Declining Decent Work and Emerging Struggles - Piler – The

Labour Rights in Pakistan

Declining Decent Work andEmerging Struggles

A Report

July 2010

Pakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research

AdvisorKaramat Ali

EditorZeenat Hisam

Section OneContributersZeenat HisamShujauddin QureshiNoriko Hara

Section TwoContributersDr. Ali Ercelawn and Karamat AliDr. Shahida WizaratBisharat AliNoriko HaraZeenia ShaukatZeenat Hisam

Cover Design and LayoutK.B. Abro

First published July 2010ISBN 978-969-9153-08-2

Published byPakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research PILER CentreST-001, Sector X, Sub-Sector VGulshan-e-Maymar, Karachi-75340, PakistanTel: (92-21) 6351145-7Fax: (92-21) 6350354Email: [email protected]

2Labour Rights in Pakistan

Foreword

Section One1. Introduction

National ContextWar on TerrorPolitical Turmoil and the Change of GovernmentFaltering Economy, Rising Poverty

2. Legislation, Policies and Tri-partite Consultations: The Gaps and the Widening ChasmIRA 2008The Workers' Perspective: Labour Charter 2008Stakeholdrs' Efforts for Alternative Industrial Relations LawTri-partite Labour Conference 2010Services Tribunal (Amendment) Bill 2010Labour Policy 2010

3. Status of Labour Rights and Workers' Struggles in Selected SectorsManufacturing: Textile Industry (Garments and Power Looms Sectors)Manufacturing: Hand stitched FootballsAgricultureFisheries

4. Women in Employment

Section TwoSpecial Articles

1. Enabling Equitable Access to Land & Fisheries (Dr. Ercelawn & Karamat Ali)2. Food security (Dr. Shahida Wizarat)3. Migrant Workers in Karachi (Noriko Hara)

4. Social Protection (Zeenia Shaukat)

5. IRA 2010: Route to Change (Zeenia Shaukat)

6. Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining: Emerging Initiatives in the Informal Sector (Zeenat Hisam)

7. Brick Kilns and Bondage (Bisharat)


Contents


Decent work and a life lived in dignity and peace is central to human aspirations, toan equitable, inclusive and sustainable development and to the existence of a con-tent society. The terms and conditions of decent work that need to be valued in

human societies encompass four elements: fundamental principles and rights at work andinternational labour standards; employment and income opportunities; social protectionand social security; and social dialogue and tripartism.

Do industrial relations in Pakistan are governed by these values? If yes, to what extent, andif not, what is the gravity of violations of these parameters? And how the workers and otherstakeholders are responding to the challenges?

The report on the status of labour rights in the country attempts to answer these questionsto some extent, and very briefly. For, the issues are complex and intricately intertwined. Afull and comprehensive exploration of all dimensions of the existing world of work is agigantic task beyond the scope of this report produced by a small resource centre.

In the first section of the report, an effort has been made to present a brief macro pictureof labour, economy and politics, and then focus on workers' conditions and their strugglesin just a few select sectors (agriculture, textile, brick kilns and the fisheries). In the secondsection, seven research articles on key issues (access to resources, food security, labour leg-islation, social protection, minimum wages, bonded labour and migrant labour) are pre-sented to share information and the researchers' insights. A few crucial areas remain to beexplored, particularly occupational health and safety and unionization in the formal sector.Efforts will be taken to include these issues in the next report.

The current report, developed by the PILER team, is the second on the subject. The firstreport came out in 2007. The present report thus covers a period between 2007 and 2010,a period of great political turmoil in the country and an economic down slide, but with a silver lining…

Zeenat Hisam


Forword



Section One



1. IntroductionNational Context

The closing years of the decade (2007-2010) were marked by political turmoil,escalating militancy and army operations

under the 'War on Terror', economic crisis,increasing provincial disparities and a deepen-ing divide of Pakistani society along ethnicity,religion, ideology and class, impacting the work-force adversely. Global financial crisis of 2008added to the morass at national level. Economicgrowth slowed down to around 2 per cent in2008-09. The IMF assistance through Stand-ByArrangement (SBA), approved in November2008, lead to harsh fiscal policies.1 Under theSBA, the government agreed to 11 strict IMFconditionalities including elimination of all pub-lic subsidies, reduction in budgetary allocationfor social sector from 60 per cent to 45 percent,depreciation of currency to further 6-7 per centand imposition of value-added tax (VAT). Generalsubsidies on fuel and food were withdrawnbetween March and October 2008. The coreinflation went up to 17 per cent.2 The number offood insecure population was estimated at 45million.3 Military expenditure increased mani-fold. During the year 2009-10 Pakistan spent Rs249.858 billion on defense. In contrast, only Rs5.964 billion and Rs 22.6 billion were spent tohealth and education respectively.

Shrinking opportunities for decent employment,growing wage inequality and a rising share ofinformal and vulnerable employment dominatedthe labour market. An estimated 61.9 per cent-in absolute figures around 32 million out of thetotal 51.78 million labour force of 15 years ofage and above-fell in to the category of vulnera-ble employment.4 Own-account workers andcontributing family workers, categorized as 'vul-nerable workers' in the current global discourse,have inadequate earnings and are denied socialsecurity and effective representation throughunionization. Similar precarious conditions pre-

vailed for contract workers in small, mediumand large national and multi-national establish-ments in the formal sector. Share of informalemployment (including vulnerable employment)rose to 73 per cent.5

Pakistan has ratified the eight core ILO labourconventions. However, 'all the core labour stan-dards are violated massively and flagrantly'6.Informal sector and agriculture sector workersremained out of ambit of labour laws. In theminiscule formal sector, labour inspection tocheck violations remains suspended. The mostdisappointing act for labour during the years wasthe arbitrary enactment of the IndustrialRelations Act, 2008, by the newly elected demo-cratic government without consultation with thetrade unions who had waged a long struggleagainst the militarily imposed IRO 2002. TheIRA 2008, containing several new and all previ-ous major restrictions on workers' rights, lapsedon 30 April 2010 leaving a void, a halted labourjudiciary and a disillusioned workforce. Anachievement, however, of the democratic gov-ernment was the 18th Amendment (signed in tolaw on 19 April 2010) that abolished the con-current list and provided space to initiate themuch-awaited recourse to provincial autonomy.

The silver lining in the grim scenario was theinduction of democratic government that led toexpanded political and social space for citizensand civil society groups and the gatheringmomentum of the struggles and resistancemovements initiated by the informal sectorworkers since the beginning of this decade.

War on Terror

The most disturbing events that severelyimpacted people, their lives, meagerassets, and livelihoods were armed con-

flicts and terrorists activities in the country signi-fying a deep-rooted malaise, related to the

increasing influence of extremist-militant reli-gious ideology. Violent acts by extremists-destruction of girls' school, music shops and bar-bar shops and attacks on public places andarmy establishments--increased in Swat when aradical cleric, Mullah Fazlullah, urged his follow-ers to wage jihad to avenge Lal Masjid operationby the Pakistan army.

The army carried out three operations in Swatfrom November 2007 onward, before launchingthe full-fledged army operation in May 2009 toclean up Malakand Division of armed extrem-

ists. A massive exodus of over 6 million ofpeople7 took place. Temporarily dislocated fromthe districts of Swat, Buner, Lower, and UpperDir, the internally displaced persons (IDPs) putup in about 20 camps faced extreme hardshipsand the majority on return found their assetsand properties damaged and sources of liveli-hoods ruined. Being a crucial ally to the US waron terror, Pakistan Army and the paramilitaryFrontier Corps troop, along with the US and NATOforces, continued operations in FATA (subse-quent to the US invasion in Afghistan inNovember 2001 after 9/11), and the areas bor-dering with Afghanistan in their never-endingchase of 'terrorists'.

The operations, including drone attacks, intensi-fied in Kyber Agency, Mohmand Agency, SouthWaziristan and Jalozai and Orakzai Agenciesduring 2008-2010, killings not only militants butcivilians and army personnel. The 2008-09 alsowitnessed increasing terrorist activities in

Punjab and Sindh. The Southern Punjab, hometo thousands of madarsahs, was termed by ana-lysts as breeding ground of militant jihadis.8

According to a report, in 2009 the casualties interrorist attacks, operational attacks by thesecurity forces, intertribal clashes and the cross-border attacks of the US and NATO forces inFATA amounted to 12,632 people dead and12,815 injured.9

Several analyst consider poverty, absence of ajudicial system and writ of law, non-existinginfrastructure and inequitable livelihood oppor-tunities in the Federally Administered TribalAreas as factors that pushed the populacetowards a militant religious ideology of jihadthat promises rewards and abundance of mate-rial comforts in afterlife.

The most economically deprived provinceBalochistan remained turbulent after the August2006 killing of its tribal-political leader NawabBugti by the state. Inter-tribal and inter-clan vio-lence continued along with skirmishes withstate personnel and sabotages against stateinfrastructure causing severe hardships to vul-nerable and poor communities displaced. Inearly 2007, an estimated 86,000 internally dis-placed people were living in make-shift hutsunder poor conditions sustained by UN feedingcenters and UNICEF support. Though by June2007, the government claimed majority of IDPsreturned home, unofficial sources claimed thou-sands of IDPs from Dera Bugti Khan were still liv-ing in camps in precarious conditions.

Defence expenditure on account of continuedmilitary operations rose from Rs. 57.5 billion in2007 to Rs. 82.2 billion in 2009 and to Rs. 86.2billion in the fiscal year 2010. Another risingcomponent of expenditure were the grants givento non-government entities mainly as paymentsto IDPs and as support programmes for the poorwhose number swelled during recent years. Lossto economy incurred through war on terror hasbeen immense. It is official estimated that dur-ing the last three years--2007-08 to 2009-10-theeconomic loss was to the tune of US$ 28.8 bil-lion. The losses include damaged/destroyedphysical infrastructure, loss of employment andincome and loss of exports.

Political Turmoil and the Changeof GovernmentIt was not just the 'War on Terror' that impactedpeople and their livelihoods but the turbulentand chaotic events of 2007 under the military


The disparities between the rich and poorhave widened sharply. This, combined

with growing poverty from 3 years of highinflation, is damaging social harmony. Thebenefits of economic development duringthe previous 5 to 6 years have largelyaccrued to the richer and more educatedbecause the bulk of this growth was wit-nessed in the relatively skill-intensive sec-tors of finance, telecommunications, IT, oiland gas and in the capital-intensive indus-tries of cement motor vehicles and motorcycles, in which those with limited skills, themajority of the labour force, could not par-ticipate meaningfully.

Report of the panel of Economists 2010 on Medium-Term Development Imperatives and Strategy forPakistan, Planning Commission, GoP |April, 2010

rule of Parvez Musharraf, disintegrating demo-cratic institutions, weakened writ of law and atotal loss of culture of dialogue for conflict reso-lution. In March 2007 a politico-judicial crisisensued when the President filed a reference inthe Supreme Judicial Council against the ChiefJustice of Pakistan and removed him. Thelawyers' associations launched a movement. On12 May 2007, street gun battles between pro-and anti-government supporters left more than40 people dead in the city of Karachi. Themonths' long struggle of the lawyers, media per-son and civil society yielded results and theSupreme Court reinstating the Chief Justice on20 July 2007.

President Musharraf promulgated the controver-sial National Reconciliation Ordinance 2007 on5 October. Through a blanket amnesty theOrdinance absolved the leaders of the PakistanPeoples' Party and other political parties (i.e.Mutehida Qaumi Movement, Pakistan MuslimLeague-Nawaz Shareef Group), bureaucrats andstate officials of all corruption and othercharges. On October 18, Benazir Bhutto's home-coming was marred by suicide bombing, killingover 100 of the PPP political workers and enthu-siasts and injuring hundreds. Aside sufferingscaused by the carnage, the resulting shut downand countrywide protests brought further hard-ships to the daily wage earners. On 3 November2007 General Musharraf declared state of emer-gency for the second time during his tenurethrough the Provisional Constitutional Order(PCO). The lawyers, the media and the civil soci-ety activists came out on the streets againstemergency and for restoration of the constitu-tion. The lawyers' boycott from March to July andfrom November onward impacted adversely oncommon people as courts, including labourcourts, proceedings were halted and the numberof pending cases rose.

The outcry against General Musharraf's holdingof the two posts-military chief and president ofthe country-finally made him quit his army poston Nov 27 and he took oath as the civilian pres-ident of Pakistan, an act supported by the par-liament. Amidst all these turbulent changes andchaos, confusion prevailed among political par-ties whether to boycott or not the general elec-tion scheduled for 8 January 2008. While mostof the lesser parties including religious partiesdecided to boycott the elections, the two majoropposition parties-PPP and the Muslim League(N)-and MQM in Sindh contested elections.

The most tragic event of the year was assassi-nation of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December 2007while she was returning from a public meeting atLiquat Bagh, Rawalpindi. Her killing sparked anunprecedented wave of violence-arson and loot-ing-and civic mayhem that continued for threedays and caused loss of lives and damage tostate and private properties and assets to thetune of billions of rupees.

A PPP-led coalition formed a government follow-ing the February 2008 general elections afterabout eight years of military rule (October 12,1999-November 28, 2007). Stark differencessoon surfaced between the PPP and the PML,the major issues being restoration of judges thatthe PPP evaded. President Asif Zardari's controlover key decisions further alienated the coalitionpartners and hampered the government func-tioning. The lawyers' struggle for an independentjudiciary took a decisive turn when PML (N) alsoactively joined it. The lawyers and the PMLlaunched a Long March from 12 to 16 March2009. Sensing the mood of the civil society, thePrime Minister restored Chaudhary Iftikhar aschief justice of Pakistan through an executiveorder.

The year 2009 was marked by an upsurge in ter-rorist activities. A total of 2,586 incidents of ter-rorism, insurgencies and sectarian related vio-lence were reported across the country. Thehighest number of the attacks was reportedfrom the North West Frontier Province (1,137),followed by Balochistan (792) and the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (559). As many as 46attacks took place in Punjab, 30 in Sindh, 12 inIslamabad and five each in Gilgit-Baltistan andPakistan administered Kashmir.12 The terroristshit mosques, public places, markets and theestablishment of law enforcement agencies. Thesituation affected the economy, trade, servicesand manufacturing, harshly impacting dailywage earners and low-tiered, low-wage workers.

Faltering Economy and RisingPovertyEscalating operations against extremism wasone of the major reasons acknowledged official-ly for unprecedented economic slow down.Policy induced imbalances of the past severalyears, sharp decline of investment inflows, andspike in world commodity prices were the otherfactors that led to a severe macroeconomic cri-sis, growing budget deficit and a sharp cut in crit-ical and social development.13 Pakistan's GDP

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growth slid down to 2.0 per cent in 2008-09(from 4.1 percent in 2007) and inflation rose to22.3 per cent in 2008-09.14 Pakistan's totalexternal debt increased from $46.3 billion at theend of June 2008 to $50.1 billion by end-March2009 - an increase of 8.2 percent.15 The ExternalDebt and Liabilities as percentage of GDPincreased to 30.2 percent by end-March 2009,an increase of 2.1 percentage point.

Pakistan endured a decline in exports of 6.0 percent in 2009, while imports contracted at amuch faster rate of 11per cent. Similarly, foreign

direct investment (FDI) sharply declined. InNovember 2008, the Government of Pakistansigned a $7.6 billion, 23-month Stand-ByArrangement with the IMF to help remedy bal-ance of payments difficulties. The loan was bor-rowed on tough conditionalities including with-drawal of subsidies on petroleum products,power and food items. The Governmentincreased the wheat support price by more than50 per cent, which pushed up retail prices ofwheat and wheat flour across the country hittinghard the vulnerable and poor strata of society.

The share of agriculture in total GDP kept falling.In 2008-09 its share was 21.8 per cent. Despiteits decline, agriculture remains the single largest

sector employing 44 per cents of labour force.Its decline indicates massive neglect of policy-makers towards this crucial sector.Manufacturing sector also registered a decline.Particularly large scale manufacturing wentthrough a negative growth of 7.67 per cent dur-ing 2008-09 due to power shortage, shrinkingdemand in the export sector and deterioratinglaw and order in the country.16 Shrinking largescale manufacturing led to a steady cut in theprotected (formal) employment and slipping ofworkers in to vulnerable employment. In con-trast, small and medium manufacturing sectormaintained its growth at 7.5 per cent. Again, thisgrowth resulted in expansion of the informallabour faced with precarious work conditions.

In 2009 , Pakistan slid to 141st position out oftotal 182 countries on human developmentindex that takes in to account the population'seducation, life expectancy, standard of living andthe country's GDP.17 In 2010, Pakistan is con-fronted with a dismal state of human develop-ment characterized by extreme social deficit inhealth, education, gender equity, decent livingand social protection: 30 per cent poverty head-count ratio, 58 per cent literacy rate, 76 per centhouseholds with access to safe drinking waterand 70 per cent households with access to sani-tation.18

Pakistan, classified as low-income country, had84.6 percent of its population earning less thanUS$2 per day.19 A 2008 UN assessment foundvulnerable households spending up to 70 per-cent of their earnings on food, but remainunable to afford an adequate diet.

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Non-Inclusive Economic Growth

Pakistan's growth experience suggestswhile it has been able to achieve fairly

decent rates of economic growth, the out-come has neither been inclusive in ensuringa fairer distribution of the benefits of growthnor has the process been sustainable. Thereasons haveincluded neglect of social indi-cators, a skewed distribution of assets,weak institutions of governance, inwardlooking economic policies and structures,poor levels and rates of savings and invest-ments (largely owning to inequitable taxstructure…). This has resulted in the heavydependence on external assistance…andthe accumulation and continued growth ofdomestic and external debt. In additions,requirements of security, further complicat-ed by the recent surge in extremism andmilitancy…have resulted in scarce resourcesbeing diverted from critical investments inhuman development.

Report of the panel of Economists 2010 on Medium-Term Development Imperatives and Strategy forPakistan, Planning Commission, GoP |April, 2010

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The Gaps and the WideningChasm

Last three years of the decade were not onlypolitically and economically tumultuousbut marked curiously by a mix of hopes and

disillusionment, expectations and disappoint-ments. The labour movement-though fragile anddivided-- was unified in its struggle against theIndustrial Relations Ordinance (IRO) 2002 prom-ulgated by the military regime of General PervezMusharraf. With the induction of democraticgovernment, trade unions, workers' organiza-tions and labour/human rights activists hopedfor an inclusive and pro-worker legislation andexpected the proposed amendments, arrivedthrough consensus of workers and employers atthe platform of WEBCOP and presented to theelected government, would be taken in to con-sideration. But the PPP-led government arbitrar-ily enacted the Industrial Relations Act 2008 inNovember 2008 for an interim period of 18months (up to 30 April 2010) without consultingthe labour and employers' representatives.Strong protests from stakeholders led the gov-ernment to call the Tri-Partite LabourConference belatedly in February 2009 with aproclaimed objective to consult on the draft thatwould replace the IRA 2008. The Tri-PartiteConference, violating its form and essence both,was instead a gathering of PPP functionariesand its political activists. Also, the governmentfailed to formulate a labour policy and neitherdid it revise the minimum wages in 2009.

Trade union federations, workers' organizationsand labour unions continued to hold consulta-tions, meetings in 2010 demanding to bringlabour laws in conformity with the guaranteesgiven in the country's constitution and with theILO core conventions ratified by Pakistan. Butthe efforts against the interim law IRA 2008lacked cohesion due to the division within labourbodies and activists along political lines and the

discord between workers and employers repre-sentatives. The situation aggravated when theIRA 2008 lapsed on 30 April 2010 creating avoid and closure of labour judiciary in theabsence of a new law. The National IndustrialRelations Commission, labour appellate tri-bunals, labour courts and registrar trade unionsat the provincial and district level ceased to func-tion temporarily. The uncertainty and confusionwas compounded with the passage of 18th con-stitutional amendment that abolished the con-current list and devolved labour in totality to theprovinces.

IRA 2008

Lke the preceding laws--the IRO 1969 andIRO 2002 promulgated by military regimes--the Industrial Relations Act 2008, enacted

by an elected government, did not conform tothe spirit of the Constitution embodied in its var-ious Articles, specifically Article 17 (whichensures the right to form association or tradeunion to every citizen). Neither the Act was incompliance with the ILO Conventions No. 87(freedom of association) and No. 98 (right to col-lective bargaining). In addition, it ignored earliercommitments made through tri-partite agree-ments and labour policies. That the governmentdid not consult its draft prior to enactment eitherwith the workers' representatives or employerswas another breach of trust.

With the exception of a few positive clauses, theessential character of the IRA 2008 was restric-tive and exclusionary, as was the case with theIRO 1969 and IRO 2002. The IRA 2008 exclud-ed workers from the largest sector--agriculture,forestry, hunting and fishing--that tops the offi-cial list of 'Major Industry Divisions'. Thisamounted to denial of rights to 22 million work-ers in this category alone. It also excluded civilservice, teachers, para-medical, contract labour.In addition, a significant number of public sectorestablishments, besides police and the armed

15Labour Rights in Pakistan2. Legislation, Policies and Tri-partiteComsultations

forces, were explicitly excluded from the ambitof this law. The IRA 2008 compromised estab-lished structures for dispute resolutions by pro-moting and encouraging individual employee-employer agreements (Sec 2 (XXV)), under-mined the bargaining position of workers andunions by reducing the CBAs' tenure to two years(Sec 24 (11)), encouraged formation of paperfederations (Sec 2(xxvii)) and promoted policingon labour through the NIRC, while making labourlaw violation an easy proposition through inade-quate deterrents (Sec 72 to 78). The IRA 2008was, thus, steeped in the restrictive spirit of theold law of 1969 drafted 40 years ago at theheight of the Cold War era, a time when workers'rights were deemed inimical to the imperativesof economic development as well as the defenceof the state, and democratization was absentfrom the agenda of the then government. Withthe exception of PPP-aligned trade unionists, thelabour bodies were unanimous in their critiqueof the IRA 2008.

Labour Charter 2008

Prior to the announcement of general elec-tion in late 2007, labour organizations,facilitated by the Pakistan Institute of

Labour Education and Research, initiated aprocess to bring the trade unionists, informalworkers' representatives, labour and humanrights activists and concerned citizens on a sin-gle platform to lobby for pro-labour legislationand reforms in labour judiciary. Informal meet-ings with trade unionists and key labour leadersin ten cities of Sindh, Punjab and North WestFrontier Province were held till January 2008.With the induction of the elected coalition gov-ernment of the PPP and PML-N after February2008 elections, these efforts gathered pace anda charter of demands was drafted for submis-sion to the newly elected government. The draftwas finalized in March in a 2-day national con-sultation of 65 representatives of national tradeunion bodies, grass-roots workers' movement,civil society organization and labour/humanrights activists. For the first time, national tradeunion bodies consulted with the leadership ofgrass-roots labour movements and informalworkers' unions. The Labour Charter 2008demanded the government to strike downrestrictive clauses and introduce the longsought-after and much-awaited fundamentalchanges in labour laws to ensure basic rights,including the rights of freedom of associationand collective bargaining, to all workers, inclu-sive of agricultural workers. The Charter wasshared with the government functionaries, par-

liamentarians, media and concerned stakehold-ers.

Stakeholders' Efforts

The arbitrary passage on 19th November ofthe IRA 2008 by the National Assemblytriggered a series of meetings, consulta-

tions and press conferences by trade unionists,workers representatives, civil society organiza-tions and employers' bodies. While a section oftrade bodies, aligned with the PPP, were quick topraise the legislation, the largest trade unionbody-Pakistan Workers' Federation-and smallerfederations (Trade Union Action Committee andNational Trade Union Federation) rejected theIRA 2008.20 Earlier, the Workers EmployersBilateral Council of Pakistan (WEBCOP) initiateda process of dialogue between partners on IRA2008 and organized a consultation on 5November 2008 at Karachi. Consensus recom-mendations were submitted to the Governmentfor approval.21 In January 2009, PakistanInstitute of Legislative Development andTransparency, a civil society organization,briefed the parliamentarians and workers repre-sentatives on the legislation's pro- and anti-workers clauses. The need for tri-partite consul-tation for a new industrial relations law was reit-erated in several more consultations. During2009, the WEBCOP held three provincial consul-tative meetings in Karachi, Lahore andIslamabad followed by a national stakeholders'consultation in 15 February 2010 inIslamabad.22

Representatives of Pakistan WorkersFederation, Workers-Employers Bilateral Councilof Pakistan, Muttahida Labour Federation, AllPakistan Trade Union Congress met the mem-bers of the National Assembly and Senate'sStanding Committees on Labour on 2 April 2010to submit their inputs.23 By mid-April, theWorkers-Employers Bilateral Council of Pakistanand three trade union bodies--Pakistan WorkersFederation, Trade Union Action Committee andMuttahida Labour Federation-had submittedseparate proposals/drafts/recommendationsfor incorporation in the new law expected toreplace IRA 2008 on 30 April 2010. Meanwhile,the other key stakeholders-employers/industri-alists-held their own meetings with the govern-ment functionaries and the Employers'Federation of Pakistan submitted its recommen-dations and many of these were in conflict withthose of the workers' proposals.

It was not only the elected government that did


not re-formulate an industrial relations law inconformity with the country's constitutions andILO conventions, the trade union bodies andlabour representatives' efforts were not cohe-sive and fell short of reaching consensus onmany proposed amendments/recommenda-tions. No unified alternate draft law was submit-ted by the stakeholders to replace the IRA 2008.

Labour Conference 2010

The Tri-Partite Labour Conference was calledon 16 Feb 2010 after a lapse of eight years.Besides the Industrial Relations Act, the

government had put on the agenda three otherdrafts legislation--Employment and ServiceConditions, Occupational Safety and Health, andSocial Safety Nets--for discussion. Ironically, theConference turned out to be the ruling party(Pakistan People's party) functionaries and polit-ical activists' gathering rather than a platformfor dialogue between contending stakeholders.The Tri-Partite Conference 2010 was neither rep-resentational nor consultative.

Tripartisim, or dialogue between the govern-ment, workers and employers on equal terms,plays a crucial role in formulating labour policyand legislation. The principle is embodied in theILO Convention 144 Tripartite Consultation(International Labour Standards Convention)1976 which Pakistan ratified in 1994. The gov-ernment though recognizes the significance oftripartite consultations, does not abide by itsprinciple. Even when the criteria of representa-tion and agenda are observed, the consensusreached on policy and legislative matter isignored while drafting the law as happened inthe enactment of IRO 2002 which negated theoutcome of the Tripartite Conference held in2001.

The issues in tripartite consultations were sub-mitted by the Pakistan Workers Federation(PWF) in its complaint to the ILO Committee ofExperts on the Application of Conventions andRecommendations (CEACR) in 2008 and againin July 2009. The PWF also noted that theGovernment constituted two national tripartiteboards for two important federal institutions(the Workers Welfare Fund and the EOBI) andthe selection process of the representatives ofworkers in the tripartite boards did not complywith the Convention. Taking into account theconcerns of the PWF, the Committee asked theGovernment to provide detailed information onhow Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Conventionwere applied, so as to ensure that the most rep-

resentative organizations of workers participatefully in the tripartite consultations required bythe Convention.24 The government, however,rarely replies to the ILO Committee's observa-tions and queries.

Services Tribunal Bill 2010

Two anti-workers laws, the Removal fromService (Special Power) Ordinance 2000and the Section 2A of the Services Tribunal

Act 1973 were repealed on 5 March 2010 withthe passage of the Services Tribunal(Amendment) Bill 2010. The draconian legisla-tive pieces violated basic human rights, theConstitution and the ratified ILO Conventions,and had deprived certain categories of employ-ees of government, semi-government andautonomous corporations of their right to accesslabour judiciary subsequent to their arbitraryremoval, often enmasse, from services. Theselaws, used against union activists as one-sidedand punitive by the management and govern-ment, had created insecurity among workersand impacted unionization. According to an esti-mate, the Removal from Service (Special Power)Act 2000 had affected 37,000 workers in thepublic sector (i.e. WAPDA and its distributioncompanies, PTCL, financial institutions, com-mercial banks, provincial departments) in thelast ten years.

Labour Policy 2010

Labour policy is a time-bound blueprint for-mulated by the state in consultations withother stakeholders that defines broader

principles and guidelines related to the world ofwork and workers' rights. A labour policy, in itsessence, affirms economic, social and politicalrights guaranteed to all citizens by the country'sconstitution and the international covenants andILO conventions. It suggests a concrete roadmap to legislative reforms. Labour Policy 2010announced on 1 May was noted by analysts asgrossly deficient on all accounts. It fell short of apolicy document, lacking in research andinsights on ground realities and ignorant of thegovernment's own past and current initiatives.Constitutional experts raised the question of itsvalidity after the abolition of the concurrent listunder the 18th Amendment which renderedlabour a provincial subject.25 Full of sweepingand redundant statements, rhetoric and a hastycut-and-paste of information, the Labour Policy2010 is full of blunders.

In Pakistan. labour policy has, by and large,


remained divorced from legislation. The previ-ous five labour policies-1955, l959, 1969, 1972and 2001-did not materialize in to pro-labourlegislation. The Labour Policy 2001 that cameout after a long wait of 29 years, did not evenacknowledge the right of association for allworkers and neither envisioned extending basicrights to agriculture and the informal sectorworkers. Labour Policy 2010 is also silent onagricultural workers' rights of unionization andcollective bargaining. It only accedes to coveragricultural workers in mechanized farms (readcorporate farms) for compensation on death orinjury under the Workmen's Compensation Act1923. On crucial issues of child labour andforced labour, the policy made cursory remakes. The policy failed to outline strategic actions toaddress gender disparity in the work force and inworkplace. Rampant violation of ILO Conventionon equal remuneration for equal work and lowparticipation of female workers is indicative ofanti-women work environment. Yet, on women'seconomic participation, the policy noted a cou-ple of projects funded by international donors.The policy talked of Smart Cards for registrationof a minute section of workers already regis-tered under Social Security and EOBI, and of pay-ment of wages via banks, ignoring the fact thatless than 15 per cent of the country's populationhas access to the banking facilities.

The labour Policy 2010 promises to consolidateand rationalize labour laws in to five core laws.The writers of the policy forgot that in 2001 theLabour and Manpower Division shared six draftsof consolidated proposed laws with the stake-holders. The drafts had included the IndustrialRelations Ordinance, the Wages Ordinance,Conditions of Employment Ordinance,Occupational Health and Safety Ordinance, theHuman Resource Development Ordinance, andthe Labour Welfare and Social SecurityOrdinance. In October 2002, General PervaizMusharraf enacted the Industrial RelationsOrdinance 2002, over-riding stakeholders' com-ments and suggestions. The remaining fivedrafts were put on hold.

The Labour Policy 2010 states that: "A full-fledged labour Market Information System shallbe established…" The policy makers, ironically,are unaware that the Ministry of Labour andManpower, Islamabad, has already establisheda Labour Market Information and Analysis(LMIA) system in collaboration with the ILO andthe United Nations Development Programme(UNDP). Operational since 2006, the unit has

brought out till today five valuable analyses aspublished documents which can be downloadedfrom the website. The system 'aims to provideup-to-date and timely Labour MarketInformation and Analysis that serves as an inputinto the formulation and monitoring of labourand employment policies.26

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21Labour Rights in Pakistan3. Status of Labour Rights and the

Workers' Struggles

Officially the country's workforce is divided under six major sectors. Data is collected and tab-

ulated on these sectors alone. Various sub-sectors under each major sector are not investi-

gated. The most labour intensive sector is agriculture/forestry/hunting and fishing. Currently

45.1 per cent of the total 50.79 million workforce is engaged in this sector.27 The next sector in terms

of workforce strength is wholesale and retail trade which employs 16.5 per cent of the workforce.

Manufacturing engages a mere 13 per cent, a sad reflection on the state of the country's economy.

Construction involves 6.6. per cent and transport and communications employs 5.2 per cent.28

The terms and conditions of work differ in each sector and its sub-sectors. The most crucial factor

determining the status of workforce is its exclusion from the ambit of national labour laws. The

largest component of the workforce, i.e. in agricultural and fisheries, is excluded from all labour

rights, i.e. pertaining to wages, work time, social protection, health and safety. Profiling all the major

sectors and/or sub-sectors is a mammoth task requiring matching human and financial resources,

and beyond the scope of this report.

The following profiles attempt to give an overview of the selected sectors based on primary and sec-

ondary data, specific case studies and limited interaction with representative constituencies. The

selection of the sectors for profiling the status of labour rights and the workers' struggles is based

on the following criteria:

1. PILER's linkages with, and support to workers' organizations, groups and movements in the

sector;

2. Small surveys (on 1000 power loom workers and 500 garment factory women workers in

Karachi), a research project (on 2500 retrenched football stitchers in Sialkot) and case

studies (tenants and brick kiln workers) under taken by PILER team members during 2007 -

2010;

3. Vulnerability and exclusion of workers;

4. Lack of official data on informal sector workers' status and struggles.

PILER has been engaged with the workers in the textile sector since the last two decades, with fish

workers since 15 years, with brick kilns worker since 12 years and with workers in agriculture since

recently. Agriculture, fisheries and brick kilns fall under the informal sector and it is only recently

that the brick kilns are being registered under the Factories Act 1934 subsequent to the kiln work-

ers' campaigns. The textile sector, once a formal and unionized sector, has slowly metamorphosed

in to informal clusters of small and medium-sized units and large factories run by contract workers

under global supply chain production or for domestic market.

Manufacturing Sector Workers in Textile: Far fromwin-win situationOverviewTextile industry is in decline since the post quota(post-2004) period. Its share in exportsdecreased from 66 per cent in 2004 to 53.7 percent in 2008-09.29 Pakistan, being the 4rthlargest cotton growing country, exports 75 to 80per cent of its total produce of cotton and syn-thetic textile in the form of yarn, fabric, ready-made garments and made-up articles. Textilesector employs 38 per cent of total manufactur-ing labour force, or 6.7 million workers.30 Textileindustry comprises three sub-sectors: cottonspinning, cotton cloth and textile made-up. Overthe years, spinning expanded, partly due toaccess to cheap raw materials and in part due toprotectionist fiscal policy and export subsidiesprovided to influential owners of ginning facto-ries. In contrast, the growth in the labour-inten-sive weaving and value-added textile manufac-turing was low.

The recent years witnessed severe yarn crisisdespite bumper raw cotton production in thecountry. As international prices of yarnincreased, the spinning sector, in a run to rakeprofits, exported cotton yarn in larger quantities,leaving little for the local industry. Yarn exportsamounted to 54 per cent of Pakistan's totalexports recorded during July-February 2009-10.31 The weaving sector, comprised mainly ofmedium and small-sized enterprises, sufferedclosure of thousands of power loom units and adecreasing production in the absence of yarn inthe local market. The crisis hit hard the unor-ganized power loom sector. Price of a 48-kg yarnbag rose from Rs 1200 to about Rs 1500-1800and led to the closure of about 100,000 powerlooms leaving about 15,000 to 20,000 workersjobless.32 The Ministry of Textile restricted theexport of yarn from 50 million kg per month to35 million kg from March 2010. In May 2010,the government imposed a 15 percent tariff onexport of yarn.

Workers in Garments/Apparel/Textile Made-upThe share of apparel manufacturing is 11.73 percent only, with around 4000 manufacturingunits of garments, knit-wear and made-ups inthe major cities-Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad,Multan, Gujranwala, Sialkot. According to thePakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association,

3,500 units of various sizes which had morethan 700,000 workers on their payrolls wereaffected and 245 hosiery and knitwear produc-ing units closed down over the last five yearsincluding 99 shuttered down just in 2008.33

There is no official data available on number offactory closed down during 2008-09 and neitheron the working hours lost. According to unoffi-cial estimates about 1,500 garment units inKarachi alone, employing about 500,000 peopleand as many as 300 garment units, i.e. 20 percent, have closed down in Karachi (year of datawas not mentioned).34 It was reported by theMinistry of Textile that 94 big units each employ-ing more than 1,000 workers in the hosiery,knitwear, polyester filament, spinning, garment,denim, silk and rayon sectors were closed in2008.35

The Pakistan Readymade GarmentManufacturers and Exporters Association(PRGMEA) estimated that about 40 per cent ofreadymade garment factories were closed downand 50 per cent of factories cut their production.'The government exports yarn to China whoprocesses it and re-sell to Pakistan but as theprice is higher, the local industry cannot buy it'.

The study conducted by a community-basedgroup, Child and Labor Rights WelfareOrganization, in 2009 about the impact of glob-al economic recession on factory workers in BinQasim, Landhi and Korangi industrial area inKarachi found massive entrenchment in the gar-ment factories. From the seven factories sur-veyed in Malir industrial area, three factorieswere completely shut down and 2,500 workerslost job. Two of the surveyed factories cut downtheir workforce by 600 and 300, respectively.Two large and well know factories alsoretrenched 30 per cent workers. In the Korangiindustrial area, the factories slashed workforceby 30 to 92 per cent. Some factories reducednumber of working days from 30 days to 20 daysper month. This had serious impacts on theworkers' households as they struggled to surviveduring unemployment of the main bread winnerof the family.

Garment/Apparel industry is a labor intensiveindustry and relies on the skills of individualworkers in Pakistan. Garment industry consistsof a large number of small and medium sizedfirms sandwiched between the two giants - bigtextile firms that sell yarn/raw fabric and themega-sized retailers who buy the finished prod-


uct. Small and medium-sized enterprises havelittle negotiation power in setting prices, andessentially they are rendered as 'price takers'.This structure has made the industry difficult tooffer workers benefits and better wages.38 Theindustry seems to be stuck in a low-skill and low-productivity rut, which could be the reason thatcutting labour cost is the only way they find tobring down production expenses to compete inthe global market.

The sector is dominated by units comprising 50machines or below.39 There are 326 reportingestablishments in apparel industry40 but offi-cial data on units that include unregistered unitsand the employed workforce is lacking. Even theregistered units do not disclose the exact work-force. The units registered with the PRGMEAgives the number of workers but only of thosewho are registered with the EOBI and SESSI. 'If aunit has 2,000 workers, and only 500 are regu-lar workers, the member reports just 500 work-ers. The Association knows it to be false but isnot mandated to physically check the manufac-turing unit.' The workers in each registered unitinclude a certain number of salary based regis-tered workers, a larger number of piece rateunregistered contract workers at production line(in the factory premises) and piece rate home-based workers.

Government's initiativeWith an objective to encourage registration ofinformal textile/apparel units, the Ministry ofTextile Industry issued the Drawback of LocalTaxes and Levies Order 2009 allowing the gar-ments, home textiles and processed fabric man-ufacturing units to claim drawback of taxes andlevies. This law has motivated garments units toregister themselves with the PRGMEA and otherregistration authorities and since September2009 the PRGMEA is receiving a larger numberof applications for membership.

The Ministry of Textile Industry also issuedReimbursement of EOBI Contribution Order2009 to encourage women employment in tex-tile industry. Under the first ever Textile Policy2009-14, the government has sought to inductwomen and disabled persons in the industry.Hence under the SRO (1)/2009, the governmenthas picked up the cost of Social SecurityInstitution and the EOBI of these two categoriesof workers. It is applicable only to the extent ofpayments made by textile units towards EOBIand SSI contributions for women and disabledworkers employed in the respective units.

Cutting labour costComparative data of production cost show thateven though labor cost in Pakistan is 2nd lowestamong 5 countries listed in the table, averageunit price of the products are almost same asother countries where labor costs are higherthan Pakistan. This implies Pakistan is neithercompetitive nor the dividend are shared withworkers. The workers are the real 'price takers'.

TABELS?

Employers/manufacturers floated an even moreunjust strategy: two scales of wages for workersin urban and rural areas and relocation of someof the apparel and garment units to rural areasto bring down the cost of production. ThePakistan Readymade Garment Manufacturersand Exporters Association (PRGMEA) proposednew parameters for establishing low-value pro-duction units in rural areas which would allowthe industry to hire workers with the minimumwages of Rs 4,000. (The minimum wage wasraised from Rs. 6000 to Rs 7,000 on 1st May2010). The PRGMEA also suggested that aver-age units should not have more than 250 to 500stitching machines and female workers shouldbe given the job in these units.42 The PRGMEAstance indicates the mindset of employers forwhom cutting labour cost is the remedy of all illsbefalling the industry. It also implies thatwomen's lack of empowerment is taken forgranted and gender inequity in wages is floutedas a remedy.

The 2009 survey conducted by PILER on 500garment female workers in Karachi found thatthe workers were young, unmarried in their early20s. More than 78 per cent of the respondentswork 12 hours per day and 97 per cent of therespondents have temporary status. Ninety-nineper cent of them do not possess a writtenemployment letter. The stitchers receive morethan Rs. 6,000 and those engaged in cropping,checking and packing receive less than the (pre-vious) official minimum wage, i.e. Rs. 6,000 permonth. The average number of respondent'sfamily is 9 and each household has 3 earners intheir family. Average income of an earner in thefamily is approximately 5,000 Rs per month. Thetotal income of the household--Rs. 15,000 feed-ing 9 persons--translates in to less than 1 dollara day per person.

Aside long working hours, low wages, and noentitlement for overtime payment, job insecuritywas the most pressing issue for the contract


workers. PILER survey found 60 percent work-ers suffer from delayed payment and more than96 percent have not been registered under thesocial security institution and EOBI. Due todepressed market conditions, piece rate work-ers experienced on average 10 to 15 days ofunemployment in a month.43 It is hard to earnenough money to buy two meals for the familydue to the slump in the industry.44 Those wholost work in the garments sector had to shift tounskilled work with low wages, or had no optionbut to return to the deprived environs of their vil-lages.

Support for skill developmentPILER survey 2009 confirmed that skilled workis paid better than unskilled work. Yet, opportu-nities for skill development are rare. There areseveral initiatives supported by internationaldonors and undertaken in collaboration with pri-vate sector to fill this gap. GEN-PROM (GenderPromotion in the Garment/Clothing Sectorthrough Skills Development) is one of the proj-ects being implemented in Sindh and Punjabwith the partnership of Pakistan ReadymadeGarments and Exporters Association (PRGMEA)and the Government College UniversityFaisalabad. The project aims at enhancing theskill level of garments industry workers so thatthis important industry can survive the toughchallenges of global competition. The project istargeted at reducing unemployment while simul-taneously increasing much needed skilled work-force efficiency for the garment industry. It alsofacilitates factory owners to equip the work-places with the women-friendly facilities includ-ing separate bathrooms, and promotes perma-nent monthly paid position instead of contract-based work.45 The project trained 266 mastertrainers and 3,847 workers by May 2009.46

However, the project is time-bound. A long termstrategy and continuous efforts are needed forrealizing a win-win situation in the years tocome.

