Democracy and Terrorism

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Other titles in the Democracy and Terrorism Series, Edited by Peter R. Neumann

Democracy anD TerrorismLeonard Weinberg

confronTing TerrorismPeter R. Neumann

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New York London

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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Contents

Editors vii

Contributors ix

Foreword xi

1. TheRootsofTerrorism:AnOverview 1Louise Richardson

IndividualandPsychologicalRoots

2. ThePsychologicalDynamicsofTerrorism 17Jerrold M. Post

3. SuicideTerrorism 29Nasra Hassan

PoliticalRoots

4. DemocracyandTerrorism 45Leonard Weinberg

5. CounterterrorismandRepression 57Michael S. Stohl

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vi TheRootsofTerrorism

6. TheCausesofRevolutionaryTerrorism 71Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca

EconomicRoots

7. EconomicFactors 85Ted Robert Gurr

8. TerrorismandGlobalization 103Atanas Gotchev

9. DiasporasandTerrorism 117Gabriel Sheffer

CultureandReligion

10.ReligionasaCauseofTerrorism 133Mark Juergensmeyer

11.TerrorismandtheRiseofPoliticalIslam 145John L. Esposito

12.TerrorismandDeculturation 159Olivier Roy

RecommendedReadings 171

AbouttheInternationalSummitonDemocracy,Terrorism,andSecurity 175

AbouttheClubdeMadrid 187

Index 191

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Editors

BookEditorLouise Richardson is executive deanof theRadcliffe Institute forAdvancedStudyatHarvardUniversity,Cambridge.ShecoordinatedtheworkinggroupsontheunderlyingfactorsofterrorismattheInternational Summit on Democracy,Terrorism, and Security, and lectureswidelyon terrorismandcounterterror-ismtoawiderangeofinternationalanddomesticmedia andpolitical,military,intelligence,academic,community,andalumniorganizations.

Dr. Richardson holds positions onnumerousinternationaladvisoryboardsincluding Club de Madrid, in Spain;

HumanitiesInstituteofIreland;andtheNationalAcademyofSciencesStudyCommitteeeonTechnicalandPrivacyDimensionsof Informa-tionforTerrorismPrevention.Authoringover20monographs,editedvolumes,articles,andchapters,shehaswrittenforNew England Jour-nal of MedicineandHarvard International Review.HermostrecentbookisWhat TerroristsWant: Understanding the Enemy Containing the Threat(RandomHouse,2006).

AlectureronlawatHarvardLawSchool,Dr.Richardsonisalsoa senior lecturer in government at Harvard University. She has wonvariousawards forher teaching includingAward forTeachingExcel-lencefromtheBokCenter,aswellasawardsfromtheAmericanPoliti-calScienceAssociationandPiSigmaAlpha, theLevensonPrize,andtheAbramsonAward,allfromHarvardUniversity.Dr.Richardsonhas

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viii TheRootsofTerrorism

alsoreceivedvariousresearchandtravelawardsfromtheFordFounda-tion,TheMiltonFund,andTheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.

Dr.RichardsonholdsaPh.D.andM.A.ingovernmentfromHar-vardUniversity,anM.A.inpoliticalsciencefromtheUniversityofCali-fornia,LosAngeles,aswellasaB.A.andM.A.inhistoryfromUniver-sityofDublin,TrinityCollege,Ireland.

SeriesEditorPeterR.Neumann is director of theCentreforDefenceStudiesatKing’sCollegeLondon.Priortothisappointment,hewastheLever-hulme research fellow in international ter-rorismat theDepartmentofWarStudiesatKing’sCollege.Heservedasacademicdirec-tor of the Club de Madrid’s International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Secu-rityinMadridinMarch2005,andactedassenioradvisortotheNational Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security and America’s Pur-pose,whichtookplaceinWashington,D.C.inSeptember2005.

Dr. Neumann authored Britain’s Long War (PalgraveMacmillan,2003),themostcomprehensiveassessmentof British strategy in the Northern Ireland conflict, and has writtennumerousarticlesonstrategicterrorism,intelligenceandcounterterror-isminsomeoftheforemostacademicjournals,includingThe Journal of Strategic Studies, Orbis, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,andTer-rorism and Political Violence.ShorterpieceshavebeenpublishedintheInternational Herald Tribune,theNew York Times,theBaltimore Sun,andmanyothers.

Currently working on a book on counterterrorism provisionallyentitledDemocracy’s Dilemma,whichwillbereleasedwithIBTaurisinearly2007,Dr.NeumannisamemberoftheClubdeMadrid’sadvisoryboard,andholdsaFellowshipoftheBritishRoyalSocietyofArts.

He obtained a Ph.D. in war studies from King’s College London, and an M.A. in political science from the Free University of Berlin.

Beforebecominganacademic,Dr.Neumannworkedasajournal-ist,servingastheLondonbureauchiefofGermany’smainradionewsnetwork,BLR.HewasanewseditorandreporterforBerlin’stwomostpopularradiostations,RTLandRS2radio.

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Contributors

JohnL.Esposito isprofessorofreligionandinternationalaffairsandfoundingdirectoroftheCenterforMuslim–ChristianUnderstandingatGeorgetownUniversityinWashington,D.C.

AtanasGotchevisprofessorofinternationalrelationsattheUniversityofNationalandWorldEconomyinSofia,Bulgaria.Currently,heisaWorldBankconsultantongovernanceissuesintheCaucusesRepublicsoftheRussia’sSouthernFederalDistrict.

TedRobertGurrisdistinguishedprofessorattheUniversityofMary-land.Hewas founderof thePolityproject, trackingdemocratizationworldwide,and theMinoritiesatRiskproject,monitoring300com-munalgroupsinconflict.

NasraHassanwasborninPakistanand,havingworkedintheMiddleEast,theBalkans,andCentralAsia,iscurrentlybasedwithaninterna-tionalorganizationinVienna,Austria.

MarkJuergensmeyerisprofessorofsociologyandreligiousstudiesanddirectoroftheOrfaleaCenterofGlobalandInternationalStudiesattheUniversityofCalifornia,SantaBarbara.

Jerrold M. Post is professor of psychiatry, political psychology, andinternationalaffairsanddirectorofthePoliticalPsychologyProgramatGeorgeWashingtonUniversityinWashington,D.C.

Louise Richardson is executive dean of the Radcliffe Institute forAdvancedStudyatHarvardUniversity,Cambridge.Shecoordinatedtheworkinggroupsontheunderlying factorsof terrorismat the Interna-tionalSummitonDemocracy,Terrorism,andSecurity.

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x TheRootsofTerrorism

OlivierRoy is professor at theEcole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. He is the author of Globalized Islam (New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004).

IgnacioSánchez-CuencaisassociateprofessorofpoliticalscienceandsociologyattheJuanMarchInstituteandtheUniversidadComplutense,bothinMadrid,Spain.

Gabriel (Gabi) Sheffer isprofessorofpolitical scienceat theHebrewUniversity of Jerusalem. He was also director of the Leonard DavisInstituteforInternationalRelationsatHebrewUniversity,andeditoroftheJerusalem Journal of International Relations.

MichaelS.StohlischairandprofessorintheDepartmentofCommu-nication at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His researchfocusesonpoliticalcommunicationwithspecialreferencetoterrorism,humanrights,andglobalrelations.

LeonardWeinberg isFoundationProfessorofPoliticalScienceat theUniversityofNevadaandservedasaconsultanttotheUnitedNationsOfficeforthePreventionofTerrorism.HeissenioreditorofthejournalDemocracy and Security.

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Foreword

WhentheClubdeMadridhostedtheInternationalSummitonDemoc-racy,Terrorism,andSecurityinMadridinMarch2005,theaimwastobringtogetherthemostimportantstakeholdersinthedebateabouthowdemocraciesshouldconfrontthethreatofterrorism.Webelievedthatthedebateamongpoliticalleaders,policymakers,andexpertpractitio-nershadbeenincompleteatbestandthatitwasimportanttoprovideaglobalforuminwhichallthosewhohadsomethingtocontributecouldsitaroundthetableandtalktoeachother.

A first result of this process of dialogue was what we called theMadridAgenda,releasedonthelastdayoftheconference.Drawingonthevariouscontributionsmadebythesummit’sparticipants,thedocu-mentoutlinedtheprinciplesandideasaroundwhichapragmaticconsen-susinthefightagainstterrorismcouldbebuilt.Iwasheartenedbythefactthateventhemosthard-nosedantiterrorismpractitioners—seniormembersoftheintelligenceservices,armygenerals,andpolicechiefs—agreedthatmaintainingtheruleoflaw,respectinghumanrights,andpromotingdemocracywereallessentialinmakingthestruggleagainstterrorismeffectiveinthelongrun.

Anotherpointthatcameacrossveryclearlywastheneedforourresponse against terrorism to be comprehensive. Even though lawenforcementagencieshavetobegiventhepowersrequiredtopreventterroristattacksandtoprotectthelivesofinnocents,thesummitpar-ticipants were unanimous in their view that we must go further. AstheMadridAgendastates,“Internationalinstitutions,governmentsandcivilsocietyshouldalsoaddresstheunderlyingriskfactorsthatprovideterroristswithsupportandrecruits.”

Lookingattherootcausesofterrorism,however,isnotasuncon-troversialasitseems.Somedismissitassimplistic;othersevenbelieveit isaneffortto justifyterrorism.Icouldnotdisagreemorestrongly.Asthevariouscontributionsinthisvolumeshow,thosewhoresearchtherootsofterrorismareconsciousthatnosinglecauseexists;instead,wearedealingwithacomplex,multifacetedproblemthatrequiresan

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xii TheRootsofTerrorism

equallysophisticatedresponse.Indeed,ifourattemptsataddressingtherootsofterrorismhavebeensimplistic,itisprobablybecausewehavenotdoneenoughtounderstandthem.

Furthermore,findingoutwhypeoplebecometerroristshasnothingtodowithexcusingtheircrimes.Onthecontrary,tobetterappreciatetherootsofterrorismstrikesmeasthemostobviousstartingpointforhowtoconstructourrangeofresponses.ItisaboutmappingwhatLou-iseRichardsononcedescribedasthe“enablingenvironment”inwhichterrorismthrives.Doingsowillallowustodrawonamuchwiderrangeofresourcesandwillenableustoemploytheseinamoretargetedway.Inotherwords,ratherthanunderminingit,suchworkwillhelptomakethefightagainstterrorismmoreeffective.

TheMadridSummitwasheldonthefirstanniversaryofthetrainbombingsinMadridin2004,anditwasthememoryofthoseterribleattacksthatspurredourefforts.Evenbackthen,Iwasconvincedthattheprocessofglobalengagement,dialogueandactionthatwasbeguninMadridmustcontinue.Followingtherecentbombings inLondon,Sharm-el-SheikhandBali,itismorenecessarythanever.Thisbookisanimportantpartofthateffort.Istronglycommendittoeveryseriousstudentofthetopic.

MaryRobinsonVice President of the Club de Madrid

Former President of Ireland

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1TheRootsofTerrorism:AnOverview

LouiseRichardson

In June 2005 White House advisor Karl Rove criticized what he described as the effort of liberals after the attacks of September 11, 2001, to understand the terrorists.1Insosaying,Rovewasreflectingacommonpredilectiontoequateunderstandingterrorismwithsympathyforterrorists.Likethesixty-fiveacademicswhodeliberatedtogetherontheunderlyingcausesofterrorismforseveralmonthsandwhoconvenedinMadridonthefirstanniversaryoftheAtochatrainbombings,Irejectthisview.Webelievethatonlybyunderstandingtheforcesleadingtotheemergenceofterrorism—therootcauses,inotherwords—canwehopetodeviseasuccessfullong-termcounterterroriststrategy.

Asthecontributionstothisvolumedemonstrate,thesearchfortheunderlying causes of terrorism is a complicated endeavor. The diffi-cultyofthetaskmustserveasaninducementtosustainedandrigorousresearchonthesubject—notasinvitationtothrowinthetowelanddealsimplywiththesymptomsthatpresentthemselves.Policymakers,facedwithpressuresforimmediateactiontodealwithaformidablethreat,canbeforgivenforseekingarapidreactionplan.Theroleofacademics,ontheotherhand,istoensurethattheplanstheyreachforarebasedonadeep-seatedunderstandingofthenatureofthethreattheyface.

Thesearchforthecauseofterrorism,likethesearchforacureforcancer,isnotgoingtoyieldasingledefinitivesolution.Butaswithanydisease, an effective cure will be dependent on the accurate diagno-sisofthemultiplicityofriskfactorsaswellastheir interactionswithoneanother.Thecureislikelytobealmostascomplicatedasthedis-ease, entailinga combinationofalleviating the risk factors,blocking

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� TheRootsofTerrorism

theinteractionsbetweenthem,andbuildingthebody’sresiliencetoexposure.Aboveall,itwillfocusfirstandforemostonpreventingthespreadofthedisease.

Theworkingdefinitionofterrorismemployedbythisgroup—intheabsenceofanagreedinternationaldefinition—iscontainedintheU.S.Code:“Premeditated,politicallymotivatedviolenceperpetratedagainst non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandes-tineagents,usuallyintendedtoinfluenceanaudience.”2Terrorism,infact,isacomplexandmultivariatephenomenon.Itappearsinmanydifferentformsinmanypartsoftheworldinpursuitofmanydiffer-entobjectives.Itoccursindemocracies,autocracies,andtransitionalstatesandindeveloped,underdeveloped,anddevelopingeconomies.It ispracticedbyadherentsofmany religions andbyadherentsofnone. What all terrorist groups have in common is that they areweakerthantheirenemiesandthattheyareprepareddeliberatelytomurdernoncombatantsinfurtheranceoftheirobjectives.Theadop-tionofterrorismasatactictoeffectpoliticalchangeis,therefore,adeliberatechoice.

Terrorist groups differ from one another in important ways.Theydiffer inthenatureoftheir ideologyandinthespecificityoftheirpoliticalobjectives.Theydifferintheirrelationshiptoreligionandtothecommunitiesfromwhichtheyderivesupport.Theyalsodiffer in the trajectoryof their violence.Historically, for example,mostterroristgroupsweredomestic,andothersstartedlocallyandwentglobal;recently,however,globalconflictsseemtoinspirelocalgroupstoterrorism.

One of the most obvious difficulties in identifying a cause orcausesofterrorismisthatterrorismisamicrophenomenon.Metaex-planationscannotbeusedsuccessfullytoexplainmicrophenomena.Take the case of social revolutionary movements in Europe in the1970sforexample.Theirbehaviorwasattributedtothealienationoftheyoungwhosepostwaridealismwasthwartedbycapitalistmate-rialism. But if this alienation was the cause, then why were therenotmanymoreterrorists?Alienationwaswidespread,butterrorism,fortunately,hadrelativelyfewadherents.Alienationalone,therefore,cannotstandasthecauseoftheirterrorism.

Nationalist terrorism,ontheotherhand,hasbeenmorebroadlybased.Ethnonationalistgroupshaveresortedtoterrorismallovertheworld fromNorthern Ireland, Spain, andCorsica toTurkey,Chech-nya, SriLanka, India, and theMiddleEast.But ifnationalismwerethecauseoftheirterrorism,thenwhyhaveotherethnicandnational-istgroups—whodonotoccupyaterritoryconsistentwiththeirsenseof identity—notalso resorted to terrorism?Nationalismcanprovide

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TheRootsofTerrorism:AnOverview �

asenseofgrievanceandaunifyingandlegitimizingaspiration,butitcannotaloneexplainwhyagroupseekstorealizetheirnationalistgoalthroughterroristviolenceasopposedtootherformsofpoliticalaction.

Thecontributorstothisvolumereflectarangeofacademicdis-ciplines frompsychologist to sociologist, fromeconomist topoliti-cal scientist andhistorian.None claim for theirfieldsamonopolyon insight intotherootcausesof terrorism.Onthecontrary,eachconcedestheneedforseveralapproachestotheproblem.Differentfields,however,tendtofocusonparticularlevelsofanalysis.Thesehavebeenbroadlydividedintoindividual,political,economic,andculturalfactors.Ifirstreviewtheargumentsmadebythecontribu-torsandthenextrapolatethepolicyprescriptionsfromtheiranalysisbeforespellingoutaresearchagendathatwouldadvanceourunder-standingofthecrucialquestionoftherootsofterrorism.

UnderlyingCausesofTerrorismAt the level of the individual, psychologists have long argued thatthereisnoparticularterroristpersonalityandthatthenotionofter-roristsascrazedfanaticsisnotconsistentwiththeplentifulempiricalevidenceavailable.JerroldPostpointsoutthatterroristsarepsycho-logicallynormalinthesenseofnotbeingclinicallypsychotic;theyare neither depressed nor severely emotionally disturbed. Instead,headvocatesananalysisofthecrucialconceptofcollectiveidentitywhere group, organizational, and social psychology provide moreanalytical power than individual psychology. He argues that thesocioculturalcontextdeterminesthebalancebetweencollectiveandindividual identityand inparticular themanner inwhich terroristrecruitssubordinatetheirindividualidentitytothatofthecollective.Hepointstotheimportanceofdistinguishingleadersfromfollow-ersandofunderstandingthecrucialroleoftheleaderinprovidingasense-makingmessagetothefollowers.Postalsostressestheimpor-tanceofgroupdynamicsandthemannerinwhichgroupsmaymakeriskierdecisionsthanindividuals.Hepointsoutthatifthepathtoleadershipinanorganizationisthroughviolence,thenthegroupwillbepushed inexorably towardgreaterandgreater levelsofviolenceirrespectiveofwhatindividualsmaythink.

NasraHassanalsofocuseson individualsand inparticularonindividual suicide jihadis. She interviewed the families and friendsof 250 suicide bombers from a variety of conflicts and comparestheappealandtheimplementationofthetacticamongthedifferentreligiousandseculargroupswhoemployit.Likeothercontributorsto this volume she challenges the view thatmadrassa andmosqueschoolsarethechiefgeneratorofsuicidejihadis,suggestinginstead

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thebroaderenvironmentandthevolunteersselectedforthespecialtrainingcamps.Thoughshecitescertainessentialelementslikeloy-altytoacharismaticfigureandpreexistinggrievancesagainstanout-group,byexaminingthemanydifferencesamongthevarioussuicideterroristcampaigns,themixtureofreligiousandpoliticalmotiveandrhetoric,andthestyleoftrainingandmethodofdeploymentHassanimplicitly challenges the notion that there is any one simple causeofeventhisparticularterroristtacticorevenasharedprofileofthesuicidejihadist.

Wherepsychologistsandwritersseekexplanationattheindivid-ualandgrouplevel,politicalscientistsbringthetoolsoftheirtradetobearinattemptingtoestablishlinesfirstofcorrelationandthencau-sationbetweentheoutbreakofterrorismandthenatureofthepoliti-calenvironmentinwhichtheviolencetakesplace.Recognizingthemyriaddifferenttypesofterrorism,IgnacioSánchez-Cuencafocuseshisanalysisonrevolutionarymovements.Thesewerethemovementsthatbedeviledseveralwealthywesterndemocraciesinthemid-1970sandearly1980s.TheyincludetheRedBrigadesandPrimaLineainItaly,theRedArmyFactioninGermany,FirstofOctoberAntifascistResistanceGroup(GRAPO)inSpain,theRevolutionaryOrganiza-tion17November inGreece,FP25Abril inPortugal,andActionDirecteinFrance.Inamultivariateanalysiswithtwenty-onecoun-tries,Sánchez-Cuencafindsthatbyfarthemostpowerfulpredictorofthelethalityofviolenceispastpoliticalinstability.Heuseswhathetermsapolitical selection modeltodemonstratewhyrevolution-aryviolentgroupsemergedinmanydevelopedcountriesinthe’70sand’80sbutonlyevolvedintoterroristgroupsinahandfulofcases.He found that terrorist groups emerged in states that had experi-encedpastpolitical instabilityandhadpowerfulsocialmovementsin the ’60s,had engaged in counterproductive repression, andhadalsoseenanemergenceoffascistterrorism.WhileSánchez-Cuencabelievesthismodelcouldprobablyalsoexplaintheemergenceofeth-nonationalistterrorisminSpainandNorthernIreland,hehasnoillu-sionsthatitcouldbeemployedconvincinglyincasesofinternationalterrorism inwhich theunit of observation is not a clearly definedstate.Hisanalysisspeakstothewisdomofdisaggregatingtheverybroadconceptofterrorismandfocusinginsteadonparticulartypesofterroristgroups.

LeonardWeinbergalsochoosestonarrowhisanalysis.Heexam-ines the political sources of terrorism in democracies. In thinkingaboutthedomesticpoliticalcausesheretainspoliticalscientistMar-thaCrenshaw’sdistinctionbetweenpermissiveand instigating fac-tors.3Theweaknessofanalyzingalongthelinesofpermissivecauses

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isdemonstratedimplicitlybySánchez-Cuenca:Thesamepermissivefactorscanexistinseveralstatesbutonlyproduceterrorisminsome.AnotherweaknesscorrectlyidentifiedbyWeinbergisthat,thankstonewformsoftechnology,behaviorcanbequicklydiffusedandter-roristcampaignscanspreadfromonecountrytoanotherinspiteofdifferencesinthepoliticalconditionsofthosecountries.

Weinbergsubjectstoempiricaltestingseveralargumentsfoundinthe literatureon therelationshipbetween terrorismanddemocracy.Hefindsthatoutbreaksofterrorismarenottheexclusivepreserveoftransitionaldemocracies.Hepointsoutthatinfact,althoughterrorismcanbepresentatthecreationofdemocracy,thefailureofdemocraciestorespondforciblyalsohasbroughtabouttheirdemise,asinUruguay,Argentina,andTurkey.Healsodemonstratesthatlongevityinnowayinsulatesdemocraciesfromoutbreaksofdomesticterrorism.

After exploring the explanatory power of temporal permissiveexplanations Weinberg turns to structural ones. He refers to dataanalysis—againlimitedtowesterndemocracies—indicatingthatthegreater thedegreeofethnicdiversityandthegreater thedegreeofpoliticalfragmentationinthepolity,thehighertheincidenceofter-rorism.Conversely,themoreevenlydistributedtheincomeandthebettertherecordinprotectingcivilrights,thelowertheincidenceofterrorism.Herecognizes theproblemsofcausalityhere,ofcourse,asstatesthathavehadfewerthreatsfromterroristsmayhavebetterprotectionsforcivillibertiesasaconsequence,notacause.Hecon-cludesthatinstigatingfactorslikeradicalizationandtheirinteractionwiththebehaviorofthestatearemorelikelytobehelpfulinunder-standingoutbreaksofterrorism.

Therelativerecencyoftransnationalterrorismmeansthatdatacollectionisatamuchmorerudimentarystage.Nevertheless,Wein-bergbelievesthatbroad-basedexplanationssuchasthestructureoftheinternationalsystemorglobalizationarenotconsistentwiththeevidence.Theunipolarsystemasanexplanatoryvariableisunder-minedbythepresenceofterrorismundermultipolaraswellasuni-polar internationaldistributionsofpower.Healsousesempiricalanalysistochallengetheexplanatorypowerofglobalization,argu-ing that an examination of terrorist incidents suggests that moreincidentstakeplaceamongthoseatthebottomoftheglobalizationscale,secondlyamongthoseatthetopandtheleastbetweenthoseatoppositeends.Thatis,mostterroristattacksarecommittedbycitiensofcountriesathebottomoftheglobalizationindexagainstcitizensofcountriesalsoatthebottomoftheindex.Whencitizensof highly globalized countries are victims their attackers tend tocomefromotherhighlyglobalizedsocieties.Attacksbycitizensof

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countriesatthebottomoftheindexagainstcitizensofcountriesatthetoparelesscommon.Thesefindings,however,againspeaktotheneedtodisaggregateamongdifferenttypesofgroupsbecausethe incidence of Islamist terrorism suggests a different result, asseeninthecontributionofAtanasGotchev.

Gotchev,aneconomist,exploresthedownsideeffectsofglobal-izationasacauseof terrorism.Heshowshowthe inequitabledis-tributionof thepositiveeffectivesofglobalizationacrosscountriesprovidesbothincentivesandopportunitiestoorganize,finance,andcarryoutterroristacts.Hedoesnotarguethatglobalizationcausesterrorismbutratherthatittoocancreativeapermissiveenvironmentfor its occurrence. He points out that globalization has increasedinequalitiesandsocialpolarizationbothwithinandbetweenstatesandthatthisinturnleadstodemandsforpoliticalchange.Moreover,thespreadofwesterncultureandtheneedtoadapttotakeadvantageofthebenefitsofglobalizationprovokepoliticalandculturalresis-tanceandanemphasisondifferences.Gotchevarguesthatglobaliza-tionalsofostersthedevelopmentofnewminoritiesbyfacilitatingthemovementof labor.These in turnmayprovideboth logisticalandfinancialsupportaswellashumancapitalfortheterroristgroups.Hegoesontoarguethatglobalizationdiminishesthepowerofthenationstatebyconstrainingthestate’sabilitytocontrolitseconomyandbyenablingaproliferationofnongovernmentalorganizations.Finally,hearguesthatglobalizationprovidesbothnewmethodsandneweasilyaccessibletargetsforterrorists.

Gotchev does not argue, contra Weinberg, that globalizationcausesterrorismbutratherthatitfacilitatesitsemergence.Globaliza-tionthenfallsintoCrenshaw’scategoryofapermissivecauseofter-rorism.GabiSheffertakesthisargumentastepfurtherbyexaminingthisotherthatisproducedbyglobalization.Heexploresthediasporaandoffersaclassificationofthevariouscomponentsoftheother.Heexploresthemanybehavioralandorganizationaldifferencesamongdifferentelementsofthediasporaandassessesthedegreeofintensityof their violence both in their adoptive and originating countries.The link between diasporas and terrorism is not hard to find. Hearguesthattwenty-sevenofthefiftymostactivecontemporaryter-roristorganizationsareeitherpartofadiasporaoraresupportedbyone—thoughhewouldnot,ofcourse,challengetheviewthatmostmembersofdiasporacommunitiesutterlyrejecttheuseofterrorismtoredresstheirgrievances.

SociologistTedGurr also explores someof themany complexlinkagesbetweeneconomicfactorsandterrorism.Arguingthatter-rorism is a choice made by groups waging conflict rather than an

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automaticresponsetodeprivation,hepointsoutthattheperpetratorsoftheSeptember11,2001,atrocityintheUnitedStatesweremiddleclassandwelleducated.Theywerealsoproductsofsocietiesunder-goingprofound socioeconomic changes inwhichopportunities forpoliticalexpressionweresharplycurtailed.Inaddition,theywereallrecruitedbyIslamistscommittedtojihadagainsttheWest.

Gurrcontendsthatobjectivepovertyisnotadirectcauseofter-rorism,thoughitcancontributeindirectlytotheoutbreakofterror-ism inmanyways.He argues quite convincingly that inequalities,orrelativedeprivation,aremoreimportantthanpovertyasasourceof terrorism. This also helps to account for the common observa-tionthatleadersofterroristmovements,likeleadersoforganizations,generallytendtobemorehighlyeducatedandofahighersocioeco-nomic status than their followers and those in their communities.Ethnonationalistterrorisminparticularcanbelinkedtodiscrimina-tiononthebasisofethnicidentity,thoughnotallinstancesofethnicdiscrimination leadtoterrorism.Rapidsocioeconomicchangealsoservesasariskfactorforterrorism.Thisisbecauseoftheinstabilityitgeneratesandtheassociateddislocationsproduced.

His argument then is that, rather than poverty, structuredinequalities within countries facilitate the emergence of terrorismandthatrapidsocioeconomicchangefeedsthisprocess.Whenthesefactors interact with the restrictions on political rights, disadvan-tagedgroupsarewhatGurrcalls“ripeforrecruitment.”AsWeinbergandMichael Stohl alsonotice, semirepressive state reactionsoftencontributetotheevolutionfrompoliticalmobilizationtoterrorismbecauseoftheirinconsistentmixofrepressionandreform.Finally,like Sheffer, Gurr explores the relationship between terrorism andconventionalcrimeastheneedtofinancetheformeroftendrawstheterroristtowardthelatter.

Turningawayfromanexaminationofeconomicandpoliticaltoexploreculturalandreligiouscauses,ourauthorsfocusonIslamandjihad.JohnEspositoprovidesahistoricalanalysisoftheemergenceofwhathecallspolitical Islam,moreoftenreferredtoasIslamismorIslamicfundamentalism,andinsodoingmakesthecrucialdistinc-tionbetweenmainstreamand extremistmovements.He concludesthatterroristslikeOsamabinLadenaredrivennotbyreligionbutbypoliticalandeconomicgrievances;however,theydrawonatraditionofreligiousextremismtolegitimizetheiractions.Theyignoreclassi-calIslam’scriteriaforajustwar,recognizingnolimitsbuttheirown.TheyalsorejectclassicalIslam’sregulationsregardingavalidjihadwithitsinsistenceontheprotectionofnoncombatantsandthepro-portionateuseofviolence.Espositoarguesthattheprimarycauses—

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whicharesocioeconomicandpoliticaltovaryingdegreesindiffer-entcontexts—areobscuredbythereligiouslanguageandextremismusedbyextremists.

Olivier Roy explores the explanatory issue of deculturation asacauseof Islamicterrorism.Anempiricalexaminationoftheper-petratorsofIslamicviolenceinWesternEurope,heargues,suggeststheyarepartofabroadsupranationalnetworkoperatingintheWestthat isdisconnectedfromanydiscreteterritorialbase.ContrarytopopularopinionRoypointsoutthattheirbackgroundshavelittletodowithtraditionalreligiouseducationorevenparticularconflictsintheMiddleEast:Theybecameborn-againMuslimsintheWest—notinradicalmosquesbutratherintheframeworkofagroupofsimi-larlyuprootedlocalfriends.Theyhaveverylittleconnectiontothereal Muslim world or to the world of their parents. They were ineffectrebelsinsearchofacausewhenIslamismpresenteditself.HeconcludesthattheirradicalizationhasnothingwhatevertodowithIslamasacultureandeverythingtodowith“deculturationandindi-vidualization.”Heseesthem,inessence,asanotherexampleofreli-giousrevivalismwithaglobalperceptionofthestateoftheummah, thatis,theglobalcommunityofIslam.IfRoyiscorrect,thenthetaskofgovernmentsistoacceptIslamasaWesternreligionamongmanyothersandnotastheexpressionofanethnoculturalcommunity.Itmeansworkingtoundermineforeignconnectionsandinsteadinte-gratingMuslimsandcommunityleadersonapluralistbasis.

MarkJuergensmeyerlooksmorebroadlyatallreligionsandtheirrelationship to terrorism. He agrees with Esposito that underlyingeconomicsocialandpoliticalgrievances—ratherthanreligion—aretheinitialproblembutpointsoutthatthesesecularconcernsarenowbeingexpressedthroughrebelliousreligiousideologies,whichmakesthenmoreintractable.Thesegrievancesprovideasenseofalienation,marginalization,andsocialfrustrationbuttheyarebeingarticulatedinreligiousterms,arebeingseenthroughreligiousimages,andarebeing organized by religious leaders through religious institutions.Religionthenbringsnewaspectstotheconflict.Itprovidespersonalrewards, vehicles for socialmobilization,organizationalnetworks,and, more importantly, a justification for violence. Juergensmeyerargues that religion does not cause terrorism but problematizesitbecause it absolutizes the conflict, therebymaking its resolutionenormouslymoredifficult.

Thecontributorstothisvolumedonotproduceasetofcausestobefixedsoastoendterrorism.Rather,throughananalysisofspecificcases,concepts,andrawdatatheyindicateasetofriskfactorsfortheemergenceofterrorism.Theriskfactorsalonewillnotcauseter-

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rorism;theyneedtobeignitedbyparticularevents,policies,orlead-ers thatmobilize thedisaffection theygenerate intoviolentaction.Amelioratingtheseriskfactorsisnotashort-termprocessandsoisunlikelytohaveimmediateresultsinthecampaignagainstterrorism,butoverthelongertermthisactionislikelytohavesignificantben-efitsthroughoutthesesocietiesandindirectlytoreducesupportforaresorttoterroristaction.

PolicyRecommendationsEffectivecounterterroristpolicieslikelywilladdressboththeunderly-ingandtheproximatecausesoftheviolenceandwillcombinelong-termdevelopmentalstrategieswithshort-termandoftencoerciveresponses.Itisimperative,however,thatintheirhastetosecureshort-termsuc-cessagainstterrorists,governmentsshouldnotlosesightofthelonger-termgoals—thattheimplementationoftheshort-termmeasuresdoesnotunderminetheachievementofthelong-termobjectives.

The long-termgoal is todelegitimizetheresort toterrorismasameansofeffectingpoliticalchangeandtoreducetheopportuni-tiesandincentivesfordoingso.Itistochanneltheefforttoredressgrievances intoconventionalpolitics.Action in furtheranceof thisaimisunlikelytoappeal tocurrentlypracticingterroristsbutoverthelongtermislikelytounderminetheirabilitytowinrecruitsfortheir cause.Amore immediate and closely relatedgoal is to sepa-rateterroristsfromthecommunitiesfromwhichtheyderivesupport,todenythemmeansofrecruitingnewmembers,andtopreventtheappealoftheirideologyandtheiractionsfromspreading

Anessentialgoaloflong-termcounterterrorismpolicymustbetoreducethereservoirofresentmentthatbreedssupportfortheresorttoterrorism.Inworkingtowardthisgoal,itiscrucialtorememberthatthemajorityofthepopulations,andeventhemajorityofpoliti-calactivistsinsocietiesthatproduceterrorism,areamongthemostpowerfulforcesforsecuringstableandsafesocieties.Punitivepoli-cies,therefore,mustbefocusedontheperpetratorsoftheviolence.Espositopointsout,forexample,thatazero-toleranceapproachtomainstream political Islamic movements not only will underminecivilsocietyandthecredibilityoftheWest’scommitmenttodemoc-racybut alsowill produce the alienation that feeds the growthofterrorism.Mainstreammovements,heargues,requireengagement,whereaszerotoleranceshouldbereservedforextremists.Stohlalsoremindsushowrepressiveactionanddenialofhumanrightsonthepartofthestatecanprecipitateoutbreaksofterroristviolenceandthat counterterrorist action, taken without regard for democraticprinciplesandtheruleoflaw,canservetogeneratemoreterrorism.

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10 TheRootsofTerrorism

Amongthelonger-termeconomicresponsestoterrorismaremit-igatingtheimpactofglobalizationorrapidsocioeconomicchangeonvulnerablesegmentsofthepopulationindevelopingcountries.Aidandinvestment,therefore,shouldbetargetedtothosemostdirectlyaffected to enable them to influence thenature andpaceofdevel-opment.Thoseattemptingtocounterterrorismshouldbepreparedtohelpfinancesocioeconomicpolicies thatpromote thegrowthofa middle class and women’s literacy and education. A burgeoningmiddleclassandthepoliticalandeconomicparticipationofwomencan serves as breaks on the development of extremism. Govern-ments must be encouraged to reduce gross inequalities and groupdiscrimination and to integrate marginalized groups into politicalandeconomicactivity.Educationalopportunitiesmustbeenhanced,butthismustgohandinhandwitheconomicdevelopmenttoensurethatemploymentopportunitiesareavailableforthosesoeducated.TheWest shouldbeprepared toprovidealternatives to traditionalIslamiceducationthatfailstoprovidethetoolsforparticipationinmodernizingsocieties.Theneedtointegratemarginalizedgroupsisnot,however,limitedtodevelopingcountries.Onthecontrary,thealienationofdiasporacommunitiesinthewealthiestcountriesintheworldremainsarealvulnerabilityandmustbeaddressed.

Finally,thoseofusintheU.S.mustengageinawarofideaswiththeextremistideologies.Weshouldbeabletomobilizelocalmoder-atestooursideinthiscampaign,butwewillonlybeabletodososuccessfullyifourrhetoricathomeismatchedbyouractionontheground. In this effortwe shouldbeprepared to supportmoderateIslamicscholarshipandpoliticalpartiesevenwhentheyarecriticalofouractions.Weneedtoengageinavigorouscampaignofpublicdiplomacytomakeourcasetothepopulationsthatproduceterror-ists.Weareonlylikelytobesuccessfulintheeffortifwecandem-onstratethatourcommitmenttoliberalidealsandtheruleoflawisconsistentlyappliedandthatweholdourselvesandouralliestothesame standards aswehold others. We need to exploit newmediatechnologiestoengageinwhatPostcallsastrategiccommunicationsprogramtoaddresssystematicallytheargumentsagainstusandtocountertheavenuesthroughwhichextremistswinrecruits.

Weshouldnothaveanyillusionsthatsuccesswillcomequickly.Many terrorist groups have ended their campaigns fairly quickly,but these were small isolated movements like the Red Army Fac-tion(RAF),ormovementseffectivelydestroyedbypoliceactionlikeRevolutionaryOrganization17Novemberorbyruthlesssuppressionby the state, as in several Latin American countries. Other move-ments—especiallythosewithclosetiestotheircommunities—have

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TheRootsofTerrorism:AnOverview 11

lastedaverylongtime.Insocietiesinwhich,inPost’swords,“hatredhasbeenbredinthebone”andinwhichsocializationbeginsatanearlyageandisreinforcedandconsolidatedintoanessentialelementofcollective identity,noshort-termsolutionexists.Thegoal,how-ever,isnottoturntheworldintoAmericancheerleaders.TheonlythresholdtheU.S.needstoreachwillcomefrompeoplenotemploy-ingterrorismasameanstovoicetheirfrustrations,theirobjectionstoAmericanpoliciesorAmericaninfluenceontheirsocieties.

Of course, more immediate steps can be and are being taken.Theseentailreducingthefinancial,material,andpoliticalresourcesofterroristorganizationsandinhibitingtheirabilitytomovefreelythroughenhancedborderandcustomscontrols.Severalcontributorsspeaktotheneedtoinvestigatefraudulentcharitiesandtootherwisedisrupttheflowofmoneytoterroristgroups.TothesesuggestionsI add the need to review the foreign policies of governments withglobalinfluencewithaviewofhowtheyadvanceabroaderdefini-tionofthestate’snationalinterest.Westernersshouldbepreparedtoincorporateintotheevaluationofourpolicieshowtheyareperceivedon the ground and whether, in the eyes of the populations whoseconfidencewearetryingtoacquire,ourpoliciesappeartobemoreconsistentwithouridealsthanwiththemotivesattributedtousbytheextremists.

Aconcertedeffortonourparttoredresspoliticalconflictsthathavebeenexploitedbyextremistswillagainunderminetheireffortstowinrecruits.AresolutionoftheIsraeli–PalestiniandisputeorthedisputebetweenIndiaandPakistanoverKashmirwillnotsatisfytheextremists,but itwill reduce thereservoirof resentmentonwhichtheyfeed.Oneofthebigadvantagesoffollowingthesepolicyrec-ommendationsisthattheyhaveamyriadofbenefits.Evenifgener-ousandstrategicallydistributeddevelopmentaidandaresolutionofpoliticalconflictsdidnotundercutterrorism,asIhavearguedtheywould,4theyhavemanyotherquitetangiblebenefitsintheimprove-menttothequalityoflifeofthoseaffected.

ResearchAgendaThisbookisfarfrombeingthelastwordonunderstandingtherootcausesof terrorism.Aseachof thecontributorsmakesclear, thereremainsagreatdealthatwedonotknowandyetweneedtoknowifwecare tounderstandthe terrorist threat.Thisbookprovidesadetailedaccountofthepermissivefactorsfacilitatingtheemergenceof terrorism. The proximate causes of terrorism are more obviousandareregularlystatedpubliclybytheperpetratorsoftheviolence.Weknowmuchlessaboutthewaytheproximateandthepermissive

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1� TheRootsofTerrorism

causesinteractwithoneanother.Weknowtheyinteractthroughtheleadersandtheirfollowers,butwehavealottolearnabouthowthishappens.Inthissense,agreatdealofresearchneedstobedoneontheterroristlifecycle.Inordertodisruptthepathintoterrorismandtodevisepoliciesthatinhibitpotentialrecruitsfromjoining,encourageexperiencedrecruitstoleave,producedissentwithinthegroup,andunderminetheinternalauthorityoftheleaders,weneedtogatheragreatdealmoreinformationabouthowthegroupsoperateinternally.Thereisnosubstituteforprimaryresearchinthisendeavor.

The proliferation of terrorist attacks and growing lethality ofterroristviolenceinclinesotherstoseeterrorismasanideologyandterrorists as auniformmassof evildoers.They cannotusefullybeunderstoodinthisway.Eachterroristgroupmustbeunderstoodinitsowncontext;themostsuccessfulcounterterroriststrategyislikelytobeparticularlygearedtothatgroup.Thatsaid,weneedtohaveakeenerunderstandingofhowgroupsaresimilarandhowtheyarenot.Detailed,structured,focusedcomparisonsbasedonintensiveanaly-sisofarangeofmovementsarelikelytoenhanceourunderstandingbothofindividualgroupsandofthephenomenonmoregenerally.

In this book we demonstrate that terrorism is not caused byreligion, globalization, political structures, or psychopaths.Wedoargue,however,thatpoliticalandeconomicinequalitiesandsocialalienationare risk factors for theemergenceof terrorism.Religioncanexacerbatetheproblem,as itcanbeusedtolegitimizetheuseofviolencetoredressthesepoliticalandsocioeconomicgrievances.Oncegrievancesareexpressedinreligioustermstheconflictbecomesaltogethermoredifficult toresolve.There isa lotwedonotknowabout the underlying causes of terrorism, but everything we doknow points to the importance of developing a long-term coordi-natedstrategythatisconsistentwithourdemocraticprinciplesandinwhichshort-termobjectivesareintegratedwithlong-termgoals.Itisbothunwiseandunnecessarytosacrificeliberaldemocraticvaluestosecureshort-termsecurity.Onthecontrary,thestrongestweap-ons inourarsenalagainst terrorismareprecisely the facetsofoursocietythatappealtothepotentialrecruitsforterrorists.Andthesepotentialrecruits—whocomefromthecommunitiesfromwhichter-roristsderivetheirsupport—shouldbecomethefocusofcounterter-roristpolicies.Ifwecanhelptoredresstherampanteconomicinequi-tiesandsociopoliticalmarginalizationinthesecommunitieswewillreduceboththeopportunitiesandtheincentivesfortheresorttoter-rorism,therebyconstrainingthegrowthandincreasingtheisolationofterroristgroups.Wecanthenfocusourcoercivepoliciesontheseperpetratorsofviolence.Thesedirectedpoliciesarefarmorelikely

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TheRootsofTerrorism:AnOverview 1�

tobesuccessfuliftheyarebasedonathoroughunderstandingofthenatureofthegroupbeingfaced.Aplanofactionthatinvolvesmobi-lizingthemoderateswhileintegratingthemarginalizedandisolatingtheextremistsisentirelyconsistentwiththeprinciplesofdemocracyourgovernmentsweredesignedtodefendinthefirstplace.

Endnotes1. KarlRove(speech,ConservativePartyofNewYorkState,June22,

2005).2. U.S.Code,title22,sec.2656f(d).3. MarthaCrenshaw,“TheCausesofTerrorism”Comparative Poli-

tics,Volume13,No.4,(July1981)pp379-400.4. LouiseRichardson,What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Ter-

rorist Threat,JohnMurray,London,2006.

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IndividualandPsychologicalRoots

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2

ThePsychologicalDynamicsofTerrorism1

JerroldM.Post

Sincethebeginningofthemoderneraofterrorism,representedbytheiconic event of the seizure of the Israeli Olympic village at the 1972MunichOlympicsbyBlackSeptemberterrorists,behavioralscientistshavesoughttheholygrailoftheterrorist personality.Buttheseeffortshaveprovenfruitless,forthelabelterrorismreferstoanextremelycom-plexanddiversephenomenon.Inconsideringthepsychologyofright-wing,nationalist-separatist, social revolutionary,andreligious funda-mentalistterrorists—givenhowdifferenttheircausesandperspectivesare—thesetypesareexpectedtodiffermarkedly.Soweshoulddiscussterrorisms—plural—and terrorist psychologies—plural—rather thansearchingforaunifiedgeneraltheoryexplainingallterroristbehavior.Inotherwords, there isnot aone-size-fits-all explanation:The lead-ershipandfollower,groupandorganizationaldynamics,anddecisionpatternswilldifferfromgrouptogroup.Andalthoughpsychologyplaysacrucialroleinunderstandingterrorism,acomprehensiveunderstand-ingofthiscomplexphenomenonrequiresaninterdisciplinaryapproach,incorporatingknowledgefrompolitical,historical,cultural,economic,ideological,andreligiousscholarship.Itisimportanttoconsidereachterrorisminitsownpolitical,historical,andculturalcontext,sinceter-rorismisaproductofitsownplaceandtime.Itisanattractivestrategytoadiversearrayofgroupsthathavelittleelseincommonotherwise.

Explanationsofterrorismatthelevelofindividualpsychologyareinsufficient in helping to understand why people become involved in

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terrorism.Indeed,itisnotgoingtoofartoassertthatterroristsarepsychologically normal—that is, not clinically psychotic. They arenotdepressedandnotseverelyemotionallydisturbed,noraretheycrazedfanatics.Infact,terroristgroupsandorganizationsregularlyweedoutemotionallyunstableindividuals.Theyrepresent,afterall,asecurityrisk.Indeed,there isamultiplicityof individualmotiva-tions.Forsome,revengeisaprimarymotivation;forothers,itistogiveasenseofpowertothepowerless;forstillothers,itistogainasenseofsignificance.Withineachgroupcanbefoundmotivationaldifferencesamongthemembers,eachofwhomismotivatedtodif-feringdegreesbygroupinterestversusself-servingactions,aswellasbyideology.

Thereisaclearconsensusthatgroup,organizational,andsocialpsychology—and not individual psychology—provide the greatestanalytic power in understanding this complex phenomenon wherecollectiveidentityisparamount.Forsomegroups,especiallynation-alist-separatistterroristgroups,thiscollectiveidentityisestablishedextremelyearlysothathatred is bred in the bone. Theimportanceofcollectiveidentityandtheprocessesofformingandtransformingcollectiveidentitiescannotbeoverstated.This,inturn,emphasizesthesocioculturalcontext,whichdeterminesthebalancebetweencol-lectiveandindividualidentity.Terroristssubordinatetheirindividualidentitytothecollectiveidentitysothatwhatservesthegroup,orga-nization,ornetworkisofprimaryimportance.Someofthethemesfollowingfromthisideaareexploredinthischapter.Inparticular,Ihighlightanumberofkeydynamicsandstructuresthataresignifi-cantinunderstandingthepsychologicalbasesofterrorismandthenoutlineaseriesofpolicyrecommendationsbasedontheseinsights.

SocialandGenerationalDynamicsThefirstimportantareaofconsiderationisthesocialandgenerationaldynamicsofterroristgroups.Thedynamicsofnationalist-separatistterroristgroups,suchasEuzakaditaAskabasuna–BasqueFatherlandandLibertyETAofSpain’sBasqueregionorthePalestiniangroupFatah,differdramaticallyfromthoseofsocial-revolutionaryterror-istgroups,suchastheRedArmyFactioninGermanyorItaly’sRedBrigades.This is illustrated in a generationalmatrix (Figure2.1).2TheXintheupperleft-handcellindicatesthatindividualswhoareatonewithparentsloyaltotheregimedonotbecometerrorists.Thelowerleft-handcellshowsindividualsrebellingagainsttheirparentswhoareloyaltotheregime.OneoftheBaader-Meinhoffterroristsoncesardonicallyremarked,“This is thegenerationofcorruptoldmenwhogaveusAuschwitzandHiroshima.”Onecanmakeacase

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ThePsychologicalDynamicsofTerrorism 1�

that these dynamics apply toOsama bin Laden, who—in strikingoutattheSaudiregime,criticizingthemforacceptingoccupationbytheU.S.militaryof“thelandofthetwocities”—wasstrikingoutatthegenerationofhisfamilythatwasloyaltotheregime.SoalthoughbinLadenisareligiousfundamentalistterrorist,hehasthedynamicsofasocialrevolutionaryaswell.Incontrast,intheupperright-handcellarethenationalist-separatistterrorists,carryingonthemissionoftheirparentswhoaredisloyalto,dissidentto,ordamagedbytheregime.WhetherinthepubsofNorthernIrelandorthecoffeehousesinthePalestinianterritories,theyhaveheardoftheeconomicinjus-ticeorofthelandsstolenfromtheirparentsandgrandparents.Theyareloyaltoparentsdisloyaltotheregime.Forthesegroupsinpar-ticular,hatredhasbeentransmittedgenerationally.

ThethemeofloyaltytoafamilythathasbeendamagedbytheregimeiswellillustratedbyOmarRezaq,anAbuNidalOrganiza-tionterroristtriedinthefederaldistrictcourt inWashingtonD.C.in 1996.3 I had the opportunity of interviewing Rezaq during myserviceasexpertonterroristpsychologyfortheDepartmentofJus-ticeinconnectionwithhistrialforthefederalcrimeofskyjacking.ItwasRezaqwhoplayedacentralroleinseizingtheEgyptAirplanethatwasforceddowninMaltain1985.Heshotfivehostages—twoIsraeliwomenandthreeAmericans—beforeabotchedSWATteam

L

Parents’ Relationship to Regime

Youth’sRelationship to

Parents

isloyalamagedissident

oyal

Loyal

X Nationalist-SeparatistTerrorism

isloyalSocial

RevolutionaryTerrorism

D

DFigure 2.1

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�0 TheRootsofTerrorism

attack by Egyptian forces led to more than fifty casualties. Con-victedofmurderinaMaltacourt,Rezaqwasgivenamnestyandwasreleasedaftersevenyearsofimprisonment.Subsequently,though,hewasarrestedbyU.S.FederalBureauofInvestigationagents.

Rezaq epitomized the life and psychology of the nationalist-separatist terrorist.Onthebasisofsomeeighthoursof interviewsandthereviewofthousandsofpagesofdocuments,acoherentstoryemerged.Thedefendantassuredlydidnotbelievethatwhathewasdoingwaswrong:FromboyhoodonRezaqhadbeensocializedtobeaheroic revolutionaryfighting for thePalestiniannation.Dem-onstrating thegenerational transmissionofhatred,hiscasecanbeconsideredemblematicofmanyfromtheranksofethnic–nationalistterroristgroups,fromNorthernIrelandtoPalestine,fromArmeniatotheBasqueregionofSpain.

Rezaq’smotherwaseightyearsoldandlivinginJaffawhenthe1948 Arab–Israeli War broke out, forcing her family to flee theirhomefortheWestBank.Themother’sdisplacementbyIsraelfromherancestralhomewasaneventofcrucialimportanceandbecameakeyelement in the family legend.Born in1958,Rezaqspenthischildhood in the West Bank village where his grandfather was afarmer.In1967,theyearheturnedeight,theArab–IsraeliSixDayWarbrokeout,andthefamilywasforcedtofleeonceagain—thistime toa refugee camp in Jordan.There, youngRezaqattendedaschoolwherehis teachersweremembersof thePalestinianLibera-tionOrganization(PLO).In1968,thebattleofKaramehoccurred,inwhichYasserArafatledagroupofPalestinianguerrillasinfight-inga twelve-hourbattleagainst superior Israeli forces,galvanizingthe previously dispirited Palestinian population. The spirit of therevolutionwaseverywhere,especiallyintherefugeecamps,andthePLObecamearallyingpoint.InRezaq’swords,“Therevolutionwastheonlyhope.”

Inschool,RezaqwastaughtbyamemberofthePLOwhomhecametoidolize,thattheonlywaytobecomeamanwastojointherevolutionandtoregainthelandstakenawayfromhisparentsandgrandparents.Inthemorning,hewasexposedtoabasicelementaryschoolcurriculum,andstartingatagenine,intheafternoonhewasgivenparamilitarytrainingandideologicalindoctrination.HejoinedFatahwhenhewasseventeenandsubsequentlybecameamemberoftheAbuNidalOrganization.Whenhe carriedout the skyjacking,itwastheproudestmomentofhislife.Hewasfulfillinghisdestiny.Hewascarryingonhisfamily’scause—acausethathadbeenbred in the bone.

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ThePsychologicalDynamicsofTerrorism �1

This,incidentally,isalsotrueformanymilitantIslamists,whosehatredoftenwassteepedfromchildhoodoninthemosques.Con-siderthefollowingstatementfromanincarceratedHamasterrorist:

IcamefromareligiousfamilywhichusedtoobservealltheIslamictraditions.Myinitialpoliticalawarenesscamedur-ingtheprayersatthemosque.That’swhereIwasalsoaskedtojoinreligiousclasses.Inthecontextofthesestudies,theSheikusedtoinjectsomehistoricalbackgroundinwhichhewouldtellushowwewereeffectivelyevictedfromPalestine.TheSheikalsousedtoexplaintousethesignificanceofthefactthattherewasamilitaryoutpost[oftheIsraeliDefenseForces]intheheartofthecamp.Hecomparedittoacancerinthehumanbody,whichwasthreateningitsveryexistence.4

Itcouldbeargued,therefore,that—whethertheyprofesstoberevo-lutionaries, tobereligiouslymotivatedortobenationalist-separat-ists—thegenerationalandsocialdynamicsofpotentialterroristshaveanimportantbearingontheirattitudesandoveralldevelopment.

LeadersandFollowersInadditiontounderstandingthesocialdynamicsofterroristgroups,itisimportanttodistinguishleadersfromfollowers.Theroleoftheleaderiscrucialindrawingtogetheralienated,frustratedindividualsintoacoherentorganization.Theyprovideasense-makingunifyingmessagethatconveysareligious,political,orideologicalgoaltotheirdisparatefollowers.Theleaderplaysacrucialroleinidentifyingtheexternalenemyasthecause,anddrawingtogetherintoacollectiveidentity otherwise dissimilar individuals who maybe discontentedandaggrieved,butwho,withoutthepowerfulpresenceoftheleader,would remain isolated and individually aggrieved. Hoffer, in The True Believer, speaksof the capacityof thehate-mongering leadertomanipulate“theslimeofdiscontentedsouls.”5Thehate-monger-ingleader—orpoliticalentrepreneur—alsoplaysacrucialorganizingrole,asexemplifiedbybinLadenwhohasbecomeapositiveidenti-ficationobject forthousandsofalienatedArabandMuslimyouth.Forthem,heservesastheheroicavengerwiththecouragetostandupagainstthesuperpower.Andinfollowinghislead,theindividualgroupmemberisseenasunselfish,altruistic,andheroictothepointofself-sacrifice.Equallysignificant—thoughlesswellunderstood—istheprocessbywhichfollowersentertheleadershipechelon,becausethisdynamiciscriticaltotheviabilityofthegroup.Systematicstudy

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�� TheRootsofTerrorism

ofautobiographicalaccountsmayhelpidentifythesalientfeaturesofthisdynamic,whichwillbeexpectedtodifferfromgrouptogroup.

Thoughitiseasytounderstandhowareligiousfundamentalistleadercanusehisreligiousauthoritytojustifyextremeactstohisfol-lowers,charismaticleaderscanpersuadetheirtrue-believerfollowerstocarryoutsuchactsinpursuitofasecularcauseaswell.ThishasbeendemonstratedbythewillingnessofmembersoftheKurdishsep-aratistPKK(TheKurdistanWorkers’Party)ortheSriLankanTamilTigers(LTTE)tocommitsuicideterrorismforanationalistcause.Ifanything,theseexamplesrevealthattheswayofadestructivecharis-maticleaderissuchthathisfollowersuncriticallyaccepttheleader’sviewsandfollowhisdirectionswithoutfurtherquestioning.

In this context it is useful to look briefly at the dynamics ofsuicide terrorism, which is a function of a culture of martyrdom,the leader’sdecision toemploy this tactic,andasupplyof recruitswilling togive their lives6 ina“martyrdomoperation” (seeNasraHassan’scontributioninthisbook).Socialpsychologicalforcesareparticularlyimportant,leadingArielMeraritospeakofthe“suicideterroristproductionline”withfirst,thesocialcontractestablished,andthentheidentificationofthe“livingmartyr,”whoaccruesgreatprestigewithinthecommunity,and,thenintheculminatingphase,theproductionofthefinalvideo.7Afterpassingthroughthesethreephases,tobackawayfromthefinalactofmartyrdomwouldbringunbearableshameandhumiliation.Thus,aswithterroristpsychol-ogy ingeneral, suicide terrorism isverymucha functionofgroupandcollectivepsychology,notindividualpsychopathology.Further-more,thecaseofsuicideterrorismillustratesthatthepowerofgroupdynamicscannotbeoveremphasized.AsdemonstratedbySemelandMinnixintheirarticleontheso-calledriskyshift,agroupcanmakeariskierdecisionthananyindividualinthegroupmightmake.Ifthepathtoleadershipinthegroupisthroughextremismandviolence,thisinexorablypushesthegroupinthatdirection.8

TheTerroristLifeCycleTerrorists differ according to their motivation, and their behavioralsomayvaryaccording to the stageof their terrorist career. It isnecessary,therefore,tounpackthelifecourseofterroriststoconsiderthepsychologicalprocessestheyareundergoingatdifferentpointsintheirevolutionasgroupmembers.Whatinitiallyattractsapotentialterroristtotheterroristgroupdiffersfromwhatheorsheexperienceswithinthegroupregardingradicalizationandconsolidationofgroupandcollectiveidentity;this inturndiffersfromwhatleadstheter-roristtocarryoutactsofviolenceand—finally—fromwhatleadsa

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ThePsychologicalDynamicsofTerrorism ��

terroristtobecomedisillusioned,thuspromptinghimorhertoleavethegroup.

