Constitutional Values, Federalism and Conflicts in Ethiopia

127© Africa Institute of South Africa AFRICA INSIGHT Vol 39 (4) – March 2010

Federalism and confl icts in Ethiopia

Since 1991, Ethiopia has been implementing an ethno-linguistic federal system. This

system established nine ethnically based regional states. In this article, I briefl y

discuss the moral and legal justifi cation of group (collective) rights of ethno-

cultural communities and introduces the concept of ethnic federalism in general,

and Ethiopian ethnic federalism in particular. I also discuss the literature

on issues of group (collective) rights (of ethno-cultural communities) and their

place in liberalism. While discussing the historical, moral and philosophical

necessities for such federal arrangement, I also point out the most binding constraints

Ethiopian federalism is facing.

Mehari Taddele Maru

Mehari Taddele Maru is currently serving as Programme Coordinator at African Union Commission and Executive

Director of African Rally for Peace and Development.

Group Rights, Liberalism, and Federalism

Ethno-Cultural Group RightsRecognition of group (collective) right can be understood as a corollary of the liberal prin-ciple that all human beings should be treated with equal respect and concern.1 The existence of plurality of values compel us to give equal re-spect and concern for all human beings without discriminating one value as superior over the other.2 Personal liberty especially the liberty to intelligibly choose and freely pursue one’s own life is clearly entailed in the principle of equal respect.3 Similarly Dworkin persuasively notes:

Government must treat those whom it govern

with concern and dignity for human being are

capable of forming and acting on intelligent

conceptions of how their lives should be lived …

[it] must not constrain liberty on the ground

that one citizens’ conception of good life … is

nobler or superior to another. 4

Conceptually, this is similar to the Kantian treatment of human beings with equal respect and concern as moral agents.5 If this Kantian moral principle (of treating individuals as

128 AFRICA INSIGHT Vol 39 (4) – March 2010 © Africa Institute of South Africa

Federalism and confl icts in Ethiopia | Mehari Taddele Mar

equals and demanding us to treat them as au-tonomous responsible moral agent) is correct, then individuals have human right to identity and recognition of their group. A society and its culture confer meaning to life of an indi-vidual.6 One of the corollaries of the principle that individuals have the right to be treated as equal moral agents is, therefore, the right to identify with a group one prefers as part the right to form association.7 Of course such as-sociation is expected to be legal. Hence, the right to identity, recognition and protection of one’s ethno- cultural identity is ‘a fundamental interest of human beings’.8 Taylor also makes a very similar point: ‘recognition of distinctive cultural identity is not just a courtesy we owe people ... it is a vital human need’.9 Moreover, under international law, the right to identity is stipulated as one of the fundamental rights.10

Accepting the plurality of conception of values and meaningful life conjoined with the moral principle of equal respect and concern to all requires recognition of an individual’s hu-man right to choose one’s identity, and identify with others and form groups. When a person chooses to defi ne and plan his or her life by as-sociating to his or her cultural or ethno-cultural communities he or she is demanding equal re-spect. The right to identity and cultural recog-nition are compatible with liberalism because individuals defi ne themselves, and their view of life based on the conception of values of their society.11 Ethnicity and cultural identity could be a conception of defi ning the self, and world-view. Indeed an individual and his conception of various issues are products of his cultural society. Equality of respect is the basis for the recognition of the rights of ethno-cultural com-munities because it is ‘a societal culture [which] provides the context within which meaningful choice is possible’.12 Hence, it is wrong to as-sume that group rights are incompatible with

liberal theory. Indeed Howard and Donnelly make similar point by saying ‘autonomy does not necessarily mean alienation from commu-nity … [t]o the (considerable) extent that indi-viduals defi ne themselves and live their lives as part of … group’.13

Majority Rule and Minority RightsEquality of respect for individual human beings is also the source of the minority right for dis-tinctiveness of ethno-cultural communities.14 For some people, for certain ethnic culture, language, land and way of life (pastoralist for example) could be essential to the defi nition of the ‘self’, and it could also be the source of meaningful conception of life and worldview.15 Some forms of cultivation, land and its re-sources (such as forest) may also constitute the basis of the existence and social cohesiveness of communities. Ethno-cultural communities (particularly minority ethno-cultural groups) may ‘feel passionately about their culture, lan-guage that is slight concern for the majority’.16 What matters most to a particular (minority or ethnic) community may well be something that may never matter to a majority.

Consequently, some ethno-cultural com-munities may be endangered to the edge of extinction due to the decision of a majority population or state such as large development projects (dam construction, park reservations, or resettlement).17 In worst cases, such develop-ment projects were used as deliberate policies of oppression and obliteration of ethno-cultural communities.18 19 It is not only equal recogni-tion but also preservation is an obligation of states. Recognition of identity is not only about the past and the present but also the future – people would like to preserve their identity from any forced destruction.20 For this reason international and many domestic human rights instruments acknowledge that full exercise of



human rights such as freedom of association, religion, and economic, social and cultural rights are possible only if the cultural, identi-ty and religious communities are protected by law.21 Disregarding these kinds of requests and needs of a specifi c group is violation of human rights.22 It is therefore right to contend that such communities have group rights that mor-ally justify self preservation and that require opportunity for a meaningful enjoyment of hu-man rights.

Historically, majoritarian democracy, as a political institution, has justifi ed the abuse and violations of minority rights and failed to effectively protect and ensure protection of these rights.23 Demand of ethno-cultural com-munities for territorial self-government is an outcome of from this failure of majoritarian rule. Communities’ requests for ‘territory not only consists of resources, but is also the basis of a particular way of life that people have a right to maintain. Thus, denial of recognition of ethno-cultural communities to exercise and preserve their culture is a human rights viola-tion’24 and ‘a form of oppression’.25 Moreover, shrinking such freedom is not in the interest of liberalism.26 Due recognition of ethno-cultural differences and tolerating a democratic expres-sion of these differences is compatible with po-litical liberalism. Allowing a public space for those who want to exercise their identity would advance liberalism by expanding and maximiz-ing freedom. After all, minority group and in-digenous people’s rights aim at protecting such group from illiberal systems of governance.27 Society’s advancement is particularly measured by how they treat their disadvantaged groups including minority groups, persons with dis-abilities and the sick.

If a majoritarian democracy tries to abolish group human rights, Dahl and Harrison argue, individuals and their associations have the

right to rebel against such governance for it is equality of respect [giving equal concern to all human beings], which is the very source of le-gitimacy of democracy.28 Any decision that abol-ishes the principle of equality of respect loses its source of legitimacy.29 Group human rights matter regardless of majority decision. In the era of human rights, the re-conceptualization of democracy distinct from majority tyranny to accommodate minority rights becomes a neces-sity. Minority rights do put a limit over a major-ity rule. Consequently, democracy is not simply majority tyranny; rather it is majority rule mi-nus minority rights. If MR stands for majority rule and its mandate area and Mr stands for mi-nority rights, then democracy= MR-Mr. Group human rights (cultural, linguistic, religious, in-digenous people and minority) are tools of the poor and the weak. Human rights and group rights are the bulwark of the minority against majority tyranny. Thus, a legal protection of ethno-cultural groups from unwarranted deci-sions of a majority, which may endanger their free exercise of their rights to identity and to preserve distinctiveness, is morally justifi -able. This is politically apt especially when the ethno-cultural communities were historically dominated and disadvantaged. Protection of group rights, therefore, redefi nes democracy as a system that provides a backup protection from majority tyranny. Protection of the human rights of minority groups justifi es an institu-tional setup, like federalism.

