838,790.00

FIXED ASSETSLand 661,558,584,250.00 163,574,708,198.00

Machinery and Equipment 1,267,341,040,658.40 733,888,261,632.00Bulidings 962,184,487,864.00 416,397,950,498.00Networks, Irrigations and Streets 1,943,615,382,745.00 491,645,399,585.00Other Fixed Assets 17,892,662,934.00 15,976,301,914.00Construction in Progress 2,592,836,178,072.00 2,269,797,749,321.00

TOTAL FIXED ASSETS 7,445,428,336,523.40 4,091,280,371,148.00

OTHER ASSETSOther Assets 486,293,304,867.00 121,021,665,470.00

TOTAL OTHER ASSETS 486,293,304,867.00 121,021,665,470.00

TOTAL ASSETS 9,326,482,811,018.51 7,699,592,875,408.00

LIABILITIES SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES

Due to KPPN 3,584,330,754.00 14,114,115,312.00Short-term Debts to Third Parties 105,954,502,049.00 2,425,944,284,122.00

TOTAL SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES 109,538,832,803.00 2,440,058,399,434.00TOTAL LIABILITIES 109,538,832,803.00 2,440,058,399,434.00

EQUITIESCURRENT EQUITIES

Advance/Prepaid Expenditures Reserves 1,207,792,696,187.00 594,839,660,739.00Inventory Reserves 79,057,282,798.11 452,392,778,617.00

TOTAL CURRENT EQUITIES 1,286,849,978,985.11 1,047,232,439,356.00

INVESTMENT EQUITIES

Invested on Fixed Assets 7,443,800,694,363.40 4,091,280,371,148.00

Invested on Other Assets 486,293,304,867.00 121,021,665,470.00TOTAL INVESTMENT EQUITIES 7,930,093,999,230.40 4,212,302,036,618.00

TOTAL EQUITIES 9,216,943,978,215.51 5,259,534,475,974.00

TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITIES 9,326,482,811,018.51 7,699,592,875,408.00

Figure 8.1 A Sample of BRR NAD-Nias Financial Report

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Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency

(BRR) for Aceh and Nias

Jl. Ir. Muhammad Thaher No. 20 Banda Aceh 23247 Phone. +62-651-636666 Fax. +62-651-637777

Website: www.e-aceh-nias.org

BRR NAD IAS 2007 FINANCIAL REPORT

Banda Aceh, 30 August 2008HEAD OF THE EXECUTING AGENCY

KUNTORO MANGKUSUBROTO

1. BRR NAD-Nias’ 2007 Financial Report received “UNQUALIFIED” opinion as stated in the Indonesian Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) Report number 126/S/XVIII. BAC/08/2008 dated 11 August 20082. BRR NAD-Nias consists of the Advisory Board, Supervisory Board and Executing Agency

BUDGET REALIZATION REPORTFOR THE PERIOD ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2007 AND 2006

UPIAH

No. Description2007 2006

Budget Realization % Realization

A. Revenues

A.1 Domestic Revenues 0.00 304,512,342,842.00 0.00 4,641,593,291.00

A.1.a Non Tax Revenues 0.00 304,512,342,842.00 0.00 4,641,593,291.00

Total Revenues 0.00 304,512,342,842.00 0.00 4,641,593,291.00

B. Expenditures

B.1 State Expenditures

B.1.1 Domestic Expenditures 7,842,028,375,000.00 5,210,833,580,102.00 66.45 9,039,086,622,981.00

Employee Expenditures 590,277,970,000.00 487,882,273,606.00 82.65 373,413,936,333.00

Good Expenditures 1,003,813,795,000.00 599,683,584,777.00 59.74 1,211,359,240,927.00

Capital Expenditures 3,783,956,356,000.00 2,449,730,727,379.00 64.74 4,564,330,077,049.00

Social Expenditures 2,463,980,254,000.00 1,673,536,994,340.00 67.92 2,889,983,368,672.00

B.1.2 Loans 129,530,620,000.00 23,164,658,050.00 17.88 0.00

Employee Expenditures 213,400,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Good Expenditures 47,210,820,000.00 23,164,658,050.00 49.07 0.00

Capital Expenditures 55,826,400,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Social Expenditures 26,280,000,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

B.1.3 Grants 2,449,862,426,000.00 1,298,844,473,744.00 53.02 937,591,303,803.00

Employee Expenditures 27,303,429,000.00 18,266,102,589.00 66.90 2,074,272,530.00

Good Expenditures 421,611,610,000.00 121,893,103,425.00 28.91 115,581,409,071.00

Capital Expenditures 796,159,236,000.00 266,508,468,361.00 33.47 69,529,269,315.00

Social Expenditures 1,204,788,151,000.00 892,176,799,369.00 74.05 750,406,352,887.00

Total Expenditures 10,421,421,421,000.00 6,532,842,711,896.00 62.69 9,976,677,926,784.00

BALANCE SHEETAS OF 31 DECEMBER 2007 AND 2006

UPIAH

ACCOUNT 2007 2006

ASSETS CURRENT ASSETS

Cash in Treasurer’s Bank 3,584,330,754.00 14,114,115,312.00Trust Fund’s Cash 0.00 2,213,702,756,920.00PMU ReKOMPAK’s Cash 59,060,265,372.00 158,504,274,302.00Medical Scholarship Committee’s Cash 45,266,594,517.00 53,737,252,900.00Advance on Capital Expenditures 1,203,629,376,124.00 581,822,001,519.00Prepaid Expenditures 4,163,320,063.00 13,017,659,220.00Inventory 79,057,282,798.11 452,392,778,617.00

TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 1,394,761,169,628.11 3,487,290,838,790.00

FIXED ASSETSLand 661,558,584,250.00 163,574,708,198.00

Machinery and Equipment 1,267,341,040,658.40 733,888,261,632.00Bulidings 962,184,487,864.00 416,397,950,498.00Networks, Irrigations and Streets 1,943,615,382,745.00 491,645,399,585.00Other Fixed Assets 17,892,662,934.00 15,976,301,914.00Construction in Progress 2,592,836,178,072.00 2,269,797,749,321.00