Informal Non-Mill SectorThe weaving sector is divided in to three subsec-tors - integrated, independent weaving units andpower loom units. Former subsectors operate inthe organized mill sector, where as power loomsfall in the informal non-mill sector. A loom canbe installed in a house and one or two workerscan run the loom. According to TextileCommissioner's Organization, the total numberof power looms in Pakistan is 360,000.47

According to an estimate over 30,000 small or

medium size power loom units are located inKarachi.48 The estimated number of powerlooms is more than 60,000 in Faisalabad49 andaround 60,000 in Multan.50 The non-mill sectordoes not maintain production statistics.Problems of the power loom sector revolvemainly around poor technology, scarcity of qual-ity yarn and lack of institutional financing for itsdevelopment.51

Long Hours, Low PayOperating power looms is arduous and demandsdexterity, an alert mind and a constant to and froby the worker as he has to operate simultane-ously four to eight machines. Production takesplace generally in two 12-hour day/night shifts.Some of the power looms operate in 8-hourslong three shifts. On an average, a power loomworker earns between Rs. 7,000 to 7,500 permonth after putting up 12 hours of work in aday. Workers in this sector are paid piece rateweekly or fortnightly on the basis of per metercloth woven. Rates differ with the quality of thecloth and are determined by the power loomowners. The cloth produced by each worker ismeasured at the end of the shift and document-ed in a register by a clerk. As production is errat-ic, due to electricity outages or yarn shortage, aworker is generally idle, hence without wages,for some days. Also, the owners organize theproduction and loom operation in a way that aworker does not earn more than Rs. 7,000-8,000 per month.52 The units vary in number oflooms and workers from smaller 8-loom units,manned by 10-12 workers to bigger 50-loomsunit with a work force of 60 to 80 all-male staff.

Workers in Karachi Power LoomUnitsDue to non-formal status, there is no data avail-able on power loom units in Karachi. However,according to an estimate by the Power LoomsWorkers General Union, Karachi, more than30,000 small and large power loom units arelocated in different areas of this mega city,mainly in four towns-Baldia, SITE, Orangi andKeamari. The area with a thick cluster of powerloom units is Ettehad Town, Baldia. The otherareas are Saeedabad, Rasheedabad, Shershah,Mominabad, Haroonabad, Korangi, AdamjeeRoad Landhi, and New Karachi.

With an objective to ascertain the workers' pro-file and the terms and conditions of work in thecity's power loom sector, PILER in collaborationwith the Power Looms Workers' General Union,


Karachi, undertook a survey of 1,000 workers in2009.

Family Size, Household Incomeand Child LabourThe survey findings indicate that power loomsare exclusively operated by male workers of agegroup 20-50 years. The average age of therespondents in the survey was 32.25 years, and68 per cent were married. Data indicates a sig-nificant 10 per cent child labour, mostly of theage group 14-17 years with fewer children below14 years of age. The family size was 7.79 witheach household having 1.71 earners in the fam-ily. The average income of a power loom workerwas Rs. 7,418 per month. Hence, an amount ofRs. 7,418 was feeding 3.8 household memberswhich translated as Rs.1,952 per person permonth, equivalent to $23 (@ Rs.84) which is lessthan one dollar a day per person.

VulnerabilitiesAbout half of the power loom workers surveyed(49 per cent) had no schooling, 28 per cent hadless than five years of schooling and 15 per centhad studied up to class eight. Power loom sectorin Karachi is dominated by workers originallyhailing from the provinces of Punjab and KhyberPakhtunkhwa who came to Karachi in search oflivelihood and settled in the city with families.The majority-47 per cent is Punjabi speaking, fol-lowed by Pashto (24%), Hindko (11%) andSaraiki (5%). Ratio of Urdu, Sindhi, and Baloch-speaking population was not significant. Anapparent reason for concentration ofmigrants/settlers in the power loom sector is itslabour intensive nature and poor terms and con-ditions of work pulling in weak and vulnerableworkforce that has little assets. Another reason,according to a power loom labour union activist,is that the units in Karachi offer better wagescompared to what the weavers get in powerlooms in Punjab. The workers live in low-income,poor infrastructure settlements close to industri-al areas in Karachi. Half of the respondent (51%)reported living in kacha dwellings, 45 per centwere on rent and 40 per cent had no access towater supply line.

Terms and conditions of WorkMost of the units are small, operated by 15 to 30workers, and containing 10 to 20 looms. Theworkforce comprises 73 per cent weavers andthe remaining staff includes pro-winders,machinists, electricians, helpers, sleyers,warpers, sorters/checkers, loaders, security and

administration personnel. A significant number-34 per cent-reported their units are producingcloth for export. On average, a weaver operatesfive machines simultaneously. More than 90 percent of the respondents reported they workedfor 12 hours per day; 93 per have no paid week-ly holiday and 99.8 per cent were not paid over-time wages. None of them had any written con-tract and only 0.5 per cent was in possession ofa factory identity card.

About half of respondents (50.8%) had beenworking for the current factory since less than ayear and 20 per cent had worked more than oneyear in the current factory indicating a high turnover and insecure nature of employment in thesector. On an average, workers in power loomunits were getting a monthly income of Rs.7,418. Only two out of 1,000 respondentsreplied they were registered at the SocialSecurity Institution and EOBI, and just 16 work-ers reported the unit he worked at, had a signboard, indicating widespread evasion of registra-tion of power loom units under the Factories Act.Unless a unit is registered by its owner, theworkers cannot be registered with the socialsecurity institutions.

Working environment for power loom workerswas not satisfactory: 26.4 per cent workersreported lack of toilet facility and 37 per centhad no access to drinking water. As much as53.6 per cent reported their units were not prop-erly lit and airy and the majority of workers-- 93per cent-- were not aware of their rights of healthand safety at work place.

UnionizationThe survey indicated moderate level of unioniza-tion (compared to other sectors), with 21 percent of the respondents reporting the presenceof unions in power loom units but only 9 per centof total respondents were found to be unionmembers. About the same number--11 per cent--were aware of their rights to unionize and col-lective bargaining which reveals that powerloom unions in Karachi, even if they exist, areweak and not contributing towards workers'empowerment. One of the factors of weakunionization in Karachi is multi-ethnicity andethnic divisions that have deepened over thedecades due to peculiar politics of the city.

Power Looms Workers General Union, Karachi,Mills Area Saeedabad, Baldia Town, a registeredtrade union, currently has about 600 members.Formed in early 1980s, the union underwent


inactive phases and was revived in 1999.Though its membership base is limited to justone cluster of power looms (Saeedabad), and ithas not succeeded in reaching out to powerloom workers in other towns of Karachi, it hascontinued its struggle and made a couple ofachievements. The Union has campaignedrelentlessly for wage increase, weekly holiday,registration of the units/workers with SocialSecurity Institution and the EOBI, and for basicamenities at work place.

In May 2008, the Union formulated a Charter ofDemand and submitted to the power loom own-ers. As the owners did not respond, the workerswent on a strike. The owners finally agreed anda written contract was signed in early June byboth the parties. The owners then sacked theunion activists. Non implementation of the con-tract compelled the workers to initiate a cam-paign. Facilitated by the state officials (LabourDepartment), the negotiations led to a raise inwages. Another Charter of Demand was submit-ted in September 2009 and for three monthsthe Labour Department held tri-partite meetingsfor conflict resolution. But the owners failed toparticipate in the meeting and the Departmentissued a Certificate of Failure to the Union per-mitting it to approach the Labour Court.53 Theprocess led to a further weakening of the union.

Powerloom Labour Movement inFaisalabadFaisalabad, the third largest city of Pakistan,with an estimated population of 5.5 million, isthe hub of cotton textile production. Known as"Manchester of Pakistan" for its clusters of tex-tile units, the city provides livelihood to estimat-ed 3.5 million people directly or indirectlythrough textile sector. There are some 60,000small and big power loom factories inFaisalabad district.54 Estimated 100,000 work-ers are engaged in the power loom sector inFaisalabad city. Terms and conditions of work inpower loom units are poor: low wages, longworking hours, lack of social security andabsence of health and safety provisions andother basic amenities at work place.

The Labour Qaumi Movement (LQM), an infor-mal power loom workers union that emerged in2003 in Faislabad, gained in strength and broad-ened its membership base during recent years.In 2008 the workers' hardship increased withunprecedented hike in fuel and food prices. TheLQM intensified its struggle for increase inwages in the entire Faisalabad Division including

Toba Tek Singh, Gojra and Jhang districts. Theworkers went on strike and held protest meet-ings. In June 2008, in a scuffle at a power loom,the owner, who was a member of the ProvincialAssembly, and his armed gunmen attacked theworkers, injuring seven. The infuriated workersburnt down a warehouse of the factory, blockedthe roads and demanded arrest of the MPA andhis gunmen. On the intervention of theProvincial Labour Minister, the police registereda case against the MPA and his accomplices.

The Labour Minister also held talks with both theparties and a committee was formed to resolvethe issues. On June 28 an agreement wassigned and the owners agreed to raise thewages for a year. The agreement was not fullyimplemented and the LQM kept submitting com-plaints to the Labour Department. After theexpiry of the agreement in 2009, the LQMserved a notice to the power loom owners andfinally gave a strike call on 28 July 2009. Duringthe strike, daily protest meetings were held,attended by thousands of workers. Almost 75percent of power looms remained closed for 11days. Finally the local administration intervenedand the workers and owners met at the DistrictCoordination Officer to resolve the issue. In afinal settlement, owners agreed on a raise inpiece rate that amounted into a monthlyincrease of Rs 1,500 on an average.

Workers-Owners Brief AllianceIn the later months of 2009, the sector wentthrough a severe yarn shortage despite bumpercotton production in the country. Rising interna-tional prices led the spinning sector export yarnin larger quantities, leaving little for the localindustry. 50,000 power looms in the countryclosed down and 40,000 looms operated undercapacity55 rendering 15,000 to 20,000 workersjobless.56 This crisis brought the owners andworkers together in an alliance 'Save the PowerLooms Movement' and the workers came out onthe streets against the government's flawed poli-cies. In early 2010, owners and workers protest-ed together against power outages. But thisalliance was short lived and soon the two partieswere at loggerhead again on the issue of wages.

Meanwhile, the power loom workers movementgained strength when its president contested fora seat in the Provincial Assembly in the bye elec-tions held in May 2010 as a Pakistan LabourParty candidate. Though he lost the elections tothe powerful and ruling party candidate, theeffort by a common worker to participate in the


national political process inspired and energizedthe labour in the city.

The Labour Qaumi Movement took up the cam-paign in June and called a strike on 5 July forwage raise as there had been no increase inpiece rates despite the raise in the minimumwage announced by the government in 2010. Toavoid closure of the industry, the owners andworkers met with the District CoordinationOfficer for dispute resolution the same day. Afterthe second round of meeting on 7 July, where adecision was made for a 17 per cent increase, arepresentative of LQM and his brother were mur-dered in their office. The workers went on a com-plete strike the next day against the murdersand the environment of intimidation and harass-ment suffered by the union activists.

The Labour Qaumi Movement has a long way togo in its struggle to achieve due labour rights butit has proved that workers in the informal sector,if organized and strong in numbers can operateas collective bargaining agent regardless of thelegal status of the union.

Football Stitchers: Getting a RawDeal in the Global Supply Chain57

The inflatable ball is the core product ofPakistan's sports goods industry. Sialkot sup-plies 22 per cent of total world exports througha network of 3,229 village-level sourcing or cot-tage enterprises and informal labour comprisingan estimated 50,000 workers.59 In 2005 thesports goods industry contributed US$ 318.8million to the national exchequer.60 A downwardtrend in production is noticeable particularlysince 2006 when the machine-made footballwas used in the World Cup for the first time.Earlier, 40 millions balls, stitched by Sialkotworkers, were exported generating $210 millionannually. For the 2010 FIFA World Cup, theexport of Sialkot balls was down to 3.5 millionfootballs worth $ 5.2 million only.61

Contrary to the prevalent perceptions that theworkers producing for multinationals and worldbrands are getting a decent wage and due ben-efits, the global production system is as exploita-tive towards workers at the lower tiers as localestablishments violate labour laws. Hence, thesubcontracted workers in Sialkot football indus-try, removed from the regulated environs of for-mal work sites and largely excluded from pro-tective legislation, are just a part of the bulk ofinformal workforce (73 per cent) in the countrythough producing formally for the global market.

Low wages, lack of social protection and lack ofrepresentational security characterize their workconditions. Unorganized and dispersed in sur-rounding villages, with low literacy level and littleor no access to information on labour rights andlegislative mechanisms, football stitchers arevulnerable to both local and global forces. Theregular workers employed at the main factorieslocated at the outskirts of the city, hardly fareany better. Placed at the lower end of productionhierarchy, these workers are largely deprived ofentitlements due to non-issuance of employ-ment contract by the manufacturer and bypass-ing of applicable rules and regulations.

MNCs, Codes of Conduct and LocalRealitiesCompetitive advantage is driving manufacturersto cut production cost. In Pakistan, entrepre-neurs cannot think of a better way to reduce costbut to cut labour cost. Local powerful stakehold-ers-manufacturers, industrialists, state bodies-deliberately sideline national labour laws andinternational standards that ensure a minimumof benefits to workers. Weak labour regulationand poor implementation of labour standards incountries where MNCs are shifting production,like in Pakistan, have created a vacuum andcompelled MNCs to address labour complianceissues in the subcontracted production places.The company's codes of conduct is a voluntarycommitment by the MNC, though usually thecompany's motives--either strategic, defensiveor ultruistic-are strong enough to compel thecompany to honour and push for the implemen-tation of its code of conduct. The mode of imple-mentation is mostly dependant on moral obliga-tion on the part of the constituent member, orthe local vendor, in the supply chain. The ulti-mate lever remains in the hand of the MNC: thatit can take its business elsewhere if the localvendor is not implementing the code. But, asseveral cases in developing countries haveshown, this lever is generally used to mask otherreasons for shifting the business to anothercountry or locale. Due to the overwhelming infor-mal nature of economy in developing countriesand lack of legal coverage to informal workerseven when the codes are implemented, the ben-efits tend to remain limited to permanent andregular workers and '…contract workers experi-ence little change' in their working conditions.62

Non-Compliance of the CodeIn November 2006, the Nike Inc. cancelled itscontract, on allegations of violation of the code


of conduct, with the Saga Sports Ltd, one oflargest football production companies in Sialkot.The Saga Sports employed a workforce of 7,637of whom 5,257 were piece-rate workers residingin more than 400 rural settlements dispersed inthree tehsils of the district (Sialkot, Pasrur,Daska)--spread over 3,016 kilometres--and con-verging to work at the Saga-operated 12 largeofficial stitching centers located in the largersemi-urban settlements.63

The Nike Inc., through a European organizationJust Solutions Network, funded a research andworkers' support project undertaken by PILER.By the time the study began in April 2007 (onemonth after the last Nike orders had been ful-filled), all of Saga Sports' 5,257 piece-rate con-tract workers had already lost work. The remain-ing 2,380 permanent employees wereretrenched by December 2007. The PILERresearch team interacted with a total of 2,484retrenched workers, scattered in 250 villages,through structured interviews, informal meet-ings, seminars and focus group discussions withselected ex-workers.

The study explored the retrenched workers' lifeand past/current work situation, the productionprocesses, the concept and the reality of 'workcentres' or 'monitorable stitching centres' andprobed the extent of non-compliance of labourstandards in football manufacturing focusing. Anumber of the identified retrenched workerswere sensitized on labour standards, nationallabour legislation and code of conduct. Legal aidwas provided to those among retrenched work-ers who could claim entitlements from the com-pany. The workers were also assisted to relocatein the new supply chain or access alternativeopportunities for livelihood.

Macro policies and livelihoodoptions in Sialkot DistrictSialkot district, a hub of labour-intensive indus-trial clusters, comprises largely a population(73.8 per cent) officially defined as rural.64 Thedistrict is one of the most fertile lands and themain crops are wheat, rice and maize. Change inland tenure pattern, since the last four decades,has led to a decline in tenancy, fragmentation offarms and an increase in the number of smallowner-cultivated farms. Rising number of smallowner-cultivated farms though has not led toincrease in productivity and crop productiongrowth has remained stagnant. Almost 50 per-cent of the households in the district aredescribed officially as agricultural household,

depending on agriculture and livestock.65

The study, however, indicated a different picture:for the majority of the respondents, footballstitching was the main source of income. Highprices of agricultural inputs, low acreage andweather uncertainties have greatly reducedincome from land. Unprofitable farming is push-ing many households to sell their small land-holdings as indicated by several case studies ofworkers during the research. Landlessness andlow return on agriculture have compelled house-holds to depend mainly on wage work in themanufacturing sector -- sports goods, leathergoods and surgical instruments.

Workers' Socio-EconomicIndicatorsMajority (72.7 per cent) of the retrenched work-ers were young, 15-30 year-old, and male (74.5per cent). The literacy rate, 79 per cent, wasmuch higher than the average rate of 56 percent literacy in the province of Punjab.66 But thelevel of literacy was low: 39 per cent had just 5years of schooling; 22 per cent had studied up to8 years while just 11 per cent had passed 10thgrade. Average family size was 6 to 7 members.A significant number, 30 per cent, did not havetoilet facility at home while the number of work-ers who reported lack of access to safe drinkingwater supply was high (75.5 per cent). Themajority (90 per cent) had no source of incomeother than football stitching indicating almosttotal lack of alternative livelihoods (i.e. agribusi-ness, dairy production, agricultural processing)in the largely rural/semi-urban Sialkot district.Some reported meager livestock, a couple ofbuffalos or goats. Just about 4 per cent workerswere earning a little additional income throughcultivation of their small piece of land.

Work ConditionsAt the Saga Sports Ltd., an overwhelming major-ity--84.4 per cent--worked on piece-rate and just15.6 per cent were regular employees. Ninety-two per cent reported they were never given anyappointment/contract letter: none of them wereaware of the importance of this key documentthat establishes their legal identity as worker. Atthe time Saga Sports retrenched its workers in2007, the majority (84 per cent) was being paidless than the minimum wage of Rs 4,600 permonth fixed in August 2006 by the government.Twenty-four percent reported a measly monthlyincome of up to Rs. 2,500 only. Twenty-two per-cent were getting between Rs. 2,500 to Rs.


3,500 and 38 per cent were paid up to Rs.4,500. None of the workers were aware of theMinimum Wage Law and of the periodic raise inminimum wage by the state.

As the majority of workers were on piece-rateand without any contract letter, they were notregistered with the state-run social security insti-tutions (EOBI, SSI). Free transport, lunch and tea,basic medical help through once-a-week accessto a doctor plus free medicines, and fair priceshops at each work centre, however, providedsome relief to the workers. Several of the per-manent workers, who possessed relevant regis-tration cards, reported access to medical facili-ties through social security hospital. Many work-ers narrated incidences of illnesses thatrequired a large sum (Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 75,000)for treatment raised personally either throughloans from relatives or sale of meager familyassets.

Subcontracting Unionizatio andRights KnowledgeThe case studies, focus group discussions andfield visits revealed that the traditional system ofsubcontracting and providing advanced pay-ment to workers was widespread despite theprovision of the formal work centers built as perNike requirement to avoid downstream subcon-tracting and the system of advance payment orpeshgi. The local vendor would pick out stitchersand offer them subcontracting work as 'makers',(local term used for subcontractors in Sialkot). A'maker' enters into an unwritten contract withthe manufacturing company and its pivotal con-dition is the number of workers he undertakes tomobilize to complete an order (received by themanufacturer from an international brand com-pany) on time. The maker gets commission perpiece from the manufacturer/vendor and isresponsible for delivery of the material (footballpanels) to the workers at his/her door step or atthe stipulated work centre. He then collects thefinished footballs and delivers the order back tothe manufacturer.

The stitchers commit their labour to the 'maker'in lieu of advance payment. The maker paysadvance from his own resources. When the com-pany collapsed, many 'makers' suffered lossesas they could not recover any money from theretrenched stitchers simply because stitcherssurvive on a hand-to-mouth condition and haveno assets. The 'makers' are found to be on thesame socio-economic boat as are stitchers butwith slight edge over other workers as they seem

to have a capacity to access resources and takerisks. The company exploited a number of work-ers-makers who had meager resources. Asthese makers were neither piece-rate contractstitchers, nor permanent employees, they hadno legal identification or documents to claimany benefits whatsoever.

Industrial(Feudal) RelationsThe study indicated an informal, non-profession-al management style operating in Sialkot whereindustrial firms are owned and managed byimmediate family members and blood relativeswith a minimum of professional staff at themanagerial level. The firms subcontract outwork at piece-rate to distant, under-privileged,low-skilled, less-educated, rural workforce. Theowner-industrialist often tends to adopt the roleof a patron-sustainer of the 'poor unemployedpeople'. This is sustained through nepotism andinformal procedures of hiring and firing, lack ofimplementation of labour standards and servic-es rule, and selective-sporadic display of 'benev-olence' instead of institutionalized mechanismsof entitlements and established facilities.

The local industrialists looked down upon work-ers, or kammis, with scorn and disapproval anduse derogatory words and stereotypes--jahil,nashaie, kaahil (ignorant, addicts, lazy).67 Theindustrialist believes that the workers are poorbecause of their own doings: 'they don't workhard'. The industrialist thinks he has to make thebest out of a semi-skilled, semi-literate work-force who stands no chance for an improve-ment. 'Because that's the way they are'. Theindustrialist seems to hold as deterministic aworld view as held by workers about their ownsituation.

Many of the local manufacturers are in posses-sion of the SA8000 certification, which accord-ing to a source '…is being sold in the city on thela(hawking cart) by accrediting companies for Rs.200,000 each'. Several of the manufacturersbelieve they take care of the workers' rights andit is the workers who are out to exploit them andsabotage their businesses.

According to one of the leading manufacturers,workers in the registered main factories get duerights. The contractual labour, working fromhome, or in private sheds, are not entitled to anyrights and as such, states the manufacturer,there is no question of labour laws violation. Themanufacturers who do accept that workers arenot getting a fair deal, think enhanced labour


cost would impact their businesses adversely.According to the local manufacturers, the indus-try has already squeezed its margin of profits toavoid child labour and is losing its competitiveedge to China. The industrialist '… cannot paythe same benefits to piece-rate, contract work-ers as to the salaried, permanent worker'.68

DDiimmiinniisshhiinngg WWoorrkkA Majority MarginalizedThe share of agriculture in GDP is declining per-sistently. In 2008-09 it was recorded at 21.8 percent.69 Despite its falling share in GDP, agricul-ture remains the largest sector in terms ofemployment, i.e. 45.1 per cent of the totallabour force, indicating a deep malaise in ruraleconomy.70 Skewed landholdings, increasingfragmentation of farms, lack of support in termsof policy, infrastructure, inputs and investmentcharacterize the sector. Nearly 62 per cent of thetotal farms range from less than one acre to 5acres but the area with these farms is only 15per cent of total farm area. Twenty-five per centof the farm holdings vary from 5 acre to lessthan 12.5 acres.71 For subsistence farming aminimum of 12.5 acres is required. Thus 87 percent of the landholdings are below subsistencelevel.72 A recent survey of Sukkur district indi-cates majority of the farmers comprise subsis-tence farmers as 65 per cent of the farmershave land holdings of up to 12.5 acres. In con-trast, only 5 per cent of the farms are under therange of 25 acre to 100 acres.

Political Power and BigLandholdingsLarge landholdings of 100 acres and above--totaling to 5.84 million acres of land73-- are con-centrated in less than one percent of total num-ber of the farms74, owned by few landlords whosit in the parliament and resist land reforms.Half-hearted attempts (1959, 1972) at landreforms have failed, and the landlords continueto hold immense power over peasants, policymakers and the military. Agricultural is not list-ed as an industry on the behest of the landlordswho continue to exist outside the taxation sys-tem. The Punjab Assembly was quick to pass aresolution against the much-feared agriculturalincome tax when the IMF demanded to imposetax on agriculture in November 2008.75

Working arrangements in agriculture range fromwage work, tenant farming, share cropping tosmall-farm cultivating. Average size of the ruralhousehold is 7.1 members.76 Due to high man-

land ratio in agriculture and rising landlessness,unemployment and underemployment hasincreased. The households can no longer surviveon the produce of small landholdings alone andthe members have turned to non-farm wagelabour comprising menial and unskilled work.According to an estimate, 100,000 workers arepushed out of agriculture annually.77

Denial of Fundamental RightsThe fundamental principles and rights at workare not applicable in the sector. Agriculturalworkforce is explicitly denied freedom of associ-ation, right to collective bargaining, eliminationof child labour and non-discrimination in wages.Labour laws do not conform to the spirit of theConstitution embodied in its various Articles,specifically Article 17 (which ensures the right toform association or trade union to every citizen).None of the country's labour law-- either ofindustrial relations, social protection, minimumwages, or health and safety-applies to agricul-tural workers. Though Pakistan has ratified alleight ILO core labour standards, it has notbrought national legislation in compliance withthe ILO Conventions No. 87 (freedom of associa-tion) and No. 98 (right to collective bargaining).In the areas where specific legislation exists,such as the Bonded Labour System (Abolition)Act 1992 and the Employment of Children Act1991, implementation is totally lacking.Pakistan has not ratified the Right ofAssociation (Agriculture) Convention (No.11)adopted by the ILO in 1921 and neither it hasratified the Rural Workers' OrganizationsConvention (No. 141).

Low Income and CapabilitiesDeprivationThe rural household has an average of 2.1 earn-ers and the household income of the poorest 20per cent (1st quintile) in the 2007-08 was report-ed to be Rs. 7,639 per month.78 The income perearner-worker in the rural households falling into 1st, 2nd and 3rd quintiles (i.e 60 per centhouseholds) was between Rs. 3,819 to Rs.5,450 per month79 in 2008 when the minimumwage was Rs. 6,000. The income of an earner inthe 4th quintile was barely Rs. 6,109.80

Agricultural workers suffer from both incomepoverty and human poverty. In the 2000 Census,63 per cent of the agricultural house-holdsmembers were reported as illiterate. In a 2007study of four districts in Kyber Pakhtunwaprovince, 64.33 per cent farmers were illiterate


and only 13.33 per cent had 9 to 10 years ofschooling. In the national PSLM 2008-09 sur-vey, rural literacy was noted as 48 per cent. Lackof access to related skills and information isanother constraint in sustainable managementof their meager resources. In a study of ruraleconomy in Sukkur district, 97.7 per cent of thefarmers were of the opinion that limited or noaccess to latest research and farming tech-niques is a hindrance to improvement in farmproductivity.81

Overwhelming majority, 80.84 per cent, of ruralfamilies live in housing/shelter made of mudbricks and wood, 26 per cent households live inone-room shelter; 69 per cent use wood/char-coal as fuel for cooking and only 21 per centhave access to tap water and 33 per cent haveno toilet facility.82

The low incomes of agricultural workers, com-bined with poor access to basic facilities inhealth and sanitation, education and physicalinfrastructure, have led to a high incidence ofpoverty, particularly among landless house-holds. Of the total farm households, 18 per centare reported to be under debt.83 According to anestimate, based on 2000 Census data, in theprovince of Punjab there were 250,000 bondedsharecropper households. With average house-hold size of 7.3, these households are estimatedto include nearly 2 million family workers. Mostof these workers suffer the worst form ofexploitation under the conditions of debtbondage.

Tenancy and SharecroppingDue to highly skewed landholdings, fragmenta-tion of farms and increasing landlessness, ten-ancy is prevalent in agrarian work arrange-ments. Legally, tenancy is defined as 'a parcelof land held by a tenant of landlord under onelease or one set of conditions'.84 One-third of thecountry's farmers are tenant farmers. Tenancy ishighest in Sindh province where almost 50 percent of the farmers are tenants. According to theCensus 2000, 10.26 million acres of farm areais cultivated by tenants either on sharecroppingor lease basis or on undefined terms of tenancy.Of this area, 72 per cent is operated by sharecroppers.85 In sharecropping arrangement, cul-tivable land is put at the disposal of landlessfarmers by the landlord through a contract. Thesharecropper provides inputs from his own pock-et-fertilizers, seeds, implements and the pro-duce are divided between tenant and owner at50: 50. According to analysts this is an unfair

arrangement to begin with, and the land ownershould invest in inputs for a fair 50:50 ratio oflabour and capital. In cases tenant-farmer is toopoor to invest, the land owner purchases inputsand keeps 75 per cent of the share and the ten-ant gets 25 per cent. In most of the cases, it isan oral agreement and no written contract isprepared by either party. The tenants, mostlywithout formal education and poor, are thus in avulnerable position to be exploited by the land-lords through various tactics.

Land Records and the Tenants'VulnerabilityThe existing land records management system,put up by the British to collect land revenue isobsolete, complicated, opaque and riddled withflaws hence exploited by the powerful to thedetriment of the poor tenants. The most prob-lematic issue is that the present land legislation-the Land Revenue Act (1967) and theRegistration Act (1908)- do not provide for astate certificate of title to land under the aegis ofa public authority.86 Many court rulings havemaintained that entries in the land records arecontestable, that the revenue records are notdocuments of title, and that it is permissible tochallenge the entries for determining the title toland.87 This state of affairs regarding records of


In Punjab, high transaction costs and dif-ficulties associated with the land recordssystem continue to impose significant

harm on land owners and prospective landowners, (particularly the poor, who havesmall holdings and less access to informa-tion or resources), making them vulnerableto the predatory behaviour of middlemen,and lowering the liquidity of family assetscomposed in whole or in part of land. Asland is also a form of capital, current obsta-cles for documenting and enforcing landrights have the effect of lowering incomefrom those assets through means such asrent, cultivation, sale, or access to otherfactors (e.g. credit). Well-defined land rightsare key for productive development andfactor market functioning. In addition, clearland rights have far-reaching implicationsfor social cohesion and governance, actingas an important catalyst in stabilizing com-munities, empowering individuals andreducing social exclusion.http://www.punjab-zameen.gov.pk/details.php?menuid=2&sub-menuid=8

land rights is damaging to the poor, who cannotafford protracted land disputes. Numerous legaldisputes are caused by contract enforcement ofland rental contracts, e.g. over illegal possessionof land, eviction of tenants, and recovery of rent.In Punjab, about 8,000 Patwaris maintain landrecords pertaining to 20 million land owners.88

The patwaris keep their records in a cloth bagcalled a basta. As there are no office or patwarbuildings, the records remain in the personalcustody of patwaris and are not easily availablefor scrutiny. More importantly, patwaris workunder the influence of landlords.

There is no publicized document outlining theexact progress of the automation project--LandRecords Management Information System(LRMIS)--undertaken by the Punjab governmentand currently in its pilot phase in the KasurDistrict. According to the website, the ServiceCentre for 7 villages at Kasur got functional inJune 2010. It is expected that once the landrecords system is fully automated and function-al, the transparency and easy accessibility wouldbe beneficial to small farmers and tenants.

Legislation on TenancyIn view of the weaker position of tenants, thearrangement between landlord and tenantswere first legislated by the British in 1887 to pro-vide security to tenants in Punjab. The PunjabTenancy Act 1887 was a comprehensive legisla-tion comprising 116 sections. After independ-ence, several changes were made in the legisla-tion through amendments, rules, instructionsand notifications, less in favour of tenants andmore often benefiting the state and thelandowners as greater area of state land wasgranted exemption from the Tenancy Act. A judi-cial critique by legal experts is needed to analyzethe sub text of these changes reflecting on thepower dynamics between the vulnerable and thepowerful brought out via Punjab Protection andRestoration of Tenancy Rights Act 1950, PunjabTenancy (Amendment) Act 1952 and subse-quent Rules, 1953, Punjab Tenancy (Validationand Extension of period for Payment of compen-sation) Ordinance 1969 and Land ReformsRegulation (martial Law Regulation 115) of1972. In Sindh and the then NWFP (now KhyberPakhtunwa) provinces, the tenancy laws wereformulated in 1950 followed by Balochistan in1978.

Due to their vicarious position, tenant farmershave rarely benefited from the legislation. One

such rare case is of the tenants of the militaryfarms in Punjab who have waged resistance tak-ing benefit of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887. TheAct categorized tenants in to two classes: occu-pancy tenants (maurusi) and tenants-at-will(ghair maurusi) on the basis of whether or notthey have a statutorily conferred right to occupythe land. Tenants-at-will do not have a statutoryright to occupy the land. They work simply on thebasis of a contract and do not have any enforce-able right in the land. On the other hand, occu-pancy tenants who did have a statutorily con-ferred right to occupy the land they till, had thebenefit of an enforceable right to occupy theirland if they met certain conditions.

In the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1952,the right of ownership was granted to those ten-ants who have tilled the land for more than 20years '…but the tenants were never granted theownership rights.'89 The Act stipulated 60:40ratio of the share for tenant and owner respec-tively. Also, land revenue, water rates, cost ofseeds and other inputs were stipulated to be theresponsibility of the land owner. However, in the1972 Land Reforms Regulation, the cost of agri-cultural inputs (i.e. seeds, fertilizers) was stipu-lated to be shared equally by the tenant and theowner. In another directive of 1973, the 60:40ratio of tenant-owner share was replaced with50:50.90

The NWFP Tenancy Act 1950 and theBalochistan Tenancy Act 1978 are similar to thePunjab Tenancy Acts in terms of definition oftenancy and classification of occupancy tenantsand their conditional rights to own land. TheSindh Tenancy Act 1950, however, differs fromthe Punjab Tenancy Act. The Sindh Tenancy Act1950 defines tenancy as 'tenancy right' thatmeans 'the permanent right of cultivation undera landlord acquired by a tenant under the provi-sions of this Act'.91 Also, the Act classifies ten-ants as 'permanent tenants' (instead of occu-pancy tenants) and tenants-at-will.

Sindh Tenancy Act 1950The Tenancy Laws Committee, Sindh of 1945had proposed that the occupancy rights shouldbe granted to tenants who had cultivated atleast 4 acres of land annually for the same landlord for 8 consecutive years. The Hari EnquiryCommittee constituted in March 1947 submit-ted its infamous report in January 1948 infavour of the land lords. Masud Khaddarposh, amember of the Committee in his Note of Dissenturged the government to abolish feudalism. In


1950 the Sindh Tenancy Act was enacted after avigorous campaign by the peasants, workers,left-oriented political activists and ComradeHyder Buksh Jatoi who had drafted the Act butmany of the pro-peasant provisions in the draftwere omitted from the Act. With the changes inthe mode of agricultural production, the Act hasincreasingly become outdated. Furthermore,lack of implementation, incumbent upon theprovincial administrative mechanism and legis-lation, i.e. Sindh Revenue Board, Sindh RevenueAct, has rendered the Act ineffective. Humanrights and labour rights activists have beencampaigning for amendments in the Act sincethe 1980s. The Sindh High Court HyderabadBranch gave a decision, in 2002, to amend theSindh Tenancy Act according to the needs of thepeasants. A few amendments were carried outin the Act in 2002, but major gaps haveremained, including lack of transparent docu-mentation system for financial transactionbetween the tenant and the landlord, and lack ofprovision of special Hari Courts, instead ofRevenue Courts, for settlement of disputes. Thelacunae in the Act, it is argued, have led to anincrease in bonded labour in agriculture.

During the 2007-10, peasant groups and civilsociety organizations providing support to agri-cultural labour campaigned for amendments inthe Sindh Tenancy Act through conferences,consultations and rallies. In 2007 Bhandar HariSangat and Sindh Hari Porhial Council initiateda series of protest rallies in different cities ofSindh to highlight the issue. In June 2007, theSindh Assembly constituted a 14-memberSpecial Committee on Sindh Tenancy Act toreview the act and submit recommendations.The peasants and civil society representativesmet with the Special Committee in July 2007and gave their recommendations.

In September 2008, Sindh Hari Prohial Councilcomprising network members undertook a sig-nature campaign in Sindh to pressurize legisla-tors to amend the Act. Dialogues with the farm-ers were conducted in 10 districts, TandoMohammad Khan, Tando Allahyar, Umerkot,Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Nawabshah, Dadu,Qambar, Shikarpur and Hyderabad, to mobilizeopinion for the amendments in the Tenancy Act.In 2009, the Special Committee presented itsfinalized report to the deputy speaker, SindhAssembly, who forwarded it to the StandingCommittee on Law and Parliamentary Affairs tolook at the proposed amendments and incorpo-rate these in to the Act.

The high point of the campaign was the 13-dayHari Long March of hundreds of peasants inFebruary 2010. The march started from thegrave of peasant leader Hyder Buksh Jatoi andended at the Sindh Assembly, Karachi, wherethe peasants' representatives met the parlia-mentarians and the deputy speaker. During April2010, the Draft Bill was discussed in the SindhAssembly. The Standing Committee on Law andParliamentary Affairs presented the report ofCommittee on 29 June 2010. The 11-memberCommittee, comprising MPAs from major politi-cal parties-PPP, Muslim League, etc.--unani-mously rejected all the amendments on thegrounds that the proposed amendments wouldcurtail landlord's power to eject the tenants.92

Plight of the Tenants: Abuse byLandlordsAccording to the Tenancy Act, 50 per cent of theproduce goes to the tenant and the 'batai' (allo-cation of shares) is done in the presence of bothtenant and the landlord but there are provi-sions/gaps in the Act that are to the advantageof the landlord. The Act does not prescribe anysystem of documentation at any time. The pro-duce is divided into shares by '…dharwai, a per-son who weighs or measures the produce atbatai'.93 But the Act does not set criteria for theselection of this person. The produce is deposit-ed after harvest in a Dero '…at a place fixed bythat landlord'94 till the time of batai. The landlordis entitled to deduct debt owed to him by the ten-ant from the produce.95 In case of dispute theprovincial government (Revenue Department)appoints a Tribunal of '…one member only whoshall be Mukhtiakar' and no lawyer 'is allowed torepresent the parties to such dispute.'96

The lacunae in the law, the revenue depart-ment/administrative personnel's loyalty towardsinfluential landlords and the vulnerable status ofthe tenant result in his gross exploitation by thelandlord. When the tenant dares to resist andseeks legal channel for dispute resolution, hefaces the wrath of the landlord ranging from ver-bal and physical threats to his life and family tofalse and fabricated cases registered againsthim.

During 2007-10, an increasing number of caseswere reported in the media of the landlords'abuse of tenants. The violations were committedwith the connivance of the RevenueDepartment, Agricultural Department and thePolice personnel. In May 2007, in Deh Nari,


Taluka Mehar, 38 peasants' households wereevicted from the land they cultivated and theirhouses bulldozed by the local landlord (thenFederal Minister for Water and Power) and hisbrother MPA. The peasants had got the 515acres of land in 1998 under the then PrimeMinister's land grant policy for Kachho area.97

Among the cases reported in 2009, one includ-ed a landlord's abuse of his tenants who wererefused due wages for the last 18 years. On ten-ants' protest, he registered cases against 7peasants and three of them were jailed.98

The case of two tenants and their families fur-ther illustrates the point. Jumman Bheel andBharo Bheel and their 18-member families (tenwomen 8 children) were cultivating cotton on 15acres of land in Jaffer Leghari Village in SangharDistrict since nine years. The landlord maltreat-ed the tenants and did not pay fair share. Thetenants decided to approach the local courtafter the landlord refused batai for three con-secutive crops in 2009. Meanwhile, the landlord,furious at the tenants approaching the court,registered a false case against them.

The court referred the matter to the RevenueDepartment and a District Officer was appointedto investigate the matter. The District Officerconcluded that the land lord owes Rs. 270,000to the tenants and was ordered to pay theamount. The amount of Rs. 270,000 was theirshare for three crops-wages for labour of 19workers for 18 months. This translates as Rs.800 per month per person. The landlord not onlyrefused to pay the outstanding amount, he didnot allow the tenant to pick cotton of the stand-ing crop. As the tenants could find no authorityto implement decision of revenue officer, recov-er the due amount from landlord and ensurethat cotton crop was distributed, they asked civilsociety (PILER in this case) for help.

The District Police Officer, Sanghar, whenapprised of the matter through PILER, called thelandlord, the tenant and the civil society repre-sentatives in his office for dispute settlement.The landlord agreed to make the payment in fulland allow cotton picking and share of the pro-duce. However, he insisted that the tenantsshould vacate his land after receiving payments.Though according to the Tenancy Act, the land-lord cannot arbitrarily terminate the tenancyrights, yet the District Officer sided with the land-lord and contended that the relation betweenthe hari and zamindar have become trouble-some hence the tenants better vacate land after

recovering payment.

A case of extreme abuse of the tenants hap-pened in July 2010 in Umerkot when two ten-ants went to meet their landlord at his autaqnear his village and demanded his share. Thelandlord's son shot them dead and injured threefemale relatives one of whom died later.According to the Human Rights Commission ofPakistan, a member of the police investigationteam-- a relative of the accused-- and some influ-ential political figures of the Mangrio communi-ty protected the accused. These cases indicate astrong nexus between landlords, politicians andlaw-enforcing agencies that deprive tenants ofjustice and ensure impunity to the powerful whoviolate laws.

During recent years (2007-10), an increasingnumber of cases of resistance from tenants andsmall farmers against land lords' extortion werereported in the media. Tenants and small farm-ers approached judiciary and relevant govern-ment departments to register complaints. Risingstruggle by agricultural workers in Sindh andPunjab provinces, though sporadic, is attributedto the 10-year old peasants' movement of themilitary farms in Okara that has now spread toother districts in Punjab including Khanewal,Sargodha, Multan and Lahore.

Tenants' Resistance: Ownershipor DeathThe resistance movement initiated by the ten-ants of the military farms in Okara district in theyear 2000 for land ownership rights, spearhead-ed by Anjuman-e-Mazarain Punjab (AMP),gained momentum and spread to several moredistricts of Punjab during 2007-10. Contestingownership right of 70,000 acres of highly cul-tivable land, over one million tenants have beenstruggling against the military-owned institu-tions (Military Farms, Army Welfare Trust andPunjab Seed Corporation) in Okara, Khanewal,Faisalabad, Sargodha, Rahimyar Khan, Multan,Pakpatan, Vehari, Shurkot, Renala, Sahiwal andLahore.