In a nutshell, it is unacceptable from the ‘human rights’ perspective and morally diffi -cult to justify the denial of individual’s rights to identify and exercise his or her group rights. This is not only against our daily intuitive mor-al judgment but it is also a violation of inter-nationally recognized human rights. Now ‘in the era of politics of identity’ it is a fact beyond dispute that the conception of ‘nation state’ as



melting pot of distinctive identities of ethno-cultural communities is waning.30 This section has briefl y provided a more or less sound moral ground and human rights basis justifying, (1) ethno-cultural communities’ right to recogni-tion, (2) preservation of their distinctiveness, and (3) the state’s obligation to respect and en-sure the implementation of such rights. One of the institutional mechanisms of accommodat-ing ethno-cultural group differentiated rights is ethno-linguistic federalism. 31

Constitutional Recognition of Ethno-Cultural Identity and FederalismRawls said that ‘communities having a dif-ferent set of interests and principles of justice would try to gain political autonomy’.32 For the sake of ‘justice, as expressing an appropriate conception of the common good’ Rawls recom-mends establishing what he calls ‘a society of societies’ as a non-ideal solution. I see Rawls ‘society of societies’ as federative unions sub-ject to the aggregated will of diverse commu-nities including ethno-cultural communities. Such aggregated will of diverse societies can be expressed by a federal constitution, which stipulates the principles and interests common-ly shared by the parties to the constitution and carves-out those areas and interests that are peculiar to a certain community. Rawls asserts that federalism is a non-ideal practical solu-tion which should be treated fi rst as of practical importance for it deals with problems we face every day.33

Like Rawls Andreas is right in pointing out that federalism does not have the universal reach the human rights regime has. This re-searcher contends that while both writers are right in treating federalism as an alternative in-stitution when conditions are unfavourable to a unitary system, neither federalism nor unitary state system are ideal theory. Both institutions

don’t have a universal reach. Rather the human right to the recognition of one’s culture and identity is universal in reach. The right to rec-ognition is not to be equated with federalism. Since federalism has no universal reach, one may tend to conclude that the right for recogni-tion of ethno-cultural identity does not have a universal reach. This is correct only if one con-siders federalism and recognition of ethno-cul-tural identity as synonymous. However, federal-ism is not necessarily a recognition of identity. It is also wrong to conclude that since federal-ism is not a fundamental interest of human beings, the recognition of cultural right is also no a fundamental interest. Andreas describes federalism as a public value. Even if federalism, in and by itself, may not be a public value, it is an institution of protection and maximiza-tion of public values and fundamental human interests such as common security, peace, com-mon economic space and self administration. While ethno-cultural identity is a fundamental human interest – or is ‘primary good’ as Rawls would have liked to call it, federalism is not. When an opportunity for adoption and expres-sion of identity is denied, life may indeed be meaningless. Thus, while federalism is not an ideal value, perhaps is not a value at all, the right to ethno-cultural identity and the recog-nition of such identity and constitutional pro-tection including self-determination is indeed a fundamental human interest with universal reach.

Consequently, recognition of cultural iden-tity is not enough; preservation of such iden-tity could be legitimately demanded by many communities.34 Preservation of distinctiveness of identity may also involve some sort of exclu-sion of non-members. Gellner tersely summa-rizes this point as follows: ‘the human need to belong, to identity and hence also to exclude’.35 The most obvious case is when others endanger



the existence of cultural distinctiveness of a community. This requires a state to actively pre-serve such ethno-cultural communities.36 Thus, it is logical to argue that ethno-cultural com-munities have group rights that morally justify self-preservation. Constitutional protection and preservation of ethno-cultural communities is also politically appropriate.37

Ethno-Linguistic Federalism One of the institutional means of recognizing and protecting the right to cultural identity is establishment of ethno-linguistic federalism. The failure of unitary systems to accommodate the claims, and address the concerns, of ethno-linguistics communities compelled many states to change from a unitary to a federal system.38 The trend is that countries change from a feder-al system to a unitary system not the other way round. Ethno-linguistic federalism establishes and legitimizes the territorial autonomous self-government of ethno-cultural communi-ties. From this perspective, ethno-linguistic federalism could be seen as an institutional mechanism for accommodating ethno-cultural diversity. Moreover, many experts agree that ethno-linguistic federalism may also serve as a confl ict-management device.39 It is also recom-mended especially in countries where ethno-cultural communities are ‘arbitrarily joined or divided’ by colonial powers. It has been also implemented in countries where secessionist ethnic mobilizations are strong.40 By ensur-ing power sharing between the centre and the units, ethno-linguistic federalism can ‘hold’ a country united if it is threatened by disintegra-tive forces.41 Such federalism is referred to as ‘holding-together federalism’.42 There are more than 24 federal states worldwide constitut-ing 40 percent of the total global population.43 Ethiopia, Switzerland, India, Spain, Nigeria, and Belgium use ethno-linguistic federalism

to ensure their respective territorial unity.44 Self-governments in Quebec (Canada) and in Scotland (United Kingdom) have also been es-tablished on the basis of ethno-linguistic ar-rangement45 as a way to prevent secession and confl ict. Now the trend to adopt federalism that promotes the rights of ethno-cultural commu-nities is increasingly seen as one of the ‘good practices of a number of states’.46

Epigrammatic Introduction to Federalism in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the third most populous African country with population over 77 million.47 Since 1991, Ethiopia has been implementing an ethno-linguistic federal politico-legal ar-rangement. As per article 1 and article 47 the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereafter referred as ‘the Federal Constitution’), Ethiopia is a federation made up of nine ethno-linguistically divided region-al states. The regional states can be classifi ed into three groups based on their population: (1) the population number, as minority or major-ity in the federation, (2) ethno-linguistic diver-sity, as multiethnic or homogeneous, (3) way of life, as settled or pastoralist.48 Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali regional states (tak-ing the name of their majority inhabitants) are more or less ethnically homogeneous with a dominant majority ethno-linguistic commu-nity at regional level. In Tigray (94.98%), Afar (91.8%), Amhara (91.2%), Oromia (85%), Somali (95.6%) of the population are from their respec-tive dominant ethno-linguistic communities.49 The remaining four regional states (SNNP, Gambella, Benshangul/Gumuz and Harari) are multiethnic without a de jure dominant ethno-linguistic community. This does not however mean there is no ethno-cultural community de



facto majority in power even if the same com-munity is minority in number.50 Such situa-tion is a result of economic majority or political power domination. This last point is discussed in detail in section IV.

Constitutional Rights of Ethno-cultural Communities in EthiopiaArt 39 (3) and (5) of the Federal Constitution assumes that every ethno-cultural community has its own territory and confers the right to ‘a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of govern-ment in the territory that it inhabits’. It also defi nes ethno-cultural communities as ‘Nation, Nationality or People … as a group of people who have or share a large measure of a com-mon culture or similar customs, mutual intelli-gibility of language, belief in a common or relat-ed identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifi able, predominantly contiguous territory’ (Emphasis supplied). The Federal Constitution does not only recognize ethno-linguistic identity but also it establishes regional states based on such identity.

The Federal Constitution has many strik-ing features. The constitutional right of ethno-cultural communities to self-determination in-cluding the right to establish a regional state or independent state makes Ethiopian constitution unique. Pursuant to the preamble and Arts 1, 8, 39, 40(4) of the Federal Constitution, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism, unlike many other constitutions, make it clear that the ethno-cultural communities as groups, not Ethiopian nationals, are sovereign, and building blocks of the federation. Constitutionally, speaking the constituent units of the Ethiopian federation are neither Ethiopian nationals nor the regional states, but rather the ethno-cultural communi-ties. A combined meaning of Arts 9, 39, 47(2) of the Federal Constitution makes this point very

clear. Moreover, the preamble to the Federal Constitution, which refl ects the object and pur-pose and of the Federal Constitutions the legisla-tive intention of the framers, begins by saying:

We, the Nations, Nationalities and peoples of

Ethiopia: strongly committed, on full and free

exercise of our right to self-determination, to

building a political community founded on the

rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting

peace, bringing a democratic order and advanc-

ing our economic and social development can

be fulfi lled if only … individual and people’s

fundamental freedoms and rights, to live to-

gether on the basis of equality and without any

sexual, religious or cultural discrimination.

(Emphasis supplied).

Taking the purposive interpretation approach (the spirit and legislative intention) of the Federal Constitution, group/collective rights of the ethno-cultural communities are given equal constitutional footing. Moreover, as stipulated in Arts 5, 8, 39 and 47 ‘all sovereign power re-sides in’ the ethno-cultural communities; and they are entitled to self-determination; and self-rule and their right to establish a regional or independent state of their own. The Federal Constitution also confers to all ethno-cultural communities’ internal authority in their affairs and empowers them to exercise and promote their culture, language and historical heritage through self-government. Conjoined reading of Art 51 and Art 52 of the Federal Constitution shows that the regional states enjoy wide-ranging executive, judicial and limited legisla-tive powers.51 The Federal Constitution, though mostly de jure, has reduced the federal execu-tive branch of the government to the weakest in the history of Ethiopia. However, there are seri-ous disparities between de jure constitutional power granted to regional states and the de



facto power exercised by regional states.52 This very point is discussed in detail in section IV.

