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Domestic Opposition, Institutions, and Conflict Initiation
Patrick E. Shea [email protected]
Terence K. Teo
Jack S. Levy [email protected]
Department of Political Science Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ
Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Seattle, WA, September 1-4.
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Abstract Recent research has demonstrated that opposition groups have a constraining effect on decision-makers during crisis bargaining. However, there has been little theoretical or empirical research on how specific institutional arrangements and political processes affect opposition groups' influence and behavior during an international crisis and thereby affect a state's propensity for conflict. We hypothesize that states with domestic institutions that hinder opposition groups (i.e., strong presidential systems and majority parliaments) will be more likely to initiate conflict than are states with institutions that espouse stronger opposition (i.e., weak presidential systems and coalition parliaments). In addition, we expect that dynamic political conditions that provide oppositions with more influence will decrease the probability of conflict. We explore these hypotheses and empirically test whether different types of domestic institutional structures and political conditions are significant predictors of behavior in conflict situations.
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INTRODUCTION
The empirical success of the democratic peace research program has motivated scholars to examine potential causal connections between the domestic political characteristics of states and crisis behavior. One particular line of scholarship focuses on the role of domestic political oppositions in crises. Schultz (2001) examined how the strategic interaction between governments, oppositions, and external adversaries could send credible signals of resolve during a crisis. However, Schultz’s model was predicated on the assumption that the opposition had no political resources and therefore no direct means to influence policy. Shea, Teo, and Levy (2011) found that by modifying this strong assumption, oppositions with political resources decreased the likelihood that a government would initiate a challenge.
In order to provide empirical support for the importance of strategic opposition in international crises, this paper examines how different types of domestic institutional structures and different dynamic political conditions are significant predictors of behavior in conflict situations. We expect that states with domestic institutions that hinder opposition groups (i.e., strong presidential systems and majority parliaments) will be more likely to initiate conflict than are states with institutions that espouse stronger opposition (i.e., weak presidential systems and coalition parliaments). Previous empirical examinations of specific institutional arrangements and conflict propensity have produced mixed results, although these studies focus more on the constraining characteristics of the institutions rather than on the informing-nature of a strategic opposition. We also expect that the dynamic political processes, such as elections, that affect opposition’s political capacity will be significant predictors of conflict initiation. While some institutions may provide oppositions with more opportunities in government, elections actually dictate the level of influence an opposition can yield. The following sections will examine the strategic opposition literature to justify our hypothesis that states with more capable oppositions will be less likely to initiate conflict. Then we will review previous empirical studies that examined how alternative domestic institutional structures and dynamic political conditions affect conflict behavior. Using data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions and the Correlates of War, we test our hypotheses using logistic regressions. We find mixed evidence that institutional structures affect conflict initiation, but do find that the dynamic political conditions that affect opposition capacity are significant predictors of conflict initiation. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for strategic opposition and international crises. STRATEGIC OPPOSITION Given the unique institutional structure of democracies and the electoral concerns of their leaders, scholars have theorized that democracies face more constraints in foreign policy decisions than their autocratic counterparts. Constraints are not necessarily a liability in international relations. Schelling (1980) argued that constraints help maintain the credibility of one’s threats or promises. Building on this, Fearon (1994) demonstrated that democratic leaders can create audience costs that allow credible threats to be made. Leaders create situations where they would be electorally punished if they deviate from a stated policy position, increasing the likelihood that the policy position will be followed. Schultz (1998, 2001) used audience costs as the foundation to model the signaling effects of oppositions during an international crisis. Working under the assumption that states in a crisis
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have incentives to conceal their capabilities and resolve, Schultz’s information model found that opposition behavior can send credible signals to adversarial states. The combination of the transparency of the democratic foreign policy process and the contradictory political interests of the ruling government and its opposition can create situations where opposition behavior sends credible signals regarding the government’s resolve to adversarial states. Schultz’s model provided clear and notable predictions that were well supported by his empirical tests. His information-based signaling approach appears to explain more than traditional institutional constrains models of democratic behavior. However, the model is based on a number of strong assumptions, such as providing oppositions with no political resources to prevent war or make the decision for war less attractive. Shea et al.’s (2011) model weakens this assumption, and provides oppositions with political resources to use, or threaten to use against the government to increase the costs of war. The opposition has incentives to prevent the government from initiating wars that it expects to be popular because the government can use war as a justification to implement policies that enhance the governing party’s power at the expense of the opposition. Therefore the capacity of the opposition to use its political