Culture Theory Matters

C. S. Herrman

Abstract – This paper examines honor-based (H-B) and dignity-based (D-B) moieties both as

human aggregates and as theoretical concepts. Sections successively deal with methodology,

typology (conceptually, then contextually), and the theory of cults and offices with emphasis on

the cult of dignity as the chief (and widespread) obstruction from attaining a true dignity-based

moiety .

The motif is stylistic: it intends to at once meet the rigor academics expect and deserve, but also

suit and satisfy a lay audience. Experience has at last convinced this writer that academics in

general have not much better comprehension of cultural theory than laymen. Worse, the former

group is embarrassingly shallow in metaphysical and methodological wherewithal.

1. Methodological Prolegomena

Two of America’s most innovative anthropologists, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, after

having made inroads into the first ever analytic tool for investigating culture, found their baby

washed away in the academic tsunami consequent to the fear and loathing of dichotomies.

Imagine the following as an environment for doing innovative research:

Margaret Mead (1937: vii) recounts the reaction to her work by a peer: “If the long

‘interpretive statement’ had been written by anyone but a proved member of the faith, it

would be regarded as almost undiluted bunkum.”1

R. Adams (1960, 157). “A more frequent objective [beyond typologies] probably will be

the identification of determinate processes of change involving…a transformation.”2

Herbert S. Lewis (1968, 101) tried, really he did. But…”Typologies are static by their

nature and cannot yield productive insights into matters of process and development.

Vincent Ostrom (2003) “We must take care not to reify concepts and conceptual models

– to treat them as though they are realities. We should avoid simple dichotomies.”3

Fig. 1.

1 She recounts as well (somewhere) that Ruth Benedict, her teacher and co-conspirator in theory, had done everything in her

power to avoid the use of the word ‘typology’ = dichotomy. That speaks volumes. 2 As a stand-alone, this is correct for being both factual and justified. It was Whitehead, however, who put ‘process’ before

the academic world, and his system was a dual intercalating binary system – not one, but two of the despised dichotomies.

Thus Adam’s strictures [if indirect] on typological approaches implies ignorance, misunderstanding, or both. The present

worker was the first to make this clear and demonstrate the case at the Tenth Annual Whitehead Conference, June 2015. 3 Husband of Elinor Ostrom (winner of the Nobel prize in economics) and developer of concepts she greatly relied upon.

Designation Pair | Dyad | Dichotomy | Dimension | Binary

Form | Usufruc- | Two Indepen- | Two Distinct | Two Con- Function | tuary | dent Units | Measurements | stituents Dependencee

2

EXCURSUS

Much of the malaise surrounding metaphysics revolves around words. Figure (1) shows the

words that are at issue in describing the lead constituents of the methodology we employ.

The word never used but which is also most commonly known is best suited to be the

fulcrum by which we evaluate the rest in order to resolve differentiae. ‘Pair’ serves this

function and is defined relative to the dependents of the referent. The referent of any pair is

the two elements it denotes collectively. For all pairs, the definition depends upon each of

the cognates being equal in one or more from classes of make, model, function, description.

A pair of shoes agrees in mirror forms, function and shape-independent style and

appearance. You can rectify the rest from the figure at leisure. The dyad is rarely used.

‘Binary’ seems the favorite of the philosophical community; ‘dichotomy seems to be the

target of the attack dogs. Typology is not included here for being a meta-term, yet it is

equivalent with ‘dichotomy’ in being a focus of derision in which regard they are

tantamountcies.

Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, both sociologists, are two of very few then or since who

understood the value of typologically based methodologies. Here is Weber (1962, p. 51) –

The premise has been repeatedly stated that the science of sociology attempts to formulate

typological concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process.

Still, Weber, as with Peirce (in the metaphysics grounding our method), fell short. Parsons

(1947: 14-15) expertly identifies the problem, one that we have tried to rectify here:

In formulating his classification…Weber neglected to develop the analysis of the structure of a

total social system which is a logically necessary prerequisite of such a classification.

An instance of Parson’s “total social system” is the honor-dignity global relation that replaced

the shame-guilt dimension of Benedict-Mead. As such it also calls for legal and religious

concepts without which ‘authority’ cannot be utilized in a social context. The methodology of

Figure (1) is called ‘paradigmatics’, the understanding of which would have obviated reliance of

context-independent variables that Weber was otherwise forced to rely upon. For future

reference we shorten honor-based to H-B, dignity-based to D-B, cult of honor to C-H and cult of

dignity to C-D.

Equivalences to the present methodology

AUTHOR ESSENCE BEING EXISTENCE EMERGENT

Aristotle Formal Cause Efficient Cause Material Cause Final Cause Zhuangzi Amorphous Realm Vital Energy Form Life Hegel Thesis Antithesis Synthesis ? Peirce Sign Object Interpretant ? (Firstness) (Secondness) (Thirdness) ? Lao Tzu First Second Third Multiplicity Weiss Essence Action Existence God Paradigmatic Essence Being Existence Reality

Table 1.

3

With the methodological criteria (Table 1) in mind a powerful heuristic can be employed to

address the matter of authority mentioned above. Specifically, what three words, no fewer or

more, totally deliver the essential character of that word?

Those with authority must be ‘willing’ to use it when called for, lest it atrophy or fail to

command respect. Additionally, there must be a will to obey the limitations inherent to its

exercise; and as well to prosecute objectives to completion. ‘Will’ is thus the Essence of

authority, ‘power’ is the action-filled Being of authority, and Existence grounds the ‘obliga-

tions’. In the method, will reflects Essence, power reflect Being, and obligation Existence.4

In the methodology used here, authority is taken to be an emergent property realized from the

cumulative interplay and integration of its discreet constituents, each reflecting the archetype

corresponding to its position in the flow. Table (1) lists actual or near relatives to the ideal.

Aristotle's is very persuasive theoretically; Peirce's has a number of practical applications, and

Hegel's, easily the most famous, is also the least applicable. Weiss forth several terms of the

paradigmatic, though he was borrowing and improving, not developing and actualizing.

Those skeptical of this particular application of the methodology can perform a check of their

own. Presuming some basic awareness of Christian principles, and treating God as an ultimate

authority, one can locate instances throughout the Bible that will justify the Father's will, the

power of the Holy Spirit, and the obligation fulfilled by Christ as Son and Word. All that has

been done is to state the elements of the Holy Trinity as reflecting the previous archetypes used.

A strong admonition requires to be inserted here, lest we make the embarrassing mistake that

compelled Friedrich Nietzsche (1967) to literarily immolate himself in public. Here is what he

got wrong, and what we also must avoid: For every dimension we employ from the tables

throughout this and similar papers, we must be mindful of one fact above all others: each and

every person, group, moiety, society; every whatever – is a composite of both cognates of any

given dimension, and most, say two-thirds on average, dimension will apply to any given

analysand. The validity of this effort comes from empirical data giving statistical warrant to the

mass drift of behavioral adience-abience (toward or from stimuli) toward one pole much more

than the other of the canopy cognates as with all the others in tow.

I can empathize with those who are hard-pressed to wrap their heads around the idea that all

alike share all polar opposites of all binaries within what they feel is a fairly uniform outfit of

human consciousness of self and others. Accordingly, I owe an explanation better suited to a

rational understanding. If no less an intellect than Nietzsche got caught up, there shouldn’t be

wonder that folks look askance at this important and vital concept of evolutionary development.

4This material is further developed in Herrman (2008b and 2009). From sociologist Richard Sennett (1980): Confer and

compare with our discussion above.“The dilemma of authority in our time, the peculiar fear it inspires, is that we feel

attracted to strong figures we do not believe to be legitimate.” (26) “Authority is…a matter of defining and interpreting

differences in strength.” (126); “The work of authority has a goal: to convert power into images of strength.” (165);

“The claim of authority is always one of personal superiority based on strength.” (193); “Authority…is itself inherently

an act of imagination.” (197). Each of these interpretations would make a great deal more sense without loss of reality-

testing were the paradigmatic approach to authority employed.

4

Dimensions

HONOR DIGNITY

Acquired Conventions Inherent

worth (merited) worth (substance)

Respect 1° Acceptance

Trust Faith

Status Conventions Contract

Spirit Principle

Prerogative 2° Authority

Partici- Represen-

pation Conventions tation

Fig. 2.