Under Article 39(4) the Federal Constitution has conferred the right of self-determination to ethno-cultural communities including and up to secession. Of course, secession could only be exercised with long and stringent procedural requirements: 1) the demand is supported by two-third majority vote of the regional state legislature, 2) the federal government organizes a referendum within three years of the vote by the regional legislature, and 3) the referendum is supported by a majority vote. Similarly, the respective regional states are expected, as some already have, granted special administrative status to ethno-cultural communities within a regional state with a dominant ethno-lin-guistic community. These administrative units are carved-out territories constituted as a spe-cial zone (Leyu Zone) or special district (Leyu Woreda). Indigenization of political power and self-administration at the lowest unities have empowered indigenous people to take their des-tiny in their hands as well as to reinstate their culture, language, historical symbols and other traditional institutions including confl ict resolv-ing mechanisms.53 Another important power of ethno-cultural communities is their collective ownership of land and its resources. A special right of pastoralist people to land for grazing and protection from displacement is also grant-ed under Art 40 of the Federal Constitution. Such priority to collective rights of ethno-cultural communities is not without reason. It was in re-sponse to the past historical legacy of ethno-lin-guistic domination that prevailed for long time in Ethiopia.54 These constitutional provisions are outcomes of compromises of ethno-linguistic based liberation forces that toppled the former military regime in Ethiopia. Hence, the Federal Constitution is a constitution under which eth-no-cultural communities are fi rst, the ultimate

sovereign entities where constitutional power of both federal and regional states rest. They are, second, constitutionally entitled to establish a regional state or their own state independent from Ethiopia. In short, under the Ethiopian fed-eral system the ethno-linguistic communities constitute the federation.55 Federalism, in gener-al, is a system of governance greatly varying de-pending on the problem it is supposed to solve. It is better understood as a system with diverse features of state power sharing.56 However, all federalist systems share few common broad characteristics with some varieties.57 The most important one is that in federalism, power is not delegated to regional states from centre, as is in the case of a unitary system. Rather in federal-ism, the central government is delegated by, and obtains its power from, the regions. In federal-ism, the central (federal) government is not the author of its own power, for the ultimate power rests in the constitute unities – in the Ethiopian case it will be the ethno-cultural communities. However, no single federal system is universally superior. Any constitution, as a political and legal institution, has to refl ect the political his-tory and principal social structure of the society it serves. In the drafting process of Ethiopian Federal Constitution, Samuel Huntington point-ed out:

Constitution has to refl ect the history, culture

of the society, its level of economic develop-

ment and social structure, ethno-linguistic

composition, and most importantly the goal of

its leaders. Political parties refl ect the principal

social identities and cleavages within society.

In Ethiopia the principal cleavage appears to be

ethno-linguistic … and regional [cleavages]. 58

Samuel Huntington asserts that the main prin-cipal political mobilization is based on eth-nic and regional identifi cations. The Federal



Constitution as a political and legal institution has refl ected the political history and princi-pal social structure of Ethiopian society. Most importantly it has attempted to form consocia-tional accommodation of the principal forces of political mobilization—mainly ethnic based parties. Taking these historical facts and the nature of the political parties into considera-tion, in the 1990s Ethiopia, majoritarian de-mocracy would have furthered ethno-linguistic domination and disintegration.59 A simple uni-tary system would allow the majority ethno-cultural group (in number or in power) to per-manently remain in power, while it leaves other principal forces of political mobilization and minorities in opposition or at the benign con-cessions of power.60 What is more since most of the political forces that toppled the former Ethiopian military regime were mobilized under ethno-linguistic lines, suppressing political mo-bilization based on ethnicity would have been a recipe for further disintegration of Ethiopia.

In the drafting process of the Federal Constitution, Huntington made a very simi-lar note: in Ethiopia ‘straight plurality system would lead to some ethno-linguistic groups being a permanent minority in their district and having no [meaningful] representation’.61 Constitutionally speaking, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism can be taken as conso-ciational in nature for two reasons. One, the Federal Constitution lays down the institutional arrangement for ethno-cultural communities to be meaningfully represented in all government institutions. Second it has granted a sort of veto power through the right to unilateral secession against ethno-linguistic domination or tyranny from the centre. Consequently, the Ethiopian federal system is designed to serve as a con-sociational institution where the ethno-cultural communities would ‘negotiate and compromise’ for unifi ed political and economic space.

Samuel Huntington did infl uence the fed-eral arrangement and the position of the ruling party to establish a dominant party democracy and federal arrangement based on the loci of power in the Ethiopian politics of early 1990s. In the same paper, Huntington suggested the adoption of ‘a single dominant party democ-racy’. He added:

It is better to have a less democratic constitu-

tion that is well observed than a more demo-

cratic constitution violated always: because

the constitution even if it is more democratic

becomes a mockery. Effective government is as

necessary as democratic government. ‘In fram-

ing government, which is to be administrated

by men over men’ James Madison observed in

the Federalist ‘the great diffi culty lies in this:

you must fi rst enable the government to control

the governed; and in the next place oblige it to

control itself.62

Huntington’s prescription to Ethiopia and other similar countries was that they should ensure stability and effective law and order fi rst then democracy second. Of course one could raise the question: are not human right and democracy a necessary pre-condition for stability and bringing law and order? In terms of priority Huntington is correct that without stability and law and order it would be very diffi cult to respect human rights and democracy. Nevertheless, it is also correct to think that stability, law and order could pre-vail without respect for human rights and rule of law. Law and human rights situation infl uence each other; human rights and democracy are a vital input for peace, stability and law and or-der, and vice versa. Such false and unnecessary prioritization and dichotomy could lead to viola-tions of fundamental human rights for the sake of stability. Prioritization of values of such kinds has led to the dominance of the political space



in Ethiopia by Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which is a coalition of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF)). Not only through its offi cial members of the coalition but also because of the affi liated ethnic-based parties of minority ethnic groups, EPRDF controls the regional states in Ethiopia. Furthermore, regional states and their ruling parties follow exactly the decisions and policies of the federal government as a result of their affi liation with EPRDF.63 Consequently, elections are mostly conducted without suffi -cient competition. Indeed, this is the norm more than anything else.

Public Reaction to Ethno-linguistic Federalism

EPRDF – the ruling party in Ethiopia since 1991 and the architect of the Federal Constitution – is criticized from two but extremely opposing political positions. Some characterize EPRDF’s government as pro-secession, a force that is relentlessly working to disintegrate the coun-try, yet others portray EPRDF as anti-self de-termination of ethno-linguistic communities, a government with the intention of continuing the hegemonic domination that prevailed for a long time in Ethiopia. The people who take the former position argue that EPRDF is implement-ing the constitutional right of ethno-linguistic communities with an ultimate aim of disinte-grating Ethiopia.64 They believe they have to fi ght to abolish or/and amend the federal nature of the Federal Constitution. These are avowed opponents of the federal system in place. They believe that EPRDF is sincere in implement-ing the Federal Constitution by respecting the

ethno-linguistic federal arrangement including the right to self-determination up to secession. They argue that by legitimizing ethnicity as the only valid marker for membership of a home-land regional state, it has impacted negatively on the economic and social development of the country as well as the political development.

On the other hand, people who take the lat-ter position argue that EPRDF’s commitment to ethno-linguistic communities’ self determina-tion is a sham, and it is a method of perpetua-tion of the domination that prevailed for a long time.65 In short, they believe that the Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalist arrangement is a continuation of domination by other means. These people rather are of the opinion that the Federal Constitution has not been implemented. They strongly demand, and some of them wage armed struggles, for genuine implementation of the Federal Constitution. Some Ethiopian scholars such as Ali Said even argue that more aggressive fi scal federalism on a par with the devolution of political power is necessary if Ethiopia has to remain peaceful.66

In sum even if both positions are in opposi-tion to the ruling party, they, have two diametri-cally opposed positions on the federal system: the fi rst opposes ethno-linguistic federalism and the Federal Constitution, the latter demands a full implementation of the same constitution. Some scholars, for example Gamest, have commented that the adoption of Ethiopian federalism was a ‘fundamental error’ because it is based on eth-nicity and will ‘deeply imprint’ ethno-linguistic identity.67 In Ethiopia, ethno-linguistic identities were already deeply imprinted before the adop-tion of ethno-linguistic federalism in 1994 as a result of the ethno-linguistic domination that had existed for a long time in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is an ethnically diverse country with a past po-litical history of ethno-linguistic domination.68 Moreover, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism



is designed to address the ‘national question’ (a popular name for the 1960’s struggle against ethno-linguistic domination in Ethiopia).69 Politicized ethno-cultural communities are not new products of Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism. Rather ethno-linguistic federalism is an outcome of the old mobilization and the struggle of politicized ethno-cultural communi-ties. Politicization of ethno-linguistic groups or ethnicization of Ethiopian politics is not a one-day event due to promulgation of the Federal Constitution; it is an outcome of long political history of Ethiopia.

