Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45 (2012) 243–254

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Communist and Post-Communist Studies

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Complaint-making as political participation in contemporary Russia

Laura A. HenryDepartment of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 24 August 2012

Keywords:AuthoritarianismComplaintsCommissioner for Human RightsParticipationRussia

0967-067X/$ – see front matter � 2012 The Regenthttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.06.010

a b s t r a c t

Prior to December 2011, instances of widespread collective mobilization were relativelyrare in contemporary Russia. Russian citizens are more likely to engage in a differentmeans of airing grievances: making an official complaint to the authorities. This articleconsiders how complaint-making, as a variety of political participation, may contributeeither to authoritarian resilience or to political liberalization. The political significance ofcomplaints made to the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation isexamined. Since it is the broader political context that shapes the significance ofcomplaints, in the absence of meaningful elections individualized appeals to the state areunlikely to promote democratic change, although they may allow for redress of individualrights violations.� 2012 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights

reserved.

In recent years, a vocal minority of Russian citizens has engaged in spontaneous public protests on issues ranging fromnew social security policies and corruption in traffic policing and property rights violations by developers, and electoral fraud(Evans, 2012; Robertson, 2009). Strategy 31, a coalition of opposition groups has highlighted the state’s infringement of thefreedom of assembly by attempting to organize a series of demonstrations in Moscow’s Triumfalnaya Square (Lipman, 2010;RIA Novosti, 2010). The Defenders of the Khimki Forest protested the construction of a highway through a forest near Moscow(Evans, 2012). Indeed, some observers predicted that protests are likely to grow as a result of popular dissatisfaction with thegovernment’s handling of the economy (Lipman, 2011; Whitmore, 2010).

Despite these high-profile examples, public acts of collective mobilization were rare in contemporary Russia prior toDecember 2011. Citizens of post-Soviet Russia remained remarkably quiescent despite well-documented violations ofpolitical rights and problems with public services. Given that grievances are common but protests were not – and thatprotests appear to be a measure of last resort – how have Russian citizens expressed their dissatisfaction with state policiesand rights violations? This article examines a more widespread and less politicized means of airing grievances: making anofficial complaint to the authorities. There is ample evidence that complaint-making is a more common means of expressingdissatisfaction with the government and bureaucracy than protest, but the political significance of complaint-making asa variety of political participation is less clear. Do citizen complaints have an effect on Russia’s political system and, if so, whatis it?

Complaining about the government – even officially – appears to be universal in all regimes, democratic and authoritarian,yet the political impact of complaint-making is under-theorized. Two broad, and somewhat contradictory, sets of assump-tions about citizen complaints emerge from two different scholarly literatures. First, scholars who study the extensive systemfor receiving and processing complaints in the Soviet Union and in contemporary authoritarian regimes, such as China, pointout the importance of complaints as a means of ensuring political stability by addressing public dissatisfaction and moni-toring implementation of policies at lower levels of government. Second, comparative political scientists focused primarily ondemocratic governments look at systems for addressing complaints, including the widespread use of ombudsmen toinvestigate citizens’ grievances, and argue that these processes serve as a check on government authority and an avenue for

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L.A. Henry / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45 (2012) 243–254244

increased accountability. Moreover, scholars note that increasing the responsiveness and accountability of state officials mayoffer a means of democratizing politics. The juxtaposition of these two sets of analyses raises the question: when docomplaints facilitate the state’s dominance of society and when do they increase citizens’ control over a state?

Viewing contemporary Russian politics through the lens of these two literatures highlights the ambiguous role ofcomplaint-making by Russian citizens. Is it a source of regime legitimation and perpetuation, used by a nondemocraticpolitical elite to identify bureaucratic inefficiencies and to simulate political responsiveness? Or is it a means of politicalliberalization, drawing attention to the government’s violation of constitutionally-endowed rights and freedoms and ameansof rectifying abuse of power? If the impact of largely similar complaint-making processes depends on political context, havingdifferent effects in different political environments, how can we evaluate its role in Russia?

This article examines these questions by looking carefully at the institution with the most significant authority toinvestigate citizen complaints: the Commissioner for Human Rights (Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka) of the RussianFederation. The data for this study are drawn from detailed annual reports by the Human Rights Commissioner’s office,scholarly literature on complaints in a variety of regimes, and media reports. The first section examines the two relevantliteratures on complaint-making. Next it considers complaint-making by Russian citizens to the Commissioner for HumanRights, including a brief review of the institution’s history and an overview of statistics on complaints. The third section offersa preliminary assessment about the political impact of complaints to the commissioner. I conclude by considering whethercomplaint-making through the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights contributes to regime stability or liberalizationin Russia. Although the commissioner’s office frequently voices sharp criticism of the Russian government and offers a usefulavenue for addressing individual and procedural complaints, its work is constrained by the broader political context inwhichother varieties of participation are circumscribed and the ultimate mechanism of accountability – elections – do not serve tocreate a competition and responsiveness among the elite.

1. The political effects of complaints

Do official systems for collecting and investigating citizens’ complaints contribute to political stability and regime survivalor political change and regime liberalization? Scholars have answered this question differently depending on the type ofa regime in question.

1.1. Complaint-making in the Soviet Union: reinforcing the regime

Authoritarian regimes, by definition, discourage autonomous activism by citizens. Instead, these regimes prefer top-downsystems of public mobilization in order to achieve objectives chosen by the political elite, not the public. Underdevelopedsystems of public feedback can create an obstacle to authoritarian governance, however. For example, the regime’s tech-nocratic goals of economic development and modernization could be derailed by self-interested bureaucratic actors whomanipulate their office for personal gain. A political system perceived as inefficient or unfair could lead to public dissatis-faction with the potential to disrupt the status quo.

