EARLY RESPONSES TO HUME

Volume 3

Edited and Introduced byJames Fieser

University of Tennessee at Martin

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Early Responses to HumeEdited and Introduced by James FieserUniversity of Tennessee at Martin, USA

Volumes 1 and 2Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory and Essays

Volumes 3 and 4Early Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and EpistemologicalWritings

Volumes 5 and 6Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion

Volumes 7 and 8Early Responses to Hume’s History of England

Volumes 9 and 10Early Responses to Hume’s Life and ReputationBibliography of Early Responses to Hume, with Indexes

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EARLY RESPONSES TO HUME’SMETAPHYSICAL AND

EPISTEMOLOGICAL WRITINGS

Second Edition, Revised

I

Edited and Introduced by

James FieserUniversity of Tennessee at Martin

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Early Responses to Hume

© James Fieser, 2003, 2005, 2021

Digital Version 1.0

Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives

4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

This document is part of a larger 10-volume series, Early Responses to Hume, published by Thoemmes Press in 1999-2003, and again in a 2005 revised edition. The terms of the original contracts permitted me to release my own digital version of the series five years after the appearance of Thoemmes's printed volumes. My desire is to make these texts freely available on the internet for the benefit of Humeans everywhere. To that end, I have designated these digital works with the creative commons license Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives.

I thank Rudi Thoemmes and Philip de Bary for the opportunity to work on this series, and David Fate Norton and M.A. Stewart for their invaluable input throughout.

James FieserMay , 2021

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Contents v

CONTENTS

EARLY RESPONSES TO HUME’S METAPHYSICALAND EPISTEMOLOGICAL WRITINGS

VOLUME I

Editor’s Introduction xiii

1. Review of A Treatise of Human Nature, in The History ofthe Works of the Learned, November and December 1739,Vol. 2, pp. 353–390, 391–404.Complete review; presents summaries, excerpts, and criticalcomments from Book 1. 1

2. Review of A Treatise of Human Nature, in GöttingischeZeitungen von gelehrten Sachen, January 7, 1740, Nr. 2,pp. 9–12.Complete review newly translated from German by ManfredKuehn; summarizes and critiques Book 1. 41

3. Review of A Treatise of Human Nature, in Bibliothèqueraisonnée des ouvrages des savans de l’Europe, April–June,1740, Vol. 24–2, pp. 324–355.Complete review newly translated from French by David FateNorton and Mary J. Norton; summarizes Book 1 as derivedfrom Hume’s Abstract. 44

4. Review of A Treatise of Human Nature, in Nouvellebibliotheque, ou histoire litteraire des principaux ecrits qui sepublient, July, 1740, Vol. 6, pp. 291–316, September, 1740,Vol. 7, pp. 44–63.

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Complete review newly translated from French by David Fate Norton and Rebecca Pates; summarizes Book 1. 64

5. Letter to the editor in Common Sense: or the Englishman’s Journal, Saturday, July 5, 1740, pp. 1–2.Complete article; critiques Hume’s view of necessity in Treatises 2.3.1, and Hume’s view of the indivisibility of matter in Treatise 1.2. 85

6. [William Wishart (1692–1753)], “A Specimen” in A Letter From a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh. (1745).Complete pamphlet; presents allegedly incriminating excerpts from the Treatise, to which Hume responded. 92

7. Review of Philosophical Essays, in Göttingische Zeitungen vongelehrten Sachen, June 1749, No. 54, pp. 431–432.Complete review newly translated from German by Curtis Bowman; summarizes contents. 111

8. Review of Philosophical Essays, second edition, in Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, May 14, 1753, No. 60, pp. 540–544.Complete review newly translated from German by Curtis Bowman; summarizes contents, and critiques “Of Miracles.” 113

9. [Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1782)], Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751).Part 2, Essays 1, 2, and 4, complete; critiques Hume’s view of belief, personal identity and causality. 117

10. Thomas Melville (1726–1753), “Observations on Light andColours,” in Essays and Observations, Physical and Literary,Volume 2 (1756). Footnote, pp. 71–72; critiques Hume’s view of indivisible space. 135

11. John Leland (1691–1766), A View of the Principal Deistical Writers (1755–1758).Letter 16, complete; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 137

12. Richard Price (1723–1791), Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758).

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Chapter 5, selections, and Appendix C; critiques Hume’s analysis of induction and notion of perception. 151

13. Thomas Reid (1710–1796), An Inquiry into the Human Mind(1764).Chapter 1, Section 5–8, Chapter 2, Section 6, complete selections; critiques Hume’s views of perception and the self. 155

14. Thomas Reid (1710–1796), “Mr Humes notion of Causes,” AUL,MS.2131/6/III/3, fols. 1r–1v (c. 1764).Manuscript transcription; critiques Hume’s view of causality and necessity. 169

15. [Joseph Highmore (1692–1780)], Essays, Moral, Religious, andMiscellaneous (1766).“On Mr. Hume’s Idea of Liberty and Necessity,” complete essay; critiques Hume’s view of necessity. 172

16. [James Oswald (1703–1793)], Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion (1766).Selections from 2.3 and 3.2; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 174

17. [James Balfour (1705–1795)], Philosophical Essays (1768).Selections from Essay 1 (pp. 36–62) and Essay 2 (pp. 63–81); critiques “Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy” and “Of the Idea of Necessary Connection.” 185

18. James Beattie (1735–1803), Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770).Selections from Introduction, 1.2.3, 1.2.5, 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.3; critiques Hume’s views of personal identity, causality, scepticism, and necessity. 200

19. [James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714–1799)], Of the Origin and Progress of Language (1773–1794).Selection from 1.1.9; critiques Hume’s view of ideas and impressions. 242

20. [Gilbert Stuart (1742–1786)], reviews in Edinburgh Magazine and Review, January 1774, Vol. 1, pp. 141–150, August, Vol. 2, pp. 588–597.Selections; defends Hume’s principles of association. 246

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21. [Thomas Blacklock (1721–1791)], review of Priestley’s Examination (1774) in Edinburgh Magazine and ReviewDecember 1774, Vol. 3, pp. 33–37.Selections; critiques Hume‚s view of impressions. 249

22. Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), The Doctrine of PhilosophicalNecessity Illustrated (1777).Selections from Section 10; critiques Hume’s view that human conduct causally originates from God. 252

23. [James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714–1799)], AncientMetaphysics, or the Science of Universals. (1779–1799).Selections from 1.3.21, 1.5.6, 1.5.9, 2.2.2; critiques Hume’s views of necessity, the external world, causality, and ideas. 256

24. Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever (1780).Letters 13 and 14 complete; critiques Hume’s view of causality and the 12 sections of the Enquiry. 275

25. An Answer to David Hume, and Others, on the Subject of Liberty and Necessity (1785).Complete pamphlet; critiques Hume’s determinism. 290

26. Thomas Reid (1710–1796), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785).Selections from 1.1, 2.12, 2.14, 3.7, 4.4, 5.6, 6.5, 6.6, 7.4; critiques Hume’s sceptical views of ideas, external perception,memory, the principles of association, contingent truths, necessary truths, and reason. 310

27. Thomas Reid (1710–1796), Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788).Essay 1.4 and 4.9, selections; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 387

28. [George Gleig (1753–1840)], “Metaphysics,” in EncyclopædiaBritannica (1792).Selections; summarises and critiques Hume’s view of causal power. 394

29. James Gregory (1753–1821) Philosophical and Literary Essays(1792).

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Selections from sections 1–4, 6, 9; critiques Hume’s determinism. 404

30. Alexander Crombie (1762–1840), An Essay on PhilosophicalNecessity (1793).Selections from 2.13, and 3.1; defends Hume’s determinism against Reid and Gregory. 418

VOLUME II

31. [John Allen (1771–1843)], Illustrations of Mr. Hume’s EssayConcerning Liberty and Necessity (1795).Complete pamphlet; defends Hume’s view of necessity against Gregory. 1

32. Henry James Richter (1772–1857), “On Mr. Hume’s Account of the Origin of the Idea of Necessary Connection,” in MonthlyMagazine (1797). Complete article; critiques Hume’s view of the idea of causal power. 20

33. Anthony Florian Madinger Willich (d. 1804), Elements of theCritical Philosophy (1798).Selections from “Historical Introduction;” describes Hume’s impact on German philosophy and translates passage from Kant’s Prolegomena. 27

34. Thomas Cogan (1736–1818), A Treatise on the Passions(1800–1817).Notes F, I, N, and Q from Volume 1; critiques Hume’s view of good and evil, pride, humility, and grief. 36

35. Richard Kirwan (1733–1812), Remarks on Some Sceptical Positions in Hume’s Enquiry... and his Treatise (1801).Sections 1–4, complete; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 45

36. Archibald Arthur (1744–1797), Discourses on Theological andLiterary Subjects (1803).Discourse 1.2, complete; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 57

37. Thomas Brown (1778–1820), Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, second edition

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(1806). Complete book; defends Hume’s view of cause as invariable sequence, and criticizes Hume’s view of cause as founded on lively belief. 69

38. Thomas Cogan (1736–1818), Ethical Questions (1817).Speculation 6, Sections 1–8; critiques Hume’s Enquiry. 152

39. Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), Philosophical Essays (1810).Note EE, selections; critiques Hume’s view of venerating the past. 190

40. “David Hume Charged by Mr Coleridge with Plagiarism from St Thomas Aquinas,” in Blackwood’s Magazine, September 1818, Vol. 3, pp. 653–657.Selections from article; defends Hume against Coleridge. 195

41. Thomas Brown (1778–1820), Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1820).Selections from Lectures 34 and 35; critiques Hume’s principles of association. 200

42. Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy (1821).Part 2, Section 8, selections; describes Hume’s scepticism and place in philosophy. 207

43. [Mary Shepherd (1777–1847)], An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824).Complete book; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 230

44. George Tucker (1775–1861), An Essay on Cause and Effect(1850).Complete Book; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 309

45. James McCosh (1811–1894), The Scottish Philosophy (1875).Selections from Section 19; summarizes and criticizes TreatiseBooks 1 and 2. 334

46. J.A. Cain, “Hume’s Theory of Cause and Effect the Basis of his Skeptical Philosophy,” in American Catholic Quarterly, Vol. 10, 1885, pp. 616–634.Complete article; critiques Hume’s view of causality. 355

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47. William W. Carlile, “The Humist Doctrine of Causation,” in Philosophical Review, 1896, Vol. 5, pp. 113–134.Complete article; critiques Hume’s and Mill’s view of causality. 374

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1 For critical discussions of Book 3 of Hume’s Treatise and Hume’s EnquiryConcerning the Principles of Morals (1753), see Volume 1 of Early Responses toHume.

2 Early critical discussions of Section 10, “Of Miracles” and 11 “Of a ParticularProvidence and of a Future State” of the Enquiry are contained in Volumes 5 and 6of this series, Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion.

Editor’s Introduction to Volumes 3 and 4 xiii

INTRODUCTION

The philosophical subjects of metaphysics and epistemology would bemuch different than they are today if there had been no David Hume(1711–1776). Hume challenged traditional philosophical beliefs in waysthat shocked the readers of his day and have demanded the attention ofphilosophers ever since. Several classic philosophical problems are nowassociated with his name: the analysis of causality, the problem of per-sonal identity, and the problem of induction. Hume is also a permanentvoice in ongoing disputes about knowledge of the external world, freewill and determinism, and meaning and verification. The aspects ofHume’s metaphysical and epistemological theories that we find interest-ing today were largely the same issues that captivated Hume’s early crit-ics. The present two volumes include some of the most important earlycritical discussions of Hume’s metaphysical and epistemological writ-ings. Although most of Hume’s philosophy in some way touches onissues of metaphysics and epistemology, the selections here are largelyrestricted to portions of three of Hume’s writings: (1) Books 1 and 2 ofthe Treatise of Human Nature (1739);1 (2) Sections 1–9 and 12 ofHume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748);2 and (3) the“Dissertation on the Passions” (1757).

Hume’s Influences. In a 1737 letter, Hume wrote that readers of theTreatise would benefit by looking at writings by Nicolas Malebranche,George Berkeley, Pierre Bayle, and René Descartes:

I shall submit all my Performances to your Examination, & to makeyou enter into them more easily, I desire of you, if you have Leizure,to read once over le Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche, thePrinciples of Human Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the moremetaphysical Articles of Baile’s Dictionary; such as those of Zeno, &

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Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations wou’d also be useful, but I don’tknow if you will find it easily among your Acquaintances. TheseBooks will make you easily comprehend the metaphysical Parts of myReasoning. And as to the rest, they have so little Dependence on on[sic] all former Systems of Philosophy, that your natural Good Sensewill afford you Light enough to judge of their Force & Solidity.[Hume to Michael Ramsay, August 26, 1737]

Chronologically, the first philosopher on Hume’s list is René Descartes(1596–1650). In his Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641),Descartes combats sceptics who doubt the existence of the external worldand the reliability of our senses. To accomplish his task, Descartes himselfprovisionally plays the role of a sceptic and doubts everything that canpossibly be doubted. Descartes then arrives at one absolute truth – hisown existence – and uses this as a foundation for demonstrating allknowledge. Hume was probably influenced by Descartes’s provisionaldoubting process, as Hume himself doubted the sources of human knowl-edge. Throughout Hume’s philosophical writings, though, he also reactedagainst the more speculative metaphysical views that Descartes developed.

The remaining three philosophers listed in Hume’s letter –Malebranche, Bayle, and Berkeley – were controversial figures when theirwritings first appeared, and they share the conviction that the true natureof the world is not as evident as we ordinarily think. French Catholicphilosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) was a follower ofDescartes and is most remembered for his Search After Truth(1674–1675). Two themes stand out in that work, both of which influ-enced Hume. First, Malebranche wrestled with how our minds receiveperceptual images from external objects. For example, as I stand in frontof a tree, I have a visual image of that tree. How does the tree itself causethat image in my mind? For Malebranche, the tree is physical in nature,yet my perceptual image is spiritual in nature, and, so, something like amiracle must take place to convert the one to the other. After rejectingvarious theories of perception, Malebranche concludes that God possessesmental/spiritual images of all external things, and that he implants theseideas in our minds at the appropriate time – when I stand before the tree,for example. In short, according to Malebranche, we see external objectsby viewing their images as they reside in God. Hume did not adoptMalebranche’s theological solution to this problem, but perhaps Humelearned from Malebranche that there is a great gulf between externalobjects and our perceptions of them, and that it is exceedingly difficult toexplain the connection between the two.

The second major theme in Malebranche concerns the nature ofcausality, or, more specifically, how two events (such as the motion of a

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stick that strikes and moves a ball) are causally connected. Malebrancheargues that physical objects by themselves simply cannot be the cause ofmotion in other objects; only spirits can do that. So, when a stick strikesa ball, some spiritual force must intervene and actually cause the ball tomove. Malebranche concludes that God is the true cause of the ball’smotion, and that the movement of the stick is only the occasion, theoccasional cause, of the ball’s motion. Malebranche pushes this theoryfurther and argues that God is also the true cause behind human bodilymotion. For example, when I wilfully pick up a book, my will is only theoccasional cause, and God is the true cause. Again, Hume did not adoptMalebranche’s theological solution to the problem of causality, but itwas perhaps through Malebranche that Hume became aware of the dif-ficulty of explaining the nature of causal connections.

Although Malebranche raised questions about our knowledge ofexternal objects and causality, he was nevertheless optimistic about theability of our human reason to unravel these philosophical mysteries.However, influenced by the ancient Greek sceptical traditions, Frenchphilosopher Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) was much more pessimistic aboutour rational abilities. A philosophy and history professor, Bayle made alasting mark in philosophy with his monumental Historical and CriticalDictionary (Dictionaire historique et critique, 1692). The Dictionarycontains hundreds of articles on notable figures from ancient throughmodern times, and in lengthy footnotes to these articles Bayle presentshis own original and often radical views. In the letter cited above, Humementions “the more metaphysical Articles of Baile’s Dictionary” andcites two particular articles: Zeno of Elea and Spinoza.

Zeno (fl. c. 450 BCE) was a follower of Greek philosopher Parmenidesand, like his teacher, Zeno argued that our ordinary notions of theworld are illusions. Zeno presents a series of logical paradoxes thatshow the inherently contradictory nature of motion and space. Baylecomments extensively on Zeno’s paradoxes and suggests that space is composed of one of three possible things: mathematical points, indi-visible physical points, or infinitely divisible parts. Bayle sceptically con-cludes that all three of these views are absurd, and, so, no adequateexplanation of space is possible. Drawing on Bayle’s discussion, Humeconcludes with an almost equally sceptical assessment regarding ournotions of space and time. Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) – anothercontroversial modern philosopher – argued that God is the single substance of the entire universe. What appear to be individual objects,such as rocks and trees, are in fact only modifications of God’s single-substance. Bayle treats Spinoza contemptuously and argues that it iscounterintuitive to see all physical things as modifications of a singlesubstance. In the Treatise Hume extends Bayle’s critique further and

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argues that theologians are equally counterintuitive when they say, forexample, that my diverse mental images are really unified in my singlespirit-mind.

A third metaphysical article in Bayle that certainly had an impact on Hume is that on Pyrrho (c. 365–c. 275 BCE). Pyrrho was the founderof one of the Greek sceptical traditions, which survives principally in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (fl. c. 200 CE). In his article on Pyrrho,Bayle discusses the Pyrrhonian assault on both perceptual knowledgeand knowledge of self-evident truths. Bayle largely agrees with Pyrrhoand argues further that human reason collapses under the weight of its own inherent paradoxes. Ultimately, for Bayle, we must reject reason as a guide for truth and rely instead on religious faith. It is probablyfrom Bayle that Hume learned to use faith as a shield to protect himfrom accusations of atheism or any other negative consequence of scep-tical philosophy. In the same article Bayle discusses the common philo-sophical distinction between what Locke later dubbed primary and secondary qualities; Bayle argues that they are both ultimately spectator-dependent. This is a line of reasoning that Hume also offers.

The last philosopher that Hume mentions in the letter is AnglicanBishop George Berkeley (1685–1753), published two of his key workswhile in his tewnties, namely A Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas andPhilonous (1713). In both of these works Berkeley argues against theexistence of an external material world. For Berkeley, our experience ofexternal reality is nothing more than a continuing stream of perceptions,nor can we say anything intelligible about any physical substance thatsupposedly causes these perceptions. Berkeley concludes that we mustreject the theory of physical reality and instead recognise that Goddirectly feeds us perceptions of external things. Although rejectingBerkeley’s theological solution, Hume adopts Berkeley’s argumentsshowing our inability to access some external world behind our percep-tions. Berkeley also critically discusses the view that there is no reality toour individual minds beyond the stream of perceptions that we experi-ence. Berkeley rejects this view and instead argues that individual mindsdo exist; however, Hume seems to advance a similar problem, whiledenying Berkeley’s solution.

In addition to the writings of Descartes, Malebranche, Bayle, andBerkeley, there were undoubtedly other philosophers that directly influ-enced Hume’s metaphysical views. An avid admirer of the Romanphilosopher Cicero (106–43 BCE), Hume was familiar with Cicero’sAcademica, a dialogue on the nature and possibility of acquiring knowledge. Perhaps most importantly, Hume was influenced by AnEssay concerning Human Understanding (1690) of John Locke

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(1632–1704). In this work Locke argues that the root of all knowledgelies in experience; Hume shares this view with Locke.

Summary of Treatise Book 1. In his short autobiography, “My OwnLife,” Hume notes that he composed his Treatise in his mid-twentieswhile on retreat for three years in France. It is a long and complex bookthat systematically re-thinks a wide range of philosophical issues. Thefirst two books of the Treatise appeared simultaneously in 1739. We willbriefly look at some of the major themes in both books.

Book 1, titled “Of the Understanding,” opens analysing various cate-gories of mental events, which roughly follow this scheme:

perceptionsA. ideas

1. from memory2. from imagination

a. from fancyb. from understanding

(1) involving relations of ideas(2) involving matters of fact

B. impressions1. of sensation (external)2. of reflection (internal)

He first divides all mental perceptions between ideas (thoughts) andimpressions (sensations and feelings), and then makes two central claimsabout the relation between ideas and impressions. First, adopting what iscommonly called Hume’s copy thesis, he argues that all ideas are ultimate-ly copied from impressions. That is, for any idea we select, we can tracethe component parts of that idea to some external sensation or internalfeeling. This claim places Hume squarely in the empiricist tradition, andthroughout Book 1 he uses this principle as a test for determining the con-tent of an idea under consideration. Second, adopting what we may callHume’s liveliness thesis, he argues that ideas and impressions differ onlyin terms of liveliness. For example, my impression of a tree is simply morevivid than my idea of that tree. His early critics pointed out an importantimplication of the liveliness thesis, which Hume himself presumably hides.Most modern philosophers held that ideas reside in our spiritual minds,whereas impressions originate in our physical bodies. So, when Humeblurs the distinction between ideas and impressions, he is ultimately deny-ing the spiritual nature of ideas and instead grounding them in our physi-cal nature. In short, these critics argue that, for Hume, all of our mentaloperations – including our most rational ideas – are physical in nature.

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Hume next notes that there are several mental faculties that areresponsible for producing our various ideas. He initially divides ideasbetween those produced by the memory, and those produced by theimagination. The memory is a faculty that conjures up ideas based onexperiences as they happened. For example, the memory I have of mydrive to the store is a comparatively accurate copy of my previous senseimpressions of that experience. The imagination, by contrast, is a facul-ty that breaks apart and combines ideas, thus forming new ones. Heuses the familiar example of a golden mountain: this idea is a combina-tion of an idea of gold and an idea of a mountain. As our imaginationchops up and forms new ideas, it is directed by three principles of asso-ciation, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Forexample, by virtue of resemblance, the sketch of a person leads me toan idea of that actual person. The ideas of the imagination are furtherdivided between two categories. Some imaginative ideas representflights of the fancy, such as the idea of a golden mountain; other imagi-native ideas, though, represent solid reasoning, such as predicting thetrajectory of a thrown ball. The fanciful ideas are derived from the fac-ulty of the fancy, and are the source of fantasies, superstitions, and badphilosophy. By contrast, the good ideas are derived from the faculty ofthe understanding – or reason – and roughly involve either mathemati-cal demonstration or factual predictions. Hume notes that, when weimaginatively exercise our understanding, our minds are guided byseven philosophical or “reasoning” relations, which are divided as fol-lows:

Principles of reasoning concerning relations of ideas (yielding demon-stration): (1) resemblance, (2) contrariety, (3) degrees in quality, and(4) proportions in quantity or number

Principles of reasoning concerning matters of fact (yielding judgmentsof probability): (5) identity, (6) relations in time and place, and (7)causation

Armed with the above conceptual distinctions, he turns his attentionto an array of standard philosophical problems. As he examines themone by one, he repeatedly does three things. First, he sceptically arguesthat we are unable to gain complete knowledge of some importantphilosophical notion under consideration. Second, he shows more posi-tively how the understanding gives us a very limited idea of the notionunder consideration. Third, he explains how some erroneous views ofthat notion are grounded in the fancy, and he accordingly recommendsthat we reject those ideas. For convenience, we will follow this three-part scheme as we consider Hume’s discussions.

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Space. (1) On the topic of space, Hume argues that we have no ideasof infinitely divisible space (1.2.2.2). (2) When accounting for the ideawe do have of space, he argues that “the idea of space is convey’d to themind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does any thing ever appearextended, that is not either visible or tangible” (1.2.3.15). Further, heargues that these objects – which are either visible or tangible – are com-posed of finite atoms or corpuscles, which are themselves “endow’d withcolour and solidity.” These impressions are then “comprehended” orconceived by the imagination; it is from the structuring of these impres-sions that we obtain our idea of space. (3) In contrast to this idea ofspace, Hume argues that we frequently presume to have an idea of spacethat lacks visibility or solidity. He accounts for this erroneous notion interms of a mistaken association that people naturally make betweenvisual and tactile space (1.2.5.21).

Time. (1) Hume’s treatment of our idea of time is like his treatment ofthe idea of space. He first maintains that we have no idea of infinitelydivisible time (1.2.4.1). (2) He then notes Locke’s point that our mindsoperate at a range of speeds that are “fix’d by the original nature andconstitution of the mind, and beyond which no influence of externalobjects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought”(1.2.3.7). The idea of time, then, is not a simple idea derived from a sim-ple impression; instead, it is a copy of impressions as they are perceivedby the mind at its fixed speed (1.2.3.10). (3) In contrast to this accountof time, he argues that we frequently entertain a faulty notion of timethat does not involve change or succession. The psychological accountof this erroneous view is that we mistake time for the cause of succes-sion instead of seeing it as the effect (1.2.5.29).

Necessary connection between causes and effects. (1) Hume scepticallyargues that we cannot get an idea of necessary connection throughabstraction or by observing it through sensory experiences (1.3.14.12ff.). (2) The idea we have of necessary connection arises as follows: weexperience a constant conjunction of events A and B – that is, repeatedsense experiences where events resembling A are always followed byevents resembling B. This produces a habit such that upon any furtherappearance of A, we expect B to follow. This, in turn, produces an inter-nal feeling “to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant,”which is the impression from which the idea of necessary connection iscopied (1.3.14.20). (3) A common but mistaken notion on this topic isthat necessity resides within the objects themselves. He explains this mis-taken belief by the natural tendency we have to impute subjectively per-ceived qualities to objects (1.3.14.24).

External objects. (1) Hume’s sceptical claim here is that we have noconception of the existence of external objects (1.2.6.9). (2) Never-theless,

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he argues, we do have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in thecontinued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for. His explana-tion is lengthy, but involves the following features. Perceptions of objectsare disjointed and have no unity of themselves (1.4.2.29). In an effort toorganize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinc-tion between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is theso-called “vulgar” view of perception). We then conflate all ideas (of per-ceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (1.4.2.33); that is,we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes.Consequently, we naturally feign the continued and external existence ofthe objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (1.4.2.35). Lastly,we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force ofthe resemblance between ideas (1.4.2.36). Although this belief is philo-sophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account ofhow we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3) In contrastto the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt amore sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence – the so-called philo-sophical view – which distinguishes between perceptions and externalobjects that cause perceptions. The psychological motivation for acceptingthis view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions havea continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted.Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and con-tinuance to objects (1.4.2.52).

Personal identity. (1) Hume’s sceptical claim on this issue is that wehave no experience of a simple, individual impression that we can callthe self (1.4.6.2) – where the “self” is the totality of a person’s consciouslife. (2) Nevertheless, we do have an idea of personal identity that mustbe accounted for. He begins his explanation of this idea by noting thatour perceptions are fleeting, and he concludes from this that all we are isa bundle of different perceptions (1.4.6.4). Because of the associativeprinciples, though, the resemblance or causal connection within thechain of our perceptions gives rise to an idea of oneself, and memoryextends this idea past our immediate perceptions (1.4.6.18 ff.). (3) Acommon abuse of the notion of personal identity occurs when the ideaof a soul or unchanging substance is added to give us a stronger or moreunified concept of the self (1.4.6.6).

In all of these discussions, Hume performs an interesting balancing actbetween making sceptical attacks (step 1) and offering positive theories(step 2). In the conclusion to Book 1, though, he appears to elevate hisscepticism to a higher level and exposes the inherent contradictions ineven his best philosophical theories. He notes three such contradictions.One centres around what we call induction. Our judgments based onpast experience all contain elements of doubt; we are then impelled to

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make a judgment about that doubt, and – since this too is based on pastexperience – this in turn will produce a new doubt. Once again, though,we are impelled to make a judgment about this second doubt, and thecycle continues. He concludes that “no finite object can subsist under adecrease repeated in infinitum.” A second contradiction involves a con-flict between two theories of external perception – our natural inclina-tion to direct realism vs. the copy theory of perception of philosophers.The third contradiction involves a conflict between causal reasoning andbelief in the continued existence of matter. After listing these contradic-tions, Hume despairs over the failure of his metaphysical reasoning:

The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfectionsin human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that Iam ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon noopinion even as more probable or likely than another. [1.4.7.8]

He then subdues his despair by recognizing that nature forces him to set aside his philosophical speculations and return to the normalactivities of common life. He recognizes, though, that in time he will bedrawn back into philosophical speculation in order to attack supersti-tion and educate the world.

Summary of the Treatise Book 2. Book 2 of the Treatise is a study ofimpressions of reflection, in contrast with impressions of sensation.Locke had discussed ideas of reflection as “being such only as the mindgets by reflecting on its own operations within itself” (Essay 2.2.4). ForLocke, these are introspective experiences of our mental faculties such asremembering, willing, discerning, reasoning, and judging. Immediatelyparting company with Locke, reflective impressions for Hume are passions – that is, emotions – and not introspective experiences of ourmental faculties. Book 2 is largely a study of the various passions.

Hume opens Book 2 offering a taxonomy of types of passions, whichwe may outline here:

impressions of reflectionA. violent

1. direct (desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, fear)2. indirect (love, hate, pride, humility)

B. calm

Hume initially divides passions between the calm and the violent. He con-cedes that this distinction is somewhat fuzzy, but he explains that peoplecommonly distinguish between types of passions in terms of their degrees offorcefulness. Adding more precision to this common distinction, for Hume

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calm passions are emotional feelings of pleasure and pain associated withmoral and aesthetic judgments. For example, according to Hume, when Isee a person commit a horrible deed, I will experience a feeling of pain.When I view a good work of art, I will experience a feeling of pleasure.

In contrast to the calm passions, violent ones constitute the bulk of ouremotions, and calm passions divide between direct and indirect passions. For Hume, “direct passions” are so called because they ariseimmediately – without complex reflection on our part – whenever we seesomething good or bad. For example, if I consider an unpleasant thing,such as being burglarised, then I will feel the passion of aversion. The keydirect passions are desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, and fear. He suggeststhat sometimes these passions are sparked instinctively – as by, for exam-ple, my desire for food when I am hungry. Others, though, are not con-nected with instinct and are more the result of social conditioning. Thereis an interesting logic to the six direct passions, which Hume borrowedfrom a tradition that can be traced to ancient Greek Stoicism. We can dia-gram the relation between the six with this chart:

Good Object Evil ObjectIn Abstract: desire aversionPresent: joy griefAnticipated: hope fear

Compare, for example, the passions that I will experience regarding win-ning the lottery vs. having my house burglarized. Suppose that I considerthem purely in the abstract – or “consider’d simply” as Hume says(2.3.9.6). I will then desire to win the lottery and have an aversiontowards being burglarized. Suppose that both situations are actuallybefore me; I will then experience joy over winning the lottery and sorrowover being burglarized. Suppose, finally, that I know that at someunknown time in the future I will win the lottery and be burglarized. I willthen experience hope regarding the lottery and fear of being burglarized.

Hume devotes most of Book 2 to an analysis of the indirect passions,and this analysis is his unique contribution to theories of the passions. Thefour principal passions are love, hate, pride, and humility. These passions are called “indirect” since they are the secondary effects of a pre-vious feeling of pleasure and pain. Suppose, for example, that I paint apicture, which gives me a feeling of pleasure. Since I am the artist, I willthen experience an additional feeling of pride. Hume explains in greatdetail the psychological process that triggers indirect passions such aspride. Specifically, he notes that these passions arise from a double rela-tion between ideas and impressions, which we can illustrate here with thepassion of pride:

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(1) I have an initial idea of some possession (or “subject”), such as mypainting, and this idea gives me pleasure.

(2) Through the associative principle of resemblance, I then immediatelyassociate this feeling of pleasure with a resembling feeling of pride;this association constitutes the first relation in the double relation.

(3) This feeling of pride then causes me to have an idea of myself (as the“object” of pride).

(4) Through some associative principle such as causality, I then associatethe idea of myself with the idea of my painting (which is the “subject”of my pride); this association constitutes the second relation in thedouble relation.

According to Hume, the three other principal indirect passions arise inparallel ways. For example, if my painting is ugly and causes me pain,then I will experience the secondary passion of “humility” – perhaps moreaccurately expressed as humiliation. By contrast, if someone else paints apleasing picture, then this will trigger in me a feeling of “love” for thatartist – perhaps more accurately expressed as esteem, which is anotherterm that Hume uses. If the artist paints a painfully ugly picture, then thiswill trigger in me a feeling of “hatred” towards the artist – perhaps moreaccurately expressed as disesteem.

The most lasting contribution of Book 2 of the Treatise is Hume’s argu-ment that human actions must be prompted by passion, and never can bemotivated by reason. Thus, Hume concludes that “Reason is, and oughtonly to be, the slave of the passions” (2.3.3.4). Looking more closely at themotivations behind our actions, he the issue of liberty and necessity, and hecomes down strongly on the side of necessity. Hume’s discussion here fol-lows the three-step scheme that he used in Book 1. (1) He rejects thenotion of liberty that denies necessity and causes (2.3.1.18). (2) He thenargues that all mental or physical actions produced by the will arise fromantecedent motives, tempers, and circumstances (2.3.1.5 ff.). Making useof his definitions of causality, he argues that these motives produce actions(mental or physical) that have the same causal necessity that we observe inexternal objects. (3) Lastly, he explains why people commonly believe inan uncaused will (2.3.2.1 ff.). Among other causes of this mistaken belief isthe fact that people erroneously believe that they have an experience of lib-erty owing to a mistaken association: first, people have an idea of liberty(or lack of determination); next, when performing actions they experiencea “looseness” which resembles their idea of liberty.

Summary of the Enquiry, and the “Dissertation on the Passions.” In“My Own Life,” Hume states his opinion that the Treatise failed largelybecause of its style, rather than its content:

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I had always entertained a notion, that my want of success in publishingthe Treatise of Human Nature, had proceeded more from the mannerthan the matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion,in going to the press too early. I, therefore, cast the first part of thatwork anew in the Enquiry concerning Human Under-standing, whichwas published while I was at Turin.

Accordingly, Hume reworked some of the contents of Books 1 and 2 intohis Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding – although he includedmuch additional material that does not appear in the Treatise. Hume’sEnquiry was first published anonymously in 1748 under the titlePhilosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. The title pageascribes the work to “the author of the Essays moral and political;”Hume’s authorship, though, was no secret since the 1748 edition of theEssays includes his name. We do not know precisely when Hume beganthis book, although we know from a correspondence that he was workingon it in 1745. Prior to publication, he circulated a manuscript of the bookamong his friends for comments. A close friend Henry Home, later LordKames (1696–1782), tried to talk Hume out of publishing the workbecause of its sceptical content and the controversy that it would provoke.Hume ignored the advice and in a letter to Home wrote that he did notcare about the consequences:

The other work [soon to be published] is the Philosophical Essays [i.e.,the Enquiry], which you dissuaded me from printing. I won’t justify theprudence of this step, any other way than by expressing my indifferenceabout all the consequences that may follow. [Hume to Henry Home,February 9, 1748]

The style of the Enquiry is in fact quite different than that of the Treatise.It is much shorter, more informal, and does not aim to present a compre-hensive theory of human nature. Its original title – Philosophical EssaysConcerning Human Understanding – reflects its place within the 18th cen-tury genre of essay writing. That is, it is a collection of twelve looselyrelated philosophical essays. The underlying theme that ties the twelveessays together is the importance of experience and causal inference inestablishing our ideas. Briefly, these are the central themes of theEnquiry’s twelve sections.

1. Of the Different Species of Philosophy: Hume describes two styles ofphilosophical writing: an easy-reading philosophy grounded in commonlife, and a difficult-reading philosophy grounded in abstract concepts. Heexplains the value of both and proposes to mix elements of the two stylesin his Enquiry.

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2. Of the Origin of Ideas: Hume argues that ideas differ from impressions only by being less lively, and that all ideas are copied fromimpressions. He concisely states his test for meaning: to see if “a philo-sophical term is employed without any meaning ... we need but enquire,from what impression is that supposed idea derived?”

3. Of the Association of Ideas: Hume argues that the only three princi-ples of association of ideas are resemblance, contiguity, and cause andeffect. Unlike in the Treatise, which describes these as principles of theimagination, here Hume states more generally that they apply in the oper-ations of both the memory and imagination. All editions of the Enquiryexcept that of 1777 – containing Hume’s final revisions – include alengthy discussion of the use of associative principles in epic poetry writ-ing and history writing.

4. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding:Hume notes that the objects of the faculty of understanding (or reason)are either relations of ideas or matters of fact. He devotes this section touncovering the foundations of our reasoning concerning matters of fact.Such reasoning is based on cause and effect relations, which in turn arebased on experience, without the aid of reason or our imagination (that is,the fancy). This in turn raises the question of how we make inductive gen-eralizations in experience.

5. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts: Hume goes on to argue thatinductive generalizations in experience result from the principle of “custom or habit.” He next examines how belief arises. For Hume, beliefis a more vivid conception of an object than we would otherwise havethrough the imagination (that is, the fancy) alone. The ideas in which webelieve become more “intense and steady” through habit and custom. Heconcludes showing how the principles of association can intensify an ideaand thus produce belief.

6. Of Probability: Hume explains the difference between chances andprobability. Chances involve situations in which there are at least twopossible outcomes, each of which may occur equally. Probability, on theother hand, entails that we have experienced one event to occur more fre-quently than another. He then shows how belief arises with both chanceand probability.

7. Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion: Hume explains the origin ofour idea of causal power using his copy thesis. He first argues that necessary connection does not arise from an outward sense impression.Neither does it arise from an internal impression – from, that is, a“reflection on the operations of our own minds;” (Hume here followsLocke’s notion of reflective impressions rather than the notion found inthe Treatise). Specifically, it does not arise from reflecting on willed bodily motions encountering a resistive physical force, the willed creation

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of thoughts, or the experience of God as the true cause (as theOccasionalists claim). Ultimately, the idea of causal power is based onthe “customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual[i.e., constantly conjoined] attendant.” He concludes by offering two def-initions of causality based on his notion of causal power.

8. Of Liberty and Necessity: Hume defends the necessitarian point ofview by arguing that all human actions are caused by antecedent motives.He offers several illustrations of the connection between motives andactions that fit his two definitions of causality. He reconciles necessitywith liberty by defining liberty as “a power of acting or not acting,according to the determinations of the will” – which is similar to Locke’sdefinition. Hume notes the criticism that necessity undermines moralitysince it eliminates moral choice. In response he argues that we rely onnecessity to link a person’s actions with his motives and thus pass moraljudgment on that person’s actions. He also notes the criticism that neces-sity forces us to trace all evil human actions back through a causal chainto God. He suggests possible solutions to this problem, but concludesthat it is a mystery that human reason is not fit to handle.

9. Of the Reason of Animals: Hume argues that what he has saidabout cause and effect, induction, habit and belief is confirmed byobserving the same processes in animals. In a footnote he lists nine pointsthat distinguish degrees of human intelligence from animal intelligenceand that also distinguish the degrees of the reasoning ability of intelligenthumans and not-so-intelligent humans.

10. Of Miracles: Hume argues that empirical judgments – includingthose based on testimony – involve weighing evidence for and against agiven claim. According to Hume, the empirical testimony of uniformlaws of nature will always outweigh the testimony of any alleged miracle. Hume notes four factors that count against the credibility ofmost miracle testimonies: the witnesses lack integrity; we have a propen-sity to sensationalize; miracle testimonies abound in barbarous nations;and miracles support rival religious systems. However, he continues, eventhe most credible miracle testimonies (which presumably are not decisive-ly weakened by these four factors) are still outweighed by the evidence ofconsistent laws of nature. Although people typically see miracles as thefoundation of their religion, Hume argues that this is unreasonable. Hesuggests that Christianity in particular is better founded on faith, ratherthan on miracle testimony. Christianity indeed requires belief in miracles,but such belief should involve an act of faith and not reason.

11. Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State: Originally titled“Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion,” this section pre-sents a fictional conversation in which two characters examine some ofthe traditional philosophical arguments about the nature and existence of

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God. The sceptical character principally attacks the design argument andthe argument that God rewards or punishes human actions either in thislife or the next.

12. Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy: Hume describes differ-ent kinds of scepticism, defending some types and rejecting others. Heassociates Pyrrhonian scepticism with blanket attacks on all reasoningabout the external world, abstract reasoning about space and time, orcausal reasoning about matters of fact. He argues, though, that we mustreject such scepticism since “no durable good can ever result from it.”Instead, Hume recommends a more moderate or Academic scepticismthat tempers Pyrrhonism by, first, exercising caution and modesty, and,second, restricting our speculations to abstract reasoning and matters offact.

In 1757 Hume published a work titled Four Dissertations, the seconditem in which was titled “Of the Passions.” Hume later incorporated thispiece into his Essays and Treatises, and, paralleling the arrangement ofthe three Books of the Treatise, he placed it between the EnquiryConcerning Human Understanding and the Enquiry Concerning thePrinciples of Morals. This brief work – titled “Dissertation on thePassions” – is an abbreviated version of much of Book 2 of the Treatise,and many parts of it are taken word for word from that earlier work.

Overview of Early Responses. When Books 1 and 2 of the Treatiseappeared in 1739, little immediate interest was shown in it. Humereflects on this unfortunate fact in “My Own Life”: “Never literaryattempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It felldead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even toexcite a murmur among the zealots.” Indeed, it did not generate a flurryof critical responses by pamphleteers or offended clergymen. However,within a year of publication, four reviews of the Treatise did in factappear in scholarly review journals. All of the reviews were restricted tothe contents of Book 1 of the Treatise, with no discussion of Hume’s the-ory of the passions from Book 2. Only one of these – in The History ofthe Works of the Learned – was in English, and this was executed by areviewer who himself admits that he was not philosophically up to thetask of grasping a work as complex as the Treatise. The reviewer wasseverely critical and, among his comments, he argued that the causalproofs for God’s existence are “utterly demolished” by Hume’s rejectionof the principle that “whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of exis-tence.” The reviewer’s point is a recurring theme among Hume’s earlycritics, and even today some philosophers discuss the extent to which thecausal proofs for God’s existence are affected by Hume’s notion ofcausality. The short review from the German Göttingische Zeitungen

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was also critical. The French review journal Bibliothèque raisonnée pub-lished a generally positive review heavily dependent on Hume’s ownAbstract of the Treatise. The French review journal Nouvelle biblio-thèque published a neutral review that consisted mainly of a translationof passages from the Treatise.

Aside from review journals, the first early response to Hume’s meta-physical views was a brief article, in 1740, in Common Sense: or theEnglishman’s Journal. The anonymous author criticized Hume’s view ofnecessity for its dangerous implication that our behaviour is beyond ourcontrol. In 1745 Hume’s sceptical and antireligious views in the Treatisecame under fire when Hume became a candidate for the chair of moralphilosophy at the University of Edinburgh. A list of charges drawn up byWilliam Wishart was circulated. These were incorporated into Hume’sresponse and published as A Letter from a Gentleman by Henry Home in1745.

The Enquiry first appeared in 1748 and, in “My Own Life,” Humenotes that, like the Treatise, the Enquiry did not at first draw criticalattention:

But this piece was at first little more successful than the Treatise ofHuman Nature. On my return from Italy, I had the mortification tofind all England in a ferment, on account of Dr. Middleton’s FreeEnquiry, while my performance was entirely overlooked and neglected.

Not only were there no immediate critical responses to the Enquiry, butthe work does not appear to have even been reviewed in any Britishperiodical. The absence of such reviews is not surprising since there wereno scholarly review journals in Great Britain at the time, and more pop-ular periodicals only sporadically included reviews. Within two years,though, critical responses to “Of Miracles” appeared, and these soonbrought notoriety to the Enquiry as a whole. Although the Enquiry wasnot reviewed in Great Britain, it was in fact reviewed twice in theGerman Göttingische Zeitungen. The first of these reviews, whichappeared in 1749, was favourable, but a review appearing in 1753 wasmixed, with especially critical comments on “Of Miracles.”

In 1751 Hume wrote in a letter that he rejected the Treatise as animmature work:

I believe the philosophical Essays [i.e., the Enquiry] contain everything of Consequence relating to the Understanding, which you woudmeet with in the Treatise; & I give you my Advice against reading thelatter. By shortening & simplifying the Questions, I really render themmuch more complete. Addo dum minuo. The philosophical Principles

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are the same in both: But I was carry’d away by the Heat of Youth &Invention to publish too precipitately. So vast an Undertaking, plan’dbefore I was one and twenty, & compos’d before twenty five, mustnecessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, &a hundred times. [Hume to Gilbert Eliot, March or April 1751]

Contrary to Hume’s wishes, critical discussions of the Treatise contin-ued to appear with more frequency. One of these was in Essays on thePrinciples of Morality and Natural Religion (1751) by Henry Home.Although respecting Hume’s philosophical abilities, in this work Homecritically discusses Hume’s theory of belief and personal identity.

Around this time Hume became one of the secretaries of thePhilosophical Society of Edinburgh, first founded in 1731. He held thispost probably until 1763 and during that time was coeditor withAlexander Monro of two volumes of Essays and Observations that wereread at the Society’s meetings. The first volume appeared in 1754 andopened with an essay by Henry Home titled “Of the Laws of Motion”(pp. 1–69). The second item in the collection is a critical and somewhatabusive discussion of Home’s essay by John Stewart (d. 1766) titled“Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion, and the Inertia of Matter.” Inthis essay, Stewart includes a brief paragraph criticizing Hume’s view ofcausality and personal identity:

That something may begin to exist, or start into being without acause, hath indeed been advanced in a very ingenious and profoundsystem of the sceptical philosophy; but hath not yet been adopted byany of the societies for the improvement of knowledge. Such sublimeconceptions are far above the reach of an ordinary genius; and couldnot have entered into the head of the greatest physiologist on earth. The man who believes that a perception may subsist without apercipient mind or a perceiver, may well comprehend, that an actionmay be performed without an agent, or a thing produced without anyCause of the production. And the author of this new and wonderfuldoctrine informs the world, that, when he looked into his own mind,he could discover nothing but a series of fleeting perceptions; and thatfrom thence he concluded, that he himself was nothing but a bundle ofsuch perceptions. [Pages 70–140]

A note to this paragraph states, “Treatise on Human Nature, 3 vols. octa-vo. This is the system at large, a work suited only to the comprehension ofAdepts. An excellent compend or sum whereof, for the benefit of vulgarcapacities, we of this nation enjoy in the Philosophical Essays, and theEssays Moral and Political.”Prior to its publication, Hume read Stewart’s

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essay and was bothered by Stewart’s contemptuous tone towards bothHome and Hume himself. In a letter to Stewart, Hume suggests – andprobably bluffs – that as editor of the volume Hume could have equallyabused Stewart in the Preface to the work. However, Hume states “I amso great a Lover of Peace, that I am resolv’d to drop this Matter altogeth-er, & not to insert a Syllable in the Preface, which can have a Reference toyour Essay.” Hume continues in the letter objecting on philosophicalgrounds to Stewart’s distortion of Hume’s actual views:

But allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd a Propositionas that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only maintain’d, thatour Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition proceeded neitherfrom Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source. ThatCaesar existed, that there is such an Island as Sicily; for thesePropositions, I affirm, we have no demonstrative nor intuitive Proof.Woud you infer that I deny their Truth, or even their Certainty? There are many different kinds of Certainty; and some of them as satisfactory to the Mind, tho perhaps not so regular, as the demonstra-tive kind.

Where a man of Sense mistakes my Meaning, I own I am angry: But itis only at myself: For having exprest my Meaning so ill as to have givenOccasion to the Mistake.

In a tone similar to his letter to Elliot above, Hume next tells Stewart thathe regrets publishing his Treatise at all:

That you may see I wou’d no way scruple of owning my Mistakes inArgument, I shall acknowledge (what is infinitely more material) a verygreat Mistake in Conduct, viz my publishing at all the Treatise ofhuman Nature, a Book, which pretended to innovate in all the sub-limest Parts of Philosophy, & which I compos’d before I was five &twenty. Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book, &which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth, so much displeases me,that I have not Patience to review it. [Hume to John Stewart, c.February 1754]

Two years after the conflict with Stewart, the Philosophical Society pub-lished their second volume of Essays and Observations, which includedan essay by Thomas Melvill (1726–1753) titled “Observations on Lightand Colours,” which includes a criticism of Hume’s view of the indivisi-bility of extension. Around the same time John Leland criticized Hume’sview of causality in his A View of the Principal Deistical Writers(1755–1756).