Nonetheless, what is new is that the now ethnically based political mobilization and power sharing is constitutionally legitimized. Under ethno-linguistic federalism, communities are not only politicized cultural and linguistic communities but also are entities bearing sov-ereignty with constitutional standing. In a nut-shell, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism is a response to the ‘unfavourable conditions’ that prevailed in a unitary system. Ethno-linguistic communities are more ‘responsive to ethnic than to social or democratic slogan’.70 Politically speaking, it is right that mobilization on ethno-linguistic lines was, and perhaps presently is, easier in Ethiopia than mobilization on over-arching countrywide ideals and principles. But, it is wrong to assume that responsiveness to ethnic slogans is necessarily anti social or un-democratic. Ethno-linguistic based liberation fronts were the forces that toppled the former military rule. They were also the main forces behind the drafting of the Federal Constitution. Logically, they would not commit suicide by promulgating a law that disbands them.

At public level, the political reaction to the ethno-linguistic federalist arrangement in Ethiopia can be summarized in the following three views: fi rst, those who support ethno-linguistic federalism as a matter of the human

rights of ethno-linguistic communities to self-determination, including and up to, secession. These are forces of diversity and freedom. They support federalism even at the cost of unity. They believe that federalism is the only means to promote freedom and check tyranny. This strand of thinking is similar to the theory of multiculturalism, which recognizes the distinct groups within a society and allows them some space of public expression.71 Second, those who believe that ethno-linguistic federalism is re-grettable but the only way to keep the country unifi ed and prevent disintegration. This is a calculated version of unity. They view ethno-linguistic federalism as a means to strengthen unity. They support diversity for the sake of unity. We may call them calculative federal-ists: inherently they are opposed to secession. A third view is held by those who are totally op-posed to ethno-linguistic federalism. They want to do away with it. Rather they want either an-other form of federalism or a unitary system. Unitarist in approach, they look at the federal system as an instrument to undo the assimila-tion efforts of the previous regimes, particularly that of Emperor Menilk and Hailesellasie.72 This line of thought is similar to theory of cultural assimilation, which encourages absorption of a minority into the dominant culture. It is contra-ry to the principle of multiculturalism.73 All have legitimate and apt concerns, which demand se-rious consideration but not equally. The third position wrongly believes that only the unitary system will ensure the unity of the country. But this position can lead to a policy of forced as-similation and worse blind nationalism.74 It can cause a total disregard of democratic rights, group injustice and probably massive human rights violation including ethnic cleansing and genocide. If such a view was to be implemented by force again, it could plunge the country into bloody civil war and a gross violation of human



rights. Moreover, it could lead ultimately to dis-integration of the country – the very situation the holders of this view abhor.

To put it in a historical perspective, the fram-ers of the Federal Constitution had fi ve choices. The fi rst choice is blanket denial of the existence of diversity and its political expression. The sec-ond choice is promoting Ethiopian nationality as the overarching ideology without recogniz-ing or denying the existence of ethno-linguistic communities. The third choice is promoting Ethiopian nationality as the overarching ideol-ogy and recognizing ethno-linguistic commu-nities but disallowing any political expression and space for ethno-linguistic communities. The fourth one is promoting human rights and the self-determination of people as overarching ideals regardless of Ethiopian unity. The fi fth choice is promoting Ethiopian nationalism while also recognizing and allowing political expres-sion and territorial self rule for ethno-linguistic communities. This last option is perhaps the best of all the options for unity with peace and equality. The fi fth choice looks at federalism mainly as a means of confl ict management – po-litical solution to political concern. It takes fed-eralism as a tool to contain disintegrative forces and to create a balance between forces of unity and diversity. It also addresses concerns of the forces of diversity and averts the secession incli-nations. For this reason no matter how long the ethno-linguistic based Ethiopian federal system will last, there will be a strong resistance to any hasty change of the existing arrangement.

Ethiopian Federalism: Its Successes, Inherent Problems and Implementation Constraints

In Ethiopia, ethnic federalism has proved in-strumental in advancing rights principally

indigenous and minority ethnic communities. It has strengthened and concretized group rights, including all rights related to self-de-termination, promotion of cultural activities, religious commitments and permits education in the native language. In this regard, Henkin has correctly stated that ‘[i]n many countries, the autonomy granted to local units are de-signed to assure self-determination and the rights of minorities and their members against abuse by national majorities’.75 By granting statehood for ethnic groups, the federal con-stitution recognizes their rights to promote and protect specifi c political and economic interests that are crucial for meaningful ex-istence according to their belief. Some of the regional states and ethnic groups have already benefi ted from the existing constitutional ar-rangement and felt that this is the best they can aspire to. Many ethnic groups, both minor-ity and majority, looked to ethnic federalism as the way to prosperity and the realization and respect of their unique self-identity and empowerment.76 Education reform has enabled communities to have their children taught in their mother tongue. Administrative, judicial and other public services are provided in their local and native language. Close to 90 per cent of the pastoralist communities are provided with some form of mobile services in education and health. Education, culture, and economic projects are to be implemented by regional states.77 Aggressive and extensive devolution of power has been carried out as a matter of principle to the local units of administration – i.e. Woreda (district), albeit serious capac-ity and political limitations. Local offi cials are elected from and by the local community.

It is also hoped that federalism, by grant-ing all ethnic communities a right to self-deter-mination up to secession, will make sure that the central government is free from tyrannical



inclination and discriminatory treatment of ethnic communities. Any attempt of discrimi-nation among the ethnic communities by the central government or domination of one ethnic community by another or the unconstitutional seizure of political power at the centre will only be possible at the risk of the unity of the coun-try, as the ethnic community may make use of their right to secession. In this way, ethnic federalism helped in managing confl ict. It was assumed to serve as a tool to contain disinte-grative forces and to create a balance between forces of unity and diversity. No matter how long the ethnic based Ethiopian federation will last, it is predictable that there will be strong resistance to any hasty attempt at changing the existing arrangement.

What are then the binding constraints hold-ing Ethiopia from having a more successful federalism? What are the lessons to be learned from almost two decades of federal experiment? The Ethiopian federal system could be improved by removing these binding constraints.

Disparity between De Jure and De Facto Federalism In Ethiopia, the de jure political devolution is not equivalently accompanied by a de facto po-litical power devolution to the regional states and local governments. The gap between the de jure (legally stated), and de facto (on the ground), powers of the regional state is wide. Or even worse, what are formally constitutionally decentralized powers are not actually exercised for a variety of reasons – one of which is self-imposed limitations on exercising one’s power. The local elected offi cials in Ethiopia exercise less authority against the federal government compared to their counterparts in Tanzania and Uganda.78 For federalism to work, the re-gional states should have the capacity and cul-ture of challenging the federal government. In

South Africa, in 2002 Uthukela district took the government of South Africa to court over an institutional capacity grant.79 Now, about 40 per cent of the budget goes to the sub-national governments.80 Unlike in South Africa, where districts and regional governments have been daring to challenge the central government, in Ethiopia regional states have never dared to exercise the powers granted by the constitution nor do they dare to contest the federal govern-ment. Constitutions, political manifestos and bylaws, development policies, laws and institu-tional setups of the regional states are copied from the ruling party or from the federal gov-ernment institutions.81 Consequently, regional states have not for a long time considered crafting their investment and development poli-cies on the basis of their resources. This could render them comparative advantages as incen-tives to attract investments. However in 2001 when the presidents of three large regional states (Oromia, Southern Regional State, and Tigray) protested against the prime minister, they were quickly and easily removed through party channels from their seats. Comparable problems have been noticed in several other countries with similar federalism. Weingarten pointed out that Argentina, Brazil and India are all de jure federal systems. In all of these coun-tries the political authority of the national gov-ernment compromises the independence of the local political authority.82 Centralizing institu-tions, cultures and structures have signifi cantly contributed to the gap between the de jure and de facto federal exercise in Ethiopia. The main reasons are discussed below.

