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Can the Right Hemisphere Speak?
Chris Code
School of Communication Disorders
Faculty of Health Sciences
University of Sydney
Lidcombe, NSW 2141
Australia
Ph: (02) 646 6450
Fax: (02) 646 4853
Email: [email protected]
(Paper appeared in Special Issue of
BRAIN & LANGUAGE Edited by Diana Van Lancker)
2
Abstract While a capacity for the right hemisphere in language and language related
functions is established, a role for the right hemisphere in speech production is
controversial. The question of the nature of a possible right hemisphere speech
production capability has centred mainly around the Jacksonian notion of
nonpropositional speech. In this paper I examine whether the right hemisphere
does have a particular role in nonpropositional speech through an exploration
of the neurophysiological evidence, research in aphasic speech automatisms
and the degree of propositionality in the retained speech of adult left
hemispherectomy patients.
3
Introduction The final dogma of the dominance model is the notion that, while the left
hemisphere may not control all language processing, what it does do that the
right cannot do is speak. While there is little doubt that the normal right
hemisphere is engaged in language processing, a role for the right hemisphere
in speech production is controversial.
After some 30 years of research it now appears certain that the right cerebral
hemisphere in human beings is involved in language processing (for reviews see
Code, 1987; Chiarello, 1988; Joanette, Goulet & Hannequin, 1990). However, for
100 years, since the earliest days of modern neuropsychology, it was considered
impossible for the right hemisphere to possess any language functioning at all
(see Bogen, 1969). The question currently concerns the extent and nature of
right hemisphere involvement in language. The significant barrier to answering
questions concerning extent and nature results in large measure from the
population and methodological differences between studies. There has been
research with normal subjects, stroke and head injured patients, epileptic
patients, hemispherectomies and commissurotomies, in groups and as single
cases. Investigators have used a range of methodologies which have included
neuropathology, lesions studies, cerebral bloodflow and metabolism, electric
activity and electrical stimulation, and the effects of anaesthetizing the
hemispheres. A variety of behavioural methods that are thought to measure
'lateral advantage' for a wide range of language tasks and materials have
developed. These methods have been used to determine the contribution of
the left and right hemisphere to language processing by examining and
measuring laterality effects in the auditory, visual and tactile modalities; and by
measuring eye and eyebrow movements, finger tapping, and degree of lateral
mouth opening during speech. Thus, there is built in incompatibility in much
neuropsychological research with a lack of agreement between studies and a
poor replication record (Code, 1987). So, the data from these studies is mainly
inconclusive. A further complication is that it is clear that there are significant
individual differences in cognitive style and response to experimental tasks
(Segalowitz and Bryden, 1983), brain organisation and representation of
language (Ojemann, 1979), and cerebral circulation (Hart, Lesser, Fisher,
Schwerdt, Bryan and Gordon 1991).
4
Holding these substantial obstacles to firm conclusions in mind, what does the
research tells us about the right hemisphere's role in language processing in the
normal brain? The study of aphasic symptomatology over the last one hundred
years or so confirms that damage to the left hemisphere for the great majority of
right handers and most left handers results in impairments of those aspects of
language which can be characterised through a formal unit-and-rule
generative linguistic model. The foundations of neuropsychology, from the time
of Broca to the present day, are based predominantly on the data that brain
damaged people provide. The brain, of course, can suffer damage in a number
of unfortunate ways, and the nature of the damage that it suffers bears directly
upon the character of the disruption to cognition and the behaviour that is
observed. The neural organization of language, or any other aspect of
cognition, is unlikely to be the same in a brain with a history of epilepsy where
the two hemispheres have been split by surgery, a brain where a hemisphere
isolated by surgical removal of its neighbour and a brain damaged by
cerebrovascular accident or progressive disease process. The source of the
evidence then should be borne in mind when evaluating its relevance to the
role of the right hemisphere in speech.
In this paper we examine the question of a right hemisphere speech capability
through a critical evaluation of the main evidence. We will focus mainly on the
claim, originating with Hughlings Jackson, that the right hemisphere has a role in
the origination and generation of nonpropositional and automatic speech. First,
we outline the nature of automatic and non propositional speech; second, we
examine neurophysiological evidence for right hemisphere involvement in
automatic speech production; the third section assesses the idea that aphasic
speech automatisms are products of the right hemisphere; lastly, the nature of
remaining speech in adult left hemispherectomy subjects is evaluated.
1. Nonpropositional and Automatic Speech
Much of our general behaviour is routine and automatically produced
(MacNeilage, 1970; Shallice, 1988). A great deal of our mental and motor
activity is not under conscious control. In speech production there is much that is
automatic and routine, despite the originality and creativity of human language
(MacNeilage, 1979). Lenneberg (1957) pointed out over 25 years ago that
5
thousands of muscular contractions take place during every second of speech,
and these involve complex interactive muscular activity at respiratory,
articulatory, laryngeal and pharyngeal levels. Much of our speech is not under
moment-to-moment segmental control, with each segment being individually
and sequentially executed. The rapid and proficient production of speech that
we are capable of would be physiologically impossible with if we had to plan
and perform each segment individually. Speech appears to be under a mixture
of closed-loop and open-loop control (Kozhevnikov & Chistovitch, 1966). Under
closed-loop control, speech is feedback-controlled, segmentally planned and
produced whereas in open-loop control whole chunks are holistically formulated
and executed. Despite the physiological and mechanico-inertial constraints of
the neuromuscular system normal speech is produced with relative speed and
fluency. This means that a significant amount of automaticity characterizes
speech production.
Jackson’s (1874) observations of brain damaged patients convinced him that
language could be contrasted in terms of it's propositionality and automaticity.
He also introduced the idea that the left hemisphere was responsible for
processing propositional language whereas both right and left were involved in
the processing of nonpropositional language. The right hemisphere is the one for
the most automatic use of words, and the left the one in which automatic use
of words merges into voluntary use of words - into speech (Jackson, 1874; pp. 81-
82).
