Do the Balkans Begin in Europe: Excerpts II

Ana Foteva

Do the Balkans Begin in Vienna?

The Imaginary and Geopolitical Borders between the Balkans and Europe

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction: The Balkans’ Postmodern Geography ................................. 1 II. Travelogues of War and Peace ............................................................... 17 III. Serbia: Between East and West ............................................................. 45 IV. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Where Orient and Occident Meet ...................... 87 V. Slovenia and Croatia: Between the Balkans and Europe ..................... 147 VI. The Balkans between Utopia and Dystopia ......................................... 195 VII. Myth and Memory in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Balkans ....... 273 Bibliography ............................................................................................... 303 Index ........................................................................................................... 315

I. Introduction: The Balkans’ Postmodern Geography

This study takes up one of the most politically fraught areas of Europe, the Balkans, in the contexts of its various modern political affiliations. At times variously part of the Austro-Hungarian (k.u.k., i.e., imperial and royal), Ottoman, Byzantine, and Roman Empires, and now often viewed as part of Central Europe, this region has always been considered Europe’s border between the Orient and the Occident, Christian Europe and the Moslem East, that is, between European and various non-European populations. Although Metternich famously declared that “The Balkans begin at the Rennweg”1 (a street near the historical center of Vienna), the countries, languages, ethnicities, and cultures actually in that region have allowed the landscape to appear in Europe’s political and cultural imagination in many forms, most often as the border beyond which “the other,” variously defined, threatens Europe.

Central Europe and the Balkans are the two liminal European regions that help Europe define what it is, and what it is not.2 Egon Schwarz defines Central Europe as a cultural, rather than geographical concept and postulates a utopian Central Europe (Schöpflin and Wood 143–56). I, on the other hand, examine the fictional imagination of the Balkans as a “utopian dystopia” (my terms), as an imaginary space (Todorova) and ab-normal no-place (ou-topia) onto which the historical tensions of empires have been projected. While examining the cultural and political contours of the Balkans and the different approaches to drawing borders between them and Europe, I pay close attention to the impact of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires on the cultural formation of the region, particularly on the liminal, in-between-zones of these empires. An analysis of the historical and political discourses and the fictional imagination of these zones unveils the historical negotiations of identity and cultural boundaries within a region whose borders have always been fluid, arbitrary, and particularly challenging of Europe’s most cherished self-images.

Traditions Constituting European Identity

Central Europe is shaped by a plurality of imperial legacies (the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy, Hitler’s and Stalin’s conquests) that superimposed historical metanarratives on the numerous local marginal nations (Petkovi! 21–23). However, despite representations of the imperial

2 Do the Balkans Begin in Vienna?

discourses to the contrary, the small nations of Central Europe do share a historical and cultural continuum and a common, even though fluid identity. It is a different case with the Balkans. My approach to “reading” the Balkans does not aim at discovering or postulating a unified identity. Quite the contrary, in accord with Bhabha’s concept of cultural difference that is in opposition to cultural diversity (The Third Space 208-09), I propose that cultural multi-belonging, historical disruption, and recurrence of conflicting identities are the ongoing processes which replace the concept of a common identity for the Balkans and require a plurality of mobile and adjustable perspectives as interpretative strategies for viewing this region considered as a cultural and geopolitical space.3 Moreover, owing to their changing boundaries, the Balkans also possess the capacity to “radiate” ambiguity onto the bordering region of Habsburg Central Europe thus placing the essentialist definitions about culture and identity generally in question. Therefore, this study examines the relations between the Habsburg Monarchy (Austria-Hungary)—an empire whose identity was from the beginning constructed on the basis of Catholic Christianity and which thus represented the Western European legacy in the Balkans as pars pro toto—and the Balkans as an intermediate space between East and West.

The Balkans themselves were shaped by the Byzantine and Ottoman imperial legacies, i.e., by both Christian and Islamic influences. Todorova (181) argues for a common cultural heritage of the Balkan peoples, but admits the difficulty involved in deciding to what degree each of the empires and their cultures respectively shaped the common Balkan identity. The questions we must raise here are: where does the Byzantine tradition belong in the general division between East and West, and how does the succeeding Ottoman legacy relate to it? If we follow historians who claim that the history and cultural identity of Modern Europe is entirely continuous with Christianity,4 then we must conclude that the Byzantine Empire clearly belongs to the European legacy.

Jenö Szücs and George Schöpflin (Schöpflin and Wood 8–29) give similar criteria for a differentiation between Western and Eastern Europe (Szücs) or between Europe and Russia (Schöpflin). Szücs focuses first on the historical and political processes which shaped the three regions that, according to him, comprise Europe. In 800 C.E. Western Europe was identical with Carolingian Europe (the realm of Charlemagne). Its borderline followed the lower reaches of the Elbe and the Saale in the South and the Leitha in the East. It was opposed to the eastern successor of the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and to the Islamic Ottoman Empire, and after the Arabic invasion its purported center was moved further to the North. Western Europe usurped the name “Europe” after the death of Charlemagne

The Balkans’ Postmodern Geography

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in 814, thus ignoring the other pole of Europe—the Byzantine Empire (13–14).

The schism between Eastern and Western Christianity in 1054 moved the border between Western and Eastern Christianity further to the East: it separated, roughly, the Polish from Russian lands, and reached into the Baltic region in the thirteenth century. These two regions were shaped by the competing influences of Rome and Constantinople. The political demarcation line was at the same time a cultural one. Western Europe was culturally shaped by the Romanesque and Gothic periods, the Renaissance and the Reformation, but also by the development of autonomous cities with corporative structure and liberties, among other things. These phenomena did not reach further than the Polish and Hungarian Kingdoms (13–14).

According to Szücs, following a not entirely perfect, yet acceptable consensus, the region between the demarcation lines of the former Carolingian Europe and Eastern Europe, which culturally still belonged to the West, was given the name Ostmitteleuropa (East-Central or Central Europe) (16). Everything beyond Central Europe was known as the East, a region that never took part in the medieval cultural development of Western Europe. In the sixteenth century the Russian state was founded between the White, the Black, and the Caspian Seas, in the territory between Poland and the Ural. In time, Russia and Eastern Europe became one and the same (16–17).