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In 1757 Hume’s Four Dissertations appeared; this included his“Dissertation on the Passions.”3 Although none of the earlier reviews ofthe Treatise discussed Book 2, three reviews of Four Dissertations dis-cuss “Of the Passions.” Two of the reviews are not very enthusiastic.The Literary Magazine states “The second essay is on the passions, inwhich, as in the former case, we do not perceive any thing new. This weshould not mention if we were not talking of an author fond of novelty.”4 The Critical Review similarly concludes its discussion by say-ing, “This whole dissertation, to say the truth, appears to us very triteand superficial; and unworthy of so eminent a writer. But no authors arealways equal to themselves.”5 William Rose’s review in the MonthlyReview states more positively that what Hume “says upon the subject, isextremely ingenious, and deserves the philosophical reader’s attentiveperusal.”6

The publication of Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind(1764) marks a turning point in early discussions of Hume’s meta-physics. Although no less critical of Hume than earlier respondents,Reid nevertheless had deep respect for Hume’s philosophical abilitiesand saw him as “the greatest Metaphysician of the Age.” According toReid, Hume’s ruthlessly sceptical philosophy is the logical outcome of aphilosophical stance that began with Descartes, and which Reid calls the“theory of ideas.” According to this theory, we do not perceive externalthings directly, but instead we only experience perceptual images – or“ideas” – of external things. The sceptical consequence of this is that wemust question the existence of everything except these perceptual images– including external objects and even the human mind, which allegedlyhouses these perceptions. And, according to Reid, this is what Humedid. As Reid himself became an important philosophical figure through-out Europe and America, many writers perpetuated his interpretation ofHume. We find, for example, a condensed statement of Reid’s view inthe following by George L. Scott:

Locke had admitted matter, spirit, and ideas. By many passages, onewould be apt to thing that he saw no absurdity in material Spirit, or inspiritual Matter. Berkeley comes, sees the difficulty, and strikes out

3 The three reviews of Four Dissertations are reprinted in Early Responses to Hume’sWritings on Religion.

4 The Literary Magazine: or Universal Review, December 1757, Vol. 2, pp. 32–36.5 The Critical Review, February 1757, Vol. 3, pp. 97–107, 209–216.6 William Rose, The Monthly Review , February 1757, Vol. 16, pp. 122–139.

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matter. Then comes a Paresian Egoist, who strikes out all spirit, buthis own. And, lastly, our friend Hume, strikes out even his own spirit,and leaves nothing but Ideas! [George L. Scott to Lord Monboddo,April 3, 1773]

Aside from Reid, in the final two decades of Hume’s life, a variety ofother philosophers wrote in reaction to his metaphysical views. RichardPrice, in his Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals(1758) criticizes Hume’s discussion of induction in the Treatise. JosephHighmore published a brief essay against Hume’s view of necessity inhis Essays, Moral, Religious, and Miscellaneous (1766). Scottishphilosophers were particularly interested in responding to Hume. JamesBalfour’s Philosophical Essays (1768) criticizes Hume’s view of acade-mic scepticism and necessary connection. In his Appeal to CommonSense (1766–1772), James Oswald attacks a variety of sceptical andanti-religious themes within Hume’s writings. The most prominent criticof this period was James Beattie who devoted a large portion of hisEssay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770) to refuting manyof Hume’s philosophical views. In the first volume of his Origin andProgress of Language (1773) James Burnett, Lord Monboddo criticizedHume’s distinction between ideas and impressions.

Although Hume’s Enquiry was the most common target of attack bythese philosophers, some also pointed their guns at offending portions ofthe Treatise. Near the close of his life in 1775, Hume composed anadvertisement to the second half of his collected philosophical works,Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, in which he officiallydenounced his Treatise, and expressed his wish to be remembered on thebasis of his Essays and Treatises:

Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, werepublished in a work in three volumes, called A Treatise of HumanNature: A work which the Author had projected before he left College,and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it suc-cessful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, andhe cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligencesin his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, cor-rected. Yet several writers who have honoured the Author’s Philosophywith answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries against thatjuvenile work, which the author never acknowledged, and have affectedto triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtainedover it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing,and a strong instance of those polemical artifices which a bigotted zealthinks itself authorised to employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that

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the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philo-sophical sentiments and principles.

Hume offers here an inaccurate chronology as to when he projectedthe Treatise. Hume “left college” at around age 14, and, according tohis letter to Elliot, he began his work on the Treatise at age 21. Thechange in chronology is apparently in effort to distance himself fromthe Treatise into an increasingly remote past. Hume here refers to“several writers” who attacked the views found in the Treatise. Of theearly critics listed so far, Reid and Beattie come the closest to matchingHume’s description of writers who have directed “all their batteriesagainst that juvenile work.” In spite of Hume’s public disavowal,philosophers continued to challenge the views of the Treatise. In the firsttwo volumes of his Ancient Metaphysics (1779, 1782), Monboddo con-tinued his attack on Hume. Reid similarly developed his criticisms ofHume in his two great works, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man(1785) and Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). JosephPriestley, who throughout his voluminous writings regularly commentson Hume, had mixed views of Hume’s metaphysics. In his Letters to aPhilosophical Unbeliever (1780), Priestley attacked the Enquiry sec-tion by section, hoping to put Hume’s unjustified fame in proper per-spective. On the other hand, in his Doctrine of Philosophical NecessityIllustrated (1777), Priestley largely endorsed Hume’s view of necessityand in the preface to that work recommends to readers “some thingsvery well written on it by Mr. Hume, and Lord Kaims.” Priestley’sdefence of necessity was so successful that it overshadowed Hume’sview in the free will and determinism debate in the late 18th century.An exception to this, though, was James Gregory’s Philosophical andLiterary Essays (1792), which, in a 300 page introductory essay,attacks Hume’s account of necessity. In his Illustrations of Mr. Hume’sEssay Concerning Liberty and Necessity (1795), John Allen defendsHume against Gregory.

As the 19th century approached, philosophers narrowed their inter-est in Hume’s metaphysics largely to his notion of causality. We seethis in George Gleig’s article on “Metaphysics” in the third edition ofthe Encyclopædia Britannica (1797), Henry James Richter’s article“Hume’s View of Necessary Connection” in the Monthly Magazine(1797), and Richard Kirwan’s Remarks (1801). Two events aroundthis time drew further interest to Hume’s view of causality. The first isImmanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which by 1800 wasgaining notice in Great Britain. In the Critique and later in theProlegomena (1783), Kant describes his metaphysical system as anattempt to answer the problem that Hume raised about causality. This

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sparked immediate interest in Hume’s theory within Germany. Althoughit was some time before Kant’s writings were translated into English, afew primers on Kant appeared in English and these drew attention toKant’s intellectual debt to Hume. One of these was A.F.M. Willich’sElements of the Critical Philosophy (1798), which translates Kant’s dis-cussion of Hume in the Prolegomena.

The second event surrounding interest in Hume’s theory of causalitywas political in nature. In 1805, Scottish scientist John Leslie was a candi-date for the chair of Mathematics at the University of Edinburgh. Severallocal clergy who opposed Leslie’s appointment exploited the fact that heendorsed Hume’s view of causality, a view which they believed under-mined the causal proof for God’s existence.7 Two prominent Scottishphilosophers came to Leslie’s rescue and published works defendingHume’s view of causality. Dugald Stewart published a pamphlet titled AShort Statement of Some Important Facts, Relative to the Late Election ofa Mathematical Professor in the Univ. of Edinburgh (1805). In thisStewart lists respected scholars who adopted Hume’s view of causalityand notes that “I found that the passage [on causality] objected to con-tained nothing… but what I myself, and many others much wiser and bet-ter than me, had openly avowed as their opinions.”8 Thomas Brown alsopublished several pamphlets during the controversy, and compiled a two-volume collection titled Tracts, Historical and Philosophical... Respectingthe Election of Mr. Leslie to the Professorship of Mathematics (1806). Ayear later, Brown greatly expanded one of his pamphlets as Observationson the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume (1806).Brown’s work is an insightful and sophisticated early discussion ofHume’s view of causality, of great merit even by contemporary standards.Brown’s Humean view of causality was adopted by physician WilliamLawrence in his Lectures on physiology (1817).

Amidst the dominant focus on his view of causality, occasional discus-sions of other topics in Hume appeared. Thomas Cogan, in his Treatiseon the Passions (1807), criticized different aspects of Hume’s theory of

7 For details on the Leslie controversy, see the selection by Henry Cockburn in EarlyResponses to Hume’s Life and Reputation. Ironically, the resistance came from themoderate clergy, who advocated natural theology and proofs for God’s existence.The evangelical clergy, by contrast, believed that Hume’s sceptical views oncausality underscored the need for faith.

8 Stewart was mainly concerned with assisting Leslie; his own view of causality wasnot particularly Humean, and neither were the views of the other philosophers thathe mentions. Similar to the theories of Clarke and Berkeley, Stewart held that activeagents are minds, and the agency that we commonly see in nature is only constantconjunction in accordance with the laws of a divine lawgiver. Brown’s view ofcausality is more truly Humean.

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the passions. Cogan also published a section-by-section critical commen-tary of Hume’s Enquiry in his Ethical Questions (1817). Dugald Stewartdiscussed Hume’s account of why we venerate the past in PhilosophicalEssays (1810) and Hume’s scepticism in Dissertation on the Progress ofPhilosophy (1821). In Biographia Literaria (1817), Samuel TaylorColeridge drew attention to the similarities between the views ofAquinas and Hume on the association of ideas, and thereby sparked adiscussion in Blackwood’s Magazine (1818). Thomas Brown also dis-cussed Hume’s principles of association in Lectures on the Philosophy ofthe Human Mind (1820).

By the middle of the 19th century, two short books devoted toHume’s theory of causality had appeared, namely, Mary Shepherd’sEssay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824) and GeorgeTucker’s Essay on Cause and Effect (1850). Although both of theseworks are critical of Hume’s theory, the Humean view of causalitybecame more widely adopted in other metaphysical discussions ofcausality. For example, although Mill does not mention Hume by name,he nevertheless clearly espouses a Humean conception of causality in hisExamination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy:

And how, or by what evidence does experience testify to it [the causa-tion hypothesis]? Not by disclosing any nexus between the cause andeffect, any sufficient reason in the cause itself why the effect shouldfollow it. No philosopher now makes this supposition, and Sir W.Hamilton positively disclaims it. What experience makes known is thefact of an invariable sequence between every event and some specialcombination of antecedent conditions, in such sort that wherever andwhenever that union of antecedents exists the event does not fail tooccur. [Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, 26]

The Humean view of causality received an additional boost fromAuguste Comte (1798-1857) in his six-volume Cours de philosophiepositive (The Positive Philosophy) (1830–1842). At the outset of thatwork, Comte acknowledges Hume as one of his precursors. In an 1868discussion of Comte’s work, the Edinburgh Review explains more pre-cisely how Hume fully anticipated Comte’s positivism:

This is the method of Positive inquiry now universally recognised inevery department of science, although as yet imperfectly carried out insome. It was formally announced by Bacon, and is commonly associ-ated with his name, although in truth it was but imperfectly under-stood and applied by that great teacher of Method. It received definiteimpulse from the speculations of Hume, who, carrying to their legiti-

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mate conclusions the philosophy of his day, showed that we could getnothing from nature, or sense-experience, but ideas of coexistence anda succession; or, in other words, of facts, and the sequences whichconnect them; and who attempted to prove that this was equally trueof the world of mind as of matter. From the one realm as well as theother he cast out all ideas of substance and cause, and left nothing butphenomena and their relations of association. Hume is, therefore, theprincipal precursor of Comte, as he himself acknowledges. He antici-pated to the full the fundamental principle of the Comtean philoso-phy. He did more than this. For he saw clearly the use that could bemade of it polemically; the sceptical or negative bearings of the princi-ple are equally to be found in his writings. So far, therefore, there isnothing original in Positivism. The Scottish sceptic had already antici-pated the nature of its attacks against theological philosophy.[Edinburgh Review, April 1868, Vol. 127, p. 322]

As history of philosophy survey books appeared in the second half ofthe 19th century, Hume found a place in the development of meta-physics, typically standing between the great figures of Berkeley andKant. An example of this is George Henry Lewes’s Biographical Historyof Philosophy (1873), which devotes a lengthy chapter to Hume.Discussions of Hume also appeared in more specialized histories of philosophy, such as James McCosh’s The Scottish Philosophy (1875)and Leslie Stephen’s History of English Thought in the EighteenthCentury (1876).

Towards the end of the 19th century, academic writings in the historyof philosophy became more “scholarly” in the sense that we understandthat term today. T.H. Green wrote a detailed, 400-page study of Hume’sTreatise, which was published as an introduction to the edition ofHume’s Works (1874), edited by Green and Thomas Grose. Shortlyafter, three introductory books on Hume’s philosophy appeared thatcontained chapters on Hume’s metaphysics, namely, Thomas Huxley’sHume (1879), William Knight’s Hume (1886), and Henry Calderwood’sDavid Hume (1898). As academic philosophy journals emerged, scholarly articles on Hume appeared, such as those by J.A. Cain (1885)and William W. Carlile (1896).

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Editorial Conventions and Acknowledgments: In prepairing theseselections, spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Someoriginal printers’ conventions have been altered; for example, footnotereferences follow punctuation marks, rather than precede them. Unlessnoted otherwise, comments contained in square brackets are mine. Theauthorship of anonymous reviews in the Monthly Review is based onBenjamin Christie Nangle’s The Monthly Review First Series 1749–1789(1934) and The Monthly Review Second Series 1790–1815 (1955).Authorship of anonymous articles in nineteenth-century journals isbased on The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824–1900(1966–89), edited by Walter E. Houghton. I thank David Fate Nortonand M.A. Stewart for input on this collection.

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[Chapter title] 1

1THE HISTORY OF THE WORKS

OF THE LEARNED

Review of Treatise, Book 1, in The history of the works of the learned,November and December 1739, Vol. 2, pp. 353–404.Complete review.

The Review of Hume’s Treatise in the History of the Works of theLearned is the first published discussion of the Treatise. It appeared

anonymously in two instalments during 1739, and covers only Book 1of the Treatise, in spite of the reviewer’s hint that Volume 2 might alsobe reviewed at a later time. The journal, edited by Jacob Robinson, waspublished for a total of 15 years (1728–1743) under various titles, andat the time it was the only English journal devoted exclusively to review-ing scholarly books. The title of the journal was taken from an earliereighteenth-century journal that survived only briefly. The author of thereview of the Treatise is unknown. Mossner attributes it to British clergyman and later Bishop of Gloucester, William Warburton (1698–1779), principally because of the review’s heavy irony, which resemblesWarburton’s style in some of his polemical pieces. The evidence for thisattribution, though, is fairly weak in view of the fact that ridicule was acommon literary technique at the time. Nevertheless, the reviewer doesindeed treat his subject with irony and contempt. He speaks of “thisextraordinary Philosopher,” “the Author’s Sagacity,” “the Genius of myAuthor,” “our Author’s superlative Modesty,” “the mighty Value of theDiscovery,” “a most wonderful Doctrine,” “this incomparable Arguer,”“A most charming System indeed,” “this fine Train of Argument,” andat one point concedes that “these are too dazzling for my weak Sight.”

In general, the author of the review has nothing favourable to sayabout the Treatise and he attacks it for its hasty conclusions, unortho-dox views, and inconsistencies. Finding Hume’s arguments strained, thereviewer acknowledges that he “cannot understand them enough to pro-nounce dogmatically.” In his review of Part 1, he contends that Hume’sentire system is founded on determinism and he attacks Hume’s writingstyle for its overabundance of personal pronouns, or “egoisms.” Humetoo briefly defends his main claim that all ideas are derived from impres-sions, and, according to the reviewer, people who first read Locke will

1

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2 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

be disgusted with Hume’s inferior treatment of those topics. Touchingon some of the issues in Part 2, the reviewer rejects Hume’s views ofspace and extension.

Regarding Part 3 and Hume’s discussion of causality, the reviewerobjects that the causal proofs of God are “utterly demolished” byHume’s discussion of the necessity of causes. He attacks Hume’s firstdefinition of causality as being “unintelligible to any but Men of ourAuthor’s Ability.” Regarding Part 4 on scepticism, he argues that Lockeand Butler resolve all Hume’s difficulties, and he is surprised at the num-ber of paradoxes that Hume introduces. He sees the problem of the selfas the basis of Hume’s attack on the soul’s immateriality. In response toHume’s concluding sceptical despair, he sarcastically comments, “WhatHeart now would not almost bleed?” The review’s final three sentencesgive qualified praise of Hume’s youthful work and are inconsistent withwhat precedes it; this inconsistency is behind a common view in Humescholarship that the concluding sentences were added by another author,perhaps by the editor of the journal. The index to volume 2 of the jour-nal contains several entries to the review; for example, “Identity, thePrinciple very oddly explained.”

Hume read this review of the Treatise shortly after it appeared, and, ina letter to Francis Hutcheson, he describes it as “somewhat abusive”:

I have got it [i.e., Hume’s Abstract of the Treatise] printed in London;but not in the Works of the Learned; there having been an Articlewith regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work,before I sent up the Abstract. [Hume to Francis Hutcheson, March 4,1740]

When Hume’s short autobiography appeared in 1777, two writers com-mented on the demeaning tone of the review of the Treatise. One writer– probably William Kenrick – alleges that Hume was so upset by thereview that he threatened the editor Jacob Robinson at sword’s point:

[the review] so highly provoked our young philosopher, that he flew ina violent rage, to demand satisfaction of Jacob Robinson, the publish-er; whom he kept during the paroxysm of his anger, at his sword’spoint, trembling behind the counter lest a period should be put to thelife of a sober critic by a raving philosopher.1

1 Review of The Life of David Hume, in The London Review, March 1777, Vol. 5,pp. 198–205. The review appeared with the initial “W.” indicating its authorship,which is usually believed to be the Journal’s editor, William Kenrick.

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The History of the Works of the Learned 3

This story is countered by the second writer:

We remember however, that it [i.e., the Treatise] was distinguished bythe Reviewers of that time, though not in a manner suitable to theexpectations or wishes of the Author. It was treated with some degreeof contempt by the Writer of the History of the Works of the Learned,vol. ii. for the year 1739; who, nevertheless, prognosticated betterthings, from the maturer age of the [then young] author. There is apleasant story of David’s paying a visit to the Critic, and threateningto put him to the sword; but as we cannot duly authenticate the par-ticulars, we do not chuse to repeat them.2

Early Hume biographer Thomas Ritchie also questioned the reliabilityof Kenrick’s story. According to Ritchie, “Kenrick’s Review [i.e., theLondon Review] was held to be rather an illiberal production, and notover-nice as to the correctness of its assertions. It is now impossible toascertain, whether this anecdote be true or false.”3 However, FrancisPalgrave believed the story and in fact criticized Hume for not mention-ing his joust with Jacob Robinson in his autobiography.4 Eventually,though, the issue was laid to rest by John Hill Burton in 1846. Burtonpointed out that “Hume was in Scotland at the time when the criticismon his work was published: he did not visit London for some years after-wards.”5

The complete review is presented below for the first time since its orig-inal appearance.

ARTICLE XXVI

A Treatise of HUMAN NATURE: Being an Attempt to introduce theexperimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. London:Printed for John-Noon, at the White Hart, near Mercers-Chapel,Cheapside, 1739. Vol. II. Octavo. Pages 475–318.

2 Ralph Griffiths, in the review of The Life of David Hume, in Monthly Review,March 1777, Vol. 56, pp. 206–213.

3 Thomas Ritchie, An Account of the Life and Writings of David Hume, Esq.,(London, T. Cadell, 1807), p. 29.

4 See, for example, Francis Palgrave, “Hume and his Influence upon History,” inQuarterly Review, 1844, Vol. 73 , pp. 536–592.

5 John Hill Burton, The Life and Correspondence of David Hume, (Edinburgh,William Tait, 1846), Vol. 1, p. 111.

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4 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

I do not recollect any Writer in the English Language who has framed aSystem of human Nature, morally considered, upon the Principle of thisAuthor, which is that of Necessity, in Opposition to Liberty or Freedom.The Truth of the Principle itself has been often and very carefully dis-cussed. Some have endeavoured to prove even the Impossibility ofLiberty, while others have asserted it to be an essential Property ofhuman Nature, the Basis of all Morality, Religion and Happiness, whichcan subsist upon no other Foundation, and are utterly subverted by theDenial of it. To form the clearest Ideas we can have upon this abstruseSubject, we should read some Letters that passed thereupon betweenthose two acute Reasoners, Mr. Locke and Mr. Limborch, and theincomparable Dr. Clarke’s Answers to several Pieces of Leibnitz andCollins.

Our Author has sufficiently (he says) explained the Design of thisWork of his in the Introduction. Perhaps he expects we should under-stand it by the following Passages.

“It is evident, that all the Sciences have Relation, greater or less, tohuman Nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to runfrom it, they still return back by one Passage or another. EvenMathematicks, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in somemeasure dependent on the Science of MAN; since they lie under theCognizance of Men, and are judged of by their Powers and Faculties.It is impossible to tell what Changes and Improvements we mightmake in these Sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with theExtent and Force of human Understanding, and could explain theNature of the Ideas we employ, and of the Operations we perform inour Reasonings. And these Improvements are the more to be hopedfor in natural Religion, as it is not content with instructing us in theNature of superior Powers, but carries its Views farther, to theirDisposition towards us, and our Duties towards them, and conse-quently we ourselves are not only the Beings that reason, but also oneof the Objects concerning which we reason.

If therefore the Sciences of Mathematicks, Natural Philosophy, andNatural Religion, have such a Dependence on the Knowledge of Man,what may be expected in the other Sciences, whose Connexion withhuman Nature is more close and intimate? The sole End of Logick isto explain the Principles and Operations of our reasoning Faculty, andthe Nature of our Ideas: Morals and Criticism regard our Tastes andSentiments; and Politicks consider Men as united in Society, anddependent on each other. In these four Sciences of Logick, Morals,Criticism and Politicks, is comprehended almost every thing which itcan any way import us to be acquainted with. –

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The History of the Works of the Learned 5

Here then is the only Expedient from which we can hope forSuccess in our philosophical Researches, to leave the tedious lingeringMethod which we have hitherto followed; and instead of taking nowand then a Castle or Village on the Frontier, to march directly to theCapital or Center of these Sciences, to human Nature itself; whichbeing once Masters of, we may every where else hope for an easyVictory. – There is no Question of Importance, whose Decision is notcomprized in the Science of Man; and there is none which can bedecided with any Certainty, before we become acquainted with thatScience. In pretending therefore to explain the Principles of humanNature, we in effect propose a compleat System of the Sciences, builton a Foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon whichthey can stand with any Security.

And as the Science of Man is the only solid Foundation for theother Sciences, so the only solid Foundation we can give to thisScience itself, must be laid on Experience and Observation. – For itseems evident, that the Essence of the Mind being equally unknown tous with that of external Bodies, it must be equally impossible to formany Notions of its Powers and Qualities, otherwise than from carefuland exact Experiments, and the Observation of those particularEffects which result from its different Circumstances and Situations. –

Moral Philosophy has indeed this peculiar Disadvantage, which isnot found in natural; that, in collecting its Experiments, it cannotmake them purposely, with Premeditation, and after such a manner,as to satisfy itself concerning every particular Difficulty which mayarise. When we are at a loss to know the Effects of one Body uponanother, we need only put them in that Situation, and observe whatresults from it. But should we endeavour to clear up after the samemanner any Doubt in moral Philosophy, by placing ourselves in thesame Case with that which we consider, it is evident this Reflectionand Premeditation would so disturb the Operation of our naturalPrinciples, as must render it impossible to form any just Conclusionfrom the Phœnomenon. We must therefore glean up our Experimentsin this Science from a cautious Observation of human Life, and takethem as they appear in the common Course of the World, by MensBehaviour in Company, in Affairs, and in their Pleasures. WhereExperiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, wemay hope to establish on them a Science, which will not be inferior inCertainty, and will be much superior in Utility, to any other of humanComprehension.”6

6 [Treatise, 1, Introduction.]

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6 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

Here the Reader has all that I can find in the Introduction to thisWork, which can in the least give him any Idea of the Design of it: Howfar he will be thereby instructed in it, must be left to his own Judgment:I go on to set before him the several Topicks therein treated of. TheUnderstanding is the Subject of the first Book, or Volume, which is bymuch the largest. In the second Book, or Volume, the Passions are con-sidered. The former of these Books is divided into four Parts. In the first,the Doctrine of Ideas is delivered; accounting for their Origin, anddescribing their Composition, Connexion and Abstraction. I shall offer ashort Hint of what he has said upon these different Heads.

To trace the Origin of our Ideas, he resolves all the Perceptions of thehuman Mind into two Kinds, which may be called Impressions andIdeas,7 He makes the Difference betwixt these to consist in the Degreesof Force and Liveliness, with which they strike the perceiving Faculty.Those that enter with the most Violence, he calls Impressions; and underthis Name he comprehends all our Sensations, Passions and Emotions,as they make their first Appearance in the Soul. By Ideas, he means thefaint Images of these in Thinking and Reasoning. – There is anotherDivision of our Perceptions whereof he takes notice, and which extendsitself both to our Impressions and Ideas: This is into simple and com-plex.

Having by these Divisions given an Order and Arrangement to hisObjects, (that is, I suppose, Ideas) we may now, he says, with the moreAccuracy consider their Qualities and Relations. The first Circumstancethat strikes his Eye,8 is the great Resemblance betwixt our Impressionsand Ideas in every Particular, except their Degree of Force and Vivacity.When he shuts his Eyes and thinks of his Chamber, the Ideas he formsare exact Representations (he tells us) of the Impressions he felt. I fancymost other People have made the same Observation. However, thisCircumstance seems to our Author remarkable, and engages hisAttention for a Moment.

Having finished his Meditations on this Point, and discovered thisRelation between Impressions and Ideas, which, he says, requires no far-ther Examination, he is curious to find some other of their Qualities. Heproceeds therefore to consider how they stand with regard to theirExistence, and which of the Impressions and Ideas are Causes, and

7 Our Author tells us, he makes use of these Terms in a Sense different from what isusual, and he hopes this Liberty will be allowed him. He thinks he rather restoresthe Word Ideas to its original Sense, from which Mr. Locke had (as he is pleased tosay) perverted it, in making it stand for all our Perceptions.

8 This Work abounds throughout with Egotisms. The Author would scarcely use thatForm of Speech more frequently, if he had written his own Memoirs.

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The History of the Works of the Learned 7

which Effects. The full Examination of this Question is, he tells us, theSubject of this Performance of his; and therefore he here contents him-self with establishing this one general Proposition, That all our simpleIdeas in their first Appearance are derived from simple Impressions,which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.When he has fixed this Assertion beyond Contradiction, he reflects onwhat he has done with great Satisfaction; saying,

“This then is the first Principle I establish in the Science of humanNature, nor ought we to despise it because of the Simplicity of itsAppearance. For it is remarkable, that the present Question is thesame with what has made so much Noise in the Terms, when it hasbeen disputed whether there be any innate Ideas, or whether all Ideasbe derived from Sensation and Reflexion. We may observe, that inorder to prove the Ideas of Extension and Colour not to be innate,Philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by ourSenses. To prove the Ideas of Passion and Desire not to be innate,they observe that we have a preceding Experience of these Emotionsin ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these Arguments, we shallfind that they prove nothing, but that Ideas are preceded by othermore lively Perceptions from which they are derived, and which theyrepresent.”

See what an extraordinary Light our Author, by two or threeArguments, has cast upon a Point, which cost Mr. Locke, and someother eminent Philosophers, no little Pains in settling.

“Accordingly he hopes his clear stating of the Question will removeall Disputes concerning it, and will render the abovesaid Principle ofmore use in our Reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been.”9

And now having made it appear, that our simple Impressions areprior to their correspondent Ideas, a very few Instances excepted,Method seems, our Author says, to require we should examine ourImpressions, before we consider our Ideas. But after informing us thatImpressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation andthose of Reflexion, and briefly illustrating both sorts, he gives us tounderstand, that it will be necessary to reverse that Method, which atfirst Sight seems most natural; and, in order to explain the Nature andPrinciples of the human Mind, give a particular Account of Ideas, beforewe proceed to Impressions.

9 [Treatise, 1.1.1.]

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10 It may be a Question whether there are indeed any abstract or general Ideas; butsurely there cannot be any such Query as this here stated: No-body, one wouldthink in his Senses, can ask whether abstract or general Ideas be general orparticular in the Mind’s Conception of them?

8 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

In Pursuance of this Resolution, he goes on: First, to describe and dis-tinguish the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination: Secondly, to explainthe Connexion or Association of Ideas: Thirdly, to assign their severalother Relations: Fourthly, to define and fix the true Essence of Modesand Substances: And Fifthly, to determine the Nature of abstract Ideas.On all these Heads, a Man, who has never had the Pleasure of readingMr. Locke’s incomparable Essay, will peruse our Author with much lessDisgust, than those can who have been used to the irresistible Reasoningand wonderful Perspicuity of that admirable Writer.

To pass over the other Topicks, let us transiently view our Author’sDiscourse on abstracted Ideas, which fills up the seventh Section of thefirst Part of his Work. He begins,

“A very material Question has been started concerning abstract orgeneral Ideas, whether they be general or particular in the Mind’sConception of them.”10

Then he tells us that Dr. Berkeley has disputed the received Opinion inthis Particular, and has asserted, that all general Ideas are nothing butparticular ones, annexed to a certain Term, which gives them a moreextensive Signification, and makes them recall upon Occasion otherIndividuals which are similar to them. This, agreeable to his Sagacity, helooks upon as one of the greatest and most valuable Discoveries that hasbeen made of late Years in the Republick of Letters; and so he sets him-self to confirm it by some Arguments, which, in his Apprehension, willput it beyond all Doubt and Controversy.

It is above twenty Years since I looked over that Piece of Dr.Berkeley’s, which contains this most precious Discovery, and, if I re-member right, that Gentleman himself boasts of some mightyAdvantages that would accrue from it to the Commonwealth ofLearning: The Acquisition of Science was to become exceeding easy, andseveral Difficulties, that were used grievously to perplex Mathematiciansand Metaphysicians, were to sink before it: In short, it was to do suchFeats in behalf of Knowledge, as no Principle beside was able to per-form. But notwithstanding all these Benefits that were to accompany it, Ido not find it has met with any favourable Reception among the Literati;or that many Persons of Ability and Penetration are become Disciples:Its Fortune may now perhaps be more prosperous under the Auspices ofits new Patron, who, we see, undertakes to raise it above all Opposition.

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11 [Treatise, 1.1.7.]

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“It is evident, he says, that in forming most of our general Ideas, ifnot all of them, we abstract from every particular Degree of Quantityand Quality, and that an Object ceases not to be of any particularSpecies on account of every small Alteration in its Extension,Duration, and other Properties. It may therefore be thought, that hereis a plain Dilemma that decides concerning the Nature of thoseabstract Ideas which have afforded so much Speculation toPhilosophers. The abstract Idea of a Man represents Men of all Sizesand all Qualities; which it is concluded it cannot do, but either by rep-resenting at once all possible Sizes and all possible Qualities, or byrepresenting no particular one at all. Now it having been esteemedabsurd to defend the former Proposition, as implying an infiniteCapacity in the Mind, it has been commonly infer’d in favour of thelatter.”11

Here is the Dilemma with which we are perplexed on this Subject, andfrom which the superior Capacity of our Author is to deliver us. The lat-ter Inference he utterly destroys. And this he does, first, by proving thatit is utterly impossible to conceive any Quantity or Quality, withoutforming a precise Notion of its Degrees. And secondly, by shewing, thatthough the Capacity of the Mind be not infinite, yet we can at once forma Notion of all possible Degrees of Quantity and Quality, in such aManner at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the Purposes ofReflection and Conversation.

Thus I have told the Reader what our Author has done. I cannot socompleatly shew him how he has done it; for at the most, I must setdown only the Heads of those Arguments whereby he demonstrates thetwo foregoing Propositions. The first, asserting the Impossibility of con-ceiving any Quantity or Quality, without forming a precise Notion of itsDegrees, he proves by these three: First, whatever Objects are differentare distinguishable, and whatever Objects are distinguishable are separa-ble by the Thought and Imagination, and vice versa. Secondly, it is con-fessed, that no Object can appear to the Senses, or, in other Words, thatno Impression can become present to the Mind, without being deter-mined in its Degrees both of Quantity and Quality: To affirm otherwise,implies that it is possible for the same Thing to be and not to be.Thirdly, it is a Principle in Philosophy, that every thing in Nature is indi-vidual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a Triangle really existent,which has no precise Proportion of Sides and Angles. If this therefore beabsurd in Fact and Reality, it must also be so in Idea; since nothing of

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12 I have revolved this Sentence in my Mind till I have quite tired myself, but cannot,after all, find any Meaning in it. I do not mention this as a singular Instance of ourAuthor’s Inscrutability, for there are, to me, innumerable in this Work of his, but Icould not point out a more short and entire one, whereby the Reader may judgehow qualified this Writer is to give us a clear Idea of so complex a Subject asHuman Nature, or, with what Justice he tramples upon Mr. Locke, and pretends torestore or rectify what he has perverted. Mind, for this Purpose also, what immedi-ately follows.

13 [Treatise, 1.1.7.]

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which we can form a clear and distinct Idea is absurd and impossible.12 Butto form the Idea of an Object, and to form an Idea simply, is the sameThing; the Reference of the Idea to an Object being an extraneousDenomination, of which, in itself, it bears no Mark or Character.

When our Author, by what he says upon these Heads, has convinced usof his first Proposition, he proceeds to confirm the second, relating to theCapacity of the Mind, for forming at once a Notion of all possible Degreesof Quantity and Quality. He tells us, when we have found a Resemblanceamong several Objects, we apply the same Name to all of them, whateverDifferences may appear among them. When we have acquired a Custom ofthis kind, the hearing of that Name revives the Idea of one of theseObjects, with all its particular Circumstances. But as the same Word hasbeen frequently applied to other Individuals, different in many Respectsfrom that Idea which is immediately present to the Mind; the Mind notbeing able to revive the Idea of all the Individuals, only revives thatCustom which we have acquired by surveying them.

“They are not really and in fact present to the Mind, but only in Power;nor do we draw them all out distinctly in the Imagination, but keep our-selves in a Readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by apresent Design or Necessity. The Word raises up an individual Idea,along with a certain Custom, and that Custom produces any other indi-vidual one for which we may have Occasion. But as the Production of allthe Ideas to which the Name may be applied, is in most Cases impossi-ble, we abridge that Work by a more partial Consideration, and find butfew Inconveniences to arise in Reasoning from that Abridgment.”13

When he has said this, and a good deal more, for the Explication of thisPoint, he tells us, the only Difficulty that can remain relating thereto is, toaccount for that Custom which so readily recalls every particular Idea forwhich we may have Occasion. The Method he takes for giving us a satis-factory Notion of it is, “by producing other Instances which are analogousto it, and other Principles which facilitate its Operation.” HisObservations for this Purpose are four, and it is evident he has a very

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14 [Treatise, 1.1.7]15 The infinite Divisibility of Space is, I think, an Impropiety. Space is, in the strictest

Sense, an Individuum; and though our Author has expressed himself as above, yethe seems by his subsequent Reasoning (if it may be so called) to intend by Space,Matter, or solid Extention.

16 He might more reasonably have said, the Mind may reach a Minimum, or beconvinced of the Existence of indivisible Atoms; for it is certain the Imaginationnever forms an Idea of partial Extension, but under some Figure: Now a Figure ofwhich no Sub-division can be conceived, is as rank a Contradiction as any ourAuthor censures in his whole performance.

The History of the Works of the Learned 11

good Opinion of them; for thus he says,

“Perhaps these four Reflections may help to remove all Difficulties tothe Hypothesis I have proposed concerning abstract Ideas, so contraryto that which has hitherto prevailed in Philosophy. But, to tell theTruth, I place my chief Confidence in what I have proved concerningthe Impossibility of general Ideas, according to the common Methodof explaining them. We must certainly seek some new System uponthis Head, and there plainly is none beside what I have proposed.”14

Before he leaves this Subject, he deduces from the foregoing Principlesan Explanation of that Distinction of Reason, (as he phrases it) which isso much talked of, and so little understood, in the Schools.

We have gone thorough the first Part of this Book. In the second Partwe find our Author’s Notions of the infinite Divisibility, and otherQualities, of our Ideas of Space and Time;15 with divers Objections thatmay be made thereunto, and his Answers. He introduces this Chapterwith an indirect Compliment upon himself; after which he repeats, in hisown Way, a great many odd Fancies relating to this Topick, that haveoften made their Appearance in the Writings of other minutePhilosophers. Of these I shall give the Reader a Taste, by the Recital oftwo or three in their Order. Thus he says,

“It is certain that the Imagination16 reaches a Minimum, and mayraise up to itself an Idea, of which it cannot conceive any Sub-division,and which cannot be diminished without a total Annihilation. Whenyou tell me of the thousandth and ten-thousandth Part of a Grain ofSand, I have a distinct Idea of these Numbers, and of their differentProportions; but the Images which I form in my Mind to represent theThings themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferiorto that Image by which I represent the Grain of Sand itself, which issupposed so vastly to exceed them. What consists of Parts is distin-

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17 This Axiom is somewhat like a Conjurer’s Hocus Pocus; it works Wonders, and isat every Turn repeated. Let this Gentleman apply it once more in the Case before us;let him try if he can conceive in his Imagination a Grain of Sand, without conceivinga Surface; and let him try if he can imagine any Surface without at least two distin-guishable, and consequently, according to his own Axiom, separable Sides.

18 [Treatise, 1.2.2.]19 This Writer fancies a Difficulty where there is none. Difficulty implies a Possibility

of the Thing it relates to, and a Capacity in the Agent to accomplish it, when exertedto the utmost, and attended with favourable Circumstances. But it is entirely abovethe Reach of the human Mind to form a just (if thereby is meant an adequate)Notion of a Mite, or any Animal whatsover.

20 How subtle a Distinction is this between the Impossibility and Difficulty attendingthe different Systems. But in reality, there is not a Man in the Universe that can reapthe least Benefit by it, except our Author himself. To every one else it is as impos-sible, upon one Supposition as on the other, to have a distinct Idea, representingevery Part of an Insect a thousand times less than a Mite, not excluding even thoseof which its animal Spirits consist.

12 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

guishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable.17 Butwhatever we may imagine, the Idea of a Grain of Sand is not distin-guishable, nor separable into 20, much less into 1000, 10000, or aninfinite Number of different Ideas.”18

In a Paragraph or two after, our Author is certain again,

“That we can form Ideas which shall be no greater than the smallestAtom of the animal Spirits of an Insect a thousand times less than aMite; and we ought rather to conclude, that the Difficulty lies inenlarging our Conceptions so much as to form a just Notion of aMite.19 For, in order to form a just Notion of these Animals, we musthave a distinct Idea representing every Part of them; which, accordingto the System of infinite Divisibility, is utterly impossible; and, accord-ing to that of indivisible Parts or Atoms, is extremely difficult, by reason of the vast Number and Multiplicity of these Parts.”20

When our Author has ran through the Arguments he had picked upagainst the infinite Divisibility of Space, he tells us, it is trueMathematicians are wont to say, that there are equally strongArguments on the other Side of the Question; and then he adds,

“Before I examine these Arguments and Objections in Detail, I willhere take them in a Body, and endeavour, by a short and decisiveReason, to prove at once that it is utterly impossible they can have anyjust Foundation.”

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What an effectual Method has this Gentleman contrived of destroyinghis Antagonists! He first slays them all in a Body, and kills them one byone afterwards. I shall not say a Syllable of his particular Executions,but give the Reader a Sight only of that dreadful Instrument, whereby ata single Blow he takes away the Lives of all his Opposers.

“It is an established Maxim (says he) in Metaphysicks, that whateverthe Mind clearly conceives includes the Idea of possible Existence; or,in other Words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. Wecan form no Idea of a Mountain without a Valley, and thereforeregard it as impossible.

Now it is certain we have an Idea of Extension; for otherwise, why do we talk or reason concerning it? It is likewise certain that thisIdea, as conceived by the Imagination, though divisible into Parts, orinferior Ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infiniteNumber of Parts: For that exceeds the Comprehension of our limitedCapacities. Here then is an Idea of Extension, which consists of Parts,or inferior Ideas, that are perfectly indivisible; consequently this Ideaimplies no Contradiction; consequently it is impossible for Extensionreally to exist conformable to it; and consequently all the Argumentsemployed against the Possibility of mathematical Points are schola-stick Quibbles, and unworthy of our Attention.

These Consequences we may carry one Step farther, and concludethat all the pretended Demonstrations for the infinite Divisibility ofExtension are equally sophistical, since it is certain these Demonstra-tions cannot be just, without proving the Impossibility of mathemati-cal Points; which it is an evident Absurdity to pretend to.”21

There is not, I am persuaded, any Reader hardy enough to withstandsuch Reasoning as this is. And I hope no one will be so ill-natur’d, as torefuse joining with the Author of it in a Compliment which he passes onhimself, at the very Entrance of the third Section immediately following,wherein he considers the other Qualities of our Ideas of Time and Space.

“No Discovery (says he there) could have been made more happily fordeciding all Controversies concerning Ideas, than that with which I atfirst set out, viz. That Impressions always take the Precedency ofthem, and that every Idea with which the Imagination is furnished,first makes its Appearance in a correspondent Impression.”22

21 [Treatise, 1.2.2.]22 [Treatise, 1.2.3.]

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23 [Treatise, 1.2.3.]

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By the Application of this fortunate Principle, he proceeds to penetratestill farther into the Nature of our Ideas of Space and Time. What a vastProgress he has made in this Science, may be easily guess’d, by my heremarking the very first Step he has therein taken:

“Upon opening my Eyes, says he, and turning them to the surroundingObjects, I perceive many visible Bodies; and upon shutting them again,and considering the Distance betwixt these Bodies, I acquire the Ideaof Extension.”

This is indeed a new Method of gaining it, entirely of our Author’sInvention; but we shall see a little lower, that this reiterated Action ofthe Eye is not always necessary for that Purpose, but that the Idea ofExtension may be had, at least without closing the Eye-lids. For thus hegoes on, full as wisely as he begun.

“As every Idea is derived from some Impression, which is exactlysimilar to it, the Impressions, similar to this Idea of Extension, musteither be some Sensations derived from the Sight, or some internalImpressions arising from these Sensations. Our internal Impressionsare our Passions; none of which, I believe, will ever be asserted to bethe Model, from which the Idea of Space is derived. There remainstherefore nothing but the Senses, which can convey to us this originalImpression. Now what Impression do our Senses here convey to us?This is the principal Question, and decides without Appeal concerningthe Nature of the Idea.”

And now follows his Answer, by the first Sentence of which we shallperceive, as I have said above, that this extraordinary Philosopher doesnot always need both to open and shut his Eyes, in order to acquire thesimple Idea of Extension.

“The Table before me, says he, is alone sufficient by its View, to giveme an Idea of Extension. This Idea, then, is borrowed from, and represents some Impression, which this Moment appears to the Senses.But my Senses convey to me only the Impressions of coloured Points,disposed in a certain manner. If the Eye is sensible of any thing far-ther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it is impossible toshew any Thing further, we may conclude with Certainty, that theIdea of Extension is nothing but a Copy of these coloured Points, andof the Manner of their Appearance.”23

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So much for the Extension of Space. Not that our Author has herequitted it. He wades still farther therein, through several Pages, mixingTime along with it, and viewing both in a Variety of Lights. Some ofthese are too dazzling for my weak Sight. I must therefore shun them;only telling the Reader, whose Eyes are strong enough for such Views,where he is to look for them. And besides the Sequel of the thirdSection, from the former Part of which we have had the three lastCitations, there is the fourth Section, wherein divers of them are to befound, under the Title of Answers to the Objections, wherebyMetaphysicians, Mathematicians, &c. have conspired to destroy ourAuthor’s Doctrine of indivisible Atoms.

When he begins to deal with the Geometricians, he says, at first Sighttheir Science seems favourable to his Thesis; and if it be contrary in itsDemonstrations, ’tis perfectly conformable in its Definitions; his presentBusiness then, as he adds, must be to defend the Definitions, and refutethe Demonstrations.

I will have nothing to do in the Quarrel; if they cannot maintain theirDemonstrations against his Attacks, they may even perish.

In the fifth Section, which is filled up likewise with Objections andReplies, he encounters the Naturalists, who hold the Reality of anabsolute Vacuum. The Dispute upon this Head including divers subtleSpeculations, interests the Metaphysicians also. The preceding Sectionwas ushered in with a very brief Recapitulation of his System concerningSpace and Time, which consists, as he tells us, of two Parts. The firstdepends on this Chain of Reasoning. The Capacity of the Mind is notinfinite; consequently no Idea of Extension or Duration, includes an infi-nite Number of Parts or inferior Ideas, but of a finite Number, and thesesimple and indivisible. The second is a Consequence of the former,which implies, that the Parts, into which the Ideas of Space and Timeresolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible Parts,being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable, when not filled withsomething real and existent. The Ideas of Space and Time are thereforeno separate or distinct Ideas, but merely those of the Manner or Order,in which Objects exist; Or, in other Words, ’tis impossible to conceiveeither a Vacuum and Extension without Matter, or a Time, when therewas no Succession or Change in any real Existence.

The first half of this System he has incontestably proved in the forego-ing Pages of this Work; and I have given my Readers a slight Taste of hisDemonstration; the second Part of it is the Basis of the fifth Section,wherein he delivers his Sentiments of a Vacuum; for therefrom, he says,it follows, “that we can form no Idea of a Vacuum, or Space, wherethere is nothing visible or tangible.” This gives Rise (and well it may) tothree Objections; which he most intelligibly tells us, he shall examine

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16 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

together, because the Answer he shall give to one is a Consequence ofthat which he shall make use of for the others.

One might from these Answers collect many Passages, which wouldgive us a high Conceit of the Author’s Sagacity. Let us pick out only twoor three for a Sample. Thus, he has discover’d, that

“a Man, who enjoys his Sight, receives no other Perception from turn-ing his Eyes on every Side, when entirely deprived of Light, than whatis common to him with one born blind; and ’tis certain, he adds, sucha one has no Idea either of Light or Darkness.”24

A Page or two after, where he is shewing, that Motion does not presup-pose a Vacuum, he says, admirably to that Purpose,

“suppose a Man to be supported in the Air, and to be softly conveyedalong by some invisible Power; ’tis evident he is sensible of nothing,and never receives the Idea of Extension, nor indeed any Idea, fromthis invariable Motion. Even suppose, he moves his Limbs too and fro,this cannot convey to him that Idea. He feels in that Case a certainSensation or Impression, the Parts of which are successive to eachother, and may give him the Idea of Time, but certainly are not dis-posed in such a Manner, as is necessary to convey the Idea of Space orExtension.”25

Again, his Argument leading him to inquire, whether the Sight can con-vey the Impression and Idea of a Vacuum? To determine that it cannot,among other Considerations he puts a Case of two luminous Bodiesappearing at some Distance from one another, upon a Field (if I may soexpress it) of absolute Darkness. Now as the Distance between theseObjects is not any thing coloured or visible, it may be thought, he says,that there is here a Vacuum or pure Extension, not only intelligible tothe Mind, but obvious to the very Senses. This, he owns, is our naturaland most familiar Way of thinking; but he evinces it to be a wrong one:For

“since this Distance causes no Perception different from what a blindMan receives from his Eyes, or what is convey’d to us in the darkestNight, it must partake of the same Properties; and as Blindness andDarkness afford us no Ideas of Extension, it is impossible, that the

24 [Treatise, 1.2.5.]25 [Treatise, 1.2.5.]

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dark and undistinguishable Distance between two Bodies can everproduce that Idea. Again,”

His Subject leading him to observe, as a general Maxim in the Scienceof human Nature, that where-ever there is a close Relation betwixt twoIdeas, the Mind is very apt in all its Discourses and Reasonings to usethe one for the other; he undertakes to assign the Causes of thisPhœnomenon (as he calls it.) Accordingly he remarks,

“that as the Mind is endowed with a Power of exciting any Idea itpleases; whenever it dispatches the Spirits into that Region of theBrain, in which the Idea is placed, these Spirits always excite the Idea,when they run precisely into the proper Traces, and rummage thatCell which belongs to the Idea. But as this Motion is seldom direct,and naturally turns a little to the one Side or the other; for this Reasonthe animal Spirits, falling into contiguous Traces, present the relatedIdeas in lieu of that, which the Mind desired at first to survey. ThisChange we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the sameTrain of Thought, make use of the related Idea, which is presented tous, and employ in our Reasoning, as if it were the same with what wedemanded.”