The idea that language can be distinguished in terms of it's automaticity and
propositionality has been utilised by a number of writers since Jackson
(Goldstein, 1948; Goldman-Eisler, 1968; Van Lancker, 1987, 1993; Code, 1987,
1991; Wray, 1992). It is argued (Van Lancker, 1987, 1993; Code, 1987, 1991; Wray,
1992) that nonpropositional, holistically processed, formulaic language does not
entail straight linguistic, unit-and-rule analysis and synthesis and does not
engage components of a generative grammar. Propositionality appears to be a
feature of natural language use, although it is not a variable which can be
easily manipulated in the psycholinguistics laboratory.
The main features of more nonpropositional and automatic language are
invariance of production and a non segmental and holistic construction. Verbal
6
activities like recitation, counting, listing the days of the week and the months of
the year and rote repetition of arithmetic tables are low in propositionality; they
do not involve the generation and process of new ideas and their conversion
into original utterances and they are very familiar. Van Lancker (1993) recently
listed examples of nonpropositional speech as idioms, slang, cliches, social
formulaic speech, rote learnt recited speech and serial speech. Such regularly
used idioms as 'Have a nice day', 'Good to see you' and 'By the way' are most
probably processed as single lexical items, as a complete holistic package, as
'sealed units'. Van Lancker (1993) suggests that the idiom is the clearest example
of nonliteral language as it is not interpretable by the simple application of
grammatical rules. The contents of popular songs, particularly the titles and
choruses of popular songs, often utilize idioms such as 'Walkin the Dog', 'What
Goes Up Must Come Down', 'What the World Needs Now', 'Give Peace a
Chance', 'The Way We Were', 'Here Comes the Sun'. The known role of the right
hemisphere in the processing of music, especially in non-musicians (see Code,
1987), suggests a more than coincidental relationship between successful
popular songs and idiomatic and slang language. Proverbs are interesting as
they appear to have a literal and a nonliteral meaning. For instance 'Rome
wasn't built in a day' at a literal concrete level means that it took more than a
day to build Rome. A more abstract nonliteral meaning is that it takes a look
time to complete major tasks. However, proverbs are never used in their literal
sense. Right hemisphere damaged patients (Hier & Kaplan, 1980) and patients
with recently diagnosed dementia (Code & Lodge, 1987) have problems with
nonliteral interpretation of proverbs.
Formulaic language is not devoid of meaning, and when such speech is used
more propositionally and appropriately, then the phonological representation
for the utterance would be activated by semantic representation. Much of it is
very high in expressive significance. Many nonpropositional communications, like
social greetings, have a major pragmatic function, and idioms express familiar
messages. Although automatic, therefore, the degree of 'propositionality'
inherent in automatically produced language must be variable and situation-
specific. Features of nonpropositional language may be evolutionally pre-
linguistic. Much of it appears to be concerned with social and emotional
aspects of communication and expression which pre-exist the capacity in
human beings to generate fully predicative propositional language.
7
It was Jackson's observations of aphasic speech automatisms and recurring
utterances which led him to propose the idea of propositionality. Jackson (1889)
saw aphasic speech automatisms as primitive and automatic behaviour and the
expression of levels lower down the neural hierarchy which have been released
from higher level inhibition. We explore these utterances in a later section, but
first examine the evidence from investigations using a range of
neurophsyiological technigues.
2. The Neurophysiological Evidence
There is little evidence that electrical stimulation of the right hemisphere
produces speech (see Ojemann, 1983). Stimulation of motor cortex impairs the
ability to mimic single orofacial movements, sometimes with arrestt of speech.
Right hemisphere stimulation rarely causes changes in mimicry of more
sequential oral movements. The classic studies of Penfield and Roberts (1959)
showed that stiluation of right and left hemisphere lip, tongue and jaw areas
precentrally (and to some degree post-centrally) caused vocalization of a fairly
unspecified and sustained vowel cry, 'which at times may have a consonant
component' (p.120). The first studies during speech using the regional cerebral
bloodflow (rCBF) technique by the Lund group in Sweden (Ingvar & Schwartz,
1974; Larsen, Skinhoj and Lassen, 1978; Skinhoj and Larsen, 1980) showed that the
right hemisphere was active during automatic speech tasks. Larsen et al. (1978)
examined automatic counting in 18 right handed, apparently neurologically
normal, subjects. The rCBF showed no significant differences between right and
left hemispheres. The bloodflow was predominatly in the upper premotor and
sensorimotor mouth areas and the auditory areas of the temporal lobes, with no
significant activation of Broca's areas on either side. Right hemipshere bloodflow
appears to be more diffuse during automatic speech tasks than in the left
(Skinhoj and Larsen, 1980). More recently, using the same technique, the same
group examined 15 nonaphasic subjects with some neurological symptoms or
history, all right handed, on reciting the days of the week and humming a
nursery rhyme with a closed mouth (Ryding, Bradvik & Ingvar, 1987). Significantly
more activity was observed in the right than left hemisphere during automatic
speech (p<.001) but not for humming which showed equal bilateral activation.
The investigators conclude that while for the left hemisphere there was more
8
activity in Broca's area, suggesting more concern with control of mouth and
tongue. The right hemisphere appeared to be mainly involved with laryngeal
motor control.
Is there any evidence for a superior role for the right hemisphere in automatic
speech production? Using the Wada technique, Milner and associates (Milner,
Branch and Rasmussen, 1966; Milner, 1974) showed that 7 from 17 left handed
(neurologically impaired) subjects with bilateral representation for speech
production made errors in serial counting forwards and backwards and reciting
the days of the week following right side anaesthesia.. However, following left
side injection the subjects made errors in naming and not in automatic speech.
