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The Children’s Board of Hillsborough County 1002 E. Palm Avenue – Boardroom
Tampa, FL 33605 Board of Directors’ - Special Meeting
March 22, 2010 – 5:45 p.m.
AGENDA CBHC Board of Directors’ - Special Meeting
March 22, 2010 – 5:45 p.m.
AGENDA
The Children’s Board Mission…
“We promote the well being of children and families across Hillsborough County by Uniting community partners, Investing in innovative opportunities and Leading the county in
best practices so that the whole community can realize its full potential.”
I. CALL TO ORDER V. Goddard A. Quorum Verification B. Review of Agenda II. DISCUSSION ITEMS
A. Status Report on the Mental Health Care/Achieve Management, Inc. D. Dixon Contract
B. Senate Bill 1216 (Attachments 1-13) A. Petrila
III. OPEN AGENDA The Children’s Board of Hillsborough County welcomes comments from the public. Those who wish to address the Board may do so at this time, Open Agenda portion of the meeting. Those addressing the Board should clearly state their full name and affiliation for the official record. IV. OTHER/NEW BUSINESS V. ADJOURNMENT
All meetings are held at The Children’s Board of Hillsborough County 1002 East Palm Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33605
Unless otherwise noticed
Table of Contents
click on title to go to document
1. Chronology of Events SB1216/HB1227
2. Children’s Board Communications Plan
3. Children’s Board Talking points (Key Facts)
4. Florida Children’s Services Council Talking points
5. SB 1216 Committee Substitute
6. SB 1216 Original
7. HB 1227
8. List of Members of Relevant Committees Scheduled
To Consider SB1216/HB 1227
9. The Capital Connection, dated March 19, 2010
10. The Children’s Trust Campaign Report
11. Key Organizational Contacts (State and Local)
12. Key Individual Contacts
13. Letter to Community Stakeholders
14. Florida Statute s125.901
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SB 1216/ HB 1227
Background: Several bills have been filed for consideration in the 2010 Legislative Session that would affect all Children’s Services Councils. Sen. Joe Negron (R- Palm City) has filed three bills with different House sponsors for each. Sen. Negron represents Martin County and parts of Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Indian River and Palm Beach Counties. He was in the House of Representatives for eight years and won a special election in 2009 to replace retiring Sen. Ken Pruitt. Sen. Negron was selected to be chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee in his first year in the Florida Senate and is a favorite of current and future Senate leadership.
#1: Senate Bill 1216 relating to Children’s Services Councils
Sponsor: Negron (R-Palm City), Co-Sponsors: Baker (R-Eustis),Dean (R-Inverness),
Fasano (R-New Port Richey), Gaetz (R-Destin), Gardiner (R-Orlando), Haridopolos (R-
Melbourne), Richter (R-Naples), Storms (R-Brandon), Thrasher (R-Jacksonville), Wise (R-
Jacksonville)
Date Chamber Action
01/14/10 SENATE Filed
02/03/10 SENATE Referred to Children, Families, and Elder Affairs; Community Affairs; Finance and Tax; Health and Human Services Appropriations (members of these committees are attached)
03/01/10 SENATE On Committee agenda - Children, Families, and Elder Affairs, 03/04/10, 8:00 am, 401 S
03/04/10 SENATE Temporarily postponed by Children, Families, and Elder Affairs
03/15/10 SENATE On Committee agenda - Children, Families, and Elder Affairs, 03/18/10, 1:00 pm, 401 S
03/18/10 SENATE Favorable with Committee Substitute by Children, Families, and Elder Affairs; 6 Yeas, 2 Nays
Companion bill : House Bill 1227
Sponsor: Mayfield (R-Vero Beach); Co-Sponsor: Snyder (R-Stuart)
Date Chamber Action
02/23/10 HOUSE Filed
03/03/10 HOUSE Referred to Military & Local Affairs Policy Committee; Health Care Services Policy Committee; Finance & Tax Council; Economic Development & Community Affairs Policy Council (members of these committees are attached)
HOUSE Now in Military & Local Affairs Policy Committee
Weekly strategy calls started on Friday, February 19 and have continued each Friday since
then. The calls included all CEOs, all lobbyists, some board chairs and CSC policy/
advocacy staff. The calls are the primary communication tools used to review options,
discuss strategy with lobbying team, and decide on next steps. See attached
Communication Plan for details.
In the first committee hearing at the Senate Committee on Children, Families and Elder
Affairs meeting on March 4, five members of the public testified in opposition. These
included Maria Alonso, Chair, The Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade County, Judge Alvarez,
Palm Beach County Juvenile Court Judge, Barbara Allan, a private business person from
Palm Beach County, Mel Jurado, Member, Hillsborough County ELC and Ted Granger,
President, United Way of Florida.
Senators posed many questions, including Sen. Detert, Sen. Justice, Sen. Garcia, and
Sen. Rich. Senator Negron then proposed a ―carve-out‖ for Miami-Dade. Sen. Garcia and
Sen. Rich indicated major problems with this approach, and the committee chair, Se.
Storms suggested that SB 1216 be temporarily postponed. She then declared that the bill
would come back for consideration in week three. During the subsequent weeks, talks
occurred with Sen. Negron and our lobbyists, as well as other Senators on the committee.
CEOs and Board Chairs met with lobbyists in Tallahassee on Tuesday, March 16. Our
lobbyist, Ron Book, and Sen. Negron had a meeting that Tuesday afternoon. Sen. Negron
offered to remove BOCC oversight and additional governing board members in return for
agreement to return to the voters for retention or dissolution of the CSCs, beginning in
2012. After discussion, the CEOs and Board Chairs declined this offer.
The strike-all amendment (attached) was filed on Wednesday, March 17. However, the
required referenda date was changed to 2010 for CSCs established before 1990 (this
would include Martin, St. Lucie, Pinellas, Hillsborough and Okeechobee.) The amendment
also requires that the question of retention or dissolution be submitted to the voters every
six years (the original bill was every eight years.)
At the committee meeting on March 18, five community members spoke to oppose the bill
including businessman and former Children’s Board Chair-- David Kennedy, Board
president from Martin County Boys and Girls Club--Lynn Frank, Broward County School
Board member-- Maureen Binnen, Broward County BOCC Govt. Affairs director, and Ted
Granger, United Way of Florida.
The Senate Committee approved the bill as amended by the strike-all by a vote of 6-2. In
favor were Sen. Storms, Sen. Detert, Sen. Wise, Sen. Diaz de la Portilla, Sen. Garcia, and
Sen. Hill (Democrat from Jacksonville). Sen. Justice and Sen. Rich voted no.
The House companion bill will likely be scheduled for a hearing on Thursday, March 25 in
the House Military and Local Affairs Committee.
Note on Procedure: Rules of the House and Senate require that bills brought to the floor
for a full vote must have been approved by at least one committee. Bills can be withdrawn
from subsequent committees by request of the sponsor and with the agreement of the
Rules Chair and the leadership of the appropriate body.
Bill # 2: Election of members of Governing Boards with millage authority SB 1180 proposes the creation of Section 28 of Article X of the Florida Constitution to require the election of members of governing boards that have the authority to adopt millage rates. If passed, this bill would appear on the ballot in 2010 and would require 60% of the electorate to become part of the Florida Constitution. It has been referred to five committees but has not yet been calendared for consideration. The committees are Environmental Preservation and Conservation; Ethics and Elections; Governmental Oversight and Accountability; Policy & Steering Committee on Ways and Means; and Rules. Rep. Carl Domino (R- Juno Beach) is sponsoring the companion bill-HB 493- which has been referred to four committees: Governmental Affairs Policy Committee; Agriculture & Natural Resources Policy Committee; Finance & Tax Council; Economic Development & Community Affairs Policy Council. HB 493 was considered in a workshop by the House Governmental Affairs Policy Committee on Feb. 17, but no votes were taken. Water management districts spoke against the bill, as did the FCSC. The Florida League of Cities spoke in support of the bill. Bill # 3- Merger and dissolution of Special Districts SB 1568 would revise provisions relating to merger and dissolution procedures for special districts. It requires certain merger and dissolution procedures to include referenda, and provides that such provisions preempt prior special acts. It also provides for a local government to assume the indebtedness of, and receive the title to property owned by, a special district under certain circumstances. This bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Community Affairs, where it passed unanimously on March 9. It is now in Ethics and Elections committee before going to Finance and Tax and the Policy & Steering Committee on Ways and Means. This bill is supported by the Florida Association of Special Districts.
The House companion bill - HB 1095- has been filed by Rep. Mark Pafford (D- West Palm Beach) and was heard by the first committee, Military and Local Affairs, on March 17 where it passed by a vote of 12-2. It is now in the Finance & Tax Council and the Economic Development & Community Affairs Policy Council.
Communication Plan
DRAFT 3-22-10
WHAT AND HOW?
Respond early and respond firmly, but not confrontationally-tone and style are important.
Seek to find and emphasize common ground.
Focus on our strengths--independent, apolitical decision making.
Seek to minimize antagonizing bill sponsors–do not get personal!
Identify friends of bill sponsors – trusted emissaries—who are willing to help.
ACTIONS taken to date:
♦ Local Activities
1. Identify constituencies who might support the proposals such as anti-tax, personal responsibility groups. Identify friends of CSCs within those constituencies.
Engage trusted parties/good emissaries/ opinion leaders. Select partners and their lobbyists in good standing/with good relationships with these
groups. Include members of the faith community.
2. Identify County Commissioners in support and opposition, as well as those who might assist with testimony.
Discuss proposals and concerns with each County Commissioner and staff (in process—meetings held with Sharpe, Beckner, Hagan, Higginbotham, scheduled phone call with Norman, White and Ferlita in process)
Request BOCC resolution opposing bill from Comm. Beckner (3-25-10 Board meeting) Add issue to county legislative package (3-25-10 Board meeting) Communicate with other County leaders (In process)
3. Identify other local leaders and elected officials who would be helpful (See attached list) Tampa Chamber Tampa Bay Partnership Hills. Co. Sheriff Supervisor of Elections Public Defender Judges
State Attorney
4. Enlist staff, Board members, providers and other state / local philanthropic organizations to speak on our behalf. Develop specific points for each audience: business, government, legislative,
other constituencies Talking points for each audience Training for spokespersons?
♦ Legislative Activities
1. Identify potential legislative paths and key legislators (Done—see attached committee lists)
Important committee chairs and members (see attached) Key Legislators – Leadership, members with history of serving on CSCs
2. Organize March board meeting in Tallahassee around political action on Capitol Hill by CEOs and Board Chairs (Done)
3. Seek opportunities for working with House members. (In process)
4. Work with Governor’s office. (In process) Explain apolitical decision making process that is scandal free and impossibility of
August 2010 date for referenda Ask for support from local Gov. office staff
5. Seek support of Florida Association of Counties and other statewide groups (e.g., Healthy Start, Early Learning Coalitions, Boards of statewide provider groups like Children’s Home Society, Big Brothers/ Big Sisters, Boys and Girls Clubs, etc.) In Process
6. Enlist support of Law Enforcement organizations (In Process)
♦ Media/PR
1. FCSC: Engage PR/media firms with track record of success for statewide / Tally effort (done-Core Message contracted)
2. Develop local media strategy for print, radio, electronic newsletters, advocacy alerts, Board member, local committees, etc. (Done)
♦ Legal
1. Obtain formal legal opinion to determine constitutional and statutory concerns (done)
♦ Work Products Completed by FCSC/ CBHC
1. Develop Background Paper (done)
2. Develop Talking Points (done—statewide and CBHC)
3. Develop Draft Op Ed pieces that speak to the value of CSCs and the need for independence (In process)
4. Hold weekly statewide conference calls (Fridays at 11:00 AM)
5. Develop position papers regarding investments in key areas: healthy births, school readiness and success, afterschool, rev max, cost-savings, organizational capacity-building, etc. –in process
SPECIFIC ACTIONS: MID TERM (During Session)
1. Monitor legislation daily; report weekly via Advocacy Alerts/ Capitol Connection
2. Hold frequent conference calls with lobbyists (daily or as needed)
3. Ramp up messaging/ Place op eds in relevant media markets
4. Ask community leaders to testify in committee hearings
5. Identify opportunities for compromise
6. Hold community forums for information sharing with community stakeholders
7. Meet with Board Chairs of each funded provider organization –schedule for early AM or evening
8. Develop materials for all employees of provider organizations
BACKGROUND:
In October 1988, the citizens of Hillsborough County voted to dedicate a new property tax to serve
the specific needs of children. This mandate led to the creation of the Children’s Board, an
independent special district organized under F.S. 125.901.
Today, the vision of the Children’s Board is that Hillsborough County will be recognized as one of
the top places in the nation to raise children. Our mission is to promote the well-being of children
and families by uniting community partners, investing in innovative opportunities, and leading the
county in best practices—so the whole community can realize its full potential.
Services and supports funded by the Children’s Board constitute the building blocks for healthy
futures for ALL children and families. This investment is unequalled in its return.
KEY FACTS:
1. The Children’s Board costs the average homeowner only $62.50 a year-- $5.20 per month-- less than the cost of one fast food meal.
2. Over the last five years the Children’s Board has generated $139,848,167 in new dollars used to serve Hillsborough County children--a return on investment of $4.39 for every $1 invested.
3. The Children’s Board brings new dollars into our community from Federal, State, corporate and private philanthropic funders.
In 2009, more than $600,000 in new revenue was earned from the federal Medicaid program and reinvested in local case management services.
In 2009, the Children’s Board earned more than $220,000 in new revenue for children’s services through the federal Adoption Assistance program.
8,400 children receive a higher quality of child care because the Children’s Board provides matching funds to the Hillsborough County Early Learning Coalition for quality incentives.
Through our Technical Assistance fund, the Children’s Board builds capacity in grassroots and faith-based organizations. Over three years, grants were made to over 200 small businesses.
The Children’s Board is the only governmental organization in Hillsborough County that can respond to new funding match opportunities on short notice. Since 2008, with match opportunities requiring a response time ranging from one week to one month, the Children’s Board generated $11,264,000 for services to our County’s children and families, a yield of $2.32 for every $1 invested.
Through our Social Enterprise initiative, the Children’s Board helps organizations to identify, develop and implement earned income strategies so that their funding base is more diversified and sustainable. Three examples: DACCO increased client fees and their new food service business nets about $33,000 annually. The Crisis Center has increased earned income from zero to nearly 30% of their budget including the ambulance and nurse examiners program. Success 4 Kids & Families has grown their speaking and consulting business from zero to approximately $100K a year.
4. The Children’s Board invests in prevention and saves State dollars by reducing need for costly programs like foster care or juvenile detention.
The Children’s Board invests in family and kinship support services for more than 7,000 children and their families to prevent child abuse and to divert children away from the formal child welfare system--saving the state approximately $52 M in just one year! Source: HKI
The Children’s Board provides funding to the 13th Judicial Court for innovative services that keep kids out of the juvenile justice system.
Through our maternal and child health services network, young mothers who are at high risk for health complications receive support and education to reduce repeat pregnancies.
The Heart Gallery, a partnership with our community based child welfare agency, Hillsborough Kids, Inc., is a traveling photography exhibit that recruits potential adoptive families for foster children. Over the past five years, families were found for forty percent of participating children. Partnering with local media and the business community, the Gallery generates resources and birthday gifts for children and was the first to feature audio messages along with the professional photos. Many of our innovations are being replicated.
5. The Children’s Board invests in making sure that Hillsborough County children are able to enter school with the skills and good health they need to be successful.
The Children’s Board is a partner with the Dolly Parton Foundation, the United Way, the Tampa Hillsborough Public Library and others to encourage reading by providing a book a month to every baby born until their fifth birthday. Last year, the Imagination Library distributed 124,112 books to families.
Over 1,100 children and their families are served through Family and School Support Teams available to students in elementary schools throughout Hillsborough County.
6. The Children’s Board invests in families and communities.
The Children’s Board served as a tax preparation site for the Hillsborough Prosperity Campaign, and CBHC staff volunteered over 200 hours to assist in the completion of 474 income tax returns for a total of $599,530 in federal taxes returned to Hillsborough County taxpayers. Of these, 135 families qualified for Earned Income Tax Credit ($207,214 returned) and 78 families qualified for the Child Tax Credit ($92,431 returned to taxpayers). In total, the Prosperity Campaign returned over $7 million to Hillsborough County citizens, including $2,705,825 in Earned Income Tax Credit and $979,040 in Child Tax Credits.
Family Support and Resource Centers in Brandon, Town ‘n Country, Ruskin, North Tampa, Central Tampa and Plant City provided services to more than 18,251 individuals. Community volunteers contributed more than 3,803 hours at the Family Support and Resource Centers.
The Children’s Board invests nearly $1.5 million and leverages an additional $1.7 million from other local, state and federal funders through an innovative flexible funding pool called the ASO. Last year, over 4,700 children and more than 19,000
household members received support for basic needs such as housing, food, clothing, and transportation that allowed families to become more self-sufficient.
7. The Children’s Board office building is a neighborhood and community asset.
In 2000 the Children’s Board determined that its office building on Eighth Avenue,
purchased in 1993, was in need of substantial repairs and that the existing space was insufficient to meet community and organizational demands. The Board engaged in a two year planning and community engagement process before settling on the purchase of land and construction of a new office building on Palm Avenue in downtown Tampa in late 2002. At a cost of $3,390,978, the Children’s Board office site and conference center was completed in early 2004 and occupied in May 2004.
The Children’s Board analyzed the costs and benefits of leasing space vs. purchasing/ building space as part of our due diligence responsibilities. Renting space was more costly to taxpayers within six years. That is, had the Children’s Board opted to lease space from 2004 to now at a cost of $19 per square foot ($570,000/year), the costs paid for leasing would have been equal to the amount spent to build the Palm Avenue offices.
The Children’s Board office building is a neighborhood-based learning and conference center for parents, child care providers, youth, educators, elected officials and community members. The Children’s Board features free meeting space, free parking, easy access to public transportation and a central location close to major transportation routes. The facility supports approximately 38,000 visitors annually. Since May 2004, the estimated value of free meeting space to the community is $1,177,800.
CBHC also has a cost sharing tenant partnership with the Early Learning Coalition of Hillsborough County, annually earning $112,444 ($60,444 for rent and $52,000 for administrative services.)
The Children’s Board is home to the Central Tampa Family Support and Resource Center, which serves the local neighborhood, and to a library that is affiliated with the Tampa Hillsborough County Public Library system. The Library and Family Support and Resource Center provide educational opportunities and family activities, all guided by a neighborhood advisory council. Car seat safety, first aid, job skills, tutoring and computer skills are just a few of the educational classes offered. Other activities hosted and supported by the FSRC include the Prosperity Campaign, Toys for Tots and the Imagination library.
The KidzCreate Art Gallery on the first floor of the Children’s Board showcases children’s art and raises awareness about critical issues. The Gallery works with local artists to develop themed art installations. Exhibits also travel to key county buildings, businesses, libraries and other venues
and are viewed by approximately 2,000,000 citizens annually. The Gallery develops partnerships with local businesses to provide art supplies and art therapy experiences for young people.
For more information contact Amy Petrila, Director of Public Policy and Advocacy, at 813-774-1854 or
F L O R I D A C H I L D R E N ’ SS E R V I C E S C O U N C I L
216 South Monroe, Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 402-5437 phone (850) 942-5437 fax www.floridacsc.org
The Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade County CSC of Martin County CSC of St. Lucie County Jacksonville Children’s Commission JWB - CSC of Pinellas County CSC of Palm Beach County CSC of Broward County Children’s Board of Hillsborough County
Florida Children’s Services Council SB 1216 Talking Points
CSCs are Approved by the People, Representative of the People • Children’s Services Councils were created for the children by the people. • Citizens wanted and voted to have local, independent bodies that focus on the needs of their
county’s kids – the Children’s Services Councils. • Local voters have been empowered to establish dedicated and stable funding sources set aside
for programs that improve the lives of the children in their area. In counties with a CSC, voters have taken advantage of this right.
• In most CSC counties, the formation of a Children’s Services Council was initiated by community leaders. However, that’s only the beginning of the process.
• To create a Children’s Services Council, the county commission must vote to place it on the ballot. Then the county’s voters must pass a referendum to formally establish the Council.
• The voters and the people they elected to represent them – their county commissioners – are the ones responsible for creating the CSC.
• The people continue to be represented on Children’s Services Council boards, through positions that include elected officials such as county commissioners, school board members and judges.
CSCs are a Local Funding Solution • In these tough economic times, Florida lawmakers are struggling to fund vital programs that serve
Florida’s children, such as VPK and School Readiness. • The state’s budget crisis has forced the Legislature to cut deeply into health and human services
programs, and consider the elimination of entire programs such as Healthy Families. • Local communities with Children’s Services Councils have done the fiscally responsible thing by
creating a local revenue stream to support children’s programs needed in their hometowns. • SB 1216 would jeopardize individual counties’ ability to fund their own local programs for children
and likely increase dependence on state-funded programs. • Losing local dollars that are invested locally will only make a bad funding scenario worse. If SB 1216 Wins, Children Lose • SB 1216 would require five of Florida’s eight Children’s Services Councils to be placed on an
August ballot this year for voters to decide the fate of their local CSC. • Children’s Services Councils do not oppose going to the voters to be reaffirmed. However, going
to ballot with less than six months to educate voters is unreasonable. • Such a short timeframe will cheat voters out of the opportunity to make informed decisions about
investments in their community’s children. • SB 1216 places Children’s Services Councils on a “reauthorization treadmill.” It mandates an
arbitrary timeline that requires CSCs to go back to the voters every six years for reauthorization. • While a voting cycle makes sense for an elected official, it wreaks havoc for publicly funded
organizations like CSCs that must operate with a long-term vision to best meet the needs of the community.
•
216 South Monroe, Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 402-5437 phone (850) 942-5437 fax www.floridacsc.org
The Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade County CSC of Martin County CSC of St. Lucie County Jacksonville Children’s Commission JWB - CSC of Pinellas County CSC of Palm Beach County CSC of Broward County Children’s Board of Hillsborough County
If SB 1216 Wins, Children Lose - continued • Repeatedly returning to the ballot diverts resources and energy away from the CSCs’ core
mission of serving children. • This legislation jeopardizes sustained investments in children that voters originally intended when
creating their local Children’s Services Councils. • Just like any other facet of government, it is difficult to function if your very existence is uncertain. • With the long-term viability of a CSC always in question, a county’s health and human services
system remains vulnerable to the politics of the day. CSCs are Accountable to the People • Children’s Services Councils are accountable to the citizens of their county, their governing
boards, their county commissions and the Florida Legislature. • At any time, a county commission or the Legislature can ask voters to decide if they want to keep
their local Council. • This provides local elected leaders, state lawmakers and voters the highest level of control and
authority over Children’s Services Councils. • No other government entity has this many layers of accountability and oversight. • Everything Children’s Services Councils do is in the sunshine – all of their records and meetings
are open to the public, including budgets, financial reports and program information. • The composition of Children’s Services Councils board is dictated by Florida law. • How Children’s Services Councils collect, budget and expend funds are also prescribed by
statute. • Children’s Services Councils submit quarterly financial reports and independent annual audits to
the county. In addition, audits of financial records go to the state each year. • Recently, the people of Miami-Dade County voted overwhelmingly to keep their Children’s
Services Council. Voters in Pinellas and Palm Beach Counties returned to the polls and gave their Councils the ability to increase local tax revenues used to fund children’s programs.