TOTAL FIXED ASSETS 7,445,428,336,523.40 4,091,280,371,148.00

OTHER ASSETSOther Assets 486,293,304,867.00 121,021,665,470.00

TOTAL OTHER ASSETS 486,293,304,867.00 121,021,665,470.00

TOTAL ASSETS 9,326,482,811,018.51 7,699,592,875,408.00

LIABILITIES SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES

Due to KPPN 3,584,330,754.00 14,114,115,312.00Short-term Debts to Third Parties 105,954,502,049.00 2,425,944,284,122.00

TOTAL SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES 109,538,832,803.00 2,440,058,399,434.00TOTAL LIABILITIES 109,538,832,803.00 2,440,058,399,434.00

EQUITIESCURRENT EQUITIES

Advance/Prepaid Expenditures Reserves 1,207,792,696,187.00 594,839,660,739.00Inventory Reserves 79,057,282,798.11 452,392,778,617.00

TOTAL CURRENT EQUITIES 1,286,849,978,985.11 1,047,232,439,356.00

INVESTMENT EQUITIES

Invested on Fixed Assets 7,443,800,694,363.40 4,091,280,371,148.00

Invested on Other Assets 486,293,304,867.00 121,021,665,470.00TOTAL INVESTMENT EQUITIES 7,930,093,999,230.40 4,212,302,036,618.00

TOTAL EQUITIES 9,216,943,978,215.51 5,259,534,475,974.00

TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITIES 9,326,482,811,018.51 7,699,592,875,408.00

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The supervision maneuver BRR adopted incorporated not only two approaches, but began from a personal realm, through a private commitment through the Integrity Pact. Along with that, there were also the independent, internal Anti-Corruption Unit and the Deputy for Supervision, an internal audit unit of BRR, and the Supervisory Board, as an separate entity under the BRR umbrella.

Background A few weeks before the tsunami hit Aceh, the President of the Republic of Indonesia

had issued Decree No. 5/2004, stipulating that all line ministries and provincial governments must optimally apply good governance. This was in contrast to the reality when BRR was established by the Indonesian government in 2005. An anticorruption organization called Transparency International (TI) had earlier released the results of its annual surveys on corruption. Indonesia was among the lowest of 145 nations surveyed, the country is perceived as one of the most corrupt in the world. Meanwhile, the Aceh governor had been detained and charged with corruption.

It was not a good picture, especially when coupled with the enormous amount of funds pledged for Aceh in the post-tsunami period, while the supervision system and control mechanism within BRR was not yet optimal. One of the criticisms lodged by the public was aimed at the tender procedure. Some bid winners could not implement the programs, others were “expired”, or did not have the qualifications to undertake a particular project. To BRR, this signified two things. First, the supervision mechanism and internal control was very weak, and second, tenders should be carried out more professionally.

Public pressure and control heightened after the Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK) publicized the results of an audit in 2006, regarding BRR’s operations in 2005. BPK stated that the performance of BRR Executing Agency did not justify their remuneration. It also concluded that the BRR Executing Agency, which functioned as the coordinator of rehabilitation and reconstruction works, had underperformed. The audit analyzed the policy, flow of funds, organization of manpower and weaknesses in the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. The audit focused on a number of sectors, covering infrastructure, housing, land, education, health, economy and business.

Under such circumstances, it was necessary to adopt a cultural, structural and institutional approach to heighten the integrity of BRR personnel and to prevent them from corruption. The breakthrough in BRR’s work system was not in supervision. Supervision is a standard procedure in every organization in the world, especially in construction activities. But to make a multilayer supervision system, like the one introduced by BRR, was unique because it dealt with all possible means of preventing corruption, collusion and nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme, KKN) as well as ensuring integration among the different layers. The different components of supervision complemented one another and generated an integrated system to prevent KKN from emerge in BRR.

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Denouncing Corruption The multilayer system to prevent corruption and other irregularities evolved and

developed during BRR’s term in Aceh-Nias. For example, the Integrity Pact comprised of several pages and had to be signed by all BRR staff when they began their employment contract with BRR. It was true that, conceptually, there was nothing new in the Pact, as each point was usually stipulated in every work contract. It was the implementation and the integration of the Pact in daily work that made it unique.

The role of the SAK was different. In any Indonesian organizations, especially government agencies, there had never been an independent unit to monitor possible corruption within its own work such as the SAK. Along with preventing corruption, this independent unit within the BRR conducted monitoring to prevent KKN. SAK had the right to investigate reports from the public about irregularities in BRR project implementation.

In addition to the Integrity Pact and SAK, BRR also adopted another supervisory unit, much like an inspectorate general in a ministry – the Deputy for Supervision. The deputy was assigned to help the Head of BRR Executing Agency in undertaking functional oversight of implementation units of the rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The aforementioned three-layer supervision was endorsed in Law No 10/2005 and Presidential decree No. 63/2005, which stated that the three interrelated agencies were to supervise the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of post-disaster Aceh-Nias. The Advisory Board is tasked with providing the terms of reference and policies for the recovery program. While the Supervisory Board, a functional instrument, was entrusted with the authority and responsibility to ensure rehabilitation and reconstruction activities run efficiently, effectively, and based on the real needs. The Supervisory Board is the outer layer of the supervision strata. While it is distinct from the BRR Executing Agency and its members consist of local figures, the Supervisory Board is a part of the BRR structure.

The Integrity Pact In line with Presidential Decree No. 8/2006 regarding the Fourth Amendment on the

Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on Procurement of Goods and Government Services, the Integrity Pact was defined as a statement signed by Contract Preparation Officer (Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen, PPK) or officials and members of the Procurement Unit as a solemn oath to avoid KKN when procuring goods and offering their services. As the first supervision layer in BRR, the signing of the Integrity Pact was done by all employees of BRR, from the Head of the Executing Agency down to the lower staff members. Such as including those who dealt with BRR tenders.

The first group of people signed the Integrity Pact at the Aceh Governor’s Office on July 11, 2005, witnessed by provincial officials, journalists from the print and electronic media. The event was administered by Head of BRR Executing Agency, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Chief of the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komite Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana

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Korupsi, KPK) and the Head of the Supervisory Board. The signing of the Integrity Pact by Kuntoro was done in front of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. BRR personnel who were employed at later dates signed the Integrity Pact at the same time as they signed their work contracts.