Theprocessofbecomingaterroristinvolvesacumulative,incre-mentallysustained,andfocusedcommitmenttothegroup.Forthemajorityofcontemporaryterrorists—whetherreligiousorsecular—thereisanearlyentranceontothepathwayintoterrorismwithmanystationsalongtheway.Also,aswehaveseen,thereisacontinuingreinforcement by manipulative leaders by consolidating the collec-tiveidentityandbyexternalizing,justifying,andrequiringviolenceagainsttheenemy.Thisimpliesthatearlyinterventionisrequired,foronceayouthisembeddedwithinthegrouphisorherextremistpsy-chologyiscontinuallyreinforcedandanydoubtsdiminished.Giventhattheattractionto,andentranceinto,theterroristpathisagradualprocess—whichforsomegroupsbeginsinearlychildhood—chang-ingtheinfluencesonthispathwaynecessarilyoccuroveranextendedtimeframe.Inotherwords,generationalchangeisnecessary,whichwillrequireasustainedeffortoverdecades.

As importantasunderstandingwhat leadsyouth into thepathof terrorism is understandingwhat leads terrorists to leave—espe-ciallytheprocessesthatoccurwithinthegroupororganizationatthis crucial juncture.Again, thesewilldiffer fromgroup togroupandfromterroristtypetoterroristtype.Identifyingthem,however,hasimportantimplicationsforcounterterroristpolicy.Indeed,JohnHorganpointedoutthatbyunderstandinggroupexitwecanidentifyandarticulate specific themes thatmayhelp toweaken theattrac-tionsofthegroup.9

OrganizationandStructureLiketheterroristlifecycle,organizationalstructurehasanimportantimpactonterroristbehavior,particularlyondecisionmakingwithinthe group. For example, groups may adhere to the same underly-ingideologybutmaydifferremarkablyinorganizationalstructure.Thus,Hamas, IslamicJihad,andAl-Qaedaallfind justification intheKoranforkillinginthenameofGod,buttheorganizationalformofbothHamasandIslamicJihadistraditionallymorehierarchicalandauthoritarian,withfollowersinactioncellsdirectedfromhigherorganizationallevelstocarryoutanactionandhavingonlylimitedsayintheconductofoperations.

In contrast, Al-Qaeda has a much looser organizational formwithdistributeddecisionmaking, reflecting the leadership styleofbinLaden.ThedecentralizationofdecisionmakingwasintensifiedaftertheeffectivedestructionofAl-QaedacommandandcontrolinAfghanistanin2001,leadingsometerrorismexpertstoconcludethat

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Al-QaedaasitwasbeforetheU.S.attacksofSeptember11,2001,isnowfunctionallydeadasanoperationalorganization.Whathasbeen termedthenewAl-Qaeda isconsideredbymanytobemorean ideology thananorganization.The successor, the global Salafijihadnetwork,iswidelydistributedandsemi-autonomous,operatingmoreoutofhubsthannodes,withwidelatitudetoplanandexecuteoperations.TheMadridtrainbombingsofMarch11,2004,reflectthisemergingnetwork.10

Furthermore, although most Muslim immigrants and refugeesarenotstateless,manysufferfromanexistentialsenseofloss,depri-vation,andalienationfromthecountrieswheretheylive.Theyareoften exposed to extreme ideologies that radicalize them and canfosterenteringthepathofterrorism.ThedisaporahasbeenidentifiedasparticularlyimportantfortheglobalSalafijihad,withalargeper-centage—upto80percent—ofrecruits joiningandbecomingradi-calizedthere.TheLondontransitsystembombingsofJuly7,2005,canbetracedtothisdiaspora(seeOlivierRoy’sandGabrielSheffer’scontributionsinthisbook).

AreasofDebateTwo specific areas of contemporary debate exist in which a fullunderstanding of terrorist psychology may be of significance. Thefirstconcernsterrorists’potentialuseofweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD),suchasdevicesinvolvingchemical,biological,andnuclearmaterials.There isabroadconsensusamongscholarsof terrorismthat, formost terrorist groups, theuseof suchweaponswouldbecounterproductive.MostterroristgroupsseektoinfluencetheWestandtocallattentiontotheircause;masscasualtyterrorismwouldbecontrarytotheiraims.Itiscrucial,however,todistinguishbetweendiscriminateandindiscriminateterrorism,forsometerroristgroupswouldentertaintheuseofsuchweaponsonatacticalbasisiftheycould guaranteed they would not injure their own constituents.Furthermore,exceptionsintermsofmotivationarefundamentalistIslamist terrorists, especially theSalafi jihadistswhoarenot inter-estedininfluencingtheWestbutwanttoexpelitscorruptmodern-izingvalues,andright-wingterrorists,whooftenseekrevenge.ForexampleincontrasttotheEgyptianIslamicJihad,becausetheSalafijihadistsarenotembeddedinaparticularnationtheyarethereforeparticularlydangerous. Itneeds tobeemphasized, though, that inadditiontomotivationsandpsychology,resourceandexpertisearerequired;italsocanbearguedthattheassistanceofstateswouldbenecessaryforterroristgroupstoproduceeffectiveWMD,especiallyinrelationtonuclearterrorism.Withoutsuchassistance,biological

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terrorismisthemostthreateningWMDterrorisminwhichsubstategroupsmightbecomeengaged.11

Asecondareaofdebateisthepsychologicaleffectsofthenewmedia. Identifying these effects—especially the impactof the24/7cable news environment and the Internet—and grappling with theapproachestocounteringthemisaseriouschallenge.Thenewmedia,particularlytheInternet,playanincreasinglyimportantroleinestab-lishingasenseofcommunityamongotherwisewidelydispersedalien-atedyouth.Thedangerinthisisthatthecommunityisdrivenandunifiedbyanincreasinglyradicalanti-Westernideology.Intermsofcounterterroristpolicy,terroristcommuniqués,ideologicalwritings,hatespeech,andInternetpropagandashouldnotgounansweredbutshouldberespondedtobywell-reasonedcounterargumentation.

PolicyImplicationsHavingoutlinedsomeofthekeystructuresandprocesses,itispossi-bletoderivesomepolicyrecommendationsthatwouldenhancecur-renteffortsinthewaronterrorism.Thisso-calledwarisunlikeotherwars,anditwillrequireconcertedeffortsoverdecades.Justastheterrorists’ collective identity has been shaped gradually over manyyears,theattitudesatthefoundationofterrorismwillnotquicklybealtered.Whenhatredhasbeenbredinthebone—whensocializationto hatred and violence begins early and is reinforced and consoli-datedintoamajorthemeofthecollectiveidentity—therecanbenoshort-termsolution.

ResearchInterventionsdesignedtobreakthiscyclemustbeginearly—thatis,beforethatidentityisconsolidated.Thenatureofthoseinterventionsshould be informed by the systematic study of the lives of terror-ists;bydifferentiatingamongterrorist types ingeneralandgroupsin particular; and by understanding each terrorism in a nuancedmannerwithin itsownparticularcultural,historical,andpoliticalcontext.Giventhedifferentdemographic,pathways,attitudes,andmotivations,thismakesitnecessarytoconductfieldwork,includinginterviewswithcapturedordefectedterrorists.Onecannotcounteragroupthatonedoesnotunderstand

Furthermore, if the goal of terrorism is to terrorize, terror isthe property of the terrorized. Programs that reduce vulnerabilitytoterrorandpromotesocietalresiliencerepresentakeycomponentofantiterrorism.Suchprogramsrequireresearchdesignedtounder-standwhatstepscanimmunizesocietyagainstterrorandcanpro-motesocietalresilience.

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Society and Governance

Asmentionedpreviously,itwillrequiredecadestochangethecultureofhatredandviolence.Inthisstruggle,themoralhighgroundneedstobemaintained,forexamplebystrengtheningtheruleoflawandbyexemplifyinggoodgovernanceandsocialjustice.Todepartfromthesestandardsistolowerourselvestotheleveloftheterroristsandtodamageliberaldemocracy.

Earlyinterventionsarerequiredtoinhibitentranceontothisvio-lent path. Such interventions should involve educational, religious,andsocialorganizationaswellasthemedia,providingopportunitiesforintegrationandcounteringmessageofhatredagainsttheminor-ity.Suchinterventionsshouldbebasedonsocialscienceresearch,asarethesuccessfulprogramsdesignedtocurbyouthgangviolence.

Allthishighlightsthefactthatthestruggleagainstterrorismisbynomeansaresponsibilityforthesecurityservicesalone.Thisisnottosay,however,thatthemilitaryhasnoroletoplayincounter-ingterrorism.Theuseofarmedforcescanbehighlysignificant inrelationtosanctuarydenial:WithouttheexistenceofsanctuarieslikeAfghanistan,thetrainingandplanningrequiredtosupportcomplexoperationsliketheSeptember11attackswillbeextremelydifficult.

Diaspora Communities

Consideringthegrowingnumberofvulnerableindividualsinémigréanddiasporacommunities,interventionsthatrespectculturaldiffer-enceswhilehelpingtointegratetherefugeeswiththerecipientsocietywillbeimportant.Westerngovernmentsshoulddirectlysupportthedevelopmentandimplementationofcommunity-basedinterventionsaimed at promoting community- and individual-level changes thatsupportgreaterincorporationandintegrationofrefugeesanddias-porayouthintothepoliticalcultureofWesternliberaldemocracies.

Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

Given that terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfarewagedthroughthemedia,itcannotbecounteredwithsmartbombsandmissiles:psychologicalwarfaremustbecounteredwithpsycho-logicalwarfare.Eachphaseof the terrorist lifecycle isapotentialfocusofintervention.Inotherwords,counterterroristmeasuresmustbedesignedto:

Inhibitpotentialterroristsfromjoiningthegroup.Onceinsidethegroup,thepowerofgroupdynamicsisimmense,continu-

•

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allyconfirmingthepowerofthegroup’sorganizingideologyandreinforcingthemember’sdedicationtothecause.Producedissensioninthegroup.Facilitate exit from the group. It is important to stimulateandencouragedefectionfromthegroup.Anumberofstateswith significant terrorism problems—Italy, Spain in theBasqueregion,andGreatBritaininNorthernIreland—havecreativelyemployedamnestyprogramstofacilitateterroristsleavingthegroup.Reducesupportforthegroupanditsleader.Ifforeveryter-roristkilledorcaptured, tenmorearewaiting in line, it iscritical tomarginalize thegroupand toderomanticizeanddelegitimatetheleader.InthecaseofradicalIslamistterror-ism,thiscanonlybedonefromwithinIslam,withmoderateArabpoliticalleadersandmoderateMuslimclericstakingontheextremistsintheirmidstwhohavehijackedtheirnationsandtheirreligion.Thegoalistoalienatetheterroristorgani-zationfromitsconstituency,whichplaysacrucialroleinpro-vidingareservoirofnewrecruits.This,inturn,willinhibitpotentialterroristsfromjoiningthegroupororganizationinthefirstplace.12

However, all these measures—however much needed—assume anunderstandingofthesignificanceofpsychologicaldynamicsonthebehaviorofindividualterroristsorterroristgroups.Unfortunately,inmanycases,counterterroristpoliciesdemonstratenosuchawareness,andthefirstchallengethereforeliesinincreasingtheknowledgeandconsciousnessofthesemechanismanddynamicsamongofficialsanddecisionmakers.

Endnotes1. Thisessayisbasedonachaptertitled“TheMindoftheTerrorist,”

inPost, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2004)[Chapter6,pg.123-161].ItalsodrawsonthefinalpaperofrecommendationsreleasedbythePsychol-ogyWorkingGroup,InternationalSummitonDemocracy,TerrorismandSecurity,Madrid,March2005,http://www.clubmadrid.org.

2. SeePost,“NotesonaPsychodynamicTheoryofTerrorism,”Terror-ism3(1984)[pg.241-256].

3. ThissummaryisdrawnfromPost,“MindoftheTerrorist.”4. Post,EhudSprinzak,andLauritaM.Denny,“Terrorists inTheir

OwnWords:Interviewswith35IncarceratedMiddleEasternTer-rorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003) [pg.177].

••

•

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5. SeeEricHoffer,TheTrueBeliever:Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements(NewYork:Harper,1951).

6. Hafez,MuhammedManufacturingHumanBombs,USInstituteofPeace(inpress).

7. ArielMerari,personalcommunicationwithauthor,Fall2003.8. DeanA.MinixandAndrewSemmel,“GroupDynamicsandRisk-

Taking: An Experimental Examination,” Experimental Study of Politics6,no.3(1978)[pg.1-36].

9. JohnHorgan,“Disengaging,”inThe Psychology of Terrorism,ed.Horgan(NewYork:Routledge,2005)[pg.140-168].

10. For the idea of netwar, see John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, andMicheleZanini,“Networks,Netwar,andInformation-AgeTerror-ism,”inCountering the New Terrorism,ed.IanO.Lesserandoth-ers(Washington,DC:RAND,1999)[pg.45-56].

11. SeePost,“PsychologicalandMotivationalFactorsinTerroristDeci-sion-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed.JonathanB.Tucker(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2000)[pg.11-12].

12.Foranextendeddiscussionoftheroleofpsychologicaloperationsincounteringterrorism,seePost,J.“PsychologicalOperationsandCounter-terrorism,”Joint Force Quarterly,Spring2005.

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3SuicideTerrorism

NasraHassan

“Preparingandcarryingoutasuicideoperationisneitherdifficultnorexpensive,”IhearrepeatedlyduringmyresearchonIslamistmilitancy.“However, therecipemustnotbeusedcarelessly,butonly formaxi-mumimpact,orwhenotheravenuesarenotavailable.”Asuicidebomb-ingisneveraspontaneousactbyanindividual;instead,itistheresultofplanningandexecutionbyasponsoringgroup. Ithasbecometer-rorists’preferredmethod,becauseadeterminedsuicidebomberhasabetterchancethanotheroperativesofreachingthetarget,andthepsy-chologicaltraumainflictedbyasuicideoperationincreasestheimpactandraisestheprofileofitssponsorsinadditiontocausingdeathandinjury.

Myinterestinhumanbombsstartedinthe1990s,whenIworkedand lived in theMiddleEast.As aMuslimwoman fromPakistan, Icould not comprehend how and why people blow themselves up inthenameofahighercause,whetheritbeIslamorthehomeland.Myresearch,whichcontinues,hasyieldedadatabankofover300profilesofPalestinian,otherArab,Pakistani,Afghan,Kashmiri,andBangla-deshi suicide bombers and their sponsors. The profiles are based ondetailed information from families, friends, sponsoring groups, mili-tants,jihadis,andsecurityofficials,aswellasfromdocumentsgiventome.Insomecases,however,theinformationissketchy.1

Veryusefulmaterialhasemergedfrominterviews—conductedovermanyyears—withleaders,planners,andtrainersofgroupsthatspon-sor suicide operations. In my research I also document the adoptionandadaptationofsuicidetacticsandevolution inthetypesofgroups

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andindividualsinvolved.Inthischapter,IfocusonPakistanisuicidesquads because relatively little is known about them. Most suicideoperationsintheIslamicworlddifferonlyslightlyfromablueprintwhichcontainsasetofessentialsthatisthenadaptedtotherespec-tivelocalcircumstances.First,Ioutlinethisblueprint,thenprovideanoverviewofmyfindingsinthecaseofPakistan,andfinallycom-parethePakistanicasetosuicideoperationssponsoredbyPalestiniangroups.

TheBlueprintThetiminganddecisiontoincludesuicidebombings inthearsenalofresistanceoperationsusuallyresult fromaconsideredagreementat thehighest levelsofamilitantgroup. It isoften initiatedby theimpassionedpleaof supporterswhopoint to its success elsewhere.AfterthestartofthefirstPalestinianIntifada(uprising)inDecember1987,forexample,ittooksixyearsandalonginternaldebatebeforethestrategywasadopted,followingagreatdealofdiscussionamongtheleadershipsintheGazaStrip,theWestBank,andthePalestiniandiaspora.Ontheotherhand,ajihadileadertoldmethatthedecisiontolaunchsuicideoperationsinAfghanistanandPakistanwastakenatasinglemeetinginKarachiinNovember2001,sixweeksafterthestartofthepost-September11,2001,bombingofAfghanistan.

Religion-basedsponsoringgroupssaythattheintentionincar-ryingoutasuicideoperationisimportant:TheactmustbeforAllahalone—neverforpersonalgain.Whereasnationalistgroupsrefertofreedomandfightingoccupation,manyPalestinianandIraqinational-istsusedIslamicterminologyintheirlastwillandtestament.Hamas,PalestinianIslamicJihad,andAl-QaedaaffiliatesintheMiddleEasthavebegunto inserthomelandreasons in theirs.Suicide jihadis inPakistan and, increasingly, in Iraq set their reasoning in sectariantermsandinthewidercontextoftheMuslimummah(nation).

Irrespectiveoftheuseofreligiousrhetoric,whichgenerallyshouldnotbedismissed,suicideattacksareconsideredmilitaryoperationsbytheirsponsors.Assuch,theyaredrivenbymilitary-typeconsider-ations,asareoperationsbyothernonstateandsubstateactorssuchas insurgents,guerrillas,and rebels.Factors enabling theadoptionof,andsupportfor,suicideoperationsarecausesandgrievancesthatdeeplyandemotionallyaffecttheworldofIslamandMuslims—eventhe secularones.Such issuesaregenerallyclearcutbetweenMus-limandnon-Muslimandhaveanundeniableresonanceandconsen-sus,regardlessofreligiosity,nationalistfervor,upbringing,orsocialbackground.Theresonanceensuresnotonlyareadysupplyofsui-

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SuicideTerrorism �1

cideoperatorsbutalsovocalorsilentsupportfromcommunitiesthatmayotherwiseopposeattackswhosevictimsaremainlyMuslim.

Acharismaticfigureisakeyingredientininspiringmartyrdom(seeJerroldPost’scontributioninthisbook),whereastelevisionandtheInternetbringdistantcausesintorealtimeandimmediacy.Fat-was(religiousedicts)givelegitimacy,butthe“okaytodo”edictsaretakenmoreseriouslythanthe“don’tdo”ones,especiallysincetheformeroutrankandoutnumberthelatter,appeartohaveweightierreligioussanctionandfindgreaterresonance.Theedictsthatprohibitaretoocautiouslywordedtohavethesameimpactandoftencontaintoomanyexclusionaryclausestohavemucheffect.ThefatwaissuedinMay2005byfifty-eightPakistaniclerics frommajorschoolsofIslamicthoughtbannedsuicidebombingsinPakistanandKashmirandinplacesofworshipandwherethevictimsarelikelytobeMus-lims;IraqandPalestinewereexcludedfromtheban.Acounter-fatwabyfortyreligiouspartiespermittedsuicideattacksinPalestine,Kash-mir,IraqandAfghanistan,butnotinPakistan.

Sponsoringgroupsarehelpedbyneuralpathways,whichconnectnetworksoffamilies,clans,tribes,andfriends.Themoreextremistmilitantsare, themore likely theyare tomarry intoa family thatsharestheirviews;insomecases,marriageintoanextremistfamilyincreasestheirmilitancy.Forexample,thesisterofamajormilitantintheBalochistanprovinceofPakistanismarriedtoRamziYusuf,who is servinga life sentence in theUnitedStates forplotting the1993 Twin Towers bombing in New York City. The sympathizersofsuicideterrorism,ontheotherhand,areamixofpiousMuslims,supportersofjihad,fanatics,militants,andsectarianhaters.DefenseofIslamandofMuslims—asdefinedbythem—isthepoliticalideol-ogyandjustificationforsuicideandrelatedterrorismbythegroups,operators,andsupporters.Clandestine support fromofficial struc-turesisoftenavailable,eitherasanofficiallysanctionedbutdeniablerogueoperationorassilentpolicy.

Thetargetsare,firstandforemost,enemystructuresandauthori-ties: their own, if consideredun-Islamicor tyrannical; or externalones such as occupation troops, external or internal allies of theenemy(thelatterrepresentedbythearmy,police,orcivilianofficials),andsectarianorideologicalenemies.“Itisnotourintentiontokillinnocentcivilians,butweareinastateofwar,”thejihadishavetoldme.“AndthemajorityofcivilianskilledbytheenemyareMuslims.”Listsaredrawnupofoptimaltargets,locations,andtiming.Thego-aheadisbasedonopportunityandfeasibility,andthefundsrequiredareminimal.

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Theobjectivesaremany.Inadditiontowreakingloss,destruc-tion,andhavoc,suicideoperationscarryactualandsymbolicmes-sagesfordifferentaudiences:theworldatlarge,enemygovernmentsand peoples, the Islamic world, and their own comrades. Otherthan revenge and retaliation—measured by the actual devastationcaused—suicide attacks contain an explicit or implicit warning topotential targets.Theyareashowofdefianceandstrengthonthejihadibattlefield.“Sometimeswesendasuicidebomberevenifwecouldusea timeror remotedetonator,”aPalestinianplanner toldmeintheGazaStrip.“Thehumanelementcreatesmuchmorepanicamongthepeople,whichisanimportantmilitarygoalinitself.”

Importantly, the sponsors gauge the fallout, especially amongthosewhosupporttheircauseorareneutralontheissue.“Wevaluelife,whichiswhywearewillingtofacedeath.SinceParadiseawaitsthe martyr, exchanging a temporary life for an immortal one isa good bargain,” I have been told. The reaction of Muslims is animportant consideration in the decision-making process, as is theinevitable reprisal.“Ouroperation isabalm for theachingheartsofourummah andbrings themsome relief,” Ihaveheard.UnlikethepublicmanifestationofjoyattheattacksontheU.S.onSeptem-ber11,2001,thereactiontotheJuly7,2005,bombingsinLondonwasdeliberatelymuted.“Wewereexpectingsomethingtohappen,sowhenitdid,wedidnotclapanddance,especiallyfortelevision,aswedidinSeptember2001.Butwefeltagreatsatisfaction,sincefarmoreoppressionhasbeenvisitedontheummaheverywhereafter9/11thandeathscausedbyMuslims,”aPakistanijihadileadertoldmeinsummer2005.

SuicideOperationsinPakistanAlthough Pakistanis are relative newcomers to suicide terrorisminvolvingexplosives,theyhavequicklybecomeadeptatit.TerrorisminPakistanispolygonal,witheachsideofa loosestructurefittingintoatemplatebelongingtoanotherset-up,whetherreligiousextrem-ist,sectarian,nationalist,criminal,ormercenary.Thesuicidesquadsdisplay a wide range of ideologies and motivations. They mutaterapidly,hideinsideothergroups,disappear,dissolve,andreappear.Sometimesmembersofdifferentgroupscarryoutanoperationunderanamenotbelongingtoanestablishedentity.Indeed,itisdifficulttotrackdownaghostgroup,astheexperienceofLebanoninthe1980sdemonstrates.Their targetsaremultiple,andtheirwingsandcellsareledbyaninordinatelylargenumberofyoung,educated,middle-classprofessionalswhohavelittlereasontobealienatedorenragedtotheextentofadoptingsuicideterrorismasaprofession.

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SuicideTerrorism ��

TheoriginsofPakistan’ssuicideterrorismlieinasectarianjihad:against fellow Muslims, the Shias. It has been waged by LashkareJhangvi(LeJ),amilitantSunniorganizationthathasattractedtoitsranksthemostextremeelementsfromotherjihadigroups.PriortoSeptember11,2001,LeJusedtheelasticityandosmosisaffordedby cross-membership in groups associated with Al-Qaeda and theTalibantofindanearlyfootholdinAfghanistan.Sincethen,ithasreinvented itself as the purveyor of suicide terrorism in Pakistan.DespiteLeJ’ssuigenerischaracter, itshybridaspectsandmutationofferausefulcomparisonwithterroristgroupingsandtheirmodusoperandielsewhereintheIslamicworld—inparticularinIraq—andtoIslamistmilitantsintheWest.

Inlate1999,jihadigroupsintroducedsuicideattacksinKashmir,withyoungmendetonatingthemselvesagainstenemytargets.Afterthe post 9/11 bombing of Afghanistan and the fall of the Talibanregime,thismodusoperandibegantofindfavorinanenvironmentofhumiliationand resulting rage, encouraged in sermonsbyArabmilitants fleeing from Afghanistan, in endorsement by Pakistaniclerics,andinimmediateacceptancebyhardenedjihadicadreswhowerefamiliarwithtraditionalmartyrdomoperationsinwhichsur-vivalwasaprioriruledout.Asofend-December2005,139Muslimhumanbombershadblownthemselvesupin115suicideoperationsinPakistan,Kashmir,India,Afghanistan,andBangladesh.

ThemethodologyofLashkareJhangvianditsassociatedcadresunderwentanevolution,becomingmoresophisticated.Startingwithan individualhumanbombcarryingexplosives, the suicide squadsgraduated to theuseofexplosives-ladenvehiclesand then tocom-plex attacks in which they use, in sequence: (1) hand grenades tocreatepanicandtokill;(2)gunfiretoblockescapeandtokill;(3)timebombs tocreateadditionalvictimsamong thosewhorush tothesceneforrescuework;and,finally,(4)theself-detonationofthetwo-orthree-memberteam.Sometimesthesequenceinthedetona-tionoftimebombsandhumanbombsisreversed.Theplasticexplo-sivesusedarepowerful enough to splitopenacupola roofand toflingbodypartstwentymetersintotheair.Despiteofficialattemptstoascribe foreignorigins to them, thevastmajorityof the suicidebomberswerelocals.Halfthesuicideattackshavebeeninornearaplaceofworship,andcreatingfearandterrorisasmuchpartoftheoperationasisdeathanddestruction.Iftheprimarytargetisinac-cessible,aproxytargetisselected—forexample,Christianvictimsinchurchesandschools,ifWesternofficialsaretoowellprotected.

Pakistan’s sprawling jihadi networks are based on national,regional, and international contacts, cooperation, and operations.

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Thegroupsworkcloselywitheachother.Cooperationtakesmanyforms, froma loanor barter ofmilitants, expertise, supplies, andfundstoanallianceorfriendlyexchangeofcausesandtargets.Mem-bersfromdifferentgroupscometogetherforasuicideoperationorcrossover fromadefunctgroup intoanactiveone.This constantmovementmakesitdifficultfortheauthoritiestotracetherealspon-sors.Lashkar’sranksareswollenwithmilitantswhoareovertlyaffil-iatedwithotherjihadigroupssuchasJaisheMohammadbutwhosecretly retainmembership inLeJ.Manystartoutasnonmilitantswho,afterbeingbrutalized inprison, joinLeJ followingescapeorrelease.Tosurvive,theybecomeundergroundkillers,asnormallifeandafairjudicialprocessareadistantdream.Itisalmostimpossibletoseparatejunior-leveljihadiextremistsfromdifferentgroups;theyonlyassumeadistinctidentitywhentheyreachseniorpositions.

The linkamongmilitancy,madrassas, and jihad is the subjectofmuchattention.Myresearchshowsthatmadrassasandmosqueschoolsarenotthemajorproducerandvectorofsuicidejihadis.SincetheemphasisofthecurriculaisonIslam,jihadandmartyrdomarenaturallyfavoredsubjects,andsomestudentsgoontoadoptjihadasavocation,part-orfull-timeprofession,ormission.Asuctionsystemattracts futureoperatorsnotonly fromthe large reservoirof sym-pathizersfoundalloverthecountrybutalsofromsecularstateandprivate schools; universities;professional institutions; thebusiness,trade,andbazaarsectors;aswellasfromgovernmentranks,includ-ingthearmedforces.PriortoSeptember11,2001,campsinsidePaki-stanprovidedtrainingmainlyforactioninKashmir.Afghanjihadisand their Pakistani,Arab, andCentralAsian comrades essentiallylearnedon the job inAfghanistanor receivedrudimentary lessonsintherefugeecampsinPakistan.Noviceswereassignedtoveterangroupsandeitherlearnedquicklyorwerekilled.Manywereautodi-dacts.Training campsand the jihad inAfghanistanbroughtPaki-stanimilitantsintoanetwork,whichhasgrowntighterastraditionalsafehavenshavedisappeared.

The jihadis I have interviewed in Pakistan since 1998 told meabouttheirmostpotentweapon:thesquadsofmartyrcommandos,whoreceivedmartyrdomtraininginspecialcamps.Theywereeigh-teen to thirty years old; most were middle or lower middle class,althoughsomewerethesonsofrichmenandevengovernmentoffi-cials. About half were married. The majority were students whoenrolledforjihadtrainingandfoughtduringvacations;theresthadjobs,someinlower-governmentechelons.

R.wasa typical jihadimilitant Imet inan industrial town inthe Punjab. He graduated from a training camp with distinction.

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Withskillshonedonthebattlefield,hebecameapart-timerecruiter,fundraiserandtrainer—inbetweentakingturnswithhisbrothersinrunningthelargefamilybusiness.Hedescribedtomethetraining,whichwasbasedonapercolationsystem.Thetwenty-one-daybasictrainingclasscontainedabouttwentyyouths;theboysweretaughttocleanandtoassemblelightweaponsandreceivedlessonsonIslam,jihad, and Paradise. Three-quarters of the spiritual training tookplaceinthisinitialperiod.Abouteightboysmadeitintothethree-monthtrainingandfiveintothenine-monthtraining,andmaybetwograduatedfromthetwo-yeartrainingcourse.“Thosewhograduatedaftertwoyearswereexplosivesexpertsandwerethemostvaluable.Althoughitisawasteofinvestment,thebestofthebestgoforsuicideattacks,becauseithasbecomeexceedinglydifficulttopulloffanyotherkindofmajoroperation,exceptafinalmission.Onlythebesthavetheironresolvetocompleteit,”R.toldme.

Thetrainingcoveredweaponry,includingsmallmissiles;under-waterskills;motorbikestuntssuchasfiringwithbothhandswhiledriving; trappingandattacking larger,better-armedmilitaryunits;and practicing ambushing and hijacking with elaborate mock-ups.Andstudentsweretrainedtomartyrthemselvesortobemartyredwhile inflicting maximum loss. Like their Muslim counterpartselsewhere,thetrainees,allofwhomhadcodenames,maderegularablutions to be in a constant state of purity for sudden entry intoParadise.

K.,agraduatefromanEnglishlanguageschoolinLahorewitha Western curriculum and who became a writer and journalist,describedformeatypicaldayathiscamp.“Wewokeuptwohoursbeforesunriseforprayersandspiritualexercises.Weprayedfivetimesaday.Twiceadayweheardlecturesonjihadbymullahcommandos,whodrew lessons from theQuranand the sayingsof theProphetMuhammadandtoldusofthefortygradesofmartyrdom.Duringthetwodailybreaks,welistenedtotapesofjihadchantsandsermons.”Thoseinthemartyrsquadspreparedalastwillandtestamentusingspecialtexts.Occasionally,famousjihadveteransvisitedfromacrossthebordertotrain,toinspire,andtoselectcommandos.

Thenumberofmartyrdomtraineesnormallydidnotexceed50atanygivenpoint,with100anexceptionalpeak.Thenumberswerereplenishedastheneedarose,withneedoftenbeingrelatedtogov-ernment liquidation.“Thisdoesnotmeanthat therewillbe50or100suicideoperations,”Iwastold.“Maybeupto5inayear,basedonanassessmentofrequirementandfeasibility.Itmeansthatatanygiven time50or100are ready todie.”While theyarewaiting tobesummoned,themartyr-commandosareorderedtolivenormally

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andtodonothingtoattractattention.Theyareadvisedtotakeofftheirbeards;toswitchfromtraditionalclothingtopantsandshirts;tomaintainaneat,everydayappearance;toavoidtheirusualhang-outs;andtocarrydocuments—realonesissuedtofakenames—atalltimes.Theyareforbiddeneventorunaredlightandaretoldtopaytheirbillsontimeandtodonothingoutoftheordinary.

However, in my research I also encountered cases of suicidebomberswhohadonlyaweekbetweentheirrecruitment,training,anddetonation.WhenLashkareJhangvi’soperationalstructurewasstill centralized,before thearrestand liquidationof its leaders, itscellsweresmall—betweenthreeandfivememberseach.Later,havinghadtoassumegreaterdecentralizedresponsibility,thecellsbecamelargerandall-purpose.Theynowdisbandaftereachoperationandregroupforthenextone.Traditionally,thekeycomponentsofacellare(1)the leader,(2)thesuicidebomberandsuicidegunman,and(3)thelinkmaninchargeoflogistics,communications,andarrange-ments.Withdecentralizednetworksandcells,linkmenarethemostcriticalfieldoperativesandarethebridgebetweensponsorsandthecellleaders.Theytransmitinstructionsandfunds,organizetherawmaterials,arrangefortheexplosives,adviseamongoptions,andcon-veythego-ahead.Seasonedlinkmenareconsideredajihadigroup’smostimportantresource,astheyusuallyinitiatetheestablishmentofmultiplecellsunconnectedtoeachotherforsimultaneous,consecu-tive,ordelayeduse.Theyarenotinthemostseniorechelonsofthegroupandoftenplayasimilarroleinmorethanonejihadioutfit.

Atpresent,mostcellsneedtobecapableofprovidingone-stopservices.Theyarestandalonestructuresintermsofon-the-groundplanning,reconnaissance,andexecutionofasuicideattack.InviewofthePakistanigovernment’scounterterrorismefforts,thecellsareencouragedtoself-finance,whichtheyincreasinglydothrougharmedrobbery and kidnappings. The commands, which emanate from ahigherleveloftheorganization,relaythetiming,target,andlocationofasuicideoperation.Thesearebasedonasetoffactors,suchastheimmediatereasonforasuicideoperation,locationofthenearestbomber,easeofaccesstothetarget,andwhetherthesponsorscanaffordyetanotherseverecrackdownbytheauthorities.LeJrecruitshitmenandoperativeswithcare,lookingforstrongconvictionandsteady nerves. In the beginning, a novice is paired with a veterananddrivesthemotorbikewhiletheassassintakesoutthetarget.AnLeJtraineecode-named“Ghaddafi”losthisnerveandwascapturedbythepolice.Onhiswaytoliquidation,heaskedwhyhewasbeingremovedfromhiscellatmidnight.“WeareputtingyouonthefasttraintoParadise,”hewastold,echoinganextremistslogan:Killa

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shia,andgotoParadise.Asawarning,hisbodywasdumpedinthemilitants’beltinthesouthernPunjab.

Theselectionofthesuicideteamandtheavailabilityofsuicidebombersdonotposea seriousproblem.Since supply continues toexceeddemand,thecellleaderconsidersonlymenwhoarereadytogo.Dependingonthespecificsoftheplannedoperation,thewingorcellleadersiftsoutvolunteersconsideredunsuitableornotyetpre-pared,refusestoaccepthighlytrainedcadreswhoseexpertise—forexample, in explosives—is indispensable for the group, places thenamesofsuitableandreadycandidatesinabox,andpullsoutfiveorsixnames.Twoarethesuicidebombers,oneisagunmanwhowillalsodie,andtwoareback-ups.Onceasuicideteamisready,itiscon-siderednecessarytodispatchthemsoonerratherthanlater.“Youngsuicidebombersdon’thavealongshelflife,andthecellleaderalsoblowshimselfup ina futureoperation, sincehiscapture isonlyaquestionoftime,”anLeJmilitanttoldme.

Theleadership iscarefulnottoselectmanyattackersfromthesamecommunity,sincetoomanylossesandtootoughacrackdownbytheauthoritieswouldprovoketoofuriousabacklashagainstthejihadigroup.“Ameasuredsuicideoperationandaresponsewithinexpectedparametersfillsourranks,”anexperiencedjihaditoldme.“This is not child’s play. We must consider our tactics within thegroup’slong-termstrategy.Weknowtheleveloflosseswecanafford,buttoomuchwouldbecounterproductiveinthelongerterm.”

Whentwosuicideoperationsarescheduledtotakeplaceinthesame town, thecell leadersbring inbombers fromdifferentareas,preferablydistantones.Thesuicidecandidatesaregenerallynotfugi-tives,thoughsomemayhavebeendetainedinanarrestcampaignorinconnectionwithpettycrime.ItispreferredthattheynotbewantedbytheauthoritiesorknownLeJmilitantswithapriceontheirheads.Incontrast,cellandwingleaders—byvirtueofyearsspentinopera-tions—areonofficialwantedlistsandcarrylargebountiesforinfor-mation leading to their capture. Cell operations have acquired anassembly-linecharacter,differentfromthetheatricalproductionsofearliertimeswhenmilitantswatchedHollywoodfilmsforideasonstuntsandscenarios.Initsheyday,LashkareJhangvi’scommanderinchief,RiazBasra,rananelaboratesystemofareachiefs,whowereresponsible forrecruitment;coordination; identificationandrecon-naissanceoftargets;logistics;executionofoperations;intimidationofofficials,judges,lawyers,andwitnesses,forwhichtherewasaspe-cialsection;infiltrationintolower-governmentechelons;andamediaandinformationwing.Financingcamefromdonationsbasedoncon-victionorcoercionandfromcharityandalmsmandatedbyIslam.

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Thefamiliesofmartyredmilitantsreceivedamonthlystipend.Thehighestamountwassetasidetopurchaseweapons,explosives,andunlistedtelephonenumbersofofficialswhoweretargetedforassas-sinationorintimidation.Thereisnoorganizedcommunalpostmar-tyrdomindustrytoglorifysuicidebombers:Theyarecommemoratedwithin theorganizationbutnot in thecommunityat large.When,where,andhowasuicideoperationcanbemounteddetermineitsexecution.However,wheretheexacttimingisnotdependentontheagenda and movement of the target, LeJ prefers to time a suicideoperationtocatchtheeveningnewsandthepressdeadline.Amili-tantoftendictatesdetailstoanewspaperreporteronthephone;iftheeventgoesunpublished,athreateningcallismadetofindoutwhytheitemwasnotreleased.

Fourfactorscomplicatethetaskof isolatingtheDNAofPaki-stanisuicideoperatives—thatis,specialcharacteristicsthatmightsetthemapartfromthousandsofotherjihadisandmilitants:

Individually,theirrootsinPakistan’sprovincial,ethnic,sectar-ian,class,andculturaldivides—thatis,theirveryordinari-nessandsimilaritytomillionsofPakistanimales.

Organizationally, their sequentialor simultaneousmembershipinmultiplegroupsandtheirdeliberateinterchangeability.

Ideologically,theirmutationfromsectarianzealotstocross-bor-derjihadis.

The dynamics of shifting motivations and motives for suicideoperations.

The following typology of Pakistani suicide bombers and vol-unteersdeveloped frommy research shows that, similar to suicidebomberselsewhere,thereisnosingleprofileormindoftheterroristandthattheircharacteristicsmatchthoseofthegeneralpopulation.

1. Age:Themajorityofthesuicidebomberswerebetweeneigh-teenandthirty;thevolunteerswereallintheirmid-andlatethirties.

2. Education:Lessthanhalfhadattendedmadrassasormosqueschools, especially if no other schooling was available; therestwenttogovernmentschools,andhalfhadhigherschool-ing,includinguniversity.

3. Socioeconomicsituation:50percentweremiddleor lower-middleclass,30percentwereupperclassorrich,and20per-centwerepoor.

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4. Maritalstatus:Themajorityofsuicidebombersweresingle;ofthevolunteers,abouthalfweremarried.

5. Familyandcommunity:Normalinthelocalcontext. 6. Familymilitancy:About one-third belonged to jihad-affili-

atedfamilies. 7. Personality:Almostallweredescribedascourageous,reso-

lute,andseriouswithnoevidenceofbrainwashing,coercion,orpsychologicalproblems.

8. Religiouspractice:Aboutone-thirdweredescribed as veryreligious;therestobservedobligatorypracticesonly.

9. Intention:Onlyforahighercause,neverforpersonalgain.10. Paradiseasmotivation:Lessthan20percentcitedthis.11. Importanceofmartyrdom:Allreferredtothis.12. Mosque affiliation: The majority did not pray regularly in a

mosque.13. Charismaticinfluence:Well-knownclericleaders,especially

thosewhohadengagedinjihad(disseminationviaspeeches,sermons,andcassettes),imams,jihadiheroes.

14. Hero:OsamabinLadencitedbyall.15. Enablingfactors:Causesandgrievancesthatdeeplyandemo-

tionallyaffectedthebombersandtheircommunities,orwerepresentedassuchbythesponsors.

16. Resonatingfactorsindecisiontovolunteerforsuicideopera-tion:DefenseofIslam,retaliationforbetrayalofAl-QaedaandTaliban, revengeonauthorities forbowing toexternalpressure, sectarian issues, ratcheted-upneedanddesire forretaliation.The resonancenotonly ensures a ready supplyof suicidebomber recruitsbut also swells the ranksof thesponsoringgroupandcreatessupportinthecommunity.

17. No special resonance: For example, Palestine, Jerusalem,Iraq,andChechnyanotcited.

18. Training:ThemajorityofthesuicidebombershadreceivedtraininginspecialcampsorhadfoughtineitherAfghanistanor Kashmir or both; almost all the volunteers were repeatjihadis;thatis,theyhadreturnedtomilitancyafteraperiodofdormancy.

19. Work:Themajorityweregainfullyemployedorhadasourceofincome,exceptthosewhowerestudentsorunderground.

PakistaniSuicideBombersinComparisonAlthoughtwosetsofprofilesIhavedeveloped—ofPalestinianandPakistanisuicidebombersandtheirsponsoringgroups—areunequalin numbers, some characteristics of the Pakistani suicide bombers

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matchtheircounterpartsfromHamasandPalestinianIslamicJihad,andother traitsmatch those of suicide bombers from the alAqsaMartyrsBrigadeandthePopularFrontfortheLiberationofPalestine(PFLP).

GeneralsimilaritiesintheenvironmentthathaveanimpactontheindividualincludetheIslamicreligionandculture;apremiumonmartyrdom;deliberateretentionandcultivationofmemory,passeddownandresurrectedineachnewgenerationofrecruits;breakdowninlawandorder;acharismaticfigureintheimmediateenvironmentofthe individual;ahistoryof jihadorresistanceorboth;presenceof sponsoring groups and ready-made networks that encourage,enable, and ennoble suicide operations; ease of joining the groupsattheperipheryandtravelingthejihadipathtowardaprogressivelyfinaldestination;atightandstronggroupculture,rituals,language,andlifestyle;aneuralgicpointwhensuicideterrorismisintroducedand is enthusiastically accepted andadopted; and easy availabilityofvolunteers,with supplyexceedingdemand.Poverty,dislocation,andpsychopathologywerenotfoundtobecausalfactorsincreatingsuicideterrorists.

At the individual level, the similarity relates to there being nosetpsychological,social,ormilitanttype,perse.Inbothsets,thereis strong anecdotal evidence of potent feelings of humiliation andrage,ofastrongdesiretodosomethingabouttheactualorperceivedgrievancesoftheirgrouporummah,ofmembershipinagroup,andoflackofconfidenceinauthoritiesandthejudicialsystem.Theindi-vidualsineachsetweredescribedasserious,quiet,determined,com-mitted,generous,helpful,andkind.Althoughnotexplicitlyvoiced,evidence exists of a desire to overcome the passive victim role byassumingaproactiveone:Wewilldieanyway,sowhynotgoinanoblemanneratatimeofourchoosing?Thereisaclearunderstand-ing of the finality and consequences of the contemplated act; onePakistanimilitantinterviewedstatedthathewishedtoexplodeonlyagainstareallyimportanttarget.

Therearealsogeneraldifferences in theenvironment. InPaki-stan,thereisnoclearconflationofreligionandnationalisminsuicideterrorism—forexample,adoublesuicidebombingtargetedPresidentPervezMusharraf inDecember2003 forhispro-U.S.andanti-Al-Qaeda and Taliban stand; no foreign occupation or troops; easyaccess toexplosivesandexpertiseandfreedomtomove,hide,andmeltaway;and,sofar,nopurelynationalistinsurgentgroupinvolvedinsuicidebombings.

AnumberofongoingarmedinsurgenciesandconflictsmuddythepictureversusaclearPalestinian–Israeliissue.InPakistan,fewrobust

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SuicideTerrorism �1

andsustainedvoicesareraisedontheunlawfulnessofsuicideattacks.SomewhoopposetheseinsidePakistanfavortheminKashmir,Iraq,andinthePalestinianterritories—wherevernon-Muslimauthoritiesarepresentinsuperiorstrength.Despitetheharrowing1947partitionofBritishIndia intotwoindependentstates—IndiaandPakistan—and the resulting forced or voluntary movement of persons acrossborders,thereisnosystematicinheritedcommunalcultivationofthenationalmemoryoflostrightsandhomes,exceptinthecaseofKash-mir.Amajorreasonforthisisthat,unlikethecaseofthePalestinians,therewerenocontinuinggenerationsofofficiallyrecognizedrefugeesafterthedisplacedacquiredanacceptedhomeland.

Attheindividuallevel,thePakistanisuicideoperatorswereolderandlessarticulate,displayedalessdefinedpurposeandalesscoher-ent worldview; used less political and more religious and sectar-ian arguments, had a less developed and less enunciated languageofParadiseandmartyrdom that stemmed from lackofknowledgeof religious texts, andpossessed a strong sectarianbut nonation-alistflavor.Membership in themostextremistandmilitantgroup,Lashkar e Jhangvi,was important for them.Postmartyrdomgloryand glorification of suicide martyrs is not a developed industry inPakistan, and the Palestinians leave behind much more materialsandmemories—oral,written,pictorial,andlegendary—thandothePakistanis.

*****The internal and external evolution in the sponsoring groups andin the profiles of its suicide squads continue, as do the expansionandadaptationofsuicide terrorism.Nosoonerdoresearchersandterrorismexpertsbegintoconsolidatetheirfindingsthannewmani-festationsandformsemerge.Thelatterdonotnecessarilynegatetheearlierfindingsbutinsteaddemonstratethatthephenomenonofsui-cideterrorismisnotrecedingandhasnotyetbeenfullyunderstood.Westillcannotproperlyexplain,forexample,unexpectedtargetedlocations (e.g., London), home-grown Western suicide bombers,activebutclandestinerecruitmentatuniversitiesandamongmiddle-classprofessionals,andtherapidmutationsinterrorism.Onething,though,isforcertain:asoneLeJmilitant—whohassincebeenliq-uidated—toldmein2003,“Ouroperationsareneverrandom.Wehavenoproblemwithsheddingthebloodofthosewhomitisadutytokill.”

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Endnotes1. All intervieweesprovided informationon conditionof strict ano-

nymity, covering up names, locations, dates, or other referenceswhichcouldidentifythem.Thiswasdonebothfortheirprotectionandformyown.Thematerial inthischapterwastakenfrommyunpublishedbookonMuslimsuicidebombers,aswellasfromanunpublishedstudyofLashkareJhangvi.

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PoliticalRoots

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4DemocracyandTerrorism

LeonardWeinberg

Repressionworks:Brutaldictatorshipsrarelysuffercampaignsofter-roristviolence—atleastnotforverylong.IntheMiddleEasttherecordseemsclear.Whenchallengedbyreligiouslyinspiredterroristbandsinthe1980s,theBaathistregimesofSyriaandofIraqunderSaddamHus-seinemployedthe toolsof their trade (e.g., secretpolicesurveillance,mass arrests, torture, summary executions) and brought these chal-lengestoaspeedyconclusion.ThesamemaybesaidabouttheconductoftherevolutionarytheocracyinIran.In1980–81theanti-KhomeiniMujaheddin and Fedayeen launched a particularly ferocious terroristcampaignaimedattopplingthenewgovernmentinTehran,includingtheassassinationofthecountry’snewlyelectedpresident.Inresponsethe government unleashed the revolutionary guards and other forcesandmanagedtobringanendtotheviolence,alongwithmanyofitsperpetrators,withinafewmonths.Overtheyears,thefewdemocraciesintheregion—Turkey,Israel,andLebanon—havebeenmuchlesssuc-cessful.Infact,asrecenteventsinNewYorkCity,Madrid,andLondonsuggest,terrorismseemslargely,thoughnotexclusively,aproblemfordemocracies.Iintendthefollowingcommentstoanswertwoquestions:First,what are the sourcesof terrorismwithindemocracies? Second,whyaredemocracies,oratleastsomeofthem,targetedforattackbyinternationalterroristorganizations?

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SourcesofTerrorisminDemocraciesThinking about terrorism’s domestic political causes, the highlyregardedanalystMarthaCrenshaw1suggestswedistinguishbetweenpermissiveorfacilitatingcausesanddirectorinstigatingfactorsandalsoamongthesourcesofterrorismwithindemocracies.Identifyingthesecauses isobviouslynoeasytask,but itneverthelessoffersaneasywayout:Wemaybetemptedtogeneralizesobroadlythatwespeakonlyplatitudes.Imaynotbeabletoavoidthispitfallbutwillatleasttry.

Twoproblemsstandoutwhenweconsiderpermissiveconditionsmakingforterrorismwithindemocracies.First,whatappeartobethesamepoliticalconditionsmaygiverisetoterrorisminoneplaceoratonetimebutnotanother.Duringthelate1960smassstudentprotestsagainsttheVietnamWarandtherepressiveatmosphereandovercrowdedclassroomsofuniversitiesgaverisetowidespreadterror-istactivityinItalybutnotinFrance.Asecondproblemisthatthankstothemassmedia,theInternet,andothermeansbywhichbehaviorcanbediffusedandcopied,terroristcampaignswithindemocraciesmayspreadfromonecountrytoanothereventhoughpoliticalcondi-tionswithin those countriesdiffer significantly.Asa consequence,thepredictivecapacityofbackgroundconditionsisnowlimited.Wemayobservelittlebeyondcertaintendencies.Despitethesedifficul-ties, a number of permissive conditions receive considerable com-mentary in the literature, categorizedas either (1) temporal condi-tionsor(2)structuralelements.ToreBjorgoandotherssuggestthattransitionaldemocraciesorcountries inwhichsuch transitionsarebeingattemptedaresubstantiallymoresusceptiblethanlong-stand-ingdemocraciestooutbreaksofterroristviolence,especiallywherethe rulesof thegamearenot clearor—as in somecases—arenotacceptedbythevariousplayers.2

Certainethnicgroups,forexample,maynotacceptthefactthattheybelongtothepoliticalcommunityundergoingthetransition.Ifgroupmembersparticipatefullyinandidentifythemselveswiththeoldordertheymaywantoutoftheneworderbecausetheirleadersbelieve theyare likely to suffer adiminutionofpowerand status.Forsuchgroupsactsofterrorismmaysignaltheirdesiretoexitthesystemormayserveassymptomsoftheirrefusaltosettlefor less.Transitionaldemocraciesoftenface theproblemofholdovers fromapreviousauthoritarianregime;someholdoversarepreparedtouseterroristviolencetomakethetransitionprocessasdifficultaspos-sible—for example, the Sunni minority in Iraq at the time of thiswriting.EvenSpainexperiencedsuchterrorismduringitsownhighlysuccessfultransitionfollowingthedeathofFranciscoFranco.

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DemocracyandTerrorism ��

Other research suggests that long-standing, or consolidated,democracies are about as susceptible to terrorism as new ones.3India,withapracticallyuninterrupteddemocraticexperiencesinceitsachievementofnational independence in1947,has experiencedterroristactivityovermuchofthishistory.Likewise,despitedecadesofuninterrupteddemocraticrule,Colombiacontinuestosufferboutsof terrorism from both the left and the right. Jan Oskar Engene’sanalysisof terroristevents inWesternEurope identifies theUnitedKingdom—surelyoneoftheworld’spremierexamplesofdemocraticcontinuity—as that region’smost frequent site of internal terroristviolencefrom1950to1995.4

If terrorism ispresent at the creationofdemocraticpolities, itsometimesoccursatandcontributestotheircollapseaswell.Insomeinstancesterroristviolenceisdirectlyrelatedtotheendofdemocracy.Inthe1970sdemocraticallyelectedgovernmentsinbothArgentinaandUruguaywerevictimsofmilitarycoupsasaresultoftheirappar-entinabilitytodefeatthechallengesposedbyvariousurbanguerrillagroups.Themilitary’sseizureofpowerinTurkeyattheendofthe1970sprovidesanotherexample.Eventhoughnewandlong-stand-ingdemocraciesmayexperiencesomevariationinthenumericalfre-quencyof terrorist events, overall it seems fair to say that longev-itybynomeansinsulatesdemocraciesfromoutbreaksofinternallydriventerrorism.

Ifthedurationofdemocraciesisnotthemostpowerfulpermis-sivecondition,orofonlylimitedexplanatorypower,whataboutthestructureofdemocraticpolities?Dovariationsinstructurematter?Ifso,howgreatadifferencedotheymake?EngeneusedhisTerror-ism in Western Europe, eventdatadatabase,whichcoversdomesticterroristeventsinWesternEuropeandemocraciesbetween1950and1995,toconsideranumberofpossibilities,bothsocietalandgovern-mental.Engenereportedmodestbutmeaningfulstatisticalassocia-tionsbetweenethnicdiversityandtheincidenceofterroristviolence.Themoreethnicallydiversethecountry,themoreterrorismitexperi-ences,especiallywhentheviolenceismotivatedbyethnicgrievances.5Given the majority principle, democracies that include permanentethnic minorities are especially vulnerable. Socially homogeneouscountries are much less vulnerable: Scandinavian countries showverylowfrequencies.TheinclusionofNorway,Denmark,Sweden,andIcelandinEngene’sanalysisalsohelpstoexplainanotherlink-age:incomedistribution.Themoreunevenlydistributedtheincome,thegreateristhefrequencyofterroristevents,especiallywhenperpe-tratedbyideologicallymotivatedgroups.

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Certain features of a country’s political system make a differ-enceinthefrequencyofterroristevents.InEngene’sstudy,democra-cieswithbetter records inprotectingcivil rightsandcivil libertiesweresomewhatlesslikelytoexperienceahighfrequencyofterroristattacks.6Theproblemwith this finding concerns causality. Itmayverywellbe thecase thatsustained terroristattackscauseddemo-craticgovernments toreduce theprivacyanddueprocessrightsoftheir citizens rather than these restrictions causing the terrorism.CertainlythispatternwasatworkinItalyandtheUnitedKingdomduring the1970sasbothgovernmentsgrappledwith seriouschal-lengesposedbyterroristorparamilitaryorganizations.

Engenemakesamorecompellingcasefortheimpactsoflegiti-macy and continuity on the frequencyof terrorist events.WesternEuropeandemocracies,whereextremistpoliticalparties—whichdidnotaccepttheprevailingconstitutionalorder—haddonewellatthepollsandbeenasignificantpresenceintheirrespectiveparliaments,alsosufferedmoreterroristviolence.Thesameholdstrueforcoun-trieswhosetwentieth-centuryhistorieshavebeenmarkedbyseriousdiscontinuities:Germany,Italy,andSpain,bycontrastwithLuxem-bourgand theScandinaviandemocracies. In short,WesternEuro-peancountrieswhereEngenefoundterrorismtobemostprevalenttendedtobenoisyandhighlycontentiousdemocracies.7Inacom-parativeanalysisofterrorismandpartypolitics,WilliamEubankandIreportedanalogousfindings.InEuropeaswellasLatinAmerica,SouthAsia,andelsewhere,wheremultiplepoliticalpartiesachievedparliamentaryrepresentationandwhereparliamentsdisplayedsub-stantialpartisandivisions,democraciesweremorelikelytoexperi-enceseriousterrorismthanotherdemocracies.8Theunderlyingcon-ditionsseemedtobeextremesocialandpoliticalfragmentation.