Centralizing Institutions and Attitudes One of the reasons for the disparity between the de jure and de facto devolved power are the cen-tralizing federal institutions and attitudes that work against genuine federalism. The two most



centralizing institutions in Ethiopia are: 1) the central government and its ministries which still maintain a monopoly on several areas due to the resource they control particularly coming from international aid; and 2) the ruling party – Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which controls all the regional state legislative and executive bodies and im-plements its policies through the party channel. EPRDF does not provide its local elected offi cials and appointees an incentive to think independ-ently and dare to challenge the federal govern-ment or to exercise powers granted to them by the Federal Constitution. Why is this so?

Dominant Party Democracy, Federalism and Party DisciplineEthiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the main architect of the Federal Constitution and the party ruling the country for the past 18 years, is known for its strong support of Article 9 (sovereignty of ethno-cultural communities), Article 39 (the right to self-determination and secession), and Article 40 (collective ownership of land) of the Federal Constitution. EPRDF is also known for its strict culture of party democratic centralism.83 Perhaps EPRDF has taken Samuel Huntington’s suggestion of a dominant party democracy very seriously. However, both democratic centralism and a dominant party democracy are agnostic to genuine federalism. A party organized under the principle of democratic centralism func-tions (or more aptly attempts, but mostly fails, to function) is like the head, brain, arms and legs of a human body. The Political Bureau or executive committee of the party acts as the head and through its sense organs receives and processes information. The leadership of the party, which does the thinking and is supposed to produce new ideas based on the information processed and provided to him, is the brain.

And the rest of members of the party are arms and legs – destined to implement and execute the decisions made. This is the reason why both high and low ranking members of the rul-ing party use the same thinking and words. The party has become more dependent on the chair-man or the executive committee for its survival than its members. This division of labour could be very effective for the party organization, but it is by nature against genuine federalism. Federalism is meant to create or allows creation of several and perhaps also different heads, brains, legs and arms. Local freedom in politi-cal and economic-decision making is essential if federalism is to effectively function and to foster economic growth.

Since EPRDF is an umbrella organization of four ethnic-based parties that control the larg-est the regional states, it exercises effective control over the federation through its member and affi liated political parties in the regions. This party chain of command has effectively replaced the state control. Almost all decisions of the party are made and implemented using the party structures instead of the state struc-ture. State institutions implement the party de-cisions. Non-state party channels are used as controlling means of the system. Procedurally, this system violates no laws; substantively this party control does not encourage discourse and deliberative democracy. The by-product of such an arrangement is a weakened state in-stitution and strong parties. Hence, while the Federal Constitution provides excellent formal institutional ground for peaceful Ethiopia and ownership of decision making powers including economic ones by communities at local level, EPRDF’s party culture and structure inhibits the implementation of the constitution. The fa-ther of the constitution –EPRDF itself through its organizational culture of democratic cen-tralism and centralized party structure, may



be weakening the federal system and regional state structures.84 The political constitution of EPRDF effectively antagonizes the federal sys-tem it has built. In short, democratic centralism is an antithesis of federalism. Logically speak-ing, the federal system would be even more weakened if a non-coalition unitarist party takes the power over.

Ethiopia is not the only country facing such a variety of problems namely the incompatibil-ity between party discipline and constitutional principles. South Africa, under the ANC, has the same problem. ANC is a quasi-federal party but with a strict central control.85 The premiers of provinces in South Africa, equivalent to the regional presidents in Ethiopia, could be eas-ily removed by ANC as they are not necessarily the powerful ANC members within that prov-ince. The chairman of the ANC party appoints the premiers of the provinces.86 Party control is very strict from centre to province. Hence the premiers are answerable to ANC leaders who appoint them and indirectly control the legis-lature and executive and judicial bodies of the provinces. For instance, regional state presi-dents are more accountable to the party than to their assembly. The dividing lines between the federation and regional states may fade and become meaningless if a single party with a strong chain of command and tight democratic centralism dictates policies and institutions of both the federal and regional states.

Another binding constraint to an effective implementation of federalism is the central government’s centralizing drifts and attitudes. Centralizing attitudes are also widely shared by the technocrats and civil servants who priori-tize economic effi ciency or nationalism rather than federalism, decentralization, justice and human right. The gradual effect, however, can be devastating for the unity of the country when the strong party vanishes, for the control over

the regional states may fall into the hands of unitarist technocrats and nationalist offi cials.

Weak Public Accountability of and Lack of Incentives for Local Offi cials to Exercise their Constitutional PowerIn Ethiopia, offi cials at local level may not feel accountable to the public, feel less responsible for failure or they totally lack development poli-cies of their own as there is no strong mecha-nism of public accountability and incentive for them to be accountable. Local offi cials are more answerable to the ruling party – EPRDF as their career is highly dependent on EPRDF’s leader-ship rather than their constituent voters. Local offi cials are more responsive to EPRDF than to their constituents because there are no politi-cal incentives for them to strive to gain support of their constituents to remain in offi ce. Their term is more dependent on the EPRDF’s deci-sions than public elections. On the other hand, those offi cials who strive to be accountable to the public are either incapable (due to their limited capacity) of coming up with new alter-native fi scal or economic development policy87 or are incapacitated (due to the chain of com-mand within the ruling party) to dare exer-cise their constitutional power. Schism within the top leadership of EPRDF leadership in the 2001 led to dismissal of presidents of regional states of Oromia, Tigray and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. The dismissals would have not been very easy if the party principle of democratic centralism was not stronger than the federal character of the Ethiopian federal arrangement.

Implementation Problems and Lack of Capacity of the Regional States to Prepare Economic Development Policies Another binding constraint in Ethiopian feder-alism is serious capacity limitations in terms of



policy-making technical competence and short-age of expertise. According to some studies more than 80 per cent of the budgetary resources are controlled by the federal state.88 Clearly there are several improvements in the performance of local governments in service delivery and capacity building and the process of federal-ism. The World Bank and other projects such as the Harvard University Project have expressed their satisfaction over the on-going public serv-ice reform for a better delivery in Ethiopia.89 However, they also have serious doubts on the competence of regional states and Woredas to implement the ambitious devolution process.90 In Ethiopia, a well trained and experienced hu-man resource is thinner in the regions than in the centre. Peterson believes that in Ethiopia, decentralization of power under federalism has dispersed human capacity as new institutions are created through devolution. Hence decen-tralization should be, he argues, evolutionary not revolutionary as the case is in Ethiopia.91

The scarcest resource in the public sector in Ethiopia is the availability of capable govern-ment staff. No amount of external consultants, commodities or funding can substitute for this resource. The availability and quality of gov-ernment staff made available determines the timing and sequence of the reform, which re-forms will be done and when, and the level of operational effi ciency to be maintained while reforms are underway’.92

Human Rights in Ethno-Linguistic Based Federalism: Minority in Power and Majority in Number, Majority at Federal and Minority at Local Level As Weiner and Katzenstein correctly pointed out, an ethno-linguistic federalist political arrange-ment favours the members of the native ethno-cultural communities (‘the sons of the soil’) over the settlers who consider themselves as ‘migrant

citizens’. Ethno-linguistic federalism may also be used as excuse to violate rights of migrants by legitimizing ethno-linguistic based competi-tion for power and resource. These are uncon-stitutional exclusions of others. People who left ‘their’ designated ethno-regional state would fi nd themselves ‘in the position of ethnic minori-ties in areas ruled by other peoples’ (emphasis supplied).93 However, Krylow’s phrase ‘in posi-tion of ethnic minorities’ would be correct only if it refers to the population number at regional state level, not the actual power balance be-tween ethno-linguistic communities. Otherwise, while members of ethno-linguistic communities, living outside ‘their’ ethno-regional state, may be in the minority in number, it doesn’t neces-sarily mean they are minority by power. That is not always the case. A minority population may exercise a ‘majority power’ due to political and economic infl uence they may have. A situation where a population majority in number exercis-es minority power will be undemocratic by na-ture and against the legislative intention of the Federal Constitution.