The Anti-Corruption Unit (Satuan Anti-Korupsi, SAK)The integrity commitment was bolstered by the SAK, which was established in August

2005, under the Head of BRR Executing Agency and technically supported by USAID and UNDP. The SAK was designed to uphold the integrity of of the agency through an autonomous internal mechanism. Based on this objective, SAK became an official part of the Supervisory Board on June 27, 2007.

The SAK was not a law enforcement unit, an investigative agency nor and audit body. Its approach was focused on:

Prevention, a measure to improve procedures that could be easily violated. For • example, to prevent the possibility of corruption during the procurement of goods, an improvement in the procurement system and process was carried out preempting and eliminating potential misconduct. The role of the Supervisory Board in providing recommendations to the President of Indonesia was strengthened by the SAK vis-à-vis the prevention and advocacy program.

Education, enhancing capacity on anti-corruption through targeted and general • programming via information dissemination and training to BRR staff and the general public. A sample information packet for staff members covered the range of elements associated with integrity, such as staff recruitment or completion of Asset Inventory for Government Officials report (Laporan Harta kekayaan Peyelenggara Negara, LHKPN). Meanwhile information packet for the general public and BRR stakeholders included the campaign known as “refrain from giving gifts” to BRR staff, contractors or NGOs. Information for local communities also covered general information on the dangers KKN posed on their own welfare.

The SAK along with KPK as well as the NGO Indonesian Procurement Watch carried • out educative programs and trainings to help maintain the integrity of BRR as an organization and to respond to reports or findings of irregularities committed.

Enforcement, ensuring administrative compliance and supporting other law • enforcement agencies. SAK did not seek cases or findings; it worked depending on claims submitted. However, SAK did not have the authority to investigate the level of compliance to regulations for all parties related to BRR. The basis for investigation for SAK remained within the realm of compliance to the Integrity Pact signed and the adherence to BRR’s code of ethics in program implementation.

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Figure 8.2 The BRR Integrity Pact

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The said investigation was limited to review of evidence related to the reported case. Based on the outcome of these investigations, the SAK then submitted recommendations to BRR senior level management including Deputy Directors heading the PIU subject to investigation.

The findings or reports of claims could be directly handled by SAK and Supervisory Board. Some findings could be resolved by the Supervisory Board and the Executing Agency. Others requiring legal actions had to be handled by the KPK and the police, depending on the complexity of the case.

The SAK also had the right to intervene in a tender, including to order partial re-tender or complete cancellation of a tender if corruption had been indicated. It also had the right to revoke a contract. The SAK could recommend the suspension or even the dismissal of any employee if involved in wrongdoing.

The SAK protected the identity of the people reporting misconduct. Many who report allegations of corruptions often feel scared have their lives threatened. To ensure their safety, two forms separating their personal information from their reports on irregularities. SAK also accepted anonymous reports. This was in line with SAK’s paradigm of prioritizing on the substance of the reports, not necessarily on the information or intention of the people reporting. In practice, the number of anonymous reports was low and the majority of those reporting clearly provided their identity.

SAK did not refuse any reports despite its lack of relevance to the recovery efforts in Aceh-Nias. In the event the case fall under the jurisdiction of other institutions and had nothing to do with BRR, SAK passed the report on to the relevant agencies. This was due to the SAK’s commitment to build communication with KPK and the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha), the BPK, the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan, BPKP), numerous student and organizations and NGOs, such as TI Indonesia, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) and Gerak, and even with the World Bank. The SAK maintained its neutrality, without affiliation to any political party or prejudice.

Between 2005 and 2006 alone, there were a total of 1,030 reports on irregularities from the public and BRR’s internal audit unit, 40 percent of which concerned tender procedures, 16 percent program deviations, 7 percent complaints regarding bureaucratic procedures, 9 percent about potential irregularities and 14 percent about corruption.

Deputy for SupervisionAlthough the Integrity Pact was signed by all staff members and SAK followed up on

reports of misconduct, BRR still considered it necessary to build an internal audit agency that would function much as the inspectorate general in various ministries. In February 2006, the Internal Supervisory Unit (Satuan Pengawas Internal, SPI) was set up and endorsed by Presidential Decree No. 76/2006. The Unit officially became BRR’s Deputy for Supervision.

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The Deputy for Supervision was assigned not only to oversee professional ethics such as corruption, collusion and nepotism within BRR but also to monitor the professional conduct of BRR staff. As an internal audit body, it took on the role of:

Monitoring the flow of funds for BRR rehabilitation and reconstruction programs, by 1. stressing transparency and accountability;Maintaining professionalism and a corporate culture by reporting and providing 2. recommendations on internal indicators such as the efficiency, effectiveness and compliance level on the resolutions and policies established by Head of BRR Executing Agency;Taking follow-up action on suspected corruption cases;3. Ensuring follow-up of recommended actions are carried out on publicized findings;4. Implementing functional monitoring based on Law No. 28/1999;5. Maintaining the performance of the staff by referring to the Basic Guidelines 6. for Employees in line with Law No.43/1999, and Inspection of Management and Accountability of State Funds (Law No.15/2004).

As one of BRR’s entities, all auditors of Deputy for Supervision had to follow the regulations established by Head of BRR Executing Agency. While undertaking internal monitoring, the auditors were to act professionally and abide by the regulations of the Indonesian government and the ethical code of conduct from the Head of the Executing Agency. After an audit, they were required to diligently, meticulously and clearly complete Work Audit Reports (Kertas Kerja Audit, KKA). The KKA will support the called Audit Results Report (Laporan Hasil Audit, LHA). The results of these reports are closely monitored by the audit team along with the internal and external (BPK and BPKP) monitoring officials. Every finding must be discussed with the party audited so as to engender common understanding.

Auditing an ongoing project was important to quickly resolve any deviations in programs already mapped out and to monitor early signs of irregularities. It was, in fact, a preventive measure. However, due to the circumstances at the time, there were occasions when projects were audited once it had been completed, or a post-audit. In this case, the evaluation was repressive in nature.

The Deputy for Supervision audited all the programs and performance of the staff including a comprehensive operational report, performance audit, and specific audits with a certain objective, and reviewed all BRR’s financial reports. These audits were in line with the Annual Work Program Monitoring (Program Kerja Pengawasan Tahunan, PKPT) that were then distributed to Inspectors I, II and III within the Deputy for Supervision. In the event of special cases, special auditing would be conducted or Non-PKPT Auditing.