Ornaments

Ornaments

We had little trouble with the formulation because the paradigm we use requires this concept, so

we were, so to say, lubricated to withstand the grinding of a contrary wrench in the wrong place

in the workshop. Paradigmatics is all about a given element, abstract or otherwise, imbibing

traits of others lower in the chain. As such its appearance is that of a child to its parents. That is

the essence of biology and genetics, and of our methodology. The concept involved is difficult to

explain in precise terms only because at the plane of actuation the players are elaborate and

intricate, yet at the macro level each of us has traits of our polar opposite male-female parents. It

is just as simple s that. When

someone says, ‘You take after

you mother’, they are saying

that the mass drift of traits

during meiosis favored your

embryo getting more expression

of her on the overall than of

your father. There really is no

need to complicate matters. That

is all there is to this, that and

nothing more. It remains to be

explained why both honor-based

and dignity-based traits exist.

All we need bear in mind is one

simple word: exposure.When

we are caught in flagrante

delicto we are shamed (the sole

remaining feature of a very old

word). Exposure retains its

etymology pretty much intact: it

speaks to a risk of inescapable

danger. Metaphorically is may

and does also suggest nearness

to ecstasy – ‘good’ exposure.

Positive and negative exposure meet on the battlefield where we strive to meet our basal needs in

food, shelter and mates.

H-B traits reflect a weltanschauung that must live in a mean dangerous world. This is of the

essence. It seems trite, it is true. Some simplicities are valid because true, and this is one of the

very most important in all of sociology, anthropology and political science. Though it be literally

gangbusters, academics hold their noses as if their status feelers were ruffled (we can explain

that as well with this powerful methodology).

Mankind did at length discover a way to raise itself above the Hobbesean madhouse. Societies

everywhere developed themselves in part by advancing public service with the various

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professions, starting with religion and military matters. In all offices the bottom line is an ideal of

honor-based life – values of and for the community – that has been reified and put on a pedestal

and their leaders saddled with stewardship requirements. Add this ‘paternalistic’ turn to the

maternal instincts toward children and the need for food and shelter, and we already can discern

the principal D-B cognates in their inchoate state: acceptance, inherency of worth, and faith.

With the exception of Rome (that we know of) all D-B entities have arisen out from the turmoil

of the Continental and Scottish Enlightenments. Kant dared us to think and challenge the

authorities who were happiest and wealthiest when we were the most ignorant and cowed.5

Adam smith created modern economics from moral postulates that men could actually benefit

one another while striving to benefit themselves specifically. It was a posture less easily accepted

by the public for it was not a little bit liberal for that day and time.

The long and short of the rise of D-B societies is the development of civilization to the point

where reasonably long stretches of calm allowed a reset of the social thermostat. With less

hardship and turmoil there was time for advanced ideas and development of social structures to

better protect from what nature was still able to land when it threw a punch. We now have within

our sights to live with our own problem front and center, not nature’s problems hugging our

doorstep. That is ultimately the distinction. The same human beings are born, but into societies

that are geared for reaction or for prevention accordingly as they are of honor or dignity

respectively.

There is a lot going on in Figure (2). Think of it as a Christmas tree. The trunk is a fascia of three

conventions, each a dimension communicating information from roots to leaves. The parallel is

with association areas of the brain filtering external information from sensory end-organs that

register external stimuli.

The branches feed from trunk or leaves to one another, as association areas and cognitive areas

do likewise. The dimensions remaining (conventions are also comprised of them) are the leaves,

and ‘ornaments’ is their class name.

There are at a minimum eight types, as if leaves from eight types of trees populated the one we

are working with. The root system feeds to the cognates and vice-versa, and takes from the

ground nutrients and water. Chart (1) takes this schema and develops it with two additional

structural parallels that between them will make clear how these components can world together

to coordinate input and output around needs and functions.

2. Typology in concept

Many words applied to multiple moieties in different cultures are apt to carry variant meanings

even when the exact same word is common to each moiety. Throughout the honor-based

universe, shame is a condition of mind functioning like a Freudian superego – dissuading the

very acts that D-B cultures describe as resulting in the selfsame word – shame! Likewise, merit

5 The Federalists of early America and the broader part of the Republican Party these days have essentially the same outlook

and have benefitted from ignorance throughout the populace.

6

H-B D-B

Cognates Cognates

Acq’d worth Inh’t worth

Status Contract

Participation Represent’n

Notes:

The caricature of a tree is retained, roots bottom, canopy top, trunk linking.

Negative freedom is passively obtained freedom from the neurological view. Sensory

organs can do little with what they take in but they take in everything that does come

within their domain and range. The former is positive freedom, the latter passive or

negative. The frontal lobes are the reverse, as active as anatomical-physiological

restriction limit, and though they receive much stimulation, little of it isn’t gated where

highest parts control it. Needless to say this doesn’t at all correlate with the tree

analogy, but that wasn’t the point. The schema is the point, top to bottom linked

rationally structurally, functionally. That is what a methodology must do in order to

mirror its analysand.

Chart 1.

Negative ++++

Freedom

Positive

Sensory organs

paired left and

right sides

Negative +++

Freedom

Positive +

Negative ++

Freedom

Positive ++

Positive +++

Freedom

Negative +

Spinal Chord

Organized in Tracts

Hind Brain

(Reptilian)

Basal Brain (Medulla

through basal ganglia

Positive ++++

Freedom

Negative

Mid Brain and

Pre-frontal

Front Brain

Presence Deciding

e

Focus Making

Consciousness Cognition

Awareness Thinking

Alertness Reasoning

Attention Creating

Concentration Imagining

7

is the quality means and/or the benefit of object by which the H-B person gains respect for

demonstrated worth.6 The D-B equivalent reflects an impression of the done deal regardless

theraison d’dêtre – merit as that which has been achieved. Sounds a tad like word-splitting.

Consult Adkins (1960) or Dodds (1973) before dismissing this out of hand as irrelevant.

In the dignity-based society the kinds of meritorious activity available are lopsidedly distributed

between individual/family preferences and the incentives offered by public/governmental

influences. Either way there is practically no formal “test”, or “initiation”, benchmark as there is

for so much of H-B culture wherever existing. Likewise, neither the fact nor the quality of D-B

marriage reflects more than minimal influence of status (beyond a college education for some).

Still today status remains important in India, Greece, Italy and others. All three have more or less

adopted legal and religious doctrines that define the dignity-based moiety, but remain as

transitional cultures because the impact of status is so widespread. The U. S. was until recently

just barely advanced beyond transitional status and is out of reach from backsliding owing only

to the recent rulings on gay marriage and related cases.7

Margaret Mead (1937: 458) long ago warned anthropologists about going overboard favoring the

individualist-collectivist distinction, made worse for being insidiously intuitive. What is being

ignored is that dignity-based people spend a third of their lives (half of their waking lives) at

work, which is, if it is anything, a highly ‘collectivistic’ enterprise, to say nothing of associations

and sporting events. Nor does the theory so strongly supported by Triandis (1995) and associates

adequately address why native groups from the Maya of South America to the Eskimo groups

feature an unaccountable degree of ‘individualism’.

The country of France hails from the country and people called the Franks, which in their

language meant ‘the free’. Free from what? From dependence. Orphans by and large fair

especially poorly (and the homeless, beggars) in H-B moieties because they of all disadvantaged

people are the most dependent. The ancient Greeks had strictures against moral omission here,

responding no doubt to the obvious: you don’t arrive at rules like that if or when people are

angelic. The honor-based peoples are virtually universal in requiring good faith efforts to meet

(true merit for exceeding) community standards of usefulness.

Thus independence for them is more about avoiding dependence (or being subjugated) than

about autonomy per se. Our ‘freedom’ to do whatever you will’ is very modern and elitist. Back

in the real world, “If you experience misfortune you are personally responsible for being weak.”

Sennett (1980: 47) “The language of rejection: making it safe to declare the need for stronger

6 For general sources dealing with merit and its role through spans of history, Greece is a favored stomping ground.

7 I do not mean to suggest that gay marriage is a benchmark. Cultural advance requires a broad-spectrum of

advance on top of which important advances prevent backsliding. Having said that, the last couple decades has

offered excellent evidence that gay marriage proved the strongest indicant of growth in the dignity-based direction.

“Gay marriage [has been] a reasonably sure index to a settled concern for dignity and general tolerance of people

across the board. All high ES scores went to countries with gay marriage and/or union (noting that on the high G

side only three qualified).” See C. S. Herrman (2008: 17-18).