Associationsamongvariouspermissiveconditionsmentionedintheliterature,thoughstatisticallysignificant,arerarelyverystrong,whichshouldleadustopayparticularlycloseattentiontowhatMar-thaCrenshawidentifiedasthedirect,instigatingconditionsthattrig-gerterroristcampaigns.InthecaseoftheIsraeli–Palestinianstrug-gle,certainconditions(e.g.,theIsraelioccupationoftheWestBankand Gaza Strip) were present for years before the outbreakof thefirstIntifadain1988.Atfirst,theIntifadawasnotcharacterizedbymuchterroristactivity.Thefirstsuicidebombing,forexample,onlyoccurred in1993.Rather, the Israeliauthoritiesconfronteda rela-tivelyspontaneousseriesofviolentprotestsinvolvingrocks,Molotovcocktails, and burning tires.9 Some time elapsed before the Pales-tineLiberationOrganization(PLO),headquarteredinTunis,andthenewPalestinianorganizationsHamasandIslamicJihadwereableto

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transformtheconflictintoaterroristcampaign.AndofcourseinthisendeavortheyachievedtheunintentionalcooperationoftheIsraeliauthoritieswhorespondedtotheirchallengewithmoderatebrutalityandmassarrests,enoughtoinflametheprotestorsbutnotenoughtostoptheirprotests.PeriodsofconfinementinIsraelijailshadtheeffectofproducinganewgenerationofPalestinianterrorists.

Whatlessonscanwederivefromthistale?Isitaparablefromwhich general principles can be learned and applied elsewhere?Though the Israeli–Palestinianconflictmaybe suigeneris in somerespects,theanswertothisquestionisyes,becauseweseeinitthreeinstigatingconditionsalsofoundelsewhere.First,theimmediatecon-ditionisoneofradicalization.Socialandpoliticaleventsoccurthatcrystallize long-standing grievances. “Attention must be paid,” toquoteArthurMiller’sDeath of a Salesman.The1968CatholiccivilrightsmarchesinNorthernIrelandmightalsoserveasanexample.Second,anoccasionthenarisesforsmallentrepreneurialbandswhoserepertoireofpoliticalactionsincludesterrorism.Third,whether,ortheextenttowhich,thisopportunityischaracterizedbyasustainedcampaignof terrorismeither against the governmentorother seg-ments in the population—for example, rival ethnic or ideologicalgroups—mostlikelydependsonthebehavioroftheauthorities.

Indemocraciesatleast,repression—asinthecaseofRussiancon-ductinChechnya—hasoftenproducedBeslanoritsequivalent.ThiscanbecomparedtowhenIndia’sgovernmentinadvertentlysparkedSikhterrorisminthePunjabbyits invasionoftheGoldenTemple.Also of note, Timothy McVeigh’s detonation of a truck bomb infrontoftheMurrahFederalBuildinginOklahomaCityin1995was,sohesaid,aresponsetotheassaultsontheBranchDavidiancom-pound inWaco,Texas,by federalagencies twoyearsearlier.Evenwhatamountstonormalpoliceconductcan,onoccasionandquiteunintentionally, intensifyterroristviolence.Thearrestandextradi-tiontoTurkeyofKurdishchieftainAbdallahOcalansparkedanewwaveof terrorismagainstTurkish targets throughoutEurope.Thekillingby Israeli securityservicesofPalestinianbomb-makerRad-wanAbuAyyash,knownas“TheEngineer,”setoffanewwaveofsuicide attacks that helped derail already fragile efforts at MiddleEastpeacemaking.Theseexamplesaregivenrecognizingthatnor-mal police conductrequiresacertainpoeticlicensewhenspeakingoftheArab–Israeliconflict.

But goodwill and a desire to compromise on the part of theauthoritiesmaynotworkeither.Sincetheleadersofterroristorga-nizations are typically radicals who regard compromise as a formof betrayal, they may react accordingly and intensify terrorism as

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partiestoaconflictnearasettlement.Inthemid-1970s,thewilling-nessof Italy’s rulingChristianDemocrats toreachahistoriccom-promisewiththeCommunistPartyledthecountry’sRedBrigadestoescalatetheirviolenceandtostrikeattheheartofthestate.The1998Good Friday agreement over Northern Ireland prompted the realIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)todetonateabombinArmaghthatleftdozensdead.InthecontextoftheMiddleEastpeaceprocess,experi-encesuggeststhatthecloserPalestinianandIsraelinegotiatorscometoanagreement,themoreterrorismintensifies.InColombiain1985membersoftherevolutionaryM-19organizationgreetedpresidentialoffersofamnestyandanopportunitytoparticipateinthepeacefulpoliticalprocessbyinvadingthepalaceofjusticeinBogota.Elevenmembers of the country’s Supreme Court were killed in the ensu-ingshootout.Andtheurbanguerrillaswho tookadvantageof theopportunitytocomeinfromthecoldandthentorunforparliamentasreform-mindedcandidateswereoftengunneddownbymembersofright-wingdeathsquadsduringtheircampaignappearances.

Ifalltheseobservationsaboutinternalsourcesofterrorismbearareasonablycloseresemblancetotherealitiesinvolved,whatpolicyrecommendationsemerge?Letusassumethatwhetherornotater-rorist campaign begins and, if it does, how long it lasts are morelikelytobearesultofinstigatingratherthanpermissiveconditions.Ifthisinferenceiscorrect,thenverycloseattentionshouldbegiventotheradicalizationofthepoliticalarenaandresponsestothisdevelop-mentbyenterprisingindividuals—bysmallgroupsforwhomterror-ismrepresentsanoptionandbytheforcesoforderinthecountry.

CitizensofIceland,Luxembourg,Norway,NewZealand,andahandfulofotherdemocraciesmayliveouttheir liveswithoutfear-ingtheircountrieswillbeconvulsedbypoliticalturmoil.Politicsinthosecountriesdoesnottakeplaceinthestreets.Butmostdemocra-cies,especiallythoseZimmermannlabelsnoisydemocracies,experi-enceperiodsofmassprotestandspiralsofradicalization,orepisodeswhereoutsidersdirectlychallengethoseinpositionsofpower.Theoutsiders, who use unconventional means or direct action to posetheirchallenge, seemtoplayaperfectlynormalpart in thedemo-craticexperience.

Terrorismisadifferentmatter.Authoritiesindemocraciescandolittletopreventasmallbandofradicalizedindividualsfromcarryingoutahandfulofterroristattacksasanexperimenttoseewhatreac-tions their exemplary deeds elicit from their potential constituentsandfromtheforcesoforder.Atsuchtimestheconductoftheauthori-tiesbecomescrucial.Calibratingtherightresponsenodoubtrequiresconsiderableskill.Itisclearthattherightresponsemust(1)beaimed

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DemocracyandTerrorism �1

atseparatingthesmallbandfromitspotentialmassconstituency;(2)denyitthemeansofrecruitingnewgenerationsofmembers;and(3)preventitfromspreadingtootherlocationsinthecountry.

InternationalTerrorismandDemocraciesWedonotneed tobe reminded thatdemocracies are also vulner-abletointernationalterrorism.TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesseemespeciallyattractivetargets.MarthaCrenshawsuggestsweconsiderthestructureof thepresent internationalsystemasanexplanationfor international terrorism against the United States and its allies,specifically that the United States is the hegemon—the unchal-lenged hyperpower—of the post-cold war era.10 A self-congratula-tory“We’renumberone”statusoftenevokesfeelingsofcontempt,thinly disguised envy, and unlimited hatred across the world. Allthreeare surelyamong themost importantmotivations for terror-ism.ThetroublewithusingthepresentstructureoftheinternationalsystemtoexplainwhyinternationalterroriststargettheUnitedStatesisthatterroristviolenceagainsttheUnitedStatesanditsalliesalsooccurredwhenotherstructuresprevailed.TheUnitedStatesanditsinstitutions,representatives,andcitizenswerefrequenttargetsofter-roristattackswhentheinternationalsystemwasbipolar,especiallyduringthelatterdecadesofthecoldwarwhenLatinAmericanurbanguerrillas,Europeansocialrevolutionaries,andvariousPLO-relatedorganizationsallfoundtheUnitedStatestobeanattractivetarget.

The multipolarity of the international system during the lastdecades of the nineteenth century and in the years leading up toWorldWarI,aswellasduringtheinterwarperiod,mayhavemeantthatAmericawaslessfrequentlytargetedbyinternationalterroristsduring theperiod,but ithardlymeant that international terrorismwasabsent.Virtuallyall themajorpowersof theerawere subjecttoterroristattackseitherbyinternationalanarchistsorbynational-istgroupshopingtoachievetheliberationoftheirnationsfromtheimperialdominationofoneempireoranother.

Globalization is another characteristicofour current conditionthat somebelievearouses international terroristviolence.The logichereisthatregionsoftheworldwhereglobalizingtrendsarefeltmostacutely in economic, social, and cultural terms are most likely toexperienceapoliticalbacklash.Internationalterrorism,then,isoneexpressionofsuchabacklash,aspeoplemosttroubledbyglobaliza-tionlashoutagainstthecountryorcountriesperceivedasinstigatingit.Moregenerally,internationalterroristsattacktheUnitedStatesandWesternEuropeancountriesbecausetheyopposetheeconomicandcultural penetration of their homelands by the West. A correlative

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contentionabouttheterrorism-inducingimpactofglobalizationcon-cernstheimmigrationoflargenumbersofMiddleEasternandNorthAfricanMuslimstothecountriesofWesternEurope.Livingamongnon-Muslims in such cities as Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Londoncausesanumberofstressesandstrains,makingyoungmeninpar-ticularvulnerabletotheappealsofAl-Qaedaanditsvariouscellsandnetworks.

After the bombings in Madrid March 11, 2004, and in Lon-donJuly7–21,2005, it isdifficult todeny that thepresenceofanalientatedimmigrantpopulationprovidedapoolfromwhichteror-istswererecruited.Immigrantpopulationshavefrequentlyprovidedlargepoolsfromwhichso-calledterroristmosquitoeshaveappearedformanyyears.At theendof thenineteenthandbeginningof thetwentiethcenturies,groupsofItalianand,tosomeextent,RussianimmigrantslivinginArgentina,France,Spain,andtheUnitedStatescontributedameaningfulnumberofviolentanarchiststothehistori-calmoment,whowagedterroristcampaignsagainstcapitalismandthebourgeoisstate.Thephenomenonthuspredatesthecurrenteraofglobalizationbyclosetoacentury.

Ifpromotingandbenefitingfromglobalizationwereasignificantcauseofinternationalterrorism,thenJapan,SouthKorea,Taiwan,andthePeople’sRepublicofChinashouldbeamongthemostfre-quenttargets.But,ofcourse,thisishardlythecase.Infact,evidencepointsinanotherdirection.EubankandIcomparedtherankingsofsixty-two countriesona recentlydeveloped indexof globalizationand then evaluated those rankings with the rankings of the samecountries on measures of international terrorism drawn from theITERATEIIIandtheRand-St.AndrewsChronologies.11Itwasdis-covered,ingeneral,thatahighproportionofinternationalterroristeventsoccurintheworld’sleastglobalizedcountries.Themostcom-montypeofinternationalterroristattackwasoneinvolvingperpe-tratorsfromacountryrankinglowontheindexofglobalizationwhoemployedviolenceagainstvictimsor targets fromanothercountryalsorankinglowonthisindex.Totheextentthatcitizensofcoun-triesrankinghighonthemeasureofglobalizationhavebeenvictim-izedbyinternationalterrorism,theperpetratorsoftheattackstendedtocomelargelyfromothercountriesalsorankinghighonthismea-sure.Thelevelof lethalitywasnottakenintoconsideration.Butiftheanalysisfromthisstudywereconfinedtothesimplefrequencyofinternationalterroristevents,thenitseemsclearthatanexplanationforthecurrentwaveofinternationalterrorismbasedonareactionagainstglobalizationandcountriesidentifiedasglobalization’sspon-sorsandbeneficiariesisnotsupportedbytheavailableevidence.

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To the degree that an explanation can be found or a lessonlearnedfromtheattacksintheUnitedStatesonSeptember11,2001,inMadridonMarch11,2004,andinLondoninJuly2005,itwillunlikelybe found in general statements about the structureof theinternational system or globalization. Such statements and criteriaaretoobroadtodomuchgood.Rather,inthesearchformeaning,thebestexplanationslikelywillbefoundinthespecificexpressionsofthosedoingthekillingandsomefeaturesaboutthecountrieswhosecitizenshavebeentargetedformurder.

Ifsuchasearchisconductedwhilelisteningtowhattheterror-istchieftainshavetosay,itisnothardtoidentifyparticularforeignpolicies that have made the United States, along with some otherdemocracies, targets for attackby international terrorist organiza-tions. In the caseof theUnitedStates andAl-Qaeda—andgroupslinkedtoit—thepoliciesinvolvedseemclearcut.OsamabinLadenand his followers were infuriated in August 1990 when the SaudiArabiagovernmentagreedtoallowthefirstGeorgeBushadminis-tration to station American troops there to protect against a pos-sibleinvasionbytheIraqisfollowingSaddamHussein’sinvasionofKuwait.12Thepresenceofnon-MuslimsinsidetheHouseofIslam—includingSomaliain1993—inadditiontoAmericansupportforthenon-IslamicregimesinCairoandRiyadhweretheprincipalreasonsbinLaden,Aymanal-Zawahiri(usuallyidentifiedasAl-Qaeda’ssec-ondincommand),andtheirfollowersofferedforlaunchingterroristattacksinteraliaontheAmericanembassiesinNairobiandDaresSalaam,theUSS Cole,andtheWorldTradeCenter.TheU.S.deci-siontoinvadeIraqinMarch2003providedanadditionalrationaleformore terrorismagainstAmerican targets.13Concomitantly, themurderousterroristattacksoncommutertrainsinMadridandtheLondonUndergroundhavebeenlinkedbyboththeterroristgroupsandtheiracademicobserverstothesupporttheSpanishandBritishgovernmentsprovidedfortheAmericaninitiativeinIraq.

Other democracies have been targets of international terror-ismforreasonsunrelatedtotheirrelationshiptotheUnitedStates.Francewasthesiteofmultipleterroristattacksduringthe1990sbytheArmedIslamicGroupbecauseoftheFrenchgovernment’ssupportfortheAlgerianregime,whichisintheprocessofrepressingvariousinsurgent Islamist organizations on its own territory. Likewise, inrecentyearsIndiahasbeenstruckrepeatedlybysuch jihadgroupsas Lashkar e-Tayba and Harakat ul Mujahadin over its continuedcontrolof Jammu/Kashmir, a statewithaMuslimmajority.14TheintractableconflictbetweenIsraelandthePalestiniansalsomustbeconsidered.Al-Qaedaanditsvariousoffspringhaverepeatedlycited

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Washington’s support for Israel—definedasanoutpostofunbeliefinsidetheHouseofIslam—asareasonforstagingterroristattacksagainstAmerican targets throughout theworld. It isworthnotingthat the principal Palestinian groups—Hamas, Palestinian IslamicJihad,andtheAlAqsaMartyrsBrigade—presentlyengagedinjihadagainstIsraelhavechosennottoattackAmericantargets.Theirter-rorismhasbeendirectedlocally,notglobally.TheolderandlargelyseculargroupsunderthePLOumbrella(e.g.,thePopularDemocraticFrontfortheLiberationofPalestine,thePopularFrontfortheLib-erationof Palestine-GeneralCommand,Fatah) carriedout attacksagainstAmericantargetsinEuropeandtheMiddleEastduringthelate1960sand1970s.ThecontextfortheseattackswasnotglobaljihadbuttheColdWarstrugglebetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesforpowerandinfluenceintheMiddleEast;PalestiniangroupsreceivedsupportfromandoftenactedonbehalfoftheSovietUnion.Infact,Al-QaedaisalatecomertothestruggleagainstIsrael.ItspronouncementsonthelinkagebetweenthesufferingsofthePal-estiniansandAmericansupportforIsraelfollowedtheoutbreakoftheAlAqsaIntifadainfall2000andthesubsequentdisplaybyal-JazeeraandotherArabmassmediaoftheIsraelimilitary’sattacksonvariousPalestiniantargetsintheWestBankandGazaStrip.

Particular foreign policies in general and the United States inparticular have made democracies the targets of international ter-rorism.Butthereismoretothestory.Democraciespossesscertainattributesthatmakethemvulnerabletoattack.Firstandforemostistheirdefiningcharacteristic:rulebythepeople.Or,toquoteOsamabinLaden’sNovember2002“LettertoAmerica,”“Byelectingtheseleaders,theAmericanpeoplehavegiventheirconsenttotheincarcer-ationofthePalestinianpeople,thedemolitionofPalestinianhomes,andtheslaughterofthechildrenofIraq.TheAmericanpeoplehavetheabilityandchoicetorefusethepoliciesoftheirgovernment,yettimeandagain,pollsshowtheAmericanpeoplesupportthepoliciesoftheelectedgovernment…ThisiswhytheAmericanpeoplearenotinnocent.”15SincetheUnitedStatesisademocracy,Americancitizensmaybeheldcollectivelyresponsiblefortheactionsoftheirgovern-ment.ThesamelogicthenappliestotheSpanish,British,Australian,and other democracies as well. Where the people rule, the peopleshouldbeheldnotmerelymorallybutalsophysicallyaccountablefortheactionsoftheirgovernments.

Democracies also possess well-known qualities that enhancetheir vulnerability to international terrorist attack. Unlike, forexample,thePeople’sRepublicofChinaorNorthKorea,theirbor-ders are usually permeable, making entry and exit relatively easy.

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Those seeking sanctuary are usually treated humanely even whentheyexpresshatredandloathingfortheverycountriesinwhichtheyhavecometoreside.Aliensusuallyenjoytheprotectionofthelaw.Itwasreported,forexample,thatasmallmilitaryintelligenceunitidentifiedMohammadAttaandthreeother9/11terrorists insum-mer 2000 and suspected them of planning attacks. The U.S. Fed-eralBureauofInvestigationwasinformedofthesesuspicions,butitrefusedtopursueaninvestigationonthegroundstheseindividualsheldvalidvisas,making their stay in the countryperfectly legal.16Democraticoffice-holdersaresensitivetopublicconcernsaboutthelossofhumanlife.Therighttoprivacy,thefreedomsofworshipandpersonalassociation,thefreedomtomovefromoneplacetoanotherwithinacountry—inshort,manyvaluescitizensprizeaboutlifeindemocraticcountries—makethemvulnerabletointernationalterror-istswhoareabletoexploitthesevaluesfortheirownends.Iamnotsayingthatopensocietiesandopenbordersmakeforinternationalterrorism.RatherIassertthatinternationalterroristbandssuchasAl-Qaeda’svariousoffspringhavefounditrelativelyeasytoconductoperationsindemocracieswhoseforeignpoliciesareinconflictwiththeirfundamentalaims.

*****Inconcludingthisshortchapter,sweepinggeneralizationsaboutrootcausesofterrorismareoflimitedvalue.Ifanything,democracyseemstobearootcause in thesense thatopensocietiesandtransparentgovernmentsprovideconditionsinwhichthosepreparedtowageter-roristcampaignsmayoperateatleastforawhile.Theresponseoftheauthoritieswithindemocraciesrequirestheclosestattention.Atthedomesticlevel,howtheyrespondtoaradicalizedpoliticalenviron-mentandahandfulofterroristeventsmaydetermineiftheywillthenconfrontalarge-scaleandprotractedterroristcampaignorsimplyaminor annoyance. The situation that policymakers in democraciesface in dealing with international terrorist attacks poses a seriousdilemma. If theseattacksare triggerednotby the structureof theinternationalsystemingeneralbutbyspecificforeignpolicies—forexampleSpanishorAustralianmilitaryinvolvementinIraqorFrenchsupportfortheAlgeriangovernment—thenthesolutionseemseasyenough.Dowhattheterroristswant,andtheirattackswillstop.

Two problems arise with this acquiescent response. First, theattacksmaynotstop.ThedepartureofAmericanforcesfromSoma-liafollowingtheBlackHawkdownincidentin1992,forexample,emboldenedAl-QaedatocarryoutmorelethalattacksonU.S.tar-gets:Witness the bombings of theAmerican embassies inNairobi

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andDaresSalaam.Second,ifblackmailworksinoneinstance—ifasmallbandofterroristsisabletocompelamajorpowertochangeitsforeignpolicybysettingoffafewbombs—thenothersmallbandswithotherforeignpolicygoalsmayverywelldolikewise.Theresultwillnotbeanendtoterrorismbutinsteadanescalatoryspiralinvolv-inggrowingviolence.Acquiescing to thedemandsof internationalterrorists may perhaps yield short-term benefits, but its long-termconsequencesmayproveanothermatter.

Endnotes1. MarthaCrenshaw,“TheCausesofTerrorism,”Comparative Poli-

tics13:4(1981):379–91.2. ToreBjorgo(ed.),The Root Causes of Terrorism(NewYork:Rout-

ledge,2004),234–5.3. LeonardWeinbergandWilliamEubank,“DoesDemocracyStimu-

lateTerrorism?”Terrorism and Political Violence6,no.4(1994):417–35.

4. Jan Oskar Engene, Terrorism in Western Europe (Northampton,MA:EdwardElgar,2004).

5. Ibid.,79–98.6. Ibid.,99–164.7. EkkartZimmermann,“PoliticalUnrestinWesternEurope,”West

European Politics12,no.3(1989):179–96.8. WeinbergandEubank,“TerrorismandChanges inPoliticalParty

Systems,” inPolitical Parties and Terrorist Groups, ed.Weinberg(London:FrankCass,1992),125–39.

9. Ze’evSchiffandEhudYa’ari,Intifada(NewYork:SimonandSchus-ter,1990),51–78.

10. MarthaCrenshaw,blogcirculatedtomembersoftheworkgrouponthepoliticalcausesofterrorismfortheMadridSummitonDemoc-racy,Terrorism,andSecurity,March8–11,2004.

11. Weinberg and Eubank, “Terrorism, Globalism, and Democracy,”inResearch on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures,ed.AndrewSilke(London:FrankCass,2004),91–103.

12.DanielBenjaminandStevenSimon,The Age of Sacred Terror(NewYork:RandomHouse,2003),108–9.

13. JeanCharlesBrissard,Zarqawi(NewYork:TheOtherPress,2005),126–27.

14. JessicaStern,Terror in the Name of God(NewYork:HarperCol-lins,2003),32–84.

15. Quoted inMohammad-MahmoudOuldMohamedu,Non-linearity of Engagement(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity,2005),4.

16. SeeNew York Times,August9,2005,A1.

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5CounterterrorismandRepression

MichaelS.Stohl

Throughactsofviolence,whetherperpetratedorthreatened,terroristsseek to create fearor compliantbehavior in a victimor an audiencefor theactor threat.Counterterrorismactions thereforemustalwaysaddressnotsimplythetreatmentofandresponsetoactionsthathavetakenplaceandthepreventionoffutureactsofterrorismbutalsothereactionsoftheaudiencetotheactsorthreats.Authoritiesmustthusnotonlymakethepublicmoresecure;theymustalsomakethepublicsubjectively believe that they are more secure and must create confi-dencethattheauthoritiesareactingtowardthatend.Suchcommunica-tiveactionsarenecessarynotonlyattheepicentersofterroristactivitybutalsoinseeminglyperipherallocationswherethepublicexperiencesasharedempathicidentityandcollectivelosswiththosestrickenandalsoasenseofvulnerabilityinpotentiallybeingfuturevictims.

Thefailureonthepartoftheauthoritiestomakethepublicmoresecure—oratleasttocreateasenseofsecurity—amountstoavictoryfortheterrorist.Butasaprocess,failingtocreateasenseofsecurityforthepublicandnotdemonstratingthatthepoliticalauthoritiesaredoing what they should often present more of a threat to the politi-calsystemthanparticularsecuritylapses.Thefactthatmanyterroristthreatsoriginateoutsidethegeographicboundariesofaparticularstateand that the scope of possible operations and targets may be foundanywhereontheglobemeansthatpublicandgovernmentalperceptionsand actions within the international community are also important.Thus, countering terrorism involves the use of all the security forcesof the statewithin thecontextofapoliticalprocess. It isnot simply

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aboutdestroyingthethreat;considerationshouldalsobegiventothemeanswithwhichtogetridofthethreat,aswellashowitandthecounterterrorinvolvedareperceived.

To understand the requirements of an effective counterterror-ismpolicywemustunderstandthatterrorismisdifferentfromotherformsofviolenceor its threat.Asdifficultas it is forus toacceptintheimmediateaftermathofanattackwithvictimsinplainview,terrorists areprimarily interested in the audience,not the victims.Terrorism isdesigned tohavedirectand indirectvictims,and it iscrucialtounderstandthathowtheaudiencereactsisasimportantastheactitselfandtheinstrumentalvictimswhoareitsdirectcasual-ties. Therefore, counterterrorism policy must address not only theviolenceoftheterroristactorbutalsothemultipleaudiencesoftheviolence,whichmaybelocal,national,regional,orglobal.

IdentifyingthePurposesofCounterterrorismCounterterrorism is not as simple as winning military battles,destroyinganetworkstructure,preventingparticularacts,orcaptur-ingparticularterroristactors.Thereisaconstantinterplayoffear,anger,anduncertaintythatterroriststrytoproduceintheirpoten-tialtargetvictimaudiencewhiletheyalsoattempttocreatesupportfortheiractionsfromthoseforwhomtheypurporttospeak.Coun-terterrorismrequiresauthoritiestoattempttoprovidesecurityandreassurancethattheycanprotectthepopulation,caneliminatethefuturethreat,andcandiscouragepotentialsupportersoftheterror-ists.Thisprocessalsofocusesonthesocialidentityoftheaudience,presentingthechallengetodecideiftheyalignwiththeterroristsandtheirgovernmentoragainstthem;withapotentialtarget,victim,orabystander;withasupporteroropponent.Terroristsseekthroughtheiractionstogenerateresponsesthatinadditiontocreatingfearwillinducepotentialrecruits,willprovidesafehavens,willprovokearesponsetofinancialrequests,andwillcausesupportfromauthoritiestobewithdrawn.Throughtheircounterterrorismpoliciesauthoritiesintend thatboth government supporters (andpotential supporters)will provide information,back theirpolicies andactions, andwilltrustthattheirfuturewillbemoresecurebydoingso.Atthesametimeauthoritiesintendthatopponents(andpotentialopponents)ofthegovernmentwillfearthatcontinuedwithholdingofsupportforthegovernmentthroughtheirsilenceorcontinuedsupportoftheter-roristswillbringthemharm.

Whatcomplicatestheeffortsofcounterterroristagentsinthecon-temporaryglobalmediaenvironmentisthatbothastate’sandterror-ists’actionsareinpublicview.Terroristsdonotneedtoattackina

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CounterterrorismandRepression ��

particularlocation—althoughsomelocationsareclearlybetterthanothers—tobroadcasttheirmessagetoaudiencesbothneartoandfarfromtheterroristevent.Likewise,theactionsofgovernmentsagainstterrorists,theirsupporters,andpotentiallyinnocentbystandersarealsoliabletobebroadcastbothathomeandabroad.Counterterroriststrategymustbesensitiveto,andmustaccommodate,thereactionsofmultiplepublics;italsoneedstoexhibitabetterunderstandingofhowdifferentsegmentsofthecommunitywillrespondtodifferenttypesandlocationsofevents,todifferentvictims,andtopotentialtargets.Counterterroriststrategymustthereforealsobeestablishedonanunderstandingofhowsocialidentityaffectstheprocessingofmessagesof fear and securityandwhether suchmessagesproducefearorangerandagreateror lessersenseofriskanduncertainty.Suchunderstandingwillaidthedevelopmentofcrediblemessagesoftrustandreassurance,whichideallywillfindexpressioninresilientandproductivecommunityinitiativescentraltosuccess.

Terroristsalsounderstandthis,whichisdemonstratedinalet-terpublishedinJuly2005byAymanal-Zawahiri,purportedlyAl-Qaeda’s second incommand, toAbuMusabal-Zarqawi, leaderoftheorganizationnownamedAl-QaedainIraq.

In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic muja-hedmovementwouldbe crushed in the shadows, far fromthe masses who are distracted or fearful, and the strugglebetweentheJihadisteliteandthearrogantauthoritieswouldbeconfinedtoprisondungeonsfarfromthepublicandthelightofday.Thisispreciselywhatthesecular,apostateforcesthatarecontrollingourcountriesarestrivingfor.Theseforcesdon’t desire to wipe out the mujahed Islamic movement,rathertheyarestealthilystrivingtoseparateitfromthemis-guidedorfrightenedMuslimmasses....Therefore,themuja-hedmovementmustavoidanyactionthatthemassesdonotunderstandorapprove,ifthereisnocontraventionofShariainsuchavoidance,andaslongasthereareotheroptionstoresortto,meaningwemustnotthrowthemasses—scantinknowledge—intotheseabeforeweteachthemtoswim.1

Theimplementationofcounterterroristpolicyisalsodirectlyinflu-encedbytheexistingrelationshipbetweenthepublicandthepoliceandothercounterterroristagencies,aswellasthepublic’sappraisalofothergovernmentsandethnicandreligiousgroups.Buildingandmaintainingtrustintheagentsandagenciesofcounterterrorisakeycomponentintheprocess.Thisinvolveshowdifferentcommunication

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processesarelikelytoaffecttheabilityoflawenforcementtosuccess-fullycarryoutitscounterterrorismrole—thatis,toaffectthepublic’sactualsecurity—andhowsuchcommunicationprocessesmayaffectthepublic’ssenseofsecurity,whichterroristsseektoundermine.

Whenshapingcounterterrorismpolicy,statesmustalsoremem-berthatthereactionsoftheaudiencesareasimportantastheirshort-term elimination of particular terrorists or their capacities to act.Terroristsrecognizethepotentialforstatestooverreactbyignoringtheirownlegalrequirementsandnormsofbehavior;indeed,CarlosMarighelaarguedthatbytheiractionsoppositiongroupsshouldtrytoprovokerepressiveandreactionaryresponsestodemonstratethetruenatureofthe“oppressiveregime.”2

CounterterrorismatHomeAttheMadridSummit,anumberofsuggestionsweremadeforcoun-teringandcombatinginsurgentterrorism.Underlyingtherecommen-dationswastheconvictionthatdemocracyanddemocraticprocesseswereattheheartofboththeterroristthreatandcorecomponentsofasuccessfulresponse.Thegeneralviewalsoemergedthatwhateveractionneeded tobe takenshould fullyapplydemocraticprinciplesandabsoluterespectfortheruleoflaw.Theseevaluationswerebasednot just on a normative preference for democracy but also on theconvictionthattheunderlyingprinciplesofdemocracyandtheruleoflawprovidethebestfoundationforpolicychoices.Anexpectedutility approach provides important insights into how democraticprocesseswillcontributetosuccessfulcounterterrorismpoliciesandhowignoringdemocraticnormsandprocesswill—particularlyinthelonger term—harm counterterrorism efforts by democratic states.The expected utility approach locates counterterrorism as a set ofstrategicactionsinaconflictsituation.Withinthisframe,authoritiesandterroristscalculatethebenefitstheywouldaccruebychoosingparticularpoliciesandweighthemagainsttheprobabilityofsuccessandthecostsofundertakingthepolicysoastodetermineiftheben-efitsexceedtherisks.Thepolicychoicesmaybedirectedateliminat-ing,quieting,ormitigatinganactualorperceivedpotentialchallengeorthreatonthepartofsomeidentifiableterrorists,eitherdomesticorinternational.Repressionandotherformsofhumanrightsviolationsmaybepartofthesetofchoices—thetoolboxfromwhichauthori-ties may choose. AsChristianDavenport argued, when repressionandhumanrightsviolationsarecalculatedasrelativelymoreeffec-tivemeansofgovernance,thenthegovernmentmightchooserepres-sivebehaviors“whenthevalueforquiescenceandtheprobabilityofsuccessarehighandthecostsarelow.Governmentsarelesslikely

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CounterterrorismandRepression �1

toviolatehumanrights,however,whenthevalueofquiescenceandtheprobabilityofsuccessarelowandthecostsarehigh.”3Thesamelogicapplieswhenstatesconductoperationsbeyondtheirborders.

TedGurroutlinedthreesetsofconditions,whichaffectthedeci-sion-makingcalculusofthreatenedelites:situational,structural,anddispositional.4 Situational conditions include the political traits ofchallenges—thestatusandstrategiesofchallengers—andtheelites’own political resources for countering those challenges—regimestrength and police apparatus. Structural conditions define elites’relations with their opponents and determine or constrain theirresponseoptions.Theseincludestates’positionintheinternationalsystem and the nature of social stratification and elites’ positionwithinit.Dispositionalconditionscanbeexpectedtoinfluencehowelitesregardtheacceptabilityofstrategiesofviolenceandterrorism.Normssupportingtheuseofviolenceareshapedbyelites’directormediatedexperiencewithviolentmeansofpowerandareinhibitedbydemocraticvalues.

Asignificantaspectofthedebatewithindemocraciesastotheapproachtotaketorespondingtoterrorismconcernsthecapacityofthestatetowithstandthethreat.Thedebateislong-standing.PaulWilkinson argued that the threat to order presented by terroristsnecessitates strong measures that will protect the rule of law andsocietalorder.J.BowyerBellrespondedthatademocraticsociety’srefugewasintheruleoflawandwarnedtobewareof“apostlesoforder”asspecialpleaderswithothermotives inmind.Simplifyinggreatly,Bell andWilkinsonmay represent the two competing ten-sionswithintheliberalapproachtopolitics:lawandorder.Bellseeksorderthroughestablishedlaw;Wilkinsonseeslawestablishedbyaninitialestablishmentoforder.5

Bellsuggestedthatanappropriateresponsetothefurtherthreatofterrorismconsistsofascrupulousrelianceonthelaw,takingcarenottooverreactnortoviolateortodispensewithcivilliberties.Ulti-matelyitmeansnotonlyrecognizingbutalsoacceptingthatnowayexists to protect open societies at all times from violent individu-als.Wilkinsonconcludedthat“thegovernmenthasadutytoinvokespecialpowerstoprotectthecommunity,restoreorder,andreestab-lishtheruleoflaw.”Bellcounteredthat“ifwecannottoleratetheexaggeratedhorrorflashedontheeveningnewsortherandombombwithoutrecoursetothetyrant’smanual—thenwedonotdeservetobefree.”6TheWilkinson–BelldebateismirroredintherecentpastintheworkofPhilipHeymannandAlanDershowitz,amongmanyothers,andthedebateswithindemocraticsocietiesabouttheneed

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foradditionalpowers,specialpowers,orthesuspensionoflong-heldconstitutionalprinciplesorguaranteesorboth.7

UsingStatePowerEventhoughthechoicesaredifficultwhenarguingaboutthepartofthecounterterrorismprocessinvolvingmanagingthethreatofattackandthetacticalresponse,itisimportanttorememberthatitisjustonepartofthecounterterroriststrategicrequirements.Asindicatedpreviously,itisalsoimportanttomanagetheissuesofidentity,trust,support,andfearandtounderstandhowtheuse,misuse,andper-ceptionsofmisuse,ofstatepoweraffecttheresponsesofthecoun-terterrorismaudiences.

Theexpectedutilityapproachsuggeststhatthemanagementofterrorismshouldbebasedon increasing thecostsandonreducingthebenefitsof theoption.JeffreyRossandGurrdiscuss fourgen-eralkindsofconditionsthatcancontributetothedeclineofpoliticalterrorism:preemption,deterrence,burnout,andbacklash.“Preemp-tionanddeterrencearecounterterroristpoliciesandactionswhichcanreduceoreliminatetheterrorists’coercivecapabilities.Burnoutandbacklasharegeneralconditionswhichreducethepoliticalcapa-bilitiesofgroupsusing terrorism.”8Thus far the focusofmuchofthe post-September 11, 2001, counterterrorism response has beenheavilymilitaryandhasfocusedontheproductionsideoftheequa-tion—thatis,onthepreemptionanddeterrenceoptionsidentifiedbyRossandGurr.Isuggestthatincreasingtheresponsecostpartoftheequation, includingburnoutandbacklash, isofequalandperhapspotentiallygreaterbenefitinthelongrun.

Burnoutreferstomembers’decliningcommitmenttothegroupanditspurposes,aneffectmorefrequentlyseenandpronouncedinideological movements. As in all militant organizations, it is rein-forcedovertimebytheagingofmembersoftheterroristorganization.Thegreatestnumbersarerecruitedintheirteensandtwentiesandbegindepartingintheirthirtiesastheylosehopein“makingadiffer-ence”andseekto“livetheirlife”.9Inideologicalnetworks,organiza-tionalmembersarefarlesslikelytobeembeddedinahomophilousmultiplex setof familial,orkinship, relations that socializes, rein-forces,andsupportsoreven isawareof theterroristorganization.Therefore,itisfarmorelikelythatdiscrepantmessages,alternativeinterpretations, anddiverseoptionswill becomevisible andviablefortheorganizationalmember.Thus,policiesthatcancontributetoburnoutbyprovidingeconomicincentivesandalternativesshouldbeofgreatutility,althoughtheywillnotbeasusefulagainstorganiza-tionsbasedonfamily,clan,orotherstrongties.10

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A successful counterterrorism policy creates backlash againstactorswho choose to employ terrorism.Backlash refers to actionsthat antagonize and alienate the terrorist organizations from thelarger sociopolitical context in which they are embedded and areinterdependent.Thesestrategies seek todelegitimize theactionsofterrorists. Accommodative political strategies initiated by govern-mentsasaresponsetoterroristthreatsoractionsmayservetoreducetheacquiescenceofsocietiestoterroristsintheirmidstiforganiza-tional leadersdonotrespondpositivelyoracceptthegainsofferedbyauthorities.Accommodativeoffers,asminimalastheymightbe,mayofferthehopeofacontinuedpresenceinthepoliticalagenda.They forcepopulationsnotdirectly linked to theorganizationbutwhosesupportoracquiescenceisvitaltotheorganizations’survivaltoconsiderwhethercontinuedadherencetotheultimategoalsoftheorganizationorcontinuingtolerancefortherighttoexist isworththeeverydayeffectsof thecontinuedpresenceof terrorists.Sucharational calculation brought on by official governmental action ismorelikelytocreatebacklashfromthewidersocietyunderminingthepoliticalcapabilitiesofdoctrinalterroristmovementsthanthoseof clan or ethnonationalist organizations. Within such a commu-nicativecontext, it iseasier forgovernmentalactions to isolate theorganization—butonlyifitdoesnotengageinactivitiescharacter-izedbyopponentsasterrorist.EthanBuenodeMesquitasoundedacautionarynotethatconcessionsmaybringinitialescalationbecausemore extreme elements are the only ones remaining but that “thebenefitsofcounterterrorismaidfromformerterroristsmayoutweighthecostsofheightenedmilitancy.”11

Hence, it is not surprising that terrorist movements showingdecline—andinmanycasesdisappearancealtogether—overthepastthirtyyearshavebeentheideologicallybasedmovementssuchastheRedArmyFaction;ActionDirecteinFrance;andtheRedBrigadesofGermany,France,andItaly.Incontrast,terroristgroupsthathaveshown the greatest resilience are the ethnonationalist movementssuchastheBasqueFatherlandandLiberty,theSriLankan-basedLib-erationTigersofTamilEelam,theIrishRepublicanArmy,andthenumerousPalestiniangroups. Intheformer,acombinationofsuc-cessfulintelligenceandpolicework,theabilitytoisolatetheterror-istsfromthepopulation,inducementstoencouragedisengagement,andburnoutallworkedtogethertoendthemovements.Inthelat-ter,thecontinuedpoliticalstalematesandtheabilityoftheterroriststomaintaintheirreservoirofsupportwithinthecommunitiestheyattempttorepresenthasmeantthattheyhavebeenabletocontinue

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torecruitandtofindasafehaventhere;overtime,theyalsodevelopfullerorganizationalpresences.

BacklashWhenconsideringtheprocessofbacklash,itisimportanttorecog-nizethatwearealsoattemptingtodelegitimizetheterroristoption.Itisnecessarytotearawayattheprotectiveclothingthatallowsoppo-sitionalorganizations,theirpublics,andthestatesthatsupportthemtoignorethehumanconsequencessuchterroristbehaviorgenerates.Ifsuchbehaviorisdelegitimized,thepsychologicalproductioncostsareincreasedfordecisionmakersandforthosewhosupportthem.Bychallengingthebehaviorandbyraisingpublicawarenessathomeandabroadweincreasethepossibilitiesofbystandersoftheterror-ismchallengingterroristbehaviorsandsupportforthem.Examiningpoliticalorganizationsindifferentgeographic,cultural,andhistoricsettingsconsideringthewidevarianceincircumstanceandcontend-ingpoliticalandsocialgroupings,andemployinganexpectedutilityapproachforcesustocontendwiththewillingnessofmanydifferentpoliticalorganizationstousenotjustviolencebutalsovictimsinstru-mentally.Bythinkingabout theprocessesandstructures thatcon-strainsuchbehaviors,itisclearthatcalculationsabouttheresponsebyenemiesaswellassupportersareakeycomponentinrestrainingtheinstrumentaluseofvictims.AsJackGoldstonesuggested,“Theactionsandreactionsofregimes,regimeopponents,counter-move-ments,andthebroaderpublicallreshapetheprocessesofgroupiden-tification,perceptionsoftheefficacyandjusticeoftheregimeanditsopponents,andestimatesofwhatchangesarepossible.”12

Counterterrorstrategiesneedtoaddresstheresponseofthecom-munities terrorists purport to represent and to choose tactics thatencourage backlash against—rather than further support for—ter-rorists.Onesuchstrategicresponsethatisalwaystemptingforgov-ernments is repression. Policies of repression employ the use of orthethreatofcoercionagainstopponentsandpotentialopponentstopreventorweakentheircapabilitytoopposetheauthoritiesandtheirpolicies.Thiscoercionmayusethefullmachineryofthestate,includ-ing the judiciaryaswell as thepoliceandmilitary.The statemayalsodenysocialandeconomicprivilegestowholeclassesofpeople,therebyalsopreventingtheenjoymentofbasichumanrightsoutlinedintheUniversalDeclaration.Thereisnoquestionthatintheshorttermgovernmentalrepressioncanproducereluctanceonthepartoftheaudiencetosupportterrorismconductedinitsname.Repressionraisesthecostsforknownsupportersandcreatesmuchgreatercau-tioninacquiescingtotheviolentclaims.However,increasedrepres-

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sion over time may actually generate increased collective actions.Often,paradoxically,fierce repression isunable todaunt—oreveninflames—revolutionaryopposition.13

Toillustrate,DavidMasonandDaleKrane,basedontheiranaly-sisofElSalvador,arguedthatindiscriminaterepressionmayincreaseoppositiontotheregime.Violentrepressionerodesthepopularlegiti-macyoftheregime,precludestheuseofmoreconventionalnonvio-lentmodesofparticipation,andtherebycompelstheoppositiontoresorttoviolenceintendednotsimplybringaboutchangesingovern-ment policy or personnel but also to force a revolutionary changeofregime.14Likewise,PeterChalkinhisexaminationofSoutheastAsiaargued that therepressionconductedby thegovernmentshascompounded the sense of dissatisfaction and has fueled separatistmovements and created greater support.15 Likewise, Bruno Coppi-eterstressedthat“fromtheperspectiveof legitimateauthority,theindiscriminateanddisproportionateuseof forceandrepressionbytheRussianauthorities,andthelackofcriminalproceedingsagainstthosewhoperpetratedwarcrimes,underminethelegitimacyoftheRussiangovernmentand theauthorityof thoseChechenswhoarereadytocooperatewiththeRussiangovernment.”16ExaminingthebehaviorofHamas,SaulMishalcomparedHamas’sresponsetotherepressionunderIsraelihandstothebehaviorofotherIslamicmove-ments, such as the Muslim Brothers groups in Jordan and Sudan,whichtendtobereformistratherthanrevolutionary,generallyprefer-ringtooperateovertlyandlegally“unlessforcedtogoundergroundandusesubversiveorviolentmethodsinresponsetosevererepres-sion.17Commonalityseemstoexistacrosscultures,time,andspacesothatone long-termresultofrepressivepolicies isacontinuationof support for violence committed in thenameof groupsmobiliz-ingagainstterrorism.Repression,thoughoftenapparentlysuccessfulintheshortrun,canservetofilltheveryreservoirsofsupportitisdesignedtoempty.

BuildingTransnationalCounterterrorismNetworksWhenwemovebeyondtheconfinesofindividualstatesthesesameprinciplesstillapply.Statesconfrontedbythethreatoftransnationalinsurgentterrorrecognizetheneedtocollaboratewithotherstatestoeliminatesafehavens,tocontrolfinancialresources,andtoguardandtopreventthesalesofweaponsandexplosives.AfterSeptember11,forexample,theU.S.government,usingbothfigurativecarrots(e.g., resources, aid,weapons)and sticks (e.g., threats towithholdfinancialaid),putpressureonnumerousgovernmentstoconnectter-roristsactingwithintheirborderstotheglobalterrornetwork.

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However,oneoftheproblemsfordemocraciesengagedinattempt-ingtobuildtransnationalcounterterrorismnetworksisthatmanyofthenationswhoseassistancewasthoughtnecessaryintheglobalwaragainstterrorwerenotdemocracies,andwereengagedinthesystem-aticviolationoftheircitizens’humanrightsandoftenusedrepressionagainsttheircitizenstomaintaintheirregimes.AmnestyInternationaland Human Rights Watch have documented numerous abuses inUzbekistan,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Azerbaijan,Kazakhstan,Kyr-gyzstan,andGeorgiawithintheCentralAsianregion.Theseregimesroutinely suppress internal dissent, arrest political opponents, andcensorthemedia.Politicaldissentofanykindisharshlysuppressed,andbeatingsandtortureofdetaineesiscommonplace.

Additionally,somenationssoughtentranceintothecoalitionfortheirowndomesticpurposesaswell.China,forexample,lobbiedfortenmonthstohavetheEastTurkistanIslamicMovementaddedtotheU.S.listofterroristorganizationslinkedtoOsamabinLaden’sglobalterrornetwork.18Tomanyexternalobservers,aswellastothepopulationswithinthesenewallies,theactionsofthedemocracies’newpartnersappearpurelyopportunistic,declaringtheirintentiontofighttheglobalterrornetworkmerelytoaidintheireliminationofunconnectedchallengestotheirownregimes.

However, the problem is not just that these governments willrepresstheirownpeople.Itisalsoimportanttorecognizeinagloballycapableinformationsocietythatastrategyofdelegitimizationiscon-nectedtocounterterrorismpoliciesandpartnershipsaswell.Coun-terterrorismpoliciesandcoalitionsthatinvolveassistingorenlistingso-calledbadgovernments—that is,governmentsthatrepress theirpopulationsorusetheirpowerstodiscriminatewithrespecttothedistributionofgoodsandopportunitiesacrossethnicdivides—mightnotalwayscreatedissonanceacrosstheentireaudienceinthenationsengagedintheglobalwaronterror.However,thesecounterterrorismpoliciesareboundtocreatethewrongkindofbacklashinsocietiesmirroringtheconditionsthatsupportorganizationsusingterrorintheirhomelandorabroad.Justastheblack–whitementalityofthecoldwarcreatedpressurestosupportbadgovernmentson“our”sideandthuscondemnedpopulationswithinthosesocietiestorepressionandunderdevelopment,theWaronTerrorhasthepotentialtodothesame in thewest, central,and innerAsian formerSoviet republicsandelsewhere.19However,intoday’sglobalizedmediaenvironmentthe resultsare sharednotonlyonCNNand theBBCbutalsoonAlJazeeraandonthewebinfrontofthepopulationsshielding,oracquiescing to, the terrorists in their midst. Any counterterrorismpolicyoractionthatlowerstheresponsecostsforterroristorganizers

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andtheirsupportivepopulationsreducesthepotentialeffectivenessofthepolicyoraction.

Thus when states sell, grant, and otherwise provide favorabletermsbywhichtheircoalitionpartners,allies,clientstates (andattimesneutralsandevenadversaries)obtainequipmentwhichenablesregimes tocontinueand/orexpandpracticesof repressionand ter-rorism,orengageintrainingthepersonnelthatconductstheterroroperations,audiencesbothintheirownstatesandinthesenationsarewitnesstothesepolicychoices.AstheMadriddiscussionsempha-sized,democraciesneedtounderminetheterroristappealtothepop-ulations of countries from whom they need to draw their supportand/oracquiescence if insurgent terroristsare tohave fewerplacesinwhichtofindsafehaven.Theywillfindthismoredifficultiftheyappeartosupportpoliciesofrepressionandterrorbygovernmentsagainstthepopulationstowhomtheyareappealing.

Intheinterconnectedglobalenvironmentinwhichtransnationalterrorismisconfronted,acounterterroristcoalitionseekingtomobi-lizemultiplepopulationsmusthavetrustasanimportantcomponent.Inageneralsenseitisalwaysimportantfordemocraciestoshowtheutmostrespectfortheprinciplesonwhichtheystand,includingtruthandjustice.InthatcontexttheabusesofAbuGhraibandGuantá-namo, the policy of rendition, all reduce the respect of the popu-lationswithinthehistoricallydemocraticnationsandfeedintothepropagandaofAl-QaedaaboutthewillingnessoftheUnitedStatesandtheWesttosystematicallydenythesamerightsandrespecttothe people Al-Qaeda purports to represent. U.S. leadership in theglobalwaronterrorisaccompaniedbyargumentsbuiltonAmericanExceptionalism.Thisexceptionalismisexemplified,forexample,bythedoctrineofpreemptionintroducedinthe2002NationalSecurityStrategyandintherefusaltojointheInternationalCriminalCourt.Thisassertionofexceptionalismmayundercuttheabilitytocounterthemessageoftheterroristsandfracturethesupportofthepopula-tionswithotherdemocraticpartnersaswell.AsDarrenDavisandBrianSilvernoted,trustingovernmentisaresourceonwhichgovern-mentsmaydraw.20Indeed,lowlevelsoftrustmakeitmoredifficultforgovernmentstosucceed.Thepopulationsofthedemocraticstatesmusttrustthatthegovernmentsofthecounterterrorismnetworkwillactingoodfaith.Heymann,addressinganAmericanaudience,sug-gestedthat“wemustlearnnevertoreacttothelimitedviolenceofsmallgroupsbylaunchingacrusadeinwhichwedestroyourunityasanationorourtrust inthefairnessandrestraintoftheinstitu-tionsoftheU.S.governmentthatcontrollegitimateforce.”21Thisisadviceacounterterrorismcoalitionofdemocraticnationsmustheed.

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Howeverseriousthethreatofterrorismtheymustnotyieldtheruleoflawtocombatit.

Inclosing,itisusefultopondertheobservationsofJeffreyGold-farb,codeveloperwithAdamMichnik,ofthe“DemocracySeminarwhichtakesplacetwiceayearinKrakowandCapeTownandbringstogetherstudentsandactiviststodiscussthecreationandsustenanceofdemocraticstructures.”Hereportsonthereactionsofstudents—theveryoneshesaysshouldbethebestalliestheUnitedStateshasinthelongrun—tothedevelopmentofthecounterterrorismnetwork.Thesestudentssay:

Itisthewaronterrorismthatisbeingusedascoverbydic-tatorsaroundtheworldtojustifycrackdownondemocracyadvocates.SuddenlytherightsofMuslimsinthePhilippinesand Indonesia—or thedemocraticcriticsof theauthoritar-ian“Asianway”inSingapore,MalaysiaandBurma—arenotimportanttotheBushadministration.Suddenlythestrategicresources of Central Asian dictatorships are more impor-tantthanthelivesofhumanrightsactivitists.SuddenlythedefenseoftheAmericanwayoflifeandourdemocracyseemstobepredicateduponalackofconcernforthedemocraticrightsofpeopleinlessadvantagecountries.22

IfthepoliciesofthecounterterrorismcoalitionandthedisregardoftheUnitedStatesfortheaudienceofthosepolicieshavecreatedsuchviewsinpotentialfriendsoftheUnitedStates,thelong-termsuccessofastrategythatdoesnotplaceitsadherencetoitsmostbasicprinci-plesatitscoreismuchindoubt.Repressionandthedenialofhumanrightswillonlyharmthecounterterrorismstruggle.Democracyanddemocraticprocessesmustbe the core componentsof a successfulcounterterrorismstrategyandcoalition.

Endnotes1. Forthefulltext,seehttp://www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf.2. CarlosMarighela,For the Liberation of Brazil (Harmondsworth,

UK:Penguin,1971),113.3. ChristianDavenport,“HumanRightsandtheDemocraticProposi-

tion,”Journal of Conflict Resolution43,no.1(1999):92–116.4. TedRobertGurr,“ThePoliticalOriginsofStateViolenceandTer-

ror:ATheoreticalAnalysis,”inGovernment Violence and Repres-sion: An Agenda for Research,ed.MichaelStohlandGeorgeLopez(Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,1986),62–7.

5. SeePaulWilkinson,Terrorism and the Liberal State(London:Hal-stead,1977);andJohnB.Bell,A Time of Terror: How Democratic

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Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: BasicBooks,1978).

6. Wilkinson,Terrorism,156;Bell,Time of Terror,279.7. PhilipB.Heymann,TerrorismandAmerica:ACommonsenseStrat-

egyforaDemocraticSociety(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1998);andAlanM.Dershowitz,“IsThereaTortuousRoutetoJustice?”Los Angeles Times,November8,2001.

8. JeffreyIanRossandGurr,“WhyTerrorismSubsides:ACompara-tiveStudyofCanadaandtheUnitedStates,”Comparative Politics21,no.4(1989):408.

9. CharlesA.RussellandBowmanMiller,“ProfileofaTerrorist,”Ter-rorism1,no.1(1977):18;andNeilLivingston,The War against Terrorism(Lexington,MA:HeathLexington,1982),43–5.

10. Stohl,“IsthePastPrologue?TerroristsandWMD,” International Studies Review 7,no.1(2005):146–8.

11. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Conciliation, Counterterrorism, andPatternsofTerroristViolence,”International Organization59,no.1(2005):146.

12.Jack A. Goldstone, “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolution-aryTheory,”Annual Review of Political Science4,no.1 (2001):139–87.

13. SeeDavenport,“HumanRights.”14. DavidMason andDaleKrane, “ThePoliticalEconomyofDeath

Squads:TowardaTheoryoftheImpactofState-SanctionedTerror,”International Studies Quarterly33,no.2(1989):192.

15. SeePeterChalk,“SeparatismandSoutheastAsia:TheIslamicFac-torinSouthernThailand,Mindanao,andAceh,”StudiesinConflict&Terrorism24,no.1(2001):241–69.

16. BrunoCoppieter,“SecessionandWar:AMoralAnalysisoftheRus-sian–Chechen Conflict,” Central Asian Survey 22, no. 4 (2003):393.

17. See Shaul Mishal, “The Pragmatic Dimension of the PalestinianHamas:ANetworkPerspective,”Armed Forces and Society29,no.4(2003):569–90.

18. “AmericanGivesBeijingGoodNews:RebelsonTerrorList,”New York Times,August27,2002.

19. Anatol Lieven, “The Secret Policemen’s Ball: The United States,Russia,andtheInternationalOrderafterSept.11,”International Affairs78,no.2(2002):250.

20.DarrenW.DavisandBrianSilver,“CivilLibertiesvs.Security:Pub-licOpinion in theContextof theTerroristAttacksonAmerica,”American Journal of Political Science48(2004):30.

21. Heymann,TerrorisminAmerica,158.22.“LosingOurBestAlliesintheWaronTerror,”New York Times,

August21,2002.

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6TheCausesofRevolutionaryTerrorism

IgnacioSánchez-Cuenca

Speculationabouttheoriginsofterrorismisrisky,ifonlybecausetheroleofcontingencyisbiggerthaninotherformsofpoliticalviolence,suchasinterstateorcivilwars.Giventhefactthattheyareclandestineorganizations,terroristgroupsaresmallerinsizethannationalarmiesorguerrillas.Thecreationofaterroristorganizationmaybedecidedbyahandfulofpeople,andahundredvolunteersmaybemorethanenoughtolaunchaterroristcampaign.Whetherthedecisionsofsuchasmallnumberofpeoplecanbeexplainedalongsimilarlinestoother,moresystematic,politicalevents—forexample,therelationshipbetweenelec-toralrulesandthenumberofpoliticalpartiesoreconomicdevelopmentandthesurvivalofdemocraticregimes—isacontentiousissue.