Control and evaluation of the Deputy for Supervision performance was undertaken by the chief officer at the Secretariat and Manager of General Administration and Monitoring. Skills and capability of all personnel of the Deputy for Supervision were upgraded from time to time so that they would have a similar perception while carrying out their duties.

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From 2006 up to December 2007, of the 187 assignments, the Deputy for Supervision found 1,669 cases of irregularities from all units of BRR. Of these, 1,376 cases, or nearly 82.4 percent, were followed up and as a result, a total Rp 69.5 billion in state funds was saved.

Supervisory Board As an agency directly set up by the President, members of the Supervisory Board were

directly appointed by the President along with the Head of BRR Executing Agency and the Advisory Board. The Supervisory Board was chaired by Professor Abdullah Ali (now deceased) who was later replaced by Naimah Hassan. Its secretary was Professor Junaidi Hadi Samito, and its members comprised Professor Emil Salim, Mar’ie Muhammad, Lieutenant General TB Silalahi, Kanaka Puradirejam, Major General Djali Yusuf, and Kemal Stamboel.

The task of the Supervisory Board was to apply a standard for transparency and a high degree of accountability in the Aceh-Nias recovery programs. This was why members of the Supervisory Board consisted of local figures, professionals and high-ranking government and non-government officials. The Supervisory Board focused more on policy and program concept, unlike the SAK and Deputy for Supervision, which controlled the operation and implementation of programs.

When SAK became a part of the Supervisory Board, the results of monitoring were not only recommendations in nature but also operational as the Board received reports of possible state losses through the SAK. Prior to directly submitting recommendations to the President, the Supervisory Board shared them with the Head of BRR Executing Agency through consultation meetings or in writing. The Supervisory Board could independently appoint or hire professional auditors or other technical expertise to assist its task. Working in a conceptual domain, the Supervisory Board ensured that BRR implement programs according to the Master Plan.

The Supervisory Board did not wait for report and relevant information from the Executing Agency, as mentioned resources were recruited to directly conduct monitoring of implementation. It was not rare that the Supervisory Board’s evaluations were reported by the mass media, as one channel to inform the public that BRR’s undertaking were both transparent and accountable. The monitoring was carried out on a macro level in terms of policies, but also on a micro level with direct evaluation mechanism on ongoing recovery efforts.

In the context of BRR’s assets, the Supervisory Board focused its work on things that had not been fully evaluated in previous years. Its recommendation, again, was to improve the performance and strategic policy in management, coordination and control systems that could benefit the general public.

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Lessons Learned BRR continued to improve its performance by conducting surveys to detect overall

implementation and application of the Integrity Pact in its operations. The result of this internal evaluation showed that most BRR employees signed the Integrity Pact without being fully aware of the importance of the personal control demanded by their signing. BRR acknowledged that this was one of the weaknesses of the Integrity Pact and hence monitoring by the SAK, Deputy for Supervision and the Supervisory Board was necessary to complement each other.

The Deputy for Supervision created a coordination system for internal BRR and other organizations within the BRR agency as well as internal monitoring department. The implementation of post-audit was carried out consistently and rigidly. Prevention from ambiguity and misinformation was carried out through daily consultation with a number of stakeholders in BRR at the sectoral and the PIU levels. The Supervisory Board also compiled and followed up on reports and findings originating from the locals. Through sustainable coordination and a stratified monitoring mechanism, monitoring was can be implemented in all layers.

Potential for ReplicationAn organization that deals with a large number of projects and an enormous amount

of funds involving various interest groups will require a stratified monitoring system. Aware of this fact, BRR made the Integrity Pact, which reflected a change of paradigm of imposing personal self-control. Although such a control covered personal matters, it nevertheless did not compromise the trust in the professionalism and ethics of those employed by BRR.

Such awareness needed to be supported by another layer for monitoring. The Deputy for Supervision served as BRR’s internal audit. By integrating SAK and the Supervisory Board, the role of recommendations and response could be executed by the Supervisory Board simultaneously. In the case of BRR, tight monitoring was applied without limiting the flexibility of the recovery players. While reports on findings could be submitted to the President, there was always a mechanism to resolve the said findings. The controls were also aimed at reducing state losses.

Quality Control of BRR Project Construction Under BRR’s work system, quality assurance (QA) was conducted by a separate unit

called the Center of Construction Quality Control (Pusat Pengendalian Mutu Konstruksi, PPMK). The unit was assigned to evaluate every project financed by APBN that had been completed by contractors or consultants following quality control (QC).

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The QA system itself was not popular among government agencies as it was applied only by private companies. Government projects only dealt with QC by the consultants without rechecking the results of such control. To BRR, QA was needed to ensure that the work of the PIU and PPK were supervised by consultants and progressed smoothly.

BackgroundThe plan to assure quality began at the establishment of BRR, because rehabilitation

and reconstruction work will be entrusted to the Provincial Government.

At that time, there was a question as to what control system BRR would use in implementing its programs. The answer was the No Objection Letter (NOL) for results of procurement, payment as well as handover. As such, there would be an overflow of administrative tasks. Aside from that, would BRR be able to issue NOLs according to the prevailing procedures? The answer was that BRR would hamper or become a bottleneck to the reconstruction process.

Based on that consideration, BRR eventually relinquish the verification task to the ahead of PIU and PPK without the NOL mechanism. BRR adopted only the QA system, namely rechecking reports on the quality of projects made by supervising consultants. The rechecking process was carried out randomly from time to time.

Quality Assurance Implementation in BRR The first QA team comprised consultants from Cardino-Acil for Technical Assistance for

Procurement and Quality Assurance Management (TA for PQAM) overseen by the Deputy for Planning and Programming. Payment for the consultants came from the Technical Assistance to BRR project funded by the MDF and managed by UNDP. Unfortunately, the quick phase of construction was not met by the speed of work of PQAM consultants so that BRR did not always obtain the latest report on the progress of projects. Besides not making very clear-cut reports, the consultants also gave weak recommendations.