For 2 other subjects from the same group, naming errors ocurred with right
hemisphere anaesthesia and automatic speech errors with left hemisphere
injection. Kurthen, Linke, Elger, Schramm (1992) reported on a small proportion of
left dominant epileptic subjects (5 out of 148) undergoing Wada investigation
who perseverated on counting while the left hemisphere was anaesthetized.
They suggest that this surprising finding is best explained as a continuation by the
right hemisphere of a programme origination in the left hemisphere.
Speedie, Wertman, Ta'ir and Heilman (1993) recently described a right-handed
Hebrew-French bilingual patient whose automatic speech was disrupted
following haemorrhage involving the right basal ganglia. The patient was not
aphasic but had marked difficulties counting up to 20, reciting the Hebrew
prayers and blessings before eating that were so familiar to him that he had
recited them daily throughout his life. He was unable to recite the intoned
prayers or sing highly familiar songs, although he was able to correctly hum
some. His comprehension of emotional prosody was intact but he could not
produce emotional prosody. While he had never been an habitual swearer he
had sworn occasionally. His ability to swear and curse was also impaired
following the basal ganglia lesion. He was unable to provide the appropriate
expletive for particular situations nor complete a curse. Despite these
impairments in production he was able to comprehend the automatic and
nonpropositional speech he could not produce. At 3 years post-onset he had
not recovered these automatic and nonpropositional speech abilities. This case
would appear to be the first to demonstrate a dissociation between
nonpropositional and propositional speech and provide evidence of actual right
9
hemisphere dominance for automatic and nonpropositional aspects of speech.
Speedie et al. (1993) consider a possible explanation for their patient's
impairments is that the lesion disrupted limbic system input to automatic speech
processes which impaired production while leaving comprehension intact. The
available evidence therefore suggests that a) there are individual differences
and that some people may have a far superior right hemisphere processing of
nonpropositional speech or b) the nature, as well as the extent, of the neural
damage in some patients determines that the right hemisphere is involved to a
larger extent in nonpropositional speech than in other patients.
3. Aphasic Speech Automatisms
Broca's (1861) aphasic patient Leborgne is probably the most familiar aphasic
patient in history; so familiar that he is best known to most simply by his nick-
name 'Tan'. He acquired the name because this was the meaningless utterance
that he produced most times he attempted speech. Tan is often cited as the first
example in the literature of an aphasic speech automatism, although Lebrun
(1986) cites a patient with the expletive 'Sacre nom de Dieu' described by
Aubertin just one week before Broca's case at a meeting of the same French
Anthropological Society. The patient with such a speech automatism, like
Leborgne, is often described as severely, often globally, aphasic in all modalities
(Alajouanine, 1957; Code, 1982a), with severe deficits in the ability to utilise
syntax, semantics and phonology in expression or comprehension in any
modality. For most patients the lesion has effectively destroyed most of the
language system. However, there are indications that certain processes, mainly
basic writing skills in the reported cases, can be partially preserved in some
individuals with CV type recurring utterances (Blanken, Dittmann, Hass &
Wallesch, 1988; Blanken, Wallesch & Papagno, 1990; Blanken, de Langen,
Dittmann & Wallesch, 1989; Kremin, 1987). Despite these retained abilities, these
utterances are associated with severe 'motor' aphasia, Broca's aphasia in
classical terminology, or severe apraxia of speech and aphasia, and they do
not occur in the fluent types of aphasia. The utterance is not an occasional one
for most patients and for some it is the only utterance they can produce (Code,
1982a).
General support for Jackson's view that automatic speech can be significantly
10
preserved in aphasia comes from recent research. Lum and Ellis (1994)
examined the nonpropositional speech skills of a group of 28 aphasic subjects
ranging in type and severity. They compared performance on a range of
nonpropositional tasks (eg., counting, reciting days of the week, months of the
year, nursery rhymes, repetition of familiar phrases and cued picture naming of
familiar phrases) with some matched propositional tasks. They found that
counting 1-10 and cued naming (eg., 'As green as...') showed a particularly
clear advantage over their propositional counterparts. More severely aphasic
patients showed a greater advantage for counting and reciting days of the
week. They too agree that nonpropositional speech is mediated via
phonological or motoric mechanisms and involves little or no semantic
mediation.
Jackson (1874, 1879) was the first to write extensively about speech
automatisms, and a number of terms have been used to describe them
(Wallesch, 1990; Code, 1991, 1994a). In contemporary research speech
automatism is the general term used for stereotyped and inappropriate
utterances, whether lexical or non lexical utterances, whereas recurring
utterance is used to refer to the non lexical variety made up of concatenated
CV syllables (Blanken, 1991; Wallesch, 1990). A range of pathological reiterative
utterances can be observed in neurological and psychiatric populations,
including verbal perseveration, echolalia, palilalia, ictal speech automatisms in
epilepsy and coprolalia in Gille de la Tourette syndrome (see Wallesch, 1990;
and Code, 1991; for reviews). These utterances are not of central concern to this
paper, although many share features and may be closely related. The central
concern here is with those speech automatisms which are a common symptom
of 'motor' forms of aphasia.
Common identifiable subtypes of lexical speech automatisms are expletives,
proper names, yes/no and serial numbers. Interestingly, while there are usually
no apparent semantic or pragmatic connections between the utterance and
the patient's world, proper names are sometimes traceable to a relative of the
patient (Code, 1982a). The most common subtype observed is probably the
pronoun+verb type (Code, 1982a). Here a pronoun is combined with an auxiliary
or modal verb, and sometimes, one or two other words. Additionally, and
intriguingly, the most common word in this subtype is "I". These utterances
11
appear as very personal and emotional expressions, often executed with great
feeling and frustration. Often they are functionally as well as syntactically
incomplete, although of those speech automatisms which do make complete, if
simple, sentences, the pronoun+verb subtype is the most common. An
interesting fact is that in Code (1982a) 3 separate patients from 3 separate
clinical settings produced the same utterance ("I want to.."). The probability of
this happening purely by chance would appear to be very low indeed. This
subtype in particular illustrates the very restricted semantic range utilised in
lexical speech automatisms.