Asaresultofthecontingentnatureofterrorism,itisprobablyfutiletoexpectthatthesocialsciencescanestablishsomecombinationofnec-essaryandsufficientconditionsthatbringaboutterrorism.YetIsuggestthatwecangainsomeusefulinsightsifweacceptthatthisformofpolit-icalviolenceis—toborrowabiologicalanalogy—amixtureofchanceandnecessity.Morespecifically,Iarguethattheformationofterroristorganizations is a random mutation that occurs within societies butthatsomepoliticalconditionsfilterorselectwhichofthesemutationssurviveandreproduce,thuscreatingaseriouschallengetothepoliticalsystem.Accordingtothismodelofpoliticalselection,theformationofterroristgroupsisacontingentevent,buttheirsurvivalorextinctionisdeterminedbyconditionsthatcanbeworkedoutsystematically.

Toillustratehowchanceandnecessityarerelatedintheproductionofterrorism,thischapterfocusesonthewaveofterroristactivitythat

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startedinthelate‘60sandearly‘70sinthedevelopedworld.Manycountriesatthattimehadtofacetheterroristchallenge.TherewasnationalistterrorismlikeinNorthernIrelandortheBasqueCountry,revolutionaryterrorismlikeinItaly,Germany,Japan,andSpain,andfascist,orblack,terrorismlikeinItaly,Spain,andPortugal.More-over,manycountriesdidnothaveanyterrorismatall,orhadverylittle,likeintheScandinaviancountries,theNetherlands,Belgium,France,Canada,theUnitedStates,andAustralia.Thereisasignifi-cantvariation,therefore,whichItrytoexplainbyusingthepoliticalselectionmodel.

MyapproachisslightlydifferentfromthatofJanOskarEngene,whoin2004publishedastudyofterrorisminWesternEurope.1First,Idealonlywithrevolutionaryterrorism,fordifferenttypesofterror-ismrequiredifferentconditionstosurviveandreproduce.Second,myanalysis includesall thecountries in thedevelopedworld,whereasEngene’sanalysiswasrestrictedtoWesternEurope.Andthird,andmostimportantly,Iprovidemoreaccuratefiguresaboutnumbersoffatalitiesdrawnfrommyowndataset.2

Terrorismcanbeunderstood inat least twodifferentways:asanaction-basedconceptorasonethatfocusesontheactors.Intheactionsense, terrorismisa formofviolence—mainlyagainstcivil-ians,ofteninindiscriminateattacks,tryingtoinstillfearinawideraudience—thatcanbecarriedoutbydifferentactors,suchasterror-istorganizations,guerrillas,orarmies.Intheactorsense,terrorismistheactivitydisplayedbyterroristorganizations.Terroristgroupsaredifferentfromotherinsurgenciesbecausetheydonotcontrolanyterritory,actwithintheenemy’sterritory,andhencehavetobesecretorunderground.Guerrillas,bycontrast,liberatesometerritoryfromthe state’s control and act in this territory like a protostate (e.g.,extractingrents,imposingorder).InthischapterIrefertoterrorismexclusively intheactorsense. Iaminterested inunderstandingtheconditionsunderwhichtheseorganizationsemerge.

Inthefollowing,Ifirstshowthattheterroristmutationofthe’70swasallpervasive:smallgroupsinfavorofarmedstrugglecouldbefoundinalmosteverycountryinthedevelopedworld.Ithenexaminethefactors,bothcontingentandstructural,thatcouldexplainwhyterrorism was more widespread in some countries than in others.Finally,thereisabriefdiscussionaboutthepossibilityofextendingthemodeltootherinstancesofterrorism.

MutationThepoliticalmobilizationofstudentsandworkersinmanycountriesofthedevelopedworldduringthesecondhalfofthe’60sgaverise—

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TheCausesofRevolutionaryTerrorism ��

insomeofthem—toawaveofterroristpoliticalviolencethatlastedfor thirtyyearsor even longer.Mostof this violencewas inspiredbyextremeleft-wingideology.Violencewasbelievedtoserveasaninspiration:Themasseswouldfollowthepathsetbythevanguardandtakeuparms.Eventhenationalist terroristorganizations thatemerged at that time—the ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, BasqueHomelandandFreedom) in theBasque countryor theProvisionalIrish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland—incorporatedMarxistjargonintotheirdiscourse.

Infact,thefirstinstancesofrevolutionaryterrorismtookplaceinLatinAmerica.TheTupamarosinUruguaywerethefirsttotheorizeandtoputintopracticethekindofurbanguerrillaassociatedwiththeterrorismof thatperiod.TheTupamarosattemptedtoemulateotherLatinAmericanguerrillas,buttheabsenceofbothmountainsandjungleintheircountrypersuadedthemthatitwasimpossibletostarttheirrebellioninthecountryside.Consequently,theyconcludedthattheironlychancewastoutilizetheurbanenvironment.3TheirexamplewasfollowedbytheMontonerosandothergroupsinArgen-tina.ThedoctrinebehindthisformofterrorismwassystematizedbytheBrazilian terroristCarlosMarighella inhisMinimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.4TheseLatinAmericanexperienceswereasourceofinspirationformanyrevolutionarymovementsinEurope.AcaseinpointistheRedArmyFaction,alsoknownastheBaader-Mein-hoffgroup,whichexplicitlytriedtoreproduceinWestGermanytheurbanguerillaexamplesetforthbytheTupamaros.

InEurope, thefirstorganizations that turned toviolencewerenationalistones:TheETAkilleditsfirstvictimin1968;theschismwithintheIRAtookplaceattheendof1969;andthePIRAbegantocarryoutassassinationsin1970.5Thetwoorganizations,ETAandPIRA,have lasted longer thananyother andhavekilled farmorethantheircontemporaries.TheETAhascostthelivesof773people,andthePIRA1,778.6Still,nationalistorganizationsaresomewhatpeculiarforageneralcross-countrycomparison,astheyonlyemergeincountrieswhereregionshaveterritorialclaims.Insteadofrestrict-ing the analysis to countries with this territorial cleavage, I focusmainly on left-wing, revolutionary terrorism, for this kind of ter-rorism—unlikethenationalistone—dependsonapoliticalcleavagepresentineverycountryofthedevelopedworld.

Asmentionedbefore,twostagesofterrorismseemtobeofrel-evance: mutation and selection. Regarding mutation, it is possibletoshowthateveninthecountriesthatdidnotsufferfromseriousrevolutionary terrorismfrom1970-1990, thereweresometerroristgroups that had the same political preferences and organizational

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resourcesofthosefoundinItaly,Spain,orGreece,yettheyrefusedtokillpeopleor—eveniftheydid—werequicklydisbandedbythepolicebecauseoftheirlackofsocialsupport.

Letusexaminefourcountriesthatdidnotsufferlethalrevolu-tionaryterrorism:GreatBritain,theUnitedStates,Belgium,andtheNetherlands.Ineachofthesecases,itispossibletofindaterroristmutationthatsoonbecameextinct.InGreatBritain,anundergroundgroupcalledtheAngryBrigadewasactiveduringtheearly’70s.Itfullyrejectedcapitalismandimperialismandbelievedinrevolutionandarmedstruggle,butitsmembersattackedpropertyratherthanpeople.Theywere easilyneutralizedby thepolice. Inoneof theircommuniqués,commentingonnonlethalattacksagainstfourdiffer-entpersons, they felt itwasnecessary toexplain that their targets“wouldallbedeadifwehadwished.”7Thequestioniswhytheydidnotwishtokillthem.

TheUnitedStateshas severalof thesemutations in itshistory.ThebestknownistheWeatherUnderground,aclandestinegroupofyoungpeoplethathadstrongrevolutionarypreferencesbutdecidednottokillanyoneafterthedeathofthreeoftheirownactivistswhoweremanipulatinganexplosivedevice inNewYorkCity in1970.Anothergroup,theSymbioneseLiberationArmy,killedtwopeople,butitsmemberswerequicklycapturedbythepolice;theUnitedFree-domFrontkilledoneperson.8NoneoftheseorganizationsbecameasourceofseriousconcernfortheUnitedStates.

InBelgium, theCommunistCombatantCells,asmall,violent,revolutionarygroupthatactedinthe’80s,didnotwanttoassassi-nateanyoneeither,thoughin1985theykilledtwofirefightersacci-dentally.IntheNetherlandsseveralultraleftistgroups,liketheRedYouthoritssuccessortheRedResistanceFront,heldradicalviewsandwere influencedbyCarlosMarighella’swritingson theurbanguerrillabutdidnotevolveintolethalterrorism.

Theseexamplesrevealthatsomeindividualsandgroupsinthesecountriespossessedstrongantisystempreferencesandwerewillingtoemployviolenttacticsbutfellshortoffullterrorismorwerequicklydisbandedafter thefirstkillings.Similargroups inothercountrieshadaverydifferenttrajectory:bloodierandlonger.ThedifferencebetweentherevolutionariesintheNetherlandsandItalydoesnotlieinideologicalpreferencesorintheorganizationalfeaturesofthesegroupsbut ratherdealswith thepolitical system.For reasons stillneedingtobedisentangled,theconditionsofItalianpoliticsfavoredthedevelopmentandreproductionoftheseleftist,undergroundorga-nizations,whereasDutchpoliticsconstitutedahostileenvironment.

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PoliticalSelectionIt is important to distinguish terrorist revolutionary organizationsaccordingtotheirdegreeoflethality.ItwouldbeoddtocountFranceandItalyashavinggonethroughthesameexperience:ActionDirecteinFrance assassinated twelvepeople,whereas theRedBrigades inItalykilledfifty-three.Table6.1dividescountriesintothreecatego-ries:thosethathadverylittlerevolutionaryterrorismornoneatall(nogroupkilledmorethanfivepeople);thosewithgroupsthatkilledbetween five and twenty people; and those where terrorist groupskilled more than twenty people. Note that the criterion is not theaggregatenumberoffatalitiesinthecountryoverallbutthepresenceof at least one terrorist group that killed with a certain intensity.Forinstance,inthecaseofFrance,ItakeintoaccountonlyActionDirecte’skillingsinthe’80swithoutconsideringthekillingsinthe’70sbyminororganizationsliketheBrigatesInternationales(Interna-tionalBrigades)(twokillings)ortheNoyauxArméspourl’AutonomiePopulaire(ArmedNucleiforPopularAutonomy)(onekilling).

Table 6.1

The impact of revolutionary terrorism in the developed world

Degree of revolutionary terrorism

None (Less than 5 Fatalities)

Some (Between 5 and 20 Fatalities)

Intense (More than 20 Fatalities)

Australia France Germany

Austria Japan Greece

Belgium Portugal Italy

Canada Spain

Denmark

Finland

Great Britain

Ireland

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Sweden

Switzerland

United States

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Excluding small countries (Iceland, Luxembourg) and LatinAmerica, Table 6.1 contains twenty-one countries of the Western,developed world. Revolutionary terrorism was an important phe-nomenoninsevencountries—thatis,one-thirdofthesample.ItwasparticularlyworrisomeinItaly,Spain,andGermany,intermsbothoffatalitiesandthepoliticalstrainitproduced.Greecealsoappearsinthegroupofcountriesafflictedbyintenseterrorism:TheRevolu-tionaryOrganization17Novemberkilledtwenty-twopeopleduringalongspanoftwenty-fiveyears,thougharguablyitdidnothaveasmuchpoliticalimpactastheRedBrigadesinItaly,GrupodeResis-tenciaAntifascistaPrimerodeOctubre(FirstofOctoberAntifascistResistance Group) (GRAPO) in Spain, or the Red Army Faction(RAF)inGermany.

Table 6.2 contains a more detailed impression of the terror-istorganizationsthatacted inthesesevencountries.TheGRAPO,a Maoist group very active during the transition to democracy inSpain, is thedeadliestorganization, followedby theRedBrigades.TerrorisminItalywasextremelyfragmented—justlikethepartysys-tem—andtheRedBrigadesandPrimaLinea[FrontLine]werethetwomaingroups,withfifty-threeandsixteenfatalities,respectively,outofatotalof149fatalitiescausedbytheextremeleft.

Toaccountforthefactthattheterroristmutationfoundanicheinsevenofthetwenty-onecountries,itisconvenienttoseparatecon-tingentandstructuralfactors.Contingentfactorsaresuchthingsasthesizeofthepopularmobilizationofthelate’60sandearly’70s,thepresenceofextremeright-wingterrorism,ortheresponseofthestate.Structuralfactorsrefertomorepermanentfeaturesofthecountry,like economic development or the political nature of the state. Ofcourse,thecombinationofcontingentandstructuralfactorsrequiresstatisticalanalysis.Inthiscontribution,though,Ilimitmyselftodis-cussing this issue in a conventional comparative way, drawing onsomeofthefindingsofmyownstatisticalresearch.

Contingent factors

Regardingthecycleofpoliticalmobilization,itisapparentfromTable6.1thatalmostallofthecountrieswheredemonstrationsweremas-siveandoccasionallyviolentendedupwithrevolutionaryterrorism(e.g.,France,Italy,Japan,Germany).TheimportantexceptionistheUnitedStates,wherethestudentmovementwasextremelypowerful,galvanizedbytheVietnamWar,butwhereterrorismdidnotbecomeanissueatall.ThecaseofFrance,ontheotherhand,isintriguing.The1968mobilizationwasenormous,tothepointthatwhenwork-ersjoinedstudentsthecountrywasparalyzed;however,terrorism

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Table 6.2

Main revolutionary terrorist organizations

Name Country Total Number of Fatalities

Year of First Fatality

Year of Last Fatality

GRAPO Spain 79 1975 2000

Brigate Rosse

Italy 53 1974 1981

RAF Germany 34 1971 1993

17 November

Greece 22 1975 2000

Prima Linea Italy 16 1976 1981

FP 25 Abril Portugal 15 1980 1986

Action Directe

France 12 1980 1986

Note: The Japanese Red Army was not included given the difficulties of providing accurate figures about its activity. First, most of their killings took place outside of Japan. Second, on Japanese soil they killed more of their own members than other people. It is not clear whether internal killings should be included.

was absent in the ’70s. It only emerged in the ’80s, with ActionDirecte,anditwasarathermarginalevent.Ifpoliticalmobilizationduringthe’60swasarelevantfactor,FranceandtheUnitedStatesaretwocountriesexpectedtohavemoreterrorism,yetlittletononecanbefound.

ItcannotbebychancethatItalyandSpain—thetwocountrieswhere revolutionary terrorism was more lethal—are the countrieswhere fascist terrorismwas important.9 Idonotmeanthekindofxenophobic,neo-Naziviolencethatspreadduringthe’80sand’90sbut instead thestrategyof tensionoriented toward thebreakdownofthedemocraticsystem.Thistypeofviolencewasintendedtocre-ateasituationofchaos thatwouldofferapretext for thearmytolaunchacoup.InItalytwocoupattempts,organizedbyacoalitionoffascistgroupsandelementsofthearmy,failedin1970and1973.Thetensionthatwastojustifythecoupwascreatedthroughindis-criminate attacks against civilians. The bloodiest of these attackswerethePiazzaFontanabombinMilaninDecember1969,produc-ingseventeenfatalities,thebombexplosionontheItalicustrainin1974,causingtwelvefatalities,andtheBolognatrainstationbombin1980, responsible for eighty-three fatalities.During theseyears,therewerealsomanyselectiveattacksagainstactivistsofultraleftist

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groups.InSpain,ontheotherhand,thefascistattacksweremainlyselective.ParticularlyshockingwasthekillingoffourlaborlawyersoftheCommunistunion,theComisionesObreras,inJanuary1977,justafewmonthsbeforethefirstdemocraticelectionsaftertheendofFranciscoFranco’sdictatorship.

Theexistenceoffascistviolencetriggeredtheemergenceofleftistorganizations.ItcreatedavisibleaggressorandlentcredibilitytothethesisheldbytheextremeleftthatWesterndemocracieswereonlyafacadeofauthoritarianregimes.TheItalianterroristsofthe’70ssawthemselvesastheheirsoftheResistance.Oneofthefirstgroupsthatemergedintheearly’70swasGrupod’AzionePartigiana(GroupofPartisanAction), createdby the famouspublisherGiangiacomoFeltrinelli,who—followingthePiazzaFontanaattack—thoughtthatonlyarmedstrugglecouldpreventthereturnoffascism.InSpain,theGRAPOfrequently justified itsattacksbyreferring to theongoingfascistnatureoftheSpanishstate.Forthem,theconnectionsbetweenthe security forces and fascist groupsproved thatdespite electionsSpain was still a dictatorial, oligarchic regime. Still, although fas-cistterrorismmayhaveintensifiedleftistterrorism,itcanhardlybethewholestory,forwecanobserverevolutionaryviolenceinothercountrieslikeGermanyorGreecewherefascistterrorismwasabsent.Thissuggeststhat,apartfrompoliticalmobilizationandfascism,thestate’sresponsetothecycleofpopularmobilizationwasimportantaswell.

Thepatternof repressionat thebeginningof the conflictmayhelptoaccountforvariationsinthedegreeoflethality.10Indiscrimi-nateorexcessiverepression(e.g.,randomdetentions,statesofemer-gency, torture, excessive use of force in demonstrations and streetfights)maybackfire,inducingpeopletojointerroristorganizations;thiswas clearly the case for nationalist terrorism.The strengthoftheETAwasderivedtoalargeextentfromthepolicerepressionofBasquenationalistsunderFranco,especiallyafterthefirstkillingin1968.Likewise,inNorthernIreland,thePIRAemergedinthemid-dleofharshpolicerepressionandharassmentbyProtestantsagainstCatholicswhoparticipatedinthecivilrightsmovement.InItaly,thepolicekilledmanystudentsindemonstrations.Thedeathoftheanar-chistPinoPinnelliinprisonin1970,whowasfalselyaccusedofthePiazzaFontanabomb,wascrucialintheperceptionamongradicalsthatthestatewasgoingtouseanymeanstoputanendtotherevolu-tionarymovements.Also,duringtheSpanishtransitionmanypeoplediedinfightswithsecurityforces.

The police displayed a very different behavior both in FranceandinGreatBritain,whereverylittletonorevolutionaryterrorism

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isobserved.Thus,inFrancenoonewaskilledduringspring1968;consequently,inthefollowingyearsnoteventhemostradicalgroupsthoughtkillingwas justified.AndifweleaveasidetheTroubles inNorthernIreland, thefact is thatboththedemonstrationsandthepoliceresponsewerequitepeacefulinGreatBritain.

Thereseemstobe,therefore,someassociationbetweenrepres-sionandtheemergenceofterrorism.However,itisdifficulttotestthis idea rigorously without some quantitative measurement ofrepression.Andtherearesomenoteworthyexceptions.Forexample,intheUnitedStatesrepressionwashigherandmoreindiscriminatethanin,say,Germany,butterrorismdidnotspread.EventslikethekillingoffourunarmedstudentsatOhio’sKentStateUniversitybytheNationalGuard,orthekillingofanothertwostudentsatJacksonStateUniversityinMississippibythepolice,bothin1970,didnotinduceterroristorganizationstolaunchviolentcampaigns.

Thisbriefoverviewofcontingentfactors—politicalmobilization,fascistterrorism,staterepression—showsthatnoneofthemcanbetakenaseithernecessaryor sufficient.Exceptionscanbe found ineachcase:PoliticalmobilizationwaslowinSpainorGreeceduringthelate’60s;therewasnofascistterrorisminGermany;andrepres-sionwashighintheUnitedStates.YetSpain,Greece,andGermanyhadimportantrevolutionaryterrorism,buttheUnitedStatesdidnothaveany.Thesefactorsshouldthereforeberegardedasindependentvariables,increasingtheprobabilitythattheterroristmutationwillsurviveandexpandincertaincountries,ratherthanasnecessaryorsufficientconditions.

Structural factors

Two structural factors can explain why terrorism finds a niche insome countries: the levelof economicdevelopment and thenatureofthestate.Withregardtoeconomicdevelopment,aquickglanceat Table 6.1 reveals that there is no obvious relationship betweenterrorismandpercapitaincome.Amongthecountriesthatsufferedrevolutionaryterrorism,somewereclearlypoorerthantheaverage(e.g., Greece, Portugal, Spain), whereas others were quite wealthy(e.g.,France,Germany,Japan).Itistrue,however,thatpoorercoun-tries—withtheexceptionoftheRepublicofIreland—hadrevolution-aryterrorism.Statistically,thecorrelationis0.4,significantat10per-cent.Importantly,though,thecorrelationdisappearsoncewecontrolfor thenatureof the state.The classificationof countries inTable6.1suggestsastrongassociationbetweentheemergenceofrevolu-tionaryterrorismandcountrieswithadictatorialpast.Ofthesevencountrieswithrevolutionaryterrorism,sixwentthroughright-wing

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authoritarian regimes during the twentieth century. France is theonlyexception,unlessweconsider,assomepeopledo,thattheVichyyearswereanauthoritarianparenthesis.11Andamongthecountriesthatdidnothaverevolutionaryterrorism,allweredemocracieswith-outanybreakdownexceptAustria.

Whywouldcountrieswithadictatorialpastprovideanicheforthe terroristmutation? In someof the cases, the authoritarianpastwasveryrecent—inGreeceandPortugaluntil1974andinSpainuntil1975—anditisonlylogical,therefore,thatitcouldhaveplayedadeci-siverole.Forexample,itseemsobviousthatthecreationoftheRevo-lutionaryOrganization17Novemberhadsomethingtodowiththedeathsofthirty-fourstudentskilledbythepoliceduringtheoccupa-tionofthePolytechnicUniversityinAthensonNovember17,1973—hencethegroup’sname.However,inthecasesofGermany,Italy,andJapan,wherethefascistregimewasoverin1945,whywasthisepisodeofhistorysocrucialfortheemergenceofrevolutionaryterrorism?

Engeneinterpretedthisfindingintermsoflegitimacy:“Ifthereareelementsofnon-democraticperiodsinthenearpast,thismaycon-tributetotheraisingofquestionsaboutthetruecharacterandlegiti-macyofthestateinthepresent.”12Butlegitimacyisalooseconcept,anditisnotobviouswhylegitimacyproblemsofthepastareauto-maticallytransmittedtothenewregime.PeterKatzensteinofferedamoreinterestinginterpretation,basedonacomparisonoftheUnitedStates,Germany,Italy,andJapan.Ontheonehand,politiciansofthenewregimereactwithgreaterfearandharsherrepressiontothechal-lengeofcollectiveprotest,makingiteasierforterroristorganizationstofindrecruitsandsupportandtosustainacampaignofviolence.On the other hand, terrorists fear the recurrence of authoritarianexperiencesandintensifytheviolenceoftheirprotest.13

Thereisyetathirdexplanation,rootedintheliteratureoncom-parative politics. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators showedthat past instability is a powerful predictor of the survival of theregime.14Regimesthathavesufferedseveral transitions in thepastarelesslikelytosurvive.Themechanismisquitesimple:Peoplelearnfromhistory that theregimecanbeoverthrownandthereforecanimagine itsdemise.AlthoughtheWeathermenwouldnot seriouslybelievethatthedemocraticsystemcouldcollapseintheUnitedStatesbecauseofthekillingsofsomepoliceofficers,bothfascistsandrevo-lutionariesinItalybelievedthatdemocracywasfragileandcouldbebroughtdownwithsomeviolence.Terroriststriedtoendthesystembecausetheyknewthishadhappenedbefore.Animmediateimplica-tionofthishypothesisisthattransitionstodemocracy,whenevery-thing is inastateofflux,offergoodchancesfortheemergenceof

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TheCausesofRevolutionaryTerrorism �1

revolutionaryterrorism,ascanbeseeninGreece,Spain,and,toalesserextent,Portugal.

Inamultivariateanalysiswiththetwenty-onecountries,themostpowerfulandrobustpredictorof the lethalityofviolence isby farpastpoliticalinstability.Itworksmuchbetterthanthesizeofpoliti-calmobilizationinthe’60sorthaneconomicdevelopment.15Fascistterrorismisalsoanexcellentpredictor,butitdoesnotconstituteanindependent variable. There is an obvious problem of endogeneityin the sense that fascist terrorismcoulddevelop in thosecountrieswheretheextremeleftturnsviolent.

*****We may conclude, therefore, that whereas revolutionary violentgroupsemergedinmostcountriesofthedevelopedworldinthe’70sand’80s,thesegroupsevolvedintofullyfledgedterroristgroupsinonlyahandfulofcountries;therewasaprocessofpoliticalselection.Terroristgroupsemergedincountrieswithpastpoliticalinstability,withpowerfulsocialmovementsinthe’60s,withcounterproductiverepression,andwithfascistterrorism.

Inprinciple,themodelofpoliticalselectioncouldbeappliedtootherformsofdomesticterrorism.Forinstance,asampleofcoun-trieswithconflictingterritorialclaimscouldbebuilttofindthefac-torsthataccountforthepresenceofnationalistterrorisminsomeofthese,butnotinothers.Thereisampleevidencethatinmostofthem,therewereradicalgroupsinfavorofviolentpolitics,butonlyinafewcases did they evolve into lasting and powerful terrorist organiza-tionssuchastheETA,theRepublicanandLoyalistparamilitariesinNorthernIreland,andHamasandothergroupsinPalestine.

Thewholeideaofpoliticalselection,however,isproblematicinthecaseof internationalterrorism.Theargumentcouldbeappliedtoterroristorganizationsthathaveaterritorialbaseinaparticularcountry—forexample,Palestinianorganizations—butitseemsmuchharder for nonterritorial organizations like Al-Qaeda or the anar-chistorganizationsinEuropeinthelatenineteenthandearlytwenti-ethcenturies.Iftheunitofobservationisnotacountry,itisdifficulttothinkofexplanatoryfactorsthatcouldanswerthequestionofwhysomeorganizationsaremoresuccessfulthanothers.Ifcontingencyplays a significant role in the occurrence of terrorism, there is nodoubtthatthisholdstrueforinternationalterrorismwithoutater-ritorialbase.Inanycase,itisworthremindingourselvesthatuntiltheemergenceofAl-Qaeda,internationalterrorismrepresentedonlyaverysmallfractionofallterrorism.

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Endnotes1. JanOskarEngene,Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the

Trendssince 1950(Cheltenham,UK:EdwardElgar,2004).2. Engene’s data set is based on Keesing’s Record of World Events,

whereasmyowndrawson local sources in each country, includ-ing country-based chronologies, data gathered by associations ofvictimsorbytheterroristorganizations,localnewspapers,officialstatistics,andmanysecondarysources.Theresultsareratherdiffer-ent:Forinstance,EngenereportedfourfatalitiescausedbyActionDirecteinFrance,buttherewereinfacttwelve.

3. Jorge Torres, Tupamaros: La derrota de las armas (Montevideo,Uruguay:FindeSiglo,2002),345–9.

4. CarlosMarighella,Urban Guerrilla Minimanual(Vancouver:PulbPress,1974).

5. The Quebec Liberation Front, another nationalist group, began itscampaignin1963,butitneverbecameaverydangerousorganization.

6. ForacomparisonbetweentheETAandtheIRA,seeIgnacioSán-chez-Cuenca,“TerrorismasWarofAttrition:ETAand the IRA”(Working Paper 204,JuanMarchInstitute,Madrid,Spain,2004).

7. TomVague,Anarchy in the UK: The Angry Brigade(London:AKPress,1997),40.

8. See Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda(London:Routledge,2003).

9. Therewas also fascist terrorism inPortugal during the late ’70s.Althoughitisnotentirelyclear,itseemsthatthestrategyoftensionwas also attempted in Belgium between 1982 and 1985 (i.e., theBrabantcrimes)whenamysteriousorganizationthatneverclaimedtheir attacks put several bombs in supermarkets, killing almostthirtycivilians.SeePhilipJenkins,“StrategyofTension:TheBel-gianTerroristCrisis,1981–1986,”Terrorism13(1990):299–309.

10. SeePeterJ.Katzenstein,“Left-WingViolenceandStateResponse:UnitedStates,Germany, ItalyandJapan,1960s–1990s”(workingpaper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca,NY,1998).

11. Thisisadifficultissue,asFrancewasoccupiedbyaforeignpower.Engene,Terrorism in Western Europe,includesFranceamongthecountrieswithadiscontinuousdemocraticpast.

12.Ibid.,38.13. Katzenstein,“Left-WingViolence,”4.14. AdamPrzeworskiandothers,Democracy and Development: Politi-

cal Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cam-bridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),127.

15. Nomeasureofpolicerepressionhasbeenincludedintheanalysisforlackofcomparabledata.

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EconomicRoots

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7EconomicFactors

TedRobertGurr

In theaftermathof theU.S.September11,2001,attacks,manyU.S.officialsandobserverslinkedpovertytoterrorism.PresidentGeorgeW.Bushremarked,“Wefightagainstpovertybecausehopeisananswertoterror.”1Yetfewoftheattackerswerepoor.MuhammadAtta,theirleader,wasthesonofalawyerandattendedgraduateschoolinGermany.Similarly,manyAl-Qaedasuspectsidentifiedaftertheattackswerewelleducated and of middle-class origin. However, they had three othertraitsincommon:(1)mostgrewupinsocietiesundergoingwrenchingsocioeconomicchanges; (2) theiropportunities forpoliticalparticipa-tionweresuppressedorsharplyrestrictedbygovernments;and(3)theywererecruitedbyIslamistscommittedtojihadagainsttheWest.

This chapter surveys some of the complex linkages between eco-nomicfactorsandterrorism,drawingonareportpreparedfortheClubdeMadridbytheEconomicsWorkingGroupIconvened.Groupmem-bers contributed working papers which provided key inputs for ourreportandforthischapter.Otherscholars’publicationsalsoarecited.2

Workinggroupmemberssharetheassumptionthatterrorismisatactic,sometimesaprimarystrategy,inwhicharmedattacksoncivil-iansaredesignedtoachievepoliticalends.Terrorismisachoicemadebygroupswagingconflict,notahard-wiredresponsetodeprivationorinjustice.Theperpetratorsjustifytheirdecisiontouseterrorism,ratherthanotherpolitical strategies,byamixof rationalcalculationaboutitscostsandbenefitsplustheir ideologicallydrivenpursuitofrevolu-tionary, ethnonational, or religiousobjectives.Fourkindsof connec-tionsbetweeneconomicfactorsandterrorismareconsideredhere.First,

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evidenceandtheory is reviewedabouthowpoverty, relativedepri-vation, and rapid socioeconomic change can create incentives, ormotivations,forpeopletoengageinpoliticalviolence.Second,twocritical intervening variables are examined that shape thepoliticaloutcomesoftheseincentives:thepoliticalcircumstancesthatdisposemilitantstouseviolenceandtheideologiesusedtojustifyterror.Thefinaltopicofdiscussionistheterrorism-crimenexus,withparticularattention to the circumstances in which the objectives of terroristmovementsshiftfromtheprovisionofpublic,orpolitical,goodstothepursuitofprivatematerialbenefits.

Theanalysisisinformedthroughoutbyabasicinsightfromeco-nomic—orrationalactor—analysis:Itisessentialtoanalyzeincentivesanddisincentivesthataffectmilitants’decisionstochooseterroristtac-ticsandindividualdecisionstojoin,toavoid,ortoopposesuchgroups.AsDavidGoldobserved inhisworkingpaper for thegroup,“Eco-nomicsisnotjustaboutwhethereconomicvariablescanhelpexplainobservedoutcomes.Itismostfundamentallyabouthowhumanbehav-iorisshapedbytheinteractionofincentivesandconstraints.”

Poverty,Inequalities,andSocioeconomicChangeAsCausesofTerrorism

Poverty per se is not a direct cause of terrorismMacrostudiesshowthatterrorismcanoccuranywherebutismorecommonindevelopingsocietiesratherthaninthepoorestcountriesorinthedevelopedWestandisespeciallylikelytoemergeinsociet-iescharacterizedbyrapidmodernizationandlackofpoliticalrights.3Studies of participants in terrorist organizations demonstrate thatmilitantstendtobebettereducatedandaremorelikelytobeofmid-dle-class background than the populations from which they come.KruegerandMalečková’scarefulanalysisof1990sdataonHizballahfightersinLebanonsupportsthisconclusion.JeroenGunningsaidinhisworkingpaperfortheEconomicsWorkingGroupthattheprin-cipleholdswhethertheterroristorganizationinquestionhasideologi-calorethnonationalmotives,religiousorsecularorientations.GroupsasdiverseasHamas,Hizballah,EuzkaditaAskatasuna(ETA)intheBasquecountry,theRedArmyFactioninGermany,theTamilTigersinSriLanka,andAl-Qaedaallsharethischaracteristic:thatis,orga-nizersandmilitantsarelikelytoberecruitedfromthebetter-educatedandmoreadvantagedmembersoftheirrespectivegroup.

Poverty nonetheless contributes indirectly to the potential forpoliticalviolence.DavidKeenhasproposedthatacountry’sfailureto create a viable economy is one of the root causes of civil war.

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EconomicFactors ��

Lowlevelsofdevelopmentcreatemassesofyoungpeoplewithfewalternatives—people with essentially zero opportunity costs—whobecome natural recruits for rebel and terrorist groups.4 Gunningobservedinhisworkingpaperthatterroristgroupsoperatingfromrural areas, suchas theRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FARC),arelikelytorecruitrank-and-filemembersfrompoorandbadlyeducatedbackgrounds,eveniftheirleadershavemoreadvan-tagedbackgrounds.Intheirdetailedstudyoftheeconomicsofcivilwar in Congo, Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet havedocumentedtheirargument that inCongo,aselsewhere inAfrica,“low-levelincomeandlowgrowthratereducedthecostoforganiz-ing rebellions and also reduced the government’s ability to fight acounterinsurgency.”5Thisanalysisshouldapplyterrorismaswellastorebellionterrorism—allthemoresobecauseinCentralAfrica,asLyubovMinchevapointedoutinherworkingpaperfortheEconom-icsWorkingGroup,rebellionsentailagreatdealof indiscriminateviolenceagainstciviliansthatwouldbelabeledasterrorismiftheyoccurredelsewhere.

Inequalities are more important than poverty as a source of terrorism

Povertyisseldominvokedbymilitantstojustifytheiractions.Rather,theyclaimtoactonbehalfofgroupsthatarerepressedormargin-alized by dominant groups. Such claims echo the essential insightoftherelativedeprivationtheoryofpoliticalviolence,whichisthatpeoplebecomeresentfulanddisposedtopoliticalactionwhentheyshareacollectiveperceptionthattheyareunjustlydeprivedofeco-nomic and political advantages or opportunities enjoyed by othergroups.6 The groups that support and give rise to terrorist move-mentsusuallyarerelativelydisadvantagedbecauseofclass,ethnic,orreligiouscleavages.Terrorisminnineteenth-centuryEuropetookrootamongmarginalizedurbanworkers. In themodernworld,asGunningpointedout inhisworkingpaper,“theFARCdrew, andcontinues todraw,muchof itssupport fromimpoverishedpeasantfarmersinColombia.TheProvisionalIRA(IrishRepublicanArmy)was,andis,inpartmotivatedbythesocioeconomicmarginalizationofCatholicsinNorthernIreland.ThesamecanbesaidofHizballahandthesocioeconomicmarginalizationoftheShi’ainLebanon,theTamilTigers inSriLanka,andtheBrigateRossoandtheworkingclassesinItaly.”

ToreBjørgohas contended thatdiscriminationon thebasisofpeople’sethnicorreligiousoriginisthechiefrootcauseofethnon-ationalistterrorismsuchasthecampaignsoftheProvisionalIRAin

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Northern Ireland, theTamilTigers in SriLanka, and theKurdishWorkers’Party,knownasthePKK,inTurkey.Whensizeableminori-tiesaresystematicallydeprivedofrightstoequalsocialandeconomicopportunitiesorareobstructedfromexpressingtheirculturaliden-tities—forexample,bybeingforbiddentowriteorpublishintheirlanguageortopracticetheirreligion—thisoftenleadstotherisetoself-determinationmovements.Iftheyarealsobarredfrompoliticalaccess,theyarelikelytochooseviolentformsofstruggleincludingterrorism.Thisisparticularlythecase,Bjørgosuggested,whentheconflictbecomes longstandingandbitter,with fewprospects foramutuallyacceptablesolution.7

Theresentmentofinequalitiescreatedandmaintainedbydomi-nant groups helps explain the findings reported by Krueger andMalečková.Publicopinionpollstakenin2001intheWestBankandGazashowedthatthemoreeducatedPalestiniansare,themoretheysupportarmedattacksagainstciviliansinsideIsrael.Fromarelativedeprivationperspective,wewouldexpecteducatedPalestinianstobemoreresentfuloftheirstatusasanoccupiedpeopleandthusmoresupportiveofterrorism—especiallyinapoliticalcontextwherenon-violentpoliticalmeanshavebeenlargelyclosedtothem.TheauthorsofthisstudyalsonotedthatasharpincreaseoccurredineducationalattainmentofPalestiniansinthe1980s,followedbyamarkeddeteri-orationintheiremploymentprospects.8Thisisconsistentwithaclas-sic relativedeprivationargument: Increasingexpectations followedbydecliningattainments—intheeconomicorpoliticalsphere—cre-ateintensegrievancesandsupportforpoliticalaction.

The relative deprivation argument also helps account for thecommonobservationthattheleadersofpolitical,ethnic,andsectar-ianmovementsusuallyarebettereducatedandofhigherstatusthanmost of the population from which they come—something that istrueofleadersofalmostallpoliticalorganizations,asEkkartZim-mermannnoted.Theyaremostlikelytohavehadpersonalexperi-enceofclassorethnicorreligiousbarrierstoupwardmobilityandthus have greater incentives to organize political action. But whyshouldterrorismbetheirstrategyofchoice?Recallthefindings,citedpreviously,thatterrorismismostcommonincountrieswithsharplyrestricted political rights. This means high opportunity costs forconventionalpoliticalactionandrelatively lowercosts forpoliticalviolencegenerallyandterrorismspecifically.Moreover,inrelativelypoorcountries,asnotedalready,governmentshavelimitedresourcestoredressgrievancesortofightcounterinsurgencycampaigns.

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Rapid socioeconomic change increases the risks of terrorismEvidencecitedpreviouslysuggeststhatterrorismismostcommonincountriesinthemiddlerangeofeconomicdevelopment.Thisisso,theWorkingGroupconcluded,becauseeconomicchangecreatescon-ditionsconduciveforinstabilityandtheemergenceofmilitantmove-ments and ideologies, asMancurOlsonpointedout in the1960s.Differentaspectsofthegrowthprocesshavereinforcingeffects.Oneis the likelihood that somegroupswillgainmuchmoreadvantagefrom economic development than others. If inequalities increasealongpreexistinglinesofclassorethniccleavage,theincentivesforrevolutionaryorseparatistmovementsincreasemarkedly.Anotheristhatlargenumbersofpeopleareuprootedfromtraditionallifepat-terns,movingintocitiesandoccupationswheretheyareexposedtodiscrimination and become susceptible to new ideologies and newformsofpoliticalorganization.

Someobservers emphasize the social trauma thataccompaniesthisprocess.RikCoolsaethasarguedthatterrorismisbornnotoutofreligionorpovertybutoutofmarginalization.Anarchistterroristsofthenineteenthcenturyfoundanaudienceamongthemarginalizedworking classes.Fascists in the1930sappealed tonationalistsbutalsotopeoplelivinginthepersonaluncertaintycausedbytheGreatDepression.9YigalCarmon’scommentsfortheEconomicsWorkingGroupparallelCoolsaet’sinterpretationthatrapidmodernizationinthecontemporaryIslamicworldthreatenstraditionalpeople.Thosedisoriented by sweeping socioeconomic change are especially sus-ceptibletomovementsthatprovideexplanationsandaprogramofpoliticalaction.

Empowerment of women may reduce incentives for terrorismAlthoughwomenhaveoccasionallybeenrecruitedassuicidebomb-ers—amongPalestinians,SriLankanTamils,andChechens—ingen-eraltheyseldomsupportterrorism.Cross-nationalstudiesshowthatthehigherwomen’srelativeeducationalstatusandpoliticalparticipa-tion,thelesscommonarepoliticalviolenceandinstability.10Threecausal processes may be at work. First, educated and empoweredwomenmaysocializeyouthinwaysthatinhibittheirsusceptibilitytorecruitmentbyviolentorganizations.Second,theymayalsohelpstrengthen civil society organizations that provide alternatives topoliticalmilitancy.Andthird,inthelongerrun,women’seducationcontributestodecliningbirthrates,leadingtoareductionintherisksposedbylargeyouthpopulations.

ThegeneralconclusionoftheEconomicsWorkingGroupisthatstructured inequalities within countries—not poverty per se—are

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breedinggroundsforviolentpoliticalmovementsingeneralandterror-ismspecifically.Rapidsocioeconomicchangefeedsthisprocess.Thegrowthofinequalitiesacrosstheinterdependentglobalsystemhassim-ilarconsequences(seeAtanasGotchev’scontributioninthisbook).

PoliticalChoicesofTerrorismWhensystematic economicandpolitical inequalitiesacrossgroupscoincide with sharp restrictions on political rights, disadvantagedgroupsareripeforrecruitmentbypoliticalmovements.Ethnonation-alistandrevolutionarymovements like thoseofKosovarmilitants,Chechenrebels,andColombia’sMarxistFARCusuallyemergeinthecontextoflargerpoliticalconflictscenteredonthedemandsofdisad-vantagedgroups.Militantshavechoices.Theycanorganizestrikes,demonstrations,politicalagitation,economicboycotts,sabotage,orguerrillawarfare.Theirresorttoterrorismisoftenatacticinalargercampaignthatleaderschooseandthendiscarddependingonoppor-tunitiesandcosts.Arecentstudyshowsthat124outof399terroristgroupsareaffiliatesof,orsplitsfrom,politicalparties.11

In what circumstances do political movements shift to terror-ist strategies?Ageneralprinciple cited inworkingpapersbyZim-mermannandMichael Stohl, amongothers, is that semirepressiveregimescontribute to theescalationofpolitical conflicts to terror-ism by relying on an inconsistent mix of repression and reform.The prospect of reform increases militants’ incentives for politicalaction;theregime’suseofrepressionreducestheopportunitycostsofoppositionalviolence,includingterrorism;andinconsistencysignalsregimeweakness.Anothergeneralprinciple,mentionedbyAlexan-derSchmidandJoshuaSinai intheirworkingpapers, isthatsomeleaders choose terror tactics in expectation that governments willincreaserepression,leadingtoashiftinpublicsupportfromthegov-ernmenttotheterrorists’cause.Other,morespecificmechanismsarealso identified.Radicalization andawaveof terrorist attacksmayresultwhenmilitantscapitalizeonpopularoutrageaboutaspecifichostile event—for example theBloodySundaymassacrebyBritishsoldiersinLondonderryin1972,ArielSharon’svisittotheTempleMount/al-AqsaMosque in2000,and theU.S.-led invasionof Iraqin2003.Inothercasesradicalizationistheresultofspilloverfromconflictsinneighboringstates.

Diasporasalsomaypromote terrorist tactics (seeGabrielShef-fer’scontributioninthisbook).Shefferobservesthattwenty-sevenofthefiftymostactivecontemporaryterroristorganizationsareeithersegments of ethnonational or religious diasporas or are supportedbythem.MembersofdiasporasofKurds,Palestinians,Sikhs,Tam-

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EconomicFactors �1

ils,andmanyothersaremotivatedbydiscriminationandrepressionagainst kindred in their homelands—and elsewhere—to organizeand to support violent resistance. Diaspora activists are “sensitivetothemiseriesoftheirbrethreninhostlands,homelands,andthirdorfourthcountriesofresidence,”heobservedinhisworkingpaperfor theEconomicsWorkingGroup.Whentheysee thatnonviolentprotestisineffective,“theytendtobecomemoreaggressiveandformcellsandnetworksforplanningandexecutingviolentandterroristactivities.”Theydonotexpecttowinbysuchtacticsbutrathertodramatizeinjusticesandtocreateimperativesforreform.

Thepolicychallengeishowtoreducetheincentivesforgroupsinconflicttochooseterroristtacticsandhowtoincreasetheincentivestogiveitup.Ihaveadvocatedthegeneralprinciplethatdemocraticrightsandinstitutionsgiveactivistsincentivestoparticipateincon-ventionalratherthanviolentpolitics.Stohlobservedthatifgovern-ments follow strategies of political accommodation in response toterroristthreats,theymaynotdeteractiveterroristsbutarelikelytounderminesupportfortheminthelargerpopulation—whonolongerseearationaleforterrorism.Justasprovocativeactionsbygovern-mentscancauseabacklashthatprecipitatesterrorism,accommoda-tionbygovernmentscancauseabacklashagainstterrorists.12

IdeologiesofTerrorismIdeologiesarekeytotheriseofpoliticalterrorism.Radicaldoctrinesprofoundly affect how people interpret their situation, respond toeffortstomobilizethem,andchooseamongalternativestrategiesofpoliticalaction.Bjørgoobservedinhisworkingpaperthat“thepres-enceofcharismaticideologicalleadersabletotransformwidespreadgrievancesandfrustrationsintoapoliticalagendaforviolentstruggleisadecisivefactorbehindtheemergenceofaterroristmovement.”Militantandexclusionaryideologies—extremenationalism,jihadistdoctrines, militant Hinduism—all frame disaffected people’s ideasabout what is possible, permissible, and required. Zimmermannnotedthatsuchideologiescanshiftcost–rewardratiosbyconvincingpeopleinducedintoterroristactsthattheirsacrificeswillhavepay-offs—ifnotinthislifetheninthenext.

People whose lives are disrupted by rapid modernization, forexamplewhensuddenoilwealthprecipitatesachangefromtribaltohigh-techsocietiesinonegenerationorless,areespeciallysuscepti-bletoradicalideologies.Whentraditionalnormsandsocialpatternsbecomeirrelevant,peopleareripeforconversiontonewideologiesbasedonreligionornostalgiaforaglorious,mythicpast.IdeologiesderivedfromIslamicprinciplesarepowerfulbecause,fortraditional

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peopleinArabsocieties,religioncoversallaspectsoflifeandgivesmeaning, counsel, and justifications for action. Depending on thecontentofideologiesandtheobjectivesofthosewhopropagatethem,theymaycreateapotentialforpoliticalviolenceandterrorism.Rapidpolitical change and insecurity canhave similar consequences, forexampleopeningopportunitiesforprotagonistsofmilitantnational-isminEastCentralEuropeinthe1990s.

In a transnational world, ideologies also help members of far-flunggroupscoordinateaction.IdeologiesofPalestinianorKurdishorChechennationalismconnectdispersedcommunitiesinsupportofacommonobjectiveandalsofacilitatetheprovisionofinternationalsupport.Similarly,jihadistdoctrinehelpsIslamistmilitantsconnectwithmarginalizedpeoplethroughouttheMuslimworldwhoexperi-encewhatCoolsaetinhisrecentbookcalled“apersistentclimateofhumiliationandoppression.”13

Ideologiesdifferinbothtypeandfunction.Theymaybeusedtojustifynationalistaspirations,callsforrevolution,culturalpurifica-tion,oramixoftheseandothergoals.ShefferandGunningbothpointedoutintheirworkingpapersthatonlysomeMuslimactivistsare concerned about jihad; others have more limited political andwelfaregoals.Thus,Islamistdoctrinecanbeusedtopromotebothviolentactionandprovisionofwelfaregoals.Goldnotedinhiswork-ingpaperthatHamashasbecomeasuccessfulsocialserviceagency,whereastheTalibanfirstachievedprominencebyprovidingsecurityontraderoutesbetweenAfghanistanandPakistan.Hesuggestedthisinterpretation:Militantgroupsthatsupplylocalpublicgoodsrequiremechanismsthatallowthemtocontrolaccesstothegoodsandser-vicesbeingsupplied.Theneedtocontrolaccesshelpsexplaintheirresorttoviolence.Participationinviolencehelpstobindsmemberstothegroupandmakesitdifficultforthemtoleave,therebyprovidingasolutiontothefree-riderprobleminherentinallproductionofpublicgoods. Inbrief, theprovisionofwelfaregoodsandterroristactionjointlycontributetomaintenanceoftheorganizationaswellastothelong-runpursuitofleaders’politicalobjectives.

Gunning offered an important qualification of the assumptionthatideologiesdeterminepoliticalaction.Thecontentofideologyisinpartaproductofsocioeconomicandpoliticalchanges.HeusedHamas’sadvocacyofradicalsolutionsasanillustration.Itsconstitu-encyincludesahighpercentageofrefugesandasignificantpercentageofhighlyeducatedpeople.Politically,Hamasmembershavehadlittletrust in theefficacyof those inpower in thePalestinianAuthorityandevenlessconfidenceindialoguewithIsrael.Itsdoctrineofvio-lentstruggle,includingsupportofsuicideoperationsduringtheSec-

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ondIntifada,wasareflectionofthesetraits.TheadventofcontestedelectionsinthePalestinianAuthorityandtheIsraeliwithdrawalfromGazaevidentlyarepromptingashiftinHamasdoctrineawayfromsuicidebombingandtowardsconventionalpolitics.Iftheargumentiscorrect,Hamas’accessiontothepowerinthePalestinianAuthor-ity inSpring2006 likelywill reinforce this shift, thoughprobablywithoutaformalbreakfromHamas’coreideologicalcommitmenttoIsrael’sdestruction.Thegeneralpoint,accordingtoGunningisthat,“ideologyisnotaneternalgiven;itismoldedandre-moldedbythelifeexperiencesofthoseinventing,adoptingandadvocatingit.”14

Alexander Schmidofferedoneotherqualification inhiswork-ingpapers:Ideologyisnotalwaysnecessaryforterroristactivity.Acollectiveorindividualdesireforrevengeagainstactsofrepressionmaybemotivationenough.Similarly,henotedthatcriminalgroupslike theColombiandrug cartelshave engaged in terrorism topre-ventextraditionstotheUnitedStateswithoutanyglossofideology.Indeed,theterrorism–crimeconnectionisdiscussedatgreaterlengthinthenextsection.

FinancingTerrorismUnderwhatcircumstancesdomilitantsshiftfromusingterrorisminpursuitofethonational,religious,orrevolutionaryobjectivestoself-servingmaterialgain?JessicaSternhasquotedadisillusionedjihad-ist:“InitiallyIwasof theviewthat[the leaders]weredoing jihad,butnowIbelievethatitisabusinessandpeopleareearningwealththrough it…I thought [the leaders] were true Muslims, but now Ibelievethattheyarefraud,theyaresellingIslamasaproduct…FirstIwasthereforjihad,nowIamthereformyfinancialreasons.”15Thissharplyillustratesoneterrorist’sagendashift,motivatedbydisillu-sionwithcorruptleadersandhisownself-interest.Themoregeneralquestioniswhetherandwhyleadersandentiremovementschoosetoseekprivategain.

Astrongargumenthasbeenmadethatrebellionsaremotivatedbygreedratherthangrievance.PaulCollierandcollaboratorshaveinterpretedrebellionasanindustrythatgeneratesprofitsfromloot-ing, especially of primary commodity exports, and have reportedeconometric models and case studies generally consistent with thetheory.16Thequestioniswhetherasimilarmodelcouldbeproposedforpoliticalterrorism.Ifconsistentwithempiricalevidence,thisthe-orywouldimplyamuchcloserconnectionbetweeneconomiccondi-tionsandterrorismthantheevidencesurveyedattheoutsetofthischapterabouttheweakandindirectlinksamongpoverty,discrimi-nation,andterrorism.

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But I doubt that “terrorism as greed” is a sustainable generalargument.Leaders of terroristmovements aremoreplausibly con-ceivedaspoliticalentrepreneursmotivatedbypersonalandideologi-callydrivenpoliticalambition.Sharedideologyandsocialpressuresmotivate most rank-and-file, unless and until they become disillu-sioned like the jihadistquoted earlier. Schmid citeda studyof therecruitment motives reported by violent activists in Kashmir. Ofthem, approximately one-third were either jobless or classified asopportunists;anotherthirdjoinedoutofreligiousandpoliticalcon-victionorbecauseofattractiontothemovement;andathirdwererespondingtopeerpressure,persuasion,orthreats.17

Thelinkagebetweenterrorismandcrimeismainlyafunctionalone.Althoughpoliticalterrorismisoftencharacterizedasrebelliononthecheap,itdoesrequireresourcesforarms,logistics,andsus-tenanceandshelterforactivists.Consequently,terroristmovementsfrequentlyengageincriminalactivitytofinancetheiractivities,rely-ing on robbery; kidnapping for ransom; extortion; and traffickingin drugs, scarce commodities, or consumer goods. They also mayreceive funds and arms from diasporas, private sympathizers, andforeigngovernments.Alternatively,theycooperateorformallianceswithpreexistingcriminalnetworks.Iftheproceedsofcriminalactiv-ity are substantial and secure, they provide incentives for agendashiftsbysomemilitantsandinsomecasesforentiremovements.

TheProvisional IRAhadanestimated$10millionperannuminfunding,accordingtoa1990sstudy,someofitfromabroadbutmostlygainedfromrobberiesandracketeeringaswellasextortionandkidnapping,welfare fraud,andrunning illegaldrinkingclubs.TheIRAalsobranchedoutintolegitimatebusinessesincludingcon-structionfirms,shops,andpubs.18SomeIRAmembersmadetheirlivelihoodbysuchactivities;indeedsomemayhavejoinedtopursueprivate gains, but themovement as awholenever lost its primaryfocusongainingpoliticalascendancy.

ThemainColombianMarxist insurgentmovement,theFARC,has longhadacloserelationshipwithdrugcartels thatsomehavelabelednarcoterrorism.Bymostaccountsthelinkageisasometimealliancebasedonintereststhatmayormaynotcoincideatanygiventimeandplace.TheFARC’sfinancialbasisrestsonkidnappingand,especially,extortionofbothlegalandillicitbusinessesinareasunderitscontrol.In1977the“narcos”decidedtolocateprocessingfacili-tiesinFARC-controlledareasandreliedontheguerrillastomaintainorderandsecurityinexchangeforpayingproductiontaxes.Subse-quently,however,asthe“narcos”developedtheirownparamilitaries,thismarriageofconveniencebrokedown,andparamilitariesfought

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withguerrillasforlocalcontrol.TheFARCreportedlycontinuestoextract significant revenue from the coca trade but is not directlyengaged in growing, processing, or trafficking.19 The FARC’s offi-cialpositionisthatdrugsshouldbelegalized,yettheorganization’sfinancialdrugdependencepresumably affects leaders’ estimatesofthecostsandbenefitsofcontinuingtheirinsurgencydespiterecurrentgovernmentpeaceinitiatives.Bjørgosuggestedasageneralprinciplethat “leaders or factions within the militant movement sometimesopposepoliticalsolutionstotheconflictbecauseitwouldunderminetheirvested ‘business interests.’Whyshould theColombianFARCguerrillasseriouslysupportapeacesolutionwhentheyrunahighlysuccessful ransom-for-money business and collect protection taxesfromdrugbarons?”

Algeria’sIslamistinsurgentsofferacontrastingexample.InMir-iamLowi’sview“apoliticallymotivatedinsurgencyquicklyturnedintoaninstrumentofpredation.”Attheoutsetin1992theinsurgentssoughtfinancingthroughraidsandarmedrobberiesbutsoonshiftedto extortion and pillaging of commercial traffic, seizing property,andtaxinglocalpopulations.Theirnextstepwasinvolvementintheparalleleconomyandillicittradeinhashish,vehicles,andfoodprod-ucts.Algeriahasavastnumberofunemployedyoungmen,manyofwhomwereattractedtotheinsurgencybyeconomicopportunity.“Astheviolencebecameincreasinglyarticulatedwiththemicroeconomy,theinterestincapturingthestategavewaytolootingitand,eventu-ally,toholdingthestateatbaysoastofocussquarelyongainingandmaintainingaccesstoresources.ViolenceandtheIslamistinsurgencyprovidedacoverforcorruptionandcontraband.”20

A transnational example comes from the Balkans. Citing thecollaborationbetweentheKosovarethnonationalistswhooperatethroughout Albanian populated areas in the Balkans on the onehandandthefares—theAlbaniancriminalclannetworkthatsmug-glesarms,drugs,andpeopleacrossbordersofKosovo,Albania,andMacedoniaontheotherhand—Minchevacontendedinherworkingpaperthatcross-borderidentitynetworksandsharedideologyarekeyconditionsfortheestablishmentofterrorist–criminalalliances.Shenoted that transborder ethnonationalmovementsprovide thesettingsinwhichsuchlinkagesdevelop,thoughthemovementsarenot directly responsible for the cross-border export of terrorism,nordotheydirectlyengageincross-borderdrugsandweaponstraf-ficking.Ratherthediffusionofmilitarizedconflictacrossbordersfrom themovement’smoremobilized to lessmobilized segments,andworseyet,thenewconflictgeneratedinneighboringterritorymakespoliticalenterpreneursprofessional“weekendwarriors”and

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turnscriminalclanactivitiesintoaweaponssupplyenterpriseforrebels.21

Insummary,theexamplessuggestfourdifferentkindsofconnec-tionsbetweenterroristorganizationsandeconomiccrime.Economiccrimemaybe strictly functional, as itwas for the IRA,with littleeffectontheIRA’spursuitofitspoliticalobjectives.TheFARCcaseillustrateshowavailabilityofillegalfinancingmayleadtostrategicchange:inthiscase,hypothetically,tosustaintheinsurgencyratherthan to give up rents. Islamists inAlgeria have largely abandonedtheirrevolutionaryobjectivesandhavebecomepoliticalbandits.IntheBalkanstransborderethnictiesprovidethebasisforcollabora-tion between militants and international criminal networks. It isspeculatedthatIslamistdoctrinesimilarlyfacilitatestransstatelink-agesbetweenjihadistsandcriminalsinCentralAsiaandelsewhere.Inthesecasespoliticalandmaterialincentivesbecomeinextricablyconnected: Today’s terrorists probably are tomorrow’s traffickers,andviceversa.