In addition, an ethno-linguistic community could also be in the majority at federal level but in the minority in a given regional state. For the object and purpose of the federal constitution is the creation of ethno-regional states dominated and ruled by the ‘native’ ethno-linguistic com-munities. Such an arrangement is potentially liable for illiberal treatment towards minori-ties and threatens the democratic and human rights of individuals. Regional states may not be willing to protect and redress any viola-tions of human rights and cases of inequality in an attempt to prove ethno-linguistic solidar-ity. Another, even more serious problem is the fact that:

[e]thnicity-based sub-national governments

exacerbate minority problems whenever they



are unable to integrate or even tolerate persons

on their territory who are of a different ethnic

origin.94

Moreover, Ethiopian ethnic federalism (for that matter most ethnic federalism) is a ‘holding-together federalism’ different from ‘coming-together federalism’.95 Holding-together fed-eralism necessitates the empowerment of the constituent unit of the federation. It divides sovereignty among the constituent regional states. Conversely, in the case of ‘coming-to-gether federalism’, like the European Union or the United States of America, the member states unite to establish a union/state by shar-ing part of their sovereignty with the federal union/state. Consequently, the direction of em-powerment in a coming-together federalism is towards the union or central government, while in a holding-together federalism it is towards the constituent units. The empowerment of regional states in holding-together federalism has a restrictive implication on human rights if the regional states wish to be so. The above distinction between the two kinds of federalism is very helpful as the author argues that human rights of non-native residents in a coming-to-gether federalism (generally speaking like EU and USA) would naturally be more protected than in a holding-together federalism (like that of Ethiopia and India). This is one of the major problems Ethiopia is facing as a result of the new federal system. ‘Holding-together federal-ism’ has different implications for migration than ‘coming-together federalism’. Moreover, it concludes that ‘holding-together federalism’ is much more restrictive on migration. When ethno-cultural communities are constitution-ally recognized as bearers of group rights such as self-determination and self-rule, population composition and demographic changes would have many serious implications. Bookman

noted ‘[The] importance of number in deter-mining both the political and economic power of a group relative to others is only valid in a legal system in which rights are based on group rather the individuals’.96

In ethnic federalism, power is shared in a direct proportion to the population of ethno-cultural communities. The relative numeri-cal superiority of ethno-cultural communities would entitle them to more power. Therefore, in ethnic federalism, freedom of mobility and migration could easily affect the demographic balance and power relationship between ethnic communities. A reversal in the population ratio could mean reversal in power balance. One of the negative effects of holding-together (ethnic) federalism is its tendency to restrict freedom of movement and cause discrimination against non-native residents. The ethnic boundaries created by the federal constitution of Ethiopia have legitimized the resistance to spontaneous inter-ethnic migration. Such resistance (for ex-ample resistance of the Anywaas to the spon-taneous cross-border migration of the Nuers, and of Ari to the Mursi seasonal migration) sometimes has led to confrontation and violent confl icts.

While the justifi cation for the establishment of the ethno-linguistic based regional state en-compassed the demand for equity, human rights and freedom from domination, it is paradoxi-cal that the internal migrants and members of other ethno-linguistic communities were not to be treated equally in any of the regional states. Even if the Federal Constitution stipulates the right of ethno-linguistic communities to set up institutions of government over the territory that such an ethno-linguistic communities in-habit, the Federal Constitution under chapter three provides a proviso to the advancement of self-governance essentially of ethno-linguistic communities: the regional state administration



has to respect human rights, and ensure good governance. This proviso furnishes a constitu-tional limitation over the constitutional power of all ethno-cultural communities and their regional states thereof on matters related to human and democratic rights of the internal migrant and settlers from other regional states or ethno-linguistic group. In such cases, the regional states must fully respect the rights of internal migrants as a minority group within the regional state. The regional states are also constitutionally obliged to ensure that internal migrants are allowed to participate in and hold public offi ce as far as they can speak the lan-guage and respect the laws and culture of the regional state.

Ethno-Linguistic Federalism and Localization of Confl icts Another perhaps inherent problem of ethno-linguistic federalism could be its tendency to localize or create new confl icts. Even if the danger Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism is currently facing is excessive centralism and an expanding space for a democratic rule by a strong ruling party, there are also excessive exclusionist behaviour of the regional state party and offi cials to members of other ethno-linguistic groups. As I have argued elsewhere, this might be why ethno-linguistic federalism may have localized confl icts.97 One example of how and why ethno-linguistic federalism may have localized confl ict in Ethiopia is the case of Gambella.

First, Gambella is one of the ethnically het-erogeneous regional states without a domi-nant ethno-cultural community. In Ethiopia, regional states with a dominant ethno-cultural community (such as Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, Somali, and Afar and with the exception of bor-der related confl icts) seem less prone to inter-ethnic confl ict, than those without a dominant

ethno-linguistic community. Second, Gambella exhibits the phenomena of spontaneous and pastoralist migration (of the Nuer). The na-tional identity of the inhabitants of bordering areas is very fl uid and hence, cross-border mi-gration (of the pastoral Nuer, Anywaa refugees fl eeing the confl ict in Gambella to the Sudan, and Sudanese refugees fl eeing to Ethiopia due to the civil war in Sudan) changes the ethno-linguistic population balance. For this reason it has a dynamic demographic composition. In ethno-linguistic federalism, demographic changes have huge effects on the region the power and resource sharing system among the ethno-linguistic. Politics of number have a sig-nifi cant role in power sharing.

Politics of number have created arguments and disagreement about the outcome of the 1994 population census because of the impli-cations of the census results for power shar-ing between ethno-linguistic communities. In Ethiopia, regional states with a pastoralist pop-ulation seem more prone to confl ict than those with sedentary populations. Thirdly, Gambella has many pockets of 1980s resettlement vil-lages and many old and newly constructed refugee camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These settlement villages and refugee camps were at the centreof the confl ict, and were attacked repeatedly. The effect of large-scale migration (about 110 000 forced migrants) on a regional state such as Gambella with a population of about 160 000 is huge in ethno-linguistic based federal system.98

Hence, one may argue at local level, Ethiopian ethno-linguistic federalism has caused similar problems to those it intended to address at national such as ethno-linguis-tic domination and ethno-linguistic confl ict. Ethno-linguistic based federalism may cause a new kind of confl ict99 because ethnicity



becomes the main factor legitimizing those gov-ernments.100 Ethno-linguistic federalism per se doesn’t create illiberalism and nor is it a cause of ethnic confl ict. Switzerland, Belgium and the United Kingdom are good examples of this.

Conclusions and Implications

In comparison to previous regimes in Ethiopia, it is right that the federal system has empowered ethno-cultural communities in many areas of cultural, linguistic, social and political life and has to some degree offset the past historical leg-acy of ethno-linguistic domination that prevailed for long time in Ethiopia. It has also concretized the rights of minority and indigenous commu-nities. However, even if the de jure equality of ethno-linguistic communities has been consti-tutionally ensured much remains to be done to ensure de facto equality in many areas where marginalized ethno-cultural communities have limited capacity to make use of these consti-tutional rights. What is particular to Ethiopian federalism is that the right to self-determination up to secession may prevent the central govern-ment from tyrannical inclination and discrimi-natory treatment of ethno-cultural communities. A reversal of the constitutional rights of ethno-linguistic communities by either the central or state government would be politically costly. Any attempt of discrimination among the ethno-cultural communities or domination of one eth-no-linguistic community by another or unconsti-tutional seizure of political power at centre may put the unity of the country at risk: for ethno-linguistic communities may attempt to exercise their constitutional right to secession.

An inherent constraint of federalism simi-lar to the Ethiopian seems the human rights of people who reside in areas inhabited as the ‘homeland’ of ethno-cultural communities

different from theirs. Such people feel insecure, out of place and uncertain about their right. Policy changes obviously have made knowledge of the offi cial regional state language necessary so they can remain in work or work as a public servant. In some cases settlers feel threatened by the ethno-linguistic federalist state structure and are disadvantaged by the language and ed-ucation policies that provide for the provision of public service and primary education in the native language. Equal opportunities have to be given to those culturally and linguistically capable of serving the regional state. Public offi ces must be divided equally between them and those affi liated to the inhabitant ethno-linguistic group by blood. The absence of such rational equality of opportunities for equally capable persons has no legal or moral ration-ale. It is discriminatory and a violation of Art 25 of the Federal Constitution. Chapter three of the Federal Constitution provides a proviso on the advancement of self-governance essentially of ethno-cultural communities: the regional state administration has to respect all human and democratic rights to all people under their jurisdiction. This proviso furnishes a constitu-tional limitation over constitutional power of all ethno-cultural communities and their re-gional states. In such cases the regional states must fully respect the rights of these migrants as minority within the regional state and rep-resent them in the regional state, and allow participation in the highest public offi ce as far as they can speak the language and respect the laws and culture of the regional state.