• Broad community support of Children’s Services Councils is a testament to the people’s confidence in and satisfaction with their work.
CSCs are a Proven Return on Investment • Children’s Services Councils take local dollars and invest them locally, all with oversight by local
leaders. • While it is difficult to quantify the value of healthy, safe children, the economic value of Children’s
Service Councils is apparent in their community return on investment -- reduced juvenile crime, better school performance, decreased child abuse and neglect, and reduced infant mortality rates.
• Children’s Services Councils leverage the local dollars they receive to secure millions in federal matching money and private donations.
• The programs funded by Children’s Services Councils create thousands of local jobs, enabling people to work.
Children’s Services Councils are...Children’s Services Councils are...Children’s Services Councils are...Children’s Services Councils are...
By The People, For The ChildrenBy The People, For The ChildrenBy The People, For The ChildrenBy The People, For The Children
Accountable and TransparentAccountable and TransparentAccountable and TransparentAccountable and Transparent
A Positive Return on InvestmentA Positive Return on InvestmentA Positive Return on InvestmentA Positive Return on Investment
♦ Established by the voters ♦ Representative of the community ♦ Placed on the ballot by county commissions ♦ Governed by elected officials, gubernatorial appointees, local leaders and state employees
♦ Authorized under law passed by the Florida Legislature ♦ Subject to the same rules and requirements that apply to city and county governments
♦ Operating under Sunshine laws with all meetings, records, budgets, financial reports and annual reports open to the public
♦ Mandated to conduct independent annual audits and submit them to the county and state
♦ Required to submit quarterly financial reports to counties ♦ Operating under multiple levels of scrutiny — the community, CSC board, county and state
♦ Investing local dollars locally ♦ Reducing the rate of juvenile crime, infant mortality, and child abuse and neglect
♦ Improving long-term outcomes for children through investments in early learning/school readiness and afterschool programs
♦ Saving taxpayers’ money by reducing the number of children in state foster care and the juvenile justice system
♦ Leveraging local dollars to secure millions in state and federal matching money and private donations
Children Children Children Children cannot vote. cannot vote. cannot vote. cannot vote. That’s why That’s why That’s why That’s why voters in voters in voters in voters in individual individual individual individual Florida Florida Florida Florida counties have counties have counties have counties have established established established established their owntheir owntheir owntheir own Children's Children's Children's Children's Services Services Services Services Councils Councils Councils Councils ———— independent independent independent independent bodies that bodies that bodies that bodies that oversee oversee oversee oversee dedicated and dedicated and dedicated and dedicated and stable funding stable funding stable funding stable funding for programs for programs for programs for programs that improve that improve that improve that improve the lives of the lives of the lives of the lives of children in the children in the children in the children in the community.community.community.community.
Florida Senate - 2010 CS for SB 1216
By the Committee on Children, Families, and Elder Affairs; and
Senators Negron, Baker, Haridopolos, Richter, Thrasher, Dean,
Gaetz, Wise, Fasano, Gardiner, and Storms
586-03220-10 20101216c1
Page 1 of 2
CODING: Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions.
A bill to be entitled 1
An act relating to children’s services; amending s. 2
125.901, F.S.; requiring the governing body of the 3
county to submit to the electorate the question of 4
retention or dissolution of a special taxing district 5
created to provide funding for children’s services; 6
prescribing a schedule for submission of the question 7
to the electorate; providing for the application of 8
the act to certain special districts in existence 9
before and after the act’s effective date; providing 10
an effective date. 11
12
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida: 13
14
Section 1. Subsection (4) of section 125.901, Florida 15
Statutes, is amended to read: 16
125.901 Children’s services; independent special district; 17
council; powers, duties, and functions; public records 18
exemption.— 19
(4)(a) Any district created pursuant to the provisions of 20
this section may be dissolved by a special act of the 21
Legislature, or the county governing body may by ordinance 22
dissolve the district subject to the approval of the electorate. 23
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), the governing body of 24
the county shall submit the question of retention or dissolution 25
of the district to the electorate in the August primary election 26
according to the following schedule and every 6 years 27
thereafter: 28
1. For a district for which the most recent referendum by 29
Florida Senate - 2010 CS for SB 1216
586-03220-10 20101216c1
Page 2 of 2
CODING: Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions.
the electorate on its taxing authority was held in 1990 or 30
before......................................................2010. 31
2. For a district for which the most recent referendum by 32
the electorate on its taxing authority was held after 1990 but 33
before 2001.................................................2012. 34
3. For a district for which the most recent referendum by 35
the electorate on its taxing authority was held after 2000 but 36
before 2010.................................................2018. 37
4. For a district whose taxing authority is initially 38
authorized by referendum by the electorate in 2010 or later, 6 39
years after the authorization. 40
41
If any district is dissolved pursuant to the provisions of this 42
subsection, each county must shall first obligate itself to 43
assume the debts, liabilities, contracts, and outstanding 44
obligations of the district within the total millage available 45
to the county governing body for all county and municipal 46
purposes as provided for under s. 9, Art. VII of the State 47
Constitution. Any district may also be dissolved pursuant to the 48
provisions of s. 189.4042. 49
Section 2. Notwithstanding s. 31 of chapter 90-288, Laws of 50
Florida, the revisions made by this act to s. 125.901, Florida 51
Statutes, apply to any special district having taxing authority 52
to provide funding for children’s services, and governed by a 53
council on children’s services, which is in existence on the 54
effective date of this act and to any such district created on 55
or after the effective date of this act. 56
Section 3. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law. 57
Florida Senate - 2010 SB 1216
By Senator Negron
28-00933B-10 20101216__
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A bill to be entitled 1
An act relating to children’s services; amending s. 2
125.901, F.S.; revising the membership of councils on 3
children’s services; requiring the governing body of 4
the county to approve the purchase of real estate or 5
the construction of a building by a council on 6
children’s services; requiring a council on children’s 7
services to submit a tentative budget and proposed 8
millage rate to the governing body of the county; 9
requiring the governing body of the county to take 10
public testimony on the council’s tentative budget and 11
proposed millage rate; providing for the governing 12
body of the county to approve the budget before final 13
adoption by a council on children’s services; 14
specifying that millage levied and fixed by a council 15
on children’s services does not count against the 16
millage limit applicable to the county under the State 17
Constitution; requiring the governing body of the 18
county to take public testimony and periodically vote 19
to retain or dissolve a council on children’s 20
services; requiring the electors of a county to 21
periodically vote on whether to retain or dissolve a 22
council on children’s services; requiring a council on 23
children’s services to give priority in the use of 24
funds to the provision of children’s services rather 25
than to the purchase of real estate or the 26
construction of buildings; expressing legislative 27
intent on application of the act; providing an 28
effective date. 29
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30
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida: 31
32
Section 1. Section 125.901, Florida Statutes, is amended to 33
read: 34
125.901 Children’s services; independent special district; 35
council; powers, duties, and functions; public records 36
exemption.— 37
(1) Each county may by ordinance create an independent 38
special district, as defined in ss. 189.403(3) and 39
200.001(8)(e), to provide funding for children’s services 40
throughout the county in accordance with this section. The 41
boundaries of such district shall be coterminous with the 42
boundaries of the county. The county governing body must shall 43
obtain approval, by a majority vote of those electors voting on 44
the question, to annually levy ad valorem taxes that may which 45
shall not exceed the maximum millage rate authorized by this 46
section. Any district created pursuant to the provisions of this 47
subsection shall be required to levy and fix millage subject to 48
the provisions of s. 200.065. Once such millage is approved by 49
the electorate, the district may shall not be required to seek 50
approval of the electorate in future years to levy the 51
previously approved millage. 52
(a) The governing board of the district shall be a council 53
on children’s services, which may also be known as a juvenile 54
welfare board or similar name as established in the ordinance by 55
the county governing body. Such council shall consist of 11 10 56
members, including: the superintendent of schools; a local 57
school board member; the district administrator from the 58
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appropriate district of the Department of Children and Family 59
Services, or his or her designee who is a member of the Senior 60
Management Service or of the Selected Exempt Service; two 61
members one member of the county governing body; and the judge 62
assigned to juvenile cases, who shall sit as a voting member of 63
the board, except that the said judge may shall not vote or 64
participate in the setting of ad valorem taxes under this 65
section. If there is more than one judge is assigned to juvenile 66
cases in a county, the chief judge shall designate one of the 67
said juvenile judges to serve on the board. The remaining five 68
members shall be appointed by the Governor, and shall, to the 69
extent possible, represent the demographic diversity of the 70
population of the county. After soliciting recommendations from 71
the public, the county governing body shall submit to the 72
Governor the names of at least three persons for each vacancy 73
occurring among the five members appointed by the Governor, and 74
the Governor shall appoint members to the council from the 75
candidates nominated by the county governing body. The Governor 76
shall make a selection within a 45-day period or request a new 77
list of candidates. All members appointed by the Governor must 78
shall have been residents of the county for the previous 24-79
month period. Such members shall be appointed for 4-year terms, 80
except that the length of the terms of the initial appointees 81
shall be adjusted to stagger the terms. The Governor may remove 82
a member for cause or upon the written petition of the county 83
governing body. If any of the members of the council required to 84
be appointed by the Governor under the provisions of this 85
subsection shall resign, die, or are be removed from office, the 86
vacancy thereby created shall, as soon as practicable, be filled 87
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by appointment by the Governor, using the same method as the 88
original appointment, and such appointment to fill a vacancy 89
shall be for the unexpired term of the person who resigns, dies, 90
or is removed from office. 91
(b) However, any county as defined in s. 125.011(1) may 92
instead have a governing board consisting of 33 members, 93
including: the superintendent of schools; two representatives of 94
public postsecondary education institutions located in the 95
county; the county manager or the equivalent county officer; the 96
district administrator from the appropriate district of the 97
Department of Children and Family Services, or the 98
administrator’s designee who is a member of the Senior 99
Management Service or the Selected Exempt Service; the director 100
of the county health department or the director’s designee; the 101
state attorney for the county or the state attorney’s designee; 102
the chief judge assigned to juvenile cases, or another juvenile 103
judge who is the chief judge’s designee and who shall sit as a 104
voting member of the board, except that the judge may not vote 105
or participate in setting ad valorem taxes under this section; 106
an individual who is selected by the board of the local United 107
Way or its equivalent; a member of a locally recognized faith-108
based coalition, selected by that coalition; a member of the 109
local chamber of commerce, selected by that chamber or, if more 110
than one chamber exists within the county, a person selected by 111
a coalition of the local chambers; a member of the early 112
learning coalition, selected by that coalition; a representative 113
of a labor organization or union active in the county; a member 114
of a local alliance or coalition engaged in cross-system 115
planning for health and social service delivery in the county, 116
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selected by that alliance or coalition; a member of the local 117
Parent-Teachers Association/Parent-Teacher-Student Association, 118
selected by that association; a youth representative selected by 119
the local school system’s student government; a local school 120
board member appointed by the chair of the school board; the 121
mayor of the county or the mayor’s designee; one member of the 122
county governing body, appointed by the chair of that body; a 123
member of the state Legislature who represents residents of the 124
county, selected by the chair of the local legislative 125
delegation; an elected official representing the residents of a 126
municipality in the county, selected by the county municipal 127
league; and four 4 members-at-large, appointed to the council by 128
the majority of sitting council members. The remaining seven 7 129
members shall be appointed by the Governor pursuant to in 130
accordance with procedures set forth in paragraph (a), except 131
that the Governor may remove a member for cause or upon the 132
written petition of the council. Appointments by the Governor 133
must, to the extent reasonably possible, represent the 134
geographic and demographic diversity of the population of the 135
county. Members who are appointed to the council by reason of 136
their position are not subject to the length of terms and limits 137
on consecutive terms as provided in this section. The remaining 138
appointed members of the governing board shall be appointed to 139
serve 2-year terms, except that those members appointed by the 140
Governor shall be appointed to serve 4-year terms, and the youth 141
representative and the legislative delegate shall be appointed 142
to serve 1-year terms. A member may be reappointed.; However, a 143
member may not serve for more than three consecutive terms. A 144
member is eligible to be appointed again after a 2-year hiatus 145
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from the council. 146
(c) This subsection does not prohibit a county from 147
exercising such power as is provided by general or special law 148
to provide children’s services or to create a special district 149
to provide such services. 150
(2)(a) Each council on children’s services shall have all 151
of the following powers and functions: 152
1. To provide and maintain in the county such preventive, 153
developmental, treatment, and rehabilitative services for 154
children as the council determines are needed for the general 155
welfare of the county. 156
2. To provide such other services for all children as the 157
council determines are needed for the general welfare of the 158
county. 159
3. To allocate and provide funds for other agencies in the 160
county which are operated for the benefit of children, if those 161
funds provided they are not under the exclusive jurisdiction of 162
the public school system. 163
4. To collect information and statistical data and to 164
conduct research that which will be helpful to the council and 165
the county in deciding the needs of children in the county. 166
5. To consult and coordinate with other agencies dedicated 167
to the welfare of children to the end that the overlapping of 168
services will be prevented. 169
6. To lease or buy such real estate, equipment, and 170
personal property and to construct such buildings as are needed 171
to execute the foregoing powers and functions, except provided 172
that no such purchases may not shall be made or building done 173
unless paid for with cash on hand or secured by funds deposited 174
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in financial institutions. The governing body of the county must 175
approve by resolution the purchase of real estate or the 176
construction of a building by the council. Nothing in This 177
subparagraph does not shall be construed to authorize a district 178
to issue bonds of any nature, and nor shall a district may not 179
have the power to require the imposition of any bond by the 180
governing body of the county. 181
7. To employ, pay, and provide benefits for any part-time 182
or full-time personnel needed to execute the foregoing powers 183
and functions. 184
(b) Each council on children’s services shall: 185
1. Immediately after the members are appointed, elect a 186
chair and a vice chair from among its members, and elect other 187
officers as deemed necessary by the council. 188
2. Immediately after the members are appointed and officers 189
are elected, identify and assess the needs of the children in 190
the county served by the council and submit to the governing 191
body of each county a written description of: 192
a. The activities, services, and opportunities that will be 193
provided to children. 194
b. The anticipated schedule for providing those activities, 195
services, and opportunities. 196
c. The manner in which children will be served, including a 197
description of arrangements and agreements that which will be 198
made with community organizations, state and local educational 199
agencies, federal agencies, public assistance agencies, the 200
juvenile courts, foster care agencies, and other applicable 201
public and private agencies and organizations. 202
d. The special outreach efforts that will be undertaken to 203
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provide services to at-risk, abused, or neglected children. 204
e. The manner in which the council will seek and provide 205
funding for unmet needs. 206
f. The strategy that which will be used for interagency 207
coordination to maximize existing human and fiscal resources. 208
3. Provide training and orientation to all new members 209
sufficient to allow them to perform their duties. 210
4. Make and adopt bylaws and rules and regulations for the 211
council’s guidance, operation, governance, and maintenance 212
which, provided such rules and regulations are not inconsistent 213
with federal or state laws or county ordinances. 214
5. Provide an annual written report, to be presented no 215
later than January 1, to the governing body of the county. The 216
annual report shall contain, but need not be limited to, the 217
following information: 218
a. Information on the effectiveness of activities, 219
services, and programs offered by the council, including cost-220
effectiveness. 221
b. A detailed anticipated budget for continuation of 222
activities, services, and programs offered by the council, and a 223
list of all sources of requested funding, both public and 224
private. 225
c. Procedures used for early identification of at-risk 226
children who need additional or continued services and methods 227
for ensuring that the additional or continued services are 228
received. 229
d. A description of the degree to which the council’s 230
objectives and activities are consistent with the goals of this 231
section. 232
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e. Detailed information on the various programs, services, 233
and activities available to participants and the degree to which 234
the programs, services, and activities have been successfully 235
used by children. 236
f. Information on programs, services, and activities that 237
should be eliminated; programs, services, and activities that 238
should be continued; and programs, services, and activities that 239
should be added to the basic format of the children’s services 240
council. 241
(c) The council shall maintain minutes of each meeting, 242
including a record of all votes cast, and shall make such 243
minutes available to any interested person. 244
(d) Members of the council shall serve without 245
compensation, but are shall be entitled to receive reimbursement 246
for per diem and travel expenses consistent with the provisions 247
of s. 112.061. 248
(3)(a) The fiscal year of the district shall be the same as 249
that of the county. 250
(b)1. On or before June 15 July 1 of each year, the council 251
on children’s services shall prepare and submit to the governing 252
body of the county a tentative annual written budget of the 253
district’s expected income and expenditures, including a 254
contingency fund. The council shall, in addition, compute and 255
submit to the governing body of the county a proposed millage 256
rate within the voter-approved cap necessary to fund the 257
tentative budget and, prior to adopting a final budget, comply 258
with the provisions of s. 200.065, relating to the method of 259
fixing millage, and shall fix the final millage rate by 260
resolution of the council. The council shall include with the 261
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submissions the council’s rationale for the budget and millage 262
rate, as well as a detailed explanation for any significant 263
changes in the proposed use of funds from the prior year’s 264
approved budget. 265
2.a. Within 20 days after receiving the tentative budget 266
and proposed millage rate from the council, the governing body 267
of the county shall hold a public hearing and receive public 268
testimony on the tentative budget and proposed millage rate. The 269
governing body of the county shall by resolution approve the 270
budget or reject it and direct the council to submit a revised 271
tentative budget within 10 days for approval or rejection by the 272
governing body. The council may not adopt a final budget until 273
the budget has been approved by the governing body. 274
b. The authority under this subparagraph for the governing 275
body of the county to approve the budget of the council does not 276
cause the millage levied and fixed by the council to count 277
toward the maximum millage authorized for all county purposes 278
under s. 9, Art. VII of the State Constitution. 279
3. Before adopting a final budget, the council must comply 280
with the provisions of s. 200.065, relating to the method of 281
fixing millage, and shall fix the final millage rate by 282
resolution of the council. 283
4. The adopted budget and final millage rate shall be 284
certified and delivered to the governing body of the county as 285
soon as possible following the council’s adoption of the final 286
budget and millage rate pursuant to chapter 200. Included in 287
each certified budget shall be the millage rate, adopted by 288
resolution of the council, necessary to be applied to raise the 289
funds budgeted for district operations and expenditures. In no 290
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circumstances, however, shall any district levy millage to 291
exceed a maximum of 0.5 mills of assessed valuation of all 292
properties within the county which are subject to ad valorem 293
county taxes. 294
(c) The adopted budget of the district so certified and 295
delivered to the governing body of the county under paragraph 296
(b) is shall not be subject to change or modification by the 297
governing body of the county or any other authority. 298
(d) All tax money collected under this section, as soon 299
after the collection thereof as is reasonably practicable, shall 300
be paid directly to the council on children’s services by the 301
tax collector of the county, or the clerk of the circuit court 302
if the clerk collects delinquent taxes. 303
(e)1. All moneys received by the council on children’s 304
services shall be deposited in qualified public depositories, as 305
defined in s. 280.02, with separate and distinguishable accounts 306
established specifically for the council and shall be withdrawn 307
only by checks signed by the chair of the council and 308
countersigned by either one other member of the council on 309
children’s services or by a chief executive officer who shall be 310
so authorized by the council. 311
2. Upon entering the duties of office, the chair and the 312
other member of the council or chief executive officer who signs 313
its checks shall each give a surety bond in the sum of at least 314
$1,000 for each $1 million or portion thereof of the council’s 315
annual budget, which bond shall be conditioned that each shall 316
faithfully discharge the duties of his or her office. The 317
premium on such bond may be paid by the district as part of the 318
expense of the council. No other member of the council shall be 319
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required to give bond or other security. 320
3. No Funds of the district may not shall be expended 321
except by check as aforesaid, except for expenditures from a 322
petty cash account, which may shall not at any time exceed $100. 323
All expenditures from petty cash shall be recorded on the books 324
and records of the council on children’s services. No Funds of 325
the council on children’s services, except excepting 326
expenditures from petty cash, may not shall be expended without 327
prior approval of the council, in addition to the budgeting 328
thereof. 329
(f) Within 10 days, exclusive of weekends and legal 330
holidays, after the expiration of each quarter annual period, 331
the council on children’s services shall cause to be prepared 332
and filed with the governing body of the county a financial 333
report that includes which shall include the following: 334
1. The total expenditures of the council for the quarter 335
annual period. 336
2. The total receipts of the council during the quarter 337
annual period. 338
3. A statement of the funds the council has on hand, has 339
invested, or has deposited with qualified public depositories at 340
the end of the quarter annual period. 341
4. The total administrative costs of the council for the 342
quarter annual period. 343
(4)(a) Any district created pursuant to the provisions of 344
this section may be dissolved by a special act of the 345
Legislature, or the county governing body may by ordinance 346
dissolve the district subject to the approval of the electorate. 347
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), beginning in May 2016, 348
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and in May every 8 years thereafter, the governing body of the 349
county shall hear public testimony relating to the effectiveness 350
of the council on children’s services and shall vote by 351
ordinance whether to retain or dissolve the district. Regardless 352
of its decision, the governing body of the county shall submit 353
the question of retention or dissolution of the district to the 354
electors in the August primary election immediately following 355
its decision. If the electorate votes to dissolve the district, 356
the district shall be dissolved. 357
358
If any district is dissolved pursuant to the provisions of this 359
subsection, each county must shall first obligate itself to 360
assume the debts, liabilities, contracts, and outstanding 361
obligations of the district within the total millage available 362
to the county governing body for all county and municipal 363
purposes as provided for under s. 9, Art. VII of the State 364
Constitution. Any district may also be dissolved pursuant to the 365
provisions of s. 189.4042. 366
(5) After or during the first year of operation of the 367
council on children’s services, the governing body of the 368
county, at its option, may fund in whole or in part the budget 369
of the council on children’s services from its own funds. 370
(6) Any district created pursuant to the provisions of this 371
section shall comply with all other statutory requirements of 372
general application which relate to the filing of any financial 373
reports or compliance reports required under part III of chapter 374
218, or any other report or documentation required by law, 375
including the requirements of ss. 189.415, 189.417, and 189.418. 376
(7)(a) Each county may by ordinance create a dependent 377
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special district within the boundaries of the county for the 378
purpose of providing preventive, developmental, treatment, and 379
rehabilitative services for children. The district may is 380
authorized to seek grants from state, federal, and local 381
agencies and to accept donations from public and private sources 382
if, provided that the district complies with the provisions of 383
paragraphs (1)(a) and (2)(b), and provided that the district has 384
a budget that requires approval through an affirmative vote of 385
the governing body of the county or that may be vetoed by the 386
governing body of the county. 387
(b) If the provisions of a county charter relating to the 388
membership of the governing board of a dependent special 389
district conflict with paragraph (1)(a), a county may by 390
ordinance create a dependent special district within the 391
boundaries of the county for the purpose of providing 392
preventive, developmental, treatment, and rehabilitative 393
services for children, and the district may shall be authorized 394
to seek grants from state, federal, and local agencies and to 395
accept donations from public and private sources if, provided 396
that the district complies with the provisions of paragraph 397
(2)(b), and provided that the district has a budget that 398
requires approval through an affirmative vote of the governing 399
body of the county or that may be vetoed by the governing body 400
of the county. 401
(8) It is the intent of the Legislature that the funds 402
collected pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be 403
used to support improvements in children’s services and that 404
such funds may shall not be used as a substitute for existing 405
resources or for resources that would otherwise be available for 406
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children’s services. The council on children’s services shall 407
give priority in the use of funds under this section to the 408
provision of children’s services rather than to the purchase of 409
real estate or the construction of buildings. 410
(9) Two or more councils on children’s services may enter 411
into a cooperative agreement to share administrative costs, 412
including, but not limited to, staff and office space, if a more 413
efficient or effective operation will result. The cooperative 414
agreement shall include provisions on apportioning costs between 415
the councils, keeping separate and distinct financial records 416
for each council, and resolving any conflicts that might arise 417
under the cooperative agreement. 418
(10) Two or more councils on children’s services may enter 419
into a cooperative agreement to seek grants, to accept 420
donations, or to jointly fund programs serving multicounty 421
areas. The cooperative agreement shall include provisions for 422
the adequate accounting of separate and joint funds. 423
(11) Personal identifying information of a child or the 424
parent or guardian of the child, held by a council on children’s 425
services, juvenile welfare board, or other similar entity 426
created under this section or by special law, or held by a 427
service provider or researcher under contract with such entity, 428
is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State 429
Constitution. This exemption applies to such information held 430
before, on, or after the effective date of this exemption. 431
Section 2. It is the intent of the Legislature that the 432
revisions made by this act to s. 125.901, Florida Statutes, 433
apply to any council on children’s services in existence on the 434
effective date of this act and to any council created on or 435
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after the effective date of this act. It is further the intent 436
of the Legislature that the revisions made by this act to the 437
process by which a council develops a budget for the special 438
district apply to the budget for the 2010-2011 fiscal year of 439
the district. 440
Section 3. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law. 441
Week Three March 19, 2010
Bill Jeopardizes Long-Term Community Investments in Children
Faced with a bill (SB 1216) that would jeopardize the future of Children's Services Councils, the Florida CSC board of directors gathered in Tallahassee this week for their annual Capitol Hill Days. Board members were updated on conversations with bill sponsor Sen. Joe Negron (R-Martin) that attempted to address his concerns about accountability, transparency, and citizen engagement. The board then spent hours deliberating options for a compromise that would make the bill more reasonable. Unfortunately, a compromise could not be reached that would preserve the integrity of CSC governance and keep local children's councils above the political and partisan fray. As a result, Sen. Negron introduced an amendment that would force five of Florida's eight CSCs to be placed on a local ballot this August for voters to determine their fate - less than six months away. In the amended bill, which passed the Children, Family & Elderly Affairs Committee, the five CSCs that would go to ballot in August are JWB-CSC of Pinellas County, CSC of Martin County, Children's Board of Hillsborough County, CSC of St. Lucie, and CSC of Okeechobee County. The amended bill also would require the remaining three CSCs to go to ballot in 2012 (CSC of Palm Beach and CSC of Broward) and in 2018 (The Children's Trust). Sadly, CSCs will have their hands tied in making their case to their communities because they (and other local governments) were prohibited by the Legislature last year from campaigning on any ballot measure (see SB216/ 2009). For CSCs on an August ballot, citizens leading private efforts to educate voters will not be able to lay the groundwork and raise the resources in time. Voters will be cheated out of the opportunity to make an informed decision about investments in their community's children.