When the QA task was taken over by BRR’s Deputy for Infrastructure, the system for quality management was studied and improved by experts from the Indonesian Research Affiliation Institute at the Bandung Institute of Technology (Lembaga Afiliasi Penelitian Indonesia-Institut Teknologi Bandung, LAPI-ITB) and the Syiah Kuala University, Aceh. The study showed that the new system was superior to the one applied by PQAM consultants and so the contract with PQAM was terminated while the funds already allocated for it was channeled to cover other technical assistance costs. The flow of information on projects swiftly reached BRR. The findings of the QA team became the new reference for technical actions toward PIUs and PPKs.

The new mechanism proved to be very helpful. Hence the QA Team was further strengthened and provided with transportation and laboratory equipment. It was also an advantage for BRR because the findings from the project sites were varied, such as quality justifications, insufficient thickness, volume shortage, and technical and administrative

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errors. These findings enabled BRR to provide an objective opinion. To give the QA Team greater independence to work beyond infrastructure issues, it was moved and included in Deputy for Operations so that QA could be applied in all sectors of BRR, otherwise known as PPMK.

Lesson Learned The PPMK’s main activities were to present and report its findings, to be followed up

by sectoral deputies or heads of representative offices. This method proved to be more effective than onsite inspections by other BRR officials. Onsite inspections by the Head of BRR Executing Agency or the head of local administration agencies could never obtain such detailed findings.

This was the reason strengthening the QA units in the respective government agencies became very important in helping government management. Government agencies that had their own laboratories could implement the QA program periodically by strengthening their employees and covering field inspection costs. Creating such a unit outside the government technical office could help the government improve its capability in quality management and even become a “sparring partner” for government technical office in heightening the overall accountability and integrity of the team as a whole.

Based on reports from PPMK, the Deputy for Operations along with other BBR officials made a list contractors, consultants and even suppliers that underperformed. If they were previous warnings given to them went unheeded, sanctions would be imposed and they would not be allowed to participate in BRR tenders in the following year.

Government agencies were not used to imposing such sanctions. To BRR, however, evaluating the performance of those involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction work was part of enhancing the QA system. BRR had thrice publicized the names of black-listed companies. The first time listed 58 companies, the second time 105 companies, and the last time 129 companies. Although the sanctions were imposed only by BRR, the Aceh Provincial Government later used the list and adopted the system as a guideline for regional development.

Potential for ReplicationGiven the benefit of its formation in BRR, similar QA units would be advantageous for

in other government PIUs. The QA unit could be a tool for control and give early warnings on the quality of construction. It could also be useful as a sub-team of an internal control along with SAK (that normally focused only on accounting matters and financial management). A QA team is highly expected to provide recommendations or resolutions for construction works, or to reduce the scope of work as necessary. Further, the QA team could put forward objective opinions in the event of disputes between consultants or contractors and PIUs or PPKs regarding the quality of a construction.

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Monitoring and Evaluating Project Implementation

The Center of Regional Program and Project Controlling (Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Wilayah, P4W) and the Center of Sectoral Project Controlling and Implementing (Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan Proyek Sektoral, P4S), present the progress of all BRR activities in every sector, from the progress of each packet, consolidation of sector and regional progress in an array of perspective. Information on overall achievement was consolidated into one S-Curve and presented to the Agency’s management board. The report was updated almost every minute during a span of 24 hours. This was a breakthrough in monitoring government activities.

Background In general, BBR projects were comprised of sector projects managed by Deputy heads

and by regional projects lead by Head of representative offices at the regional or district level. Responsibility for project implementation were therefore divided into two as well with the P4W and P4S.

Onsite monitoring was intensively carried out by involving various parties, such as representatives of the P4W and P4S, the SAK, the Agency’s Secretary, Head of Representative offices and Sector Deputies. To accelerate the attainment of goals in rehabilitation and reconstruction work, the Deputy for Operations focused the work of the P4W on project implementation management. Reports of the monitoring were presented and jointly analyzed. For this reason, problems can be mapped out and presented at the bi-weekly meetings of the BRR management board.

From Monitoring and Evaluating Team to Problem Solving Initially, both the P4W and P4S. teams focused only on monitoring project

implementation by making onsite visits. But as time went by, the teams were often asked to solve practical problems on the field. Their valuable field experience had enabled the teams to quickly detect and be responsive to the probably of success of a project.

During a Board meeting in Banda Aceh, the teams presented their reports by using various media that directly illustrated their findings in monitoring, such photographs and video recordings, serving as solid evidence of the progress. Parties responsible for providing an explanation and argumentation on the cause of delay and the appropriate next steps were discussed openly.

To accelerate the coordinated action plan process, the units were then given greater responsibilities. They also handled the approval of projects, DIPA, and construction implementation. A number of projects previously overseen by the Deputy for Finance and Planning and the relevant sector Deputies were transferred to P4W and P4S.

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Fund usage was monitored through SPM at the KPPN-K13 , while physical progress from the P4W and P4S team monitoring were integrated with the financial disbursements. The information then appeared in real-time on TVs placed at strategic locations and at the office of the Head of BRR Executing Agency as dashboard to keep everyone up-to-date on a project’s progress at any given time.

Broadly speaking, P4W and P4S compiled their data by using a system much like that used by other government agencies, namely by consolidating and analyzing basic data. In short, they simplified dozens of data sheets into a single sheet and even into a single figure. This process was supported and assisted by all deputies and representative offices.

Lessons Learned To BRR, monitoring through real-time updates was very useful because it enabled the

agency to instantly assess progress and make quick decisions. At its onset, consolidating all information into one format agreed upon by all parties was not easy. Apart from that, the management board meetings fostered an open leadership, decision-making, and discussion style. If this model was used by other ministries/government agencies, it could speed up slow bureaucratic procedures. BRR’s monitoring system could be taken as an example by provincial governments and other development projects.

Potential for ReplicationThrough various processes, the monitoring format used by BRR was well tested and

improved upon. Besides being effective in solving problems in the field, the system is easy to apply, in just one or two days. The reliability of the system applied in P4W and P4S is in the discipline of the team to jointly use the agreed upon format and their diligence in updating information.

In the case of BRR, some 30 professionals were involved in collecting data from the field to prepare reports and make action plans for each unit before presenting the reports as a dashboard of progress to the management board. Similar mechanism can be adopted by central and provincial governments.

Eventually, a leader and leadership pattern of an organization becomes a key factor in determining the success of a massive project. Success can be easily achieved when the leader demonstrates political will and consistently turns his ideas into reality, maintaining it as a valuable “best practice”.