At the end of the medieval period the Seljuk Turks conquered the Byzantine Empire and renamed its Asian region Anatolia and the Southeastern European parts Rumelia—referring to the lands inherited from the Roman Empire.5 Since the Ottoman conquests stopped in Hungary, Szücs assigns it the role of the new border region from which Central Europe had just been liberated. He also decides to leave Southeastern Europe out of consideration because it was excluded from the European structures for a half a millennium (17–18). After “dividing” Europe into three parts, Szücs elaborates on the basic characteristics of the West (19). The main principle is the division between society and state (20) that sets in motion a development essentially different from any other in the world, most importantly from that of Eastern and, of course, of Southeastern Europe.

Schöpflin discusses all the basic elements of Western society (which logically originate in the initial separation of state and society that Szücs stressed). The division of power brought about an attendant separation of secular from religious power, the founding of church universities independent of the state, and an autonomous development of the sciences and a spread of literacy that eventually undermined the role of the Church. The independent cities played a crucial role in promoting the market, the money economy, and technologies (Schöpflin and Wood 10–11).


Schöpflin compares the Russian model to the Western situation and concludes that it is inherently different. The ruler not only of Russia, but also of the Byzantine state was able to integrate the Church into the framework of secular power and thereby exercise control over the religious domain. In the Byzantine Empire, where the political tradition was reinforced by the influence of Islam, the ruler used religion to strengthen the myth of legitimacy, according to which the Empire was divinely ordained, so that religion could never emerge as an autonomous, competitive value in the way that it did in Europe (13).

The Byzantine Empire, with its traditional urban civilization and centralized bureaucratic state structure, was the opposite of the West-European division of power, and Islam combined elements of Persian-Byzantine structures with its own military-theocratic autocracy. The cities in both the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires were therefore dependent on the centralized state and, although they were administrative, military and economic centers, they did not develop in the zone of interaction between sovereignty and power which gave Western cities the possibility of building up an independent communal existence (Szücs 22–23).

Therefore, Szücs’ conclusion is that the Byzantine Empire did not partake in the Western European or, according to Schöpflin, in the European model of development. Central Europe, on the other hand, notwithstanding the intermediate and liminal, pervious nature of the area between Latin and Orthodox lands, emerged as a part of Western Christianity and thus firmly associated with the West (Schöpflin and Wood 19–20).

Huntington mentions the possibility of differentiating between Orthodox Russian, Orthodox Byzantine, and Western Christian civilizations (45). He also argues that civilizations outlive empires (43), which brings us to the question of the Byzantine legacy after the demise of the Byzantine and the birth of the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to the previous mainstream in historiography, according to which “Ottoman rule […] sundered the Balkans from the rest of the continent and ushered in new dark ages for the region” (xl), both Todorova (162) and Mazower suggest that the Ottoman Empire did not destroy the Byzantine heritage, but much to the contrary regarded itself as a “successor to the ‘universal state’ of Byzantine Orthodoxy” (xl) and included Byzantine elements in its state structure.

The Ottoman historian Brown goes a step further and includes the Ottoman Empire among the three Mediterranean empires, together with the Roman and Byzantine Empires. He further points out that although the Roman Empire was, for a short period, more extensive, it did not last as long as the Ottoman, whereas the Byzantine Empire lasted longer but could not match the diversity of the peoples ruled by the Ottomans (1).


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Brown’s categorization is important for this study because all the aforementioned empires—from the Roman, which embodies the Western imperial tradition, to the Ottoman, which is considered foreign, even hostile to the European/Western civilization—included the Balkans, which were also part of the empire of Alexander the Great. Due to these imperial legacies the Balkans are seen alternately as the “cradle of the European civilization,” a perception focusing on the ancient Greek legacy on the one hand, and, on the other, as a non-European, “other” space due to five centuries of Ottoman rule since the beginning of the Modern Age.

The reasons for including the Western Catholic Habsburg Monarchy in the discussions on the Balkans in this study are the Monarchy’s own cultural ambiguity and its political influence on the history of the Balkan countries. Not only was this empire considered to be the border to the Orient, it also invited Orthodox inhabitants from the Ottoman Empire to serve as mercenary troops to defend the border areas against the Ottomans as early as 1522 (Rothenberg 8–15); with the occupation of Bosnia formalized at the Berlin Conference in 1878, it incorporated Ottoman territories populated by Slavic Moslems, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats living next to each other, and it was a coveted destination for many different peoples from the Ottoman Empire who aspired towards both education and economic prosperity.

Considering the above facts, Metternich’s famous declaration that the Balkans begin in Vienna, or more precisely at the Rennweg6 could be interpreted in three ways: as an expression of his frustration over the inevitable political and cultural intermingling of Austria with the uncanny space; as an acknowledgment of the similarity between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires in regard to the complexity of nationalities and cultures in these two supranational states; and finally, from a postmodern point of view, as a dismissal of essentialist notions about what is West or Europe and where the borderline between the Orient and the Occident should be drawn.

Geographical, Geopolitical, and Cultural Borders of the Balkans

A perfect example of the Balkans’ ambiguity is that not only their cultural bases, but also their geographical names could well be disputed. The geographical name “Balkans” was based on the erroneous ancient Greek belief that the Haemus (the ancient Greek name for the Balkans) was a mountain chain linking the Adriatic and Black Seas, with a dominant position in the peninsula (Todorova 25), that it ran all throughout the peninsula, similar to the Pyrenees of the Iberian Peninsula (Mazower xxvi), i.e., it stretched from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. In fact, it ends in eastern Serbia (Glenny xxii). Therefore, even the geographical boundaries have been and still are being renegotiated. Todorova draws the geographical borders of the Balkans as follows:


The standard approach of geographers distinguishes between a stricto sensu physico geographical definition, and one employed for more practical purposes. The first accepts as the undisputed eastern, southern, and western borders the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean, Mediterranean, Ionian, and Adriatic Seas. (30)

It is significant that the northern geographical border of the Balkans is the most disputed one. According to Todorova (30), geographically “it is most often considered” to begin at the mouth of the river Idria in the gulf of Trieste and to coincide with the Sava and the Danube rivers. It is disputed because here the geographical and the cultural definitions of the region based on historical metanarratives collide, and every attempt to determine the border opens a Pandora’s box of historical and cultural argumentation. Since the above definition includes both Slovenia (or part of the Habsburg Monarchy) and the European part of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, it automatically questions not only the border between the Balkans and Europe, but also the border between the Orient and the Occident. Mazower gives a concise, but ambiguous definition of the Balkans as a part of Europe, but “not of it” (xxviii), alluding to its oriental heritage, and Glenny abandons the attempts for definition altogether, because “[a] serious consideration of the Balkan peninsula runs up against the unanswerable question of borders” (xxii).