8

people, for an anchor in the world, by rejecting the legitimacy of those who are strong.” Here

Sennett (1980: 46)is better explained as follows: H-B dependence implies that one is too weak

to gain or maintain independence, and 2) being dependent on those earning (meriting) the right

to be strong is far less an issue, for what sturdies the deck is having a ruler capable of

maintaining structural integrity and security. Again, this plays into the widespread tolerance of

top-heavy authoritarian regimes.

Trust and faith are, in addition to independence-dependence, the most difficult dimension to deal

with. What follows is a statement excerpted from the changingminds.org website, under heading

‘Principle of trust’ –

If I trust you, I will accept what you say as true and expose my vulnerabilities to you.

Trust and acceptance are cognates of a first tier dimension. Trust goes with H-B, acceptance

with D-B. To an expert a sentence such as the one above starts hitting wrong cylinders right off

the bat. D-B peoples are typically working with larger word counts in their languages and have

many more opportunities for metaphorical ad-ons. Thus for us, trust means many things all

loosely tied to a core notion that we get from the Latin original (fides). Less involved languages

are less flexible and require widespread reliance on inflexions to achieve extended meanings. So

a D-B person won’t likely snap at hearing that sentence except at the edges where s/he will

wonder how ‘trust’ releases us from the embarrassment of ‘sharing’ in the pejorative rendering

of that word. They are right to raise the issue. To see why, let’s re-phrase the idea thus:

If I accept you, I will trust what you say as true and expose my vulnerabilities to you.

Our two cognates have merely been transposed. Bearing the vulnerable is associated with

acceptance, not with trust. That’s for starters. Though we D-B folk pride ourselves on ‘airing our

dirty laundry’, ask anybody from a foreign land outside of Europe and the common law states if

they feel the same. Not. The association of vulnerability and trust in the H-B world has validity

only when used metaphorically, as in doing business with dignity-based creatures. Contracts do

not come naturally to H-B folks and that generalization is pretty well-nigh universal (this

typology stuff really works, by the way). Were a Chinese or Indian businessman to accept a

contract before having had a chance to establish trust in us, he would assuredly believe

vulnerability to be at play. For them trust is how we relate to a cruel, capricious and changeable

world. The need for certainty and security makes ‘trust’ what it is and why jumping off ramps

without it is tantamount to exposure. Here is a great actual example (Salacuse, 2004: Abstract):

When Enron was still - and only - a pipeline company, it lost a major contract in India

because local authorities felt that it was pushing negotiations too fast. In fact, the loss of the

contract underlines the important role that cultural differences play in international

negotiation. For one country's negotiators, time is money; for another's, the slower the

negotiations, the better and more trust in the other side.

We D-B folk are able to bask in the luxury of a fair degree of independence from unaccountable

nature, and our language reflects that fact. We are also apt to believe that how we do things is the

most reasonable when our Chinese and Indian friends across the table think very differently.

9

What goes wrong in boardroom goes wrong in diplomacy for precisely the same reasons. Bill

Clinton will disagree (because he’s always right and always the smartest in the room – Not!), but

pushing Yasser Arafat to a conclusion at Camp David sent Arafat the basic message that Clinton

was not trustworthy. Why? Because forcing a contract demonstrates a one-lane, one-way road. It

presupposes lack of consideration for others. Arafat only did what was right and prudent; Clinton

will never ever admit anything wrong whatsoever. That is why Americans are thought ‘arrogant’

by so many across the ponds and also to our immediate neighbors south and north of our borders.

And we never seem to learn. We elect strong bipolar personalities to high offices without the

slightest accountability.8 In the stewardship of offices section we will continue this argument.

Charles Valentine (1963:455) wrote that the men manifesting a collection of traits that look (to

trained observers) suspiciously like the litany culled from DSMIII, IV and V make plausible the

observation that “in most situations the aggressive, mobile men…are best equipped

temperamentally to learn the ways of the wider colonial society and to deal with Europeans. In

particular, their relative ability to overcome shame is important here.”

For the record, I am not the only person aware of these matters, just a member of too small a

minority. Here is the same argument translated to a business context (McLellen, 2016):

“Rewarding top advertising talent [bipolar traits] with a supervisory position can seriously

backfire, especially in today’s market. It’s understandable to want to reward exceptional

workers, but managers often believe that the only way they can do so is by promoting them to

supervisory roles. This thinking is not only untrue, it is dangerous. … Today’s marketing

environment makes it treacherous to move ad agency employees around without planning.”

The denouement actually comes from the article’s title: ‘Don't Be Mad About Promoting Madmen

(or Women)’. A possible translation from psychobabble might look like this: Don’t be madly in

love with rewarding nonsupervisory high bipolar energy workers, those who to staid bosses and

peers appear ‘mad’.

Finally, Figure (2) lists the dimension ‘participation-representation’. Methodologically, we want

to bear something in mind. H-B ‘representation’ is what Charles Peirce9 called the ‘sign’ in

terms of its referent. It is a metaphorical extension of the referent, suggesting the ability to

change in all but its defining qualities. ‘Man’ might be a person talking to you; or perhaps the

figure in a photograph, or the likeness in a statue. D-B folk use the same word to indicate not the

8 Having said that, let me also state that the answer is simply to place mechanisms of accountability around their

conduct in office. William Jefferson Clinton wouldn’t have been sticking things up dark parts of female anatomy in the

Oval Office had that exercise been taken seriously (Ronald Reagan donned a coat and tie any time he was there). And

you don’t have to be Bill Clinton to learn that being both smart and knowledgeable can get you into trouble with

entrenched establishment types. I was asked by an editor at opendemoncracy.net to write a piece explaining why we

elect such lousy officials. One part of my reply dealt with our predilection to elect those heavily endowed with bipolar

traits, and used the Lakalai as an example. My editor, a brilliant editor, complained that I had not gotten academic

approval of certain of the ideas – whereas it was the direct object via the Lakalai to show that it was precisely such peer

approval that which was not required!. 9 Charles Sanders Peirce was an American late 19

th century thinker who was the first of three to independently arrive

at a recursive paradigm and write reams of material in its support. He made numerous discoveries in various fields

and is considered a forerunner of set theory in math, but who is best known as the philosopher giving birth to

pragmatism.

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altered presence of something remaining otherwise the same, but rather the person or thing apart

from a referent that is able to actively deliver information about the referent regardless whether it

exists or where it exists – if it does exist. We elect representatives who represent our interests,

not ourselves per se, as with the H-B usage, which means that in their role as representing, they

are more like the lawyer to her client.

Once we understand how the same words mean different things across cultures (even within the

same country) we can use tables based on paradigmatic methodology without risk of needless

mistakes. It is worthwhile appreciating the all-important flexibility of our native tongue. When

other language groups borrow our words they must tailor them to far more limited semantic

resources. Ergo, the successful borrowings happen when they feel certain about the bond. Which

of course is a wide open invitation for us not to understand the nuance they observe, and yet

because they saw and took, their meanings are crystal clear – to themselves.

In a little book explicating maxims of La Rochfoucauld, the translator (Tancock, 1958: 19)

displays the appropriate sensitivity:

In rendering into English a [foreign] prose work…it is not merely permissible but desirable

to manipulate words, parts of speech, the order of the various elements within a chosen

unit…. Moreover the translator has a very wide choice between synonyms from which he

can select the most appropriate word or expression from the points of view of atmosphere,

stylistic suitability (heavy, light, pompous, frivolous, learned, popular, etc.), sound value,

social class and character of the speaker in dialogue passages, humorous effects, and so on.”

A good bit of this is a one-way exercise owing to our flexibility and the lack thereof in the

honor-based equivalents. Here, then, are some of the most important takeaways from the use of

our tables.

No one living in a dignity-based country needs to be well versed in the metaphysics of dignity to

realize – as does just about any observant foreigner – that the legislature, police and judiciary

exist to assure that we can be and act ourselves. We have rights. Institutions exist to protect

those rights, but we have to understand that these rights exist only because dignity provides

them. Thank goodness the Enlightenment philosophes knew their stuff.

Both the D-B and H-B societies want opportunity for all, but for different reasons. This is not

unusual. “[It] seems unrealistic to us – although in most non-Western societies the right to

nurturance [opportunity] is taken for granted and exercised face-to-face” (Sennet, 1980: 186).