resources, coupled with its incentives to prevent war, can lead to the opposition directly affecting the government’s value for war. Shea et al (2011) find that governments that face oppositions with political resources are less likely to issue challenges to adversarial states in comparison to Schultz’s model. One theoretical implication of Shea et al.’s model is that regime types that provide more political resources to oppositions will be less likely to initiate conflict. Ultimately, this is an empirical question. Previous empirical monadic comparisons between democracies and autocracies have not yielded robust differences in conflict propensity (Levy 1988; Prins and Sprecher 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004). This does not necessarily contradict the predictions from the strategic opposition models, given that some democracies provide oppositions with limited or no political resources, just as Schultz’s model is specified. Therefore, significant variance in conflict propensity may not be found between democracies and autocracies, but specifically within different types of democracies.1 The oppositions’ capacity to control political resources is a function of both variant institutional structures within a state and of the dynamic political processes, such as elections, that determine the opposition’s influence within a state. Institutional structures affect the ability of the opposition to directly influence policy. This can be accomplished by providing the opposition with effective veto power or the means to overcome the executive’s veto. In 1798 President Adams wanted a declaration of war against France in the Quasi-War crisis, but decided against submitting it to Congress because he anticipated a Republican opposition veto (DeConde 1966, 68). Institutional structures also affect the survival prospects of a ruling government. Institutional rules and specific political conditions may allow the opposition to defect from a ruling coalition, thus ending the government and forcing unwanted elections. In a presidential system, the opposition may have sufficient control to effectively remove the executive through an impeachment process. Finally institutional structure can affect the probability that the policy can be implemented without additional hindrances or costs added by the opposition. If the opposition has considerable influence
1 Weeks (2008) examination of audience costs provides a plausible explanation why we should not always expect democracies to be less likely to initiate conflict.
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over the fiscal mechanisms associated with foreign policy implementation or lead key bureaucracies and cabinet positions that carry out foreign policies, then the opposition is well-positioned to obstruct, delay, or prevent foreign policy orders from the government. In 1812, the Federalist opposition initially attempted to block a war against Britain, and when that effort failed, they successfully engaged in efforts to impede the mobilization of both men and money to support the war effort (Mabe and Levy 1999). Given varying institutional structures we identify four main categories for democratic regimes. Coalition parliaments are governments that are often too fragile for one group of political actors to impose its policy preferences without the consent of the other governing groups. Efforts to unilaterally implement policy could bring about the end of the government.2 This provides oppositions with more leverage over the governing process Weak presidential systems also provide opposition with political resources, given that, institutionally, the president relies on other institutional structures (i.e. parliaments, congresses) to ratify policies. Often in weak presidential systems, the legislative branches control the fiscal means to finance foreign policies. The legislative branch can also require procedural obligations such as reporting requirements or budgetary limitations. Conversely, majority parliamentary and strong presidential regimes provide comparatively less political resources to oppositions than coalition or weak presidential systems. Majority parliamentary systems grant more political security for the ruling government, limiting the influence on the opposition, and face fewer difficulties in formulating and implementing policies than coalition governments (Prins and Sprecher 1999). Strong presidential systems also provide little to no political resources to the opposition, as the executive branch of the government has nearly exclusive control over policy. Given the variation of opposition political resources in these different regimes, we expect each to exhibit varying degrees of conflict propensity. Specifically, we predict that coalition parliaments and weak presidential systems will be less likely to initiate conflict, while majority parliaments and strong presidential systems will be more likely. We also expect a variation of opposition influence across democratic regimes and within democratic regimes because of the political environment created by election results. Partisan and political processes, or what Clark and Nordstrom (2005) classified as the “dynamic” constraints, can influence behavior. Elections determine the partisan make up of the legislative and executive branches and by what margins. This creates large or slight majorities within governments, dictating how much compromise or negotiation is needed to enact policy. It can also create political mandates where political actors and groups claim the freedom to create policy based on perceived public support. These dynamic processes vary within a government more than the institutional structure. Additionally, the impact of these dynamic constraints on foreign policy decision-making varies by the tolerance of the executive branch for internal political conflict. Some executives are debilitated by an adversarial legislature, while others thrive on this political conflict. We expect that domestic political processes that provide more resources and influence to the opposition will decrease the probability that a state will initiate conflict. Specifically, we expect that
2 On decision-making in coalitional regimes see Hagan et al (2001).
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when the opposition does not control the legislative branch in a government, conflict initiation will be more likely. Similarly, as the number of opposition representatives increases in a government, the less likely a government will initiate conflict. The next section reviews previous scholarship that has examined how institutional structures and dynamic politics affect crisis behavior.