The disagreements and difficulties in naming and mapping the Balkans show the crisis of geography as “a concept, a sign system and an order of knowledge established at the centers of power” (Rogoff 20). Rogoff therefore proposes introducing critical epistemology, subjectivity, and spectatorship into the area of geography, which will “shift the interrogation from the center to the margins, to the site at which new and multi-dimensional knowledge and identities are constantly in the process of being formed” (20).

Abandoning the “sequentially unfolding narrative” and historical thinking (1), Soja introduces the concept of postmodern human geography and proposes spatialization of the historical narrative that would emphasize “the combination of time and space, history and geography, period and region, sequence and simultaneity” (2). The postmodern and critical human geography provides us with a new vision that allows us to see in different ways “the interplay of history and geography, the vertical and horizontal dimensions of being in the world […]” (11). Like Rogoff, Soja points to the “relations of power and discipline […] inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality” and the interference of politics and ideology with human geographies (6).

Drawing on the “spatial turn” paradigm proposed by Soja, Bla!evi" suggests the use of the term “Balkan” “as a flexible, dynamic, and relational heuristic concept […] [that] enables and promotes a critical, multi-


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perspective and self-reflexive thinking about space,” rather than as a criterion for symbolic inclusion/exclusion (1), i.e., belonging or not belonging to Europe. Precisely postmodern geography opens the possibility of conceptualizing “space as a dynamic network,” in which “heterogeneous historical trajectories […] [are] densely interwoven with the asymmetrical relations of power” (Bla!evi" 1). The Balkans should therefore be reconceptualized as “a space of permeation and overlapping, where individual and collective identities have constantly been (re)created in the game of attraction and rejection” (2).

Rogoff finds the connection between discourses on geography and those on space in the understanding “that power produces a space which then gets materialized as place” (Rogoff 22). Spatialization thus precedes geographical determination, but it also unveils geography’s subjective structure. The history of naming the Balkan space is a very illustrative example of the relation between spatialization and geography as a structure of subjectivity. For the ancient Greeks the mountain Haemus was a toponym, but the historian Strabo also considered it a natural divide between the Thracian-Hellenistic world and the barbarian lands along the Danube (Todorova 25), thus transforming a natural divide into a place of cultural boundary. The Ottomans first used the name Balkans, which in Ottoman Turkish means “a chain of wooded mountains” and corresponds to the land configuration, when they conquered the region and envisaged it as one space (Todorova 26). The space soon became an official place named Rumelia—the lands of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire (27)—which entailed a clear political message: the conquered Roman lands gave the Ottomans the role of successors to the Eastern Roman Empire. As we will see below, the other two terms for the Balkans, “European Turkey” and “Southeastern Europe,” came into existence in similar processes of interaction between a system of knowledge and changing centers of power.

Rogoff suggests following the relations between the structures of metaphor and metonymy in order to develop a method that will offer an alternative to the subjective and power-centered geography (15). Both metaphor and metonymy are cognitive structures, the former based on relationships of similarity between things, not words, and the latter on relations of contiguity between things, not words, i.e., between a thing and its attributes, its environments, and its adjuncts (Silverman 111). Geography as a metonymic structure would then mediate between the concrete, material, and psychic conditions and metaphorical articulations of relations between subjects, places, and spaces (Rogoff 15–16). Applied to the discussion of the Balkans in this book, metonymic geography will mediate between spaces, which I define as the four Sub-Balkans, their treatment in history and the media as orders of knowledge and sign systems, and metaphorical


articulations in literature of the relations between these spaces and local and external subjects. Therefore with this study I hope to offer a metonymic work of its own kind and, in Rogoff’s words (3) and in the Brechtian sense, to arrive at a positionality, rather than the clarity of having a position, as a possible model for mediation between political, historical, literary, and media discourses on the Balkans.

In order to circumvent the aporia in the attempt to define the borders of the Balkans I will identify the four different Sub-Balkans based on the interactions between different external centers of power which have been most dominant in each, on the one hand, and collective local identities formed in a “game of attraction [to] and rejection” (Bla!evi" 2) from the centers of power, on the other. I will also envisage the Balkans as a four-dimensional space due to its unstable, moveable borders. This approach will do justice to the “simultaneity” of Soja’s postmodern geography (1) and Bla!evi"’s vision of the Balkans as “a space of permeation and overlapping” (2).

The philosophical stream of four dimensionalism, as defined by Theodore Sider in 1997, explains the relations between objects, space, and time in the following way:

As I see it, the heart of four dimensionalism is the claim that the part-whole relation behaves analogously with respect to time as it does with respect to space: just as things have arbitrary spatial parts, they likewise have arbitrary temporal parts. When applied to space, the idea that things have arbitrary parts means, roughly, that for any way of dividing the region of space occupied by a given object, there is a corresponding way to divide that object into parts which exactly occupy those regions of space. Applied to time, the idea is that to any way of dividing up the lifetime of an object into separate intervals of time, there is a corresponding way of dividing the object into temporal parts that are confined to those intervals of time. (204)

The Byzantine-Ottoman legacy defines, according to Todorova (162), the space of the Balkans and will therefore be considered the dominant cultural/historical/political object occupying the physical space of the Balkans in the sense of four dimensionalism. I argue that the Habsburg legacy must also be taken into consideration as the second cultural/political/historical object occupying or influencing the Balkans. In Sider’s sense, we must envisage the empires’ persistence through time as extension through space (197). They have spatial parts like their Balkan possessions/territories, which are also their temporal parts insofar as they belong to one or the other empire for a limited amount of time, i.e., “are confined to those intervals of time” (Sider 204). The Balkan territories are then subregions of the total region of time the empires occupy (197). In this sense, the objects (empires) “perdure” in the Balkans, i.e., are confined to


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intervals of time, never “enduring,” never being “wholly present” (197). For example, after the victory at the First Battle of Mohács in 1529 the Ottomans conquered the southern parts of the Kingdom of Hungary. The Habsburgs took back these lands from the Ottomans at the Second Battle of Mohács in 1687 and kept them in possession for almost two centuries. The Ottoman “perduring” in southern Hungary was a long interval of over two hundred and fifty years, and Hungary was a temporal part of the Ottoman Empire for roughly two hundred and fifty years. The lands between these reconquered territories and the Ottoman Empire, like the Pashalik of Belgrade in Serbia, experienced extremely short intervals of Habsburg rule, as I explain in the third chapter, on Serbia. They were then a short temporal part of the Habsburg Empire. This pattern, with substantial differences in the time intervals, applies to the entire border zone between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. The four dimensionalism understood in a political sense corresponds to the processes of cultural multi-belonging, historical disruption, and recurrence of conflicting identities.