The rest of the constraints discussed above are attributable to the immaturity of the fed-eral system. The major problem can be best described as problems of implementation, inter-pretation, and legal lacuna and shortcomings. Institutional overhauling of the nature and the democratizing of the culture of all parties



mainly the ruling party EPRDF is vital if the federal arrangement is to function well. Other implementation problems – such as problems of violations of human rights of internal mi-grants are encountered as a result of the lack of understanding or of the lack of political will of regional state offi cials to strictly implement the Federal Constitution. Therefore, one impor-tant way of tackling the leading diffi culties in federalism and relationship between the centre and regions is to increase accountability of offi -cials and conduct training on the relevant laws to increase their knowledge of the concerned organs of the federal and regional state. This will help in building human rights and move towards protective federalism. Moreover, since the danger of secession in linguistic or ethno-linguistic based federalism mainly comes from the regions, reaching the regional offi cials and academics may help in building a common con-ception of federalism. Striking the balance be-tween the forces of unity and diversity, between regional state power and federal power needs the educating and the training of the offi cials, academics and public servants at the centre but also more importantly at the regional states.

The most important recommendation in this regard is the need for the promotion of a democratic pan-Ethiopian national unity based on equality, rule of law, human rights and com-monly shared values such as historical legacy, economic development and political commit-ments. In this regard, the championing of historic legacies such as the victory of Adwa, Ethiopia’s tolerance and acceptance of the ma-jor religions for a long time, strong democra-tized nationalism around the fl ag which sym-bolize unity could serve to strike the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces. While addressing historical grievances due to previous exclusionist regimes and rejecting new political tendencies to bring the old regimes of

discrimination and exclusion entirely, but still a lot has to be done in championing commonly appreciated and accepted legacies.

Historic legacy of Axsum in culture, reli-gion and language, the meaning of the victory of Adwa for the black race and freedom-loving people, as well as the role of iconic Ethiopia leaders like Ras Alula are not necessarily in-compatible with democratization and the new constitutional federal experiment. On the one hand, the idea of national unity through the promotion of historical legacy of an inclusive nature as discussed by Donald Levine in this recent article ‘Aksum as a Seedbed Society’ is an important area of improvement,101 the intro-duction of civic education, democratic patriot-ism, the celebration of the Day of the Flag and recent increasing acknowledgement of iconic leaders and emperors of Ethiopia would con-tribute a lot to a unifying project.

As noted earlier, Ethiopian ethno-linguis-tic federalism is a complex institutional re-sponse to very complex and vexing problems of Ethiopia. Addressing the causes of ethnic con-fl icts such as ethnic domination and ensuring the equality of all ethno-linguistic communities is a diffi cult task. The preservation and promo-tion of ethno-cultural identity and language as well as teaching and working in the native lan-guage that have been opposed by an oppressive offi cial policy of a state are daunting work. It requires precision and sensitivity to many fac-tors. In ethno-linguistic based federal system institutions have to adjust according to the demographic changes and be ethnically repre-sentative. A political system sensitive to demo-graphic changes would have to reject any ma-jority power by a minority in number at federal and regional level. Such a system also requires an effective implementation of preferential poli-cies in education, and employment. It needs ensuring striking the delicate balance between



the above mentioned group rights (of ethno-cul-tural communities) and individual human and democratic rights (such as freedom of mobility, residence, political participation, education and employment).

These all requires effective institutions such as courts that are independent enough from ethnic biases. Sophisticated judges and lawyers that understand the delicate nature of ethno-linguistic based federalism are nec-essary. Ethno-linguistic federalism requires well-staffed public service institutions and well-educated public servants who understand the Federal Constitution very well. Above all it requires political forces that are sensitive to the

concerns and equality of all ethno-linguistic communities, and a leadership with a politi-cal will and commitment to implement both the group and individual rights. This makes ethno-linguistic federalism very expensive to maintain. In countries like Ethiopia, maintain-ing institutions of democracy such as courts, parliament and election is very expensive. Protecting and promoting group rights (such as introduction of native language in school and public offi ces, preservation of culture) and even maintaining institutions of ethno-linguistic federalism are too expensive. Hence, economic development is as vital as the political progress for Ethiopian federalism to be successful.

Notes and References

1 C Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in C Taylor, and Gutmann (eds) Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition, Princeton, Princeton University Press,1997, pp 235–245; and K Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Right, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p 9.

2 R Harrison, The Problem of Philosophy: Democracy, London, Routledge Press, 1993, p 221.

3 R Howard and J Donnelly, ‘Liberalism and Human Rights: A Necessary Connection’, 268–276 in M Ishay (ed) The Human Rights Readers Major Political Essay, Speeches and Documents, From the Bible to the Present, London, Routledge,1996, p 269 and J Carens, ‘Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective’, in 25–49 Free Movement,1992, p 40.

4 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, 1997, p 272.

5 Taylor 1992, pp 235–245.

6 Carens, 1992, p 40.

7 W Kymlicka, Contemporary political phi-losophy: An Introduction Multiculturalism: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp 327–376.

8 Carens, 1992, p 40.

9 Taylor, 1992, p 22.

10 Henrard, 2000, p 12.

11 Howard and Donnelly, 1996, p 169.

12 Carens,1992, p 40.

13 Howard and Donnelly, 1996, p 269.

14 Harrison, 1993, p 230.

15 International Democratic Electoral Assistance, ‘Democracy in Nigeria,’ Capacity-Building Series 10, Halmstad, Sweden, 2001 Available from: http://www.idea.int; and Taylor 1992, pp 36–39.

16 Harrison, 1993, p 220.

17 M Cernea, ‘Risks, safeguards, and reconstruction: a model for population dis-placement and resettlement,’ 11–55 in M Cernea, and C McDowell, (eds) Risk and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees, Washington DC: the World\ Bank, 1999.

18 W Kymlicka, ‘Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are They Relevant to Africa?’ Paper delivered at the confer-ence on Ethnic Federalism: The Challenges for Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 14th–16th April 2004, pp 35–48.

19 C Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University

Press, 1997, p 244; and C de Wet, ‘Why Do Things So Often Go Wrong in Resettlement Projects?’ Paper delivered at 1st Workshop on Settlement and Resettlement in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 28th–30th January, 2003.

20 Ibid., p 235.

21 Howard and Donnelly, 1996, pp 270–275.

22 Taylor, 1997, p 225.

23 Kymlicka, 2002, pp 35–48; and Taylor, 1997, p 244.

24 D Bevan, ‘The Fiscal Dimensions of Ethiopia’s Transition and Reconstruction’, Discussion Paper No. 2001/56, University of Oxford, 2001, p 49.

25 Taylor, 1997, p 225.

26 W Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp 112–113.

27 Kymlicka, 2004, p 13.

28 Harrison, 1993, pp 230–231.

29 D Robert, On Political Equality, New Havens, 2006.

30 W Kymlicka, ‘Current Trends in Accommodating Ethnic Diversity in Liberal Democracies.’ Paper delivered at 2003 Summer Institute Legal and Social Realities of Forced Migration, Asch Center for



Study of Ethnopolitical confl icts, University of Pennsylvania, June 10– August 8, 2003, pp 1–6. Available from: http://www.psych.upenn.edu/sacsec; and E Andreas, ‘Ethnic Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics.’ Paper delivered at 1st National Conference on Federalism, Confl ict and Peace Building, UNCC, Addis Ababa, 5th–7th May, 2003, p 1.

31 Kymlicka, 2004; and Kymlicka, 2003.

32 J Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’ in The Politics of Human Rights, Obrad Savic (ed) The Belgrade Circle, London: Verso,1999, p 24.

33 Ibid., p 22.

34 Taylor, 1997, p 235.

35 D Turton, ‘War and Ethnicity: global connections and local violence in North East Africa and former Yugoslavia’, Oxford Development Studies, 1997, p 92; and E Gellner, Nation and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwells, 1983.