Lexical speech automatisms are syntactically correct structures in the
overwhelming majority of cases. The utterances do not break the syntactic rules
of English. With few exceptions the initial words are syntactically stressed content
words. Although it is not possible to be sure of the syntactic function of words in
speech automatisms, or even if the words have a syntactic function, taking the
words at their face value shows that most are either nouns, pronouns or verbs.
With the exception of expletives and proper names (which do not appear in
frequency counts of normal conversational English) the words which make up
these utterances are all high frequency. Although many automatisms are single,
often repeated, lexical items there are some syntactically complete sentences,
for instance 'now wait a minute', and 'I bin to town' (Code, 1982a). The majority
of pronoun+modal/aux. utterances may fail to complete because of an
inadequate lexical specification of the main verb of an intended utterance, but
many of the utterances observed that do make up complete sentences are of
this subtype.Although made up of recognisable words, the lexical speech
automatism, with the interesting exception of the few personally relevant names
which were traceable to relatives of the patients, has no apparent referential or
contextual connection with the patient's world; the utterance appears to be
phonologically, syntactically and semantically identical each time it is produced
(Code, 1982a).
There is a marked reduction in articulatory complexity compared to normal
conversational English, an increase in the ratio of vowel to consonant
articulations, an increase in stops and nasals and a decrease in fricatives. Where
/n/ and /t/ are the most common phonemes in normal English (Mines, Hanson &
12
Shoup, 1978) and in the lexical type, in non lexical recurring utterances /i/,
schwa, /b/ and /d/ are the most common. This pattern suggests an increase in
use of the motorically 'easier', and unmarked articulations and a reduction of
articulations which are motorically more complex and marked.
Syllabification in non lexical speech automatisms adheres to the sonority
principle, at least in English and German examples of these utterances (Code
and Ball, 1994). Sound segments can be ordered along a sonority hierarchy or
scale from most to least sonorous. All such scales that have been devised agree
with an order that places obstruents (stops, fricatives and affricates) at the least
sonorant end, followed by nasals, liquids, glides to vowels (at the most sonorant
end) (Christman, 1992). The sonority sequencing principle (SSP) aims to account
for segment ordering within syllables, by positing a syntagmatic relationship
between the segments defined by relative sonority. Thus the syllable peak
(normally a vowel) is highlighted by there being an increase of sonority from the
syllable onset to the peak, and then a decrease of sonority from the syllable
peak to the coda. The ideal exponence of such a principle would be for
obstruents to take the onset and coda positions, thus resulting in a maximum
difference in sonority between those positions and the peak. In the case that
onsets and or codas contain more than one segment, the SSP predicts that the
sonority hierarchy comes into play. In onsets an initial obstruent would be
followed by other segments increasing in sonority until we reach the syllable
peak (i.e. obstruent-nasal-liquid-glide-vowel, or O-N-L-G-V), while in syllable
codas we expect the reverse ordering (i.e. V-G-L-N-O). This ordering would
account for commonly occurring syllable types in natural language such as /tra,
dva, sma, mla/, while excluding /*rta, *vda, *msa, *lma/ (Clements, 1988, 1990).
So, what evidence is there to support Jackson's original notion that the right
hemisphere plays a major role in the production of aphasic speech
automatisms? One question concerns the possible origins of the lexical type.
Over the years a number of authors have proposed that the utterance has some
special relationship to the actual moment of brain damage. Jackson (1879,
p.178) states 'I believe them to represent what was, or to represent part of what
ws, the last proposition the patient uttered or was about to utter when taken ill'.
Jackson's well known example is the man who was compiling a catalogue when
his stroke occurred and was left with the automatism 'list complete'. Gowers
13
(1887) believed that the utterance was a though that had already been
expressed; ie. the last thing the patient said before the cerebral incident.
Critchley (1970) supports Gowers position. Alajouanine (1957) proposed that the
utterance was a thought in the process of being organized into an utterance at
the time of the incident. A range of possible origins related to environmental
stimuli experienced by the patient following the cerebral incident are also
possible (Code, 1982b). There would appear to be an incompatibility between
some of these explanations and the very restricted nature of some of the
utterances that we have considered above. It is unlikely, for instance, that 3
separate individuals in separate clinics were all planning to say or had just said 'I
want to...' (Code, 1982a) when their stroke occurred. The major subtypes that
these utterances appear to fall in would also suggest that many were not
'ordinary' utterances just produced or in the process of being produced.
A further possible explanation is that the utterance originates not at the time of
the insult through these cognitive-behavioural activities in operation before or
during the stroke, but as a result of the neuro-chemical activity accompanying
the CVA. The origins of different subtypes may lie in the disturbance of or
disruption to electrical or neurotransmitter activity during or immediately
following the CVA. Thus, some, like the expletive utterances, may have their
origin following a sudden release of limbic mechanisms from the normal neural
balance or inhibition. Clinicians often report patients who were not in the habit
of swearing before their CVA, like the Minister of the church who could produce
only an expletive following his stroke, anecdotally supporting this idea that
expletives may result from release of inhibition of limbic structures. What we may
be observing is the fractionated output of different sub-systems reflecting
contributions from neuronal structures and mechanisms at different
organisational and representational levels throughout the brain.