We have seen the reason elsewhere. As before, the same here: without a baseline of ‘equal

opportunity’ society becomes destabilized, something anathema to the H-B notions of survival.

The D-B want the same things, but for the reason the philosophes did: because all alike deserve

the right to exercise their dignity to the natural maximum, which presupposes a baseline of equal

opportunity. You don’t rise to that level of idealism when reality is itself a barrier.

You are not responsible to anybody else for success with an equal opportunity baseline. One

respects dignity by living up to this implied admonishment to exercise responsibility in the

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favorable position of not being dependent on others. The H-B know this because they actually

believe in the baseline. And it goes far to explain why they are adamant that all do their duty to

society by holding down a real job, no excuses. We deny that same opportunity and then react

worse even than the H-B as we sanctimoniously hurl invectives at lazy sorts living on public

assistance. We will have more to say about this when examining the ‘cult of dignity’.

It is admittedly a trial negotiating the nuances when two broad culture types each respect each

cognate of a prominent dimension. Participation and representation are a formidable pair

indeed. Aside from politics, we Americans have no one to represent us, in the sense that H-B

expect to be represented by kinfolk, for example. And even this goes to our choice for it is our

national and cultural legacy. Two takeaways: the dignity-based individual primarily expresses;

the H-B participates but in so doing must in some manner also represent cultural will and

legacy. We represent others from a distance, but ourselves by expression regardless distance.

only a tiny bit by comparison mediated by collective activities outside of the workplace.

On the other hand, a perceived unity is gained in representing through participation in the H-B

moieties, but not without attendant blood-letting in the form of proprieties and courtesies that

exist not to perform so much as to communicate one’s trustworthiness to support the community.

Participation implies having the eyes of the entire community upon your every jot and tittle. The

D-B will have none of this. An observer must be forgiven for the observation that we seem to

act upon authority rather than prerogative: our authority, not some ruler’s. It is a true distinction

we ourselves often fail to realize. As distinctions go, it is really rather important.

Honor-based peoples have been historically mistrustful, both of one another as well as of

foreigners. Dignity, on the other hand, is like a child; it is color-blind and willing to meet and

get along with just about anyone. Honor-based peoples value honor, of course; it is the true coin

of the realm with a value to be revered and protected. In Gaul, the Romans observed that the

local tribes did not barricade themselves at night for protection as did they themselves, for fear of

sneak attacks and thievery” Balsdon, (1970). The locals knew better than to violate sanctity.

Acceptance and respect are two faces of regard; one allows closer contact, the other requires a

distance. Likewise, one permits familiarity, the other likely will not. In a dignity-based society

the one fundamental expectation is that dignity be accepted. That implies the outward respect of

all the rights that necessarily flow from dignity. So it isn't that dignity-based people don't value

respect; but at the level of mythic statements, one’s acceptance, being prior to respect, entitles a

degree of reverence. Dignity-based peoples are broadly tolerant, again owing to acceptance.

They are also generally optimistic, yet again owing largely to an acceptance of themselves – their

self-assuredness and self – confidence – which speaks again to a spiritual presence of authority.

Table (3) is purposefully redundant, giving the honor and dignity interpretations for each of the

three generally observable leaders at each cognate polarity. This allows a direct contrast and

comparison of words respected equally by both moieties but nuanced differently. Figure (2)

below expands on this table by including and specializing in the two cults. There you can see for

yourself the parallels by directing the focus down each column and then across each row. By

12

way of completing the first and introducing the second, we mention some tricky issues in dealing

with the most prominent of all H-B characteristics, the ubiquitous reliance on respect-mongering.

3. Typology in context

One anthropologist (Caughey, 1977: 24-31) working in a Micronesian community, suggested

that this people communicated with what amounted to what any of us would be sore tempted to

Table 2.

H-B | D-B

Merit

Self-credit

on condition

of other-

credit

Respect

Earned on esteem

from merit

Requires contin-

uous meriting

Authority

permits cmmand-

ing of respect

Trust

Earned from

tradition of

respectability

Required prior

to placing faith

Merit

That deserving of

regard

Generally said of

persons, not

groups

Respect

General term

indicating

worth, regard,

merit, from

inter-personal

far more than

public

Trust

Usually sign

for placing

faith.

Otherwise

about the

same as in

H-B

Inherency

Used

with

status or

physical

properties

only

Acceptance

Regarding

children same but

more intense than

D-B. Otherwise

used as a kind of

toleration for what

is not approved

Faith

Earnest regard

or identifica-

tion with

religious

figures.

Otherwise

rarely found

Inherency

Conceptualized

transfer of

immaterial

properties to all

alike of a set or

class

Acceptance

Tolerance out of

a sense of duty

to principle.

Used ethically

than morally

Faith

Reflecting

unconditional

devotion to a

principle

NOTES TO TABLE 1.

1. Earned H-B worth tends to take the form of acts bringing self-credit as well as honor to the

family (or other group represented). By “self-credit” I mean another notch on the worth scale,

where each addition calls for a slight additional respect, or a better and more solid foundation on

which to be thought trustworthy.

2.Greek ostracism occurred when the honoree failed to continue meriting position, evidence of

course when transgressing the principle on which honor is predicated.

3. Note that the D-B feel far more devoted to personal than to public interactions.

4. Inherency to the H-B pertains to aristocratic deservedness coming with the genes, conduct is

supposed to reflect that status.

5. By and large, H-B parents are more and less devoted to their children. Usually more; they leave

children to their own devices more, or they have them always under thumb (usually distinguishing

quiet subtype – free-wheeling – from the loud and authoritarian (teaching via guilt is an in

between variant, as for example in Russia)

6. The H-B are moralistic, not so much ethical, vice versa for D-B. Similarly, H-B more earnestly

spiritual, often to extremes, the D-B basically principled, often to extremes (ignoring religion).

7. Note the remarkable resemblance between our faith and the expression in Hebrews 11.1.

13

call a ‘respect language’. Any attentive anthropologist should be able to say the same of almost

any traditional society, and not a few pocket sub-cultures within modern nation-state as well

(indigenous cultures in particular, but also some we usually fail to see as such, namely, the

occasional corporate, bureaucratic and professional cultures). The most interesting, because most

colorful, groups are in the ‘loud’ sub-categories of our typology. The present discussion will thus

also unwittingly return us to previous remarks that would not typically remind us of primitive

mindsets.

Bravery does not mean looking for fights, it does not mean being arrogant and starting fights. It

means being respectful – until someone wants a fight. The envy of ‘strong thought’ is not the

same as (regular) envy. It means that if someone else has a boat, I will also get a boat…. It

makes us feel good inside. Envy just means that I despise the fact that he has a boat and I do not.

The happy envy (of strong thought) means that I myself will get one.

Honor-based societies (in absence of the correct typology, stigmatized as ‘primitive’) are widely

considered to be especially prone to, and moved by, envy (Schoeck, 1966)10

. This is regrettable,

especially for being so ignorantly conceived. Here is how an excellent thesaurus matter

(O.A.W.T., 2004: 502):

Envious implies wanting something that belongs to another and to which one has no

particular right or claim…Jealous may refer to a strong feeling of envy…or it may imply an

intense effort to hold on to what one possesses.

This reflects not how an impartial intellectual might view the matter but, as with dictionaries,

how current language usage views it. It is muddled, to say the least. In our line of work that will

not do. The issue distinguishing the words envy and jealousy relates to the subtexts implied in

their use. Thus envy reflects what one wistfully wishes one could happen upon or what one feels

as if deserving. It need not and usually does not imply distaste or ill-will toward the person who

actually has possession. Jealousy combines the very opposite composite of traits: one feels

deserving of what is not possessed, and imputes lack of derservedness in the actual possessor.

Placing this into cultural perspective: Respect-mongering seeks recognition of deservedness of

esteem for evident merit. The claim is that one deserves the valued possession of respect, repute.

Should a competitor get what oneself deserves, jealously rules, and it rules supreme. If another

possesses what we wish we could have, it is envy, purely and simply. A dignity-based person

does not ill-judge his wealthier neighbor, regardless their ‘deservedness’. Old money or new,

inherited or earned, earned income or passive income, none of this is the gravamen. None of it

imputes ill-will, none of it makes oneself feel worse for wear (okay, we might feel a tad smaller

by comparison as when we are ‘green with envy’).