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS AND CONFLICT Previous studies have examined how variations within democracies can lead to varying foreign policy decision-making behavior (Prins and Sprecher 1999; Elman 2000; Ireland and Gartner 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; Clark and Nordstrom 2005; Schjolset 2008; Kisangani and Pickering 2009; Koch 2009). These studies are theoretically grounded in institutional constraints theory rather than a strategic opposition framework. Regardless, the empirical findings, and their theoretical justification provide some insight as to how institutional variations affect conflict propensity. The evidence that democracies do not fight each other is perhaps the most robust and consistent empirical finding in international relations. Despite the empirical robustness of the democratic peace, there is a lack of consensus as to the theoretical explanations for these findings and even the direction of the causal relationship (Rasler and Thompson 2005). Normative explanations contend that shared cultural ideals prevent wars between democracies. Institutional explanations argue that the constraining mechanisms of democratic institutions limit the foreign policy adventurism of democratic leaders. Both explanations have received some empirical support, although institutional explanations appear better suited for explaining variations of conflict initiation within different democracies (Prins and Sprecher 1999). The empirical robustness of the dyadic findings of the democratic peace program has not carried over to monadic studies. Scholars have found varied results that both support and contradict the assertion that democracies are less likely to engage in conflict and war (Small and Singer 1976; Chan 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Raknerud and Hegre 1997; Schjolset 2008). In order to rectify the contradicting dyadic and monadic findings, and to strengthen the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace, scholars have examined how variances across democratic regimes explain variances for conflict propensity. There are several ways in which democratic institutions have varying effects on the constraints of leaders. First, electoral accountability may constrain foreign policy decisions. Decision makers are electorally sensitive to the preferences of the general public or specific constituencies, and therefore will be less likely to pursue a potentially unpopular foreign policy.3 This electoral concern coupled with the presence of political opposition that is also sensitive to electoral demands, force decision-makers to be selective in their foreign policy choices.4 In addition, veto players within democratic
3 One implication of this is that if the population is more hawkish than the government, the government will be more likely to initiate conflict. For example, Arab populations are generally more hawkish toward Israel than are their governments. This is a complication that institutional constraint models fail to address properly. 4 There may be instances where decision-makers do pursue the electorally popular policy, but oppositions make efforts
to prevent that policy. If the popular policy were implemented successfully, it would provide the government with political benefits at the detriment of the opposition. See Shea et al. (2010) for more discussion on the motivations of opposition parties.
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systems limit the freedom of choice of the decision-makers (Tsebelis 2002). If leaders’ decisions are subject to the approval of other political actors, then the preferences of these actors must be respected, or leaders risk their policy being vetoed. Scholars have looked at the conflict propensity difference of parliamentary and presidential systems. There are two competing theoretical expectations for differences between parliamentary and presidential systems and foreign policy decision-making. On the one hand, presidential systems usually afford the executives with more flexibility in formulating and implementing foreign policies, and therefore should be more likely to initiate conflict. On the other hand, presidential systems are more fragile than parliamentary systems (Cheibub 2007).5 The tenuousness of this regime type could either force leaders to be more cautious in their decision-making and avoid unnecessary conflict initiation to mitigate regime upheaval, or provide the leaders the incentives to follow diversionary tactics that could lead to more conflict. Auerswald’s (2000) case study analysis found that presidential systems are more likely to initiate conflict than parliamentary systems. However, the limited number of cases he examined may not be the most appropriate test of his probabilistic argument.6 Quantitative analyses that examined the conflict propensity for parliamentary and presidential systems yielded mixed results at best (Schjolset 2008). Reiter and Tillman (2002) and Leblang and Chan (2003) found little to no supporting empirical evidence that one political system is more likely to initiate conflict. Examining the variation within parliaments produces even more varied results. Prins and Sprecher (1999) found that the number of seats controlled by the major opposition bloc in a parliament is not a significant predictor of conflict reciprocation. The authors did find evidence that coalition governments are more likely to respond to military aggression than single party governments. Ireland and Gartner’s (2001) study demonstrated that minority governments are less likely to initiate conflict than coalition or majority government. However, other studies found no significant differences in conflict propensity based on coalition characteristics (Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Reiter and Tillman 2002). Comparing an array of institutional structures, Schjolset’s (2008) analysis showed that majoritarian democracies are more likely to get involved in a conflict than proportional representative democracies and non-democracies. In this same study, the author found that presidential states are more likely to go to war than parliamentary and autocratic governments. However, much of this variance is explained by one case, the United States. Conditionally, American presidents are more likely to initiate conflict when the president’s party also controls Congress (Clark 2000). This is consistent with Howell and Pevehouse’s (2005) assertion that opposition to American military force is more likely to arise in Congress when the executive and legislative branches are controlled by two different parties.