The contours of the four Sub-Balkans are then a result of the time intervals in which different subregions of the Balkans were temporal parts of the two neighboring empires. From this perspective, one can say that some Sub-Balkans are “more Balkan” than others, and that a region can belong to more than one cultural and geopolitical legacy. Moreover, within the same Sub-Balkans different parts have been temporal parts of one and/or the other empire in different intervals of time. Yet, this division takes into account all temporal shifts between the two empires in the Balkans, and a closer analysis of the critical junctures between the empires will provide a differentiated perspective on the temporal “perduring” of each empire in the respective zone.

One Balkan region was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and thus has long been considered part of Central Europe, part of Europe’s k.u.k. heritage. This area includes Croatia and possibly Slovenia. Todorova’s definition of the Balkans as an Ottoman-Byzantine legacy includes Croatia because of its cultural and political contacts with the Ottoman Empire (31)—the Croatian population in the Ottoman Empire ruled Herzegovina—and excludes Slovenia, conversely, because it had no direct political or cultural contacts with the Ottomans. We can use the same argument regarding Croatia and say that since Slovenia was part of both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1941) and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, now better known as the former Yugoslavia (1943–1991), one could categorize it as part of the Slavic Balkans. I will come back to this question when I discuss the Sub-Balkans of the South Slavs.

A second Sub-Balkan includes regions that were part of both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Hungary,


and parts of Croatia and Romania. These regions admit to a mixed heritage—to Austrian Catholic and to Turkish-Islamic influences. Like Slovenia and Croatia, Hungary also belongs to Central Europe. Obviously, Central Europe recurs in the discussions on the Balkans. The distinction between these two regions is of great importance for this study because it adds yet another dimension to the discussion about cultural borders.

“Western” travel reports on the Balkans from the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries categorized the region as “Turkey in Europe” (Mazower xxvi) and alternated between Philhellenism, pity for the local Christian ethnicities and outrage against the Islamic conquerors, and admiration for the Ottoman rulers (Todorova 89–140). Reports from the early twentieth century labeled the newly independent Balkan nations that emerged from the Ottoman Empire as troublemakers that were jeopardizing stability and challenging every state structure (West 21). After World War II, all Balkan states, with the exception of Greece, became communist, and the rhetoric on the Balkans as “cultural others” was replaced by the Cold War bipolar rhetoric of the politically and ideologically opposed. Central Europe and the Balkans reemerged as cultural concepts after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

In this context, it is critical to remember that the idea of Central Europe was reborn in the late 1980s as a historical-political and cultural program of a number of intellectuals from the communist European countries that had been part of Austria-Hungary. The goal was to revive their common identity built in the Habsburg era. This automatically implied setting boundaries between Central Europeans and “the others.” The most prominent figure of this movement, Milan Kundera, gave the impulse for a cultural reconstruction of the Central European identity and thus asserted its cultural identity markers—the Renaissance and the Enlightenment—which he regarded also as pan-European. Excluded from the European cultural identity was the Russian Orthodox culture, because, as Kundera claimed, it was never influenced by these two paradigms of European intellectual history (Kundera, “Tragedy of Central Europe”). As Todorova (147) points out, the non-European “other” in Kundera’s view was only Russia; he made no mention of the Balkans.

The field of Eastern European studies in the United States has traditionally differentiated between Russia, which was covered in the field of Eurasian studies, and Eastern Europe. As the collapse of the communist block was becoming more apparent, Eastern Europe was divided into East-Central Europe and Southeastern Europe (Todorova 140), something that Szücs had done as early as 1983. The latter was a name for the Balkans coined by the German geographer Otto Maul in 1929 in order to overcome “the standing historical-political dichotomy between the Danubian monarchy


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and the Ottoman Balkans that had become irrelevant” (Todorova 29). Ironically, this term recurred in the last decade of the twentieth century during the demise of the multinational and multicultural state of Yugoslavia, when the dichotomy between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires became relevant again. Parallel to the military actions, a verbal battle was also fought to prove that Croatia was only Central-European and not Balkan at all.7

The third Sub-Balkan region is comprised by the territories populated by Slavic peoples and includes Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, or simply the former Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The common Slavic identity was considered one of the cohesive mechanisms in the former Yugoslavia—the name denotes the land of South Slavs. However, during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia it reemerged as one of the most problematic identity markers, because it ignored the Habsburg, Byzantine, and Ottoman cultural legacies of the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples who lived there for centuries. When the power-hungry Milo!evi" began manipulating the South Slavic idea, Slovenia and Croatia began gravitating towards the Central-European identity and marked once again the invisible border between Central and Southeastern Europe/the Balkans.

Finally, a fourth Sub-Balkan region, which could bear the epithet “most Balkan,” was part of both the Ottoman and Byzantine Empires, an area including Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and part of today’s Romania. The delineations of this region must account for Greek, Greco-Roman, and Islamic influences, which is why it lies somewhat outside of the paradigmatic Slavic/European ethnic divide figuring in European thought.

My study aims at clarifying the politics of drawing cultural borders in this region. I demonstrate that the simple dichotomy Orient versus Occident is insufficient to explain the utter complexity of the region. To that end I compare cultural borderlines established through religion, myth, and literary narrative as used for political goals, to boundaries defined through historiography. To accomplish this, I deal with the three Sub-Balkans of the former Yugoslavia, which had cultural and political relations with the Habsburg Monarchy, substantiating my discussions of these regions with reference to literary texts written in German and Serbian/Bosnian, as well as with reference to pertinent historiography on these Sub-Balkan regions. Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are the three regions (now independent states) where the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Byzantine legacies encounter each other in an extremely complex net of political decisions, followed by cultural contacts, and therefore illustrate vividly the above-mentioned Balkan processes of cultural multi-belonging, historical disruption, and recurrence.


Colonial/Imperial Legacies and Postcolonial Struggles

It is evident that the imperial/colonial legacies of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires play the key role in defining the borders of the Balkans. Within the large bodies of these empires lived numerous peoples who experienced self-governance very late in their histories. Moreover, the process of acquiring complete self-governance in the former Yugoslav republics was accompanied by atrocities and historical and cultural disputes. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was at the same time the final stage in the breakdown of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Therefore it provoked processes typical for postcolonial states, e.g., enforcement of national identity and state building through violent exclusion of those who did not belong to the own group.