InternationalandDomesticResponseStrategiesTheanalysesinthischaptersuggestanumberoflong-termstrategiesthatshouldreducetheincentivesandopportunitiesforallviolentpolit-icalmovements.Theyarenotlikelytodissuadecurrentlyactivegroupsfromusingterrorismbutinthelongrunshoulddryuptheirsupportandshouldchannelfuturegrievancesintoconventionalpolitics.

The first set of recommendations addresses the socioeconomicenvironmentsthatbreedterrorism:

1. The creation of strategies to mitigate the impact of rapidsocioeconomicchangeonvulnerablesegmentsofthepopula-tion in poorer countries—more specifically, the implemen-tationofinternationalaidandinvestmentpoliciesthathelpempowergroupsmostdirectlyaffectedtocontrolorinfluencethenatureandpaceofdevelopment.Itisespeciallyimportantto promote participation and opportunities for groups leftbehindinrapiddevelopment.Redistributionofnewwealthamong thepopulation in the formof educationandcorre-spondingjobopportunitiesisimportant.Educationwithoutopportunitiesisanexplosivecombination.Evenmoreexplo-sive is expansionof traditional Islamic education thatpro-videsnoskillsforparticipationinmodernizingsocietiesbutsanctionsjihadistresistancetomodernizationanditsagents.

2. Thepromotionofwomen’sliteracy,education,andeconomicand political participation. Almost everywhere women are

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less likely to join or support militant political movementsthanmenand,totheextenttheyareempowered,canprovideadomesticconstraintonterroristrecruitmentandaction.

3. Encouraging governments of heterogeneous societies toreducegroupdiscriminationandbarrierstodomesticsocio-economic mobility by promoting international norms ofequal rights, supporting small-scale private enterprise, andoffering inducements such as conditional economic assis-tanceandfavorabletradingpartnershipstogovernmentsthatimplementsuchpolicies.

4. Enlisting the cooperation of the private sector in long-runsocioeconomic reform efforts, for example by designinginvestment and employment strategies that help incorpo-rate disadvantaged and marginalized groups. Internationalcorporationsandinvestorsareinastrongpositiontoinflu-ence thepolicies of governments in host countries inwaysthatminimizerisksofterroristattacksontheirfacilitiesandpersonnel.

Thesecondsetofstrategiesdealswiththepoliticalenvironmentsthatfacilitateterrorism,ontheprinciplethatpoliticaldevelopmentisanessentialcomplementtosocioeconomicimprovements:

5. Promotingthegrowthofthemiddleandprofessionalclassesand their organizations. Middle-class, civil society groupsusuallyhavestrongincentivestosupportnonviolentpoliticsandtodiscouragemilitantsfromterroristactions.Terroristcampaigns have well-documented adverse effects on eco-nomicperformance.

6. In countries where political militants are active but havenot yet resorted to terrorism, encouraging governments todesign opportunities—political and economic ones—thataltercost–benefitcalculations forpoliticalactivists inwaysthat discourage recruitment to and support for terrorism.Promote political compromise with dissident groups, par-ticularlythosethathavebroad-basedsupport.Internationalengagementinsuchsituationsshouldbedoneinagreementwithlocalgovernmentsandsocialgroups;otherwiseitmayworsentheconflicts.

7. Countering the propagation of extremist ideologies, espe-cially but not only jihadist doctrines, and encouraging theinternational media, local schools, and public figures tochallenge and to provide alternatives to hate propaganda.

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Supporting mainstream Islamist scholarship, media, andreform programs. Devising programs that increase Mus-lims’favorableexposuretoWesternsocieties,forexamplebysponsoringshort-termvisitsofMuslimstudentstoWesterncommunities.

Long-runsocioeconomicandpoliticalpoliciestoreducetherisksofterrorismare easier to implement indemocracies thanautocracies.Western-style democracy is not a magic bullet, however. In somesocieties, transitions to democracy prompt cultural resistance andmaycreateshort-termopportunitiesforviolentpoliticalmovements.Internationalsupportforspecificreformslikethoselistedaboveisafirststep.Achievingthosereformswillcontributeoverthelongerruntotheemergenceofstrongandstabledemocracies.

It is also important,however, toaddress theproximate causesof terrorism.The thirdsetof recommendations, therefore,aims toreducethematerialandpoliticalresourcesofmilitantorganizations,andcallsfortheadoptionofthefollowingproposals:

8. Interruptingtheflowoffinancialresourcestomilitantgroupsisalreadybeingpursuedbytheinternationalcommunitybuthas limited effectiveness because (1) most terrorism is lowcost;and(2)militantshaverecoursetoalternativeremittancesystems, use of couriers, and fund-raising locally throughcrime.Attemptingtocutoffallinternationalfundsisimpos-sible,andforpoliciesnottobecounterproductive,newmeth-odsareneededtofocusoninformalmethods.Manycharitygroups are, first and foremost, engaged in activitieswhosepurposes are to enhance the cultural, civic and economicwell-beingof theirown communities.Thus it is importantto allow charities suspected of having funded terrorism tocontinuehelpingordinarypeoplewithinasystemof“robustchecksandbalances,asexemplifiedbytheapproachadoptedbytheUKCharityCommission”(accordingtoJeroenGun-ning’sworkingpaper).

9. Underminingpoliticalsupportformilitantsmaybeamorepotentstrategy.Internationally,diasporagroups—especiallythose in Western societies—can bring pressure to bear onactivistsintheirhomelandstofollowmoremoderatestrate-gies,especiallyifitcanbeshownthatthealternativeshavepotentialpayoffsforreducingtheirgrievances.Domestically,militantsalwaysfacerisksofdefectionand lossofsupportfromtheirpotentialsupporters.Offersofamnestyandeco-

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nomicincentivestofighterswhogiveuparmedstrugglehavelong been used to help defuse rebellions, and are equallyapplicabletoterroristmovements.Governmentsalsoshouldplayupthenegativeconsequencesofterroristacts,aimingtodelegitimateterroristsintheeyesoftheirsupportgroups.

10. Betterinternationalcoordinationandjointactionareessen-tial. Regional and international organizations should takethe lead in containing cross-border terrorism generated byregionalconflictsintheBalkans,CentralAfrica,theMiddleEast, and elsewhere, provided this is done in cooperationwiththeauthoritiesandcivilsocietyorganizationsofcoun-triesineachregioninconflict.Inaddition,allgovernmentsshouldcreatecentralauthoritiesforinternationalcoordina-tionagainstinternationalterrorismandcrimethatarecapa-bleof taking swift, jointactionwithcounterparts inothercountries.Thecreationandnetworkingof suchauthoritiesshould help compensate for the fact that judicial and lawenforcementsystemsarestillmainlynational,whereasbor-dershavebecomemuchmoreporousinwaysthatfacilitateinternationalterrorismandcrime.

Endnotes1. QuotedinAlanB.KruegerandJitkaMalekčová,“Education,Pov-

erty,PoliticalViolenceandTerrorism: IsThereaCausalConnec-tion?” Journal of Economic Perspectives17,no.4(2004):119–44.

2. Workinggroupmembersare listedbelow.TheirworkingpapersareincludedintheClubdeMadrid’sDocumentLibraryathttp://summit.clubmadrid.org/info/document-library.html.

AlbertoAbadie,HarvardUniversity JoseAntonioAlonso,UniversidadComplutensedeMadrid ToreBjørgo,NorwegianPoliceUniversityCollege YigalCarmon,MiddleEastMediaResearchInstitute,USA SueEckert,BrownUniversity DavidGold,NewSchoolUniversity,NewYork Atanas Gotchev, University of National and World Economy,

Bulgaria JeroenGunning,UniversityofAberystwyth,Wales JitkaMalečková,RussellSageFoundation,NewYork(withdrew) LyubovMincheva,UniversityofSofia,Bulgaria Alex Schmid, United Nations Office for the Prevention of

InternationalTerrorism(advisorymember) GabrielSheffer,HebrewUniversityofJerusalem JoshuaSinai,independentresearcher,USA

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MichaelStohl,UniversityofCaliforniaatSantaBarbara EkkartZimmermann,DresdenUniversityofTechnology.3. SeeAlbertoAbadie,“Poverty,PoliticalFreedom,andtheRootsof

Terrorism” (workingpaper10859,National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10859); and KruegerandMalekčová,“Education,Poverty,”137–41.Other evidence isreviewed inToreBjørgo (ed.),Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and Ways Forward(London:Routledge,2005).

4. DavidKeen,“TheEconomicFunctionsofViolence inCivilWar”(AdelphiPaperno.320,InternationalInstituteofStrategicStudies,1998).

5. Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani F. Emizet, “The Economicsof Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,”in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1: Africa,ed.PaulCollierandNicholasSambanis(Washington,DC:WorldBank,2005),63.

6. TedRobertGurr,Why Men Rebel(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniver-sityPress,1970),chs.1–5.

7. Bjørgo,Root Causes,ch.20.8. KruegerandMalekčová,“Education,Poverty,”125–9.9. RikCoolsaet,Al-Qaeda: The Myth. The Root Causes of Interna-

tional Terrorism and How to Tackle Them(Ghent,Belgium:Aca-demiaPress,2005).

10. See Mary Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role of GenderInequality in Predicting Internal Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly49(2005):161–78.

11. AmiPedahzurandLeonardWeinberg,Political Parties and Terror-ist Groups(London:Routledge,2003).

12.SeeJeffreyIanRossandGurr,“WhyTerrorismSubsides:ACom-parativeStudyofCanadaandtheUnitedStates,”Comparative Poli-tics21,no.4(1989):405–26.

13. Coolsaet, Al-Qaeda.14. Quotationsare fromJeroenGunning’sworkingpaper for theEco-

nomicsWorkingGroup.Alsoseehis“PeacewithHamas?TheTrans-formingPotentialofPoliticalParticipation,”International Affairs80,no.2(2004):233–56;andJohnTirmanandMarianneHeiberg(eds.),Turning the Tables on Terrorism: Understanding Protracted Con-flicts (Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,inpress).

15. JessicaStern,Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill(NewYork:HarperCollins,2003),213–7.

16. TheargumentandevidencewerefirstpresentedinCollierandAnkeHoeffler,“GreedandGrievanceinCivilWar”(workingpaper2355,WorldBankPolicyResearch,Washington,DC,WorldBank,2001).Theargumenthasnowbeen evaluated in a seriesof comparativecasestudies inCollierandSambanis (seenote5).Support forthegeneralargumentisqualifiedatbest.

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EconomicFactors 101

17. Citing Paul Medhurst, Global Terrorism: A Course Produced by UNITAR(NewYork:UNITAR,2000),68.

18. JohnHorganandMaxTaylor,“Playingthe‘GreenCard’—Financ-ingtheProvisionalIRA:PartI,”Terrorism and Political Violence 11,no.2(1999):1–38.

19. Information in thisparagraph isdrawn fromJenniferS.Holmes,SheilaAminGutiérrezdePiñeres,andKevinM.Curtin,“ASubna-tionalStudyofInsurgency:FARCViolenceinthe1990s.”Thistextcanbeviewedathttp://usregsec.sdsu.edu/docs/holmes3.

20.MiriamR.Lowi,“Algeria,1990–2002:AnatomyofaCivilWar,”inCollier(seenote5),232–3.

21. TheselinksareexploredinLyubovMincheva,“Cross-BorderTer-rorism:EconomicandRelatedCauses”(workingpaperfortheEco-nomicsWorkingGroup).Theyarenowthebasisforajointresearchprojectwiththeauthorofthischapter.

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8TerrorismandGlobalization

AtanasGotchev

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States andthe subsequentwar on terrorism, someof the debate focusedon therootcausesof terrorismandpossible response strategies.Partof thisdebateaddressedglobalizationandwhetheritprovidesincentivesandfacilitates international terrorism. Though no empirical studies pro-videconclusiveevidence thatglobalizationcreates terrorism, someoftheliteratureimpliesthatcertainaspectsofthisphenomenonmaycre-ate incentives for terrorismandsuggests that inaglobalizedworld itbecomesmucheasier toorganize, tofinance,and to sustain terroristtacticsandactivities.Thepurposeofthiscontributionistoexplainthedynamicsbehindtherelationshipbetweenterrorismandglobalizationandtoshowhowsomeofitsmaligneffectscouldbeaddressed.

Over the past twenty-five years, globalization has been a hotlydebatedphenomenon.Mostcommonly,itisassociatedwiththedevel-opmentofglobalproductionandmarketsandtheirsocial,political,andculturalconsequences.Themajorityofanalysestakeaneconomicper-spectiveandassociateitwithincreasedeconomicintegration,growthofinternationalexchange,andinterdependence.1Fromthisperspective,globalization implies liberalization—that is, the elimination of staterestrictionsontradeandforeignexchangeaswellasthereductionofcontrolsonmovementsof capital, labor,knowledge, and technology.Globalization is, however, also regarded as a phenomenon broughtaboutbytechnologicalandsocialchange,furtheringthelinksofhumanactivitiesacrossregionsandcontinents.2

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Theglobalizationdiscoursecutsacrosstheideologicalspectrumandacademicdisciplines.Itisveryheated,contentious,andpolarized.Proponentsofglobalizationregarditasapanacea,promotingeco-nomicgrowthandprosperityandspreadingthevaluesofdemocracy,restrictinggovernmental interference in the international economy,andenhancingtheeasewithwhichlabor,ideas,capital,technology,andprofitscanmoveacrossborders.Thedefendersofglobalizationalsoarguethatithasprovidedopportunitiesforenormouseconomicandsocialbenefits,particularlyforcountriesthathavemanagedtousetheopportunitiesprovidedbyglobalmarkets.

Opponents of globalization regard it as a thoroughly negativeprocess,increasingthedominationandcontrolofdevelopednationsofthepoorandlessdevelopedones.AsobservedbyDouglasKellner,forcriticsglobalizationisacoverforglobalcapitalismandimperial-ismandiscondemnedasanotherformofimpositionofthelogicofcapitalandthemarketonmoreregionsoftheworld.3Forinstance,JamesPetrasandHenryVeltmeyercontendedthat“althoughglobal-izationispresentedasaneconomicprocess,aparadigmfordescrib-ingandexplainingworldwidetrends,itisbetterviewedasapoliti-calproject,adesiredoutcomethatreflects the interplayofspecificsocio-economicinterests.”4Theyarguedthatglobalizationprovidesan inadequate description and understanding of worldwide trendsandthattheconceptofimperialismismoresuitableinthisregard.Fromthisperspective,globalizationcanberegardedasanewformof imperialism, suggesting power struggles, the domination of thestronger,and—therefore—asequenceofconflicts.

Thisbriefoutlineoftheopposingperspectivesdemonstratesthatglobalizationhastoberegardedasacomplexandcontradictorypro-cesswithpositiveandnegativeattributes.Accordingtotheadvocatesof globalization, interdependence should result in a dynamic andconstantly modernizing world of prosperous nations.5 However, itmustbetakenintoaccountthatintegrationintheworldeconomyhasbeenuneven,withtheeffectsofglobalizationdifferingfromnationtonation.Theconsequencesofglobalizationaremainlypositiveforthe developed countries of the West and the newly industrializednations—theso-calledtrueglobalizers—andlargelynegativefortheweakglobalizersfromthelessdevelopedworld.

A World Bank study on globalization, growth, and povertysuggested that weak globalizers increasingly diverge from theglobal econonomic decline.6 In the context of the global econ-omy,suchcountriestendtobeeconomicallymarginalized.Weakglobalizers become less competitive, incomes fall or stagnate,absolute poverty grows, social stratification increases, and—in

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TerrorismandGlobalization 10�

manycases—lifeexpectancydeclines.Thesocialconsequencesareunemployment,politicaltension,andthegrowthofreligiousfunda-mentalism.Largestrataof thepopulation insuchcountriesregardglobalizationasimposedfromthehegemoniccapitalistcountriesandinternationalfinancial institution.This, indirectly, createsanenvi-ronmentthatcanfacilitateviolentbehaviorandactsofterrorism.

The group of weak globalizers largely comprises African andMuslimcountries,someofwhichhavebeenstronglyassociatedwithterrorism. In fact, as Edward Gresser noted, most of the Muslimcountriesweresteadilydeglobalizedoverthelasttwenty-fiveyears.UnlikeEastAsia,thegrowingshareofyoungpeople,especiallymen,inrelationtotheoverallpopulation—thedemographicbulge—andurbanizationintheMuslimworldhavebeenaccompaniedbyshrink-ingsharesinworldtradeandinvestment.In1980,about13.5percentofworldexportscamefromthesecountries,whereasin2002thefig-urewasabout4percent.In2001theMuslimworld—withapopu-lationof1.3billionpeople—receivedbarelyasmuchforeigndirectinvestmentasSweden,acountrywithapopulationofninemillionpeople.DeglobalizationmademanyMuslimcountriespoorer—theper capita grossdomestic productofArab countries, for instance,hasshrunkbynearly25percentsince1980,fallingfrom$2,300to$1,650.7

Thoughthereviewoftheglobalizationdebatepresentedhereisfar fromcomprehensive, it suggests that globalizationhas resultedinunevendevelopmentand inequitabledistributionof thepositiveeffects of globalization across countries. As noted by Veltmeyer,RobertKapstein,thendirectoroftheCouncilonForeignRelations,pointedoutasearlyas1996thatneoliberalcapitalismbearsaten-dencytowardexcessivesocialinequalitiesinthedistributionofglobalresourcesandincome.This,hecontinued,ledto“socialdiscontentthe forcesofwhichcouldbemobilizedpolitically inways thataredestabilizingforthedemocraticregimesandthesystemasawhole.”8The deepening division between true and weak globalizers in the2000scanthusbeseenascreatingapermissiveenvironmentforter-rorism.Thisenvironmentincludesbothincentivesandopportunitiestoorganize,finance,andcarryoutterroristacts.

GlobalizationAsaCauseandMotivationforTerroristActivities

Globalization has increased inequalities and social polarizationwithinandbetweennations.Althoughdifferentstudiesfailtoprovideconclusiveevidencethatpovertyandinequalityaredirectlylinkedto

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terrorism, it is evident that economic deprivation increases thedemands forpolitical change.Economicdisparitiesusually lead topoliticalupheavalsandcouldinviteinterestedgroupstoresorttoter-rorismasamethodofachieving thedesiredgoals.AsToreBjørgonoted,povertyhasfrequentlybeenusedasjustificationforviolencebysocialrevolutionaryterrorists,whoclaimtorepresentthepoorandmarginalizedstratawithoutbeingpoorthemselves.9Suchterrorismismorecommonlyassociatedwithcountrieswithamediumlevelofdevelopment and whose societies are characterized by rapid mod-ernizationandtransition(seeTedRobertGurr’scontributioninthisbook).

Thecurrentunequalstatusquoofwealthandcapitalaccumula-tionindevelopedcountriescouldprovokewavesofterroristactsjus-tifiedbythecauseforfairerdistributionofglobalwealth.The2000–2001WorldBankDevelopmentReportindicatedthat2.8billionoftheworld’ssixbillionpeoplearelivingonlessthantwodollarsadaywithlimitedaccesstoeducationandhealthcareandlackofpoliticalpowerandvoice,leavingthemthereforeextremelyvulnerabletoillhealth, economicdislocation,personalviolence,andnaturaldisas-ters.10Sustainingthisworldorderonlybymeansofmilitarypowerandwithoutlong-termefficientdevelopmentalstrategiesisboundtoprovokeresistance.Militantgroupscouldjustifyterrorismasalastresort,excusingitasatacticalresponseoftheweak.Inotherwords,thecauseofajustdistributionofglobalwealthmaybecomeoneofthecontributingfactors forcyclesofasymmetricalwarfareagainsttherichercountriesandtheirallies.

TheUnitedNationshasrecognizedtheimportanceofaddress-ingtheissuesofpovertyandterrorisminacomprehensiveway.TheaftermathoftheSeptember11attacksandthesubsequentwaragainstterrorismsuggestthatconfrontingterrorismonlywithmilitaryforce,while failing to deal with the issues of poverty and inequality, isboundtocreateweakclientregimesthatareunabletowithstandthepressures of globalization. Such states cannot apply the principlesofgoodgovernance,theyexperiencepovertyandinstability,whichleadstooppositionandviolenceandthuscreatesthebreedinggroundforterrorism.

Globalization,however,alsofosterspoliticalandculturalresis-tance.Thedevelopmentofglobalmarkets forgoods, services,andcapitalcompelssocietiestoaltertheirculturalpractices.Globaliza-tion brings about cultural Westernization and destroys traditionalwaysoflife.Inresponse,thisprovokesoppositionofbroadsegmentsin the affected societies, providing another justification for terror-ism.11 Indeed, the infiltration of a supposedly alien and corrupt

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culture isusedbynationalistandradicalreligiousmovementsasawayof explaining their campaigns.They claim that their violencehasthepurposeofcleansingtheirsocietiesandculturefromforeigninfluence.Inreality,theseareoftenmereexcuses,yetitisalsotruethat the“threat to the localwayof life”hasbecomeaconvenientmotivationandjustificationforterroristactivities.12

GlobalizationandtheDevelopmentofNewMinoritiesThereare,however,evenmoretangiblewaysthatglobalizationhascreated conditions inwhich terrorism canflourish.Wagedifferen-tials,differencesincareeropportunities,andtheprovisionofpub-lic servicesacross countries coupledwith theavailabilityofglobaltransportation and communication networks have brought aboutunprecedented global migration to countries which provide betteropportunities in termsofhumandevelopment.Thishas led to thedevelopmentofnewminorities in settled societies,manyofwhicharelinkedtokindredgroupselsewhere.Asimilarprocessoccurredinthe1960sand1970swhenasaresultofdecolonizationnewminor-itygroupsappearedincountrieslikeFranceandBritain.Becauseofdifferentials in incomesandstandardsof living,migrationstreamsfromthelessdevelopedworldflowtowardnotonlythemostdevel-oped industrial countriesbut also the emergingmarket economiesandtomedium-incomecountriesinCentral,Eastern,andSouthernEurope.Moreover,processesofmigrationalsooccuramongthelessdevelopedcountriesandintheArabworld—forinstance,fromIraqtoJordanorfromEgypttoJordan.

ThisprocessanditsimplicationscanbeillustratedbylookingattheBulgarianborderstatisticsfortheyears2002and2003.Thisdataindicatethatthedifferencebetweenrecordedarrivalsanddeparturesisapproximately300,000peopleannually.OneoftheassumptionsisthatalargepercentageofthesepeoplestayinBulgariainanefforttoexploreopportunitiesformovingfurtherwestintotheenlargedEuro-peanUnion(EU)zone.Indeed,asimilarsituationcanbeobservedinotherEUaccessioncountries,suchasRomania.Theissueofconcernisthat,foracountrylikeBulgariawithapopulationofaroundeightmillion,thefigureissubstantial.Ifoneassumesthatalloftheillegalimmigrants stay inBulgaria, then the size of this new communitymaysoonbecomeequaltothatoftheRomaminorityinBulgaria.

Segments of these minorities participate in criminal activities,andthiscanhelptofacilitateterrorism,especiallysincethedistinc-tionbetweenpoliticalandcriminalisbecomingincreasinglyblurred.AsLyubovMinchevaobserved,theSerbiancriminalmafia,theAlba-niandrugmafia,andBosnianMuslims terrorists frequentlyact in

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concert and engage in“marriagesof convenience”not topromoteWahhabismbuttopursuetheirsharedinterestinmakingmoney.Like-wise,criminalgroupsliketheColombiandrugcartelshaveengagedinterrorismtopreventextraditiontotheUnitedStateswithoutanyglossof ideology.Suchmalignconnectionsareevidentnotonly intheBalkansbutalso intheCaucusesand inLatinAmerica.Theselinkages often arise from what could be described as the politicaleconomyofconflict.Eveniftheinitialmotivationofmilitantgroupsto turn to crimewas tofinance theirpolitical activities, over timepoliticstendstobecomeamereexcuseforcrimeforprofit.Bjørgopointsoutthatleadersorfactionswithinmilitantmovementssome-timesopposepoliticalsolutionstoconflictbecausethiswouldunder-minetheirvestedbusinessinterests.WhyshouldtherebeapoliticalsolutionoftheTransnistrianconflictinMoldovaoroftheconflictsin theCaucuses,when theopposingpartiescan takeadvantageofsmuggling alcohol, tobacco, consumer goods, weapons, and drugsandcanseizetheopportunitythatexistssimplybecausetheareaoftheconflictisoutofthecontroloftaxandcustomsauthorities?13

Morespecifically,theinvolvementofthenewminoritiesinthesenetworkscouldbesaidtofacilitateinternationalterrorisminthreerelatedways.First,itimprovesterrorists’logisticalsupport.Organizedcrime and terrorist groups frequently use similar—sometimes thesame—means and routes for moving materials, people, and fundsacross boundaries. The so-called Informal Value Transfer Systems(i.e., underground banking networks) were originally designed toservetheneedsofminoritygroupswhowantedtosendtoorreceivefunds from their families.The improved versionsof such systems,however,weredevelopedbycriminalgroupsandarenowalsousedbyterroristgroups.

Second, new minorities provide additional sources of funding.Someoftheproceedsoriginatingfromtheillegalbusinessesofmem-bersofthenewminoritiesendupfundingterroristgroups.Thesecanbeeitherpaymentsforprotectionandtaxesimposedbyterrorists,agoodwillgestureofprosperousmembersofthecommunity,orasplitofprofitsofajointcriminal–terroristoperation.Itshouldbenotedthat it is not only illegal businesses that secure funds. Legitimatebusinessoperationsrunbynewminoritygroups—usuallysmallandmedium-sizedbusinesses—couldalsobetrackedassponsorsofter-rorism.14Furthermore, inmanydevelopedcountries,newminoritygroupshaveestablishedculturalinstitutions,whichoperateaschari-tiesandhavebeenimplicatedinthedonationofmillionsofdollarstovariousterroristorganizations.15Thesignificanceofthedifferentfundingschemesinwhichnewminoritygroupsareinvolvedvaries,

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andnotallofthemareamajorfundingsourceofterrorism.However,thistypeoffundingisanimportantenablerofterroristactivities,asitdiversifiesfundingandmakesitmoredifficulttotrack.Lastbutnotleast,itshouldbepointedoutthatevenrelativelysmallamounts—forinstance,earnedinsinglesmugglingoralegitimatebusinessopera-tion—canbeusedtocausedisproportionatedamage.

Third,newminoritiesarea sourceofhumancapital for inter-nationalterrorism.InSheffer’scontributioninthisbook,hepointsoutthattwenty-sevenofthefiftymostactiveterroristorganizationstodayareeithersegmentsofethnonationalorreligiousdiasporasoraresupportedbythem.Minorities’attractiontoparticipateinterror-ismmayresultfromideologicalorreligioussentiments.Ontheotherhand, terrorist organizations actively recruit members of minoritycommunitieswhoresideintheindustrializedworld,particularlyintheir Western host countries. From the terrorists’ perspective, theminorities’ education, training, and living experience in the Westincreasesthechancesforsuccessincarryingoutaterroristact,espe-ciallycomparedtoaterroristwhoisresidinginalessdevelopedpartoftheworld.

GlobalizationandthePoweroftheNationStateAnotheraspectworthyofconsiderationistheconsequencesofglo-balizationforthenationstate.Thedebateaboutthefateofthenationstateishighlypolarizedanddrawsonvariouschangesingovernancethatmayaccompanytheprocessesofglobalization.Divergingviewsrangefromthepositionthatglobalizationhaseliminatedstatesover-eigntyor—atbest—diminisheditinfavorofglobalcorporatepowertothepositionthatglobalizationhasnotunderminedstatehoodatall.Adifferent,andperhapsmorepromising,approach is to focusnotsomuchonthepowerofcontemporarystatesbutratheronhowitsfunctionshavechanged.

Therecanbenodoubt, forexample, thatasaresultofglobal-izationgovernmentshaveexperiencedadecline in theircapacity tocontroltheireconomies.Inthe1990sandearly2000s,thevolatilityofglobalforeignexchangemarketshastriggeredwavesoffinancialcrises affecting even thedeveloped economiesofBritain, Italy, andSweden.Inlessdevelopedcountries,thediminishedpowerofthestatetocontroltheeconomyhasledtogovernmentalcollapseandstatefail-ure.Inpostcommunistcountries,thespin-offeffectsofthetransitiontowarddemocratization,economicrestructuring,andreintegrationintheglobaleconomyhaveweakenedtheeconomicandpoliticalcontrolofthestate,resultinginthefailureoflawenforcementandthegrowthofcrimeaswellasdeepeningincomestratification.Furthermore,the

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fact that international financial institutions grant financial supportbasedonanumberofconditionalitiesalsorestrictpolicyoptionsofbeneficiarygovernments.Taking intoaccount thatdevelopedcoun-triesdominatetheseinstitutions,foreignaidpoliciesbasedonneolib-eralrecipesandunpopularausteritymeasures,implementedbyben-eficiarygovernments,haveprovokedpopularprotests andhave ledtodifferentformsofmobilization,particularlyinthelessdevelopedworld.Thediminishedcapacityofthelessdevelopedcountriestocon-troltheireconomies,theweakenedcapacityoflawenforcement,theimpositionofWesternmarketvaluesandinstitutionsthroughthepro-gramsoftheinternationalfinancialinstitutionsandotherdonorsarephenomena,atleastinpartassociatedwithglobalization.Althoughthesephenomenashouldnotberegardedasaprimefactor,theyhaveprovidedjustificationsforextremistmovementstoresorttoviolenceasatacticalweapon.

The growth of nonstate actors is another argument used toexplainthediminishedroleofthestate intheeraofglobalization.Thisprocesshasawide rangeof implications,both related to thefunctioningof the international systemand state governance.Oneoftheseisthattheincreasingprominenceofthenonstatesectorhascreatedopportunitiesforterroristorganizationstoavoiddirectlinkswith the stateand, inparticular,with states sponsoring terrorism.Terroristgroupshaveincreasinglybeguntorelyonamorphoussup-portersandfinancialsources.Oneoftheconsequences,aspointedoutbyMatthewMorgan,isthatwhenterroristsdonotrelyondirectstatesponsorship,theybecomelessaccountableandhardertotrack.At the same time, states sponsoring terrorismexercise less controloverandhavelessofaninterestinmaintainingcomprehensiveintel-ligenceonradicalterroristorganizations.16Thisoutcomeofglobal-ization makes contemporary international terrorism more difficulttomonitorandtopredictandlimitstheutilityoftraditionalpoliti-calanddiplomaticinstruments,whichcannotbeappliedeffectivelyagainstelusiveandobscurenonstateactors.

Moreover,thoughthespreadofnewtechnologieshasproducedconsiderable benefits in terms of productivity growth, it has alsoincreasedthedestructivenessandeffectivenessofweapons.Inturn,globaltradeandtransportationhaveproliferatednewweaponsandhavemade themmore readilyaccessible.Asa result, globalizationhasprovidednewopportunitiesforterroristorganizationstoacquireandtousemoreefficientanddeadlierweaponsandtoperformmorespectacularanddestructiveterroristacts.Ithasalsobenefitedterror-istgroupsintermsoftargeting.17Fastertravelandbettercommunica-tiontechnologiesfacilitatetheoperationsofterroristgroupsandalso

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TerrorismandGlobalization 111

makeiteasiertospreadradicalideasthatmayinflamelargeconstitu-encies.Thisassiststerroristsinfund-raising,inrecruitingfollowers,and in mobilizing support for terrorist groups. At the same time,thesinewsofglobalization—frompipelinesandelectricitygrids tonuclearpowerplantsandcommunicationnetworks—providearangeofsofttargetsforinternationalterrorism.

Finally, globalization has caused changes in the organizationalbehaviorstructuresofterroristorganizations.Theglobaloperationsoftransnationalcorporationshaveprovidedagoodexampletoter-roristgroupsforhowtoplan, toorganize,andtoaccomplishtheirobjectivesattheinternationallevel.Muchlikethesecorporations,ter-roristgroupshaveevolvedorganizationally.AspointedoutbyMor-gan, terrorist groups have moved from strict hierarchical, or verti-cal, structures tomorehorizontal andmoreflexibleorganizationalarrangements.18Thecapacitytoadapttochangescopiedfromthebestpracticemodelsoftransnationalcorporationshasallowedanumberofterroristgroupstorecruitsupporters,tosecurefunds,andtocon-cealoperationsinspiteofglobaleffortstocurbterroristactivities.

ResponseStrategiesThereisnoeasyanswertothequestionofwhatourresponseshouldbetothedevelopmentscausedbyglobalization.Globalizationisonlyone of many factors that influence the development of terrorism.Indeed,ashighlightedthroughoutthisbook,terrorismisacomplex,multifaceted phenomenon and obviously requires a comprehensiveand consistent response strategy. To be effective, such a strategyneedstobebasedonawideinternationalconsensus,includingthedefinitionofterrorism,bothacademicandlegal;appropriateantiter-roristpolicies,strategies,andtactics;aswellasthemethodsoftheirimplementation. Response strategies also require a comprehensivecoordinationofmultilateral,bilateral,andnationalefforts.

Anyattempttodesignantiglobalizationmeasures isunrealisticandlikelytofail.Atthesametime,policiestomitigatesomeofthedownsideeffectsofglobalizationmayrestrictthebaseofterrorismintermsofmotivationandjustificationofterroristactivities.Thesearelong-termdevelopmentalstrategies,whichdonotaimattheeradi-cation of terrorism but at developing a social and economic envi-ronmentthatwilldiscreditterrorismasameanstoachievepoliticalends.Inthisrespect,strategiestoreintegrateweakglobalizersintotheworldeconomyareanimportantpartofthelong-termdevelop-mentalresponsetoterrorism.Suchstrategiesarelikelytocurbgriev-ancesarisingfromglobalinequalities,todecreaseanti-Westernsenti-ments,andtocurbreligiousfundamentalism.Moreover,althoughthe

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integrationintheglobaleconomyisaprocessthatcanbecontrolledbygovernmentsonlytoalimitedextent,multilateraleffortsbyindus-trialized countries may facilitate the access of weak globalizers toworldmarkets.Forexample,developingaduty-freeregimefortheirproducts and facilitating their membership in international tradeorganizationsisoneofthepossibleapproaches.Thiscouldbeaccom-paniedbysubsidizedtransferofkeyinputsandtechnologies.19

CraginandChalkpointedout that the successofdevelopmen-talpoliciesincounteringterrorismisstronglyrelatedtothetypeofprojectsandthemodeofimplementation.Theyarecorrectinsayingthatunderfundedandpoorlyexecuteddevelopmentalprojectscould“actasadouble-edgedswordbyprecipitatingarevolutionofrising(andunfulfilled)expectations.”20Thisobservationcanbeconfirmedbytheexperienceofdevelopmentalprojectsincountriesintransition.Thereisabundantevidenceindicatingthatinappropriatelydesignedprojectsaimedatalleviatingthesituationofminorityandunderprivi-legedgroupsintransitioneconomiesleadtohigherlevelsofdiscon-tent and tensiononce the funding is exhausted. Suchprojects tendtobeperceivedbythebeneficiariesasapermanentsolution,givingrisetounjustifiedexpectationsforaquickandlong-lastingimprove-ment.Developmentalprojectsshouldthereforehavetheappropriatelevelof fundingcommitment,and theprojects shouldbe sustainedfora relatively longperiodof time.Governmentswilling to imple-mentdevelopmentalprojectsshouldbeencouragedandshouldreceiveappropriate technical assistance and positive inducements, such asconditionaleconomicassistance.However,economicincentivesandconditionalitiesneedtobelinkedverycarefullytoavoidpossibleanti-Westernsentiments.

Bjørgopointsout that educationand relatedopportunities areanimportantelementinchangingthesocioeconomicenvironmentsthatbreedterrorism.21Itisimportanttoconsider,however,thatdif-ferentagegroupsrespondtoeducationdifferently,anditisthereforeimportant to tailor these initiatives carefully. For example, educa-tionalprogramstargetingearlyageeducation(i.e.,preschoolandpri-maryschool)tendtobemoreeffectiveinthelongerrun.Experiencesuggests that stronger andmore sustainable long-term impacts areachieved if earlyage education is coupledwithwomen’s educationandempowerment(seeTedRobertGurr’scontributioninthisbook).Thiscanbeoneofthepossibleapproachestocountertheexpansionofextremistfundamentalistideologies.

Anumberofshort-termandcoercivemeasuresshouldbetaken.Curbingterroristfinancing, forexample,couldbemoreefficient ifthere isacoordinatedeffort tofightboth terrorismandorganized

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crime.Sinceterrorismandorganizedcrimedeveloplinkageswhichhelp them resist international action, it is necessary to design andcoordinate strategies aimed at both terrorism and crime. Thoughinternationalcooperation inthefightagainstcrimehasa longhis-tory,internationalcooperationagainstterrorismisstillinitsnascentstage.Thecreationofanewinternationalregime,forinstance,shouldaimtocompensateforthesituationthatjudicialandlawenforcementsystemsarenational,whereas terrorismandcrimeare increasinglyinternationalized.The effort to restrict the funding sourcesof ter-rorismshouldalsoconsiderenhancedborderandcustomscontrolsaimedatrestrictingillegaltransfersofweapons,drugs,andpeople,particularly incases inwhich transfersoriginate fromdestinationssuspected tohave linkageswith terroristgroups.Thesehave tobecomplementedbythedevelopmentofmoresophisticatedmechanismsaimedatpreventingmoneylaundering.Althoughdifficulttoaccom-plish,seriousattentionshouldbegiventomoneytransfersbycouriersandinformalvaluetransfersystems.Furthermore, therearestrongindicationsthatsometerroristgroupsusecharitiesasanimportantfunding source. A system of enhanced control of such activities,whileguaranteeingthefreedomofsuchorganizationstoattaintheircharitablemissions,shouldbedeveloped.Finally,althoughterrorismhasevolvedandrelieslessonopenstatesponsorship,itisprematureto regard state sponsored terrorismasanunimportant factor.Bet-terinternationalcoordinationandjointactionareessentialforcon-strainingthistypeofterrorism.

Endnotes1. SeeRobertKeohaneandJosephNye,“Globalization:What’sNew

andWhat’sNot?(andSoWhat?),”Foreign Policy118,no.2(2000),pp.104-119.

2. See, for example, Keohane, “The Globalization of Informal Vio-lence, Theories of World Politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear,’”International Organization 52, no. 1 (2002): 29–30. Jan AartScholtearguedthattheideationalandmaterialdriversofglobaliza-tionarecodeterminingandthatglobalizationcanbeexplainedwithreferencetotrendsinproduction,governance,identity,andknowl-edge.SeeScholte,Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Basing-stoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2005),esp.pp.20–2,andch.4.

3. DouglasKellner,Globalization,TerrorismandDemocracy:9/11andIts Aftermath in http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/globalizationterroraftermath.pdf.

4. JamesPetrasandHenryVeltmeyer,“WorldDevelopment:Global-izationorImperialism?”inGlobalization and Antiglobalization: Dynamics of Change in the New World Order, ed.HenryVelt-

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meyer(Hants,UKandBurlington,VT,USA:AshgatePublishing,2004),11.

5. Ibid.,23.6. SeeDavidDollarandPaulCollier,Globalization,Growth,andPov-

erty:Buildingan InclusiveWorldEconomy,AWorldBankPolicyResearchReport.Aco-publicationoftheWorldBankandOxfordUniversity Press (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), esp. theoverview(pp.3-18)andch.1(pp.31-53).

7. SeeEdwardGresser,“BlankSpotontheMap—HowTradePolicyIsWorkingagainsttheWaronTerror,”ProgressivePolicyInstitutePolicyReport,February2003,1.

8. SeeVeltmeyer,“TheAntinomiesofAntiglobalization,”inVeltmeyer(seenote4),171.

9. SeeToreBjørgo,RootCausesofTerrorism:FindingsfromanInterna-tionalExpertMeetinginOslo,NorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairs,http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Root_Causes_report.pdf.

10. SeeWorldBank,WorldDevelopmentReport2000–2001:Attack-ingPoverty(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).

11. See Dani Roderik, Has Globalization Gone too Far? (Washing-ton,DC: Institute for InternationalEconomics,1997),1; seealsoScholte,Globalization,26.

12.Diversepoliticalmovementssuchashard-corecommunistsinRus-siaandIslamicfundamentalistsinTurkeycandisplaystrikingcom-monalitiesrootedinabacklashagainstglobalization,seeRoderik,Has Globalization Gone too Far,1.Scholteassertedthatmicrona-tionalist and religious revivals—encouraged in part by globaliza-tion—havepromotedasubstantialriseinintrastatewarfareoutsidetheNorth,suchasinAfghanistan,Angola,Indonesia,Russia,andtheformerYugoslavia.SeeScholte,Globalization,283.

13. Thisparagraphisbasedondiscussions,WorkingGroupontheEco-nomicCausesofTerrorism, InternationalSummitonDemocracy,Terrorism,andSecurity(hereafterreferredtoasWorkingGroup),Madrid,Spain,March2005.

14. Matthew Levitt, “Blood Money,” Wall Street Journal, June 4,2003.

15. See,forinstance,U.S.GeneralAccountingOffice,TerroristFinanc-ing,GAO-04-15,November2003;andLevitt,“ThePoliticalEcon-omyofMiddleEastTerrorism,”Middle East Review of Interna-tional Affairs Journal6,no.4(2002),pp.49-65.

16. ThisandthefollowingtwoparagraphsdrawonMatthewMorgan’sanalysis.SeeMatthewJ.Morgan,“TheOriginsoftheNewTerror-ism,”Parameters34,no.1(2004):37.

17. Ibid,38.SeealsoPaulR.Pillar,“TerrorismGoesGlobal:ExtremistGroupsExtendtheirReachWorldwide,”The Brookings Review,19(Fall2001),34-37.

18. Ibid,38.

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19. Discussions, Working Group. See also Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on democracy and Terrorism, Volume 1, pp 24-25, http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf.

20.KimCraginandPeterChalk,Terrorism and Development—Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit Resurgence of Ter-rorism (Washington,DC:RAND,2003),33.

21. Discussions,WorkingGroup.

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9DiasporasandTerrorism

GabrielSheffer

Like most minorities’ members and leaders, individuals belonging tointernationallydispersed groups andmovements—namely, todiaspo-ras—such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Basque Fatherland and Liberty(ETA),Hamas,andtheLiberationTigersofTamilElam(LTTE),vehe-mently reject their characterization as terrorists and of their violentactionsasterrorism.Theyclaimthatinviewoftheirpuremotivationsandnobleandhighlyjustifiedgoalstheyshouldbeconsideredasfree-domfighters;cultural,political,andcivilrightsactivists;protectorsoftheir religions; or anticolonialists and antiglobalizationists. Yet mostoftheseentities’violentactivitiesfitwidelyacceptedviewsofterrorismandsomeofitsdefinitions.1

Insufficientattentionhasbeengiventothedifferentiatedinvolvementofthevariouscategoriesof“others,”andparticularlyofdiasporans,intheexecutionofextremeactsofviolenceandterroristattacks.Inmoststudiesandevaluations,allthesegroupsarelumpedtogether,withnosufficienttheoretical,analytical,orempiricaldistinctionsoftheirvariedorigins, connections, motivations, capabilities, resources, and contri-butionstotheexacerbationoftheconflictsinwhichtheyareengagedandtothenatureoftheirrelatedviolentorterroristacts.Thus,thereisaneedforcomparativestudiesandanalysesofthediversepurposes,involvement,androlesofmembersofsuchgroupsandtheirorganiza-tions inviolentandterroristcampaigns.Thiscontribution, therefore,offers a classification of these others; it focuses on the motivational,organizational, andbehavioraldifferencesamong thevarious entitiesthatuseradicalviolentstrategiesandtactics; itassessesthedegreeof

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theintensityoftheuseofviolencebythevarioustypesofothersbothintheircountriesofresidenceandintheirperceivedoractualhome-lands;and,finally,itofferssomepolicy-orientedproposals.

AShortReviewofOthersIt needs to be stressed that diasporic terrorism is not a postmod-ernphenomenonprimarilyrelatedtothebreakdownofthecoldwarregime, theso-calledweakeningof thenationstate, theexpansionof economic and cultural globalization, the spread of, or distanceshrinking, communication technologies, or the increase in globalmigration.2Evenabriefandcursoryhistoricalreviewshowsthatthephenomenonofdiaspora support for terrorismhas existedas longasmodern terrorismand thatmore fundamental causes shouldbeexplored.3Indeed,oneofthemostsignificantcommonfeatureofthevariousperpetratorsandsupportersofterrorism—newandold—isthattheyareothersintheirhostlands.Theyare,however,notallthesame. Indeed, it is useful to differentiate among the various typestheseentitiesrepresent.

Therapidlygrowingantiglobalizationmovement—whichduringthelastdecadehasbeengatheringmomentumandhasprovedwillingandcapabletolaunchandexecutebothviolentandpeacefulprotests,demonstrations,andresistancetopoliceforces—ismainlycomposedof tourists rather thanof permanently settleddiasporans.Usually,afterparticipatinginviolentandnonviolentactivitiessuchasthoseinSeattle,Genoa,andDurban,theyreturntotheircountriesoforiginormovetootherhostcountriestolaunchproteststhere.Likewise,someofthemostblatantterroristattackslaunchedbydiasporansareexecutedbyhard-core terroristswho reside inother countriesandcomeandleavethehostcountrywheretheyeitheraccomplish,orfailat,theirmissions.Thewishtopreventtheseactshasbeenthemaindriverbehindtheintroductionofradicalchangesinvisagrantingandbordercontrolinmanycountries.

Thesecondgroupiscomposedofrefugeesandasylumseekers.According to theUnitedNationsHighCommissioner forRefugees(UNCHR),morethantwentymillionpeoplefall intothesecatego-ries.Whereastwelvemillionqualifyasrefugees,theremainingninemillion are asylum seekers and returnees to their homelands thathavenotbeenfullyreintegratedintotheiroriginalsocieties.Also,themajorityareinternallydisplacedpersons,whichmakesitinappropri-atetoregardthemasdiasporans.AccordingtotheUNCHR,themaincountrieshostingrefugeesfleeingfromdifficultiesintheirhomelandsareBurundi,Sudan,Somalia,Angola,SierraLeone,Eritrea,Congo,

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DiasporasandTerrorism 11�

Liberia,Rwanda,Lebanon,andJordan;allarecountries thathaverecentlyexperiencedinternalturmoil,insurgency,orterrorism.4

The third category contains legal and illegal, nonorganized,newlyarrivedmigrants—mostlyguestworkersorstudents.Thoughmost,butnotall,hostcountriesrecordthenumbersand identitiesofnewlyarrivedlegalmigrants,whichgloballynumbertensofmil-lions, bydefinitionno reliablefigures exist about illegalmigrants.Attractivepolitical,economic,andeducationalconditionsleadmostof thesemigrants to try toenterdevelopedandmostlydemocraticcountries, includingAustraliaandJapan.FollowingtheattacksonSeptember11,2001,intheUnitedStates,mosthostcountrieshaveattemptedtolimitandcontroltheflowofmigrantstopreventbothterrorism and worsened economic conditions. Nevertheless, mostborders, especially in the European Union and the United States,areporous,andsuchtrafficcanhardlybecontrolledentirely.Inthisrespect, of course, democratic and democratizing states are disad-vantaged,astheyencounterimmenseideological,legal,andpracticalinhibitionswhenhandlingimmigration.Asaresult,manyterroristactivitieshavebeencarriedoutby thiscategoryofpeople inmoredevelopeddemocraticstates.

Fourth,therearemembersoforganizedtransstateethnonationaldiasporas. These are dispersed persons in various hostlands. Themembersof these entities areof the sameethnicandnationalori-gins,permanentlyresidingintheirhostcountries,andareintegratedbutnotassimilatedintotheirhostsocieties.Coremembersofthesegroupsareorganizedandmaintaincontactswiththeirhomelands.Accordingtocurrentestimates,therearemorethan300millionsuchpeopleworldwide.5 Someof theseorganizeddiasporas arehistori-cal,veteran,andestablished;theJewish,Armenian,Greek,Indian,and Chinese are obvious examples. Some are relatively new andwereestablishedinthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies—forinstance, the Italians, Irish,andPolish.Someare incipientdiaspo-ras—thatis,entities intheearlystagesofformationandorganiza-tion—suchasthepost-1948Palestiniandispersion,theRussiansintheformerSovietUnionempire,andtheChechens.Membersofbothestablishedand incipientdiasporashavesupportedviolentandter-roristactivitiesineithertheirhomelands,hostcountries,orthirdandfourthcountries.Therefore,specialattentionshouldbepaidtotheseentities,whichiswhythiscontributionfocusesonthiscategory.

The final category could be labeled as cultural and religioustransnational dispersals. As in the fourth category, these are dis-persedgroupsresidingoutoftheirhomelands.Theysharethesamebeliefs,yeteachofthemiscomposedofpersonsfromdifferentethnic

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1�0 TheRootsofTerrorism

andnationalbackgrounds.ExamplesofthesedispersalsaretheMus-lim,African,andLatinodiasporas.AsaresultofterroristactivitieslaunchedbyAl-QaedaandotherdispersedSunniandShiiteMuslimtransnationalgroupsandorganizations,observershave referred tothesegroupsashomogeneousdiasporas.Inreality,though,thelat-estwaveofterrorismandotherviolentactionshasbeencarriedoutnotbyhighlyorganizedandhomogeneousMuslimorNorthAfricandiasporas but rather—separately and autonomously—by membersofolderorganizedandincipienttransstateethnonationaldiasporas,whosemembers’onlycommoncharacteristicisthattheirreligionisIslam.Indeed,muchcloserattentionshouldbepaidtothemotiva-tionsandpurposesofvariousMuslim,Latino,andAfricangroups,whoseoriginsareindifferentnationstates.

Generally,itisextremelydifficulttoattributeexactnumbersofterroristactivities to eachof these categoriesofothers.This is forseveralreasons:

1. Lackofaccuratedata 2. Thesensitivesituationofguestworkersandotherlegaland

illegalmigrantsintheirhostcountries 3. The secrecy surrounding the preventive and secret intelli-

genceactivitiesofvariousgovernments 4. The uncertain assimilation and integration rates of such

groupsthat in turndeterminethesizeand influenceof thecoremembersineachdiaspora.

Yetbasedonreliableestimates,itispossibletoapproximatelyrankthesegroupsaccordingtotheintensityandratesoftheirparticipationin terrorism.Touristsand refugeesare increasingly involved in ter-roristactivities.Atthesametime,thereisalmostnodoubtthatmostofthosewhocarryoutterroristactivitiesaremembersoftransstateethnonationaldiasporasandoftransnationalreligiousdispersals.Arecentstudyclaimsthat32.3percentofallactsofmasscasualtyter-rorism(MCT)—whichoverthepastdecadehavecausedabout1,670deaths—havebeenperformedbymembersofwhatmightbecalledpureethnonationalgroups,thatis,groupswhosemostprevalentcom-moncharacteristicistheirbelongingtothesameethnicnation;23.5percentofMCT—amountingto5,000deaths, includingSeptember11—havebeenperformedbyso-calledpurereligiousgroups,thatistosay,peoplewhosegroupmembershipisdeterminedbytheirreligiousbeliefs;and14.7percentofMCT—835deaths—havebeenperformedbymixedethnoreligiousgroups,forexample,SunnisorProtestants.6

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DiasporasandTerrorism 1�1

Currently,twenty-fivegroupshavebeeninvolvedinconflictsorrebellions in either their homelands or host countries, which haveespousedterrorism.Allthesegroupshavebeenlinkedtotransstateethnonational diasporas, and all have performed terrorist acts inaddition to their involvement innonviolent tactical activities, suchaspropagandacampaignsandlegalprotestmarchesanddemonstra-tions.7Furthermore,of thefiftymostactive terroristorganizationsandgroups,twenty-seveneitherconstitutesegmentsofethnonationaldiasporasoraresupportedbythem.8InsurgentsinEgypt,India(i.e.,in thePunjabandKashmir), Indonesia (i.e.,Aceh),Azerbaijan,SriLanka,Ireland,Kosovo,Lebanon,Palestine,Israel,Pakistan,Alge-ria,TurkishKurdistan,IraqiKurdistan,Iran,Greece,thePhilippines,and Russia all have received various kinds of support—whetherfinancial,political,diplomatic,orpsychological—fromtheirrespec-tivediasporiccommunities.

Among the organizations using terrorism that have provenlinkstoethnonationaldiasporicentitiesarethePalestinianHamas,IslamicJihad,andFatah-Tanzim;theLebaneseHezbollah;theEgyp-tian Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group; the Irish Republican Army;theAlgerianArmedIslamicGroup(GIA);theIndianBarbarKhalsaInternational; theSriLankanLTTE; theTurkishKurdistanWork-ers’Party(PKK);andAl-Qaeda,whoisconnectedtoandcooperateswithvariousethnic–religiousdiasporas.9

Regarding the state sponsors of terrorism—according to theUnitedStatesStateDepartment,theseareSaudiArabia,Iran,Iraq,Syria,Libya,Cuba,NorthKorea,andSudan—someofthesenotonlysupportedactivitiesoftheirowndiasporansinhostcountriesbutalsosupportedvarioustypesofsubversiveactionscarriedoutbypersonsofothernationalitiesandethnoreligiousbackgroundswhoaretem-poraryorpermanentresidentsinhostcountries.Itistruethatsomeoftheaforementionedgovernmentsstoppeddoingso—thecasesofIraq and Libya are pertinent here—and others have declared thattheyhadtakenstepstocooperateintheglobalcampaignagainstter-rorism,suchasIran,Syria,andNorthKorea.Apparently,however,theselatterstates,andprobablyalsoSudan,havepersistedwiththeveryactionsthathadledinternationalorganizations,othernationalgovernments,andacademicanalyststoregardthemasstatesponsorsofterrorism.

DistinctionsandDebatesAlthoughcertainsimilaritiesexistbetweenthevariousdiasporasandtheir organizations thatuse violence and terrorism, three essentialdistinctionsmustbemadebetweenthem.

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1�� TheRootsofTerrorism

The first distinction, which has already been mentioned, isbetweenterroristactionscarriedoutbypureethnonationalistswhopursue nationalist goals in their homelands or host countries andpure religionistswhoaim to achieve religiousobjectives.This dis-tinction is essential forunderstandingcurrent terrorismand,moreparticularly,foraccuratelygraspingdiasporas’varyingmotivationsforemployingsuchviolence.10This,however,isfarfromsimple.Forexample, when considering the motivations of Muslim fundamen-talist groups in Europe, such as those comprising Middle EasternPalestiniansandKurds,NorthAfricanMoroccans,andAsianPaki-stanisresidinginBritain,France,Germany,andBelgium,itishardtodeterminewhethertheirmembersaremotivatedbypurereligioussentimentsorwhethertheyaremainlyconcernedwiththepoliticalandculturalrightsoftheirconationalsintheirhomelandsandhostcountries.Thisobservation isparticularlypertinent inviewof therecenttendencytolumptogetherallMuslimdiasporiccommunitiesand to attribute solely ultra religious motivations and purposes totheirviolentactions.11

Thisdifficultdistinction isrelatedtothedebateabout theroleofreligioninshapingtheidentityandbehavioralpatternsofethnicentities in general and that of diasporic groups in particular. Theargumenthereisthatnototallyhomogeneousandcoherentreligioustransnationalentitiesactasfullyunifiedcollectivesinlaunchingvio-lentandterroristactivitiestopursueonlyMuslimideas.Rather,mostofthemovementsandorganizationsformedbydiasporaslikethosementionedpreviously—includingsomeAl-Qaeda-linkedgroups—areclosely connected to their respective ethnonational homelands andactinaccordancewiththeirperceivedgrievances.