36 Carens, 1992.

37 Kymlicka, 2004; Kymlicka, 2003; Andreas, 2003, p1; and C Young, The Rising Tide of cultural Pluralism: The Nation State at Bay? Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.

38 Kymlicka, 2004, p 40.

39 W Kälin, Decentralised Governance in Fragmented Societies: Solution or Cause of New Evils? Chur/Zürich: Ruegger,2003, pp 6–9; and J McGarry, and O’Leary, Federations as Method of Ethnic Confl ict Regulation, The Forum of Federation 2003, p1. Available from http://www.forumfed.org.

40 Andreas, 2003, pp 2–4.

41 D Horowitiz, Ethnic Groups in Confl icts, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001, pp 611–619.

42 Ibid., p1.

43 Forum of Federations (2009) Federalism by Country, also available from http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/by_country/index.php.

44 Kymlicka, 2003; and Andreas, 2003. M Kimneyi, ‘Harmonizing Ethnic Claims in Africa: A Proposal for Ethnic-based Federalism’; 101–123 in J Mbaku, and M Kimenyi, (eds) Ethnicity and Governance in the Third World, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001; E. Osaghae, ‘Federalism and the Ethnic Question in Africa’,pp 33–56 in JMbaku, P Agbese and M Kimenyi (eds), Ethnicity

and Governances in the Third World, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001; and M Weiner, and M Katzenstein, India’s Preferential Policies: Migrants, the Middle Classes and Ethnic Equality, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.

45 S Huntington, Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-Based Dominate-Party Democracy? Paper presented on the Ethiopian Constitutional Commission, Addis Ababa, 28th March 1993, pp 271–278; A Habtu, Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Background Conditions and Future Prospects, paper presented at the Second International Symposium on Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia, July 11–12, 2003, pp 6–6.

46 P Kovacs, ‘On Minority-Related Autonomy Issues: Summary and Comments’, pp 343–348 in Gal Kinga (ed) Minority Governance in Europe, LGI/ECMI Series On Ethno-politics and Minority issues, Hungary, Open Society Institute, 2002, pp 343–348; and Weiner and Katzenstein, 1981, p 138.

47 United Nations, ‘Country Profi le Ethiopia’, 2007 http://www.unfpa.org/profi le/ethiopia.cfm.

48 Andreas, 2003.

49 Central Statistical Authority, The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Ethiopian Regional Population Distribution and Ethnic Composition, Statistical Report 1, Addis Ababa, Central Statistical Authority, 1995, Available from http://www.telecom.net.et/ethfacts.htm.

50 M Maru, ‘Migration, Ethnic Diversity and Federalism in Ethiopia’, Unpublished Dissertation, University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre Queen Elizabeth House, 2004.

51 Andreas, 2003, p 25.

52 Maru, 2004.

53 E Watson, ‘Capturing a Local Elite: The Konso Honeymoon ’, 198–218 in W James, D Donham, and E Kurimoto, and A Triulzi, (eds) Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University Press, 2002, pp 202–204.

54 C Young, ‘Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia’, Review of African Political Economy Vol. 23, no. 70, 1996; and Andreas 2003.

55 M Maru, ‘Federalism in Ethiopia: After Fifteen Years’, Journal of The Horn of Africa, 2006, Vol. XXXVII No 134, July.

56 Andreas 2003, pp 4–5.

57 Huntington, 1993, p 268.

58 Ibid., p 267.

59 Andreas, 2003, pp 1–5; and Kymlicka 2004; p 13.

60 Horowitiz, 2001, pp 611–619.

61 Huntington, 1993, pp 272–274.

62 Ibid., p 267.

63 L Aalen, ‘Institutionalising the Politics of Ethnicity: Actors, power and mobilisation in southern Ethiopia under ethnic federal-ism’, Oslo, PhD thesis, 2007; J Young, ‘Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia’, Third World Quarterly, 1998vol. 19, no. 2, p 195; Paulos Chanie, ‘Clientelism and Ethiopia’s post-1991 decentralisation’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 2007, vol. 45, no. 3, pp 355–384.

64 Habtu, 2003, pp 2–3.

65 Ibid.

66 S Ali, ‘Afar Ethnicity in Ethiopian Politics’, 107–115 in M Salih and J Markakis (eds) Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa, Stockholm, Elanders Gotab, 1998, p 114.

67 Turton, 1997, p 81.

68 B Zewde, What Did We Dream? What Did We Achieve? And Where Are We Heading? Paper delivered at the conference, The Ethiopian Economic Association, Addis Ababa, 11th January 2004; and Young 1996.

69 J Markakis, ‘Ethnic Confl ict in Pre-Federal Ethiopia’ Paper delivered at 1st National Conference on Federalism, Confl ict and Peace Building, UNCC, Addis Ababa, 2003,p5

70 A Krylow, ‘Ethnic Factor in Post Mengistu Ethiopia’, 208–243 in Z Abebe and Pausewang (eds), Ethiopia In Change Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy, London: British Academy Press, 1994., p 240.

71 Kymlicka, 2002, pp 327–376.

72 Habtu, 2003, pp 10–11.

73 R Alba, Remaking the American Mainstream, Assimilation and Contemproary Immigration, 2003, Harvard University Press.

74 Maru, 2004.

75 L Henkin, ‘Federalism, Decentralisation and Human Rights’, in Fleiner-Gerster, Thomas, Hutter, Silvan (eds), Federalism and Decentralisation: Constitutional Problems of



Territorial Decentralization in Federal and Centralized States, vol. 2, Fribourg: Editions universitaires, 1987, p 392.

76 Watson, 2002, 198–199; Andreas, 2003, Kymlicka, 2004; and D Hailemariam, ‘Experience of Confl ict Handling and Prevention in SNNPR’ Paper delivered at 1st National Conference on Federalism, Confl ict and Peace Building, UNCC, Addis Ababa, 5th–7th May 2003.

77 Habtu, 2003 pp 15–18.

78 United Nation, IFAD’s Regional Strategy Paper for Eastern and Southern Africa, Performance and Impact in Decentralizing Environments: Experiences from Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda, No. 36, March 2005, pp 3–5.

79 M Wittenberg, Decentralization in South Africa, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 2003, pp 36–37.

80 Ibid., p 38.

81 E Keller, ‘Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia’, African Journal of Political Science, 2002, vol. 7, no. 1, pp 21–45; A Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study, 2007, Nijmegen, pp 213–292.

82 B Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism

and Economic Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p 28.

83 V Sarah and T Kjetil, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Stockholm, 2003, p15; and M Paulos, ‘Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor’, Northeast African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp 13–66.

84 Habtu, 2003, pp 23–25.

85 J Ahmad, Rethinking Decentralization in South Africa, Presentation J. F. Kennedy School of Government, April, 2007.

86 Ibid.

87 S Peterson, ‘Financial Reform in a Devolved African Country: Lessons from Ethiopia’, Harvard University Development Discussion Papers No. 766, Harvard Institute for International Development, June 2000; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy (CAS): Decentralization in Ethiopia, World Bank Expresses Satisfaction on Public Service Delivery, 2005. http://www.uncdf.org/english/countries/ethiopia/index.php.

88 P Chanie, ‘Clientelism and Ethiopia’s post-1991 decentralization’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 2007vol. 45, no. 3, pp 355–384.

89 Peterson, 2000.

90 World Bank’s 2003–2005 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS): Decentralization in Ethiopia, World Bank Expresses Satisfaction on Public Service Delivery, 2005. http://www.uncdf.org/english/countries/ethiopia/index.php.

91 Peterson, 2000, p 3.

92 Ibid., p 24.

93 Krylow, 1994, p 239.

94 Kälin, 2003, p 9.

95 A Stepan, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, Number 4, October 1999, pp 19–34; and Andreas 2003.

96 M Bookman, Ethnic Group in Motion: Economic Competitions and Migration in Multiethnic State, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p 152.

97 Maru, 2004.

98 Ibid.

99 Kälin, 2003, p 9.

100 M Basta-Fleiner, (ed), Federalism and Multiethnic States, The Case of Switzerland, Fribourg: Institut du Fédéralisme, 1996.

101 D Levine, ‘Aksum as a “Seedbed’ Society”’, unpublished article, 2009.