What could Cartesius or Malebranch have said more a propos upon thisHead! How admirably does this account for the Mistakes and Sophismsso frequent and so fatal in Philosophy.

I said at the Head of these Citations, that I should extract them fromour Author’s Reply to certain Objections, and I verily thought I haddone so, when reading farther, I was a little staggered, at the Top of aParagraph, with this Sentence,

“After this Chain of Reasoning and Explication of my Principles, I amnow prepared to answer all the Objections that have been offered,whether deriv’d from Metaphysicks or Mechanicks.”

I was just resolving to look back, to see how I came to be so mistaken,when I made myself easy, by reflecting on the Genius of my Author,who often affects to startle or perplex his Readers: And indeed as I wentforward, I found nothing to alter my Opinion of what was past, or toanswer the Expectation that might naturally be rais’d by the aboveDeclaration.

If what I have been mentioning in some Measure puzzled me, I was noless charmed at an Instance of our Author’s superlative Modesty, whichappears a Page or two after. For there, when he is returning as it were

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from the utter Overthrow of his Opposers, his Stile is so unlike that of aConqueror, that it would rather induce one to think he had beendefeated.

“Thus, says he, I seem to have answer’d the three Objections above-mentioned; tho’ at the same time I am sensible, that few will be satis-fied with these Answers, but will immediately propose new Objectionsand Difficulties.”

One of these he guesses at, and tells us,

“’Twill probably be said, that his Reasoning makes nothing to theMatter in hand, and that he explains only the Manner in whichObjects affect the Senses, without endeavouring to account for theirreal Nature and Operations.”

To this Objection, he very candidly says, he answers,

“by pleading guilty, and by confessing that his Intention never was topenetrate into the Nature of Bodies, or explain the secret Causes oftheir Operations. – As to those who attempt to do so, he cannotapprove of their Ambition, till he sees, in some one Instance at least,that they have met with Success. He contents himself with knowingperfectly the Manner in which Objects affect his Senses, and theirConnexions with each other, as far as Experience informs him ofthem. This suffices for the Conduct of Life; and this suffices also forhis Philosophy, which pretends only to explain the Nature and Causesof our Perceptions, or Impressions and Ideas.”

I cannot say what will suffice for his Philosophy, but I will venture toaffirm his Philosophy will never suffice to acquaint us with either theNature or Causes of our Perceptions; any farther than any Man’sConsciousness will do, without it.

In the next Paragraph he assumes the Air of a Sphinx, only not attend-ed with the horrible Cruelty of that Monster. He advances a Paradox atleast as obscure as the other’s Enigma; notwithstanding he is pleased toassert it will easily be explain’d from the foregoing Reasoning. The ensu-ing is an exact Transcript of it.

“I shall (says he) conclude this Subject of Extension, with a Paradox. –This Paradox is, that if you are pleased to give to invisible and intangi-ble Distance, or in other Words, to the Capacity of becoming a visibleand tangible Distance, the Name of a Vacuum, Extension and Matter

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26 [Treatise, 1.2.5.]

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are the same, and yet there is a Vacuum. If you will not give it thatName, Motion is possible in a Plenum, without any Impulse in infini-tum, without returning in a Circle, and without Penetration.”26

This dark Saying brings us very near to the End of the fifth Section,which closes with proving Time to be nothing but the Manner in whichsome real Object exists.

The sixth (which is the last) Section of the second Part of this Work,treats of the Ideas of Existence, and of external Existence. As ourAuthor handles these abstruse Points more fully hereafter, I shall take nonotice of what he has said here, where he has only hinted his Sentimentsconcerning them.

I proceed now therefore to the third Part of this Treatise, where theAuthor has descanted very largely on two very curious Topicks,Knowledge and Probability. Were I to make a methodical Abstract ofthe several Sections into which his Discourse on these Heads is divided,it would carry me far beyond the Space I ought to allow this Article; Imust therefore follow the Course I have hitherto gone in, contentingmyself with only selecting here and there an extraordinary Passage, forthe Readers Information and Entertainment.

The first Section of this Part opens with an Enumeration of the differ-ent Kinds of philosophical Relation. They are seven, viz. Resemblance,Identity, Relations of Time and Place, Proportion in Quantity orNumber, Degrees in any Quality, Contrariety, and Causation. OurAuthor afterwards tells us, that only four of these can be the Objects ofKnowledge and Certainty. These four are Resemblance, Contrariety,Degrees in Quality, and Proportions in Quantity or Number. The threefirst, he says, are discoverable at first Sight, and fall more properly underthe Province of Intuition than Demonstration: Which last is chiefly con-cerned in fixing the Proportions of Quantity or Number. Here he takesOccasion of passing a Verdict on Geometry, very different from that ofthe more unthinking Bulk of Mankind, who are apt to entertain I knownot what Prejudices in its Favour.

“It is, he tells us, the Art, by which we fix the Proportions of Figures;but which, tho’ it much excels, both in Universality and Exactness, theloose Judgments of the Senses and Imagination, yet never attains aperfect Precision and Exactness. Its first Principles are still drawn fromthe general Appearance of the Objects; and that Appearance can neverafford us any Security, when we examine the prodigious Minutenessof which Nature is susceptible. Our Ideas seem to give a perfect

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27 [Treatise, 1.3.1.]

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Assurance, that no two right Lines can have a common Segment; but ifwe consider these Ideas, we shall find, that they always suppose a sensi-ble Inclination of the two Lines, and that where the Angle they form isextremely small, we have no Standard of a right Line so precise as toassure us of the Truth of this Proposition.”27

The Geometricians, who would consult their own Edification, may, in theOriginal, whence I have extracted this Passage, meet with others on thesame Head, which discover the Depth of this great Mathematician’sErudition. One thing pleases me vastly, which is the Impartiality where-with he checks the Boastings of some of his scientific Brethren.

“’Tis usual, says he, with Mathematicians, to pretend that those Ideas,which are their Objects, are of so refin’d and spiritual a Nature, thatthey fall not under the Conception of the Fancy, but must be compre-hended by a pure and intellectual View, of which the superior Facultiesof the Soul are alone capable.”

This, he affirms, is all an Artifice; and to destroy it we need only, as hesays, reflect on that Principle (of his) so oft insisted on, that all our Ideasare copied from our Impressions. I have afore hinted the mighty Value ofthis Discovery, the Honour of which is intirely due to our Author, but itcannot be too often inculcated. I verily think, if it were closely pursued, itwould lead us to several inestimable Desiderata, such as the perpetualMotion, the grand Elixir, a Dissolvent of the Stone, &c. Many Wondershave been done in the Republick of Letters by a single and very simplePrinciple; tho’ I question if any may compare with the above-mentioned,except that of M. Leibnitz. Every one has heard, what an immense Field ofKnowledge he opened by his sufficient Reason, and how much wiser theWorld is by it, at this Day. Such Benefactors to Mankind will always bethe Admiration of Posterity.

I proceed to say a Word or two of the second and third Sections. In theformer we have somewhat about Probability, and the Idea of Cause andEffect. In the latter we are told, Why a Cause is always necessary. All man-ner of Persons, that have any Antipathy to the Argument à Priori for theExistence of God, may repair to this latter Section, where they will havethe Satisfaction of seeing it utterly demolished. This Writer has heredestroy’d the Foundation of it, and so there’s an End of the whole Fabrick.Dr. Clarke, and one John Lock, Esq; whom he particularly names, two ofthe most superficial Reasoners, were, as well as many others, so weak as tofancy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a Cause of Existence; nay,

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Hobbes himself, as much an Atheist as we believe him, was of thisOpinion: Every one knows, how he, and the greater Men afore named,pretended to evince the Proposition; but our Author pronounces all theyproduced for that Purpose fallacious, sophistical, and frivolous; and hereally thinks it unnecessary to employ many Words in shewing theWeakness of their Arguments.

But, tho’ our Author has quite erased the Argument à Priori for theDivine Existence, I would willingly hope, he has no Intention of weaken-ing this fundamental Truth, that there is some one necessary, eternal, inde-pendent Being; nor does he directly assert a Thing may come into Beingwithout a Cause; only he will have Experience to be the sole Road bywhich we can arrive at the Certainty of this Thesis, Whatever has began toexist, must have had a Cause of its Existence. And that Experience willlead us thereunto, is what, I fancy, our Author aims at proving, in someensuing Sections. I would be more positive upon this Point if I could; buthaving run over the Sections referr’d to (13 in Number) in order to knowwhether this were the real Scope of them, I acknowledge I cannot under-stand them enough to pronounce dogmatically: Nor is it to be wonder’dat, if I am at a Loss in this Matter, seeing any Man must be so, who is notbless’d with an extraordinary Penetration; according to our Author’s ownAcknowledgement of the relative Obscurity of this Part of his Argument.For about the Middle of the twelfth Section he very well says,

“I am sensible how abstruse all this Reasoning must appear to the gener-ality of Readers, who not being accustomed to such profoundReflections on the intellectual Faculties of the Mind, will be apt to rejectas chimerical whatever strikes not in with the common receivedNotions, and with the easiest and most obvious Principles ofPhilosophy. And no doubt there are some Pains required to enter intothese Arguments; tho’ perhaps very little are necessary to perceive theImperfection of every vulgar Hypothesis on this Subject, and the littleLight, which Philosophy can yet afford us in such sublime and such curi-ous Speculations.”28

And again, in the XIVth Section, after some farther refined Speculations,

“he thinks it proper to give Warning, that he has just now examined oneof the most sublime Questions in Philosophy, viz. that concerning thePower and Efficacy of Causes; where all the Sciences seem so muchinterested.”29

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And the Reason of this Warning partakes of the Excellency of itsSubject: For he adds,

“Such a Warning will naturally rouze up the Attention of the Reader,and make him desire a more full Account of his Doctrine, as well as ofthe Arguments on which it is founded.”

A noble issue indeed, and most graciously encouraged, for thus he treatsit:

“This Request, says he, is so reasonable, that I cannot refuse comply-ing with it; especially as I am hopeful, that the Principles I proceed on,the more they are examined, will acquire the more Force andEvidence.”

Undoubtedly.That I was right in my Conjecture, as to the real Purport of the afore-

named Sections, appears with great Probability from the ensuingPassages, which occur toward the latter End of them; and which I donot vainly quote as Testimonies of my Sagacity in guessing, but toinstruct the Reader in a Question of the highest Dignity inMetaphysicks; that is, in our Author’s own Stile, Why a Cause is alwaysnecessary? Or, in vulgar Phrase, Why the Mind conceives a Cause neces-sary to the Existence of every thing that has a Beginning? He says,

“The Idea of Necessity arises from some Impression. There is noImpression conveyed by our Senses which can give Rise to that Idea. Itmust therefore be derived from some internal Impression, orImpression of Reflection. There is no internal Impression which hasany Relation to the present Business, but that Propensity whichCustom produces to pass from an Object to the Idea of its usualAttendant. This therefore is the Essence of Necessity. Upon the whole,Necessity is something that exists in the Mind, not in Objects; nor is itpossible for us ever to form the most distant Idea of it, considered as aQuality in Bodies. Either we have no Idea of Necessity, or Necessity isnothing but that Determination of the Thought to pass from Causesto Effects, and from Effects to Causes, according to their experiencedUnion.

Thus as the Necessity which makes two times two equal to four, orthree Angles of a Triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the Actof the Understanding, by which we consider and compare these Ideas;in like manner the Necessity of Power, which unites Causes andEffects, lies in the Determination of the Mind to pass from the one to

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the other. The Efficacy or Energy of Causes is neither placed in theCauses themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the Concurrence of thesetwo Principles; but belongs entirely to the Soul, which considers theUnion of two or more Objects in all past Instances. It is here that thereal Power of Causes is placed along with their Connexion andNecessity.”

A most wonderful Doctrine, I protest, and such our Author acknowl-edges it to be; for he immediately subjoins,

“I am sensible, that of all the Paradoxes which I have had, or shallhave Occasion to advance in the Course of this Treatise, the presentone is the most violent, and that it is merely by Dint of solid Proof andReasoning I can ever hope it will have Admission, and overcome theinveterate Prejudices of Mankind. – There is commonly anAstonishment attending every thing extraordinary; and this Astonish-ment changes immediately into the highest Degree of Esteem orContempt, according as we approve or disapprove of the Subject. I ammuch afraid that though the foregoing Reason appears to me theshortest and most decisive imaginable; yet with the generality ofReaders the Bias of the Mind will prevail, and give them a Prejudiceagainst the present Doctrine. – The contrary Notion is so riveted inthe Mind from the Principles above-mentioned, that I doubt not butmy Sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridicu-lous.”

Likely enough, truly; for any one who reads these Passages must be con-vinced, that some Men are very strange and uncouth Animals. Ouradmirable Author must expect to be nibbled at, as all great Genius’shave been, by a Parcel of stupid Impertinents, for whom he has gener-ously framed a compleat Set of Objections: What!

“the Efficacy of Causes lie in the Determination of the Mind! As ifCauses did not operate entirely independent of the Mind, and wouldnot continue their Operation, even though there was no Mind existentto contemplate them, or reason concerning them. Thought may welldepend on Causes for its Operation, but not Causes on Thought. Thisis to reverse the Order of Nature. To every Operation there is a Powerproportioned; and this Power must be placed on the Body that oper-ates. If we remove the Power from one Cause, we must ascribe it toanother: But to remove it from all Causes, and bestow it on a Beingthat is no ways related to the Cause or Effect by perceiving them, iscontrary to the most certain Principles of human Reason.”

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Let these Simpletons talk thus if they please, our Author despises theirAttacks as he ought: He only replies to all these Arguments (as hevouchsafes to call them)

“That the Case is here much the same, as if a blind Man should pre-tend to find a great many Absurdities in the Supposition, that theColour of Scarlet is not the same with the Sound of a Trumpet, norLight the same with Solidity.”

A Page or two after this notable Sentence, he begins to think it is Timeto collect all the different Parts of his Reasoning, (in which he acknowl-edges he has, though on justifiable Motives, advanced in a seeminglypreposterous Manner) and by joining them together, form an exactDistinction of the Relation of Cause and Effect, which makes theSubject of the present Inquiry. There may, he tells us, two Definitions begiven of this Relation, which are different, only by their presenting a dif-ferent View of the same Object, and making us consider it either as aphilosophical or as a natural Relation. We may define a CAUSE to be

“An Object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all theObjects resembling the former are placed in like Relations ofPrecedency and Contiguity to those Objects that resemble the latter.”

This Definition lies far out of the Reach of my Capacity, and I amindeed in some Doubt whether it be intelligible to any but Men of ourAuthor’s Ability. His second Definition is a little more comprehensible,and is designed for the Satisfaction of such as may esteem the formerdefective, because drawn from Objects, as he says, foreign to the Cause.It is this,

“A CAUSE is an Object precedent and contiguous to another, and sounited with it, that the Idea of the one determines the Mind to formthe Idea of the other, and the Impression of the one to form a morelively Idea of the other.”

Should this Definition be rejected for the same Reason as the foregoing,he knows no other Remedy, than that the Persons who express thisDelicacy, should substitute a juster Definition in its Place. But for hisPart, he honestly owns his Incapacity for such an Undertaking. For

“when he examines with the utmost Accuracy those Objects, whichare commonly denominated Causes and Effects, he finds, in consider-ing a single Instance, that the one Object is precedent and contiguous

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30 [Treatise, 1.3.14.]31 [The bracketed comment here is that of the reviewer.]32 [Treatise, 1.3.15.]

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to the other; and in enlarging his View to consider several Instances,he finds only, that like Objects are constantly placed in like Relationsof Succession and Contiguity. Again, when he considers the Influenceof this constant Conjunction, he perceives, that such a Relation cannever be an Object of Reasoning, and can never operate upon theMind but by means of Custom, which determines the Imagination tomake a Transition from the Idea of one Object to that of its usualAttendant, and from the Impression of one to a more lively Idea of theother.”30

However extraordinary these Sentiments may appear, [I use this incom-parable Arguer’s own Words]31 he thinks it fruitless to trouble himselfwith any further Inquiry or Reasoning upon the Subject, but shall reposehimself on them as on established Maxims. Amen.

But though he has thus taken Leave of his Subject, with respect toInquiring and Reasoning, he does not part with it for-good-and all, tillhe has drawn some Corollaries from it; by which he very kindly under-takes to remove several Prejudices and popular Errors that have verymuch prevailed in Philosophy. They that will see these Curiosities mustgo to the Original; for I cannot in this Abstract insert Examples of everything therein remarkable.

I proceed to the fifteenth Section of the first Book, where eight Rulesare laid down, by which to judge of Causes and Effects. The Reader maylook at them if he pleases, when he goes to view the above-mentionedCorollaries. All I shall take notice of here, is a Passage ushering them in,and another that follows them: And really they are both admirable intheir several Ways. In the first, our Author says, that according to theDoctrine he has been establishing,

“any thing may produce any thing. Creation, Annihilation, Motion,Reason, Volition; all these may arise from one another, or from anyother Object we can imagine.”32

A most charming System indeed! one can hardly conceive the Uses itmay be put to, and the different Purposes it will serve: It is to be hoped,the inimitable Inventor will one Day give us a large and ample Accountof them.

I cannot help violating a rash Engagement. I said I would take no

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notice of the Rules above spoken of. But, casting my Eye on the last ofthem, it was impossible not to admire the beautiful Example thereinexhibited of the Justness of our Author’s Principles. This Rule is,

“That an Object which exists for any Time in its full Perfection with-out any Effect, is not the sole Cause of that Effect, but requires to beassisted by some other Principle which may forward its Influence andOperation.”

Now here the Reader, as I say, may see an Exemplification of ourAuthor’s Doctrine, “That any thing may produce any thing.” Amongwhich any Things he reckons Annihilation and Creation; or, in otherTerms, he asserts, something may arise from, or be produced by, noth-ing. And so it is in the above Rule, where we find without any Effect, i.e.nothing, turned, in the Twinkling of an Eye, into that Effect, which issomething.

When he has led us thorough this fine Train of Argument concerningCause and Effect, he tells us,

“Here is all the Logic he thinks proper to employ in his Reasoning;and perhaps even this was not very necessary, but might have beensupplied by the natural Principles of our Understanding. Our schola-stick Head-pieces and Logicians shew no such Superiority above themere Vulgar in their Reason and Ability, as to give us any Inclinationto imitate them in delivering a long System of Rules and Precepts todirect our Judgment in Philosophy.”33

In the sixteenth Section, which finishes the third Part of the first Book,we meet with certain Reflections on the Reason of Animals. These arecalculated for confirming the foregoing Doctrine about Cause andEffect, how remote soever they may seem from such a Purpose; and yetso effectually they answer it, as almost intuitively, he tells us, to evincethe Truth of his System.

We come now to the fourth Part of this Volume, of which we shall notoffer to make any exact Analysis, only select a few curious Passages,such as we think most conducive to the Reader’s Pleasure andEdification. In this Part our Author treats of the sceptical and otherSystems of Philosophy; and he sets out like himself, advancing and des-canting upon Propositions that never enter into the Heads of ordinaryWriters. Thus in the very first Paragraph he shews there is no such Thing

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34 [Treatise, 1.4.1.]

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as Science, strictly speaking, but that all Knowledge degenerates intoProbability;

“and this Probability is greater or less, according to our Experience ofthe Veracity or Deceitfulness of our Understanding, and according tothe Simplicity or Intricacy of the Question.”34

And his second paragraph assures us,

“there is no Algebraist nor Mathematician that places entireConfidence in any Truth immediately upon his Discovery of it, orregards it as any thing but a mere Probability. Every Time he runsover his Proofs, his Confidence increases; but still more by theApprobation of his Friends; and is raised to its utmost Perfection bythe universal Assent and Applauses of the learned World.”

After this he proceeds thorough five Pages in the Language of a Sceptic;and then he informs us of the Design he had in view by so doing, whichwas to render us sensible of the Truth of his Hypothesis, viz. That allour Reasonings concerning Causes and Effects are derived from nothingbut Custom; and that Belief is more properly an Act of the sensitive,than of the cogitative Part of our Natures. That Sequel of this Section isemployed in guarding what he has advanced upon this Head, from someObjections to which it might unwarily be thought liable.

In the second Section he considers Scepticism with regard to theSenses. And here he inquires into the Causes which induce us to believein the Existence of Body: And his Reasonings on this Point he beginswith a Distinction which will contribute, he assures us, very much to theperfect understanding of what follows. We ought, as he says, to examineapart those two Questions, which are commonly confounded together,viz. Why we attribute a CONTINUED Existence to Objects, even whenthey are not present to the Senses? and why we suppose them to have anExistence DISTINCT from the Mind and Perception. Upon a very carefulScrutiny, he rejects what has commonly been offered for the Solution ofthese Queries, and proposes one of his own; which, as he apprehends,very clearly and satisfactorily accounts for what is contained in them.

Glad would I be, could I present my Readers with the Sentiments of soprofound and accurate a Genius as we are now dealing with, upon oneof the most abstruse and perplexing Topicks in all Metaphysicks; butalas! they are of too wide an Extent for the Compass of this Article:However, we will endeavour to introduce some Specimens thereof,

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whereby we shall at least see how happy a Talent he has for surmount-ing those Difficulties, which have proved the ne plus ultra of manyothers.

“After a little Examination we shall, he says, find, that all thoseObjects to which we attribute a continued Existence, have a peculiarConstancy which distinguishes them from the Impressions, whoseExistence depends upon our Perception. Those Mountains, andHouses, and Trees, which lie at present under my Eye, have alwaysappeared to me in the same Order; it is so also with my Bed andTable, my Books and Papers; and when I lose Sight of them by shut-ting my Eyes, or moving my Head, I soon after find them recur uponme without the least Alteration. This is the Case with all theImpressions, whose Objects are supposed to have an externalExistence; and is the Case with no other Impression, whether gentle orviolent, voluntary or involuntary.

This Constancy, however, is not so perfect as not to admit of veryconsiderable Exceptions. Bodies often change their Position andQualities, and after a little Absence or Interruption may become hard-ly knowable. But in these Changes they preserve a Coherence, andhave a regular Dependence on each other, which produces, very rea-sonably, the Opinion of their continued Existence. – This Coherencetherefore in their Changes, is one of the Characteristics of externalObjects, as well as their Constancy.”35

When our Author has shewn that the Opinion of the continuedExistence of Body depends on the COHERENCE and CONSTANCY of cer-tain Impressions, he proceeds to examine after what Manner theseQualities give rise to so extraordinary a Judgment. He begins with theCoherence, which he considers very minutely, in order to discover itswhole Efficacy this way; the Consequence of which is,

“that he is afraid, whatever Force we may ascribe to this Principle, ’tistoo weak to support alone so vast an Edifice, as is that of the contin-ued Existence of all external Bodies; and that we must join theConstancy of their Appearance to the Coherence, to give a satisfactoryAccount of that Opinion.”

How pertinent is this Conclusion, when our Author has afore expreslygrounded the Opinion here spoken of, on the Constancy of Appearance,and brought in the Coherence only as a Sort of Succedaneum! Besides

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36 In the 5th Section of the second Part of this Volume.

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that, his Business here, as may be supposed from the fourth Line of thisParagraph, is not to say what the Effect of these Properties is, but toinstruct us in the Modus of their Operation. However, we must followhim in his own Way. Accordingly,

Having taken a strict Survey of the Power of Coherence, and seenwhat it will, and what it will not do in the Case before us, he takesConstancy to task in much the same manner. But,

“as the Explication of this, he says, will lead him into a considerableCompass of very profound Reasoning, he thinks it proper, to avoidConfusion, to give a short Sketch or Abridgment of his System, andafterwards draw out all its Parts in their full Compass.”

As for his System in Miniature, there are four Things, he tells us, requi-site to justify it. I shall take notice only of the first, which is, to explainthe Principium individuationis, or Principle of Identity. Concerning thismost curious Point, he observes,

“That the View of any one Object is not sufficient to convey the Ideaof Identity. For in that Proposition, an Object is the same with itself, ifthe Idea express’d by the Word, Object, were no ways distinguishedfrom that meant by itself; we really should mean nothing, nor wouldthe Proposition contain a Predicate and a Subject, which however areimplied in this Affirmation. One single Object conveys the Idea ofUnity, not that of Identity. On the other hand, a Multiplicity ofObjects can never convey this Idea, however resembling they may besupposed. The Mind always pronounces the one not to be the other. –Since then both Number and Unity are incompatible with the Relationof Identity, it must lie in something that is neither of them. But to tellthe Truth, at first Sight this seems utterly impossible. Betwixt Unityand Number there can be no Medium; no more than betweenExistence and Non-existence.” –

Very true. But now let us see how dexterously our most ingeniousAuthor gets rid of this seemingly inextricable Difficulty. For this Purposehe needs only have recourse to the Idea of Time or Duration. He hasalready remark’d,36

“That Time, in a strict Sense, implies Succession, and that when weapply its Idea to any unchangeable Object, ’tis only by a Fiction of theImagination, by which the unchangeable Object is supposed to partici-

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pate of the Changes of the coexistent Objects, and in particular of thatof our Perceptions. This Fiction of the Imagination almost universallytakes place; and ’tis by means of it, that a single Object, placed beforeus, and survey’d for any Time without our discovering in it anyInterruption or Variation, is able to give us a Notion of Identity. Forwhen we consider any two Points of this Time, we may place them indifferent Lights: We may either survey them at the very same instant;in which Case they give us the Idea of Number, both by themselvesand by the Object; which must be multiplied, in order to be conceivedat once, as existent in these two different Points of Time: Or on theother hand, we may trace a Succession of Time by a like Succession ofIdeas, and conceiving first one Moment, along with the Object thenexistent, imagine afterwards a Change in the Time without anyVariation or Interruption in the Object; in which Case it gives us theIdea of Unity.”

Here then, our Author says, is an Idea, which is a Medium betwixtUnity and Number; or more properly speaking, is either of them,according to the View in which we take it: And this Idea we call that ofIdentity.–

“Thus, as he adds a little after, the Principle of Individuation is noth-ing but the Invariableness and Uninterruptedness of any Object,through a supposed Variation of Time, by which the Mind can trace itin the different Periods of its Existence, without any Break of theView, and without being obliged to form the Idea of Multiplicity orNumber.”37

Those Readers, who know all that Mr. Lock and his Corrector Dr.Butler have wrote upon this puzzling Subject, without being fully satis-fied therewith, will certainly be pleas’d to find all their Difficulties vanishupon the Perusal of these few Paragraphs relating to it.

Where our Author’s little System ends, and his great and extensive onebegins, I have not been able, notwithstanding I have search’d very diligently, to perceive; I am apt to think they insensibly run into, andincorporate with one another. Perhaps the larger System is no other butthe Explication of those four Things which he proposed to consider, as requisite for the Justification of the lesser. I must leave that Pointundetermined.

[To be continued.]

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A Continuation of the Twenty-sixth Article.

There are many curious Particulars in the Section I am now upon,besides those I have mentioned; but without stretching my Account ofthis Work into a Volume, there is no insisting upon them as theydeserve; I shall therefore drop them all, excepting one little Passage,which merits a peculiar Attention, and that is his Definition of thehuman Mind:

“What we call a Mind, says our Author, is nothing but a Heap orCollection of different Perceptions united together by certainRelations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfectSimplicity and Identity.”38

In the third Section we meet with some very profound Reflections onthe ancient Philosophy. Our Author is persuaded there might be severaluseful Discoveries made from a Criticism of the Fictions of it, concern-ing Substances and substantial Forms, Accidents and occult Qualities;which, however unreasonable and capricious, have, he says, a very inti-mate Connexion with the Principles of human Nature. In the Sequel ofthis Section he has obliged us with an inductive Proof of this Position.

That which follows contains a Set of Observations on the modernPhilosophy. This, he tells us, pretends to subsist on a Basis very differentfrom that of the foregoing, and to arise only from such as are the solid,permanent, and consistent Principles of the Imagination. He goes on indiscussing the Equity of this Pretension. He remarks, that the fundamen-tal Principle of this Philosophy is the Opinion of the secondary Qualitiesof Bodies being merely Sensations in us, like to which there is nothing inthe Bodies themselves; but this Supposition, as he labours to prove,

“instead of explaining the Operations of external Objects, utterlyannihilates all those Objects, and reduces ourselves to the Opinions ofthe most extravagant Scepticism concerning them.”39

With this Section our Author concludes his Speculations on theMaterials, the Modifications, and the Instruments of our Knowledge. Hehas traced the Origin of our Ideas, and has ranged them in their severaland proper Classes; he has then combined, separated, and done I knownot what with them; and lastly, he has given us a faithful Representationof the ancient and modern Systems, invented for the Acquisition of

38 [Treatise, 1.4.2.]39 [Treatise, 1.2.5.]

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Science. His Scheme now carries him much further, into vastly sublimerRegions of Metaphysicks; the Immateriality of the Soul, and itsAffections, are hereafter the nobler Subjects of his Researches; I shallendeavour, notwithstanding, to keep him still in view, and every nowand then to let my Readers have a Glimpse of him.

I have remarked,40 that this Writer deals mightily in Egotisms; he is noless notable for Paradoxes. Some few of these I have cited, and we shallmeet with many others in what follows; even in the very next, that is,the fifth Section, which I am now entering upon, there are at least half aDozen, enough to stagger any Man who has not a strong Head-piece.The Title of this Section is, Of the Immateriality of the Soul. And theIntention of it is to shew, that the Immateriality of the Soul is a nonsen-sical Expression, and the Belief of it a most horrible Heresy. The Authorbegins with telling us, that the intellectual World, though involved ininfinite Obscurities, is not however perplexed with any such Contradic-tions as in the foregoing Pages he has proved to attend every Systemconcerning external Objects, and the Idea of Matter, which we fancy soclear and determinate. There are indeed certain Philosophers, as he com-plains, who, envious of this good Quality in the Subject, would fain loadit with those Absurdities from which it is naturally free. These trouble-some Gentlemen are the curious Reasoners concerning the material orimmaterial Substances, in which they suppose our Perceptions to inhere.But, to put an effectual Stop to their Impertinence, he has set them aQuestion, which he very well knows is sufficient entirely to employ themtill Doom’s-day, and that is, in a few Words, What they mean bySubstance and Inhesion? Some of the Difficulties which will obstruct theResponse of this Query, he has very fairly set down, and he as fairlywarns his Antagonists that he will keep them strictly to the Point, andthat it will be in vain for them to think of shuffling; for if any shouldattempt to evade the foresaid Difficulties, by saying, that the Definitionof a Substance is something which may exist by itself, and that thisDefinition ought to satisfy us, he presently whips about, to theirConfusion, and observes, “That this Definition agrees to every thing thatcan possibly be conceived; and never will serve to distinguish Substancefrom Accident, or the Soul from its Perceptions.” For thus he reasons.“Whatever is clearly conceived may exist; and whatever is clearly con-ceived after any manner, may exist after the same manner.” This is onePrinciple, which has been already acknowledged. “Again, every thingwhich is different, is distinguishable, and every thing which is distin-guishable, is separable by the Imagination.” This is another Principle.The Conclusion from both is,

40 Page 357.

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“that since all our Perceptions are different from each other, and fromevery thing else in the Universe, they are also distinct and separable,and may be considered as separately existent, and may exist separate-ly, and have no need of any thing else to support their Existence. They are therefore Substances, as far as this Definition explains aSubstance.”41

When by these, and some other wise Sayings, he has evinced that wecan never arrive at any satisfactory Notion of Substance, and that weought therefore utterly to abandon all Dispute concerning theMateriality or Immateriality of the Soul, he proceeds however, oddlyenough, to engage himself in the Controversy, by attacking an Argumentfor the Soul’s Immateriality, commonly employed, but which yet seemsto him, he says, remarkable. This Argument he has spread over a wholePage. The Sum of it is, That Thought, or Consciousness, cannot be theProperty of a divisible Subject. The whole of what he replies to this, istoo long to be here transcribed; but I can assure the Reader, that he hasseldom, if ever, met with any thing more extraordinary. What he hasdelivered in the first and second Paragraphs of his Answer, is of sounusual a Nature, that it will, it seems, prevent our being surprised, ifhe, in consequence of it, lays down a Maxim, which he owns is con-demned by several Metaphysicians, and is esteemed contrary to the mostcertain Principles of human Reason. This Maxim is, that an Object mayexist, and yet be no where: And he asserts, that this is not only possible,but that the greatest Part of Beings do and must exist after this manner.See how he proves and illustrates this Proposition.

“An Object can be said to be no where, when its Parts are not so situ-ated with respect to each other, as to form any Figure or Quantity;nor the whole, with respect to other Bodies, so as to answer to ourNotions of Contiguity or Distance. Now this is evidently the Casewith all our Perceptions and Objects, except those of the Sight andFeeling. A moral Reflection cannot be placed on the Right or on theLeft-Hand of a Passion; nor can a Smell or Sound be either of a circu-lar or square Figure. These Objects and Perceptions, so far fromrequiring any particular Place, are absolutely incompatible with it.” –

What a prodigious Stretch of Invention is here? How vastly do theseSpeculations exceed in Fineness the finest of the Aristotelian Cobwebs?They are coarse as Sackcloth in comparison with them. And then as to

41 [Treatise, 1.4.5.]

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42 [Treatise, 1.4.5.]

34 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

the Absurdity of imagining real Objects to be no where, our Authorsays,

“if they appear not to have any particular Place, they may possiblyexist in the same manner; since whatever we conceive is possible.”

It will not after this, he says, be necessary to prove that thosePerceptions which are simple, and exist no where, are incapable of anyConjunction in Place with Matter or Body which is extended and divisi-ble; since it is impossible to found a Relation but on some commonQuality. But it is certain, according to him, that all the Difficulties theylabour under who ascribe Thought to an extended divisible Subject, allthe Absurdities they lay themselves open to the Imputation of, are owingmerely to their Ignorance and Neglect of this Doctrine: Did they butunderstand it, they might, by a dexterous Use thereof, effectually silenceall the Cavils of their Adversaries. Indeed, while they go upon otherPrinciples, bestowing a Place on what is absolutely incapable of it, andconjoining Thought with Extension locally, our Author himself says, wecannot refuse to condemn them; but let them espouse his Tenet, and hewill insure them a Triumph. He instructs them not only how they maybaffle, but retort their Enemies Attacks, and carry the War into theirown Quarters, by displaying the equal Absurdity of their conjoining allThought with a simple and indivisible Substance. For, says he,

“the most vulgar Philosophy informs us, that no external Object can make itself known to the Mind immediately, and without the Interposition of an Image or Perception. That Table which just now appears to me, is only a Perception, and all its Qualities areQualities of a Perception. Now the most obvious of all its Qualities is Extension. The Perception consists of Parts. These Parts are so situ-ated, as to afford us the Notion of Distance and Contiguity; ofLength, Breadth and Thickness. – And, to cut short all Disputes, thevery Idea of Extension is copied from nothing but an Impression, andconsequently must perfectly agree to it. To say the Idea of Extensionagrees to any thing, is to say that thing is extended.”42

Thus, as he adds, the Free-Thinker may exult in his Turn; and havingfound there are Impressions and Ideas really extended, may ask hisAntagonists, how they can incorporate a simple and indivisible Subjectwith an extended Perception? All their Arguments recoil, as he evinces,on themselves; nor is it possible for them to evade their Force.

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43 See Pages 379–384.

The History of the Works of the Learned 35

What he has said upon this Head, gives him an Occasion of re-enter-ing on the Question concerning the Substance of the Soul; and though,as we have already seen, he has pronounced that Matter to be altogetherunintelligible, yet he cannot forbear some farther Reflections thereon.He roundly asserts, that the Doctrine of the Immateriality, Simplicity,and Indivisibility of a thinking Substance, is a true Atheism, and willserve to justify all those Sentiments for which Spinoza is so universallyinfamous.

This, to many Readers, will appear the harshest of all the Paradoxesthis Author has advanced. Alas! will they exclaim, Poor Dr. Clarke, is itthy Fate to be branded as a true Atheist? Thou illustrious, thou mostlearned, judicious, sincere, zealous, and yet candid Advocate for Naturaland Revealed Religion; thou immortal Defender of the Immaterialityand natural Immortality of thinking Substances! Shall all thy strong, thyclear, and unanswerable Arguments, as so many of the best Judges haveesteemed them, be now levelled with the Dust, and trampled on withAbhorrence! This is indeed a lamentable Case; but such is the absolutePleasure of our Author, and we must submit: Neither Locke, norClarke, nor the most venerable Names, shall usurp the Place of Truth inhis Affections.

However, we are not to look upon this as an arbitrary Sentence; it isfounded on Reason and Equity. To convince us hereof, our Author laysbefore us a Summary of Spinozism, which he terms an hideousHypotheses, and then shews, first in general, and afterwards more par-ticularly, in what Respects it agrees with the Doctrine of theImmaterialists; at the same time making it evident, that those Objectionswhich have been urged against the former, are of equal Force against thelatter also. His Reasoning upon this Subject still turns, in a greatMeasure, on his favourite Notion of the Mind being no continuedSubstance, but merely a Series of fleeting independent Perceptions.

When he has settled the Nature of thinking Beings, and corrected theatheistical Errors of the Immaterialists with Relation thereto, he pro-ceeds to consider what those heterodox Gentlemen hold concerning theCause of our Perceptions. And after a brief Rehearsal of theirParalogisms, to prove that Matter and Motion can never produceThought, the seeming Evidence of which, he says, few have been able towithstand, he goes on to refute them, (than which, he says, nothing inthe World is more easy) by the Application of his Doctrine of Causality,which the Reader has already seen in a foregoing Extract.43 From whathe has offered on this Point, he would have us certainly conclude, “ThatMatter may be, and actually is, the Cause of Thought and Perception.”

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36 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

The Refusal of our Assent to this Proposition, reduces us to thisDilemma, either to assert, that nothing can be the Cause of another, butwhere the Mind can perceive the Connexion in its Idea of the Objects,which will exclude all Causes out of the Universe, not excepting theDeity; or own that all Objects, which are found to be constantly con-joined, are upon that Account only to be regarded as Causes and Effects,– which evidently gives the Advantage to the Materialists above theirAntagonists.

At the Close of this Section, our Author, in a very few Words, endeav-ours to shew, that what he has advanced with reference to this Pointdoes not any way affect Religion. If his Philosophy, he says, makes noAddition to the Arguments for it, he has at least the Satisfaction to thinkit takes nothing from them, but that every thing remains precisely asbefore.

In the Section ensuing, he discourses at large of personal Identity. Hespecifies the Notions some Philosophers form of this Matter, in allwhich they pretend an absolute Certainty; but which, on the other hand,he proves to have no manner of Foundation. As for him, he can perceivenothing of the Identity these mistaken Men talk of. If they are consciousof something simple and continued, which they call themselves, he iscertain there is no such Principle in him; and he may venture, he says, toaffirm, that neither he nor the rest of Mankind are any thing but aBundle or Collection of different Perceptions, which succeed each otherwith an inconceivable Rapidity, and are in a perpetual Flux andMovement. There is not, according to him, a single Power of the Soulwhich remains unalterably the same. There is properly no Simplicity inthe Mind at one Time, nor Identity in different, whatever naturalPropension we may have to imagine that Simplicity and Identity. Such aPropension it is undeniable we have, and he spends some Pages in mak-ing us know how we came by it, and how it imposes on us. Here he hasoccasion for the Principles he made use of in the second Section of thisPart of his Work, and which we have said somewhat of in p. 88, &c.preceding, for explaining the Principium Individuationis; and he shewswhat this is, and how we are inclined to conceive of it with regard tovegetable and inanimate Systems. Upon the same Principles, and by thesame Method of Reasoning, he leads us to apprehend the Nature of per-sonal Identity, or that which we ascribe to the Mind of Man. This, hesays, is only a fictitious one, and of a like Kind with that which weattribute to Vegetables and animal Bodies, derived from the sameOrigin, and proceeding from a like Operation of the Imagination uponlike Objects. He labours with great Assiduity to evince this notableTruth, as if his Readers were really to receive some Benefit by the Beliefof it. What he has offered upon this Head, puts an End to his

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The History of the Works of the Learned 37

Examination of the several Schemes of Philosophy, both of the intellec-tual and moral World. –

“It is now Time, (he says) to return to a more close Examination ofhis Subject, and proceed in the accurate Anatomy of human Nature,having fully explained the Nature of our Judgment and Under-standing.”44

But (as he expresses himself in the seventh Section, wherewith he closes this Book) before he launches out into those immense Depthswhich lie before him, he finds himself inclined to stop a Moment in hispresent Situation, and to ponder that Voyage he himself has undertaken,and which undoubtedly requires the utmost Art and Industry to bebrought to a happy Conclusion. Methinks, says he, (in a Strain thatwhile it raises our Idea of his Resolution is yet enough to pierce theHeart of any human Reader)

“I am like a Man, who, having struck on many Shoals, and havingnarrowly escaped Shipwreck in passing a small Frith, has yet theTemerity to put out to Sea in the same leaky weather-beaten Vessel;and even carries his Ambition so far, as to think of compassing theGlobe under these disadvantageous Circumstances. My Memory ofpast Errors and Perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. TheWeakness and Disorder of the Faculties, I must employ in myInquiries, increase my Apprehensions; and the Impossibility of amend-ing or correcting these Faculties, reduces me almost to Despair, andmakes me resolve to perish on the barren Rock on which I am at pre-sent, rather than venture myself upon that boundless Ocean whichruns out into Immensity. This sudden View of my Danger strikes mewith Melancholy; and as it is usual for that Passion, above all others,to indulge itself, I cannot forbear feeding my Despair with all thosedesponding Reflections, which the present Subject furnishes me within such Abundance.

I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn Solitude inwhich I am placed in my Philosophy, and fancy myself some strangeuncouth Monster, who, not being able to mingle and unite in Society,has been expelled all human Commerce, and left utterly abandonedand disconsolate. Fain would I run into the Crowd for Shelter andWarmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such Deformity. Icall upon others to join me, in order to make a Company apart, but

44 [Treatise, 1.4.6.]

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45 [Treatise, 1.4.7.]46 The Reader who will consult the Original, will find a full Representation of these in

the Paragraphs preceding this Extract. He will there likewise see, that they are theSource of most of those Calamities which our Author apprehends, or labours under.

38 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

no one will hearken to me; every one keeps at a Distance, and dreadsthat Storm which beats upon me from every Side. I have exposedmyself to the Enmity of all Metaphysicians, Logicians, Mathemati-cians, and even Theologians; and can I wonder at the Insults I mustsuffer? I have declared my Disapprobation of their Systems; and can Ibe surprised, if they should express a Hatred of mine and of myPerson? When I look abroad, I foresee on every Side Dispute,Contradiction, Anger, Calumny and Detraction. When I turn my Eyeinward, I find nothing but Doubt and Ignorance; all the World con-spires to oppose and contradict me, though such is my Weakness, thatI feel all my Opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupport-ed by the Approbations of others; every Step I take is with Hesitation,and every new Reflection makes me dread an Error and Absurdity inmy Reasoning.”45

What Heart now would not almost bleed? what Breast can forbear tosympathize with this brave Adventurer? For my part, I cannot, withoutthe utmost Emotion and Solicitude, take even a transient Prospect of theDangers and terrible Catastrophe to which he is exposed. Somewhat ofthese appears in the foregoing Citation; but we have a much largermelancholy Description of them in the Sequel of the Section fromwhence I copied it. However, after all, as it becomes us to mourn withthose that mourn, so it is but fitting we should rejoice with such as arejoyful; and seeing our Author is so at certain Seasons, notwithstandinghis tragical Circumstances, it would be ridiculous in us not to join in hisExhilerations. Take his own Account of the Matter, for it is impossiblefor any other Language in the World to express his Condition like thatwhich he uses.

“The intense View (says he) of these manifold Contradictions and Imperfections in human Reason,46 has so wrought upon me, andheated my Brain, that I am ready to reject all Belief and Reasoning,and can look upon no Opinion even as more probable or likely thananother. Where am I or what? from what Causes do I derive myExistence, and to what Condition shall I return? whose Favour shall Icourt, and whose Anger must I dread? what Beings surround me? andon whom have I any Influence, or who have any Influence on me? Iam confounded with all these Questions, and begin to fancy myself in

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The History of the Works of the Learned 39

the most deplorable State imaginable, inviron’d with the deepestDarkness, and utterly deprived of the Use of every Member andFaculty.”

This is a little Sketch of the dismal Part of the Scene; now it turns, andpresents a gay and chearing Aspect; for he immediately adjoins,

“Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of dis-pelling these Clouds, Nature herself suffices to that Purpose, and curesme of this philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, either by relaxingthis Bent of Mind, or by some Avocation and lively Impression of mySenses, which obliterate all these Chimera’s, I dine, I play a Game atBackgammon, I converse and am merry with my Friends; and when,after three or four Hours Amusement, I would return to theseSpeculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that Icannot find in my Heart to enter into them any farther. – I am readyto throw all my Books and Papers into the Fire, and resolve nevermore to renounce the Pleasures of Life for the sake of Reasoning andPhilosophy.”47

I will take Leave of our Author while he is in this chearful Mood, inthis agreeable Situation; for, by looking forward, I perceive him ex-tremely ready to relapse into profound Meditations on incomprehensibleSubjects, and so into Scepticism, Chagrin, and all that gloomy frightfulTrain of Ideas from whence he is but this Moment emerged. Whether Ishall wait upon him any more, and venture with him into those immenseDepths of Philosophy which he launches into in his second Volume, Iam not yet determined. Perhaps I have already and sufficiently answeredthe End of this Article, which is to make the Treatise it refers to moregenerally known than I think it has been; to bring it, as far as I am able,into the Observation of the Learned, who are the proper Judges of itsContents, who will give a Sanction to its Doctrines, where they are trueand useful, and who have Authority to correct the Mistakes where theyare of a different Nature; and lastly, to hint to the ingenious Writer,whoever he is, some Particulars in his Performance, that may require avery serious Reconsideration. It bears indeed incontestable Marks of agreat Capacity, of a soaring Genius, but young, and not yet thoroughlypracticed. The Subject is vast and noble as any that can exercise theUnderstanding; but it requires a very mature Judgment to handle it asbecomes its Dignity and Importance; the utmost Prudence, Tendernessand Delicacy, are requisite to this desirable Issue. Time and Use may

47 [Treatise, 1.4.7.]

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40 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

ripen these Qualities in our Author; and we shall probably have Reasonto consider this, compared with his later Productions, in the same Lightas we view the Juvenile Works of Milton, or the first Manner of aRaphael, to other celebrated Painter.

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The History of the Works of the Learned 41

2GÖTTINGISCHE ZEITUNGEN

Review of Treatise, Book 1, in Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrtenSachen, January 7, 1740, Nr. 2, pp. 9–12.English translation of complete review by Manfred Kuehn.

The Göttingische Zeitungen was one of the world’s longest serial publi-cations, covering over 200 years, from 1739–1940. The journal went

through several name changes, and was devoted to the review of scholarlybooks.1 In their first year of publication, the journal takes notice of Hume’sTreatise twice. The first notice simply lists the title of the Treatise underbooks recently received, but the second gives a more detailed account:

An unknown author has worked up A Treatise of Human Nature. In ithe attempts to introduce a way of basing morality more upon sensationand experience than has been customary until now. He has dealt withthe understanding and the passions in the work. But it is only the begin-ning of a larger one. Though the author has much in common with Mr.Hutchinson, he also has not a few thoughts of his own [GöttingischeZeitungen, December 21, 1739, Nr. 102, p. 904]2

The next year the journal published a brief review of Book 1 of Hume’sTreatise. The review opens noting that the Treatise deserves “a high rankamong extraordinary books,” but, as the review unfolds, it becomes clearthat, for the reviewer, the Treatise is extraordinary in an unflattering way.Hume’s views on memory and the imagination in Part 1 are unclear. Hisdiscussion of probability and causality in Part 3 is obscure and strange. Hissceptical views in Part 4 are equally extraordinary. Although the reviewersuggests that the journal might provide a more detailed discussion, noother review of the Treatise appeared.