Theseconddistinctionsetsapartgroupswhoseviolentandterror-istactivitiesaretargetedattheirhomelandsandthoseactingagainsttheirhostlands.Thus,Al-Qaeda, theChechensandPakistanis, forexample,mainlytargettheirhostcountries.TheBasques,Palestin-ians,andTurkishKurds,ontheotherhand,mostlysupportviolentactions carried out by their brethren in their homelands and onlyoccasionallysupportterrorismintheirhostlandsorotherstates.Thedifferencesbetweentheterroristactivitiesthesegroupseitherinitiateorsupportdonotmerelylieintheirgeographicallocationsbutinthereasons,dynamics,andconsequencesthatcharacterizetheiractions.Thesedifferencesarediscussedfurtherlaterinthechapter.

Anotherdistinctionisbetweenstate-linkedandstatelessdiaspo-ras.Whereastheformermaintainscontactsandsharesinterestswiththeindependentstatesintheirhomelands,suchastheJewish,Arme-nian, Iranian,andPakistanidiasporas, the lattergroupconstitutes

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DiasporasandTerrorism 1��

segmentsofnationswhohavenotsucceededtoestablishastateoftheirownorwhosehomelandsaredominatedbyothernationstates,like thePalestinians,Kurds, andTibetans. It seems clear that as aresultoftheirfullorpartialintegrationintotheirhostsocieties;theirtendencytoobservethelaw;andtheirinclinationtoprotectandpro-motemultiplecultural,political,andeconomicinterestsintheirhostcountries,mostdiasporasinthefirstcategoryaremorereluctanttouseviolenceandterrorismtopromotetheirinterests.Thesediasporasrefraintouseterrorismalsobecauseoftherestraintimposedonthembytheirhomelands’governments.Ontheotherhand,statelessdias-porasaremorepronetobeengagedinviolentandterroristactivities.

CausesandMotivationsThedeepercausesandthemoreimmediatemotivationsthatleadeth-nonationaldiasporicentitiesandtheirsupporterstolaunchortosup-portviolentandterroristactivitieshavenotchangedmuchthrough-outthelastfewdecades.ThisisstillthecaseintheaftermathofthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,whichmarkedtheendoftheColdWarera,andduringtherecentperiodofglobalizationandglocalization.

Oneofthemostprevalentcausesandmotivationsfordiasporicterrorismisagroup’sexpulsionfromitscountryoforigin.Some,butnot all, of the variousPalestinianorganizations serve as examplesin this category. This includes, for instance, the Abu Nidal Orga-nization,whichisastateless,transstatediasporicorganizationthatcarriedout terroristattacks in twentycountrieskillingor injuringalmost 900 people and was supported by individuals and groupswithinthePalestiniandiasporaintheWest.OtherPalestinianorga-nizationsestablishedasareactiontotheirexpulsionfrompartsofPalestinein1948andthenin1967arethePalestineLiberationFrontandthePopularFrontfortheLiberationofPalestine.Itisimportanttonotethat,becauseofIsraelicontroloverthePalestinian-occupiedterritories,theheadquartersoftheseandotherPalestinianorganiza-tionsareoutsidePalestine,suchasinSyria.

Anothercommoncauseistheexistenceofstrugglesforsepara-tion and independence in one’s homeland. One of the best-knownorganizations in this category is the ETA, which is supported bysegmentsoftheBasquediaspora.Palestinianorganizations,suchasHamas,receivefundingfromPalestinianexpatriatesinthediaspora,fromIran,andfromprivatebenefactorsinSaudiArabiaandinotherArabstates.Somefund-raisingandpropagandaactivitiesonbehalfofHamastakeplaceinWesternEuropeandinbothNorthandSouthAmerica.Likewise, thePKKreceiveda safehavenandmodestaidfrom Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as financial and psychological

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supportfromtheKurdishdiaspora.TheLTTE,ontheotherhand,iscloselyconnectedtoTamilcommunitiesinNorthAmerica,Europe,andAsia.Through thesenetworks, someofwhichare involved insmugglingnarcotics, theTamilTigers raise fundsandsupply theirfightersinSriLanka.

Afurthermotivationisthesystematicdiscriminationofagroupinitshomeland.TheLebaneseradicalShiitemovementHezbollah,for example, exists mainly to protect Shiite interests in Lebanon.However,becauseitalsoopposesIsraelandisagainstpeacenegotia-tionswiththatstate,itisregardedasatransnationaldiaspora.IthasestablishedcellsinEurope,Africa,SouthAmerica,NorthAmerica,andAsia,anditreceivessubstantialamountsoftraining;weapons;explosives;andfinancial,political,diplomatic,andorganizationalaidfromIran,Syria,andtheLebaneseShiitediaspora.SimilardynamicscanbefoundinthecaseoftheIslamicMovementofUzbekistan;theEgyptianIslamicJihad;theNationalLiberationArmyofIran;andtheRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia.

Equally,discriminationinthediasporas’hostcountriescanalsobecome a cause or motivation for supporting terrorism. ExamplesincludetheHarakatul-Mujahidin,anIslamicmilitantgroupbasedinPakistanthatoperatesprimarilyinKashmir.Leadersofthisorga-nizationhavebeenlinkedtoOsamabinLaden’sAl-QaedaandhavesignedhisfatwacallingforattacksonU.S.andWesterninterests.ItobtainsdonationsfromSaudiArabiaandotherIslamicstates,aswellas from Pakistanis and Kashmiris in the diaspora. Another groupinthiscategoryistheJaish-e-Mohammad[ArmyofMohammad],aMuslimgroupbasedinPakistanthathasalsoestablishedconnectionstoAl-QaedaandtoanumberofPakistanidiasporiccommunities.

Legal andpolitical persecution in the homeland is yet anotherrelatedmotivation for supporting terrorism.Forexample,Algerianexpatriates,manyofwhomresideinWesternEuropeandespeciallyinFrance,usedtoprovidefinancialandlogisticsupporttotheGIA.TheEgyptianAl-Gama’aal-Islamiyyahasadiasporicexternalwingthatdisplaysaworldwidepresence.TheRevolutionaryOrganization17NovemberispurportedtohavereceivedassistancefromgroupsintheGreekdiaspora.KachandKahaneChai,twogroupsactiveinthestruggleofultrareligiousandnationalistIsraeliJews,werefoundedbyaradicalIsraeli–AmericanrabbinamedMeirKahaneintheUnitedStatesandaresupportedmainlybysympathizersinthatcountry.

Otherreasonsfordiasporicinvolvementwithterrorismincludeblatantracism,religiousandantireligiousdenigration,aswellascon-nections to organized crime (seeAtanas Gotchev’s contribution inthisbook).Indeed,ifwereviewthefulllistofthesemovementsand

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organizations and examinequantitativedata about the lengthandintensity of their campaigns aswell as the volumeof their violentandterroristactivities,itseemsthatexceptforAl-Qaedaandafewother culturally and religiously motivated organizations, the mostactivesupportersofterrorismareethnonationalstatelessdiasporas.The secondmost relevantcategoryappears tobe thoseattemptingtoimprovethecultural,political,andeconomicconditionsintheirhomelands. These findings are further elaborated in the followingsection.

DynamicsSince the1990s, a clearer picturehas emergedof the variousdia-sporicentities’motivations,strategies,tactics,resources,means,andmodesofoperation.According to theexpanding literatureondia-sporas, themost evidentbackground factors thathavenot createdbut nevertheless have further motivated and facilitated the violentandterroristactivitiesofsuchentitiesareconnectedtothecurrenttrendsofglobalization,regionalization,glocalization,liberalization,anddemocratization.Morespecifically,theinvolvementofdiasporasin subversive actions is facilitated by the increasing ease of trans-portation; the lackof control atmost states’ borders; the growingdemandforforeignworkers;theramificationsofpluralism,liberal-ization,democratization,andmulticulturalism,mainlyindemocraticanddemocratizinghostcountries;andthewidespreaduseofglobalmeansofcommunication.12

Themostimportantcharacteristicofthediasporas’“hardcores,”whouseor support violenceor terrorism, is the renewed substan-tialsignificanceoftheethnonationalidentity,whichincertaincasesis enhancedbyreligious feelings. Inall thecasespresentedearlier,includingthePalestinians,Jews,Irish,andTamils,identityisshapedandmaintainedasa resultof the impactof strongprimordialandmythicalfactorsthatareinseparablyintertwinedwiththesomewhatlessimportantinstrumentalconsiderations.

Evenifmostoftheexistingethnonationaldiasporasdonotcon-stitute tightlyknit traditionalcommunitiesandalthough theymaybeinfluencedbymoderndevelopments,theirmembers’deeplyrootedidentities—and,morerecently,theirreadinesstopubliclyidentifyasmembersofsuchentities—generatehigherlevelsofcohesionandsoli-darityamongtheactivistcoremembersoftheseentities.Inturn,thecohesionand solidarityof suchentitiesaredirectly linked to theirmembers’strongattachmenttoandcontactswiththeirethnonationalhomelandsor totheirveneratedreligiouscenters. Invariouscases,the religious beliefs, whether moderate or fundamentalist, held by

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individualsandcoregroupsaugmentthemobilizationofmembers,theirdedication,andconsequentlytheirreadinesseithertocarryoutor to support insurgent actions. Whenever members of these coregroupsshowstrongcommitmenttofollowtheiremotionalandcog-nitiveinclinations,theytendtodevelopambiguous,dual,ordividedloyalties to their host countries. As a consequence, some of themwouldbemoreinclinedtoperformterroristactsortosupportthem.

Generally,statelessdiasporasfightingforsecessionor indepen-dence in their homeland, such as the Palestinians, Irish, TurkishKurds, and Kashmiris, have shown the greatest commitment anddedicationtothesupportof insurgencyintheirhomelandsandonsomeoccasionsalsointhehostlands.Likewise,suchdiasporashavebeenmoreactiveinaggressivepublicitycampaignsonbehalfoftheirbrethrenintheirhomelandsorinotherhostcountries.

To make mobilization and insurgent activities effective, suchgroupsmustbehighlyorganizedandledbydedicatedpeople.Bothproletarians, such as the Kurds in Germany and the Algerians inFrance,andricherdiasporas,suchas theJewsandtheIrish in theUnited States, have engaged in or have supported such insurgen-cies.However, though it is evident that the latter—whoarebetterorganized and have access to more economic, political, and otherresources—canbemoreeffective,theymayatthesametimebelesscommittedtothecauseoftheentiredispersednation.ThishasbeenthecasewiththeArmenianandGreekdiasporaswhenfullindepen-denceoftheirhomelandswasachieved.

ResourcesExceptfordiasporicmafiasandcriminalgroups,andapartfromthepoorestandmostdeprivedgroupsinboththeirhostcountriesandhomelands,pureeconomicinterestsorgoalsdonotserveasthecriti-calmotivationalfactorsorcausesforterrorism.Infact,manyoftheactivistsandterroristsareeducatedandcomparativelywelloff.Still,themobilizationofmanpower,funds,andotherresourcesaresignifi-cantaspectsofthephenomenon.Inthisrespect,bettereducatedandmoderatelywealthydiasporanshavebetterchancestosucceed.

Again, these are hardly new issues. Palestinians been engagedintheseactivities fordecades,ashavetheTurkishKurdish,Arme-nians,and,ofcourse,theJews.Whenthefundingbyhomelandsorbyotherstatesceases,orwhenitbecomesunobtainableorinacces-sible,theimportanceofdiasporicentitiesinmobilizingfinancialandother resources is considerably enhanced.13 In the early1990s, forexample,theendoftheSovietUnion’sfinancialandmilitaryspon-sorship caused the collapseof anumberof insurgent and terrorist

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groups thathadpreviouslybeendependentonMoscow.The sameappliestoallthegroupsthathadreceivedfinancialandotherkindsofsupportfromSaddamHussein’sIraq.Atthesametime,theincreaseinthenumberofethnicorcommunalinsurgencieshasheightenedtherelativesignificanceofethnonationaldiasporasupport.Forobviousreasons,accuratedataonthevolumeofthevariousresourcessup-pliedto,andusedby,terroristgroupsareunavailableorextremelydifficulttoaccess.Neithertheterroristorganizationsandmovementsnortherelevantgovernmentsarereadytosupplysuchdata.14

PolicyImplicationsAsthegroups’reasonsforusingterrorismarefirmlylinkedtotheirideationalandculturalaspirationsaswellastheirethnonationalandreligiousbeliefsandneeds,themostessentialandobviouspolicysug-gestionisthatallinvolvedpartiesshouldtrytosolvetheverybasicconflictsandtensionsamongthesegroups.Genuineandsystematiceffortsdirectedattheresolutionofsuchconflicts,includingthemostdifficulttask—theestablishmentofindependentsovereignstatesforstatelessnationsandtheirdiasporas—canmeaningfullyreducetheinclinationtouseterrorism.ThecaseoftheIrishisagoodexampleofsuchadevelopment.

It is clear that someof these conflicts, such as the Israeli–Pal-estinian or the Kurdish–Turkish confrontations, are impossibleor extremelydifficult to solve.Therefore, at the very least, honestattemptsshouldbemadeatconflictmanagement.Forexample,dur-ing various stages of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict this was suc-cessfully tried and led to a temporary reduction in terrorism. It isextremelyimportant, forexample,toreducestructural inequalitiesinhomelandsandhostcountriesbyeliminatingminorities’discrimi-nation,barrierstosociopoliticalandsocioeconomicmobility,depri-vation, and the possession of full rights. Equally important is theneedtomitigatetheimpactofrapidsociopoliticalandsocioeconomicchanges.Thisshouldbedonethroughlong-termsocial,political,andeconomicaidandinvestmentsthatwouldcontributetosustainabledevelopment and empower marginalized groups and individuals,especiallywomenandyoungpersons(seeTedRobertGurr’scontri-butioninthisbook).

Itisimportanttotrytoameliorate,evenpartially,theimmedi-ate social, political, and economic conditions that lead to terror-ismbypromotingpolitical compromises andbyprovidingoppor-tunitiesforindividualandcollectivedisengagementfromterrorism.Regionalunions,nongovernmentalorganizations,thecorporatesec-tor,privatefinancialinstitutions,andcivilsocietygenerallyshould

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beencouragedtoleadtheformulationofstrategiesandshouldinvestinplansaimedatreducinginequalitiesanddiscriminationaffectingminoritiesanddiasporas.

As we have seen, most existing diasporas are not tightly knithomogenousentitiesthatcollectivelypursueasinglestrategy,espe-cially not when it comes to terrorism. Nobody should postulate,therefore,thatentirediasporicentitiespartakeinterroristactivitiesorsupportthem.Infact,inmostcases—theIrish,Jewish,Turkish,Basque,orKurdishdiasporasspringtomind—onlyrelativelysmallnumber of individuals and small groups of core members supportsuch activities. In most cases, terrorismdoes not constitute a per-manentstrategybutratheratemporarytactic,whichisintendedtoachieve social andpolitical goals, andonce these are achieved thediasporas’tacticschange.Itisalsotruethat,historically,theuseofterroras a tactic is confined to relatively shortperiodsof crisis inthehomelands,hostcountries,orinotherstateswheretheirbreth-rensreside.Hence,theuseofterrorandviolencedoesnottransformentirecommunitiesintowarriorcommunities.

Finally,itshouldberememberedthatmanyofthesegroupsareengagedinactivitiesintendedtoenhancethecultural,civic,andeco-nomicwell-beingoftheirowncommunities,theirhostcountries,andtheirhomelands.Therefore,weshouldbecarefulnottostigmatizeentirediasporicentities,therebycreatingapermanentlyhostileenvi-ronment thatcanmake the livesofdiasporansanddiasporasevenharderthantheyusuallyareandcanpushthesepeopletouseevenmoredangeroustacticsandmeans.

Endnotes1. GerhardMueller,“TheNature,Definition,andUsesofTerrorism,

andtheRangeofRationalOptionstoDealwithIt:ASummary,”inMeeting the Challenges of Global Terrorism. Prevention, Control and Recovery,ed.DunnDilipandPeterC.Kratcoski(NewYork:LexingtonBook,2003);and“TheWarforIslam’sHeart,”Econo-mist,September18,2004.

2. WalterLaqueur,“PostmodernTerrorism,”Foreign Affairs75,no.5,pp24-36,(1996).

3. Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States: A Counter Conventional Strategic Problem (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1974); see also Alex SchmidandAlbertJongman,Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (NewYork:TransactionsPublishers,2005).

4. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 56th GeneralAssembly,ThirdCommittee,November19,2001.

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5. See Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (Cam-bridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),ch.4.

6. VictorAsal andAndrewBlum,“HolyTerror andMassKillings?MassCasualtyTerrorism,”International Studies Review7,no.1,pp.153-155,,(2005).

7. For a list of these organizations, see for example, the Center ofDefenseInformationatwww.cdi.org.

8. U.S.StateDepartmentCounterterrorismOffice,PatternsofGlobalTerrorism,Officeof theCoordinator forCounterterrorism,2005,www.state.gov.

9. RandCorporationPolicyResourcesforCongress,Terrorism:Cur-rent and Long Term Threats. Testimony presented to the SenateArmedServicesCommitteeonEmergingThreats,Nov.15,2001.

10. Sheffer,DiasporaPolitics,chap.3.11. Rivka Yadlin, “The Muslim Diaspora in the West,” in Middle

Eastern Minorities and Diasporas, ed.MosheMaozandSheffer,pp.219-230(Brighton,UK:SussexAcademicPress,2002);seealsoRiva Kastoryano, “The Reach of Transnationalism,” in Critical Views of September 11,ed.EricHershbergandKevinMoore,pp.209-223(NewYork:NewPress,2003).

12.See Michael Dahan and Sheffer, “Ethnic Groups and DistanceShrinkingCommunicationTechnologies,”Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7,no.1,pp.85-107,(2001).

13. SeeAlineAngousturesandValeriePascal,“DiasporasetFinance-ment des Conflits,” in Economie des Guerres Civiles, ed. Fran-cois Jean Rufin and Jean-Christophe Rufin, pp. 495-542, (Paris:Hachette,1996).

14. Lawrence Malkin and Yuval Elizur, “Terrorism’s Money Trail,”World Policy Journal18,no.1,;pp.60-70,.(2001).

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CultureandReligion

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10ReligionasaCauseofTerrorism

MarkJuergensmeyer

ThesubwayattacksinLondoninJuly2005broughtbackbittermemo-ries of theMadrid train bombings in 2004, theWorldTradeCenterassault in2001,andthemanysuicidebombings inIraqandIsrael inrecentyears.Inthewakeofanyterroristattacktheimmediatequestionsarewhoandwhy:Whowoulddosuchathing,andwhywouldtheywanttodoit?Whenreligionisapartofthepicture,thequestionsarecompounded.ThisisthecasewhethertheperpetratorsaretheMuslimactivists intheLondonandMadridbombings, jihadiresistancefight-ersinIraq,ChristianabortionclinicbombersintheUnitedStates,orviolentIsraelisettlerswhomPrimeMinisterArielSharoncalledJewishterroristsduringthedismantlementofsettlementsinGazaandtheWestBankinAugust2005.

Oneoftheenduringquestionsiswhatreligionhastodowiththis—withthemandwhattheydid.Putsimply,doesreligioncauseterrorism?Couldtheseviolentactsbe the faultofreligion—theresultofadarkstrainofreligious thinkingthat leadstoabsolutismandviolence?Orhastheinnocenceofreligionbeenabusedbywilypoliticalactivistswhotwist religion’s essentialmessageofpeace for theirowndeviouspur-poses?Isreligiontheproblemorthevictim?

Eachcaseinwhichreligionhasbeenlinkedtoviolenceisdifferent.Soonecouldbejustifiedinsayingthereisnoonesimpleanswer.Yetthishasnotstoppedthemediacommentators,publicofficials,andacadem-icswhosegeneralizationsaboutreligion’sroleabound.Theirpositionsmay be found in the assumptions lurking behind policy choices andnewsmediareportsandwithinthecausativetheoriesaboutterrorism

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thattheacademicspropose.Curiously,theirpositionsaresometimesdiametricallyopposed.Anexampleofthediversityofopinionsmaybefoundintwowidelydiscussedbookspublished in2005:Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide TerrorismbyRobertAPapeandFighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence byHectorAvalos.1

TheArgumentThatReligionDoesCauseTerrorismAvalos’s book, Fighting Words, posits that religious terrorism isindeedcausedby religionor, rather, that religioncreatesan imagi-narysupplyofsacredresourcesoverwhichhumanscontend.Avalosregardsall formsofsocialandpoliticalconflicttobecontestsoverscarceresources.Theoneswhodonothavethescarceresourceswantthem,andtheonesthathavethemwanttokeepthem.Inthecaseofreligiousconflictthescarceresourcesarethingsthatreligionspecifi-callysupplies:thefavorofGod,blessings,andsalvation.Bydefinitionthesearenotequallybestowedoneveryoneandmustbeearnedandprotected.WhenRabbiMeirKahanechallengedJewstorestoreGod’shonor,itwasGod’sfavortotheJewsthathewishedtorestore.Henceanordinarybattleisaconflicttoearnthehighestheavenlyrewards.

FromAvalos’spointofview,moreover,thenecessityofviolenceisoftenbuiltintotheverystructureofreligiouscommitment.TheactofatonementinChristianity,thesenseofrevengeinJudaism,andthemartialtriumphalismofIslamallrequireviolentactstofulfilltheirreligiousimagesoftheworld.Andineachcasetheresultofviolenceistobringthebenefitsofthescarceresourcesofspiritualblessingstothegratefulperpetratorofthereligiousviolence.

Avalos’spositioniscontroversialevenintheacademiccommu-nity.Manyobservershavepointedoutthatcurrentreligiousconflictsareseldomaboutreligionperse—theyareaboutnationalterritory,politicalleadership,andsocioeconomiccontrolallcastinareligiouslight.Withinthewiderpublicthereisperhapsevenlesssupportforthenotionthatreligioningeneralleadsdirectlytoviolentacts.Despitetheriseofreligiousviolenceinrecentyearsmostpeoplestillregardreligion—atleasttheirownreligion—assomethingbenign.Thisatti-tudeisprevalentevenamongmembersofreligiouscommunitiesfromwhichviolencehasoriginated.MostMuslimsregardIslamasareli-gionofpeace,andChristiansandJewsregardtheirownreligioninthesameway.Mostofthefaithfulinthesereligionsrefusetobelievethattheirownbeliefscouldhaveledtoviolence.

Yetwhenonelooksoutsideone’sfaithitiseasiertoblamereli-gion. In thecurrentclimateofMuslimpoliticalviolence,a signifi-cantsectoroftheAmericanandEuropeanpublicassumesthatIslam

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is part of the problem. Despite the cautionary words of PresidentGeorge W. Bush imploring Americans not to blame Islam for theSeptember11,2001,attacks,acertainIslamophobiahascreptintopublicconversation.

The implication of this point of view is the unfortunate notionthat thewholeof Islamhas supported acts of terrorism.The inevi-tableattachmentofIslamtoterrorismintheubiquitousphraseIslamic terrorismisoneexampleofthishabitofthinking.Anotherisvaunt-ingthetermjihad toaplaceofsupremeIslamicimportance,asifallMuslims agreedwith itsmilitarizedusagebyunauthorized extrem-istgroups.ThemoststridentexpositionsofthiswayofthinkingarefoundinassertionsofChristiantelevangelistssuchasPatRobertsonand Jerry Falwell that the Prophet himself was a kind of terrorist.Moremoderateformsaretheattemptsbypoliticalcommentatorsandsomescholarstoexplain—asiftherewasneedforit—whyIslamissopolitical.EvenConnecticut’s liberal senatorChristopherDodd, inatelevision interviewinNovember2003,cautionedAmericansnot toexpecttoomuchtolerancefromIslamgivenitspropensityforideologi-calcontroloverpubliclife.HereferencedabookbyhistorianBernardLewisforthispointofview,whichherecommendedtotheviewers.2

Theassumptionof thosewhohold the“Islam is theproblem”position is that theMuslimrelationship topolitics ispeculiar.Butthisisnottrue.Mosttraditionalsocietieshavehadaclosetiebetweenpoliticalleadershipandreligiousauthority,andreligionoftenplaysaroleinundergirdingthemoralauthorityofpubliclife.InJudaismtheDavidic line of kingship is anointed byGod; inHinduism thekingsarethoughttoupholddivineorderthroughthewhiteumbrellaofdharma;inChristianitythepoliticalhistoryofEuropeisrifewithcontestingandsometimesmerginglinesofauthoritybetweenchurchand state. At the turn of the twenty-first century, violent Jewish,Hindu,andChristianactivistshaveall, like theirMuslimcounter-parts,lookedtotraditionalreligiouspatternsofpoliticizedreligiontojustifytheirownmilitantstance.

Thepublic lifeof contemporaryAmerica isno exception. It isoneinwhichreligionisverymuchinvolvedwithpoliticsandpoliticswithreligion.TheevangelicalprofessionsoffaithofPresidentBushandadviserssuchasformerattorneygeneralJohnAshcroftfueltheimpressionthatU.S.foreignpolicyhasatriumphantagendaofglobalChristendom.Thischaracterizationofreligion’shandinU.S.politicsisoftenexaggeratedbyforeignobserversinEuropeandtheMiddleEast,buttheChristianrhetoricofsomemembersoftheGeorgeW.Bush administration has been undeniable and lends credibility tosuchaview.

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EvenmoretroublingarestrandsofChristiantheocracythathaveemergedamongextremegroupsintheUnitedStates.Someemployviolenceintheiroppositiontosecularsocietyandtheirhatredofaglobalizedcultureandeconomy.Aneo-Calvinisttheologyofareli-giousstateliesbehindthebombingofabortionclinicsandtheshoot-ingofabortionclinicstaffbyLutheranandPresbyterianactivistsinMarylandandFlorida.TheChristianidentityphilosophyofracewarandagovernmentenshriningawhiteChristiansupremacyliesbehindEric Robert Rudolph’s attack on the Atlanta Olympic Park, otherbombingsofgaybarsandabortionclinics, thekillingofaDenverradiotalk-showhost,anassaultonaJewishday-carecenterinLosAngeles,andmanyotherincidents—includingRubyRidge—perpe-tratedbyChristianmilitiainrecentyears.Theso-called“Cosmothe-ism,” based on Christianity, that was espoused by William PierceandembracedbyTimothyMcVeighwastheideologicaljustificationforMcVeigh’sbombingoftheOklahomaCityFederalBuilding.Infact,therehavebeenfarmoreattacksbyChristianterroristgroupsonAmericansoil inthe lastfifteenyearsthanMuslimones.AsidefromSeptember11andthe1993attempttodestroytheWorldTradeCenter,almostalloftheotherterroristactshavebeenperpetratedbyChristiantheocracy.

Yet somehow, despite evidence to the contrary, the AmericanpubliclabelsIslamasaterroristreligionratherthanChristianity.Theargumentsthatagreeordisagreewiththispositionoftengetmiredinthetedioustaskofdredgingupscripturalorhistoricalexamplesto show the political and militant side of Islam—or contrarily, ofotherreligionslikeChristianity,Judaism,orHinduism.Thenoppo-nents challenge the utility of those examples, and the debate goeson.Theargumentswouldnotbenecessary,however,ifonedidnotassumethatreligionisresponsibleforactsofpublicviolenceinthefirstplace.

TheArgumentThatReligionDoesNotCauseTerrorismThepositionthatreligionisnot theproblemistakenbyobserversontheothersideofthepublicdiscussionoverreligionafterSeptember11. Insomecases theysee religionasan innocentvictim; inothercasestheyseeitassimplyirrelevant.InDying to Win, RobertPapearguedthatreligionisnotthemotiveinmostactsofsuicidebombing.Lookingatabroadswathofcasesofsuicideactivistsinrecentyears,Papeconcludedthattheyarenotmotivatedbyablindreligiousfervorasmuchasacalculatedpoliticalattempt.Theprimarymotiveistodefendterritory.Papeaccuratelypointedoutthatuntil2003themost

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suicidebombingswereconductednotbyareligiousgroupbutbyasecularethnicmovement:theTamilTigersinSriLanka.

Papebasedhisconclusionsonananalysisofthedatabasemain-tainedbytheChicagoProjectofSuicideTerrorism.Heprovidedademographicprofileofover460menandwomen,thoughtheyaremostly men. They are not, he argued, “mainly poor, uneducated,immaturereligiouszealotsorsociallosers,”astheyhavesometimesbeenportrayed.3Whattheyhaveincommonisthesensethattheirterritoryorculturehasbeeninvadedbyanalienpowerthatcannoteasily beoverthrown. In this desperate situationof social survivaltheyturnto thesimplestandmostdirect formofmilitantengage-ment:usingtheirownbodiesasbombs.Contrarytotheperceptionofmany,suicidebombersarenotreligiouslonersbutareusuallypartof largemilitantorganizationswithwell-honedstrategiesaimedatoustingforeigncontrolfromwhattheyconsidertheirownterritory.Theconcessionsmadetosuchorganizationsinthepastbythegov-ernments who have been opposed to them have given the organi-zationsbehindsuicidebombingstheconfidencethattheirstrategiesworkandareworthrepeating.

Little issaidaboutreligion inPape’sbook.Papedoesdevoteachapter describing how religion can intensify the main motivationofdefendingone’s territory.But ingeneral, inPape’sanalysis, reli-giousmotivesarebesidethepoint.Forthisreasonthereisnoattempttoexplain theextraordinarilyubiquitousroleof religion inviolentmovementsaroundtheworld,fromSikhactivistsinIndiatoChris-tianmilitiainIdahotoMuslimjihadisfromMoroccotoBali.Noristhereanyattempttoexplainwhatdifferencereligionmakeswhenitentersintoaconflictandreligionizesthestruggle,asbothMuslimandJewishextremistsdidintheIsrael–Palestinedispute—aconflictthatprior to the1990swas largelya secular struggleover territo-rial control. One is left with the impression that, although Pape’sstudyisuseful inremindingusthatactsofviolenceareaboutrealthings—suchasthedefenseofcultureandterritory—itstilldoesnotexplainwhyreligionhasbecomesuchaforcefulanddifficultvehicleforframingtheseconcernsinrecentyears.

Nonetheless, appreciation for Pape’s position has been wide-spread,inpartbecauseitappearstocontradicttheU.S.administra-tion’spositionthat Islamicmilitantsareopposedtofreedom.Papearguedthat,tothecontrary,freedomispreciselywhattheyarefight-ingfor.Moreover,hisargumentsbuttressthepositionoftwoother,quitedifferentcamps:religiousdefenderseagertodistancereligionfromtheviolentactswithwhichreligionhasrecentlybeenassoci-ated; and secular analysts who have always thought that secular

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factors,particularlyeconomicandpoliticalconcerns,are themainingredientsofsocialconflict.

This secular perspective is the one that lies behind the phrasecommonlyfoundinthenewsmediaandinthestatementsofpoliticalleaders,“theuseofreligionforpoliticalpurposes.”Whenthisphraseis employed religion is dismissed of any culpability in creating anatmosphereofviolence.AU.S.StateDepartmentofficialoncetoldmethatreligionwasbeingusedthroughouttheMiddleEast,mask-ingproblemsthatwereessentiallyeconomicinnature.Heassuredmethatif jobsweretobehadbyunemployedEgyptiansandPalestin-ianstheproblemofreligiouspoliticsintheseimpoverishedsocietieswouldquicklyvanish.Fromhispointofviewitwasunthinkablethatreligiousactivistswouldactuallybemotivatedbyreligion,oratleastbyideologicalviewsoftheworldthatwereframedinreligiouslan-guage.Similarly,MichaelSells’sstudyoftheroleofChristiansym-bolisminresurgentSerbiannationalism,The Bridge Betrayed,wasridiculedbyareviewer for theEconomistwhosawtheconflictaspurelyamatterof secularnationalism inwhichreligionplayednorole.4Theassumptionofthereviewer,likethatoftheStateDepart-mentofficialwithwhomIspoke,wasthatreligionwasthedependentvariable,arhetoricalglossoverthereal issuesthatwereinvariablyeconomicorpolitical.

FromtheperspectivesofPapeandtheStateDepartmentecono-mist, religion is essentially irrelevant to the motivations of terror-ism.Religiousdefendersagreeandtakethispointofviewastepfur-ther.Theystatethatreligionisnotjustneutralaboutviolence;itisopposedtoit,andthusitisaninnocentvictimofpoliticalactivists.Insomecasesthesereligiousdefendersdonotdenythattheremaybereligiouselementsinthemotivesofviolentactivists,buttheyclaimthat theseextremereligiousgroupsdonotrepresent thenormativetraditions.MostBuddhist leaders in Japan, for instance,distancedthemselvesfromwhattheyregardedasthepseudo-BuddhismoftheAumShinrikyosectimplicatedinthenervegasattackontheTokyosubways.MostMuslims refused tobelieve that fellowmembersoftheirfaithcouldhavebeenresponsibleforanythingasatrociousastheSeptember11attacks—andhencethepopularconspiracytheoryintheMuslimworldthatsomehowIsraelisecretpolicehadplottedtheterribledeed.MostChristiansinAmericasawthereligiosityofTimothyMcVeighasanti-Christian,evenantireligious,andrefusedtodescribehimasaChristianterrorist,despitethestrongChristiansubtextofthenovelThe Turner Diaries,whichMcVeighregardedashisBible.5

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Somescholarshavecometothedefenseofreligioninasimilarway,bycharacterizingthereligionofactivistsgroupsasdeviantfromthereligiousnormandthereforeuncharacteristicoftruereligion.ThisisessentiallythestancethatBruceLawrencetookindefendingIslaminShattering the Myth.6Thetermfundamentalism—appliednotjusttoChristianitybuttoawholehostofreligioustraditions—isanotherwayofexcusingso-callednormalreligionandofisolatingreligion’sproblems toadeviant formof the species. It isused sometimes tosuggestanalmostviralspreadofanoddanddangerousmutationofreligionthatifleftonitsownnaturallyleadstoviolence,autocracy,andotherextremes.Fortunately,sothislineofthinkinggoes,normalreligion is exempt. Recently, however, Islam and fundamentalismaretiedtogethersofrequentlyinpublicconversationthatthetermfundamentalismhasbecomeawayofcondemningallofIslamasadeviantbranchofreligion.Buteveninthiscasetheuseofthetermfundamentalismallowsforthedefendersofotherreligionstotakecomfortinthenotionthattheirkindofnonfundamentalistreligionisexemptfromviolenceorotherextremeformsofpublicbehavior.

Thesevariouspointsofviewpresentuswithtwoorperhapsthreeorfourdifferentanswerstothequestion,Isreligionacauseofterror-ism?Avalossaysyes,religioningeneralisacauseofterrorism.TheIslamophobessayyes,Islaminparticularisaproblem.Papesaysno,religionisirrelevanttothefighttodefendterritory.Otherreligiousdefenderssayno,ordinaryreligionisinnocentofviolence,butsomeoddformsofreligionmightcontributetoit.

TheArgumentThatReligionIsNottheProblembutThatItIsProblematic

It seemstomethat it isnotnecessary tohave tomakeonechoiceamongtheseoptions.Asanyonewhohasevertakenamultiple-choicetestknows, there isadilemmawhenpresentedwith suchabsolutedifferences.Themostaccurateresponsesareoftenfoundinthegraycategories:(c)noneoftheabove;or(d)alloftheabove.Inthecaseofthequestionregardingtheinvolvementofreligionincontemporarypubliclife,theanswerisnotsimplyamatterofpeculiarreligiongonebadorofgoodreligionbeingusedbybadpeople.Weknowthattherearestrataofreligiousimaginationthatdealwithallsidesandmoodsof human existence—the peace and the perversity, the tranquilityandtheterror.

Inmyown studies of cases of religious violence, I have foundthat religious language and ideas play an important role, thoughnotnecessarily the initialone.Theconditionsof conflict that lead

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totensionareusuallyeconomicandsocialincharacter—andoften,asPapedescribedthem,adefenseofterritoryorcultureperceivedtobeundercontrolbyanoutsidepower.Atsomepointintheconflict,however,usuallyatatimeoffrustrationanddesperation,thepoliti-calcontestbecomesreligionized.Thenwhatwasprimarilyasecularstruggle takeson theauraof sacred conflict.This creates awholenewsetofproblems.

Beginninginthe1980s,Ihavestudiedavarietyofcasesofcon-temporary religiousactivism. I startedwith the situation involvingthe Sikhs in the Punjab, a region in which I lived for some yearsandknowfairlywell.IhavealsoobservedtheriseofHindupoliticalviolence;theMuslimseparatistmovementinKashmir;theBuddhistantigovernmentprotestsinSriLanka;theAumShinrikyomovementinJapan;theIslamicrevolutioninIran;SunnijihadimovementsinEgypt,Palestine,andelsewhereintheMiddleEast;militantMessi-anicJewishmovementsinIsrael;CatholicandProtestantmilitantsinNorthernIreland;andtheChristianmilitiaintheUnitedStates.7

Ifoundinallofthesecasesaninterestingreplicationofacentralthesis. Though each group was responding to its own set of localsocial,economic,andpoliticalfactors,inallcasestherewasacom-monideologicalcomponent:theperceptionthatthemodernideaofsecular nationalism was insufficient in moral, political, and socialterms. Inmanycases theeffectsofglobalizationwere in theback-ground as global economic and communications systems undercutthedistinctivenessofnation-stateidentities.Insomecasesthehatredoftheglobalsystemwasovert,asintheAmericanChristianmilitia’shatredofthenewworldorderandtheAl-Qaedanetwork’stargetingof theWorldTradeCenter.Thus, themotivatingcause—if suchatermcanbeused—wasthesenseofalossofidentityandcontrolinthemodernworld.

Thissenseofsocialmalaiseisnotnecessarilyareligiousproblem,butitisoneforwhichideologies,bothsecularnationalistandreli-gioustransnational,providereadyresponses.Hence,ineachofthecasesIexamined,religionbecamethe ideologyofprotest.Particu-larreligiousimagesandthemesweremarshaledtoresistwhatwereimaginedtobetheenemiesoftraditionalcultureandidentities:theglobalsecularsystemsandtheirsecularnation-statesupporters.

There were other similarities among these cases. In each casethosewhoembracedradicalantistatereligiousideologiesfeltperson-allyupsetwithwhattheyregardedastheoppressionofthesecularstate.Theyexperiencedthisoppressionasanassaultontheirprideandidentityandfelthumiliatedasaresult.Thefailuresofthestate—

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thougheconomic,political,andcultural—wereoftenexperiencedinpersonalwaysashumiliationandalienation,asalossofselfhood.

Itisunderstandablethen,thatthemen—andtheywereusuallymen—whoexperiencedthislossofprideandidentitywouldlashoutinviolencethewaythatmenoftendowhentheyarefrustrated.Suchexpressionsofpoweraremeanttoatleastsymbolicallyregaintheirsense of manhood. In each case, however, the activists challengedthesefeelingsofviolencethroughimagesofcollectiveviolencebor-rowedfromtheirreligioustraditions:theideaofcosmicwar.

Theideaofcosmicwarwasaremarkablyconsistentfeatureofallofthesecases.Thosepeoplewhomwemightthinkofasterroristsregardedthemselvesassoldiersinwhattheyimaginedtobesacredbattles.Icallsuchnotionsofwarfarecosmicbecausetheyarelargerthan life.Theyevokegreatbattlesof the legendarypast,and theyrelate tometaphysical conflictsbetweengoodandevil.Notionsofcosmicwarareintimatelypersonalbutcanalsobetranslatedtothesocialplane.Ultimately,though,theytranscendhumanexperience.Oftenactivists employ imagesof sacredwarfare that are found inevery religious tradition—such as the battles in the Hebrew Bible(i.e.,theOldTestament),theepicsofHinduismandBuddhism,andthe Islamic idea of jihad. What makes religious violence particu-larly savageandrelentless is that itsperpetratorshaveplacedsuchreligious imagesofdivine struggle—cosmicwar—in the serviceofworldlypoliticalbattles.Forthisreason,actsofreligiousterrorservenotonlyastacticsinapoliticalstrategybutalsoasevocationsofamuchlargerspiritualconfrontation.

This brings us back to the question of whether religion is theproblem. In looking at the variety of cases, from the PalestinianHamasmovementtoAl-QaedaandtheChristianmilitia,itiscleartomethatinmostcasestherewererealgrievances:economicandsocialtensionsexperiencedby largenumbersofpeople.Thesegrievanceswerenotreligious.Theywerenotaimedatreligiousdifferencesorissuesofdoctrineandbelief.Theywereissuesofsocialidentityandmeaningful participation inpublic life that inother contextswereexpressed through Marxist and nationalist ideologies. But in thispresentmomentoflatemodernity,thesesecularconcernshavebeenexpressed throughrebelliousreligious ideologies.Thegrievances—thesenseofalienation,marginalization,andsocialfrustration—areoftenarticulatedinreligioustermsandseenthroughreligiousimages,andtheprotestagainstthemisorganizedbyreligiousleadersthroughthemediumorreligiousinstitutions.Thus,religionisnottheinitialproblem,butthefactthatreligionisthemediumthroughwhichtheseissuesareexpressedisproblematic.

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WhatReligionBringstoaViolentConflictWhatisproblematicaboutthereligiousexpressionofantimodernism,anti-Americanism,andantiglobalizationisthatitbringsnewaspectstoconflictsthatwereotherwisenotapartofthem.Foronething,religionpersonalizestheconflict.Itprovidespersonalrewards—forexample,religiousmerit,redemptionorthepromiseofheavenlylux-uries—to thosewho struggle in conflicts thatotherwisehaveonlysocialbenefits. It alsoprovidesvehiclesof socialmobilization thatembrace vast numbers of supporters who otherwise would not bemobilizedaroundsocialorpoliticalissues.Inmanycases,itprovidesanorganizationalnetworkoflocalchurches,mosques,temples,andreligiousassociationsintowhichpatternsofleadershipandsupportmaybetapped.Itgivesthelegitimacyofmoraljustificationforpoliti-calencounter.Evenmoreimportantly,itprovidesjustificationforvio-lencethatchallengesthestate’smonopolyonmorallysanctionedkill-ing.AccordingtothefamiliarsociologicaldictumattributedtoMaxWeber,thestate’sauthorityisalwaysrootedinthesocialapprovalofthestatetoenforceitspowerthroughtheuseofbloodshed—inpoliceauthority,punishment,andarmeddefense.Religionistheonlyotherentitythatcangivemoralsanctionforviolenceandisthereforeinher-entlyatleastpotentiallyrevolutionary.

Religionalsoprovidestheimageofcosmicwar,whichaddsfur-thercomplicationstoaconflictthathasbecomebaptizedwithreli-giousauthority.Thenotionofcosmicwargivesanall-encompassingworldviewto thosewhoembrace it.SupportersofChristianmili-tiamovements,forinstance,describedtheir“aha”experiencewhentheydiscovered theworldviewof theChristian identity totalizingideologythathelpedthemmakesenseofthemodernworld,oftheirincreasinglyperipheral role in it, andof thedramatic actions theycantaketosettheworldright.Itgivesthemrolesasreligioussoldierswhocanliterallyfightbackagainsttheforcesofevil.

The imageofcosmicwar isapotentforce.Whenthetemplateofspiritualbattleisimplantedontoaworldlyoppositionitdramati-cally changes theperceptionof the conflict by those engaged in itandvastlyaltersthewaythatthestruggleiswaged.Itabsolutizestheconflict intoextremeopposingpositionsanddemonizesopponentsbyimaginingthemtobesatanicpowers.Thisabsolutismmakescom-promisedifficulttofathomandholdsoutthepromiseoftotalvictorythroughdivineintervention.Asacredwarwagedinagodlyspanoftimeneednotbewonimmediately,however.Thetimelineofsacredstruggleisvast,perhapseveneternal.

Ioncehadtheoccasiontopointoutthefutility—insecularmili-taryterms—oftheIslamicstruggleinPalestinetoAbdulAzizRan-

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tisi,thelateleaderofthepoliticalwingoftheHamasmovement.Itseemed tome that Israel’smilitary forcewas such that aPalestin-ianmilitaryeffortcouldneversucceed.Rantisiassuredmethatthat“Palestinewasoccupiedbefore,for200years.”HeexplainedthatheandhisPalestiniancomrades“canwaitagain—atleastthatlong.”8Inhis calculation, the strugglesofGod can endure for eons.Ulti-mately,however,theyknewtheywouldsucceed.

Soreligioncanbeaproblematicaspectofcontemporarysocialconflictevenifitisnottheproblem,inthesenseoftherootcausesofdiscontent.Muchoftheviolenceincontemporarylifethatisper-ceivedasterrorismaroundtheworldisdirectlyrelatedtotheabso-lutismof conflict.Thedemonizationof enemies allows thosewhoregardthemselvesassoldiersforGodtokillwithnomoralimpunity.Quite theopposite is true:They feel that theiractswill give themspiritualrewards.

Curiously,thesamekindofthinkinghascreptintosomeoftheresponsestoterrorism.ThewaronterrorismlaunchedbytheU.S.governmentafterSeptember11isacaseinpoint.Tothedegreethatthewarreferencesaremetaphoricalandaremeanttoimplyanall-outeffortinthemannerofpreviousadministrations’warondrugsandwaronpoverty, it is anunderstandable and appropriate response.TheSeptember11attackswere,afterall,hideousacts thatdeeplyscarredtheAmericanconsciousness,andonecouldcertainlyunder-standthataresponsiblegovernmentwouldwanttowageanall-outefforttohuntdownthoseculpableandtobringthemtojustice.

Butamong somewhoespouseawaron terrorism themilitantlanguage ismore thanmetaphor.God’sblessing is imagined tobebestowed on a view of confrontation that is, like cosmic war, allencompassing, absolutizing, and demonizing. What is problematicaboutthisviewisthatitbringsanimpatiencewithmoderatesolu-tionsthatrequiretheslowproceduresofsystemsofjustice.Itdemandsinsteadthequickandviolentresponsesofwarthatlendsimplicitytothe confrontation anda senseofdivine certainty to its resolution.Alas,suchapositioncanfuelthefiresofretaliation,leadingtomoreactsofterrorisminsteadofless.

Theroleofreligioninthisliteralwaronterrorismisinacuriouswaysimilar to religion’s role in thecosmicwar imaginedby thoseperpetratingterrorism.Inbothcasesreligionisaproblematicpart-nerofpoliticalconfrontation.Religionbringsmoretoconflictthansimply a repository of symbols and the aura of divine support. Itproblematizesaconflictthroughitsabidingabsolutism,itsjustifica-tionforviolence,anditsultimateimagesofwarfarethatdemonizeopponentsandcasttheconflictintranshistoricalterms.

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Endnotes1. SeeHectorAvalos,Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Vio-

lence(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,2005);andRobertA.Pape,Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism(NewYork:RandomHouse,2005).

2. BernardLewis,The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror(NewYork:RandomHouse,2003).

3. Pape,Dying to Win,32.4. MichaelA.Sells,The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in

Bosnia(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996).5. Andrew Macdonald [William Pierce], The Turner Diaries (Hills-

boro,WV:NationalVanguardBooks,1978).6. Bruce Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence

(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000).7. SeeMarkJuergensmeyer,Terror in the Mind of God: The Global

Rise of Religious Violence,3ded.(Berkeley:UniversityofCalifor-niaPress,2003);andJuergensmeyer,The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University ofCaliforniaPress,1993).

8. AbdulAzizRantisi(cofounderandpoliticalleaderofHamas),inter-viewwithauthor,KhanYunis,Gaza,March1,1998.

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11TerrorismandtheRiseofPoliticalIslam

JohnL.Esposito

AstheU.S.attacksofSeptember11,2001,andthewaronglobalter-rorismhavetragicallydemonstrated,understandingtherelationshipofIslamto terrorism iscritical tonationaland international security inthetwenty-firstcentury.OsamabinLadenandAl-Qaedasymbolizeaglobaljihad,anetworkofextremistgroupsthreateningMuslimcoun-triesandtheWest,whoserootshaveproveddeeperandmoreperva-siveinternationallythanmosthadanticipated.Thisnewglobalthreat,which emerged from the jihad against the Soviet Union’s occupationofAfghanistan,hasexplodedacrosstheMuslimworldfromCentral,South,andSoutheastAsiatoEuropeandAmerica.

Sincethelatetwentiethcentury,politicalIslam,oftenalsoreferredtoasIslamicfundamentalismandIslamism,hasbeenasignificantfactorinthepoliticsofpredominantlyMuslimcountriesaswellastheprimarylanguageofpoliticaldiscourseandmobilizationfromNorthAfricatoSoutheastAsia.IslamicrepublicsorgovernmentswerecreatedinSudan,Iran, General Zia ul-Haq’s Pakistan, and the Taliban’s Afghanistan.MuslimrulershaveappealedtoIslamtoenhancetheirlegitimacy,rule,andpolicies;mainstreammovementsandpoliticalpartieshaveappealedtoIslamforlegitimacyandtomobilizepopularsupport.Islamistshavebeenelectedpresident,primeminister,ordeputyprimeministerandtoparliamentandhaveservedincabinetsincountriesasdiverseasSudan,Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen,Pakistan,Afghanistan,Malaysia,andIndonesia.

At the same time, extremist organizations have used violenceand terrorism in the name of Islam to threaten and to destabilize

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governmentsandtoattackgovernmentofficials,institutions,andordinary citizens in Muslim countries and the West. In discuss-ingpoliticalIslam,however,itisimportanttodistinguishbetweenmainstream and extremist movements. The former participatewithinthepoliticalsystem,whereasthelatterengageinterrorisminthenameofIslam.Bothhaverootsinabroaderreligiousrevivalthathastouchedallmajorfaithsinthepastfewdecades,andbothdraw—to differing degrees depending on time and place—oninterpretationsof Islam.However, tounderstand thembothandin particular to combat religious extremism and terrorism, it isimportanttorecognizetheirrelationshiptooneanotherand,moreimportantly,howtheydiffer.Thesedistinctionshaveseriousimpli-cations on policy approaches. A strict military and security andlawenforcementzero-toleranceapproachtoterrorismisnecessary,thoughitwillneverbecompletelysuccessfulbecauseopensociet-iescanalwaysbeinfiltrated.Conversely,azero-toleranceapproachto mainstream movements will not only undermine civil societyand thecredibilityof theWest’scommitment todemocratizationbutwillalsoproducethealienationandresentmentthatfeedsthegrowthofterrorism.

OriginsandNatureofPoliticalIslamPoliticalIslamisinmanywaysthesuccessoroffailednationalistide-ologiesandprojectsinthe1950sand1960s,fromtheArabnational-ismandsocialismofNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEasttotheMus-limnationalismofpost-independencePakistan.Indeed,thefoundersofmanymodern Islamicmovementswere formerly participants innationalistmovements:theEgyptianMuslimBrotherhood’sfounder,Hasan al-Banna; Tunisia’s Rashid Ghannoushi of the RenaissanceParty;Algeria’sAbbasiMadanioftheIslamicSalvationFront;andTurkey’sEcmettinErbakan,founderoftheWelfare(Refah)Party.

ThereassertionofIslaminpoliticsisrootedinacontemporaryreligiousrevivalorresurgencebeginninginthelate1960sand1970sthataffectedbothpersonalandpubliclife.Ontheonehand,manyMuslims became more religiously observant, as demonstrated bytheiremphasisonprayer,fasting,dress,familyvaluesandbytherevi-talizationofIslamicmysticismorSufism.Ontheotherhand,Islamreemergedasanalternativereligiopoliticalideologytotheperceivedfailuresofmoresecularformsofnationalism,capitalism,andsocial-ism. Islamic symbols, rhetoric, actors, and organizations becamemajor sources of legitimacy and mobilization, informing politicaland social activism.Whereas governments and IslamicmovementsappealedtoIslam,theauthoritariannatureofmanygovernmentsin

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TerrorismandtheRiseofPoliticalIslam 1��

theArabandMuslimworldmadepoliticalorganizingandmeetingsdifficult,ifnotimpossible.Themosquewastheoneinstitutionthestate had the most difficulty dominating or controlling. Religion,mosques,andmullahsbecamea rallyingpointwhen therewasnospaceallowedforanyother.Theuseofthemosque–mullahnetworkwascriticalintheIranianrevolutionashavebeenprivate(nongovern-mental)mosquesandtheirimamsinEgyptandmanyothercountries.The importance of clergy–mosquenetworks (Shii and Sunni) havebeenseenmostrecentlyinpost-SaddamHusseinIraqandamongShiithroughouttheGulf.State-assertedauthorityovermosquesandreli-giousleadershasfedtheradicalizationofreligio-politicalmovementswhosawthereligiousestablishmentco-opted,intertwined,andthusdiscreditedasrepresentativeoftrueIslam.

More often than not, faith and politics have been intertwinedcauses or catalysts. And though they vary by country and region,therearecommonthreads:awidespreadfeelingoffailureandlossofself-esteeminmanyMuslimsocieties.Issuesofpoliticalandsocialinjustice,suchasauthoritarianism,repression,unemployment,inad-equatehousing and social services,maldistributionofwealth, andcorruption,combinedwithconcernsaboutthepreservationofreli-giousandculturalidentityandvaluesbecameprominentthemesinMuslim discourse. Many blamed Western models of political andeconomicdevelopmentforthesefailures.Onceenthusiasticallypur-suedassymbolsofmodernity,thesemodelsincreasinglycameundercriticismas sourcesofmoraldeclineand spiritualmalaise.Conse-quently,manybecamedisillusionedwiththeWestandparticularlywiththeUnitedStates.However,outsideforcesandpetrodollarsalsoservedascatalystsforIslamicmovements.CountrieslikeSaudiAra-bia, Iran, andLibya aswell aswealthy individuals used their pet-rodollarstoextendtheirinfluenceinternationally,topromotetheirreligious–ideological worldviews and politics, and to support gov-ernmentIslamizationprogramsaswellasIslamistmovements,bothmainstreamandextremist.Bythelate1980sand1990sinternationalissuesandactorsincreasinglyplayedimportantrolesinMuslimpoli-tics: theSoviet–AfghanWar; sanctionsagainstHussein’s Iraq;andtheoppressionand liberationofMuslims inBosnia,Kashmir,andChechnya.

Though the majority of Islamists have worked to bring aboutchange throughsocialandpoliticalactivismwithin their societies,participatinginelectoralpoliticsandcivilsocietywherepermitted,asignificantanddangerousminorityofextremists—jihadgroupsfromEgypttoIndonesia,Al-Qaeda,andotherterrorists—believetheyhaveamandatefromGod.TheirwarisagainstrulersintheMuslimworld

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andtheirsocietieswhomtheybelievetobeauthoritarian,oppressive,corrupt,andun-Islamic,aswellastheWest.Forextremists,Islamisnotsimplyanideologicalandpoliticalalternativebutanimperative.SinceitisGod’scommand,implementationmustbeimmediate,notgradual, and theobligation to implement is incumbentonall trueMuslims. For these extremists, Muslims who remain apolitical orresist—individualMuslimsorgovernments—arenolongerregardedasMuslimsbutratherasatheistsorunbelievers,orenemiesofGod,againstwhomalltrueMuslimsmustwageholywar,orjihad.More-over,actsnormallyforbidden—suchasstealing,murderingnoncom-batants, and terrorism—against Muslim and non-Muslim enemiesalikeareseenasrequired.Theyarereligiouslylegitimatedinwhatisportrayedasacosmicwarbetweengoodandevil,betweenthearmyofGodandtheforcesofSatan.Oneman,SayyidQutb,standsoutastheideologueofmilitantIslam.Thoughexecutedin1966,hisworld-viewhasbothdirectlyandindirectlyinfluencedextremistgroupsandmovementsforhalfacentury.

SayyidQutb:IdeologueandMartyrofIslamicRadicalismItwouldbedifficulttooverestimatetheroleplayedbyEgypt’sSayyidQutb(1906–66)intheriseofpoliticalIslamandinparticularintheideologyofmilitantjihad.Hehasbeenbotharespectedintellectualandreligiouswriterwhoseworksincludeaninfluentialcommentaryon theQuranand the ideologue forMuslimextremistmovementsaround the globe. His journey from educated intellectual, govern-ment official, and admirer of the West to militant ideologue andactivist who condemned both theEgyptian andAmerican govern-mentsanddefendedthelegitimacyofmilitantjihadinfluencedandinspired many militants from the assassins of Anwar Sadat to thefollowersofOsamabinLadenandAl-Qaeda.