The most typical case is Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Moslems were forced to defend themselves against Serbian and Croatian claims to the territory based on the pre-Ottoman Christian and Slavic past of the region. These historically delayed processes took place at the end of the twentieth century because of the specific character of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. These empires were typical supranational state structures and, as Benedict Anderson describes them, “were able to sustain their rule over immensely heterogeneous, and often not even contiguous, populations for long periods of time (19).”

Anderson (37–38) traces the origins of national consciousness in Europe to the invention of the printing press and the subsequent gradual prevalence of the vernacular languages over Latin, a process that began in 1500. In the Habsburg Monarchy, however, Latin survived well into the nineteenth century (42). The Ottoman Empire was not only well behind the Western European development of press culture, but also had a completely different concept of nation. The Turkish word for nation was millet, which denoted religious affiliation. Consequently, there were only three millets—the Muslim, the Greek Orthodox, and the Jewish—and these covered the multitude of ethnicities (Glenny 71), some of which became nations only after World War II.

Petkovi! argues that, although Central Europe has been associated with the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1), it would be more appropriate to observe it as a cross-cultural space in which traditions of many ethnic groups blended and which was at the margins of the Habsburg Monarchy (2). These same arguments apply to the entire Balkans, to which one must add that the region has the double burden of two partially overlapping but culturally diverging imperial legacies in the Modern Age. Petkovi! (5) describes Central Europe as permanently postcolonial because an external power has always exerted dominance over it. More importantly, he asks whether fundamental questions of identity encountered in


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postcolonial political situations should not rather be addressed through the link between postmodern and postcolonial theories, which would do justice to the fluid political and geographical situation of Central Europe (13–14) and distinguish the theoretical approaches to the overseas Western colonial tradition from the postcolonial situations within Europe (19).

The multiplex character of the Balkans fits perfectly into the postmodern discourse of deconstruction of master narratives because, as we have seen, any classification tending to establish boundaries fails with respect to the Balkans. We will also see that the concept of nation breaks down due to the simultaneity of pre- and postmodern identities in the Balkans. Here again Irit Rogoff’s discourse of “unlearning” and “unbelonging,” or of destabilizing conventionally accepted knowledge, will be useful. It is precisely the Balkans, or more specifically the former Yugoslavia, that Rogoff discusses as the perfect example of a region that destabilizes Western historical knowledge:

Issues such as rights and belonging … [which] entail the kind of horrific consequences we have seen throughout the former Yugoslavia since 1992, are bound to be dealt within political rhetoric, both instrumentally and in high moralizing tones […] the long shadows cast by […] the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, by two World Wars, by allegiances with fascism to the West and communism to the East, did not translate into a clear-cut policy, into an unequivocal knowledge of what was right or wrong in this case. Everyone in the West had some sort of dirty history in the Balkans and everyone in the West had also taken part in demonizing some part of its population in the context of other conflicts located elsewhere on the globe […]. More than anything, the crisis in the Balkans—in dialogue with the general crisis of the ability to represent any form of stable geographic knowledge as a set of guidelines regarding identity, belonging and rights—has made manifest the degree to which we have collectively lost the navigational principles by which such questions were determined in the recent past such as mid-century. (2–3)

In the case of the Balkans I propose changing Rogoff’s exclusive concept of unbelonging into the inclusive concept of double or multiple belonging and elaborate on this in more detail in the chapter on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which as both an Ottoman and Habsburg territory populated by Serbs, Croats, and Moslems of Slavic origin illustrates this situation perfectly.

Bosnia-Herzegovina will also be the case study for a discussion of the applicability of postcolonial theory to the Balkans, considering its double imperial legacy. For the authors of Habsburg Postcolonial: Machstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis (2003) the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina was an Ottoman territory and therefore belonged to a non-European cultural paradigm for almost five hundred years leaves no doubt either that Habsburg rule there from the late nineteenth century until the beginning of World War I should be considered colonial, or that the postcolonial theory must be an


adequate theoretical tool for examining the region. This well argued position, nonetheless, leaves other questions open, like the nature of the Ottoman imperial legacy in regard to colonialism and postcolonialism, the present-day implications of the non-European cultural legacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other lands of the former Ottoman Empire and, in relation to the latter, the question of European cultural identity/ies in view of the ongoing integration processes. All these questions will be addressed in the fourth chapter.

Postmodern theory, with its promotion of the artistic procedures of pastiche (Jameson 1962–63) and bricolage Lyotard (1613), which legitimize the simultaneity of different styles, does justice to the four-dimensional space whose subregions are temporal parts of once reigning empires and subsequent state formations, thus bearing traces which often create disharmonious architectural landscapes. In addition, postmodern literature can function for the Balkans as a region in a permanent post-traumatic condition in the same way as does psychoanalysis when it deals with post-traumatic stress disorders by working through the past. Lyotard believes that postmodern literature, with its diachronic retention of the past next to the present, functions similarly to Freud’s interpretation of dreams as a process which discloses the parallel existence of all past and present psychological experiences in the unconscious (1613).

The above-mentioned theories and approaches are complemented by theories on nation-building, critical discourse analysis, as well as by historical sources on the origin and spread of nationalism in Eastern Europe, thus following the initial objective of this book to function as a metonymic work that mediates between political, historical, literary, and media discourses on the Balkans and also aspires to provide a facetted picture of this region envisaged as a four-dimensional space.