The tenants have successfully resisted the cash-rent and yearly lease system the Military Farmsmanagers tried to introduce in July 2000. Priorto this date, the tenants paid half of the share ofthe produce under the batai system. Since themovement started, the tenants have refused topay any share to the Military authorities. Bykeeping the full crop for their household expen-diture, the tenants have reported a marked


improvement in their lives in terms of foodintake, access to education and other basic facil-ities.99

In April 2007, 400 tenants of the Jaindra MilitaryFarms, Lahore, resisted the Defense HousingAuthority's plan to eject the tenants. In 2008resistance spread to remount lands used forstud farming for the military in Okara where 74per cent of the total stud farming area is with thecivilian breeders and 26 per cent stud farms arewith the retired army personnel.100 The peasants'movement drew strength from the Charter ofDemocracy, signed in October 2006 by themajor political parties, that includes a proposalfor a commission to review the legitimacy of allmilitary urban and agricultural allotments.101

Following the 2008 elections provincial ministerfor Labour and the Peoples Party of PakistanMPA from Okara, assured the peasants' repre-sentatives that the issue would be resolved infavour of tenants. Ironically, meanwhile, severalretired military officers got the tenants' cul-tivable land illegally allotted to themselvesthrough the government. In addition, there werereports in the media that the military officialswere getting lands transferred to them. In March2009, the peasants protested against illegalallotment of rakh (common grazing land) landto retired military personnel in Sadiqabad andAzizabad mouzas in Multan district.102

On 19 January 2009, over 2,000 tenants gath-ered at Renala Khurd and demanded land own-ership rights. On 5 April 2009, three tenantswere shot dead by the allottees' armed menwhile 27, including women, were injured in theclash at Kulyana Military Estate. False caseswere registered against 120 tenants. On 17 April2009, over 5000 tenants gathered at the OkaraMilitary Farms on the occasion of the interna-tional day of the peasants. The police tried tointerrupt the arrangements but the Anjumanwent ahead with the assembly.

It is to be noted that during the last military reignof General Parvez Musharraf, the peasant move-ment had gone through a cycle of state abuseand violence, tenants' resistance and persever-ance followed by dialogue and promises by thestate that the ownership rights would be soonconferred upon the tenants. Ironically, after theinduction of democratic government, the sameprocess of state abuse, resistance and falsepromises has restarted.

On 24 February 2010, the military farms admin-

istration tried to raze down the houses of sometenants in Okara and eight tenants, six of themwomen, suffered minor injuries in the clash withthe police personnel. The incident led to a roundof dialogue between the government and theAnjuman representatives, and the Punjab ChiefMinister assured them the ownership rightswould be granted soon. On 9 March 2010, thepeasants of Okara and Khanewal started a longmarch towards the Provincial Assembly Building,Lahore. The administration blockaded the intercity roads at various points and at the GrandTrunk Road. The women leaders of the AMPwere able to reach Lahore and stage a sit-in infront of the Assembly Building. The AMP leader-ship was invited to a meeting with the govern-ment functionaries and the Chief Minister gavewritten assurance that'… no state land allottedto the departments but under cultivations by themuzareen will be offered for sale to any multi-national or local company.'103 On 17 April, theAMP tenants again took out a rally and staged asit-in at the Mall Road, Lahore. Again the gov-ernment representatives called the AMP leadersand assured them the land ownership would besoon transferred to the tenants.

In May 2010, another conflict erupted when theowners of the Roberts Agricultural Farm raidedthe villages with the help of a large police squad,interrupted threshing of the wheat crop andarrested several tenants. The Farm has beenrecently sold to a new owner. The tenantsblocked the roads and put an armed resistanceagainst the entry of the new owners.

In June 2010, over 3000 peasants gathered atthe Bail Gunj Army Welfare Trust, Pakpattan, tocommemorate the death anniversary of twoAMP activists. Both had died at the hands of theArmy and the police sponsored gangsters in2002 and 2005 while they were at public ralliesto demand land rights. The Bail Ganj 1400 acresof fertile land were cultivated by tenants sincemany generations. The tenants were evicted dur-ing General Zia's regime. In a daring move, theland was taken back by the AMP peasants in2006 from the administration of the ArmyWelfare Estate. In 2009, around 200 acre ofland was again taken over by the military per-sonnel. The Bail Ganj and Dulmain Gunj ArmyWelfare Trust has over 10,000 acre of land. Thetenants are demanding their 200 acres of landback from the army.104

Though Anjuman Muzarain Punjab has still notachieved its goal-land ownership rights-it has


successfully put the tenants' rights on thenational agenda and pushed the government toconsider granting land ownership to peasants.The success of the AMP is mass membershipand its tenacity to remain true to its goal and slo-gan-Maliki ya Maut (Ownership or Death).

Tenants' Resistance: Seed FarmSetharja, SindhAt Setharja Farm, run by the Sindh SeedCorporation, 87 peasants cultivating 900 acresof land, put up resistance for the first time in July2007 against 'unlawful and corrupt' practices ofthe farm administration. The management didnot give the tenants their share in full in 2007and when in July 2008, the managers tried topick up the entire wheat crop the tenants resis-ted the move and demanded their share. On 26July, the management called police for securitycover. The police used baton-charge, tear gasshelling and aerial firing. Several tenants, includ-ing women and children were injured in theclash. The Setharja town people observed com-plete strike against police brutality. The tenants'representatives observed token hunger strikeand called a press conference at the HyderabadPress Club on 10 August. In September theCorporation constituted a committee to settlethe dispute between the farm management andthe tenants.105 The Pakistan Institute of LabourEducation and Research investigated the matterand facilitated the tenants in negotiation.

A long list of irregularities and malpracticeswere reported by the tenants. According to therules, when the wheat crop is used for seedingpurposes, the farm management pays the ten-ants' share in cash on market rate so that thetenants are able to purchase wheat for subsis-tence on time. Since 2007, the management didnot only delay the payment but give less thandue share. Cotton picking charges and the costof diesel for tube-wells were not paid to the ten-ants. Land development cost, including chargesof cleaning/repair of Noot Miner (canal) wereforcibly extracted from the tenants in violation ofthe law.

The Sindh Seed Corporation manages eight (8)farms in Lodhra, Ghotki, Setharja, Sakrand,Kotdiji, Ruk, Lakhi and Sangi in Khairpur districtspread over a total area of 6,232 acres. TheCorporation was established in 1976 to ensureprovision of certified seeds of wheat, cotton andrice to the farmers. In 2000, the AsianDevelopment Bank proposed its closure in viewof its poor performance106 and in September

2001, its operations were suspended on thedecision of the Sindh Cabinet.107 During the peri-od, tenants provided the inputs themselves andcontinued cultivation. In 2004, a Committee rec-ommended its revival and in 2006 its operationswere revived with a reduced workforce.

The PILER field investigation indicated similarterms and conditions of work and issues facedby the tenants at Kotdiji Farm and Pai SakrandFarm.

Right to Shelter: Usurpation byLandlordsIn addition to the lack of ownership of the landthey till, agricultural workers are deprived ofaccess to land ownership for housing and shel-ter. Land management and tenure systems, poli-cies and legislation that help achieve adequateshelter and security of tenure to rural populationare either obsolete, in shambles or in manyinstances, do not exist. Currently agrarian andnon-agrarian land in rural areas is managedthrough dysfunctional systems operated by pat-waris, tehsildars, tapedars and mukhtiarkar. TheRegistration Act 1908 does not register titlesbut only documents. The Land Acquisition Act1894 does not cover resettlement, relocation,loss of livelihood, or the rights of affected per-sons without a land title or those with usufructrights. The absence of a secure system of landtitle management has impacted the rural popu-lation the most. The peasants, tenants, wageworkers and small farmers live in villages sur-rounding or closer to the agricultural lands.Though the villagers have had the abodes on theland for the last many years, or since severalgenerations, they have no sanad or lease docu-ments to prove ownership of the houses or hut-ments. The obsolete land record managementsystems and the peasants' vulnerable position(low literacy, lower status) deprive them of theaccess to registration and documentationprocess. In most of the cases, land belongs tothe state. The local landlords often in their greedto acquire more land, in collusion with theRevenue Department, forcibly and illegally evictthe tenants. The following case is illustrative ofthis abusive practice.

In March 2009, a group of residents of the IssaKhaskheli Goth of deh Bittor, Taluka Sinjhoro,District Sanghar, fled their village as they fearedan attack by the landlord who claimed fabricat-ed ownership of 12 acres of land of the villagecomprising 150 houses and had fabricated falsecases against three villagers. The land was


owned by the Irrigation Department who issuedthe relevant document in favour of the villagers.The landlord Varyam Faqir owned 10,000 acresof land, was convicted of corruption in 2002(fined and jailed for 7 years) and had earlierattacked the small goth in 2005. The village, set-tled more than 40 years ago, had a mosque,imam bargah, school and a graveyard. In 2007the landlord bribed the District Officers Revenueof Sinjhoro and Sanghar to declare that no vil-lage existed on the site.

On 23 March 2009, the group moved to theKarachi Press Club to protest and seek justice.The landlord's men came to the Press Club andthreatened the group. One of the elderly vil-lagers died of heart attack. Meanwhile civil soci-ety organizations provided support, flagged theissue and helped the villagers registered FIRagainst the landlord and his accomplices whowere then granted bail by the court. Later thecourt cancelled the bail and ordered arrest ofthe culprits who, however, escaped from thecourt premises. It was only after determined pur-suit of civil society actors (including PILER) thatthe villagers' houses were measured anddemarcated and finally the villagers were award-ed ownership document sanad, in August 2009,given to each head of the household.

Bonded Labour in AgriculturTenants and sharecroppers, due to their precari-ous socio-economic status, are compelled totake loans from the landlords for daily subsis-tence and agricultural inputs. The landlord'sgreed and inhumanity and the tenant's disem-powerment transform the work relations in todebt bondage: the tenant and his family mem-bers lose their freedom to move and/or chooseanother employment till the accumulated debtis paid off to the satisfaction of the landlord.Despite its prevalence, magnitude and intensityof exploitation, the extent of debt bondage is notestablished. The Agricultural Census does enu-merate households under debt but does notspecify debt bondage.

According to the 2000 Agricultural Census, 1.5million agricultural households were underdebt.108 The next, sixth census, due in 2010 wasnot yet launched at the time of this report (July2010). No study was undertaken either by thestate or the private sector to investigate theextent of bondage in agriculture. Unofficial esti-mates do indicate increase in the number ofbonded labour. One of the indicators is the risingnumber of bonded labour freed through inter-

vention of human rights/labour rights organiza-tions and the judiciary. During 2008, the HRCPnoted 21 such interventions, freeing 539 ten-ants out of the clutches of landlords. In 2009,25 interventions led to the freedom of 731peasants from the farms of the land lords most-ly in the Sindh province.109

The petitions for release are filed under habeascorpus (Section 491, Cr. Penal Code) mostly bycivil society organizations and at times throughsuo moto notices by the judiciary. The relevantlaw, Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act1992, is not used in these cases. The main con-cern of habeas corpus petition is to securerelease of the tenants from illegal detention.Under habeas corpus petitions no dispute settle-ment is sought, and if the tenants have griev-ances against landlord, they can register an FIRin the court. Unfortunately, the tenants are notempowered enough to register FIR, and in rarecases if they decide to approach the court, thejudiciary, the administration and the law-enforcement agencies are all under the influ-ence of landlords and simply refuse to registerFIR. Hence, the landlords remain unaccountableand revert to hiring other batches of tenantsunder similar terms and conditions, while thefreed tenants either land in the camps or end upwith toiling for other landlords and thus exploita-tion and debt bondage is perpetuated. In rarecases when the FIR against the landlord doesget registered, it is next to impossible for theharis to get justice due to the influence of thelandlords on the judiciary. The following caseillustrates the point.

In late 2009, a hari Pono Kohli escaped fromthe farm of a landlord and approached theSociety for the Protection Against Rights ofChildren (SPARC) who helped him to file a peti-tion at the District Court, Omerkot, for therelease of his 32 relatives from illegal detentionof the landlord. When the Court gave order forthe release of the detainees, the landlordforcibly took the haris from his village andsecretly detained them at different locations inKhipro. One of the haris escaped andapproached Green Rural DevelopmentOrganization whose activist was recently award-ed a human rights award by a US organization.On the pressure built by the civil society and theinvolvement of the US Embassy in the case, theharis were finally recovered by the police andfreed by the District Court. The civil societyorganization helped the haris register an FIRagainst the landlord in District Court Omerkot


where he got an interim bail which was laterturned in to a permanent bail. Meanwhile thelandlord filed a constitutional petition againstthe hari in the Sindh High Court. The Green RuralDevelopment Organization and PILER jointlyengaged a lawyer to pursue the case on behalfof the hari and he appeared in the High Court 14times from 14 January 2010 up till 12 Aprilwhen the court reserved its decision. The land-lord is still free and unpunished.

Unfortunately, there is hardly any case on record,filed under the relevant Bonded Labour (System)Abolition Act 1992. The primary reason for non-use of this piece of legislation lies in its Section9 of the Act that delegates the responsibility tothe Provincial Government to specify throughnotification '…a District Magistrate to ensure theprovisions of this Act'. According to a legalexpert, the provincial governments, from thedate of the enactment of the Act in 1992 till thewriting of this report, have not issued notifica-tion to this effect to any district magistrate.110

Fisheries Little Dividends for Small Scale FishersThe fisheries is an important source of livelihoodfor the communities settled along the Sindh andBalochistan coastline. The sector includes inlandwater bodies-notably the Indus delta that covers600,000 hectre of land, other rivers and theirtributaries, canal irrigation system, naturallakes, storage reservoirs and small and largesize ponds. In Sindh, fishing communities aresettled in the coastal areas of Karachi, Thattaand Badin districts where as in Balochistan, fish-erfolk mostly reside in Gawadar, Pasni, Jiwani,Ormara, Kalmat, Sur, Sonminai, Damb, andGadani districts. The number of fishers directlydependent upon the fisheries is estimated to be400,000. In addition, about 600,000 people areinvolved in the ancillary industries.111 BesidesSindh and Baloch ethnic fishing communities,settled since ages, a number of communities ofinternal migrants (Pathans) from KhyberPakhtunkhwa and the Bengalis and Afghansimmigrants and refugees from Bangladesh andAfghanistan, work as crew helpers, watchmen ormanual labour at harbours in the city. Officially112fisheries workers include crew membersemployed on craft plying in marine and inlandwater bodies as well as those engaged inseafood processing plants, curing yards, fish car-riers, fish farming and other auxiliary industries.

Growth Potential and Government

InitiativesPakistan produces 4.5 million to 6 million met-ric tons of fish products in a fiscal year, of whichapproximately 70 per cent is marine productionand 22 per cent aquaculture and 8 per centinland capture fish.113 The value of the presentcatch alone, it is believed, can increase manifoldwith investment in fish harvesting and handlingtechniques, processing, chilling and storage,marketing and value addition.114 Previously, 50per cent of the catch was exported to Europeandestinations, but due to lack of quality control inthe local processing units these were de-listedby the EU in April 2007. The EU ban was a seri-ous setback for Pakistan's fisheries sector.Currently, both the government and private sec-tor are making efforts to meet the EU standardsand engaged in modernization of vessels andimprovement in the harbor infrastructure. InApril 2010 the country completed its third yearof EU ban on fish exports. However, despite theEU ban, the sector has experienced a 12 percent growth in 2008-2009 as the seafood exportis now diverted to Southeast Asia (China, Korea,Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong) andthe Middle East (UAE, Egypt).

The share of the fisheries sector in the country'sGDP is minimal, i.e. 0.3 per cent115 though it isbelieved it has huge potential. Negligence andlack of institutional capacity of the concerneddepartments are cited as major constraintstowards a sound growth of the sector. Thoughseveral policies and plans were envisaged in thepast, these did not result '…in any great leapsforwards; planning has remained haphazard'.116

In 2006 the Pakistan National Policy andStrategy for Fisheries and AquacultureDevelopment was formulated to increase thecontribution of the fisheries sector to the'…national growth, poverty alleviation and foodsecurity'.117

In 2007, under the Competitiveness SupportFund (CSF), a joint initiative of the FinanceMinistry and the USAID, the issues plaguing thesector were identified and a work plan chalkedout. In 2009, the CSF provided assistance to theSindh Fisheries Department on a series of initia-tives and programs including developing thefisheries of the Indus delta region and improvingthe income and livelihoods of the indigenousfishermen of Thatta and Badin.

The Sindh Fisheries and Aquaculture Strategy2010-2013, unveiled in September 2009, talksof plans that would not only result in the eco-


nomic growth of the sector but social andhuman development of the work force affiliatedwith fisheries including: '…training and skilldevelopment of staff and fishermen; develop-ment of warning and rescue centers in coastalareas to protect lives and assets of fishermen;development of post harvest facilities such asjetties, processing plants and cold storages etc,establishment of model fishermen villages toupgrade their living standard; provision of softloan to the fishermen/farming community'.While development projects have been initiated,implementation of Sindh Annual developmentplan 2009-2010 is lacking. Funds allocated tothe projects that include improvement of fisher-men settlements in rural coastal areas of Sindh(Rs.250 million) and inland fishing improvement(Rs100million), had not been utilized as of May2010.119

Terms and conditions of workThough the development initiatives and growthin seafood exports are observed, small-scalefisher's life did not experience positive changesin the years 2007-2010. The workers in the sec-tor are poorly paid or barely able to eke out a liv-ing and have no access to social protectionschemes offered by the state. Despite hazardsand risks involved, no occupational health andsafety system is in place. Employer-worker rela-tionship remains informal and workers areexcluded from labour legislation. In addition,deteriorating marine ecology system and rapidlydepleting fish resources threaten the livelihoodsof workers. Fishing communities cite increasingoverfishing, activities of foreign deep seatrawlers, use of harmful nets, pollution andreduction in fresh water flow from River Indus asfactors for depletion of fish resources. Theissues fishers face today include exclusionary,neo-liberal policies, exploitation of naturalresources by powerful stakeholders (multina-tional companies, Pakistan Army, local elite)and climate change.

In addition to work related issues, fishers aresocially marginalized. The fishing communitiesare deprived of basic amenities. Drinking wateris a major problem in the villages along theentire coastline that stretches from Sindh toBalochistan. Even the villages located in threetowns (Keamari, Lyari, Bin Qasim) of Karachimegapolis have no access to piped water, elec-tricity and proper roads. Water is purchasedfrom the tankers, putting additional burden onalready meager incomes. The socio-economicconditions of fishers settled in Aathar, a coastal

village in Kharo Chaan, Thatta, typify the situa-tion of the fishing communities. The populationof Aathar and surrounding villages is 7,000. Theresidents of 1,400 households have no accessto safe drinking water and sanitation. Waterpumped from wells is brackish and the commu-nity suffers from many ailments. There is nohealth facility and due to non-availability of evenlady health visitors in the area, maternal mortal-ity and infant mortality rates are higher. There isjust one primary school in the area.120

Wages and Mode of Payment Marine fishers on small fishing boats managedby two to four persons go for catch nearer to thecoastline for 24 to 36 hours. Big launches withlarger crew (30-35) remain in deep seas for 20days a month. Remuneration depends on thecatch divided according to the traditional shar-ing system called patti (literally, leaf). In eithertype of boat, after deduction of expeditionexpenses, i.e. diesel, ice for storage, food forcrew, the catch is divided in to two portions. Oneis kept by the owner of the boat. The other por-tion is divided among the crew. In the traditionalpatti system, nakhuda (captain) is given 3 patti(2 from the owner's portion and one from thecrew's); engine driver similarly gets 3 patti; for-man gets one and a half patti (half from theowner, one from the crew's portion), and theremaining portion of the crew is divided amongcrewmen.121

Impact of InflationFor fishers on small boats, catch has decreasedduring the last three years due to marine pollu-tion and over-fishing. Also, the cost of fishingexpedition has increased manifold owing to fueland food price hike. Thirdly, the catch is erraticand never steady. Hence, the fishers do not enjoyany guarantee of minimum wages to be receivedmonthly. Though the rates of small fishes usedfor fish-meal have increased two-fold since2007, the benefits have not trickled down to thefishers. Inflation and price hikes have made itdifficult for the fisher's household (with averagefamily size of 7.6 members) to make ends meetwith the same amount of income as was donethree years before. Average monthly incomeshared by one of the fishermen working as acaptain on a boat was reported to be Rs. 8,000to Rs. 10,000.

The households have no option but to reduceexpenses to survive. 'We don't eat three fullmeals any more but two meager meals of what-ever is available'.122 Purchase of clothes four


times a year is reduced to twice annually.Healthcare from private clinics has becomeunaffordable and replaced with cumbersomevisits to poorly-equipped government hospitalsand dispensaries. Children who were sent to pri-vate schools three years ago had to shift to gov-ernment schools or in some cases dropped outaltogether. Repair and maintenance of houseswhich require some certain amount of moneyhave been suspended.123 This corroborates withother studies that indicate the poorest house-holds now spend over 70 per cent of theirincome on food items and their ability to meethealth and education expenditure has been seri-ously compromised.124

The fishers were of the view that though exporthas grown, the profit remains with exporters andbusinessmen. There was little evidence of theoutreach and impact of government develop-ment projects for the fishers, while small-scalepartnership (community-state) projects werementioned by some fishers. The state policy, itappears, has given priority to commercial andshort term goals pushing sustainable resourceutilization and livelihood rights of small scalefishers at the back burner.

Collective struggle The Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), a grass-roots organization, has now a membership-baseof 32,000 workers mobilized through 148 unitsor community-based groups spread along thecoast and in the proximity of in-land waterresources. The PFF has been raising andaddressing core issues linked to dignity of sur-vival and sustenance of the fishing communi-ties. During 2007-10, the PFF campaignedagainst unsustainable development projects ofthe state and private sector and the exploitationof fish resources by business tycoons and politi-cal elements. The campaigns included abolitionof contract system, restoration of Indus Delta,ban on deep sea factory trawlers, ban on dump-ing industrial wastes in the sea and water bodiesand curbing mega development projects andappropriation of land by the Army along coastalareas.

Abolition of contract systemThe PFF's persistent and prolonged struggleagainst the exploitative contract system finallycompelled the Government of Sindh to scrapsection 7 of the Sindh Fisheries Ordinance 1980through a notification issued in October 2007and introduced a fisher-friendly license system. But the struggle continues as the contractors

took to resisting the new system through thesupport of and kickbacks to local feudal lordscum politicians, local administrators and thepolice personnel. Fabricated criminal cases wereregistered against local fishers by those whoillegally occupied fishing waters includingNarreri Lake in Badin district. The PFF's struggleagainst illegal and brutal acts of former contrac-tors and their allies resulted in removal of occu-piers from fishing waters and the fishers wereresettled at their native places.

Similar case of illegal occupation occurred inChotyari Reservoir. Spread over 100 sq km nearSanghar town, the waters of the Reservoir wereforcibly occupied by a former contractor whoapproached the Fisheries Department for anextension of his contract and on refusal filed apetition in the Civil Court Sanghar. The case con-tinued for 13 months as on each hearing theJudge gave the stay order. Finally, through PFFintervention, the stay order was removed by thecourt in July 2008. But the fishers' rights couldnot be restored as another politically influentialindividual, with the support of District PoliceOfficer forcibly occupied the reservoir and regis-tered false cases against fishers and the PFFactivists. The PFF organised rallies and a visit ofmedia personnel to the site. It was only after thePresident of Pakistan personally intervened thathis relative withdrew from the reservoir inDecember 2008. The fishers have to continu-ously fight against the influential and corruptpoliticians and feudals to protect livelihoodrights by means of advocacy, provision of legalaid as well as meetings with concerned govern-ment stakeholders.

Saving Indus DeltaThe Indus Delta, spread over 52,800 sq km, isthe 7th largest delta in the world having 17creeks. Degradation of the delta and its eco-sys-tem has impacted the livelihoods of the com-munities and caused migration of about 3 mil-lion people. The ecological degradation of thedelta began with the development of mega irri-gation infrastructures on Indus River in pre-par-tition era. Nineteen barrages and 43 canal sys-tems with 48 off-takes on the Indus RiverSystem had been constructed so far, which havereduced the freshwater discharge in the deltaicregion to one-fifth of the natural flow.125 Besidesthe irrigation dams, the agricultural effluentsfrom the Left Bank Outfall Drain and Right BankOutfall Drain have further degraded waterresources in the Indus River System. Though theimpact of dams on the Indus River System is


obvious, the state has plans to build several newdams. During 2007 to 2010, the PFF held sev-eral seminars and conferences to high lightthese issues and suggest alternatives. It alsoorganized 13-day long march commemoratingthe international Rivers Day in March 2010.126

Resisting illegal occupation of thecommunity graveyardThe Pakistan Fisherfolk took up another strugglewith the military agencies in Karachi against theoccupation of a graveyard in Chasma Goth, BinQasim Town by the Malir Cantonment SecurityForces. The 100 year-old graveyard is used bymore than seven coastal villages which have acombined population of 100,000. In October2009, the military personnel intruded during aburial asking the villagers to bury the dead else-where. On 20 May 2010, personnel of the secu-rity forces came to build a boundary wall around300 acres including the graveyard but the fish-ers resisted the move. The army officialsclaimed to possess the lease documents of1,300 acres in the coastal area for the estab-lishment of an army training centre but couldnot produce the documents. The police refusedto register an FIR against the influential agency.On 21 May, the military personnel raided the vil-lages and registered false cases against 350fishers (male & female) including the PFFChairperson Mohammad Ali Shah and 18activists. Facilitated by the Joint ActionCommittee (of Karchi civil society organiza-tions), the bail application was filed in the Courtof the District & Session Judge Malir, Karachi inwhich the interim pre-arrest bail was granted.Five consequent hearings had taken place. Thecase is still pending.

Livelihoods and Lack of DisasterManagementThe fishers along the coastal belt of Sindh andBalochistan suffered disaster twice during thereporting period. Cyclone Yemyin in June 2007affected an estimated 2.5 million people in thetwo provinces destroying habitats, and socialand physical infrastructure.127 The flooding whichfollowed four days of cyclonic rains left 296 peo-ple dead, 195 missing and over 377,000 dis-placed.128 Again in June 2010, Cyclone Phetbrought devastation to the fishers' assets andthe livelihoods. Factors that lead to devastationinclude development infrastructure such as thecanal and raised road network in katcho plains(river bed) extending into Balochistan and Sindheast of Kirthar Ranges enhancing flood dam-

ages by impeding water flows. Similarly, humandwellings that were located in storm water chan-nels caused most fatalities in Balochistan.Absence of local coping and early warningmechanisms and general lack of awarenesswith regards to risk management indicatingweaknesses in local governance and ProvincialDisaster Management Authorities were someother reasons officially cited for loss of lives,livelihoods and assets of marginalized commu-nities.129

Detained Fishermen across BorderAnother issue, the PFF strongly advocated forduring 2007-10 is the end to arrest and deten-tion of fishermen for so-called violation of sea-border between India and Pakistan. The PFFhighlighted the plight of the arrested fishermenthrough public protests, publications, documen-taries and statements in newspapers, and lob-bying with state officials and the judiciary.

Since more than two decades Pakistani andIndian forces have been apprehending fisher-men for allegedly crossing the sea border.Pakistan's coastline is spread over 1,050 kilo-meters, out of which 350 km coast and 17creeks are located in Sindh. Most arrests on thePakistani side take place at Sir Creek, a 96kmstrip of water that divides the Kutch region inGujrat, India, and the Sindh region in Pakistan.The border at Sir Creek is not agreed upon byIndia and Pakistan. Each claims a larger portionof the sea extending outwards from the creek astheir Exclusive Economic Zone. The punishmentfor crossing into the other country's water by thefishing boats is imprisonment for a few monthsbut due to the hostility between the countries,the fishermen languish for years in the detentioncenters even after completing their imprison-ment term.

In accordance with the May 2008 India-PakistanAgreement on Consular Access, both countriesare required to exchange lists of prisoners ineach other's custody on January 1 and July 1every year. On these lists, the number ofdetained Pakistani fishermen in Indian custodyis about 500. India failed to submit the list sinceJanuary 2009.130 Pakistani Senate claimed thereare 132131 to 785132 Pakistani prisoners in India.Even after the initiation of the exchange of list ofprisoners, the arrest of fishermen continues. Infour months, from Oct. 2009 to Jan. 2010,Pakistani media reported arrest of 32 Pakistanifishermen and 53 Indian fishermen,respectively.



Of all gender disparities that pervadePakistan society, most noticeable anddeeply embedded is the disparity in eco-

nomic empowerment. The barriers that hinderwomen's entry in labour market are systemic,linked to culture and ideology. The section offemale population that is pushed, or enabled, tocross the barriers and becomes a part of thelabour force, faces a range of discrimination atwork place. Economic empowerment, hence,remains an elusive dream for the majority ofwomen workers.

Women's participation (15 years and above) inlabour force has remained painfully slow--21.8per cent in 2008133. It is the lowest in South Asiaand one of the lowest among Muslim countries,especially when compared to the global rate offemale labour force participation rate that stoodat 51.7 per cent in 2008.134 The overwhelmingmajority of women who joined the labour forceduring recent years have ended up in non-decentand vulnerable work categories.

Following is an overview of the status of womenin labour force during 2007 -2010, outlining theconstraints they continue to face and the adver-sities they confronted during recent years,including economic crisis, fuel and food pricehikes and the impact of 'war on terror' and ter-rorist activities.

Data LimitationsPakistan suffers from a number of constraints,including lack of gender disaggregation, in enu-meration and data collection in all sectors. Lackof institutional coordination and insufficientanalytical capacity has aggravated the paucityof accurate information on gender. Data onlabour and employment is particularly inade-quate in terms of its disaggregation by sex. Acrucial definitional problem relates to 'economi-cally active population' that includes 'persons of10 years and above' in the country's Labour

Force Surveys. Internationally, economicallyactive population is counted from amongst per-sons of 15 years of age and above. The gender-disaggregated data on employed population iscollected for six major industry divisions (i.e.agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing com-bined in to one, and manufacturing as anothermonolithic category). Lack of data within impor-tant sub-categories, such as textile/garments,leads to partial portrayal of women's contribu-tion to the economy. Adequate data on workers'health and safety and on unionization is alsomissing from the LFS. In addition, regular, com-prehensive and disaggregated data on wagesare not available, making it difficult to calculategender wage differential.

Despite official acknowledgement that womenare under-enumerated due to social biases andflaws in sample size and data-collection method-ologies, and recommendations by the academi-cians and the civil society, the national census-es, labour force and household surveys have yetto incorporate comprehensive labour marketand economic empowerment indicators to yieldaccurate information on the status of women inlabour force. Small surveys and specific datagenerated, or analysed, by citizen sector organi-zations are sporadic and not widely disseminat-ed. Similar is the case with the state's specificefforts towards gender-specific data collectionand analysis.

Labour Market Information andAnalysisA note worthy effort during the reporting periodis setting up of the Labour Market Informationand Analysis (LMIA) Unit by the Ministry ofLabour and Manpower, with technical support ofthe ILO-Pakistan. Operational since late 2006,the LMIA brings out a series of reports onemployment trends and its fifth report broughtout in June 2009 focuses on women's employ-


4. Women in Employment

ment trends. The reports contain labour marketanalysis based on a mix of select key labourmarket indicators (out of 20 internationallyaccepted indicators135) and highlight gender dis-parities. The report notes that '…although labourmarket access for women improved over theyears, this has not gone hand in hand withprogress in the creation of decent work opportu-nities for the same.'

Non-decent Work Indicators Of the total female work force, 7 out of 10women (or 73.8 per cent) in 2008 toiled in agri-culture mostly (65 per cent) as unpaid familyworkers. Only 12.2 per cent found work in indus-trial sector and 13.9 per cent were engaged inthe services sector. Of all the women in thelabour force only 22.9 per cent had access towage/salary work. Of these, 43.9 per womenwere paid per piece rate and 12.9 per cent werecasual paid employees.136

Between 2007 and 2008, share of femaleemployment in informal sector increased from69.9 per cent to 71.7 per cent.137 Work in theinformal sector (both urban and rural) and inagriculture, in Pakistan, is considered vulnerableand non-decent as both sectors of economy areout of the ambit of labour laws hence conditionsare exploitative and unjust beyond imagination.Women in vulnerable work category includeunpaid family workers and own-account workersand 8 out of 10 employed women were workingin vulnerable employment.138 More women werefound to be working for longer hours and receiv-ing one third less wages than their male coun-terparts. Real wages for women decreased fromRs. 3,607 to Rs. 3,419 per month in 2008whereas during the same period real wages formen increased from Rs. 4,878 to Rs. 4,917.139

Ground Realities: Profiles fromthe SectorsWhile labour market analysis gives an overallpicture of current and emerging trends, and isessential for policy formulation, the extent ofwomen's vulnerability as workers, and the mag-nitude of the issues they confront at work placeemerge clearly with focused studies and fielddata. Below are insights from a survey on gar-ments/apparel factory workers in the informalsector in Karachi and a research study on foot-ball stitchers in the global production chain inSialkot undertaken by the PILER during recentyears.

Textile/GarmentsAn estimated 30 percent of the workforce in tex-tile is female.140 Within the sector, women work-ers are concentrated in low-paid, labour-inten-sive down-stream production (readymade gar-ments, linen, towels), while men dominate capi-tal-intensive ginning, spinning and weavingprocesses. According to an estimate, 90 percentof the work in apparel manufacturing is sub-con-tracted, and a large portion to home-basedworkers.141 Yet the number of small, formallyregistered factories employing women is signifi-cant. A substantial portion of this work is fortransnational companies. The extent of globalsupply chain work, sub-contracted to home-based women is not known, as contractors donot share this information and state mecha-nisms for documentation are weak or non-exis-tent.

Women workers in the apparel manufacturingsector in Pakistan are mostly young, unmarried,literate (few years of formal schooling), withlarge family size, living in low-income settle-ments surrounding the manufacturing units andfactories in the cities, working either as home-based piece-rate workers or employed on con-tract basis in small or medium-sized enterprisesproducing for local markets or linked with globalsupply chain.

A survey of 500 women workers employed at 79small and medium-sized units mainly in threetowns of Karachi (Baldia, SITE, Orangi), wasundertaken by PILER in collaboration with theHoisery Garments Textile Workers General UnionSindh (a fledgling unregistered union/group with500 members in Karachi) during February toMay 2009. The Survey revealed 43.2 per centwomen of age between 19 to 24 years and 57per cent were unmarried. Thirty per cent hadschooling up to eight years and 22 per cent wereilliterate. The overwhelming majority, 97.6 per-cent, of women were hired on temporary basis;80.4 percent were not issued any identificationcard; 64 percent were getting less than the min-imum wages for unskilled workers fixed by thegovernment (Rs. 6,000); 92 percent were doingovertime; 73 percent did not get weekly holi-days; 53 percent were not given due maternitybenefits and of them, only 21 percent receivedfull three-months paid leave.

The survey indicted better infrastructure at work-place in the city's small and medium-sized fac-tories: 96 percent women reported presence ofseparate toilet facility; 89 percent workers had

44


access to safe drinking water and the factorieswere reported to be properly lit and equippedwith fire extinguishing kits. Hidden behind theseapparently better facilities are the stories ofhardship and humiliation suffered by womenfactory workers. In focus group discussions, itwas revealed that often separate toilets forwomen, in addition to unhygienic conditions, arelocated at distance and at premises closer tomale working areas hence women had toendure catcalls in addition to supervisors' wrathon taking too much time to and fro toilet facility.Canteen facilities are also located likewise, elsedo not exist at all. Women complained thatwhen they eat in the corridors or other areasthey are reprimanded by supervisors for break-ing the rules.

There is no visible, or invisible, mobilization ofwomen workers in Pakistan in textile-apparelmanufacturing sector though awareness onworkplace rights, including the rights of organiz-ing and collective bargaining is increasing. In the2009 Survey, 56 percent women working in gar-ments factories knew that workers have a rightto form unions to negotiate for better terms andconditions. But no trade union/workers groupmembership was reported by 500 respondentsof 79 factories.

Fight for better wagesFear of dismissal and loss of work was cited asa major reason for lack of initiative for collectiveaction. "We are afraid to talk about unionsbecause we know we will be fired immediatelyand we cannot afford to lose this meagreincome."142 Most of the women narrated inci-dents of taking stand against unlawful cuts inwages, denial of sick leave, lower than minimumwages and other unfair practices. The strategiesused by them included verbal confrontation withemployers/supervisors in a group (of 4-8) andwork stoppage to demand a raise, timely pay-ment or gazetted holiday. The outcome wasmixed as reported by women. "At times they lis-ten to us. This happens particularly when mentoo stop work in greater number. But mostly theytell us to get lost. They use bad language andhurl abuses on us. It is difficult to take thishumiliation."143

The survey indicated that 97 per cent workersnever demanded increase in wages and noneof them were member of labor union. Lack ofaccess to information and legal procedure, lackof awareness on labor rights, fear of losingemployment and threats from employers, unfa-

vorable atmosphere for union activities are thereasons for fragmented and unorganized situa-tion of women workers. Yet minor successeswere reported sporadically such as the onenoted by the Hosiery Garment Textile WorkersUnion. Three female union members and facto-ry workers of a garment factory in Baldia Town,Karachi, struggled for increase of wages. Aftertwo months of struggle, female workers suc-ceeded in compelling the factory owner toincrease monthly wages of women in the clean-ing section by Rs 1,000. Now the female work-ers are receiving Rs 3,500 per month, almosthalf of the minimum wages!

Women in Football ManufacturingThe research conducted by the PILER in Sialkotindicated women comprised one-forth (25.5 percent) of the work force engaged in footballstitching. Among females a higher proportion,72 percent, was between 15 to 25 years of ageand the majority was unmarried. Predominanceof young females in football stitching indicatesrestricted mobility and limited options for girlswho have to adhere to traditional norms and ifthey work for wages, it is done either at homeor closer premises compared to young menwho have greater mobility and options otherthan stitching at village-based work centers.

The survey indicated a greater number (51.5per cent) of women had completed five years ofschooling compared to 35 per cent of men. Butthe number of men who continued schooling till8th grade was almost twice (25 per cent) asmuch as of females (14 per cent). Again it indi-cates restricted mobility of women. As field vis-its revealed many of the villages do not havesecondary schools and boys have to commuteto other larger settlements for middle levelschooling while girls are not allowed to com-mute that far.

Terms and Conditions of WorkAn overwhelming majority of women footballstitchers--84.4 per cent--worked on piece-rateand just 15.6 per cent were regular employees.Ninety-two per cent reported they were nevergiven any appointment/contract letter thuswere not registered with the Employees OldAge Benefits Institution or the Provincial SocialSecurity Institutions. The majority (84 per cent)was being paid less than national minimumwage of Rs 4,600 per month fixed in August2006.

Data revealed that women were getting less


wages than men. While a larger number ofwomen, 38 per cent, received up to Rs. 2,500per month, fewer men (19 per cent) earned thislow salary. In contrast, forty-three per cent ofmen earned between Rs. 3,500 to Rs. 4,500 permonth while just 26 per cent women reportedthey were given that amount. Though it could notbe ascertained whether women were paid lesswages for similar work, that is, different rate forsame ball, or they were given low quality, low-rate ball to stitch. It is more likely that the man-agement discriminated in terms of nature ofwork given to women: so-called lighter ballswere given to women while balls for use in pro-fessional matches were sewn by men.

Access to InformationFewer women workers were aware of existingnational labour laws, ILO conventions and theNike Code of Conduct. Just 13 per cent ofwomen knew about the Nike Code of Conductcompared to 24 per cent men. Knowledge of theexistence of national labour legislation was everpoorer: only 6 per cent women knew that lawsexist to provide safeguards to workers. Level ofawareness of ILO conventions was also pooreramong women: 18 per cent women had heardof ILO conventions compared to 36 per centmen.

Custom-built Work Places vs.Home-based WorkThe Saga Sports (Pvt.) Ltd. (now defunct) wasthe first local vendor in Sialkot that constructed,maintained and operated 12 large, formal work-places in rural areas exclusively for footballstitching, primarily to meet the Nike's require-ment for a child labour free production.144 One ofthe 12 centres, the Machralla Centre, was exclu-sively for women, while two other centers hadseparate halls and toilet facilities for women.The centres' capacity ranged from 350 to 650workers and these, custom-built on larger prem-ises, comprised spacious halls, storage areasand basic facilities (ventilation, lighting, toilets,drinking water, canteen, clinic, fair price shop,baby care centre, open space and plantation).The centers with official paraphernalia and pro-tocol-registration as workers, timings, supervi-sion, pick-and-drop and lunch facilities, provideda formal work place to an informal labour. Thesurvey indicated that 94 per cent of womenfootball stitchers preferred to work at the formalworkplace rather than at their respective homes. The formal workplace provided them the spacefor social interaction and bonding, learning and

information sharing with other women. It gavethem a unique opportunity to meet women fromother villages, castes and beraderis as in ruralmilieu, women's mobility is restricted to theirrespective villages unless a visit to other villageis necessitated by family circumstances and per-mitted by male kin. At the center, the womendeveloped a sense of solidarity and friendship.They could share family problems and improvecoping mechanisms. They helped each other inwork.

The formal workplace gave them the opportuni-ty to get away from home chores. They couldfocus on work and produce more, compared tohome-based work where distractions are manyand home errands are done intermittently. Evenmarried women with children and support sys-tem for childcare preferred to work at a formalplace. Only those women who were forty plusand had no support system at home reportedthey prefer to work from home instead of com-muting to the center so as to take care of chil-dren and the household tasks simultaneously.The reasons for preferring formal work place tohome-based work included access to amenitiesand better infrastructure, and the space provid-ed for collective resistance and bargaining. Thetwo factors that determined this preference wasthe provision of transport by the employer andthe male support from the communities andfamilies.

Women and Home-based WorkHome-based work done on piece-rate, is gener-ally viewed by many quarters-different sectionsof society, manufacturers, the state--as anacceptable mode of productive work for womento engage in. In view of social and cultural con-straints, particularly in Pakistan, private infor-mal space of one's home is considered appro-priate for productive work as it spares woman ofthe hassle of moving in to the public sphere. Formanufacturers, home-based work is cheap asthe cost of rent, utilities, and tools is borne bythe worker. Also, the employers/manufacturersare rid of the cost of social protection, includingoccupational safety and health.

A dual and contradictory nature characterizeshome-based work. It provides the family with themuch needed income to ward off extreme pover-ty and improve its living, particularly if home-based work is own-account and home workershave entrepreneurial skills. It also has the poten-tial of turning in to a profit generating small ormedium sized enterprise. On the other hand


home-based work is deprived of social protec-tion and in many instance use child labour thusleading the family towards potential genera-tional poverty.