Large anterior lesions have been found in globally aphasic patients with non
lexical types (Blunk, de Bleser, Willmes & Zeumer, 1981), whereas globally
affected patients without automatisms had a more posterior pattern of
damage. Non lexical types may therefore occur more often with lesions of the
greater Broca's area, and are accompanied by severe aphasia and apraxia of
speech. Subcortical and limbic structures have been implicated in automatism
production, and the basal ganglia have received particular attention. The
14
structure is seen as the site of a motor program generator (Darley, Aronson &
Brown, 1975; Kornhuber, 1977), and damage here has been implicated in the
production of non lexical recurring utterances, lexical speech automatisms,
coprolalia of Tourette's syndrome and pallilalia as found in Parkinson's disease
(Darley, Aronson & Brown, 1975; Leckman et al., 1991) and impaired automatic
speech production (Speedie, Wertman, Ta'ir and Heilman, 1993). Brunner,
Kornhuber, Seemuller, Suger and Wallesch's, 1982) found that basal ganglia
damage is essential for the production of speech automatisms. Using CT they
examined 26 patients with basal ganglia involvement of whom 12 had either
lexical or non lexical utterances. Neither type of utterance occurred in the
patients without basal ganglia damage but automatisms did not occur in
patients who had only subcortical (including basal ganglia) damage. In other
words, a large left hemisphere lesion incorporating both the cortex and basal
ganglia appears to be required in patients with automatisms. Of the 12 patients
with automatisms, 9 had both anterior and posterior damage involving the basal
ganglia and 3 had only anterior damage involving the basal ganglia. Haas,
Blanken, Mezger and Wallesch (1988) used CT scans to examine 49 subjects with
damage including more than 2% of forebrain volume who were more than 4
months post-onset. Sixteen had non lexical and 2 had lexical automatism and all
18 had lesions in the deep fronto-parietal white matter of the left hemisphere. A
relationship between automatism production and structures in the depth of the
area of supply of the middle cerebral artery was found. Automatisms were also
associated with older patients suggesting that they may perhaps be associated
with degenerative processes not visible to the CT scan, or some diffuse and
progressive vascular pathology.
It has been hypothesised that some lexical speech automatisms fit well with
what we know of right hemisphere-limbic interactions (Code, 1987). The limbic
forebrain makes a large contribution to human communication (Lamandella,
1977). In all mammals the phylogenically ancient limbic system is centrally
involved in the expression of emotional and affective signals of rage, fear,
surprise and social expressions of dominance, submission and aggression, as well
as inter-gender and mother-child relationships. The right hemisphere may have
an phylogenically old and unique relationship with the affective subsystems of
the limbic system, a relationship that the left hemisphere does not have. The
limbic system is 'the obvious candidate for the level of brain activity likely to be
15
responsible for the bulk of nonpropositional human communication'
(Lamandella, 1977; p.159). Tourette's syndrome presents with clear limbic
features (Leckman et al., 1991). Van Lancker (Van Lancker, 1991, Van Lancker
and Nicklay, 1992; Van Lancker and Klein, 1990) has suggested that the right
hemisphere has a special role in processing personally relevant entities such as
familiar faces, persons, topography, voices and names. Two globally aphasic
individuals with massive left hemisphere lesions studied by Van Lancker and
Nicklay (1992), were consistently better at recognizing familiar, intimate and
personal names compared to non familiar, intimate and personal words.
In people with Tourette's syndrome we observe probably the only example of
spontaneous, involuntary lexical speech produced by a conscious individual.
The obscene coprolalic nature of the utterance has parallels with expletive
speech automatisms. Although individuals with Tourette's syndrome appear
unable to suppress the emergence of the utterance, they are aware that they
are producing the utterance. It may be that the utterances emerge during
stressful episodes which appears to reduce the individuals powers to suppress
the utterance (Sweet, Solomon, Wayne, Shapiro, & Shapiro, 1973). Why it is the
foulest of expletives which should emerge in Tourette’s is unknown, but the
disorder presents with clear limbic features (Lamandella, 1977, Leckman et al.,
1991), and basal ganglia involvement have been suggested (Darley, Aronson &
Brown, 1975; Kent, 1984; Leckman et al., 1991). These utterances also are
invariantly and holistically produced.
The emotionally charged pronoun+verb subtype of speech automatism and the
expletive subtype are obvious candidates for central limbic involvement, being
holistically produced without formal linguistic input. I have suggested elsewhere
that 'assuming that the limbic system has no linguistic or phonetic programming
capability, but is simply the motivational force behind the utterance, then the
right hemisphere, through its capacity to provide a motor Gestalt, controls the
actual motor speech activity of the phono-articulatory mechanisms' (Code,
1987; p.73). Similar arguments can be made for coprolalia; also a fragment of
emotionally charged, holistically structured and invariantly produced speech
which could implicate a limbic-right hemisphere interaction.
Non lexical speech automatisms are clearly nonpropositional, they have minimal
16
linguistic structure and do not appear to engage linguistic processes in their
continues production, they do not entail affective-emotional processing. They
are not arbitrary syllables, as has been suggested (Critchley, 1970), but, as shown
earlier, concatenated CV syllables governed by phonotactic constraints and
their syllable structure adheres to the sonority sequencing principle. They appear
to reflect articulatory simplification where only high frequency and motorically
unmarked articulations taken from the phonetic inventory of the speaker's
language are produced to conform to phonotactic rules. The fact that the non
lexical type do not break phonotactic constraints and the sonority sequencing
principle may suggest that they access a phonological output lexicon the first
time they are produced. For these reasons the initial production of a nonlexical
recurring utterance may be by a severely damaged left hemisphere
phonological system which does not have access to limbic-right hemisphere
input.
Code (1994a, 1994b) outlines a model which attempts to characterise some of
the features of speech automatisms. The model acknowledges the lack of
linguistic input, reflects the apparent holistic preparation and the invariance of
production of the utterance, distinguishes between the two major types and
accounts for a) the initial production and b) the subsequent productions of the
utterance. The model assumes, as the evidence suggests (Blanken, 1991; Code,
1991) that most of the language production system is severely damaged for
most patients. The model therefore attempts to capture what remains of the
language system that can account for speech automatisms. The first
components of the model are labelled intention to communicate and
expression of state. An utterance may be formulated as either a result of an
intention to communicate or as an expression of internal state, where for the
latter the utterer has no intention to communicate to another party. The model
assumes that for an initial production of either type of utterance an intention to
communicate or an expression of state is generated and a speech act (e.g.,
question, command, statement, etc.) is formulated by the component labelled
speech act formulation. This component determines the essential message of
the utterance. In the case of lexical speech automatisms, the form of the
utterance is then generated by an holistic speech lexicon and passed to an
articulatory buffer [2] before final production. Initial non lexical recurring
utterances are generated by an articulatory formulation module which inputs
17
the articulatory buffer before final production. For these non lexical utterances,
however, it is the most unmarked and higher frequency phones that are
selected for production. For subsequent productions of both types of utterance,
shown by the thick arrow, an intention to communicate or an expression of state
inputs to speech act formulation and then directly into the articulatory buffer
before expression as an utterance.