Public complaints serve a useful purpose for the political elite in an authoritarian system in the following ways:

B highlighting areas of inefficiency in the administrative apparatus;B revealing corrupt practices or arbitrary conduct by lower level officials;B creating the appearance of regime responsiveness and accountability to the public; andB addressing public dissatisfaction in a way that pre-empts collective action.

Even when they rely on elaborate mechanisms of repression, leaders of authoritarian regimes need some way to assesspublic attitudes. After the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin encouraged complaint-making, stating that the party should “teach thepeople the immense value of practical complaints, bringing about as they do desirable and serious results” (Leninskii SbornikXXI, p. 227, as cited in Boim,1974, p. 516). Fitzpatrick summarizes the Soviet dilemma in regard to public feedback, stating, “TheSoviet regime was wary of allowing citizens to express uncensored opinions about matters of public import in public. At thesame time, it was extremely anxious to knowwhat people were thinking” (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 164). The Soviet state gatheredinformation on public sentiment using secret police reports, often compiled by eavesdropping on citizens’ complaints inmarkets and other public venues, and citizens’ letters to officials and newspapers (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 165; Bittner, 2003).

Citizens are not the only subjects of surveillance. Ultimately, the regime cannot achieve its goals unless discipline ismaintained throughout the state hierarchy. Friedgut captures this dynamic, stating, “Every Soviet student of public adminis-tration learns in thefirst pagesof his textbook Lenin’s dictum that ‘practice in the localities is the test of the center’s leadership’”(Friedgut,1978, p. 461). The complaints process thus offers the opportunity for “two-way surveillance” – citizen’s surveillanceof the bureaucracy and the regime’s surveillance of citizens (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 177). Bader and Brompton suggest that in theSoviet system “the complaining citizen serves as an important source for obtaining information on departures from legality, onarbitrary acts, and on abuse of power by agencies of public administration (Bader and Brompton, 1968, p. 80).

Historians have examined the Soviet regime’s use of complaints during some of the most critical political developments inthe USSR. Fitzpatrick chronicles the active use of complaints by Soviet citizens who saw themselves as unfair victims of

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policies against kulaks (Fitzpatrick, 1999, pp. 199–121) and Kang-Bohr describes how complaints played a role in legitimizingStalin’s purges (Kang-Bohr, 2005, p. 150).

Of course, there were clear limits to the kind of citizens’ complaint that was acceptable to the regime. Those complainantsarticulating “anti-Soviet” opinions or framing their grievance inways not consistent with Leninist ideology could be subject toarrest or some other penalty. Soviet authorities were also less positive about collective complaints which could be charac-terized as gruppovshchina (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 176), or unsanctioned collective action, instead preferring to deal with indi-viduals. Looking at the 1960s, Friedgut found that the majority of complaints in the Soviet Unionwere related to housing andpensions (Friedgut, 1978, p. 466). In 1958, due to the high number of complaints sent to Moscow over the heads of localofficials, the Central Committee issued a decree “On the serious shortcomings in the examinations of the letters, complaints,and declarations of the working people” (Bittner, 2003, p. 282). In this way, “the regime represents itself before the public assolicitous of their welfare and for safeguarding their rights” (Boim, 1974, p. 510). Indeed, Soviet officials trumpeted that therich tradition of letters to the editor in which citizens made complaints and suggestions demonstrated the vibrant nature ofSoviet democracy (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 175).

Examining the final Soviet decades, Bogdanova further explores how the state claimed to demonstrate “care” (zabota) forcitizens through the complaints process, and considers the way in which these practices influenced political culture,potentially over the long term. She argues that the institutionalization of a system of complaints and appeals reinforced Sovietlegal norms and political passivity. Bogdanova states, “Throughout its entire existence, Soviet society retained a pronouncedasymmetry in the distribution of rights between citizens and the state. The state’s many promises to take care of its citizensenabled the state to balance the existing asymmetries in the distribution of rights between citizens and the state and keep thesystem in a state of relative stability” (Bogdanova, 2006, p. 12).

Clearly the Soviet authorities tolerated, or even encouraged, complaints, but did the complaints process benefit citizens? Anumber of Sovietologists – albeit with scant evidence – judged the complaints system to be reasonably effective at addressingindividual citizens’ grievances (Bader and Brompton, 1968, p. 80; Boim, 1974, p. 509; Fitzpatrick, 1999, pp. 165, 175). Stateresponsiveness occurred within parameters that were strictly circumscribed by Soviet ideology, however. The regime wasreceptive to claims demanding more careful implementation of existing policies, and less tolerant of critical demands for newpolicies. A dynamic of ideologically-contextualized responsiveness occurs in other authoritarian systems as well. Reviewingalmost fifty years of complaints in China, Luerhmann (2003) shows that Chinese political officials actively solicited instancesof public dissatisfaction through the complaints process see also (Dimitrov, 2010). Luehrmann concludes that in China stateinstitutions for complaint-making promote a sense of “citizen efficacy, regime legitimacy, and system stability” (Luerhmann,2003, p. 846). She adds, “Ironically, petitioners, in abiding by the institutional rules of the system, often strengthen regimeinstitutions” (Luerhmann, 2003, p. 865). Paradoxically, complaints may assist the regime in enhancing its durability, and donot necessarily undermine the regime’s authoritarian characteristics.