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Figure 8.3 BRR Performance Dashboard

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THE breakthroughs described in the previous chapters were completed with the group of innovative steps in monitoring and evaluation phase. This was not without purpose. In implementing rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, BRR ensured that every stage of project development was keenly monitored and regulated. Results of evaluations were used as lessons to be learned, that feed back into the cycle as it continues to turn. First came planning, followed by updated data, project identification, review of funding resources, preparation, management, project implementation, evaluation and so forth. A cyclic process of a government agency’s undertakings takes one fiscal year.

Entrusted with a four-year mandate, BRR underwent four cyclic processes, namely the fiscal years of 2005 to 2008. In the 2009 fiscal year, BRR received no further special funds from the government as its term ended on April 16, 2009.

No matter how unique BRR was compared to other government agencies, it nevertheless was a government body that operated under the state budget scheme. At times, the Agency had to undergo several processes before it could make a breakthrough, after careful planning and improving its performance.

Conclusion

A playground at the drifted PLTD (Diesel Powered Plant Center) a notable tsunami site, Banda Aceh, February 19, 2009. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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The international commitment to help the recovery process after the greatest natural disaster of the early 21st century could be said to be extraordinarily unusual. This was due to the innovative measure taken by the Indonesian government to set up BRR. The breakthroughs described in this book were possible because they were supported by strong pillars, namely accountable program management and the transparent flow of funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction work. Transparency boosted the trust of a number of countries as well as national and international donor organizations in the recovery work.

To maintain international trust and commitment, BRR designed a work system that reduced complicated bureaucratic procedures. The Agency tried to create a user-friendly work system as well as friendly atmosphere for all parties involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. Not only was the system applicable, it also reduced the risk of deviations and irregularities. In line with the growing trust of the international community, aid commitments to Aceh and Nias also increased.

International support grew as the various innovative measures taken and breakthroughs made by BRR proved to be efficient and effective in rebuilding the disaster

The BRR flag is lowered for the last time in a ceremony marking the end

of four years of hard work toward the recovery of Aceh and Nias after the

tsunami. Banda Aceh, April 15, 2009. Photo: Ricky Sugiarto

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areas. This prompted international parties to give various grants that had never been extended to Indonesia before. More than that, BRR also lobbied and cooperated with a number of countries, some of which even participated in reconstruction projects. All of BBR’s efforts were like building a stairway to gain greater international trust.

The breakthroughs, either conceptual or procedural, were like a refreshing breeze sweeping BRR along to perform better. Better here meant working faster while maintaining the targeted quality of rehabilitation and reconstruction. A better work system obviously facilitated both the government and donor organizations to undertake development projects in disaster-hit areas in Aceh and Nias.

In fact breakthroughs are needed not only to achieve a better quality of development but also to simplify bureaucratic procedures so that the government can offer quick services to the public and improve their welfare. Obviously certain conditions need to be taken into consideration to make breakthroughs in particular sectors.

Evidence of the breakthroughs could be seen in the fact that 93 percent of the pledged international aid was disbursed. This illustrates that breakthroughs made by any government agency can boost an agency’s performance no matter where it operates. An organization with a flexible work system is very useful for disaster-prone regions. Likewise, an ad hoc organization can be more functional operating in areas with damaged infrastructure and facilities. BRR is a good example of such a combination.

BRR made various breakthroughs in Aceh and Nias – regions that are prone to natural disasters and armed conflict. Similar measures could be applied in other remote areas, not only in Indonesia but also elsewhere in the world.

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Notes

1 Presidential Decree No. 30 Year 2005 on Master Plan revised through Presidential Regulation No. 47 Year 2008 on Master Plan Revision.

2 Clustering of several projects in one environmental report, such as DPPL and Amdal. This was based on the consideration that the impacts of facilities and infrastructure constructed in adjacent locations could share similarities.

3 CFAN was held four times during BRR’s mandate. CFAN 1 in 2005 was was held in Jakarta.

4 Literally meaning house owners; figuratively meaning local people5 Literally meaning neighbors; figuratively meaning outsiders providing

assistance6 Considering point c: “that rehabilitation and reconstruction … should be

conducted in a special, systematic and wholly integrated manner through participation, and by respecting the community’s aspirations and needs …”

7 A group supported by the Urban Poor Consortium, Jakarta.8 Through collaboration of NGOs and several international institutions such

as AIPRD Logica (Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh), Mercy Corps, UN-Habitat, and during the process of formation supported by US-AID (United States Agency for International Development).

9 The number of villages that were monitored and evaluated: Banda Aceh 35, Aceh Besar 35, Aceh Jaya 72, West Aceh 43, Aceh Singkil 12, Simeulue 10, Pidie 34, Bireuen 38, North Aceh 10, East Aceh 6. In total: 346 villages.

10 Deviations in the implementation of village planning programs were calculated by adding (a) programs that had not yet been implemented to (b) implementations that were not conducted according to the respective detailed programs. Deviations of implementation were classified similarly as deviations of village planning documents.

11 As described below, KSF did not directly cover the whole sub-district as it did in 2008 and 2009. Previously it only covered 19 sub-districts due to the limited available time and the focus was on areas that were destroyed by the disaster, which meant, mostly to coastal areas.

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12 WIMAX is Broadband Wireless Access technology with high-speed accessibility with a wide coverage. WiMAX is an evolution from the previous BWA technology, with more attractive features. (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/WiMAX)

13 The Special Office for State Services and Treasury set up to pay the expenses of reconstruction work in Aceh and Nias.