A significant difference between home-basedand formal workplace relates to the identity ofthe worker. Home-based work is individual work,done within the confines of private sphere wherewoman's identity as mother/wife/daughter/sis-ter takes precedence. In contrast, at formal pro-duction place, work is part of a collectiveprocess that facilitates the formation of individ-ual's identity as worker and the coalescing of acollective identity. Also, home-based work leadsto immobility and isolation of the worker,restricting access to information related to rightsand entitlements, market trends and opportuni-ties to skill enhancement. In contrast, work atformal workplace necessitate mobility and pro-vides space for social interaction and mutualsupport, learning and information sharing, thusopening of space for collective resistanceagainst exploitative terms and conditions vis-à-vis rights at workplace.

An increasing number of women are engaged inthe informal economy in diverse sectors, mostlyas home-based, piece-rate or casual workers onexploitative wages under poor working condi-tions. Unofficial estimates put the figure ofhome-based women workers in the informal sec-tor as 75 per cent of the total informal labourforce. Official data do not include the category'home-based' but only indicate that women com-prise 53.7 per cent of the informal sector labourforce in the manufacturing sector.

Home-based workers include both own accountand piece-rate/sub-contracted workers. InPakistan, the percentage of own-account home-based women workers, who fall under the cate-gory of self-employed, is only 13.4 per cent.Most of the home-based women workers areeither unpaid family workers (61.9 percent) oremployees (24.6 per cent) working on piece-rate.146

Legislation on Sexual Harassmentat WorkplaceWomen's vulnerable status in society and theirparticipation in lower and the lowest tiers ofwork force under non-decent terms and condi-tions make them an easy target for sexualharassment at workplace. Human rightsactivists and women's groups had been advo-cating for specific legislation to curb sexual

harassment. The Alliance Against SexualHarassment-a network of nine NGOs--activelylobbied the issue, facilitated drafting of a newlaw on sexual harassment and requisite amend-ments to the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and theCode of Criminal Procedure 1898, by legalexperts in consultation with civil society.

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2009 wasincorporated as amendments to Section 509XLV of 1860 and to the Code of CriminalProcedure 1898 (Act V of 1898) in Schedule II.The Act has rendered sexual harassment both inwork places and public spaces a punishablecrime. The draft bill on the Protection againstHarassment of Women at Workplace was unan-imously passed by the National Assembly on 21January and by the Senate on 26 February andwas signed by the President to become a law on10 March 2010. Under the new law, sexualharassment at workplace is a crime punishablewith penalties ranging from compulsory retire-ment, removal or dismissal from service, up tothree-year imprisonment and fine up to Rs500,000 payable to the complainant.

The Act is applicable to all organizations andestablishments, and covers all categories ofworkers, regular or contractual. Under the law,the employer is required to constitute an inquirycommittee of at least three members - one ofthem a woman - to probe complaints and givetheir findings within 30 days. The complainantcan also approach an ombudsperson if not sat-isfied with the committee's proceedings or deci-sion. The National Commission on the Status ofWomen constituted a committee in May to facil-itate, monitor and oversee the implementationprocess of the Act in the country for the next twoyears.

1 The New Vision for Pakistan, Investing in People,10th Five-Year Plan 2010-2015 Approach Paper,Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, June2009.2 Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09, Government ofPakistan, Finance Division, Economic Advisor's Wing,Islamabad.3 UN Inter Agency Assessment Mission Pakistan,Report 2008.4 Pakistan Employment Trends for Women, 2009,Series No. 5, Labour Market Information & AnalysisUnit, Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Islamabad.5 Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2008-09.6 International Trade Union Confederation Report forthe WTO General council Review of Trade Policies of


Pakistan, Geneva, 16-18 Jan 2008.7 Humanitarian Assistance to IDPs, UN Pakistan,Newsletter Issue No. 21/09 (4 August 2009)8 Ayesha Siddiqa, Terror's Training Ground, Newsline,September 2009.9 Pakistan Security Report 2009, Pakistan Instituteof Peace Studies, Islamabad.10 The State of Pakistan's Economy, First QuarterlyReport for the year 2009-2010 11 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-1012 Pakistan Security Report 2009, Pakistan Institutefor Peace Studies13 Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09, 14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 Human Development Report 2009,http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_PAK.html18 The New Vision for Pakistan, Investing in People,10th Five Year Plan 2010-2015 Approach Paper,Planning Commission, GoP, June 2009.19 World Food Programme, website:http://www.wfp.org/countries/pakistan20 Trade unions turn down Industrial Relations Act,Dawn report, 21 Nov 2008, Trade unions reject IRA-2008, Dawn, 22 Nov 2008.21 Industrial Relations Act 2010, Consensus Draft,WEBCOP.22 Ibid.23 Call to engage standing committees, Dawn report,2 April 201024 CEACR: Individual Observation concerning TripartiteConsultation (International Labour Standards)Convention, 1976 (No. 144) Pakistan (ratification:1994) Published: 2010, www.ilo.org.ilolex25 Justice (Rtd) Rasheed. A. Rizvi26 Labour Policy 2010.27 Pakistan Employment Trends, Skills, 2007, Ministryof Labour and Manpower, Labour market InformationAnalysis Unit, GoP.28 Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2008-0929 Ibid.30 Pakistan Economic Sur vey 2008-0931 Source: Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2007-0832 Pakistan Textile Journal, April 201033 Daily Dawn November 10, 200934 Sohaib Jalil, The Cripple Textile Industry,http://www.theutrade.com/eMagazine/03-2010/inner-pages/TheCrippleTextileIndustry.asp35 The News report, July 3, 200836 Dawn report, 27 April 200937 Interview with Shaikh Shafiq Rafiq, Zonal ChairmanSouth PRGMEA, Karachi, on March 201038 Ibid39 Apparel industry: human skills and managementpractices, Muhammad Ayaz, Dawn March 12, 200740 Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09 41 Censuses of Manufacturing Industry 2005-06,Federal Bureau of Statistics, GOP42 Shaikh Shafiq Rafiq, Zonal Chairman SouthPRGMEA, Karachi, in an interview on March 201043 Dawn news report, 17 Nov. 200944 The News, July 3, 2008

45 The News, March 24, 200946 Interview with National Project Director, GENPROM,Karachi on March 201047 Report of Three Modules, GEN-PROM, Pakistan,UNDP, Islamabad48http://www.tco.gov.pk/web/tem/Textile%20Weaving%20Sector.htm49 Estimated by Power Looms Workers General Union,Karachi.50 Labour Quomi Movement estimates51 PPI news report, 11 May 2010,http://www.onepakistan.com/finance/news/pak-istan-business-general-news/52 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-1053 Suhail Raza, Power Loom Workers General Union,Karachi.54 Sohail Raza, labour activist, former GeneralSecretary of the Union.55 Ibid56 The Nation, 9 Dec 200957 Daily Dawn, November 10, 200958 Zeenat Hisam, Labour Standards in FootballManufacturing Industry, A Case Study of a NikeVendor in Sialkot, Pakistan, 2009, PILER.59 The Sports Goods Sector in Pakistan, September2007, ITC, UNIDO, WIPO60 Sialkot Economic Alternatives: Assessment andRecommendations, MercyCorps, September 25,2006 (unpublished document)61 Ibid.62 Chairman Pakistan Sports Manufacturers andExporters Association Ziaur Rehman, quoted byDawn report, 24 June 2010.63 The ETI code of labour practice: Do workers reallybenefit? Summary of an independent assessmentfor the Ethical Trading Initiative, IDS, University ofSussex, 2006.64 Saga Sports Employees List provided by Matrix65 1998 Population Census.66 Agricultural Census 2000.67 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2005-0668 Comments by industrials during consultations andinformal interviews.69 Multi-stake holders consultation in Sialkot held inJanuary 2007.70 Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-0971 Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2008-0972 Pakistan Agricultural Census 200073 Ibid.74 Source: Pakistan Agricultural Census 200075 Ibid.76 The Nation, 29 November 2008.77 Ibid.78 Dilawar Khan, An investigation in to the level ofunder employment in agricultural sector of PeshawarValley, 2007, Agricultural University Peshawar.79 HIES 2007-0880 Source: HIES 2007-0881 Ibid.82 Exploring the District's Rural Economy: AgriculturalSurvey of Sukkur District, State Bank of Pakistan-IBASukkar83 Source: PSLM 2008-0984 Ibid.


85 Punjab Tenancy Act 1887, NWFP Tenancy Act1950, Balochistan Tenancy Act 1978.86 Pakistan Agricultural Census 200087 LRMIS Phase 1 Background, Project ManagementUnit, Board of Revenue, http://www.punjab-zameen.gov.pk/details.php?menuid=2&sub-menuid=888 Ibid.89 Land Records Management System,http://www.pitb.gov.pk/LRMIS.aspx90 Dr. Christopher John, Chief Executive AnjumanMuzarain Punjab.91 Official document (photocopy) No. SOS(EXT)V (A)6/71, Govt of the Punjab, Agricultural DepartmentLahore, dated 20 Feb 1973 (courtesy AMP)92 Sindh Tenancy Act 1950.93 Anwar Ahmad Khan Mahar, MPA, reported in TheNews, 30 Jun 201094 Sindh Tenancy Act 195095 Ibid.96 Section 25, Ibid97 Section 26-27, Ibid98 Daily Times, Forcible evacuation: peasants stageprotest demo against minister, 22 Feb 200799 Jang, news report, 5 September 2009.100 Aqeela Naz, Finance Secretary, AMP, in an inter-view to the PILER team.101 IRSP spokesperson, quoted in The News, SpecialReport on Okara Military Farms102 Syed Mohammad Ali, A genuine peasant move-ment, Daily Times, 13 April 2010103 Dawn, Farmers protest land allotment to service-men, 20 March 2009104 Official letter No. PSO/CMS/1-6/2008, ChiefMinister's Secretariat, Punjab, dated 9th March2010.105 A communiqué from Farooq Tariq, PakistanLabour party, 23 June 2010106 Dawn, Body formed to end row at governmentfarm, news report 13 Sept 2008107 http://www.sindhagri.gov.pk/ssc.html108 Untitled document, http://www.sgrrp.gos.pk/user-files/Agriculture%20-%20Sindh%20Seed%20Corporation.pdf109 Pakistan Agricultural Census 2000110 Source: HRCP Annual Reports 2008 & 2009 onthe State of Human Rights111 Munaza Hashmi, Advocate112 Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-2009113 Marine Fisheries Department, Government ofPakistan 114 Fisheries Development Board Pakistan,http://www.fdb.org.pk/fishsector.html

115 Pakistan Economic Survey 2006-2007116 ADB, Pakistan: Sindh Coastal and InlandCommunity Development Project117 Sindh Fisheries and Aquaculture Strategy 2010-2013118 Ibid.119 Ibid.120 Dawn report, 8 May 2010121 Fisherfolk Newsletter, PFF, Jul-Sept 2009.122 Majeed Motani, President, PFF

123 Interview with fishermen at Pakistan FisherfolkForum on May 2010124 Interview with fishermen at Pakistan FisherfolkForum on May 2010125 WFP response to food crisis in Pakistan, WFPreport 2008126 Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, Indus Delta: an envi-ronmental assessment 2005127 http://iaoj.workpress.com128 Response to Cyclone Yemyin and Floods,Evaluation Report, National Disaster ManagementAuthority, October 2007

129 UNICEF Report,http://www.unicef.org/pakistan/reallives_3088.htm130 Response to Cyclone Yemyin and Floods,Evaluation Report, National Disaster ManagementAuthority, October 2007131 The Hindu, 2 Jan. 2010132 The News, 25 Dec. 2009 only fishermen133 Dawn, 20 Jan. 2010 (not limited to fishermen)134 Labour Market Information and Analysis Unit, ILO-Pakistan,http://www.lmis.gov.pk/Data%20Bank.html135 Women in labour markets: Measuring progressand identifying challenges, ILO, Geneva, March2010.136 Pakistan Female Employment Trends 2009,Labour Market Information and Analysis Unit ReportSeries No. 5137 Ibid.138 Ibid.139 Ibid.140 Ibid.141 The United States International Trade Commission(USITC), 2004.142 Karin Astrid Siegmann, The Agreement on Textilesand Clothing: Potential Effects On Gender Equality inPakistan, 2004, 'Transforming Institutions of Power:Towards Gender Responsive Governance', Rozan,Islamabad.143 Mehrunnisa, a worker.144 Naseem, a worker.145 Saga Sports Centres List provided to PILER by JustSolutions Network146 Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2006-07147 bid.




Section Two


Minimal human security includes decentlivelihoods as a universal citizen right,but is mocked by chronic mass poverty

in Pakistan, as a consequence of governancerather than resource deficits. Social discourseframes women, and children, as supplementaryearners, and consequently results in lower stan-dards for women and children in both rights atwork as well as rights to work.

Rights are differentiated from entitlements: notjust as concrete reflections of rights, but also asstandards that can be altered in a majoritariandemocracy unlike rights that cannot be denied.Entitlements may also be differentiatedbetween citizens to achieve similar outcomes indissimilar situations.

Excluding charity or debt bondage, there areinadequate private or public assets to offsetlarge or frequent shocks to income and con-sumption among the rural population.

Specialised institutions such as Social Security,Old Age Benefits, Workers' Welfare Fund all per-form poorly in coverage and services even forthe much smaller urban population. Hence thereis little point in simply extending spatial cover-age of these unreformed public organisations.

A public system could provide income security,but government in Pakistan is unlikely torespond promptly and adequately, given eco-nomic crisis and recurring poor provision ofbasic services. Hence a proposal for asset trans-fers, whose returns as level and variability will ofcourse be partly dependent upon complementa-ry public action. Redistribution of assets isexplored in two directions as the creation of reg-ulated commons. One is the conversion of largeprivate land holdings; another is public waterresources.

To the extent that asset transfers are inade-

quate, temporarily (such as bad harvest) or per-manently (too little land or water), a citizen-based system of entitlements is needed. In theabsence of alternative assets, there is need for asecurity system built upon guaranteed minimumemployment for all adults. Ideally this shouldensure a safe margin of household consumptionabove the poverty line.

Voice is essential to secure livelihoods as citi-zens -- income security in markets and represen-tation security in public policy. But Pakistanranks among the worst examples of law and pol-icy for collective action.

Neither the low direct tax-GDP ratio nor the highsecurity-budget ratio suggests a paucity of socialresources to fund such universal security.Washington's priorities for employment overdecent work must be rejected.

The note has no pretence to academic stan-dards, nor aims for a concrete plan for policyimplementation. Its modest aim is to illustratesome issues for public debate.

Several issues require more serious attentionthan given here. These include the what and howof collective action for achieving land reforms;averting subsequent increase of child labour infamily farms, and decrease of paid femaleemployment; mitigation of expanded differentia-


Social Protection: Enabling Equitable Access toLand And Fisheries Dr. Aly Arcelawn and Karamat Ali

tion between workers and peasants.

Why should any citizen be ever threatened byunder-nourishment? At $800 per capita, aver-age annual income in Pakistan is nearly five-foldof a conservative poverty line of Rs 10,000.Purchasing parity adjustments suggest an evenhigher differential between average income and$ a day type poverty lines. Other illustrations ofadequate social resources are domestic produc-tion of 200 kg per capita of main cereals (wheat,rice and maize); above $ 100 per capita in for-eign exchange reserves plus aid and debt; andexports of more than $300 per capita, Yet, at least 40 million men, women and chil-dren remain at risk because the state fails toassure adequate income [would jump with morehumane standards such as that of Sri Lanka forlow child under nourishment, low infant andmaternal mortality, high primary education, lowdebt bondage].

As the atta crisis of the year 2008 illustrated,many millions can easily slide into ultra poverty,and several million made chronically poor,because of food inflation despite bumper har-vests. Escaping this fate requires appallingtradeoffs: indignity of charity; brain-numbing inreligious or state security forces; humiliatingdebt bondage; abusive trafficking of childrenand women - all in evidence in Pakistan despite62 years of supposed freedom from a predatorycolonial state. Food subsidies through a limitednumber of urban-based "utility stores" are aninadequate response. The major slash in devel-opment expenditure is being cast as fiscalrestraint without any acknowledgement of theloss in jobs and income to the poor.

Poverty of their guardians forces millions of chil-dren into labour and away from schooling. A par-ticularly damning indictment of the state is thenumber of children in hundreds of thousands ofchildren who will not live to celebrate the fifthbirthday.

With inadequate and insecure livelihoods, citi-zens cannot afford collective action for otherfundamental rights to life, let alone attain andsustain them. In a vicious cycle, deficits in otherrights contribute to the chronic shortfalls indecent livelihoods, well illustrated by debtbondage, child labour and gender discriminationin both rights to work and at work.

Nothing but a guarantee of decent income willavert such tragedy. This is not to propose thatthe state be the full time employer of last resort.What we do suggest is that the state be maderesponsive and responsible, beginning withtransfers of public assets, but not excluding theneed to redistribute private assets.

Hence a focus on livelihood rights in a frame-work of citizen rights which are secured by legalentitlements, delivered effectively i.e. efficientlyresponsive.

Realism requires that little should be expectedof the state and its donors responsible for gover-nance deficits. This note therefore invites dis-cussion within social movements for a richeragenda of collective resistance to private andpublic expropriation of marginal livelihoods inthe first instance, and subsequent struggles forbetter lives.

The note is only a partial reflection upon socialsecurity, since it reflects upon needs andresponses of only a section of people - in house-holds whose income security is, or can be, pro-vided by guaranteed access to (fertile) land and(unpolluted) water.

In its comprehensive review of socio-economicsecurity, ILO places Pakistan pretty muchamong the bottom 10 of around 100 countries.The data is a decade old, but there is nothing tosuggest any serious change in the rankings,which is also much the case for the country'srank in the Human Development Index.

Decent LivelihoodsHowsoever one bases this claim, residents ofany country do have a right - and hence claimupon the state -- to adequate and secure liveli-hoods, citizens and migrants alike.

Public action can be temporary, as special sup-port limited to illness, disability, or unemploy-ment. Much preferable is to enable permanentaccess (and use) of assets at a level that ensuresa decent life. Complementary public action

54


would ensure that asset returns fluctuate as lit-tle as feasible, and never fall below a threshold(real) income.

What would be a threshold income? As much asis necessary to ensure a decent life, thatincludes a fair degree of participation in collec-tive action for cultural and political democracy.The threshold should obviously not contain gen-der discrimination; except to the extent thatwomen require a higher threshold because ofgender-specific needs such as extra or specialnourishment before and after childbirth. Agediscrimination should best be avoided, againbecause of special needs of young and old, suchas transport, diet, education and medication.

Public provisioning of assets would include bothnatural and human resources. The latter extendsto acquisition of skills for using naturalresources productively and sustainably. Alsoimportant are skills for supplementary incomesources to offset emergency needs and tempo-rary shortfalls in earnings from naturalresources.

The right to decent livelihood goes beyond theright to adequate income. Obviously decentworking conditions must be present as rights atwork.

Discussion also needs to embrace the right tochoose a livelihood. Two illustrations from oursolidarity experiences may be useful - cattleherders refusing to become farmers as compen-sation for displacement (in the Saudi funded,World Bank supervised, Chotiari reservoir proj-ect); fisher folk declining to become wage labouras compensation for displacement (in variousdonor funded projects, past and present).

Access to Land and WaterA vast population derives its sustenance fromland or water, and generally both. The jointresource need is most pronounced in farming,increasingly even in rain fed areas where irriga-tion canals divert hill torrents, such as inChashma.

Obviously, land is needed to conveniently accessfisheries, inland riverine or coastal marine.Government remains in denial, an example ofwhich is the project to hand over more than80,000 acres of coastal land to private "devel-opers" for a nightmarish mix of Caribbean andUAE. On a smaller scale, irrigation infrastructureregularly displaces riverine fisher folk.

Fishing in flood zones (kacho areas) is anotherillustration of the need for both land and water infisheries.

Vast ecological damage to the Indus Delta testi-fies to shortage of fresh water for marine fish-eries and to prevent excess salinity in farmland.Some species such as the hilsa disappear in theabsence of silt-laden fresh water in creeks. Effluents from agriculture and industry destroythe food chain for fisheries. Manchar lake is afrightening example of mismanaged irrigationdrainage, with pollution so extensive that boatpeople had to abandon the lake, losing both res-idence and livelihood.

On a larger scale, Badin district is being devas-tated from the Left Bank Outfall Drain used toremove effluents from upland agriculture;Karachi suffers from unchecked urban andindustrial sewage dumped untreated into theArabian Sea.

Only socially abstract analysis may project a netgain for poverty reduction. This is unacceptable,yet government and donors continue withdestructive boondoggles as mega-city develop-ment.

Land for Secure LivelihoodsNational accounts indicate that enough cul-tivable land is available to eradicate rural pover-ty through land redistribution. Annual incomefrom crops and livestock of over Rs 150 billion isderived from about 55 million cultivated acres.Land productivity is then nearly Rs 30,000 peracre. Cultivated land available is around one-halfacre per capita (and more as cultivable land)across the rural population of over 100 million.For a conservative threshold of Rs 10,000 theaverage rural citizen could escape poverty witharound one-third of an acre as citizen entitle-ment.

Of course would need nonfarm employment tooffset bad harvests (or bad credit markets).Reversing gender discrimination is implicit inaccepting universal entitlement. Similarly, chil-dren are assured a claim to assets independent-ly of their parents.

This land-for-income security assumes comple-mentary public action for protecting real incomethrough prices of farm inputs, products and non-farm goods and services (implicit in the expen-diture poverty line), plus nonfarm employment


and wages to offset bad harvests (and covariantdownswings). It also assumes that the croppingpattern and intensity implicit in agriculture GDPare the best and also ecologically sustainable.The latter is a heroic assumption, suggesting anupward revision of the land poverty threshold.

A modest step in agrarian reform would focus oneradicating poverty among sharecroppers, mostsusceptible to the abuse of debt bondage. Publicpolicy should impose a floor for size of tenantholding and for tenant shares, or provide a sub-sistence plot where production is not sharedwith the landlord.

[Using estimates made above, minimum holdingwould be about two-third acres per capita if netearnings were equally shared between tenantand landowner. Since net shares get manipulat-ed downwards, a precautionary floor would betenant farm of an acre per capita. Applied tofarm holdings in the Agriculture Census 2000,the standard indicates that tenant farms under7.5 acres -- 70 % of tenant farms -- wouldrequire either a higher income share to escapepoverty, or a larger farm. An exclusive plot forsubsistence seems best to ensure food needseven when other higher revenue but riskier cashcrops are imposed on the shared farm by thelandlord.]

Alternative approaches may be considered forsetting the land standard. One may be speciallyappealing because it lends itself to transparencyin setting standards and accounting for ecologi-cal variations.

This would base land entitlements upon wheatyields. It could use local prices of atta to deducethe wheat equivalent of a rupee poverty line,then used to estimate land needs. Across thecountry wheat yield is around a ton per acre. Ataverage wheat price of Rs 20 per kilo (net of pro-duction costs), a poverty line of Rs 10,000requires nearly half-acre per capita, almost thesame as total cultivated land of one-half acreper capita among the rural population.

It seems simpler to use the wheat equivalent ofa calorie standard that underlies the incomepoverty line. Translating a rural poverty standardof 2000 calories daily through the calorie con-tent of flour indicates an annual need of around200 kg per capita. With an average yield of1000 kg per acre, and assuming production costat around one-half of production, land redistrib-ution would aim for a rural poverty threshold of

two-fifth acre per capita. Pro-agriculture publicpolicies - such as for higher wheat yields, lowerinput costs, second crop - would lower thisthreshold.

This is a result very similar to the one basedupon GDP from crops and livestock. Addressingecological variations indicates a wide range ofdistrict wheat yields - could be as low as 120 kgper acre (such as rain fed Karak in NWFP) butmore than ten-fold elsewhere (such as irrigatedNawabshah in Sindh).

When committed to land redistribution, publicaction requires several adjustments or refine-ments to the land poverty threshold.

The obvious ones include locational variations inland productivity and prices, often negativelycorrelated but without obvious relief to the poor.One example is rain fed versus irrigated agricul-ture; another is opportunities for nonfarmincome. Yet another perspective would compen-sate for very young and old family members, oragree to privilege "care work" of adult females. Sustained escape from poverty will then dependupon wheat and other food prices, plus non-foodprices. This reinforces the need for public actionon relative prices to maintain "real" income.

A politically complex variation in needs of land:at the low end, there may not be enough cul-tivable land or crop choices when redistributionis confined -- to the district, in order to minimizetensions of cultural dislocation, or whateverrequires more limited boundaries than province,let alone a "country" of unsettled "nationalities." In addition to other benefits such as protectingfemale entitlements, cooperative farming canrealize economies of scale. Hence vesting landrights in cooperatives may lower the land pover-ty threshold. The constraint to size may lie morein the limits to (local) social cooperation ratherthan scale economies in production.

Land RedistibutionThough a decade old, the Agricultural Census2000 may be used to illustrate additional issuesin land redistribution.

Average cultivated land is around one-half acreper capita in the rural population. This indicatesthat the entire rural population could be provid-ed the poverty threshold of one-third acre for anannual minimum income of Rs 10,000 per capi-ta.


Poverty estimates suggest that at least a third ofthe rural population is poor. As the right toescape poverty, these 35 million citizens areentitled to around 12 million cultivable acres. Atmost (if all landless) this would be around one-firth of available cultivated land. Debt bondageis another priority claim, specially so for share-croppers and brick kiln workers.

Redistribution should begin with state land, per-haps even from those provided as large landgrants to public officials. However, the statedoes not make available reliable estimates ofeven state land. State farms indicate insignifi-cant area. More realistically, privately ownedland just has to bear the main burden of redis-tribution through rather low land ownership ceil-ing per capita [or on self-operated land per capi-ta?]

An essential constraint in the redistribution is tomaintain a minimum of one-third acre per capi-ta [or in productivity index units] among thoselosing land. Unless one takes the reasonableposition that large landowners already haveother assets that can compensate for allocatingthem less land than the minimum [which wouldreduce their burdens of funding other assettransfers to the landless and near landless].

In equitable redistribution, the landless deservefirst priority as beneficiaries, and the largestlandowners will naturally have to bear the mostsacrifices. Over 90 million own no land in therural population of just over 100 million, whoseequal claims would account for over 30 millionacres. Even with full expropriation - which con-tradicts the idea of land rights as a minimumper capita applying to all rural citizens - fromthose with 50 acres or more, less than half ofclaims can be met.

The productivity of land will have to be substan-tially increased if there is a very large gapbetween land ceiling and floor. For example, aland ceiling of 50 acres per capita can makeavailable at most 12 million acres of cultivableland. This meets the requirement for the currentpoor, but will not provide universal land-basedsecurity against poverty.

The first claim on redistribution would be forthose without land. Targeting the poorest one-third or rural population would probably restrictland transfers to those households described bythe Census as non-agricultural or livestock hold-ers. If zero land ownership were the basis, then

(pure) tenants would also be included. Whenpoverty is the core criterion, then very smalllandowners may also qualify. Since targetingrequires choice within categories, land distribu-tion can become messy in comparison to a uni-versal target of one-third cultivable acre percapita for the entire rural population. Plus, usinghousehold occupation categories violates citizenrights that should be independent of householdarrangements and hierarchies.

Should lease or sale be disallowed? Certainlynot. Least because some adults are entirelyunsuited to farming, plus may do much better inother occupations and make better use of otherassets traded for land. It is not even feasible toenforce self-operation or residence in village tomaintain eligibility for land transfer. Again, coop-eratives would help to prevent "misuse" of whatare essentially community resources.

Spatial Issues in Land ReformsCountry availability of land exceeds the countrypoverty threshold. However, it may be quiteinfeasible and undesirable to invoke inter-provin-cial land transfers. And even between distantdistricts. Which provinces and districts appearland-deficit or land-surplus? How may, should,would one define deficit or surplus, including the'blindingly' obvious criteria?

The most complex circumstances for land redis-tribution arise when both land availability andproductivity fall much short of benchmarks.Several districts fall into this category. Theseinclude the more than 1.5 million in districtGujrat (Punjab) with wheat yield of less than halfthe average. Much of NWFP has both large landdeficits and low wheat yields. Bumper harvestscannot make up the difference. Hence cashcrops [including orchards; forest products] maymake up the deficit, as they do in e.g. Mardandistrict with over a million in population. Butnon-land assets and income will remain impor-tant to offset the land deficit. Zhob is an exam-ple of fewer alternative assets.

Consider Sialkot (Punjab) district as a differentillustration. Its rural population of 2 millionowned (in 2000) about one-fourth acre per capi-ta, and hence even less of cultivable land, ascompared to the benchmark of one-third cul-tivable acre. Wheat yield was about average at900+ kg per acre, indicating that the bench-mark may not be lowered on account of veryhigh productivity. If surrounding areas cannotprovide for the land deficit, or people do not wish


to move, then complementary efforts will berequired to raise farm productivity and providenonland assets.

With a (then) population of 1.6 million, Sahiwal(Punjab) district is an example of land deficitthat may be offset by high productivity - of 30percent more than the average wheat yield.

Could high levels of land per capita be very mis-leading as to the potential of land distribution forasset security? Accommodating nearly 3 millionpeople, Districts Dadu and Naushero Feroz(Sindh) are examples of the need for caution.Owned land per capita safely exceeds the landthreshold, but cultivated acres show a cleardeficit. While the latter has high wheat yield -- of50 per cent larger than average -- to allow down-ward adjustments in the land benchmark,Dadu's yield is almost the reverse at 650 kg peracre.

A final example of the case when both ownedand cultivated land indicate no deficit, but wheatyield is quite low, and not necessarily offset byproductivity of other food [or cash] crops [or live-stock]. With a population of over 1 million,Attock (Punjab) district has land per capitaratios well above the benchmark. However,wheat yield is less than one-third of average.Jacobabad (Sindh) is similar, as is Turbat(Balochistan).

Compared to a wheat consumption benchmark,production of wheat per capita is a compositeindicator of land inadequacy [productivity adjust-ed for population]. Providing room for modestincrease through a higher share of wheat in cul-tivated acreage or larger cultivated acreage, abenchmark of 200 kg per capita may be used.The inference is stark - low productivity is gener-ally unable to offset a 'high' endowment, sug-gesting that the lower population density of adistrict in fact reflects the lower capacity of landto feed its population. For example, Attock hasnearly an acre of land per capita and well overhalf an acre of cultivated land, but wheat pro-duction is not more than 100 kg per capita - halfthe wheat benchmark.

A more modest approach to land redistributionwould focus just on the existing poor. Perhapswith the argument that non-poor have otherassets. Ideally, those barely above the povertyline should also be included.

If only a fourth of the population was income

poor, then land transfer needs would be similar-ly smaller. Enough land may be available for thissmaller population even when the rest cannotbe enabled to secure the land minimum (with-out much dislocation).

Redistribution of public water can be a serioussupplement, such as to farms at tail end of irri-gation canals. It cam also be a substitute forland redistribution - such as in much ofBalochistan, or Tharparkar in Sindh andCholistan in Punjab. The scope for redistributionis substantial - nearly half the water used is sim-ply wasted; more can be "saved" by changes incropping patterns, away from ecologically unsus-tainable crops that are also a huge recipient ofnot just untenable but also unnecessary publicsubsidies (sugarcane?). Implementing suchredistribution can be problematic because newirrigation infrastructure remains one of displace-ment (Tarbela, Ghazi-Barotha) and disposses-sion (Chotiari; Chashma).

Public FinanceHow is the land redistribution to be financed?Some state land would be available, but therehas to be much reliance on redistribution of pri-vate land.

Simple expropriation seems infeasible. Whatthen will be the public subsidy required, special-ly for realizing land entitlements of the poor.If one could assume that the poor can pay forthe land in affordable instalments, then the pub-lic subsidy is essentially that of providing creditfor land purchase. This can be imposed uponland losers, indirectly though compensation infixed maturity, low interest bonds. But to do this,the state needs to challenge the Shariat BenchSupreme Court judgment as prior compensationfor compulsory acquisition of land; or just ignorethe decision as it does blatantly in mega infra-structure projects.

It is more probable that many of the poor couldnot pay for land over even a generation, unlessthey were given additional land. Alternatively,they require a partial write-off for the debt. Theissue of subsidy has special significance for chil-dren.

Income or other tax on agriculture. What rev-enue possible to pay for land purchase? Give life-time tax exemption in exchange for a certainamount of land?

As suggested earlier, it may be infeasible to


move people to distant areas. Transfers acrossdistricts should be definitely avoided. Hencesome families with less than minimum land willbe entitled to special assistance for raising landproductivity or enabling nonfarm incomes. If cultural rights are acknowledged, then similarpublic assistance will be required for families,which will suffer serious loss of communitythrough dislocation. Whether a land-surplus hostcommunity refuses to accept migrants, ormigrants refuse to dislocate, special assistancemay be mainly funded by taxing (remaining)land-surplus areas.

FisheriesMost fisher folk are among the chronic andespecially vulnerable poor. Hence their rele-vance to better claims to social assets, publicand private. For those sensitive to cultural hier-archies, fisher folk are at special risk.

There are several kinds of communities thathave a claim on fisheries, which suggests cau-tion in generalisation. A (likely minority)engages in farming along with fishing, mostly inthe Indus delta. Another (probable majority)depends primarily on fishing, combined withsome supplementary income from other non-

farm activities. Yet another group relies primari-ly on labour for handling and processing.Another perspective is self-employed boat "own-ers," sharecropping "crews," and the "rest."

As with inequity in cropland, the core issues offisheries are sharing (in control of) public assetsand in redistribution of private assets directly orindirectly. Similarly, public action cannot endwith asset transfers, but must also embrace spe-cific action for decent returns to assets. Forexample, "protected" fisheries are necessary butinsufficient if marketing is exploitative.

Both the nature of fisheries and paucity of dataprovide less number crunching than that donefor illustrations of land redistribution.

In 2006 (before the EU ban on imports as unsan-itary), Pakistan exported seafood valued at $180 million. Of total production at around600,000 tons, sea food accounts for more thantwo-thirds; a similar share is in total vessels (andmore in capacity). Sea food data is likely to bean underestimate in the (deliberate) absence ofcredible records on harvesting by deep seatrawlers.

Fisher folk population is estimated at around 5million, using an estimate of fish harvesters andfish workers as 0.7 million, and family size of 7persons.

As the basis for equitable fisheries, strategiesfor asset transfer are both simpler and morecomplex as compared to redistribution of cul-tivable land.

Large water bodies -- whether inland as rivers,barrages, wetlands etc or the sea - are constitu-tionally public resources. Hence governmentsimply has to convert its sole jurisdiction to com-munity stewardship. Some collision with power-ful "private" interests is inevitable, but much lessthan confrontation with large landowners in landredistribution, except where land and waterlords coincide.

Complexity appears, at least for us, becausewater resources should allow public access,however regulated. This is unlike land re-distri-bution where specific parcels of land can beassigned to specific persons. Hence externalitiesare inevitable and must be handled innovatively.There is also complexity because fresh water isneeded both for crop agriculture and fisheries.Both farming and industry need drainage, which


degrades downstream fisheries on a very largescale. These issues are important for both inlandand marine fisheries; the latter is tragically illus-trated by the desertification of the Indus delta.

To achieve equitable fisheries, the most impor-tant public action is to reverse state supportfrom supporting commercial fisheries to pro-moting largely subsistence fisheries. This willrequire a complete ban on deep-sea trawlers,which discard several folds more than they storeand thereby deny such harvest to fisher folk. Asimilar change is required in inland fisherieswhere the (monopoly) contract system is madeextinct in favour of access by community fisherfolk.

Transfer of Controle OverWater BodiesHence, the essence of our proposal is simple -effectively transfer state control over water bod-ies to "local collectives," in a manner thatensures equitable access to fisheries by local(resident) fisher folk, including crews of smallvessels and workers who handle harvests.

Would equitable fisheries provide universalescape from poverty? One indicator is GDP infisheries, of Rs 24 billion (mostly marine fish-eries). At a conservative threshold of Rs 10,000per capita, around 2.5 million citizens canescape poverty. This is half as many estimatedto depend upon fisheries. If all families chose toremain in fisheries, annual income would beless than half the poverty line.

Official data provide production estimates forinland and marine fisheries, at around 165 and400 thousand tons, respectively. The only whole-sale price data is for a single premium species(rahu). Prices in Lahore and Karachi may beused. A rough adjustment for other species, andcosts, is to assume that net price to fisher folk isabout one-third of the wholesale price. Averageincome per capita is then derived as around one-third the poverty line, indicating an even largerneed for transfers of other assets. Alternatively,less than 150,000 persons could achieve fullpoverty line income, and the rest would need tobe provided other occupations.

A more optimistic estimate appears when wheatconsumption at 215 kg per capita is used as thebasis of a poverty line. Using wholesale prices offlour and fish (adjusted), fish production forwheat purchase could meet the need for most ofthe fisher folk population. Accounting for non-

food needs is necessary. This significantlyreduces the "covered" population if it is reason-ably assumed that nonfood needs require anoth-er one-third of income - from 90 percent down to60 percent of the fisher folk population that cansubsist entirely on fisheries.

For some but not most fisher folk, redistributionof farmland may offset the shortfall in fisheriesincome. However, more can benefit by higherand more stable fish prices, or lower costs.

Can public investments for higher productivitybridge much if not the entire gap? Current overfishing points away from even higher levels ofcatch, and towards reducing substantial waste.Deep-sea trawlers are an enormous source ofwaste and have to be banned altogether. Thiswould naturally increase stocks available forfisher folk, who would require public support intraining and equipment to reduce their waste(such as 'trash fish').

An alternative option is to increase stocks sothat higher catch is ecologically sustainable. Tobe a successful strategy, action is required upontwo fronts. Significant increase in fresh waterflow to the delta is needed to replenish andexpand stocks in marine fisheries. A higher flowto the sea can also be used to protect upstreaminland fisheries. Much hostility can be expectedfrom upland agriculture, even though their croplosses are wholly avoidable by reducing simplewaste in water.

Expanding stocks can also be achieved throughreduced pollution across the country.Agricultural drainage is a serious threat to fish-eries, for which the LBOD is a tragic illustration.Yet another serious threat to stocks is industrialwaste from major cities [also a threat to higherprice exports]. Neither source of pollution isinevitable; polluter pays can raise funds for pub-lic infrastructure and compensate fisher folk forecological damage.

It is our judgement that despite equitableaccess, increased productivity and better pricesthe gap between needs and available fisherieswill not be eliminated, at least not in the medi-um term.

Hence public action would be required to under-take other asset transfers to accommodatemany persons that should choose alternativeoccupations, and other asset transfers to bridgethe income gap for those who remain in fish-


eries.

We propose a specific asset transfer scheme,managed by community organisations at asdecentralised a level as possible. A license andquota system is the entitlement of communityresidents. A license is reserved for persons whofish themselves, with or without crew. Thelicense may be transferable only among thecommunity.

Independently of the license, a catch quota isgiven to each person in the community, youngand old, men or women, boat owner or crew, har-vester or worker. The quota may be transferableso that crew and workers can also benefit - com-mercial fishing with crew will become depend-ent upon catch quotas of crew, and hence pro-vide decent compensation. Workers should havethe (national) minimum wage as a floor for theprevailing system of shares in catch.

This transferability has an added advantage ofpromoting cooperatives for leasing or purchas-ing large commercial vessels, as a sort of com-pensation to those excluded from the new fish-eries regime.

Ecological considerations indicate the total pre-cautionary quota available in a specific waterbody. Hence an alternative license and quotasystem would begin with very small boats, andmove to higher categories according to quotaremaining. This is likely to completely excludethe very largest commercial vessels, as it shouldbe. As in land redistribution, public funds willdetermine the extent of compensation for thoseexcluded from fisheries. Of course, if their gripon marketing is not diluted, fisher folk will fail toescape from poverty.

Fish harvests and prices can fluctuate no lessthan in crop farming. Any system of (group)insurance for crops can be adapted to fisheries.The best insurance would be an asset or employ-ment whose returns are more stable or at leastnot generally covariant with fisheries income.Social Security Institutions

Low formal coverage and further exclusions,plus low quality services characterise such insti-tutions. Serious discussion is needed to restruc-ture the delivery of services needed to comple-ment asset transfers. We offer only briefremarks.

In their present dismal functioning there would

be no point in expanding coverage to the ruralpopulation.

Health services should be funded through uni-versal public facilities such as clinics and districthospitals rather than additional autonomousinfrastructure.

Unemployment benefits can be consideredmore broadly to cover bad harvests, disability,and inadequate asset transfers. Rather thaninvite patronage and corruption through discre-tionary targeting, a universal employment guar-antee scheme is needed. This should assure aminimum income of say two-thirds the povertyline.

As a universal entitlement, children and old ageor disabled citizens could achieve their guaran-tee through working adults, no differently fromthe purchase of food through vouchers or rationshops.

No public scheme is ever accountable withoutcontinuing active interest of beneficiaries. A uni-versal tax for universal social security is neededas an insurance premium, and to provide moreto those who need more (ill) from those whoneed less (healthy). Such contributions wouldsupplement those provided by government andenterprises. Funding by the latter should be assimple as possible to avoid under-registrationand false registration of workers. A fixed tax onprofits would do it.

A mix of funding by different levels of govern-ment seems advisable both to secure minimalprotection of citizens, and to ease implementa-tion. Federal and provincial governments com-mit to fixed share of their budgets. District gov-ernment contributes a minimum absolute levelper capita, say matching the amount con-tributed by citizens.

A national institution would manage the schemethrough fairly elected district government.



IntroductionIn-spite of being an agricultural country produc-ing most of the food crops which serve as thestaple diet of the majority of the population,Pakistan continues to be food insecure. A recentstudy states that 48.6 per cent of the people inPakistan are faced with food insecurity.1 Out of130 districts, 80 are food insecure in the coun-try, and of them, 45 are extremely food insecure.This compares with 38 extremely food insecuredistricts in 2003.2 Only 30 per cent districts pro-duce surplus wheat, 13 per cent are in the defi-cient category, while almost half are in theextremely deficient category. Almost 24 per centdistricts produce surplus rice. When both agri-cultural and animal based food availability isincluded, almost 60 per cent districts count asextremely food insecure.