1.2. Complaints as a vehicle for political liberalization

Complaint-making by citizens is not a practice limited to authoritarian regimes. Many advanced democracies haveinstitutions that allow citizens to communicate their grievances to political officials. Several literatures in comparativepolitics examine this kind of state–society engagement, such as citizen “contacting” (Zuckerman and West, 1985) and theinstitution of the ombudsman (Rowat, 1968; Stacy, 1978; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008). Scholars who examine establisheddemocracies, as well as states which have undergone recent regime change, tend to see complaint-making as a means offurther democratization. Complaints reinforce political liberalization by allowing for the impartial adjudication of griev-ances and empowering citizens in their interactions with state agencies. Complaints contribute to democracy in thefollowing way:

� defending citizen rights guaranteed in the constitution and other founding documents;� ensuring the equal application of the law;� publicizing rectifying mistreatment of citizens by officials; and� reinforcing the rule of law over arbitrary rule.

If the merits of complaints by citizens are evaluated by a neutral body in the context of a democratic legal system, overtime complaint-making serves to reinforce democratic principles and law-based interactions among citizens and governmentofficials, further consolidating democracy.

A number of scholars have focused on the institution of ombudsman to illustrate the potential democratizing effect ofcomplaints. The ombudsman is an institution created by elites in order to constrain – or at least shame – political officials whoviolate the rule of law. The first ombudsman was established in Sweden in 1713 “to exercise a general supervision to ensurethat laws and regulations were complied with, and that public servants discharged their duties properly” (Rudholm, 1968, p.17). In the 1950s, the Danish ombudsman began a campaign to publicize and promote the adoption of the institution(Abraham, 1968). The office has now spread to numerous states, many subnational levels of governance, and even interna-tional institutions such as the European Union and United Nations (Rowat, 1968, p. xxiv).

“Ombudsmania” in Eastern Europe followed the collapse of communism. The creation of the office of ombudsman becameyet another symbolic way for post-communist states to demonstrate their adherence to democratic principles. The European

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Ombudsman Institute has twenty members from the post-communist region, ranging from Poland to Uzbekistan (EuropeanOmbudsman Institute, 2012). Vangansuren, arguing that the institution is particularly necessary for states in this region,offers three reasons: the broad range of complaints from citizens undergoing “transitional crises,” the weak rule of law andlack of neutral public officials, and the scarcity and significant expense of private lawyers (Vangansuren, 2002, p. 17). Van-gansuren also suggests that the presence of an ombudsman in post-communist states strengthens civil society by reaffirmingthe status and priorities of citizen associations (2002, pp. 19–20).

What both of these literatures share is a vision of complaint-making as a means for citizens to influence political outcomes– and as a variety of political participation (Kweit and Kweit, 1986; Friedgut, 1978). In this sense, political participation is anyactivity intended to influence the government policy, personnel or practice in such a way that either supports or opposes thestatus quo (Conge, 1988; Verba et al., 1978). The question remains, however, of how to think more systematically about theeffect of citizen complaints on political continuity or liberalization. In democracies, the durability and effectiveness of theombudsman have been attributed to its independence from administrative offices and from the legislative branch and itsaccess to government documents (Marx, 1968, p. 257). The role of the broader political context in shaping the overalleffectiveness of the complaints process outside of advanced democracies is a question that has received less attention.

2. Complaints and the Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia

Complaint-making is a significant type of political participation in contemporary Russia. Citizens have a variety of avenuesfor submitting complaints, including the State Duma, the Public Chamber (Obshchestvennaia Palata), the President’s Councilon Human Rights (Sovet po razvitiiu grazhdankogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka), and the Prosecutor General’s office, inaddition to a variety of regional andmunicipal agencies responsible for particular services. For example, the administration ofthe city of St. Petersburg includes an Office of Appeals and Complaints and lists fifteen heads of the city administration whooffer monthly public reception hours. According to the website, in the first quarter of 2012 the office received 13,468 writtencomplaints and a growing number of complaints by phone, mostly related to public utilities and housing (AdministratsiiaSankt-Peterburga, 2011). Lussier’s research shows that citizens’ “contacting” political officials about their problems andneeds is the most common form of non-voting participation in Russia (Lussier, 2011, pp. 310, 313).1 Russian citizens also seethese personal communications as more effective than other types of participation, including protesting or taking part inelectoral campaigns (Lussier, 2011, p. 315). The number and variety of complaints, demonstrated by the data from the office ofthe Commissioner for Human Rights, also are notable because of Russians’ low level of political participation, even by thestandards of other post-authoritarian regimes (World Values Survey, 2011). Low participation is seen as both a legacy of theSoviet experience and the result of a number of formal and informal restrictions on political activities, including bureaucraticobstacles to registering NGOs and holding demonstrations (Robertson, 2009; Howard, 2003), laws on extremism, and the self-censorship of the media (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

Of course, “[c]omplaining presupposes a complaint” (Miewald and Comer, 1984, p. 22). In contemporary Russia, citizenshave no shortage of issues to complain about – and complaining about the powerlessness of the people in the face of the stateis a perennial theme in Russia’s political culture (Ries, 1997). In surveys Russians routinely express dissatisfaction with theirliving standards and economic and political conditions. In a September 2011 survey by the Levada Center found that 59percent of Russians are dissatisfied with their lives in general (Levada Center, 2011). Polls also indicate high levels of concernabout the economy and frustration with corruption and poor social services.

In order to consider the significance of complaints as a variety of political participation, this sectionwill examine onemajoravenue for citizen complaints – the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation. In many ways, asa federal-level office with broad oversight for constitutional rights and freedoms, the commissioner’s office serves as thepinnacle of complaint-making in Russia. The Commissioner also publishes extensive annual reports that serve as a yearlybenchmark of violations of human rights in the Russian Federation. As a federal-level institution, the commissioner canpresent his report directly to the president, parliamentary deputies, and other officials.