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Glossary of Abbreviations

Abbreviations Indonesian English

ADB Bank Pembangunan Asia Asian Development BankAGDC Pusat Data Geospasial Aceh Aceh Geospatial Data CenterAmdal Analisis Mengenai Dampak

LingkunganAnalysis Concerning Environmental Impact

AMT Tim Pengelola Hubungan Mitra Kerja Account Management TeamANTF Dana Perwalian Aceh Nias; Cikal bakal

Dana Perwalian Pemulihan Aceh Nias (RANTF)

Aceh Nias Trust Fund; Later becomes Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF)

APBD Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah

Provincial Annual Budget

APBN Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara

Government of Indonesia’s National Annual Budget

ASEAN Perhimpunan Negara-Negara Asia Tenggara

Association of South East Asia Nations

ASMT Tim Keamanan Wilayah (unit keamanan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa)

Area Security Management Team

Bakosurtanal Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional

Indonesia’s National Coordinating Agency for Survey and Mapping

Bapel Badan Pelaksana Executing AgencyBappeda Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan

DaerahRegional Development Planning Agency

Bappenas Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional

National Development Planning Agency

BPK Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Supreme Audit AgencyBPN Badan Pertanahan Nasional National Land AgencyBPPN Badan Penyehatan Perbankan

NasionalIndonesian Bank Reconstruction Agency

BPS Badan Pusat Statistik Statistic Center AgencyBRA Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh Aceh Peace-Reintegration AgencyBRR Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi

Wilayah dan Kehidupan Masyarakat Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan Kepulauan Nias Provinsi Sumatera Utara

Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Regions and Community of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and the Nias Island of the Province of North Sumatera

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Abbreviations Indonesian English

CDP Program Pengembangan Komunitas Community Development ProgramCFAN Forum Koordinasi untuk Aceh dan

NiasCoordination Forum for Aceh and Nias

CRS Pelayanan Tanggap-darurat Katolik Catholic Relief ServicesDAD Pangkalan Data Dukungan

PembangunanDevelopment Assistance Database

DLA Asesmen Kerusakan dan Kerugian Damage and Loss AssessmentDED Desain Enjinering Detail Detail Engineering DesignDIPA Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran Issuance of Spending AuthorityDPPL Dokumen Pengelolaan dan

Pemantauan LingkunganEnvironment Management and Monitoring Document

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat House of Representative DPRA Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh Aceh’s Regional House of

RepresentativeDPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Regional House of RepresentativeDPRK Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

Kabupaten/KotaDistrict’s House of Representative

DRR Pengurangan Risiko Bencana Disaster Risk ReductionEIA Asesmen Dampak Lingkungan Environmental Impact Assesmente-proc Pengadaan barang/jasa secara

elektronikE-Procurement

EWS Sistem Peringatan Dini Early Warning SystemFM Manajemen Keuangan Financial ManagementFPK Forum Pemulihan Kabupaten/Kota Kabupaten/ Kota Recovery ForumGAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Free Aceh MovementGFP Pihak yang diandalkan untuk

penyebaran dan penerapan informasi isu gender

Gender Focal Point

GIS Sistem Informasi Geospasial Geospatial Information SystemGoI Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Government of IndonesiaGPS Sistem navigasi satelit Global Positioning SystemGTZ Gesselschaft for Technische

Zusammenarbeit (Kerja Sama Teknis Indonesia-Jerman)

Gesselschaft for Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)

HMKU Hubungan Mitra Kerja Utama Key Account RelationsHSU Harga Satuan Umum Standard Unit PriceIAP Investasi dan Akses Pasar Market investment and access

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Abbreviations Indonesian English

IASC Dewan Koordinasi antar Donor di Aceh Nias

Inter Agency Standing Committee

ICT Teknologi Informasi dan Komunikasi Information and Communication Technology

ICW Pemantau Korupsi Indonesia Indonesia Corruption WatchIFRC Federasi Palang Merah Internasional

dan Komunitas Bulan Sabit MerahInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Inpres Instruksi Presiden Presidential InstructionIntosai Organisasi Internasional Badan

Pemeriksa Keuangan se-DuniaInternational Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions

IOM Organisasi Internasional untuk Migrasi Penduduk

Internal Organization for Migration

IPM Indeks Pembangunan Manusia Human Development IndexIREP Program Pemampuan Rekonstruksi

PrasaranaInfrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Program

IRFF Sarana Pendanaan Rekonstruksi Prasarana

Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facilitiy

JICA Badan Kerja Sama Internasional Jepang

Japan International Cooperation Agency

JICS Badan Jepang mengenai Sistem Kerja Sama Internasional

Japan International Cooperation System

JLT Sertifikat Kepemilikan Bersama atas Tanah

Joint Land Titling

K/L Kementerian Negara/Lembaga Ministry/InstitutionKabapel Kepala Badan Pelaksana Head of Executing AgencyKAP Kecamatan Action Plan Rencana Aksi KecamatanKasatker Kepala Satker Head of Project Implementing Unit Keppres Keputusan Presiden Presidential DecreeKKA Kertas Kerja Audit Audit WorksheetKKN Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme Corruption, Collusion, and NepotismKP4D Komite Percepatan Pembangunan

Perumahan dan Permukiman DesaThe Village Committee for Housing and Settlement Development Acceleration

KPPN Kantor Pelayanan dan Perbendaharaan Negara

Office for State Services and Treasury

KPPN-K Kantor Pelayanan dan Perbendaharaan Negara-Khusus

Special Office for State Services and Treasury

KSF-AP Kerangka-kerja Tata Ruang dan Rencana Aksi Kecamatan

Kecamatan Spatial Framework and Action Plan

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Abbreviations Indonesian English

LAPI-ITB Lembaga Afiliasi Penelitian Indonesia-Institut Teknologi Bandung

Indonesian Research Afiliation Institute- Bandung Institute of Technology

LARAP Rencana Aksi Akuisisi Lahan dan Pemukiman-kembali

Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan

LHA Laporan Hasil Audit Audit ReportLHKPN Laporan Harta Kekayaan

Penyelenggara NegaraAsset Inventory of Government Officials

LSM Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

MDF Dana Multi-Donor Multi-Donor FundMDTF Dana Perwalian Multi-Donor; Cikal

bakal Dana Multi-DonorMulti-Donor Trust Fund; Later becomes Multi-Donor Fund

monev Pemantauan dan evaluasi Monitoring and evaluationMoU Nota Kesepahaman Memorandum of UnderstandingMPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat People’s Consultative AssemblyMTR Evaluasi Paruh Waktu Mid-Term ReviewNAD Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam ProvinceNASA Badan Antariksa Nasional Amerika

SerikatNational Aeronautics and Space Administration

NGO Organisasi nonpemerintah/ Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM)

Non-Governmental Organization

NIRAM Pemetaan aset Pemulihan di Kepulauan Nias

Nias Islands Recovery Asset Mapping

Nisel Kabupaten Nias Selatan District of South NiasNISM Pertemuan pemangku kepentingan