Notes

1 It is impossible to determine the source of this concise description of the Habsburg-Balkan relations attributed to Metternich. Historians use the term “Asia” instead of Balkans, e.g., Okey (Eastern Europe 17). 2 While the idea of the Orient was, in Said’s words, “almost a European invention [that] has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 24), the relationship between the Balkans and Europe is not based on a binary opposition and displays ambivalent features. On the one hand, Balkan Studies, similarly to Orientalism, “provided civilized and progressive Western Europe with an “other,” conceptualized in terms of deficiencies and backwardness” (Bla!evi" 1). On the other hand, due to “a disturbing similarity between Europe and its Balkan periphery,” the region was “perceived as incomplete and anomalous” despite the awareness that it possesses marks of European civilization (1). In


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this sense, we can say that the Balkans tend to destabilization, rather than reinforcement of European self-images. 3 In Bhabha’s view, cultural diversity in Western plural democratic societies is based on a transparent norm given by the host society or dominant culture that functions as a grid within which the other cultures are located and evaluated, thus creating a containment of cultural difference (The Third Space 208). He attempts to expose the limits of Western cultural liberalism and relativism with the notion of cultural difference, which is a position of liminality, a productive space of the construction of culture as difference in the spirit of alterity or otherness (209). From this point of view, the Balkans are the paradigmatic liminal space within Europe that cannot be positioned in the European universalist grid and evaluated from a singular normative stance. The pluralistic concept of cultural multi-belonging, on the other hand, dismisses the notion of center and allows us to see Balkan cultures as “incommensurable” (209) both to one another and to the normative notions of European culture. 4 Mazower gives the example of the Polish historian Halecki, who claims: “[T]hroughout the whole course of European history in its proper sense, Europe was practically identical with Christendom” (xl–xli). This historical approach, according to Mazower, has led the historiography and politics of the Balkan states to a denial of the Ottoman legacy. However, the Byzantine Orthodox legacy was also not considered European “enough” (xl–xli). 5 I discuss this region, whose other name is the Balkans, in detail below. 6 Rennweg is a street in the Third Viennese District, or Landstraße, located in the southeasternmost part of the city and thus geographically closest to the Balkans. The district also shows other surprising historical similarities to the Balkans. In Roman times it coincided almost entirely with the Roman Limesstraße, a road along the limes (a fortified frontier erected along the borderline of the Roman Empire as a defense against the “barbarians”), and during Habsburg rule it was the frontline of the Austrian defense against the Ottomans in the First (1529) and Second (1683) Ottoman Sieges of Vienna, thus enduring the most severe consequences of the Austro-Turkish Wars (Kretschmer). Today, this district is one of the most diverse parts of Vienna, mostly populated by immigrants from all parts of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. The Landstraße, then, like the Balkans, has been a margin and a boundary since ancient days, and it exhibits an ethnic and cultural diversity similar to that of the Balkans. From this perspective the Balkans are the first, and Vienna/Rennweg is second border between Europe and the Orient/Asia. 7 This is illustrated in the analysis of Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts.


communication has been replaced by public discourses of nation, democracy, and human rights (“straight talk”), all of which are for Handke less authentic than the one-to-one interaction between the locals.

Just like the silent gathering of taxi-drivers in Belgrade, the silent communication of the enemies/neighbors creates authenticity in the spontaneous reaction of the present. This act of reconciliation also refers to the framework of theatrum mundi. In Calderón’s The Great Theater of the World reason and free will are insufficient in themselves to discern and obey the Eternal Law of God because they are obscured by original sin. Man must, therefore, perform an act of grace, which has to be accepted as well as offered (Shergold 169–70). The act of grace in VD is the mutual recognition of the neighbor, which is not disturbed by verbal metanarratives and interpretations imposed from outside. Instead, it entails in a condensed form centuries of shared cultural experience in the Balkans, thus representing the totality of time in the postmodern version of the baroque “play of human history.”

Handke’s extreme close-up utilized in the interpretation of the Yugoslav wars may be interpreted as naïve and dangerously relative because it does not name entire nations as victims or perpetrators, but rather sees all peoples of the region as both. Yet careful analyses of the intricate history of the region as well as a detailed perception of the most recent wars lead to the same conclusion: the roles of victims and perpetrators shift constantly, even within the same war. This realization must be reached by each nation in the region because it is the only successful recipe for a long-term peace. Otherwise, despite the ceasefire and peace agreements, we will have, as Handke put it, a “fauler Frieden” (false peace) (“Nachtstudio”). Recognition of the enemy as a former neighbor and a human being restores the locality as the basic cell of every society. Without a genuinely functioning locality, all comprehensive discourses of democracy, human rights, and nation remain ideologies void of substance.

The Balkans and Europe in the Axis of Utopia and Dystopia

The concept of utopia is complex and contradictory in itself. Foucault, for example, defines utopias as “sites with no real place [but] with a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space […] which they present […] in a perfected form” (24). This definition explains Thomas More’s original concept of utopia of 1516, which, as Beilharz and Ellem explain, is “both the good place and no place” (Hayden and el-Ojeili 13), combining the ancient Greek prefixes () (good) and *) (no), blended in the English u. Yet Hayden claims that the concept of utopia constantly transgresses its original semantic field and becomes “more than an alternative society,” following Bloch’s recognition that “utopia conveys a

The Balkans between Utopia and Dystopia

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powerful impulse or drive that is simultaneously critical of present sociopolitical realities and anticipatory of positive alternative futures” and that it remains “a basic human aspiration” (Hayden and el-Ojeili 51). On the other hand, we must consider that communities and spaces that we are used to perceiving as real have an inherently utopian quality, i.e., they do not exist as such. Hayden gives the example of the nation as imagined community in Anderson’s sense (54), and Foucault compares the mirror to a utopia “since it is a placeless place” (24). Foucault introduces the concept of heterotopia to describe the ambivalent and dubious nature of the mirror and other places, which function on the same principle. In the mirror we see ourselves where we are not, in a virtual space that opens up behind the surface and enables us to see ourselves where we are absent. The mirror does, nonetheless, exist in reality and, as such, functions as a heterotopia insofar as it makes the place that we occupy at the moment when we look at ourselves at once absolutely real, connected with the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through the virtual point which is “over there”, not “here,” where we are (24).

The analogy between the mirror and the media as places that show absent reality as present is very obvious. In this sense, Friedrich Kittler’s comparison of Plato’s allegory of the cave50 to present-day technical media functions as a comparison of two different kinds of simulations of reality. According to Kittler, Plato’s allegory primarily implements a certain type of perception and experience, namely that of a culture which knows only theater, architecture, and sculpture. In this context, every shadow on the wall in the cave functions as a signified, its name spoken by the men passing along as the signifier, and the entire allegory as a system of signs of an oral culture. The chained people watch and discuss what they see, incapable of seeing through the simulacrum of the framework conditions. There is constant coming and going and incessant talking because they cannot write anything down. The message of this allegory, according to Kittler, is to learn reading Plato’s works in order to overcome oral captivity (211).

Standing in seeming opposition to the cave allegory are technical media that for the first time make storage possible and hence control of reality perceived through senses as well. Reading thereby loses its relation to ideal meaning beyond mere signifiers, as was required by Plato; just like listening to records and watching films, it becomes yet another conditioned reflex. Only two differences distinguish the cave allegory from the present-day condition. First, the signified, which was the only thing capable of being stored in an oral culture, has been replaced by pure signifiers (212). Second, the TV set has no guide or exit,51 things that Plato provided people in the cave with to bring them into the sunlight of truth. Data processing knows no beyond (212), it merely simulates totality.