The position of Commissioner is provided for in the 1997 federal law “On the Commissioner for Human Rights of theRussian Federation.” Thus far, three individuals have occupied the office (Gilligan, 2010). In January 1994, the State Dumaelected Sergei Kovalev as Commissioner for Human Rights, a position that he held while also serving as a deputy in the StateDuma and as the Chair of the Human Rights Commission under the President of Russia. Kovalev had been a leading Sovietdissident, serving time in a Soviet labor camp for his activism, and human rights advocate, lending him great credibility asa commissioner (Gilligan, 2004). After his sharp criticism of the state’s prosecution of the war in Chechnya, however, theDuma dismissed Kovalev from the office of Commissioner in March 1995 (Prava cheloveka v Rossii, 2010). The newspaperNezavisimaia Gazeta charged that Kovalev “focused all his efforts only on Chechnya – or more precisely only on the Chechens”(RFE/RL Newsline, May 30, 2001).

After this controversial beginning, the position remained empty until 1998 when the Duma, in a highly politicizedprocess of horse-trading, selected Oleg Mironov, a member of the Communist party, as the next commissioner. UnlikeKovalev, Mironov gave up his Duma seat, signifying his distance from partisan politics, but his selection sparked significantcontroversy (RFE/RL Newsline, May 25, 1998). Critics asked how a communist could serve as a legitimate defender of human

1 Note that in her measurement of this variety of participation, Lussier combines traditional “contacting” with signing petitions (2011, 308).

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rights. Mironov struggled with a lack of funding for his office and distrust within the Russian human rights community.Despite fears that he would be inactive, Mironov came into conflict with the government on several occasions for dis-agreeing with state policies and practices. For example, in 2000 he was prevented from traveling to Chechnya withrepresentatives of the Council of Europe because of his critical stance on the government’s prosecution of the war (BBC,2000).

In 1998, Mironov reported that at first his office had “no premises, no staff, no necessary documents, or financial resources”and that work was carried out by volunteers in a temporary office (Doklad, 1998). Mironov initially anticipated that he wouldneed 200–250 staff members and 30million rubles (at that time $4.8 million) to carry out his work (RFE/RL Newsline, June 27,1998). In fact, the office currently has approximately 20 employees. Mironov also attempted, only somewhat successfully, toexpand the role of ombudsmen in Russia, calling for a similar office in eachRussian region and special commissioners to protectthe rights of soldiers, journalists, women and children. Mironov served until 2003 when his term expired.

When Mironov left the Commissioner’s office in June 2003, the Duma was deadlocked over his successor, with somedeputies calling for the office to be closed since it was perceived as duplicating the responsibilities of the publicprosecutor and the Justice Ministry (RFE/RL Russia Report, June 26, 2003). Ultimately, reflecting the growing impor-tance of presidential power in Russian political life, President Putin proposed the candidacy of Vladimir Lukin who wasthen confirmed by the Duma. Lukin was one of the founders of the liberal Yabloko party, served as ambassador to theUnited States from 1992 to 1994, and later was elected as a deputy in the State Duma. Lukin’s public remarks indicatethat he is sensitive to the need for neutrality to make the office of commissioner legitimate to an array of politicalactors, but he also has stated that the commissioner’s role is to “stir up the traditional bureaucratic machine” (Doklad,2005). He has advocated for the rights of ethnic minorities and gays and for NGOs’ freedom to organize. Lukin wasreappointed in February 2009 by the Duma, at the suggestion of President Medvedev (NewRu, 2009). During Lukin’stenure, the role of the commissioner as an ombudsman has been further institutionalized by the creation of similaroffices in more than 50 of Russia’s 83 federal subjects, although they are not under the jurisdiction of the federalcommissioner.

The Russian Commissioner for Human Rights is responsible for evaluating citizen complaints about violations of all rightsand freedoms guaranteed in the Russian constitution. Specifically, according to federal law, the Commissioner is chargedwith:

� considering complaints and claims of violations of human rights and freedoms of citizens;� adopting measures to rehabilitate rights and freedoms;� analyzing legislation for its effect on human rights and civil rights; and� making recommendations to improve legislation and to ensure its compliance with generally recognized principles and

norms of international law.

In addition to accepting complaints by mail and through its website, the commissioner’s office also offers reception hoursfor face-to-face complaint-making as well as telephone consultations.

Since the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation largely retains the array of social rights traditionally guaranteedunder the communist system, as well as enshrines political rights and civil liberties, the Russian commissioner has a some-what broader scope of work than similar officials in other states. In Chapter 1, Article 7, the constitution guarantees that theRussian Federation

shall be a social state, whose policies shall be aimed at creating conditions which ensure a dignified life and freedevelopment of man” and “ shall protect the work and health of its people, establish a guaranteed minimum wage,provide state support for family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood, and also for the disabled and for elderlycitizens, develop a system of social services and establish government pensions, benefits and other social securityguarantees.

Given this scope of activity by the Commissioner, the possible political effects of complaint-making to his office are broad.Effects may range from resolving individual complaints to altering legislation and to educating the public to change the waypeople perceive and act based on their rights. The work of the commissioner in addressing citizen complaints may act asa safety valve for public dissatisfaction with the government while resulting in relatively little fundamental change or may infact reinforce and expand the democratic aspects of Russia’s regime.

2.1. Complaints to the Commissioner: How many? What kind?

The annual reports (doklady) produced by the Commissioner offer a window into the volume and variety of complaintsthat are made by Russian citizens each year. The reports are substantial documents, running to more than 100 pages, whichcover not only basic statistics about complaints but also offer an assessment of various subcategories of complaint supportedby anecdotal evidence from the complaints themselves. Often the commissioner also selects several issues of concern thatarose during that year to examine more carefully. For example, the government’s decision to monetize social benefitspreviously given as free services in 2005 and the new law on NGOs in 2006 both received focused consideration in the reports.The 2010 report directs attention to issues of discrimination and disability.