Kepulauan NiasNias Islands Stakeholder Meeting

NOL Surat Pernyataan Tidak Berkeberatan No Objection LetterOC Sebuah unit di bawah Deputi

Operasi yang kemudian dipecah menjadi Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan Proyek Wilayah (P4W), Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan Proyek Sektoral (P4S) dan Pusat Data dan Informasi (Pusdatin)

Operation Centre (a unit under BRR’s Deputy of Operation)

off-budget Anggaran non-Pemerintah Indonesia (non-APBN)

Non-Indonesian state budget

on-budget Anggaran Pemerintah Indonesia (APBN)

Indonesian state budget

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P2TP2A Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu untuk Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak

Integrated Service Centre for Women and Children

P4S Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan Proyek Sektoral

Center of Sectoral Project Controlling and Implementing

P4W Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Wilayah

Center of Regional Program and Project Controlling

PBB Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa United Nations (UN) PCN Nota-Konsep Proyek Project Concept-NotePDAM Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Regional Potable Water CompanyPemda Pemda Regional GovernmentPemkab Pemerintah Kabupaten District GovernmentPemprov Pemerintah Provinsi Province GovernmentPerpres Peraturan Presiden Presidential RegulationPerppu Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti

Undang-UndangGovernment Regulation in Lieu of Law

PHLN Pinjaman/Hibah Luar Negeri Foreign Soft Loans/GrantPIWG Kelompok Kerja Informasi Publik Public Information Working GroupPLTMH Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Mikro

HidroMicro Hydro-powered Electrical Generator

PLTS Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Surya Solar-powered Electrical GeneratorPMI Palang Merah Indonesia Indonesian Red CrossPMT Pengakhiran Masa Tugas Exit StrategyPNS Pegawai Negeri Sipil Civil ServantPP Peraturan Pemerintah Government RegulationPPK Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen Contract Preparation Officer PPMK Pusat Pengendalian Mutu Konstruksi

(dalam BRR)Center of Construction Quality Control (within BRR)

PQAM Nama konsultan di bidang Pengelolaan Pengadaan Jasa dan Penjaminan Mutu

Procurement and Quality Assurance Management

PRB Pengurangan Risiko Bencana Disaster Risk ReductionPusdatin Pusat Data dan Informasi Center for Data and InformationQA Penjaminan Mutu Quality AssuranceQC Pengendalian Mutu Quality ControlRANdatabase Basis-data Pemulihan Aceh-Nias Recovery Aceh-Nias DatabaseRANTF Dana Perwalian Pemulihan Aceh-Nias Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund

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Abbreviations Indonesian English

RDTRK Rencana Detail Tata Ruang Kota A standard nomenclature of Indonesian (Partial/ Subdivisions of) City Plan

Renaksi Rencana Aksi Action PlanRenstra Rencana Strategis Strategic PlanRI Republik Indonesia Republic of IndonesiaRKL Rencana Pengelolaan Lingkungan Environment Management PlanRp Rupiah Rupiah (Indonesian currency)RPL Rencana Pemantauan Lingkungan Environmental Monitoring PlanRTRWK Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kota A standard nomenclature of

Indonesian City PlanSAK Satuan Antikorupsi Anti-corruption UnitSatker Satuan Kerja Project Implementing UnitSBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (presiden

keenam RI)Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (the 6th president of Indonesia)

SDI Data Informasi Tata Ruang/ Spasial Spatial Data InfrastructureSDM Sumber Daya Manusia Human ResourcesSekjen Sekretaris Jendreal Secretary GeneralSimas Sistem Informasi Manajemen Aset Asset Management Information

SystemSIM-C Pusat Informasi Spasial dan

PemetaanSpatial Information and Mapping-Centre

SK Surat Keputusan DecreeSMS Layanan pesan singkat Short Message ServiceSNI Standar Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Standards

(published by the Department of Public Works)

SOP Prosedur Operasi Standar Standard Operating ProcedureSP2D Surat Perintah Pencairan Dana Fund Disbursement Order LetterSPI Satuan Pengawas Internal Internal Supervisory UnitSPM Sistem Pengendalian Manajemen Management Control SystemSumut Sumatera Utara North SumateraTA Tahun Anggaran Fiscal YearTDMRC Pusat Riset Tsunami dan Mitigasi

BencanaTsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center

TGLL Hikmah Ajar Global Tsunami Tsunami Global Lessons LearnedTII Organisasi nonpemerintah (LSM) yang

berfokus melawan korupsi Transparency International Indonesia

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Abbreviations Indonesian English

TPA Tempat Pembuangan Akhir Final Disposal AreaTPI Tempat Pelelangan Ikan Fish Auction MarketTPS Tempat Pembuangan Sementara Temporary Disposal AreaTRIP Daftar Indikator Pemulihan Tsunami

(Berupa Buku Laporan per tahun)Tsunami Recovery Indicators Package

UKL Upaya Pengelolaan Lingkungan Environmental Management EffortUN Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB) United NationsUNDP Program Pembangunan Perserikatan

Bangsa-BangsaUnited Nations Development Programme

UNECLAC Komisi Ekonomi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa untuk Amerika Latin dan Karibia

United Nations- Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

UNHIC Pusat Informasi Kemanusiaan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa

United Nations Humanitarian Information Centre

UNICEF Dana Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa untuk urusan Anak-anak

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNIMS Sistem Manajemen Informasi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa

United Nations Information Management Systems

UNJLS Pusat Gabungan Logistik Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa

United Nations Joint Logistic Centre

UNOCHA Badan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa mengenai Koordinasi Urusan Kemanusiaan

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNORC Badan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa Koordinator Pemulihan khusus untuk Aceh dan Nias

United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias

UPL Upaya Pemantauan Lingkungan Environmental Monitoring EffortUS$ Dollar Amerika Serikat American Dollars USAID Badan Amerika Serikat untuk

Pembangunan InternasionalUnited States Agency for International Development

UU Undang-Undang LawUUPA Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh Law on Governing of AcehVM Pemetaan Desa Village MappingVP Perencanaan Desa Village PlanningWanrah Dewan Pengarah Advisory BoardWanwas Dewan Pengawas Supervisory BoardWapres Wakil Presiden Vice PresidentWFP Badan Pangan Dunia World Food Programme

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