The amended bill passed Thursday on a 6-2 vote with yes votes from Sens. Storms (chair), Hill, Diaz de la Portilla, Garcia, Wise, and Detert. Sens. Rich and Justice voted no. The next stop for SB 1216 is the Community Affairs Committee. In the House, a similar bill (HB 1227) by Rep. Debbie Mayfield (R-Indian River) is expected to be heard in the Committee on Military and Community Affairs. Special thanks go to community leaders who testified in opposition to the bill during yesterday's committee meeting: David Kennedy (former Board Chair, Children's Board of Hillsborough County), Lynn Frank (Board Member, Boys & Girls Club in Martin County), Maureen Dinnen (Member, Broward County
TAKE NOTE
Children's Week
April 11-14
Tallahassee
Rally for Afterschool April 20 Washington, DC
One Goal Summer Conference July 21-23 Tampa ---------------------------- St. Lucie CSC Launches "Do You Know" Campaign The St. Lucie CSC has launched a new campaign designed to generate greater awareness of the many ways it serves children in the community. As part of the campaign, a video titled, "Do You Know? Now You Know," was created and placed on You Tube. The video taps into audiences that may recognize a program, such as the Boys & Girls Club, but not know that the St. Lucie CSC provides funds for the program. The video helps viewers connect the CSC to the programs it funds. A special page was also created on the CSC web site to direct viewers to the site
School Board), Ted Granger (President, United Way of Florida), Karen Woodall (Coordinator, Coalition for Fair and Comprehensive Tax Reform), and Bobbie Sewell (State Government Relations, Broward County). CALL TO ACTION: SB 1216 now goes to the Senate Community Affairs
Committee. Contact members of the committee to tell them to vote NO on this bad bill. Please also contact members of the House Military & Local Affairs Committee immediately to voice your opposition to this bill. At a time when funding for children's programs is being cut to levels that will endanger thousands of children, the possibility of losing locally invested dollars will make the crisis even worse. This unnecessary
proposal impinges on local communities and could not come at a worse time for state-funded programs that rely on CSC support. Download additional talk points.
Florida CSC Board Convenes for Capitol Hill Days in Tallahassee
In addition to their work on SB 1216, the Florida CSC Board of Directors heard from Dr. Brittany Birken, Director of the AWI Office of Early Learning (OEL), who provided a report on major initiatives underway led by OEL, including development of the Early Learning Information System and the Professional Development initiative. Dr. Birken also updated Florida CSC members on the up-to-the minute status of legislative budget proposals for VPK and School Readiness which are, along with most state programs, very vulnerable to catastrophic reductions. Department of Children and Families Secretary George Sheldon also participated in the meeting to brief the board on recent department accomplishments and ongoing challenges. He too reviewed the grave outlook for funding in the midst of Florida's budget crisis. Both leaders expressed gratitude for the important part CSCs play in assisting their state programs, and lauded the strengthening of the working partnership between CSCs and state agencies in recent years.
OTHER STATE NEWS
Budget is Primary Focus in Week Three
Standing on the brink of a $3-billion budget hole, lawmakers focused on little else this week except cutting costs. Entire state agencies were even offered up for restructuring or dismantling in an effort to reduce expenses. Not surprisingly, very few bills of interest saw movement. In the House, budget committees released more details on allocations for specific programs. Among those hardest hit were VPK and Healthy Start. VPK was reduced approximately $54 million from just a week ago. Budget negotiations are expected to begin much earlier than usual according to leadership. As of this week, here's where the House stands on other issues of interest.
KidCare - Overall increase of $37 million to cover enrollment growth, capitation rate freeze for HK resulting in $10 million savings, and funds dental benefit at $12 per member
Healthy Start -- $4 million cut (eliminates Healthy Start Coalitions)
Healthy Families - Funded at current level
Children's Medical Services -- $3.4 million cut
Community Based Care - Funded at current levels for programs
where additional videos and information about the other CSC funded programs will be posted. View the video. Federal Funding Available for Communities
A federal funding opportunity is being offered to strengthen, through granting organizations, the capacity of community-based organizations to serve low-income communities through innovative and replicable programming. The Corporation for National and Community Service is accepting applications for the Social Innovation Fund. Applications are due by April 8, 2010. The Governor's Commission on Volunteerism and Community Service, Volunteer Florida, invites nonprofit foundations throughout Florida to partner in seeking up to $5 million in funding from the new Social Innovation Fund. More information about this funding opportunity is available at: www.nationalservice.org -------------------------
Capitol Connection is also available online at the FCSC web site.
(some admin cuts)
Child Protection Investigation - Funded at current levels
Independent Living - Reduces stipend from $875 per child to $675
Adoption Maintenance Subsidy -- $12.8 million (replaces non-recurring)
CALLS TO ACTION: A full court press is needed on calls to Representatives
on the House Full Appropriations Council and the Senate Ways and Means Committee regarding VPK funding. Ask legislators not to reduce the "per student" funding amount (Base Student Allocation). See AWI fact sheet. The House Health Care Appropriations Committee proposal would eliminate Healthy Start Coalitions and shift service dollars and responsibilities to the local County Health Departments. The state will save $4 million, but it will lose $32 million annually in additional funds leveraged by Healthy Start Coalitions. Call your Representative and urge them not to make these cuts. See FAHSC alert. Lawmakers Attempt to Gain Control of Medicaid Costs
With Medicaid spending accounting for about half of the state shortfall, the Health and Human Services (HHS) budget committee advanced a plan to move 247,671 Medicaid recipients across 19 counties into HMOs, a shift expected to save the state $28.6 million next year - but close to $100 million annually in future years. Still, with 2.7 million Floridians crowded onto Medicaid rolls now absorbing about one-quarter of all state spending, HHS budget chairman Sen. Durell Peaden conceded that gains from the dramatic effort were less than hoped for once they were reviewed by state analysts. The 19 counties targeted for the HMO move are those that have two or more managed care Medicaid plans already operating and are considered to have the capacity to serve a larger population. Among them are most Central Florida counties, including Orange, Seminole and Osceola, along with Miami-Dade, Hillsborough, Palm Beach and Pinellas counties. Already, about 1 million Florida Medicaid patients are treated through managed care.
EARLY LEARNING
ELC Bills Get Committee References
The Early Learning bill, SB 2014 by Sen. Stephen Wise (R-Duval), which addresses various administrative and governance issues, cleared its first hurdle having been heard, amended and passed unanimously by the Senate Commerce Committee. Now a Committee Substitute, the bill travels on to the Education PreK-12 Committee with 4 amendments including one that directs the Agency for Workforce Innovation to adopt procedures for merging early learning coalitions and for early termination of the terms of coalition members. A similar bill, HB 1203 by Rep Nelson, passed the Pre-K-12 Committee on March 17 with an amendment to address exemptions for the kindergarten readiness rate for children with disabilities. HB 1571 by Rep. Greg Evers (R-Santa Rosa) and SB 2710 by Sen. Mike Bennett (R-Manatee) were filed in both the House and Senate. The bills address administrative issues affecting the early learning coalitions including establishment of standardized procurement and exemption from the Administrative Procedures Act. No action this week.
STATE & LOCAL REVENUES
Property / Annual Assessment / Exemption
SJR 1254 by Mike Fasano (R-Pasco) passed Senate Community Affairs on Wednesday this week on an 11-0 vote. The resolution proposes amendments to the State Constitution to reduce from 10 percent to 5 percent the limitation on annual assessment increases applicable to non-homestead real property, provide an additional homestead exemption for new owners of homestead property and application and limitations with respect thereto. Referred to Community Affairs, Finance & Tax, Education PreK-12 Appropriations, Policy & Steering Committee On Ways & Means, and Rules. Similar Bill, HB 655 by Carl Domino (R- Palm Beach), awaits hearing in Finance & Tax Council. TABOR
SJR 2420 by Sen. Mike Haridopolos (R-Brevard), also known as TABOR, proposes an amendment to the state constitution to limit state and local government tax revenues and, if passed by the electorate, would require voter approval of new taxes and fees. It is scheduled to be heard in the Community Affairs Committee on March 23. No House version has been filed.
CHILD WELFARE
Independent Living
Each year, older foster youth make the difficult transition to independent living. Many of these kids have spent their entire lives in the foster care system drifting from placement to placement. They need strong support - from the state of Florida and our communities - as they move toward adulthood. Unfortunately, HCA 4 passed out of the House Health Care Appropriations Committee on Tuesday with language limiting the Road to Independence Award to an amount "not to exceed amount of $675 per month." This is tantamount to a 50% reduction. In addition, the bill prorates the award in the month the youth turns age 18. Currently the youth gets a full-month subsidy. The most expensive month for a former foster youth is the one in which they strike out on their own. They desperately need funds to assist with utility and housing deposits. Without the strongest level of Road to Independence support, former foster youth could wind up homeless or in prison. We urge the House and Senate to maintain existing levels of support for the Road to Independence Program Transition Services for Youth
HB 627 by Rep. Ari Porth (D-Broward) and SB 1356 by Sen. Stephen Wise (R-Duval), permits the Department of Juvenile Justice to provide transition to adulthood services to youth in DJJ's custody or supervision. Both bills moved forward during the second week of session. HB 627 was unanimously approved by the Public Safety & Domestic Security Committee and now heads to the Full Appropriations Council on Education & Economic Development. No action this week.
HEALTH CARE
Florida KidCare
SB 2082 by Sen. Nan Rich (D-Broward) provides that: children under the age of 1 may participate in the Medikids program; an eligible child who is a lawful immigrant may enroll in the Florida Kidcare Program regardless of the child's date of entry; authorizes Kidcare coverage for temporomandibular joint disease. provides that Medicaid-eligible children are deemed eligible for 12 months of coverage regardless of any change in circumstances, etc. Referred to Health Regulation, Banking & Insurance, Health & Human Services Appropriations, and Way & Means. No action thus far. No action on similar bill,
HB 1545 by Juan Zapata (R-Miami).
JUVENILE JUSTICE
Bill Would Eliminate Life Sentences for Juveniles
SB 184 would establish parole for adolescent offenders, making it likely that life sentences for juveniles would be eliminated. The measure would establish parole for kids who committed a crime when they were 15 years old or younger and were sentenced to more than 10 years in prison. Approved last week by Senate Criminal Justice Committee, the proposal is next slated for the Senate Criminal and Civil Justice Appropriations Committee. The House companion (HB 23) also passed the Public Safety & Domestic Security Policy Committee, and is now before the House Criminal and Civil Justice Appropriations Committee. There was no action in either house on the proposal this week.
OTHER ISSUES
Booster Seats
SB 316 by Sen. Thad Altman (R-Brevard) would require booster seats, in addition to seat belts, for children aged 4 through 7 and less than 4'9" to protect the child by properly using a crash tested, federally approved child restraint device. It also provides certain exceptions, and redefines the term "motor vehicle" to exclude certain vehicles from such requirements. No action this week. CALL TO ACTION: Please call Reps. Dave Murzin and Dean Cannon to urge
them to allow the bill to move forward in the House.
FEDERAL NEWS
Early Learning Challenge Fund, Child Nutrition
The U.S. Senate has stripped the Early Learning Challenge Fund from the Higher Education bill. Education Committee chairs are talking about other possible vehicles, but it is not clear what the other options might be. The Senate Agriculture committee released the Chairman's Mark of the Child Nutrition Act (markup next week) and it has some positive things, but it does not include opportunities to increase access to preschool CACFP.
This issue of Capitol Connection is brought to you by The Firm, composed of CSC legislative liaisons around the state, and Editor Kriss Vallese. Please contact Firm Chair Diana Ragbeer, Director of Public Policy & Communications with The Children's Trust, at [email protected], Amy Petrila, Director of Public Policy & Advocacy at the Children's Board of Hillsborough County, at [email protected], or Vivian Alarcon, CEO, Florida Children's Services Council, at [email protected] with questions regarding legislative issues in this newsletter.
How The Children’s Trust persuaded the 2.4 million residents of Florida’slargest county to tax themselves during an economic downturn
The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
By Martin Merzer
Preface
This report – and the children’s programs that serve as its centerpiece – would not be possible without the support and leadership
of the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, which has forged a path for children’s advocates in Miami-Dade County, the state of Florida and
beyond. The W.K. Kellogg Foundation and its partners in Florida - The Early Childhood Initiative Foundation, the University of Florida’s
Lastinger Center for Learning, Miami-Dade Public Schools, The Children’s Trust, the Early Learning Coalition and United Way’s Center
for Excellence in Early Education – have worked collaboratively to improve the well-being and learning of children through the
SPARK Initiative (Supporting Partnerships to Assure Ready Kids) and the Early Childhood Learning Labs Initiative.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary..………………………………………………………………………….. 2
Introduction…………..………………………………………………………………………… 3
Applying Lessons Painfully Learned………………………………………………….…….. 5
What Was At Stake……………………………………………………………………….….. 7
And So It Begins/The Strategy Takes Shape………………………………………….….. 9
Building A War Chest/Managing A Budget……………………………………………....... 13
The Campaign Begins Firing on All Cylinders…………………………………………….. 15
Ballot wording…………………………………………………………………………… 15
Specifi c approaches to each group…………………………………………………… 16
Advertising………………………………..……………………………………………… 17
Neutralizing opposition/damage control…………………………………………….… 18
Field operations/grassroots efforts……………………………………………………. 20
Triumph………………………………………………………………………………………… 21
Appendix I: Portland, Oregon……………………………………………………………….. 23
Appendix II: Seattle, Washington…………………………………………………………… 31
1The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Executive Summary
In August 2008, The Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade County confronted and overcame a profound threat to
its existence. Under a “sunset” provision included in an original 2002 ballot initiative, The Trust would disappear
unless voters reauthorized it.
If that happened – if The Trust vanished – hundreds of high-quality health, educational and safety programs
that serve hundreds of thousands of children would have evaporated. At least $100 million of annual services
would be lost forever – more than $1 billion during the next 10 years alone.
The challenge was enormous. Children’s advocates were compelled to persuade voters to tax themselves
during an intensifying economic collapse – and forever. Nevertheless, a group led by David Lawrence Jr.,
chairman of The Children’s Trust and a former publisher of The Miami Herald, shouldered the task.
This study examines and analyzes the planning and implementation of that campaign.
The report is divided into six main sections that survey the history of The Trust and its previous campaigns,
the current scope of its work, and the creation, development and execution of the 2008 eff ort. It also includes,
in two appendices, looks at similar eff orts in Portland, Ore., and in Seattle, Wash. The study found that Lawrence
nearly single-handedly raised $1.64 million – enough to support a full-bore, multi-faceted electoral campaign.
That campaign was mapped by Sergio Bendixen, a nationally known political strategist who was instrumental in
helping Lawrence pass The Trust’s original ballot initiative in 2002. Key roles also were played by their campaign
manager, Susan Vodicka, and by Modesto Abety, The Trust’s president and chief executive offi cer, among others.
The campaign was designed to be non-partisan and comprehensive, conducted in English, Spanish and
Creole, though diff erent tactics were employed for each of the county’s three main racial and ethnic groups.
It was critically important to make clear that The Trust served all children in the community – and, in addition,
after fi ve years of operation, with a vast variety of benefi cial, high-quality programs. And the campaign had to
be as pure and untouched by scandal as The Trust itself had been.
Bendixen, as is his style, commissioned numerous opinion surveys. The results were used to spotlight
potential areas of resistance and mold individual messages for each voter bloc.
To win black votes, campaign strategists enlisted black-oriented radio stations and the county’s wide,
infl uential network of black church leaders. To win Hispanic votes, strategists enlisted Hispanic radio
personalities with suffi cient infl uence to off set deeply rooted Hispanic resistance to new taxes. To win non-
Hispanic white votes, the campaign employed carefully produced, precisely placed television commercials,
including a particularly eff ective spot that featured Lawrence speaking passionately about The Trust and the
children it serves.
In addition, the campaign worked diligently to neutralize potential opposition, and it developed a muscular
grassroots operation that drove extremely high percentages of targeted voter blocs to the polls.
The result: The Trust won 85.44 percent of the vote – including 97 percent of the votes cast by blacks, 85
percent of non-Hispanic white votes, and 77 percent of the Hispanic vote. All of these people voted to tax
themselves in perpetuity on behalf of the county’s children.
In accomplishing this, The Children’s Trust employed strategies, tactics and techniques that can be replicated
by children’s advocates throughout the nation.
The full report, which follows, describes and analyzes the details of those eff orts.
2 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
3The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
How The Children’s Trust persuaded the 2.4 million residents of Florida’slargest county to tax themselves during an economic downturn
The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
By Martin Merzer“There are a lot of people – I know them and so do you – trying to do work that helps, that can turn it around, that can make things better, that can save lives…. And in this, though it would not occur to them, they are heroic.”
It’s 2:45 p.m. on a school day and 16 children who
achieved their educational goals weave themselves
into life vests and clamber into a boat, bound for
their reward: a short cruise to the mud fl ats of
Biscayne Bay and the Stiltsville community of historic
houses. Nearby, a giggling gaggle of kids race each
other – and a few counselors – in kayaks. In a room
overlooking this, a dozen youngsters labor over
computerized math and reading exercises, each
accompanied by a tutor. They and several thousand
others are served by Shake-A-Leg Miami, which off ers
recreational, educational and social opportunities to
children with physical, developmental and economic
challenges. Twenty-two percent of its budget comes
from The Children’s Trust. Without that money, “this
program would not exist in this form,” says Education
Director Ashley Sullivan.
Three miles away, on the 10th fl oor of an offi ce
building, seven people sit at telephones and
computer terminals. Joaquim Fernandes takes a call.
“211 Children’s Trust Helpline,” he says in Spanish.
The caller is in Miami Beach. Her baby needs food.
Fernandes punches “nutrition” into his computer,
along with an address. One hundred and 14 possible
referrals appear, including one for the Healthy Start
program. Between October 2007 and September
2008, the helpline handled 51,569 calls in English,
Spanish and Creole. Nearly 10,000 calls involved
child or adolescent health care, including calls about
suicidal thoughts and other mental health issues.
More than 10,000 involved after-school care and other
family-life issues. More than 10,000 involved food,
shelter and other basic needs. The helpline is fully
funded by The Children’s Trust. “Cries for help,” says
Maria del Rosario Soto, the 211 program manager.
“That’s all we hear here.”
That same day, a 13-year-old boy named Franklin
walks into Room 4 at Jose de Diego Middle School,
deep in Miami’s inner city. The room is now a medical
clinic, part of a rapidly expanding network called
Health Connect In Our Schools. Two cots, one scale,
two desks, a supply cabinet, a few posters. Franklin
has a headache and an ear ache. Maria Caridad,
a registered nurse, tends to him. Nearly all of the
program’s funding comes from The Children’s Trust. A
visitor asks Franklin: “Have you heard of The Children’s
Trust?” Franklin says, “Yes.” Visitor: “What do you know
about it?” Franklin: “They take care of kids.”
That, they do. None of this would be possible
without The Children’s Trust.
The Trust serves hundreds of thousands of kids in
Florida’s Miami-Dade County by funding, in full or
in part, nearly 300 health, educational and safety
programs. It created all of this in less than six years.
And, in August 2008, it confronted and overcame a
truly existential threat.
In doing so, it secured its future – and enhanced
and amplifi ed the future prospects of Miami-Dade’s
children. Their health. Their safety. Their educational
and recreational opportunities.
Forever.
The Children’s Trust also widened
the trail it already had been blazing
for a movement on the brink of going
national. Clearly worthy of study for
the audacious scope and diversity of the programs it
has created and/or funds on behalf of kids, The Trust
also now serves as a model for achieving another
seemingly impossible goal: persuading citizens to tax
themselves in support of these programs.