The holistic speech lexicon is seen as a store of holistic-automatic schemas [45]
which holds the representations of lexical speech automatisms like expletives,
serial speech, pronoun+verb. An assumption of the model is that a non lexical
utterance will ensue at initial attempts to speak if the route through the holistic
lexicon is blocked by extensive neural damage. The lack of semantic range
observed in many lexical automatisms could be a reflection of the holistic
lexicon’s responsibility for very restricted and automatic output.
The model includes an articulatory buffer, after Blanken (1991), which could be
the locus of continued production. The buffer is responsible for temporary
storage of the phonetic plan of an utterance which becomes necessary for
most models of speech production to cope with the probability that the neural
planning of an utterance is a lot faster than the ability of the phonoarticulatory
mechanism to actually realise it. The buffer stores prepared utterances for short
time durations. Neural damage prevents changing the program within the
buffer so that input into the buffer causes it to generate the same stored
utterance each time.
The failure of the patient with an expletive speech automatism to inhibit the
utterance, may be accounted for by the model. The patient may be unable to
inhibit an expression of limbic state on initial production. This inputs the model at
the level of the speech act and its continued production is due to impairment at
the level of the articulatory buffer.
Lexical speech automatisms may originate as holistically created products of a
subcortical right hemisphere-limbic system mechanism. If they do then the
linguistic system of the left hemisphere is not engaged during their genesis. Non
lexical recurrent utterances show little evidence of right hemisphere language
structure and I have suggested that they might be the product of severely
18
compromised left hemisphere mechanisms disconnected from right hemisphere
mechanisms. This might suggest that access to the phonology was so impaired
that only very primitive CV syllables (usually one repeated syllable) are
produced. The continuing failure on the part of the individual to produce more
than the automatism is frustrated by an almost total apraxia of
phonoarticulatory mechanisms.
Code (1987, 1991, 1994a) has suggested that the fact that the non lexical type
do not break phonotactic constraints may imply that they access a
phonological output module the first time they are produced. Unlike the lexical
speech automatisms, recurring utterances do not involve words which might
implicate right hemisphere processing. The initial production of a non lexical
recurring utterance may be by a severely damaged left hemisphere
phonological system which does not have access to limbic-right hemisphere
input.
This notion gains support from Sussman (1984) who suggests that the reason
phonotactic constraints are not seen to be violated in even the most severely
aphasic patients, and syllabification is unaffected by extensive brain damage, is
because syllabification is 'hard-wired', and hard-wired specifically in the left
hemisphere. Sussman suggests it is this is that helps to provide the automaticity
characteristic of phonological organization. A neuronal model is outlined by
Sussman (1984) 'where each consonant and vowel position is associated with a
specific cell assembly network' (p.169). The model is supported by Code and Ball
(1994) which firstly confirms that phonotactic constraints are rigidly adhered to in
both English and German recurring utterances and shows that recurring
utterances retain strict syllabification.
The evidence from left hemisphere damaged aphasic individuals with speech
automatisms appears to suggest that the right hemisphere is responsible for
producing their lexical speech automatism providing support for the hypothesis
that nonpropositional and automatic aspects of speech entail right hemisphere
processing. If an individual has an entire left hemisphere removed in adult life
what happens to speech? The hemispherectomy cases EC and NF. demonstrate
that the isolated right hemisphere is capable of producing speech.
19
4. Left Hemispherectomy in Adulthood
Strictly, the term hemispherectomy describes the surgical procedure to remove
an entire cerebral hemisphere and should be reserved for this purpose.
Hemidecortication describes the removal of only the neocortex while leaving
intact subcortical nuclear masses such as components of the basal ganglia and
the thalamus. This distinction is important where discussion of the role of
remaining subcortical areas in cognition is concerned. Hemispherectomy and
hemidecortication are radical surgical procedures performed either on adults
with large life-threatening neoplastic tumours, or on children to reduce the
effects on congenital infantile hemiplegia. The hemispherectomy operation
entails a brutal insult to the brain which can have a massive effect upon the
patient's cognitive and behavioural functions. It is important to note that these
adult patients had tumours which precipitated their radical surgery and
therefore, unlike commisurotomy subjects who had long histories of severe
epilepsy, there is no reason to suspect a neurological abnormality in early life
which may have interfered with the ‘normal’ establishment and balance of
hemispheric specialisation for language or any other aspect of cognition during
development.
There have been relatively few left hemidecortications in adults reported in the
literature and the detail and care of recording much of the language
impairment in most reports is disappointing. Zollinger's (1935) early case (AC) was
a 43 year old right-handed woman who, following surgery which left the medial
part of the thalamus and a small portion of the globus pallidus. AC retained 'an
elementary vocabulary which was partially increased by training' (p.1063), but
comprehension is not discussed. Observed speech included 'all right' to all
questions several hours after surgery, but Zollinger does not say if this was
appropriately used. In the three days following surgery AC was able to say 'yes'
and 'no', 'thank you' and 'sleep', 'goodbye' and 'please'. On the third day AC is
reported to have shown 'a more accurate use of words' (p.1060). AC survived
just 17 days.