Fig. 1. Number of complaints to the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation, 1998–2011.

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There has been some variation over time in how data on complaints is collected and reported. Due to vacancies in thecommissioner’s post, the years 1998 and 2004 represent only a partial accounting of complaints. The biggest change occurredwhen Lukin came to office and began differentiating between what he viewed as actual “complaints” and other kinds ofcommunications with the commissioner’s office, such as suggestions and more general questions. This difference is indicatedin Fig. 1 beginning in 2004. In 2004, Lukin also instituted a new five-fold system for categorizing complaints, as demonstratedbelow in Fig. 2.

The number of overall communications to the commissioner rose steadily, and indeed quite rapidly, until 2006, when thevolume began to decline modestly. Actual complaints also appear to begin a slight decline in 2004, although that may be inpart a result of the new accounting system, and then increased again in 2009 and 2010 (see Appendix A).

The increasing number of complaints from 1998 to 2004 may stem from a variety of factors, including more numerousviolations of rights, citizens’ greater awareness of rights, or greater awareness of the commissioner’s office. Economic factorsalso may influence the overall numbers of complaints. The post-2005 decline in communications coincides with a period ofgrowing economic prosperity and political stability. In 2009, Lukin connected growth in complaints to hardship generated bythe financial crisis, noting sharp increases in citizen concerns related to the protection of children, housing rights, and laborrights (Medvedev, 2009). Basic statistical correlations cast doubt on a primarily economic explanation for complaints,however. An effort to correlate data on annual complaints per capita for Russia’s 83 regions from 1998 to 2010 provided by theCommissioner’s office with government statistics on average change in regional GDP per capita reveals a non-statisticallysignificant correlation of only 0.026. A similar correlation between complaints and growth during the previous year alsodid not yield a significant result.

Fig. 2. Types of complaints, as a percentage of total complaints, 1998–2011.

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Fig. 2 illustrates the different types of complaints that are received by the commissioner on an annual basis in the cate-gories including the violation of civil, social, economic, political and cultural rights (Appendix B)2. Complaints reveal howRussian citizens perceive and experience their rights and freedoms in practice, demonstrating a broader interpretation ofrights than onewould expect based on conventional meaning of the term “human rights” in theWest. The greatest number ofcomplaints, averaging 49.9 percent from 1999 to 2011, has been onwhat the report refers to as civil (grazhdanskie) or personal(lichnye) rights, specifically violations related to the law-enforcement authorities, the judicial system, the penal system, andpassports and regulations. Thus, the agencies of coercive force account for the most significant violations in contemporaryRussia.

Social and economic rights also emerge as prominent areas of concern, especially in contrast to political rights. From 1999to 2011, the percentage of overall complaints in the social rights category averaged 30.8% and those in the economic rightscategory 15.3%. The social rights that are reported to be frequently violated include the payment of pensions and other socialbenefits, the need for housing and other municipal services, and access to medical care and education. Complaints related toeconomic rights most often refer to violations of employment contracts, failure to pay salaries or other compensationviolations, the right to equal pay for equal work, and violations of property rights. A significant minority of economiccomplaints comes from members of the military.

There are a variety of reasons for the prominence of social rights, including their status as valuable achievements of theSoviet period and public discontent due to the decline in living standards during the economic turbulence and social upheavalof the 1990s. Mironov began his work during the tumult of the 1998 economic crisis and the 1998 report is sharply critical ofthe state’s violation of social and economic rights. It states:

2 As nyears 19not alw

The decisions of the federal government and the Central Bank of Russia, adopted in mid-August 1998, led to thedevaluation of the ruble, rising prices, the paralysis of the banking system. The government of Russia has capped federalspending, which worsened social conditions, particularly in health, education, science and culture. This led to thegrowth of arrears in wages, pensions, and allowances, and a reduction in funding for social programs for state supportof the population (Doklad, 1998).

The importance of social and economic rights remains a consistent feature of the annual reports. Writing in 2007, after sixyears of steady economic growth in Russia, the Commissioner’s report once again highlighted the importance of social andeconomic rights, charging that the violation of these rights prevents citizens from freely exercising their political and civilrights (Doklad, 2006, p. 16).

In contrast Russian citizens are much less likely to complain to the commissioner about their political rights. Over theperiod 2003–2011, political rights averaged 2.3% of total complaints. Within this relatively small number, complaints rangedfrom reports of violation of the right of assembly, when organizations are prevented from holding meetings, demonstra-tions and other events, to violations of the freedom of speech and the press. A smaller number of complaints are related tothe rehabilitation of victims of political repression and violations of the freedom of conscience associated with religiouspractice. In the 2010 report acknowledges, “political rights are always in demand in the active minority of citizens,” but alsowarns:

.the low proportion of complaints of violation of political rights should not be misleading: in fact almost everycomplaint are claims of hundreds if not thousands of people. In this sense very symptomatic of an increase of 3.8% ofthe number of complaints of violations of freedom of assembly. Nor should we forget the fact that the demand forpolitical rights tends to grow rapidly and unpredictably (Doklad, 2010, pp. 10–11).