In a nutshell, here is why:
Under a “sunset” provision The Children’s Trust
voluntarily included in its enabling ballot initiative
of 2002, the organization would disappear in 2008
unless voters reauthorized it. That vote was scheduled
for Aug. 26, 2008. As it turned out, the timing could
hardly have been worse.
The national economy was tanking, with the dual
– Writer Peggy Noonan, 2008
Introduction
local bulwarks of tourism and real estate development
in particular peril. Anti-tax sentiment raged from coast
to coast and found considerable support in the Miami
area. Several similar initiatives – mostly notably, the
so-called “latte tax” in Seattle – had failed miserably in
recent years.
In addition, Miami-Dade County is not a particularly
homogenous and serene place, to put it mildly. Its
2.4 million residents include more than 1.4 million
Hispanic people from a great variety of nations,
more than 400,000 African-American and other black
people from many backgrounds and places, including
considerable numbers from Haiti, more than 400,000
non-Hispanic white people,
also with varied backgrounds,
and thousands of people from
other national origins and
cultures.
The place is crowded. It
is politically diverse and
sometimes extreme. It often is
tense.
And yet, at this time and
in this place, The Children’s
Trust launched a full-bore,
multi-faceted, Obama-
esque campaign that raised
$1.64 million from 686
contributors and persuaded an
overwhelming number of voters to tax themselves –
in perpetuity – on behalf of its programs. For children.
The tax, assessed at a rate that costs the owner of
a median-assessed home less than $60 a year, will
produce around $100 million every year. That’s about
$1 billion over the next 10 years alone. For children.
The contributions to this campaign, by the way,
were not tax deductible. They ranged from $10 to
$110,000.
“It’s pretty extraordinary,” said Greg Taylor, vice
president of programs at the W.K. Kellogg Foundation,
which commissioned this study. “No question about
it. One of the reasons we want to capture information
about how they did this is that it was such an
extraordinary eff ort.
“It supports or verifi es what I believe is a tenet
of the Kellogg Foundation – to do something
like this requires amazing leadership and also a
comprehensive communications and engagement
strategy.”
That leadership was provided by David Lawrence
Jr., chairman of The Children’s Trust, former publisher
of The Miami Herald and, by all accounts, the single
most important fi gure in the creation of The Trust,
the development of its programs, the campaign to
preserve it, and – now – the eff ort to build a national
movement based on it.
“We have 797,000 children in Florida without health
insurance [125,000 of those in Miami-Dade] and 18.8
percent of all the children in this country without
health insurance,” Lawrence said. “My God, we’re
surely a better people than that. Any country that can
spend $400 million a day to bring democracy to Iraq
probably can do better by its own children.”
To be sure, other U.S. counties or cities have
enjoyed some success with similar
campaigns on behalf of their
children, but none approached
the scope of The Children’s Trust’s
electoral eff ort – or the portfolio of
programs that eff ort was launched
to preserve.
“It can be done, but it can’t be
done if you don’t have certain
things in place,” said Dr. Ruby
Takanishi, president of the
Foundation for Child Development
in New York City. “The day after the
vote, I told Dave that there should
be a case study that describes how
he did it.”
What follows is that case study, one that examines
and illuminates the planning and execution of this
remarkable ballot initiative. This report, presented in
sections and accompanied by several appendices,
is intended to serve as a “lessons learned” model for
others throughout the United States.
“I think that what was done here could be done in
any American community,” Lawrence said.
Those who work with or for Lawrence know him as a
force of nature, a man of uncommon intensity, which
is a nice way of saying that he can get under your skin,
though virtually always for a cause that is right and
good, even noble. Generally speaking, it is a cliché to
say that someone doesn’t take ‘No’ for an answer. It is
not a cliché to say that about Dave Lawrence.
“I got a note the other day from someone in
Baltimore, who said, ‘Gee, this is really extraordinary
what you did there, but we could never do that in
Baltimore,’ ” Lawrence said.
Now, his voice rises.
“Don’t give me that,” he said. “If you can do it in
Miami, you can do it anywhere.” ■
4 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Applying Lessons Painfully Learned
“You had to make the case that it was about the entire community.”
– David Lawrence
The triumph that arrived in August 2008 did not
occur spontaneously or in the absence of previous
hardships. The fi rst lessons to be drawn from The
Children’s Trust stretch back over two decades and,
like many of the best lessons in life, some are derived
from setbacks.
In September 1988, then-State Attorney Janet Reno
(later to become U.S. attorney general) and others
led a campaign to establish a Juvenile Welfare Board
that would serve Miami-Dade’s most disadvantaged
children. The eff ort was based on a Florida law that
allows any county to establish a dedicated funding
source for children, if the citizenry votes for it.
The initial concept passed by a 2-1 margin. No
problem. How could you vote against kids? Two
months later, however, those same voters turned
around and rejected a measure, again by a 2-1 margin,
to actually fund the board with a half-mill (50 cents
per $1,000 valuation) property tax.
First lesson: Most people support children’s programs in theory, but getting them to pay for these programs is a much more diffi cult matter.
Ultimately, the county commission stepped up
and established a Children’s Services Council, but
with almost no government funding. A few grants,
however, permitted the group to conduct research,
produce some reports, develop a few modest
programs and an advocacy agenda that began
to build a constituency for children, according to
Modesto (Mo) Abety, who headed the council.
And there it stood for 12 years, until Dave Lawrence
and others took a renewed interest. The hard-driving
publisher of The Miami Herald since 1989, Lawrence
was unfamiliar with the challenges of early education
until then-Gov. Lawton Chiles recruited him in 1996
to serve on the Governor’s Commission on Education
and, then, to chair its school readiness task force.
What Lawrence learned shocked him.
“I’m a full graduate of public schools, but we’re now
in a signifi cantly diff erent world,” he said recently,
recalling his initial impressions. “We’ve let go of a lot of
the fundamentals.
“In the last 25 years in this country, we’ve taken
away great gobs of art, gym, music, recess – believe
it or not – and school nurses. And unless the private
sector gets involved in this – some of it funding, but
principally advocacy – we’re doomed to simply wither
away on these sorts of fundamentals.”
And more…
“I didn’t realize that one out of every 10 children
in the United States is a child with a special
need. It could be a neurologically based learning
disability. It could be many, many other things.
Most neurologically based learning disabilities are
discovered at age 8 or 9. How tragic that is. If you
could discover it at, say, age 4, what a diff erence you
would make in that child’s life.”
And still more…
Nationally, one-third of entering kindergarten
students cannot pay attention in class. Studies show
that 88 of every 100 children who have trouble
reading in the fi rst grade will still have trouble in the
fourth grade. Sure enough, 32 percent of Florida’s
fourth graders did not meet minimum reading
profi ciency standards as recently as in 2007.
Experts say that $1 wisely invested in high-quality
early education programs can save at least $7 in
money that won’t have to be spent for remediation,
law enforcement, prisons, etc. (Some experts see
much higher savings, as much as $17 later for every $1
spent now.)
It all resonated with Lawrence. Truth be known, he
always had a tendency to tilt at windmills and here
was a cause as worthy as any.
“I’d never even heard of the subject of school
readiness,” he said. “I’m the father of fi ve, the
grandfather of several, but it doesn’t connect at all
to me until I end up doing this assignment, get head
over heels involved in it, get truly energized and
excited about it, and ultimately decide in 1998 that I’ll
retire in the beginning of 1999 and work full time on
this.”
So, at the age of 56, Lawrence did. And typically,
he followed several paths at once. A multi-faceted
movement soon emerged, one
that focused on Miami-Dade
County and, in several key
elements, the entire state.
Beginning with signifi cant and
still-sustained fi nancial support
from Dr. Jane and Gerald Katcher,
a public-spirited Miami couple,
Lawrence in early 1999 founded
5The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
6 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Applying Lessons Painfully Learned
The Early Childhood Initiative Foundation. Supported
by private funding, the foundation served – and still
serves – as the cornerstone of his plan to turn Miami-
Dade and Florida into national test labs for early
childhood education and “universal school readiness.”
Another lesson: That “universal” part is absolutely crucial, at least in South Florida and likely in many other communities. Lawrence and others believed that the 1988 initiative (on which only $30,000 was spent) failed, at least in part, because it focused almost entirely on disadvantaged kids. From now on, the focus would be on all children, especially those up to age 5.
After all, every child deserves high quality health
care, educational opportunities, after-school
programs, and devoted nurturing.
“It wasn’t about those children, whoever those
children might be, and that’s a fact that’s central to
my philosophy,” Lawrence said. “The same principles
that raised my fi ve children are the same principles
that raise anyone’s children, while realizing that some
children in some families need more assistance than
other children.”
Though sincere and noble, the philosophy obviously
serves as an advantage when voters are asked to
reach into their pockets or otherwise support new
programs. This was clearly demonstrated twice within
two months in 2002.
In both cases, Lawrence played a central role.
First, on Sept. 10, 2002, Miami-Dade voters approved
creation of The Children’s Trust and, at the same
time, assented to the same half-mill property tax levy
they had rejected in 1988. The margin: again 2-1,
but this time in favor. The concept had been created
by Lawrence and Abety, who was still serving as
executive director of the Children’s Services Council,
with assistance from many other children’s advocates.
“The Children’s Trust really grew out of concepts that
Mo and I had together,” Lawrence said. The actual
campaign was engineered by Lawrence and political
consultant Sergio Bendixen, and it served as the
model for the 2008 renewal-versus-sunset campaign
that we will look at in close detail later in this study.
At the same time, Lawrence and Alex Penelas,
then-mayor of Miami-Dade County, were organizing
an audacious eff ort to thwart an apathetic state
legislature and create a statewide pre-kindergarten
program for all 4-year-olds.
Raising $1.84 million, they launched a petition
campaign in early 2002, navigated the treacherous
legal waters of proposed amendments to the state
constitution, and ultimately gathered 722,000
signatures.
On Nov. 5, 2002, 59.2 percent of Floridians voted
to approve state-paid, voluntary universal pre-K
education beginning in 2005. Now, just six years
after that vote, more than half of Florida’s 4-year-olds
attend state-funded pre-K programs.
A penetrating study of the pre-K Florida campaign,
written by Jim Hampton, a former editor of The Miami
Herald, is available here and is highly recommended:
www.teachmorelovemore.com/docs/HowFloridasVotersEnactedUPK.pdf
Meanwhile, seven other Florida counties (of the 67
counties in the state) had been taking advantage of
the Florida law that allows voters to establish new,
dedicated funding sources for children. Each operates
a little diff erently than the others, but they all fund
children’s programs and collectively serve about two-
thirds of the state’s population.
Nationally, a variety of county and city governments
or other entities fund special programs for children,
but few – if any – of those programs approach the
magnitude of the eff ort underway in Miami-Dade
County and supported by The Children’s Trust.
In early 2008, program manager Kelley Pasatta of
Chicago Metropolis 2020, a civic organization that
promotes long-term planning for the Chicago area,
conducted a study that was based on work performed
by the University of Chicago. It found that many ballot
initiatives around the country required the dedication
of some existing revenues to children’s programs.
Relatively few authorized new funding streams,
particularly in the form of property or sales taxes.
In November 2008, for instance, voters in Oakland,
Calif., narrowly supported Kids First! Two, an initiative
that extends a previous program and requires the
dedication of 2.5 percent of total city revenues to
youth activities – delivering about $11 million per
year.
But ballot issues that mandate additional funding
have yielded mixed results.
Residents of Portland, Ore., voted in strong numbers
in November 2008 to renew a modest property tax
that will generate about $14 million for children
programs for each of the next fi ve years.
To the north, however, Seattle voters soundly
rejected the so-called “latte tax” in 2003. It would have
cost some coff ee drinkers an extra dime per cup,
with the money going to kids. Still, Seattle residents
continue to fund children’s programs through a
property tax imposed in 1990 and most recently
reapproved in 2004. (Closer looks at the experiences
in Portland and Seattle are available as Appendix I and
Appendix II.)
Pasatta notes another complication for many
7The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
areas, though it does not aff ect Florida. Not every
state allows citizens to place issues on the ballot. A
state by state map and list can be found here: www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i&r.htm
“There are far fewer examples of funding streams
established in states without the ability to add
propositions and measures to their ballots,” she said.
“In Illinois and Chicago, one of the challenges we
face is that we need to go through the state General
Assembly or the City Council to get any sort of new
initiative approved,” she said. “It isn’t simply a matter
of getting the voters to back a measure, which
makes it even more challenging in the current fi scal
environment. States and cities are broke.”
And so, a movement was underway, but times were
tough and a great test was on the horizon, rushing
toward Miami-Dade and its children. The children’s
programs in those seven other Florida counties had
been approved in perpetuity. Miami-Dade’s had not.
The vote was scheduled for Aug. 26, 2008. It was all
or nothing. The Children’s Trust and all it had created
and all it meant would be approved forever. Or it
would disappear entirely.
Mo Abety, now The Trust’s president and chief
executive offi cer: “The money would have run out. It
would have been gone. It would have been over.”
Dave Lawrence, now 66: “Lose this and the honest
answer is, I wouldn’t be alive the next time people
try it.” ■
Applying Lessons Painfully Learned
What Was At Stake
“If this were to disappear, it would have been such a blow to our community, to the children.”
– Dr. Judith Schaechter, The Children’s Trust health committee
It is diffi cult to overstate the importance of The
Children’s Trust to the county and its children.
Health care, day care, after-school programs, literacy
programs, the 211 hotline, youth violence and
substance abuse prevention. On and on and on.
In short order, The Trust had become ingrained
in the very texture of Miami-Dade’s life. A full list of
programs can be found here:
www.thechildrenstrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16&Itemid=19
“What was at stake in the August initiative was the
future of kids in Miami-Dade County,” Abety said.
“And the hope that what we’re building here is a real
movement for children.”
The Trust spent more than $15 million in 2008 alone
on behalf of children with special needs. More than
50,000 kids participated in after-school and summer
programs. More than 90,000 kids were seen in The
Trust’s in-school health clinics.
When it comes to child health, the need is
particularly manifest: According to a recent report by
The Trust, 19 percent of the county’s 571,400 children
below the age of 18 are in less than very good health.
One in three do not see a dentist regularly. One in fi ve
infants are not properly immunized. Eighteen percent
of 6- to 11-year-olds and 24 percent of 12- to 17-year-
olds are overweight. Ten to 15 percent of all children
never eat fruits or vegetables.
Take just that one
program – Health
Connect, which provides
pre- and post-natal
health care for infants
and their mothers,
installs health teams
in public schools, and
sponsors community-
based health services.
When many readers of this report were students,
school nurses were nearly universal. Times have
changed. Budgets have tightened. Priorities have
shifted. And now, through much of this nation,
particularly in inner cities and rural areas where the
needs are most intense, school nurses cannot be
found.
But that is not the case in Miami-Dade County, not
any longer.
The Trust’s Health Connect network already has
placed health teams – nurses, nurse practitioners and
social workers – in 165 of Miami-Dade’s 350 public
schools, and it aspires to bring that program to every
public school in the county.
“When we were going to school, there weren’t
health teams in schools, there were nurses in schools,”
said Dr. Judith Schaechter, a pediatrician who chairs
The Trust’s health committee and is a driving force
8 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
What Was At Stake
behind Health Connect. “The fi eld of pediatrics and
our society have changed so much that we need
health teams in schools now, which include social
workers.”
But at every level, government agencies ignore the
obvious need and the obvious benefi t.
“It’s sad what it says about education,” Schaechter
said. “In education, we keep ripping things apart.
While we used to be communities that took care of
our own, we stopped doing that.
“The question really is a very deep one: What does it
say about our society when we don’t pay for what we
say is a right – quality education for all of our children
– and when we don’t take care of our most vulnerable,
which are our children?”
Schaechter was asked to describe the situation
before The Trust came along.
“Children needed glasses and couldn’t aff ord them.
Children who couldn’t concentrate because they had
itchy skin and couldn’t see a doctor about it, or were
not able to go to school and were failing out because
they kept getting asthma attacks and no one could
educate them about how to prevent that. That’s
where we found ourselves.
“And The Children’s Trust stepped in to help. We
were able to implement this vision of taking care of all
children in our county.”
At one point during the 2008 campaign to
reauthorize The Trust, she recalled, teachers, parents
and students fi lled a meeting room. Having seen what
was possible, what could be done to improve kids’
health, the thought of losing it again was crushing.
“Please don’t take this away,” they said during the
meeting. “This is the only health care we can get.”
For an outside view of another program, let’s turn
for a moment to Ashley Stevens Kehoe, a Miami
resident whose 9-year-old daughter, Zemia, attended
the Miami Children’s Theater Creative Camp’s summer
program, largely funded by The Trust.
“When Zemia started camp six weeks ago, she had
no formal training in theater or dance,” Kehoe wrote
in an e-mail to The Trust. “She was somewhat shy and
intimidated to speak to adults she did not know.
“I can see the beautiful transformation that has
happened in just the six weeks since she began at
Miami Children’s Theater…. I thank you with the
deepest and most sincere gratitude for funding
programs like Creative Camps, and for the scholarship
that has allowed my child to be in sheer delight day
after day.”
And all of this represents just a fraction of The
Children’s Trust’s programs and activities, just a
fraction of what was at stake in August 2008.
“It would have been a tragic loss for this community,”
said Diana Ragbeer, The Trust’s director of public
policy and communications who took a six-week
leave of absence to work on the campaign.
“Every other day, I run into somebody who’s a part of
our programs. Sometimes, you’re sitting in a restaurant
and somebody will see a card on the table or see your
pin and come up and tell you what a diff erence you
made to them.
“We really are on the right side of the angels.” ■
9The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
And So It Begins / The Strategy Takes Shape
“Sometimes you can do something beautiful, and The Children’s Trust campaign of 2008 was a beautiful thing”.
– Campaign strategist Sergio Bendixen
Chastened by the experiences of the late 1980s and
by the prevailing economic and political realities, The
Children’s Trust’s leaders and their supporters were
under no illusions in 2008. Reauthorizing The Trust
would require a comprehensive, sustained, well-
endowed eff ort – one that would cut across the grain
of the anti-tax sentiment sweeping the nation, the
state and the region.
“This is very, very hard to do,” Lawrence said. “It’s
a tax and it’s not really a happy time for taxes in
America. The economy was moving into shambles
and we’re asking people, ‘How
about doing this and it might
not even benefi t your children
specifi cally, but it might benefi t
the community overall.’ “
Sergio Bendixen, the nationally
known campaign strategist who
served as Lawrence’s closest
partner in the political eff ort,
said the challenge seemed
enormous.
“Most people would have said,
‘Mission impossible,’ especially
in a community where in a
primary, the majority of the
electorate was going to be
Hispanic or Cuban-American
voters, who almost never
support tax increases, with
the notable exception of
2002, when they supported the
Children’s Trust but by a small margin,” said Bendixen, a
veteran campaign specialist, a pioneer of multilingual
polling and president of Bendixen and Associates of
Coral Gables, Fl.
“Cuban-Americans have rejected every other tax
increase that ever came before them,” he said. “So it
looked like it was going to be a diffi cult campaign at
the very beginning.”
The Trust’s fi les show that Lawrence, Bendixen and
others began mapping their strategy more than two
years in advance of the August 2008 referendum.
In fact, to some extent, the campaign already was
underway on Sept. 13, 2006, when Lawrence asked a
Children’s Trust staff er to determine the median and
average assessed values of Miami-Dade homes and
what The Trust’s levy would cost those owners.
“This helps me considerably as I go about ‘making
the case’ for The Trust,” Lawrence wrote that day in a
“Some Help, Please” e-mail.
From that day forward, the referendum steadily
gained ground as Lawrence’s top priority.
“I’m always nervous,” Lawrence said. “Getting this
reauthorized was a really big deal, because it goes
away, it’s gone, if we don’t.”
A few fundamental strands
of the strategy swiftly occurred
to Lawrence and Bendixen.
Much of this was based on the
careful, penetrating, repetitive
polling that marks any Sergio
Bendixen campaign.
Though somewhat obvious,
especially in retrospect, these
insights serve as vital tips for
anyone attempting to replicate
the eff ort:
■ As had been the case in
2002, it was critically important
to make clear that The Trust
served all children in the
community – and, now, after
fi ve years of operation, with a
vast variety of benefi cial, high-
quality programs.
“The unifying concept, the overall
message, was that The Children’s Trust has
done work that was of importance to the
community,” Bendixen said. “The research
made it clear that as long as people were
informed about what The Children’s Trust is
and what it has accomplished, they felt the
money was well spent.”
■ Scheduling the vote during a primary or other
non-general election can be a smart strategic
move. The reason: Voters who participate in
primaries tend to be particularly civic-minded
and, thus, more likely to support these kinds of
initiatives.
Sergio Benixen
And So It Begins / The Strategy Takes Shape
10 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
■ A tax is a tax, but some are less painful than
others. Thus, the modest individual cost of the
levy – less than $60 per year for the owner of a
median-priced home – had to be emphasized.
■ The campaign had to be broadly based, run
in the county’s three dominant languages
– English, Spanish and Creole – and utterly
nonpartisan. “This wasn’t about Republicans
or Democrats,” Lawrence said. “And this wasn’t
about one ethnic or racial or national origin
vis-à-vis another group.”
■ It also had to be multi-faceted – advertising,
community outreach and media relations.
It also included a surprisingly energetic
grassroots component that eventually
produced thousands of volunteers and
300,000 get-out-the-vote e-mails.
■ A comprehensive campaign conducted in
three languages and in a media-intensive
market would be expensive, requiring a
muscular fund-raising eff ort. The initial goal:
$1.1 million. The fi nal fund-raising tally:
$1,646,765.
■ But Bendixen and Susan Vodicka, the
campaign manager he selected to run day-to-
day operations and tactical oversight, knew
that there was no need to reach and win over
every single eligible voter, especially for a
vote that would be held as part of a primary
election. They just needed to reach the voters
mostly likely to participate in the election in
question, and that meant they could conserve
some funds.
For example:
“We purchased a list of voters who always vote
in a fall primary,” Vodicka said. “We didn’t waste
money or time on people who don’t vote in
fall primaries frequently.”
■ Potential foes had to be identifi ed and
neutralized, preferably through a better
understanding of the sheer value of The Trust’s
programs.
■ The campaign had to be as pure and
untouched by scandal as The Trust itself had
been. Thus far, none of The Trust’s hundreds
of programs had been tattooed by bad
publicity. Even The Miami Herald, a newspaper
that had won numerous Pulitzer Prizes and
other awards for its investigations of local
corruption, seemed impressed. “The Trust has
avoided even the hint of impropriety,” The
Herald reported as the 2008 campaign was
underway.
“That was crucial,” Bendixen said. “That was
part of our message, because in Miami-Dade
County, and I’m sure it’s the case in many parts
of the country, programs run by government
usually have the reputation of being either
ineffi cient or dishonest, and that was not the
case with The Trust.”
Known as the leading pollster of the Hispanic
community for Democratic candidates, Bendixen and
Associates was one of six polling fi rms considered
by Lawrence for his fi rst Trust campaign in 2002.
Lawrence’s polling budget back then was $30,000,
but Sergio Bendixen had another idea. He would
do it – and more – for free, as a contribution to his
community.