A vast majority of the population that hasbecome poorer and poorer over the years cannotafford regular food items due to high prices,declining real wages, and loss of employment -all these resulting from narrow-based govern-ment policies that compromised the interests ofthe poor. Decline in the scale of investment inagriculture, inappropriate rules for trade andinvestment between rich and poor countries andthe production of bio-fuels and animal feed arestated to be causing food insecurity in the poorcountries. According to Ugarte and Murphy3

"…Rather than some overwhelming act ofnature - described by too many commentatorsas a 'silent tsunami' - the world food crisis islargely human made." They go on to argue thatthe food price crisis is due to poor policy choicesboth at the national and intergovernmental lev-els. Among the many mistakes cited is the abo-lition of public stock holding under pressurefrom the World Bank.

In spite of structural shift towards industrializa-tion that came about during the course of devel-opment in Pakistan, agriculture sector is still the

largest sector of the economy contributing 21.8per cent to the GDP and providing employmentto 45 per cent of total employed labour force.

Agricultural GrowthThe fluctuations in agricultural growth in thepast years have largely stemmed from irregular-ities in the growth of major crops which is theresult of weather shifts and pest attacks oncrops, among other factors. Table 3 showstrends in the agriculture sector that grew at anaverage rate of 4.4 per cent per annum duringthe 1990s. During the decade of 2000, the agri-cultural sector experienced erratic growth, withthe rate ranging between 2.7 percent to 6.5 per-cent. The poor performance is also on account ofthe fact that no investments had been made inthe agricultural sector to increase crop yield.4

Water, which is a crucial input, is deficient. Noinvestments were made, during the course ofthe last two decades, in water development proj-ects, farm-to-market roads, power developmentprojects, and storage and warehousing facilities,etc. to help increase agricultural output growth.The performance of the agriculture sector during2008-09 has been stronger than expected. Thesector registered a growth rate of 4.7 per cent asagainst the target of 3.5 per cent and earlieryear's performance of 1.1 per cent. This was onaccount of bumper wheat, rice and maize cropsestimated as 23.42, 6.9, and 4.0 million tonsrespectively.

Crop SituationTwo principal crop seasons in Pakistan areKharif and Rabi. The sowing season Kharifbegins in April and runs till June. Harvestingtakes place during October to December. Majorkharif crops are rice, cotton, sugarcane, mung,mash, and bajra. The Rabi sowing season runsfrom October to December followed by harvest-ing during April to May. Major Rabi crops arewheat, gram, masoor and tobacco. Wheat, rice,

63Labour Rights in PakistanThe Challenge of Food SecurityDr Shahida Wizarat

sugarcane and cotton account for 89.1 per centof value added of major crops. Four main crops,sugarcane, cotton, wheat, and rice contribute29.8 per cent to the agriculture value added and6.5 per cent to the GDP. Sugarcane is an impor-tant cash crop of Pakistan used as an input insugar and sugar-related products, chipboard andpaper. Sugar accounts for 3.4 per cent of theagriculture value added and 0.7 per cent of theGDP.

Rice is an important food crop and one of themajor export items of the country. It accounts for5.9 per cent of the valued added in agricultureand 1.3 per cent of the GDP. Pakistan growsenough high quality rice to meet domesticdemand and exports. It is produced mainly inPunjab and Sindh. Wheat is the main staplefood item in the country and largest grain crop ofthe country. It contributes 13.1 per cent to valueadded in agriculture and 2.8 per cent to GDP.The production of gram, maize and tobacco hasincreased by 60 per cent, 11.9 per cent and 4.6per cent respectively during 2007-8 to 2008-09.While the production of rapeseed and mustard,barely, bajra and jawar decreased by 16.7, 4.6,3.0 and 2.9 per cent respectively.

Causes of Food InsecurityIrrigation WaterPakistan's agriculture output is closely linkedwith supply of irrigation water. Table 11 showsthe proportion of the three main sources towater resources. The data have also been pre-sented in Figure 3. We find that the majorsource of irrigation is canal water contributingalmost 60 percent to the total agricultural pro-duction. Almost a quarter is contributed byground water and about 15 percent by rainfall.

Table 11 Water Resources

The normal surface water availability at canal

heads is 103.5 million acre feet (MAF). The Rabiseason faced more water shortage than theKharif period during these years.

Inflationary TrendsThe shrinking food availability in Pakistan isattributed to an increase in the price levels ofregular items generally, and food items specifi-cally. The Consumer Price Index (CPI), foodInflation, non-food inflation, core inflation,Whole Sale Price Index (WPI) and Sensitive PriceIndex (SPI), all jumped between 2007 and 2008.The increase in food prices in Pakistan was aresult of soaring agricultural commodity pricesin world markets, which reached their highestlevel in thirty years. Ugarte and Murphy (2008)state that the major cause of food price inflationon world markets from 2004-05 onwards wasthe spectacular increase in production and useof bio-fuels, as this raised the demand for manyagricultural commodities, which not only pushedtheir prices, but had a 'knock-on' effect on therates of other commodities as well. The situationon the supply side did not help much either aspersistent drought and unfavourable weatherconditions reduced supply at a time when thedemand was expanding.

Average retail prices of individual food itemsalso increased at a spectacular rate during July -April 2008-09. All major food products inPakistan such as rice, wheat, pulses, sugar, veg-etable ghee, beef, chicken and milk registeredsubstantial escalation in their prices. Moreover,post-2009 increase in food prices has been at afar more substantial rate.

64


Table 3 Growth Performance2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09

Commodity Producing Sector 0.2 1.3 4.2 9.3 9.5 5.1 6.6 1.4 0.2Agriculture- 2.7 0.1 4.1 2.4 6.5 6.3 4.1 1.1 4.7Manufacturing 8.2 4.5 6.9 14 15.5 8.7 8.3 4.8 -3.3Services Sector 4.8 4.8 5.2 5.8 8.5 6.5 7 6.6 3.6GDP (Constant Factor Cost) 2.2 3.1 4.7 7.5 9 5.8 6.8 4.1 2GNP (Constant Factor Cost) 2.3 5.1 7.5 6.4 8.7 5.6 6.7 4.1 2.6

Source: Pakistan Economic Surveys 1994-95, 1997-98, 1999-00, 2000-01, 2002-03, 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2008-09.

Population GrowthPopulation growth is another very important fac-tor causing increase in the demand for food. Therate of growth of population was 3 per cent dur-ing the early 1980s, thereafter it started declin-ing. The data shows that the decline has contin-ued throughout at a steady pace, which does nottally with the ground realities prevailing in thecountry. The increase in the rate of growth ofpopulation, which now stands at around 170 mil-lion people, increases the demand for alreadyscarce food supplies.

Decline in Real WageIncrease in the CPI generally and food pricesspecifically, is eroding the purchasing power ofthe workers. Table 17 gives the average realwage by industry for the period 1990-91 to2006-07. These have been obtained by deflatingthe average nominal wage by the CPI. Deflatingthe average nominal wage by the food priceindex would give much lower real wage esti-mates as the rate of growth of food price indexis much higher than the rate of growth of theCPI. As a result of the decline in real wages, thepurchasing power of workers is diminishing andwith it the problem of food insecurity is worsen-ing.

Government PoliciesGovernment policies have also contributed toincreasing food insecurity in Pakistan. Constantborrowing from foreign sources and the structur-al adjustments and stabilization policies pur-sued by the government as a part of the condi-tionalitiies attached to foreign assistance, has

led to a major stretch on the government'scapacity to maintain control over prices ofessential items. The processes and the reper-cussion described below give a clear idea of howextreme dependence on external funding hassought to compromise the government's deliv-ery capacity in terms of relief for the public.

First, due to the adoption of a market-basedmonetary policy, the government started bor-rowing from international financial institutionsleading to a tremendous increase in foreigndebt. With the bulk of the country's revenuesgoing into debt servicing, the developmentoptions shrunk to a great degree. The resultantdistributional, growth, and social crisis directlyfuelled political instability. Increase in povertyas a result of debt servicing and erosion of devel-opment opportunities has been a major con-tributing factor to food insecurity in the country.

Second, the 1990s was also the first decade dur-ing which the country adopted the World Bankand the International Monetary Fund's (WB-IMF's) Stabilization and Structural Adjustmentpolicies. The focus of these policies was on lib-eralization, privatization and reduction in gov-ernment expenditures. This meant slashingspending on health, education, infrastructure,and human resource development. Since thebulk of these expenditures are consumed by thepoor, a cutback led to an unprecedentedincrease in the poverty level in the country. TheWB-IMF dictation for a tight monetary policyraised the lending rate, causing reduction in therate of investment, the GDP growth and employ-ment level - again fuelling poverty. Moreover, thewithdrawal of subsidies due to the IMF condi-


Table 17 Average Real Wages by Industry 1990/91 - 2006/07 (Rs per month)

1991-92 1993-94 1996-97 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 2006-07 INDUSTRY

Agriculture 157.1947 193.5972 289.7896 450.5583 921.115 832.9 882.722 590.4 775.55 Mining & quarrying 151.7703 121.9823 209.2984 280.5147 635.137 351.7 564.221 398.7 514.53 Manufacturing 173.9943 147.7622 423.3828 502.3355 774.399 1602 1207.66 519.6 815.77 Electric gas & water 157.1205 193.5972 289.7896 450.5583 921.115 832.9 882.722 590.4 775.55 Construction 151.7703 121.9823 209.2984 280.5147 635.137 351.7 564.221 398.7 514.53 Wholesale & retail trade 173.9943 147.7622 423.3828 502.3355 774.399 1602 1207.66 519.6 815.77 Transportation 157.1947 193.5972 289.7896 450.5583 921.115 832.9 882.722 590.4 775.55 Financial real estate 151.7703 121.9823 209.2984 280.5147 635.137 351.7 564.221 398.7 514.53 Other 173.9943 147.7622 423.3828 502.3355 774.399 1602 1207.66 519.6 815.77 Total 157.1947 193.5972 289.7896 450.5583 921.115 832.9 882.722 590.4 775.55 Real Wages have been obtained by deflating nominal wages by the Consumer Price Index with 1990-91=100 as the base. SOURCE: LFS various issues.

tionalities increased the tariffs on utilities com-promising the disposable income of the people.Increase in poverty emanating from structuraladjustment and stabilization policies raised foodinsecurity in Pakistan. Ugarte and Murphy(2008) suggest a fundamental rethinking of thefoundations of trade liberalization. According tothem food should be treated differently from tex-tiles, automobiles, airplanes, electronic good,and intellectual property rights, etc.

Improving Food SecurityThough food security in Pakistan is at a criticalphase, the situation can be improved throughpromoting land distribution, improved watermanagement, and upgrading agricultural pro-duction techniques: A few of these options arediscussed below.

Land DistributionFree distribution of economically viable agricul-tural plots to peasants and workers for produc-tion of organic foods has the potential of improv-ing the food insecurity crisis. There is about 4million acres of virgin land in the river belt of thecountry. Due to their proximity to the river belt,access to irrigation water could also be facilitat-ed at low cost. Moreover, organic farming couldalso be considered as a production option.Being virgin, these lands are ideal for organicfarming.

Irrigation WaterThe most important factor that can reduce foodinsecurity in Pakistan and boost food supply isincrease in the supply of irrigation water. Thiscan be achieved through water developmentprojects such as small dams, desalinationplants, and tube well technology, etc. Better irri-gation methods such as sprinklers have beenfound to be very effective in conserving waterand can therefore help in spreading the scarceinput over larger area.

FertilizerIn the modern agriculture era, fertilizer is animportant input to boost the yield. Balanced con-tribution of fertilizer increases yield by 30 percent to 60 per cent in different crops. Forinstance, one kg of fertilizer nutrient produces 8kg of cereals (maize, rice and wheat), 2.5 kg ofcotton and 114 kg of stripped sugarcane.

Improved SeedsQuality seed can increase crop yields quite dra-

matically. High yielding seeds were a major con-tributory factor to boost the Green Revolution.Improving access to good quality seeds can,through increasing the supply of crops, play acrucial role in addressing food insecurity in thecountry.

MechanizationIn order to improve food security, efficient devel-opment and utilization of agricultural resourcesis required. Cost of production of various cropsare not competitive due to low productivityattributed mainly to inefficient farming prac-tices. Farm operations, being time-specific,demand precision in order to optimize the effi-ciencies of agricultural input for higher produc-tivity.

On the demand side, population control meas-ures that reduce the demand for food to bring itin line with growth of food supply will be crucialin dampening the expanding demand for food.

Flawed Solutions While food security is emerging as a major chal-lenge for Pakistan, a number of proposals arebeing suggested to address the situation. It isimportant to weigh all options before pursingany solution. Proposed solutions such as corpo-rate farming and genetically modified crops,briefly discussed below, may receive corporatebacking, but they have not always yielded posi-tive results.

Corporate FarmingCorporate farming has often been suggested asa possible solution to the problem of food inse-curity. The argument is that water developmentprojects, farm-to-market roads, and power pro-duction projects require heavy investments.Since neither the government nor the localfarmers have the kind of resources, large tractsof land are being sold to foreigners. The idea isto encourage them to undertake investment per-taining to infrastructure development to supportthe agriculture sector. Groups favouring corpo-rate farming argue that the boost in productioncan also contribute to exports enabling the coun-try to earn higher foreign exchange. However,this is a misleading argument. It is a conse-quence of the approach depicted by the WorldBank and the IMF where the entire focus is ondebt servicing and not on the needs of the localpeople. This approach has led to seriousfamines as the countries switched from produc-ing food crops to cash crops. Corporate farming


will turn small peasants into landless agricultur-al workers and thus lead to further increase inthe level of poverty and exacerbate food insecu-rity in the country.

Genetically Modified (GM) CropsWhile consumers in western countries arebecoming extremely quality conscious aboutfood, Genetically Modified (GM) crops are beingproduced in large quantities. If consumers in therich countries are eating organic foods and thegovernments of these countries are imposingstrict quality standards, it is unlikely that theywould want to consume GM foods. It appearsthat increase in food insecurity and faminesaround the world are creating a market for GMcrops throughout the world. As the health bene-fits of the GM crops remain controversial, creat-ing space for the production of such crops willnot only compromise health standards, theseshould also negatively influence the economy

ConclusionThe agriculture sector contributed 21.8 per centto the GDP in 2008-09 and provided employ-ment to 44.7 per cent of total employed labourforce in 2008-09. Despite a massive contribu-tion by the agriculture sector to the economy,Pakistan continues to struggle with food insecu-rity.Major causes of food insecurity in Pakistan are:

Increase in inflation rate;

Increase in support prices of agricultural products as a result of World Bankdictation;

IMF dictated government policies causingdecline in output, employment and real wages;

Shortage of irrigation water;

High population growth rate.

Corporate farming and the genetically modifiedfoods are sometimes suggested as solutions bythe vested interest to food insecurity in Pakistan.Experts agree that these two options promise norelief for food insecurity. Self sufficiency in foodcan be brought about through formulation of aNational Food Security Policy that should focuson:

Investment in water developmentprojects, farm-to-market roads, storage

and transportation, productive capacity, research and extension, etc.;Better irrigation methods;Increased supply of inputs;Free distribution of economically viable agricultural plots to peasants and workersfor production of organic foods; On the demand side, population control measures that reduce the demand for food to bring it in line with growth of foodsupply.

End Notes

1 The State of Food Security in Pakistan, 2010, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.2 The extremely insecure food districts include L a k k iMarwat, Karak, Malakand, Umerkot, Mirpurkhas, Dadu, Dalbandin, Panjgur, Nushki, Loralai,Mastang, Turbat, Mach, Neelam, Muzzafarabad, Kotli.3 Ugarte & Murphy, The Global food Crisis: Creating an Opportunity for Fairer and Sustainable Food Worldwide, Discussion Paper No.11, Oct 2008.4 One World Food Security Guide, http://un.oneworld.net/guides/food

ReferencesGovernment of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey,various issues.Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau ofStatistics, Islamabad.Government of Pakistan, Indus River SystemAuthority (IRSA), Islamabad.Government of Pakistan, Metrological Department,Islamabad.'One World Food Security Guide, athttp://uk.oneworld.net/guides/foodSouth Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE)'Poverty in South Asia: Civil Society Concerns,'(2006) Ugarte and Murphy, "The Global Food Crisis: CreatingAn Opportunity for Fairer and More Sustainable FoodWorldwide," Discussion Paper No 11, October 2008. United Nations, 'The United Nations Systems inPakistan', United Nations Statement on FoodSecurity in Pakistan, (2000)Wizarat, Shahida, "Technological Change inPakistan's Agriculture", Pakistan DevelopmentReview, Winter, (1981).



IntroductionThe United Nations estimated that in 2005 therewere 191 million migrants, approximately 3 percent of the world population, living outside theircountry of birth. Levels of migration are predict-ed to rise to 230 million by 2050. People movein search of better terms and conditions of lifeand work. The inequality in the world drivesmore and more human movement within andacross the border. Unlike capital, cash, com-modities and services which rather enjoy freemovement across borders, human mobility islargely restricted and controlled by states' regu-lations and politics. This creates the room forirregular channels of migration for those who donot come under the eligibility of legal migrationbut, nonetheless, wish to move to other coun-tries in search of better economic and socialopportunities.

Credible data of the number of irregularmigrants cannot be found due to the clandestinenature of their mobility. However, it is believedthat irregular migrants comprise a significantportion of the total number of migrants. Someestimates suggest that irregular migrationaccounts for around one third of all migration fordeveloping countries.1 Irregular migrants arethought to be vulnerable to exploitation or inhu-mane treatment because of their legal status inthe host and the transit countries. Common per-ception regarding international migration is thatmigration from developing to developed coun-tries constitutes a major fraction of humanmovement. However, reality is that those areminor numbers and migration from one devel-oping economy to another is much more com-mon.

Pakistan, categorized as one of the developingcountries, is a country of source, transit and des-tination of irregular migration and Karachi issaid to be home to irregular migrant communi-ties. Several studies available about these com-

munities mainly focus on living conditions of theirregular migrants or implication on security ofthe host societies. Studies focusing on workingconditions of irregular migrants are scarce. Thisstudy aims to highlight the situation of irregularmigrants to investigate whether the irregulari-ties lead to violation of labour rights in the caseof Pakistan like in other countries; and presentrecommendations for state and civil societiesactions to protect the rights of migrant workers.The study also explores the capacity of the coun-try's National Alien Registration Agency, and itsstrategy to protect irregular migrants.

Study Methodology andLimitationsMethodology includes literature review and inter-views with a select number of members of themigrant communities, interviews with con-cerned authorities and with employers. Thereare said to be more than 100 migrant-concen-trated residential pockets in Karachi . Amongthem, this study picked up migrants residing inthe Korangi area as selected interviewees.Korangi is close to Karachi's industrial estate aswell as to the creek where communities areengaged in fisheries. The area has a heavy pres-ence of migrant communities originating bothfrom Bangladesh and Burma. The intervieweesincluded: 1) Bengali and Burmese originmigrants; 2) men and women; 3) those who areworking in the fisheries and the textile sectors,4) both those who migrated by themselves andthe descendants, who were recognized by com-munity members. Total number of intervieweeswas 18. (Breakdown of respondents is given inAppendix 1).

Since the number of interviewee was limitedand selection was based on the network of com-munity members, the study aims only to illus-trate issues, whose additional ramificationsrequire a large-scale survey.

69Labour Rights in PakistanIrregular Migrant Workers in Karachi: Victims,Menace or Comrades?Norika Hara

Irregular Migrant workers:OverviewMigrant workers are defined as "A person whois to be engaged, is engaged or has beenengaged in a remunerated activity in a State ofwhich he or she is not a national," while irregularmigrants include: "those who enter a countrywithout the proper authority (for examplethrough clandestine entry and entry with fraudu-lent documents); people who remain in a coun-try in contravention of their authority (for exam-ple by staying after the expiry of visa or work per-mit, through sham marriages or fake adapta-tions, as bogus students or fraudulently self-employed); people moved by migrant smugglersor human trafficking, and those who deliberate-ly abuse the asylum system." (Koser, 2005).Irregular migrants are thought to be vulnerableto any type of exploitation or inhumane treat-ment because of their legal status in the hostand transit countries. These include: unpaid orunderpaid wages, exclusion from social securityschemes, poor working conditions, limited or noaccess to social services including health, edu-cation and training, forced labour, sexualexploitation and so on.

Pakistan is a country of source, transit and des-tination of irregular migration and Karachi issaid to be home of irregular migrant communi-ties, especially those from Bangladesh andBurma (apart from Afghans). Despite their pro-longed presence in the city, the government didnot develop concrete policy for irregularmigrants till 2000 when the federal interior min-istry set up the National Alien RegistrationAuthority (hereinafter called, NARA) to regulatethem. The NARA entitles the irregular migrantsto regularization through issuance of three-yearrenewable work permits upon registration withthem. Though the government accepted thepresence of these migrants and tried to regular-ize them, granting certain rights, the generalattitude towards irregular migrants is that ofcontempt and disdain. This is reflected in thedescription of the irregular migrants at the web-site of the Ministry of Interior that states thatthey are "...burdening the country's alreadystrained socio-economic infrastructure, andadding to the crime rate…"

In 1990, the United Nation's General Assemblyadopted the Convention on the Protection of theRights of All Migrant Workers and Members ofTheir Families which covers both irregularmigrant workers and family members ofmigrant workers for minimum degree of protec-

tion. The convention entered into force in 2003,but Pakistan is yet to ratify it. The internationalconvention states: "...all migrants, irrespective oftheir legal status, are entitled to a minimumdegree of protection."

It is always difficult to have exact number or reli-able statistics of irregular migrants in the coun-try due to its "clandestine" nature. The govern-ment of Pakistan conducted census of Afghans,the largest group of foreigners living in Pakistan,in 2005. The census covered the whole countrywith the exception of the Northern Areas. Itincluded the Afghans who arrived afterDecember 1979 and those who do not have thePakistani national identity card. Census found3,049,268 Afghan individuals residing inPakistan in 2005. This includes irregularmigrants too. During 2005-09, 1,229,507refugees were repatriated (EBDM, 2009). As perthe data of the UNHCR , registered Afghans areapproximately 1.8 million in 2009 and of which1,015,200 are outside of the refugee campsand do not directly receive material assistancefrom the UNHCR. Since they are not receivingany material assistance, they might be engagedin some occupation in the country on the statusof refugee. Apart from these populations, theremight be movement of people which cannot becounted by the existing system.

The NARA estimates that there are 3.35 millionirregular immigrants in Pakistan and of which2.5 million are residing in Karachi. Out of these2.5 millions, about 1.8 million are of Bengaliorigin, 200,000 are Burmese and 0.5 million areAfghan origin. It is the estimation based onunknown sources. The last population censuscarried out in 1998 did not include foreigners asa target population, or included partially andthe available data does not allow grasping theexact figure of the population of migrants bynationality.

Generally it is perceived that biggest foreignnational population residing in Pakistan is thosefrom Afghanistan, followed by those fromBangladesh and Burma, respectively. The exactstatistics of registered and irregular Afghans arenot available. While most of Afghans are regard-ed as refugees, those from Bangladesh are con-sidered irregular economic migrants. And forthe Burmese, the Government of Pakistan con-siders them as refugees who shifted to Pakistanwith facilitation from the Pakistani governmentbecause of their political persecution and for thecause of Islam.


Other nationals who enter Pakistan throughirregular channels include those from Iran,Somalia, Iraq, and India. These are counted asonly a few thousand people and seem to beregarded as refugees.

Karachi is thought to be home to more than halfof irregular migrants residing in Pakistan. Thereare certain localities where irregular migrantpopulations are concentrated in. Generally thisconcentration is grouped by their place of origin,like those who came from Chittagong/Dhaka,Bangladesh, and Burma and so on. Nearly 30communities or localities of migrants ofBangladesh and Burma origin are found inKarachi.

According to the Collective for Social ScienceResearch (CSSR) study (2006), as much as 79.2per cent of the sample populations of Bengaliand Burmese in Karachi were born in Pakistan.There are perceptions within the Bengalimigrant communities that those who remainedin Pakistan are the ones with families who couldnot easily return to their country of origin. Afterthe Bangladesh economy boomed, those whowere willing to go back have returned to theirplace of origin. These statements correspondwith the outcome of the census of the CSSRstudy. The majority of the remaining populationin Karachi is with families and with the passageof time, the ratio of those who were born inPakistan has been increasing.

There is no chronological data of the migrants'influx into Pakistan. The two studies show differ-ent outcome with regards to the distribution ofmigrants by ethnic groups and by year of arrival.

Grouping of years in the InternationalOrganisation for Migration (IOM) study did notallow data to show trend of migrants' inflowclearly. If we look at trends from the first table,the number of inflow is on the decline after thepeak of influx of migrants during 1978-89. Thisalso corresponds with the perception of themigrants and host communities.

There is no demographic data of Bengali andBurmese population available; hence the pro-portion of male-female and age-group are notclear. But if the data that 79.2 per cent of thepopulation were born in Pakistan are true, about80 per cent of the Bengali and Burmese popula-

tion are below the age of 40. Large proportion ofthe population is of working age. There is con-siderable presence of children who are underthe age of schooling. And those who are of work-ing age belong to reproductively active agegroup, too.

The Bengali and Burmese migrants in Karachiare said to be engaged in the fisheries, con-struction and textile sectors, else are home-based workers involved in carpet-weaving, ciga-rette-making, embroidery or textile relatedworks. They are also found in domestic service,working as cooks, helpers and so on.

The occupation they took up varies in the locali-ty they reside. Those who are residing close tothe coastline are engaged in fisheries. The local-ities in proximity to industrial areas havemigrant workers labouring in textile ancillaryfactories. Most women work at home as home-based, piece rate workers while some of themwork outside.

National LegislationThe Foreigners Act, 1946 provides overall legalframework for foreigners in the country. A fewpoints related to irregular migrants are dis-cussed below.

Illegal entryThere are laws to regulate irregular movementof foreigners into and within the state. TheForeigners Act 1946, Section 14 states that"where any person knowingly enters in Pakistanillegally, he shall be guilty of an offence underthis Act and shall be punished with imprison-


Table 1: Distribution of migrants by ethnicgroups and year of arrival

Year Bengali Burmese All Migrants

Up to 1971 14.3% 20.0% 14.7%

1972-77 18.2% 27.5% 18.9%

1978-88 38.5% 37.5% 38.4%

1989-98 28.2% 15.0% 27.2%

1999-2005 0.8% - 0.8%(Source: Gazdar H., Bux Mallah H. and Memon R, 2006)

Table 2: Distribution of migrants by ethnicgroups and year of arrival

Year Bangladesh Burma Others

Prior to 1970 36% 33% 9%

1971-79 29% 29% 70%

1980-2000 34% 38% 21%(Source: International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2004)

ment for a term which might be extended to tenyears and fine which may extend to ten thou-sand rupees."

The Foreigners Order, 1951, Section 3 (2)describes that "Leave to enter shall be refused ifthe civil authority is satisfied that (a) the for-eigner is not in possession of a passport or visavalid for Pakistan or has not been exemptedfrom the possession of passport or visa."

Irregular migrants who enter Pakistan withoutany documents or visa, therefore, come underthe allegation of entering a country without pos-session of a passport or visa. A person who staysin the country beyond the time stipulated by theauthority will be fined "overstay charges" fixedby the Ministry of Interior.

Employment of foreignersThe Foreigners Act 1951, Section 13B prohibitsemployment of an illegal entrant. "No one shallknowingly employ or provide employment to aperson who has no permission to stay inPakistan." The violator is punished with impris-onment for a term which may extend to threeyears and shall also be liable to fine.

The law prohibits employment of an illegalentrant and this might be applied as well tothose who were born in Pakistan but have notacquired its citizenship. (See page 11 for provi-sion of citizenship)

While Section 13B of the Foreigners Act, 1952prohibits the employment of illegal entrants,Foreigners Order, 1951, Section 10 defines therestrictions on employment. "No foreigner shall,without the general or special permission in writ-ing of the civil authority, enter any premisesrelating to, or be employed in, or in connectionwith (a) any undertaking for the supply toGovernment or to the public of light, petroleum,power or water, or (b) any other undertakingwhich may be specified by the FederalGovernment in this behalf."

The general visa policy allows migrant workersto engage in certain occupations such as housemaids (principally employed by foreign diplo-mats), NGOs, and employees or employers of pri-vate companies that invest in business to a cer-tain degree. But there is no policy for issuing visato those who wish to engage in the informal sec-tor: the sector otherwise open to irregularmigrant workers.

Assisting illegal entry of foreignersThe Section 13A of the Foreigners Act prohibitsassisting illegal entry of foreigners. "No oneshall make or carry out arrangements for secur-ing or facilitating the entry into Pakistan of anyone whom he knows or has reasonable causefor believing to be an illegal entrant."Those who assisted irregular migrants in enter-ing into the country, therefore, fall under the vio-lation of this section.

CitizenshipBangladesh used to be a part of Pakistan till itsindependence in 1971. Bangladeshis, therefore,had been citizens of Pakistan till their independ-ence. Some irregular migrants, then, argue thatthey belong to Pakistan on the basis of thesense of belonging to the country or the self-pro-claimed fact of entering into Pakistan before1971. How the legislation defines the entitle-ment of citizenship in this case?

The Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, Section 16Bdrew the line for entitlement of the citizenship tothose who belonged to then East Pakistan,Bangladesh. The entitlement is limited to thosewho stayed in Pakistan before 1971.

Those who entered the country after the periodfixed by the Pakistani government will not enjoythe entitlement of the citizenship unless they fallunder any other clause that entitles citizenship.The Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, Section 4defines citizenship by birth as "Every personborn in Pakistan after the commencement ofthis Act shall be a citizen of Pakistan by birth."According to law, Pakistan gives its citizenshipbased on one's birth place.

Those who entered Pakistan without valid docu-ments fall under the violation of the Section 14of the Foreigners Act, while those who were bornin Pakistan might be given the right to obtain itscitizenship according to this clause, but the judi-cial precedent interpreted this clause as "Personborn in Pakistan after the commencement ofPakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 shall be a citizenof Pakistan by descent if his father was a citizenof Pakistan at the time of his birth." (Ahmed Sand Basit M.A., 2008)

Policy and Regulatory FrameworkThere was no concrete policy on irregularmigrant population and importing foreign work-ers in the country till 2000. In 2000, thePakistan government amended the Foreigners


Act, 1952 by adding Section 14D relating to theregistration of illegal immigrants. Based on thisamendment, the National Alien RegistrationAuthority (NARA) was established on 10 May2004 to register any foreigners in Pakistan whoimmediately before the commencement of theForeigners Act 1952 (Amendment 2000) name-ly on July 10, 2000, and those who had no per-mission to stay in Pakistan. The registration sys-tem may benefit both the government and theirregular migrants. On the one hand it enablesthe government to grasp the data of irregularmigrants residing in the country as there hadbeen no mechanism for their registration in thecountry before. On the other hand, it enablesirregular migrants to obtain certain status forstaying in the country within certain legal frame-work and with certain rights. Under this regula-tion, irregular migrants are given a one year reg-ularization status and are free from punishmentenvisaged in the Foreigners Act, 1952, i.e. maxi-mum 10 years imprisonment and 10,000rupees fine. With the application of work permitwhich is valid for 3 years, the irregular migrantsare able to seek employment or do own busi-ness, which is, otherwise, prohibited in Section13B of the Pakistan Citizenship Act. Apart fromthat, the registered migrants are given the fol-lowing benefits: a)they will be protected fromthe inquiry of any government agency; b)theycan educate themselves and their children;c)they can avail important utility facilities, e.g.electricity, gas and telephone connections;d)they can get car/vehicle registration and driv-ing license; e)they can open their own bankaccount, and, f)they can get their own mobilephone connection. The limitation is that a regis-tered alien does not have the right to shift andsettle in any city of Pakistan other than the oneindicated in his registration card without the per-mission of the authorities. Also, s/he has noright to vote and obtain a passport.

Despite the benefits prescribed in the NARAbrochure, the number of registered irregularmigrants is approximately 10 per cent of theestimated migrant population.

Limited resources were cited by the NARA offi-cials as a constraint to carry out effective publicrelations about the NARA card and extensionservices to register the targeted population.

Generally speaking, the irregular migrants havenot welcomed the introduction of the NARA card

because some of irregular migrants possess thenational identity cards (hereinafter called NIC)through paying extra money to the governmentofficials via agents. The status of the NARA cardholder certainly degrades the status of the per-son previously holding NIC. There is distrustamong irregular migrants on the role of NARAtoo.

Since 2001, the government has introduced thecomputerized national identity card(hereinaftercalled CNIC) which is valid for a fixed period.According to the migrant communities, thosewho hold old NIC had experienced no hardship torenew their old card to the computerized card.However, many face difficulties to renew theirCNIC at the time of this study since they couldnot prove that they were residing in Pakistanduring 1971 to 1975.

Supposedly if fraudulent documentation is nomore of easy access to irregular migrants, itmight be the right time for the NARA to gain themomentum to attract more irregular migrants toget registered with them, while for the irregularmigrants, too, it is time to decide either to go forthe NARA registration or seek amnesty or citi-zenship on the basis of their long presence in thecountry.

International conventionsWhile Pakistan has introduced regularization of


Table 3 Registration of Aliensby NARA 2008

Registration activity Population registeredTotal Work permits 925Work permits issued 915Renewal of Alien Registration Card 76,847Renewal of Alien Registration Card issued 74,845Total registration (including minors) 125,987(Source: EBDM, 2009)

Table 4 Number of Registered irregularmigrants by nationality

Nationality Registered Registered Totaladults Dependents

Bangladesh 49,817 39,043 88,860Afghanistan 8,087 8,664 16,751Somalia 917 468 1,385Nigeria 1,112 48 1,160Burma 398 398 796Total 59,933 48,621 108,952

(Source: Compiled from presentation of Facts & Figures relatingto Migration, Bureau of Emigration & Overseas employment.)

irregular migrants in the country in 2000, whichgives certain rights to them, there is need to lookinto how the international convention definesthe rights of irregular migrants?

We also look at the rights of refugees brieflysince the Government of Pakistan recognizedBurmese Muslims as refugees. The internationalconventions related to refugees define theirrights.

International Convention on the Protection ofthe Rights of All Migrant Workers and Membersof Their Families (45/158 of 18 December1990)

The 1990 International Convention on theProtection of the Rights of All Migrant Workersand Members of Their Families (hereinaftercalled ICRMW) constitutes the comprehensiveframework in international law for the protectionof the rights of migrant workers and members oftheir families and for guidance of States on howto develop labour migration policies whilerespecting the rights of migrants (TheInternational Steering Committee for theCampaign for Ratification of the Migrants RightsConvention, 2003).

One of the important points of the convention isthat it is addressed to all the migrant workersirrespective of their legal status. Thus, basichuman rights are also protected for all the work-ers including undocumented and irregular work-ers under this convention.

Part III of this convention expresses the humanrights of all migrants workers irrespective oftheir legal status including freedom of move-ment (subject to restriction), right to life; fleeingfrom torture; forced or compulsory labour; rightto freedom of thought; right to seek, receive andimpart information; fleeing from arbitrary orunlawful interference on his or her privacy; arbi-trarily deprived of property; right to liberty andsecurity of person; humane treatment ofaccused migrant workers and their families;equality before the courts and tribunals; prohibi-tion of confiscation of identity documents; rightsat the time of expulsion; rights to have recourseto the protection and assistance of the consularor diplomatic authorities of their State of origin;equality of employment; rights to organize tradeunions and other associations; equal socialsecurity; right to receive any medical careurgently required; right of a child to be named,registered, and have nationality; right of a child

to have access to education; respect for culturalidentity; rights to transfer their earnings and sav-ings at the time of departure; rights to beinformed their rights arising out of the presentconvention and rights and obligations under thelaw and practice of the State' respect for thelaws and regulations of the Sate. However, theconvention does not include implication for reg-ularization of non-documented migrant workers.

As of 2009 October, 42 countries ratified butmost of the receiving countries of migrant work-ers have not ratified the convention. Pakistanhas not been either signatory to or ratified thesaid Convention as of December 2009.

Though Pakistan has not ratified the saidConvention, we try to look into the current statusof migrant workers with reference to the follow-ing articles which can be closely related with thecurrent situation of migrant workers in Karachifor the discussion.

Article 25: Equality of the employmentArticle 25 expresses the equality of the employ-ment irrespective of their legal status. Migrantworkers shall enjoy same treatment as nationalsenjoy in respect of remuneration, overtime,hours of work, weekly rest, holidays with pay,safety, health, termination of the employmentrelationship, minimum age of employment,restriction on home work and so on.

Article 26: Right to participate in trade unionArticle 26 ensures migrant workers' right to joinand seek the aid of any trade union.

Article 27: Grant of social securityArticle 27 mentions the same treatment grantedto nationals with respect to social security formigrant workers.

Article 28: Access to emergency medical careArticle 28 states that migrant workers andmembers of their families shall have the right toreceive any medical care that is urgentlyrequired for the preservation of their life or theavoidance of irreparable harm to their health.

Article 29: Migrants' Children's Right to benamed and registeredArticle 29 mentions that each child of a migrantworker shall have the right to a name, to regis-tration of birth and to a nationality.

Article 30: Migrants' children's right to access toeducation


Article 30 ensures the children's right of accessto education. It states that "Each child of amigrant worker shall have the basic right ofaccess to education on the basis of equality oftreatment with nationals of the State concerned.Access to public pre-school educational institu-tions or schools shall not be refused or limited byreason of the irregular situation with respect tostay or employment of either parent or by reasonof the irregularity of the child's stay in the Stateof employment".

Article 33: Right to informationArticle 33 states the right to be informed by theState of origin, the State of employment or theState of transit about their rights arising out ofthe convention and rights and obligations underthe law and practice of the State concerned.

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees(429(v) of 14 December 1950)The ICRMW excludes its application to refugeesand stateless persons, but the 1951 Conventionrelating to the Status of Refugees covers rightsof refugees and stateless persons.

Pakistan has not ratified the convention relatingto the Status of Refugees, though hosting about1.8 million Afghans in the countries. Non-Afghanrefugees recognized by the UNHCR include thosefrom Somalia, Iraq and Iran, who are granted theright to work under the NARA registration withthe facilitation of the UNHCR. The BurmeseMuslims are referred as refugees in the leaflet ofNARA which mentions: "These people have beenconsidered as refugees because theGovernment of Pakistan hasn't granted themPakistani nationality at any stage". Pakistan hasnot ratified the Convention but the saidConvention states the right to engage in wage-earning employment, right to receive public edu-cation, and facilitation of naturalization processof the refugees.

End Notes

1 Human Development Report 2009, UNDP2 Human Development Report 2009, UNDP3 According to NARA leaflet4 According to UN Migrant Workers Convention, Article2 (1), but no universally accepted definition5http://www.unhcr.org/cgi_bin/texis/vtx/pag?page=49e4870166 EBDM, 2009 and interview with NARA officials7 Interview with Population Census Organization offi-cials8 Gazdar H, 20089 NARA leaflet and Gazdar H., Bux Mallah H. and

Memon R., 200610 http://www.refugees.org World Refugee Survey2004 Country Report11 Interview with NARA officials12 Source from a migrant community member. InNARA leaflet it is mentioned that there were 102Bengali slums in Karachi.13 http://www.pakistan.gov.pk14 NARA leaflet and interview with NARA officials15 Interview with NARA officials16 http://www.refugees.org World Refugee Survey2004 Country Report17 Stated by the migrants in Orangi town, Karachi18 "Saudis don't want Burmese as nationals" DailyTimes, June 19, 200619 Katra net is fixed surrounding the area offish/shrimp population. When taken out it collectsthe whole fish/shrimp population, along with the juve-nile fish, while sweeping the whole ground. Katra netwas introduced about 50 to 60 years ago. See WWFPakistan 200520 Interviewed boat owner even shared his experiencethat he had travelled up to Bangladesh when one ofhis crew, Bengali fisherman lost his life. He broughthis savings to their survived family in Bangladesh.21 Quoted by an interviewed migrant. Monthly salarycannot simply be calculated since work is not alwaysavailable in whole month.22 Dawn dated Nov. 21, 2009 reported that issuance ofCNIC for 15,000 cases of Machhar Colony residentspending at the NADRA offices were expedited afterthe meeting with MNA whose constituency includesMachhar colony. Machhar colony is known as irregu-lar migrants' community.23 As for the case of Arakan Muslims, this recommen-dation would not be applied since they were political-ly persecuted.



Bangladesh independenceOn 16th December 1971, East Pakistan becameBangladesh. Based on the New DelhiAgreement, repatriation accord betweenPakistan, Bangladesh and India, in 1973 and1974, some 116,000 Bengali-speaking residingin Pakistan repatriated to Bangladesh (UNHCR,2000). Some of the current migrants claimedthat they had been residing in the territory ofnow Pakistan before 1971 but could not affordto go back to Bangladesh at that time and evencould not follow the necessary procedurerequired for the repatriation at the time of 1973and 1974 since they were illiterate. In 1978, thePakistani government promulgated thePakistan Citizenship (Amendment) Ordinance1978 by adding section 16A: "certain persons tolose and others to retain citizenship". In that itwas decided that "(1)All persons who at anytime before 16 day of December 1971, were cit-izens of Pakistan domiciled in the territorieswhich before said day constituted the Provinceof East Pakistan and who: (i)were residing inthose territories on that day and are residingtherein since that day voluntarily or otherwiseshall cease to be citizens of Pakistan: and(iii)were residing in Pakistan on that day and arevoluntarily residing therein since that day shallcontinue to be citizens of Pakistan;" Therefore,if those who claimed that they had been residingin Pakistan before 1971 may fall under the cat-egory of (iii) and proved to be a citizen ofPakistan but the question is if they have evi-dence of proof or not. The authority requestedthe migrants to give the proof of evidence thatthey were residing in Pakistan from 1971 to1975.

Facilitation by the stateBurmese Muslim migration towards Pakistan isreported to have started some time in early1960s (Gazdar H., Bux Mallah H. and Memon R.,2006), at the time of Ayub Khan's era. The

Arakan Muslims known as Rohingya claimedthat persecution by the Burmese governmentstarted towards the end of World War II and with-drawal of the Japanese Army from Burma, i.e. in1942. In late 1950s, there was conspiracy offomentation of separatist tendencies among theArakan Muslims, which is believed to haveinvolvement of the Pakistani government(Morshed, 2001). This might be the reason forallowing Arakan Muslims to stay in the then EastPakistan and move to the then West Pakistan onthe basis of religion at the time of Ayub Khan'sera.