For purposes of understanding the passage which this commentary wishes to explicate:

10

“I have been struck,” says Schoeck, “by the tendency to use the word ‘jealousy’ instead of ‘envy’, the former no

doubt being more tolerable to those who confess to it than the latter, which is an ignoble sentiment.” Hard to say who’s

more tipsy, him or the other experts.

14

Differentiae for Bio-Behavior, Bio-Social

and Psycho-Social Parameters

1° Focus

(Relation)

+ –

Bio-Behavioral Flight Paralysis Fight

Bio-Social Abient Exposure Adient

Psycho-Social Hate Equanimity Love

Regret Indignation

Respect

Regard Intimidation

1° Focus

(Relation)

+ –

Bio-Behavioral Flight Paralysis Fight

Bio-Social Abient Exposure Adient

Psycho-Social Hate Equanimity Love

Succor Unrequited

Respect

Regard Challenge

Positive distance re respect = regard Positive intimacy re respect = regard

Negative distance re respect = intimidation Negative intimacy re respect = challenge

Paradigmatic Array

Intimidation Regard Regard Challenge

Concerning a relation of Respect

Framing: You leave a positive relation Why? Respect, Acceptance, Faith, Trust

(Fear of interfering, betrayal, rejection) (Regard for other-desires)

You leave a negative relation Why? Antonyms

Bio- (Safety, Easement, Gesture) (Fear of embarrassment) Psycho-

Social You approach a positive relation Why? Respect, Acceptance, Faith, Trust Social (Affection, Advantage, Aid) (Regard desires intimacy)

You approach a negative relation Why? Antonyms

(Gesture, Correction Commiseration) (Challenge )

N.B. The bio-behavioral parameters describe motions upon instinctual drives and urges. The bio-social

are those that relay these last into the cognitive framework or what psychologists term the ‘stimulus-

Integration-Response (S-I-R) formulation that works through the psycho-social parameters to influence

the environment accordingly.

Table 3.

15

Strong

Thought

Bravery Respect

|| ||

Cowardice Arrogant

Weak

Thought

Fig. 2.

Here is how we would rephrase the two leading remarks: The envy of strong thought is not the

same as jealousy (regular envy). It means that if someone else has a boat I will also get a

boat….

I will also want to outdo him, mine will be bigger than his…. Jealousy just means that I despise

the fact that he has a boat and I do not.

These good folk doubtless had no word corresponding to jealously, and the good anthropologist

was under the reigning anthropological delusion. Ergo, his analysand did have a canopy word

that in one sense spoke to envy (strong = good) and the other to jealously (regular, less good). So

this primitive people had things better figured out than we smarty-pants. Not the first time this

has happened (the Lakalai are a superb example as well).

The rule: envy is to all intents and purposes associated with D-B moieties, and jealousy with the

H-B. The anthropologists have had it essentially wrong for a hundred and fifty years. That is no

minor matter, and it compares with departments of philosophy that had the same period of time

to understand the metaphysics of Peirce and Whitehead and have acted like incompetent dolts.

We are now paying a very steep price for each of these two catastrophes born of academic

lassitude. To prefigure an upcoming discussion: this is all largely owing to these professional

(academic) offices having degraded into ‘cults of dignity). But I digress…

The excerpt that follows is in italics, our commentary in regular font.

In the culture of Fáánakkar, most beliefs about that which is

‘good’ or ‘bad’ in human conduct are related to three

character dimensions…each consisting of a pair of

expressions….They are listed below with English glosses

[n.b. we have omitted the native terms].

1) Native name: ~ bravery; mastery; power; 2) Name ~

respectfulness, humility, kindness; 3) Name ~ strong

thought, competitive thought / weak thought, lazy

thought.

In each instance the first synonym listed will name the

respective category. Compare this with our metaphysical

pattern of will (thought), power (power); obligation

(kindness, like the incurred obligation repaid with

kindness).

These terms are also the basic categories by which an individual’s personality or ‘character’ is

classified and evaluated. Every member of this society is judged to be brave or cowardly,

respectful or arrogant, and strong or weak of thought.

Enduring pain without flinching is said to be bravery;, declining an invitation to fight is

cowardly; modesty downplays the extent of one’s magical abilities, yelping ‘What?’ in a loud

voice is arrogance, acquiring many lands is strong thought, and being without tools for work is

deemed weak thought.

16

Figure (2) shows how these pairs are related. Three dyads are each joined by double lines. In

addition two composites are identified. In the figure they are the top and bottom triads. They are

named as follows: bravery + respectfulness = ‘true bravery’ (the best dyad); bravery + arrogance

= ‘man lowering’ (~ ‘putting down’ in our vernacular. This dyad is viewed with ambivalence.

Some traits of arrogance elevate what bravery offers, for example. The last subcategory has

cowardice + arrogance + weak thought. The absolute ideal combines bravery + respectfulness +

strong thought. The worst has arrogance + cowardice + weak thought.

Bravery: In appropriate situations, he engages in the following types of behavior. 1) He

responds eagerly and aggressively to a challenge to fight. as well as to any other behavior,

especially act of arrogance, which are understood as indirect challenges to his character; 2)

He is willing and capable of committing acts (good or evil) which will be interpreted by

others as challenges to fight….; 3) He faces dangerous situations without showing fear (e.g.

encountering sharks in the water, working with explosives, etc.); 4) He is able to perform

capably before an audience of

One wants to compare this to the Aurora Indians (of the Confederation, renowned for fear of

heights, called on to work on NYC skyscrapers.

enemies (e.g. in giving a speech at a formal meeting with sorcerers present); 5) He does not give

into pain as by crying out or flinching.

This is expected of every young man under initiation or circumcision. It is said that Chinese

youth could have teeth pulled without analgesic simply by attending to a picture of Mao on the

wall. We are well aware that most of these things can be done by those understanding hypnosis

(including this author).

The opposite of bravery is cowardice. This term is used for actions which are understood to

show a contemptible lack of mastery, power, and self respect….

Respectfulness: 1) He demonstrates ‘true understanding of respect etiquette’. Respect

etiquette consists of a set of symbolic tokens of deference (polite phrases, words, and

gesture) which a person owes to any one of higher status…; 2) He ‘feels sympathetic concern

for others’. In practice this means that he fulfills his substantive obligations to others more

generously than is necessary. He shows pity for the plight of others by contributing to their

welfare even when this is not required or expected; 3) He is quiet in manner, speech and

movement; 4) Such a person is ‘slow to anger’, he is not overly quick to take offence at the

lapses of others; 5) He is modest about his strength, his powers, and his past

accomplishments; 6) He only engages in social behavior appropriate to his social status. He

does not act with false superiority.

The opposite of respectfulness is arrogance. A person of arrogance is ‘uncivilized’; 1) He

does not understand respect etiquette. That is, (a) his aactions indicate that he does not

really feel respect for others though he may make a show of it, (b) he deliberately and

insultingly fails to offer the forms of respect behavior to others in situations where they are

required or appropriate. This means he is presumptuously demeaning them by acting as if

they were afraid of him, subservient to him, or socially below him; 2) he lacks sympathetic

concern for others. He does not care about their difficulties and he does not adequately fulfill

17

his substantive obligations; 3) He is assertive, and ‘belligerent’, ‘forceful in his movements’,

and given to ‘loud, crude, argumentative speech’; 4) He becomes anger quickly; 5) He brags

or makes an improper show of pride in his powers of accomplishments; He engages in

behavior proper only for one in a higher social position. He acts with unjustified social

superiority.

Strong thought: [Such a one] is proudly ambitious, competitive and acquisitive. He is very

concerned about ‘losing’ to others; he does not wish to be outdone in any activity or to lack

that which somebody possesses. Strong though is composed of three states of mind…. 1) If

another person performs some impressive activity or acquires something which he lacks, the

person of strong thought vies it as arrogance…. 2) [There is] ‘happiness that is felt inside’

when a person has determined that he too will do or acquire X. It also represents the desire

to have it quickly accomplished; 3) [The] desire and decision, not only to acquire X, but to

outdo the performance of one’s rivals, as by acquiring a larger, better, grander X.

Because he thinks and acts this way, a person of strong thought does not ‘make requests’ of

others; he does not ask or borrow from others or beg that they do things for him.