5 Cheibub (2007) argues that presidential systems are not more fragile because of a deficiency in their institutional structure, but rather presidential systems are more likely to emerge in countries where there probability of regime instability is already high. 6 Auerswald (2000) provides in-depth analysis of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1990s Bosnian War. He also provides some treatment of the U.S. threats towards Syria and Iraq, British threats towards Indonesia and Argentia, and French threats towards Libya.
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In regards to diversionary theory, Kisangani and Pickering (2009) discovered that, contrary to their expectations, that majoritarian governments are more likely to engage in diversionary behavior when compared to presidential and coalitional governments. The authors explained that majoritarian governments enjoy “relative freedom of maneuver…in policymaking” allowing them to use diversionary force more than other democratic regimes (511). Our paper builds off of these previous studies, but instead of focusing on the institutional constraints of a regime, we are interested in how institutional structures affect the capacity of opposition groups. We argue that governments that provide oppositions with more political resources, and thus, more influence over the policy process will be less likely to initiate conflict than regimes that provide opposition with little or no political resources.7 Specifically, we expect that coalition parliaments and weak presidential systems to be less likely to initiate conflict because of the political resources these regimes provide oppositions. Conversely, we predict that strong presidential systems and majoritarian parliaments will be more likely to initiate conflict. Previous attempts at examining the relationship between dynamic political variables and conflict have produced more consistent results, although not in all cases. Clare (2010) finds that increases in ideological fractionalization can decrease the prevalence of conflict given the increased probability of the government dissolving. Parties that are ideologically farther from the rest of government faces higher electoral costs for compromising, and therefore have a credible threat to defect from the ruling government. Conversely, ideological homogeneity or cohesiveness gives members less motivation to defect from their coalition. Clark and Nordstrom’s (2005) study shows that dynamic variables, such as electoral participation and the number of parties in the ruling coalition, not only predict the likelihood of conflict initiation, but also explain the variance around these decisions. Clark (2000) and Howell and Pevehouse (2005) demonstrate that the U.S. propensity for conflict propensity is a function of party control of the presidency and congress. Conversely, Prins and Sprecher (1999) find no evidence the dynamic political process affect conflict reciprocation. Their analysis reveals that political fractionalization and the percentage of seats held by the opposition are not significant predictors, although the authors were examining conflict reciprocation, not initiation. The inconclusive empirical results discussed above do not necessarily temper our expectations. It is not surprising that parliamentary and presidential systems do not exhibit significantly different conflict behavior given that there are subcategories within each group with varying conflict behavior. We are confident that our alternative categorization of regimes will produce more conclusive results than previous works because our categorization is motivated by strategic oppositions rather than institutional constraints. In addition, we expect that dynamic political variables will be significant predictors in explaining conflict initiation, regardless of the evidence from studies that examined other dependent variables and data sets. RESEARCH DESIGN We have argued in the previous sections that different institutional structures and dynamic political conditions provide a varying amount of political resources to opposition groups within states. Well-resourced oppositions will be more likely to deter or prevent governments from initiating conflict,