“He didn’t get a penny the fi rst time,” Lawrence said.
“This time, I said to him, ‘This isn’t right. This isn’t fair. I
want to pay you.’ He said, with a big smile, ‘You can’t
aff ord me.’ “
In the end, Bendixen billed the campaign $275,000
for his company’s 2008 polling services, but most staff
time, rent and other costs were donated. Bendixen’s
time alone, 100 days at his usual rate of $2,500 a day,
accounted for the majority of the $378,000 that was
written off as an in-kind contribution.
Why?“We all have to do something for our community,”
Bendixen said. “Politics and campaigns in Miami have
been very good to Sergio Bendixen and it’s about
time that Sergio Bendixen did something back for
the community and show people that politics can do
good.”
It is not possible to exaggerate Bendixen’s
importance to the eff ort, another lesson emphasized
by Lawrence. His message: Find yourself a professional
campaign strategist and manager, and give him or her
freedom to manage the campaign.
“I think it’s important to know that he called every
strategic shot in the campaign,” Lawrence said of
Bendixen. “I would push back and I would even win a
few times, but basically my job was to raise the money
and to raise the allies. His was to decide what was the
wisest use of those dollars.”
This is important, Lawrence said, because, whether
you like it or not, you are running a political campaign
– with all of the bells and whistles, challenges and
potential pitfalls that entails.
“This campaign was not won because people love
children,” Lawrence said. “If it were won in that fashion,
then it would have been won in 1988. It was won
because it was a disciplined political campaign.”
That discipline was enforced by Lawrence, Bendixen
and Vodicka, who had worked with Bendixen on a
11The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
variety of campaigns and other projects intermittently
since 1972.
By the beginning of 2007, a voluntary one-year
sabbatical had recharged Vodicka’s internal batteries,
and she was eager to join Lawrence’s new eff ort. On
Monday, Jan. 8, 2007, the fi rst working day of the fi rst
full week of the new year, Vodicka sent Lawrence an
exploratory e-mail.
“When you are ready to begin assembling a
staff for your campaign organization, I would like
the opportunity to be considered for one of the
organizational positions,” she wrote. “It suits my skills,
experience and desire to participate in something
important in our community.”
Seven minutes later, Lawrence responded. With
a budget to manage, he was coy. He told Vodicka
that he already was at work raising money for the
campaign, but Bendixen was the
man she should contact.
In truth, Lawrence was
pleased. He and Vodicka had
worked together during the
1994 Presidential Summit of the
Americas in Miami. No one else
was seriously considered. The
result ratifi ed the decision.
“What a team – Susan and Sergio,” said Ana Sejeck,
Lawrence’s top aide and chief operating offi cer at his
Early Childhood Initiative Foundation. “She fi nishes his
sentences. They knew each other. They understand
each other. They can fi gure out what’s going on just
by the temperature in the room.”
Vodicka was hired as of March 1, 2007, as campaign
manager and executive director of the Children’s
Trust Political Committee, the entity that offi cially was
running the campaign. An independent contractor,
she was paid $5,000 a month for part-time work
through May 2008 and then $10,000 a month for
full-time work during the last three months of the
campaign.
“I’ve lived here a long time now and I don’t have to
have children to know how important this is for our
community,” Vodicka said. “The beauty, specifi cally, of
The Children’s Trust is that it’s an opportunity for the
people living here to take care of our children. I don’t
want to live someplace where we don’t take care of
our children.
“I believed there was a good story to tell. Rather
than having a political candidate that was fl awed, we
had a cause that was noble. And I believed that from
the beginning.”
Even before she came aboard, momentum was
beginning to build – and organization and discipline
were evident.
A Feb. 6, 2007, meeting among Lawrence, Abety,
Bendixen and members of their staff s yielded a
two-page memo listing fi ve key elements requiring
action, most with deadlines attached. (It was only the
beginning. By April 2008, strategic meetings would
end with as many as 37 unresolved items requiring
immediate action.)
The fi ve elements identifi ed in the February 2007
memo:
■ The generation of fi ve lists of contacts,
including board members of every
organization funded by The Trust and parents
of children who had benefi ted from Trust
programs.
■ Orders to begin submitting reports each time
a Trust representative spoke to a community
group or any other group. Each summary
was to include: name of speaker, name of
organization, date, and comments relating to
audience reaction.
■ The collection of every media article ever
written about The Trust and creation of a
complete list of media contacts.
■ Development of a “Unifi ed Children’s Trust
Message.” Bendixen wrote: “It is of the utmost
priority to develop a unifi ed message for The
Children’s Trust. This ‘discipline on paper’ will
help for all speaking engagements and [for]
any other questions that those involved with
The Trust may be confronted with throughout
the campaign.”
Asked later about the content of that
message, Bendixen said: “It had to be a
message that basically made every family
and every voter in Miami feel that they would
benefi t. That in the future there might be
reason for them to use The Children’s Trust for
the benefi t of their families or their children,
notwithstanding how much money they had
or their position in the community.”
■ The planning of meetings with The Trust’s
board of directors “to begin the development
of a team that will assist The Children’s Trust
campaign.”
That last item was particularly sensitive. Again, the
campaign was of a political nature, and The Trust is
funded with public money. That can be a combustible
combination if not handled carefully.
Abety, his staff and The Trust’s board of directors
could be called upon for factual assistance and, under
some circumstances, for advice, but for the most part,
they had to recuse themselves from the nuts and
bolts of the campaign.
Susan Vodicka
And So It Begins / The Strategy Takes Shape
And So It Begins / The Strategy Takes Shape
12 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
“What we
didn’t want was
the perception
and the real
possibility that
we might be
accused of using
public funding
to fi nance
a political
campaign,” Abety
said. “And so,
my participating
was very arm’s distance and we continued to focus on
administering The Children’s Trust. I was called upon
for advice occasionally and would meet with folks
when necessary after the work day was over.”
Importantly, this concern also extended to the
contractors who ran programs dependent on Trust
money. Lawrence, a veteran newspaperman who
knew the damage that could be infl icted by negative
coverage, hammered away at that point relentlessly,
often directly with his staff and with contractors.
“I am trying to make sure – even bend over
backwards – to make sure that no one can say that
I or anyone else connected with The Trust leaned
on any provider to contribute to the campaign for
reauthorization,” Lawrence wrote to Bill de la Sierra,
president of an early education program called
Kidworks USA.
Lawrence copied Abety, Vodicka and Bendixen
into the e-mail, and added this sentence to it: “I do
not want those who work for Mo involved in the
campaign. They need to concentrate on services to
children and families.”
And so, the strategic framework and the campaign
hierarchy were coming into place.
Now, somehow, Lawrence would have to raise the
money to pay for it. ■
Modesto Abety
13The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
The original fund-raising goal of $1.1 million includ-
ed $50,000 for a bedrock “where do we stand” poll and
$50,000 for Vodicka’s salary in 2007, and $1 million to
run the rest of the campaign. That seemed suffi cient
– and suffi ciently diffi cult, given the environment for
fund-raising – when compared to the $743,000 that
had been raised for the 2002 eff ort.
But then, three circumstances compelled reconsid-
eration.
First, in just six years, early voting had taken hold
in Florida (and many other places). That extended the
prime campaign season from four weeks to at least
six weeks, requiring proportionally more money to be
spent.
Secondly, the economy was darkening, adding to
the challenge of persuading voters to tax themselves.
In addition, to Bendixen’s surprise, Vodicka already
was seeing signs that she could build a wide and
deep army of grassroots volunteers, motivated by a
desire to help children.
In the age of the Internet and mass media, Bendix-
en had come to see little value in volunteer networks
– at least for most conventional campaigns. But his
own campaign for The Children’s Trust was the fi rst
of two exceptions to that rule in 2008. (The second,
of course, turned out to be the Barack Obama cam-
paign.)
“Was I wrong when it came to this campaign,”
Bendixen said. “We were a lot more aggressive about
energizing what we might call the advocates, the ac-
tivists, the people who provided services for children.
Thousands of people were mobilized.”
But that cost money, too, and more than $165,000
would be needed to adequately support this army of
children’s advocates.
In the end, around $1 million was spent on televi-
sion, radio and newspaper advertising alone. Polling
cost $275,000. Consultants and grassroots campaigns
added hundreds of thousands of dollars to the bud-
get.
So, the fund-raising bar was raised to $1.6 million,
even as Lawrence already was hard at work on that
front, an eff ort that began in early 2006 and persisted
through the summer of 2008.
Surely, the reader will think, fund-raising of this
magnitude was a team eff ort. Surely, David Lawrence
simply led the team.
No, not really. Every document in the fi les, every
account by those close to the campaign, leads to the
conclusion that Lawrence raised $1,646,765 from 686
donors virtually by himself.
“Dave takes it on as a missionary,” Sejeck said. “It was
a tough time to raise $1.6 million, which is what he
raised singlehandedly – I promise you.”
How does one do this over a period of more than
two years? By being obsessively organized and relent-
less. By delivering speech after speech. By following
up every chance encounter with a phone or e-mail
solicitation. By following up the follow-ups with ad-
ditional calls or e-mails, on a regular, clockwork basis.
“Money-raising is a very personal business,” Law-
rence said. “And lots of time, perhaps a majority of the
time, you don’t get money the fi rst time. It’s cultiva-
tion. It’s building a relationship. It’s looking people in
the eye. You don’t raise money generally by writing
letters – it’s personal contact.
“I always felt that I could sit down with anyone in
the world. Give them enough time, and why should
they refuse me a meeting? There may be a little bit of
chutzpah in it, but that’s what happens.”
He set his sights on pretty much everyone, but
especially on the big hitters in the community, hoping
to reap large contributions from corporations and
prominent, wealthy individuals.
Major six-fi gure or fi ve-fi gure contributions came
from Healthcare Atlantic and its chairman, Mike
Fernandez; Lennar Corp. and its president, Stuart
Miller; AT&T Florida and its president, Marshall Criser III;
philanthropists Kirk Landon and Dan Lewis; developer
Jorge Perez; retired savings and loan executive Charles
Stuzin, and many others.
Lawrence worked hard to embrace all political
persuasions, ensuring that the campaign remained
obsessively non-partisan. Hence, contributors in-
cluded well-known and generally anti-tax Republicans
such as Florida House Speaker Marco Rubio and U.S.
Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and the brothers Lincoln
and Mario Diaz-Balart.
Contributions ranging from $110,000 to $10,000
came from 53 of the 686 benefactors and accounted
Building A War Chest / Managing A Budget
“Dave is relentless. He’s a machine for fund-raising.”—Ana Sejeck, chief operating offi cer of The Early Childhood Initiative Foundation
Building A War Chest / Managing A Budget
14 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
for about $450,000 of the total, a signifi cant harvest.
In some cases, one visit, followed by a phone call or
e-mail, did the trick. But, in many instances, these
solicitations required ongoing Herculean eff orts.
The correspondence with AT&T Florida, for instance,
spanned many months, fi nally culminating in August
2007. It featured dozens of e-mails among Lawrence,
Criser, lawyers, accountants, tax experts and adminis-
trative assistants.
Lawrence also took advantage, in a good sense, of
a relationship he already had developed with local
professional basketball star Alonzo Mourning and his
wife, Tracy.
The 6-foot, 10-inch “Zo“ and the somewhat shorter
Lawrence had gotten to know each other during
the 2002 campaign, when Tracy Mourning became
interested in The Trust. Mourning ended up contribut-
ing $10,000 to that fi rst campaign. Now, during the
summer of 2006,
Lawrence met the
Mournings for lunch
in Coconut Grove.
He asked them for
$25,000 to support
the renewal vote.
Alonzo Mourning
hesitated a moment,
and then said: “Make
it $50,000.”
Lawrence: “I
almost have a tear
in my eye and I
am humbled and
inspired.”
Mourning: “Please
don’t say that. It is we
who are humbled
and inspired.”
So, those eff orts proved successful, though that
was not always the case with others.
A lengthy series of solicitations to entertainment
heavyweights Gloria and Emilio Estefan hit the rocks
over the couple’s policy of not contributing to “politi-
cal” campaigns.
“This is deeply disappointing. Truly painful,” Law-
rence wrote to Frank Amadeo, an aide to the mu-
sic stars, who was serving as an intermediary. “The
Children’s Trust can only continue its good work if we
have a campaign to do so….
“Last time the Estefans gave $5,000 to the cam-
paign. This is not a ‘political campaign’ in the sense of
the usual politics. It is for a community asset that will
be able to invest at least $85 million every year into
early intervention and prevention. What could be
more important?”
Still, setbacks like those were rare, even though
Lawrence juggled dozens of these major fund-raising
attempts simultaneously.
He kept track of them through what he called a
“bring-up” fi le that reminded him when it was time to
remind someone about the promise of a forthcom-
ing contribution. Any new promise or suggestion of
a contribution – generated through a speech or a
chance meeting in a restaurant or theater – also trig-
gered a dated “BU” entry in the bring-up fi le.
“If you say, ‘Call me in two weeks, to the minute it
will be two weeks,’ ” Sejeck said. “If you say, ‘I can’t give
you that much, but I can give you some now and
some later.’ Fine, and when later comes, we’re there.
He is the most organized human I know, truly.”
The checks, by the way, were made out to The
Children’s Trust
Political Com-
mittee and Law-
rence asked that
they be mailed
to his home,
rather than to
his offi ce at the
Early Childhood
Initiative Foun-
dation “so I keep
my ‘political life’
separate from
my nonprofi t
work.”
Another les-
son: Be aware of
every rule and
regulation, every
fi ling deadline. A few tardy campaign treasury reports
to state elections offi cials cost the campaign $16,700
in fi nes.
So, in conclusion, fund-raising on this scope can be
done, if one is suffi ciently focused and willing to de-
vote long hours. But, in the end, how does Lawrence
feel about repeatedly asking for money? Did he grow
anxious before a crucial meeting? Did he dread it?
“I never met anybody who said, ‘Boy, I really love to
raise money,’ ” Lawrence said. “So I don’t love to raise
money, but there is an exhilaration about it. How can
I not be exhilarated when Alonzo and Tracy Mourning
are saying, ‘Make it 50?’ ” ■
Alonzo and Tracy Mourning
15The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
The stage had been set for nearly two years. Now,
as 2008 began, many trains were moving down the
track, pretty much at the same time.
Lawrence still was raising money, consulting with
staff ers at The Trust, meeting with people who ran
programs funded by The Trust, delivering scores of
speeches at local churches and synagogues and
meeting halls, aligning allies in local government,
and putting out brushfi res ignited by potential op-
ponents. Bendixen was working on general strategy
and conducting poll after poll, looking for approaches
that would work best, searching for pockets of voter
resistance. Vodicka, on board since March 2007, in-
tensifi ed her eff orts and started mapping her tactical
framework.
Ballot wording
They also began devoting considerable attention
to a key issue often not suffi ciently considered by
organizers of ballot-initiative campaigns – the actual
wording of the ballot question. This can be crucial. For
one thing, many election offi ces enforce strict limits
on the number and content of the words that can be
used. For another, the precise wording of the question
can elevate – or diminish – support for it.
Research by Vodicka, aided by attorney Alicia Apfel,
determined in early January 2008 that the question’s
title had to be limited to 15 words, the body of the
question could not exceed 75 words and it was legally
prudent to count hyphenated words as two words.
All this took on great importance over the follow-
ing weeks and months as the proposed question
was written, edited, tested, rewritten and submitted
to county offi cials. Keep in mind that, in Miami-Dade
County, this issue is magnifi ed by a
factor of three because every-
thing written in English must be
translated – with complete
accuracy and no
chance of misun-
derstanding – into
Spanish and Creole.
On January 18,
Vodicka worked up
a “Schedule for De-
velopment of Ballot Language” that included 12 steps,
a cost estimate and contact information at the county
attorney’s offi ce.
Using the ballot question of 2002 as a template,
she, Bendixen and Lawrence had two versions of a
2008 question ready for testing by telephone survey.
The two versions, each similar but with a slightly dif-
ferent focus and sequence of selling points:
Option A:
Shall The Children’s Trust, the independent special
district for children’s services, be renewed to:
Fund improvements to children’s health,
development and safety such as:
- Programs to reduce violence and keep
children safe;
- After-school and summer programs;
- Programs to improve the educational quality
of child care;
- Health care teams for public schools;
Promote parental and community responsibility
for children;
Continue the annual ad valorem tax not to exceed
one-half (1/2) mill?
Option B:
Shall The Children’s Trust, the independent special
district for children’s services, be renewed to:
Fund improvements to children’s health,
development and safety such as:
- Programs that improve the lives of children
and families;
- Programs to reduce violence and keep
children safe;
- After-school and summer programs;
- Health care teams for public schools;
Promote parental and community responsibility
for children;
Continue the annual ad valorem tax levy not to
exceed one-half (1/2) mill?
The Campaign Begins Firing On All Cylinders
“It started out as a jackhammer. ” – Campaign Manager Susan Vodicka
The Campaign Begins Firing On All Cylinders
16 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Bendixen and his fi rm conducted 500 telephone
interviews between March 19 and 27, some in English,
some in Spanish. Forty-four percent of the respon-
dents were registered Democrats, 44 percent were
Republicans and 12 percent were independents. The
margin of error was 4 percentage points. It was the
third signifi cant voter survey since July 2007.
Both options tested well, but Option A yielded a 66
percent approval rate versus 61 percent for Option B.
In the end, Option A prevailed and made it to the
ballot with only cosmetic tweaks in wording and
punctuation.
Two other interesting fi ndings of that March survey:
71 percent of the respondents identifi ed “helping chil-
dren” as their main reason for voting “Yes,” compared
with 15 percent who said the programs were “neces-
sary and important,” and only 8 percent who approved
because they were aware of The Trust’s programs.
In addition, one-in-fi ve “No” voters said taxes already
were too high.
The apparent “brand-name” defi ciency and concern
about taxes spotlighted hurdles that the subsequent
advertising campaign attempted to overcome.
But that ballot-language survey was only one com-
ponent of a vigorous and ongoing campaign of voter
research.
Bendixen’s staff and others produced detailed
analyses of those who vote regularly during primary
elections, of the local Haitian-American community,
and of other categories of voters.
In addition to several major, countywide surveys
in the months leading up to the vote, the campaign
leadership also ran a daily tracking study during the
fi nal month of the campaign.
Specifi c approaches to each group
Bendixen’s polling obviously found considerable
support for The Trust, but it also revealed a worrisome
fact. About 40 percent of the respondents had heard
of The Children’s Trust, but only 10 percent thought it
had touched their families.
“They were voting not only for a tax increase, but
for an institution that didn’t really have an impact on
their individual lives,” Bendixen said.
This informed the work of Bendixen and Vodicka
as they tailored their strategy – which, in reality, were
three diff erent strategies. “This is Miami, so you had to
have three very diff erent strategies for the three major
ethnic groups that make up Miami.” Bendixen said.
The black community
The March survey found that blacks tended to
support The Trust by higher percentages than Hispan-
ics or non-Hispanic whites, but black participation in
elections – most especially primary elections – tended
to be low.
The strategy: Launch an intense campaign to
inform black voters, both African American and those
from Caribbean nations, about what was at stake and
then get them to the polls. The tactical plan: Enlist
black-oriented radio stations and the county’s wide,
infl uential network of black church leaders, especially
Bishop Victor T. Curry, senior pastor of the New Birth
Baptist Church, local president of the NAACP, and a
long-time ally of Dave Lawrence.
Curry and other black leaders, including Darryl
Reeves, a former state representative, brought scores
of black churches into the fold.
“Through his [Curry’s] lead-
ership, at least 100 of the most
important churches in Miami
became mini-headquarters
for The Children’s Trust in their
neighborhoods,” Bendixen
said. “Almost every Sunday,
there was some element of
The Children’s Trust that they
discussed with their parishioners.
The bumper stickers, the yard signs, a lot of materials
went through the churches.”
Curry said he aligned with Lawrence and the cam-
paign because “I believe The Children’s Trust has so
much integrity. It’s just all about the children.
“I normally don’t endorse candidates or campaigns,
but this one – I wanted to throw my full weight be-
hind it,” Curry said. “It’s an opportunity to help chil-
dren.”
Knowing the importance of personal contact, Curry
drafted a widely known local public relations and mar-
keting consultant, Da-Venya Armstrong, to build the
network of churches and coordinate other ground-
level eff orts in the community.
“It was her job to galvanize and then mobilize the
churches and the faith community,” Curry said. “She
was able to bring the pastors together in meetings
and luncheons, and then rally everyone to do some-
thing we’ve never done before – and that was to get
the community to vote in record numbers during a
primary.”
In fact, predominantly black precincts turned out
at a rate nearly twice that of predominantly Hispanic
or non-Hispanic white precincts. “Never happened
before, may never happen again,” Bendixen said. “That
Bishop Victor T. Curry
had a lot to do with the fact that we reached so deep
into the community, through the churches, through
the radio stations, and through a wonderful group of
organizers who worked their precincts in such a ter-
rifi c way.”
The Hispanic community
The strategy: Off set an inherent and particularly
strong reluctance to shoulder additional taxes. The
tactical plan: Enlist popular Hispanic radio personali-
ties.
“In the Hispanic community, our organizing base
was the radio stations – the Spanish-radio listener,
who is the heavy primary voter,” Bendixen said. “Many
radio announcers went to the comedores, the din-
ing halls, to the Meals on Wheels programs, to senior
homes in the Hispanic community, where, in a sense,
the Republican-conservative point of view is sold to
them by these radio personalities. By being able to re-
cruit them early on, convince them that The Children’s
Trust was something worthwhile to be supporting, we
basically neutralized what could have been the most
anti-tax group in the community.”
One major example of leadership in the Hispanic
community came from Claudia Puig, the daughter
of a Cuban patriot executed by Fidel Castro’s regime.
Puig runs Univision’s four powerful Spanish-language
stations in the Miami area, and – accompanied by
Lawrence and campaign consultant Freddy Balsera
– she led a staff meeting at which she emphasized her
commitment to the success of The Trust’s campaign.
“She was instrumental,” Bendixen said. “She really
opened the door for us at her radio stations.”
The non-Hispanic white community
The strategy: Again off set anti-tax sentiment, and
emphasize the universality of The Trust’s programs.
The tactical plan: Reach these through carefully pro-
duced, precisely placed television commercials.
“It was clear from all our research that they would
very much react to television advertising and to cred-
ible spokespeople,” Bendixen said. “And that is where
David Lawrence, the editorial support of The Miami
Herald, the print campaign that showed that we had
ideological support for The Children’s Trust, not only
from the liberals and the Democrats but also from the
conservatives and the Republicans, allowed us to get
the 84-85 percent support that we did from non-His-
panic white voters.”
Advertising
As one would imagine, the advertising element
was seen as crucial and not just when it came to tele-
vision and not just when it came to building non-His-
panic white support. Television, radio, print, Internet.
All came into play, and the region’s demographic
diversity was a touchstone.
The campaign budgeted $718,000 for television
commercials, $237,000 for radio commercials, $60,000
for newspaper ads, and $45,000 for direct mail.
Bendixen and Lawrence agreed that the campaign
– in its entirety – should keep a low profi le until just
six weeks or so before the August 26 vote. The think-
ing: Why give any opponents who might emerge
more time than that to mount a counter-campaign?