1 Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen (1739–1752); Göttingische Anzeigenvon gelehrten Sachen, unter der Aufsicht der Königl. Gesellschaft derWissenschaften (1753–1801); Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, unter der Aufsichtder Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften (1802–1940).

2 The translation of this passage is as appears in Manfred Kuehn, “Hume in theGöttingische Anzeigen: 1739–1800,” Hume Studies, Vol. 13, April, 1987. Theearlier notice of the Treatise appeared in March 5, 1739, Nr. 19, p. 168.

41

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3 [No further review was published in this journal. The review consist of one longparagraph; breaks between paragraphs have been added to make reading easier.]

42 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

Below is the first published English translation of the complete review,by Manfred Kuehn. Bracketed comments below are those of the translator.

London.

This book on human nature by an anonymous author, which attemptsto introduce the way of reasoning, grounded in experience, into moralphilosophy, must be given such a high rank among extraordinary booksthat we cannot resist giving you an idea of the main concerns of thework by providing information about the most remarkable thoughts ofthe author; only in the future will we have a full discussion of thiswork.3 The title reads: A treatise of human nature; being an attempt tointroduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects.8vo. 2 vols. At the beginning the author teaches us that all the scienceshave a connection with human nature. Therefore, the best way ofaccomplishing anything in them would be to learn to know this natureitself, and then build on its principles a new and unchanging structure ofall the sciences. We could reach this knowledge best by means of experiments; but experiments cannot be used in moral matters becauseby them we would change the true qualities of our soul in cases whenwe intentionally and often induce the same state in ourselves, and thuswe must give very careful attention to other people. This will not beconsidered entirely novel; nevertheless, its explication is sometimes origi-nal enough, if only it were otherwise correct.

The first book deals with the understanding, the other with the pas-sions. Book 1 is made up of four parts. In its first the author presents histhoughts about ideas. These are for him nothing more than images madeby the lively impressions, with which he contrasts ideas. These impres-sions comprise all sensations, passions, and first motions of the soul. Allideas originate thus from impressions, and thus correspond precisely tothem. With this single stroke, the author hopes to have defeated [thedoctrine of] innate ideas. He has such abstract, or more accurately,unclear notions of the ideas of memory and the imagination, of the con-nection of ideas, of the concepts of substance and modes, and ofabstract ideas, that we can scarcely expect that he will shed more lighton moral truths than previous thinkers have. It is the opinion of Dr.Berkeley, whose view the author believes himself to have proved incon-

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Göttingische Zeitungen 43

trovertibly, that all supposedly general ideas are only particular onesthat are connected with certain words that give them a wider meaning,and which allow us at times to represent other individual things whichare similar. If the reader can obtain as good an opinion of the author’sproofs as the author himself has, then the reader must allow himself tobe persuaded without fail; otherwise, we doubt this will happen.

In the second and third parts of the work the author talks of infinitedivisibility, space and time. All proofs for the infinite divisibility ofextension are, according to the judgment of the author, sophistries, andthey are invalid as long as the impossibility of mathematical points hasnot been proved. He cannot obtain the concept of extension in any otherway than by directing his eyes to many bodies, by averting them fromthese bodies, and by considering the distance between two of them. Hecannot imagine a vacuum absolutum either. He concludes this discus-sion with the following riddle: If we call an invisible and untouchablebreadth a vacuum, then extension and matter are identical, yet still avacuum. If we do not call them thus, then a motion in a full space with-out impact, penetration, etc. is possible.

The author has peculiar thoughts about certainty and probability, anda great talent for obscuring what others might have said clearly aboutthese subjects. As clear as is our experience that whatever begins to existmust have a cause, just so obscure is the proof that the author gives ofthis. The necessary connection between cause and effect is for him only[a connection] in thought and not in the thing itself; he supposes that allthe necessity of causes and effects consists only in a determination of thesoul to think two objects as always connected. Strange enough! We shallnot even consider the related conclusions which the author draws fromthis.

The fourth part, of the sceptical and other philosophical doctrines, isas extraordinary as the ones that precede it. Everything is only probable,nothing is certain, if we listen to the author. His ideas about the proofthat bodies exist resembles in thoroughness those that he has givenbefore. The principium individuationis is, as he finally says after [havingoffered] different intricate thoughts, nothing but the immutability, and(if we may talk this way) uninterruptedness of a thing’s existencebetween two different representations of it. This will be sufficient for thereader to get some idea of the other volume in advance.

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44 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

1 Editors and authors of the Bibliothèque raisonnée included Armand Boisbeleau deLa Chapelle (1676–1746), Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744), Pierre Massuet (1698–1776), Willem Jacob ’sGravesande (1688–1742), Jean Rousset (1686–1762), Louisde Jaucourt (1704–1780), and Pierre Desmaizeaux (1673?–1745).

3BIBLIOTHÈQUE RAISONNÉE

Review of Treatise, Books 1 and 2, Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvragesdes savans de l’Europe, April–June, 1740, Vol. 24–2, pp. 324–355. English translation of complete review by David Fate Norton and MaryJ. Norton.

The French journal Bibliothèque raisonnée was published from 1728to 1753.1 Devoted exclusively to the review of new books, the

journal was founded as a continuation of Jean Leclerc’s Bibliothèqueuniverselle (1686–1727). The Bibliothèque raisonnée was published inThe Hague, Holland, a safe-haven for French authors at a time whenpublishing in France was tightly controlled. Hume was personallyacquainted with at least one of the editors and authors of theBibliothèque raisonnée, namely, French philosopher and biographerPierre Desmaizeaux (1673?–1745). About two months after the Treatisewas published, Hume wrote to Desmaizeaux, requesting comments onthe Treatise:

Whenever you see my Name, you’ll readily imagine the Subject of myLetter. A young Author can scarce forbear speaking of hisPerformances to all the World: But when he meets with one, that is agood Judge, & whose Instruction & Advice he depends on, thereought some Indulgence to be given him. You were so good as topromise me, that, if you cou’d find Leizure from your otherOccupations, you woud look over my System of Philosophy, & at thesame time ask the Opinion of such of your Acquaintance as youthought proper Judges. Have you found it sufficiently intelligible?Does it appear true to you? Do the Style & Language seem tolerable?These three Questions comprehend every thing; & I beg of you toanswer them with the utmost Freedom & Sincerity. I know ’tis aCustom to flatter Poets on their Performances; but I hope Philosophersmay be exempted: And the more so, that their Cases are by no means

44

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2 A review of Book 3 of the Treatise appeared a year later in the Bibliothèqueraisonnée, April–June, 1741, Vol. 26–2, pp. 411–427. This review makes no use ofHume’s Abstract, which discusses only Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise. For a trans-lation of the review of Book 3, see Early Responses to Hume, Vol. 1.

Bibliothèque Raisonnée 45

alike. When we do not approve of any thing in a Poet, we commonlycan give no Reason for our Dislike, but our particular Taste; whichnot being convincing we think it better to conceal our Sentiments altogether. But every Error in Philosophy can be distinctly markt, &prov’d to be such; & this is a Favour I flatter myself you’ll indulge mein with regard to the Performance I put into your Hands. I am, indeed,afraid, that it wou’d be too great a Trouble for you to mark all theErrors you have observ’d. I shall only insist on being informd of themost material of them, & you may assure yourself will consider it as asingular Favour. [Hume to Pierre Desmaizeaux, April 6, 1739]

We do not know if Desmaizeaux responded to Hume’s letter, but aboutthe time of this letter a brief notice of the Treatise appeared in theBibliothèque raisonnée:

A gentleman, a Mr. Hume, has published A Treatise of humanNature: being an Attempt, &c. That is, Traité de la Nature humaine;où l’on essaye d’introduire la Méthode expérimentale de raissonerdans les sujets de Morale. 8vo. 2 vol. This work is divided into twovolumes, of which the first, concerning the Understanding, containsfour Parts each divided into several Sections. The first Part concernsideas, their origin, composition, abstraction, connection, &c.; the second, the ideas of space and time; the third, knowledge and proba-bility; and the fourth, scepticism [Pyrrhonisme] and the other systemsof philosophy. The second volume, concerning the passions, consistsof three parts. The first part is concerned with pride and humility; thesecond with love and hatred; and the third with the will and the directpassions. Those who desire something new will find what they wanthere. The author argues on his own terms, he goes thoroughly intothings, and he follows new ways of thinking. He is very original.[Bibliothèque raisonnée, 1739, April-June, Vol. 22–2, pp. 481–482]

This notice is interesting, not only for its neutral and occasionally evenfavourable tone towards the Treatise, but also because it identifiesHume by name as the author of the anonymously published Treatise –possibly as a result of Desmaizeaux’s acquaintance with Hume. A yearlater a review of Book 1 of the Treatise appeared in the Bibliothèqueraisonnée;2 it is possible that Desmaizeaux was the author of this review.

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3 Bibliothèque raisonnée, April–June, 1740, Vol. 24–2, pp. 481–482. This and thenotice above are translated by David Fate Norton. For a discussion of the noticesand reviews in the Bibliothèque raisonnée, see Ernest C. Mossner, “The ContinentalReception of Hume’s Treatise, 1739–1741,” Mind, 1947, Vol. 56, pp. 31–43.

46 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

In the same issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée, a notice also appearedabout the publication of Hume’s anonymous Abstract of a book latelypublished (1740). The notice simply states “Because some have foundMr. Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature a little too abstruse, a pamphlethas been published to help them understand it.”3 This notice also identi-fies Hume as the author of the Treatise.

John W. Yolton has drawn attention to the fact that the Bibliothèqueraisonnée review of Book 1 of the Treatise is heavily dependent onHume’s Abstract. Yolton writes,

There can be no doubt that the reviewer had before him a copy ofthe Abstract. The order and content of the review is identical with theorder and content of the Abstract, for three-quarters of the Abstract atleast. For the most part, the review is a close translation of sentencesin the Abstract. In some instances, the order of sentences is altered. Inothers, the sense of the Abstract sentences is explicated by additionalphrases in the review. On three or four occasions, direct quotationsare taken and translated from the Treatise, as a way of illustrating apoint summarized in the Abstract. These quotations from the Treatiseare usually verbatim, though sometimes rather loose, translations ofHume: in about the same way that the whole review is a translation of the Abstract. [Journal of the History of Ideas, 1979, vol. 40, pp. 157–158]

Indeed, the parallels between the French review and the Abstract areundeniable. A comparison of the first sentence of each illustrates this:

Abstract: “This book seems to be wrote upon the same plan with several other works that have had a great vogue of late yearsin England.”

Review: “At first glance this work, of which we gave a general ideaanother time, appears to have been written with the samedesign as many others published in Great Britain in recentyears.” (Au prémier coup d’œil que l’on jette sur cet Ouvrage,dont nous donnames une idée générale il y a quelque tems, ilparoît écrit dans les mêmes vues que tant d’autres, qui ont étépubliés dans la Grande Bretagne depuis quelques années.)

The review incorporates virtually the entirety of the Abstract as this per-

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tains to Book 1 of the Treatise. However, the review differs in threerespects from the Abstract. First, it leaves out entirely that portion of theAbstract that deals with Book 2 of the Treatise. Second, the reviewerincorporates material from the Treatise, including two lengthy quota-tions and some shorter quotations or paraphrases. Third, and mostimportantly, the review includes four paragraphs of material that do nothave parallels in the Abstract. In the first of these – the fifth paragraphof the review – the reviewer warns that the Treatise favours Pyrrhonism,although he suggests that this is a side effect of metaphysics in general.In the very next paragraph the reviewer notes that he intends to restricthimself to Book 1 of the Treatise, aiming only to examine the founda-tions of Hume’s logic. The remaining two paragraphs are those withwhich the review ends. In these the reviewer expresses shock at the con-fidence Hume shows in presenting sceptical paradoxes. Nevertheless, thereviewer notes his debt to the “young Philosopher” and looks forwardto what he might write “once age has matured his taste.” In addition tothese complete paragraphs of new material, the reviewer from time totime adds comments about Hume’s views; some of these also reveal thathe has before him a copy of the Abstract.

Although we might suppose that the reviewer was working from aprinted copy of Hume’s Abstract, it may well be that he was consultinga manuscript version of the work sent to him by Hume. In a cryptic let-ter that has occasioned much discussion, Hume informs FrancisHutcheson about matters relating to the review of his Treatise and theAbstract:

My Bookseller has sent to Mr Smith a Copy of my Book, which I hopehe has receiv’d, as well as your Letter. I have not yet heard what hehas done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed inLondon; but not in the Works of the Learned; there having been anArticle with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in thatWork, before I sent up the Abstract. [Hume to Francis Hutcheson,March 4, 1740]

Hume indicates here that a “Mr Smith” had been sent a copy of theAbstract. Two points need to be made concerning this. First, theAbstract was announced as having been published in London, on March11, 1740. Consequently, it is clear that, prior to March 11, Hume, inEdinburgh, could only have sent to Smith a manuscript copy of thiswork. Second, James Moore and David Raynor have argued that the“Mr Smith” mentioned in this letter is William (Guillaume, in French)Smith who, as “G. Smith,” is listed on the title page of the Bibliothèqueraisonnée as one of the publishers of that journal.4 Thus it is possible,

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4 James Moore and M.A. Stewart, “William Smith (1698–1741) and the Dissenters’Book Trade,” Bulletin of the Presbyterian Historical Society of Ireland, No. 23(1993), pp. 20–27. David Raynor, “The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited,”Hume Studies, April 1993, Vol. 19, pp. 213–215. Raynor disputes the view that the“Mr Smith” mentioned is Adam Smith, and that Adam Smith is the author of theAbstract. For additional evidence that Hume is the author of the Abstract; seeDavid Fate Norton, “More Evidence that Hume Wrote the Abstract,” HumeStudies, April 1993, Vol. 19, pp. 217–219.

5 [The review first gives the title of Hume’s work in English, then in French.]6 [Bibliothèque raisonnée 22 (April–June, 1739), 481–2.]

even likely, that the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviewer of the Treatise wasworking from the manuscript copy of the Abstract sent to Smith byHume.

Below is the first published English translation of the complete review,by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Bracketed insertions arethose of the translators.

A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, being an attempt to introduce theexperimental method of reasoning into Moral Subjects.5 That is, Traitésur la nature Humaine, dans lequel on essaye d’introduire la éthode deraisonner par expérience dans les Sujets de Morale. Vol. I. Of theUnderstanding, 475 pages. Vol. II. Of the Passions, 318 pages. London:John Noon, 1739, large 8vo.

At first glance this work, of which we gave a general idea another time,6

appears to have been written with the same design as many others pub-lished in Great Britain in recent years. We see that throughout Europe,for nearly a half-century now, the taste for philosophy has become moredominant and more widely cultivated, but nowhere has there been moreprogress than in that island. Metaphysics especially is greatly improvedthere. In emulation, many of the learned English have been stimulated toturn their studies in this direction. Original in all that they do, they haveset off on a new path: they have tried to make philosophy more usefulby teaching men to know themselves better than they previously did.And we must do them justice: they have not laboured in vain. It is cer-tain that most ancient philosophers who wrote about human naturewere more concerned with elegant expression than with going deeplyinto things. We find in their books the delicate, the grand, the beautiful;but method is lacking and the elegance of style and the sublimity ofthoughts found there, although admirable, do not compensate for the

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7 Introduction, page 6 [Treatise, Introduction, ¶2].

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lack of details that we would wish to have. Is it possible that the scienceof man, unlike the other sciences, is incapable of being developed by aset of related and evident propositions that lead the mind to the truth inan orderly and precise manner? Could not the science of man benefitjust as natural philosophy has? The answer is not obvious. What do werisk if we make an attempt at this science? If by giving all our attentionto that which takes place within us, we could once find the key in somegeneral principle, and discover subsequently the connection of this prin-ciple with others, we could in this way uncover those few general princi-ples that are the source of all the others. In any case, we would have thesatisfaction of having made discoveries, as far as our faculties permit,about the subject that interests us most. Why not, then, give it a try?

The anonymous author of this treatise praises the penetration of several philosophers who have lately followed this method. These heproposes to imitate in his researches. Persuaded that Mr. Locke, LordShaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutcheson, Dr. Butler, and severalothers besides7 have rendered the world a very great service by excludinghypotheses and conjectures from morals, just as the illustrious Baconbanished them from physics, in order to substitute observations andexperiments. Our author proposes to imitate this model although work-ing on another level. While he very often distances himself from theirideas, he claims none the less not to depart from their method. His goalis to provide us with an accurate anatomy of human nature by followingthe experimental method in its most rigorous form. The reader willjudge if he has achieved all the order and clarity that we could wish tohave on this topic.

To consider the subject itself, not only is no other more interesting tous, but we can also say that the author actually includes all the scienceswithin his scope. Logic concerns the nature of our ideas and the natureand operations of our understanding; morals concerns our passions; crit-icism our tastes; politics our duties in society. All these are clearly relat-ed to our knowledge of ourselves. Thus to promise a treatise on humannature is really to propose a comprehensive work, a system of all the sci-ences, but a system built on a new and especially sound foundation. Thisis the design that our author outlines and that he begins to carry out inthe present work, which contains the first two parts of his new science.

The question is how to deal with such an important subject with theclarity, precision, and comprehensiveness appropriate to it. The famousLeibnitz has somewhere complained that almost all the works of logic

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8 [A work by John Locke.]9 [That is, De la recherche de la verité, by Nicolas Malebranche.]10 [That is, L’Art de penser by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole.]

and metaphysics, not excepting An Essay concerning HumanUnderstanding,8 The Search after Truth,9 and The Art of Thinking,10

were extremely prolix concerning the operations of the understandingthat are involved in forming demonstrations, but that they provided toolittle detail when instructing us about probability and the differentdegrees of belief on which the greatest part of the actions of our lives,and often even the greatest part of our philosophical speculations,depend. In this respect, we cannot reproach our author. He elaboratesamply on these matters, and if the principles that he posits in explainingthem are not to the taste of everyone, everyone will at least find theresomething new, and even the most accomplished metaphysicians willfind something to challenge them.

In general, this work is full of original thoughts that have all the meritof singularity. Readers will find that by dint of his desire to go thoroughly into the innermost nature of things, the anonymous authoruses barely intelligible language. I fear, moreover, that his paradoxes notonly savour of Pyrrhonism, but also lead to consequences that theauthor appears to disapprove. Metaphysics, as much as the other sciences, has its pitfalls. When it goes beyond certain limits, it obscuresthe very objects that it seeks to reveal. Under pretext of yielding only toevidence, it finds difficulty everywhere. Even religion suffers much inencounters with metaphysics, for sometimes in trying to demonstrateand clarify it produces first principles too arcane, too difficult, For allthat, among some English theologians it is now fashionable to sprinkleeven their sermons with the most subtle metaphysics. At the least, unlesswe have Locke at our fingertips, we cannot begin to understand them.We must hope that such an unfortunate fashion will not survive in thebosom of such an enlightened and perceptive country.

Our author, although concerned with the most subtle metaphysics,does not get beyond his depth. We, however, will get beyond ours if, inorder to examine his principles, and in order to give a complete idea ofhis work, we try to grasp all the details he introduces, both about theunderstanding and about the passions. It will be enough for the presentif we limit ourselves to examining the foundations of his logic, and if,without leaving his treatise on the understanding, we focus on, amongother things, what he says concerning our manner of reasoning on caus-es and their effects. If we have the good fortune to express clearly hisprinciples on this issue, the reader can judge of all the rest by that.

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11 Book I. Part I. Sect. I, page 11 [i.e. Treatise 1.1.1.1 (Book 1, Part 1, Section 1, ¶1).Page numbers are those of the first edition; paragraph numbers are given in ATreatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, OxfordPhilosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and may be easilydetermined in any edition of the Treatise if allowance is made for the paragraphsadded in the Appendix first published as a part of volume 3 of the Treatise.]

12 Ibid., page 16 [i.e. Treatise 1.1.1.7].13 Ibid., page 21 [i.e. Treatise 1.1.1.12].

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At the beginning of this treatise,11 the author defines the term percep-tion, to which he gives a new meaning. He says first that by perceptionhe means everything that can be present to our mind, either by means ofthe senses, by the operation of the passions, or by the exercise of reflec-tion and thought. He next distinguishes two sorts of perception, calledimpressions and ideas. When our mind is activated by some passion, orwhen the senses directly present to it the image of some object, the per-ception, he says, is an impression. When later the mind reflects on thepassion, or on this object, without having any feeling, this perception isan idea. An idea is here, in a word, only a languid and weak perception,while, on the contrary, an impression is a forceful and lively perception.There is between these two the same difference as that between thinkingand feeling.

Having made this distinction, the first proposition that the anonymousauthor bases on it is that all simple ideas arise in us for the first timefrom some simple impression, to which they correspond exactly.12 Or, tospeak in other terms, our strongest perceptions are the cause of theweakest, and we only think of that which we have previously felt. Atfirst, I believed that this proposition amounted to Mr. Locke’s opinionthat there are no innate ideas; but since under the term idea Mr. Lockegenerally includes all our perceptions, there is a real difference betweenhis opinion and that of our author. The latter will readily grant that ourlanguid and weak perceptions are not innate, because, given his defini-tion of terms, these weak perceptions (those he calls ideas) are only, tobe precise, perceptions produced by other perceptions – perceptions thatour mind has only second hand. But, on the other hand, our author doesnot hesitate to regard as innate all those stronger perceptions, such ascompassion, love of virtue, anger, and in general all the human passions,that he calls impressions. This approach, he believes, even reconcilesperfectly those systems most antithetical on this issue. A Malebrancheanwould have no difficulty avowing that our mind receives all its ideas, ifnot from the senses, at least from some internal perceptions. A discipleof Locke on his part will agree without scruple that all our passions areinnate because, in effect, they derive immediately from the constitutionof our nature.13 In order to show, for example, that the idea of

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14 Ibid., page 22 [i.e. Treatise 1.1.2.1.].

extension or the idea of colour are not innate, philosophers observe thatthey enter the mind through the channel of the senses. In order to showthat the idea of a desire and that the idea of a passion are no more innatethan those of colour or extension, they observe that we know the passionsand desires by feeling before we know them by reflection. What are we toconclude from this if not that our ideas are only weak perceptions pro-duced by other, preceding perceptions, some of which come from an inter-nal cause that is innate and the others from an external cause that is not.

In order to explain all this better, it will be useful to listen to the authorhimself and to learn from him how he understands his own principles.Here then is what he says in the second Section of the first Part, where hedivides his subject.14 “Since all our simple ideas are ordinarily preceded bythose impressions, of which they are the effect and the image, properorder would seem to require that we treat of that which concerns impres-sions, before explaining that which concerns ideas. However, it is advis-able to follow another method. Our impressions are of two kinds; the onecoming from feeling, the other from reflection. The first originate in ourminds, as a consequence of our natural constitution and in a manner thatis unknown to us. The second derive for the most part from our ideas andin the following order. An impression affects our senses so that we feel,for example, cold or heat, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain. This impres-sion leaves in our mind an image, that is to say, a copy of itself, that itretains after the impression has completely ceased; and this image I call anidea. Now whether this idea is a pleasure, or a pain, in its turn it producesin the mind new impressions; impressions of desire or aversion, of hope orfear, and it is these that I call impressions of reflection, because reflectionproduces them. But afterwards these impressions copied by the imagina-tion or by the memory arise as new ideas, that may themselves after thatbecome new impressions, accompanied by other ideas, that correspond tothem. In this manner, the impressions of reflection are found to precedethose ideas to which they correspond; but they are posterior to thoseimpressions of sensation, and derive from them. We could begin then bytreating of sensations, if that subject were not rather the province of nat-ural philosophy and anatomy, than of logic and morals. We will comeafterwards to the impressions of reflection, that is to say, to that whichconcerns the desires and passions of our mind. But as the impressions ofreflection are ordinarily produced by our ideas, it is necessary that wereverse the method that appears at first the most natural. In order toknow better the nature of man, considered as a moral being, we shouldtreat of ideas before speaking of impressions. That is, therefore, the plan Ihave chosen and that I will follow.”

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15 Part III. Sect II., page 135 [i.e. Treatise 1.3.2.4–5, but the reviewer is in factfollowing the text of Abstract 8].

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Such, in short, are the views of our author, such is the fundamentalprinciple of his entire system. There is no idea, whether of the understand-ing, or of the imagination, or of the memory, that has not been precededby some impression. This principle, our anonymous author claims, is thekey to all the controversies that divide philosophers concerning the originof ideas. It is because they have failed to grasp this principle that theyhave not sufficiently understood one another. It follows first from thisprinciple that, whereas impressions always excite or give rise in the mindto perceptions both clear and lively, ideas in contrast are for the most partperceptions so obscure and weak that it is often very difficult to sort outtheir mechanism and composition. There is only one way to do this.When the idea is obscure, it is necessary to have recourse to its impressionin order to make the idea clear. When we do not readily see which ideasare commonly attached to certain philosophical terms, and we suspectthat these terms as used have no meaning, it is necessary to ask from whatimpression we appear to derive the idea. If we can discover that, we canthus determine the precise significance of this idea; but if it is impossibleto discover this impression, it will be clear that the term in question istruly a word void of sense. We ought to try this on the word substanceand on many others with which the language of philosophy is overbur-dened.

The English philosopher himself provides a detailed application of hisprinciple to a most important subject in metaphysics, namely, our mannerof reasoning in judging a cause by its effects, or effects by their cause. It isclear that all our reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded on theknowledge of the relation that is found between causes and the effectsthat we attribute to them,15 because we never attribute the existence ofone object to another without previously conceiving that there is betweenthe two some connection, either mediate or immediate. In order thereforeto understand what we say when we reason about these facts, it is firstnecessary to try to have a distinct and precise idea of what we understandby a cause. For that we have only to examine carefully the first object thatpresents itself as a cause of another.

Suppose, for example, that a ball resting on a billiard table were sud-denly to be forcefully struck by another ball. The first ball, which I willcall B, would cease to be at rest because the second, which I will call A,communicates its motion to it. Here we have, then, a cause and an effect.We see a little on what this relation depends. I see that ball A moves ballB only at the moment that it touches it; but I also see that it clearly movesB in the very instant that it strikes it, so that there is no interval between

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16 This is close to the way that Sextus Empiricus argued earlier; see his Hypotheses Bk.3, Chap. 3.

impact and the communication of motion. From this I conclude that thereis a contiguity of time and place between an effect and the cause that pro-duces it; and that the cause is always prior to the effect. But that is not all.If I take a third ball, C, and place it in the same situation that ball B origi-nally had, I find that, if ball C is struck by ball A with the same force, thenit will also be given the same quantity of motion. The same experimentrepeated a hundred times has the same result. I must then conclude thatthere is an unvarying connection between a cause and its effects.Contiguity of time and of place; priority of time; unvarying connection –these three ideas and no others are uniformly presented to me by theexperiments that I undertake. But if instead of supposing that the causeand the effect are actually before our eyes, we suppose that we now seeonly the cause alone, to what judgement would we be inclined? It is easyto say. Because of our experience, we foresee that if the circumstanceshave not changed, the cause in question will produce its usual effect. If wesee ball A strike ball B with the same degree of force as in the previousinstance, we will say that ball A is going to move ball B, and that it willcommunicate to ball B a given degree of motion. That is an inferencefrom cause to effect, and it is thus that we reason every day in those rea-sonings that concern the conduct of life. On this is founded all our beliefin history. From the same thing is derived the judgements we make in allparts of philosophy, with the exception of geometry and arithmetic.Consequently, if we succeed in explaining in a clear and distinct mannerour reasoning about the impact of two balls, we will then be able toexplain without difficulty all the operations of our mind, when we reasonin the same manner.

Suppose a man, having a vigorous, normal mind, but no experience,were suddenly placed in the world. This man could not predict the effectthat ball A, striking against ball B, would produce on the latter. He couldat the very most guess the outcome, but he could have no certaintybecause, the author says, the effects implicit in a cause cannot be demon-strated a priori by reasoning from the idea of this cause. We can certainlyconceive that some particular cause could produce some particular effect,that some particular event may have some particular consequence: any-thing that the mind can conceive is, at least metaphysically speaking, pos-sible. But just because something is possible, it does not follow that itscontrary is impossible or implies a contradiction. Consequently, we canhave no a priori demonstration, properly speaking, of the connectionholding between a cause and an effect.16

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17 Part III. Sect. VI. page 159 [i.e. Treatise 1.3.6.5].

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Thus the man, the new Adam, we imagine suddenly put on the earth,could not, before experience had taught him about it, have any idea of theeffect that ball A would produce on ball B. He would need to have seenbefore he could say. But when he had seen, several times in succession,ball B moved by ball A, he would not hesitate to predict that, should hesee the latter moving, it was again going to move the former. He woulddecide before seeing the effect; his mind, enlightened by experience, wouldno longer wait for the event before deciding about the outcome.

The same thing happens in all other possible and similar cases. All ourreasonings concerning causes and their effects are based on experience,and all the inferences that we draw from experience rest on this supposi-tion, that the course of nature will remain uniformly the same. From thiswe conclude that when the circumstances are entirely unchanged, similarcauses will surely produce similar effects. But is this conclusion correct?Have we good reasons for believing thus? This is what we must examine.Below we present the arguments of our anonymous author, leaving thementirely to the understanding of the reader, without doing anything otherthan abridging them.

We can have, he says,17 “no demonstration to convince us that, in thosecases of which we have had no experience, the same thing will happen asin those where experience has taught us.” The reason he gives for this isthat we have no certainty that the course of nature will not change, andthat the future will exactly resemble the past. Since it is possible that inthe future things will change, we cannot demonstrate that they will not.What do I mean? According to our author, we cannot, by probable argu-ments alone, be convinced that the course of nature will remain alwaysand invariably the same. The reason that he gives comes down to this. Allprobable arguments showing that the future will resemble the past presup-pose that there is naturally a conformity between the past and the present:consequently, these arguments cannot be used to prove this is the case.This conformity, this resemblance, is a matter of fact. Thus we can onlyprove it by experience. But experience of the past proves nothing regard-ing the future unless we suppose that the future will resemble the past.Consequently, this resemblance is only presumed; it is not proved, nor canit be proved.

What is it, then, that determines us to judge so decisively that such andsuch will happen, because in a similar case and in entirely similar circum-stances it has already happened? It is custom, replies our philosopher. Byvirtue of having seen the same causes produce the same effects, we becomeconvinced that they will always produce these effects. It is certain that wedo not know the precise nature of the faculties or powers by which bodies

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18 Part III. Sect. VII [i.e. Treatise 1.3.7].

produce specific effects. All we know is that they at present produce theseeffects. But what assurance do we have that they will produce themtomorrow? None, except that provided by our habit of thinking in thisway. Thus in the conduct of life it is not reason, but, once again, customalone that serves as our guide. It is custom alone that determines us topresume that the future will correspond to the past, and that what hashappened a hundred times will happen again. Reason could never speakto us in such language.

We are thus reduced, if the philosophy of this learned Englishman istrue, to believing nothing about the future until we see it. Fortunately forus, all these fine speculations are not as obvious as he thinks they are. Ifwe take the trouble to examine this claim, that the conformity of thefuture effects with the past effects of any cause is a matter of fact that canbe decided only by new experience, we will readily find that it is far fromcertain. I grant that the resemblance of the future to the past is a matter offact, but I deny that it is a matter that we can know with some probabilityonly from experience. Our anonymous author claims that we cannotresolve this issue without presupposing that which is in doubt, namely,that the future will resemble the past. Not so. We can decide from thenature of the things about which experience has already taught us. Wecan say: this cause has always produced, and always produces every-where, this particular effect; therefore it will always produce this effect inso far as it will be this particular cause and operates in the same circum-stances. To reply, but the course of nature may change, is to say nothingto the point. For, if the course of nature changes, the cause will not be thesame cause nor will it operate in the same circumstances, and it will beclear that it will not produce the same effects. Moreover, this is not theright question. The question is that of knowing if ball A, striking againstball B, which is imagined to be at rest, will tomorrow communicate thesame degree of motion that it communicated today. I say that it would,provided that the circumstances remain exactly the same, and I submitthat this effect is inevitable because a cause that operates in the same man-ner must produce the same effect. If you change the circumstances inwhich the action takes place or the nature of the agent, you alter the caseand substantially alter the question.

This deserves all the more to be thoroughly examined because ourauthor draws from it, as we will see, consequences of the greatest impor-tance.18 According to him, it is impossible that there could ever be ademonstration of the certainty of the truths that we believe. To demon-strate a proposition is not only to conceive that it is true; it is in addition

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19 Ibid., page 169 [i.e., Treatise 1.3.7.2].

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to convince us that the contrary is impossible, inconceivable, contradicto-ry. But if it is a matter of fact, however strong may be our proof of it, andeven if we could not refrain from believing it, we can always conceive thecontrary because the contrary implies no contradiction; consequently,strictly speaking, no matter of fact can be demonstrated. From this it fol-lows that to believe and to conceive are two distinct things. Belief makes areal difference between a proposition that we conceive and to which wegive our assent, and another proposition that we conceive but from whichwe refrain from giving our assent. How can we explain this? If someonewere to claim that belief adds some new idea to the ideas we have of anobject conceived, he would advance an absolutely untenable notion. For1) What is this new idea? Let it be produced and identified. When we con-ceive an object, we conceive it in all its parts; we can, that is to say, con-ceive it completely and perfectly without yet believing it to exist. When wego on to believe, what idea does this belief add to the conception? 2. Ourmind clearly has the ability to bring together and unite any ideas that donot imply a contradiction. Consequently, if belief were to consist in a dis-tinct idea, in an idea different from all those that imply no contradiction,we could, by joining this idea to all of those we already have on any sub-ject whatever, believe of that subject something that we cannot conceiveof it. According to our author’s system, this is manifestly absurd.

But if belief is more than merely conceiving an object, and if it neverthe-less adds no new idea to the ideas that we have of this object when weconceive of it, what, once again, constitutes its nature? What is believingin contrast to conceiving? “The entire difference between these twothings,” says our anonymous metaphysician, “consists in their manner.”19

To believe is always to conceive, but it is to conceive differently. This dif-ference consists in what we feel when, unlike our ideas, something is notsubject to our will; it is habit that makes this difference. Accustomed toseeing that a ball, when striking with force against another ball, immedi-ately moves the latter, we, thinking of past experience, anticipate andbelieve by custom that the same thing will happen again. That is, whenour mind has already had certain impressions, it is more strongly affectedthan it would be if it had only a simple idea of the motion of two balls. Inorder to understand better the author’s thought, we will retrace here thechain of propositions that, according to his principles, leads to this con-clusion. Here are the essentials. A fact can only be proved by pointing outthe cause that produces it. It is only by experience that this cause can berecognized as the principle giving rise to a particular effect. The experi-ence of the past provides no certainty about the future. It is from habitand custom alone that we presume that a particular cause will produce a

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20 A lively idea, related to or associated with a present impression. page 172 [i.e.Treatise 1.3.7.5].

particular effect. In believing that this effect will take place, our mindreceives no new idea, either of the effect or of the cause. Thus belief isonly a different manner of conceiving the same idea. This difference con-sists in a livelier feeling. This feeling is formed in our mind only by expe-rience and custom. Thus if we believe something as a matter of fact, it isto custom alone that we are indebted, for it is custom that has led us toconceive in a livelier manner, by feeling, what we have already con-ceived in only a languid manner. Thus, in this system, belief is a livelyidea, related to or associated with a present impression.20 This is the def-inition that the author himself has offered. It would be entirely unintelli-gible if we had not well understood all the consequences and all the con-nections of the propositions we have reviewed. I do not know that, evenwith all this effort, his view will seem very clear, or if the reader will notat this point say, Fiat lux!

Some will doubtless ask for a clearer and more developed account ofwhat constitutes the peculiar and distinctive character of this lively ideathat our philosopher makes to be the essence of belief. To say that whenwe believe that a ball struck with a certain measure of force acquires acertain measure of motion, we have a livelier idea that is more sensiblyfelt by the mind than when we only conceive it – that is surely to speak alanguage in great need of explanation. What is this feeling? What is thisidea that is livelier than a mere conception? The author is very troubledby his definition. He is unable to find terms that precisely represent hisviews. The feeling of belief, when compared with the mere idea of athing, he calls sometimes a more active conception, sometimes astronger conception, and sometimes a more intensive conception. Butnone of this adequately explains what he wants to say. He admits this,and in order to supply what is lacking he appeals to experience.

“Who is there,” he says, “who does not feel that the ideas of thosethings that he believes are stronger, more vivid, and more active in hismind than those ideas of things that he does not believe and that hetakes to be, on the contrary, chimera? If two men read the same book,but one reads it as a romance, and the other as a true history, both willhave in their reading the same ideas in the same order. The incredulityof the one, and the belief of the other, do not prevent them from under-standing alike the words of the author. The words in which the authorexpresses himself arouse the same ideas in both of them, even though histestimony affects each differently. But whereas the first develops onlyweak and languid ideas of the events reported by the historian, the sec-ond will be affected by them in a lively manner. He will enter more

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21 [Treatise 1.3.7.8.]22 Part III. Sect. VII, pages 175–189. [Although the reviewer refers to Treatise 1.3.7, the

page numbers he gives are for Treatise 1.3.8.]

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deeply into the views of the author. He will have a better grasp of thecharacters, actions, and circumstances of the people of whom the authorspeaks. The one will but superficially notice the beauties of style and theskilful composition of the work. But the other will even represent tohimself the events; he will form an idea of the persons, their behaviour,their appearance. He will, in a word, take an interest in all the detailsportrayed by the historian.”21 Such is the effect of belief, according toour author. It makes the mind feel what would otherwise only be indif-ferently conceived.

We still need to understand how it comes about that belief, in contrastto bare conception, is always accompanied by a livelier idea. On thistopic our English philosopher enters into discussions we are unable tofollow in detail. His view comes down to this:22 That when an impres-sion affects our mind it not only arouses there the ideas that are relatedto it, but at the same time also communicates to these ideas a part of itsown force and vivacity. Experience again, if we are to believe him, is ouronly guide in understanding this proposition. But it is not possible toabridge the arguments by which he develops this position. The author isas profound as he is ingenious, and so it is easy, if one’s attention straysfor a moment, to lose one’s way in what follows. In general, if I reallyunderstand his view, he thinks that belief (that is, the conviction wehave that a particular cause will produce a particular effect) is entirelyfounded on past experience, that we believe only to the extent that, fromhabit, we remember the impressions by which the mind has been affect-ed in the past. From this it follows that, if belief communicates to thebare conceptions of the mind some degree of vivacity, it takes this fromthe vivacity (which itself may vary) of the original impressions on whichit is founded. Perhaps the author would put this differently: it is onlyhesitantly that we flatter ourselves with having understood him.

In addition, we must not forget to make two further remarks. The firstis that in those cases in which experience is not uniform, the mind isdetermined to judge or believe by what has most often happened. Thesecond is that all our author’s speculations on the relation of physicalcauses and their effects must be applied to the operations of the mindand to the judgements it is led to make in the affairs of life. In the latter,just as in the movement of bodies, we believe nothing except by experi-ence – by means of our habit, in seeing certain causes, of recalling cer-tain impressions that give us a lively conviction that they will producetheir accustomed effects.

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23 Ibid., Sect VIII, page 190. [The cited page begins Treatise 1.3.9; the reviewer is infact drawing on Abstract 26.]

24 Sect. XIV, page 275 [i.e. Treatise 1.3.14.4].25 It is principally at Mr. Locke that he wishes to direct this. See The Essay concerning

Human Understanding, Bk. II, Chap. XXI.

Having at length discussed his principal claim regarding the relationfound between causes and their effects, our author retraces his steps andasks23 anew what precisely must be the idea that we have of this rela-tion. We have observed above that when we carefully examine whathappens when a ball communicates its motion to another ball, wealways find the moving ball to be contiguous in time and place with theball moved, that the motion of the moving ball is prior in time to that ofthe ball moved, and that there is an unvarying connection between theimpulse of the first ball and the movement of the second. But this is notall. We commonly suppose that there is a kind of connection between acause and its effects; we suppose that there is always in the cause some-thing that is not in the effects, and we call this force, power, faculty,energy. The question is to determine what ideas we must attach to theseterms.24 If all our ideas are the effect of our impressions, we must knowthis power or force either by means of the senses or by an internal feel-ing. Is it by the first of these that we know this force or power? No, aCartesian will say. We do not learn of the efficacy of physical causes bymeans of a sense impression; it is from the Deity, from the action of theDeity alone, that we learn this. But what is this action of the Deity? Theidea that we form of the Deity, according to those who completely rejectthe hypothesis of innate ideas, this idea, I say, we derive principally fromthe reflections that we make on the operations of our own mind. Andwhat does this study of our mind teach us about the force or power inquestion that is not learned by the study of matter itself? Consideringour will a priori, independently of experience, we are unable to say whateffects it will produce. Assisted by experience, we discover betweencause and effect the three relations mentioned, contiguity, priority, con-nection. In a word, to whichever side we turn, we cannot refrain fromconcluding that we have no ideas of that which philosophers call power;power is a term without meaning. Or if it has a meaning, it means onlythe mind’s capacity, acquired by habit, of believing in the effects that acause will produce. Whichever side we take, this issue positively bristleswith difficulties. Until now no one has raised these difficulties, and itseems that our author wants to drive this point home to those who havenot bothered to raise them.25

That is the dominant spirit of this work. The subtle metaphysicianthat composed it substantially contracts the limits of our knowledge. To

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26 Part IV, Sect. V, page 418 [i.e. Treatise 1.4.5.17 ].

believe him, we know very little with certainty. Philosophy would makeus entirely Pyrrhonian if nature were not stronger and in opposition toit. Feeling makes up for what reason lacks: without it, reason wouldlead us to doubt almost everything. The fourth part of this work is inlarge part intended to show us this.

It is impossible for us to follow the author in his many deliberationson this subject. But we cannot finish this review without observing that,among the many singular and original opinions found in this book,there are two others to which he appears to be especially attached.

The first is the singular view that our mind, as far as it is known to us,is nothing more than a system or train of different perceptions unitedtogether without having among them a perfect simplicity or identity.Descartes made the essence of the mind to consist of thought in general.According to our author, nothing is more absurd, because, he says,everything that exists is a particular thing. It is necessary, therefore, thatour mind be composed, in effect, of a number of thoughts or percep-tions. It is necessary, I emphasize, that the mind be composed of these,and not that these perceptions be attached to it as to a substance differ-ent from themselves. Moreover, Locke is no less absurd than Descartes,according to the principles of our author. Speaking of substance, in hisview, is to make sounds without knowing what one says. We have noidea corresponding to this term. As all of our ideas derive from ourimpressions, and as we have no impression to which we give the namesubstance, either corporeal or spiritual, it is impossible that we couldform an intelligible notion of substance. We know things only by theirqualities. The idea that we form of a body, of a peach, for example, orof a pear, is obviously only the idea of a certain colour, taste, figure, etc.Similarly, the idea that we have of our mind is, in the philosophy of ourauthor, nothing more than the idea of certain perceptions, without anynotion of that which we call substance, whether simple or complex. Heheaps up paradox on paradox in this way and comes at last to maintainthe singular view26 that the doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, andindivisibility of thinking substance is a true atheism, uniquely suited tosupport those views for which Spinoza is so generally detested. Fromthis he concludes that the arguments a priori by which any one wouldundertake to demonstrate the immortality of the soul are pure sophisms,and that we can only demonstrate this by moral proofs, the strength ofwhich he acknowledges.

Another extraordinary opinion that our metaphysician embraces andwarmly defends is that, contrary to the arguments, even mathematical

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27 See the entire second part of the book on the understanding.

arguments, of some, matter is not infinitely divisible.27 Geometry, hesays, is not an exact enough science to establish conclusions as subtle asthose which would establish infinite divisibility.28 Here, more or less, ishow he thinks he can prove this. All geometry, he claims, rests on ourideas of equality and inequality. If these ideas were completely clear, ifwe had a precise or exact standard of these two relations, geometrywould be perfectly exact. But it is clear that we could have an exactstandard of equality only if quantity or size is found to be made up ofindivisible atoms or points. Two lines would be perfectly equal if thenumber of points making them up were equal, and if the points makingup the one everywhere corresponded to the points of the other. Butwhile this standard of equality is exact if considered in itself, it is never-theless true that it is useless because we are never able to count exactlythe number of points that make up a line. Moreover, this standardassumes a determinate number of points, and thus is incompatible withinfinite divisibility. What then shall we use for the exact standard ofequality in geometry? Some believe they have produced this marvelwhen they say, for example, that a rod three feet long is equal to anoth-er rod that is also three feet long because they each contain the samenumber of inches. This is to measure a larger quantity by smaller ones.But how will we measure the small quantities? Suppose you reply bysaying that two inches are equal because each contains twelve lines. Iwill then ask how you know the lines are equal. The questions may bemultiplied infinitely, and we find that our alleged standard is useless.The greatest part of philosophers, asked what they mean by the equalityof quantities, say with assurance that this term cannot be defined, butthat when we place two equal quantities, as, for example, two circles,one on top of the other, we see at once the meaning of this term. This is,however, a travesty, for then the senses and the imagination are made tobe competent judges of the equality and proportion of bodies. And suchjudges, for giving exact pronouncements on that! What likelihood isthere that, contrary to their own perceptions, the senses will ever decidethat matter is infinitely divisible? We leave to the geometers the task ofexamining these problems. If they consult only reason, without amusingthemselves with the imagination, the problems will soon be solved.

There are in our author a hundred other things we could note: thespirit of Pyrrhonism that directs his manner of philosophizing; theinconsistency of many of the singular propositions that he takes pleasurein accumulating; finally, the pernicious consequences that we coulddraw from his principles. What is most shocking is the confidence with

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29 [No review of volume 2 appeared in the Bibliothèque raisonnée.]30 Part III, Sect. XII, page 244 [i.e. Treatise 1.3.13.20].31 [We wish to thank Prof. David Raynor for allowing us to consult his unpublished

translation of this review.]

which he pronounces his paradoxes. Never have I seen a more dogmaticPyrrhonism. He is not in doubt when he dares to substitute his specula-tions for the opinions of the greatest philosophers on the most abstractmatters (on the nature of our ideas, of extension, of space, of the void,of identity, etc.). He is not in doubt when he advances the argument, forexample, that it is false that everything that exists must necessarily havea cause of its existence; that we have a priori no proof of the existenceof the Deity; that the most able mathematicians are unsure of the truthof their discoveries until the wise public has applauded them; and aquantity of other propositions equally audacious, not to say anythingstronger. On every point the author is as decisive as he can be. In com-parison with himself, the Lockes and Clarkes are often in his eyes butpoor and superficial reasoners. If we may be allowed to speak in his lan-guage, we clearly see that habit and custom have already so formed hisbeliefs that he believes only in a very lively manner. It is neverthelessappropriate for the public to know that it is to a young philosopher thatwe are indebted for the essays discussed. What can we not expect fromso subtle and profound a genius once age has matured his taste andgiven him time to think anew on the subjects he has outlined? He seemsto us to have already achieved more clarity in his treatise on thepassions, which makes up the second volume of this work. Perhaps wecan later help our readers to judge this treatise.29 Until then we ask thiswise and ingenious author to pardon us for the mistakes we may havemade in trying to summarize his arguments. We would need to be asquick-witted as he is in order not to stray from the obscure paths heobliges us to take. We are among that group who cannot yet see theimperfection and absurdity of all the vulgar hypotheses that he rejects.He clearly expected that those, unaccustomed as he is, to profoundreflections on the intellectual faculties of the mind, would not immedi-ately understand his principles.30 He also saw that he may sometimeshave exceeded the limits of a prudent scepticism and too often made useof those forms of speaking, it is evident, it is certain, it is undeniable,that are commonly but inappropriately employed. But he expressly saysthat if this has happened it was by inadvertence, the result of a livelyimpression that objects made on him, and not from conceit or from ataste for philosophical dogmatism, from which, he says, he is farremoved. Indeed, we would have to be passionately Pyrrhonian not tobelieve what he says about that.31

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1 Nouvelle bibliothèque, ou Histoire litteraire des principaux écrits qui se publient. Ala Haye: Chez Pierre Paupie, 1738–1743, 17 v. The editors included Jean-Baptistede Boyer, Marquis d’ Argens (1704–1771), Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744), ArmandBoisbeleau de La Chapelle (1676–1746), and Charles Pierre Chais (1701–1788).