7 Less likely to initiate conflict does not necessarily translate to less likely to be engaged in conflict (Levy 1988).
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even if the expected benefits from conflict initiation is relatively high. We expect that the institutional government structures that provide oppositions with more resources – coalition parliaments and weak presidential systems – will be less likely to initiate conflict than states with institutions that provide oppositions with little to no resources – majority parliaments and strong presidential systems. We also expect that the dynamic processes that affect opposition’s political capacity will be significant predictors. The make-up of government – who controls the different branches of government and by what margins – can impact conflict initiation decisions. If the same party controls both the executive and legislative branches, the opposition has less influence, and therefore, conflict initiation is more likely. Also, as the number of opposition members increases in a government, conflict initiation will be less likely. To investigate these hypotheses, this paper will analyze a sample of country-years from 1975 to 2001. We will use logistic regressions to estimate the coefficients and predict the likelihood of conflict initiation given varying institutional structures and dynamic political outcomes. We cluster the standard errors on each country, and use Carter and Signorino’s (2010) spline technique to account for temporal dependence. Dependent Variables The dependent variable for this analysis will rely on a dichotomous coding of a militarized interstate dispute (MID). We use Maoz (2005) Dyadic MID Dataset (v. 2.0) for the construction of this variable, with “1” representing a state initiating a conflict against a given state, and “0” otherwise. Independent Variables The coding of variant institutional structures draws on the Database of Political Institutions 2010 (DPI) from the World Bank (Keefer 2010). We code parliamentary systems as states that have legislatures that elect the executive and can easily remove or recall him. We make a further distinction between coalition parliamentary systems that enact proportional representative elections and marjoritarian parliaments who have winner-take-all, majority-plurality elections. DPI codes a country as a presidential system if the executive can veto the legislative branch. We make the distinction between weak and strong presidential systems using DPI’s checks and balances measure. States with a minimum number of checks against the executive (a value of one in the DPI data) is considered a strong presidency. If the government has a score of more than one check, it is considered a weak presidential system. In measuring the dynamics constraints within a government, we use the binary variable Same Party to discern when the executive and legislature are composed of the same political party. We expect that when this is the case, oppositions have less political resources, and therefore conflict initiation will be more likely to occur, ceteris paribus. We also use DPI’s measure of opposition capacity, derived using the Herfindahl method, summing the squared seat shares of all parties in the opposition. This value represents the opposition’s concentration within the government.
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Control Variables Capabilities are measured using the CINC data from the Correlates of War (COW) data set, and represents a state’s share of capabilities in comparison to all the other states in the system. To limit the disproportionate effects of outliers and to remain consistent with other studies (Oneal and Russett 2001, Gartzke 2007), we use the natural log of capabilities. We expect that states with more capabilities will be more likely to initiate conflict. The Neighbors variable counts the number of states that either share a land border with a given state or are separated by less 150 miles of water. We expect that states with more neighbors are more likely to engage in conflict, and therefore more likely to initiate conflict (Bremer 1992). Year of peace tallies the length of time since a state’s last conflict. We expect that the longer the time period from the last conflict, the less likely the state will initiate conflict. In other words, past conflict predicts the prevalence of future conflict. Following Carter and Signorino (2010) use the squared and cubed value of years of peace (coefficients not shown) to account for the temporal dependence in our models. Finally, states are coded “1” if they are considered a major power, as defined by the COW data (Ghosn, Palmer , and Bremer 2004). See Table 4 in the Appendix for the summary statistics for all variables. RESULTS Table 1 reports the results of our institutional models. Model 1 is a baseline model with only capabilities and years of peace having significant effects on conflict initiation. In Model 2, we include the presidential systems variables into the base model to isolate any effects that strong and weak presidential regimes may have on conflict initiation. As expected we find that weak presidential systems are less likely to initiate conflict. Strong presidential systems also have a negative coefficient, but it is not significant. Model 3 examines both coalition and majority parliaments, and finds that, contrary to our expectations, coalition parliaments are more likely to initiate conflict. Majority parliaments also have a positive coefficient, but it is not statistically significant. The results of this model, however, are not robust. The significance of the coalition parliament coefficient disappears when Israel is removed from the data set. The results from Table 1 provide minimal support for our hypothesis that institutional structures that provide political resources to oppositions will be less likely to initiate conflict. Model 3 results directly contradict our expectations, although these finding are reliant on Israel’s inclusion in the data. Model 2 does provide some support for our expectations, but again these results are not robust. When we include all institutional variables into the same model (Model 4 in Table 2) we find no significant relationship between institutional and conflict initiation.8
8 We also ran statistical analyses for a broader time period (1816-2001) using Schjolset’s (2008) data but also found inconclusive results.