Western reports on human rights in Russia have, in contrast, focused almost exclusively on political rights (see, forexample, U.S. Department of State, 2011). Evaluating the commissioner’s 2006 report, commentators from the newspaperVedomosti noted, “In contrast to the US State Department’s annual report on the same subject, it says not a word about high-profile political killings or pressure on the courts and it mentions Chechnya only in passing” (Latukhina and Kornya, 2007, p.9). In general, the commissioner’s response to communications to his office that encompass requests to “comment on politicalstatements and . to cooperate with political organizations” is to send “clarification of the Commissioner cannot participatein politics” (Doklad, 2010, p. 9). Russian human rights groups occasionally have been critical of the commissioner’s emphasison social and economic rights and charge that he should play a more active role in protecting political rights. As the sameVedomosti article reported “[R]ights advocate Lev Ponomaryov pointed out that the commissioner, unlike the State Depart-ment, did not make use of monitoring conducted by human rights organizations, and that even the experts whom Lukinenlisted have not been allowed to review the document’s text” (Latukhina and Kornya, 2007, p. 9). Ponomaryov added that“Lukin does a great deal but doesn’t mete out much criticism.” Lukin has responded to this charge in general by saying, “I havehad and continue to have my own personal opinions, but I did not base the report on them; I based it on the complaints Ireceived from people” (Kozenko, 2007, p. 7).

oted above, Lukin instituted new broad categories for accounting for types of complaints in 2004 and applied them retroactively to 2003. For the98–2002, the author has estimated the number of complaints in each category based on the earlier accounting system although complete data wasays available.

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3. Political effects of complaint-making

What are the political effects of these complaints? Their impact is difficult to judge in part because of the array of possibleshort- and long-term results and direct and indirect effects of the commissioner’s work. Recognizing these challenges, Ipropose three ways of conceptualizing effectiveness. First, are specific complaints addressed and applicants’ rights restored?Second, does the complaint process serve to reassert and rhetorically entrench the protection of citizens’ rights as a norm thatshould structure political practice? Third, are there systemic changes in practices or institutions as a result of complaints thatserve to either stabilize or liberalize the regime?

On the first criteria, the reports have not always offered data on the number of individual complaints that have beenaddressed, mentioning it some years and not in others. In 1998, the annual report testified that approximately 17 percent ofcomplainants had their problems resolved. In the following years underMironov, reports estimate that rights had been restoredfor 16–20% of complainants. The 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 reports stated that, with the assistance of the relevant authorities,31.8%, 32.9%, 32.2%, and 27.2 percent of complaints had been investigated respectively3. For 2007, the text of the annual reportnotes that only 12.9% of the complainants had their rights restored. Reflecting on 2009 in an interview, Lukin claimed that hisofficewas able to help approximately 10 percent of applicants (Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2010). In a 2010 interview, Lukin estimated hisoffice resolved 7 percent of complaints (Ekho Moskvy, 2011). Thus it appears that the average number of individual complaintsresolved is somewhere in between 10 and 15%. This figuremay not be surprising given the sheer volume of complaints, many ofwhich are deemed unfounded in law after the first readings. And, as Lukin has frequently noted, the resolution of a singlecomplaint may correct the problem for a whole category of citizens, many of whommay not have put in an official request forredress. Thus, the commissioner’s office does seem to provide a meaningful channel for addressing complaints for a significantminority of applicants. Which types of complaints are most frequently resolved is not clear, however.

Rhetorically, the reports are notable for their critical tone, which is consistent throughout the Yeltsin, Putin, andMedvedevpresidencies. In 1998, under the leadership of Mironov, the report stated, “The complaints and appeals of citizens testify thatthe situation with human rights remains in Russia extremely tense” (Doklad, 1998). In recent years, the reports haverepeatedly assessed the protection of human rights in Russia as “unsatisfactory.” In 2005, the commissioner’s report stated,“Against the background of economic growth, the inflow of petrodollars, and increase in the stabilization fund and currencyreserves of the country it is especially noticeable that the necessary social and economic transformations were carried outhastily, unprofessionally, and occasionally in quite an inhumane way” (Doklad, 2005, p. 9). The next year, reflecting on 2006,Lukin’s report argued that the growing gap between rich and poor led citizens to believe that the government is not workingin their interests (Doklad, 2007). More recent reports have been critical about the reliance on personal power over theattention to the law. In the 2010 report, Lukin writes that the commissioner’s office as a “public institution is designed toprotect the legitimate rights of citizens, and, no less, to legitimate society as a whole to become, finally, civil, and notpaternalistic” (Doklad, 2010).

While the causality is impossible to prove, the language of human rights has become entrenched in elite politics, mostnotably in presidential rhetoric, although the effect on Duma deputies and lower level officials appears to be somewhat lessapparent. Medvedev spoke out clearly about the rights the disabled, prisoners (in the wake of the Magnitsky scandal4), andthose citizens living in the North Caucasus. The language of recent reports echoed and reinforced President Medvedev’sconcern about “legal nihilism.” Putin also has paid lip service to safeguarding human rights even as Russia is engaged in awaron terror; for example, after the murder of Natalia Estemirova in Chechnya, he called on local police and officials to protecthuman rights groups (RT, 2010)5. These examples are anecdotal, but provide evidence of the need to support human rights inpublic statements as an emerging norm in Russia. In addition, after a negligible start, the commissioner also has beenexpanding the civic education aspect of his office, running essay contests and producing materials for classroom use on thesubject of human rights. These efforts may contribute to changing public discourse on human rights and a changing contextfor interpreting violations of rights. In fact, the use of the bully pulpit, and the ability to gain media attention and tocommunicate directly with federal agencies appears to be the most significant political leverage possessed by thecommissioner’s office.

Impacts at the systemic level are most challenging to assess. In 2004, the commissioner reportedly made more than 70recommendations for improving legislation to officials ranging from the president to the committees of the State Duma.However, the report notes, “The Commissioner very often is unable ‘to get through’ to the legislators” (Doklad, 2005).Interactions with the Constitutional Court appeared marginally more effective, as the report notes several instances of lawsdeemed unconstitutional. Later reports are less specific about interactions with the State Duma and constitutional court,

3 In other cases, either the petitioner was found to have no legal basis for the complaint or the commissioner concluded that the petitioner had notexhausted other remedies for redress and sent instructions on how to proceed.