It is reported that in the early 1970s the MuslimWorld League had obtained permission fromSaudi Arabia to allow Burmese Muslims fleeingfrom religious persecution in their country to set-tle in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government hadtold them to procure passports of any country tofacilitate their stay in the Saudi Arabia. In 1986,Burmese Muslims residing in Saudi Arabiaapproached Pakistan government and the thenpresident General Zia ul Haq had agreed to help.In 1978, there was exodus of 300,000 peoplefrom Arakan to Bangladesh caused by the Armyoperation for which repatriation operation gotmoral and material support from the Islamiccountries including Saudi Arabia (Morshed,2001). It can be guessed all these environmentsfacilitated the steady flood of Arakan Muslimsinto Karachi in 1970s and 1980s.

There was another massive exodus of ArakanMuslims in 1991 and 1992 from Burma toBangladesh but there was decline of inflow ofBurmese Muslims into Karachi after 1988. It issaid that the Arab and Islamic countries weremuch more reticent in regard to the exodus ofArakan Muslims in the 1990s compared to1978 (Morshed, 2001). This shows that perse-cution at the country of origin is not the only rea-son for Burmese Muslim migrants to come toKarachi but the pull factor, i.e. state facilitation

77Labour Rights in PakistanFindings of StudyMigratory Process

played a big role to bring migrants from Burmato settle in Karachi.

Economic migrationMost of the migrants cited extreme economicvulnerability in their original place as the reasonfor migration. Those who are Arakan Muslimsalso mentioned difficulties making their endsmeet due to political persecution of the govern-ment as a reason for migration. Economic com-pulsions were the apparent push factor for irreg-ular migrants to migrate to Karachi, Pakistan.

There is perception in the Bangladesh communi-ties that the Pakistani economy was better thanBangladesh in 1980s.That was the pull factor forBangladeshi workers to come to Pakistan.Employers of textile sector recalled that in1980s many workers from Bangladesh wereworking in textile factories in Karachi. They werepreferred by the employers because they com-plained less and kept working for the same fac-tory. Since wages of textile factories were com-paratively low at that time, turnover of Pakistaniworkers was high. The employer preferredBengali workers due to this docility. There is nospecific administrative guidance from the gov-ernment for hiring or not hiring those peopleaccording to the employers.

As for the fisheries sectors, a boat ownerrecalled that many Bengali fishermen had beenseen from 1986 to 2001. The introduction ofheavy katra net which requires manpower anddemanding work facilitated the induction ofnumbers of Bengali fishermen according to him.That might be a chance factor for inducting num-bers of Bengali fishermen, but it was not evidentthat the fisheries sectors experienced shortageof crew members during that time.

It seems that after 1990s the economic pull fac-tor was lost. It is reported that those who earlierremitted money from Pakistan to Bangladesh,are now sometime receiving remittance fromBangladesh. Many of single migrants have eitherreturned to their home or they have proceededto other destinations for better earning.Pakistan, at the point of 2009-10 was not anattractive place for new migrants to makemoney.

Chain migrationMany of the migrants mentioned that they hadrelatives in Karachi prior to their migration. It issaid that there is much evidence that little irreg-ular movement can occur without information,

advice, encouragement and support of the fam-ily and friends (Battistella, 2008). Though mostof the families reported they did not receive anymonetary or material support at the time ofmigrating from their original place to Karachi,information or presence of their relatives appar-ently played a role to facilitate migration toKarachi.

Many of those who came to Karachi fromBangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s were foundto be from places such as Cox Bazaar andTeknaf which were very close to the Arakan stateof Burma. They are in close proximity in terms ofdistance and ethnic background. Many ArakanMuslims also resided in the same area ofBangladesh for certain years. It might be hypoth-esized that the initial flow of Arakan Muslimsfrom Burma to Karachi caused the next flow ofthe people from Bangladesh especially from CoxBazaar and Teknaf area. This might be the rea-son why people from Cox Bazaar and Teknafarea can be found in large numbers in Karachi.

Smuggling and traffickingWith the passage of time, more structured routefor bringing people from Bangladesh to Pakistanmay have been established by migrant brokersand immigration officials, which includes smug-gling of Pakistani passports out of the country tobring foreign nationals bearing on them fakeexit stamps to enter Pakistan, issuance of fakeNICs with the connivance of registration officesby the illegal entrants, issuance of authenticpassports based on the fake NICs, bogus policeverification or fake repatriation certificates. Thesmuggling of blank passports had been reportedsince 1993. These passports were forged andaltered for the usage of human smuggling fromBangladesh. Fake NICs and passports wereissued through bribery (Immigration andRefugee Board of Canada, 2000).

In 2000, the Pakistani government decidedformed the National Database RegistrationAuthority (NADRA) and introduced new machine-readable computerized passports to eliminatefraudulent NICs and passports. New CNIC is validfor a fixed period while old identity card was aone time card. However, migrant communitiesreported some ambiguity regarding issuance ofCNICs. These were issued arbitrarily on the basisof corruption or illegitimate political decisions,according to them.

According to the migrant community, after 1989potential migrants intended to come to Karachi


for the purpose of travelling to other places thanPakistan. It is reported that the establishedinternational networks were existing to bringpeople not only from Bangladesh but also fromsome other countries to take them to other des-tinations such as Europe. These people arepotential migrants who might spend a certainamount of time in Karachi for earning therequired fee for travelling or remain here due tofailure to reach their destinations.

MMiiggrraanntt WWoorrkkeerrss IInnTThhee FFiisshheerriieess SSeeccttoorrFisheries Sector OverviewThe fisheries sector in Pakistan - inland andmarine - cover rivers and their tributaries, canalirrigation system, natural lakes, storage reser-voirs, small and large size ponds, coastal anddeep sea fishing. Karachi has two main sites forfish landing; one is Karachi fish harbour in theKemari Town and Ibrahim Hyderi, and the BinQasim Town where a large numbers of boats areanchoring at nine jetties. Fishing sector isregarded as a part of agricultural sector inPakistan where no coverage of labour lawsexists.

The distribution of remuneration is based on'Patti' system, in which various stakeholders arepaid profit according to the share prescribed foreach stakeholder. The stakeholders include theboat owner, captain, engine operator, recruitingagent, steersman and crew members. The crewcan borrow money from the captain or therecruiting agent for their personal usage. Thesmall amount of loan taken by crews usuallydoes not have any interest. They are repaid bydeducting any amount of loan based on mutualconsent from crew's remuneration. At the timeof injury or loss of life of crew, the captain usu-ally extends his assistance to them and theirfamily. It is an informal and traditional type ofsocial security system.

Shrimp-peeling business found in Korangi areais a small cottage industry run by families.Under a small shed, the owner of the shed firstpurchases a bulk of unsorted shrimps. Theseshrimps are sorted by respective size and peeledat the shelter by daily wage workers. After that,peeled shrimps are sold either to companies orindependent businessmen. This business isalmost dying in the area since the big factoriesexporting shrimps began to undertake thisprocess at their factories in West Wharf, KarachiPort area, and catch of shrimps have been con-

tinuously decreasing, as well. There is littledemand for this business now. The peeling job isa seasonal work. For five to six months whenshrimps are available, the shed is operative. Inone shed 25 to 30 workers, all women, engagein peeling. The workers come to the shed in themorning and the owner hires workers accordingto the catch available for the day. The wagesdepend on the shed and the size of the shrimps.The owner of one such shed shared that he paid35 Rs per 6kg of shrimps. Workers can peel sixbaskets of 6kg shrimps and could earn Rs. 210per day. However, due to small catch, they usu-ally peel only 6kg per day. Hence the earningsare extremely low and the most disadvantaged,including children and aged women, areinvolved in this job.

Profile of Migrant Workers in theFisheries SectorThere are two areas where many migrants areengaged in fisheries. One is close to the KarachiFish Harbour, the other is close to the IbrahimHyderi jetties. It is said that the majority of thesecommunities are from either Burma orChittagong and Cox Bazaar, Teknaf area ofBangladesh. Proximity of the fishing sites andmigrant communities and the ethnic networkmight be the reason for migrants to enter thefisheries sector as a means for livelihood inKarachi. Those who work for fisheries were notnecessarily involved in fishing in their originalplace. Most of them were engaged in farming attheir original place and had no experience infishing.

A local boat-owner stated that it was during1986 to 2001 when many Bengali/Burmesefishermen were seen in Ibahim Hyderi, thoughinterviews with migrants found many hadmigrated earlier and joined the sector for a liv-ing. It could be supply of labour from the pool ofirregular migrant communities that was conve-niently utilized by employers. One respondentshares that:

"I was allowed to stay in the empty land of thelocal sea load. Later, I purchased a plot with thefacilitation of a carpet-weaving middleman wholent me money in exchange of engaging my chil-dren in carpet-weaving at home." (Burmesemale migrant working as fishermen)

The employer or middlemen did not initiate andguide the influx of irregular migrants but they didplay a role of facilitation of continuous stay ofirregular migrants in the area. The aforesaid


boat owner recalled:

"It was in 1979 when heavy katra net was intro-duced for catching trash fish. Local people didnot prefer this work which was very demanding,thus available single irregular migrants who hadno other option were recruited as boat crewmembers." (Boat owner at Ibrahim Hyderi)

The informal and demanding job as a crew wasentry point into the local labour market for irreg-ular migrants, but it seems they did not alwaysstay in the same stratum of labour market in thefisheries sector. After spending years in this sec-tor, some moved on to have their own boats andbig launch. Many small boats which accommo-date two to three crew members are owned byirregular migrants. As a crew member, theyreceive share of catch according to the pre-scribed distribution rate. As a boat owner, theyreceive half share of the catch. The traditionaldistribution of remuneration was followed by allfishermen irrespective of their place of originand legal status. As a crew, they earn Rs. 2,000- Rs. 4,000 per week. As a boat-owner they couldearn approximately Rs. 5,000 per trip. Days ofworking are approximately 20 per month: fourdays off and no fishing from 10th to 17th days ofmoon since it is too bright to catch fish in thenight, plus the weather is unsuitable. Thus,income is not stable.

Pakistan is experiencing huge decline of fishstock due to environmental threats to marineand inland body and due to over-fishing, hencediminishing catch. On the other hand, the ratesof fish have increased over the time. Thus theirincome has remained the same despite thedecrease in catch. Nevertheless, inflationaryprices of daily commodities in recent years haveimpacted their lives adversely.

Women migrant workers, who make a livingfrom shrimp-peeling belong to an extremely vul-nerable group. One woman, when interviewedfor the study, recounted:

"My husband went blind six years ago and hecould not work since then. I was working for afish processing factory and earning Rs. 4,000per month. After I was fired by the factory, Iworked as a domestic maid but I became ill andcould not work there any more. If shrimp-peelingis available, I work for 6-7 hours but could earnonly Rs.20 to 30 in a day. I have no skills such assewing."

Migrant Workers in Textile andAncillary SectorWorkers rights are described in the various actsincluding the Factories Act, 1934; the WestPakistan Standing Ordinance, 1968; theIndustrial Relations Ordinance, 1969; theEmployees Social Security Ordinance 1965; andthe Employee Old-age Benefits Ordinance, 1976.According to those legislations, working time isdefined as 48 hours per week and 8 hours perday. One weekly holiday is compulsory; 14 daysannual holidays, 10 days casual leaves, 16 dayssick leaves and festival holidays are defined asholiday with pay. Double rates for over-timewages are stipulated. Termination of servicerequires one month advance notice in case ofpermanent employment and in lieu of notice,one month's wages is paid to the employee. TheIndustrial Relations Ordinance stipulates theright to association, i.e. forming trade unions.The Employees Old-age Benefits Ordinancedefines the provision of pensions whereas theSocial Security Ordinance introduces a schemeof social security for providing benefits to work-ers or their dependents in the event of sickness,maternity, employment injury or death related toemployment.

Though rights for workers are properly stipulatedin the law, violation and non-compliance is themain issue. The applicability of ordinance isbased on the number of employees, andemployers tend to report less than actual num-ber of employees to escape law. Contract work-ers are included in the definition of workers,therefore, in principal, they are covered by thesame ordinances. However, besides under-reporting, applicability of ordinances, whichvaries from 5 to 20 numbers of employees asminimum number of employees, has ambiguityin terms of definition of establishment. "…employer could have more than one establish-ment. Expression 'establishment' could includenot whole of the establishments of an employer,but each of them individually. Where number ofworkers in each establishment was less thantwenty, establishments could not by any stretchof imagination be joined together for the pur-pose of showing number of workers to be morethan twenty." (Rashid M J., 2008) It is, therefore,deemed that ordinances are not applicable tocontract workers, which can be counted sepa-rately and counted less than 5 or 20 numbers ofa group of people employed. It is said thatmajority of workforce in the textile and the ancil-lary textile industry is comprised of contractworkers who are not enjoying rights and privi-


leges as workers.

After the end of the quota system, the textileindustry in Pakistan is going through tough com-petition and remains under pressure.

Profile of migrant workers in thetextile sectorThe respondents perceived that 40 per cent ofthe contract workers in the textile sector werefrom Bangladesh while very few Bengalimigrants were found among salary-based regis-tered workers because most of them do not pos-sess NIC required by an employer for employingregistered workers. Both migrants and employ-ers perceived that employers preferred Bengalimigrants because they are obedient, complainless about low wages and have experience inthis field. The PILER Survey (2009) on 500women garment workers in Karachi found thatBengali women were receiving the highestsalary compared to other ethnic groups. Theemployer's statements were supported by thedata. The migrant workers might be highlyskilled and working for longer hours, thus earn-ing more.

According to the interviews conducted for thisstudy, earnings vary, ranging from Rs.3,000 perweek to Rs. 8,000 to 10,000 per month.Change of workplace, factory and contractor arequite common. Migrant workers frequentlychange their place of work based on the avail-ability of work and a piece rate paid to them.Work subcontracted to contractors is based onthe order received. Production schedule isbound by the shipment schedule of the orderreceived and the contractors tend to give unreal-istic targets thus requiring long hours from work-ers. However, once a target is achieved for ship-ment, there is a time gap till the next ordercomes. Since the workers earn wages based onpiece rate, they shift to next workplace for sur-vival. As a piece rate contract worker, workinghours last 14 to 16 hours a day, exceeding thestipulated working hours. Piece rate given fromthe employer to the contractor include the shareof contractor and the rate for rejection, thus theshare of workers is less than the rate given bythe employer. Even so, some workers prefer towork as a contract worker.

"I prefer to work as a piece rate worker becauseI am used to working as a contract worker. Ithink the person who works on a contract basisis skilled or professional worker. When you workas a registered, monthly salary-based worker,

the salary is comparatively low." (Burmese originKarachi-born male migrant working in garmentfactory)

Some migrant workers attributed the overalldecline of work in the sector to recession andthe post quota regime, therefore they have start-ed considering taking up salary-based work forjob security if they possess the NIC. Social secu-rity scheme could be one of the attracting fac-tors for them to enter salary-based jobs, but thisis applicable only to large factories according tothe migrant workers.

The ICRMW and IssuesIssues related to remunerated activity

ICRMW, Article 25 (Equality ofemployment)ICRMW, Article 26 (Rights to participate inthe trade union)ICRMW, Article 27 (Grant of socialsecurity)

Though Pakistan has not ratified the ICRMW, asfar as Article 25 of the Convention is concerned,all the respondents stated that they did not faceany discrimination due to ethnicity and legal sta-tus, which includes remuneration, overtime,hours of work, weekly rest, holidays with pay,safety, health, termination of the employmentrelationship, and minimum age of employment.But are they enjoying benefits from this treat-ment? The answer is "No".

As in other countries, the entry point into thelocal labour market for irregular migrants inPakistan is the so-called "3D" (dirty, demandingand dangerous) work. The 3D work falls in theinformal sector which is less protected and lesspaid be it nationals or immigrants. In the caseof the textile sector, many migrant workers areengaged as contract workers and experiencesimilar issues as those of nationals, i.e. longworking hours, job insecurity, and lack of socialsecurity. As for the fisheries sector, labour lawsdo not cover it and irregular migrants work undersimilar conditions as nationals. However, theywere sometimes preferred by the employerbecause they were obedient, less complaining,and available for 24 hours. Their concentrationin the informal sector due to their legal statusplaces them in a more vulnerable position.

Is their vulnerability protected through the enti-tlement of rights to participate in the tradeunion? There are collective struggles of informalworkers in some sectors, such as the fisheries,


agriculture, textile, initiated by themselves tobring about a change in their working conditions,yet as far as migrant workers are concerned, norespondents were found to be a member oftrade unions nor showed interest in being part ofit.

"There is no trade union in a small factory. Thefactory owner does not like it." (Burmese OriginKarachi Born Contract Worker in a garment fac-tory)

"If someone is working in a production depart-ment (i.e. contract worker), they usually do notget information about trade unions. I myselfdon't know about it." (Burmese origin Karachi-born salary-based worker in a garment factory)

"I heard from my friend about trade union, butyou cannot make this kind of organization with-out support from any political party or influentialfigures." (Bengali/Burmese origin Karachi-borncontract worker in a garment factory).

"They (organization of fishers) are not interestedin Bengali fishermen and we could not join themeither." (Bangladesh-origin fisherman)

"I do not know much about their organization(fishers' organization) and am not interested in itsince it is the captain who extends assistance tous at the time of need." (Bangladesh-origin fish-erman)

"We are just an employee. What we can do?Though we have problems, we cannot negotiatewith employer. (Burmese-origin, Karachi-bornContractor working in garment factory for thelast 20 years)

Unfortunately though migrants are considered tobe part of the proper system at the work placeand receive equal treatment, they have not beena part of trade unions as far as respondents ofthis study are concerned; though Article 26 ofthe ICRMW enshrines migrant workers' right tojoin and seek aid of any trade union.

The state of social security also reflects onmigrants' unequal terms and conditions of work.

"Though working as a registered salary-basedworker, social security card is not provided in thecase of small factories." (Bengali-origin, Karachi-born Contract Worker of a garment factory)

Migrants perceived that 40 per cent of the con-

tract workers in the textile sector areBengali/Burmese but few people found salary-based registered workers because not all peoplehave NIC required to be recruited for registeredworkers. Registration of workers is required forgranting social security, thus, in principle, irregu-lar migrants are not entitled to receive socialsecurity.

Issues related to healthArticle 28 of the ICRMW only assures the rightsof access to emergency medical care. InPakistan, weak state system of social servicedelivery, including medical care, compels almostall and sundry to rely on private healthcare serv-ice delivery. Social services, thus, sometimesare beyond the reach of even nationals whobelong to low economic strata. However, injuryand sickness can impact migrant workers' livesrather more adversely.

"A contract worker is more vulnerable. Thesalary-based workers get some compensationfor minor injuries, but if it is too serious, theylose their job. When somebody gets injured, thecontractor pays small amount such as Rs. 200for the initial treatment to save face, but theymay not part with any big amount of money forthe worker's treatment. When somebody dies,the company pays some amount, again for facesaving. When somebody falls ill, they do notpay." (Burmese origin, Karachi-born Worker of agarment factory)

"Working in a seafood factory makes you proneto illness. It is very cold in the factory." (Bengaliwoman used to work in a processing factory)

"I had severe pain at my breast and went to seea doctor. He told me to go to a big hospital but Ihave not been able to visit the hospital till now. Ineed Rs.500 to go to a big hospital. I do not haveenough money." (Burmese woman helping herhusband in cleaning and selling rice).

"When I become sick, I had to stop working as amaid." (Bengali woman)

There is no mechanism to support those whoare afflicted with injury or sickness.

Issues related to rights of childrenArticle 29 (Migrants' children rights to benamed and registered)Article 30 (Migrants' children's right to access to education)


It is reported that as much as 80 per cent of thepopulation of the current irregular migrant com-munities was born in Pakistan (Gazdar H., BuxMallah H. and Memon R., 2006). Article 29 ofthe ICRMW states the migrants' children's rightto be named and registered and Article 30 men-tions the migrants' children's right to access toeducation. The Pakistani Citizenship Act, 1951itself has given the citizenship by birth. As theAct states, "Every person born in Pakistan afterthe commencement of this Act shall be a citizenof Pakistan by birth." However, the judicialprecedent interpreted that this was by descent,that is, provided that the father of the childrenwas citizen of Pakistan at the time of children'sbirth. When asked how the practice was beingfollowed, some respondents reported that theyregistered their children's birth in the B-form inPakistan, including even those who were notborn in Pakistan. These statements need to beinterpreted with caution and need further inves-tigation since it is not proved if they have reallyregistered children's birth. The reason cited bythose who did not have their children registeredwas that they did not have the money to pay forit (either to agents or to government officials).Since they do not possess documents of thecountry of origin either, it can be assumed thatthey rarely register their children's birth to theconsular authorities of their country of origin.Unless they register their children's birth to anyof the states, the children remain a kind of state-less population.

One of the respondents estimated that around50 per cent of teenage population of themigrant community is engaged in some kind ofwork and the rest of the teenage population is inthe school system. An estimated 25 per centare in regular schools while 75 per cent are inmadrassahs. It was not possible to have exactpercentage of the educational attainments ofthe migrants' children but the general impres-sion was that a high percentage of migrants'children were attending Madrassahs instead ofregular schools. Possible reasons mentioned bythe respondents were: 1)many of migrant fami-lies cannot afford to pay school fees required forregular schooling and opt for madrassahs whichdo not charge any fees or charge small amountof fees; 2)some madrassahs charge higher thanregular schools and even parents would like tosend their children to regular schooling, theycould not do it because they require either theCNIC or the B-form to have children accepted inthe schools; 3) there is no role model in the com-munity that proves that education will lead them

to a better life. That might be one reason whyparents do not place importance on regularschooling. The NARA registration gives regis-tered irregular migrants the rights to access tobasic education, but this facility/right was not assuch perceived or appreciated by the migrantcommunities.

One migrant respondent recalled;"In exchange of providing child labour for carpet-weaving, the small plot of the vacant land wasallotted for their residence. This was the reasonwhy many children did not go to school in thepast." (Bengali-origin, Karachi-born malemigrant)

However, carpet-weaving gradually disappearedfrom the communities in the mid 1990s. It was,therefore, not the reason for children not attend-ing school at present.

Though many reported the use of mother tongue(Bengali) at home, no respondent had showninterest in learning or teaching to read and writein Bengali language. Thus, children are inductedin the Pakistani educational system and assimi-lated into Pakistani society as Pakistanis.

To some extent, irregular migrants have accessto basic education and mainstreaming them ismore or less dependent on aspirations for socialmobility among each family.

Issues related to liberty andsecurityArticle 16 of the ICRMW includes the state's obli-gation to protect migrant workers and membersof their families against violence, physical injury,threats and intimidation. Article 14 mentionsmigrant workers shall not be subjected to arbi-trary or unlawful interference with their privacy,family, home, correspondence or other commu-nications or to unlawful attacks upon their hon-our or reputation.

The issues highlighted by migrant communitieswere not harassment by employers but by lawenforcement agencies. Due process of law at thetime of investigations, arrests and detentionsneeds to be ensured for all migrant workers(Articles 16-20). Usually, irregular migrants'encounter with law enforcement agenciesinvolves payment of bribes for release/freedom.The procedures of arrests and detentions werebeyond the scope of this study and have notbeen examined, but further study might be


needed.

It can be said that the communities areharassed or exploited by the political parties aswell. The demographic weight of theBengali/Burmese communities can be the moti-vation for political parties to approach the com-munities during times of elections with unful-filled promise of the provision of citizenship.Generally, strict measures (such as raids) havenot been conducted on irregular migrants. Theyare not arrested nor deported followed by strictrules. Ambiguous status of irregular migrantsallows law enforcement agencies or politicalparties to take advantage of their vulnerability.Two councillors were elected from migrant com-munities in the last local bodies elections.Nevertheless, one of respondents feels that thiswould not help his community for better futurebut he considers it as one of the tools for politi-cal mobilization of the migrant communities.

Issues of integration,social mobilityIt was estimated that 80 per cent of the migrantcommunity members were born or/and broughtup in Karachi. Those who were born or broughtup in Pakistan regard themselves as Pakistanis.The issues mostly highlighted by the migrantcommunities were issuance of CNIC and pass-port. The Citizenship Act, 1951 under Section16A draws a line of recognition as citizen ofPakistan if they were in Pakistan before 1975.Therefore, in fact, if any person arrives after thesaid year, she/he has no recourse to claimher/his citizenship. However, the enforcement ofthe law is weak and much depends on theamount of bribe migrants pay for it, according torespondents. As described earlier, many fraudu-lent NICs and passports were issued throughbribery. At the same time, even those who comeunder the citizenship entitled category, findthemselves struggling with lack of documents topresent evidence of residence to the concernedauthorities. The registration of NARA is sup-posed to give amnesty to those who do not havelegal status in the country but ironically the arbi-trary enforcement of law does not allow themigrant community to have a sense of securityand gives the impression that the NARA regis-tration would degrade their status in the country.One of respondents was of the opinion thatNARA registration was good for single migrantsbut not for those with families. With NARA regis-tration, single migrants whose principal motiveis earning money can at least fulfil their purpose,i.e. finding a job. However, it is not good for those

with families who will face multiple needs for liv-ing.

Given the fact that they have been living inKarachi for the last 20 or 30 years and majorityof them were brought up or born in Karachi, thecommunities or individuals were almost com-pletely integrated in the local society. If he/sheis not migrated himself/herself, they regardthemselves as Pakistani but not as Bangladeshior Burmese. Some are not even interested intheir parents' original place and has no desire tovisit that place, either.

"I want to visit Bangladesh once just out ofcuriosity, but not for the purpose of stayingthere. I was brought up in Karachi and will con-tinue to live here." (Bangladeshi-origin femalemigrant who migrated at the age of 3)

"I never think about Burma and Bangladeshbecause I have no one I know there. I am inter-ested in going either to Dubai or Saudi Arabiawhere my relatives are living."(Burma/Bangladesh origin Karachi-born malewhose parents spent many years in Saudi Arabiabefore migrating to Karachi)

As far as language is concerned, use of Urdu iswidely adopted by migrant communities, fami-lies and individuals. Even for education, thoughmajority is studying at madrassahs, communi-ties do not opt for educating their children by theway that inherits their cultural values and normsand their languages.

Then, can we say they are completely adaptedto, or integrated into Pakistani society? One ofrespondents shared that if they confine them-selves within lower strata of the host country, i.e.Pakistan, they may not face many issues.However, once they wish to have ambition in thehost county, their social mobility will be limited.When they want to work for multinational com-panies or study further in higher education insti-tutions, there is stigma on "Bengali" speakingpeople even though they have proper legal sta-tus.

Provided that they continue to stay in the exist-ing legal status and laws addressing migrantcommunities are not properly implemented, themigrant groups residing in Pakistan would con-tinue to be taken advantage of for their vulnera-bility, especially by law enforcement agenciesand political parties. Their integration into thesociety may go further, but their vulnerability or

84


insecurity may remain.

On the other hand, for the case of migrants withlegal documents but having same kind of migra-tory history, some do make effective use of thetransnational nature of networks of their fami-lies to obtain upward social mobility. There is evi-dence of movement of migrant families anddescendants not only from their place of originbut from and to the third countries as well.Money earned in the third countries had some-times been invested in Pakistan in the form ofproperty or in business. This adds anotherdimension to the migrant communities' interac-tion with the host societies which cannot begrasped by the traditional stereotypes ofmigrants . The changing characteristics ofmigrant communities need to be captured fromtime to time.

Issues of female-headedhouseholdBoth Burmese and Bangladeshi women are con-sidered to be less mobile. They, therefore, tendto be engaged in home-based work rather thanworking outside such as in factories. Femalelabour participation rates of irregular migrantcommunities are not captured by official databut perceived to be low by the community mem-bers. Interviews of female workers revealed thatthose who were working outside tend to beeither from female-headed households orbelonged to disparately economically disadvan-taged group.

"My husband went blind six years ago and couldnot work. I became ill, too. Sometimes I couldearn Rs. 20 to 30 per day for peeling shrimps.When I have no work, we have nothing to eat.Some people give us small money to survive."(Bengali woman)

"My husband went to Bangladesh two years agoand could not come back here. I had worked fora factory for six years, but had to quit due tohealth problems. Now I sometimes peelshrimps." (Bengali woman)

"I was divorced and staying at my parent's housenow. After my mother died, I started working asa maid to take care of my siblings. I earnRs.1,800 per month, not enough for my house-hold." (17years old Bengali woman)

Economic necessities compel migrant women

to work outside. Same as Pakistani women ofthe lower strata of the society, migrant womenare usually unskilled, and are paid less, whichmakes their household extremely vulnerable.This vulnerability intensifies when they fall sick.

ConclusionIs the NARA registration policy in line with theground realities of the irregular migrants inKarachi?As for policy in terms of regulating the inflow oflabour migrants, there has been no concrete pol-icy formulated by the government so far. Thepush factor from the migrant communities isapparently seeking better economic opportunityor escaping insecurities in the country of origin.As for pull factors, there seems to be littledemand for foreign workers by employers in thecase of Pakistan. It could be the reason that pol-icy formulation on migrant workers has not beena priority of the government. While there is noshortage of low-skilled, low-paid labour to act aspull factor, regulative valve of the influx ofmigrant workers in the country had been a net-work of smuggling agents and groups involved infraudulent issuance of travelling documents andidentity cards.

The employers apparently make use of migrantworkers simply because of their presence in thecountry, but not from the motive of exploitingthem for reaping economic benefit. This couldbe the reason why migrant workers have notfaced any discrimination in terms of workingconditions; they are working in already severeconditions like most of the Pakistani nationals.

The influx of migrants workers both fromBangladesh or Burma have declined notbecause of any intervention by the Pakistanigovernment, but because of the deterioration ofthe country's economy, construction of barbed-wire fencing along the Pakistan-India border andstrict action of Bangladesh government againstthe movement of Arakan Muslims intoBangladesh (Human Rights DocumentationUnits, 2006).

Nevertheless, those who have been in the coun-try for 20 to 30 years most probably will contin-ue to stay. Unfortunately the government policyof registering them and providing amnesty hasnot been successfully introduced so far. The pos-sible reasons are: 1) contradiction or inconsis-tency in precedent and current practices couldnot provide a sense of benefit to migrant com-


munities; 2)proper information has not been dis-seminated to migrant communities; 3)variousaspects of the communities, families or individ-uals were not fully translated into policies. Thebenefits of registration listed by the NARA lookattractive but these are not necessarilyaccessed by the irregular migrants consideringground realities, i.e., weak implementation oflaws and non-compliance of standards in gener-al.

The census carried out in 1998 did not fullycover migrant population including irregularmigrant population, nor was data made public; aconstraint that hampers sound argument on thecountry's policy alternatives.

The NARA's policy - regularization - can benefitthe state since regularization programmes canbe a good source of information about migrantpopulation in the host country and can aid poli-cy formulation. If regularization is only for theadvantage of the state, but not for the migrantcommunities, motivation for regularization bythe migrants would remain low. Nevertheless,proper legal status can give a sense of securityto irregular migrants, even if it is a temporaryone. However, government needs to build itscredibility among migrant communities in termsof consistency and continuity and proper imple-mentation of the policy.

Victims, Menace or Comrades?The study shows non existence of discriminationin remunerated activities of irregular migrants inPakistan. Further, if regularization works proper-ly, it is supposed to provide favourable employ-ment opportunities to irregular migrants such asaccess to formal employment. However, regular-ization is not always the perfect solution forreducing number of irregular migrants in thecountry or for granting favourable employmentfor irregular migrants as other countries' experi-ence shows. In the country where the informaleconomy is well entrenched and articulatedwithin the formal labour market structures,migrants may remain in the informal economyeven after regularization (Papadopoulou, 2005).This might be applicable to Pakistan wheremajority are employed in the informal sector.

The growth of labour subcontracting might becontributing to hiring of irregular migrants sinceemployers do not need to ensure possession ofidentity card of employees and employers arenot directory contacting irregular migrants.

As the case of Pakistan shows, role of labourmarket is the single most determining factor forinflux as well as for working conditions of irregu-lar migrant workers. Where the informal sectoris large, irregular migrants will remain there andwhere subcontracting prevails, irregular migrantwill be inducted there. On the contrary, wherelabour market is characterized by high flexibilityand a small informal economy, even irregularmigrants can enjoy upward mobility.(Papadopulou, 2005).

In Pakistan, it can be said that irregularmigrants are not categorically discriminatedagainst, but integrated into the country's infor-mal sector, i.e. the deprived sector. Yet, they arenot fully part of unionization. Those regularizedunder the regularization program and eventhose who are not legalised can be members ofunions for betterment of working conditions asthis is one of the rights assured for all migrantworkers. This could result in momentum to bothnationals and migrants for improving their work-ing conditions.

RecommendationsPromote regularizationThough the current implementation of the NARApolicy did not get full acknowledgment fromirregular migrant communities, the regulariza-tion or proper legal status can give a sense ofsecurity, provided the laws and regulations areimplemented properly. The review of strategy,implementation procedures and approach ofregularization process are necessary to benefitboth concerned authorities and irregularmigrant communities. Occasional survey onirregular migrants can help evolve argumentsabout policy options and directions as well asalternative strategy of regularization.

Initiate bilateral talkDeportation in the consequence of violation ofForeign Act is not really practiced in the country.Nevertheless, one of the constraints for deporta-tion identified by the NARA authorities (as wellas by a section of the migrant communities) isthat migrants do not possess evidence docu-ments of country of origin as the government ofBangladesh does not accept them asBangladeshi nationals. Concerted effort mightbe more effective to get them out of an ambigu-ous position and endow them with proper status.

NaturalizationIt is not clear whether the migrant descents born


in the country have recourse to the CitizenshipAct for entitlement of citizenship. Given the factthat those who are born here have been inte-grated in the Pakistani society and identifythemselves as Pakistani citizens, they have nei-ther any desire nor any legal possibility to returnto original place of their parents. Realistic policyoption such as naturalization or granting a per-manent visa needs to be discussed so as toavoid this group of population from becomingmarginalised or stateless..

In the Convention relating to the state ofrefugees, facilitation of naturalization processwas stated as an obligation on the part of theratifying country. Though Pakistan recognizedBurmese Muslim as refugees, there was noestablished naturalization process for themannounced publicly. They are also one of thegroups deserving naturalization.

Facilitating unionisation (recom-mendations for union activists)As the study shows, legal status of irregularmigrant workers is not a determining factor fordiscrimination or exploitation, but the country'slabour market is. Migrant workers are not dis-criminated against but are incorporated inunprotected and insecure segments of the soci-ety. There are a few unions/associations whichinclude irregular migrant workers as their mem-bers. Hence, migrant workers are not fully mobi-lized, organized and unionized. Equality ofemployment and rights to participate in tradeunions are the basic rights of all migrant work-ers. They are equal, but in a sense that they areequally suffering severe working conditions asare Pakistani nationals. Both nationals andmigrant workers can equally fight for decentwork. Facilitating irregular migrants to be a partof unionization should be considered.

Developing safety net for theneedy The study found that irregular migrant's house-hold becomes more vulnerable when a bread-earner fall sick or when it is a female-headedhousehold. Yet, there is no mechanism to sup-port these vulnerable groups among the com-munity. Though Article 28 of the ICRMW assuresmigrant's rights of access to emergency medicalcare, there was no such provision by the state. Itis recommended for migrant communities ornon governmental organizations to develop safe-ty net for the needy among the migrant commu-nities.

Appendix 1

Details of Interviewees

References

Asian Development Bank, "Technical AssistanceConsultant's Report, Pakistan: Sindh Coastaland Inland Community Development Project,"report prepared as interim report by consultants2005

Ahmed S and Basit M. A., The Foreigners Laws,Federal Law House, 2008.

Battistella Gl, "Irregular Migration" in The WorldMigration 2008 International Organization forMigration (IOM), 2008.

Enterprise for Business & DevelopmentManagement (EBDM),Baseline Study on IllegalMigration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking inPakistan, Conducted for Basic Education forAwareness Reforms & Empowerment (BEFARE)in Collaboration with Action Aid Pakistan withthe support of European Union, Peshawar, June2009

Gazdar H., "A review of migration issues inPakistan." Paper prepared for and presented atthe Regional Conference on Migration,Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices inAsia that took place on June 2003 in Dhaka,Bangladesh

Gazdar H., "International Migration Statisticsand Data Sources - Pakistan," Asian and PacificMigration Journal, Vol. 17, Nos. 304, 2008

Gazdar H., Bux Mallah H. and Memon R.,"Irregular Migration and Non-Traditional Threatsto State Security: The Case of Karachi." Paperprepared as part of Ford Foundation-supportedregional study of non-traditional security threatsand irregular international migration, April2006, Collective for Social Science Research

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GenderMale Female Total

12 6 18

OriginBangladesh Burma Mix Unknown Total

9 5 3 1 18

Field of WorkFisheries Textile/Gament Home Based House Maid Not Working Others Total

5 9 1 1 1 1 18

Migrants/DecendantsMigrants Decendants Total

8 10 18

Pakistan: Between regulation and regulariza-tion," Collective for Social Science Research,2006.

Human Rights Documentation Unit, "TheSituation of Migrants Workers" in the BurmaHuman Rights Year Book 2007, The NationalCoalition Government of the Union of Burma,2006.

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Morshed K., "Bangladesh - Burma Relations" inChallenges To Democratization In Burma -Perspectives On Multilateral And BilateralResponses, , International Institute forDemocracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001.

Sayeed A T., et al, "Contract Labour in thePakistani Garment and Textile Sector," PakistanInstitute of Labour Education and Research,1997.

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UNHCR, "Rapture in South Asia" in The State ofthe World's Refugees 2000; Fifty Years ofHumanitarian Action, (2000).

WWF Pakistan, "Study on Knowledge, Attitudes& Practices of Fisherfolk Communities aboutFisheries and Mangrove Resources, KetiBunder," 2005.




IntroductionAccording to a recent estimate, clay brick manu-facturing sector in Pakistan contributes 1.5 percent to the GDP and provides livelihood to about2 million people largely as informal,casual/seasonal labour. The sector uses oldtechnology of coal-fired Bull's trench kiln andmanual techniques for production. The sector isunregulated and afflicted with debt bondage.Most of the bonded labourers in brick industryare in the Punjab province--where 5000 brickkilns out of total 6000 are located--followed bySindh, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa and Balochistan.

Apparently an outcome of poverty, debt bondageis closely linked to the socio-cultural fabric ofsociety. The vicious cycle of bondage subjugatesthe families economically, socially and physical-ly rendering them incapable to break out of thetrap despite putting in hard labor. The term'bonded labor' refers to workers who render serv-ices under conditions of bondage arising fromeconomic considerations, notably through aloan or advance. Where debt is the root cause ofbondage, the implication is that the worker andhis dependants or heirs are tied to a particularcreditor for a specified or unspecified perioduntil the loan is repaid. The majority ofPakistan's bonded labourers belong to religiousor lower caste minorities. Usually, the entirefamily works, hence, child labour, is widespread.Physical and emotional abuse of workers iscommon.

Working conditionsBrick kiln workers can be divided in two cate-gories: who work and live on the brick kilns withtheir families and those who live at settled vil-lages/towns and work at nearby brick kilns bothindividually and with families. Personal observa-tion reveals that second category of the brickkiln workers is, comparatively, better off eco-nomically and socially than the first category.

The reason is the second category of the brickkiln workers feels less insecure than the first cat-egory as they have their own homes. Those livingat the sites have no or little social support andare more vulnerable at the hands of the brickkiln owners. However, both the categories ofbrick kiln workers, in most cases, get advancesand are bound to work at the terms and condi-tions setby the brick kiln owners. Unless theyhave paid all the debt and are declared as suchby the owner, they feel 'bound' and 'insecure'because no brick kiln owner gives work to a per-son who has not paid debt of any previous own-ers.

The majority of the workers/families live in muddwellings built at the premises of the brick kilnsdue to poverty and lack of shelter. A limitednumber of the workers have a written contractand the rest have a verbal understanding.Remuneration is fixed on the basis of the num-ber of bricks made/carried. On average, workershave to work for 11-13 hours. Usually a brick kilnworker (pathera) family gets up early in themorning; male family members including chil-dren go to work place, which is just a five min-utes walk for those who live on site. Then theystart mixing up the mud they had prepared ear-lier and then start the process of making bricks.Female members join in a bit later after finish-ing household chores. The work continues tillafternoon and then they can take a short break.Women with infant children usually bring themalong at work and feed them during this break.Work starts again which is ended at sunsetaround 6 to 7 pm. Female members leave tocook and do other chores while male membersspend couple of hours more at the site preparingmud for the next day.

Health and safetyBrick kiln workers work and live in very poor con-ditions and degraded environment. The coal-fired kilns emit hazardous smoke and gases.


Brick Kilns and BondageBisharat Ali

The workers who stoke the kilns and those whowork with the mud do not use any protectivegears. According to a worker Daulat Ali Mohsinthe workers have no basic civic facilities at all.Brick kiln workers live at the sites in small mudhuts and at most of the sites they use samewater for brick making, drinking, food process-ing and bathing. The children (both male andfemale) work with their parents and do not go tothe schools as there are no facilities at the sites:

There is a lot of dust and workers complain thatchest and skin diseases are very commonbesides fever among kiln workers and their fam-ilies. No measures have been taken to protectworkers from such exposure. At a couple of brickkilns in Multan district, owners even do notmake proper arrangements for water used inmaking the mud and workers are compelled touse sewerage and chemically polluted water forthis purpose. For instance workers at brick kilnsaround fertilizer factory in Multan told that thereis no arrangement of water for mud making andthey are using chemically polluted water dis-charged from factory for this purpose. In thesame locality at another brick kiln, workers usecity's sewerage water for mud making. All this isseriously affecting their health but owners payno attention.

About 90 per cent of the brick kilns are locatedin rural area. The reasons are availability ofcheap land, proximity of roads for transportationof fuel and bricks, proximity of markets forbricks and low paid workforce.

WagesOne of the major issues of brick kiln workers isthat they are paid very low wages. Alreadyburied under debt, brick kiln workers face diffi-culty in managing the household budget giventhe current inflation. The brick kiln owner takesverbal commitment from workers while givingadvance to them and continues to deduct 20 to40 per cent of their income on weekly basis.Besides, workers at brick kiln do not get thewages that are notified by the government forthis sector. For example government of Punjabhas fixed Rs 442 per 1000 brick making in theprovince but, according to APBMU the workersare getting Rs275 to 350 per 1000 bricks.