4NOUVELLE BIBLIOTHÈQUE

Review of Treatise, Book 1, in Nouvelle bibliothèque, ou histoire litteraire des principaux écrits qui se publient, July, 1740, Vol. 6, pp.291–316, September, 1740, Vol. 7, pp. 44–63.English translation of complete review by David Fate Norton andRebecca Pates.

The Nouvelle bibliothéque was a short-lived monthly review journal,published from 1738–1743. Like the Bibliothèque raisonnée, the

Nouvelle bibliothèque was published in The Hague, Holland.1 In October1739, under the heading “Literary News from London,” the journal pub-lished a brief notice of the Treatise, which included this comment:

Although the ideas of the author approach closely in some places tothose of Dr. Hutcheson on the moral sentiment and on the human pas-sions, there are yet many original things in this new treatise, which, how-ever, is only the commencement of a more extended and more completework. [Nouvelle bibliothèque, October 1739, Vol. 4, p. 302]

In 1740, a review of Book 1 of the Treatise appeared in two instalments,in July and September. The review is largely a summary of argumentsselected from Book 1 of the Treatise; only occasionally does the revieweroffer critical comments. Much of the summary consists of loosely trans-lated selections from the Treatise. We can see the translator’s method bycomparing the following passages from the Treatise and the review:

Treatise: “Thirdly, ’tis a principle generally receiv’d in philosophy,that every thing in nature is individual, and that ’tis utterlyabsurd to suppose a triangle really existent, which has noprecise proportion of sides and angles. If this therefore beabsurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in idea;

64

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2 That is, Book 1, Part 1, Section 7, ¶6 of the Treatise. Treatise paragraph numbersare given in A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J.Norton, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) andmay be easily determined in any edition of the Treatise if allowance is made for theparagraphs added in the Appendix first published as a part of volume 3 of theTreatise.

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since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct ideais absurd and impossible. ... Abstract ideas are therefore inthemselves individual, however they may become general intheir representation. The image in the mind is only that of aparticular object, tho’ the application of it in our reasoningbe the same, as if it were universal.” (Treatise 1.1.7.6)3

Review: “III. Finally, everything existing in nature is individual. Itwould be absurd to suppose there really exists a triangle thathas no determinate proportion of sides and angles. If thissupposition is absurd in fact and reality, it must also beabsurd in idea; since nothing of which we can form an idea isabsurd and impossible. Abstract ideas are therefore in them-selves individual, however they may become general in theirrepresentation. The image in the mind is that of a particularobject; but the use we make of this idea in reasoning is as if itwere universal.”

The reviewer summarizes Hume’s views, found in Part 1 of the Treatise,concerning the origin of ideas; he concurs with Hume’s attempt toground our conception of the understanding on experience. However,the reviewer challenges, by offering counterexamples, Hume’s claim thatall of our ideas are less lively copies of impressions. He then summarizesHume’s views on abstraction. The reviewer next summarizes the discus-sion of space and time found in Part 2. The first instalment ends with asummary of Hume’s account of the seven philosophical relations and hisanalysis of the principle that “whatever begins to exist, must have acause of existence.”

The second instalment of the review begins with an account ofHume’s view of belief. The reviewer challenges the claim that belief con-sists in the greater vivacity of an idea, rather than in the combining oftwo separate ideas, such as “God” and “existence.” Hume errs, he says,because he confuses belief with judgement. The reviewer then outlinesHume’s account of probability, and briefly touches on the discussion ofnecessary connection. He concludes with a paragraph summary of eachof the sections of Part 4.

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3 [In the original review this first paragraph is printed in English and Latin, just as itis here, and is followed by a French version of the title.]

4 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise, Introduction, ¶2. Manypassages in the review, although not in quotation marks, are none the less directtranslations of identifiable passages of the Treatise.]

66 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

Below is the first published English translation of the complete review,translated by David Fate Norton and Rebecca Pates. Bracketed com-ments are those of the translators.

A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: being an attempt to introduce the experi-mental method of reasoning into moral subjects. Rara temporum felic-itas, ubi sentire, quae velis; & quae sentias, dicere licet. TACIT. VOL. I.OF THE UNDERSTANDING. London. Printed for John Noon, at theWhite-Hart, near Mercer’s Chapel, in Cheapside. 1739.3

That isTraité sur la nature Humaine, dans lequel on essaye d’introduire laMéthode de raisonner par expérience dans les Sujets de Morale. Vol. 1.De L’Entendement. 8vo, 475 pages. First extract.

We cannot help but deplore the disgraceful state in which philosophyfinds itself of late. True philosophers easily perceive the weaknesses evenof those systems that are the most popular. Even those of little learningcan testify to the endless, acrimonious debates that divide the learnedworld and that have brought scorn upon philosophy itself. One philoso-pher destroys what another builds. It is enough that an opinion be pro-posed with warmth and eloquence for it to be blindly accepted. “It isnot,” says our author, “those who wield the sword and the pike whogain the victory; the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the armyhave alone that honour.”4

Metaphysicians have so often blinded us with their vain sophistriesthat we may be tempted to reject all abstruse reasonings requiring anyconsiderable degree of attention. Nothing, however, is more unjust thanthis prejudice. For if man is capable of discovering the truth, it is certain,seeing the narrow limits of his faculties, that he could not discover itwithout much labour, or even the utmost pains. It is then no great sur-prise if the author’s reasonings and the principles that he proposes tounfold are difficult to comprehend. Those not fond of philosophical dis-cussions should ignore this article altogether.

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5 Mr. Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutcheson, Dr. Butler.6 [The quoted material is a based on the final sentence of Treatise, Introduction, ¶7.]

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The title of the work announces this new philosopher’s design. In thefirst volume, divided by the author into four parts, he discusses theHUMAN UNDERSTANDING. The first part treats of ideas, their origin, com-position, connection and abstraction. In the second part, he speaks of theideas of space and time and of existence. The third concerns knowledge,probability and the reason of animals. The systems of the sceptics and ofother philosophers, ancient and modern, are the subject of the fourthpart. The second volume examines the passions in detail.

Everything that the author proposes on these interesting topics is to befounded only on experience and observation. Nothing is more naturalthan this method. The essence of the human mind being unknown to us,it is impossible to form any notion of its powers other than from the care-ful and repeated examination of the different effects that result from thedifferent circumstances in which these powers are found. In this respect,we can reasonably demand only that, by showing the most immediateeffects of these powers, the principles established be as simple and as uni-versal as possible, and that we explain all effects by means of a few suchprinciples. This is indeed what the author promises.

Until now, few philosophers have endeavoured to understand man bysuch natural means. In most nations one must fear straying from the beat-en path. England has of late, however, produced several philosophers5

who have already excited the attention and the curiosity of the public byfollowing in this path. “A land of tolerance and liberty,” says our author,“is the only one able to produce learned men capable of improving reasonand philosophy.” 6

For a long time now philosophers have disputed the origin of ideas.Some claim that they are innate. Others say that all ideas are derived fromsensation and reflection. To make his views on this subject clear, ouranonymous author first divides perceptions into two kinds, which he callsimpressions and ideas. These perceptions are of the same nature. Theydiffer only in their degree of force and liveliness. The most forceful andliveliest perceptions he calls impressions; these include sensations, pas-sions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the mind. Bythis term impression he does not mean to describe the manner in whichperceptions are produced in the soul, but, rather, the lively perceptionsthemselves. This must be kept well in mind.

By ideas the author means the faint images of impressions in thinkingor reasoning. Such are, for instance, all the perceptions excited by reading the present discourse, excepting only those that arise from the

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7 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise 1.1.1.6.]

senses, from sight and touch, and excepting the sensation of pleasure oruneasiness this discourse may occasion.

He then divides perceptions, as logicians commonly do, into simple andcomplex.

Up to this point we can agree with the author’s views without muchdiscomfort. But will not what he adds involve him in contradictions? Heclaims that our impressions and our ideas are resembling in all respects,except for their degree of force or liveliness. Ideas, he says, seem in a man-ner to be a reflection of impressions, so that all the perceptions of themind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I shutmy eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are images and exactrepresentations of the impressions that I feel. Nor is there anything in theimpressions that is not to be found in the ideas. The idea of red that weform in the dark, and the impression of this colour that strikes our eyes,differ only in degree, not in nature. The same goes for all other simpleperceptions. We find, however, that many of our complex ideas never hadimpressions that corresponded to them, and that many of our compleximpressions are never exactly copied by our ideas. I can form the idea of acity such as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls arerubies, though I never saw anything like that. I have seen Paris; but I can-not form ideas of that city that are exact enough to represent all its streetsand houses in their just and true proportion.

After these preliminary remarks, the author propounds his theory onthe origin of ideas. According to him, “all our simple ideas, when theyfirst appear to the mind, are derived from simple impressions, that corre-spond to them and that these ideas exactly represent.”7

Our author bases this principle on experience. If we examine experienceclosely we find that the impressions and ideas that resemble each other orcorrespond to each other are constantly conjoined. A simple impressionalways has a corresponding simple idea and vice versa. This can neverarise from chance. We must rather conclude that since there is an intimateconnection between impressions and their corresponding ideas, the exis-tence of the one must have a great influence on the existence of the other.But, as impressions always come first, it is only natural to think thatimpressions are the causes of ideas, not ideas the causes of impressions.

Moreover, it clearly appears from the behaviour of men that they havethese ideas, without necessarily being aware of them. In order to give achild the idea of the colour scarlet, what do we do? Do we begin by giv-ing him an idea of it? Certainly not. We present him, rather, with theobject, or, what amounts to the same thing, we give him an impression ofit. Vainly would we pursue a different route. Thus, a man born blind,

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8 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise 1.1.7.1.]

being incapable of having an impression of colours, could not have anidea of them.

Here an objection could be made. Let us suppose that a man who hasreached the age of thirty had never had occasion to see a particular shadeof blue. Were we to place before him all the different shades of coloursexcept the shade of blue of which he has never had an impression, he willthen indubitably perceive a gap or a hiatus in the sequence of blues.Would it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to form the ideaof that shade of which he has never had an impression? Our anonymousauthor does not seem very disturbed by this objection: even were he toadmit that a man could form the idea of this shade, this concessionregarding a unique case would not undermine the general maxim that theauthor has just established.

However interesting may be the author’s reflections in the followingsections on memory, imagination, the connection of ideas, relations,modes and substances, we will not discuss these, so that we may spendmore time on abstract ideas, the subject of Section VII.

A question can be asked concerning abstract or general ideas. We mayask whether these ideas are conceived by the mind as general or particu-lar. Against received opinion, the author claims that “all general ideas arenothing but particular ones, attached to a certain term which, giving thema more extensive signification, makes them recall, on use, other individu-als resembling them.”8 He is not the originator of this paradox; beforehim, Dr. Berkeley had taken this view. But since it will doubtless be newto the majority of our readers, they will not be offended to find here theclarifications and proofs that our author uses to establish this opinion.

Those who follow received opinion say that the abstract idea of man, forexample, represents men of all sizes and qualities. It is obvious that it isthen necessary either that the idea represents at once all possible sizes andall possible qualities of all men, or that it represents no particular one atall. But this first proposition is absurd, since, in order to represent at thesame time all possible sizes and qualities of all men, the human mindwould need to have infinite capacity. Therefore, abstract ideas represent noparticular degree, either of quantity or quality. In opposition, the authorclaims that it is impossible to conceive any quality or quantity withoutforming a precise notion of their degrees. And he denies that it is necessaryfor the human mind to be infinite in order to form at once a notion, ade-quate to serve our purposes, of all the possible degrees of quantity andquality.

He employs three arguments to establish the first proposition.

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I. Whatever objects are separable, are distinguishable, and whateverobjects are distinguishable, are different. It is not possible to separatewhat is not distinguishable, or to distinguish what is inseparable. Allseparation presupposes distinction and difference. This being the case,abstraction could not bring about separation. For the different circum-stances that we abstract from in our general ideas cannot be separate ordistinct. In short, they are not different from the circumstances that weretain as essential parts of these ideas. The precise length of a line is notdifferent from the line itself, and in consequence cannot be separatedfrom it. The general idea of a line incorporates a precise degree of quan-tity and quality, even though at the same time this idea of a particularline can represent lines that have different degrees of both.

II. It is agreed that the senses cannot produce an impression which isnot determined in quantity and quality. If sometimes we do not distinct-ly perceive the degrees of this quantity and quality, it is because theimpression is faint, confused and unsteady. However, given that all ideasare faint but complete impressions, that is, faithful copies of theseimpressions, it is obvious that ideas must contain all the elements thatimpressions contain.

III. Finally, everything existing in nature is individual. It would beabsurd to suppose there really exists a triangle that has no determinateproportion of sides and angles. If this supposition is absurd in fact andreality, it must also be absurd in idea; since nothing of which we canform an idea is absurd and impossible. Abstract ideas are therefore inthemselves individual, however they may become general in their repre-sentation. The image in the mind is that of a particular object; but theuse we make of this idea in reasoning is as if it were universal.

One difficulty arises. How is it possible for us to make a universalapplication of this particular image? It is custom, says the author, thatteaches us to do this with ease. First, having found a great resemblancebetween several objects, we give the same name to all of them in spite oftheir different degrees of quantity and quality. Subsequently, the hearingof that name revives in us the idea of one of these objects, with all itsparticular circumstances and proportions. But as we are accustomed toapplying the same name to other individuals that are different in manynon-essential respects from the idea that we presently have, this nameevokes in us, in certain respects, the idea of all these individuals. It is notbecause they are actually present in the mind; they are only present inpower. That is, the mind does not actually draw them from the imagina-tion, but is prepared to survey them, prompted by a present occasion ornecessity. A particular idea thus becomes general by the application of ageneral term that by custom has a close connection with many otherparticular ideas that the term calls promptly to the imagination.

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We need not be surprised at the effect of custom in this respect, for itproduces quite similar effects in analogous instances. Often certainwords or sounds promptly recall to us all the particular ideas that weneed, and that we do not presently have, but are accustomed to seeingunited. If we mention any great number, such as a thousand, for exam-ple, the mind has no adequate idea of it. This imperfection in the ideadoes not affect our reasonings. To the degree that we need particularideas of this number, they present themselves to the mind. What onesays here of large numbers can be applied to all terms that include com-plex ideas, such as those of government, church, negotiation, conquest.The mind does not actually have all the ideas that are included in theseterms; it has them only in power. Notwithstanding this imperfection, themind readily detects the similarity and contrariety of attributes. Finally,let us note that the capacity of the human mind is admirable in thethings to which it is accustomed. With what promptness does not theimagination offer its images in thought or conversation? In one instant,it flies from one end of the universe to the other to collect those ideasthat befit its subject. It seems as if the whole intellectual world is at oncesubjected to its view, and that it does nothing but pick and choose whatsuits its purpose.

The principle of the author, that what is really different is separable,seems contrary to the principle of the schools, which establishes a dis-tinction of reason by means of which we distinguish the figure from thefigured body, the motion from the moved body. Here is an example of adistinction that does not presuppose a difference, nor a separation. Inorder to meet this objection our anonymous author engages in a fewreflections.

“It is certain that the mind would never have thought of distinguishingfigure from a body figured, had it not observed that even in this simplici-ty there could be many different resemblances and relations. For reallythe two things are neither separable nor different nor, consequently, dis-tinguishable. Thus when a globe of white marble is presented to us, wehave only an impression of a white colour disposed in a certain form,and are unable to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. Butlater, observing a globe of black marble and a cube of white marble andcomparing them with our first object, we find two separate resemblancesin what to us at first seemed, as it really is, perfectly inseparable. Afterseveral similar experiences, we begin to distinguish the figure from thecolour by a distinction of reason; that is, we consider the figure andcolour together, because they are in effect the same and indistinguish-able, but we still view them under different aspects, according to theresemblances of which they are susceptible. When we would consideronly the figure of the globe of white marble, we really form an idea of

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9 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise 1.1.7.18.]

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both the figure and the colour, but we tacitly carry our view to the resem-blance that the globe has with the black marble. In the same manner,when we would consider only its colour, we turn our view to the resem-blance it has with the cube of white marble. In this way we accompanyour ideas with a kind of reflection, of which custom makes us almostinsensible. A person who asks us to consider the figure of a globe of whitemarble without thinking of its colour asks for something impossible, buthe wishes only that we consider the colour and figure together, while atthe same time keeping in mind the resemblance of this globe to the globeof black marble or to some other globe of another colour or substance.”9

This is how our anonymous author claims to explain a term that, accord-ing to him, has until now been very little, or very poorly, understood.

This is not the only paradox that the author puts forward in this work.Against the received opinion of philosophers, he claims that all theso-called demonstrations used to establish the infinite divisibility of spaceand of time are sophistical. According to him, everything that can be infi-nitely divided must consist of an infinite number of parts, and consequent-ly the idea that we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible; allthat the mind can do is to arrive at absolutely simple and indivisible parts.When a person talks of the thousandth or ten thousandth part of a grainof sand, the image that the mind forms in order to represent this isabsolutely the same as the one represented to it by the grain of sand itself.

The author then proves the same thing with respect to time. He claimsthat an inseparable property of time is that each of its parts succeedsanother. A moment can be contiguous to another moment; but twomoments can never be coexistent. But if each moment were infinitelydivisible, there would be an infinite number of coexistent moments, whichis the greatest absurdity.

From this it follows that atoms, or the simple and indivisible parts intowhich the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, are nothing in them-selves unless something real and existing has been added to them. For theideas of space and of time are not separate or distinct ideas; they representmerely the manner or the order in which objects exist. This is to say that avoid is impossible, and that time is produced by change and the successionof existing objects.

As the opinion the anonymous author has of extension is founded onthe principle that one cannot have an idea of pure space, he offers thecommon objection that one can conceive that God by His infinite powercould, without producing any change in the position of the walls thatform a chamber, destroy all the air and subtle matter in that chamber. Hedoes not accept the view of the Cartesians, that the walls would then

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10 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise 1.2.5.23.]11 Part III.12 The author calls this last kind of relation causation, or as we could say, production.

touch. But at the same time he denies that the walls would enclose aspace. I seriously doubt that his new solution will satisfy the Cartesians orthe Newtonians. “When,” he says, “everything in a chamber is annihilat-ed while the walls remain unmoved, the chamber must be conceived muchas it is at present when it is filled with air that is not an object of the sens-es. The annihilation leaves to the eye that imaginary distance which is dis-covered by the different parts of that organ that are affected by degrees oflight and shade; and it leaves to feeling a sensation of motion in the handor other movement of the body. In vain would we search for somethingelse. To whichever side we turn this subject, we shall find that these arethe only impressions such an object can produce after the supposed anni-hilation; and we have already remarked that impressions can give rise tono ideas but to such as resemble them.”10 If then light, shade, etc. enterinto this impression, they must so affect the idea that it cannot serve torepresent the void.

This system has however this advantage, that it is not necessary to sup-pose that motion requires continuous impulse. Finally, the author doesnot argue against calling this intangible distance, which has the capacityof becoming visible and tangible, a void. But whatever term we use, it isalways certain that we have no idea of a genuine extension empty of visi-ble objects; we always conceive of the parts of this extension as visible ortangible.

Philosophers have established seven different kinds of relation, onwhich all our judgements are based:11 resemblance, identity, relations oftime and place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality,contrariety, and the relation of cause and effect.12 Four of these relationsdepend entirely on ideas, and can be objects of knowledge, properlyspeaking. These four relations are resemblance, contrariety, degrees inquality, and proportions in quantity or number. By intuition alone weperceive the resemblance or contrariety which exists between two objects,as well as their degrees in any quality. We make decisions concerning suchobjects at first sight, without further examination.

We can also by simple intuition perceive some properties of figures andnumbers, their superiority or inferiority, for example, at least when theirdifference is considerable. However, in the majority of cases, we must relyon artifice.

Our author recognises that geometry, the art by which we fix the pro-portions of figures, surpasses in exactness and in universality theambiguous judgements of the senses and imagination. Yet he denies that

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it is capable of perfect exactness and precision because the fundamentalprinciples on which it is founded are drawn from the general appear-ances of objects, appearances that always leave some uncertainty, eventhough in the end the errors into which they could lead us are not con-siderable.

Thus, according to the author, only algebra and arithmetic are capableof being perfectly exact.

The three other relations, viz., identity, the relations of time and place,and cause and effect, do not depend upon our ideas. The relation of con-tiguity or distance can be changed, without any change in the relatedobjects or ideas. Two objects, albeit perfectly resembling, could at differ-ent times seem to be in the same place, and nevertheless be different innumber. And it is experience, rather than our ideas, that teaches usabout the relation of cause and effect. Thus these three relations cannotbe the object of knowledge, properly speaking.

But there is a great difference between these three relations. When theobjects that we compare are both present to the senses, we experience aperception rather than a reasoning. It is for us an entirely passiveimpression via the sense organs. This is the case for identity and the rela-tions of time and place, because in this respect the mind cannot gobeyond what is immediately present to the senses. It is only the relationof cause and effect that can produce a connection capable of persuadingus of the existence or the action of an object which is followed or pre-ceded by some other object or action. This relation thus extends furtherthan that of identity and that of time and place. It informs us of the exis-tence or of the action of objects that we do not [at present] see or feel.

In the third section, the author takes up a very important question,and as usual he rejects the general sentiment of philosophers. He claimsthat it has never been demonstrated that everything that begins to exist,must have a cause of existence. What am I saying? He takes such ademonstration to be impossible. According to him, this opinion [thateverything that begins to exist, etc.] is founded solely on experience andobservation.

In order to establish this paradox, he makes use of a principle that he has already frequently used – that all distinct ideas are separable, or,according to him, that the ideas of cause and effect are clearly distinctand different. This makes it easy for us to conceive of some object,non-existent at present, which will exist a moment later, without conjoining to this idea the distinct idea of a cause or of a productiveprinciple. He concludes from this that, because the imagination is ableto separate the ideas of cause and effect, it is possible that these objects are actually distinct, separate and different. It is therefore impossible to demonstrate this relation.

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13 [The quoted material is based on Treatise 1.3.3.4.]14 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise 1.3.3.5.] 15 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise 1.3.3.6.]16 [The original of the quoted material is found at Treatise 1.3.3.8.]

Several philosophers have nevertheless tried to establish this principle[by demonstration]. Our anonymous author refutes their arguments.“All the points of time and place,” says Hobbes, “in which we can sup-pose any object to begin to exist, are in themselves equal and indifferent.It is therefore necessary that some cause determine and fix the existenceof an object in one place rather than another and in one time rather thananother.”13 In response to this argument, the author says that, if it is notabsurd to suppose that existence itself is determined without any cause,it is also not absurd to conceive that time and place are also determinedwithout a cause.

Dr. Clarke and some others have employed another argument. “Eachobject,” they say, “must have a cause; for if a thing lacked a cause, itwould be necessary that it produce itself; that is, that it had existedbefore it exists, which is impossible.”14 Our anonymous author findsthat this argument begs the question, for it presupposes that everythingmust have a cause, whether external or internal, which is what is beingformally denied.

Mr. Locke demonstrates in another manner the necessity of a cause:“Whatever is produced without any cause,” he says, “is produced bynothing; or what comes to the same thing, has nothing for its cause. Butnothing can never be a cause, any more than it can be something, orequal to two right angles. By the same intuition, that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be something, weperceive that it can never be a cause; and thus must conclude that everyobject has a real cause of its existence.”15 The author finds in this argu-ment the same defect that he found in the preceding one, because he dis-allows all cause of whatever nature, whatever name may be given it.

Finally, there are others who say “that every effect must have a cause,because the idea of a cause is implied in that of an effect, or that effectand cause are relative terms.”16 But the author says that this argumentfails to prove that each thing must proceed from a cause. It is as if oneconcluded that every man must be married, because every husband musthave a wife.

We should now indicate how experience has led us to believe thisprinciple [namely, that everything that begins to exist, must have a causeof existence].

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We remember that we have had several examples of the existence ofone species of object which is always accompanied by individuals ofanother species, and exists in relation to them in a regular order of con-tiguity and succession. This is how we remember having seen thatspecies of object called flame, and having experienced that species ofsensation that we call heat. In addition, we remember that these twoobjects are in all cases found constantly united. This is enough for us tocall the one cause and the other effect, and to conclude that the exis-tence of the one depends on the existence of the other. In all instancesthat have taught us the conjunction of particular causes and effects, thecauses and effects have been perceived by the senses, and can be remem-bered. But when it is a matter of reasoning about these relations, wenotice or remember one of these particular objects and the second pre-sents itself in conformity with our previous experience. It is thus that theideas of cause and effect are found to be united in the mind.

The matters that we are yet to discuss are too interesting to pass overlightly and too abstract to explain at present. It would thus be preferableto leave them for another time.

A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, &c., Vol. 1. Second extract.

The nature and the idea of belief are the subject of Section VII of PartIII. Belief or opinion is, according to our anonymous author, a lively,corresponding idea, or one that is associated with a present impression;that is to say, in the author’s way of speaking, an idea produced by apresent impression. When I am convinced of some principle, it is onlybecause its idea has made a strong and vivid impression on me. When Iprefer a particular train of inferences, I declare that I feel the superiorityof its influence more vividly.

In order to believe something, we must necessarily have an idea of it.This idea, however, does not by itself constitute belief, since we conceiveof many things which we do not believe. If someone told me that Caesardied in his bed, or that mercury is heavier than gold, I could well have asdistinct an idea of these things as does the person who makes theseclaims, even if I do not believe them. Furthermore, I claim that there isno difference between the parts that compose these similar ideas. A per-son who reads a book as a novel, and another person who reads it as atrue relation of events, both receive exactly the same ideas and in thesame order. The incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other, donot hinder them from attaching the same sense to the words of theauthor. From this we can reasonably conclude that belief does notchange anything in the component parts of an idea.

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How, then, can we find the genuine difference that exists betweenthese two acts of the mind? The difference lies only in the manner inwhich we conceive the ideas; that is, in their strength and vivacity. I willexplain by using an example. If a particular shade of colour were simplyto acquire a new degree of vivacity or brilliance, it would not for all thatchange its nature; but if there were some other change, it would cease tobe the same colour. Thus, whether one believes, or whether one does notbelieve, the ideas remain absolutely the same in their component parts.Beyond their degrees of liveliness, there is nothing that could make themdiffer from one another.

Let us note in passing that logicians, in dividing the acts of the mindinto simple perception, judgement, or reasoning, have views quite differ-ent from those of our anonymous author. He claims that we makejudgements without unifying two different ideas. Thus, if we say God is,we simply form the idea of a being that we have represented to ourselvesin the imagination. The idea of existence that we attribute to it is not anidea distinct from its other qualities. It is easy to extend the conse-quences of this principle that the diverse acts of the understanding arenothing but distinctive ways of perceiving the same objects and of hav-ing the same ideas. But considering only our author’s idea of belief,namely, that belief is simply a lively idea, it seems to us that he has con-fused belief (l’evidence) with an act that follows immediately from it,namely, judgement. But let us continue to propound the system of theauthor.

We can readily grant that a present impression can communicate to itscorresponding idea a measure of its force and vivacity. I have an idea ofan absent friend, but if I look at his picture, this idea becomes more live-ly because of the additional degree of vivacity contributed by thisimpression. Contiguity produces the same effect. If, then, the relations ofresemblance and of contiguity can produce this effect, there is all themore reason to believe that cause and effect can produce it. This result,however, is not brought about by a power belonging to this impressionitself. For it is often clear that an impression from which I had not hitherto drawn a conclusion becomes later the foundation of a belief:when, that is to say, I have had occasion to experience the ordinary con-sequences of this impression. It is custom that gives to the impressionthe power to produce the lively idea to which I am referring. We musthave had the opportunity of seeing two impressions constantly joined inorder for the presence or the sentiment of the one to excite immediatelythe idea of the other. This explanation is a continuation of the principlesof our anonymous author, who denies that there is a necessary connec-tion between causes and effects. If experience does not immediatelyshow us this connection, it is none the less experience that convinces us

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of this principle. The instances of which we have had no experience,must necessarily resemble those of which we have had experience.

An objection arises. If contiguity and resemblance make ideas livelier,they too should produce belief. This is not the case, for only the relationof cause and effect has this capability. The author responds by sayingthat these two relations cannot produce ideas lively enough [to producebelief] unless they are joined to the ideas of cause and effect; but they dogive the ideas of cause and effect more vivacity, and in consequence theyincrease conviction. Thus we find that among Muslims, as amongChristians, pilgrims who have seen Mecca, or the Holy Land, are morezealous believers than those who have not had the same good fortune.Why are men so incredulous about the life to come when they seem socredulous on other subjects? Because, says the author, the idea of afuture state is not strengthened by a resemblance to the present state; theidea is not lively enough. Because their ideas are weak, they do notbelieve at all. Because there is no resemblance to strengthen the idea,much work and a profound and repeated meditation are necessary inorder to make an idea lively and in order for us to feel its reality. Now,according to the author, two things reveal the incredulity of men on thissubject. The first is the lack of concern they show for their future state –the little influence, that is, that the notion of a future state has on thebehaviour of the majority of men. The second is that people, who intheir ordinary affairs do not like the sentiment of terror, yet like the factthat a prophet excites this passion in them. This is what the prophet hasin common with the tragic poet. Whence the difference between thesediverse sentiments of terror? In the ordinary affairs of life, we are con-vinced of the reality of the object. In tragedies and sermons, on the otherhand, the imagination accepts indifferently the ideas it is offered, andterror merely serves to awaken our curiosity and excite our attention.

In Section XI the author addresses the probability of chance, evidencefor which is always accompanied by uncertainty. Probabilities, or rea-soning based on conjectures, can be divided into two kinds: there is aprobability based on chance, and another based on causes.

Chance is actually a negation of cause, and consequently leaves theimagination in a perfect and total indifference as to the existence ornon-existence of an object that we perceive as contingent. One chance,considered by itself, could not be superior to another; nothing deter-mines the event to fall more to one side than the other. If some event ismore probable than another one, there must be a greater number ofchances on one side than the other. If we have a die, four sides of whichare marked by the same number of points, and the other two sides aremarked by another number of points, we will probably predict that thenumber that is marked four times [will turn up when the die is thrown],

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because there are a greater number of equal chances; but still, there willremain a doubt, in proportion to the number of chances that are con-trary to those favouring our choice. However, as there are more sidesinscribed with one figure, the idea that we form of this figure is livelier.This leads us to conclude that the die [when thrown] is more likely toturn up a side having that figure than the other one.

Given what we have said about the probability of chance, it is onlyproper to outline the reflections of our anonymous author on the proba-bility of causes.

These probabilities are of several kinds, but they have the same origin,namely, the association of ideas with a present impression. And sincethis association is only formed through the frequent conjunction ofobjects, it is evident that it can arrive at its perfection only by degrees.At first, we have only suppositions; later, we have arguments and a fullassurance. Finally, there is the learned man who is motivated to observethe connection of causes and effects; such a man can base a completeproof on a single, unique experiment, well-designed and carefully exam-ined.

There is another type of probability, that produced when one observation is contrary to another. It is not the case that the causes areuncertain in themselves, for nothing can hinder their action and theireffectiveness except some unknown obstacle. Nevertheless, the contra-dictory nature of events produces an imperfect transition from a presentimpression to a related idea and thus must transfer uncertainty to thebelief. We regard the consequences as being probable, and as followingthe number of corresponding and opposite experiences that we havehad. Thus through long observation, I have found that of twenty shipsthat go to sea, only nineteen finally return to port safe and sound. Let usthen assume that I see twenty ships raise anchor, imagine nineteen shipsto come back, and the twentieth to sink. While I reason on the probabil-ity of the return of the ships, I take note both of the number of thosethat failed to sink, and of the number of those that sank.

The third species of probability is founded on analogy; that is to say,on the resemblance between two cases. But as this resemblance is sus-ceptible to different degrees, the reasoning we base on it becomes pro-portionately more or less certain and probable. These are the species ofprobability accepted by philosophers, but there are others which theyreject as sophistical. A span of time or space weakens the force of animpression, and consequently diminishes belief. If an event is long pastand occurred in a country far away, it will not make on us the impres-sion it would if it were more recent or if it had happened in the verycountry which we inhabit. Hence, such a fact will not be received withthe same certainty.

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What am I saying? An experienced event after a certain length of timeceases to make on the mind as vivid an impression as it did when it firstarose. A drunkard who actually sees one of his companions in debaucherydie from his intemperance is struck by this event and fears the same fatefor himself. But little by little the memory of the tragic death weakens,and he falls back into his former feelings of security.

Finally, a proposition loses much of its force if, in order to establish it,we are obliged to employ a long train of inferences, even if those infer-ences are sound; this is because the idea loses vivacity in proportion to thedistance that it has from its corresponding impression.

But if temporal and spatial distance and a long train of inferences weak-en the probability of facts so much, historical belief, given that the eventsoccurred long ago, etc., should be nullified. Moreover, we can assure our-selves of none of these events without passing through millions of causes and effects and through, so to speak, an immense chainof inferences. We can apply this reasoning to the Christian Religion,founded in large part on facts. Our anonymous author admits that thechains that connect each fact with the present impression are innumer-able; but he observes that all these chains are of the same kind, anddepend entirely on the same things, namely, on the reliability of the copy-ists and printers, so that there is no difference between them. It suffices to have seen one of them to be able to judge all the others. Themind moves without difficulty from one to the other, and forms easily ageneral notion. In the case of historical facts, a long chain of inferencesbut little diminishes the vivacity of the original impression.

A fourth kind of unphilosophical probability is that founded on general rules. An Irishman, it is said, has no wit, and a Frenchman nosolidity. In vain do we find a thousand examples contrary to these preju-dices founded on general rules: some obstinately continue to hold theseviews. Custom has so firmly joined the different ideas that reason tries invain to separate them. This is not the only case where habit prevails overreason. Imagine that a man is imprisoned in an extremely strong iron cagesolidly attached to the summit of a high tower. Could he, without trem-bling, look on the frightful precipice that he sees before him? Reason maywell tell him that he cannot fall down, but custom has so closely unitedthe ideas of falling and of a precipice, of wounds and death, that the ideaof the solidity of his cage is unable to separate them.

May I be permitted to remark in passing that if the principles of theauthor on impression, belief, and custom are not sound, we must at leastagree that he makes adroit use of them to explain several intellectual phe-nomena that are equally surprising and difficult to explain.

From here, the author moves on to examine the idea of a necessaryassociation or connection. All ideas come from impressions. The idea of

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17 [The reviewer has written “dix,” but goes on to give the eight rules found inTreatise 1.3.15.]

necessary connection arises from objects that are related by cause andeffect. If I examine them with attention, I discover that they are contigu-ous or related in time and space, and that the object that we call causeprecedes the object we call effect.

If I continue my research, I find, after frequent repetition, that it is bycustom that, at the sight of one of those objects, the mind is determined tothink of the other that ordinarily accompanies it, and to consider it withmore force because of its relation to the first object. That is all our authorrecognizes in the idea of necessary connection.

Our anonymous author gives ten17 rules by which to judge causes andeffects. 1. The cause and the effect must be contiguous in space and intime. 2. The cause precedes the effect. 3. There is a constant unionbetween the cause and the effect. It is primarily in this quality that thisrelation consists. 4. The same cause always produces the same effect, andthe same effect never occurs but from the same cause. 5. If, then, severalobjects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some commonquality shared by them. 6. On the other hand, the difference between theeffects of two objects that resemble each other must proceed from differ-ences between the two objects. 7. When any object increases or diminishesbecause of the increase or diminution of its cause, we must regard this asan effect compounded of different effects that result from different partsof the cause. 8. Finally, an object that exists for any time without produc-ing a given effect cannot be the unique cause of this effect; it must beassisted by some other principle.

The last section of the third part concerns the reason of animals.According to the author it is absurd to deny that animals reason. It seemsto us that the proofs of this are so evident and so common that it wouldbe useless to outline them here. They can always be read in the author’sown words. It would be better to use the space remaining to us here toelucidate the fourth and last part of this volume.

The author examines scepticism regarding reason and regarding thesenses. First, he remarks that the rules on which the demonstrative sci-ences are founded are certain and infallible. But in the application that ourweak and fallible understanding makes of these rules, we can err, andconsequently our knowledge, properly speaking, degenerates into simpleprobability. This probability is great or small depending on the experiencewe have of the force or weakness of our understanding, or on the simplici-ty or complexity of the question. As algebraists and mathematicians willdoubtlessly object to this conclusion, the author asks them if they haveever supposed a discovery, at the very moment that they happened to

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make it, to be certain and incontestable. If they have not, then theyregard it as a simple probability. If they repeat the demonstration, theirconfidence increases, but their assurance is never complete until after thescholarly world has judged that the discovery is a real one. We readilysee that such assurance cannot produce true knowledge.

The author goes further. After having reduced all our knowledge tosimple probability, he claims that our first judgement, derived from thenature of the object, must always be corrected by a second judgement,derived from the nature of the understanding. But this second judgementis itself but probable, because of the weakness and the fallibility of ourfaculties; consequently, our first doubt is followed by a second one. Andeven if, after a new examination, we find that our doubt was not well-founded, this further judgement is, for all that, only probable. Thus arebrought about several consecutive doubts, or even a sequence of similardoubts ad infinitum, which destroy absolutely all probability, howevergreat it appears to us at first.

But as the author could be accused of Pyrrhonism, he insists that nei-ther he nor anyone else can ever doubt everything. Nature by an absolutenecessity determines us to judge just as she obliges us to breathe and tofeel. We cannot refrain from having a lively idea following a presentimpression, just as we cannot stop thinking while we are awake, orrefrain from perceiving the bodies that surround us while we have oureyes open. The only goal that I set myself, says the author, is to make usmore aware of the truth of the hypothesis that all our inferences regard-ing causes and effects are uniquely derived from custom, and that belief isan act of the sensitive, rather than the thinking, part of us.

It is much the same for the existence of external objects. Nature hasnot left it to our choice to believe that they really exist; the matter is oftoo great importance to us. It is thus pointless to ask if there are or arenot bodies. We can only ask what causes us to believe that there arebodies. We will not engage in the details of this question. It is treated insuch an abstract manner that I would need to copy Section II in itsentirety in order to make myself understood, and perhaps even thenreaders would not understand much of it, so singular are the ideas ofour anonymous author and such the air of singularity that he gives tothe most common ideas.

In Section III our anonymous author discusses not only the opinionsof the Peripatetics, but also how they have come to fill their systemswith all the absurdities that bewilder us today. First, they concludedfrom the transformations and changes that perpetually take place inbodies that bodies are perfectly homogenous. Then, in order to explainthe real differences that they noticed between bodies, they introducedthe notion of substantial forms. Following this feat of the imagination

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came their invention of accidents which, since they cannot subsist sepa-rately, require, according to them, a subject to which they are joinedinseparably. Concerning effects, having remarked in the operations andthe movements of bodies things relatively similar to the operations andmovements of men, they attributed to both the same principles; fromthis came their sympathy, antipathy, and horror of a vacuum.

The author turns all modern philosophers into so many sceptics. Theirsystem of colours, smells, tastes, sounds, heat, cold, and the other sensible qualities does not explain the operations of external objects. Ittends, rather, to destroy all objects. For if colours, etc. are simple per-ceptions that have no real existence outside of ourselves, we havegrounds for concluding that movement, extension, and solidity have noreal existence. The idea of motion is not an idea that is separable from abody in motion; it depends on extension and solidity. But it is neverthe-less impossible to conceive extension other than as a composite ofcoloured and solid parts. If then colour does not really exist, the realityof our idea of extension depends on the idea of solidity. Let us thenexamine this idea.

The idea of solidity is that of two objects, which, although thrusttogether with the greatest force, nevertheless cannot penetrate oneanother, and always preserve a separate and distinct existence. Thussolidity is by itself incomprehensible. We must conceive of some bodiesthat are solid and that exist separately. But what idea do we have ofbodies? We have the ideas of colours, etc. The idea of motion dependson that of extension, and that of extension depends on that of solidity.The idea of solidity cannot depend on these qualities; to say otherwisewould land us in a vicious circle. Our anonymous author, who admitsthat this reasoning is abstract and perplexing, tries to make it clearer bychanging the manner of expression. You can see in the work itselfwhether the author’s explication is clearer than the matter that he claimsto be explaining.

The immateriality of the soul is the subject of Section V. The authorfaults equally the materialists and the immaterialists. Against the opinion of the former, who join every idea to extension, he claims thatan object can very well exist and yet be nowhere. But at the same timehe condemns the immaterialists who attach every idea to a simple andindivisible substance, for no external object can make itself knownimmediately to the understanding without the intermediary of an imageor of a perception. The table that I see at this very moment is simply aperception, and all its qualities are the qualities of a perception.However, the first of all these qualities is extension, and consequentlyperception is composed of parts. The idea is an exact copy of the object,and consequently the idea of extension is itself extended.

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After having proved in this manner that our perceptions are extended,the author ventures to assert that the doctrine of the immateriality, sim-plicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a form of atheismand a true Spinozism. This is how he claims to avoid a possiblereproach, namely, that he saps the foundations of religion.

Our anonymous author finishes this volume by examining personalidentity, a notion that depends on resemblance and the relation of causeand effect. But since the essence of these relations consists, properlyspeaking, in their power to produce an easy and smooth transition ofone idea to another corresponding idea, it follows that the notion of per-sonal identity depends uniquely on the continued and imperceptibleprogress of thought, following a train of perceived ideas. It is memorythat enables us to judge of resemblance and that instructs us concerningthis succession of thoughts; thus memory discovers, but does not pro-duce, personal identity.

A second volume of this work has appeared. There our anonymousauthor talks in detail of the passions. We will not undertake to give anextensive extract of this discussion. Those who like such controversiesabstractly treated will prefer to read about them in the original. Here wewill limit ourselves to an outline. The volume is divided into three parts.The first part treats of pride and humility and their causes, namely, viceand virtue, beauty and deformity, poverty and riches. The second parttreats of love and hatred, of benevolence and anger, of compassion, malice, and envy, of esteem and contempt. The third part concerns liberty and the necessary influence of motives on the will.

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1 An essay towards demonstrating the immateriality and free-agency of the soul: inanswer to two pamphlets, one intitled, A philosophical enquiry into the physicalspring of human actions &c. supposed to have been wrote by Mr. Samuel Strutt andthe other intitled, A philosophical enquiry concerning human liberty supposed tohave been wrote by Anthony Collins, Esq. London: Printed for J. Shuckburgh ...,1760 [i.e., 1740], xvi, 136 p.

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5COMMON SENSE:

OR THE ENGLISHMAN’S JOURNAL

Letter to the editor in Common Sense: or the Englishman’s Journal,Saturday, July 5, 1740, pp. 1–2.Complete article.

The anonymous writer of this essay identifies himself as the author ofAn Essay towards demonstrating the Immateriality and Free-Agency

of the Soul (1740).1 The aim of the article is to prevent Hume’s accountof necessity from having “any mischievous Effect upon the Opinions orMorals of Mankind.” The author begins by describing the downfall ofwriters who advocate necessity, and he finds Hume’s Treatise to be acase in point. In general he believes that Hume’s Treatise is a “tediousperformance” and confesses that he does not fully understand the thrustof Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity in Book 2.3.1–3. Aftersummarizing Hume’s views on necessity, he begins his refutation. Theauthor believes that the issues of free will and necessary connection arerelated, and that Newton adequately explains the notion of necessaryconnection as cohesion, attraction, repulsion and communication ofmotion. According to the author, the proof that we are free consists inthe fact that we recognize causal necessity in external objects onlybecause such necessity stands in sharp contrast to human freedom. Heargues that the mischievous threat of Hume’s theory is its implicationthat our conduct is beyond our control. Although agreeing with Humethat there is a causal-like relation between our motives and the morallysignificant actions that they elicit, the author argues that our feeling offreedom shows that this connection is not absolute. Changing subjects,he argues, contrary to Hume, that space is indeed infinitely divisible in a

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2 For a discussion of this essay, see E.C. Mossner, “The First Answer to Hume’sTreatise: An Unnoticed Item of 1740,” in Journal of the History of Ideas, 1951,Vol. 12, pp. 291–294.

3 [See above note.]

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speculative sense; for, given any spatial object considered as a whole, itmust necessarily be seen to have parts.2

Some of our Papers being designed for the Learned, and others for theUnlearned, we hope the latter will, in Complaisance to the former,excuse our publishing the following Dissertation, which, we think, maybe of great Use, tho’ it may not perhaps be so entertaining to those thatnever have employed their Thoughts about such Subjects.

To the AUTHOR of COMMON SENSE.SIR,

As I published lately An Essay towards demonstrating theImmateriality and Free Agency of the Soul,3 which one of yourCorrespondents has already taken notice of, and as the establishing ofboth these Doctrines is, in my Opinion necessary for the Establishmentof Religion, Virtue, and Morality, nay, and even of social Liberty itself, Imust beg you’ll [by printer] give what follows a Place in your Paper.

The Liberty of Human Action is a Doctrine so agreeable to Reason,and to the common Sense of Mankind, that it is never opposed but bythose who either lay down to themselves false Principles, or mistake theTerms they make Use of; which is the chief Cause of that impenetrableObscurity and incomprehensible Jargon, we find in the Writings ofalmost all those, who have hitherto appeared as Advocates forNecessity.

Mr. Collins, I think, is the only one, who has treated the Subject withany Order or Perspicuity. As he was a Gentleman of a most extensiveGenius, and a clear Understanding, he has, indeed, expressed himself so asto be understood; but I have, in the above mentioned Essay, answeredevery Philosophical Argument he has advanced in favour of Necessity; and,I hope, I have done it to the Satisfaction of all those who delight in what isplain and easy, and do not think that every piece of Metaphysicks ought tosoar above the common Reach of Human Capacity.

What follows, I intend as a short Answer to a long Book lately published, intitled, A Treatise of Human Nature, the Author of which

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4 [i.e., Treatise 2.3.1.]5 Vol. II. P. 220.

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seems, if I understand him, which, I profess, I am not quite sure of, toadopt the Doctrine of Necessity, in the 4th and last Part of the 2d Book4

of his tedious Performance; but, according to Custom, he stumbles at hisfirst setting out.

He desires it may be observed, and I desire it too, “That by the Will,he means nothing but, the internal Impression we feel and are consciousof, when we knowingly give Rise to any new Motion of our Body, ornew Perception of our Mind”.5 Now, does not every one see, that by thisDefinition he means, if he means what every understanding Man mustmean, not the Will itself, but the Exercise of that Faculty called the Will, orwhat we call the Act of Volition. After this Definition he goes on thus.“This Impression; (meaning the Will) like the preceding ones of Pride andHumility, Love and Hatred, ’tis impossible to define, and needless todescribe any farther.” What Pity it is, he did not think of this before hegave us his Definition? But by his Favour, if I understand the EnglishLanguage, (which is generally the Dispute among Metaphysicians) neitherthe Will, nor Pride of Humility, nor Love or Hatred, ought to be calledImpressions. The Will is a Faculty; and Pride, Humility, Love, and Hatred,are Passions of the Human Soul.

Then he tells us, “Every Object (material he means) is determined byan absolute Fate to a certain Degree and Direction of its Motion, &c”.But I, as a Philosopher, and as a Christian, must say, that no materialObject is determined by an absolute Fate to any Thing; for all Objects,meerly material, are determined in their Motions and Directions, bythose Qualities which were given to them, and still preserved in them,by God Almighty, as I have shewn in my Essay, Chap. 9th.

After having established, as he supposes, the absolute Fate by whichthe Motions and Directions of material Objects are determined, he pro-ceeds to examine the Motions and Directions, or rather the Actions, ofthe Mind, and tells us,

“That in no single Instance the ultimate Connexion of any Objects isdiscoverable, either by our Senses or Reason, and that we can neverpenetrate so far into the Essence and Construction of Bodies, as toperceive the Principle, on which their mutual Influence depends. ’Tistheir constant Union alone, with which we are acquainted; and ’tisfrom the constant Union the Necessity arises. If Objects had not anuniform and regular Conjunction with each other, we should neverarrive at any Idea of Cause and Effect; and even after all, the Necessitywhich enters into that Idea, is nothing but a Determination of the Mind

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6 D.P. 221. [Treatise, 2.3.1.]