QutbhadamoderneducationandbecameanofficialintheMin-istryofPublicInstructionaswellasapoetandliterarycritic.Qutb’svisit toAmerica in the late1940sproved tobea turningpoint inhislife,transforminghimfromanadmirerintoaseverecriticoftheWest.HisexperiencesinAmericaprovidedacultureshockthatmadehimmorereligiousandconvincedhimofthemoraldecadenceoftheWest.Shortlyafterhe returned toEgypt,Qutb joined theMuslimBrotherhood.Hequicklyemergedasamajorvoice in theBrother-hoodanditsmostinfluentialideologueamidthegrowingconfronta-tionwiththeEgyptianregime.ImprisonedandtorturedforallegedinvolvementinafailedattempttoassassinateGamalAbdal-Nasser,he became increasingly militant and radicalized, convinced thattheEgyptiangovernmentwasun-Islamicandmustbeoverthrown.

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Qutb’srevolutionaryvisionissetforthinhismostinfluentialtract,Milestones.1 His ideas have reverberated in the radical rhetoric ofrevolutionariesfromAyatollahKhomeinitobinLaden.

Qutb sharply divided Muslim societies into two diametricallyopposedcamps:theforcesofgoodandofevil,thosecommittedtotheruleofGodandthoseopposed,thepartyofGodandthepartyofSatan.Therewasnomiddleground.Heemphasizedtheneedtodevelopaspecialgroup—avanguard—oftrueMuslimswithinthiscorruptandfaithlesssociety.SincethecreationofanIslamicgovern-mentwas a divine commandment, he argued, itwas not an alter-nativetobeworkedtoward.Rather, itwasanimperativeMuslimsmuststrivetoimplementormustimposeimmediately.Indeed,giventheauthoritarianandrepressivenatureoftheEgyptiangovernmentandmanyothergovernmentsintheMuslimworld,QutbconcludedthatjihadasarmedstrugglewastheonlywaytoimplementthenewIslamicorder.ForQutb, jihad,asarmedstruggle inthedefenseofIslam against the injustice and oppression of anti-Islamic govern-mentsandtheneocolonialismoftheWestandtheEast(i.e.,SovietUnion),wasincumbentonallMuslims.Thosewhorefusedtopar-ticipateweretobecountedamongtheenemiesofGodandshouldbeexcommunicatedordeclaredunbelievers,ortakfir,andfoughtandkilledalongwiththeotherenemiesofGod.Qutb’sradicalizedworldviewbecamea source for ideologues fromthe foundersofEgypt’sIslamicJihadtobinLadenandAl-Qaeda’scallforaglobaljihad.

TheGlobalizationandHijackingofJihadInthelatetwentiethandearlytwenty-firstcenturies,becauseofMus-limpoliticsandglobalcommunications,jihadhasbecomeevenmorewidespreadandcomplexinusage.2TheimportanceofjihadisrootedintheQuran’scommandtostruggle—theliteralmeaningofthewordjihad—inthepathofGodandintheexampleoftheProphetMuham-madandhisearlyCompanions.Initsmostgeneralmeaning,jihadreferstotheobligationincumbentonallMuslims,individuals,andthecommunitytofollowandrealizeGod’swill:toleadavirtuouslifeandtospreadIslamthroughpreaching,education,example,andwriting.Jihadalsoincludestheright,indeedtheobligation,todefendIslamandtheMuslimcommunityfromaggression.

Thesetwobroadmeaningsofjihad—asspiritual–moralandasarmed struggle—are contrasted in a prophetic tradition in whichMuhammadisreportedtohavesaid,“Wereturnfromthelesserjihad[warfare]tothegreaterjihad[thepersonalstruggletoliveamorallife].”Historicallyjihadhasbeensubjecttomanyinterpretationsandusages: spiritualandpolitical,peacefulandviolent, legitimateand

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illegitimate.Jihadhasbeeninterpretedandmisinterpretedtojustifyresistance and liberation struggles, extremism and terrorism, andholyandunholywars.Inadditiontohistoricbattlesandwarstopro-tectMuslimpeoplesandlands,rulersfromearlycaliphstoheadsofmodernstateslikeHusseinhaveusedjihadtolegitimatecampaignsthatcouldspreadtheboundariesoftheirstatesorempires.Extrem-ists past and present—from the Kharajites who assassinated thefourthcaliphAlitotheassassinsofEgypt’sPresidentAnwarSadat,binLaden,andAl-Qaeda,andahostofextremistmovementsfromMoroccotoIndonesia—havejustifiedtheiractsofviolenceandter-rorbycallingthemactsofjihad.

Inrecentdecades,jihad’sprimaryQuranicreligiousorspiritualmeanings, thestruggleoreffort to followGod’spathandtobuilda just society, became more multifaceted and contemporary in itsapplications—forexample, leading toa jihad tocreateamore justsocietyor toengage ineducational, community,andsocial serviceprojects.Atthesametime,inresponsetoauthoritarianregimesandpoliticalconflicts,jihadbecameaclarioncallusedbyresistance,lib-eration,and terroristmovementsalike to legitimate their cause, tomobilizesupport,andtomotivatetheirfollowers.TheAfghanMuja-hiddin,theTaliban,andtheNorthernAllianceeachwagedajihadinAfghanistanagainstforeignpowersandamongthemselves;Mus-limsmovementsinKashmir,Chechnya,Daghestan,andthesouth-ernPhilippines,Bosnia,andKosovohavefashionedtheirstrugglesasjihads;Hizbollah,Hamas,andIslamicJihadPalestinecharacterizedwarwithIsraelasajihad;Algeria’sArmedIslamicGroupengagedinajihadofterroragainstthegovernmentandtheirfellowcitizens;andbinLadenandAl-QaedawagedaglobaljihadagainstMuslimgov-ernmentsandtheWest.Thetermsjihadandmartyrdom,orshahid,gainedsuchcurrencyandprovedtobesuchpowerfulsymbolsthattheywerealsousedbynationalist,orsecular,leadersandmovementssuchasYasserArafatandthesecularPalestinianNationalAuthorityanditsmilitarywingtheal-AqsaMartyrsBrigades.

TheSoviet–Afghanwarmarkedanewturningpointasajihadarmedstrugglewentglobaltoadegreeneverseeninthepast.ThemujahidinholywardrewMuslimsfrommanypartsoftheworldandsupportfromMuslimandnon-Muslimcountriesandsources.ThosewhofoughtinAfghanistan,calledAfghanArabs,movedontofightotherjihadsintheirhomecountriesandinBosnia,Kosovo,andCen-tralAsia.Othersstayedonorweretrainedandrecruitedinthenewjihadimadrasas[religiousschools]andtrainingcamps,joininginbinLaden’sglobaljihadagainstMuslimgovernmentsandtheWest.

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TerrorismandtheRiseofPoliticalIslam 1�1

Although the distinction is often made between Quranic pre-scriptions about just war versus unjust war, many and conflictinginterpretationsoftheverseshavebeenmadeovertime.Atissuearethemeaningoftermslikeaggressionanddefenseandquestionsaboutwhen the command to sacrifice life and property to defend Islamis appropriate andhow todefine the enemies of Islam.For exam-ple,theQuranspeaksrepeatedlyofthe“enemiesofGod”andthe“enemiesofIslam,”oftendefiningthemas“unbelievers.”AlthoughotherQuranicversesappeartomakeitclearthatsuchpeopleshouldbephysicallyfoughtagainstonlyiftheybehaveaggressivelytowardMuslims,someMuslimshaveinterpretedthecalltostruggleorstriveagainstsuchenemiestobeapermanentengagementrequiredofallMuslimsofeverytimeandplaceuntiltheentireworldisconvertedtoIslam.AmajorexampleofthiskindofthinkingwouldbethoseresponsiblefortheattacksontheWorldTradeCenterandthePenta-gonintheUnitedStatesonSeptember11,2001.

TerroristslikebinLadenandothershavegonebeyondclassicalIslam’scriteriaforajustjihadandrecognizenolimitsbuttheirown,employinganyweaponsormeans.AdoptingQutb’smilitantworldviewofanIslamundersiege,theyignoreorrejectIslamiclaw’sregu-lationsregardingthegoalsandmeansofavalidjihad:thatviolencemustbeproportional;thatonlythenecessaryamountofforceshouldbeusedtorepeltheenemy;thatinnocentciviliansshouldnotbetar-geted;andthatjihadmustbedeclaredbytherulerorheadofstate.Moreover, extremists have departed from the traditional MuslimviewofarmedjihadasacollectivecommunityresponsibilityandhaveassertedthatjihadisanindividualdutyrequiredofeveryMuslim.

SuicideBombingandTerrorismThe most controversial and increasingly widespread form of jihadhasbeensuicidebombing.Theuseofsuicideterrorismhasbecomeaweaponofchoice.ItwasusedintheSeptember11attacksagainsttheWorldTradeCenterandthePentagon,andsubsequentlyinextremistattacksglobally,inparticularinitswidespreaduseinpost-HusseinIraq.Historically,SunniandShiiMuslimshaveforbiddenreligioussuicideandactsofterrorism.TheNizari Ismailis,popularlycalledtheAssassins,whointheeleventhandtwelfthcenturieswerenotori-ousforsendingsuicidalassassinsagainsttheirenemies,wererejectedbymainstreamIslamasfanatics.However,inthelatetwentiethcen-tury,theissueresurfacedasmany,ShiiandSunnialike,engagedinsuicide bombings, legitimating their actions religiously with termslike jihad andmartyrdom.Although theoriginsof suicideattacksareoftenequatedwithHamasintheIsraeli–Palestinianconflict,in

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factsuicidebombingsintheMuslimworldfirstoccurredinLebanon,usedbyHizbollahandal-JihadinattackssuchasthoseagainsttheU.S.MarinebarracksandFrenchmilitaryheadquartersinBeirutin1983inwhich241Americantroopswerekilled.

Suicidebombing laterbecame theweaponof last resort in theIsrael–Palestine conflict, often associatedwithHamas, a religious,social,political,andmilitarymovement thatemerged in late1987and was the product of Israeli occupation of the West Bank andGaza.Thecombinationofpoliticalandsocialactivismwithguerrillawarfare won financial and moral support from many PalestiniansandsympatheticsupportersinthebroaderArabandMuslimworld.3However, the actions of the Qassim Brigade, the Hamas militarywing,earnedHamas itsreputationfor terrorism.Created in1991,thebrigadeinitiallyengagedinwell-plannedselectiveattacksagainstIsraelimilitaryandpolice.Organizedintosmallclandestinecells,itusedguerrillawarfare,not randomactsofviolence, to respond toIsraelipoliciesandactions.

This position changed dramatically after the Oslo Accords in1993.RespondingtospecificeventsinIsraelandtheWestBankandGaza, inwhat theyclaimedwasanescalationof Israeli repressionof targeted assassinations, mass detentions, and deportations, theQassimBrigadeundertookdirectattacksoutsidetheheartofIsraelagainstcivilianaswellasmilitarytargets.Itadoptedanewtypeofwarfare:suicidebombing.ItsdeadlyattacksincreasedexponentiallyafteraJewishsettlerkilledtwenty-nineworshippersduringtheFri-daycongregationalprayerattheMosqueofthePatriarchinHebronon February 25, 1994. The brigade promised swift revenge andretaliation for the massacre and undertook five anti-Israeli opera-tionswithinIsraelitselfincitieslikeGalilee,Jerusalem,andTelAviv.TheuseofsuicidebombingbyHamasfurtherincreasedduringtheSecondIntifada,whichbeganin2000,andalsobecamemoreindis-criminate.SuicidebombingwasjustifiedbyHamasasaweaponoflastresortinresponsetotheIsraelimilitary’soverwhelmingmilitarysuperiority.Theybelievedthatsuicidebomberswerecommittingnotanactofsuicidebutoneofself-sacrifice,engagedinpoliticalresis-tanceandretaliationagainstIsraelioccupationandoppression.

Hamas provides an excellent example of diverse strategicresponsestoacomplexandchangingpoliticalcontext.IthashadastrongpoliticalwingthathasengagedinpoliticaloppositiontoIsraelandthePalestinianLiberationOrganization(PLO)andhaspartici-pated in university student elections and, more recently, municipalelections.Atthesametime,itspawnedamilitiathatinitiallyengagedtheIsraelimilitarywithconventionalweapons.Hamasturnedtosui-

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cidebombinginresponsetowhatitperceivedasachangingcontextinwhichsuicidebomberswereitsmosteffectiveweapon,especiallyinstrikingterrorintheheartsofIsrael’scitizenswiththehopethatthiswouldpressuretheIsraeligovernmenttowithdrawitsmilitaryasithaddoneinLebanoninMay2000.TheattitudeofHamastowardtheuseofviolenceisareminderofthepatternofmanygroupsandmovements.WhereasmainstreamIslamicactivistsoperatewithinthesystem,extremistsbelievethatthenatureoftheparticularpoliticalcontextissuchthatviolentoppositionisrequired—indeed,divinelymandated.Atthesametime,Hamasdemonstratedin2005-2006,theextenttowhichsomemovementsadapttheirstrategiesandpoliciesinlightofexperiencesandchangingpoliticalcontexts.Whilerefusingtosurrenderitsarms,HamasdiddecidetoparticipateasapoliticalpartyintheJanuary2006Palestinianparliamentaryelections.Inastunningvictory,Hamasswepttheelections,winningamajorityoftheparliamentaryseatsandtherighttoformagovernment.

Hizbollah,whichinitiatedtheuseofsuicidebombingintheMid-dleEastin1983,providesanotherimportantandinfluentialexampleofthetendencyofmovementstodefineandtoadjusttheirstrategyinresponsetopoliticalcontexts.HizbollahbeganasanIranian-sup-portedmilitiamovementinLebanoninresponsetotheIsraeliinva-sionofLebanon.Itusedguerillawarfareandin1983turnedtosui-cidebombingtodrivetheAmericanandFrenchmilitaryforcesoutofLebanon.WhenthepoliticalcontextchangedaftertheTaifAccordsin1989,HizbollahbecameamajorplayerinelectoralpoliticsasapoliticalpartyandsignificantpresenceintheLebaneseparliament.However, it refused to laydown itsarms in the southofLebanonwhereitcontinuedtofightwhatitregardedasanIsraelioccupation.Indeed,theIsraelipulloutin2000—aftertwenty-twoyearsofoccu-pation—waswidelyseenbymany,inparticularmilitantIslamists,asvindicatingthetacticaluseofviolenceandsuicidebombing.

Suicide bombing has precipitated a sharp debate in the Mus-limworld, garneringboth support and condemnationon religiousgrounds,withprominentreligiousleadersdifferingsharplyintheirlegalopinions(fatwa).SheikhAhmadYasin,thelatereligiousleaderandfounderofHamas,andAkramSabri,themufti,orlegalexpert,ofJerusalem,aswellasmanyotherArabandPalestinianreligiousleadersarguedthatsuicidebombingisnecessaryandjustified.Otherreligiousleadersandscholarscondemnedsuicidebombings—inpar-ticular those that target civilians—as terrorism. Sheikh AbdulazizbinAbdallahAl-Sheikh,GrandMuftiofSaudiArabia,condemnedallsuicidebombingassuicideandthereforeun-IslamicandforbiddenbyIslam.However,SheikhMuhammadSayyidTantawi,theformer

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grandmuftiofEgyptandcurrentrectorofAl-AzharUniversity,drewasharpdistinctionbetweensuicidebombings thatareactsof self-sacrificeandself-defenseandthekillingofnoncombatants,women,and children, which he has consistently condemned. Sheikh Yusufal-Qardawi,amongthemost influential religiousauthorities in theworld,hasgivenfatwasthatrecognizesuicidebombinginIsrael–Pal-estineasanactofself-defense,thegivingofone’slifeforGodwiththehopethatGodwillgrantParadise.Qardawihaslegitimatedthekillingofcivilians,arguingthatIsraelisamilitantandmilitarysoci-etyinwhichbothmenandwomenserveinthemilitaryandreservesandthatifanelderlypersonorachildiskilledinsuchacts,itisaninvoluntarykilling.Atthesametime,hehasdenouncedactsofter-rorismelsewhereasun-IslamicoragainsttheteachingsofIslam.

OsamabinLadenandtheSpreadofGlobalTerrorismThesuicideattacksofSeptember11,2001,wereawatershedinthehistoryofpoliticalIslamandglobalterrorism,signalingthemagni-tudeofthethreatofbinLadenandAl-Qaedaandtheglobalizationofjihad.4BinLaden,theeducated,wealthysonofaprominentSaudifamilywithclosetiestotheHouseofSaud,hadfoughtagainsttheSoviets in Afghanistan. The struggle allied him with a cause sup-portedbytheUnitedStates,SaudiArabia,Pakistan,andmanyoth-ers.However,afterthewarhebecameradicalizedbytheprospectofanAmerican-ledcoalitioninthe1991GulfWarandthesubsequentincreasedpresenceandinfluenceofAmericainSaudiArabiaandtheGulf. His opposition to the war escalated rapidly, resulting in hislossofSaudicitizenship,hismovetoSudan,andthenhisreturntoAfghanistan,whichbecametheprimarytrainingbaseforAl-QaedaanditsglobaljihadagainstMuslimgovernmentsaswellasAmericaandtheWest.

BinLadenbecamethegodfatherofanemergingglobalterrorism,amajorfunderofterroristgroups,andasuspectinthe1993bomb-ingoftheWorldTradeCenter,oftheslaughterofeighteenAmericansoldiersinSomalia,andofbombingsinRiyadhin1995andinDhah-ranin1996.HethreatenedattacksagainstAmericanswhoremainedonSaudisoilandpromisedretaliationinternationallyforcruisemis-sileattacksagainstSudanandhisreportedbaseinAfghanistan.5InFebruary1998,binLadenandothermilitantleadersannouncedthecreationofTheIslamicFrontforJihadagainstJewsandCrusaders,atransnationalcoalitionofextremistgroups.Al-Qaedawaslinkedtoaseriesofactsofterrorism:thetruckbombingofAmericanembas-siesinKenyaandTanzaniaonAugust7,1998,thatkilled263peopleandinjuredmorethan5,000,followedonOctober12,2000,bya

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suicidebombingattackagainsttheUSS Cole,whichkilledseventeenAmericansailors.

OsamabinLaden’smessagewasprimarilypoliticalratherthantheological; he appealed to the grievances and popular causes ofmany in the Arab and Muslim world. A sharp critic of Americanforeignpolicy,hedenouncedthesubstantialAmericanmilitaryandeconomic involvementandpresence inSaudiArabiaand theGulf,which he dismissed as Zionist crusaders; U.S. support for Israel;sanctionsagainstSaddam’sIraqthatresultedinthedeathsofhun-dredsofthousandsofcivilians;SaudiArabia;andotherun-Islamicgovernments. To these were added other populist causes like Bos-nia,Kosovo,Chechnya, andKashmir.BinLaden’s intentionswereforcefullystatedin“ADeclarationofWaragainsttheAmericans”in1996.BinLadendeclaredhewasfightingU.S.foreignpolicyintheMiddleEastand,inparticular,AmericansupportfortheHouseofSaudandthestateofIsrael.Hisgoal,hesaid,wastounleashaclashofcivilizationsbetweenIslamandtheZionistcrusadersoftheWesttoprovokeanAmericanbacklashthatwouldradicalizetheMuslimworldandwouldtopplepro-WesternMuslimgovernments.

BinLadenandAl-QaedarepresentedanewinternationalbrandofSunnimilitancyandterrorismassociatedwiththeAfghanArabs—thosewhohadcomefromtheArabandMuslimworldtofightalong-side the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets. The sources andgrowthofextremismandactsofterrorismwerenotconfinedtotheMiddle East but also encompassed Central, South, and SoutheastAsiaandlaterspreadtoAmericaandEurope.BinLadenandhischiefofstaff,AymanalZawahiri,werecommittedtoaglobaljihad.

*****Therecanbenodoubt thatreligionprovidesapowerful sourceofauthority,meaning,and legitimacy.Religiouslymotivatedor legiti-matedviolenceandterroraddsthedimensionsofdivineorabsoluteauthoritybuttressingtheauthorityofterroristleaders,religioussym-bolism,moraljustification,motivationandobligation,certitude,andheavenlyrewardthatenhancerecruitmentandawillingnesstofightanddieinasacredstruggle(seeMarkJuergensmeyer’scontributioninthisbook).Thus,evenmoresecularmovementshaveappealedtoandhaveusedreligion.Thepowerofreligioussymbolismcouldbeseen,forexample,whenArafat,leaderofthesecularnationalistmovementsPLOandthenPNA,usedthetermsjihadandshahidtodescribehissituationwhenhewasundersiegeinRamallah.ThePalestinianmili-tia—notjusttheIslamistHamas—appropriatedreligioussymbolism,choosingtocallitselftheAl-AqsaMartyrsBrigadeanddrawingon

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thesymbolsofjihadandmartyrdom.Moreover,thoughreligiousandnonreligiousorganizationsandmovements,whetherAl-QaedaortheMarxistTamilTigers,shareacommonstrategy,Muslimsofteniden-tifytheirgoalasIslamic:tocreateanIslamicgovernment,acaliph-ate,orsimplyamoreIslamicallyorientedstateandsociety.

However,Muslimpoliticalterrorismcanboomerangandalienatesegmentsofasocietythatmightotherwisebesympathetic.Amajorturningpoint intheEgyptiangovernment’swaragainstextremistslikeAl-JihadandtheGamaaIslamiyyaoccurredwhentheattacksinLuxorandelsewhereindiscriminatelyslaughteredinnocentforeignersandcivilianEgyptians.Similarly,despitethefactthatthevastmajor-ityofthoseresponsibleforattacksagainsttheWorldTradeCenterandthePentagonwereSaudis,boththeSaudigovernmentandthepopulacebecameconcernedandaggressiveincombatingAl-QaedaandterrorismonlyaftermajorattacksinSaudiArabiatargetedandkilledSaudis,includingwomenandchildren.

Acriticalissueinthewaragainstglobalterrorismistheissueoflegitimateversusillegitimateusesofviolence.Theproblemiscom-poundedbyreligiousauthority.Islamlacksacentralauthority:asin-glereligiousauthority,hierarchy,orboardofseniorclergy.Thiscanbeasourceofhealthydiversityandflexibility.Forexample,basedonjuristinterpretationsoftextsandsocialcontexts,muftiscanrenderdifferingopinions,or fatwas, insuchcasesascontracts,marriage,divorce,andmaintenance.Thislackofacentralauthority,however,hasalsoledtoawaroffatwas.TheproblemcanbeseeninthediverseandconflictingrulingsregardingsuicidebombingingeneralanditsuseintheIsraeli–Palestinianconflict;thesharpdifferencesbetweenmainstreamreligious leaders likeAyatollahSistaniand theactionsofmilitants likeMoqtedar al-SadrorAbuMusabal-Zarqawi; therulingsofthemuftiofSaudiArabia;andtheactionsofal-QaedainSaudiArabia.

ThewaragainstglobalterrorismwillcontinuetochallengeEuro-pean and American policymakers as well as Muslim governmentsnotonlytousemilitaryandeconomicmeansbutalsotoemphasizepublicdiplomacy.Themilitarycankill,capture,andcontainterror-ists,but,aswehaveseen,thishasnotlessenedthegrowthofMus-limextremismand terrorism.Terroristsmustbemarginalizedanddelegitmated.Attemptstowintheheartsandmindsandtowageanideologicalcounteroffensiveinthiswarofideasrequiresubstantiveforeignpolicyreforms.Theprimarycausesormotivationsofterror-ism—thepoliticalandeconomicconditionsandgrievancesthatfeedanger,alienation,andrage—mustbeaddressedandameliorated.

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Drawinga sharpdistinctionbetweenmainstreamand extrem-istmovementsremainscritical.Whereasterroristsrequireasecuritypolicy with zero tolerance, mainstream Islamists, especially politi-calparties, require engagementby their governmentsandWesterngovernments. If theyarenot allowed to voteorbe inpositionsofpoliticalpowerbutarebannedor repressed, the riskofalienationandradicalizationissignificant.Aswehaveseen,terroristscanbekilledandcapturedbutnotcompletelyeliminated.Post-September11,manymajorterroristleadersremainatliberty,andthenumbersofterroristsandgroupscontinuetogrow.Thegreaterchallengeistolimitthegrowthofglobalterrorism,toaddresscriticalpoliticalandideologicalfactors,andthustodrainthefuelthatignitesandthethe-ologiesofhatethatreinforceandlegitimateglobalterrorism.

MuslimreligiousleadersandintellectualsplayacriticalroleintheideologicalwaragainstMuslimextremismandterrorism,whichisthestruggleforthesoulofIslam.Theybringtobearareligiousauthority and interpretations of Islam that discredit theologies ofhate. They formulate and seek to implement doctrinal and educa-tional reforms—in schools, madrasas, and universities—that moreeffectivelyrespondtothechallengesofglobalizationinthetwenty-firstcenturywithitsneedforallreligiousfaithstoemphasizeinclu-siveratherthanexclusivetheologiesthatfostermutualunderstand-ing, religious pluralism, and tolerance. Finally, it is important toremember thatMuslim societieshave longbeen themost frequentvictimsof religiousextremismand terrorism.ThevastmajorityofMuslimsandthemajorityofIslamicmovementsandactivistsdesireandareoneofthemostimportantforcesforsecuringstableandsafesocieties,representativegovernments,andtheruleoflaw.

Endnotes1. Milestones(CedarRapids,Iowa:UnitedPublications,nd).Seealso

JohnL.Esposito,Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam,ch.2(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),andAhmadMoussalli,Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Dis-course of Sayyid Qutb(Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress,1993).

2. For this discussion, I drew from John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2003);andEsposito,The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?3rded.(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).

3. AmongthebetterstudiesofHamasaswellasitsuseofsuicideareShaul Mishal and Avraham, Sela Palestinian Hamas (New York:Columbia University Press 2000); Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Politi-cal Thought and Practice (Washington,D.C.:InstituteforPalestineStudies, 2000); Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic

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of Suicide Bombing(NewYork:RandomHouse,2005);andJean-FrancoisLegrain,“Hamas:LegitimateHeirofPalestinianNation-alism?”inPolitical Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?ed.JohnL.Esposito(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,1997).

4. ForperceptivediscussionsofOsamabinLaden,seePeterL.Bergen,The Osama bin Laden I Know(NewYork:FreePress,2006);Holy War Inc.(NewYork:FreePress,2002);JasonBurke,Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: I.B.Tauris,2004);AhmedRashid,Taliban: Militant Islam(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2001);andJ.K.Cooley,Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism(London:PlutoPress,2000).

5. TranscriptofOsamabinLadenInterview,CNN/Time,August25,1998.

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12TerrorismandDeculturation

OlivierRoy

ApopularviewamongjournalistsandexpertsisthatofIslamicterror-ismasanexpressionoftheMuslimwrath.Accordingtothisnotion,aminorityvanguard—theterrorists—usesunacceptablemeanstoexpressawholecommunity’sgrievances.Itisareactionofacommunitythatfeelsunderthreat:aresponsetoWesternencroachmentsintheMiddleEast and the imposition of Western values on Muslims living in theWest. In reality, although it is obvious that many Muslims do reactnegativelytowhattheyseeasbothapoliticalandaculturalaggression,acloseranalysisoftheIslamicterroristswhostrucktheWestin2001andcontinuetocommitterroristactivityinpresentlyseemstolargelydebunktheideathattheirstrugglehassomethingtodowithaclashofcultureor civilizationsor religions—even if they sometimesuse suchterms.

WhereDoTheyComeFrom?IfweanalyzetheviolentIslamicmilitantswhohaveoperatedinWest-ernEuropesincetheearly1990s,aclearpatternemerges.Theseindi-viduals, evenwhen theyhaveaMiddleEastern familialbackground,do not come from the Middle East to perpetrate terrorist attacks intheWest,noraretheysentbyaMiddleEasternterroristorganizationwithalocalagenda,suchastheliberationofPalestine.1Theyarepartofthedeterritorialized,supranationalIslamicnetworksthatoperateintheWestandattheperipheryoftheMiddleEast.TheirbackgroundshavelittletodowithMiddleEasternconflictsortraditionalreligious

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education,exceptthefewSaudisandYemeniswhocarriedouttheSeptember11,2001,attacksontheUnitedStates.Onthecontrary,theyarebasedinEurope,fluentinWesternlanguages,andWesterneducated:NoneofthemunderwentareligiouscurriculuminIslamicmadrassas,orreligiousschools.SomewereborninEurope;otherscame as children, students, or political refugees; many even pos-sessedWesterncitizenship.AlloftheSeptember11pilotsandtheiraccomplices, except the Saudis’ muscle, left their countries of ori-gintostudyabroad,especiallyscientificortechnicalsubjects.TheyallhavesecularbackgroundswithWesternhabitslikedrinkinganddatinggirlsuntil thedaysof their return,or conversion, to Islam.Allbrokewithordissociatedthemselvesfromtheirfamilies.ThoughtheyweresettlingintheWest,theywereneverinvolvedinthelocalMuslimcommunitylifeorwithanyreligiouscongregation.Almostnoneofthemmadeendogamicmarriageswithcousinsorthosefromthe same villages. In fact, many married non-Muslim Europeans,who,inmanycases,convertedtoIslam.

Inotherwords,theywereculturaloutcasts,livingatthemarginofsocietyineithertheircountriesoforiginortheirhostcountries.Moreinterestingly,allofthem—followingnormallivesintheircoun-triesoforiginorinWesternEurope—becameborn-againMuslimsinEurope.ThemosquesofHamburg, al-Qods,London,FinsburyPark,Marseilles,andevenMontrealplayedabiggerrolethanaSaudimadrassaintheprocessoftheirradicalIslamization.Morerecently,in2004 to thepresent, the radicalization ishappeningoutside themosque,suchaswithinagroupoflocalfriends,orindeedinjail.Inanycase,themainpointisthattheyareWesternizedanddeterritori-alized,meaningthattheyarenotlinkedwithagivencountry,includ-ingtheirfamily’scountryoforigin.Theirgroupsareoftenmixesofeducatedmiddle-classleadersandworking-classdropouts,apatterncommon tomostof theWestEuropean radicalsof the1970s and1980s;thesegroupsincludetheGermanRedArmyFaction,theRedBrigadesinItaly,andActionDirecteinFrance.

InalmosteveryAl-QaedacellinEurope,wenowfindconverts.They sharemany commonpatternswith theborn-againMuslims.A few are middle class—usually the leaders, like Christian Cazein France who was a medical doctor killed in action against thepoliceinRoubaixin1996—whereasmanyaredropoutsfromwork-ingclass,suchastheAmerican“dirtybomber”JoséPadilla,“shoebomber”RichardReid,LondonsubwayattackerGermaineLindsay,andFrenchmanLionelDumontwhofoughtinBosnia.Twentyyearsago, such individualswouldhave joined radical leftistmovements,but these have disappeared from the spaces of social exclusion or

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TerrorismandDeculturation 1�1

havebecomebourgeoisliketheRevolutionaryCommunistLeagueinFrance,whichtook5percentinthelastpresidentialelection.NowonlytwomovementsofradicalprotestintheWestclaimtobeinter-nationalist:theantiglobalizationmovementandradicalIslamists.Toconvert to European Islam is a way for a rebel to find a cause. ItfollowsthatthesecondgenerationofAl-Qaedamilitants,whowererecruited after 1992, is characterized precisely by the breaking oftheirtieswiththeallegedly“real”Muslimworldtheypretendtorep-resent.Clearly,theyareallfarmoreaproductofaWesternizedIslamthanoftraditionalMiddleEasternpolitics.However“oldtime”theirtheologymaysoundtoWesterners,andwhatevertheymaythinkofthemselves,theyareclearlymoreapostmodernphenomenonthanapremodernone.

Thus, far from representing a traditional religious communityorculture,thesemilitantsbrokewiththeirownpast,andwithtra-ditional Islam, and experienced an individual re-Islamization in asmall cellofuprooted fellows,where they forged theirown Islam.This is illustrated vividly, for example, by Mohammed Atta, whostatedthathedidnotwanttogetburiedaccordingtoEgyptiantra-dition,whichhedubbedun-Islamic.Thesemilitantsdonot followanyschoolornotableclericinIslamandoftenliveaccordingtonon-Muslimstandards.Indeed,thoughtaqiya,orhidingone’sideas,isapopularexplanationforsuchbehavior,itishardtoseehowdrinkingandtryingtohireprostitutesthenightbeforeaterroristact—asdidsomeoftheSeptember11terrorists—wouldbeagoodwaytodeceivetheenemy.Afterall,secretagentsaresupposedtoknowhownottoattractattention.Moreover,taqiyaisaShi’anotionandisconsideredaninnovationintheSunniworld.

WhomDoTheyFight?Terrorists’ conceptionof spacehas little todowith thedefenseofDarulIslam,thetraditionalterritorywhereMuslimsliveunderMus-limrulers.First,theyusuallydonotconsiderthatthepresentrulersarelegitimate,yettheydonotfighttoreplacethembytrueIslamicleaders. Al-Qaeda—from Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya toNewYorkandFallujah—isfightingfirstofallagainst theWestorits supposed allies (e.g., Jews andShi’as) butnot against thepres-entregimes.Al-Qaedahasbeen involved inattacksagainst Jewishtargetsbut almostneveragainst Israeli targets.And even inSaudiArabia, theyare targeting foreigners rather than local governmentofficials.Infact,thisispreciselybecausetheyseeDarulIslamasadeterritorializedconcept:whereverMuslimsareunderpressureisagoodplacetofight.

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Al-Qaeda’s fight started long before any Western militaryencroachmentintheMiddleEastorAfghanistan.ThepredecessorofOsamabinLaden—AbdullahAzzam,aPalestinianMuslimbrother—gave up the fight to free Palestine, because in his view this was anationalist struggle rather than a purely religious jihad. No Euro-peanAl-QaedamemberleftEuropeortheUnitedStatestofightforIslaminhisorhisfamily’scountryoforigin,exceptsomePakistanis.TheypreferredBosnia,Afghanistan,andKashmir.Forexample,alltheAlgeriansinvolvedinAl-QaedacamefromEurope—or,likeRes-sam,becameradicalizedinEurope—andnonewaseverfoundinthestrongholdsof theAlgerianArmed IslamicGroup (GIA).The for-eignerssentencedinYemeninJanuary1999fortakinghostagesweresixBritishcitizensofPakistanidescent,includingtheson-in-lawofSheykhHamza,theEgyptian-bornformerimamofFinsburyPark,andtwoAlgerians.SheykhSaïdOmar,sentencedinPakistanforthekidnappingofDaniel Pearl, is aBritish citizenborn in theUnitedKingdom.ThetwoyoungMuslimssentencedinMoroccoforfiringontouristsinaMarrakeshhotelin1994werefromFrenchAlgerianfamilies. Inotherwords, inmanycases the Islamicviolence in theMiddleEastisimportedfromrecommunalizedWesternMuslims.

Theborn-againMuslimsofEuropearefightingatthefrontiersoftheirimaginaryummah,andwhatagitatesthemisaconsequenceoftheirWesternizationratherthananyspilloverfromMiddleEast-ernconflicts.All the literatureandwebsites linkedwithAl-Qaedastress theperipheral jihad fromBosnia to thePhilippines,whereasthe struggles in Palestine and Iraq are not considered central—anemphasisthathasbeennotedandcriticizedbysomeArabmilitantsliketheSaudiSheykhAbuAymanalHilali.Unsurprisingly,mostofthejihadiwebsitesarebasedintheWestorinSouthAsia.Thisisnotonlybecauseofcensorship;itisalso,andmostimportantly,becausethepeoplewhoarebehindthemarebasedintheWest.

WhatKindofIslam?TheradicalismoftheterroristshasnothingtodowithIslamasacul-ture.NeitherisittheexpressionofthecollectiveidentityofaMus-limcommunity.Deculturationandindividualizationarethetwokeyissuesintheprocessofradicalization,andIslamistheexpressionofareconstructedselfinreferencetoavirtualummah.Indeed,theIslamwithwhichsuchyoungpeople identify isnot thecultural Islamoftheirparentsorhomecountries.ItisbothSalafiandjihadist.SalafistsseektopurgeIslamofalloutside influences,startingwiththecul-turesandtraditionsofMuslimsocieties,andtorestoreittotheletteroftheKoranaswellastothetraditionoftheProphetMuhammed.

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TerrorismandDeculturation 1��

SalafismisfundamentallyopposedtoallculturalornationalformsofIslam.BynomeansareallSalafistsjihadists.Buttoday’sterroristsarealso jihadists,sincetheyhaveoptedfromtheoutset forarmedstruggle,whichhasessentiallytakenoverthetargetsofthefarleftin the1970s, suchasUnitedStates imperialism insteadofgenuinesupportforspecificnationalliberationmovements.Infact,formanyradicals,andespeciallytheconverts,activismseemstosupersedereli-giousconvictions.

As mentioned already, radicalization is a consequence of theWesternization of Muslims being born and living in Europe. It islinkedwithagenerationalgapandadepressedsocialstatus,anditperpetuates a preexistent tradition of leftist, Third Worldist, anti-imperialistyouthprotest.Notwithstandingsuchradicalization,mostEuropeanMuslimshavefoundawaytoconciliatefaithandanon-Muslimenvironmentinapractical,ifsometimesmakeshift,manner.Theproblemisthatthisdefactoliberalismisnotyetembeddedorexpressedintheologicalterms.Thismeansthatsuchliberalismisnotboundintoasocializationmechanismthatcanbetransmittedeasilytosubsequentgenerations,suggestingthatthepresentgenerationwillremainopentoradicalization.

ReligionorCulture?Neofundamentalism does not target communities with ties to aculture of origin but instead seeks out individuals in doubt abouttheirfaithandidentity.Itappealstoanuprooted,oftenyoung,well-educated,butfrustratedandalreadydisgruntledyouth.NowonderSalafismattractsthelosersofdeculturation.Butlosershouldnotbeunderstoodineconomicterms:It isnotamatterofpovertybutofself-identity.Salafismevenmadeabreakthroughamonganeducatedmiddleclassthatisnotrevolutionaryandislookingforrespectabilitywhile experiencing some sortof acculturation. InEgyptandPaki-stan,forexample,SalafismreachesmanyworkersreturningfromtheGulfStates.2Forsuchuprootedindividuals—whetherintheWestorintheMiddleEast—fundamentalismoffersasystemforregulatingbehaviorthatcanfitanysituation,fromAfghandesertstoAmericancollegecampuses.Indeed,Islam—aspreachedbytheTaliban,SaudiWahhabisandbinLaden’sradicals—ishostileeventoculturethatisMusliminorigin.Whateverithasdestroyed,whetherMohammad’stomb, theBuddhistBamiyan statues inAfghanistan,or theWorldTradeCenter,itexpressesthesamerejectionofmaterialcivilizationorculture,withMuslimculturesthefirsttargetandWesternculturesecond.Indoingso,theWestisnotrejectedinfavorofanysortofIslamic culture.Salafistsdonot consider Islamasa culturebutas

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amerereligionthatwould lose itspurityandholisticdimensionifembeddedinaspecificculture.Thisiswhyitappealstoanunmooredsecond-generationyouthinEurope.

Salafistsdreamof a tabula rasa.Theydonot value the classi-calgreatMuslimcivilizations,suchastheUmayyadortheOttomanEmpire.TheyrejectthedifferentreligiousschoolsaswellasSufism,whichhavebeensoinstrumentalinthenativizationofIslam.HowcanwestudyYemenwithoutconsideringtheriftbetweenZaydismandShafeismorCentralAsiawithouttakingintoaccounttheroleofHanafismandSufism?SalafistsrejectlocalIslamsandwagearelent-less war on folk customs and even learned traditions, religious orsecular.Forinstance,theyopposeanycultofthesaints—zyaratinCentralAsiaandmousseminNorthAfrica,whichisareligiouspil-grimageinwhichpeoplecometopraytothelocalpatronsaint—andeventhecelebrationoftheProphet’sbirthday,knownasmawlud.3TheyrejectSufismandmysticalpractices,calledzikr, andanyformofartisticperformanceassociatedwithareligiouspractice,suchasqawwalimusicinPakistan,withsomeexceptions,suchasreligioussongsunaccompaniedbymusical instruments.4Theyrejectspecificburialrituals.5Quiteevidentlytheyalsoforbidparticipationinpaganor secular celebrations. For example, the popular Persian NawruzfestivalonApril21wasbannedbytheTaliban;theSaudiCouncilofFatwaruledagainstatraditionalfestivity,GrayqaanorQuraiqa’an,inwhichchildrenfromtheGulfCoastusedtoknockondoorsandcollecttreats.6

TheTaliban,forexample,wentveryfarintheirstruggleagainsttraditional Afghan culture. As is the practice of all Salafists, theyfirsttargetedbadMuslims,whereasWesternculturecameonlysec-ond.TheyhadrathergoodrelationswiththeUnitedStatesuntilfall1997anddidnotbothertoexpelWesternnongovernmentalorgani-zations.InsteadtheytookahardlineagainstAfghancustomsandculture. They banned music, movies, dancing, and kite flying, thelatterbecausesomeoneclimbingatreetoremoveakitemightendupwatching,eveninadvertently,unveiledwomeninsidetheadjacenthousegarden.Petsongbirdswereoutlawedbecausetheymighthavevoidedabeliever’sprayerbydistractinghim.TheTalibandestroyedthestatuesoftheBuddhas,notinoppositiontoBuddhismbut—apartfromIslamforbiddingrepresentationof thehumanform—becausethesestatueswerenot linkedwiththecurrentreligion inAfghani-stan.Even if such statues hadno religiousmeaning, or anegativereligiousmeaning,theywouldstillhavehadtobedestroyed.FortheTaliban,religionshouldhavethemonopolyofthesymbolicsphere.Lifeshouldbeentirelydevotedtopreparetheindividualforthehere-

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after,andthiscanbedoneonlythroughabidingbyastrictcodeofconductsandrituals.

Agoodexampleof theoppositionbetweencodeandculture isfoodversuscuisine.Salafistsdonotcareaboutcuisine.Anythingthatishalalisgood—whateverthebasicingredientsandtherecipe.Whentheyopena restaurant in theWest, it neverpromotesOttomanorMoroccancuisinebutinsteadhalalfoodandmostoftenwillsimplyoffertheusualWesternfastfoodproducts.Similarly,halaldresscanbebasedonWesternraincoats,gloves,fashionablescarves,andsoon.Halal,therefore,isacodeadaptabletoanyculture.Objectsceasetohaveahistoryandtobeculturallymeaningful;oncechosenbecausetheymeetanormativerequirementtheydonotrefertoaspecificcul-ture.SuchaviewprobablycreatesthegreatdividebetweenSalafistsandEuropeanopponentsofAmericanculturalhegemony.ForSalaf-iststhehamburgerisseenasculturallyneutralaslongasitismadealongthelinesofareligiousnorm.7Forinstance,in2003asuccess-fulMuslimbusinessexecutiveinFrancelaunchedasoftdrinkcalledMecca-Cola,whoseforemostqualityisthatitlooksandtastesalmostexactlylikeCoca-Cola,exceptthatthemarketingappealsexplicitlytoIslamicvaluesandisaimedatprovidingsupportforthePalestinians.8Likewise,in2004,anewfashionbrandhasappearedontheEuro-peanmarket:dawa-wear,whichputanIslamiclogo,thestylizationofamanpraying,onclothesadaptedtotheurbanyouthculture.

AReligiousRevival?SalafiststhereforearenotinterestedincreatingorassertingaMuslimculture.Theyrejecttheconcept,eveniftheysometimesendupusingthetermtofindacommonlanguagewithWesternsocieties,wherethelanguageofmulticulturalismisthemainidiomtodealwithoth-erness.There isnoSalafistnovelist, poet,musician,filmmaker,orcomedian.Bystressingthegapbetweencultureandreligionandbystrivingtoestablishapurereligionseparatedfromsecularandlayele-ments,Salafistscontributetotheparadoxicalsecularizationofmod-ernsociety,becausetheyisolatereligionfromtheotherdimensionsofsociallifethattheywouldliketo—butcannot—ignoreordestroy.Atthesametime,contemporaryformsofreligiosityamongsecond-gen-erationMuslimsoutsidetheMiddleEastareclosertothoseoftheirnineteenth-andtwentieth-centuryAmericanChristiancounterpartsthan tomedieval Islam. In short, theyare examplesof revivalism.Religiousrevivalism,afterall,iscenterednotintraditionsandfamil-ialvaluesbutonindividualswhoexperienceacrisisofidentityandthediscontinuityoffamilialandcommunalties.Itaccordswithindi-vidualism; thereconstructionofan imaginedcommunity,which is

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thefaithcommunityortheummah;acrisisofauthorityandknowl-edge,ordefiancetowardlegitimateholdersofreligiousknowledge;self-teaching; and insistence on code, values, and emotional faithmorethanonphilosophyorabstracttheology.Inourtime,religiousrevivalismisalmostalwayssociallyconservative,fromtheAmericanBibleBelttotheLubavitchmovementtoPopeJohnPaulII’sassaulton liberation theology,a leftistand revolutionary interpretationoftheGospels.Conservativereligiousleadersrailagainstwhatisper-ceivedascorruptionandalossofvalues.InthatsensetransnationalEuropeanIslamisbecominga logicalpartoftheEuropeandebateonvalues.Manyimamspreachaboutregaininghappiness,recover-ingfromdestitution,affirmingacategoricaldifferencebetweenrightandwrong,makingagoodlife,andsoon—nodifferent,inessence,fromwhatChristianandJewishclergyoforthodoxorientationsayto their congregations.But thepeople involved inglobal terrorismareMuslims.

Itisnotarguedherethatotherreligionsdoalsoproducepoliticalviolence(seeMarkJuergensmeyer’scontributioninthisbook).ItisclearthatthereisnorealsymmetryamongWesternreligions,includ-ingIslam,inthetranslationofreligiousradicalismintopoliticalvio-lence.ButthespecificityofIslamdoesnotcomefromtheKoranorfromtraditionalMuslimpoliticalculture.Itcomesfromcontempo-raryMuslims,andfactorspertainingtoIslamareclearlylinkedwiththe socialconditionsofMuslims inWesternEurope.For instance,almostnoterroristscanbefoundamongAmericansecond-genera-tionMuslims.9ThislackofradicalismisobviouslylinkedwiththedifferencebetweenthetwoWesternMuslimpopulationsintermsofstatus,representation,andexpectations.TheMuslimsintheUnitedStatesarejustpartofawiderimmigrationmovementofpeoplewhointendtosettleintheAmerica,whereassecond-generationMuslimsin Europe are the offspring of a misunderstanding: Their parentsneverreallyintendtobecomeEuropeans.IntheUnitedStatesMus-limsaremainlymiddleandevenupperclass—themedianincomeishigherthanthatoftheU.S.population—whereasinEuropetherateofunemploymentamongsecond-generationMuslimsishigherthantheaverage.By the same tokenpeoplewithaMuslimbackgroundareoverrepresentedamongprison inmates.10TheU.S. radicals aremainly converts, such as Jose Padilla, the U.S. convert who wasindictedin2005forgivingsupporttoAlQaeda,andtheseconvertsfitpreciselyintothesamecategoriesoftheirEuropeancounterparts:racialminoritiesoroutcasts.

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AClashofCivilizations?Theconsequenceisthatwecanspeakneitherofaclashnorofdia-logue of cultures, because the very notion of culture is in crisis.Nevertheless, the current debate on Islam—already heavily loadedwith security consideration—is still waged under the paradigm ofclash–dialogueofcivilizations,cultures,orreligions,withallthreetermslargelyequated.Roughly,thedebateonhowtofightterrorismofferstwoconflictingviews:(1)Islamistheissue,andwearehead-ingtowardaclashofcivilizationsunlessanin-depthreformationofIslamoccurs;or(2)Islamisnottheissue,andwemustturntheclashintoadialogueamongcivilizationstoaddresstherootsoftheMus-limwrath.Bothpositionsarebasedoncommonpremises:Religionisembeddedinaculture,andacultureisrootedinreligion,whichmeansthatthesocialandpoliticalbehaviorofbelieversisdeterminedbythetheologicaltenetsoftheirreligion.Callingforareligiousref-ormationignoresthewaybelieversadaptandexperiencetheirfaiththroughpracticesandnot throughtheologicaldebates.Calling forcommunityleaderstopolicetheirflockignorestheprocessofdecul-turation.AddressingtheMiddleEastissues,whichisapositivestepinitself,ignoresthedeterritorializationofcontemporaryIslam.ThereisnosuchathingasaMuslimcommunitybutinsteadapopulationofMuslimswhohaveadifferentexperienceofwhatitmeanstobeaMuslim—eveniftheysharethesamecreed.

InEuropeitisacommonviewtocontrasttwoapproaches,espe-ciallytheBritishmulticulturalism,whereMuslimsaredefinedbyadistinct ethnocultural identity, and the French assimilation, whereMuslimsmaybecomefullcitizensonlybysheddingawaytheirpristineidentity.Yetparadoxically,bothapproachessharethesameassump-tions:Religionisembeddedintoaculture,sothatMuslimsbelongtoadifferentculture.Interestingly,though,thelevelofradicalismhaslittletodowithgovernmentpolicy:Therehasbeenasmuchofater-roristthreatinGreatBritain,France,Spain,Belgium,andHolland,thoughineachofthesecasesthepolicytowardIslamisverydifferent.Theexplanationisthatradicalsdonotanswertoaspecificnationalpolicybuttoaglobalperceptionofthestateoftheummah.

Inanycase,bothmulticulturalismandassimilationfailedforthesamereason:MuslimsintheWestdonotpushforanethnoculturalidentitybutwanttoberecognizedasamerefaithcommunity.InGreatBritain, born-again Muslims do not care about traditional cultureand,thus,donotanswertotraditionalcommunityleaders.SecularistFrance,ontheotherhand,wasverysurprisedtoseethatthefadingawayoftraditionalMuslimculturewenthandinhandwithastrongreligiousassertiveness:thesuddenveilingofsomeFrenchschoolgirls

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inthe‘90s(the“scarfaffair”)isnottheresultofanimportedculturebutisaconsequenceoftheconstructionofapurelyreligiousidentityamongeducatedand integratedschoolgirls.Thedominant idea inFrenchpublicopinionwas that cultural assimilationwill goalongwith secularization.The concept of a noncultural religious revivalwasseenasunthinkable,butithappened.BycreatingaFrenchCoun-cil ofMuslimFaith, the government reluctantly acknowledged theexistenceofIslamasamerereligion.

*****Sowhataretheanswerstothecurrentcrisis?TheissueisnotsolvingthecrisisintheMiddleEastbutaccompanyingtheprocessofdecul-turationandassertionofIslamasamerereligion.ItmeansmakingroomforIslamintheWestasaWesternreligionamongothers—notas the expression of an ethnocultural community. This is the realprocessofsecularization,whichhasnothingtodowiththeologicalreformationbutcouldentailatheologicaldebateasanalmostforcedsecularization did for the Catholic Church in continental WesternEurope: The emergence of the Christian democracy—that is, theChurch’s fullacceptationofdemocracy—isaconsequenceandnota prerequisite of the process of secularization. Political authoritiesshouldnotlookfortraditionalmoderatereligiousthinkersfromtheMiddleEasttoappeaseWesternMuslims,norshouldtheyspendsub-sidies to promote civil or liberal Islam. They should simply makeroomforIslamwithoutchanginglawsorprinciples.Genuineplural-ismisthebestwaytoavoidconfrontationwithaMuslimpopulationthatisverydiverseandthatcouldfeelcoercedintoaghettoizedcom-munity.AsdemonstratedbyahostofProtestant,Catholic,andJew-ishcases,conservativeandevenfundamentalistviewsofreligionaremanageableinapluralenvironment.Indeed,apluralisticapproachallowscivilsocietytoreachtheyouthwhocouldbeidealtargetsforradicalsandSalafistgroups.Statepolicyshouldthereforebebasedon integrationofMuslimsand community leadersonapluralisticbasis.Thepriorityshouldbe toweakenthe linkswith foreignele-mentsbypushingforthenativizationofIslamandforpreventingthedeepeningoftheghettosyndrome.Transparencyanddemocracyaretheaims.

Endnotes1. The exception is the Kelkal networks that operated in France in

1995. They were undoubtedly linked to and manipulated by theAlgerianArmedIslamicGroup(GIA)(withorwithoutsomeinter-ference from the Algerian Military Security). If we consider the

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motivationsofthearrestedmilitants,however,theyhadlittletodowithnational solidaritywithAlgeriabutmorewith a call for anoveralljihadagainstFranceandtheWest.

2. See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2002),148.

3. SeeImaamAbdul-AzeezbinBaaz,“Fataawaaal-Islaamiyyah,”theSalafiSocietyofNorthAmerica,http://www.al-manhaj.com/Page1.cfm?ArticleID=131.

4. InIraqiKurdistan,thegroupAnsaral-IslamdesecratedthegravesofSheikhHusamal-Din,SheikhBahaal-Din,andSheikhSirajal-Din, known guides of the Naqishbandi order, in July 2002. Theheadofthegroup,MullahKrekar,isapermanentresidentofNor-way—anothergoodexampleoftherelationbetweenneofundamen-talismandglobalization.

5. Amongothers,thePakistanicustomofrecitingtheKoranatcertaintimeperiodsafteraperson’sdeathisdismissedasnon-Muslim.

6. ThecouncilconsideredthistobeaShi’acelebration.Perhapssomeoftheexplanationcanbefoundinthefactthatthecelebrationistoo close to Halloween; the fact that it is more and more widelyobserved is another signof globalization. It is interesting tonotethattheIslamicregimeinIranneverbannedtraditionalcultureornowruz,even if itdemoted themin favorofreligiousceremonies.Aftersomedebates,forexample,FerdowsiStreetinTehranwasnotrenamed.Ingeneral,allIslamistsacknowledgetheconceptofcul-tureeveniftheystressitsreligiousdimension.

7. ForMuslimorganizations’requesttobeincludedinaprotocolofagreement with McDonald’s see http://www.soundvision.com/info/mcdonalds/.Forradicals’protestagainsttheIslamicFoodandNutritionCouncilofAmerica forallegedlydeclaringMcDonald’shalal,see“IFANCAPutsLabelof‘Halal’onMcDonald’sExportstoMuslimWorld,”New Trend Magazine,September21,2003.

8. ItisinterestingthatoneofthefewattacksfromIslamicmilitantsagainst McDonald’s did not originate with neofundamentalistsbut—onthecontrary—frompoliticalIslamists,whostillretaintheconceptofnationalheritage.QaziHusseynAhmed,theleaderofthePakistaniJama’at-iIslami,saidinaspeech,“Wewillboycottthem,thePepsiandCocaCola,andMcDonaldburger.Thisisfor-bidden—theKentuckychickenandtheMcDonaldburgerisforbid-denfortheMuslims.TherearepeoplepresentherewhocanmakesuchfoodswhicharebetterthanthisMcDonaldburgerandKen-tuckychicken.Whyshouldweallowfromabroadthesethings?”http://www.mecca-cola.com/fr/index2.php.

9. SomeofthemhavebeenindictedfortheirsupportofHamasorHez-bollah.Tome,however,thereisabigdifferencebetweenthesetwoformsofpoliticalviolence.HamasandHezbollahareIslamonational-istmovements,fightingforterritoryandstatehood.Theirsupporters

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intheUnitedStateshaveamorediasporicattitudeanddonotactasglobaljihadists(seeGabrielSheffer’scontributioninthisbook).

10. SeeFarhadKhosrokhavar,L’Islam dans les Prisons(Paris:Balland,2004).

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RecommendedReadings

Avalos, Hector. Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence.NewYork:PrometheusBooks,2005.

Bell,JohnB. A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence. NewYork:BasicBooks,1978.

Bergen,Peter.Holy War Inc.NewYork:FreePress,2002.

Bjørgo, Tore (ed.). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and Ways Forward.NewYork:Routledge,2005.

Crenshaw,Martha.Terrorism in Context. UniversityPark:Pennsylva-niaStateUniversityPress,1995.

Crenshaw,Martha.“TheCausesofTerrorism.” Comparative Politics13, no. 4 (1981): 379–99. Engene, Jan Oskar. Terrorism in Western Europe. Explaining the Trends since 1950.Cheltenham,UK:EdwardElgar,2004.

Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1999.

Esposito,JohnL.Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2003.

Fuller,GrahamE.The Future of Political Islam.NewYork:PalgraveMacMillan,2003.

Gambetta,Diego(ed.).Making Sense of Suicide Missions. NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005.

Heymann, Phil.Terrorism Freedom and Security: Winning without War.Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2003.

Horgan, John. The Psychology of Terrorism. New York: Routledge,2005.

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Juergensmeyer,Mark.Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 3ded.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2003.

Kaldor,MaryandDiegoMuro.“ReligiousandNationalistMilitantGroups,”inGlobal Civil Society 2003: Yearbook,ed.MaryKaldor,HelmuntAnheier,andMarliesGlasius.London:LSE,2004.