4 Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian lawyer who was arrested for tax evasion after accusing government officials of corruption. Held for almost a yearwithout trial, Magnitsky suffered health problems in detention. His supporters charge that he was given inadequate medical care. Magnitsky died indetention in November 2009.

5 Natalia Estemirova was a human rights activist who worked with the organization Memorial and was based in Grozny, Chechnya. In July 2009, she wasabducted from her home and shot several times; her body was dumped in a forest. Journalists and rights activists charge that the official investigation failedto identify Estemirova's murders.

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making the broader impact of the commissioner’s work challenging to judge. In general, the lack of reporting about successfulinstances of legislative change would seem to indicate a weak role for the commissioner in this area.

Some of Lukin’s broader critiques embedded in the reports argue for a thorough-going reconceptualization of currentstate–society relations. Lukin has advocated a different model of civil society than that promoted by the state, for example,remarking that: “[h]owever inconvenient it may be for some state institutions, civil society is not meant to be obedient andconcordant....” (Doklad, 2006). He also has expressed concern that the complaints process could reinforce the legacy of pastpolitical arrangements in Russia:

[T]he right to appeal is a special form of interaction between subjects, first, and then citizens and the state that hastaken root in Russia in the familiar historical circumstances of our state. Autocracy, as well as its successor the total-itarian Soviet regime, carefully “guarded” the country’s population from real participation in state affairs. Electionswere, at best, a mere formality; trials are not intended to review cases of complaints against the actions and decisions ofofficials; the idea of public expediency took precedence over the principles of procedural fairness; and power wasincomparably stronger than the law. In such circumstances, to petition . a high official was almost the only way toprotect the rights and interests of the applicant (Doklad, 2010, p. 75).

Scholarly opinion on the role of the commissioner and complaints in Russia continues to be divided. After thoroughlyreviewing the development of the institution of Human Rights Commissioner, Gilligan argues, “the role of the human rightsombudsman in Russia has grown to occupy a meaningful place in the field of administrative and criminal justice. Not only asa venue that elucidates ongoing patterns of social injustice, but as an institution that directly challenges the decisions andpractices of government bodies” (Gilligan, 2010, pp. 578–9). In a broader study of political participation in Russia, Lussierexamines conventional and contentious political participation in Russia, including contacting, and its effect on democracy.While she finds some regional variations of the effectiveness of complaints, Lussier concludes that there are few benefits fordemocratization:

While one would expect that over time those officials who do a poor job of responding to constituent demands wouldlose votes, it is also possible that public officials could resolve basic local and regional management problems, such ashousing and transportation, in a way that voters deem as satisfactory without otherwise increasing political compe-tition, increasing transparency, or extending civil liberties (Lussier, 2011, p. 318).

Without broad public awareness of the issues under scrutiny, complaint-making may not result in the kind of widespreadpublic mobilization that could lead to collective accountability, rather than the resolution of individual grievances. In addi-tion, due to weak party competition in Russia, citizens’ leverage over elected officials is poor. Political elites do not face thethreat of electoral defeat due to a lack of accountability and responsiveness, thus limiting the ability of complaint-making toserve a democratizing role.

How does the Russian political context affect the Commissioner’s work? The 1998 report cites obstacles to the devel-opment of the commissioner’s office, including the legal nihilism of society, the skeptical attitude of civil servants, and theinertia of government bodies required toworkwith the commissioner (Doklad,1998). In 2006, the report noted the particularproblems of “transition” states that hinder the commissioner’s work:

...administrative arbitrariness is frequently systemic in nature, the judicial authorities customarily fail to adequatelyprotect the rights of citizens, and sometimes these rights are insufficiently guaranteed by law. Cases when law andjustice contradict each other are not rare, and government sometimes tends to assert itself as standing above the law.The public is silent, as best basing its hopes on a “kind tsar” instead of defending its rights with knowledge andexperience (Doklad, 2006).

Lukin has been somewhat circumspect about direct criticism of the president’s office, focusing instead on the Duma, courtsand administration. In a February 2010 interview published in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, a newspaper generally considered to be theofficial mouthpiece of the government, Lukin responded to a question as to whether it became easier for him to work withPresidents Putin and Medvedev when their rhetoric began to be more critical of the political status quo. He replied:

Psychologically, yes; and yes, in practice as well. The effectiveness of my task is largely dependent on the various layersof bureaucracy.. If themotivation comes from the highest superiors that you need to listen, that should be responsibleto the citizens and their representatives, or, God forbid, we can throw you out – this is essential. Themotivation is weak,but it is present (Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2010).

In addition, Lukin has expressed reluctance to state that the protection of human rights in Russia is declining orimproving over any given year. He does, however, argue that the problem is very large, rejecting the idea that resolving theviolation of rights is a matter of simply firing a few bad apples in the bureaucracy. Instead, it is a “more entrenched, serious,and complex social problem with long-term challenges and long-term solutions” (Radio Svoboda, 2010). Lukin links theproblem to the country’s legal culture, developed in the pre-Soviet and Soviet eras, the long period of serfdom, andsystematic repression.

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4. Regime stability or liberalization?

Citizen complaints offer Russian political leaders a means of taking the public’s temperature on the current state ofgovernance in Russia. The fact that political elites recognize the important function of direct communication with thepublic is evidenced by practices such as President Putin’s frequent use of radio call-in programs, and former PresidentMedvedev’s on-line blog with comments from the public, and the ease with which government websites now acceptcommunications from citizens. In the absence of public feedback, the government may misstep and alienate citizens, asarguably happened in 2005 with the monetization of social benefits (Wengle and Rasell, 2008) and later in cases ofcorruption by the traffic police (Lonkila, 2011). Reacting to the protests by pensioners in January 2005, Lukin attributedthem in part to “an acute shortage of feedback mechanisms between the authorities and the public” (Tsepliaev, 2005, ascited in Evans, 2006, p. 156).