A person is guilty of weak thought if he does not behave in terms of the three stones [above],

that is if he does not match the accomplishments of others, or fails to acquire comparable

valuables. This makes him inferior and leaves him open to ‘derision’. It also means that he

may be forced to borrow from others or make requests of them.

Two overriding elements should stand out for immediate remark: 1) The staple of survival and

the staple for order. These appear in any number of combinations in nature, and so behaviors

reflect the variegated nature. We see demands placed upon all who would aaspir to status that

they must strive to perform maximally, which is an attitude necessary for defense, and also helps

prevent disorder as happens when people aren’t pulling their share and it causes jealously and

friction, then feuds. Bravery includes both as well, for responding to challenges merges the will

to defend status as with that of defending the group from external attack. Respectfulness is

frequently a way of showing off one’s status and powers without ruffling feathers. Generosity

(the Greeks called it ‘magnanimity’), as it is defined here, seems to embrace the potlatch

ceremonies in which high status personages separate themselves from significant wealth solely

as a gesture that in power they will have no desire or reason to aggrandize. In times of crisis this

prevents division from internal strife over disagreements in policy.

The disposition to nurture or other acquire the traits just described, and those ancillary thereto, as

for example the tendency towards ‘thin-skinnedness’ is fostered from early rearing, where

children are either left to 'duke it out', or they (boys more than girls) are the subjects of relentless

strictness. Often another equally good agency is left out, namely, needling and hectoring. Truly

they are together far worse than mere strictness. They also add to the current discussions, both as

to differentiae as well as to function.

Rearing that breeds a need to be respected is not a natural mode. It is a culturally embedded

modality because of the need for protection and order. So embedded are these that they are

second nature, and so they are retained long after the rationale has been long since waned. Such

18

is the case with most honor-based societies today. But there is one last function that has stood the

test of time, and while it is not specific to defense or order, it is so companionable with them that

its continued expression through rearing methods has actually had beneficial results sufficient to

keep the methods alive in the absence of any other rationale.

If strictness and hectoring are opposites in a continuum, the middle way is represented by

admonishment, cajoling and guilt-related techniques. The societies with astonishingly successful

educational attainments records use varying combinations of the strict and middle way both at

home and then again throughout school, as for instance China and South Korea. Russia long had

the middle way and has apparently not only kept it but steadily improved upon it (ostensibly to

better engender communism). Today Russia is scarcely more communistic than anywhere else,

but these middle way ideas just may catch on elsewhere.

Dress it how you will, authoritarianism, heckling, hectoring and needling, as well as implicit or

explicit threats are almost universal in the honor-based societies. At length, the child learns one

of the most important lessons of life: be worthy of respect and give others their due. Regrettably

a downside of all of this is a competitiveness that feeds combativeness, and no minor amount of

insecurity into the bargain. If good test scores are worth the downside, there you have it.

Mary Kingsley is now largely forgotten, but in her day she ruffled feathers and was, a century

almost to the year after Mary Wollstonecraaft, one of those whose achievements turned them

into role models. Kingsley, for her part, refuse the label ‘New Woman’ and may well have

increased her real impact for having played down the obvious. Her intense interest in spirituality

and anthropology led to titillating, if not necessarily exciting, consequences. At a young age she

(Birkett,1990:171-185) was the first to awaken the world to a fascinating cultural reality

regarding hectoring and needling.

[U]nless you live among the natives you can never get to know them. At first you see nothing

but a confused stupidity and crime; but when you get to see – well!.... you see things worth

seeing. I will import to you, in strict confidence, for if it were known it would damage me

badly, my opinion on the African. He is not ‘half devil and half child’, anymore than he is

‘our benighted brother’ and all that sort of thing. He is a woman…I know those nigs because

I am a woman, a woman of a masculine race but a woman still.

I little further research reveals that her subjects in Africa role reversed relative to English

society. Men did the hectoring and needling of the kids, not the woman. Perhaps Professor

Higgins would have been happier as an African? At any rate, a question is worth raising: Does

this role reversal make the respect-mongering what it is? There are arguments each way, just not

methodologically verified that I know of.

Shame and guilt are by far and away the most famous dimension, and though they are lower on

the ladder than once upon a year, now displaced by honor and dignity, they are infinitely more

fascinating for being so directly relevant to conduct. Of course each presupposes a falling away

from responsibility. Shame is associated with over-stating or over-stepping propriety; guilt

19

comes in denying or forsaking what should have been accepted.11

Both of these are so utterly

human (and no one denies they are inextricably interrelated) that it seems perhaps odd that Ruth

Benedict should have chosen these two as differentiae in her initial culture typology. Yet it is

undeniably true that shame is of greater concern to the honor-based groups and that guilt is more

frequently found with the dignity-based. By the same token, there are honor-based cultures in

which guilt is used as a disciplinary tool (Russia has been one of them though I do not have up-

to-date information on the current status, but see Bronfenbrenner, 1970, for recent times).

People are surprised to learn that the ‘Hungarian liar’ disarms his accuser with guilt: ‘What kind

of person are you that would think to accuse somebody like me of this kind of thing?!’ Even the

importance attached in honor-based societies to ‘having shame’ is as often as not aimed at

possessing a ready-made guilt response to current matters from past or possible violations.

These and similar reasons forced the once popular shame-guilt typology from prominence and

into obscurity (Cairns, 1970).

Shame and guilt, like the other cognate pairs, are relevant to the typology but not sufficiently so

to actually define it. Only the concepts of honor and dignity have the reach and penetration to

canopy the multifaceted aspects of culture. The ever-popular “individualist/collectivist” dyad is

not in the top tier of binaries we employ. Of course the reason for this choice of typology is that

we associate honor-based groups with a broad consideration given to the needs of the group (for

which members receive honor as a badge of prominence in building and/or maintaining

communitarian spirit), and we observe what we believe to be the comparative opposite in

dignity-based moieties (dignity is an immaterial iconographic source of individualist rights and

responsibilities). But to blankly identify this ‘communitarian spirit’, collectively the various

modalities of group-centered cooperation, with one given modal culture, is logically illusory.

True enough, societies evolve structures to prevent social disintegration if only because the

central fear of a culture is disruption, a perspective that helps determine the shape such

institutions will take. The predominating fear in the vast majority of cultures has always been

that powerful individuals will get a clique of faction behind them and with that reserve of will

and support cause trouble. Individuals are therefore kept in place with requirements oriented

toward the community rather than toward their own potential power base. This is indeed why

'respect' figures so prominently in the honor-based moiety, but not for the reasons typically

adduced. It is not respect in a personality cult context, but in a ‘respect your place’ context, what

the ancient Greeks knew as moira. In addition to the need for social cohesion in facing reality,

this is the true foundation for the distinctive psychosocial outlook of honor-based societies.

If everyone has to be respected, so much less the justification not to; accordingly, there is less

justification to stir up trouble. The issue is not, ‘Do what you can for your society’; it is, rather,

11

In exposure theory (Herrman, 2010a), shame results from breaking a respect bond; guilt results from breaking an

acceptance bond. In saying this, we are forcing a linkage between biology and behavior, with what this writer calls

‘biosocial’ attributes (2010b). And per the present topic, another question is in the offing: Benedict and Mead saw

shame as the fundamental psychosocial element in what we see as the honor-based camp. They also saw guilt as with

something other, what Benedict would equate with the Appolinian culture type (Hopi, for example, as in her Patterns of

Culture book. We say that guilt is with the dignity-based groups. As it turns out, paradigmatics was a lot closer to

Benedict-Mead than might have been imagined.

20

‘Do what diverts any disposition to large-scale mischief.’12

As against this standard, dignity-

based societies have a mythos incontestably opposed, entirely favoring the individual qua

individual. Those aware of this nuance in the argument (especially Huntington, 1996) are more

aware than most that the upshot of this is an expectation of a cultural mistrust from the honor-

based to the dignity-based.

The Enlightenment thesis was, despite all of this, completely correct: give people the freedom to

be all they can be, and individuals will not only not be more, but will actually be less encouraged

to upset social institutions. Counter-intuitive or not, that mythos has less to do with

individualism or collectivism per se, and more to do with the dignity of individuals versus the

socially accepted methods of maintaining individual honor for the sake of group harmony.

Dignity and honor, not the individual or collectivity, constitute the correct ‘parent’ binary.