Crockett and Estridge (1951) described GS, a male patient whose surgery
spared half the globus pallidus, a third of the caudate nucleus, and all of the
thalamus. This hemidecorticated patient was able to say 'yes' and 'no' some
20
hours after surgery, although it is not clear if this was appropriately used. Two
weeks later the patient was able to say 'No, I don't want any' and 'Put me back
to bed'. Other simple words were observed until about one month post-surgery
when he began to deteriorate and could utter only 'caw' and 'aw-caw' (if this is
a non lexical recurring utterance, it is the only example reported following left
hemispherectomy), as well as 'yes' and 'no'. GS survived a further four months.
Hillier's (1954) patient was a 15-year-old boy who underwent two operations to
remove a glioblastoma within a year before a left hemidecortication 'sparing as
much of the basal ganglia as possible' (p.720). Sixteen days after the
hemidecortication he said 'mother', 'father', 'nurse' and other words. The patient
was discharged at 1 month and he was said to have normal auditory
comprehension and daily improvement in vocabulary. The patient survived for
27 months. Before his death he is described as being slightly euphoric with an
improving 'motor' aphasia and anomia.
In a series of studies, Smith and Burklund describe in detail the cases of EC and
NF (Smith, 1966; Smith & Burklund, 1966; Burklund, 1972; Burklund & Smith, 1977).
These studies include not only detailed examinations but the surgery was
sufficiently radical to permit the conclusion that only the right hemisphere could
account for the patient's speech. They therefore allow us to make some
confident inferences on the role of the isolated right hemisphere in speech.
Despite the complete absence of a left hemisphere EC had significant, if limited,
speech. EC was a 47 years old male who was experiencing attacks of
speechlessness and right sided signs in November, 1964. In March, 1965 Burklund
removed a neoplasm from the left sensori-motor area. A moderate 'expressive'
aphasia was evident but there was little evidence of receptive difficulties. The
neoplasm recurred and EC underwent a complete hemispherectomy in
December 1965, some 12 months following the emergence of the original
symptoms and 7 months after the first operation.
Following the second operation EC had a right hemiplegia and hemianopia and
global aphasia. His speech attempts were mostly unsuccessful at this time, but
expletives and emotional phrases were produced. 'He would open his mouth
and utter isolated words, and after apparently struggling to organise words for
21
meaningful speech, recognised his inability and would utter expletives or short
emotional phrases (e.g., "Goddamit!")' (Smith, 1966; p.468).
Zangwill (1967) examined EC about 18 months after surgery. He observed
appropriately used ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘don’t know’, and the emotional expressions ‘No,
God damn it, that’s...’, ‘Yes, but I cannot’, God damn it, yes’, and ‘Oh my God!’
Zangwill observed that EC could repeat some words, occasionally name objects
and colours, but with semantic paraphasic errors (he called a ‘pen’ a ‘pencil’,
and ‘black’ he called ‘red’). But he also made errors in ‘automatic speech’ and
was able to count to 20 with some errors. He could read some object and colour
words, but could not even read a simple sentence. He was only able to only
print his name. Zangwill was convinced that some of EC's utterances must be
considered 'as essentially propositional' (p.1018). (But see also Bogen's
contribution to this Special Issue.)
Burklund and Smith reported NF in 1977. NF was also a right handed male in his
forties (age 41 years) and showed a similar recovery to EC. However, his
language recovered more rapidly than EC. NF began to experience episodes of
right hemiparesis and speechlessness 5 years before Burklund performed his first
surgery. The first operation was an 'inferior subtotal left frontal lobectomy with
removal of gross neoplasm' (Burklund and Smith, 1977; p. 628). The entire frontal
operculum was included in the resection. There was 'some difficulty expressing
words, especially names' and some dysarthria at discharge, but recovery of
speech was rapid. Eighteen months after the left lobectomy there was
recurrence of the neoplasm in the left frontal area with extension into the
temporal lobe and the right frontal lobe, and Burklund performed a left
hemispherectomy at this time. This surgery left some left thalamus but included
removal of some right frontal cortex and occlusion of both anterior cerebral
arteries. NF was very ill following this extensive surgery, but nonverbal response to
simple verbal commands was appropriate and prompt. Speech which was
described as appropriate but dysarthric emerged three days post-surgery.
Problems with fatigue and focusing attention during formal testing are reflected
in his performance at one month post-surgery where he could repeat words and
phrases but was unable to repeat the same utterances just a few moments later.
But he could sing the words and melody of "Jingle Bells" and respond 'yes' and
'no' appropriately. Spontaneous speech was observed about one month post-
22
surgery when he asked a nurse, "You got a match?". Three weeks after this he
responded with, "Well, it was OK", when asked if he liked his breakfast. But he
was unable to name objects, read object names, copy his name or simple
designs, or write single letters to dictation at this time. There was erratic
improvement in both verbal and nonverbal response to testing for a further 9
months.
Formal testing on the Minnesota Test of Differential Diagnosis of Aphasia at 8
months post-hemispherectomy showed just one error out of 32 in repeating
phrases, no errors in counting and reciting days of the week and two errors in
completing 8 sentences. Two months after this he was able to repeat 4 digits
forward and 3 backwards, 5 errors from 32 in matching words to objects and 8
from 32 in matching printed to spoken words. Writing was slower to recover but
by 6 months post-surgery he could print letters, his name and concrete words
(eg., cat, dog, banana) but errors in spelling were frequent. He could spell single
words to dictation and his name with a letter board, but made errors on words
of more than 4 letters. NF died 18 months following hemispherectomy.
Unquestionably, the right hemispheres of EC and NF were able to speak. For NF
language recovery was more rapid than for EC. This may be due to the 5 year
onset in NF's neoplasm which may have caused the right hemisphere to
become gradually more involved over time in left hemisphere functions. Further,
as in Hillier's case, there was an interval between operations. In NF's case there
was a period of 18 months between the first left frontal lobectomy on NF and the
complete hemispherectomy. Considerable shifting of language processing to
the right hemisphere may have taken place a) during the interceding 5 years
between commencement of symptoms and the lobectomy and b) as a
consequence of the staging of the surgery, with 18 months between first and
second operation.