Krueger,AlanB.andJitkaMalekcová.“Education,Poverty,PoliticalViolenceandTerrorism:IsThereaCausalConnection?”Journal of Economic Perspectives 17,no.4(2004):119–44.

Lodge,Juliet(ed.).The Threat of Terrorism.Brighton,UK:Weat-sheaf,1988.

Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004.

McCormick,GordonH.andGuillermoOwen.“RevolutionaryOri-ginsandConditionalMobilization.”European Journal of Political Economy12(1996):377–402.

Pape,RobertA.Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Ter-rorism.NewYork:RandomHouse,2005.

Post,JerroldM.Leaders and Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress,2004.

Post,JerroldM.,EhudSprinzak,andLauritaDenny.“TheTerroristsinTheirOwnWords:Interviewwith35IncarceratedMiddleEast-ernTerrorists.”Terrorism and Political Violence 15,no.1 (2003):171–84.

Ross, Jeffrey Ian and Ted R. Gurr. “Why Terrorism Subsides: AComparativeStudyofCanadaandtheUnitedStates.”Comparative Politics21,no.4(1989):405–26.

Roy,Olivier.Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004.

Sageman,Marc.Understanding Terror Networks.UniversityPark:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2004.

Schmid,AlexandAlbertJongman.Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature.NewYork:TransactionsPublishers,2005.

Shcholte, Jan Art. Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2d ed.NewYork:PalgravePalgraveMacMillan,2005.

Sheffer,Gabriel.Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003.

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RecommendedReadings 1��

Sheffer,Gabriel.“Ethno-nationalDiasporasandSecurity.”Survival36,no.1(1994).

Veltmeyer,Henry(ed.)Globalization and Antiglobalization: Dynam-ics of Change in the New World Order.Hants,UKandBurlington,VT,USA:Ashgate,2004.

Wardlaw,Grant.Political Terrorism.2ded.Cambridge,UK:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress1989.

Weinberg,LeonardandAmiPedahzur.Political Parties and Terror-ist Groups. NewYork:Routledge,2003.

Weinberg,LeonardandWilliamEubank.“DoesDemocracyStimu-lateTerrorism?”Terrorism and Political Violence 6,no.4 (1994):417–35.

Wilkinson,Paul.Terrorism and the Liberal State.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1979.

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AbouttheInternationalSummitonDemocracy,Terrorism,andSecurity

March11,2004TenbombsexplodedonfourtrainsduringrushhourinMadrid.Morethan 190 people died, almost 2,000 were injured. It was one of themostdevastatingterroristattacksinEuropeinrecenthistory.AsintheUnitedStatesofAmericaonSeptember11,2001,itwasanattackonfreedomanddemocracybyaninternationalnetworkofterrorists.

Oneyearon,Madridwasthesettingforauniqueconference,theInternationalSummitonDemocracy,Terrorism,andSecurity.Itspur-posewastobuildacommonagendaonhowthecommunityofdemo-craticnationscanmosteffectivelyconfrontterrorism,inmemoryofitsvictimsfromacrosstheworld.

ObjectivesTheMadridSummitaimedtopromoteavisionofaworldfoundedondemocraticvaluesandcommittedtoeffectivecooperationinthefightagainstterrorism.Itbroughttogethertheworld’sleadingscholars,prac-titioners,andmostinfluentialpolicymakers.Itwasthelargestgatheringofsecurityandterrorismexpertsthathasevertakenplace:

Twenty-threeservingHeadsofStateandGovernment.Thirty-fourformerHeadsofStateandGovernment.OfficialDelegationsfrommorethansixtycountries.Heads of inter-governmental and international organizationsincludingtheUnitedNations,theEuropeanParliament,CouncilandCommission,NATO,Interpol,theLeagueofArabStates,andmanyothers.

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200expertsonterrorismandsecurity.500 representatives from non-governmental organizationsandcivilsociety.

ResultsTheprincipallegacyoftheMadridSummitisaninnovativeplanofaction, the Madrid Agenda, which was adopted by an Extraordi-naryGeneralAssemblyoftheClubdeMadridonMarch11,2005.ItdrawsonthecontributionsmadeattheSummit,inparticularthespeechesgivenbytheleadersofofficialdelegations,thediscussionsthattookplaceduringmorethantwentypanelsessions,and—mostimportantly—thepapersdeliveredbymembersoftheexpertworkinggroups.

TheWorkingGroupsInthemonthsleadinguptotheMadridSummit,morethan200oftheworld’sleadingscholarsandexpertpractitionersexploredtheissuesofdemocracy,terrorism,andsecurityinanunparalleledprocessofscholarlydebate.Thediscussionswereconductedthroughasystemofpassword-protectedweb-logs.Onthefirstdayofthesummit,thegroupsmetinclosedsessionstoconcludetheirdiscussions.

Oftheseventeenworkinggroups,fivedealtwiththecausesandunderlyingfactorsofterrorism.Someofthemostnoteworthypapersproducedbyindividualmembersofthesegroupsarereproducedinthisbook.

Psychology

JerroldPost,GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,USA(coordinator)Scott Atran, University of Michigan, USA, and CentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique,FranceDipakGupta,SanDiegoStateUniversity,USANasraHasan,UnitedNationsInformationServiceJohnHorgan,UniversityCollegeCork,IrelandArielMerari,TelAvivUniversity,IsraelMarcSageman,ForeignPolicyResearchInstitute,USAAlexSchmid,UnitedNationsOfficeforDrugsandCrimeChrisStout,UniversityofIllinois,USAJeffVictoroff,UniversityofSouthernCalifornia,USAStevanWeine,UniversityofIllinois,USA

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AbouttheInternationalSummit 1��

PoliticalFactorsMarthaCrenshaw,WesleyanUniversity,USA(coordinator)RogelioAlonso,UniversidadReyJuanCarlos,SpainMohamedFaredAzzi,OranUniversity,AlgeriaRonaldCrelinsten,UniversityofOttawa,CanadaJoséLuisHerrero,FRIDEFoundation,SpainBarbaraLethemIbrahim,PopulationCouncil,EgyptSaadEddinIbrahim,AmericanUniversityCairo,EgyptFernandoReinares,UniversidadReyJuanCarlos,SpainIgnacioSánchez-Cuenca,InstitutoJuanMarch,SpainEkaterinaStepanova,RussianAcademyofSciencesMarioSznajder,HebrewUniversity,IsraelLeonardWeinberg,UniversityofNevada,USA

EconomicFactorsTedGurr,UniversityofMaryland,USA(coordinator)AlbertoAbadie,HarvardUniversity,USAJoseAntonioAlonso,UniversidadComplutensedeMadrid,SpainTore Bjorgo, Norwegian Police University College (deputycoordinator)YigalCarmon,MiddleEastMediaResearchInstitute,USASueEckert,BrownUniversity,USADavidGold,NewSchoolUniversity,NewYork,USAAtanas Gotchev, University of National and World Econ-omy,BulgariaJeroenGunning,UniversityofAberystwyth,WalesJitkaMaleckova,CharlesUniversity,CzechRepublicLyubovMincheva,UniversityofSofia,BulgariaAlex Schmid, United Nations Office for the Prevention ofInternationalTerrorism(advisory)GabrielSheffer,HebrewUniversityofJerusalem,IsraelJoshuaSinai,independentresearcher,USAMichaelStohl,UniversityofCaliforniaatSantaBarbara,USAEkkart Zimmermann, Dresden University of Technology,Germany

ReligionMarkJuergensmeyer,UniversityofCaliforniaatSantaBar-bara,USA(coordinator)JalalAl-Mashta,Al-Nahdhahnewspaper,IraqAzyumardiAzra,StateIslamicUniversity,Indonesia

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DalilBoubaker,FrenchMuslimCouncilAntonioElorza,UniversidadComplutensedeMadrid,SpainJohnEsposito,GeorgetownUniversity,USADruGladney,UniversityofHawaii/East-WestCenter,USASamuelPeleg,StrategicDialogueCentreIsraelHarishPuri,GuruNanakDevUniversity,IndiaIanReader,LancasterUniversity,EnglandDavidRosen,AmericanJewishCommitteeBehzadShahndeh,TehranUniversity,IranSusumuShimazono,TokyoUniversity,JapanShibleyTelhami,UniversityofMaryland,USABassamTibbi,GöttingenUniversity,Germany

CultureJessicaStern,HarvardUniversity,USA(coordinator)NabiAbdullaev,TheMoscowTimes,RussiaHassanAbbas,HarvardLawSchool,USAHaizamAmirahFernandez,RealInstitutoElcano,SpainMarkBeissinger,UniversityofWisconsin,USAEjazHaider,TheFridayTimes,PakistanGillesKepel,Institutd’EtudesPolitiques,FranceJean-Luc Marret, Fondation pour la Recherche Strate-gique,FranceAndresOrtega,ElPais,SpainGardnerPeckham,BKSH,USAOlivier Roy, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,FranceGiandomenicoPicco,GDPAssociates,USA

TheMadridAgendaTo remember and honour the victims of the terrorist attacks ofMarch11,2004,thestrengthandcourageofthecitizensofMadrid,andthroughthem,allvictimsofterrorismandthosewhoconfrontitsthreat.

We,themembersoftheClubdeMadrid,formerPresidentsandPrimeMinistersofdemocraticcountriesdedicatedtothepromotionofdemocracy,havebroughttogetherpolitical leaders,experts,andcitizensfromacrosstheworld.

We listened tomanyvoices.Weacknowledged thewidespreadfearanduncertaintygeneratedbyterrorism.Ourprinciplesandpol-icyrecommendationsaddressthesefundamentalconcerns.

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Oursisacalltoactionforleaderseverywhere.Anagendaforactionforgovernments,institutions,civilsociety,themedia,andindividuals.Aglobaldemocraticresponsetotheglobalthreatofterrorism.

TheMadridPrinciplesTerrorismisacrimeagainstallhumanity.Itendangersthelivesofinnocentpeople.Itcreatesaclimateofhateandfear.Itfuelsglobaldivisionsalongethnicandreligiouslines.Terrorismconstitutesoneof the most serious violations of peace, international law, and thevaluesofhumandignity.

Terrorismisanattackondemocracyandhumanrights.Nocausejustifiesthetargetingofciviliansandnon-combatantsthroughintim-idationanddeadlyactsofviolence.

Wefirmlyrejectanyideologythatguidestheactionsofterrorists.Wedecisivelycondemntheirmethods.Ourvisionisbasedonacom-monsetofuniversalvaluesandprinciples.Freedomandhumandig-nity.Protectionandempowermentofcitizens.Buildingandstrength-eningofdemocracyatalllevels.Promotionofpeaceandjustice.

A Comprehensive ResponseWeoweittothevictimstobringtheterroriststojustice.Lawenforce-mentagenciesneedthepowersrequired,yettheymustneversacrificetheprinciplestheyaremeanttodefend.Measurestocounterterror-ismshouldfullyrespectinternationalstandardsofhumanrightsandtheruleoflaw.

In thefight against terrorism, forcefulmeasures arenecessary.Militaryaction,whenneeded,mustalwaysbecoordinatedwithlawenforcementandjudicialmeasures,aswellaspolitical,diplomatic,economic,andsocialresponses.

Wecalluponeverystatetoexerciseitsrightandfulfillitsdutyto protect its citizens. Governments, individually and collectively,shouldpreventandcombatterroristacts.Internationalinstitutions,governments, and civil society should also address the underlyingriskfactorsthatprovideterroristswithsupportandrecruits.

International CooperationTerrorismisnowaglobalthreat.WesawitnotonlyinMadrid,NewYork,andWashington,butalsoinDar-es-Salaam,Nairobi,TelAviv,Bali,Riyadh,Casablanca,Baghdad,Bombay,andBeslan.Itcallsforaglobalresponse.Governmentsandcivilsocietymustreignitetheireffortsatpromotinginternationalengagement,cooperation,anddialogue.

International legitimacy isamoralandpractical imperative.Amultilateral approach is indispensable. International institutions,

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especiallytheUnitedNations,mustbestrengthened.Wemustrenewoureffortstomaketheseinstitutionsmoretransparent,democratic,andeffectiveincombatingthethreat.

Narrownationalmindsetsarecounterproductive.Legalinstitu-tions,lawenforcement,andintelligenceagenciesmustcooperateandexchangepertinentinformationacrossnationalboundaries.

Citizens and DemocracyOnly freedom and democracy can ultimately defeat terrorism. Noothersystemofgovernmentcanclaimmorelegitimacy,andthroughnoothersystemcanpoliticalgrievancesbeaddressedmoreeffectively.

Citizens promote and defend democracy. We must support thegrowth of democratic movements in every nation, and reaffirm ourcommitment to solidarity, inclusiveness, and respect for culturaldiversity.

Citizensareactors,notspectators.Theyembodytheprinciplesandvaluesofdemocracy.Avibrantcivilsocietyplaysastrategicrolein protecting local communities, countering extremist ideologies,anddealingwithpoliticalviolence.

A Call to ActionAnaggressiononanynationisanaggressiononallnations.Aninjurytoonehumanbeingisaninjurytoallhumanity.Indifferencecannotbecountenanced.Wecalloneachandeveryone.OnallStates,allorganizations—nationalandinternational.Onallcitizens.

Drawingonthedeliberationsofpoliticalleaders,experts,andcit-izens,wehaveidentifiedthefollowingrecommendationsforaction,whichwebelieveshouldbeextended,reviewed,andimplementedaspartofanongoing,dynamicprocess.

TheMadridRecommendationsPoliticalandphilosophicaldifferencesaboutthenatureofterrorismmustnotbeusedasanexcuseforinaction.WesupporttheGlobalStrategy for Fighting Terrorism announced by the Secretary Gen-eraloftheUnitedNationsattheMadridSummitonMarch10.Weurgentlycallfor:

theadoptionofthedefinitionproposedbytheUnitedNationsHigh-LevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChange.the ratification and implementationof all terrorism-relatedconventionsbythosestateswhichhavenotyetdoneso.

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AbouttheInternationalSummit 1�1

thespeedyconclusionoftheComprehensiveConventiononInternationalTerrorism.

Andwebelieve it isamoralandpracticalnecessity toaddress theneedsofterroristvictims.Wethereforerecommend:

theexplorationofthepossibilityofcreatinghighcommis-sionersforvictimsbothattheinternationalandthenationallevel,whowillrepresentthevictims’righttoknowthetruth,aswellasobtainjustice,adequateredress,andinte-gralreparation.

International CooperationThebasis for effective cooperationacrossnationalborders is trustandrespectfortheruleoflaw.Trustisbuiltthroughsharednorms,reciprocityandthepracticalexperienceofeffectivecollaboration.Toencouragethissenseofmutualconfidence,wepropose:

theestablishmentofregular,informalforumsforlawenforcementandintelligenceofficials,whichmaygrowfrombilateralconsultationsintoaformalizedstructureformultilateralcooperation.thestrengtheningofregionalorganizations,sothatmeasurestocombat terrorismare tailored to localneedsandbenefitfromlocalknowledgeandnetworks.theeffectivecoordinationofthesemechanismsatthegloballevel.

International collaboration in the fight against terrorism is also aquestionofhumanandfinancialcapital.Wecallfor:

theestablishmentofaninternationalmechanism—includ-ingstates,non-governmentalorganizations,andtheprivatesector—tohelplinkstatesthatareinneedofresourceswiththosethatcanprovideassistance.thecreationofatrustfundforthepurposeofassistinggovern-mentsthatlackthefinancialresourcestoimplementtheirobli-gations,asproposedbytheUnitedNationsHigh-LevelPanel.

Underlying Risk FactorsTerrorismthrivesonintimidation,fear,andhatred.Whileauthoritieshavearesponsibilitytoensurefreedom,includingreligiousfreedom,leaders,includingreligiousleaders,havearesponsibilitynottoabuse

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thatfreedombyencouragingorjustifyinghatred,fanaticism,orreli-giouswar.Wepropose:

thesystematicpromotionofculturalandreligiousdialoguethroughlocalencounters,roundtables,andinternationalexchangeprograms.thecontinuousreviewbyauthoritiesandthemassmediaoftheir useof language, to ensure it doesnotunwittinglyordisproportionatelyreinforcetheterroristobjectiveofintimi-dation,fear,andhatred.the creation of programs, national and international, tomonitortheexpressionofracism,ethnicconfrontation,andreligiousextremismandtheirimpactinthemedia,aswellastoreviewschooltextbooksfortheirstanceonculturalandreligioustolerance.

Whilepovertyisnotadirectcauseofterrorism,economicandsocialpolicycanhelpmitigateexclusionandtheimpactofrapidsocioeco-nomicchange,whichgiverisetogrievancesthatareoftenexploitedbyterrorists.Werecommend:

theadoptionoflong-termtrade,aid,andinvestmentpoli-ciesthathelpempowermarginalizedgroupsandpromoteparticipation.neweffortstoreducestructuralinequalitieswithinsocietiesbyeliminatinggroupdiscrimination.thelaunchofprogramsaimedatpromotingwomen’seduca-tion,employment,andempowerment.the implementation of the Millennium Development Goalsby2015.

Terrorists prosper in societieswhere there areunresolved conflictsandfewaccountablemechanismsforaddressingpoliticalgrievances.Wecallfor:

newinitiativesatmediationandpeace-makingforsocietieswhicharemarkedbyconflictanddivision,becausedemoc-racyandpeacegohandinhand.aredoublingofeffortstopromoteandstrengthendemocraticinstitutions and transparency within countries and at thegloballevel.InitiativessuchastheCommunityofDemocra-ciesmaycontributetothisgoal.

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Confronting TerrorismDemocratic principles and values are essential tools in the fightagainstterrorism.Anysuccessfulstrategyfordealingwithterrorismrequiresterroriststobeisolated.Consequently,thepreferencemustbetotreatterrorismascriminalactstobehandledthroughexistingsystemsof lawenforcementandwithfullrespectforhumanrightsandtheruleoflaw.Werecommend:

takingeffectivemeasurestomakeimpunityimpossibleeitherforactsofterrorismorfortheabuseofhumanrightsincounter-terrorismmeasures.theincorporationofhumanrightslawsinallanti-terrorismprograms and policies of national governments as well asinternationalbodies.Theimplementationoftheproposaltocreateaspecialrap-porteurwhowouldreporttotheUnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRightsonthecompatibilityofcounter-terrorismmeasureswithhumanrightslaw,asendorsedbytheUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralinMadrid.theinclusionandintegrationofminorityanddiasporacom-munitiesinoursocieties.the building of democratic political institutions across theworldembodyingthesesameprinciples.

In the fight against terrorism, any information about attacks onanotherstatemustbetreatedlikeinformationrelatingtoattacksonone’sownstate.Inordertofacilitatethesharingofintelligenceacrossborders,wepropose:

theoverhaulofclassificationrulesthathindertherapidexchangeofinformation.theclarificationofconditionsunderwhichinformationwillbesharedwithotherstatesonthebasisofavailability.theuseofstate-of-the-arttechnologytocreateregionalandglobalanti-terrorismdatabases.

Theprincipleof internationalsolidarityandcooperationmustalsoapplytodefensivemeasures.Werecommend:

thecreationofcross-borderpreparednessprogramsinwhichgovernmentsandprivatebusinessparticipatein

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buildingsharedstockpilesofpharmaceuticalsandvaccines,aswellastheseamlesscooperationofemergencyservices.

Solidaritymustbeenhancedbyneweffortsatcoordinatingtheexist-inginstrumentsofanti-terroristcollaboration.Wepropose:

thestreamliningandharmonizationofnationalandinter-nationaltoolsinthefightagainstterrorism.the creation of clear guidelines on the role of the armedforcesinrelationtootheragenciesoflawenforcementatthenationallevel.thedrawingupofnationalplanstocoordinateresponsibili-ties in thefight against terrorism, allowing for agenciesororganizationswithspecialskillstocontributetoacompre-hensiveeffort.

Thethreatfromterrorismhasmadeeffortstolimittheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionevenmoreurgent.Wecallfor:

theUnitedNationsSecurityCounciltoinitiateon-siteinvestigationswhereitisbelievedthatastateissupportingterroristnetworks,andifnecessarytousethefullrangeofmeasuresunderChapterVIIoftheUnitedNationsCharter.theconclusionoftheInternationalConventionfortheSup-pressionofActsofNuclearTerrorism,andthestrengtheningandimplementationofthebiologicalweaponsconvention.the continuation of innovative global efforts to reduce thethreatfromweaponsofmassdestruction,suchastheGlobalThreatReductionInitiativeandtheGlobalPartnerships.

Terroristsmustbedeprivedofthefinancialresourcesnecessarytoconducttheircampaigns.Tocurbterroristfundingnetworks,werecommend:

increasedandcoordinatedlawenforcementandpoliticalandciviceducationcampaignsaimedatreducingthetraf-fickingofillegalnarcotics,revenuesfromwhichareusedtofinanceterrorism.the creation of an international anti-terrorist finance center,whichfurthersresearch,trainsnationalenforcementofficials,andservesasasourceofcoordinationandmutualassistance.the development of tools to increase the transparency offundraisingintheprivateandcharitablesectorsthroughtheexchangeofbestpractices.

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theexpansionof‘financialintelligenceunits’,whichfacilitatetheeffectivecorporationbetweengovernmentagenciesandfinancialinstitutions.

Civil SocietyTheprocessofbuildingdemocracyasanantidotetoterrorismandviolenceneedstobesupportedbytheinternationalcommunityanditscitizens.Wepropose:

Thecreationofaglobalcitizensnetwork,linkingthelead-ersofcivilsocietyattheforefrontofthefightfordemocracyfromacrosstheworld,takingfulladvantageofweb-basedtechnologiesandotherinnovativeformsofcommunication.

An‘earlywarningsystem’aspartofthisnetwork,helpingtodefuselocalconflictsbeforetheyescalate,aswellasprovid-ingachannelformoralandmaterialsupporttocivilsocietygroupsfacingrepression.

Club de MadridMadrid, March 11, 2005

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AbouttheClubdeMadrid

MissionThe Club de Madrid is an independent organization dedicated tostrengtheningdemocracyaround theworld. It launches global initia-tives, conducts projects, and acts as a consultative body for govern-ments, democratic leaders, and institutions involved in processes ofdemocratic transition. The personal practical experience of its mem-bers—fifty-sevenformerheadsofstateandgovernment—inprocessesofdemocratictransitionandconsolidationistheClubdeMadrid’suniqueresource.Alongwiththeexperienceandcooperationofotherhighlevelpoliticalpractitionersandgovernanceexperts,thisresourceisawork-ingtooltoconvertideasintopracticalrecommendations.

ProgramsandActivitiesTheClubdeMadridbringsthreemajorresourcestoitswork:

Auniquemixofformerheadsofstateandgovernment.Acommittedfocusondemocratictransitionandconsolidation.Programswithapracticalapproachandmeasurableresults.

The Club de Madrid undertakes projects related to its core missionofpromotinganddefendingdemocracy.OneoftheClubdeMadrid’smajorassetsistheabilityofitsmemberstoofferstrategicadviceandpeer-to-peercounseltocurrentleadersstrivingtobuildorconsolidatedemocracy.Theorganizationalsoplaysanadvocacyroleinpromotingdemocratic principles in certain country, regional, or thematic cases,suchaswith the InternationalSummitonDemocracy,TerrorismandSecurity.

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TolearnmoreabouttheClubdeMadrid’smissionandactivi-ties,pleasegotoitswebsite—www.clubmadrid.org—orcontacttheClubdirectly:

ClubdeMadridFelipeIV,9–3ºizqda.28014MadridSpainTel:+34915237216Fax:+34915320088Email:[email protected]

MembersoftheClubdeMadridAdamkus,Valdas(onleave) PresidentofLithuaniaAho,Esko FormerPrimeMinisterofFinlandAhtisaari,Martti FormerPresidentofFinlandAlfonsín,Raúl FormerPresidentofArgentinaAlMahdi,Sadig FormerPrimeMinisterofSudanArzú,Alvaro FormerPresidentofGuatemalaAylwin,Patricio FormerPresidentofChileAznar,JoséMaría FormerPrimeMinisterofSpainBetancur,Belisario FormerPresidentofColombiaBildt,Carl FormerPrimeMinisterofSwedenBirkavs,Valdis FormerPrimeMinisterofLatviaBondevik,KjellMagne FormerPrimeMinisterofNorwayBrundtland,GroHarlem FormerPrimeMinisterofNorwayCalvoSotelo,Leopoldo FormerPrimeMinisterofSpainCampbell,Kim FormerPrimeMinisterofCanada;Secretary-General

oftheClubdeMadridCardoso,FernandoHenrique FormerPresidentofBrazil;Presidentof

theClubdeMadridCavacoSilva,Aníbal FormerPrimeMinisterofPortugalChissano,Joaquim FormerPresidentofMozambiqueClinton,WilliamJ. FormerPresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,

HonoraryCo-ChairoftheClubdeMadridDelors,Jacques FormerPresidentoftheEuropeanCommissionDimitrov,Philip FormerPrimeMinisterofBulgariaElEryani,Abdulkarim FormerPrimeMinisterofYemenFernández,Leonel(onleave) PresidentoftheDominicanRepublicFigueres,JoséMaría FormerPresidentofCostaRicaFinnbogadottír,Vigdís FormerPresidentofIcelandFreiRuiz-Tagle,Eduardo FormerPresidentofChileGaviria,César FormerPresidentofColombiaGonzálezMárquez,Felipe FormerPrimeMinisterofSpain

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AbouttheClubdeMadrid 1��

Gorbachev,Mikhail FormerPresidentoftheSovietUnionGujral,InderKumar FormerPrimeMinisterofIndiaGuterres,António FormerPrimeMinisterofPortugalHavel,Václav FormerPresidentofCzechoslovakiaandof theCzech

RepublicHurtado,Osvaldo FormerPresidentofEcuadorJospin,Lionel FormerPrimeMinisterofFranceKohl,Helmut FormerChancellorofGermanyKok,Wim FormerPrimeMinisteroftheNetherlandsKonare,AlphaOumar FormerPresidentofMaliKučan,Milan FormerPresidentofSloveniaLacalleHerrera,LuisAlberto FormerPresidentofUruguayLagos,Ricardo PresidentofChile(aftercompletionofmandate)Lagumdžija,Zlatko FormerPrimeMinisterofBosniaandHerzegovinaLee,HongKoo FormerPrimeMinisterofKoreaMajor,JohnSir FormerPrimeMinisteroftheUnitedKingdomMascarenhasMonteiro,AntonioM. FormerPresidentofCapeVerdeMasire,Ketumile FormerPresidentofBotswanaMazowiecki,Tadeusz FormerPrimeMinisterofPolandMeidani,Rexhep FormerPresidentoftheRepublicofAlbaniaMeri,Lennart FormerPresidentofEstoniaMkapa, Benjamin President of Tanzania (after completion of

mandate)Paniagua,Valentín FormerPresidentofPeruPanyarachun,Anand FormerPrimeMinisterofThailandPastrana,Andrés FormerPresidentofColombiaPérezdeCuéllar,Javier FormerPrimeMinisterofPeruProdi,Romano FormerPresidentof theEC,FormerPrimeMinister

ofItalyQuiroga,Jorge FormerPresidentofBoliviaRamos, Fidel Valdes Former President of the Republic of the

PhilippinesRasmussen,PoulNyrup FormerPrimeMinisterofDenmarkRobinson, Mary Former President of Ireland, Vice-President of the

ClubdeMadridRoman,Petre FormerPrimeMinisterofRomaniaSampaio,JorgeFernandoBrancode PresidentofPortugal(aftercom-

pletionofmandate)SánchezdeLozada,Gonzalo FormerPresidentofBoliviaSanguinetti,JulioMaría FormerPresidentofUruguayShipley,JenniferMary FormerPrimeMinisterofNewZealandSoares,Mario FormerPresidentofPortugalSuárez,Adolfo FormerPrimeMinisterofSpain

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Suchocka,Hanna FormerPrimeMinisterofPolandUteem,Cassam FormerPresidentofMauritiusZedillo,Ernesto FormerPresidentofMexico

Honorary MembersAguirre,Esperanza PresidentoftheRegionalGovernmentofMadridCarter,Jimmy FormerPresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaRodríguezZapatero,JoséLuis PrimeMinisterofSpainRuizGallardón,Alberto MayoroftheCityofMadrid

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Index

1993TwinTowersbombing,312002NationalSecurityStrategy,679/11,1,7,32,45,53,85,151,154,177 backgroundofterroristsinvolvedin

attacks,160 counterterrorismmeasures

following,65

AAbortionclinicbombings,133,136AbuAyyash,Radwan,49AbuGhraib,67AbuNidalOrganization,19Accommodativepoliticalstrategies,63ActionDirecte,4,63,75,160Activism,147Afghanistan,26,145,150 Islamicgovernmentin,145 suicideoperationsin,30 targetingofMuslimsbyTalibanin,

164 terroristgroupsin,33Africa,87Africandiaspora,120Aggression,Quranicinterpretationof,

151AlAqsaMartyrsBrigade,54,85,155AlAqsaMartyrsBrigade,40AlHilali,SheykhAbuAyman,162AlJazeera,66Al-AqsaMartyrsBrigades,150Al-Banna,Hasan,146Al-Gama’sal-Islamiyya,124Al-Jihad,suicidebombingsby,152Al-Nasser,GamalAbd,148Al-Qaeda,33,39,52,55,59,67,81,

86,117,120,121,140,145,147,149,154,160

organizationalstructureof,23 suicidebombers,30

targetsof,161Al-Qardawi,SheikhYusuf,154Al-Sadr,Moqtedar,156Al-Sheikh,SheikhAbdulazizbin

Abdallah,153Al-Zarqawi,AbuMusab,59,156Al-Zawahiri,Ayman,53,59,155Albania,95Algeria,121 IslamicSalvationFront,146 Islamistinsurgentsin,95AlgerianArmedIslamicGroup,121Alienation,2,8,24,141,146Aliens,protectionofindemocratic

nations,55AmericanExceptionalism,67Amnesty,27,98AmnestyInternational,66Anarchists,52Angola,118AngryBrigade,74Anti-Americanism,142Anti-Westernideology,25Antiglobalizationmeasures,111,142Antiglobalizationmovement,118,161Antimodernism,142Antireligiousdenigration,124Antiterrorism,programsfor,25Arafat,Yasser,20,150,155Argentina,5,47ArmedIslamicGroup,53,121,124,

150ArmedNucleiforPopularAutonomy,

75Ashcroft,John,135Assassins,151Assimilation,167Asylumseekers,118Atochatrainbombings,1,24,45,52,

133,177

RT5438X.indb 191 10/16/06 9:09:58 AM


Atta,Mohammad,55,85,161AumShinrikyo,138,140Authoritarianregimes,80Authorities,behaviorofasan

instigatingconditionforterrorism,49

Azerbaijan,66,121Azzam,Abdullah,162

BBaader-Meinhoffterrorists,18,73.

See alsoRedArmyFactionBacklash,62,64Balkans,95,108Bangladesh,suicideoperationsin,33BarbarKhalsaInternational,121BasqueFatherland,18,63,72,73,

117Basra,Riaz,37BBC,66Beirut,suicidebombingattacksin,

152Belgium,74 CommunistCombatantCells,74Bell,J.Bowyer,61Beslan,49BinLaden,Osama,7,19,21,39,53,

66,145,148,151,162 “LettertoAmerica,”54 spreadofglobalterrorismdueto,

154Biologicalweapons,24BlackHawkdownincident,55BlackSeptemberterrorists,17Blackterrorism,72BloodySundayMassacre,90Bolognatrainstationbombing,77Bombers,suicide,3,29Born-againMuslims,8,160,162,

167Bosnia,150 oppressionandliberationof

Muslimsin,147BrigatesInternationales,75Buddhism,138Bulgaria,107Burnout,62Burundi,118

Bush,GeorgeW.,135

CCairo,Americansupportfornon-

Islamicregimein,53Capitalism,105Catholicmilitants,140Caucuses,108Caze,Christian,160Cells,componentsof,36CentralAfrica,87CentralAsia,66Charismaticleaders,22,31,91Charities,checksandbalancesfor,98Chechnya,2,49,65,90,150 oppressionandliberationof

Muslimsin,147Chemicalweapons,24ChicagoProjectofSuicideTerrorism,

137China.SeePeople’sRepublicof

ChinaChristianabortionclinicbombers,

133Christianmilitia,136,140Christianity,135Civilliberties,relationshipto

terrorismincidentsto,48Civilrights,relationshiptoterrorism

incidentsto,48Civilsociety,186Clergy-mosquenetworks,147CNN,66ColdWar,54Collectiveidentity,3,18,22Collectiveprotest,80Columbia,90,108 M-19organizationin,50(See also

M-19organization) RevolutionaryArmedForcesof,

87,94 terrorismin,47 terroristgroupsin,87(See also

specificgroups)ComisionesObreraskillings,78CommunistCombatantCells,74Comparativepolitics,80Congo,87,118

RT5438X.indb 192 10/16/06 9:09:58 AM

Index 1��

Contingentfactors,76Continuityofdemocracy,relationship

toterrorismincidentsand,47

Converts,160Corsica,2Cosmicwar,141Cosmotheoism,136Counterterroristpolicies,9,12,57 backlash,64 identifyingpurposesof,58 internationalanddomestic

responsestrategies,96 internationalnatureof,59 psychologicaldynamicsand,27Coupattempts,77Crime,94.See alsoeconomiccrime organized,124Criminalterrorism,107Cross-borderterrorism,99.See also

transnationalterrorismCuba,121Culturalidentities,140Culturalresistance,106Culturaltransnationaldispersals,119

DDaghestan,150DaresSalaam,terroristattackon

Americanembassyin,53,56

DarulIslam,161Deculturation,8,162Defense,Quranicinterpretationof,

151Deglobalization,105Democracy,184 accountabilityofcitizensin,54 counterterrorismpoliciesand,60 internationalterrorismand,51 noisy,50 relationshipwithterrorismof,5,

45Democratization,146Deprivation,7Deterrence,62Developmentalprojects,112Diaspora,6,24,26,90,117

ethnonationalterrorismby,123,125

Palestinian,30 stateless,123,126(See also

specificgroups) transstateethnonational,119Dictatorships,79Discriminateterrorism,24Discrimination,124.See also

inequalities reductionof,97 terrorismdueto,91Dispersedpersons,119Displacedpersons,118Dispositionalconditions,61Dissension,27Dodd,Christopher,135Domesticterrorism,5Drugtrafficking,94Dumont,Lionel,160

EEarlyintervention,23,26EastTurkistanIslamicMovement,66Economicconditions,93Economiccrime,96Economicdeprivation,106Economicdevelopment,79Economicfactors,6,85,126Economicincentives,98Economicinjustice,19Economicresponsestoterrorism,10Education,10,96,112 religious,8 womenand,89Egypt,121 Al-Gama’sal-Islamiyya,124 IslamicJihadin,124 jihadgroupsin,147 MuslimBrotherhood,146ElSalvador,65Engene,JanOskar,47,72Equalrights,97Erbakan,Ecmettin,146Eritrea,118ETA,63,86,117,123

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Ethnicgroups,acceptanceoftransitionaldemocraciesby,46

Ethnonationalidentity,125Ethnonationalistterrorism,4,7,63,

87,122 causesandmotivationsfor,123 diasporaand,121 financing,95Europe.SeeWesternEuropeEuropeanIslam,161,166EuropeanUnion,107 immigrationin,119EuzakaditaAskabasuna.SeeETAExclusionaryideologies,91Extremistorganizations,7,145,157

FFacilitatingcausesofterrorism,46Falwell,Jerry,135Familyloyalty,19Fanaticism,184Fascistterrorism,72,78,79.See also

specificgroupsFatah,54Fatah-Tanzim,121Fatwas,suicidebombingsand,31Fatwas,156Fear,183Financing,37,98,108,112,186FirstofOctoberAntifascist

ResistanceGroup.SeeGRAPO

Followers,roleofinterroristgroups,21

Foreignaid,110Foreignpolicyreform,156FP25Abril,4France,46 ActionDirecte,4(See alsoAction

Directe) revolutionaryterrorismin,75 supportofAlgerianregimeby,53 terroristgroupsin,75(See also

specificgroups)Franco,Francisco,46,78Freedomfighters,viewofdiaspora

as,117

FrenchCouncilofMuslimFaith,168Fundamentalism,139,163

GGamaaIslamiyya,156GazaStrip,54,88,133,152 Israelioccupationof,48Generationaldynamicsofterrorist

groups,18 interventionrequiredforchange

of,23Georgia,66Germany,48,78 fascistregimein,80 RedArmyFaction,4(See alsoRed

ArmyFaction) revolutionaryterrorismin,76Ghannoushi,Tashid,146Ghettosyndrome,168Ghostgroups,32GlobalStrategyforFighting

Terrorism,182Globalterrorism legitimatevs.illegitimateviolence,

156 OsamabinLadenand,154Globalization,5,10,103,140 internationalterrorismand,51 powerofthenationstateand,109Governmentlegitimacy,relationship

toterrorismincidentsand,48

GRAPO,4,76Grayqaan,164GreatBritain.SeeUnitedKingdomGreatDepression,89Greece,74,78,121 authoritarianpastof,80 RevolutionaryOrganization

17November,4(See alsoRevolutionaryOrganization17November)

revolutionaryterrorismin,76Greed,93Groupdynamics,26Groupexit,23,27GroupofPartisanAction,78

RT5438X.indb 194 10/16/06 9:09:59 AM

Index 1��

Grupod’AzionePartigiana,78Guantánamo,67Guerrillas,72

HHalal,165Hamas,21,23,40,54,65,81,86,

92,117,121,141,150,151,155

suicidebombers,30Hanafism,164HarakatulMujahadin,53Hate-mongeringleaders,21Hatred,183Hezbollah,86,117,121,124,150,

153 suicidebombingsby,152Hindupoliticalviolence,140Hinduism,135 militant,91Hizballah.SeeHezbollahHizbollah.SeeHezbollahHouseofIslam,terrorismdueto

presenceofnon-Muslimsin,53

Humanbombs,29,33.See alsobombers;suicidejihadis

Humancapital,109Humanrights,97 counterterrorismand,61 terrorismandthelackof,86HumanRightsWatch,66Humiliation,40,141Hussein,Saddam,45,53,127Hyrgyzstan,66

IIceland,50Ideologyofterrorism,2 countering,97 religionand,140Immigration,terrorismand,52Incomedistribution,47Incomestratification,109India,2,11,41,121 BarbarKhalsaInternational,121 suicideoperationsin,33 terrorismin,47,53

Indiscriminateterrorism,24Individualization,162Indonesia,121 jihadgroupsin,147Inequalities,7,87 increaseinduetoglobalization,

105 womenand,89InformalValueTransferSystems,108Instigatingcausesofterrorism,4Insurgentterrorism,126 combating,60InternationalBrigades,75InternationalCriminalCourt,67InternationalSummitonDemocracy,

Terrorism,andSecurity.SeeMadridSummit

Internationalterrorism,5,54 democraciesand,51 globalizationand,103 measuresof,52 newminoritiesand,108 politicalselectionand,81 softtargetsfor,111Internet psychologicaleffectsof,25 terrorismand,46Intervention generational,23 measures,26Intifada,30,48,54,93Intimidation,183Iran,121 Islamicgovernmentin,145 NationalLiberationArmy,124 useofmosque-mullahnetworkin,

147 useofpetrodollarsby,147Iraq,45,121 Al-Qaedaorganizationin,59(See

alsoAl-Qaeda) suicideoperationsin,31,133 SunniMuslimsin,46(See also

SunniMuslims) terroristgroupsin,33 U.S.-ledinvasionof,90 useofclergy-mosquenetworksin,

147

RT5438X.indb 195 10/16/06 9:09:59 AM


IraqiKurdistan,121Ireland.SeeNorthernIrelandIrishRepublicanArmy,50,63,73,

87,121 fundingof,94Islam,7,134 acceptanceof,8 European,161 financingofterrorismby,37 ideologicalprinciplesderived

from,91 militants,33 relationshipoftoterror,145 suicideoperationsof,30IslamicFrontforJihadagainstJews

andCrusaders,154IslamicJihad,23,121,124,137,149.

See alsoPalestinianIslamicJihad

Egyptian,24 suicidebombers,30Islamicmilitants,159.See also

extremistorganizationsIslamicmysticism,146Islamicradicalism,148Islamicterrorism,135Israel,45,92,121 displacementofWestBank

Palestiniansby,20 occupationofWestBankand

GazaStrip,48 suicideoperationsin,133IsraeliOlympicvillageseizure,17Israeli-Palestinianconflict,11,48,

53,127,137,151 useofsuicidebombingin,156

(See alsosuicidebombing)Italy,46,48 amnestyprogramsforgroupexit

in,27 bombingsin,77 ChristianDemocrats,50 fascistregimein,80 PrimaLinea,4(See alsoPrima

Linea) RedBrigades,4(See alsoRed

Brigades) revolutionaryterrorismin,74

terroristgroupsin,78(See alsospecificgroups)

ITERATEIII,52

JJaisheMohammad,34Jammu,53.See alsoKashmirJapan,52 AumShinrikyomovementin,138,

140 fascistregimein,80 nervegasattacksin,138 revolutionaryterrorismin,76Jewishterroristgroups,124,133 Messianicmovements,140Jews,124,126Jihad,7,135,145,155 interpretationof,149 linkwithmilitancyand

madrassas,34 materialgainand,93 peripheral,162 suicidebombers,3,33Jihadistdoctrines,91Jordan,65,119Judaism,135

KKach,124KahaneChai,124Kahane,RabbiMeir,124,134Kashmir,11,41,53,94,121,150 Muslimseparatistmovementin,

140 oppressionandliberationof

Muslimsin,147 suicideoperationsin,31,33Kazakhstan,66Kenya,truckbombingsin,154Kharajites,150Khomeini,Ayatollah,149Kosovo,90,95,121,150Kurdish-Turkishconflict,127Kurdistan,121 Workers’Party,22(See alsoPKK)

RT5438X.indb 196 10/16/06 9:09:59 AM

Index 1��

LLashkareJhangvi.SeeLeJLashkare-Tayba,53LatinAmerica,48 revolutionaryterrorismin,73 suppressionbythestatein,10Latinodiaspora,120Lawenforcement,roleofin

counterterrorism,60Leaders,36 roleofinterroristgroups,21Lebanon,32,45,119,121,153 Shi’a,87(See alsoShias)Left-wingideology,terroristpolitical

violencedueto,73Legalpersecution,124Legitimacyofgovernment,80 relationshiptoterrorismincidents

and,48LeJ,33,36,41Liberalism,163Liberia,119LibertyETA,18,63,73,81,117.See

alsoETALibya,121 useofpetrodollarsby,147Lindsay,Germaine,160Livingmartyrs,22Londontransitsystembombings,24,

45,52,133LTTE,22,63,86,117,121,124,

137,156Luxembourg,50

MM-19organization,50Macedonia,95Madani,Abbasi,146Madrassa,3,34,150MadridAgenda,178,180MadridSummit,60,177 policyrecommendations,182 Principles,181MainstreamMuslims,7,145,151,

153,157 policiestargeting,9 supportfor,98

Majorityprinciple,47Marginalization,8,87,141Marighella,Carlos,73Martyrcommandos,34Martyrdom,22,34,150,156 training,35MasqueofthePatriarchkillings,152Masscasualtyterrorism,24,120Mawlud,164McVeigh,Timothy,49,136Media,66 provisionofanaudiencefor

terroristsby,58 psychologicaleffectsof,25 terrorismand,46MessianicJewishmovements,140MiddleEast,2 Arabnationalismandsocialism

of,146Migrants,119Migration,107Militancy,34Militantideologies,91 Muslim,148Minorities,107Mobilization,76,126,145.See also

politicalmobilizationModernization,91Moldova,108Moraljustification,142Mosqueschools,3,34Mosque-mullahnetwork,147Moussem,164Mujahiddin,150Mujahidinholywar,150Multiculturalism,167Multipolarityofinternationalsystem,

51MuslimBrothers,65,146Muslimcountries.See alsospecific

countries deglobalizationof,105Muslimdiaspora,120Muslimfundamentalists,122Muslimnationalism,146Muslimpolitics,147Muslimseparatists,140Muslims

RT5438X.indb 197 10/16/06 9:09:59 AM


born-again,8,160,162,167 extremist(Seeextremist

organizations) mainstream,9,98,145,151,153,

157

NNairobi,terroristattackonAmerican

embassyin,53,55Narcoterrorism,94Nationstate,80 globalizationandthepowerof

the,109NationalLiberationArmy,124Nationalism,2,73 extremesof,91 relationshipofsuicideoperations

to,40 useofsuicidebombersin

terrorism,30Nationalistterrorism,2Nationalist-separatistterrorist

groups,psychologyof,18Nawruzfestival,164Neofundamentalism,163Neoliberalcapitalism,105Netherlands,74 RedResistanceFront,74 RedYouth,74Newminorities,globalizationand,

107NewZealand,50NizariIsmailis,151Noisydemocracies,50Non-MuslimsintheHouseofIslam,

53Nonstatesector,110NorthAfrica,Arabnationalismand

socialismof,146NorthKorea,54,121NorthernAlliance,150NorthernIreland,2,4,49,72,78,

121,140 amnestyprogramsforgroupexit

in,27 GoodFridayagreement,50 terroristgroupsin,81(See also

specificgroups)

Norway,50NoyauxArméspourl’Autonomie

Populaire,75Nuclearweapons,24

OOcalan,Abdallah,49OklahomaCityBombing,49Omar,SheykhSaïd,162Oppressiveregime,60Organizationalstructureofterrorist

groups,23Organizedcrime,124OsloAccords,152Others,118.See alsodiaspora

PPadilla,José,160,166Pakistan,11,41,121 Islamicgovernmentin,145 suicideoperationsin,30,32 characteristics,38Palestine,19,41,121 AbuNidalOrganization,19

(See alsoAbuNidalOrganization)

Intifada,30,48 IslamicJihad,150 PLO,20(See alsoPalestinian

LiberationOrganization) suicideoperationsin,40 terroristgroupsof,63,81,123

(See alsospecificgroups)PalestinianAuthority,92PalestinianIslamicJihad,40,54PalestinianLiberationOrganization,

20,48,54,152PalestinianNationalAuthority,150Pearl,Daniel,162Pentagonattack,151,156.See also

9/11People’sRepublicofChina,52,54Percolationsystem,35Permissivecausesofterrorism,4,46,

48Persecution,124Petrodollars,147PFLP,40,54

RT5438X.indb 198 10/16/06 9:10:00 AM

Index 1��

Philippines,121,150PiazzaFontanabombing,77Pierce,William,136Pinnelli,Pino,78PIRA,73,78.See alsoIrish

RepublicanArmyPKK,22,88,121Plasticexplosives,33Pluralism,168Policeconduct,relationshipto

terrorismof,49Policyrecommendations,9,25,50,

168,182 counterterrorism,60 democraticrightsandincentives,

91 diasporicterrorismand,127Politicalaccommodations,91Politicalactivism,147Politicalcausesofterrorism,46,48,

90Politicalcompromises,127Politicalconfrontation,143Politicaldiscourse,145Politicaldissent,66Politicalentrepreneurs,21,95Politicalfragmentation,48Politicalinjustice,147Politicalinstability,4,81PoliticalIslam,7,146Politicalmobilization,72,76,79Politicalobjectivesofterrorism,2Politicalpersecution,124Politicalresistance,106Politicalselectionmodel,4,72,75,

81Politicalterrorism,107 Muslim,156Politicalviolence,71,166 povertyand,86PopularDemocraticFrontforthe

LiberationofPalestine,54PopularFrontfortheLiberationof

Palestine.SeePFLPPortugal authoritarianpastof,80 FP25Abril,4(See alsoFP25

Abril)

Poverty,7,106,184 terrorismand,85Preemption,62 doctrineof,67PrimaLinea,4,76Protestantmilitants,140Psychologicalwarfare,26Psychologyofterrorism,17 suicideterrorism,22Publicdiplomacy,10,26Punjab,34,37,49,121,140

QQassimBrigade,152Quraiqa’an,164Qutb,Sayyid,148,151

RRacism,124,136Radicalization,5,90,160,161,162Rage,40Rand-St.AndrewsChronologies,52Rantisi,AbdulAziz,142Rebellion,93RedArmyFaction,4,10,18,63,73,

76,86,160RedBrigades,4,18,50,63,75,87,

160RedResistanceFront,74RedYouth,74Refugees,118Reid,Richard,160Religion roleofinshapingidentityand

behavioralpatterns,122 roleofinterrorism,133,155,167 sacredwarfareand,142Religionists,122Religions legitimizationofviolenceby,12 relationshiptoterrorismof,8 suicidebombersandreligious

rhetoric,30Religiousactivism,140Religiousdenigration,124Religiousedicts,31Religioustransnationaldispersals,

119

RT5438X.indb 199 10/16/06 9:10:00 AM


Religiouswar,184Repression,4,45,49,64,78,91,152Resonance,30Responsestrategies,111Retaliation,143Revivalism,165RevolutionaryArmedForcesof

Columbia,87,124 financialactivitiesof,94RevolutionaryCommunistLeague,

161Revolutionarymovements,4 social,2RevolutionaryOrganization17

November,4,10,76,80,124

Revolutionaryterrorism,72,106 contingentfactors,76 lethalityof,75 structuralfactorsof,79Rezaq,Omar,19Riskyshift,22Riyadh,Americansupportfornon-

Islamicregimein,53Robertson,Pat,135Romania,107Rove,Karl,1RubyRidge,136Rudolph,EricRobert,136Russia,121Rwanda,119

SSabri,Akram,153Sacredwarfare,141Sadat,Anwar,148Salafijihadnetwork,24Salafism fundamentalismof,163 isolationofreligionby,165Sanctuary denial,26 treatmentofseekersofby

democraticnations,55SaudiArabia,53,121,156 useofpetrodollarsby,147Scandinavia,lowincidenceof

terrorismin,47,72

Scarfaffair,168Secularnationalism,138Secularization,168September11,2001.See9/11Shafeism,164Shahid,150,155Sharon,Ariel,visitoftoTemple

Mount/al-AqsaMosque,90

Shias,33,87ShiiteMuslims,120,124,147,151SierraLeone,118Sikhterrorism,49,137,140Sistani,Ayatollah,156Situationalconditions,61SixDayWar,20Socialactivism,147Socialconflictandreligion,143Socialdynamicsofterroristgroups,

18Socialfragmentation,48Socialfrustration,8,141Socialinjustice,147Socialmalaise,140Socialmobilization,142Socialpolarization,increaseindueto

globalization,105Socialrevolutionarymovements,2,

106Societalresilience,promotionof,25Socioculturalcontext,3Socioeconomicchange,7,10,86,89,

96Socioeconomicmarginalization,87.

See alsomarginalizationSolidarity,186Somalia,53,55,118SouthAsia,48SouthKorea,52SoutheastAsia,65SovietUnion,54,126Soviet-AfghanWar,147,150Spain,2,45,46,72,74 amnestyprogramsforgroupexit

in,27 Atochatrainbombingsin,1 authoritarianpastof,80 ComisionesObreraskillings,78

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Index �01

GRAPO,4(See alsoGRAPO) revolutionaryterrorismin,76 terroristgroupsin,18(See also

specificgroups)Spiritualtraining,35SriLanka,2,121,140 TamilTigers,22(See alsoLTTE)Statepower,useoffor

counterterrorism,62Staterepression,79.See also

repressionStatelessdiaspora,123,126Strategiccommunicationsprogram,

10,26Structuralelements,46,61,76,79Sudan,65,118,121 Islamicgovernmentin,145Sufism,146Suicidebombing,29,151.See also

suicidejihadis debateamongMuslims

concerning,153 religionand,136Suicidejihadis,3,29 objectivesof,32 reasonsbehind,40 selectionof,37 sponsoringgroups,31 trainingof,35Suicideteams,37Suicideterrorism,22Sunnijihadimovements,140,151,

155SunniMuslims,46,120,147 LeJ,33SymbioneseLiberationArmy,74Sympathizers,31,34Syria,121 Baathistregimeof,45

TTaiwan,52Tajikistan,66Taliban,33,39,92,145,150,163TamilTigers.SeeLTTETantawi,SheikhMuhammadSayyid,

153Tanzania,truckbombingsin,154

Taqiya,161Technology,facilitationofterrorism

by,110Temporalconditions,46Terrorism addressingthecausesof,156 audiencefor,58 confronting,185 definitionof,2 delegitimizationof,64 diasporic,118,120 economicresponsesto,10 financing,7,93 globalizationand,103 homelandvs.hostland,122 ideologiesof,91 inequalitiesasasourceof,87 instigatingconditionsfor,49 international,5,51 cooperationofnationsto

counter,113 internationalanddomestic

responsestrategiesto,96 linkbetweencrimeand,94 linkbetweeneconomicfactors

and,85 linkofrepressionwithemergency

of,79(See alsorepression) masscasualty,24 natureofthestateand,80 originsof,71 OsamabinLadenandtheglobal

spreadof,154 Pakistan,32(See alsoPakistan) policyapproachesto,146(See also

policyrecommendations) politicalcausesofdomestic,46 politicalchoicesof,90 proximatecausesof,98 psychologyof,17 relationshipofbehaviorof

authoritiesto,49 relationshiptodemocracy,5,45 research,11,25 responsestrategiesfor,111 riskfactorsfor,8,183 roleofreligionin,133 socialrevolutionary,106

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�0� TheRootsofTerrorism

socioeconomicchangeandincreaseinrisksfor,89

statesponsorsof,121 suicide,31,151(See alsosuicide

jihadis) sympathizersof,31,34 underlyingcausesof,3 understandingcausesof,1 womenand,89Terroristgroups.See alsospecific

groups backgroundsofIslamicmilitants,

159 cells,36 cooperationbetween,34 exploitationofdemocraticrights

by,55 formationof,71 generationalandsocialdynamics

of,18 organizationalstructureof,23 changesinduetoglobalization,

111Terroristmutation,72,76Terroristpersonality,17Terrorists,life-cycleof,22TheEngineer,49Timebombs,33Tortureofdetainees,66Tourists,118Trainingcamps,34Transitionaldemocracies,46,80Transnationalcounterterrorism

networks,65Transnationaldispersals,119Transnationalterrorism,5Transparency,168Transstateethnonationaldiasporas,

119Trueglobalizers,104Tunisia,RenaissanceParty,146Tupamaros,73Turkey,2,5,45,47,49 WelfareParty,146TurkishKurdistan,121Turkmenistan,66TwinTowersbombing,31

UUl-Haq,GeneralZia,145Ummah,8,30,40 virtual,162Undergroundbankingnetworks,108UnitedFreedomFront,74UnitedKingdom,74.See also

NorthernIreland amnestyprogramsforgroupexit

in,27 AngryBrigade,74(See alsoAngry

Brigade) Londontransitsystembombings,

24 terrorismin,47UnitedStates,74 abortionclinicbombersin,133 AmericanExceptionalism,67 Christiantheocracyin,136 immigrationin,119 internationalterrorismagainst,

51,53(See alsospecificterroristattacks)

MiddleEastpolicies,54 OsamabinLaden’swaragainst,

155 SymbioneseLiberationArmy,74 terroristgroupsin,74(See also

specificgroups) UnitedFreedomFront,74 viewsofalliesonWaronTerror,

68 WeatherUnderground,74UniversalDeclaration,64Uruguay,5,47 Tupamaros,73(See also

Tupamaros)USSCole,terroristattackon,53,155Uzbekistan,66 IslamicMovementof,124

VVichygovernment,80Victimsofterrorism,24,33VietnamWar,46,76Violence activitiesofdiaspora,117

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Index �0�

earlyinterventionmeasurestoprevent,26

legitimatevs.illegitimate,156 lethalityofduetopolitical

instability,4 moraljustificationfor,142 political,71 religiouscommitmentand,134,

139 roleofleadershipin,3Vulnerability,programstoreduce,25

WWahhabis,163WaronTerror,66,143 alliedviewsof,68Weakglobalizers,104 reintegrationof,111Weaponsofmassdestruction,24,

186WeatherUnderground,74WestBank,54,88,133,152 Israelioccupationof,48WesternEurope Islamicviolencein,8

studyofterrorismin,47,72 terrorismin,47 terrorisminduetoglobalization,

51Westernization,106WhiteChristiansupremacy,136Wilkinson,Paul,61Wilkinson-Belldebate,61Women educationof,10,112 empowermentofasaterrorism

reductionincentive,89,96WorldTradeCenter,53,133,140,

151,156.See also9/11

YYasin,SheikhAhmad,153Yusuf,Ramzi,31

ZZaydism,164Zerotolerancepolicies,9,146,157Zikr,164Zyarat,164

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Documents

Democracy and Terrorism