In the context of utopia, the cave allegory, as interpreted by Kittler, admonishes us readers and media consumers of the digital age to come back to a Platonic reading related to ideal meaning that will replace the passive consumption of simulated reality as a conditioned reflex; or, paraphrasing Kittler, it encourages us to relearn to read in the Platonic sense in order to overcome our visual captivity. Literary utopias are based on hypothetical, imagined ideal conditions that only function imaginatively and can therefore provide alternative models for the interpretation of reality. Utopias and dystopias stem from the same desire to rebel against a reality perceived as defective, oppressive, unjust, and without prospects for a better future, or against presentations of reality perceived as fraudulent and misleading, as is the case, for example, with Kraus’ The Last Days of Mankind. Fogg also points out that one and the same condition or phenomenon can be considered both as utopia and dystopia, as illustrated by the saying “One man’s utopia is another man’s dystopia,” which is especially true for the technological progress of the twentieth century (Richter 66).

In the literary depictions of the Balkans we can establish another pattern that brings utopia and dystopia together. The Bridge on the Drina, by far the most dystopian literary work analyzed in this study, leaves at the end a very vague glimmer of hope with utopian quality, expressed through the thoughts of the dying Alihod$a, who hopes that noble individuals with great visions will continue the struggle to make the world better (Andri!, The Bridge 314). Since Alihod$a is dying on a bridge cruelly cut in half, we should interpret his vision of the world against the background of the metaphorical significance of the bridge and its fictional destruction in the novel. The bridge, as already mentioned, functions as theatrum mundi in which the locals play their roles parabolically within the larger framework of history. The combination of historical factors and the interaction between local and global actors results this time in a disastrous breach of communication and violence between the locals symbolized by the destruction of the bridge. “This time” is both an ahistorical and a pan-historical moment, insofar as it could refer equally to all the conflicts between the locals during Ottoman rule, to the outbreak of World War I, to the fratricidal wars during World War II, and, as an uncanny clairvoyance, even to the most recent wars at the end of the twentieth century, or to all of these together, always remaining in the same locality of Vi%egrad, which in this way becomes a paradigm of dystopia.

We must consider the very brief utopian hope expressed by Alihod$a, which can easily go unnoticed, in relation to the above concept of historical time. By having the bridge explode, in contrast to the historical reality of its continuous existence, Andri! “explode[s] the continuum of history,” which is


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the utopian function of what Bloch calls the now-time (Jetzt-Zeit) of literature (218). Yet exploding the continuum of history,

does not mean also to explode the context, which is called the “current,” the “tendency” of history […] For only within this tendency of the course […] cracks the crust, the corresponding points of the now sparkle and transmit each other. Therefore, to explode, in this instance, does not mean to focus on one point […] Rather, to explode is a liberating act that frees all essentially related, utopian moments from before and after within the respective dawning of now-time […] Only this actual emphasis and messianic content (as Benjamin called the flowing, ultimate ending) can finally make the distinction between the partiality of the true point of the now-time and the historicism of collected dead pasts that are to be done away with again. And the respective now-time, if it really is one in this sense, understands itself either as a connecting corridor that has been prepared again, much better prepared, or even as the first stop of a time that has to be fulfilled, that is, one wherein appears what has not appeared, was not yet able to appear. (Bloch 218)

In a seemingly dystopian, and essentially utopian procedure, Andri! condenses all essentially related dystopian moments from before and after, only to do with them again in order to much better prepare for something that has not occurred for a long time, namely the messianic time expressed in Alihod$a’s hope that individuals with great humane visions will come again, and that this time people will be much better prepared to turn their vision into reality. Thus, the essentially pessimistic metaphor of the broken bridge expresses an optimistic message for the future in accordance with Bloch’s interpretation that “[n]ow time in the past cannot be a possession: it is help and warning” and “the misunderstanding [must] remain far away on the margins, as if the historical novel were a step toward the intended way of thinking […]” (216).

We should also read Roth’s imaginary Slovenia and Hofmannsthal’s imaginary Slavonia in the context of literary now-time as a corridor between the dead historical past and that, which has to be fulfilled, a time in which there appears what has not appeared heretofore. Roth’s imaginary Slovenia reaches beyond the imagination and wishful thinking of his naïve character who confuses it with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The imaginary Slovenia of The Radetzky March is a condensed vision of an ideal pan-European communication of different cultures and nations, including those from the Balkans, that may have been intended, but was never really achieved in the Habsburg Monarchy, a vision conceived against the background of an increasingly divided Europe on its way to another devastating war.

Hofmannsthal consciously borrows the now-time of the past from the historical novel and employs it in a play that can absorb it without contradictions because its structure is based on the totality of the baroque theater and the metaphor of theatrum mundi. Following performative logic, he gives messianic time a body and personifies it in the character of the


fortune-teller. This ahistorical character, who has the first line in the play, stating that a better hand has been dealt than the last time (Hofmannsthal, Gesammelte Werke in zehn Einzelbänden: Operndichtungen, 513), explodes the continuum of history by embedding the play in the framework of an ideal historical moment, the utopian now-time symbolized by the good hand. This framework gives the characters in the play a chance to learn from their mistakes, thus correcting the past and preparing for what has not yet appeared, namely mutual understanding between the Balkans and Europe symbolized by the marriage of Mandryka and Arabella.

Handke’s utopian vision of the Balkans is conceived differently than the above literary models of utopian now-time. The voyage by dugout follows Holz’s “real philosophical history [which] is not inscribed into the linear time any longer, but […] is a kind of concentric time that in perspective rounds itself around the present […]” following Benjamin’s observation that “[…] basically it is the same time that reappears in the form of holidays […]” (Bloch 218). This voyage is in actuality both a utopia and a heterotopia, or a utopian heterotopia. Foucault defines heterotopias as “counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, […] are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality” (24).