There is no mechanism for fixing national wagesfor the sector. Different provinces fix differentwages for similar work: in Punjab the rate is Rs442.48 per 1000 bricks; in Sindh, Rs 280 per1000 in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Rs 295. Wages

for brick kiln workers in Balochistan could not beascertained. This a an irrational mechanism forwage-fixing because commodity prices and allother factors are similar all over the country. In2009, the government raised the national mini-mum wage for unskilled work to Rs. 7000 permonth. The wages for all categories of workersare notified by provincial governments under theMinimum Wages Act, 1961. Punjab Ministrynotified the rate prevalent today (Rs. 422.48) in2008.

A family consisting of four persons (man,woman and two children) could make 1000bricks in a day after working 8 to 11 hours. Itamounts to each person earning Rs 75 to 88 perday given the rate kiln owners are offering per1000 bricks making.

It is to be noted that hand baked bricks are soldfor more or less the same prices all overPakistan. The brick kiln owners sell 1000 bakedbricks in Sindh and Punjab for Rs 2,100 to2,600. According to a brick owner, the cost oflabour and inputs comes to Rs 1600 to 2000 per1000 bricks. According to a union representa-tive, the owners spend Rs 1400 to 1800 per1000 bricks. It means the owners are earning aprofit of Rs 600 to 1200per 1000 bricks but arenot willing to pay fair wages to the workers.

Recent developmentsSupreme Court of Pakistan issued directives inJune 2010 to all Chief Secretaries of fourprovinces to register all the brick kilns. Initiallyprovincial governments did not take action. Thebrick kiln workers and their representatives havealso been demanding that all brick kilns must beregistered so as the workers could access socialsecurity benefits. According to the NationalCoalition Against Bonded Labour , 3,456 kilnsout of 3858 kilns in Punjab have been registeredunder the Factories Act 1934 in recent years.

In Sindh province, after intense pressure fromthe workers and civil society organizations, aseparate portfolio of Bonded Labour was estab-lished in 2008. It was first time that a provincialgovernment realized the issue of bonded labour.This response was followed by the governmentof Sindh's decision to form a committee' to mon-itor the process of registration of brick kiln in theprovince. It is being claimed that more than 500brick kilns have been registered with the provin-cial Labour Department. Some 62 brick kilnsand their workers have also been registered withSESSI . The Labour Department, Sindh, has also


shared the list of registered brick kilns but socialsecurity cards to the brick kiln workers in theregistered kilns have not yet been provided.

The incidence of bonded labour in brick kilns isvery high in Punjab. A 2004 survey of brick kilnsin Punjab by the Federal Bureau of Statisticsfound that nearly 90 per cent of workers tookadvances from the kiln owners. The Punjab gov-ernment in 2008 started a major project,Elimination of Bonded Labour in Brick Kilns, inLahore and Kasur districts at a cost of Rs123million under its annual development plan. Forthe first time, Punjab government has allocatedfund to fight bonded labour. Through the project,with the assistance of NGOs, the Punjab govern-ment has been providing education to approxi-mately 7,000 children in 200 non-formalschools and helping 5,000 or so children toenroll with mainstream state-owned educationalinstitutions. The Labour Department claims tohave conducted a survey of all the brick kilns inthe Punjab province to register. However, brickkiln workers in Faisalabad and adjacent districtsdeny any facility provided to them, like socialsecurity cards etc.

Labour Legislation: Applicabilityand non-ImplementationThe major labor laws applicable to brick kilnindustry and indirectly relevant to the issue ofbonded labor are as under:

i) Factories Act 1934; the law relating to working conditions and health and safetyof the workers at the workplace.

ii) Minimum Wages Ordinance, 1961; dealing with the fixation and implementation of minimum wages for different categories of skilled and semi-skilled workers including the brick kiln workers.

iii) Payment of Wages Act, 1936; deals with the payment of wages, time period of payment and mode of payment of wagesto the workers.

iv) Industrial and Commercial Establishments (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968; relates to terms of employment, bonus, gratuity and group insurance of the employees.

v) Workmen Compensation, Act 1923; relates to payment of compensation to

the workers in case of injury or death.

vi) Industrial Relations Act; deals with registration of trade unions, CBA, collective bargaining, conciliation and labor judiciary.

vii) Employment of Children Act 1991; regulates employment of children in factories and brick kilns.

viii) Employees Social Security Ordinance which provides medical coverage to the workers.

ix) Employees Old Age Benefits Act which deals with old age pension.

If all these laws are implemented properly, brickkiln workers would have been in better condi-tions. Unfortunately successive governmentshave failed in implementing the above laws inbrick kiln sector. Besides, the workers have alsohave not been able to form a nation-wide pres-sure group that caused the government havebeen very lenient with the brick kiln owners.

Emerging self agency The brick kiln workers' alliance of the fourprovinces, All Pakistan Bhatta Mazdoor Union(APBMU), was formed in2005. It campaigned forregistration of brick kilns under the Factories Act1934 and the coverage of brick kilns workersunder labour laws. The APBMU had provided anation-wide platform to realize their labourrights. Unfortunately it could not sustain and dis-integrated quickly. Efforts are being taken by thelabour leaders and brick kiln workers to revivethe platform.

However, the workers have continued their strug-gle as localized informal workers' organizationsand unions in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh.In many cases, different NGOs are supportinggroups of brick kiln workers in their struggle forlegal rights. Brick kiln workers in Hyderabad,Sanghar, Lahore, Multan, Sahiwal andFaisalabad have been more vocal in demandingtheir rights as are supported by civil societyorganizations and media.

In Shehdadpur, Sanghar District, a group of 200brick kiln workers prepared a "Charter ofDemand" that include 30 per cent raise in ratesof different type of work at brick kiln. Theyformed a committee, consisting five memberswho represented different type of workers. This


committee presented the Charter to the BrickKiln Owners Association and started a series ofmeetings with local political leadership, offi-cials, media and local consumers. This resultedin formal talks with the local Owners'Association and both the parties reached a writ-ten agreement in which kiln owners from 32brick kiln group agreed on raise in wages: Thenews of this initiative has created confidenceamong workers of other kilns that they can bar-gain with owners if united and organized on aplatform.

During last five years thousands of brick kilnworkers got release from bondage through theintervention of the judiciary. For example in2009, according to news reports, some 428brick kiln workers were released in Sindh only. Insome cases civil society organisations facilitatedbrick kiln workers' release from bondage but inmany cases the workers approached the districtcourts directly to get relief. However, onlyrelease from debt bondage is not the solution ofthe brick kiln workers' plight. In case of Sindhprovince, it is observed that after release fromthe clutches of exploiting kiln owners, very fewof could find a decent job and rest of them eitherreturned to debt bondage or are living in pathet-ic conditions in the camps near Hyderabad.

End Notes1 Abrar Ahmad, Consultant, Energy Projects,Islamabad, SDPI Bulletin, Jan-March 2010)2 Zulfiqar Ali Shah Bukhari, Consultant, Legal Servicesfor Engineering and Energy Projects, Islamabad, SDPIBulletin, Jan-Mar 2010.3 The State of Bonded Labour in Pakistan, 2009,National Coalition against Bonded Labour, Islamabad.4 Javed, Mohammad Iqbal, Bonded Labor in the BrickKiln Industry of Pakistan, The Lahore Journal ofEconomics, Summer 2006.5 ILO, 2001:326 For example most brick kilns in Matiari and Sanghardistricts of Sindh province derive their labour fromnearby villages and towns and after visiting those vil-lages and town I found that their living conditions arebetter than those who live with their families at brickkilns. It should be noted that in Punjab province mostof the work force of brick kilns live at the sites.7 Mohammad Arif, a brick kiln worker confirms thatthey are bound to oblige the 'verbal' contract with thebrick kiln owner while taking the advance/seekingthe work.8 When asked Rasheed Noonari, a brick kiln worker atShehdadpur, said that the brick kiln owners havestrong loyalty and friendship/solidarity with eachother and, to curb the uprising of workers, brick kilnowners don't give employment once we have a riftwith one owner.

9 Shah, Zulfiqar. Analysis of interventions in bondedlabour report, PILER, 200510 Daulat Ali Mohsin is a brick kiln worker and presi-dent of All Pakistan Bhatta Mazdoor Uninion(APBMU). He works at a brick kiln in Faisalabad.11 Shah, Zulfiqar. Analysis of interventions in bondedlabour report: PILER 200512 Javed, Mohammad Iqbal, Bonded Labor in the BrickKiln Industry of Pakistan, The Lahore Journal ofEconomics, Summer 2006.13 President of APBMU Faisalabad14 Abid Ali, a brick kiln worker at Piraywala area nearMultan.15 Feroz Ali runs a brick kiln near Bhit Shah in Matiaridistrict of Sindh Povince.16 Mohammad Eidan Noonari is president of APBMU inSindh and works at brick kiln near Shehdadpur,Sanghar district of Sindh province.17 The National Coalition against Bonded Labour(NCABL) is a coalition of civil society organizations ofPakistan formed with collective objective to uplift theplight of bonded labourers through joint struggle forthe realization of their rights to equality before lawand equal entitlements and protection before the pub-lic and private institutions. Found in ………….thealliance has more than 30 members. This coalitionalso aims at raising the profile of bonded labour inPakistan along with strengthening the coordinationamong various civil society actors.18 The State of Bonded Labour in Pakistan, 2009,NCABL, Islamabad.19 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/big-industrialists-deny-workers-rights-adviser-16020 Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution (SESSI)is a service oriented organization. The function of theInstitution is unique in nature for the welfare of labourclass. It aims at providing medical care facilities andcash benefits to the secured workers and their depen-dants.21 When brick kiln workers of Sanghar district werecontacted they denied any provision of these cards.However, the brick kiln they work on is showed regis-tered with the labour department of Sindh.22http://www.antislavery.org/english/campaigns/take_action/background_bonded_labour_in_pakistan.aspx23 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-c o n t e n t - l i b r a r y / d a w n / t h e -newspaper/local/lahore/joint-efforts-urged-to-curb-bonded-labour-36024 Rahi, Shujaat Ali Shah, The State of Bonded Labour.NCABL. p7425 Deniel and Discrimination: Labour rights inPakiastan. PILER. 200726 This has been taken from the office record of thebrick kiln union. Though not registered with the gov-ernment workers were able to sign a MoU with thekiln owners' association in the Sanghar district.




IntroductionSocial protection is generally understood to be aset of public policy actions that address poverty,vulnerability and exclusion. The term broadlyimplies support to the poor and vulnerablethrough social assistance and social insuranceprogrammes. Though social protection is oftenused interchangeably with social security andsocial safety nets, these are subsets of socialprotection. Social security and social safety netsmay feature similar products and services; theydiffer substantially from each other in terms ofconcept and aims. Social safety nets primarilyinclude benefits in cash and in kind such as cashtransfers, food-related programs, price and othersubsidies, and public works programs etc. Socialsecurity offers unemployment insurance, retire-ment income, disability income, access tohealthcare, nutrition, housing, and other pay-ments to all employed persons and their depen-dants. It also includes labour market interven-tion establishing minimum wage, abolition ofchild labour, elimination of forced labour;amendments and implementation of labour leg-islation.

Social security is rights-based, emphasising aframework of collective social responsibility as itestablishes that people derive their individualrights from social security. Social safety nets arebased on the premise that poor have to be facil-itated to allow them to manage (economic) risksand prevent them from resorting to measuresthat undermine their assets. The main objectiveof safety nets is to create conducive environ-ment for the acceptance of market-basedreforms and ensure political stability. While bothsocial security and social safety nets offer pro-tection, they represent a markedly differentapproach in terms of individual life cycle. Socialsecurity covers old-age, maternity and childcarebenefits, safety nets concentrate on existinglabour force and to a limited extent on children.The two, therefore, cannot be interchanged as

protection mechanisms. Though social securitynets are important, especially in times of eco-nomic downturns, to ensure sustainability forthe vulnerable, social security continues to be apreferred mode of protection for its broad andright-based scope.

Social Protection Programmes inPakistanThere are a number of social protectionschemes pursued by the state, some of themspecifically targeting employed population whileothers focusing on the disadvantaged. However,due to its limited scope, this paper will givegreater coverage to national level schemes spe-cific to workers only.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II identi-fies and divides the government's social protec-tion strategies along the lines of direct and indi-rect provisions: direct provisions include employ-ment-based guarantees (such as Employees' OldAge Benefit Institution, Workers' Welfare Fundand provincial social security benefits); directtransfers (Zakat, Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal and nowBenazir Income Support Programme); and mar-ket-based interventions (microfinance). Indirectprovisions include the provision of the minimumwage; lifeline tariff on electricity; and food subsi-dies. Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund also fea-tures as an important contribution outliningmeasures to encourage community participa-tion for enhanced income-generation and socialuplift activities. For the purpose of this study, wewill focus on the direct transfers identified by thePRSP, for their impact on the working class.

Before a review of social protection system isundertaken, it is important to understand thedynamics of Pakistan's economy and the labourmarket. A look at emerging issues should alsohelp explain the significance of social protectionallowing space for a clearer analysis.


Social Protection for Workers: Mind the GapZeenia Shaukat

Pakistan's Labour MarketPakistan has a population of 169.9 million as atend-June 2009. The total labour force of thecountry is 53.72 million, out of which, 50.79 mil-lion are employed while 2.93 million persons areunemployed, resulting in an unemployment rateof 5.5 per cent. The three main sectors of theeconomy are agriculture, industrial and the serv-ices sector. The services sector has a dominantshare in the Gross Domestic Product at 53.8 percent while the agriculture sector's share standsat 21.8 per cent and that of the industrial sectoris 18.2 per cent. In terms of employment, 45per cent of the labour force is employed by theagricultural/forestary/fishing sector, 13 per centby the manufacturing sector, 6.6 per cent by con-struction, 16.5 per cent by the wholesale/retailsector and 11.2 per cent by thecommunity/social and personal services.

Pakistan's economic structure is largely tiltedtowards the informal sector, which accounts for73 per cent of the employment in main jobs out-side agriculture sector. The size of the informaleconomy is roughly 30 per cent. The sector ismore dominant in the rural areas (75 per cent)compared to the urban centres (71 per cent),where there is greater concentration of formalactivities at 29 per cent. As the informal sectoris totally linked to the private sector, the privatesector makes a significant contribution to theeconomy. In Pakistan today, over 77 per cent ofthe commercial banking sector, 100 per cent ofthe textile and telecommunications sector, anda significant part of the cement, sugar, automo-bile and fertilizer industries are in the privatesector. The Sector's contribution to the GDP atcurrent factor cost is estimated at an over-whelming 84 per cent.

A vast majority of jobs in the private sector aregenerated in small enterprises sector compris-ing 1-4 people. This sector engages almost 95per cent of the total (employed) labour force. Onthe other hand, Pakistan has an insignificant"medium" sector that employs only 5 per cent ofthe labour force. Public sector employment -once a source of employment for a significantpart of the workforce - in the wake of reforms,adjustments and down-sizing has declined overthe years. Today, it constitutes less than 10 per-cent of the employed labour force (5.81mn).Pakistan's 650,000 strong armed forces, arenot counted in the labour force survey.

The wage structure in Pakistan is highly irregularcharacterised by lack of implementation of the

minimum wage (now at Rs 7,000). According tothe Labour Force Survey 2008-09 the white col-lard-ness of an industry division seems to posi-tively influence the size of the wage. The averagemonthly wages of employees in the agriculturalsector (employing 45 per cent of the total labourforce), was Rs 5,601 while wholesale, retailtrade employee earned an average wage of Rs5,914. Manufacturing sector wage rate, at Rs6,769, and construction sector at Rs 6,510 weremarginally above the prevailing minimum wageof Rs 6,000 last year.

Current Issues of the Economy Pakistan's decisive shift to liberalisation in the1990s followed the nationalisation drive of thestate in the 1970s and the aid-driven economyof the 1980s. The post 1999 military-led gov-ernment of General Musharraf too pursued asupply side economic model, supported by for-eign aid, private investments and a preferencefor services-sector-led capital economy at thecost of the agriculture and the manufacturingsectors. Since the political government tookoffice in 2008, Pakistan's economy continueson the liberalisation path, with the IMF and inter-national aid agencies playing an instrumentalrole in determining the direction of the econom-ic development and growth. However, the needfor state intervention for public welfare andsocial protection has come to take up significantspace in economic discourse and seeks to influ-ence policy-making exercises and the directionof public provisions.

Apart from the state's role, there are a host ofissues that directly influence the economy, itsdirection and the status of labour in the country.Key issues include poverty, compromised socialindicators, poor law and order and energy crisis.

Poverty: There have been varied estimates onpoverty in Pakistan, but there has been a gener-al consensus that 30-35 per cent of the popula-tion could be counted as "poor" based on variousdefinitions of the term. Some estimates suggestthat poverty stands at 38 per cent. This trans-lates into 65 million out of 170 million peopleliving below the poverty line.

Social Indicators: Pakistan ranks 141 out of 182countries on the Human Development Index.The 'Human Poverty Index' value of Pakistan is33.4 per cent and the country ranks 101stamong 135 countries. State's expenditure onhealth constitutes 3.5 per cent of the annualbudget and is 0.54 per cent of the GDP. The


meagre health spending translates into a $4 percapita as national public expenditure on health.Thus private sector accounts for 75.6 per cent ofhealthcare expenditure. Social health insurancecovers only 5 per cent of the population but rep-resents about 40 per cent of federal and provin-cial governments spending on health. Similarly,expenditure on education too accounts for only 2per cent of GDP in 2009-10. Net Enrolment Rate(NER), defined as the number of students aged5-9 years that are enrolled in a primary schooldivided by the number of children in the agegroup for that level of education is 57 per cent(2008-09).

Law and Order: Law and order and terrorismremain paramount deterrence to the economicdevelopment of the country. In year 2009 alone,a total of 2,586 terrorist, insurgent and sectari-an-related incidents were reported from acrossthe country killing 3,021 people and injuring7,334 individuals. The direct and indirect cost tothe economy due to terrorism since 2005 standsat Rs 43 billion. In year 2009-10, it totalled$11.5 billion up from $8.6 billion in 2008-09.This includes loss of exports, foreign investment,privatization, industrial output, and tax collec-tion, etc.

Energy Crisis: Another important challengefaced by the country's economy is the power cri-sis. The energy shortage that intensified in thelast few years was fuelled by the rise in demandfor commercial electricity caused by a highereconomic activity, subsidised energy supply andgrowth in the use of electrical appliances in thelast decade. The rise in growth was not matchedby expansion in generation capacity. The shareof public sector expenditure on power sector,which averaged at 28% in the 1980s, fell to 3%in the current decade. The cost to the economydue to power crisis is serious, leading to a slow-down in economic activity and job losses. Thecost of industrial power outages in year 2009came down to 2.5 per cent of the GDP causing535,000 jobs losses in this period alone.

The economic meltdown, the spate of terrorism,the expansion of an increasingly privatised andinformal structure of the economy, the state'sdeclining role in economic regulation as well asin social protection has marginalised Pakistan'sworking class to a great extent, leaving them vul-nerable to market imperfections and fluctua-tions. As we will see below, the labour marketstructure remains outside the government's reg-ulation regime, while labour laws and their

implementation order too do not favour theworking class. A poor social security regime thushas adverse impact on workers' welfare in thebackdrop of deficits in the social and the eco-nomic structures and the non-regulation of thelabour market.

Constitutional Provisions forSocial SecurityPakistan's constitution outlines social securityas a basic right of the citizens and marks state'srole in establishing institutions to fulfil this con-stitutional guarantee. Pakistan is one of the fewunderdeveloped countries that recognises socialsecurity as an explicit citizenship right. Article 38of the Constitution of Pakistan binds the state to"...provide for all persons employed in the serv-ice of Pakistan or otherwise, social security bycompulsory social insurance or other means;provide basic necessities of life such as food,clothing, housing, education and medical relief,for all such citizens, irrespective of sex, creed,caste, or race, as are permanently or temporari-ly unable to earn their livelihood on account ofinfirmity, sickness or unemployment; (and)reduce disparity in the income and earnings ofindividuals..."

Pakistan has also ratified ILO Convention 18 onWorkmen's Compensation (OccupationalDisease), Convention 19 on Equality ofTreatment (Accident Compensation), andConvention 118 on Equality of Treatment (SocialSecurity). All these conventions require the stateto ensure provisions for safety at work and com-pensation in case of occupational diseases anddeath, extend relevant branches of social securi-ty (medical care; sickness benefit; maternitybenefit; invalidity benefit; old-age benefit; sur-vivors' benefit; employment injury benefit;unemployment benefit; and family benefit) to itsworkforce; and maintain non-discrimination inextension of related benefits.

National Legislation The country follows a set of legislation, few ofwhich were inherited from colonial rule, dealingwith social security. Key legislation covering theprovision include:

The Provincial Employees' Social SecurityOrdinance (PESSO), 1965: This comprehensivepiece of legislation provides cash and in-kindbenefits for employment injury, sickness, mater-nity, death, invalidity and iddat. Being a provin-cial ordinance, the PESSO is applicable to


employees on the provincial level only. Thosecovered include regular and contract employees,skilled, unskilled, supervisory, clerical, and man-ual workers. The PESSO, however, excludes per-sons in the service of the State including armedforces, police and railway servants, and theemployees of the local council, municipal com-mittee, cantonment board or any other localauthority. Under the current law, employeesdrawing salary up to Rs. 10,000 are liable to beregistered under the PESSO.

The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923: ThisAct is applicable on establishments not coveredby the PESSO. Under this law, workers are enti-tled to compensation for work injury, occupa-tional disease, invalidity and death. The presentrate of compensation in case of death and inva-lidity is Rs. 200,000.

The West Pakistan Maternity Benefit Ordinance1958: The Act applies to the whole of Pakistanand provides for 12 weeks of paid maternityleave for women employed in an establishment,whether industrial, commercial, or otherwise.The Mines Maternity Act 1941 while providingfor the same for women, prohibits the employ-ment of or work by pregnant women in a mineduring specified period before and after child-birth. Both these acts are however, not applica-ble in establishments that follow PESSO.

Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976: Underthis law the employees of selected private sectorindustries/establishments are entitled to Old-Age Pension, Old-Age Grant, Invalidity Pension,and Survivors pension. The Act covers non-gov-ernment establishments that include construc-tion industry, factories, mines, road transporta-tion services, hospitals, clubs, hostels, organisa-tions and not-for-profit messes, as defined in therelated acts.

The presence of formidable constitutional provi-sions and legislation is neither matched by thepolitical will to implement laws, nor have therebeen adequate efforts to protect and promotethe interest of workers and the marginalised inthe successive economic programmes and poli-cy directions adopted by the state. Pakistan'slabour laws and policy orders have been gener-ally exclusionary and selective, with restrictedscope and coverage. The social security services,as will be studied in detail in the latter part, tooare characterised by limited outreach anddeficits in designs.

Social ProtectionFacilities/SchemesEmployee Old Age Benefit Scheme:The social security scheme for private sectoremployees under the EOBI Act 1976, coversindustries or commercial establishments withfive or more employees, with an option of volun-tary registration for organisations with less thanfive employees. The scheme requires employersto pay 6 per cent of lower basic salary of theemployees while the employees contribute 1 percent of the salary. The government makes nocontribution to the scheme. Minimum pensionrate is Rs 2, 000 a month. According to the EOBIwebsite, there are 48,377 active registeredemployers and 2,164,160 active insured per-sons. However, the number of beneficiaries isjust 358,230.

Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) inPakistan:The Workers Welfare Fund was established in1969, followed by the Workers Welfare FundOrdinance 1971 to make provisions for regularsource of income for the fund. This ordinance isapplicable to industries that earn Rs. 100,000,employ more than 50 workers, have paid-upcapital of over Rs 2 million or fixed assets worthRs 4 million. Such industries are required to pay2 per cent of their income to the fund.

The fund administered by the federal tripartiteboard is used for: (i) construction of houses thatare sold to workers, (ii) marriage grant to work-ers for marriage of their daughters, (iii) scholar-ship for workers' children, and (iv) constructionof educational institutions and hospitals; deathgrant, ambulance service, water supplyschemes, tricycles for the disabled, and provi-sion of sewing machines etc.. Qualified workersinclude those who fit the definition of 'Workman'outlined in the IRA 2008, in addition to havingregistered with the EOBI or the PESSI. The work-ers are also required to have at least three yearsof association with any industrial unit to avail theWWF. Workers also contribute under the'Workers Participation Fund'.

The industries/establishments currently coveredby the WWF include: factories, workshops andestablishment producing articles employingelectrical, mechanical, thermal, and nuclear orany other form of energy transmitted mechani-cally; mine or quarry or natural gas or oilfieldemployees; a section of transport services; andany concern engaged in the growing of tea, cof-


fee, rubber or cinchona.

In terms of coverage, the record of the WWF isno better than the EOBI. According to the figuresprovided by the WWF Office, 2,456,212 workershave benefitted from the products and servicesof the WWF over a period of forty years from1971 to March 2010.

Provincial Employees Social SecurityInstitutions (ESSI):Introduced in March 1967, the Employees SocialSecurity Institutions was reorganised on aprovincial basis in July 1970. The Board ofTrustees in the Provincial Employees SocialSecurity Institution (PESSI) include representa-tives of employers, workers, and Government.The scheme covers contingencies such as sick-ness, maternity, work injury, invalidity and deathbenefits. The ESSI is applicable to industrial andcommercial establishments employing 10 ormore employees (except Balochistan where itapplies to five workers or more). The coverage isprovided to the employees of these establish-ments drawing monthly wages up to Rs. 10,000.The ESSI is funded through contribution ofemployees at 7 per cent of the wages of securedworkers. Apart from the different number ofworker thresholds, the coverage of the PESSI issimilar to the EOBI in that they exclude govern-ment workers, the armed forces and other nom-inated industries.

Workers Children Education Scheme:Established in 1972, this scheme provides freeeducation to two children of a worker up to anylevel. Applicable to establishments of ten ormore employees, the scheme is financedthrough the contribution paid by employers atthe rate of Rs. 100 per worker per annum. Thescheme is managed by the Provincial SocialSecurity Institutions.

Pension for Government Employees:Permanently employed public servants, andthose in the armed forces, and the police receivepensions and other benefits under the regula-tions pursued by the respective governments.Government servants are entitled to receive pen-sion and other benefits such as provident fundon retirement, at the age of 60 or earlier after25 years of pensionable service. However, con-tract employees hired by the government are notentitled to any social benefits.

Private Sector Pension Plans:

Private sector pension plans are uncommon,though they are promoted by multinationals.These defined benefit plans are employer-fund-ed on the basis of actuarial recommendations.These offer benefits in the form of life annuitiesfor the retiree and reduced contingent pensionsfor the spouse and minor children. The pensionsaccrue at the rate of 1 per cent to 3 per cent ofbasic pay for each completed year of coveredservice. Contributions to these plans are taxdeductible, subject to a maximum of 20 per centof salary earned by members.

Direct Income TransfersDirect income transfers are not specifically tar-geted at workers, but are meant to serve theneedy. Four institutions comprise the major sec-tions for direct income transfers: Zakat, thePakistan Bait-ul-Mal (PBM), the Benazir IncomeSupport Programme (BISP) and the Punjab FoodSupport Scheme.

Zakat: The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance in 1980 madeZakat deduction at the rate of 2.5 per cent onthe value of specified financial assets a compul-sory exercise once a year for Sunni Muslims.Zakat is disbursed under different programmes,such as: financial assistance (guzara allowance),educational stipends (generally directed atMadrassahs), healthcare, Eid grant, assistanceto leprosy patients, national level health institu-tions, and marriage assistance. A total ofRs.768.7 million was disbursed under differentZakat programmes during July-March FY 2009-10, marking a reduction of 46 per cent com-pared to Rs. 1.421 billion during the same peri-od in FY 2008-09. The number of beneficiariestoo recorded a decrease of 25 per cent, from538,050 during July-March in the previous finan-cial year to 404,124 during the same period ofthe current financial year. The amount distrib-uted constitutes 0.005 per cent of GDP in 2009-10.

Issues:About 25 per cent of the Zakat budget is giventhrough institutions while the remaining 75 percent is disbursed directly to individuals throughLocal Zakat Committees. Being tax-financedsocial transfers, Zakat would appear to have realredistributive potential. Its tax-based featurealso lends itself to a permanent and earmarkedsource of revenue, ensuring sustainability.Furthermore, due to the nature of the Zakat sys-tem the burden of contribution falls mostly onupper income households. Therefore, Zakat has


the potential of playing a strong redistributiverole.

Evaluations, however, suggest that Zakat hasfailed as both a redistributive and a risk man-agement mechanism. This failure appears tostem from the same parochial social relation-ships which fragment access to informal socialprotection within the community. Various stud-ies indicate corruption, patronage, exclusion,and distortions in the Zakat machinery. Theissue of patronage is particularly serious. Astudy by the Social Policy and DevelopmentCentre (2000) observed that proceduresinvolved in identifying eligibility for Zakat lentitself to 'some patronage at the local level'. TheZakat department relies heavily on political per-sons for identification of the needy, and thosewith connections with political figures such as anazim, MNA or MPA get easy access to Zakatfunds, even if they do not strictly fall in the cate-gory of the deserving. It has also been observedthat the religious identity of the potential benefi-ciaries creeps in as a factor influencing the dis-tribution. Shias, recent converts to Islam, andother sects biased against on religious groundsdo face discrimination by the Zakat officials.There are issues with information system aswell. A World Bank/Gallup study in the 2006concluded that of those that needed assistancebut did not apply for it, more than 25 per centdid not know where to go (for information andaccess to the funds).

Pakistan Bait-uul Maal: Established in 1992, the Pakistan Bait-ul Maalaims to provide assistance, mainly cashstipends, to those groups, primarily religiousminorities, who are excluded from the Zakat pro-gramme. It is funded through federal grants aswell as smaller grants from the provincial andlocal governments, national organisations, inter-national agencies and voluntary donations. ThePBM runs programmes encompassing food sup-port, child support, rehabilitation of child labour,vocational training, support to medical centres,and others. It is largely dominated by the FoodSupport Programme which provides a bi-annualcash transfer to poor households. However, thesize and contribution of the PBM has declined inrecent years. It started with Rs 6 million in 1992benefitting 25,000 individuals and went up to Rs5.52 billion disbursed in FY 2007/08 to around2 million households. However, in year 2009-10,the PBM disbursed an amount of Rs. 1.65 billionrelative to Rs. 2.7 billion incurred in the corre-sponding period of FY 2008-09, marking a

decrease of 38.9 percent. The number of benefi-ciaries has declined by 22.8% from 1,437,569during July-March FY 2008-09 to 1,110,264 overthe same period in the current financial year.According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan2009-10, the decline in disbursements andnumber of beneficiaries is caused by the mergerof the Food Support Scheme, a major compo-nent of the Pakistan Bait-ul Mal into the BenazirIncome Support Programme since FY 2008-09.

Issues: One problem with Bait-ul-Maal is its lim-ited coverage as it targets religious minoritiesand others who are unable to benefit fromZakat. Furthermore, like Zakat, Bait-ul-Maal suf-fers from a culture of patronage where politicaland social influence determines the distribution.This restricts its outreach. The Bait-ul Maal isfinanced through grants. There is no identifiableand permanent source of income for thescheme, making it vulnerable to fiscal shocks.The amount transferred is extremely limited too.For instance, Rs 1.65bn distributed this year to1,110,264 amounts to Rs 1,500 per person. Inrecent studies, it has been estimated that Zakatand the Pakistan Bait-ul Maal add just 4 per centto the incomes of the households bordering onthe poverty line and meet less than 40 per centof the incomes of the 20 per cent poorest house-holds.

The Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP):The BISP is a cash transfer programme targetedat families that have a monthly income of lessthan Rs 6,000 (minimum wage 2008). Anamount of Rs 2,000 is disbursed every alternatemonth to the nominated women of the targetedhousehold. Other eligibility criteria includes:Computerised National ID Card; possession ofno or less than 3 acres of agricultural land or upto 3 marlas residential property; no familymember in government service; the applicantshould not be beneficiary of any other pro-gramme; and should not posses a foreignaccount or a passport. The BISP is a part of cur-rent expenditure of the annual budget.

The budget allocation for the year 2010-11 is Rs50 billion, while it was 70 billion targeting 5 mil-lion households in year 2009-10.

At the time of its launch in 2008, the BISP appli-cants were required to apply through forms dis-tributed by members of the national assembly intheir respective constituencies. However, thissystem was criticised for its potential for politicalpatronage, issues with verification process and


the ID cards conditionality. The beneficiary-iden-tification through parliamentarians was stoppedin mid-2009 as the IMF asked the governmentto adopt a World Bank-devised methodology ofidentifying the deserving families, precondition-ing it with its $7.6 billion loan for Pakistan. Witha $60 million World Bank loan, the governmenthas initiated a survey using 'Poverty Scorecard'to identify the poor families. A total of 100points are allocated based on responses to suchquestions, and the families with scores under 16points are identified as "deserving". The surveyhas been completed in 15 districts, while it isunderway in 20 others.

Issues: So far, the BISP has received a positiveresponse from the public. Since the old systeminvolving legislators has been abandoned,issues of patronage and corruption have, tosome extent, been addressed. However, therehave been reservations regarding the PovertyScorecard being developed. Experts argue thatthe Scorecard is using the 1994 database whichmight lead to inaccuracies while ignoring newimpoverished regions. At least 37 per cent bene-ficiaries of the scheme are suspected to be non-poor due to the flawed methodology of the sur-vey. There have also been apprehensions thatthe involvement of notables and elected repre-sentatives in data collection exercise may politi-cise and negatively influence the beneficiaries'selection process.

Punjab Food Support Scheme (PFSS):The Punjab Food Support Scheme (PFSS) wasinitiated in 2008 as a provincial programme. Itwas originally designed to provide food stampsfor the poorest households, but has now beenconverted into a cash grant of Rs. 1,000 perhousehold per month along the lines of the BISP.The total cost of the scheme is estimated at Rs.10.8 billion for the year 2008-09. The subsidy isdirected at households that do not have a bread-earner; widows, orphans, and the destitute;chronically sick and/or disabled persons; elderlypersons who have been abandoned by their fam-ily; and the poorest of the poor segments of thesociety with marginal income.

Issues: A major flaw of the programme is that itrelies on local government officials (district andunion councils) and political appointees to pro-pose an initial list of beneficiaries. This couldlead to corruption and patronage as in the caseof Zakat and Bait-ul-Maal, wasting stateresources and depriving the deserving section ofthe population from benefitting from the pro-

gramme.

Other ProgrammesPakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund:Under the PPAF, the government provides fundsto civil society organizations for development ofprojects forming partnership following a set cri-teria. The PPAF is sponsored by the Governmentof Pakistan and funded by the World Bank andother leading donors. As of April, 2010, it had aresource base of US$ 1,062.79 million (Rs.79,709.25 million). Credit and enterprise devel-opment is the largest component of the PPAFaccounting for 76 per cent of cumulative dis-bursements followed by community physicalinfrastructure (15 per cent); capacity buildingassistance (6 per cent); social mobilizationgrants (2 per cent) and health & education hada share of 1 Per cent. By the end of FY 2009,cumulative disbursements for core operationsstood at Rs. 42,933 million.

According to its Director's Report, by the end ofJune 2009, the PPAF funding had been dis-bursed in to about 141,000 community organi-zations/groups in urban and rural areas of 124districts of the country. This exercise involved 77partner organizations of which 12 were focusingexclusively on women.

People's Rozgar Programme (PRP):This is a programme to facilitate access of theunemployed to credit to enable them to start auseful business. A total of Rs. 104.7 billion hasbeen allocated for a period of five years underthe current PRP. The maximum financing limit isup to Rs. 200,000, which is disbursed throughthe National Bank of Pakistan (NBP). Support isextended through Interest Rate Subsidy (6 percent), Credit Loss Sharing (up to first 10 per centof total credit loss) and Life/Disability Insurance,while the NBP is offering a set of schemes underthe PRP.

The trickle down effect of PRP is extremely lim-ited, as identified by the PRSP report that indi-cates 65 beneficiaries for Rs 4.9 billion dis-bursed through the Programme in 2006-07 and13 beneficiaries for 2.33 billion in year 2007-08.

Microfinance:Microfinance is an expanding industry inPakistan. By 2008, the sector had reached morethan 1.7 million savers, and had a clientele ofalmost 1.6 million borrowers, of which nearlyhalf were female. Though the private sector is


very active in the provision of microfinance, thegovernment has aligned the Pakistan PovertyAlleviation Fund with the evolving microfinancelandscape in the country. On cumulative basis,the PPAF financed 3,000,000 microcredit loans,of which 46 per cent were extended to women,according to its 2009 Financial Statement.Cumulative disbursement amounted to Rs6.949 billion in 2009.

Microfinance has usually been subjected to criti-cism for its inability to address poverty. Highinterest rates, funding-base from donors thateventually influences the policy direction andinadequate institutional specialisation has pre-vented microfinance from extending sufficientbenefits to the poor.

Subsidies:Apart from the broad schemes, successive gov-ernments have used subsidies as a tool to pro-tect the poor from bearing the burden of risingcosts of essential items. Subsidies on wheat,sugar, fertilisers and utilities have been extend-ed by the state on a regular basis. .

The state's preference for this form of social pro-tection is reflected in the highest share of subsi-dies in 'Safety Nets' budgets during the recentyears. According to the Economic Survey ofPakistan 2009-10, the Safety Nets Budgetincludes: Social Security and Welfare, FoodSupport Programme, Peoples WorkProgrammes, Natural Calamities and Low CostHousing. Subsidies claimed 91% of the SafetyNets Budget in 2007-08, 79 per cent in 2008-09, and around 77 per cent in Jul-March 2009-10. Drawn from public funds, subsidies are non-targeted in the sense that there is no discrimi-nation between the beneficiaries. In socialterms, such an approach benefits rich more thanthe poor as the former, enjoying higher dispos-able income, ends up spending less on sub-sidised items.

The state has also established 745 franchiseutility stores, acting as price moderators thatprovide items for daily use at a comparativelylower price than the market.

The Benazir Zarai Card Scheme (BZCS):The Benazir Zarai Card Scheme (BZCS) offersinstitutional credit to farmers of up to Rs500,000. The Agri-Credit product enablesaccess to quality inputs at reasonable prices.The Scheme is expected to benefit 3.8 millionfarmers in its initial stages, and aims to imple-

ment a structure of institutional credit replacingthe passbook system.

Public Works Programme [Currently titledPeople's Work Programme (PWP), previouslyKhushal Pakistan Programme]: The PWP hasbeen recently revived for small developmentschemes covering basic areas such as: provisionof electricity, gas, farm-to-market roads, andwater supply. The programme targeting ruralunemployed/landless haris, envisages servingthe dual purpose of providing employment andimproving infrastructure. The programmedesign engages the local communities to identi-fy relevant projects.

The Benazir Employees Stock OptionScheme (BESO):Through the BESO Scheme, employees of thestate-owned entities will be given 12% shares,worth more than Rs. 110 billion free of cost. Sofar, 22,745 employees have been given sharescertificates in five entities namely HeavyMechanical Complex (HMC), Oil & GasDevelopment Company Limited (OGDCL),Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), Sui NorthernGas Pipeline Limited (SNGPL) and PakistanState Oil (PSO). The government states that thedistribution of shares among its workers wouldcreate motivation and raise their stakes.

The Benazir Green Tractors Scheme:Launched in 2009, the scheme envisages thesupply of 20,000 tractors to farmers over a peri-od of two years, with a subsidy of Rs 0.2 millionper tractor.

The National Internship Program:Offering cash for work to fresh but unemployedgraduates, the year-long National InternshipProgram includes placement for applicants withvarious government organizations according totheir qualifications and broader academic disci-plines for a period of one year.

Issues with Social SecuritySchemes Social security remains an under-representedand low priority item in the economic order ofthe country and as a part of the state's interac-tion with the workers or citizens. This is not onlyreflected in its minimal budget allocation, butalso in the structure and the outreach of theseprogrammes where deficits such as restrictedcoverage, limited scope and systemic weak-nesses prevent a major section of the population


from benefitting from these facilities.

Low Budget SpendingThe Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-10maintains 'Pro-Poor Spending' as separate headcounting 'Market Access and CommunityServices', 'Human Development', 'RuralDevelopment', 'Safety Nets' and oddly'Governance' as five major areas of spending.This Pro-Poor Spending has undergone a mixedtrend in the last few years as it was 4.89per centof the GDP in 2006-07, 9.7 per cent in 2007-08,7.46 per cent in 2008-09 and 4.3 per cent in2009-10. Social security and welfare is a part ofthe pro-poor spending falling under the 'SafetyNets' area.

Tracing 'Social Security and Welfare' as a part ofthe budget and the GDP allows a better under-standing of the government's spending priori-ties. A look at related figures demonstrates thatthe state does not favour social protection as animportant means for welfare. In the federalbudget 2007-08, the 22.5 billion earmarked forsocial protection comprised merely 1.5 per centof the budget. In 2008-09, it was 1.45 per centof the budget followed by an even lower per-centage of 1.107 in 2009-10. The share ofsocial security and welfare in the GDP remainedlow at 0.23 per cent of the GDP in 2007-08,0.288 per cent in 2008-09, and 0.18per cent in2009-10. The minimal spending on social secu-rity not only reflects low government interest inthis important area, it also goes on to influencethe quality of social security products, their out-reach and the delivery capacity of the respectivedepartments. These deficiencies are manifestedin low coverage, inadequate provisions, designflaws, and inability of the government to makethese institutions efficient.

CoverageThe existing social security programmes arehighly exclusionary in terms of the beneficiariescovered. Large sections of the workforce remainunprotected. The two general and most compre-hensive social security schemes, the PESSI andthe EOBI, do not cover workers from the agricul-ture sector, the self-employed, and the informaleconomy, and those establishments that employless than ten (PESSI or five (EOBI) workers.

The agriculture sector is not covered by any leg-islation and provisions pertaining to labour inPakistan. Similarly, the small and medium scalesectors too have not been protected by anysocial security provisions. Informal labour, which

constitutes 73 per cent of the non-agriculturelabour force and includes construction, trans-port, wholesale and retail sectors, home-basedworkers, daily wage labourers, and domestichelp among others too remains outside theambit of social security provisions.

Even the tilt in favour of the formal sector fails tooffer adequate coverage to the related sections.For instance, according to the EOBI website, outof 2,164,160 active insured persons, the num-ber of beneficiaries is just 358,230. The PESSItoo is limited in its coverage. In terms of workers(excluding dependents) covered under thePESSI, the available data shows that about amillion workers in the whole country employedin 41,498 establishments benefitted from theSocial Security Institution. Together, the EOBIand the PESSI cover merely 5 per cent of thetotal workforce of 53 million.