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While not supportive of our theory, these results do not necessarily invalidate our theory. Opposition capacity is not only a function of the institutional structures in a state, but also the political dynamics that affect governance (Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Therefore, we expect that the dynamic political conditions that dictate domestic opposition capacity within the state will help predict conflict initiation. Model 5 in Table 2 includes two dynamic variables, and both are significant predictors of conflict initiation. If the executive and legislature are controlled by the same party, a state will be more likely to initiate conflict. This is consist with studies who have can executive-legislative control within the United States (Clark 2000, Howell and Pevehouse 2005) Also, as the opposition’s concentration within a government increases, the state will be less likely to initiate conflict, ceteris paribus. The results remain robust when we include the institutional variables in Model 6. To provide more meaningful interpretation of the dynamic political variables coefficients, we use predicted probabilities.9 When holding the continuous variables (capabilities, years of peace, and opposition) to their mean and the binary variables to their median, we find that a government that has both the executive and legislature controlled by the same party has a 25% chance of initiating a conflict in a given year. Compare this to 18% initiation rate of governments that do not have universal party control.
9 Predicted probabilities were generated from Model 6.
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Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of conflict initiation given varying amounts of opposition concentration, holding capabilities and years of peace to their mean, and all other variables to their medians. We see a steady decline in the probability of conflict initiation as the opposition concentration increases.
Figure 1- Predicted Probabilities of Opposition Concentration
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Thus far, our results provide evidence that dynamic political process, such as elections, affect conflict initiation propensity, while structural variables show mixed results at best. There are several explanations for these results. First, governments that have institutions that provide oppositions political resources may have more incentive to use conflict initiation as a mechanism to consolidate support, as described by diversionary theory (Levy 1989). States with institutional structures that provide oppositions more opportunities motivate the ruling government to use conflict as a means to bolster its internal political standing. Similarly, as the influence of oppositions increase, governments have more incentives to use conflict as a way to marginalize the opposition. Given an international crisis, the government can justify the implementation of policies that enhance the governing party’s power at the expense of the opposition, but given its political resources, the opposition will be more likely to prevent the initiation of conflict in the first place. The government’s incentives conflict with the opposition’s capacity to prevent conflict initiation, thus providing no clear theoretical prediction as to whether these regimes are more or less likely to initiate conflict. 10 Another explanation for the lack of institutional significance when explaining conflict initiation is the dyadic nature of international conflict. If our initial theory was correct, and states that provide oppositions political resources are less likely to initiate conflict, other states may recognize this as an opportunity to extract concessions from a conflict weary state. However, this increases the probability of conflict, and provides the conflict weary state incentives to initiate conflict in order to gain a strategic advantage. Therefore, the dyadic nature of conflict may muddle the monadic results of our model. These explanations suggest that structural variables may not be well-suited in predicting the direction of the relationship between institutions and conflict initiation, but may be well-suited to predict variance in conflict initiation. Fortunately, this can be modeled. We utilize a heteroskedastic probit model, which has been used in previous studies of institutions and conflict (Clark and Nordstrom 2005). The upper portion of Table 3 shows the estimates of the effects of our covariates on states’ mean conflict behavior. Consistent with the previous models above, the dynamic opposition variables are significant predictors of conflict initiation. The lower portion of Table 3 shows the coefficients and robust standard errors of the variables that affect the variance in conflict initiation decisions. We find that coalition parliaments increase the variance in initiating conflict while the other institutional variables are not significant.
10 See Levy and Mabe (2004) and Shea et al. (2011) on the incentives of the government to use conflict as a means to limit the political capacity of the opposition.
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CONCLUSION The results of this paper show that institutional structures have limited power in explaining conflict initiation, while dynamic opposition variables are significant predicators of conflict initiation. These latter results support the theory that oppositions with political resources will constrain the government, decreasing the probability that governments will initiate conflict. This study faced a number of limitations, but the most evident is the limited temporal scope of our analysis. Unfortunately, DPI data only extends back to 1975, and there is lack of alternative data that quantifies the role and capacity of oppositions. We hope that future research can increase our observational range and help unravel the relationship between strategic oppositions and international conflict. Despite this and other limitations, this paper does demonstrate the oppositional factors help predict conflict initiation in a more robust way than institutional patterns. Oppositions not only constrain ruling governments from initiating conflict, but can send credible signals to adversarial states. Given this, future research should focus more on the dynamic political processes involving opposition politics rather than static institutional structures.
References
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APPENDIX
Table 4 – Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean StD. Min Max
Initition 3578 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Strong President 3578 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Weak President 3578 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Coalition Parl 3578 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Majority Parl 3578 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Same Party 3578 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Opposition 3578 0.56 0.28 0.00 1.00
Capabilities 3578 -6.29 2.07 -11.51 -1.88
Major Power 3578 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
Neighbors 3578 6.05 3.25 0.00 17.00
Years Peace 3578 11.12 16.05 0.00 88.00