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to pass from one Object to its usual Attendant, and infer the Existenceof one from that of the other.6

I shall take no Notice of this Novel Sort of Diction, because mostMetaphysicians, to the great Prejudice of the Science, affect to think, andto express their Thoughts, in a Method peculiar to themselves; but I mustobserve, that if the Author had read, and considered (for there is a greatDifference) the Philosophical Works of the great Sir Isaac Newton, hewould have perceived, that the ultimate Connexion of Objects, (by which,I suppose, he means Causes and Effects) so far as it depends upon, or pro-ceeds from any Quality in Matter, has been discovered, and that itdepends upon or proceeds from Cohesion, Attraction, Repulsion, andCommunication of Motion, which are Qualities given in different Degreesto Matter, by the Author of Nature, as I have, after Sir Isaac Newton,shewn in the 9th Chapter of my Essay.

But suppose, these four Qualities depended upon, or proceeded fromsome other Quality or Qualities as yet unknown, neither they, nor thoseQualities upon which they depend, nor any essential or accidental Qualitythat is, or can be in Matter, can properly be said to be the first Principle,on which the mutual Influence of Bodies depends. Because, as Matter is initself absolutely passive, no Part of Matter can ever of itself act uponitself, or upon any other Part of Matter; and consequently, Matter cannever of itself produce any Effect. Therefore, that active Being, supreme orsubordinate, which we call Spirit, must be the first Principle, on which themutual Influence of Bodies must always originally depend. This, I think, Ihave fully shewn in my said Essay; and the Author will, I believe, be of myOpinion, if he will but descend from those Clouds where he now seems towander, and deign to tread upon the Low, but solid Surface of commonApprehension.

Now, with Regard to the Origin of that Idea we call Necessity, theAuthor will see by reading my Essay Chap. 4th and 11th, that we nevershould, nor ever could have formed an Idea of Necessity or necessaryMotion, if we had not perceived in ourselves a Motion that is not neces-sary; and that with Regard to the Motion of any external Object, it is notfrom any necessary Connexion, or constant Union between Cause andEffect, that we determine the Motion to be necessary or voluntary;because we see many Motions or Effects, the Cause of which we neithersee nor can perceive: It is from Observation and Examination only, we inthis Case determine; and for this very Reason, we are often liable to bedeceived in our Judgments about the Necessity or Freedom of externalMotions or Effects.

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As for the Author’s Proof from Experience, that there is a constantUnion between our Actions of one Side, and our Motives, Tempers, orCircumstances of the other, I shall grant that the latter have a very greatInfluence upon the former; and it is upon this, that moral Certainty, orwhat he calls moral Evidence, depends: But every Man must be con-vinced from what he feels within himself, that this Influence is notabsolute and necessary; and Self Conviction is a much stronger Proofthan any we can have from our Observation of external Objects,because we cannot know their Tempers and Circumstances, and muchless the Motives they are governed by, so well as we do our own.

This, I believe, will be sufficient for preventing my Author’sPhilosophy from having any mischievous Effect upon the Opinions orMorals of Mankind; and, indeed, I should have taken no Notice of whathe has wrote, if I had not thought his Book, in several Parts, so veryabstruse and perplex’d, that, I am convinced, no Man can comprehendwhat he means; and as one of the greatest Wits of this Age has justlyobserved, this may impose upon weak Readers, and make them imagine,there is a great Deal of deep Learning in it, because they do not under-stand it.

But as the same Author, in the 2d Part of his first Book sets himself upin Opposition to the now General, and, I think, Self-evident Opinion,That Space is Divisible in infinitum, I must have a Word with him uponthat Subject, before I leave him. His very first Argument is founded upona false Position: He affirms, That it is a Contradiction to suppose, thatany finite Part of Space contains an infinite Number of Parts. This is sofar from being a Contradiction, that it is certainly true, as every Manwho understands any Thing of the Nature of Infinites, or even of Spaceitself, must acknowledge; for tho’ a certain Magnitude be necessary, foran actual Division of any Thing that can be divided, or for rendering theParts perceptible to us after they are divided, yet the Magnitude of anObject has nothing to do with its speculative Divisibility, nor does theone in the least contribute to, or derogate from the other. We may con-sider an Object as a Whole, without at that Time comparing our Ideacalled Whole, with our Idea called Parts, which is the Case inMathematicks; for a Mathematician’s Demonstration will hold as true,when he takes a Church or a City for his Mathematical Point, as whenhe takes a Point almost imperceptible to the Eye, tho’ assisted by thebest magnifying Glass. But when we do actually compare our Idea calledWhole, with our Idea called Parts, it is as impossible for us to suppose aWhole, without Parts, as it is to suppose it without Figure or Extension.

I shall therefore give myself no farther Trouble about my Author’sArguments for shewing, that Space is not infinitely divisible; for, inTruth, they seem to be as indivisible as his Space. But I must ask him,

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whether he can suppose any Part of Space to be void of Extension? If hedoes, I will say, that he supposes it to be void of one of the most essen-tial Qualities of Space; and if he does not, he must then grant, that everyPart of Space is Divisible, or has Parts, and so on in infinitum: for if Iremember any Thing of the old Philosophy I learned at School, theDefinition of Extension was, Quod habet Partes extra partes; and I amvery sure, that if any Part of Space could be supposed to have no Parts,that Part of Space could not be supposed to have partes extra partes,that is to say, it could not be supposed to have any Extension.

I shall conclude my Remarks upon this modern Piece of Philosophywith observing, that when we speak properly, it is a very improperQuestion to ask, if Space be divisible in infinitum? Every Part of Space,the smallest we can imagine, must be supposed to have Parts, that is tosay, it must be supposed to have Extension; for this is all we can meanby the Divisibility of Space; because no Part of Space, the most immenseor largest we can imagine, can be actually divided; that is to say, it isimpossible to divide Space as we do Matter, by removing or destroyingthat Contiguity which is between any two of its Parts; therefore, I hope,my Readers will suppose, that I have talked of the infinite Divisibility ofSpace, only in Complaisance to my Author and in order to lead him, ifpossible, into a right Way of thinking about those Subjects, upon whichhe has wrote such a Huge Treatise.

And now I must beg his Pardon for the Freedom I have taken withhim. I can upon Honour declare, I never had the least Intimation, whohe is; so that my Criticism cannot proceed from any Malice or Ill-will. Itproceeds entirely from the Regard I have for that Science calledMetaphysicks: A Science which is in itself of great Dignity, because itmay do infinite Service to Religion, Virtue, and Morality, and conse-quently to Religious as well as Civil Liberty, when handled in a naturaland concise Manner; but it does infinite Mischief, when, by departingfrom Nature, it is rendered obscure, perplex’d and contemptible, as ithas designedly been for many Ages by those who were, and still are,endeavouring to rob Mankind of their Liberities, both religious andcivil, by rendering every Man an implicit Believer in whatever Opinionsthey may think fit to propagate, and an abject Slave to whateverCommands they may have a Mind to impose.

It is this, and this chiefly, that interests me so much in the cause ofMetaphysicks. It is by them, and them only, we can naturally come atthe Knowledge of our own Soul or Spirit, and of the supreme Spirit thathas created, and still governs the Universe; which I call Religion: It is bythem, and them only, we can naturally come at the Knowledge of thoseDuties we owe to Mankind, our Country, and our Friends, which I callVirtue; and it is by them, and them only, we can naturally come at the

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Knowledge of those Duties we owe to our Neighbours and ourselves,which I call Morality. Therefore, it behoves Mankind to have theScience called Metaphysicks as fully and clearly explained as possible: Itis an Injury to Human Nature to render it obscure and perplex’dthrough Ignorance or Want of Capacity: It is a Most flagitious Crime todo so designedly, for the Sake of any private View; or for the Sake ofpropagating any particular Sect of Religion, or any Selfish Party inPoliticks. I am, Sir,

Your constant Readerand humble Servant.

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6WILLIAM WISHART

[William Wishart], “A specimen of the principles concerning religionand morality, said to be maintain’d in a book lately publish’d, intitled, Atreatise of human nature,” in A letter from a gentleman to his friend inEdinburgh. Edinburgh, 1745, 34 p.Complete pamphlet, including Hume’s response; from 1745 edition.

In 1744–1745 Hume was a candidate for the Chair of Moral Philosophyat the University of Edinburgh. The position was to be vacated by John

Pringle, and the leading candidates were Hume and William Cleghorn. TheEdinburgh Town Council was responsible for electing a replacement; con-sequently, politics was a key factor in the decision. Loyalties were drawnchiefly along the two key political party lines: the Argathelians (whoseleaders were backing Hume), and the Squadrone (whose leaders werebacking Cleghorn). Pringle, a Squadrone supporter, procrastinated in step-ping down, thus allowing the Squadrone to unify enough anti-Argathelianinterest among the independents to defeat the Argathelians’ candidate.Among other tactics, the Squadrone opposition condemned what they per-ceived as the anti-religious tendency of Hume’s writings. Chief among thecritics was clergyman William Wishart (1692–1753), the Principal of theUniversity of Edinburgh. Lists of allegedly dangerous propositions fromHume’s Treatise circulated, penned by Wishart. Wishart’s interventionensured that opposition increased among Edinburgh’s ministers, who hada right to be consulted in the matter of the Chair of Moral Philosophy andwould accordingly influence Council members. Hoping to strengthen hisposition, Hume composed a point-by-point reply to the charges againsthim. This reply he sent, in the form of a letter, to John Coutts, the previousyear’s Provost of Edinburgh. Henry Home then published this letter andthe charges against Hume as a pamphlet with the title, A Letter from aGentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh. In a letter to Home, Hume recallsthe circumstances surrounding its publication:

I am sorry you shou’d have found yourself oblig’d to print the Letter[i.e., the letter incorporated into A Letter from a gentleman] I wrote toMr Couts, it being so hastily compos’d that I scarce had time to revise it.Indeed the Charge was so weak, that it did not require much time toanswer it, if the Matter had been to be judg’d by Reason. The Principal

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1 Hume to James Johnstone, June 18, 1745.2 For a discussion of the politics behind Hume’s candidacy for professorship, see

Roger L. Emerson, “The ‘Affair’ at Edinburgh and the ‘Project’ at Glasgow: thePolitics of Hume’s Attempt to Become a Professor,” in Hume and Hume’sConnexions, ed., M.A. Stewart, John P. Wright (University Park: The PennsylvaniaState University Press, 1995), pp. 1–22. See also a letter by Wishart to John Forrestdescribing his motives in blocking Hume's academic appointment; included in M.A.Stewart, The Kirk and the Infidel, Lancaster: Lancaster University Publications,1995.

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[i.e., Wishart] found himself reduc’d to this Dilemma; either to drawHeresies from my Principles by Inferences & Deductions, which he knewwou’d never do with the Ministers & Town Council. Or if he made useof my Words, he must pervert them & misrepresent them in the grossestway in the World. This last Expedient he chose, with much Prudence butvery little Honesty. I think Mr Wallace’s Conduct has been very noble &generous; & I am much oblig’d to him. [Hume to Henry Home, June13–15, 1745]

Sensing a humiliating defeat, Hume apparently withdrew his candidacybefore the ministers voted on the issue, and even before he knew thatHenry Home had published the Letter. Unaware of Hume’s withdrawal,the Edinburgh clergy considered the issue, and 12 of the 15 ministers ulti-mately voted against Hume. One of Hume’s supporters was clergymanRobert Wallace (1697–1771), whose conduct Hume praises in the lettercited above. A letter published 31 years later in the London Chronicledescribes Wallace’s stance in the deliberations:

The late celebrated Dr. Wallace ... declared to the counsellors in strongterms, that he did not think himself entitled to give his opinion, on pre-text too of a juvenile as well as anonymous performance [i.e., theTreatise], which had been little read, and which was less understood,against choosing that ingenuous gentleman, more than any of the othercandidates. The Doctor’s liberal mind was elevated far above, and hisphilosophic indignation was greatly raised at the inquisitorial zeal dis-covered on this occasion. [London Chronicle, 5–7 Nov. 1776]

A month after the vote, Hume reflected in a letter that the matter of hisvocational opportunities “was brought to an issue, and by the cabals of thePrincipal [i.e. Wishart], the bigotry of the clergy, and the credulity of themob, we lost it.”1 In 1751–1752 Hume sought a philosophy chair at theUniversity of Glasgow, and was again unsuccessful. Hume’s lesson, per-haps, was to seek civil employment through his Argathelian supporters,rather than academic employment.2

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Wishart’s initial attack on Hume apparently no longer survives; it mayhave been only a handwritten manuscript, or perhaps a sheet printed forcirculation among the clergy. In any event, the substance of Wishart’sattack appears to be preserved in A Letter from a Gentleman. The pam-phlet is in three parts. First, there is “A Specimen” of extracted quota-tions from Hume’s Treatise that highlight his alleged scepticism andatheism. Second, there is a “Sum of the Charge” which briefly itemizessix specific offences set out in the Specimen. This claims that Humemaintains, (1) universal scepticism, (2) principles leading to downrightatheism, (3) errors concerning the very being and existence of God, (4)errors concerning God’s being the first cause, (5) that the soul is notimmaterial, and (6) views that sap the foundations of morality. Thethird part of the pamphlet consists of Hume’s responses to the “Sum ofthe Charge.” To the charge of universal scepticism, Hume responds thatthe scepticism of the Treatise “was meant as a mere PhilosophicalAmusement, or Trial of Wit and Subtility,” and claims that in theTreatise itself these sceptical notions are “positively renounced” as the“Effects of Philosophical Melancholy and Delusion.” Further, Humenotes that a number of respected philosophers were in many ways scep-tical, and that such scepticism provides a path to faith.

In response to the charge that his views lead to atheism because hedenies the certainty of causality and thus undermines the causal prooffor God’s existence, Hume contends that causality is certain as a matterof experience. Further, even if this did undermine the causal proof, thedesign argument for God’s existence would remain intact. To the thirdcharge of errors regarding God’s existence, which Wishart links toHume’s view of abstraction, Hume responds by noting that he had simply followed Berkeley’s view, and that any inference of atheism fromthis is unfounded. In response to the fourth charge, denying that God isthe first cause, Hume argues that in the relevant part of the Treatise hehad in mind an attack on occasionalism, and that the issue has generallybeen seen as a philosophical, not a religious, one. In reply to the fifthcharge, denying the immateriality of the soul, Hume argues that he wasonly considering the notion of the self, and not the notion of the soul.And in reply to the sixth charge, of sapping the foundations of morality,Hume argues that he followed Hutcheson in grounding morality inhuman nature and instinct.

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3 [Title page: A | LETTER | FROM A | GENTLEMAN | TO | HIS FRIEND INEdinburgh: | CONTAINING | Some OBSERVATIONS | ON | A Specimen of thePrinciples concerning | RELIGION and MORALITY, | said to be maintain’d in a Booklately pu– | blish’d, intituled, A Treatise of Human | Nature, &c. | EDINBURGH, |Printed in the year M.DCC.XLV.]

4 [i.e., “A specimen of the principles concerning religion and morality, said to bemaintain’d in a book lately publish’d, intitled, A treatise of human nature.”]

5 [Page numbers were originally inserted in the margin at the start of the quotedpassages. In the original, some page numbers are misprinted or incorrectly associatedwith the quoted passage. Although the more obvious errors are changed here, I haveinserted the numbers how and approximately where they appear in the original.]

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SIR,3

I have read over the Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion andMorality, said to be maintain’d in a Book lately published, intituled, ATreatise of Human Nature; being an Attempt to introduce the ExperimentalMethod of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. I have also read over what is calledthe Sum of the Charge. Which Papers, as you inform me, have been industri-ously spread about, and were put into your hands some few Days ago.

I was perswaded that the Clamour of Scepticism, Atheism, &c. had beenso often employ’d by the worst of Men against the best, that it had now lostall its Influence; and should never have thought of making any Remarks onthese maim’d Excerpts, if you had not laid your Commands on me, as apiece of common Justice to the Author, and for undeceiving some well-meaning People, on whom it seems the enormous Charge has madeImpression.

I shall insert the Accusation at full Length, and then go regularly throughwhat is called the Sum of the Charge; because it is intended, I suppose, tocontain the Substance of the whole. I shall also take notice of the Specimenas I go along.

Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality, &c.4

The Author puts on his Title-page (Vol. I printed for J. Noon, 1739) aPassage of Tacitus to this Purpose; “Rare Happiness of our Times, that youmay think as you will, and speak as you think.”

He expresses his Deference to the Publick in these Words (Advertisement,p. 2.) “The Approbation of the Publick I consider as the greatest Reward ofmy Labours; but am determined to regard its Judgment, whatever it be, asmy best Instruction.”

He gives us the summary View of his Philosophy from p. 458. to 470. –

[458. 459.]5 “I am confounded with that forlorn Solitude, in which Iam placed in my Philosophy. – I have exposed myself to the Enmity

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of all Metaphysicians, Logicians, Mathematicians, and evenTheologians. – I have declared my Disapprobations of their Systems.– When I turn my Eye inward, I find nothing but Doubt andIgnorance. All the World conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho’such is my Weakness, that I feel all my Opinions loosen and fall ofthemselves, when unsupported by the Approbation of others. – [460.]Can I be sure, that, in leaving all established Opinions, I am follow-ing Truth? and by what Criterion shall I distinguish her, even ifFortune should at last guide me on her Footsteps? After the mostaccurate and exact of my Reasonings, I can give no Reason why Ishould assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong Propensity to con-sider Objects strongly in that View under which they appear to me. –[461.] The Memory, Senses, and Understanding, are all of themfounded on the Imagination. – No Wonder a Principle so inconstantand fallacious should lead us into Errors, when implicitely followed(as it must be) in all its Variations. – [464.] I have already shown,that the Understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its mostgeneral Principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowestDegree of Evidence in any Proposition either in Philosophy or com-mon Life. – [465. 466.] We have no Choice left, but betwixt a falseReason and none at all. – [467.] Where am I, or what? From whatCauses do I derive my Existence, and to what Condition shall Ireturn? Whose Favour shall I court, and whose Anger must I dread?What Beings surround me? On whom have I any Influence, or whohave any Influence on me? I am confounded with all these Questions,and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable Condition imagin-able, invironed with the deepest Darkness, and utterly deprived of theUse of every Member and Faculty. – [468.] If I must be a Fool, as allthose who reason or believe any Thing certainly are, my Follies shallat least be natural and agreeable. – [469.] In all the Incidents of Life,we ought still to preserve our Scepticism: If we believe that Firewarms, or Water refreshes, ’tis only because it costs us too muchPains to think otherwise; nay, if we are Philosophers, it ought only tobe upon sceptical Principles. – [470.] I cannot forbear having aCuriosity to be acquainted with the Principles of moral Good andEvil, &c. I am concerned for the Condition of the learned World,which lies under such a deplorable Ignorance in all these Particulars. Ifeel an Ambition arise in me of contributing to the Instruction ofMankind, and of acquiring a Name by my Inventions andDiscoveries. – Should I endeavour to banish these Sentiments, I feel Ishould be a Loser in point of Pleasure; and this is the Origin of myPhilosophy.”

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Agreeable to this summary View, he tells us, p. 123.

“Let us fix our Attention out of ourselves as much as possible. – We real-ly never advance a Step beyond ourselves; nor can conceive any Kind ofExistence, but these Perceptions which have appeared in that narrowCompass: This is the Universe of the Imagination, nor have we any Ideabut what is there produced.”–

Accordingly,

“An Opinion or Belief may be most accurately defined, [172.] A livelyIdea related or associated with a present Impression; [321.] and ismore properly an Act of the sensitive than of the cogitive Part of ourNatures.”

And,

[363.] “Belief in general consists in nothing but the Vivacity of anIdea. Again, the Idea of Existence is the very same with the Idea ofwhat we conceive to be existent. – [122.] Any Idea we please to formis the Idea of a Being; and the Idea of a Being is any Idea we please toform. And as to the Notion of an external Existence, when taken forsomething specifically different from our Perceptions, we have shownits Absurdity: [330.] And what we call a Mind is nothing but a Heapor Collection of different Perceptions united together by certainRelations, and supposed, tho’ falsly, to be endowed with a perfectSimplicity.” [361.]

And,

[370.] “The only Existence, of which we are certain, are Perceptions.[438.] When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I alwaysstumble on some particular Perception or other. – I never can catchmyself at any Time without a Perception, and never can observe anyThing but the Perception. – [439.] If any one think he has a differentNotion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. – Imay venture to affirm of the rest of Mankind, that they are nothingbut a Bundle of Perceptions, which succeed each other with an incon-ceivable Rapidity, and are in a perpetual Flux and Movement.” –

And lest the Reader should forget to apply all this to the Supreme Mind,and the Existence of the First Cause, he has a long Disquisition concern-ing Causes and Effects, the Sum of which amounts to this, [321. 138.]

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That all our Reasoning concerning Causes and Effects are derived fromnothing but Custom: That,

“if any pretend to define a Cause by saying it is something productive ofanother, ’tis evident he would say nothing; for what does he mean byProduction? [298.] That we may define a Cause to be an Object prece-dent and contiguous to another, and where all the Objects resemblingthe former are placed in like Relations of Precedency and Contiguity tothese Objects that resemble the latter; or, a Cause is an Object precedentand contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the Idea of the onedetermines the Mind to form the Idea of the other, and the Impression ofthe one to form a more lively Idea of the other.”

From these clear and plain Definitions he infers,

“That all Causes are of the same Kind; and there is no Foundation forthe Distinction betwixt efficient Causes, and Causes sine qua non; orbetwixt efficient Causes, and formal and material, and exemplary, andfinal Causes: [300.] And that there is but one Kind of Necessity, [301.]and the common Distinction betwixt Moral and Physical is without anyFoundation in Nature: And that the Distinction we often make betwixtPower, and the Exercise of it, is equally without Foundation: And thatthe Necessity of a Cause to every Beginning of Existence, is not foundedon any Arguments demonstrative or intuitive: And in fine, That anyThing may produce any Thing; Creation, Annihilation, Motion, Reason,Volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other Objectwe can imagine.”

The curious Nostrum he often repeats, p. 430, 434. Again he tells us,

[284.] “That when we talk of any Being, whether of a Superior orInferior Nature, as endowed with a Power or Force proportioned to anyEffect, – We have really no distinct Meaning, and make Use only of com-mon Words, without any clear and determinate Ideas. [294.] And if wehave really no Idea of Power or Efficacy in any Object, or of any realconnection betwixt Causes and Effects, ’twill be to little Purpose toprove that an Efficacy is necessary in all Operations. We do not under-stand our own Meaning in talking so, but ignorantly confound Ideaswhich are intirely distinct from each other.”

Again he says,

[291.] “The Efficacy or Energy of Causes is neither placed in the

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Causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the Concurrence of these twoPrinciples, but belongs entirely to the Soul (or the Bundle of Perceptions)which considers the Union of two or more Objects in all past Instances:’Tis here that the real Power of Causes is placed, along with theirConnection and Necessity. And in fine, we may observe a Conjunction ora Relation of Cause and Effect between different Perceptions, but cannever observe it between Perceptions and Objects.”

’Tis impossible therefore, that, from the Existence or any of the Qualities ofthe former, we can ever form any Conclusion concerning the Existence ofthe latter, or ever satisfy our Reason in this Particular with regard to theExistence of a Supreme Being. ’Tis well known that this Principle, Whateverbegins to exist must have a Cause of Existence, is the first Step in theArgument for the Being of a Supreme Cause; and that, without it, ’tis impos-sible to go one Step further in that Argument. Now this Maxim he is at greatPains from p. 141. to explode, and to show, “That it is neither intuitivelynor demonstratively certain;” and he says,

“Reason can never satisfy us that the Existence of any Object does everimply that of another. [173.] So that, when we pass from the Impressionof one to the Idea and Belief of another, we are not determined by Reason,but by Custom.”

[172.] In a marginal Note on the preceeding Page he says,

“In that Proposition, God is, or indeed any other which regards Existence,the Idea of Existence is no distinct Idea which we unite with that of theObject, and which is capable of forming a compound Idea by the Union.”

Concerning this Principle, [280.] That the Deity is the prime Mover of theUniverse, who first created Matter, and gave its original Impulse, and like-wise supports its Existence, and successively bestows on it its Motions; hesays,

“This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will appear superfluous toexamine it in this Place. – For, if the very Idea be derived from anImpression, the Idea of a Deity proceeds from the same Origin; and, if noImpression implies any Force or Efficacy, ’tis equally impossible to discov-er, or even imagine, any such active Principle in the Deity. – SincePhilosophers therefore have concluded, that Matter cannot be endowedwith any efficacious Principle, because it is impossible to discover in it sucha Principle; the same Course of Reasoning should determine them toexclude it from the Supreme Being: Or if they esteem that Opinion absurd

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and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how they may avoid it, andthat is, by concluding from the very first, that they have no adequate Ideaof Power or Efficacy in any Object; since neither in Body nor Spirit, neitherin Superior nor Inferior Natures, are they able to discover one singleInstance of it.”

And says he, [432.] “We have no Idea of a Being endowed with any Power,much less of one endowed with infinite Power.”

Concerning the Immateriality of the Soul (from which the Argument istaken for its natural Immortality, or that it cannot perish by Dissolution asthe Body) he says,

[431.] “We certainly may conclude that Motion may be and actually is theCause of Thought and Perception: [434.] And no wonder, for any Thingmay be the Cause or Effect of any Thing; which evidently gives theAdvantage to the Materialists above their Adversaries.”

But yet more plainly,

[418.] “I assert, says he, that the Doctrine of the Immateriality, Simplicity,and Indivisibility of a thinking Substance, is a true Atheism, and will serveto justify all these Sentiments for which Spinoza is so universally infa-mous.”

[419.] This hideous Hypothesis is almost the same with that of theImmateriality of the Soul, which has become so popular. [423.] And againhe endeavours to prove, that all the Absurdities which have been found inthe Systems of Spinoza, may likewise be discovered in that of theTheologians: And concludes, that

[425.] “We cannot advance one Step towards the establishing theSimplicity and Immateriality of the Soul, without preparing the Way for adangerous and irrecoverable Atheism.”

The Author’s Sentiments in Morality we have in Vol. 3. printed for T. Longman, 1740. He there tells us, that

[p. 5.] “Reason has no Influence on our Passions and Actions: Actionsmay be laudable or blameable, but they cannot be reasonable or unreason-able. [19.] That all Beings in the Universe, considered in themselves,appear entirely loose and independent of each other; ’Tis only byExperience we learn their Influence and Connection, and this Influence weought never to extend beyond Experience.”

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He takes great Pains to prove, from p. 37. That Justice is not a natur-al, but an artificial Virtue; and gives one pretty odd Reason for it:

[128.] “We may conclude, that the Laws of Justice, being universaland perfectly inflexible, can never be derived from Nature. [101.] Isuppose (says he) a Person to have lent me a Sum of Money, onCondition that it be restored in a few Days; and also suppose, that,after Expiration of the Term agreed on, he demands the Sum: I ask,What Reason or Motive have I to restore the Money? [43.] PublickInterest is not naturally attach’d to the Observation of the Rules ofJustice, but is only connected with it, [48.] after an artificialConvention, for Establishment of these Rules. Unless we will allowthat Nature has established a Sophistry, and rendered it necessary andunavoidable; we must allow that the Sense of Justice and Injustice isnot derived from Nature, but arises artificially, tho’ necessarily, fromEducation and human Conventions. [69.] Here is a Proposition whichI think may be regarded as certain, That it is only from the Selfishnessand confined Generosity of Men, along with the scanty ProvisionNature has made for his Wants, that Justice derives its Origin. TheseImpressions, which give Rise to this Sense of Justice, are not natural tothe Mind of Man, but arise from Artifice and human Conventions.[73.] Without such a Convention, no one would ever have dreamedthat there was such a Virtue as Justice, or have been induced to con-form his Actions to it. Taking any single Act, my Justice may be perni-cious in every Respect: And ’tis only upon the Supposition that othersare to imitate my Example, that I can be induced to embrace thatVirtue; since nothing but the Combination can render Justice advanta-geous, or afford me any Motive to conform myself to its Rules. [44.]And in general it may be affirmed, that there is no such Passion inhuman Minds, as the Love of Mankind merely as such, independent ofpersonal Qualities, of Service or of Relation to ourself.”

Mr. Hobbs, who was at Pains to shake loose all other naturalObligations, yet found it necessary to leave, or pretended to leave, theObligation of Promises or Pactions; but our Author strikes a bolderStroke:

[101.] “That the Rule of Morality (says he) which enjoins thePerformance of Promises, is not natural, will sufficiently appear fromthese two Propositions, which I proceed to prove, viz. That a Promisewould not be intelligible before human Conventions had establishedit; and that, [114.] even if it were intelligible, it would not be attendedwith any moral Obligation.”

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And he concludes, “That Promises impose no natural Obligation.”And, p.115.

“I shall further observe, That since every new Promise imposes a newObligation of Morality upon the Person who promises, and since thisnew Obligation arises from his Will, it is one of the most mysteriousand incomprehensible Operations that can possibly be imagined, andmay even be compared to Transubstantiation or Holy Orders, where acertain Form of Words, along with a certain Intention, changes entire-ly the Nature of an external Object, and even of a human Creature.[117.] In fine (says he) as Force is supposed to invalidate all Contracts,such a Principle is a Proof that Promises have no natural Obligation,and are mere artificial Contrivances, for the Conveniency andAdvantage of Society.”

Sum of the Charge.

From the preceeding Specimen it will appear, that the Author main-tains,

1. Universal Scepticism. See his Assertions, p. 458, – 470. where hedoubts of every Thing (his own Existence excepted) and maintains theFolly of pretending to believe any Thing with Certainty.

2. Principles leading to downright Atheism, by denying the Doctrineof Causes and Effects, p. 321, 138, 298, 300, 301, 303, 430, 434, 284.where he maintains, that the Necessity of a Cause to every Beginning ofExistence is not founded on any Arguments demonstrative or intuitive.

3. Errors concerning the very Being and Existence of a God. ForInstance, Marginal Note, p. 172. as to that Proposition, God is, he says(or indeed as to any other Thing which regards Existence) “The Idea ofExistence is no distinct Idea which we unite with that of the Object, andwhich is capable of forming a compound Idea by Union.”

4. Errors concerning God’s being the first Cause, and prime Mover ofthe Universe: For as to this Principle, That the Deity first created Matter,and gave it its original Impulse, and likewise supports its Existence, hesays, “This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this Place, &c.” p. 280.

5. He is chargable with denying the Immateriality of the Soul, and theConsequences flowing from this Denial, p. 431, 4, 418, 419, 423.

6. With sapping the Foundations of Morality, by denying the natural andessential Difference betwixt Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, Justice andInjustice; making the Difference only artificial, and to arise from human

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Conventions and Compacts, Vol. 2. p. 5, 19, 128, 41, 43, 48, 69, 70, 73, 4,44.

You see, Dear Sir, that I have concealed no Part of the Accusation, buthave inserted the Specimen and Charge, as transmitted to me, without thesmallest Variation. I shall now go regularly thro’ what is called the Sum ofthe Charge, because it is intended, I suppose, to contain the Substance of thewhole; and shall take Notice of the Specimen as I go along.

1st, As to the Scepticism with which the Author is charged, I mustobserve, that the Doctrine of the Pyrrhonians or Scepticks have beenregarded in all Ages as Principles of mere Curiosity, or a Kind of Feux d’esprit, without any Influence on a Man’s steady Principles or Conduct inLife. In Reality, a Philosopher who affects to doubt of the Maxims of com-mon Reason, and even of his Senses, declares sufficiently that he is not inearnest, and that he intends not to advance an Opinion which he would rec-ommend as Standards of Judgment and Action. All he means by theseScruples is to abate the Pride of mere human Reasoners, by showing them,that even with regard to Principles which seem the clearest, and which theyare necessitated from the strongest Instincts of Nature to embrace, they arenot able to attain a full Consistence and absolute Certainty. Modesty then,and Humility, with regard to the Operations of our natural Faculties, is theResult of Scepticism; not an universal Doubt, which it is impossible for anyMan to support, and which the first and most trivial Accident in Life mustimmediately disconcert and destroy.

How is such a Frame of Mind prejudicial to Piety? And must not a Manbe ridiculous to assert that our Author denies the Principles of Religion,when he looks upon them as equally certain with the Objects of his Senses?If I be as much assured of these Principles, as that this Table at which I nowwrite is before me; Can any Thing further be desired by the most rigorousAntagonist? ’Tis evident, that so extravagant a Doubt as that whichScepticism may seem to recommend, by destroying every Thing, reallyaffects nothing, and was never intended to be understood seriously, but wasmeant as a mere Philosophical Amusement, or Trial of Wit and Subtility.

This is a Construction suggested by the very Nature of the Subject; but hehas not been contented with that, but expressly declared it. And all thosePrinciples, cited in the Specimen as Proofs of his Scepticism, are positivelyrenounced in a few Pages afterwards, and called the Effects of PhilosophicalMelancholy and Delusion. These are his very Words; and his Accuser’soverlooking them may be thought very prudent, but is a Degree ofUnfairness which appears to me altogether astonishing.

Were Authorities proper to be employed in any PhilosophicalReasoning, I could cite you that of Socrates the wisest and most religiousof the Greek Philosophers, as well as Cicero among the Romans, who

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both of them carried their Philosophical Doubts to the highest Degree ofScepticism. All the antient Fathers, as well as our first Reformers, are copi-ous in representing the Weakness and Uncertainty of mere human Reason.And Monsieur Huet the learned Bishop of Avaranches (so celebrated forhis Demonstration Evangelique which contains all the great Proofs of theChristian Religion) wrote also a Book on this very Topick, wherein heendeavours to revive all the Doctrines of the antient Skepticks orPyrrhonians.

In Reality, whence come all the various Tribes of Hereticks, the Arians,Socinians and Deists, but from too great a Confidence in mere humanReason, which they regard as the Standard of every Thing, and whichthey will not submit to the superior Light of Revelation? And can one doa more essential Service to Piety, than by showing them that this boastedReason of theirs, so far from accounting for the great Mysteries of theTrinity and Incarnation, is not able fully to satisfy itself with regard to itsown Operations, and must in some Measure fall into a Kind of impliciteFaith, even in the most obvious and familiar Principles?

II. The Author is charged with Opinions leading to downright Atheism,chiefly by denying this Principle, That whatever begins to exist must havea Cause of Existence. To give you a Notion of the Extravagance of thisCharge, I must enter into a little Detail. It is common for Philosophers todistinguish the Kinds of Evidence into intuitive, demonstrative, sensible,and moral; by which they intend only to mark a Difference betwixt them,not to denote a Superiority of one above another. Moral Certainty mayreach as high a Degree of Assurance as Mathematical; and our Senses aresurely to be comprised amongst the clearest and most convincing of allEvidences. Now, it being the Author’s Purpose, in the Pages cited in theSpecimen, to examine the Grounds of that Proposition; he used theFreedom of disputing the common Opinion, that it was founded ondemonstrative or intuitive Certainty; but asserts, that it is supported bymoral Evidence, and is followed by a Conviction of the same Kind withthese Truths, That all Men must die, and that the Sun will rise To-morrow. Is this any Thing like denying the Truth of that Proposition,which indeed a Man must have lost all common Sense to doubt of?

But, granting that he had denied it, how is this a Principle that leads toAtheism? It would be no difficult Matter to show, that the Arguments aposteriori from the Order and Course of Nature, these Arguments so sen-sible, so convincing, and so obvious, remain still in their full Force; andthat nothing is affected by it but the metaphysical Argument a priori,which many Men of Learning cannot comprehend, and which many Menboth of Piety and Learning show no great Value for. Bishop Tillotson hasused a Degree of Freedom on this Head, which I would not willinglyallow myself; ’tis in his excellent Sermon concerning the Wisdom of being

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religious, where he says, That the Being of a God is not capable ofDemonstration, but of moral Evidence. I hope none will pretend thatpious Prelate intended by these Assertions to weaken the Evidences for aDivine Existence, but only to distinguish accurately its Species ofEvidence.

I say further, that even the metaphysical Arguments for a Deity are notaffected by a Denial of the Proposition above-mentioned. It is only Dr.Clark’s Argument which can be supposed to be any way concerned. Manyother Arguments of the same Kind still remain; Des Cartes’s for Instance,which has always been esteemed as solid and convincing as the other. Ishall add, that a great Distinction ought always to be made betwixt aMan’s positive and avowed Opinions, and the Inferences which it mayplease others to draw from them. Had the Author really denied the Truthof the foregoing Proposition, (which the most superficial Reader cannotthink ever entred his Head) still he could not properly be charged asdesigning to invalidate any one Argument that any Philosopher hasemployed for a Divine Existence; that is only an Inference andConstruction of others, which he may refuse if he thinks proper.

Thus you may judge of the Candor of the whole Charge, when you seethe assigning of one Kind of Evidence for a Proposition, instead of anoth-er, is called denying that Proposition; that the invalidating only one Kindof Argument for the Divine Existence is called positive Atheism; nay, thatthe weakning only of one individual Argument of that Kind is calledrejecting that whole Species of Argument, and the Inferences of others areascribed to the Author as his real Opinion.

’Tis impossible ever to satisfy a captious Adversary, but it would beeasy for me to convince the severest Judge, that all the solid Argumentsfor Natural Religion retain their full Force upon the Author’s Principlesconcerning Causes and Effects, and that there is no Necessity even foraltering the common Methods of expressing or conceiving theseArguments. The Author has indeed asserted, That we can judge only ofthe Operations of Causes by Experience, and that, reasoning a priori, anything might appear able to produce any thing. We could not know thatStones would descend, or Fire burn, had we not Experience of theseEffects; and indeed, without such Experience, we could not certainly inferthe Existence of one Thing from that of another. This is no great Paradox,but seems to have been the Opinion of several Philosophers, and seemsthe most obvious and familiar Sentiment on that Subject; but, tho’ allInferences concerning Matter of Fact be thus resolved into Experience,these Inferences are noway weakned by such an Assertion, but on the con-trary will be found to acquire more Force, as long as Men are disposed totrust to their Experience rather than to mere human Reasoning. WhereverI see Order, I infer from Experience that there, there hath been Design and

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Contrivance. And the same Principle which leads me into this Inference,when I contemplate a Building, regular and beautiful in its whole Frameand Structure; the same Principle obliges me to infer an infinitely perfectArchitect, from the infinite Art and Contrivance which is display’d in thewhole Fabrick of the Universe. Is not this the Light in which thisArgument hath been placed by all Writers concerning Natural Religion?

III. The next Proof of Atheism is so unaccountable, that I know notwhat to make of it. Our Author indeed asserts, after the present pious andlearned Bishop of Cloyne, That we have no abstract or general Ideas,properly so speaking; and that those Ideas, which are called general, arenothing but particular Ideas affixed to general Terms. Thus, when I thinkof a Horse in general, I must always conceive that Horse as black orwhite, fat or lean, &c. and can form no Notion of a Horse that is not ofsome particular Colour or Size. In Prosecution of the same Topick, theAuthor hath said, That we have no general Idea of Existence, distinctfrom every particular Existence. But a Man must have strange Sagacity,that could discover Atheism in so harmless a Proposition. This, in myOpinion, might be justified before the University of Salamanca, or aSpanish Inquisition. I do indeed believe, that, when we assert theExistence of a Deity, we do not form a general abstract Idea of Existence,which we unite with the Idea of God, and which is capable of forming acompound Idea by Union; but this is the Case with regard to everyProposition concerning Existence. So that, by this Course of Reasoning,we must deny the Existence of every Thing, even of ourselves, of which atleast even the Accuser himself will admit our Author is perswaded.

IV. Ere answering the fourth Charge, I must use the Freedom to delivera short History of a particular Opinion in Philosophy. When Men consid-ered the several Effects and Operations of Nature, they were led to exam-ine into the Force or Power by which they were performed; and theydivided into several Opinions upon this Head, according as their otherPrinciples were more or less favourable to Religion. The Followers ofEpicurus and Strato asserted, That this Force was original and inherent inMatter, and, operating blindly, produced all the various Effects which webehold. The Platonick and Peripatetick Schools, perceiving the Absurdityof this Proposition, ascribed the Origin of all Force to one primary effi-cient Cause, who first bestowed it on Matter, and successively guided it inall its Operations. But all the antient Philosophers agreed, that there was areal Force in Matter, either original or derived; and that it was really Firewhich burnt, and Food that nourished, when we observed any of theseEffects to follow upon the Operations of these Bodies: The Schoolmensupposed also a real Power in Matter, to whose Operations however thecontinual Concurrence of the Deity was requisite, as well as to theSupport of that Existence which had been bestowed on Matter, and which

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they considered as a perpetual Creation. No one, till Des Cartes andMalbranche, ever entertained an Opinion that Matter had no Forceeither primary or secondary, and independent or concurrent, and couldnot so much as properly be called an Instrument in the Hands of theDeity, to serve any of the Purposes of Providence. These Philosopherslast-mentioned substituted the Notion of occasional Causes, by which itwas asserted that a Billiard Ball did not move another by its Impulse, butwas only the Occasion why the Deity, in pursuance of general Laws,bestowed Motion on the second Ball. But, tho’ this Opinion be veryinnocent, it never gained great Credit, especially in England, where it wasconsidered as too much contrary to received popular Opinions, and toolittle supported by Philosophical Arguments, ever to be admitted as anyThing but a mere Hypothesis. Cudworth, Lock and Clark make little orno mention of it. Sir Isaac Newton (tho’ some of his Followers havetaken a different Turn of thinking) plainly rejects it, by substituting theHypothesis of an Ætheral Fluid, not the immediate Volition of the Deity,as the Cause of Attraction. And, in short, this has been a Dispute leftentirely to the Arguments of Philosophers, and in which Religion hasnever been supposed to be in the least concerned.

Now it is evidently concerning this Cartesian Doctrine, of secondaryCauses, the Author is treating, when he says, (in the Passage referred toin the Charge) That it was a curious Opinion, but which it would appearsuperfluous to examine in that Place.

The Topick there handled is somewhat abstract: But I believe anyReader will easily perceive the Truth of this Assertion, and that theAuthor is far from pretending to deny (as asserted in the Charge) God’sbeing the first Cause and prime Mover of the Universe. That the Author’sWords could have no such Meaning as they stand connected, is to me soevident, that I could pledge on this Head, not only my small Credit as aPhilosopher, but even all my Pretensions to Trust or Belief in the com-mon Affairs of Life.

V. As to the fifth Article; The Author has not anywhere that I remem-ber denied the Immateriality of the Soul in the common Sense of theWord. He only says, That that Question did not admit of any distinctMeaning; because we had no distinct Idea of Substance. This Opinionmay be found everywhere in Mr. Lock, as well as in Bishop Berkley.

VI. I come now to the last Charge, which, according to the prevalentOpinion of Philosophers in this Age, will certainly be regarded as theseverest, viz. the Author’s destroying all the Foundations of Morality.

He hath indeed denied the eternal Difference of Right and Wrong inthe Sense in which Clark and Woolaston maintained them, viz. That thePropositions of Morality were of the same Nature with the Truths of

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Mathematicks and the abstract Sciences, the Objects merely of Reason,not the Feelings of our internal Tastes and Sentiments. In this Opinion heconcurs with all the antient Moralists, as well as with Mr. HutchisonProfessor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, who, withothers, has revived the antient Philosophy in this Particular. How poorthe Artifice, to cite a broken Passage of a Philosophical Discourse, inorder to throw an Odium on the Author!

When the Author asserts that Justice is an artificial not a naturalVirtue, he seems sensible that he employed Words that admit of an invid-ious Construction; and therefore makes use of all proper Expedients, byDefinitions and Explanations, to prevent it. But of these his Accusertakes no Notice. By the natural Virtues he plainly understandsCompassion and Generosity, and such as we are immediately carried toby a natural Instinct; and by the artificial Virtues he means Justice,Loyalty, and such as require, along with a natural Instinct, a certainReflection on the general Interests of Human Society, and a Combinationwith others. In the same Sense, Sucking is an Action natural to Man, andSpeech is artificial. But what is there in this Doctrine that can be sup-posed in the least pernicious? Has he not expresly asserted, That Justice,in another Sense of the Word, is so natural to Man, that no Society ofMen, and even no individual Member of any Society, was ever entirelydevoid of all Sense of it? Some Persons (tho’ without any Reason, in myOpinion) are displeased with Mr. Hutchison’s Philosophy, in foundingall the Virtues so much on Instinct, and admitting so little of Reason andReflection. Those should be pleased to find that so considerable a Branchof the Moral Duties are founded on that Principle.

The Author has likewise taken care in positive Terms to assert, That hedoes not maintain that Men ly under no Obligation to observe Contracts,independent of Society; but only, that they never would have formedContracts, and even would not have understood the Meaning of them,independent of Society. And whereas it is observed in the Specimen, Thatour Author offers further to prove, that, suppose a Promise was intelligi-ble before Human Conventions had established it, it would not beattended with any Moral Obligation. The most careless Reader must per-ceive that he does not understand Moral in such an extended Sense, as todeny the Obligation of Promises, independent of Society; seeing he notonly asserts what is above-represented, but likewise that the Laws ofJustice are universal, and perfectly inflexible. It is evident, that supposeMankind, in some primitive unconnected State, should by some Meanscome to the Knowledge of the Nature of those Things which we callContracts and Promises; that this Knowledge would have laid themunder no such actual Obligation, if not placed in such Circumstances asgive rise to these Contracts.

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I am sorry I should be obliged to cite from my Memory, and cannotmention Page and Chapter so accurately as the Accuser. I came hither byPost, and brought no Books along with me, and cannot now providemyself in the Country with the Book referred to.

This long Letter, with which I have troubled you, was composed in oneMorning, that I might gratify your Demand of an immediate Answer tothe heavy Charge brought against your Friend; and this, I hope, willexcuse any Inaccuracies that may have crept into it. I am indeed ofOpinion, that the Author had better delayed the publishing of that Book;not on account of any dangerous Principles contained in it, but becauseon more mature Consideration he might have rendered it much lessimperfect by further Corrections and Revisals. I must not at the sameTime omit observing, that nothing can be wrote so accurately or innocent-ly, which may not be perverted by such Arts as have been imployed onthis Occasion. No Man would undertake so invidious a Task as that ofour Author’s Accuser, who was not actuated by particular Interests; andyou know how easy it is, by broken and partial Citations, to pervert anyDiscourse, much more one of so abstract a Nature, where it is difficult, oralmost impossible, to justify one’s self to the Publick. The Words whichhave been carefully pickt out from a large Volume will no doubt have adangerous Aspect to careless Readers; and the Author, in myApprehension, cannot fully defend himself without a particular Detail,which it is impossible for a careless Reader to enter into. This Advantageof the Ground has been trusted to by his Accuser, and surely never moreabused than on the present Occasion. But he has one Advantage, I trust,which is worth a Hundred of what his Opposers can boast of, viz. that ofInnocence; and I hope he has also another Advantage, viz. that of Favour,if we really live in a Country of Freedom, where Informers and Inquisitorsare so deservedly held in universal Detestation, where Liberty, at least ofPhilosophy, is so highly valu’d and esteem’d.

I am,Sir,

Your most obedienthumble Servant.

May 8th 1745.

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7GÖTTINGISCHE ZEITUNGEN

Review of Philosophical Essays, in Göttingische Zeitungen vongelehrten Sachen, June 1749, Nr. 54, pp. 431–432.English translation of complete review, translated by Curtis Bowman.

The German review journal, Göttingische Zeitungen, had earlierreviewed Book 1 of the Treatise, contained in this collection. In

1749 it published a brief review of Hume’s Enquiry – then titledPhilosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding – apparentlyunaware that Hume was the author of both the Treatise and thePhilosophical Essays. Unlike the negative review of the Treatise, theshort review of the Philosophical Essays has a favourable tone and theauthor praises Hume’s ability to “garb” his “wit.” After summarizingthe first section, the reviewer mainly lists the titles of the book’s othersections. Below is the first published English translation of the completereview, by Curtis Bowman. Bracketed comments in the notes below arethose of the translator.

London.