When it fi nally came to buying time and space with
those precious funds, Lawrence and Vodicka engaged
media representatives in frequent, ongoing negotia-
tions aimed at getting the most for their money.
Neither was reluctant to exploit the relative righ-
teousness of a children’s campaign or their previous
relationships or contacts within the media. Lawrence,
for instance, sometimes squeezed former colleagues
(and employees) at The Miami Herald for more favor-
able rates and placement.
“Alex: I really need your help on this,” Lawrence
wrote on July 8, 2008, to Alexandra Villoch, the
Herald’s senior vice president of advertising and mar-
keting, with a copy going to publisher David Lands-
berg, now sitting in Lawrence’s former offi ce. “How
can it be that if we scatter 11 ads through August it is
more expensive than consecutive days? Moreover, the
Children’s Trust is just hugely crucial to the future of
our community…”
The actual ads and commercials were designed to
be simple, plain-spoken and eff ective.
“We were going for the gut in people,” Vodicka
said. “‘This has worked well. This is something we can
establish in perpetuity. You can trust this organization.
It is completely independent of county government,
state government, the federal government. You’ve
done a wonderful thing in this community. Now, let’s
keep it going.’
“We’re going for the heart fi rst, and the head sec-
ond,” she said.
On the print side, the campaign developed a series
of three endorsement ads. Each pictured eight diff er-
ent respected community leaders of all demographic
stripes: former Gov. Jeb Bush, school superintendent
Dr. Rudy Crew, Bishop Curry, Lawrence, Alonzo and
Tracy Mourning, Gloria and Emilio Estefan (no money
from them, but they agreed to lend their endorse-
17The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
The Campaign Begins Firing On All Cylinders
The Campaign Begins Firing On All Cylinders
18 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
ments), and so on. The headline: “Miami-Dade is
united for The Children’s Trust.” The tagline: “Join our
co-chairs and vote yes on August 26th.”
On the television side, Bendixen encountered
another surprise. A full-production-value commercial
featuring the Mournings played nicely but didn’t seem
to move the approval numbers his surveys were track-
ing.
Then, they tried one that simply showed Lawrence
sitting on a chair, looking slightly off camera and talk-
ing about The Children’s Trust.
“There hasn’t been a whiff of scandal about a single
nickel spent by the Trust…,” Lawrence said on camera.
“Trust is the basic issue in our community, and we’ve
not abused the trust that people gave us. We kept our
word.”
And…boom.
“Two days later those numbers were jumping,” Ben-
dixen said. ”We had been stuck at 48, 48, 47, 46, 48. We
were in the 60s after three or four days. And every day
it would go a little higher.”
Vodicka called it a “turning point.”
“We were concerned about our numbers,” she said.
“I don’t believe we ever believed we would lose at that
point in June and July, but we were concerned that
our numbers should be up a little higher than they
were.
“We could see that it [the Lawrence commercial]
was resonating with that older, solid voter, who was
defi nitely going to vote, and they just went, ‘Aha, I
know this man. I knew this man for all these years and
I believe what he’s telling me. I think he’s honest.’ “
They also used TV spots featuring Bishop Curry,
local Haitian-American radio personality Piman Bouk,
former Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré, and others.
A few days before the vote, now a little concerned
about the Hispanic vote,
the campaign added a
commercial that featured
Jeb Bush. Though not a
Hispanic, Bush spoke fl u-
ent Spanish and enjoyed
enormous popularity in
the Hispanic community.
“That was the other
major jump,” Bendixen
said. “We put him up
in Spanish. We had the
Hispanics at 55, 54, 56 for
too long. Then he went on. Seventies.”
And where did Bendixen run all of these commer-
cials? Only one place, and it – again – was determined
by voter research.
“News, news, news,” he said. “The one common
denominator of heavy primary voters is that they
watch news. We never bought the Olympics. We
never bought prime time television. This wasn’t the
kind of campaign where you spend $1 million a week
on television.”
All of this was augmented by direct mailings (in-
cluding a “Dear Voter” letter from Lawrence), a web-
site (with solicitations for volunteers and donations),
bumper stickers, buttons, palm cards, lawn signs and
the other, usual paraphernalia of a major electoral
campaign.
Neutralizing opposition/damage controlVirtually no campaign proceeds without a few
bumps and unanticipated problems, and The Chil-
dren’s Trust campaign of 2008 had its share. Here are a
few examples, off ered in the order of their occurrence
– and as learning experiences for others:
■ March 2007 – Lawrence began working on Bush,
the former governor, seeking his fi nancial sup-
port and public endorsement. Bush, however, ex-
pressed particular interest in program outcomes
and accountability, a hallmark of his gubernato-
rial administration.
Paraphrasing, Lawrence remembers Bush telling
him: I’m in favor, I’m not going to oppose, but
truthfully, I worry that this is a liberal thing – giv-
ing away money with no controls.
Rising to the challenge, Lawrence responded
with three lengthy letters during the next three
weeks. Each laid out in exquisite detail results al-
ready achieved and the steps taken by The Trust
to create and maintain rigorous standards. At one
point, Lawrence forwarded a list of programs that
had their funding removed. “We want our funded
partners to succeed and we see it as partly our
failure if they don’t,” Lawrence wrote. “We monitor
closely and send outside contracted CPA fi rms to
do fi scal audits annually.”
Bush, as previously mentioned, ended up ap-
pearing in The Trust’s television and print ads,
and he also made a campaign contribution.
The lesson: Big fi sh are worth the eff ort it takes
to catch them.
■ May 2007 – An infl uential Miami-Dade commis-
sioner, Joe Martinez, began expressing concern
over a “fund balance” of about $100 million that
The Trust had accumulated. Was The Trust hoard-
ing public money instead of spending it as prom-
ised?
Absolutely not, Abety explained in a letter swift-
ly sent to Martinez, other county commissioners
and the county mayor. The Trust’s fi ve-year plan
always envisioned the slow but steady “ramp-
Former Gov. Jeb Bush
19The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
The Campaign Begins Firing On All Cylinders
up” of some programs, an alternative greatly
preferred to an overly swift, careless approach.
“These reserves will be depleted, as intended,
during the fi nal two years of The Trust’s fi ve-year
plan, and be eliminated by the end of FY 2008,”
Abety wrote.
The lesson: Respond quickly and fully to ques-
tions from public offi cials and others, especially
when the queries involve funding.
■ June 2007 – “A very irate voter” called Abety and
complained that, by funding some programs
aimed at gay, lesbian and transgender youths,
The Trust was “promoting homosexuality to
children.” The caller vowed to lobby church-goers
and other friends to oppose renewal.
Abety asked Emily Cardenas, The Trust’s senior
communications manager, to craft descriptions
that better explain the needs of these programs.
“We’re not apologizing for funding these pro-
grams,” he told Cardenas in an e-mail. “The needs
of this population speak to the need. We merely
want to explain this better.”
The lesson: Again, respond quickly and affi rma-
tively to perceived dangers.
■ November 2007 – Somehow, some way, a batch
of red Children’s Trust volunteer shirts ended up
for sale at a Uno Dollar Store in Miami’s Little Ha-
vana neighborhood. The store proudly advertised
the shirts’ availability in its front window: “Sale,
Limited Quantities: $1.”
This was a problem. For one thing, the shirts
cost The Trust $3 each. For another, they were
given only to individual volunteers. That raised
the possibility that dozens of shirts had been
stolen, a breach not only of security but of The
Trust’s hard-won reputation for careful manage-
ment of its resources.
“It raises all kinds of questions regarding other
equipment, recreational supplies, etc., that
should be used by the kids in these programs,”
Abety wrote in an e-mail to Pablo Canton, who
runs the city’s one-stop Neighborhood Enhance-
ment Team in Little Havana. “As you know, The
Children’s Trust comes up for a vote of re-autho-
rization by the voters in August of 2008. If there
is any misappropriation of the public dollars en-
trusted to us, we want it stopped and the people
involved brought to justice.”
Police offi cers ultimately seized the shirts.
The lesson: No threat to the organization’s repu-
tation is too minor to deal with, especially during
an authorization campaign.
■ January 2008 – Four anonymous, critical com-
ments posted on The Miami Herald’s website in
response to a generally favorable article about
The Trust attracted Vodicka’s attention. She e-
mailed the comments – illogical, incendiary and
grammatically challenged, as is usually the case
with such postings – to Lawrence.
“This underscores for me Sergio’s wisdom in
staying under the radar as much as possible until
we get much closer to the election,” Lawrence
responded.
The lesson: Maintain a low profi le for as long as
possible but stay alert for any signs of trouble,
especially on the Internet, which can provide
strong leading indicators of trends.
■ Trouble also can come from inside, and with the
best of intentions. Trust staff ers and, especially,
managers of programs funded by The Trust have
vested interests in winning re-approval. They
become anxious and they want to help, but
sometimes they need to be chilled down a bit.
“People need to be reassured that the cam-
paign is going well,” Vodicka said. “Sometimes,
they need to understand why they’re not being
asked to help.”
She and Bendixen said that Lawrence provided
a real service to them by off ering himself as a
human shield and by sponsoring frequent meet-
ings with groups of well-meaning critics and
observers from inside the organization.
“In organizing people and leading people, I’ve
found that the more information people have,
the better they perform, the better they behave,”
Vodicka said. “Uninformed people get frightened
that something important is happening without
them or that something is being mishandled and
somehow it’s going to be bad for them. So, every
few months, we’d bring everyone together and
update them on how we are proceeding.”
Said Bendixen: “We had only one thing to worry
about – win. If one of the activists or one of the
board members or one of the fund-raisers did
not like what we were doing, he [Lawrence] took
care of them and he protected us from having
to deal with all the people who think they know
how to do it better.”
The lesson: Campaign managers appreciate the
spirit of cooperation, but campaigns must be left
to the professionals.
■ The most potentially serious problem involved
said pass this along, pass this along,” Vodicka said.
“And I could see my own e-mails coming back to
me. It truly was viral.”
The Campaign Begins Firing On All Cylinders
20 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Ragbeer: “It had all the levels – the grassroots com-
ponent, the advertising component, the faith-based
component, the strategizing that was daily.
“Sergio Bendixen was seeking to elevate the cam-
paign every week. He talked about wanting to come
out of meetings with a new idea every week,” she said.
“So, if we were polling at 54 percent or 58 percent,
what do we need to do to get it to 68 percent, 78 per-
cent and so forth. Sergio was always seeking to add
components that would drive up the level of success.
“It was a whirlwind, and I loved every minute of it.”
And it worked. All of it.
Field operations/grassroots efforts
The fi nal piece of the puzzle was crafted by Diana
Ragbeer, The Trust’s director of public policy who took
a leave of absence to run the grassroots campaign as
director of fi eld operations. She started just before July
4, about six weeks before the election, and she started
quick and hard.
“It seemed like a short period of time,” Ragbeer said.
“We did the learning curve in a very vertical manner.”
She called it “a cradle-to-grave operation.” It in-
volved locating offi ce space, training and hiring 10
fi eld captains (each of whom recruited 20 precinct
captains), developing a volunteer base, building an
infrastructure that included computers, cell phones,
and producing collateral campaign material such as
bumper stickers and yard signs.
“All of the things that would energize the campaign
and create some excitement about it,” Ragbeer said.
She also had to staff 20 early voting sites for two
weeks before Election Day. That meant 80 people
every day, two shifts of four hours each, including
weekends. And she was
responsible for running the
telephone banks and send-
ing volunteers to commu-
nity events.
Ragbeer and Vodicka
prepared training materials
for the volunteers – tele-
phone scripts, approaches
to use during door-to-door
canvassing.
Ragbeer’s personnel fl ow chart looks like it was
crafted at the Pentagon. Her Election Day precinct
personnel assignment sheet runs for 26 pages and
lists 390 names, just a portion of her full roster of 641
Election Day volunteers.
Vodicka, meanwhile, sent out weekly blasts of
get-out-the-vote e-mails. They were forwarded. And
forwarded. And forwarded. Hundreds of thousands
of them fl ying through cyberspace, all within a single
county.
“My message always said pass this along, pass this
along,” Vodicka said. “And I could see my own e-mails
coming back to me. It truly was viral.”
Ragbeer: “It had all the levels – the grassroots com-
ponent, the advertising component, the faith-based
component, the strategizing that was daily.
“Sergio Bendixen was seeking to elevate the cam-
paign every week. He talked about wanting to come
out of meetings with a new idea every week,” she said.
“So, if we were polling at 54 percent or 58 percent,
what do we need to do to get it to 68 percent, 78 per-
cent and so forth. Sergio was always seeking to add
components that would drive up the level of success.
“It was a whirlwind, and I loved every minute of it.”
And it worked. All of it. ■
Diana Ragbeer
21The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Triumph
“How blessed we are by this wonderful news”. – Dave Lawrence, Aug. 26, 2008
And so, the people voted, and the votes were counted. And this was the result:
Yes: 151,203 85.44 percent No: 25,774 14.56 percent
Offi cial Miami-Dade County Precinct Map (Areas shaded in brown and described as “tie” actually produced no votes at all)
Seventy-seven percent of Hispanic voters voted to
fund The Children’s Trust in perpetuity, along with 85
percent of non-Hispanic white voters and a remark-
able 97 percent of black voters. Those margins prob-
ably would have been even more lopsided if not for
the back-of-the-ballot problem, which undoubtedly
explained many of the 12,000 under votes – ballots
that did not include any vote on The Trust.
But no matter. It was an impressive, sweeping,
satisfying triumph. Lawrence and his forces lost in only
one of Miami-Dade’s 764 precincts. Did Lawrence look
into that? Of course.
“I know it’s North Palm Baptist Church,” he said.
“I know it’s in extreme northwestern Miami-Dade
County. I know there are 70 registered voters. I know
that we were outvoted 6-2. So I know exactly what
happened in that district. If it had a tiny bit more im-
portance, I would do more work in that area.”
Ana Sejeck: “That one precinct will haunt Dave for
the rest of his life.”
That’s probably true, but it’s a small price to pay,
and Lawrence knew it then and he knows it now.
“This is an extraordinary evening in all of our lives,”
he told a crowd of supporters during his victory
speech that night. “Voters, in overwhelming numbers
from every corner of our community, have given a
great gift to the children of this generation and gen-
erations to come….
“Let us not be defi ned only by the boundaries
of our own community. Right now, leaders in other
Florida counties, among them Monroe and Volusia
and Collier, are contemplating establishing their own
Children’s Trusts. This very day, we gave them a signal
that, even in tough economic times, this can be done.”
Triumph
22 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Now, with the passage of a bit of time, those feelings
have only deepened. There is simply no reason, Law-
rence and his teammates say, why committed people
in other communities across the nation cannot dupli-
cate this achievement.
Bendixen:
“This may be the new issue of American politics.
It may be that in the 21st century, we’re able to build
political coalitions based on support for programs that
help children and families. We may not all agree on
our foreign policy, we may not all agree on economic
policy, we may not all agree on the environment or
even immigration, but I think when it comes to doing
everything that we can to help children and families,
there is a very strong consensus in the country and one
that generates a lot of energy among regular people.
“Hopefully, campaigns like the one that we ran in Mi-
ami – the percentage of people who voted for it, which
raised some eyebrows – will put children’s issues on the
front stage of American politics.”
Sejeck:
“To see other communities coming to us and saying,
if you could do it in Miami, you could do it anywhere.
That’s the biggest testament to the work.”
Lawrence:
“I hear now from all sorts of people in the children’s
community. I think people really do want to believe
that good things can happen and be inspired. And
amidst everything else, isn’t it reaffi rming about human
beings and human nature that 85 plus percent of the
people voted for a tax in a tough economic time?
“This is what I have lived my whole life for, with a
sense that if you do good things and tell people as
close to the truth as you can get and are willing to be
fair, they’re willing to do things.” ■
Martin Merzer, formerly The Miami Herald’s senior writer,
recently retired after a 35-year career at the newspaper
and at The Associated Press.
23The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
A strong leader, a modest tax, another victory for children
By Martin MerzerThe timing was identical, the objectives very similar, the play-
book interestingly – and coincidentally – familiar.
In 2002, as The Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade County was
planning and winning its enabling ballot initiative in the
nation’s southeast corner, supporters of the Portland Children’s
Investment Fund were planning and winning their fi rst ballot
initiative in the nation’s northwest corner.
Moreover, both groups were required to repeat the feat in
2008, and both succeeded, again employing similar tactics,
this time to counteract economic turbulence and deepening
anti-tax sentiment.
The experiences and lessons shared by children’s advocates
in Portland tend to verify and amplify those absorbed by
children’s advocates in the Miami area. Thus, they serve as ad-
ditional guidance for anyone aiming to replicate these accom-
plishments.
“We were looking at the state and federal governments
always jerking us around when it came to how much funding
was available for children, so we began asking, ‘How about
the notion of more local control over funding?,’ ” said Dan
Saltzman, a Portland city commissioner who championed the
fund and made its creation a centerpiece of his re-election
campaign in 2002.
“And we decided to ask our own voters if they were willing
to tax themselves more.”
The answer was yes, but before we dive into details, a quick
summary of similarities and diff erences between the two en-
terprises might prove helpful.
Tips From Oregon
• Survey the community to assess needs
• Seek allies in the business community, the media and elsewhere
• Raise suffi cient funds and plot a multi-pronged, professionally run campaign
• Test ballot language with voters
• Develop a memorable brand name
• Build transparency and accountability into the program
• Promote benefi ts to all voters
Appendix I
Portland, Oregon
Appendix I
24 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Similarities:
■ Strong leaders with high public visibility and
unquestioned credibility: Saltzman in Portland,
David Lawrence Jr. in Miami-Dade County.
■ Modest, seemingly insignifi cant levies: about
40 cents per $1,000 of assessed property value
in Portland, 50 cents per $1,000 in Miami-Dade
– promoted in both places as equaling about
$60 per year for a typical homeowner.
■ A full range of programs that concentrate on
early childhood health and education, after-
school and mentoring activities, child abuse/
youth violence prevention and intervention.
■ Authorization campaigns run with the same
mind-set and precision employed in successful
electoral campaigns, including eff ective fund-
raising and marketing eff orts and development
of wide community support.
■ Vigorous oversight of funding decisions,
combined with exacting quality controls and
evaluation standards.
Diff erences:
■ Portland’s program concentrates on disadvan-
taged children; Miami-Dade’s strives to reach all
children, while focusing more dollars on at-risk
children.
■ Portland’s tax generates about $14 million a
year to help support 66 programs that serve
16,000 children; Miami-Dade’s generates about
$100 million a year for nearly 300 programs
that serve hundreds of thousands of children.
■ Portland’s fund helps support already proven
programs; Miami-Dade’s fund can and some-
times does support newly created programs.
■ Portland’s program is funded and managed
by a branch of city government, and the city
council and county commission retain some
degree of oversight; Miami-Dade’s program is
run by an “independent special taxing dis-
trict,” separate from the county or any city and
divorced from the oversight of those govern-
ments.
■ Under state law, voters must reauthorize the
Portland Children’s Investment Fund every fi ve
years – they did so in November 2008 and will
vote again in 2013; The Children’s Trust faced its
only fi ve-year sunset vote in August 2008, suc-
cessfully winning reauthorization and achiev-
ing permanence in the community. “That’s nice
– they’re home free,” Saltzman said. “Why didn’t
we think of that?”
As in Miami-Dade, the campaign to improve the
lives of children in Portland was grounded in grow-
ing awareness of a profound need. It was nurtured
by diverse elements of the community. And it was
relentlessly advocated by an impassioned individual
– Saltzman, assisted by equally committed partners.
“It’s been manifestly clear for a very long time
that we don’t give kids the tools they need to thrive,
particularly as the world has been changing,” said
Jeff Cogen, Saltzman’s former chief of staff who now
serves as a commissioner of Multnomah County,
which encompasses Portland. “It’s crazy – we know in
the long term, not only is it good for the kids, it saves
us money. I just found it incredibly frustrating that we
weren’t doing much about that.”
So, as the 2002 election approached. Saltzman
and Cogen gave it a try.
They decided to leverage two serendipitous events:
In 2001, a local crime commission – aligned with the
Chamber of Commerce – issued a report concluding
that the best way to reduce crime was to invest in kids
so they don’t get into trouble to begin with, and local
newspaper columnist David Sarasohn wrote a piece
urging local leaders to emulate an early childhood
program underway in San Francisco.
That tilled ground already rich in nutrients for the
planting of progressive programs. Without doubt,
Portland off ered Saltzman, Cogen and their support-
ers advantages not enjoyed by children’s advocates in
Miami-Dade or some other places.
Most notable among those advantages: Residents
of Oregon in general and Portland in particular tend
to be progressive thinkers, more willing than most to
consider innovative solutions to vexing challenges.
Oregon, for instance, is the only state to require that
all elections be conducted by mail (though voters can
return ballots to county drop sites). The result: perpet-
ually high turnout and, thus far, no sweeping electoral
scandals.
In addition, residents are particularly sensitive to
the environment, relatively well-mannered (jaywalk-
ing is so rare in Portland that it appears to be a capital
crime), and generous when called upon to support
charitable endeavors.
25The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix I
Cogen, who was raised in the Miami area, calls Port-
land “the little blue bubble that we have here.”
“People here are very nice, they’re very polite,
they’re very orderly,” he said. “There’s a general sense
that collectively we still have the capacity to address
our problems. Having been brought up in Florida and
living in California before I came here, I know that’s
not necessarily the broad sense in those places.”
Saltzman and Cogen were determined to create the
Portland Children’s Investment Fund as a branch of
city government, one of the key factors that diff erenti-
ate it from The Children’s Trust in Miami-Dade. Call it a
demonstration project.
“To me, it’s important that it be government’s job,”
Cogen said. “A big piece of what it’s about is helping
kids, giving resources to kids.
“But to me, it’s also about creating a model that
helps show government how to operate in an effi -
cient and innovative way, but also shows the commu-
nity that government is well positioned to deal with
these huge challenges that we face.”
Reminded that many governments elsewhere ex-
hibit little interest in children’s programs, Cogen said:
“Well, that’s too bad.”
But opposition still had to be confronted in Portland
– not in the general public, but within the local politi-
cal community.
Rather than deal with the complexities of getting
a referendum on the ballot, Saltzman and Cogen
availed themselves of another option – asking the
fi ve-member city council (the mayor and four com-
missioners) to refer the measure to the electorate.
They needed three solid votes. It was a tough fi ght.
“Though every politician you will ever meet tells
you that kids are their highest priority, and though the
mayor said kids were her highest priority, the mayor
did not want it to go to the ballot and another com-
missioner didn’t want it to go to the ballot,” Cogen
said. “Not because they didn’t like kids – ‘the timing
wasn’t right’ and they had other priorities, other agen-
das.”
Saltzman and Cogen ultimately prevailed, in part by
rallying support from the Chamber of Commerce and
other elements of the business community and from
children’s rights organizations.
“Kids don’t advocate for themselves,” Cogen said.
“What we were able to bring to the table that hadn’t
been there before was organized, active adult lobby-
ing on behalf of kids.”