The Workers Welfare Fund is restricted in thesame manner. According to the figures providedby the WWF Office, 2,456,212 workers havebenefitted from the products and services of theWWF during the period of 1971 to March 2010.The Scheme provided 60,001 houses to work-ers, gave 52,395 workers educational facilities,provided 1,251,599 workers health benefits and129,916 workers marriage grants. In total, itcovered merely 4.5 per cent of the labour forcein the last 40 years.

RegistrationOne major reason behind the restricted scopeand delivery capacity of social security schemesin Pakistan is loopholes in the system that alloweasy escape for those evading extra cost. TheEOBI Scheme covers industries/establishmentswith five employees, the WWF covers those thatemploy more than 50 workers, and the PESSI isapplicable to commercial setups employing 10or more workers. This means that even thoseestablishments with one worker less than theminimum requirement remain outside theambit of these schemes. Furthermore, theabsence of a self-registration system for workerspromotes under-reporting on the part of theemployers, since the responsibility of employ-ees' registration lies with them.

The design of the schemes places the onus offinancial contribution as well as resource mobil-isation in terms of set up, time and energy onthe employer, making registration with theseschemes an unattractive proposition. Manyestablishments that are covered by the law are


either not registered or if registered, the fullstrength of the workers are not covered.

Looking beyond the element of evasion, enforc-ing coverage remains a problem since employ-ers have repeatedly contested the compulsionfor providing updated list of workers. In case ofthe PESSIs, many employers provide the numberof workers and the appropriate payment, buthave refused to submit lists of workers coveredciting continued staff turnover.

It has been repeatedly suggested that the work-ers should have the right to register themselvesin cases where employers fail to get them regis-tered. The right to self-registration of workersfrom the formal, informal and the self-employedsector will ensure expansion of benefits of thecurrent social security schemes to a larger sec-tion of the workforce.

Another restricting feature of the ongoing socialsecurity institutions is the provincial nature ofsome of the schemes. The PESSIs are regulatedand run under provincial management; hencethe beneficiaries are able to obtain the servicesonly if they are physically present in the provinceof their registration. The employees are requiredto update their registration in case they move toanother province. The government is consideringprovincialising other social security schemes fol-lowing the 18th Amendment that authorisesgreater provincial autonomy. Such a move wouldnot only restrict social security schemes, thesecould negatively impact inter-provincial move-ment of labour.

Design FlawsOne important deficit with the design of thesocial security system that promotes greatercontribution from employer compared toemployees is that such a system takes awaysense of ownership from the workers. Sinceemployees are not made to contribute towardstheir own benefit, the sense of participation ofworkers towards their own welfare is not creat-ed.

Lack of Systematic TargetingThe exclusionary nature of the social securityschemes is augmented by a system of selectedtargeting that favours better-off formal sectorworkers including civil servants and state enter-prise workers, given their low tax base. At thesame time, jobs that are particularly vulnerableto accidents and work-related injury such as theconstruction and the transport sectors get little

coverage. Furthermore, excessive employmentsecurity for formal sector workers promotesinformality and reduces employment prospectsfor the poor and the marginalized groups.

Adequacy The real value of pensions received by the bene-ficiaries is extremely low and this becomes evenmore challenging in the face of spiralling infla-tion. Fixed in nominal terms, the adjustment inthe pension rates are hardly adequate to keepup with the rising cost of living. The minimumpension offered by the EOBI, for instance is Rs.2,000. This amount is extremely limited in thebackdrop of expanded household expenditure(estimated to be Rs. 8,583 nationwide accord-ing to a study ). For government servants, pen-sions are fixed according to the length of theservice. There is no provision for indexation ofthe payment with the rising cost of living whichleads to erosion of real content over time.

Organisational DeficienciesOrganizations implementing social safety pro-grams are involved in multiple activities outsidetheir core competency, for instance runningschools, hospital, training centre etc. Though thelegislation allows investment of funds, suchpractices have led to the allegations of corrup-tion both in the EOBI and the WWF. For instance,the EOBI's recent move to participate in a tenderbid to construct and operate the Rs. 17 billionKarachi-Hyderabad Motorway (M-9) raised con-cerns regarding relevance and transparency.

The involvement of social security bodies in con-struction and other activities also lead to dupli-cation of other ministries' work. The WorkersWelfare Fund constructs and operates schoolsand hospitals, which is a replication of the lineministries' work.

There have also been reservations about thelack of effective monitoring and evaluationmechanisms pertaining to these schemes.Weak internal review; absence of third party val-idation, assessment of benefits to the intendingbeneficiaries, and regular audits; limited database and follow-up actions restrict improve-ments, expansions and an understanding ofissues related to these schemes.

Cumbersome ProcessesPoor management of the systems and officialtransactions has led many stakeholders to callfor improved procedures at the EOBI and other


social security institutions. In the past, therehave been complaints from employers andemployees against harassment at the hands ofthe EOBI staff, poor maintenance of records, andevasion and manipulation. Inconsistencies inpayments and time-consuming bureaucraticprocedure with regards to claiming of benefitshave also been raised as major issues by work-ers, hindering their access to the schemes.

High Administrative CostThough the latest figures on administrative costsrelated to each institution is unavailable, highadministrative per capita cost has been an issuehighlighted in a number of studies. Such costseat into the funds reserved for workers. In theFederal Budget 2010-11 documents, the admin-istrative cost of social protection that falls underCurrent Expenditure is alarmingly high at Rs.916 million out of Rs. 1,463 million in 2010-11and Rs. 3,866 million out of Rs. 4,384 million in2009-10.

Revamping Social Protection inPakistanThe existing social protection apparatus hasfailed to benefit workers and even non-workersdue to its limited coverage, design flaws, inade-quate provision and low budget allocation by thegovernment that restrict the proper develop-ment of these schemes. Upcoming develop-ments such as provincialising the social securityschemes are further likely to complicate the sit-uation compromising the access of the benefici-aries to these schemes.

In the past, the state had constituted severaltaskforces and committees to make recommen-dations for improvement in the social securitysystems in Pakistan. The proposals of thesecommittees and those from experts in researchpapers and policy outlines pertain to expansionin the scope and coverage of the schemes;enhancing tax base of the country to fund socialsecurity; consolidation of existing schemes tocreate one-window operation and promotinggreater contribution from employees to encour-age ownership. A brief explanation of the pro-posed reforms is given below.

There should be a system of self registration of workers with social securityinstitutions. This should reduce dependency of workers on employers for registration and should also encourage workers participation and commitment to

pursue their own welfare. A system of self-registration and self-payment should also promote expansion in coverage, while also allowing workers to move fromone sector to the other, without compromising their interest.

Social security schemes should cover agriculture labour, self-employed, daily wage earners and all sections of the informal economy.

A 2002 Taskforce on Labour Welfare hadmade some useful suggestions regardingupgradation of the social security apparatus in the country. The Taskforce had proposed the establishment of a National Social Security Institution (NSSI)and National Pension Institution (NPI). According to the proposal, the NSSI should be mandated to universalise the social security system for all workers across all sectors of the economy either through employer's contributions or through self-contribution. The secured workers would be issued a national security card to entitle access to social security institutions. A national, as opposed to a federal institution, was proposed to ensure provincial autonomy stays intact. Similarly, the NPI was proposed to be responsible for handling old-age pensions and related matters. It was suggested that the Pension Institution should work on the patterns ofthe EOBI but with universal coverage of allworkers.

The 2002 Taskforce on Labour Welfare had also suggested the establishment of a National Labour Welfare Authority to oversee the work of the NSSI and the NPI.The proposed Institution was envisaged toact as an autonomous body - with representation from the policy makers, legislators and the civil society - capable of underwriting the security of benefits under the NSSI and the NPI. It was also suggested that the labour levies be collected by the Labour Welfare Authorityto create space for one-window operationfor the convenience of the stakeholders.

Countries with a low per capita income such as Pakistan, have always expressedreservation that a lower tax base and a much larger base of claimants restrict


source of funding for social security. Pakistan's current tax base stands at 10 per cent of the GDP. The Country's debt-to-GDP ratio, which touched 61 per cent justrecently, leaves the economy more dependent on external finances. Understandably, public welfare remains acompromised agenda in a scenario wheredonors' priorities shape economic agenda. An overhaul in tax collection systems and base is indeed needed to promote resource availability for public welfare and social security programmes from internal sources.

The existing schemes should be redesigned to enable workers to commit greater contribution to the schemes compared to employers. Workers' payment towards the scheme will enhance sense of participation enabling employees to exercise some control and say over the nature and magnitude of benefits. Furthermore, excluding the employers from making direct contributions will address their genuine grievance that such schemes add to theiroperational cost. The government would also be in a better position to direct taxeson employers, which it is currently unableto due to employers' resistance on the grounds of a high business cost.

The organisational deficits of all social security institutions need to be addressed.Currently, there are issues related to corruption, delayed payments, inefficiencies, overlapping in programmes, duplication of mandate and functions, and redundant products and services. These need to be addressed to enable these institutions to serve the existing beneficiaries in a more organisedmanner.

ConclusionPakistan is one of the few underdeveloped coun-tries that outlines social security as an explicitcitizenship right and marks state's role in estab-lishing institutions to fulfil this constitutionalguarantee, as enshrined in Article 38 of theConstitution. Though a number of legislationhave been developed in this regard followed bythe establishment of related institutions, thecoverage of social security schemes remainsextremely limited. Schemes targeting workersincluding the EOBI, the WWF, the PESSI, and the

Workers Children Education Scheme offer pen-sions, grants, low-cost housing, medical benefitswhile also covering contingencies such as sick-ness, maternity, work injury, invalidity and deathbenefits to varying degrees. However, togetherthese schemes cover only around 5 per cent ofthe total labour force.

The social security schemes for labour remainnarrow in terms of their design, scope, adequacyand organisational and systemic deficiencies.The government's budget allocation for socialprotection too has been on a decline, standing at0.18 per cent of the GDP in 2009-10. None ofthe social security programmes cover the agri-cultural sector, the informal sector, the selfemployed, wholesale and retail sectors, home-based workers, and daily wage labourers. Theseemploy the bulk of labour force in the country.The exclusion of these sectors from the existingschemes restricts state's capacity to deliver onits constitutional obligations and ILO commit-ments regarding social protection.

In the face of deteriorating economy, risingpoverty and spiralling inflation, the restrictedscope and outreach of social protectionschemes negatively impacts the wellbeing oflabour. The need for revamping the social secu-rity apparatus is therefore imperative. Extensionof social security schemes across all economicsectors, a system of self-registration, consolida-tion of services for one window operation, cre-ation of sustainable source of funding for socialsecurity and promoting greater contributionfrom employees to encourage ownership aresome of the key starting steps that need to betaken to rebuild social security institutions andstrengthen systems to deliver on public welfare force. The Central Labour Advisor of the federalMinistry of Labour admitted lack of capacity.There is no mechanism in the Ministry to pre-pare compliance briefs and follow-up reports tobe submitted to the ILO as committed by thegovernment. The posts of researchers were abol-ished in 1998 and since then the Ministry has noresearch team.

Conclusion The power loom workers' seven-year old strugglein Faisalabad presents a test case of emerginginitiatives in collective bargaining in the informalsector. The LQM, as representative of workers,has succeeded in pressurizing the state to inter-vene, organize tri-partite consultations as man-dated and notify enhanced piece-rates for powerloom cloth production within the existing frame-


work. The revised minimum wages are, however,not implemented due to myriad factors.

It appears that informal sector workers' initia-tives and struggles for collective bargaining havereached a point where input from workers alonewill not bring about the required change unlessthe intervening key stakeholder-the statemachinery-is strengthened and other social part-ners, i.e. academicians, economists and laboursupport organizations come forward to providemuch needed input in to improving and refiningthe system (criteria for calculating minimumwages, living wages or decent floor wage), insti-tutionalizing a uniform collective bargainingprocess and establishing monitoring mecha-nisms in to place.

End Notes1 'The State of Pakistan's Economy, Special Section:An Introduction to Social Protection', State Bank ofPakistan, 2008, atwww.sbp.org.pk/reports/quarterly/fy08/Third/Special-Section-08.pdf2 Dr. Asad Sayeed and Farhan Sami Khan, 'BeyondSafety Nets: Provision of Comprehensive SocialSecurity in Pakistan', PILER, 20003 Ibid4 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)-II, GoP,Finance Division5 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10, Chapter'Population, Labour Force and Employment'6 Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09, Chapter 'Growthand Investment'7 Labour Force Survey 2008-09, Section 'Employed:Major Industry Division'8 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10, Chapter'Population, Labour Force and Employment'9 SBP Working Paper Series, 'The Size of InformalEconomy in Pakistan', No 33, May 201010 'Private Sector Assessment Pakistan', AsianDevelopment Bank, December 200811 Ibid12 Ibid13 Sustainable Economic Growth, Employment andHuman Resource Development, Ministry ofLabour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, March,2007 at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/pub-lic/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocu-ment/wcms_089941.pdf14 Active Military Manpower at http://www.globalfire-power.com/active-military-manpower.asp15 Labour Force Survey 2008-09, Table 3016 Shahid Javed Burki, 'Need for a new paradigm',Dawn, April 27, 201017 Human Development Report 2009, 'Pakistan', athttp://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_PAK.html18 The HPI measures the proportion of people belowcertain threshold levels in each of the dimensions ofthe human development index. These include: living a

long and healthy life, having access to education, anda decent standard of living.19 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10, Chapter'Health and Nutrition'20 'Social Health Insurance: can we ever make a casefor Pakistan?' by Farina Gul Abrejo, Babar TasneemShaikh Department of Community Health Sciences,Aga Khan University, Karachi, Vol. 58, No. 5, May200821 Asian Development Bank. Technical Assistance tothe Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the DevelopingSocial Health Insurance Project. Islamabad 2005,cited in 'Social Health Insurance: can we ever make acase for Pakistan?' by Farina Gul Abrejo, BabarTasneem ShaikhDepartment of Community Health Sciences, AgaKhan University, Karachi, Vol. 58, No. 5, May 200822 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10, Chapter'Education'23 Pakistan Security Report 2009 by Pakistan Instituteof Peace Studies24 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10, Chapter'Growth and Investment'25 'State of the Economy: Pulling bank from the Abyss',Chapter 'Infrastructural Shortages: Cost to theEconomy', Third Annual Report, Institute of PublicPolicy, Beaconhouse National University, 2010,26 Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 197627 EOBI, Database Statistics as on 24.05.2010 onhttp://www.eobi.gov.pk/pice/database-stat.htm28 Pakistan Institute of Labour Education andResearch, 'Institutions for Social and FinancialProtection for the Workers,' Afzal Bela, 2010(Document in Urdu) 29 See Annexure30 Mohammad Irfan, 'Poverty and Social Safety Nets: ACase Study of Pakistan', Pakistan Institute OfDevelopment Economics Islamabad, Jul 200331 Ibid32 Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10, Chapter'Poverty' 33 Poverty Reduction Survey Programme


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IntroductionOne of the key functions of minimum wage reg-ulation is to ensure basic protection to vulnera-ble workers who are in a weak position to bar-gain. In Pakistan, a wage regulation system thatworks through decentralized and tripartite wageboards at provincial level provides a substitutecollective bargaining process for revision of min-imum wages in specific industrial undertakings.The statuary monthly minimum wage is deter-mined by the federal government for all cate-gories of workers. This includes 'any skilled, orunskilled, intellectual, technical, clerical, manu-al or other work' in any industry with the excep-tion of defense services, government servicesand coal mines. Minimum wage rate in differentcategories of work are determined locally andsector-wise by the provincial Minimum WageBoards keeping in view the statuary monthlyminimum wage announced by the federal gov-ernment. The 6-member Wage Board in eachprovince comprises two nominated representa-tives of workers and two of employers besidesthe designated Chairman and an independentmember appointed by the provincial govern-ment. It is believed if the system is furtherrefined and effectively implemented and moni-tored, periodic minimum wage increases-calcu-lated on the basis of fair criteria-can benefit dis-advantaged workers, help reduce exploitationand help reverse the trend of declining realwages for low-wage workers.

In recent years, wage fixing in two specific sec-tors in the informal economy in Pakistan hasemerged as a key concern of workers. In powerloom units (in the textile sector) weavers arepaid piece-rate, i.e. per meter cloth, and in brickkilns (a sector afflicted with debt bondage) work-ers are paid at the rate of per 1000 brick pro-duced. As precise criteria for revision of wagesby the tripartite Wage Board are not spelled outin legislation, mixed patterns of wage regulationand collective bargaining, both in terms of

process and outcome, have emerged. There areregional differences in the minimum wagesfixed for the sectors through Wage Boardsthough the rate of inflation, commodity pricesand other economic indicators remain the samein the provinces. The workers' initiatives/mobi-lization in power loom sector in the province ofPunjab is stronger and broad-based than in theprovince of Sindh, hence a large number ofworkers in Punjab are able to negotiate andreceive better rates. Also, the power loom work-ers in the Punjab have pushed for access tosocial security provision. This case affirms thatcollective bargaining benefits a broader spec-trum of workers and '… goes beyond wage nego-tiations to include other aspects of working con-ditions…' .

Similar is the case with stronger, consolidatedbrick kilns workers mobilization in the Punjabcompared to isolated and sporadic initiatives incertain districts within the province of Sindh.While the revised piece-rates of different cate-gories of work in brick kilns notified by theMinimum Wages Board in the province ofPunjab (in 2008) were acceptable to both own-ers and workers, the Sindh Wage Board came upwith a revision not acceptable to workers.Thereafter, the workers in a few districts in Sindhtook a different course to secure improvedpiece-rates and bargained collectively with brickkiln owners through the direct mediation of theDistrict Labour Office, bypassing the provincialWage Board.The paper provides an overview of work rela-tions, minimum wage regulation and wageshare and structure. Then it analyzes the powerlooms' workers initiatives in the province ofPunjab.

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Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining:Emerging Initiatives in the Informal SectorZeenat Hisam

1. National Socio-Economic ContextEconomic constraints Pakistan's fragile economy is currently goingthrough a down slide. Small gains achieved dur-ing the last few years have been lost. Besidefood and fuel price hikes and the impact of theglobal financial crisis'…one of the prime contrib-utors to this derailing is Pakistan's proactive rolein war against terror' . With a meager per capitaincome of $ 1085--eroded further by a soaringinflation of 20 per cent (ADB, 2009) -and anunemployment rate of 5.2 per cent, the majorityof the 53.72 million workforce face extremehardships as terms and conditions of work dete-riorate.

Low wages, long working hours, poor health andsafety conditions, rising contractual work andincreasing curbs on freedom of association andcollective bargaining characterize the currentstatus. Scrapping of protective clauses and intro-duction of restrictive labour legislation is on therise. Violations of basic labour rights are on theincrease across the board. The state has gradu-ally withdrawn itself from monitoring and imple-mentation of labour laws (initially banninglabour inspection in the biggest provincethrough the Punjab Industrial Policy 2003 andlater weakening it in other provinces through theLabour Inspection Policy 2006 developed by theADB consultants). Capacity of labour judiciary toprovide justice and oversight is eroding. Tradeunions, with legally empowered collective bar-gaining agency, stands shrunk in power and sizeand are barely able to put up collective resist-ance. (Less than 3 per cent of the total labourforce, according to an estimate, is unionized.)

The statuary minimum wage, since July 2009, isRs. 7000 ($ 85) per month (or $ 2.7 per day) butthe law is not implemented and the overwhelm-ing majority of workers are paid less than theminimum wages. During 2000 to 2007, the per-centage of population living on $2 a day wasindicated to be 60.3 per cent and those living on$ 1.25 a day was noted to be 22.6 per cent.

2. Minimum wage legislationNational legislationThe system of minimum wage fixing evolvedrather late in Pakistan compared to other SouthAsian countries (i.e. Sri Lanka 1941; Burma1945; India 1948). The Pakistan MinimumWages Ordinance 1961 was the first major leg-

islation to regulate minimum rates of wages forworkers (all classes of workers in any grade,employed in specified industrial undertakings)and stipulated a monthly minimum wage withrevisions done not earlier than one year and notlater than three years. The law was applicable toevery establishment wherein 50 or more per-sons were employed. The minimum monthlywage stipulated at that time (Rs. 140) wastermed inadequate by economists for conditionsprevailing then (and was suggested to be Rs.250).

The Ordinance was followed the MinimumWages Council Rules 1961, and the MinimumWages Rules 1962. As this legislation did notspecify wage fixing for unskilled workers, theMinimum Wages for Unskilled WorkersOrdinance 1969 was enacted (later amendedthrough an Act in 1993 and again in 2001through an ordinance). The Pakistan MinimumWages for Unskilled Workers (Amendment)Ordinance 2001 is applicable to all establish-ments irrespective of the size of the work force(even if there is only one employee) and permitscollective negotiations by workers via represen-tation in the Wage Board. The legislation coversinformal sector workers (officially 73 per cent ofthe total workforce) . Another piece of legislationwith bearing on the minimum wages is theEmployees Cost of Living (Relief) Act 1974 whichstipulated nominal allowances to be included inthe minimum wages accordingly. This Act,known as COLA Act was revised and amendedseveral times.

In recent years the government has adopted anunconstitutional practice of making amend-ments in labour-related laws through yearlyFinance Act. Through this move, the state bringsout changes in labour laws without tripartiteconsultations. The national standard minimumwages is now revised through Finance Act viaamendment in the Minimum Wages for theUnskilled Workers Ordinance 1969.

In the 1969 Ordinance 'per month' is defined asa 'working period of 26 days at the rate of 48hours per week' with 8 hours of work per day.Through the Finance Act 2006, under the con-cept of 'flexible' timings, an amendment in theShops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969,has allowed spread over period of daily work,inclusive of rest interval and meals, to 12 hours.In an increasing number of sectors in informaleconomy work day now legally stretches up to12 hours; over time is not paid according to stip-

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ulated rates, and neither the workers are paidfor weekly or gazette holidays.

It is to be noted that all minimum wage legisla-tions and rules exclude agricultural workers, whocomprise 44.6 per cent of the country's totallabour force.

Gaps and caveats in the minimumwage legislationUnder the Constitution, labour till recently waslisted among the subjects that can be taken upat federal as well as provincial level. The federalgovernment drafted labour policy and key legis-lation and the provincial governments had theprerogative to formulate specific policies, laws,rules and procedures, if required. Hence, wagerates for similar categories of work differ inprovinces. Within the province, distinction ismade between 'industrial' and 'other areas'. No criteria (i.e. consumption units, food intake,shelter, clothing, transport expenses) are estab-lished in the legislation for fixing of minimumwage for decent living and neither the basis forits revision are set. Also, coverage is limited to51 scheduled categories in the Punjab (thelargest province) and to 36 categories in theprovince of Sindh.

While the Ordinance 1961 and the Ordinance1969 can co-exist, the amended versions of thePakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers1969 could have been collapsed to avoid com-plexity. A major problem with legal text is theuse of word 'may' that renders the legislationweak and becomes a ground for argument forlapses in enforcement and specificities. Forinstance the Minimum Wages Ordinance 1961,Clause 5 (2) and (3) states:

'…the Board may recommend minimum rates ofwages for all classes of workers in any grade,and in such recommendation, may specify…time work; piece work; overtime work; and workon the weekly day of rest and for paid holidays…'and '…The rates recommended by the Boardmay be on hourly, daily, weekly or monthlybasis.'

According to a legal text analysis'The Board is not authorized to recommend min-imum wages on its own initiative. The discretionto issue a direction to the Board to recommendminimum wages rests entirely with theProvincial Government…' and ' …When recom-mendations of the Board in respect of minimum

wages have been received by the ProvincialGovernment, it is not bound to enforce them. Itmay-and that too with such exceptions or modi-fications as it may specify.'

While the federal government fixes and revisesthe monthly minimum wage, fixing of piece-rate,hourly rate, daily rate in specific categoriesneeds to be done by the Boards in consultationwith representatives of employers organizationsand trade unions/workers organizations in thescheduled industrial and commercial undertak-ings and usually the Boards fail to do so.

Enforcement of the minimum wages legislation--despite clear rules (i.e., for selection of wageboard, publicity of rates, penalties for falserecords, appointment of inspectors)-is totallylacking. Reasons are many and the foremost isa weakened and crumbling labour inspectionsystem. The appointment of the Wage Boardchairman is often based on political expediencyrather than on the criteria spelled out in the law,i.e. adequate knowledge of industrial labour andeconomic conditions. Members are similarlynominated. The workers' representatives arealmost invariably the old leadership from one orthe other politically-affiliated trade union federa-tions with vested interests. Another crucial rea-son for poor enforcement is non-existence oflabour movement, trade unionism or collectivestruggles in the majority of sectors and estab-lishments. Majority of workers at the lowest tierare not aware of their rights, including the stipu-lated right to minimum wages.

Ratification of related ILOConventionsPakistan has not ratified any of the ILO conven-tions related to minimum wages. These are:Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention,1928 (C 26); Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery(Agriculture) Convention, 1951 (C 99); andMinimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (C126).

Minimum Wage RevisionThe minimum wage for unskilled workers set inthe 1969 Ordinance at Rs. 140 per month wasrevised for the first time after 24 years to Rs.1,500 through an amendment in the Act in1993, a legislation disapproved by employersand challenged by few in the court on variousgrounds. The Act was further amended throughan ordinance in 2001 and the rate revised. In2005, minimum wage was revised through the

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Finance Act. The raise was also criticized byemployers who regarded Rs.3,000 ($ 36) permonth wage on the higher side and its applica-tion to establishments with less 50 workers aharsh measure impacting negatively on produc-tivity, a rather baseless assumption as accordingto the Census of Manufacturing Industries 1995-96, labour cost accounted for 7 per cent of thetotal cost of production. The yearly revision inminimum wages, since 2005, took place in2006, 2007 and 2009 via amendments madethrough the Finance Act.

Currently the national minimum wage is Rs.7000. But a large number of workers in specificcategories and sectors are getting lower thannational minimum wages. In a March 2009 sur-vey, undertaken by Pakistan Institute of LabourEducation and research, of 500 women garmentworkers of small units in Karachi, 52.83 per centrespondents were getting a monthly incomebetween Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 5,000. In a surveyundertaken by PILER recently of 950 powerloom workers (all male) in Karachi, 43 per cent(receiving piece-rate and putting in 12 to 16working hours) reported making a monthlyamount between Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 7,000.

Trends in wage employment andwage inequalityA declining trend in wage employment is notedsince the beginning of the current decade. From37.3 per cent in 2003-04, wage employmentshare decreased to 36.0 per cent in 2007-08,with a marked drop in female wage employment(31.2 per cent in 2003-04 to 22.2 per cent in2007-08). In contrast, the number of womenworking as unpaid family workers has shown asteady increase over the years and from 52.8per cent in 2003-04 the percentage jumped to65.0 per cent in 2007-08 (compared to 19.7 percent men working as unpaid family help). Thedeterioration in female wage employmentneeds to be investigated. Anecdotal evidencesuggests women bear the major brunt of pover-ty either through supplementing the householdincome as unpaid workers in family farms andcottage enterprises or by taking up low-skilled,low tiered work at very low wages.

Within wage employment, the number of casualpaid employees is increasing: up from 24 percent in 1997-98 to 26 per cent in 2005-06.Also, the proportion of daily wage earner hasincreased from 18 per cent in 1997-98 to 21 percent in 2005-06.

The trend in real wage levels has been charac-terized by two factors: declining wage ratio andwidening of wage differentials. The gap betweenwages of low-income and high-income groupswidened further in 2005-06. This was due toabove-average uptrend in wages in the upperwage groups and also from a massive expansionof low-wage sector. In the corporate sector, civilservices, army, and multi-nationals, currently amonthly package for Rs. 100,000 is standard formid-level professional and managerial staff, instark contrast with (and 140 times of) the mini-mum wage of Rs. 7,000 for unskilled worker.

There are disparities in wages between urbanand rural areas and between districts. Urban-rural wage differential was noted at 0.70 in2005-06. Gender-based wage differential waseven higher and stood at 0.64 in the same peri-od. Official data indicate that women earnabout half of men's earning. In agriculture sectormonthly wages of male workers are cited as Rs.5,927 and of women Rs.2,972. In manufactur-ing, women make Rs.2,912 per month and menget Rs.7,385.

3. Wages and CollectiveBargaining in the Power LoomSectorThe silver lining in this grim scenario, however, isthe emergence of sector-based, issued-orientedcollective resistance/bargaining initiatives in theinformal sector. Initiatives focusing on wage fix-ing include concerted struggles of power looms'workers in Faisalabad (Punjab) and Karachi(Sindh) and the brick kilns workers in Multanand Sahiwal (Punjab) and Shahdadpur (Sindh).

Mention is to be made of the struggle of one mil-lion tenants/share croppers working on the farmlands owned by the Punjab government butunconstitutionally controlled by the military. Ledby the Anjuman-e-Mazarain Punjab (TenantsAssociation Punjab), the 10-year old movementhas focused on land rights, in Okara andKhanewal, with its popular slogan Maliki yaMaut-ownership or death-and has continued itsresistance, refusing to pay the share to the mili-tary. Similarly, the campaign of the PakistanFisherfolk Forum (Sindh) on rights on waterresources has resulted in enhanced earnings ofinland fish workers. The fishers got back the con-trol of water bodies in Badin district from thepara-military forces who were forcibly buyingfishermen's catch at very low price.

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Among these initiatives, the case of Faislabadpower loom workers is discussed in detail toexplore strategies adopted by the movementand to recommend indicators for future direc-tion for similar nascent initiatives. The powerloom workers initiative in Faisalabad is selectedfor its broad-base (more than 25,000 members),its focus on minimum wages revision and socialsecurity provision, and its continued struggle(since 2003) despite constraints.

Collective bargaining for wages Weaving is an important sub-sector of the textileindustry in Pakistan and the share of smallpower loom units is high with a total of 360,000units in operation in the informal sector in dif-ferent cities employing a significant workforce.Long working hours, poor work conditions, lowwages, lack of health and safety measures andlack of social protection characterize this sector.Wages are based on piece-rates that vary withquality of cloth and machine, and are paid fort-nightly or weekly.

Faisalabad, the third largest city of 5.5 million isthe hub of cotton textile production. Of this, 3.5million people are directly or indirectly earningtheir livelihood from the sector and 500,000 areestimated to be working in big and small powerloom factories spread all over the city. An infor-mal labour union-Labour Qaumi Movement(LQM)--emerged in 2003 when a few labouractivists took to mobilizing power loom workersfor collective bargaining with the PowerloomOwners' Association and the DistrictGovernment. The Movement has retained itsinformal characteristic as it is not yet registeredunder any law but has gained recognition at thestate level due to its numerical strength.

The movement was strengthened with the induc-tion of 40 labour councilors and 2 union councilnazim, or deputy mayors, in local governmentwho won election in 2005 with the support ofLabour Qaumi Movement. In September 2005,LQM initiated its first all-out campaign for revi-sion of wages and social security benefits andsucceeded in negotiating a tri-partite agreementfor 20 per cent increase in piece rates and reg-istration of workers with the social security insti-tution. During the same year, Labour QuamiMovement members, allied with textile workersin other parts of the country in an effort to formindustry-based union to fight collectively for theirrights. The effort failed for various reasons,including geographical distances, regional varia-tions and ethnic divisions, but several linkages

among power loom unions in different citieswere developed.

Persistent struggle, strategized through expand-ing membership-base, alliance-building and sup-port-seeking with informal labour organizationsand unions, and carried forward through protestrallies, strikes, press conferences, workers' sem-inars and dialogue with district and provincialgovernments, showed some results when inMarch 2006 the District Human Resource Board(DHRB), Faislabad, accepted workers' demands,after their prolonged hunger strike, for enhancedrates, issuance of social security cards, weeklypaid holiday and registration of power-loom fac-tories. A special pay committee was constitutedto evolve a formula for increase in wages. Permeter rates of different categories of cloth wereenhanced and notified. While some of the powerloom owners implemented the new rates, themajority did not. In the absence of effectivelabour inspection, there was no significantchange in wages or over all working conditions.

A political achievement of the workers in 2006was the transfer of the Director LabourDepartment, Faisalabad, who had adopted aharsher attitude towards workers after theacceptance of their demands. This came aboutafter the workers took over the LabourDepartment premises and locked the officials inone room for 6 hours. State officials had a dia-logue with the workers and consequently thedirector was transferred. The replaced directorwas said to be responsive to the needs and com-plaints of workers and on occasion took to taskthe employers on violation of laws. Anotherimportant achievement cited by the LQM, wasthe changed attitude of law-enforcing personnel.Previously the police used to harass, detain andregister FIR (first information report) againstworker unlawfully. The increasing strength ofpower loom workers led to the counter forma-tion of the Alliance of Faisalabad Power LoomOwners' Association which sought solidarity withthe All-Pakistan Cotton Power-loomsAssociation.

The LQM, with a 25,000 strong membership,continued to rally for implementation ofenhanced rates of minimum wages and for fur-ther revision during 2007-08. The LQM was ableto negotiate a 15 per cent increase in piecerates after the federal government revised themonthly minimum wage in July 2008 to Rs.6,000. According to the LQM, after the revision,the workers were earning in 2008-09, on aver-

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age, a monthly income between Rs. 6,000 andRs 7,000 but putting up a labour up to 14 hours.Also, not all the power loom owners implement-ed the revised wages. This led to increasing inci-dents of confrontation, including physical abuse,between workers and power loom owners. TheLQM advocated for revival of labour inspection.Chairman Punjab Minimum Wage Board acced-ed that abolition of inspection (by theGovernment of Punjab in 2003) was a major rea-

son for non-implementation of minimum wagelaw. The Punjab Government agreed in principleto restore the system in October 2008 but nochange came about on the ground.

In mid 2009, the LQM served a legal notice tothe power loom owners for violation of minimumwages and other labour legislation but there wasno outcome due to the powerful nexus betweenindustrialists-politicians-judiciary. In July the

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Box The LQM strategies The strategies adopted by the Labour QaumiMovement differ significantly from the way tra-ditional, formal, registered trade unions oper-ate in the country. The trade unions in the for-mal sector do not strategize rank and file cadreto expand its base hence their membershipremains restricted. Secondly, the registeredtrade unions have no strategies to include theinformal sector workers. Thirdly, the tradeunions avoid confrontational tactics because oftheir political affiliations and vested interest.The strategies adopted by the movement canbe summarized as below:

acquiring formal organizational structureon the pattern of a trade union (though not a legal entity); expanding membership base and establishing units in other cities (Toba Tek Singh, Jhang, Gojra) in Punjab and afew cities bordering with North West Frontier Province (Chakwal, Haripur);holding formal training sessions, group discussions and public seminars with thesupport of civil society organizations, human and labour rights groups;providing solidarity support to workers inother sectors in the city (i.e. woodindustry workers, brick kiln workers;building linkages with trade union federations, labour organizations and left-wing political parties (i.e. National Trade Union Federation Pakistan (NTUFP), Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER); LabourEducation Foundation; Labour Party Pakistan (LPP);soliciting and participating in tri-partite consultations (state functionaries, employers, workers);advocacy and linkages with the Provincial and District Governments;linkages with media;adopting confrontational tactics (sit-ins, rallies, lockouts, hunger strikes).

The level of change in terms and conditions ofwork by and large in the power loom units inFaisalabad cannot be ascertained. Due to lackof research on the status of paid minimumwages in the pre and post-revision phases, itcannot be established how many looms payaccording to stipulated piece rates or what isthe extent of violation by power loom ownersdespite notification by the provincial govern-ment on minimum wage enhancement, thoughaccording to the LQM, most of the workers aregetting enhanced wages.

The movement, however, has endowed workerswith political consciousness, education andinformation on existing legal mechanisms (i.e.minimum wages law, social security provisions)to claim and access (where possible) rights atwork place conferred by the state.

A cursory analysis of tri-partite consultationssolicited by the LQM, particularly of the role ofthe district and provincial governments--asgleaned from the media and the LQM informaldocumentation--reveals existence of space,within the legal framework, that the statemachinery is willing to accede in favour ofworkers. Each round of consultation resulted inenhanced rates agreed upon by the two warringparties. The Labour Department solicited theLQM support in data collection of power loomunits and the workforce. The state functionar-ies accepted the wrong done by the ban onlabour inspections and acknowledged it as themain factor in deteriorating labour conditions.There is a possibility that labour inspection sys-tem is restored in future as Pakistan textileindustry struggles to catch up the market it islosing. An important aspect to emerge is theincreasing awareness within the labour depart-ment on its lack of capacity to implement andmonitor labour standards in an environment ofconstraints and anomalies, pressures for socialcompliance by international buyers and anexpanding work

LQM gave a strike call and production in almost75 per cent of the city's power loom units wassuspended. On the district government's inter-vention and assurance, workers went back towork after 2-day strike to find out the ownershad closed down the units accusing workers ofviolence. The LQM took to organizing regularpublic meetings (with participation of up to4,000 workers) in the city that made the provin-cial government institute a tri-partite committeeto avoid confrontation between workers andemployers in the backdrop of overall deteriorat-ing law and order situation, secular strife andacts of terrorism in the country. In a final settle-ment, power loom owners agreed in August2009, on enhanced piece rates that would trans-late in to additional Rs 1,500 in the monthlyincome of a worker on an average. (It is to benoted that in 2009 the federal government hasnot revised the monthly statutory minimumwages). This gain did not come easy: many LQMactivists were arrested and implicated on falsecharges during the struggle. In addition, long clo-sure of production units meant no wages andsevere hardships to the working communities.

In July 2010, the national minimum wages wereraised to Rs. 7,000 per month. The LQM took upt

OutcomesThe LQM is not registered under labour (or anyother) law but has an organizational structurecomprising executive committee and generalbody. It has 25,000 members many of whompaid initial membership fee of Rs. 120 and paya monthly fee of Rs. 10. According to the LQM,its campaign, since 2005, has led to the regis-tration of 850 small power loom units (out ofapproximately 1250 units) under the FactoriesAct 1934, benefitting 30,000 workers who areissued the social security card by the PunjabSocial Security Institution. According to the LQMrepresentative, after the tri-partite consultationand the formation of a tri-partite monitoringcommittee, the provincial Labour Departmentsought LQM's assistance in data collection ofthe number of power loom units in the city andthe number of workers. Thereafter, members-volunteers of 14 geographical units, formed bythe LQM in the city of Faislabad, prepared thelists of power loom units in respective areas forthe Labour Department.

End Notes

1 Minimum Wages ordinance, 1961.2 Coal mines and state employment are ruled by dif-ferent legislation.3 Global Wage Report 2008/09: Minimum wages andcollective bargaining: Towards policy coherence, ILO,Geneva.4 Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09, GoP, FinanceDivision, Economic Advisor's Wing.5 Asian Development Outlook 2009: RebalancingAsia's Growth, ADB 2009.6 Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2008-09.7 Human Development Report, UNDP, 2008.8 Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2007-08.9 Through the 18th Amendment, enacted in April2010, the concurrent list stands abolished.10 The number of industrial undertakings in theprovince of Balochistan and North West FrontierProvince is not cited due to lack of access to provincialnotifications of the same year (2007) at the time ofwriting of this paper.11 Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled WorkersOrdinance 1969.12 M. Shafi, law of Minimum Wages: commentary onthe Minimum Wages Ordinance 1961 with completetext of the Act, Bureau of Labour Publications,Karachi, 1967.13 Mohammad Irfan, Employment Structure and WageTrends in Pakistan 1997-2006, PILER, 2008.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2008-0917 Textile Commissioner's Organisationhttp://www.tco.gov.pk/18 Trade unionism in Pakistanis extremely restricted.Registered trade unions exist only in the formal sectorand that too on a limited scale. According to esti-mates only 2-4 per cent of the formal sector labour isunionized. But many workers' groups and alliancesoperate in the informal sector.19 Zeenat Hisam, Denial and Discrimination: LabourRights in Pakistan, 2007, PILER. 20 Nasir Jamal, Enforcement of Minimum Wages,DailyDawn report, 1 Dec. 2008.22 Mian Abdul Qayyum, President Labour QaumiMovement.23 Informal meeting of the official by the joint directorPILER, Oct 2009.

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Notes on Contributors

Karamat AliAn eminent labour and development activistsince the last four decades, Karamat Ali isExecutive Director and a founding member ofPakistan Institute of Labour Education &Research (PILER). Currently Honorary Fellow,International Institute of Social History,Amsterdam, Karamat Ali holds a Master'sdegree in Development Studies (specializing inLabour and Development) from the Institute ofSocial Studies, the Hague, the Netherland, andhas authored numerous articles and essays onlabour, politics and development. ([email protected])

Dr. Aly ErcelawnSenior Research Fellow, PILER, Dr. Aly Ercelawn,a noted economist and development-activist,has taught at the University of Karachi, AppliedEconomics Research Centre, Textile Institute ofPakistan and the Quaid-i-Azam University. Dr.Ercelawn has been actively involved with in poli-cy campaigns undertaken by various citizen sec-tor organizations notably the Creed Alliance,Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, Pakistan Network ofRivers, Dams and People, Urban ResourceCentre, Sustainable Development PolicyInstitute and the NGO-Forum on the ADB.

Dr. Shahida WizaratA noted economist and former Director AppliedEconomics Research Centre, University ofKarachi, where she taught for 26 years, Dr.Shahida Wizarat is currently associated with the

Institute of Business Management, Karachi, asResearch Fellow and Head of the EconomicsDepartment. Dr. Wizarat has contributed numer-ous papers and articles to national and interna-tional journals and national media andauthored/edited several books.

Noriko HaraMs. Noriko Hara, currently based in Karachi, hasa BA (International Cultural Studies) from theTsudajuku University, Tokyo, Japan, and MA(Social Development) from the National Instituteof Development Administration, Bangkok,Thailand. She has worked as a developmentconsultant in Thailand, Myanmar and Pakistan.Her major areas of interest are labour migration,migrant integration and education.

Bisharat AliBisharat Ali Lanjwani, Lecturer, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Sindh, Jamshoro,holds a Master's degree in Political Studies fromthe Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

Zeenia ShaukatSenior Research Associates at PILER, Ms.Shaukat holds a Master's degree in InternationalCommunications from the University of Leeds,UK.

Zeenat HisamSenior Research Associate at PILER, Ms. ZeenatHisam holds a Master's degree in DevelopmentStudies (specializing in Women andDevelopment) from the Institute of SocialStudies, the Hague, the Netherlands.

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