Here in this very place, Philosophical Essays concerning HumanUnderstanding, by the Author of the Essays Moral and Political hasbeen printed at A. Millar in a large duodecimo of 256 pages (London,1748). This work consists of twelve philosophical essays, in which muchboldness and peculiarity are to be found, which the wit of the authorknew how to garb in a beautiful fashion. The author treats (1) of thevarious forms of philosophy. The abstract philosophers receive heretheir reprimand; such people are only famous as long as they live, andeven this fame arises from the ignorance of the times in which they havelived. If such a philosopher errs in one proposition, then he errs in manyothers at the same time. He who philosophises in a cavalier fashion doesnot have to fear this. His error has no consequences, and he easily comesback to the right path if he has gone astray. Cicero lives still. Aristotle’sfame is utterly gone. Addison will still be read with pleasure when no

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1 [eine fruchtbare Wirkung. Hume’s original English says that metaphysics “ariseseither from the fruitless efforts of human vanity… or from the craft of popularsuperstitions.” If the German reviewer is simply summarizing what Hume has said(as he does in much of the review), then he has made a translation mistake. It couldbe, though, that he is agreeing with Hume in some fashion, and thus is saying thatmetaphysics is one of the fruits of human vanity, and that, as such, it is foul.]

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one thinks of Locke any longer. Metaphysics is a fruitful effect1 ofhuman vanity. In things themselves there is no morality. The latterdepends solely on the opinion of mankind. Abstract philosophy is thesafeguard of superstition and error up to the present day. (2) of the origin of ideas. (3) of the association of ideas. In this essay there are allsorts of beautiful remarks for orators and poets. (4) sceptical doubtsconcerning the operations of the human understanding. The followingproposition is noteworthy. The relation of cause and effect can never becognised a priori, but can only be known from experience when we seethat certain things are conjoined with each other in all cases. Adam mayhave had before the Fall ever so great a body of knowledge yet still nothave been able to know in advance that one could drown in water. (5) asceptical solution of this doubt. (6) of probability. (7) of power or neces-sary connection. (8) of liberty and necessity. No disputes about thesematters have hitherto been debated correctly. The author thinks that hehas hit the nail on the head and fully clarified this doctrine. (9) of thereason of animals. (10) of miracles. The author attempts to prove theirimpossibility. (11) of the practical consequences of natural religion. (12)of the sceptical philosophy.

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1 Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen, June 1749, Nr. 54, pp. 431–432,included earlier in this volume.

2 The title page of the 1748 edition of the Philosophical Essays indicates only that thework is by “the author of the Essays moral and political”; the 1748 edition ofEssays does include Hume’s name.

8GÖTTINGISCHE ANZEIGEN

Review of Philosophical Essays, third edition, in Göttingische Anzeigenvon gelehrten Sachen, May 14, 1753, Nr. 60, pp. 540–544.English translation of complete review, by Curtis Bowman.

In 1753 the Göttingische Anzeigen – formerly titled GöttingischeZeitungen – printed a second review of Hume’s Philosophical Essays,

apparently unaware that it had reviewed that work four years earlier.1

The second review is of the 1751 edition of the Philosophical Essays,which was a reissue of the second edition of 1750. Unlike the first edi-tion, which Hume published anonymously,2 the second edition includesHume’s name directly on the title page. Accordingly, the reviewer identi-fies Hume as the author of the Philosophical Essays. Unlike the earlierreviewer, who was favourably disposed, this reviewer has mixed feelingsabout the work. Recognising that there is “much in the book that isgood,” the reviewer notes that there are “many deceptive objectionsagainst religion,” especially in the essay “Of Miracles.” The authorbriefly summarizes the first section, and suggests that the unpopularityof Aristotle and popularity of Cicero are owing to the current disuse ofGreek and use of Latin. Regarding section 2, the reviewer suggests thatwe arrive at the idea of the missing shade of blue by compounding thetwo nearest colours. After briefly discussing Sections 4, 5, and 8, thereviewer goes on to dedicate the second half of the review to “OfMiracles.” The author concedes that God rarely alters the course ofnature, but this does not justify Hume’s view that experience completelyrules out such interventions by God. The author also objects to factualpoints within Hume’s account, such as whether Muhammad claimed tohave performed miracles. Below is the first published English translationof the complete review, by Curtis Bowman. Bracketed comments in thenotes below are those of the translator.

113

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3 [Expanding aus solchen to make sense in the context.]

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London.

Only now have we gotten hold of a very noteworthy book, alreadyprinted two years ago, namely, Philosophical Essays concerning humanUnderstanding, by Mr. Hume, 1751, 260 octavo pages. It treats of thetwo different species of philosophy; the origin and association of ideas;certain sceptical thoughts and their solution; probability; the effects ofthings; liberty and necessity; the understanding of animals; miracles,particular providence, a future state; and sceptical philosophy. There ismuch in the book that is good, but also very many deceptive objectionsagainst religion, which we may note all the more securely since beforelong the most dubious part of this book will be examined in an essay onmiracles in general and the miracles of Moses and Christ in particular.H. divides philosophy into an easier one more in harmony with commonlife and an abstract one which investigates the first grounds of the principles of common life. His work is indeed dedicated to the latter philosophy, yet he subordinates the latter to the former and denies itposthumous fame: the fame of Cicero flourishes even now; Aristotle’sfame decayed long ago. (But should not the blame for this lie in the factthat so few people understand the language of the Greek philosophers,and does the Roman’s fame flourish because of his philosophy?)Metaphysics is misused by superstition, and page 10 paints a very spite-ful picture of this, a picture which is doubtless supposed to tell againstno other religion than against the single one to which it justly bringstrue honour that its defenders may dare to combine it with philosophy.On pages 26 and 27 he attempts to prove that we can also form ideas ofthings which have never appeared in our senses, and which also cannotbe compounded from such ideas3 which have appeared in our senses. If,he says, someone lays before someone else all specimens of blue colours,except for only one which he has never seen before, he will nevertheless discover and fill the blank. (But what he asserts here is notcorroborated by witnesses, but is merely a historical conjecture; andshould not one say that the missing specimen is compounded from amixture of two colours?) Because without experiences we would neverdiscover the effects of anything completely unknown to us, all our infer-ences from cause to effect, and from effect to cause, are grounded solelyon prior experiences; we can, however, believe nothing at all of thingswhich have passed, which we ourselves have not perceived by means ofthe senses, merely because we perceive their effects (among which healso rightly reckons the testimony of authors). But now the inferencefrom prior experience is disrupted by an irreparable gap. One reasons as

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4 [The phrase “amount to a full proof” is in English in the original review.]

follows: the object has hitherto always had this effect; therefore, it willalways have this effect. Still another proposition is lacking between thesetwo. He does not wish, however, that we should thereby turn to doubt-ing: our natural propensity to infer the future from the experience of thepast is really too strong for that to be feared. This is carried out in avery lively and subtle manner. We are surprised, however, that he doesnot also extend his merely philosophical doubt to that which we our-selves perceive by means of our senses; for from them we likewise per-ceive only the effects on the instruments of the senses. Whoever permitsthe testimony of the senses to hold true cannot also permit philosophicaldoubt about the inference from the effect to the existence of the cause toprevail upon himself. By the way, he takes this inference to be a conse-quence of universal custom, to which a natural propensity prepares theway for us; and he takes it to be correct, even though we cannot demonstrate the ground of its correctness. Necessity, which is opposedto liberty of actions, he asserts in the most unlimited sense of the word.He also complains of a hitherto interminable verbal dispute: from him,however, we would never know how to form for ourselves a correctconcept of liberty; and in this way, he can oppose the principle of suffi-cient reason, which is only expressed in another way, to liberty. Themost dubious part is the tenth essay, Of Miracles. At the beginning henotes, not unjustly, that one has a special right to doubt all miraculousstories; but he extends this, in the case of an actual miracle, so far thateven if the testimony for it should be a complete proof (amount to a fullproof),4 one must nevertheless not believe it, because one has an evenstronger proof against it. That is to say, whatever has never happenedcannot happen (experience teaches us to infer this); now, a miracle isthat which has otherwise never occurred in human existence; conse-quently, all stories of miracles are incorrect. Who would have thoughtthis of an author who had just attempted to demonstrate the weaknessesof inferences from experience, and from what experience will an intelligent person infer that the creator of the world cannot directly alteranything in the world, because he does it rarely? In the beginning westill wanted to defend H., and were of the opinion that he perhapsdeclares all miracles, as the work states, to be natural effects of causeswhich are unknown to us, whose prediction, however, is prophetic anda sign a of divine mission. Yet in the remark on pages 181 and 182 healso extends his contradiction to the prediction of such a miraculousaccident, because the prediction would be a miracle. After this quitecomplete explanation for believing nothing about miracles, however

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5 [King of the Assyrians who laid siege to Jerusalem. See 2 Chronicles 32.]6 [The phrase “that impious maxim of the ancient philosophers” is in English in the

original review.]

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strong the proof might be, he offers individual objections against priortestimony about miracles. He must not know that the Egyptian annalsthemselves have perpetuated the miracles of Moses and the miraculousdefeat of Sennacherib;5 otherwise, he would not deny that miracles hadever occurred except among ignorant barbarians. When he opposes, onpage 191, the miracles of one religion to the miracles of another, andthinks of the Mohammedan miracle, this is irresponsible ignoranceabout a subject that he wants to write about. Mohammed himselfdeclares that he has neither performed nor can perform miracles. Theproof and testimony for the well-known Jansenist miracles of the AbbéParis appear to him, on page 196, to be more important than the testi-mony for Christ’s miracles, which, however, are authenticated by theblasphemous books of the Jews and by the heathens, which he concealsin a cunning or ignorant manner. Here, however, begins the usual,deceitful defence of Christianity, with which deists secretly attempt todisarm it. He says, the Biblical miracles possess divine attestation; ratio-nal proof is not demanded of religion, but rather only faith, and in thecase of a required rational investigation, no book would become moresuspect than the Pentateuch, which relates all sorts of miracles and otherincredible things without being corroborated by a second witness. Wecan understand the eleventh essay as nothing other than the denial ofrewards and punishments in a future life; indeed, on pages 232 and 233,even the existence of God is thrown into doubt. From the effect, he says,I can infer the cause in no other way except from repeated experience, ifthey are constantly conjoined; but since there is only one world, onecannot infer from it the existence of God, who is likewise entirely singu-lar in His kind. We almost do not know whether or not it is a misprinton page 258 when the principle “from nothing, nothing comes” is calledthat impious maxim of the ancient philosophers;6 for what can be impi-ous in this principle, even if it were false? His repeated objection is, sinceinferences from experience are ungrounded, according to this philoso-phy, not merely God’s will, but also (as far as we knew a priori) the willof any ever so negligible being would be able to create something fromnothing.

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1 For a discussion of the growing tensions between Hume and Kames and also thecontroversy surrounding the appearance of Kames’s Essays see Ian Simpson Ross,Lord Kames and the Scotland of his day, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972, xv, 420 p.

9HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES

[Henry Home, Lord Kames], Essays on the principles of morality andnatural religion in two parts. Edinburgh: Printed by R. Fleming, for A.Kincaid and A. Donaldson, 1751, 3 p. l., 394 p. Part 2, Essays 1, 2, and 4, complete; from 1751 edition.

Henry Home (1696–1782) – later Lord Kames after 1752 when he wasappointed to the Scottish Court of Session and Justiciary – was a close

friend to Hume, although relations between the two appear to have cooledduring the last two decades of Hume’s life. Kames authored works on avariety of topics, including motion, law, criticism, and historical anthropol-ogy. The first of his philosophical works, Essays on the Principles ofMorality and Natural Religion (1751) evoked controversy on its firstappearance, and was frequently associated with Hume’s philosophy.1 Thework is in two parts, the first of which focuses on moral issues, while thesecond focuses on metaphysics.

Three essays in Part two discuss Hume’s views. In Essay 1, “Of Belief,”Kames notes two claims central to Hume’s view of belief. The first is thatbelief is not a simple perception that can be added to other perceptions,but, rather, a modification of existing perceptions; the second is that beliefdoes not accompany all of our perceptions. Kames takes particular issuewith Hume’s view that belief modifies our perceptions by increasing theliveliness of certain ideas. In opposition to this claim, Kames offers counterexamples showing that some beliefs are in fact less lively than fictions. Webelieve, for example, historical narrations that are less lively than the sto-ries of epic poetry that we do not believe. The true explanation of belief,according to Kames, consists in a modification that is brought about by“the authority of our senses.” One source of this authority is that whichwe perceive through our own senses, and here Kames agrees with Humethat beliefs are always conjoined with vivacity. A second source of authori-ty is the testimony of others, but this source is “qualified by the opinion wehave of the witness, and the nature of the story he relates.” Belief from tes-timony, for Kames, is not always correlated with vivacity.

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In Essay 2, “Of the Idea of Self and of Personal Identity,” Kamesbegins by agreeing with Hume that we cannot arrive at an idea of ourself and of personal identity by means of the external senses alone. Heclaims, however, that we get an “original feeling” of our selves bymeans of an internal sense. He goes on to argue that perception of one’sself is exceptionally lively, and is necessary to our self-preservation inso-far as it makes us attentive to our interests and to dangers. Such percep-tion of one’s self, Kames argues, is the basis of our idea of our individualidentities through the various changes in our lives. In contrast to whathe takes to be Descartes’s view that we deduce our existence through achain of reasoning, Kames argues that we simply experience our identityby means of a natural feeling. Anticipating Reid and other Scottish com-mon sense philosophers, he argues that “If natural feelings, whetherfrom internal or external senses, are not admitted as evidence of truth, Icannot see, that we can be certain of any fact whatever.”

In Essay 4 Kames discusses the idea of causal power, and notes theimportance of this idea in arriving at knowledge of God. Like Hume,Kames argues that causal events are related by both contiguity in spaceand succession in time, and that the key feature of the causal relation ispower. Kames considers several accounts of how we derive the idea ofpower. He agrees with Hume that we cannot derive this idea from eitherreason or experience. For Kames, reason operates with data and princi-ples, and no reasoning about data or principles will produce the idea ofpower. And so far as experience is concerned, Kames argues that it canonly inform us that two objects have been constantly conjoined. Suchconjunctions fall far short of the notion of power. According to Kames,we gain our idea of power by means of a “peculiar manner of percep-tion,” by means, that is, of a simple feeling that we experience when weobserve cause and effect relations in the world. He grants that this feel-ing, like the faculty that regulates belief, may sometimes be erroneous,but insists that it is none the less accurate enough to guide us throughlife.

Kames next considers Hume’s claim that necessity does not exist inobjects, but only in our minds as habits that arise from observing con-stantly conjoined events. In opposition to this view, Kames argues that“to deny our perception of such a quality in bodies, as our author does, is taking upon him to contradict a plain matter of fact.” Citingcounterexamples, Kames argues further that some events are constantlyconjoined, yet are not causally connected. Finally, he argues that Humehimself inconsistently refers to causal powers residing in external things.Returning to the issue of proving God’s existence, Kames concludes byarguing that our experience of purpose in the world justifies the conclu-sion that there is a designing and benevolent cause of this purpose.

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2 Phileleutherus. A letter to a friend, upon occasion of a late book, intitled, Essaysupon morality and natural religion. Edinburgh: Printed for G. Hamilton and J.Balfour, 1751, 70 p.; Some late opinions concerning the foundation of moralityexamined, in a letter to a friend. London: Printed for R. Dodsley and M. Cooper,1753, 46 p.; [George Anderson], An estimate of the profit and loss of religionpersonally and publicly stated: illustrated with references to Essays on morality andnatural religion. Edinburgh: 1753, iv, 392 p. The last two of these works areincluded in Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Theory, Volume 1 of this series.

3 [Hugh Blair (1718–1800)] Objections against the Essays on morality and naturalreligion examined. Edinburgh, [n.p.] 1756, 64 p. A manuscript note by RobertWallace in a copy of this pamphlet indicates that it was prepared by Blair with assis-tance from George Wishart, Robert Hamilton, and Wallace himself.

4 The Monthly Review contains a brief review of the 1758 edition (1758, Vol. 18, pp.599–601). This consists mainly of what appears to be an unsolicited correspon-dence that highlights the changes from the first editions.

In his favourable review of the Essays in the Monthly Review, WilliamRose wrote,

Moral enquiries are, of all others, the most important; and when theyare not built on hypotheses assumed at random, or not sufficientlyconfirmed by experience, but upon a strict examination of the struc-ture and fabric of the human mind, and the frame and connection ofits various powers and affections, cannot fail of being eminently use-ful, as well as highly entertaining. The ingenious Author of the Essaysnow before us, has pursued his enquiries into human nature in this,which we take to be the only true method; trying the conclusions hedraws from the principles of our frame by their true touchstone, thatof facts and experiments. He has, as far as we are able to judge,thrown new light on several very curious and useful points; andthough few of his readers, as we imagine, will fall in entirely with hissentiments on liberty and necessity, a subject which he sets in a veryuncommon point of view, yet all of them, we are persuaded, will bepleased with his ingenuity, and the genteel and candid manner inwhich he writes. [Monthly Review, 1751, Vol. 5, pp. 129–155]

Shortly after its publication, the Essays were sharply criticized in threeworks,2 and defended – apparently by Kames’s friends – in another.3

Kames revised his Essays in the second and third editions of 1758 and1779.4 The following is from the edition of 1751.

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ESSAY I.

Of BELIEF

Belief is a term so familiar, as to have escaped the inquiry of allphilosophers, except the author of the treatise of human nature. And yetthe subject is, by no means, so plain as to admit of no doubts nor diffi-culties. This author has made two propositions sufficiently evident; first,that belief is not any separate action or perception of the mind, but amodification of our perceptions, or a certain manner of conceivingpropositions. 2d, That it does not accompany every one of our percep-tions. A man, in some circumstances, sees objects double, but he doesnot believe them to be double. He can form the idea of a golden moun-tain: he can form the idea of it, as of a certain size, and as existing in acertain place: but he does not believe it to be existing.

Having proved that belief is not a separate perception, but only amodification of some perceptions, our author goes on to explain thenature of this modification. And his doctrine is, that belief making noalteration upon the idea, as to its parts and composition, must consist inthe lively manner of conceiving the idea; and that, in reality, a lively ideaand belief are the same. I have a high opinion of this author’s acutenessand penetration; but no authority can prevail with me to embrace such adoctrine. For, at this rate, credulity and a lively imagination would bealways connected, which does not hold in fact. Poetry and painting pro-duce lively ideas, but they seldom produce belief. For my part, I have nodifficulty to form as lively a conception of Cesar’s dying in his bed, des-canting upon the vanity of ambition, or dictating rules of government tohis successor, as of his being put to death in the senate-house. Nothing istold with more vivacity, than the death of Cyrus, in a pitched battle withthe queen of the Scythians, who dipped his head, as we are told, in avessel full of blood, saying, “Satiate thyself with blood, of which thouwast ever thirsty.” Yet, upon comparing circumstances and authors, themore probable opinion is, that Cyrus died in his bed.

It may be observed, at the same time, that the conclusion is very lame,which this author draws from his premises. Belief makes no alterationupon the idea, as to its parts and composition. It can only therefore con-sist in a modification of the idea. But does it follow, that it consists in alively conception of the idea, which is but one of many modifications?There is not here the shadow of an inference.

Our author indeed urges, that true history takes fast hold of the mind,and presents its objects in a more lively manner, than any fabulous nar-ration can do. Every man must judge for himself: I cannot admit this tobe my case. History, no doubt, takes faster hold of the mind, than any

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fiction told in the plain historical stile. But can any man doubt, who hasnot an hypothesis to defend, that poetry makes a stronger impressionthan history? Let a man, if he has feelings, attend the celebrated Garrickin the character of Richard, or in that of king Lear; and he will find, thatdramatic representations make strong and lively impressions, which his-tory seldom comes up to.

But now, if it shall be supposed, that history presents its objects in amore lively manner, than can be done by dramatic or epic poetry; it willnot therefore follow, that a lively idea is the same with belief. I read apassage in Virgil. Let it be the episode of Nisus and Euryalus. I read apassage in Livy, sciz. the sacking of Rome by the Gauls. If I have a morelively idea of the latter story, I put it to my author, to point out thecause of this effect. He surely will not affirm, that it is the force ofexpression, or harmony of numbers: for, in these particulars, the histori-an cannot be compared to the poet. It is evident, that no other satisfac-tory account of the matter can be given, but this, that Livy’s superiorinfluence upon the imagination, is the effect of his being considered, as atrue historian. The most, then, that our author can make of his observa-tion, supposing it to hold true in fact, is, that the authority of the histo-rian produces belief, and that belief produces a more lively idea, thanany fabulous narration can do. The truth of the matter is, that belief anda lively conception, are really two distinct modifications of the idea;which, tho’ often conjoined, are not only separable in the imagination,but in fact are often separated. Truth, indeed, bestows a certain degreeof vivacity upon our ideas. At the same time, I cannot admit, that histo-ry exceeds dramatic or epic poetry, in conveying a lively conception offacts; because it appears evident, that, in works of imagination, the wantof truth, is more than compensated by sentiment and language.

Sometimes, indeed, belief is the result of a lively impression. A dra-matic representation is one instance, when it affects us so much, as todraw off the attention from every other object, and even from ourselves.In this situation, we don’t consider the actor, but conceive him to be thevery man whose character he assumes. We have that very man beforeour eyes. We perceive him as existing and acting, and believe him to beexisting and acting. This belief, however, is but momentary. It vanishes,like a dream, so soon as we are rouzed by any trivial circumstance, to aconsciousness of ourselves, and of the place we are in. Nor is the livelyimpression, even in this case, the cause of belief, but only the occasion ofit, by diverting the attention of the mind, from itself and its situation. Itis in some such manner, that the idea of a spectre in the dark, which fillsthe mind, and diverts it from itself, is, by the force of imagination, con-verted into a reality. We think we see and hear it. We are convinced ofit, and believe the matter to be so.

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Rejecting therefore this author’s opinion, the real truth appears to bethis. There is a certain peculiar manner of perceiving objects, and con-ceiving propositions, which, being a simple feeling, cannot be described,but is expressed by the word belief. The causes of this modification,termed belief, are the authority of my own senses, and the authority ofothers, who either relate facts upon the authority of their senses, orwhat they have heard at second or third hand. So that belief, mediatelyor immediately, is founded upon the authority of our senses. We are soconstituted by nature, as to put trust in our senses. Nor, in general, is itin our power to disbelieve our senses: they have authority with us irresistible. There is but one exception that I can think of. Finding, byexperience, that we have been sometimes led into an error, by trustingsome particular perceptions, the remembrance of these instances,counter-balances the authority of our perception in the like cases, andeither keeps the mind suspended, or, perhaps, makes it rest in a convic-tion, that the perception is erroneous.

With regard to the evidence of my own senses, tho’ I cannot admit,that the essence of belief consists in the vivacity of the impression, I sofar agree with our author, that vivacity and belief, in this case, arealways conjoined. A mountain I have once seen, I believe to be existing,tho’ I am a thousand miles from it; and the image or idea I have of thatmountain, is more lively and more distinct, than of any I can form mere-ly by the force of imagination. But this is far from being the case, asabove observed, of ideas raised in my mind by the force of language.

Belief arising from the evidence of others, rests upon a different foun-dation. Veracity and a disposition to believe, are corresponding princi-ples in the nature of man; and, in the main, these principles are soadjusted, that men are not often deceived. The disposition we have tobelieve, is qualified by the opinion we have of the witness, and thenature of the story he relates. But, supposing a concurrence of all othercircumstances to prompt our belief, yet, if the speaker pretends only toamuse, without confining himself to truth, his narration will not, in thesmallest degree, prompt our belief; let him enliven it with the strongestcolours that poetry is master of.

I have only to add, that tho’ our own senses, and the testimony of others, are the proper causes of belief; yet that these causes are more orless efficacious, according to the temper of mind we are in at the time.Hope and fear are influenced by passion, so is belief. Hope and fear aremodifications of our conception of future events. If the event be agree-able, and the probability of its existence, be great, our conception of itsexistence takes on a modification, which is called hope. If the event beextremely agreeable, and the probability of its existing do greatly preponderate, our hope is increased proportionally, and sometimes is

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converted into a firm belief, that it will really happen. Upon weakminds, the delightfulness of the expected event, will of itself have that effect. The imagination, fired with the prospect, augments the probability, ’till it convert it to a firm persuasion or belief. On the otherhand, if fear get the ascendent, by a conceived improbability of the exis-tence of the event, the mind desponds, and fear is converted into a firmbelief, that the event will not happen. The operations of the mind arequite similar, where the event in view is disagreeable.

ESSAY II.

Of the IDEA of SELF and of PERSONAL IDENTITY.

Had we no original impressions but those of the external senses,according to the author of the treatise of human nature, we never couldhave any consciousness of self; because such consciousness cannot arisefrom any external sense. Mankind would be in a perpetual reverie; ideaswould be constantly floating in the mind; and no man be able to connecthis ideas with himself. Neither could there be any idea of personal iden-tity. For a man, cannot consider himself to be the same person, in differ-ent circumstances, when he has no idea or consciousness of himself atall.

Beings there may be, who are thus constituted: but man is none ofthese beings. It is an undoubted truth, that he has an original feeling, orconsciousness of himself, and of his existence; which, for the most part,accompanies every one of his impressions and ideas, and every action ofhis mind and body. I say, for the most part; for the faculty or internalsense, which is the cause of this peculiar perception, is not always inaction. In a dead sleep, we have no consciousness of self. We dreamsometimes without this consciousness; and even some of our wakinghours pass without it. A reverie is nothing else, but a wandering of themind through its ideas, without carrying along the perception of self.

This consciousness or perception of self, is, at the same time, of theliveliest kind. Self-preservation is every one’s peculiar duty; and thevivacity of this perception, is necessary to make us attentive to our owninterest, and, particularly, to shun every appearance of danger. When aman is in a reverie, he has no circumspection, nor any manner of atten-tion to his own interest.

’Tis remarkable, that one has scarce any chance to fall asleep, ’till thisperception vanish. Its vivacity keeps the mind in a certain degree of agi-tation, which bars sleep. A fall of water disposes to sleep. It fixes theattention, both by sound and sight, and, without creating much agita-

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tion, occupies the mind, so as to make it forget itself. Reading of somebooks has the same effect.

It is this perception, or consciousness of self, carried through all the different stages of life, and all the variety of action, which is thefoundation of personal identity. It is, by means of this perception, that Iconsider myself to be the same person, in all varieties of fortune, andevery change of circumstance.

The main purpose of this short essay, is to introduce an observation,that it is not by any argument or reasoning, I conclude myself to be thesame person, I was ten years ago. This conclusion rests entirely upon thefeeling of identity, which accompanies me through all my changes, andwhich is the only connecting principle, that binds together, all the vari-ous thoughts and actions of my life. Far less is it by any argument, orchain of reasoning, that I discover my own existence. It would bestrange indeed, if every man’s existence was kept a secret from him, ’tillthe celebrated argument was invented, that cogito ergo sum. And if afact, that, to common understanding, appears self-evident, is not to berelied on without an argument; why should I take for granted, withoutan argument, that I think, more than that I exist? For surely I am notmore conscious of thinking, than of existing.

Upon this subject, I shall just suggest a thought, which will be morefully insisted on afterwards; that any doctrine, which leads to a distrustof our senses, must land in universal scepticism. If natural feelings,whether from internal or external senses, are not admitted as evidence oftruth, I cannot see, that we can be certain of any fact whatever. It isclear, from what is now observed, that, upon this sceptical system, wecannot be certain even of our own existence.5

5 The deceitful feeling of liberty, unfolded in the essay upon liberty and necessity, mayperhaps embarrass some readers, as in some measure contradictory to the position herelaid down. But the matter is easily cleared. Natural feelings are satisfying evidence oftruth; and, in fact, have full authority over us, unless in some singular cases, where weare admonished by counter-feelings, or by reasoning, not to give implicit trust. This is asufficient foundation for all the arguments, that are built upon the authority of oursenses, in point of evidence. The feeling of liberty is a very singular case. The reasons areclearly traced for the necessity of this delusive feeling, which distinguishes it in a veryparticular manner, and leaves no room, to draw any consequence from it, to our otherfeelings. But there is, besides, a circumstance yet more distinguishing, in this delusivefeeling of liberty, which entirely exempts it, from being an exception to the general ruleabove laid down. It is this; that the feeling is by no means entire on the side of liberty. Itis counter-balanced by other feelings, which, in many instances, afford such aconviction of the necessary influence of motives, that physical and moral necessity canscarce be distinguished. The sense of liberty operates chiefly in the after reflection. But,previous to the action, there is no distinct or clear feeling, that it can happen otherways,than in connection with its proper motive. Here the feelings being, on the whole,opposite to each other, nothing can be inferred from this case, to derogate from theevidence of feelings that are clear, cogent and authoritative; and to which, nothing can

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ESSAY IV.

Of our IDEA of POWER.

The subject proposed to be handled in the present essay is the idea ofpower, and its origin. This term is found in all languages: we talk familiar-ly, of a power in one body, to produce certain effects, and of a capacity inanother body, to have certain effects produced upon it. Yet authors havediffered strangely, about the foundation of these ideas; and, after all thathas been said, it seems yet to be a matter of uncertainty, whether they aresuggested by reason, by experience, or by what other means. This subjectdeserves our attention the more, that the bulk of useful knowledgedepends upon it. Without some insight into causes and their effects, weshould be a very imperfect race of beings. And, with regard to the presentundertaking, this subject must not, at any rate, be overlooked; becausefrom it, principally, is derived any knowledge we have of the Deity, as willbe afterwards made evident.

Power denotes a simple idea, which, upon that account, cannot admitof a definition. But no person is, nor can be at a loss, about the meaning.Every action we perceive, gives us a notion of power; for a productivecause is implied in our perception of every action or event;6 and the veryidea of cause comprehends a power of producing its effect. Let us onlyreflect upon the perception we have, when we see a stone thrown into theair out of one’s hand. In the perception of this action, are included, conti-guity of the hand and stone, the motion of the person’s hand with thestone in it, and the separate motion of the stone, following the other cir-cumstances in point of time. The first circumstance is necessary, to put theman in a condition to exert his power upon the stone; the second is theactual exertion of the power; and the last is the effect produced by thatexertion. But these circumstances, which include both contiguity and suc-cession, make no part of the idea of power; which is conceived or felt asan inherent property subsisting in the man, not merely when he is exertingit, but even when he is at rest. That all men have this very idea, is a factnot to be controverted. The only doubt is, whence it is derived; from whatsource it springs.

That reason cannot help us out, will be evident. For reason must alwayshave some object to employ itself upon. There must be known Data orprinciples, to lead us to the discovery of things, which are connected with

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be opposed, from the side of reason or counter-feelings. So that our principle remainssafe and unshaken, that a general distrust of our senses, internal or external, must landus in universal scepticism.

6 Essay of liberty and necessity.

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these Data or principles. But with regard to power, which makes a neces-sary connection betwixt a cause and its effect, we have no Data nor prin-ciples to lead us to the discovery. We are not acquainted with the beingsand things about us, otherways than by certain qualities and properties,obvious to the external senses. Power is none of these; nor is there anyconnection which we can discover, betwixt power and any of these. In aword, we have not the least foundation for concluding power in anybody, till it once exert its power. If it be urged, that the effects producedare Data, from which, we can infer a cause by a process of reasoning, andconsequently, a power in the cause to produce these effects; I answer, thatwhen a new thing or quality is produced, when in general any change isbrought about, it is extremely doubtful, whether, by any process of rea-soning, we can conclude it to be an effect, so as necessarily to require acause of its existence. That we do conclude it to be an effect, is most cer-tain. But that we can draw any such conclusion, merely from reason, Idon’t clearly see. What leads me, I confess, to this way of thinking, is, thatmen of the greatest genius have been unsuccessful, in attempting to prove,that every thing which begins to exist, must have a cause of its existence.“Whatever is produced (says Mr. Locke) without any cause, is producedby nothing; or, in other words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing cannever be a cause, no more than it can be something.” This is obviouslybegging the question. To affirm that nothing is the cause, is taking forgranted that a cause is necessary; which is the very point undertaken to bemade out. Doctor Clarke’s argument labours under the same defect.“Every thing (he says) must have a cause; for if any thing wanted a cause,it would produce itself; that is, exist before it existed, which is impossi-ble.” If a thing can exist without a cause, there is no necessity it shouldproduce itself, or that any thing should produce it. In short, there does notappear to me any contradiction in the above proposition, that a thing maybegin to exist without a cause: and therefore, I dare not declare the fact tobe impossible. But sense and feeling afford me a conviction, that nothingbegins to exist without a cause, tho’ reason cannot afford me a demon-stration of it. This matter will be opened afterwards. At present, it is suffi-cient to observe, that the conviction in this case is complete, and carries somuch authority with it, as scarce to admit of a bare conception, that thething can possibly be otherways. This subject, at the same time, affords anew instance of what we have had more than once occasion to observe.Fond of arguments drawn from the nature of things, we are too apt toapply such arguments without discretion; and to call that demonstration,which, at bottom, is nothing but a conviction from sense and feeling. Ourperceptions, which work silently, and without effort, are apt to be over-looked; and we vainly imagine, we can demonstrate every proposition,which we perceive to be true.

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It will be pretty obvious, that the idea of power is not deducible fromexperience, more than from reason. We can learn nothing merely fromexperience, but that two objects may have been constantly conjoined intime past, such as fire and heat, the sun and light. But, in the first place,all that can be gathered from such facts, comes far short of our idea ofcause and effect, or of a power in one body to produce some change inanother. In the second place, experience, which relates only to theactions of the particular bodies we are acquainted with, cannot aid us todiscover power in any body, that we have not formerly seen in action.Yet, from the very first operation of such a body, we have the perceptionof cause and effect, which therefore cannot be from experience. And, inthe last place, as experience in no case reaches to futurity, our idea ofpower, did it depend upon experience, could only look backward: withregard to every new production, depending upon causes even the mostfamiliar, we should be utterly at a loss to form any idea of power.

It being now evident, that our idea of power is not derived, eitherfrom reason or experience, we shall endeavour to trace out the truefoundation of this idea. Running over the subject, the followingthoughts occur, which I shall set before the reader, in their naturalorder. As man, in his life and actions, is necessarily connected, both withthe animate and inanimate world; he would be utterly at a loss to con-duct himself, without some acquaintance with the beings around him,and their operations. His external senses give him all the intelligencethat is necessary, not only for being, but for well-being. They discover tohim, in the first place, the existence of external things. But this wouldnot be sufficient, unless they also discovered to him their powers andoperations. The sense of seeing is the principal means of his intelligence.I have explained, in a former essay, that peculiar manner of perception,by which we discover the existence of external objects. And when theseare put in motion, whereby certain things follow, ’tis by another pecu-liar manner of perception, that we discover a relation betwixt certainobjects, which makes one be termed the cause, the other the effect. Ineed scarce repeat again, that there is no explaining simple feelings andperceptions, otherways than by suggesting the terms which denote them.All that can be done in this case, is to request of the reader, to attend towhat passes in his mind, when he sees one billiard ball struck againstanother, or a tree, which the wind is blowing down, or a stone throwninto the air out of one’s hand. We are obviously so constituted, as notonly to perceive the one body acting, and exerting its power; but also toperceive, that the change in the other body is produced by means of thataction or exertion of power. This change we perceive to be an effect;and we perceive a necessary connection betwixt the action and theeffect, so as that the one must unavoidably follow the other.

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As I discover power in external objects, by the eye, so I discover powerin my mind, by an internal sense. By one act of the will ideas are raised.By another act of the will, my limbs are put in motion. Attending to theseoperations, I perceive or feel the motion of the limbs, and the entry of theideas, to follow necessarily from the act of the will. In other words, I per-ceive or feel these to be effects, and the act of the will to be the cause.

And that this feeling is involved in the very perception of the action,without taking in either reason or experience, may be illustrated by someplain observations. There is no relation more familiar, even to children, than that of cause and effect. The first time a child lifts a bit ofbread, the perception it has of this action, not only includes a conjunc-tion of the hand with the bread, and that the motion of the latter follows the motion of the former; but it likeways includes that peculiarmodification, which is exprest by a power in the hand to lift the bread.Accordingly, we find no expression more familiar among infants andrusticks, nor better understood than I can do this, I can do that. Further,as things are best illustrated by their contraries, let us put the case of abeing, if there is such a one, who, in viewing external objects, has no ideaof substance, but only of qualities; and who, in viewing motion, does notfeel the change produced by it, to be an effect, or any way connectedwith the motion, further than as following it in point of time. It appearsextremely evident, that this supposed being can never have the idea ofbody, or of its powers. Reason or experience can never give it the idea ofbody or substance, and far less of their powers.

It is very true, we cannot discover power in any object, as we discoverthe object itself, merely by intuition. But the moment an alteration is pro-duced by any object, we perceive that the object has a power to producethat alteration; which leads to denominate the one a cause, and the otheran effect. I don’t assert that we can never be in a mistake about this mat-ter. Children often err, by attributing an effect to one cause instead ofanother, or by considering that to be a cause, which is not. Mistakes ofthis kind are corrected by experience. But they prove the reality of theperception of power, just as much as where our perceptions are agreeableto the truth of things.

And with regard to the fallibility of the sense of seeing, when it pointsout to us causes and effects, the comparison may be justly instituted,betwixt it and belief. The faculty which regulates belief is not infallible. Itsometimes leads us into errors. Neither is the faculty infallible, by whichwe discern one thing to be a cause, another to be an effect. Yet both areexerted with sufficient certainty, to guide us through life, without manycapital errors.

The author of the treatise of human nature, has employed a world ofreasoning, in searching for the foundation of our idea of power and of

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7 [This is not a direct quote from either Hume’s Treatise or Enquiry.]8 Philosophical essays, ess. 7. [Enquiry, 7.2.]9 Treatise of human nature, vol. I. pag. 290, 291 [Treatise, 1.3.14.]

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necessary connection. And, after all his anxious researches, he can makeno more of it, but

“That the idea of necessary connection, alias power or energy, arisesfrom a number of instances, of one thing always following another,which connects them in the imagination; whereby we can readily fore-tel the existence of the one from the appearance of the other.”7

And he pronounces, “That this connection can never be suggested fromany one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights andpositions.”8 Thus he places the essence of necessary connection, orpower, upon that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from anobject to the idea of its usual attendant. And from these premises, hedraws a conclusion of a very extraordinary nature, and which he himselfacknowledges to be not a little paradoxical. His words are:

“Upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not inobjects; nor is it possible for us even to form the most distant idea ofit, considered as a quality in bodies. The efficacy or energy in causes,is neither placed in the causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in theconcurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul,which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances.’Tis here that the real power of causes is placed, along with their con-nection and necessity.”9

He may well admit this doctrine to be a violent paradox, because, inreality, it contradicts our natural feelings, and wages war with the com-mon sense of mankind. We cannot put this in a stronger light than ourauthor himself does, in forming an objection against his own doctrine.

“What! the efficacy of causes ly in the determination of the mind! as ifcauses did not operate entirely independent of the mind, and wouldnot continue their operation, even tho’ there was no mind existent tocontemplate them, or reason concerning them. This is to reverse theorder of nature, and to make that secondary which is really primary.To every operation there is a power proportioned; and this powermust be placed on the body that operates. If we remove the power

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from one cause, we must ascribe it to another. But to remove it fromall causes, and bestow it on a being that is noways related to thecause, or effect, but by perceiving them, is a gross absurdity, and con-trary to the most certain principles of human reason.”10

In short, nothing is more clear, than that, from the very sight of bodiesin motion, we have the idea of power, which connects them together, inthe relation of cause and effect. This power is perceived as a quality inthe acting body, and by no means is an operation of the mind, or aneasy transition of thought from one object to another. And therefore,flatly to deny our perception of such a quality in bodies, as our authordoes, is taking upon him to contradict a plain matter of fact, of whichall the world11 can give testimony. He may be at a loss, indeed, to dis-cover the source of this perception, because he can neither derive it, northe idea of substance, from his own principles. But it has been morethan once observed, that it is too bold, to deny a fact, supported by thebest evidence, merely because one is at a loss to discover the cause. Atthe same time, there is no manner of difficulty to lay open the founda-tion of these perceptions. Both of them are impressions of sight, as isclearly made out above.

And to show, that our author’s account of this matter comes far shortof truth, it will be plain from one or two instances, that tho’ a constantconnection of two objects, may, by habit or custom, produce a similarconnection in the imagination; yet that a constant connection, whetherin the imagination, or betwixt the objects themselves, does by no meanscome up to our idea of power. Far from it. In a garrison, the soldiersconstantly turn out at a certain beat of the drum. The gates of the townare opened and shut regularly, as the clock points at a certain hour.These facts are observed by a child, grow up with him, and turn habitu-al during a long life. In this instance, there is a constant connectionbetwixt objects, which is attended with a similar connection in the imagination: yet the person above supposed, if not a changeling, neverimagined, the beat of the drum to be the cause of the motion of the sol-diers; nor the pointing of the clock to a certain hour, to be the cause ofthe opening or shutting of the gates. He perceives the cause of theseoperations to be very different; and is not led into any mistake by theabove circumstances, however closely connected. Let us put anotherinstance still more apposite. Such is the human constitution, that we actnecessarily, upon the existence of certain perceptions or motives. Theprospect of victuals makes a hungry man accelerate his pace. Respect to

10 Pag. 294.11 [The original here states “word” rather than “world”.]

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an antient family moves him to take a wife. An object of distressprompts him to lay out his money, or venture his person. Yet no mandreams a motive to be the cause of action; tho’, if the doctrine of neces-sity hold true, here is not only a constant, but a necessary connection.12

From the instance last given, it appears, that constant connection, andthe other circumstances mentioned by our author, are far from comingup to our idea of power. There may be even a necessary connectionbetwixt two objects, without putting them in the relation of cause andeffect, and without involving a power in the one to produce the other.Our author, then, attempts rather too bold an enterprize, when heundertakes to argue mankind out of their senses and feelings. That wehave such a feeling of power, as is above described, is a fact that cannotadmit of the smallest controversy. And all that is left him, would heargue with any prospect of success, is to question, whether this feelingdoes, in fact, correspond to the truth of things. But he will not under-take so stubborn a task, as to prove this a delusive feeling; when he mustbe sensible to the wonderful harmony, that subsists betwixt it and thereality of causes and their effects. We have no reason to suspect deceit inthis case, more than with regard to many other senses, some of whichremain to be unfolded, that are wrought into the constitution of man,for wise and good purposes, and without which, he would be a veryirregular and defective being.

And were it necessary to say more upon a subject, which indeed meritsthe utmost attention; we have, if I mistake not, this author’s own evi-dence for us; which I consider as no mean evidence in any case; andwhich must be held of the greatest authority, when given against him-self. And this evidence he gives in his philosophical essays. For tho’, inthis work, he continues to maintain “That necessity exists only in themind, not in objects, and that it is not possible for us even to form themost distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies;” yet, in thecourse of the argument, he more than once discovers, that he himself is

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12 A thought or idea, ’tis obvious, cannot be the cause of action; cannot, of itself,produce motion. After what manner then does it operate? I explain the matter thus:The power of magnetism, or any other particular power in matter, by which thebody endued with the power is impelled towards other bodies, cannot operate, ifthere is no other body placed within its sphere of activity. But placing another bodythere, the magnetic body is directly impelled towards this new body. Yet the newbody is not the cause of the motion, but only the occasion of it; the condition of thepower being such, that the body endued with it cannot operate, but with relation toanother body, within its sphere of action. Precisely, in the same manner, does themind act, upon presenting of a thought or idea. The idea is not the cause of theaction, but only the occasion of it. It is the mind which exerts the action; only ’tis soframed, that it cannot exert its powers, otherways than upon the presenting ofcertain perceptions to it.

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13 London edition, pag. 58. [Enquiry, 4.2.]14 Pag. 72. [Enquiry, 5.1.]15 Pag. 121. [Enquiry, 7.2.]16 Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.

possessed of an idea of power, considered as a quality in bodies, tho’ hehas not attended to it. Thus he observes,13 “That nature conceals fromus, those powers and principles, on which the influence of objects entire-ly depends.” And of these powers and principles, he gives several aptinstances, such as a power or quality in bread to nourish; a power bywhich bodies persevere in motion. This is not only owning an idea ofpower as a quality in bodies, but also owning the reality of this power.In another passage,14 he observes, “That the particular powers, by whichall natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses;” and“that experience does not lead us to the knowledge of the secret powerby which one object produces another.” What leads us to the knowledgeof this secret power, is not at present the question. But here is theauthor’s own acknowledgment, that he has an idea of a power in oneobject to produce another; for he certainly will not say, that he is heremaking use of words, without having any ideas annexed to them. In onepassage in particular,15 he talks distinctly and explicitly of “A power inone object, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates withthe greatest certainty and strongest necessity.” No master of languagecan give a description of power, considered as a quality in bodies, inmore apt or more expressive terms. So difficult it is to stifle, or to dis-guise natural feelings and sentiments.16

If the foregoing arguments have not prevailed, may not the followingargument hope for success? Figure the simplest of all cases; a man risingfrom his seat, to walk through the room; and try to analyse the percep-tion of this simple event. In the first place, is the man active or passive?Is he moved, or does he move himself? No mortal is at a loss to under-stand these questions; and no mortal is at a loss to answer them. Wehave a distinct perception or feeling, that the man is not moved, butmoves; or, which is the same, moves himself. Let us examine, in the nextplace, what is involved in the perception or feeling we have, when wesee this man walking. Do we not say familiarly, does not a child say,that he can walk? And what other thing do we mean by this expression,than that he has a power to walk? Does not the very idea of walkinginclude in it a power to walk? In this instance, our author, unhappily forhis argument, has neither contiguity nor succession to recur to, forexplaining his idea of power, imperfect as it is. And therefore, withregard to this instance, he must either admit, that we have an idea of

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17 See the essay upon liberty and necessity, pag. 88.

power, considered as a quality in objects, or take upon him to deny, thatwe have any idea of power at all: for it is evident, that the idea ofpower, when it comprehends only a single object, can never be resolvedinto a connection in the imagination, betwixt two or more objects. Wehave thus the feeling of power from every action, be it of the simplestkind that can be figured. And having once acquired the idea of powerexerted by an animal, to put itself in motion, we readily transfer thatidea to the actions of bodies, animate and inanimate, upon each other.And, after all, with due regard to an author of very acute parts, I cannothelp observing, that there is, perhaps, not one idea of all the train, whichis more familiar to us, or more universal, than the idea of power.

Having thus ascertained the reality of our idea of power, as a qualityin bodies, and traced it to its proper source, I shall close this essay withsome observations upon causes and their effects. That we cannot discov-er power in any object, otherways than by seeing it exert its power, isabove observed. Therefore, we can never discover any object to be acause, otherways than by the effect produced. But with regard to thingscaused or produced, the case is very different. For we can discover anobject to be an effect, after the cause is removed, or when it is not at allseen. For instance, no one is at a loss to say, that a table or a chair is aneffect produced. A child will ask, who made it? We perceive every event,every new object, to be an effect or production, the very conception ofwhich involves the idea of a cause. Hence the maxim, “That nothing canfall out, nothing begin to exist, without a cause;” in other words, “Thatevery thing which begins to exist must have a cause:” a maxim univer-sally recognised, and admitted by all mankind as self-evident. Nor canthis be attributed to experience. The feeling is original, regarding singu-lar objects and events, the causes of which are utterly unknown, not lessthan objects and events, which depend upon familiar causes. Childrenand rusticks are conscious of this feeling, equally with those who havethe most consummate experience of nature, and its operations.17

Further, the perception we have of any object, as an effect, includes init the feeling of a cause proportioned to the effect. If the object be aneffect properly adapted to some end, the perception of it necessarilyincludes an intelligent designing cause. If the effect be some good endbrought about by proper means, the perception necessarily includes adesigning and benevolent cause. Nor is it in our power, by any sort ofconstraint, to vary these feelings, or to give them a different modifica-tion from what they have by nature. It may be in our power to conceive,but it is not in our power to believe, that a fine piece of painting, a wellwrote poem, or a beautiful piece of architecture, can ever be the effect of

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chance, or of blind fatality. The supposition, indeed, so far as we candiscover, does not involve any inconsistency in the nature of things. Itmay be possible, for any reason we have to the contrary, that a blindand undesigning cause may be productive of excellent effects. But oursenses discover, what reason does not, that every object, which appearsbeautiful as adapted to an end or purpose, is the effect of a designingcause; and that every object, which appears beautiful as fitted to a goodend or purpose, is the effect of a designing cause; and that every object,which appears beautiful as fitted to a good end or purpose, is the effectof a designing and benevolent cause. We are so constituted, that we canentertain no doubt of this, if we would. And, so far as we gather fromexperience, we are not deceiv’d.