4. The Theory of Cults and Offices

H-B C-H C-D D-B

4 2-3 6 1-2

Merited worth Social responsibility Façade of goodness Inherent worth

Respect Sine qua non work Do because can Acceptance

Trustworthiness Fount of ethics Immoral seems moral Faith in others

Figure 3.

For any other than the very simplest of social groups, some means must be devised to categorize

generalized mass drift phenomena that offer prospects of yielding statistically valid metrics. This

begins with theory, translates to methodology, and then to empirical verification. Figure (3) is

the result.

A 30-mile high overview might start something like this: Worth reflected and expressed through

meritorious efforts presupposes that H-B people couch worth and merit together as follows: 1) a

responsibility to be successful; 2) prerogative announcing felt worth and the expectancy of

respect, taking for granted that one’s words and deeds are normative, and 3) accept the obligation

and exposure entailed in representing one’s local groups, as if by homage and fealty to honor,

e.g., its protection and avenging. The D-B equivalent is to couch acceptance and authority

together ( will, power and obligation [=authority] incorporate Table (3) values of inherent regard

for dignity and faith in others to respect it) as follows: 1) the will to reflect dignity in one’s

words and deeds; 2) the obligation to protect society from those disaccepting dignity and 3) the

personal and social muscle to prevent or limit negative tendencies that promise but are self-

serving.

12

As an attitude, this is the sort of thing that could add to either or both the ‘quiet’ or ‘loud’ sub-categories. All of us

were ‘born honor-based’, not ‘born free’. We are fully capable of hating whatever disagrees with what disagrees with

culture, patriotism or nationalism (quiet), or hatred toward anyone getting in our way when we are helping society

(loud).

21

The piece de resistance in the figure comes in elaborating the import of the numbers under the

headings. Scoring from 1 to 6 records the least to most prevalent configuration. The least

prevalent goes to our own designation, the nominal dignity-based (‘nominal’ by defining

standards, not evident behavioral norms). We define cultural types by the influence of law and

religion on the way society directs its moral compass (business, professions, politics, etc.).

Americans have a system whose ideals in law and religion are centered on authority in each

individual; the H-B take a sense of prerogative from perceived cultural allowance. It cannot be

overstated (whence the repetition) that the H-B would rather maintain order, copping a presume-

it-on-the-horizon frame of mind, than permit the assumed propensity of tall egos to become

powerful and, willingly or otherwise, negotiate destruction.

The upshot is that a true D-B society is relatively easy to talk about, less easy to understand from

a conceptual vantage, and not at all easy to walk the walk; Americans are a classic example of

the type. Given these observations it is not beside the point to ask what percentage of the

world’s population entertains this label. It isn’t much. Adding transitional countries to nominal

listings this number is a theoretical max of about 15%.13

Perhaps more important is gauging the

influence of the philosophy behind the dignity-based concept and how well it is being put into

practice – the ‘observed’ as opposed to ‘designated’ indicators. Here we break down the D-B

cognate into four subgroups: 1) near to nominal but advancing; 2) nominal; 3) near normative; 4)

normative. Clearly these are not just observational but are also impressionable, and the first

impression should be this: it is not easy to be a normative dignity-based country. That said, the

world has a lot of work to do on this head (for those who agree with the dignity thesis, and of

course many do not).

Somewhat more prevalent than the D-B are the honor cults. These spontaneously sprung up

everywhere in the ancient world, from age-groups in traditional societies to warrior societies and

on up the ladder of breadth and depth. We are mainly interested in those serving a scaled need,

so we attend to ancient Egypt, Rome, Greece, India and China. Here we have on display the

highest ideals of character and performance that an aristocratic temperament could hope to offer

the general populace. Such cults also offered an oxymoron for up-close observation: created to

meet needs of large populations yet run by small groups with seemingly little worry over hubris

let alone inability to handle the weighty tasks. How very un-H-B! Well, hold on. Giving leaders

the power to solve problems is what the H-B groups best learned how to do in experience with

tribal methods (not necessarily the ‘solving the problem part’).

13

Because of the relevance of law and legal philosophy, a place to start categorizing is with on organization like The

World Legal Systems Research Group out of the University of Ottawa. The rationale is as follows: Common Law

systems hewed fairly closely to the Enlightenment notion of the individual’s large role in promoting dignity. The civil

law tradition, as filtered through the Christian church that handed down Roman law until the Justinian Code was

available to Europe, concentrated on the office (which Roman law articulated marvelously well but emulated terribly

unwell) gave credit to the individual but placed much more emphasis on the community of believers. It also placed very

much more stress on order and continuity both in message and space and time. The latter were not always helpful. In

the end there is no surprise that its influence, while displaying no real anathema to the individualists, strongly abetted

H-B norms. Those with the highest objective dignity-based scores are former strong-arming leaders whose policies of

securing the welfare (in substance identical to the D-B equivalent) welcomes the Enlightenment by and large and the H-

B ideals now were settled upon a new rationale.

22

Not so much invention was required, for it was mainly a matter of scaling up the basic product

they all knew rather well. This, then, is how we arrived at militaries and our professions; later

the same gave us civic offices.

The configuration in order of prevalence is the garden variety H-B society. It is half way

between the basic D-B unit and its cult. Might is be that the cult comes to pass via the standard

H-B group? But another question looms now even larger: where do the H-B groups come from?

They come from the nature humans inherit from their evolutionary forebears. This is where I

say, “I warned you.” Failing to understand counter-intuitive things like this does no one any

good and serves the appetite of those numbed to indecency and dis-acceptance. ‘Nowhere Man’,

the song, pops into mind. Wags have defined Civilization as the result of Hobbesian nature

rendered effete and ineffectual as higher morals display the creds necessary to displace the

lower.

A few brave souls working behind the protective outer garments of tenure and repute have

occasionally but carefully flayed open academe. The pinnacle of the honor cult should by reason

be found where most critical, in the research environments that all others must rely on. The

dignity cult, if the above explanation be justified at all, should confirm the account given. What

follows is my own interpretation of one research scientist who braved the waters of truth (2010:

2) and who uncovered a record of both the H-B and D-B elements in research –

Boguslaw (1968: 59-60) illustrates how modern American research labs and institutes fit the

pattern of declination from C-H to C-D. He begins with a four-part recitation of the ‘classic’

scientific values – the idealized cult of honor approach, based largely on Merton (1968: 604-

615) and Storer (1966: 78-79). He then proceeds to characterize what he takes to be

prevailing norms, paralleling them against the previous four as if to generate his own four

‘dimensions’ – these latter the very epitome of a cult of dignity.

CULT OF HONOR CULT OF DIGNITY

1) Universalism – objectivity reigns 1) Particularism – “[He who] proved the superi-

over personal aspiration; ority of…a rival research society would

2) Communality – collaborative en- rapidly find himself ostracized…

deavors where “reward for… 2) Miserism – “[It is] necessary to be

achievement should be restrict- a miser and hoard one’s own findings

ted to recognition and esteem” to prevent use by rivals

3) Disinterestedness – no explana- 3) Interestedness – “Or, ‘Are you

tion required kidding?’

4) Organized skepticism – each scien- 4) Organized dogmatism – “Above all, one

tist held responsible for self- and must not raise significant questions about

other-accountability previous [in-house] research... it is behavior

best described as traitorous”

5. Offices and Stewardship

We continue with cults, where we find the highest prevalence across the board, and it isn’t even

23

very close. The cult of dignity is not likely anybody’s invention or hobbyhorse; it seems rather to

be a declination away from an ideal, somewhat along the lines of the Latin noun system. Many

have pointed to this as a process that appears inherent. Here is an especially clear example from

F.S.C. Schiller (1930: 2):

All human institutions have a way of growing into perversions of their original purpose that

block its attainment. . . . Those who run the institutions are allowed to acquire interests that

conflict with the professed purpose of the institutions they serve.

We have noted that societies often have both terms of a cognate pair though from varying

perspectives. Others continue to be important, even in the daily headlines. Equality, a necessary

value for dignity, is no less a value in the honor-based moiety, if upon slightly different grounds.

Individual freedom is likewise universally observed, an example being the Franks, whose name

happens also to be their word for “freedom”. As with many other traditional tribes, their view of

freedom was all but sacrosanct, many considering freedom to be their “birthright” (such societies

were often governed practically by direct democracy). In fact, however, what we were pleased

to interpret as ‘freedom’ is far closer to what they will term independence, and the further we

look, the more intense is the difference separating it from its cognate ‘dependence’, one of the

very worst conditions to befall man or woman.