Now came the electoral campaign for what became
known as the Portland’s Children’s Levy. To Saltzman,
the approach was clear. As in Miami-Dade, supporters
would launch a full-bore political campaign on behalf
of kids – complete with an accomplished strategist,
an aggressive fund-raising eff ort, a strategic marketing
plan.
“That is essential,” Saltzman said. “We were sophis-
ticated about it from the start. This is a campaign,
especially the fi rst time around. You have a lot more of
people’s inherent skepticism to overcome. I believe if
you’re going to do something, you have to do it right.”
It is instructive to note that there was no contact
between the forces in Portland and Miami-Dade; each
group, acting on its own, developed virtually identical
approaches.
In Portland, Saltzman turned to Mark Wiener, a
prominent political consultant who has managed
elective campaigns for Saltzman and Cogen and
many others.
“He’s the brains behind it all,” Saltzman said of Wie-
ner and his political skills.
To a large extent, Wiener (his fi rm is called “Winning
Mark”) is to Portland as political consultant Sergio
Bendixen is to Miami-Dade, much as Saltzman is to
the Portland Children’s Investment Fund as Lawrence
is to The Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade.
“I do a lot of campaigns of all stripes, but the kids’
stuff is closest to my heart,” Wiener said.
As Wiener began working on strategy, Saltzman
– seemingly channeling Lawrence – launched himself
into the fund-raising universe, making countless calls,
sending a stream of e-mails, speaking to community
group after community group. For the 2002 cam-
paign, he raised about $350,000, a signifi cant amount
for a city-wide election.
Strategically, supporters found themselves chal-
lenged by economic hardship.
“The fi rst time, we were doing this in the middle of
a really bad recession, but it was worse for us than in
2008 because we were further along the cycle,” Cogen
said. “Unemployment approached 8 percent when we
were on the ballot.
“This was a new program, so one of the challenges
was, when governments are making massive cuts to
existing programs, how do we convince people that a
new program is a good idea?”
Another problem: In Portland, only about 18 percent
of all households have a school-age child. “So, you can’t
rely just on parents to pass something like this,” Cogen
said. “You have to have a broader message that answers,
‘What’s in it for me?’ “
The solution: Focus not only on the kids, but also
on the benefi ts to all voters. Among other things,
supporters stressed the long-term fi nancial benefi ts
of helping children now and preventing them from
becoming burdens on society later.
26 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix I
“The message at the core was ‘our kids need our
help’ and not only does it help them, but it helps you
because it saves money,” Cogen said.
“We found there are two groups of people out
there – people who cared about kids and people
who didn’t give a shit. And people who cared about
kids were not necessarily a majority, so in order to get
everyone on board, you had to show them that it was
a good investment in the community.”
That’s where Wiener came in. He kept the approach
and the message simple and focused.
“The basic strategy was to have a well-funded cam-
paign that delivered the message through paid voter
contact,” Wiener said.
And his message: “The Children’s Levy is a way
that we can make children a higher priority. It funds
proven programs in the specifi c areas of child abuse,
early childhood education and helping kids succeed
in school while keeping them safe. The levy is also ac-
countable to voters.”
Wiener’s media and outreach strategies were
equally focused.
“Our principal medium was direct mail, but we also
used a certain amount of broadcast and cable TV,” he
said.
“Don’t try to pass one of these things on the cheap,”
Wiener advises. “To have a reasonable expectation
of success, you must have an adequately-funded
campaign that includes polling and probably focus
groups, paid voter contact that includes at least fi ve
pieces of targeted direct mail and probably some
electronic media – TV and-or radio – and a fi eld cam-
paign that activates the various child advocacy and
provider groups that either care about it or stand to
receive funding from the measure.”
He also recalled another challenge related to the
media, one that others will confront in the future:
skeptical editorial environments.
“The editorial boards were sympathetic to help-
ing children, but were very concerned that this was a
considerable reach beyond the mission of city gov-
ernment,” Wiener said. “We worked very hard with the
most important editorial board, The Oregonian, and
turned what would have likely been a ‘No’ recommen-
dation into a very compelling endorsement.”
Two important facets of the plan that particularly
appealed to editorial writers and voters:
■ A 5 percent cap on the fund’s administrative ex-
penses. “That was very much about assuring people
that these were dollars that would go to helping
kids rather than hiring bureaucrats,” Cogen said.
■ A vow that money would not go to unproven or
otherwise experimental programs. (Portland’s aff ec-
tion for progressive solutions apparently was not
unlimited.)
“People want an investment program that works,”
Saltzman said. “There are lots of places that can
fund pilot programs or demonstration projects, but
that’s not what we’re about.”
The vote on what was called Measure 26-33 was set
for November 2002. (The text of the measure, along
with explanatory information that was available to
voters, can be found at the end of this report.)
It was a squeaker: The initiative was approved by a
51.5 to 48.5 margin.
Now, as in Miami-Dade, the clock began ticking.
Proponents knew they had to earn re-approval in
fi ve years or so. That meant demonstrating that the
money was being used properly and productively.
By city ordinance, an Allocation Committee was
created to distribute the funds. It decided to de-
vote about 40 percent to early childhood health
and education, 40 percent to mentoring and other
after-school programs, and 20 percent to child abuse
prevention and intervention. (That currently is being
changed to 33 percent for early childhood, 20 percent
for after-school, 20 percent for child-abuse prevention,
13.5 percent for mentoring, and 13.5 percent for foster
care.)
Funding recommendations must be approved
by the Allocation Committee, which is chaired by
Saltzman and includes representatives of the city, the
county and the business community. They also must
be approved by the city council and county commis-
sion, though that is largely a rubber-stamp process.
Working swiftly but carefully, the fund’s small staff
– then consisting of one full-time employee and
three part-timers – vetted and recommended pro-
grams. Now, fi ve years later, those programs off er a
wide range of services in many ways similar to those
funded in Miami-Dade, though on a smaller scale.
The objectives are simple: To assure that children
arrive at school ready to learn, provide safe and
constructive after-school alternatives for kids, and to
prevent child abuse, neglect and family violence.
Take, for instance, the after-school program at
Portland’s Humboldt Elementary, a place that serves
a community so economically depressed that 96 per-
cent of the students qualify for free or reduced-price
lunches.
On one afternoon in late 2008, several students
could be found enjoying a program run by the
Ethos Music Center and supported by the Portland
27The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix I
Children’s Investment Fund. The Ethos program was
established in 1998 in response to budget cuts that
curtailed music education in the city’s public schools.
In one room, guitar teacher Graham Nystrom was
working with two young students, Bradford and
Brenda. They practiced note-writing and elemental
guitar playing. They took turns programming an
electronic percussion machine. They recorded several
songs, including one they had written.
Here, at Humboldt School, we are real smart,
we are not fools.
Here, at Humboldt School, I’ve got good grades
and friends, too.
Here, at Humboldt School, we are so cool,
we’re really cool.
Here at Humboldt School, we got good rhythm
and rhyme, too.
“This is my dream job,” said Amy Vanacore, Ethos’
outreach director. “Without these programs, a lot of
these kids would completely lose the capacity to learn
about music.”
Socially, the programs are of obvious value, but
they can exist below many radar screens. From the
standpoint of cultivating ongoing support, that value
must be demonstrated on a regular basis.
Toward that end, the fund’s staff – now consisting
of only four part-timers – produced explanatory and
promotional mailers that were distributed every other
year to all Portland households. In alternate years, the
fund took out ads in local newspapers.
“The basic message was, ‘Hey, remember us,’ “ said
Mary Gay Broderick, a former newspaper reporter who
serves as the fund’s part-time communications and
outreach director.
And so, as the 2008 reauthorization vote drew near,
Saltzman, Cogen, Wiener, Broderick and others began
planning their strategy.
“This time, we had fi ve years of experience under
our belt and we wanted to highlight the 66 programs
we have out there,” Saltzman said.
He also was aided by wider support in the social-
welfare community – namely managers and employ-
ees of those 66 programs that partly depended on
the fund and were not shy about lobbying voters on
behalf of it.
Despite all of that, as is often the case in politics, a
modest initial campaign inevitably morphed into a
more expansive re-election/renewal campaign.
Saltzman raised about $600,000 this time, nearly
double the 2002 fi gure. That fund-raising prowess in-
spired a local weekly newspaper, the Portland Tribune,
to dub Saltzman, “The Big Daddy Warbucks of City
Hall.”
Once again, Wiener handled top-line strategy,
though he hired campaign manager Emerald Bogue
to run the day-to-day operation. A fast-talking, hard-
working, extraordinarily sharp 28-year-old, Bogue had
not previously run an electoral campaign but she was
a veteran union organizer.
She and Wiener crafted a carefully targeted, multi-
phased campaign that built on the 2002 eff ort,
though with an adjusted focus and with enhanced
reliance on data-crunching, grassroots organization
and the Internet.
“We found that if people understood what the
levy did, they supported it,” Bogue said. “So we had to
make sure they understood it.”
Saltzman, a hands-on type of guy (“He’s obsessed,”
Bogue said, “but I’ve never seen anyone work harder”)
kept in close touch with the campaign but turned
much of it over to Wiener and Bogue.
“You need to have certifi ably smart campaign
people,” Saltzman said. “Get a good strategist. Get a
good campaign manager. And do it in an informed
manner starting with a baseline poll. And you have to
raise money and that is something people are loathe
to do.”
The initial poll was designed to help strategists
achieve three goals: defi ne the message, determine
the degree of diffi culty of winning re-approval, and
determine whom to target. It found that the tax
polled well – 59 percent seemed to support it – but
when you subtracted the 5 percent margin of error,
that left things a little too close for comfort.
“We would like to sound a note of caution here,”
the pollsters, Lisa Grove and Ben Patinkin of Grover
Insight, wrote in a Feb. 11, 2008, briefi ng document.
“While we start in what seems to be a good position
with the electorate, we may be fi ghting a current this
year that we have little control over. Other recent poll-
ing conducted in Multnomah County, the state and
the region has detected a real concern about rising
household costs and the economy.”
Bottom line: More support had to be generated.
“We decided we didn’t need to target Democrats
[because they already tended to support the levy] and
we weren’t going to bother with Republicans,” Bogue
said. “So we had to target the unaffi liated.”
One concern that surfaced during the “baseline”
poll will be familiar to counterparts in Miami-Dade:
Despite previous outreach eff orts, few voters could
identify the Portland Children’s Investment Fund or
describe what it did.
28 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix I
“Branding is key, and it turned out that hundreds
of thousands of people didn’t know who the hell we
were,” Broderick said.
The campaign would have to repeatedly contact
voters and remind them about the fund’s existence
and value. Before long, references to the Portland
Children’s Investment Fund – a mouthful – fell away,
replaced by references to the Portland Children’s
Levy, which is the name of the tax and is more widely
recognized.
Broderick and others in the group knew of no or-
ganized opposition in 2008, but the ballot was going
to be crowded with other initiatives, which was one
problem, and – once again – the economy was tank-
ing, which was another.
Broderick recalled working a phone bank one
Sunday evening a few weeks before the election and
growing alarmed. “It was a bit depressing to hear
folks say they can’t aff ord $5 a month,” she said. “The
economy was our opposition.”
Given the branding issue, the crowded ballot and
the bleak economy, supporters of what became
known as Measure 26-94 organized a multi-faceted
campaign to win re-approval of the levy and the fund.
(The text of the measure, along with explanatory
information that was available to voters, can be found
at the end of this report.)
The fi rst time, in 2002, the core strategy was to illus-
trate the sheer necessity of the levy and the programs
it would fund. Bogue: “This is something that matters,
and we want you to vote for it.”
Now, more than fi ve years later, the core strategy
was adjusted. Bogue: “The need is still evident, but
look at our track record. If you vote ‘No,’ we’ll lose all of
this.”
Said Wiener: “The core approach for the 2008 cam-
paign wasn’t very diff erent than the fi rst one. The main
diff erence was that we had a very successful track
record to reference, along with good stories to tell.”
And so, the overarching slogan: “Vote Yes for
Portland’s Children.”
They bought television spots, billboards, bus bench
ads, and four or fi ve massive mailings, including one
that focused on the plight of children during econom-
ic downturns. Its headline: “Tough times are toughest
on them.”
Interestingly, polling revealed that, despite the
deteriorating economy, many voters did not favor a
lower tax. They liked things pretty much as they were.
The result: “We put the word ‘renew’ in every ad, every
mailing, everything we could think of,” Bogue said.
They launched neighborhood canvassing, tele-
phone and speaker-circuit eff orts. They gathered
endorsements from nearly 200 local companies and
organizations and hundreds of local residents.
And they concentrated a great deal of eff ort on the
Internet, building MySpace and Facebook pages and
buying fewer newspaper ads and additional ads on
blogs and other web pages. “No one reads newspa-
pers anymore,” Bogue said.
She and her two-member part-time staff also
created a dedicated campaign website that told the
fund’s story and central theme – Because Portland
Cares About Kids – in clear, affi rmative language. You
can examine it here: www.childrenslevy.com
Enlisting student volunteers and taking out some
ads in college newspapers, they concentrated a great
deal of eff ort on younger voters, knowing that many
would turn out for the Obama-McCain presidential
race. In addition, younger voters were less likely to be
property owners, thus more likely to vote for a prop-
erty tax.
Raising the consciousness of young, fi rst-time vot-
ers was crucial for another reason: As luck would have
it, the levy issue was positioned at the very end of a
long ballot, and supporters would have to go hunting
for it. (This was another point of connection between
Portland and Miami-Dade, where that 2008 ballot
question was the only issue to be positioned on the
fl ip side of paper ballots.)
And Bogue, a self-admitted data-collecting ma-
chine who now carries a fi ve-inch thick loose-leaf
book fi lled with campaign-related data bases and
planning documents (a template for similar cam-
paigns elsewhere), tried a grab bag of innovative
techniques.
Among them:
■ Yard-sign canvassing – setting loose scores of vol-
unteers assigned to sweet talk homeowners into
planting campaign yard signs on their properties.
“We gave them street names and said, ‘Godspeed
to you,’ ” Bogue said.
■ Persuading directors of levy-funded programs
and other supporters to send get-out-the-vote
e-mails to their entire address books. Health care
provider Kaiser Permanente, alone, passed the
word to 8,000 local residents.
■ Never missing an opportunity. The campaign
even paid for and included its logo on a news-
paper ad that featured Saltzman’s annual holiday
greeting to Jewish voters. The ad’s headline:
“Happy Rosh Hashanah.” The ad’s tagline: “Vote Yes
for Portland’s Children.”
29The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix I
■ Asking one children’s program, which encourages
kids to read, to distribute thousands of campaign-
themed bookmarks. “That cost us exactly $60 at
Kinko’s,” Bogue said.
All of that contributed, but in the end, what mat-
tered most was the fund’s sheer good work and – cru-
cially – its credibility and squeaky clean image.
“Like the diligent student at the back of the class, it’s
not showy or fl ashy,” The Oregonian, the area’s major
paper, wrote in an editorial that endorsed re-approval.
“No drama. No wisecracks. It just keeps doing the
work and doing it well…
“If you could meet every child served by the
children’s levy – roughly 16,000 kids each year – the
vote on renewing it would be easy. The Children’s
Investment Fund would have you at ‘hello.’ “
And it did. Measure 26-94 passed by an overwhelm-
ing 72 percent to 28 percent margin. The fund will
survive for at least another fi ve years. Its good work
will continue.
“I think Portland voters have proven that, although
these are tough times and concerns about jobs and
mortgage payments are on people’s minds, they rec-
ognize a good long-term investment in the city’s kids,”
Saltzman told The Oregonian on Election Night.
Asked a month later about his advice for other
communities, Saltzman said:
“If you want to tackle some of the most pressing is-
sues, child-development and child-abuse issues, if you
want to do that locally, you have to fi gure out a way to
fund them locally.”
Said Bogue: “If you organize this right, you can
spread it anywhere. This is something that can totally
be duplicated elsewhere.”
Text of Measure 26-33 – Portland, Oregon, General Election of November 2002
CAPTION: Five-year levy for Children’s Investment
Fund.
QUESTION: Shall Portland support early childhood,
after-school, child abuse programs; fi ve-year levy
$0.4026 per $1,000 assessed value beginning in 2003?
This measure may cause property taxes to increase
more than three percent.
Explanatory information:Measure would fi nance Portland Children’s Investment
Fund to support proven programs designed to help
children arrive at school ready to learn, provide safe
and constructive after school alternatives for kids, and
prevent child abuse and neglect and family violence.
This Children’s Investment Fund can only be used for:
Child abuse prevention and intervention, which ad-
dresses juvenile crime, school failure, drug and alcohol
abuse and homeless youth.
Early childhood programs which make child care
more aff ordable and prepare children for success in
school.
After-school and mentoring programs that promote
academic achievement, reduce the number of ju-
veniles victimized by crime and increase graduation
rates.
Accountability measures include:
Programs must be cost eff ective and have a proven
record of success.
Investment fund will be subject to annual audits.
Administrative costs cannot exceed 5%.
Levy produces an estimated $50 million over 5 years,
averaging $10 million per year. Levy is $0.4026 per
$1,000 of assessed property value. A home valued at
$150,000 pays $5.03 per month, $60.39 per year.
Text of Measure 26-94 – Portland, Oregon, General Election of November 2008
CAPTION: Renew fi ve-year levy for Children’s Invest-
ment Fund
QUESTION: Shall Portland continue supporting child
abuse prevention, foster children, early childhood,
after-school programs, renewing fi ve-year levy start-
ing 2009?
This Measure may cause property taxes to increase by
more than three percent.
Explanatory information: Measure would continue fi nancing the Children’s In-
vestment Fund to support proven programs designed
to help children arrive at school ready to learn, pro-
vide safe and constructive after- school alternatives for
kids, help foster children and prevent child abuse and
neglect and family violence.
30 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix I
This Children’s Investment Fund can only be used for:
Child abuse prevention and intervention: address-
ing juvenile crime, school failure, drug and alcohol
abuse and homeless youth.
Early childhood programs: making child care more
aff ordable and preparing children for success in
school.
■ After-school, summer and mentoring pro-grams : promoting academic achievement,
reducing the number of juveniles victimized by
crime and increasing graduation rates.
■ Children in foster care programs: helping
foster children succeed who have been abused
and neglected.
Accountability measures include:
■ Programs funded must be cost eff ective and
have a proven record of success.
■ Investment fund subject to oversight by a citi-
zen committee.
■ Investment fund subject to annual audits.
■ Administrative costs cannot exceed 5%.
Levy is $0.4026 per $1,000 of assessed property value,
and produces an estimated $14 million per year for
5 years. ■
The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future 3131
One instructive triumph for children, one instructive defeat
By Martin MerzerThis is a tale of one city and two initiatives on behalf of
children.
The fi rst eff ort was spearheaded by an energetic, charismatic
local fi gure who made children’s welfare the centerpiece of his
mayoral candidacy. The proposal was clear. Its cost was modest
and widely dispersed. Its campaign was carefully planned and
strategically executed.
Known as the Family and Education Levy, it was passed by
57 percent of the voters in 1990, renewed by 65 percent of
the voters in 1997, and renewed again by 62 percent of the
voters in 2004. It now funnels about $16.6 million a year into
programs intended to ensure that children are ready to learn,
perform to state testing standards, and graduate from high
school.
“Without the levy, we would have seen a faster downward
spiral in our educational system, leaving the children of this
community in peril,” said Norman B. Rice, who made Seattle’s
struggling public education system the focus of a 1989 elec-
toral campaign that he ultimately won, becoming the city’s
fi rst – and thus far only – black mayor.
The other initiative was sponsored in 2003 by a non-profi t
institute with a relatively low profi le. Its purpose – to provide
pre-kindergarten programs for low-income families and
improve wages for child care workers – seemed noble but re-
dundant, given the long-approved Family and Education Levy.
Its cost also was modest, nearly inconsequential, but fell on
one segment of the population, a segment served by power-
ful local business interests. Its campaign was outmaneuvered,
underfunded and poorly timed.
Tips From Oregon
• Involve the business community
• Sharply focus your goals
• Involve unions, if present
• Include accountability standards
• Control the media message
Appendix II
32 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix II
Known formally as Initiative 77 or the Early Learning
and Care Campaign, the proposal soon was dubbed
the “latte tax.”
The reason: It would add 10 cents to every espres-
so drink. Lattes, cappuccinos, Americanos, macchiatos.
Hot or cold. In Seattle, the corporate base of Starbucks
and ancestral home of the nation’s ever-growing fi xa-
tion on all things coff ee.
Widely mocked, the latte tax was ground into fi ne
powder, rejected by 68 percent of the voters in Sep-
tember 2003.
“As soon as the frame shifted from early learning to
‘this silly latte tax,’ we were done,” said John Burbank,
executive director of the Economic Opportunity Insti-
tute, which sponsored the latte tax.
Often, more can be learned from defeats than from
triumphs, but before we examine the campaign for
the latte tax, a brief look at the Family and Education
Levy is in order – for lessons also can be found there.
The levy was conceived, developed, approved and
implemented through a pattern of events that now
is becoming familiar to us: A determined local leader,
concerned about the welfare of the area’s children
and the condition of the public education system,
organized a group of like-minded citizens, con-
ducted community meetings and voter surveys, and
launched a carefully planned ballot initiative that won
wide public support.
In this case, that leader was Rice, a prominent local
fi gure with a varied background that provided access
to many elements of the community. Before becom-
ing mayor, he had served as a television and radio
reporter, in executive positions at the Urban League,
other community groups and a local bank, and as a
city councilman.
Soon after his election in 1989, Rice sponsored an
Education Summit that attracted more than 800 par-
ticipants and drew attention to the needs of the area’s
children and to a public school system that was being
bled of resources and left desperate for fi nancial sup-
port. Participants recommended a special emphasis
on services that ensured children and youth are safe,
healthy and ready to learn.
A subsequent survey detected voter support for a
modest property tax increase. A group called Families
First was formed to launch a 1990 campaign on behalf
of what became known as the Families and Education
Levy.
That group raised only about $200,000 for direct
marketing and advertising eff orts, but the campaign
benefi ted from Rice’s popularity and from the intense
support of his offi ce, other city departments and
much of the business community.
It also benefi ted from the nature of Seattle’s citizens.
To some extent like those in Portland, Seattle residents
tend to support initiatives they understand to be
worthy. In 2008 alone, they agreed to tax themselves
through special levies for transportation, city parks,
and redevelopment of the Pikes Place market and
tourism area.
“We are civic-minded and liberal,” said Bea Kelleigh,
director of the city’s Early Learning and Family Support
Division. “Seattle’s a diff erent place. We have a very
engaged population here.”
No major opposition formed, and the education
initiative won easy approval, raising $69.2 million over
the next seven years.
This is particularly notable, given that Seattle’s
youth population is relatively small. Only about 17
percent of the population is under 18, compared
to about 25 percent nationally, according to Gerard
“Sid” Sidorowicz, acting director of the city’s Offi ce for
Education.
“Yet, people recognize the value of this investment,”
Sidorowicz said.
Programs and services funded by the levy include
early childhood development, school-based student
and family services, comprehensive student health
services, and after-school/out-of-school activities.
These eff orts serve all children, though special em-
phasis is placed on reducing the achievement gap
suff ered by disadvantaged kids.