The voyage by dugout combines two principles, hence two different types of heterotopia. First, with its periodic reemergence after the demise of every empire, it is linked to time “in its most fleeting, transitory, precarious aspect, to time in the mode of the festival,” meaning that it is not oriented towards the eternal, but that it is absolutely temporal (Foucault 26). This concept of time corresponds to Holz’s concentric time, which wraps around history, and to Benjamin’s time, which reappears in the form of holidays. Second, being distinct from the monumental buildings and technological inventions of the empires as well as from the populated areas on solid ground, it functions “in relation to all the space that remains,” creating “a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as [the surrounding space] is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled” (Foucault 27). Foucault sees an embodiment of the paradigmatic heterotopia of this kind in the boat, which he defines as “a floating piece of space, a place without a place that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea […]” (27). In this way, the dugout functions as a utopian alternative space, a sanctuary where historical linearity is suspended and time is concentric, with a periodic structure identical to the cycles of holidays and seasons. Harmony, symbolized by the voyage by dugout, can be expected to appear periodically as a coincidence in agreement with Handke’s aforementioned concept of history. The absence of


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historical linearity eliminates the possibility of historical disruptions caused by the interference of empires from outside as well as the recurrence of bloody conflicts caused by antagonistic interpretations of history among the Balkan populations, who attempt to correct historical injustice by evoking the past in the present.

In an age in which literature is mercilessly dominated by the electronic and digital media, it remains, paradoxically, the only instrument which defies their dangerously simplifying logic. This logic perpetuates and intensifies centuries-old prejudices in the omnipresent digital reality of the global village. The dominance of the simplified style in the media has also changed the literary reception and the expectations that modern individuals have from literature. The metaphorical and metonymic logic of literature, which never claims a one-to-one analogy to reality and always allows for more voices to be heard, has been interpreted by media consumers in a linear way that allows perception of only one voice and an analogy to reality only as depicted by media. Yet the gap between reality and staging in the media, which Kraus discussed using the photograph of the hanged Cesare Battisti, has become even larger in the digital age. Handke is therefore right when, following Kraus, he designates our present time “the time after the last days of mankind,” especially when one bears in mind that people remain largely unaware of this gap. The next chapter discusses another kind of constructed reality, the reality of the public sphere with the public personae of statesmen and their influence on the individual identity.

Notes 1 The media are thus not unlike fiction, which, as we have seen in Hamburger’s analysis of fictional narrative, differs from historical narrative in that it creates the appearance of characters acting here and now (150). The difference between the media and fiction is that, as readers of fiction, we remain aware of the appearance, or illusion, of present action, whereas with the media we believe we are witnessing absolute reality. 2 All translations of Die Fahrt im Einbaum are mine. 3 All translations of Roda’s text are mine. 4 Promitzer explains:

Austrian sympathy for Serbia decreased following the Congress of Berlin, when Austria occupied the former Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which Serbia also claimed. […] In this period several journalistic publications on Serbia began to reflect the arrogance and sense of power that would dominate Austrian journalism before the First World War. (Wingfield 192)

Further along Promitzer also points out that “the Viennese press also propagated a radical anti-Serbism that dominated the years prior to 1914.” The press became obsessed with the threat from Serbia and described the Serbs as “Austro-phobic” (Wingfield 193).


pronounced as the English -sh-). The word kom#ija conveys a cultural concept reaching beyond the simple meaning of someone living in the vicinity. A kom#ija is someone who helps in good times and bad, someone with whom one drinks coffee, a social activity involving chatting and exchanging good and bad news, indeed a variant of coffee house activity. People therefore do not use personal names when they address their neighbors, but rather the word kom#ija, which hints at a special relationship. The concept of kom#ija was able to bridge the ethnic and religious differences that were otherwise always present in the background. Handke captures the broad and dense socio-cultural semantic field of the word by using it in the greeting of one of the local characters. By this means, as we shall see later, he describes the beginning of hostilities between the ethnicities as the moment in which the neighbor becomes invisible, thus indicating that the socio-cultural fabric which held the communities together has been torn in the name of the larger community of ethnicity/nation which destroyed the concept of neighbor. 45 See Fiedler (319–21) on the prototype of the character Ranger, Novislav D$aji#, his trial by the Criminal Law Chamber of the Bavarian Supreme Court, and Handke’s objections to the sentence. 46 The city at war is Sarajevo, whose three-year besiegement by Serbian forces was broadcast daily by European networks, thus creating spectators who believed they identified with the suffering of the Sarajevan citizens. Handke questions the moral justification of this belief by mocking the “foreigners,” most likely journalists and internationals, who visited the city, for their illusion that they have become one with the unfortunate Sarajevan citizens. 47 Part of Handke’s dialectical procedure is to have the characters utter contradictory theses in the same speech, thus showing that all history is but a web of contradictory perceptions and interpretations. The meaning of the International’s speech should be sought in the space between his claim that war is considered to be a coincidence and his unconscious admission that war is practiced on an almost yearly basis. 48 Abbott points to Handke’s continuing effort to reconstitute certain words, among which also the word Volk. He strives to reconstruct the material idea of the word Volk (Abbot assumes that by material Handke means non-metaphysical), which had been imbued with Nazi ideology, by working “beyond that into a dialectic, or a “weaving,” as he puts it, to introduce lost words onto the literary stage” (Abbot, “The Material Idea of a Volk” 480). In VD the Volk is constituted through a momentary and spontaneous action, it is not rooted in the ideological basis of the word, and is defined only through acting, thus representing a community of individuals united through solidarity. 49 Handke never ceased thinking about peace and pondering the possibilities of both achieving and preserving it. As already mentioned in the second chapter, Thucydides is, among other things, a narrative of a landscape at peace, whose literary imagery resists the war reports. By the end of A Journey to the Rivers Handke claims that determining the evil facts is not enough for peace, because peace requires something else, something no less important than facts, yet he does not say what that is (Handke, Eine Reise nach Serbien 133). He appears to give his answer with the utopian project from VD. 50 Plato’s allegory of the cave is a fictional dialogue between Socrates and Plato’s brother Glaukon, in which Socrates describes the existence of humans beings in a cave deprived of sunlight. This allegory represents the delusive perception of reality of these people. Socrates asks Glaukon to imagine human beings living in an underground cave, whose mouth opens towards the light and reaches all along the cave. They have been there since childhood and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move and can only see in front of them, being prevented from turning their heads by the chains. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised pathway. A low


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wall is built along the pathway, resembling the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets. Socrates then asks Glaukon to imagine men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, statues, and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials that appear over the wall. Some of the men carrying the statues are talking, while others are silent. (Kittler 211) 51 The second difference that Kittler mentions refers specifically to the change in the reading process under conditions of developed technology, but it can be applied without alteration to the changes in the visual perception of TV viewers.

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