The plasticity of the young (i.e., before puberty) brain has been appreciated for
some time. The staging of the surgery over time in NF allows us also to re-assess
the plasticity of the older brain and its abilities to reorganize. The permitable
inference appears to be that the completely mature brain may also have
significant facility to reorganization.
23
What these cases appear to substantiate is that the right hemisphere can
indeed speak, at least nonpropositionally, and at least in the absence of a left
hemisphere. Questions remains concerning the degree of propositionality in the
speech of the left hemispherectomy subject. Zangwill described EC's speech as
'essentially propositional' at times, but utterances like “You gotta match?” and
“Well, it was okay”, while certainly sentences would appear to be situation-
specific and responsive. Such utterances may be propositionally produced in
some circumstances but relatively automatically and responsively produced in
others. “You gotta match?” for a smoker would be a very habitually produced
utterance and not at all uniquely generated. So while the isolated adult right
hemisphere has been shown to be engaged in speech production, the
evidence does not permit us to claim that it is capable of generating
propositional speech.
As with aphasic speech automatisms, which we have suggested essentially
reflect right hemisphere processing, the phonotactic constraints of the language
are not broken by the adult left hemispherectomy patients we have discussed.
For left hemispherectomy subjects too syllabification is organized according to
the sonority sequencing principle discussed earlier. So, removal of the entire left
hemisphere in adulthood, while catastrophic for speech and language
processing, does not appear to obstruct the syllabification of speech
production. Why is this? Two alternative explanations seem plausible.
First, the left hemisphere model for syllabification proposed by Sussman's (1984)
may not be supported by the left hemispherectomy evidence. Syllabification, if
hard-wired, is hard-wired either subcortically or is diffusely represented
throughout the brain. This would support the position that sonority is not an
intrinsic feature of phonological processing but simply an artifact of speech
production (Ohala, 1984, cited in Christman, 1992). Christman (1992) too
suggests that sonority may be 'well-distributed' neurologically and linguistically
and may in fact be accessed at lexical levels to organise word syllabification, at
sub-segmental levels to organise phoneme sequencing, and also at the motor
instantation level.
If syllabification is not hard-wired in the left hemisphere but is diffusely
represented, this would suggest that it does not enjoy a fully abstract cognitive
24
representation, no mental reality and is simply an inevitable by-product of
speech production, an epiphenomenon, a non causal consequence of
neurophysiology and the mechanico-inertial properties and limitations of the
speech production mechanism. This could be why it survives even the most
serious brain damage, and even complete left hemispherectomy.
A second possiblility is that the nonpropositional utterances of left
hemispherectomy patients, as well as the lexical speech automatisms of aphasic
patients, were generated originally by a left hemisphere system in early
development. The processing of automatic and nonpropositional speech by the
right hemisphere may be part of a task-sharing metasystem. For the child
learning to speak there is no overlearnt, familiar, formulaic, automatic speech.
For the child all speech is newly generated by the left hemisphere's linguistic
system. Counting and days of the week, for instance, will acquire their
morphological and phonological framework, including syllabification perhaps,
during this early learning period. With time and (over)use, these utterances, like
other overlearnt and familiar utterances, will not require left hemisphere
processing. The left hemisphere’s role will have become redundant, and the
utterances may be passed to a right hemisphere holistic speech lexicon in order
to free-up the left hemisphere to allow it more processing space to do the most
demanding and exacting of human activities, the generation of novel language
for the expression of semantic states.
Conclusions
The right hemisphere is not mute. Evidence from several perspectives supports
this idea. The kind of speech that the right hemisphere is capable of appears to
be confined to the automatic, familiar, nonpropositional. There may be a
particular role for the right hemisphere in automatic and nonpropositional
aspects of speech production, perhaps as part of a task-sharing metasystem in
collaboration with the left hemipshere. The strongest evidence seems to come
from severely aphasic subjects with speech automatisms and adults with only a
right hemisphere. But does the evidence from severely aphasic and left
hemipherectomy patients converge?
25
A severely damaged left hemisphere in many aphasic patients appears to result
in an intact right hemisphere producing an unaltering nonpropostional lexical
speech automatism. The complete removal of the left hemisphere leaves the
individual with the ability to produce occasional, automatic, nonpropositional
speech. The right hemisphere in both groups would appear capable of
nonpropositional speech production. It may be, therefore, that the severely
aphasic individual with extensive left hemisphere damage is using a similar
deleted neurocognitive system to the left hemispherectomy. Extensive left
hemisphere damage may, in many practical respects, be equivalent to an
hemispherectomy (Smith and Sugar, 1975; Cummings, Benson, Walsh and
Levine, 1979; Cappa and Vallar, 1992; Landis, Cummings and Benson, 1980).
Investigation of the contribution of the right hemisphere to the recovery of
aphasia indicates that it is in severely aphasic patients that the right appears to
be involved rather than in milder patients and that this involvement increases as
a function of time since onset of damage (Code, 1987; Cappa & Vallar, 1992;
Gainotti, 1993). Milder patients of recent onset may not therefore utilize the right
hemiphere to the same degree as the severely aphasic individual with extensive
left hemiphere damage. The degree of right hemisphere involvement in the
hemispherectomy patients too appears to be related to a) a gradual
deteriorate of left hemisphere processing due the insidious advancement of the
tumour and b) the staging of surgery.
EC, for Zangwill, was indistinguishable from a left hemisphere damaged severely
aphasic patient. He concludes:
The general impression made upon me by this patient was very much like that of
a case of severe motor aphasia and right hemiplegia from left-sided
cerebrovascular accident. There was a typical severe motor aphasia, though
with some retention of emotional and automatic utterance; good oral
comprehension; evidence of insight into the speech defect, and almost total
absence of paraphasia or jargon (Zangwill, 1967; p1017).
These two groups may, therefore, have more in common than has previously
been thought.
26
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