The levy must be re-approved every seven years
and has been, despite limited opposition that arose
in 2004, sparked by a near doubling of the millage
rate to .39 for every $1,000 of assessed property value.
Now, the levy is projected to raise about $116 million
between 2005 and 2012 or about $16.6 million per
year.
In contrast to The Children’s Trust in Florida’s Miami-
Dade County, which administers about $100 million
of tax money every year with little offi cial scrutiny
(and, thus far, without a single blemish on its record),
Seattle’s levy is tightly linked to the city and to the
public school system.
34 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix II
The program is overseen by the city’s Department
of Neighborhoods, a unit of the Seattle’s Offi ce for
Education. In addition, a Levy Oversight Committee
– a seven-member panel of elected offi cials, citizens
and school district offi cers – directs the use of levy
funds, setting desired outcomes and accountability
standards.
Another contrast: Programs sponsored by The
Children’s Trust are entirely separate from public
school programs. In Seattle, some funds support exist-
ing city and school-based programs, though a portion
of the levy is used to launch and support new pro-
grams and services. The original idea was to free the
school board’s funds for other educational purposes,
but it often didn’t work out that way. Rather than aug-
ment school board funding, the levy’s proceeds some-
times merely replace money diverted elsewhere.
This is a particular point of contention for Burbank,
organizer of the latte tax, and for others with a some-
what sour view of government eff orts and the Seattle
business community’s motives.
“The Families and Education Levy is a prime ex-
ample of building a bureaucracy and not solving a
problem,” Burbank said. “It’s not systemic at all. It’s just
sort of continuing a funding basis for what is essen-
tially Seattle city services.
“The levy is not an early learning initiative. The
mayor may want to make it look like it is, but it ain’t.”
Still, supporters say, the Families and Education
Levy and the programs it supports are doing good
work, have won plaudits from early-education experts
and are embraced locally with great pride.
“What the levy was meant to do, fi rst and para-
mount, was generate a renewed interest in this city
and its citizens in education, reminding them that
they have a role to play,” said Rice, who later served as
president of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle
and now is the distinguished practitioner-in-residence
at the University of Washington’s Evans School of
Public Aff airs.
How popular is the levy and its programs? During
the 2004 renewal eff ort, supporters placed virtually
no media advertising or spent much money on other
standard campaign tactics. For the most part, they
simply enlisted the support of newspaper editorial
boards and other opinion leaders.
“The early polling showed we had very broad sup-
port, so we took kind of a back seat,” Sidorowicz said.
“We said, ‘As long as things are working well, there’s no
need to put on a strong eff ort.’ ”
Alas, Burbanks and a few other early-education
advocates believed that the city should do more, and
thus was born the proposed latte tax.
The tax was conceived in 2002 by Burbank and his
Economic Opportunity Institute as a way to provide
additional funds specifi cally for early-childhood
projects: pre-school programs, improved training and
wages for child-care workers, and subsidies so low-in-
come families could aff ord child care.
“A lot of people in the child care community really
don’t understand that if you talk about child care
quality, you have to talk about child care teachers and
child care providers, and so you have to talk about
compensation and professionalism,” said Burbank,
whose institute is largely supported by labor unions.
“If you avoid that conversation, you will not be able to
obtain any kind of high-quality early childhood educa-
tion.
The idea seemed worthy, early polling seemed
promising, and the issue was set for a vote in Sep-
tember 2003, but the proposal soon ran into major
problems, some of the institute’s own making. Many
of the strategies and techniques that marked success-
ful campaigns for children elsewhere were missing or
violated this time around:
■ To many voters in Seattle, the proposal seemed
redundant and unnecessary. They already had
approved the Families and Education Levy on
behalf of kids, and supporters of the latte tax
had trouble distinguishing their purpose from
the levy’s purpose.
“I never was a latte tax person,” said Rice, the
former mayor. “It just wasn’t well thought out. I
can’t even remember what it was supposed to
pay for.”
■ Support that was expected from aff ected parties
such as groups of child care workers did not
materialize.
“We just didn’t have the horses,” Burbank said.
“I thought that if we had an initiative like this, it
would catalyze the child care workers to mobi-
lize, and that didn’t happen.
“The workers don’t see themselves as political
actors. They’re passive and depressed in some
ways. They get paid shitty wages and they didn’t
have much of an organization to move them
along.”
■ The tax itself seemed a little…loopy.
35The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix II
It would have added 10 cents to virtually all
hot and cold espresso-type drinks sold in the
city. (For the uninitiated, espresso is a concen-
trated coff ee beverage brewed by forcing very
hot water under high pressure through coff ee
that has been ground to a powder-like consis-
tency – rather then dripping hot water through
ground coff ee beans. Espresso is the key com-
ponent of lattes, cappuccinos and most of those
other fancy drinks sold by Starbucks and similar
outlets.)
National and a few international media outlets
carried somewhat arch reports about the pro-
posal and comedians had a fi eld day, poking fun
at those wacky, liberal coff ee lovers of the Pacifi c
Northwest.
■ Clarity was not achieved on an element as basic
as how much the tax would raise. Supporters
claimed $7 million to $10 million a year; op-
ponents estimated no more than $1.5 million a
year; an analysis sponsored by the City Council
came up with $3 million a year, maybe. It all
depended on a wide range of variables concern-
ing per-capita consumption of the drinks that
would be taxed.
■ Coff ee beans, drip coff ee and any business with
less than $50,000 in annual sales would have
been exempt from the tax, but opposition im-
mediately mushroomed throughout the busi-
ness community.
Starbucks, the Washington Restaurant Associa-
tion, the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce
and more than 125 others formed a group call-
ing itself JOLT (Joined to Oppose the Latte Tax)
to campaign against the proposal.
To see coverage of the latte tax by
The Daily Show with comedian
Jon Stewart, go to this link:
http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/
index.jhtml?videoId=112379&title=Too
-Little-Too-Latte
36 The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s Future
Appendix II
They said the tax was unfair (aff ecting only one
portion of the community – high-end coff ee
drinkers) and would be diffi cult to administer,
with many coff ee outlets, including restaurants,
department stores and even hospitals, hav-
ing no way to easily distinguish revenue from
espresso-based products.
■ These opponents had plenty of time to mount
their attack. In Miami-Dade, David Lawrence Jr.
and other leaders of The Children’s Trust kept
their campaign eff orts low-key and under the
radar until just a few months before the vote
and at a time that seemed strategically right – a
policy crafted to keep opposition from forming
too quickly and solidly.
In Seattle, it didn’t happen that way. Burbank
concedes that he was outmaneuvered by city offi cials
and the business community, with the vote getting
delayed from November 2002 until September 2003.
Prominent stories about Burbank’s latte tax appeared
in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer as early as July 2002,
giving opposition more than a year to coalesce.
“You can say they stumbled right at the gate,”
Sidorowicz said. “They were open for ridicule right
away. And the lack of clarity about what the levy
would do really hurt them.”
Kelleigh: “The business community was strong
against it. I thought it was a nonstarter. You can’t get
things done in Washington state without the business
community.
As the September 2003 election approached, the
depth of that opposition overwhelmed Burbank, his
small band of supporters and his anemic resources.
“The issue was pretty much dead,” Burbank said.
Still, his institute, also supported by foundations
and private donors, contributed $51,000 to the Early
Learning and Care Campaign, which raised a total
of only $144,811. JOLT spent $172,007 fi ghting the
proposal, according to fi lings at the city’s Ethics and
Elections Commission.
But the campaign was, at best, half-hearted. No
television, radio or newspaper advertising. No com-
munity organizing, in the modern sense. No campaign
manager.
“Maybe we did one or two pieces of mail, but it was
pretty pathetic,” Burbank said.
Opponents, on the other hand, planted lawn signs
saying “No I-77 Espresso Tax” and organized media-
savvy performance-art events, including one in which
be-wigged protestors tossed symbolic bags of “coff ee”
(actually balloons) into the harbor.
Heaving aroused well-fi nanced and powerful oppo-
nents, unable to make a clear case for the proposal’s
need, Burbank’s latte tax lost by greater than a 2-1
margin.
Burbank is a little bitter – but also candid and help-
ful – as he reviews the painful episode.
About his fellow residents: “Seattleites like to think
of themselves as liberals. They would have voted on a
tax for cigarettes – no problem. But you touch their $3
espresso drinks and, ‘My God, a 10-cent tax!’ The fact is,
it was an act of selfi shness on their part.”
About the local business community: “When push
comes to shove, the business community is interested
in philanthropic stuff that makes them look good, but
not systemic programs that create the foundation for
high-quality early learning. They are not interested in
some components of social democracy, such as early
learning. Anything that disrupts or challenges current
relationships of power is something they’re not going
to be happy about.”
About the current state of aff airs: “The real problem
is that this is a public good that is not funded publicly.
I don’t know how you make that change. We’re taken
some strides in the last 10 years in terms of public
consciousness, but frankly, there is no dedicated fund-
ing source for early learning, which is what this would
have been. And frankly, I think a lot of it [the Family
and Education Levy] is show. It’s not really boots-on-
the-ground, actual funding.”
Others diff er, and on the more affi rmative side,
Sidorowicz, Kelleigh and others already are plan-
ning their 2011 levy-renewal eff ort. They expect the
campaign to be low-key, driven primarily by data that
demonstrates the levy’s benefi cial eff ects on Seattle’s
children.
“We’re beginning more evaluations of what we’ve
accomplished,” Sidorowicz said. “We’re at the point
now where I think we’re pretty stabilized in the pro-
grams we’re running. There should just be improve-
ments now.” ■
The Billion-Dollar Bet On A Community’s FutureA collaboration among: The W.K. Kellogg Foundation, The Early Childhood Initiative Foundation,
University of Florida’s Lastinger Center for Learning and The Children’s Trust.
For further information, contact:
David Lawrence Jr. or Ana Sejeck
The Early Childhood Initiative Foundation
3250 SW Third Ave.
Miami, FL 33129
305-646-7229/305-646-7231
KEY ORGANIZATIONS—State and Local Rev 3-22-10
Organization
Key Contact
Assn of ELCs and ELAC
Dave McGerald, Alisa Ghazvini, Harry Duncanson
ELCs in respective counties
Dave McGerald, Hillsborough ELC Board members
United Way of FL./ United Way of Tampa Bay
Ted Granger Diana Baker Stephen Ponzillo and members of UWTB Public Policy Committee
Children’s Forum
Phyllis Kalifeh
Assn of Healthy Start Coalitions and Healthy Start Coalition of Hillsborough County
Jane Murphy and local board members
Florida Coalition for Children
Mike Cusick, Debbie Mortham
Hillsborough Kids, Inc. Jeff Rainey and HKI Board members
Florida Chamber
Tony Carvajal
Tampa Chamber Bob Rohrlack (Pres.), Rafaela Amador-Carlisle (VP Public Policy)
Florida Association of Counties
Chris Holley, Heather Wildermuth
Hillsborough BOCC
Commissioners, Edith Stewart, Brandon Wagner, Tom Papin, Manus O’Donnell, Dave Rogoff
Florida Association of Special Districts
Terry Lewis
Florida Philanthropic Network
Katie Ensign
Funders’ Forum members Eileen Boyle (Allegany Foundation), Maggie Osborn (Conn Foundation), other members
Florida Afterschool Network
Larry Pintacuda, Linda Lanier
Florida CHAIN Linda Merrill
Florida TaxWatch
Dominic Calabro
Hospital Districts/ Florida Safety Net Assocation
Tony Carvalho
Florida Association of Supervisors of Elections
Ron Labasky
Hillsborough Supervisor of Elections Earl Lennard, Craig Latimer
Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association/ Florida Council on Behavioral Health Care Central Florida Behavioral Health Network
Mark Fontaine Bob Sharpe Linda McKinnon
University of South Florida
Judy Genshaft, Kathy Betancourt
Tampa General Jan Gorrie -lobbyist
Large CBHC Funded Providers: Mental Health Care, Inc. DACCO Big Brothers/ Big Sisters The Crisis Center The Child Abuse Council Early Childhood Association Early Childhood Council Healthy Start Coalition Catholic Charities Success 4 Kids and Families
Julian Rice (Larry Overton-lobbyist) Mary Lyn Ulrey (Jan Gorrie-lobbyist) Stephen Koch David Braughton Paul D’Agostino, Brian McEwen Suzanne Gellens Steve Martaus Jane Murphy (Brian Jogerst-lobbyist) Sheila Lopez Clara Reynolds
Florida Association of School Boards Wayne Blanton
Florida Association of District School Superintendents
Bill Montford
Tampa Children’s Museum Al Najaar, Heidi Shimberg, Board members
Hillsborough County Public Schools Mary Ellen Elia, School Readiness staff, Connie Milito
Florida Sheriffs Association
Hillsborough County Sheriff David Gee, Jennifer Hock, Rob Bullara
Tampa Police Dept., Plant City PD, Temple Terrace PD
Media organizations: Senior editors of both Tribune and Times,
Brighthouse; CBS Outdoors, WTSP TV 10; Tampa Bay Parenting, Latin and African American media and leadership. WTMP,WFLA radio and NPR USF radio.
1
Key Individual Contacts Revised 3-22-1-
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE: HOUSE
All Local House Members Will Weatherford Anitere Flores Dorothy Hukill Janet Long Dean Cannon David Rivera Ed Homan Ellyn Bogdanoff Bill Galvano Ron Saunders Rich Glorioso Adam Hasner
Representing Hillsborough County Ed Policy Chair & Speaker Designate Appropriations – PreK Chair Local Affairs Chair Local Affairs Vice Chair Speaker Designate (pitch substantial loss of revenue) Chair – Full Appropriations – Health Care Health Care Policy Chair Finance & Tax Chair Rules Chair – supporter of children’s issues Democratic leader Full Appropriations on Education & Economic Devel. Rules – Majority Leader
Amy –talking points given 3-3 Amy -talking points given to aide on 2-17 and 3-18 Diana Sam Bell JWB Ron Book Diana Amy P-discussed personally/ talking points w/ staff 2-17-10 Broward /Palm Beach Amy -talking points given 2-17-10 Diana Amy discussed/ left talking points 2-17-10 and 3-18-10 Palm Beach CSC personal meeting 3-17-10
2
SENATE
Joe Negron Jeff Atwater Rudy Garcia John Thrasher Nan Rich Ronda Storms Alex Villalobos J.D. Alexander Victor Crist Arthenia Joyner
Sponsor Senate President Ways & Means / Ed-PreK Ways & Means / Ed-PreK Child Ad / Democratic Leader Children & Families Chair Rules Chair Appropriations Chair Criminal Justice Appropriations Hillsborough senator
Ron Book Broward/ Palm Beach personal meetings held in Feb. and 3-17-10 with FCSC Diana Linda Lanier –Jax Kids Broward/ Dade CSCs Amy –talking points provided in January and Feb.; letter and personal meeting 3-17 Miami-Dade David Lawrence – Publix Amy –talking points provided 1-20 and 2-17; response letter & personal meeting 3-17 Amy—talking points 3-17
OTHER CONTACTS
David Coburn Terry Walsh and Carol Preston Bob Brown-Barrios Jim Kallinger
Senate Rules Staff Staff Director for Senate Children and Families Comm. Gov. Budget Staff – Children & Families
Sam Bell Sam Bell Sam Bell Vivian
3
Michelle Todd Sandy Murman Jack Latvala Provider Groups BOCC
Chief Child Advocate Special Asst. to Gov. Crist Former Representative Former Senator Nonprofits that receive CSC money BOCC members/ County Staff/ County lobbyists
Amy / Luanne 2-24-10 Amy/ Luanne Deborah Prewitt Local Boards Luanne, Amy and Don
Jane Tombs, Lynn Ramsey, David and Liz Kennedy, many others
Local opinion leaders CBHC Board, Staff
March 22, 2010
Representative <first name><last name>
<Capitol Address>
Tallahassee, FL
Dear Representative <Name>:
At a time when lawmakers are struggling to fund vital programs for Florida’s children, a bill (HB
1227) is being considered in the House Military and Local Affairs Policy Committee this week that
would devastate a local funding solution that has worked well for children for more than 60 years –
Children’s Services Councils. I urge you to vote ―No‖ on HB 1227 sponsored by Rep. Debbie
Mayfield (SB 1216 by Sen. Joe Negron). It is a solution looking for a problem.
On its face, the bill appears well intentioned. It would require Florida’s eight Children’s Services
Councils with taxing authority to regularly go back to referendum in their respective counties for
reaffirmation by the electorate. What has not been made clear is that these eight Children’s
Services Councils were already approved by the voters once before, and some even twice.
Furthermore, current law already allows a county commission or the state legislature to place a
Children’s Services Council on the ballot at any time for reconsideration. What does this bill really
improve?
Children’s Services Councils are an example of government that works. In fact, they are a good
state partner because they invest in front-end programs that reduce reliance on more costly state-
funded programs down the line, such as juvenile justice and foster care. Children’s Services
Councils also leverage local dollars to draw down federal funds directly into their communities.
Being on a ―referendum treadmill‖ distracts Councils from their core mission of making strategic
investments in children.
Lastly, Children’s Services Councils are accountable to the voters in their communities. They
operate under Sunshine Laws just like other government organizations. All meetings, budgets and
program information are open to the public. The boards are representative of the communities they
serve with a combination of elected officials, gubernatorial appointees, and state representatives.
No other government organization has as many layers of accountability and oversight.
The voters in CSC communities have spoken. They want sustained investments in children in their
community managed by an organization that rises above the political and partisan fray. Florida law
gives them that now in FS 125.901. Why mess with success?
Respectfully,
1 4
This is the law under which the CBHC has always operated and continues to
operate.
FL ST s 125.901
West's F.S.A. ' 125.901
WEST'S FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED
COPR. 8 WEST 1990 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
TITLE XI. COUNTY ORGANIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
CHAPTER 125. COUNTY GOVERNMENT
PART V. JUVENILE WELFARE SERVICES
125.901. County juvenile welfare services; independent special district; powers,
duties, and functions of governing body
(1) Each county may by ordinance create an independent special district to provide
juvenile welfare services throughout the county in accordance with this act. The
boundaries of such district shall be coterminous with the boundaries of the county.
(2) The governing board of the district shall be a board of juvenile welfare consisting
of ten members, including: the superintendent of schools, a local school board
member, the district administrator from the appropriate district of the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services or his designee, one member of the board of county
commissioners, and the judge assigned to juvenile cases who shall sit as a voting
member of the board, except that said judge shall not vote or participate in the setting
of ad valorem taxes under this section. In the event there is more than one judge
assigned to juvenile cases in a county, the chief judge shall designate one of said
juvenile judges to serve on the board. The other five members of the board shall be
appointed by the Governor and shall serve for terms of 4 years each. If any of the
members of the board required to be appointed by the Governor under the provisions
of this act shall resign, die, or be removed from office, the vacancy thereby created
shall, as soon as practicable, be filled by appointment by the Governor, and such
appointment to fill a vacancy shall be for the unexpired term of the person who resigns,
2 4
dies, or is removed from office. Attachment 14
(3)(a) Each board of juvenile welfare shall have the following powers and duties:
1. To provide and maintain in the county such child guidance, psychological, or
psychiatric clinics for juveniles as the board determines are needed for the general
welfare of the county.
2. To provide for the care of dependent juveniles and to provide such other services
for all juveniles as the board determines are needed for the general welfare of the
county.
3. To allocate and provide funds for other agencies in the county which are operated
for the benefit of juveniles, provided they are not under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
public school system.
4. To collect information and statistical data which will be helpful to the board in
deciding the needs of juveniles in the county.
5. To consult with other agencies dedicated to the welfare of juveniles to the end that
the overlapping of services will be prevented.
6. To lease or buy such real estate, equipment, and personal property and to construct
such buildings as are needed to execute the foregoing powers and duties, provided that
no such purchases shall be made or building done except for cash with funds on hand.
7. To employ and pay, on a part-time or full-time basis, personnel needed to execute
the foregoing powers and duties.
(b) Books of account shall be kept by the board or its clerical assistants, and the fiscal
affairs of the board shall be exclusively audited by state auditors as they are assigned
from time to time to audit the affairs of the county officials.
(4)(a) The fiscal year of the district shall be the same as that of the county.
(b) On or before July 1 of each year, the board of juvenile welfare shall prepare and
adopt an annual written budget of its expected income and expenditures, including a
contingency fund. The written budget shall be certified and delivered to the board of
3 4
county commissioners on or before July 1 of each year. Included in each certified
budget shall be an estimate of the millage rate necessary to be applied to raise the funds
budgeted for expenditures, which millage rate shall not exceed a maximum of 50 cents
for each $1,000 of assessed valuation of all properties within the county which are
subject to county taxes.
(c) The budget of the board of juvenile welfare so certified and delivered to the board
of county commissioners shall not be subject to change or modification by the board of
county commissioners or any other authority.
(d) In order to provide funds for the board of juvenile welfare, the district may levy ad
valorem taxes annually on all taxable property in the county in an amount not to exceed
one-half mill, provided that the authority to levy such taxes has been approved by a
majority vote of the electors of the district voting in an election called by the board of
county commissioners for such purpose. The tax shall be assessed, levied, and
collected in the same manner and at the same times provided by law for the levy,
collection, and enforcement of collection of county taxes. All tax money collected
under this act, as soon after the collection thereof as is reasonably practicable, shall be
paid directly to the board of juvenile welfare by the tax collector of the county, or the
clerk of the circuit court if he collects delinquent taxes. The moneys so received by the
board of juvenile welfare shall be deposited in a special bank account and shall be
withdrawn only by checks signed by the chairman of the board and countersigned by
one other member of the board of juvenile welfare who shall be so authorized by the
board. The chairman and the other member of the board who signs its checks shall
each give a surety bond in the sum of $1,000, which bond shall be conditioned that
each shall faithfully discharge the duties of his office. No other member of the board
shall be required to give bond or other security. No funds of the board of juvenile
welfare shall be expended except by check as aforesaid, except expenditures from a
petty cash account which shall not at any time exceed $25. All expenditures from petty
cash shall be recorded on the books and records of the board of juvenile welfare. No
funds of the board of juvenile welfare, excepting expenditures from petty cash, shall be
expended without prior approval of the board, in addition to the budgeting thereof.
(e) Within 10 days after the expiration of each quarter annual period, the board of
juvenile welfare shall cause to be prepared and filed with the board of county
commissioners a financial report which shall include the following:
1. The total expenditures of the board for the quarter annual period.
4 4
2. The total receipts of the board during the quarter annual period.
3. A statement of the funds the board has on hand or in banks at the end of the quarter
annual period.
(5) After the first year of operation of the board of juvenile welfare, the board of
county commissioners may, at its option, fund the budget of the board of juvenile
welfare from its own funds.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
1990 Main Volume Historical and Statutory Notes
Derivation:
Laws 1989, c. 89-379, ' 26.
Laws 1986, c. 86-197, '' 1 to 5.
Laws 1989, c. 89-379, ' 26, eff. July 6, 1989, in subsec. (2), increased the
membership of the board from nine to ten, allowed designees of district administrators
to serve on the board, and inserted the provisions relating to judges assigned to juvenile
cases.
END OF DOCUMENT