The cults of honor and dignity follow upon the two fundamental variations in the meaning of that

word. Cults are slivers or chips off of a larger social entity, and they tend to magnify their own

value or even claim for themselves all the benefits of the parent. A dictionary will use words

like ‘bogus’ and ‘extremism’, as well as ‘obsessive devotion’. Our approach is not far from this,

permitting the cult of dignity to be both extreme and bogus, whereas the cult of honor stresses

devotion to an ideal, except that I prefer to avoid using 'obsessive' in that connection.

More particularly, the cult of dignity is a society within a society, a class of people who

individually and collectively pretend to both espouse and deliver aspects of dignity that simply

can not, or otherwise will not, ever be made available to the larger community. Their

pretensions become further extreme and even bogus when claiming as many benefits as possible

for themselves, rather than working to spread them about. Fundamentally, then, this cult is

disposed to hypocrisy.

It is reasonable to inquire why there is not a dignity-based equivalent of the honor cult, or why,

on the other hand, there is not an honor-based equivalent of what I have styled the cult of

dignity. In developing this system there were a few self-imposed rules. One of them was to

avoid pointless replication or needless duplication; another was to label a thing for what it was, is

and will be – above all not for ulterior reasons. While arbitrary, I believe these rules serve the

needs of intellectual honesty. The cults of honor and dignity are what they are, and are properly

labeled given their nature and character. If they appear in several styles of governance or in both

typologies, so be it; they are what they are, and wherever they are, they go by (because correct)

their given names.

Of course, each cult abstracts fundamentals from its larger society. How, therefore, can an honor

24

cult exist in a dignity-based society having dignity-based precepts? This seeming contradiction

in fact proves a very important rule mentioned earlier. Values such as equality and freedom are

not the privileged possession of just one type of culture. In addition, all major cultures require

certain institutions, various of which are candidates for an honor cult, as for example the

military, thus there really is no logical choice but to acknowledge that the question was pointless

because useless.

In the end, what makes for a cult of honor is less where it comes from and more what it is and

does. I call it a cult of honor because it is an honor-based principle that gives the cult its

character. It is the honor-based groups who first saw fit to institutionalize it and it is the honor-

based groups who have often done the most to kept it alive. And of course there will always of

necessity (inherent tendencies given that we are all born honor-based) exist honor-based

principles in every dignity-based society just as there are dignity-based elements in every honor-

based society.

The specific honor-based principle responsible for honor cults appears to me to be the felt need

to retain “esteem” for principles whose outward workings bring pleasure, pride and honor to

society. By this criterion I readily acknowledge chess and ballet to be Russian honor cults.

When foreigners remark that America lacks culture, I wonder if part of this isn't the fact that we

do not possess much, if any, of this mass devotion (baseball? football?). While it hardly means

that there is no culture – by any definition of the word – it does suggest in strong terms that we

seem not to appreciate and nourish culture to the same extent, and certainly not in the same way,

as other peoples. And that should give us pause, not to up and change colors, but to think about

what we do and don't do, what we do and don't praise.

Both cults are intimately related to social class. Class can be viewed as the philosophical

equivalent of the “set” in mathematics, in which case it should be known as a “descriptive”

class—such as, for example, the 'wealthy', or the 'blacks'. But considering class as a social

phenomenon suggests that we add a specifically social attribute, something that bespeaks putting

ideas into common and consistent conduct. If, therefore, we consider the moneyed and

propertied set (a descriptive class) to be an example of a cult of dignity, we are implying a social

class in which the de facto membership (they needn't apply to qualify) has operated individually

and collectively to accomplish what preserves and promotes the class privileges, notably in

violation of stated objectives.

Suppose that the same descriptive class of moneyed and propertied folk were instead declared to

be an honor cult. They would constitute a group that felt that their power and privilege, while

useful, should be held accountable, that their conduct should meet certain standards. Such a

group would be the ideal form of aristocracy. Once in the military, patriotic youth submit to

drills and a hundred other rigors and learn a style of conduct befitting their station.

Cults of honor attract perfectionists, patriots, as well as those who are ‘climbers’ – those ‘go-

getters’, folks who remind us of salespeople – and sometimes just good ol’ used car salespeople.

In short, where success is at once the credential to play and the objective to slay, we are going to

25

find hordes with bipolar personalities, as indeed has always been the case here and abroad; but

especially here, where there are no lets nor hindrances to the excesses such begets. Power and

notability are powerful lures.

It goes without saying and has been already noted, that salespeople, when very successful, have

a lot of bipolar traits that have been honed and that have served them well – for sales but not so

much anything else. These traits are what make the movers and shakers what they are. They are

also responsible for rushing contracts, getting two or three divorces (or more), and being a little

‘too much’ for staid listeners such as the parentalist Obama, who could not tolerate Clinton at a

golfing outing and left after thirteen holes (which Clinton, always at the ready with an excuse –

what we expect of bipolars – chalked up to having nearly caught up after Obama’s early four

shot lead).

This is the same Bill Clinton who was the first of the me-me-me generation to reach the White

House. His bipolar traits were in evidence throughout the campaigns. Nothing too outlandish to

promise; the Party Platform needn’t be relied on because he was selling himself, not the party. In

office he was even more disrespectful of the Office than of the Party. Where Ronald Reagan

donned a coat and tie on entering that august Oval Office, out of respect to it and a gesture of

acceptance of whatever verdict the people shall make of his use of that office. It is a self-

policing oath, that form of respect. It is a duty ‘to’ the office, that which when people hear of it

gives them reason to trust the office and its occupant. Bill Clinton had none of that and when his

behavior stained the office the public proved as me-me-me as their leader.

His victories left long memories in the minds of those who hire on as advisors to candidate and

those who write their speeches. Thus candidate Obama was if anything worse than Clinton in

behind the scenes dirty tricks and wild promises. He sold audiences on his seeming sincerity. It

was sincere, at least the part about believing he was god’s gift to the nation. Fortunately, he was

also, apart from politics a very, very decent man, which kept him in respect of his office. The

Greeks would have plastered Bill Clinton’s name over every shard available and he would have

been railroaded out of town. This is how the methodology interprets the signs of history. They

are not always pleasant, but they awaken us to perspectives not currently in favor.

Other common examples include the ideal forms of the various professions. In ancient Greece a

group of healers cooperated to secure a specialized education, then took an oath (Hippocratic or

Aesculapian) whereby they were at once held accountable and given standards to follow. Today

the same oaths are administered yet modern physicians seem more concerned to escape liability

than to care for any and all of our sick and injured. At trial, lawyers are to to serve as “officers

of the court”. Do they truly know what those words signify, namely, that they owe an allegiance

to the law itself and not merely to a client?

Returning to ancient Greece, we find the playwright Euripides making a career out of castigating

an honor cult that had turned into a dignity cult. He seems to suggest in more than one place that

the aristocracy, still thinking to know what was best for a people lately in the throes of social

upheaval, were at the same time so self-righteously serious about themselves, that they made an

26

unintended mockery of their vaunted standards in the attempt to demonstrate their perfect

adherence. All of which goes to show that honor cults can and do degenerate into dignity cults,

another way of saying what we excerpted from Schiller.

Socials classes are highly correlated with status-seeking, one of the commonest – if not the most

common – social features of honor-based life. Every branch of the military has a flight of ranks

almost impossible to keep track of; the academics aren't satisfied merely to be lecturers or

tenured professors, for they too have a system of ranks. Most bureaucracies, corporate or

otherwise, are also honor cults of a sort, though they spend much less time rehearsing their larger

obligations. These organizations are known for their ladder of status designations that are often

only jokingly related to an actual function. They are likewise occasionally known for the stiff,

sometimes even off-putting, style of conduct that is difficult for the outsider not to recognize.

Closely associated with status is the tendency of social classes to go to extreme lengths to

preserve, in some instances to extend, their prerogatives, powers and privileges. I needn't

describe this feature since it is obvious to all. It is, however, this feature above all others that

accounts for the honor cult's degeneration to a dignity cult. To become so self-important that

your obligations become mere lip service is to presume to a dignity not otherwise presumed of

others outside the cult. Which is, once again, why the dignity-based label is appropriate even

when the cult exists within an honor-based society.

27

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