One drawback of complaints as a meaningful variety of political participation is the individualized nature of the process.Making a complaint is generally an isolated activity based on a personal grievance embedded in a specific context. Ascompared to other varieties of participation, including institutional means such as lobbying and extra-institutional meanssuch as protests, the opportunity for citizens to act as agents of change through complaints appears minimal. In many cases,complaint-making serves to depoliticize rights violations by engaging the administrative apparatus and to demobilize thepublic by encouraging individual rather than collective action. The complaints process does not build ties among citizens,generating the social capital that is thought to be the beneficial result of other forms of political and civic engagement (Henry,2009). As the Commissioner for Human Rights, Lukin has been one of the most important voices in the domestic sphere forupholding the rule of law and for the development of an active civil society. Despite the efforts of the Commissioner forHuman Rights, however, making complaints most directly engages the bureaucracy, emphasizing the administrative ortechnocratic natures of grievances rather than the overall political regime and the policy-making process that contributes tofrequent violations of rights.

In the 2007 report, the commissioner recognizes two competing sets of expectations about his office:

Ten years after the establishment of the office of the Human Rights Commissioner, both society and the state are stilllargely unaccustomed to the institution. Some individuals and organizations often perceive it as an omnipotentsupervisory body, while others see it as some kind of cardboard cut-out or useless cog in the machinery of government(Doklad, 2007).

During his time in office, President Medvedev claimed to see the value of complaints. In December 2009, Medvedevaccepted the news of a rapid increase in complaints to the commissioner with equanimity, remarking, “This figure, in myopinion, speaks to the fact people pin a certain degree of hope to these requests. You see, if they did not make appeals, if theybelieve that it is ineffective, or useless, then they would not write” (Medvedev, 2009). It may be that Medvedev saw thepotential for legitimizing his own effort, however short-lived, to reform the bureaucracy and modernize the economy byreferring to citizens’ dissatisfaction, as illustrated by complaints. In the Soviet period, citizens’ complaints were enlisted in the“struggle against bureaucratism,” a practice not so different from President Medvedev’s pleas for public action in the battleagainst “legal nihilism.”

It is the broader political context that shapes the significance of political participation through complaints in Russia today,however – and, prior to December 2011, that context seemed to elevate the attractiveness of complaining over other kinds ofactivismwhile at the same time limiting the overall effectiveness of complaints. Electoral machinations among the elite havereverberated in ways that undermine other varieties of participation – such as voting, participating in campaigns, and policyadvocacy. In the 2011 report, Lukin acknowledges the systemic nature of the problem, stating “the Commissioner is inclinedto explain many of the violation of human rights and freedoms of the fact that their defense is not always perceived by thepublic authorities and local self-government as a priority, much less a major problem” (Doklad, 2011). He recommends“developing and expanding the responsibilities of the Institute for Human Rights Commissioners” as one way to “stimulateofficials to care about the rights and interests of individual citizens – this is what binds them to the letter and spirit of theConstitution” (Doklad, 2011).

In the 2011 report, Lukin also cautions that citizens’ dissatisfaction is beginning to take on a more political form and to bedirected at the state as a whole, rather than specific individuals and agencies. It may be that Russians now recognize thatcomplaining is a strategy which may result in individual redress on social issues, and therefore may promote limitedaccountability, but without the additional incentives of electoral competition citizens’ choice to participate in politics bymaking a complaint is unlikely to generate broader political change.

Acknowledgement

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Western Political Science Association Conference in SanFrancisco in April 2010 and the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, Los Angeles in November2010. The author is grateful to Cynthia Horne, Alfred Evans, and anonymous reviewers for the helpful comments on thepaper.

L.A. Henry / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45 (2012) 243–254 253

Appendix A. Volume of complaints to the Commissioner for Human Rights, 1998–2010.

1998a 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004b 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Total complaints 30,392 33,424 32,477 28,617 27,577 32,043 29,064 26,197Total communications

(including complaints)6978 22,815 24,985 30,056 33,455 36,634 48,231 54,617 51,832 48,235 47,147 54,056 56,801 54,336

Percentage change fromprevious year

NA NA 9.5% 20.2% 11.3% 9.5% (�17%)31.6%

(9.9%)13.2%

(�2.8%)�5.1%

(�11%)�6.9%

(�3.6%)�2.2%

(16.1%)14.6%

(�9.3%)5.1%

(�9.8)�4.3%

a Counted from May 1998.b Counted from February 13, 2004. In 2004, with the arrival of Vladimir Lukin as commissioner, the annual reports began to offer separate statistics for

overall communications and complaints to the commissioner’s office.

Appendix B. Type of complaints to the Commissioner for Human Rights, 1998–2008.a Percentages of overallcomplaints.

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Civil rights 26 36.7 51.1 53.8 48 58 42 44.7 46.7 50.1 51.9 55.3 52.8 57.7Social rights NA 39.2 30.9 29.3 33 24 34.4 34.9 34.3 32.3 30.6 25.3 27.5 25.1Economic rights 29 15.7 14.3 14.8 16.3 15.9 18.9 16.4 15.5 13.9 12.9 15.3 15.9 13.2Political rights NA NA NA NA NA 1.6 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.3 4.1 1.6 1.2 1.8Cultural rights NA NA NA NA NA 0.5 0.4 0.36 0.03 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9

a In 2003, the commissioner changed the categories for rights presented in the annual reports. For that reason, the data provided for 1998–2002 are

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