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1 I thank M. A. Stewart for bringing this item to my attention and providing me withthe following transcription.

John Leland 135

10THOMAS MELVILLE

Thomas Melvill, “Observations on Light and Colours,” pp. 12–90, inEssays and Observations, Physical and Literary. Read before a Societyin Edinburgh, and Published by them. Volume II. Edinburgh: Printed byG. Hamilton and J. Balfour, Printers to the University. 1756.1

Footnote, pp. 71–2.

Thomas Melvill (1726–1753) graduated M.A. at Glasgow in 1744and died at Geneva in December 1753, at age 27. He delivered his

paper “Observations on Light and Colours” at two meetings of thePhilosophical Society of Edinburgh, on January 3 and February 7, 1752.He died before the paper was published. The volume in which itappeared was jointly edited by Alexander Monro (primus) and DavidHume. Although he does not mention Hume by name, Melville in a notecriticises the contention of Treatise 1.2 that our ideas of quantity cannotbe infinitely divisible since our imagination must arrive at some mini-mum conception. Melville argues, in contrast to Hume, that the limita-tions of our senses and imagination are irrelevant to the divisibility ofquantity itself. Further, Melville argues that our ideas of extension arenot formed from ideas of indivisible things, but from the motion of theeye as it scans across an object, and this, he believes, rules out the notionof indivisible quantity. Melville’s discussion is indexed at the end of thevolume under the heading “Sceptics, an objection of theirs against theendless divisibility of quantity answered.”

Some Sceptics have disputed against the endless divisibility of quanti-ty, because the imagination soon arrives at a minimum; alledging fromthence, that our idea of extension involves the notion of indivisibles, andis as it were compounded of them. Nothing corporeal can be imaginedor conceived at all which is not conceived as seen, handled, or other-ways sensibly perceived. Imaginative ideas are nothing else than tran-

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scripts or images of sensations, and therefore must be limited by thesame bounds and in the same manner as sensation. Now the minimumsensibile is rather in all cases a confused, indistinct and uncertain transi-tion from perceivable to not perceivable, than the clear perception of apoint indivisible in magnitude; for its magnitude depends on the lustreof the object. That nothing can be conceived or imagined which is lessthan a certain bulk, is no more an argument against the endless divisibil-ity of quantity, than that nothing can be felt or seen below that size;which, it is evident, from every magnifying glass and from every differ-ent distance of an object, depends not at all on the constitution of thething perceived, but on that of the perceiver, or the means and circum-stances of his perception.

Nor, tho’ it were granted that the minimum visibile is distinctly seenas an indivisible point, would it follow, that the idea of extension,received by sight, is made up of the ideas of indivisibles; for we receivethe idea of extension by that motion of the eye which is necessary todirect its axis to different objects or parts of an object: and, it is wellknown, that the generation of quantity by motion is preferred by thebest writers, for this very reason, that it necessarily excludes the notionof indivisibles. It should be remembered likeways, that a visible object isnot divided by the eye into a number of contiguous minima visibilia; for,to whatever mathematical point in the object the eye is directed, a mini-mum visibile may be seen there by means of a certain portion of theobject immediately surrounding it.

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[Chapter title] 137

1 Letters 16–19 were originally published as letters 1–4 in the 1755 edition of Volume2; letters 20–21 were originally published as letters 3 and 4 in the 1756 Supplement.

11JOHN LELAND

John Leland, A view of the principal deistical writers of the last and present century. London: B. Dod, 1755–1756, 2 vol. and Supplement.Complete Letter 16; from 1757 edition.

John Leland (1691–1766) was a Presbyterian minister in Dublin.Beginning in 1733, he authored several works attacking deists and

defending traditional notions of Christianity and revelation. Leland’sgreatest work is his multi-volume View of the Principal DeisticalWriters, published in a series of volumes in 1755 and 1756. The fin-ished work consists of 36 letters to his friend Dr. Thomas Wilson. Sixof these letters pertain to Hume, specifically Letters 16–21.1 In Letter16 (originally published in 1755), Leland discusses Hume’s notion ofcausality as appears in the Enquiry. He begins by summarizingHume’s view of causation and notes that Hume is not consistent inhis use of the notion of habit. Leland also argues that, by destroyingour reasoning concerning causes and effects, Hume undermines thecausal proofs for God’s existence. Leland next turns to a moredetailed critique of Hume’s theory and makes four particular observa-tions. First, Hume holds that experience rests on cause and effect, andcausality, in turn, is not grounded in the nature of things. Accordingto Leland, then, we gain no certainty at all from experience. Second,Hume rejects power or energy within causes since we cannot explainprecisely what it consists of and how it operates. However, accordingto Leland, we nevertheless know that there is something in the causethat produces the effect, “though we cannot distinctly explain whatthat circumstance in the cause is.” Leland believes that Hume shouldhave followed Chevalier Ramsay’s view that, even though we have noadequate idea of power, we still see that there must be such a thing innature. Hume’s view is also contrary to common sense, Lelandargues, since it is reasonable to believe that from specific causes spe-cific circumstances will follow. According to Leland, Hume is incon-

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2 For reviews of Leland’s View, see Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Philosophyand Essays, Volume 1, which includes Leland’s discussion of Hume’s moral theoryin Letter 21 of A View.

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sistent in the credence that he gives cause-effect relations. Althoughon the one hand Hume holds that the course of nature may change,yet on the other hand he holds, in the essay on miracles, that thecourse of nature is constant or uniform.

Third, Hume is also said to run contrary to common sense when heclaims that we observe only a constant conjunction, never a real tiebetween causes and effects. For Leland, we commonly see real con-nections in things themselves – as a heap of sand, for example –which does not depend merely on our own minds, but on the natureof things themselves. Fourth, Hume makes inconsistent statementsabout the validity of causality. On the one hand, he says that it isuncertain. Yet, on the other hand, in his discussions of probabilityand chance, he holds that inferences from experiences are not onlyreliable, but are a kind of “proof.” Similarly, in his discussion of lib-erty and necessity, Hume holds that there is a predictable causal con-nection between our motives and actions. Leland concludes by notingthat Hume is even inconsistent in the value that he gives to scepti-cism. In earlier parts of the Enquiry, Hume apparently thought thatsceptical reasoning had merit; but, in the concluding section, Humeconsiders the arguments of excessive scepticism to be trifling and use-less.2

In his discussion of Hume, Leland included dozens of brief foot-notes indicating the page numbers of the passages cited from the1750 edition of Hume’s Philosophical Essays (later retitled as theEnquiry). These footnotes have not been included here.

LETTER XVI.

Mr. Hume a subtil and ingenious writer, but extremely sceptical, andfond of novelty. He proposes to free metaphysics from that jar-gon and obscurity which has served only as a shelter to supersti-tion and error. His doctrine concerning the relation of Cause andEffect examined. He declares, that the knowlege of this relation isof the highest importance, and that all our reasonings concerningmatter of fact and experience, and concerning the existence ofany Being, are founded upon it. Yet he sets himself to shew, thatthere is no real connexion between Cause and Effect, and that

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there can be no certain, nor even probable reasoning from the oneto the other. Reflections upon the great absurdity and perniciousconsequences of this scheme. The inconsistencies this writer hathfallen into.

S I R,I now send you some observations upon Mr. Hume, an ingenious

writer, who hath lately appeared against the Christian cause, and thatin a manner which seems to have something new in it, and differentfrom what others had written before him, especially in what he callshis Philosophical Essays concerning human understanding. The sec-ond edition of this book, with additions and corrections, which iswhat I have now before me, was published at London in 1750. Thisgentleman must be acknowleged to be a subtil writer, of a very meta-physical genius, and has a neat and agreeable manner of expression.But it is obvious to every judicious reader, that he hath in manyinstances carried scepticism to an unreasonable height; and seemethevery-where to affect an air of making new observations and discov-eries. His writings seem, for the most part, to be calculated rather toamuse, or even confound, than to instruct and enlighten the under-standing. And there are not a few things in them, which strikes at thefoundation of nature, as well as the proofs and evidences of revealedreligion. This appeareth to me to be, in a particular manner, the char-acter of his Philosophical Essays. And you will, perhaps, be of thesame opinion, when you have considered the remarks I now send you.

If we were to form a judgment of these Essays, from the account hehimself is pleased to give of them, and of his intention in writingthem, our notion of them would be highly to their advantage. Havingtaken notice of the abstractedness of metaphysical speculations, hesays, that he has, “in the following Essays, endeavoured to throwsome light upon subjects, from which, uncertainty has hithertodeterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant.” He proposes “to unitethe boundaries of the different Species of Philosophy, by reconcilingprofound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty;” and thinks“it will be happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, he can underminethe foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to haveserved hitherto only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absur-dity and error.” He undertakes to “banish all that jargon, which hasso long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn suchdisgrace upon them.” And after having represented all the receivedsystems of Philosophy, and all common Theories, as extremely defec-tive, he promises to “avoid all jargon and confusion, in treating ofsuch subtil and profound subjects.”

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That part of these Essays, which I shall first take notice of, andwhich is indeed of a very uncommon strain, and seems to lie at thefoundation of many of those extraordinary things which he after-wards advances, is what he proposes to consider, p. 47, & seq.;where he observes, that “it is a subject worthy curiosity, to enquirewhat is the nature of that evidence, which assures us of any real exis-tence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses,or the records of our memory.” He observes, that “this part of phi-losophy has been little cultivated either by the antients or moderns.”But though it is difficult, it may be “useful, by destroying that implic-it faith and credulity, which is the bane of all reasoning and freeenquiry.” After such a pompous profession, one would be apt toexpect something extremely deserving of our attention. Let us there-fore examine into his scheme, that we may know what it really is; andthen our way will be clear to make the necessary remarks upon it.

He observes, that “the relation of cause and effect is necessary tothe subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct inevery circumstance and occurrence of human life. Without this, weshould never have been able to adjust means to ends, nor employ ourrational powers either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil.”And, accordingly, he expresly declares, that “if there be any relation,any object, which it imports us to know perfectly, it is that of causeand effect. On this we found all our reasonings, concerning matter offact and experience: And by this alone we retain any assurance con-cerning objects that are removed from the present testimony of ourmemory and senses;” and that the existence of any Being can only beknown by arguments from its cause, or its effect.” It appeareth then,that by his own acknowlegement, it is of the highest importance toknow the relation of cause and effect. Let us now see what instruc-tion he gives us with regard to that relation.

He absolutely denies, that this relation can possibly be known apriori; and asserts, that it entirely arises from experience: That it isthis only “that teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect,and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of anoth-er.” But he takes a great deal of pains to shew, that experience cannotfurnish a reasonable foundation for such an inference. He had laid itdown as a principle, that all arguments from experience can at bestonly be probable. But he will not allow even this, in the present case;He sets himself to prove, that “not so much as any probable argu-ments can be drawn from cause to effect, or from effect to cause:”That “the conjunction of the effect with the cause is entirely arbi-trary, not only in its first conception, a priori, but after it is suggestedby experience:” That, indeed, in fact we infer the one from the other;

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but that this is not by a chain of reasoning; nor is there any mediumwhich may enable the mind to draw such an inference. The onlyground of such an inference, is the supposed resemblance between thepast and future; but that it is impossible any argument, from experi-ence, should prove that resemblance: And yet if there be not such aresemblance, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to noinference or conclusion.” He positively asserts, that “we know onlyby experience the frequent conjunction of objects, without being everable to comprehend any thing like connection between them.” And hefrequently observes, that the connection is only in our own thoughtsor conceptions, not in the things themselves; and resolves the con-junction between cause and effect, and the inference drawn from theone to the other, wholly into custom; that it is a “customary connec-tion in the thought or imagination betwixt one object, and its usualattendant;” that custom, he sometimes calls a habit; and represents itas owing to a repetition of acts; at other times, he ascribes it to aninstinct, or mechanical tendency, and represents it as a necessary actof the mind, and infallible in its operations: Yet afterwards, speakingof the same custom or instinct, he says, that, like other instincts, itmay be fallacious and deceitful.

The great argument he produces, and upon which he lays the great-est stress, to shew that we can have no certainty in our conclusionsconcerning the relation of cause and effect, nor reason from one tothe other, is, that we have no idea of that connection which unites theeffect to the cause, or of the force, power, or energy, in the cause,which produces the effect; nor, consequently, any medium wherebywe can infer the one from the other. He sets himself particularly toshew, that neither external objects give us the idea of power, norreflections on the operations of our own minds.

If what our author offers on this head, had been only to display thesubtilty of his metaphysical genius, and shew how little we are abledistinctly to explain the manner even of those things of which wehave the greatest certainty, we should have allowed him to amusehimself, and his readers, with a little philosophical play. But what hehere advances, concerning cause and effect, power and connection, hemakes the foundation of conclusions relating to matters of greatimportance,

– Hæ nugæ seria ducuntIn mala –

By endeavouring to destroy all reasoning, from causes to effects, orfrom effects to causes; and not allowing, that we can so much as

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probably infer the one from the other, by arguing either a priori, orfrom experience, he subverts, as far as in him lies, the very founda-tion of those reasonings, that are drawn from the effects which webehold in the frame of the universe, to the existence of one supreme,intelligent, all-powerful cause; and accordingly we shall find, that hehimself afterwards applies this principle to this very purpose. Anotheruse that he makes of this doctrine concerning cause and effect, iswhat we would not have expected from it, to confound all differencebetween physical and moral causes; and to shew that the latter havethe same kind of causality with the former. This is the purport of hiseighth Essay, which is concerning Liberty and Necessity. Though if heargued consistently, he must deny that there is any such thing innature as Necessity, or Necessary Connection; or that there is eitherphysical or moral cause at all.

You will scarce expect, that I should enter upon a laborious confu-tation of so whimsical a scheme, though proposed to the world withgreat pomp, and represented by the author himself as of vast impor-tance. I shall content myself with making some general observationsupon it.

And first, whereas this writer frequently, throughout these Essays,lays a mighty stress upon experience, as the great guide of human life,and the only foundation of all our knowlege, especially with respectto matter of fact, and the existence of objects: He here plainlyendeavours to shew, that there can be no argument from experienceat all; nor can any reasonable conclusion be drawn from it: For hewill not allow, that any argument can be drawn, or inference madefrom experience, but what is founded on the supposed relation orconnection betwixt cause and effect. If therefore there be no relationof connection betwixt cause and effect at all, in the nature of things,which it is the whole design of his reasoning on this subject to shew,then all certainty of experience, all proof from it, entirely fail; allexperience, as he himself expresses it, becomes useless, and can giverise to no inference or conclusion.

Secondly. Another remark I would make upon Mr. Hume’s way ofarguing, is, that it proceeds upon a wrong foundation, and which is contrary to truth and reason; viz. that we cannot have any reasonablecertainty of the truth of a thing, or that it really is, when we cannotdistinctly explain the manner of it, or how it is. The sum of his argu-mentation, as I have already hinted with relation to cause and effect,is, that we cannot be certain of any such thing, as power or energy,because we cannot conceive or explain precisely wherein it consists,or how it operates. But this is a very fallacious way of reasoning.Though we cannot metaphysically explain the manner in which the

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cause operateth upon the effect, yet we may, in many cases, be surethat there is a connection between them; and that, where there arecertain effects produced, there are powers correspondent or adequateto the production of those effects. The mind, in such cases, when itsees an effect produced, is led, by a quick and undoubted process ofreasoning, to acknowlege that there must be a cause which hath apower of producing it; or else we must say, that it is produced with-out any cause at all, or that nothing in nature hath any power of pro-ducing it; which is the greatest of all absurdities. He urgeth, that “itmust be allowed, that when we know a power, we know that very cir-cumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce the effect.”And then he asks, “Do we pretend to be acquainted with the natureof the human soul, and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of theone to produce the other.” But certainly we may know, that there issomething in the cause which produceth the effect, though we cannotdistinctly explain what that circumstance in the cause is, by which itis enabled to produce it. We must not deny, that there is in the minda power of raising up ideas, and recalling them, and fixing the atten-tion upon them, because we cannot explain how this is done. Theargument Mr. Hume offers to prove, that we can have no assuranceof the reality of force or power; viz. because we cannot distinctly con-ceive or explain how it operateth, would equally prove that we can-not be sure that we have any ideas at all, because we cannot wellexplain the nature of an idea, or how it is formed in the mind. Hehimself, on another occasion, observes against Malebranche, and themodern Cartesians, who deny all power and activity in second causes,and ascribe all to God; that “we are indeed ignorant of the manner inwhich bodies operate upon one another; and so we are of the manneror force by which the mind, even the Supreme mind, operates, eitheron itself or on Body. Were our ignorance therefore a sufficient reasonfor rejecting any thing, we should be led into that principle of refus-ing all energy to the Supreme Being, as much as to the grossest mat-ter.” He here seems to censure it as a wrong way of arguing, to denythat a thing is, because we cannot distinctly conceive the manner howit is; or to make our ignorance of any thing a sufficient reason forrejecting it: And yet it is manifest, that his own reasoning againstpower or causality, force or energy, depends upon this principle; andindeed, by comparing the several parts of his scheme, there is toomuch reason to apprehend, that he had it in view to deny all forceand energy, and all power whatsoever, in the Supreme, as well as insecondary causes; or at least to represent it as very uncertain. I thinkthis Gentleman would have done better, to have said, as a late inge-nious author of his own country, “We have no adequate idea of

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power; we see evidently that there must be such a thing in nature; butwe cannot conceive how it acts, nor what connects the producingcause with the produced effect.” Chevalier Ramsay’s principles ofnatural and revealed religion, vol. i, p. 109.3

Thirdly, A third remark is, that many of our author’s arguings, onthis subject, are contrary to the most evident dictates of commonsense. Such is that, where he asserts, that not so much as a probableargument can be drawn, in any case, from experience, concerning theconnection betwixt cause and effect; or from whence we may con-clude, that from a similar cause we may expect similar effects. Thus,e.g. according to his way of reasoning, it cannot so much as probablybe concluded from experience, that if a quantity of dry gun-powderbe laid in any place, and fire be applied to it, it will cause an explo-sion; or that if it hath such an effect today, a like quantity of powder,the same way circumstanced, will produce the same effect to-morrow.No probable reason can be brought to shew, that that which has hadthe effect in thousands of instances in time past, will, though all cir-cumstances appear perfectly similar, have the same effect in timefuture. He grants, indeed, that, in such cases, the mind is determinedto draw the inference; yet he asserts, that the understanding has nopart in the operation. But surely, when, from observation and experi-ence, we come to know and judge of the ordinary course of nature,the understanding may justly draw a probable argument or conclu-sion, that from such and such causes, so circumstanced, such effectswill follow. This inference is perfectly rational. And it is a strangeway of talking, that, even from a number of uniform experiments, wecannot so much as probably infer a connection between the cause andthe effect, the sensible qualities and the secret powers: The reason hegives, is, that “if there be any suspicion, that the course of naturemay change; and that the past may be no rule for the future; experi-ence can give rise to no inference or conclusion.” But is the probabili-ty of a thing destroyed, according to any way of reasoning allowedhitherto, because it is barely possible it may happen otherwise,though there is ten thousand to one against it? Mr. Hume, elsewhere,when arguing against miracles, lays it down as a principle, that thereis a constant uniformity in the course of nature, never to be violated;but here, in order to shew, that no probable reason can be broughtfrom experience, concerning the connection of cause and effect, he

3 [Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686–1743), follower and biographer of the Frenchphilosopher François de Salignac Fénelon; Hume knew Ramsay, although Ramsaydid not highly regard Hume’s philosophical abilities.]

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supposes, that there may be a suspicion that the course of nature maychange. Thus this Gentleman knows how to assume and alter princi-ples, as best suits his own present convenience. Reason leadeth us toconclude, that the course of nature is the appointment and constitu-tion of that most wise and powerful Being, who made the world, andsettled that law and order which he judged fittest and properest; andthen reason leadeth us also to conclude, that, except in very extraor-dinary cases, the same order will continue; and extraordinary casesdo not hinder the probability of the ordinary course. So that reasonaffords a proper medium for a probable conclusion concerning whateffects are to be expected. He affirms, indeed, that all inferences ofthis kind are only the effects of custom or habit, not of reasoning. Butwhy is custom or habit here mentioned in opposition to reason, or asexclusive of it? May they not both concur? It is evident, that theyoften go together, and mutually strengthen one another. Customalone, without reason, is often not to be depended on: But in thiscase, reason gives its suffrage; and, in all arguings in experimentalphilosophy, reason argues from similar causes to similar effects. It isby reason we draw those inferences, and the inferences are rational. Itmust not be said, that in this case there is no reasoning at all; but thatthe reasoning is often so obvious, that it carries conviction by thevery constitution of the human mind, which naturally acquiesceth init as satisfactory. It seems evident, that the Great Author of ourbeings hath formed our minds, so as to reason in this manner; and hewould not have done this, if he had not been both of great use inhuman life to make such inferences, and if there were not a real foun-dation for it in the nature of things. This writer himself owns, that“none but a fool or a madman will ever pretend to dispute theauthority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life:But he thinks it may be allowed a philosopher to have so muchcuriosity as to examine the principle of human nature, which givesthis weighty authority to experience.” But I cannot help thinking,that if we were to judge of philosophy, by the specimen thisGentleman hath given of it in this instance, many would be apt toconclude, that there is a great difference, and even opposition,between philosophy and common sense; that what is so obvious andapparent to the common sense and reason of mankind, that he is afool and a madman, who doubts of it; yet in philosophy is not somuch as probable.

Another instance, in which our author’s scheme is not very recon-cilable to the common sentiments of mankind, is, that he says, that“though we learn, by experience, the frequent conjunction of objects,yet we are unable to comprehend any thing like connection between

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them; and that there appears not in all nature any thing like connec-tion, conceivable by us; all events are entirely loose and separate; oneevent follows another; but we never observe any tye betwixt them;they seem conjoined, but never connected.” But it is evident, that inmany cases we have a distinct idea of conjunction or contiguity, as ina heap of sand; and of connection, as betwixt cause and effect; andthe connection in this case is not merely in our thoughts, as this gen-tleman is pleased to represent it; but this very connection in ourthoughts is founded on a connection which we perceive in the thingsthemselves. They are not connected as cause and effect, because wethink them so; but we perceive them to be connected, because we findthey are so: Nor is this owing merely to a custom or habit in ourminds, but there is in nature a real foundation for it.

Fourthly, Another remark which occurs to me, upon consideringMr. Hume’s scheme, is, that he hath fallen into several inconsistenciesand contradictions: And, indeed, it is not to be wondered at, that aman who argueth against common sense, however subtil and inge-nious he may otherwise be, should also be inconsistent with himself. Ihave already taken notice of the passages in which he representethexperience as uncertain, and that not so much as a probable argu-ment can be drawn from it; and yet in his sixth essay, which is con-cerning probability, he shews that experience may not only furnishprobable conclusions, but what he calls proofs; which he explains tobe such arguments from experience, as leave no room for doubt oropposition. And he frequently speaks of experience in very highterms, as a certain guide. Again, in several passages above referred to,he expressly declares, that in making experimental conclusions, thereis no place for reasoning; that the inference in this case is entirelyowing to custom, and the understanding has no part in it. And yet heelsewhere owns, that there is great scope of reasoning in inferences ofthis kind from observation and experience; and that not only mengreatly surpass the inferior animals in this way of reasoning, but thatone man very much excels another. And he declares, that “all our rea-sonings are founded on a species of analogy; where the causes areentirely similar, the analogy is perfect; and the inference drawn fromit is regarded as certain and conclusive;” though he had said, that “itis impossible that any arguments from experience can prove such aresemblance.” Another inconsistency, which may be observed in Mr.Hume’s reasoning on this subject is, that though he represents theconnection betwixt cause and effect to be only a connection in ourthoughts, not in the things themselves; yet he asserts, that “there is akind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature, andthe succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by

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which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us, yet ourthoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the sametrain with other works of nature.” Where he seems to suppose thatthere is a real connection in the nature of things, to which the connec-tion in our own minds correspondeth.. The general strain of his argu-ing in several of his essays, seems to be designed to prove, if it provesany thing, that we cannot be sure there is any such thing as cause orcausal connection in the universe: Yet he says, “it is universallyallowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence; and thatchance is a negative word, and means not any real power which hasany-where a being in nature.” Here he falls into the common way ofspeaking, that every thing which existeth must have a cause of itsexistence; otherwise we must acknowlege the operation of chance.And he observes, that “there is no such thing as chance in the world.”Causes therefore must be acknowleged, though we cannot explain themanner of their causality: And he himself, in reckoning up the princi-ples of the connection of our ideas, distinctly mentions resemblance,contiguity, and causation; and this last he makes to be the most com-mon and useful of all. And yet, in the course of his reasoning, he real-ly leaves no place for causation, distinct from similarity or resem-blance, and contiguity. It may be mentioned, as another instance ofhis inconsistency, that he frequently makes power, and necessarayconnection, the same thing; and argues, that if there be any connec-tion betwixt cause and effect at all, it must be a necessary one; forthat cannot be called a cause, that is not necessarily connected withthe effect. And yet, in his Essay on Liberty and Necessity, whenspeaking of the influence of motives upon the mind, he saith, that “asthis influence is usually conjoined with the action, it must beesteemed a cause, and be looked upon as an instance of the necessitywhich we would establish:” Where he plainly supposeth, that it is notessential to the notion of a cause, that it is infallibly and alway[s]connected with the effect; but that it is sufficient, if it be usuallyjoined with it. And to the same purpose, he saith, that “all causes arenot conjoined to their usual effects, with like constancy and uniformi-ty.” Indeed, his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity, though seem-ingly built upon the scheme he had advanced in his foregoing Essays,with relation to cause and effect, is really not reconcilable to it. In allhis reasonings in those Essays, concerning cause and effect, he hadargued that there is no such thing as necessary connection, or indeedany connection at all, betwixt cause and effect: And upon thisscheme, it is idle to talk of a necessity either in physical or moralcauses: And yet in his Essay on Liberty and Necessity, he plainlyargues upon the supposition of a real connection; though he will only

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call it a conjunction betwixt cause and effect: And he all along sup-poseth the influence of causes, and the power of motives; and that anecessity must be acknowleged in moral as well as physical causes.He would have us begin the question concerning Liberty andNecessity, not “by examining the faculties of the soul, but by examin-ing the operations of body, and of brute unintelligent matter.” Andwith regard to this, he observes, that “it is universally allowed, thatmatter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force; and thatevery effect is so precisely determined by the nature and energy of itscause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, couldpossibly have resulted from the operation of its cause.” And heexpresly asserteth, that “the conjunction betwixt motives and volun-tary actions, is as regular and uniform as that betwixt the cause andeffect, in any part of nature.” Thus we see, that he can acknowlegecause and effect, and the connection betwixt them, when he has amind to take advantage of this, for overthrowing the liberty of humanactions. And he concludes the Essay, with taking notice of the objec-tion which might be raised against what he had advanced; viz. that“if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity withthe operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary caus-es, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original causeof all, to every single volition of every human creature. While we act,we are, at the same time, acted upon. There is no contingency any-where in the universe, no indifferency, no liberty.” This objection heputteth very strongly; and yet I cannot see, that, according to thehypothesis he had advanced in the foregoing Essays, there can be anyjust foundation for it: For if there be only a mere conjunction ofevents, but no causal influence, it cannot be said, that whilst we actwe are acted upon. On the contrary, nothing is acted upon, nor isthere any power, force, or energy in nature. All events are loose, sepa-rate, and unconnected, and only follow one another, without connec-tion; and therefore there can be no continued chain of necessary caus-es at all. This would be the proper answer, according to the principleshe had laid down, if he had thought those principles would bear. Buthe hath not thought fit to make use of it; but, in contradiction to hisown scheme, seems here to admit a chain of necessary causes, physi-cal and moral, in order to load providence; and plainly represents theobjection as unanswerable.

Thus I have considered, pretty largely, our author’s extraordinaryscheme; and the observations that have been made, may help us tojudge of this gentleman’s character as a writer, whether it deservethall the admiration and applause, which he himself, as well as others,have been willing to bestow upon it. We may see, by what hath been

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observed, how far he hath answered what he had prepared the readerto expect, clearness and precision, in his way of treating these curiousand sublime subjects. He had particularly proposed, with regard topower, force, and energy, “to fix, if possible, the precise meaning ofthose terms; and thereby remove part of that obscurity, which is somuch complained of in this species of philosophy.”

What Mr. Hume hath offered, concerning cause and effect, puts mein mind of a remarkable passage in Lord Bolingbroke’s posthumousworks, which I shall mention on this occasion. “Whatever knowlege(saith his Lordship) we acquire of apparent causes, we can acquirenone of real causality, or that power, that virtue, whatever it be, bywhich one being acts on another, and becomes a cause. We may callthis by different names, according to the different effects of it; but toknow it in its first principles, to know the nature of it, would be toknow as God himself knows; and therefore this will be alwaysunknown to us, in causes that seem to be most under our inspection,as well as in others that are the most remote from it.” And he repre-sents those “philosophers as ridiculous, who, when they have discov-ered a real actual cause, in its effects, by the phænomena, reject itbecause they cannot conceive its causality, nor assign a sufficient rea-son why and how it is.” This may seem to bear hard upon Mr. Hume:But what is more to be wondered at, he hath in effect passed a cen-sure upon himself. He indeed gives a high encomium on sceptical phi-losophy, in the beginning of his sixth Essay; that “every passion ismortified by it, but the love of truth; and that passion never is, norcan be carried to too high a degree. It is surprising therefore, that thisphilosophy, which, in almost every instance, must be harmless andinnocent, should be the subject of so much groundless reproach andobloquy.” But afterwards, in his twelfth Essay, which is of the acade-mical, or sceptical philosophy, he gives no advantageous notion ofscepticism. He says, that “the grand scope of all the enquiries and dis-putes of the sceptics, is to destroy reason by ratiocination and argu-ment.” And speaking of the sceptical objections against the relationof cause and effect, he saith, that “while the Sceptic insists upon thesetopics, he seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance andconviction:” And then he adds, that “these arguments might be dis-played at a greater length, if any durable good or benefit to societycould ever be expected to result from them. For (saith he) here is thechief, and most confounding objection, to excessive scepticism, thatno durable good can ever be expected from it, while it remains in itsfull force and vigour.” And he had said, that “nature will alwaysmaintain her rights, and prevaileth in the end, over any abstract rea-soning whatsoever.” And if so, I think we may justly conclude, that

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any abstract reasoning which is contrary to the plain voice of natureought to be rejected, as false and trifling, and of no real use or serviceto mankind.

But it were well, if the worst thing that could be said of ourauthor’s excessive scepticism, were, that it is trifling and useless. Itwill soon appear, that as he hath managed it, it is of a pernicious ten-dency. But you will probably be of opinion, that enough hath beensaid of this gentleman, and his oddities for the present.

I am, &c.

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1 Hume to Richard Price, March 8, 1767.

12RICHARD PRICE

Richard Price, Review of the principal questions and difficulties inmorals.... London, A. Miller, 1758, viii, 485 p.Selections from Chapter 5 and Appendix, Note C; from 1787 edition.

Richard Price (1723–1791) was a Welsh-born minister; in philosophy, he is principally remembered for his Review of the

Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, which appeared in 1758and was revised in 1769 and 1787. In this work, Price criticizes theories,such as Francis Hutcheson’s, that base morality on empirical knowledge.Price argues instead that morality is grounded in rational intuitions. InChapter 5 he defends the notion of divine goodness and, in the course ofhis reasoning, attacks scepticism and maintains that we do indeed haveassurance regarding the truth of beliefs based on experience. In a note tohis discussion, Price attacks Hume’s claim that, when we reflect on theuncertainty of empirical judgments, these reflections themselves are alsouncertain. For Price, if subsequent reflections are uncertain, they actuallystrengthen, rather than diminish, the original judgment, “because themore precarious a judgment or probability unfavourable to anotherappears, the less must be its effect in weakening it.”

In the 1787 third edition of the Review, Price added an Appendix. InNote C of the Appendix, he argues that Hume is misled by languagewhen making “the immediate object of the mind in perception to be thesame with perception itself.” As a result, Hume annihilates all externalexistence. However, Price is hesitant to follow Reid’s solution, namely,that there actually is no immediate object in our minds. According toPrice, Reid’s view results in the annihilation of perception.

Hume was on friendly terms with Price and owned a copy of hisReview. In a letter concerning another of Price’s publications, Humewrote to Price that “you like a true Philosopher, while you overwhelmme with the Weight of your Arguments, give me Encouragement by theMildness of your Expressions.”1 Journal reviews of Price’s Review wereexceptionally glowing. In the Monthly Review William Rose commentedthat,

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every candid Reader, who is acquainted with the subject, will, weapprehend, readily allow that Mr. Price has treated it in a very judicious manner, and that his book is one of the most valuable per-formances we have upon the subject. [Monthly Review, June 1758,Volume 18, pp. 513–527]

The Critical Review recommends Price’s work,

as a masterly performance, to all those who desire an intimateacquaintance with the metaphysical theory of morals; as well as tothose who want a proper stimulus to the practice of virtue. [CriticalReview, May 1758, Vol. 5, 361–368, June, 461–467]

The following is from the 1787 edition of Price’s Review, which reflectshis final alterations to that work.

CHAP. V.Of the Reference of Morality to the Divine Nature, the Rectitude of

our Faculties, and the Grounds of Belief.

... Shall it still be objected; “I have found myself mistaken in many cases;

and how shall I know but I may be so in all?” – I answer; look into your-self and examine your own conceptions. Clearness and distinctness ofapprehension, as you have or want it, will and must satisfy you, when youare right, and when it is possible you may be wrong. Do not you reallyknow, that you are not deceived, when you think, that if equals are takenfrom equals, the remaiders will be equal? Can you entertain the leastdoubt, whether the body of the sun is bigger than it appears to the nakedeye? or is it any reason for questioning this, that you once may havethought otherwise? Is it reasonable, because you have judged wrong insome cases, through ignorance, haste, prejudice, or partial views, to suspectthat you judge wrong in all cases, however clear? Because, through bodilyindisposition or other causes, our senses sometimes misrepresent outwardobjects to us, are they for ever to be discredited? Because we sometimesdream, must it be doubtful whether we are ever awake? Because one manimposed upon us, are we to conclude that no faith is due to any human tes-timony? or because our memories have deceived us with respect to someevents, must we question whether we remember right what happened thelast moment?”

{[Note:] Conclusions of this sort, (strange as they may seem) have

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been actually drawn; and it has been asserted, that because in addingtogether a long series of numbers, we are liable to err, we cannot be surethat we are right in the addition of the smallest numbers; and, therefore,not in reckoning twice two to be four.

Another sceptical argument which has been insisted on, is this. Inevery judgment we can form, besides the uncertainty attending the origi-nal consideration of the subject itself; there is another derived from theconsideration of the fallibility of our faculties, and the past instances inwhich we have been mistaken; to which must be added a third uncer-tainty, derived from the possibility of error in this estimation we makeof the fidelity of our faculties; and to this a fourth of the same kind, andso on in infinitum; till at last the first evidence, by a constant diminutionof it, must be reduced to nothing. See Mr. Hume’s Treatise of HumanNature, Vol. I. p. 315, &c. As much of this strange reasoning as is notabove my comprehension, proves just the reverse of what was intendedby it. For let it be acknowledged, that the consideration of the fallibilityof our understandings, and the instances in which they have deceived us,necessarily diminishes our assurance of the rectitude of our sentiments;the subsequent reflection on the uncertainty attending this judgmentwhich we make of our faculties, diminishes not, but contributes torestore to its first strength, our original assurance; because the more pre-carious a judgment or probability unfavourable to another appears, theless must be its effect in weakening it.}

...

APPENDIX

NOTE C.

P. 55. “It should be observed, that I have all along endeavoured toavoid speaking of an idea as an image in the mind of the object we thinkof. A writer of deep reflexion has charged this language with laying thefoundation of all modern scepticism. See Dr. REID’s Enquiry into thehuman mind on the principles of common Sense.”

I am always mortified when I find, that my sentiments are differentfrom those of the writer to whom I have now referred. Mr. HUME makesthe immediate object of the mind in perception to be the same with per-ception itself, and thus annihilates all external existence. Dr. REID, if Iunderstand him, asserts (in his Enquiry, &c. and also in his Essays onthe intellectual powers of man) that there is no such object, and thusseems to me to annihilate all perception. When we investigate the prop-erties of triangles or circles, are there not objects, independent of ourminds, then present to them? We call these objects, ideas. This word

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generally signifying the apprehension or conception of an object, it is improperly used to signify the object itself of conception; but thepoverty of language obliging us to this, it must be excused; and caremust be taken not to be misled by it, as I think Mr. HUME and someother writers have been.

In such instances we call, I have said, the objects present to our minds,ideas. If ideas have no existence, and nothing is present to our mindswhen we contemplate these objects, does it not follow that we then con-template nothing? The same enquiry may be made with respect to our perception of external objects. These objects themselves not being pre-sent, if perceived, they must be perceived by ideas of them. Nor will itfollow from hence, that we can have no assurance of the existence ofexternal objects. All ideas imply the possibility of the existence of corre-spondent objects; and our belief of the actual existence of the objects ofsense, we may resolve (as Dr. REID does) into impressions on our sensesforcing belief at the moment of the impression, in a manner we cannotexplain. And this may be done to more advantage on the supposition ofideas than without it. For scepticism seems to be less favoured by sup-posing that, in perception by our senses, there is something distinct fromthe mind and independent of it really perceived, than by supposing thatthere is nothing then perceived. It is unavoidable to enquire what this is?The Dissertation that follows these notes will shew how I am inclined tothink on this subject. The truth is (if I mistake not) that the justeranswer to this enquiry would carry us higher than we are willing to go,and imply a presence of the Deity with us and dependence upon himmore close and constant and necessary, than we are apt to suspect orcan easily believe.

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1 For background on Reid’s relation to Hume, see Early Responses to Hume’s MoralPhilosophy and Essays, Volume 1.

2 Members of the Society included several writers who also published responses toHume. These include James Beattie, George Campbell, James Dunbar, andAlexander Gerard. A transcription of Reid’s surviving lectures to the Society isprovided in Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles ofCommon Sense: a Critical Edition, ed. Derek Brookes, University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

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13THOMAS REID

Thomas Reid, An inquiry into the human mind, on the principles ofcommon sense. London, A. Millar, 1764, xvi, 541 p.Chapter 1, Section 5–8, Chapter 2, Section 6, complete selections; from1785 edition.

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was regent of philosophy at King’sCollege, Aberdeen, and later professor of moral philosophy at the

University of Glasgow.2 The Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) wasReid’s first major philosophical work, which appeared a few monthsbefore he succeeded Adam Smith at Glasgow in 1764. Reid composedhis Inquiry over several years; he says at the outset of this work that histhoughts on the subject were “put together in another form, for the useof my pupils.” He also notes that he later presented his ideas to theAberdeen Philosophical Society.3 Reid also circulated sections of themanuscript among his philosophical acquaintances, one of whom wasHume’s friend Hugh Blair (1718–1800). Probably at Reid’s urging, Blairshowed part of the manuscript to Hume, who responded with a list ofsuggestions. Hume opens his letter praising the manuscript’s “livelyentertaining style”:

I have read over your Friend’s performance & read it over withPleasure, because it has a Quality seldom to be met with inPerformances of that Nature; which is that it is wrote in a lively enter-taining manner & will be able to fix the Attention even of those who

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3 From Brookes’s critical edition of Reid’s Inquiry, cited in the previous note, pp. 256–257. An earlier transcription of this letter appears in Paul Wood’s “DavidHume on Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles ofCommon Sense: a New Letter to Hume Blair from July 1762,” Mind, 1986, Vol. 95, pp. 411–416.

are the [least] curious about metaphysical Reasonings. [Hume toHugh Blair, July 4, 1762]4

A year later Hume wrote a letter directly to Reid, reiterating many ofthe points in his letter to Blair:

By Dr Blair’s means I have been favoured with the perusal of your per-formance, which I have read with great pleasure and attention. It iscertainly very rare, that a piece so deeply philosophical is wrote withso much spirit, and affords so much entertainment to the reader; tho Imust still regret the disadvantages under which I read it, as I never hadthe whole performance at once before me, and could not be able fullyto compare one part with another. To this reason, chiefly, I ascribesome obscurities, which, in spite of your short analysis or abstract,still seem to hang over your system. For I must do you the justice toown, that when I enter into your ideas, no man appears to expresshimself with greater perspicuity than you do; a talent which, above allothers, is requisite in that species of literature which you have cultivat-ed. There are some objections, which I would willingly propose, to thechapter ‘Of Sight,’ did I not suspect that they proceed from my notsufficiently understanding it; and I am the more confirmed in this sus-picion, as Dr Blair tells me, that the former objections I made, hadbeen derived chiefly from that cause. I shall therefore forbear till thewhole can be before me, and shall not at present propose any fartherdifficulties to your reasonings. I shall only say, that if you have beenable to clear up these abstruse and important subjects, instead of beingmortified, I shall be so vain as to pretend to a share of the praise; andshall think that my errors, by having at least some coherence, had ledyou to make a more strict review of my principles, which were thecommon ones, and to perceive their futility. ... [Hume to Reid,February 25, 1763]

Reid responded to Hume’s letter, noting his admiration for him and theinfluence that Hume had on him:

In attempting to throw some new light upon these abstruse Subjects, Iwish to preserve the due mean betwixt Confidence and Despair. Butwhether I have any Success in this Attempt or not, I shall always avow

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4 Reid’s abstract of Hume’s Treatise is apparently no longer extant.5 The abstract is undated. This passage is taken from the transcription in Derek

Brookes’s critical edition of Reid’s Inquiry, cited above, pp. 257–262. An earliertranscription of Reid’s “Abstract” appears in “Reid’s Abstract of the Inquiry intothe Human Mind,” David Fate Norton, Philosophical Monographs, 3, 1976, pp. 125–132.

myself your Disciple in Metaphysicks. I have learned more from yourwritings in this kind than from all others put together. Your Systemappears to me not onely coherent in all its parts, but likeways justlydeduced from principles commonly received among Philosophers:Principles, which I never thought of calling in Question, untill the con-clusions you draw from them in the treatise of human Nature mademe suspect them. If these principles are Solid your System must stand;And whether they are or not, can better be judged after you havebrought to Light the whole System that grows out of them, than whenthe greater part of it was wrapped up in clouds and darkness. I agreewith you therefore that if this System shall ever be demolished, youhave a just claim to a great share of the Praise, both because you havemade it a distinct and determinate mark to be aimed at, and have fur-nished proper artillery for the purpose. [Reid to Hume, March 18,1763]

Reid wrote a brief abstract of his Inquiry, which, until recently,remained in manuscript form. Although the date of the abstract is notknown, Reid in it makes similar comments about his respect for Humeand even refers to Hume as “the greatest Metaphysican of the Age”:

Ever since the treatise of human Nature was published I respected MrHume as the greatest Metaphysician of the Age, and have learnedmore from his writings in matters of that kind than from all others puttogether. I read that treatise over and over with great care, made anabstract of it and wrote my observations upon it.5 I perceived that hisSystem is all founded upon one principle, from which his conclusions,however extraordinary, are deduced with irresistible Evidence. Theprinciple I mean is, That all the objects of human thought are eitherImpressions or Ideas: which I was very much disposed to believe untillI read that Treatise; but finding that if this is true I must be anabsolute Sceptic, I thought that it deserved a carefull Examination.6

In the Inquiry, Reid launches an attack on modern philosophers fromDescartes through Hume, accusing them – in their commitment to whatReid calls the theory of ideas – of a basic philosophical error. The specific mistake consists of holding that only mental images (ideas), and

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not real objects themselves, are present to our minds. Hume specificallyargued that “nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image orperception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which theseimages are conveyed.” For example, the table in front of me seems to getlarger and smaller as I get closer and further away from it. However, forHume, “the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alter-ation: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to themind”(Enquiry, 12.1). Thus, for Hume, our senses are only inlets formental images, and our mental faculties are only mechanisms that holdand shape these mental images. According to Reid, this view leads toscepticism, since it eliminates the possibility of knowledge of the exter-nal world: all that we ever know are our mental images. In contrast tothe theory of ideas, Reid offers his own theory of perception, a theorythat explains how our senses give us direct knowledge of objects withoutrelying on mental images as middlemen. For Reid, when we perceive anexternal object, we have some conception of the object itself, and wehave an immediate and uncontrollable conviction of its existence. Theprinciples in human nature that lead us to these convictions are whatReid calls the principles of common sense.

According to Reid, modern philosophers before Hume downplayed orignored the sceptical implications of the theory of ideas. Hume, though,boldly embraces that scepticism, and so represents the most logical out-come of the theory of ideas. Throughout the Inquiry Reid discussessceptical aspects of Hume’s theory, particularly as appears in theTreatise. Perhaps out of respect for Hume, though, Reid does not referto Hume by name, but only as the “author of the Treatise of HumanNature.” Two sections of the Inquiry, in which Hume’s theory is dis-cussed most prominently, are presented below. The first selection is fromthe Introduction; there Reid traces the theory of ideas from Descartesthrough Hume. According to Reid, the immediate problem with Hume’stheory is that he cannot maintain his scepticism in normal life. Further,human nature, as Hume describes it, simply creates a deceptive,enchanted castle for us. Ultimately, for Reid, Hume pushes the theory ofideas to its absurd conclusion, thus proving it wrong. Reid continues inthe Inquiry by showing how each of our five senses gives us directacquaintance with external objects. Reid’s second extended discussion ofHume is in his chapter on smelling. In Section 6 of that chapter Reidattacks Hume’s view that the self is only a bundle of perceptions. Reidtakes this to mean that the self is not a mental, thinking thing. This leadsto the absurd view that “we can conceive or believe smelling to exist ofitself, without a mind.”

William Rose in the Monthly Review gives a mixed evaluation ofReid’s Inquiry, suggesting that the Inquiry is imperfect without a sequel:

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The doctrine of the existence of ideas, or images of things in the mind,deserves a more particular and accurate examination than he has yetbestowed upon it; and we hope he will consider what he has nowoffered to the public, as in some measure, imperfect without it. Hehas, no doubt, given Scepticism a very severe blow, but he must domore, before he gains a compleat victory. [Monthly Review, Vol. 30,May 1764, pp. 358–379; Vol. 31, July 1764, pp. 1–21]

The Critical Review praised the Inquiry, but contended that Reid couldhave picked a more formidable adversary than Hume:

This is a sensible, and, we think, candid, attempt to restore the intimate connection that ought to subsist between two very oldacquaintances, we mean philosophy and common-sense. We wish thatthe ingenious author had attacked a more formidable performancethan the Treatise of Human Nature, which was published in 1739, theconclusion of which Dr. Reid seems to think cannot be refuted with-out examining and destroying its principles. The doctor being adeclared enemy to scepticism, entered into this disquisition, whichopens a far larger vineyard for literary labour than what the abovepamphlet affords. [Critical Review, Vol. 17, May 1764, pp. 321–329]

The selections below are from the 1785 edition of the Inquiry, whichreflects Reid’s final changes to that work.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

SECT. V

Of Bishop Berkeley; the Treatise of human nature; and of scepticism.

The present age, I apprehend, has not produced two more acute ormore practised in this part of philosophy, than the Bishop of Cloyne,and the author of the Treatise of human nature. The first was no friendto scepticism, but had that warm concern for religious and moral princi-ples which became his order: yet the result of his inquiry was, a seriousconviction, that there is no such thing as a material world; nothing innature but spirits and ideas: and that the belief of material sustances,and of abstract ideas, are the chief causes of all our errors in philosophy,

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and of all infidelity and heresy in religion. His arguments are foundedupon the principles which were formerly laid down by Des Cartes,Malebranche, and Locke, and which have been very generally received.

And the opinion of the ablest judges seems to be, that they neither havebeen, nor can be confuted; and that he hath proved, by unanswerablearguments what no man in his senses can believe.

The second proceeds upon the same principles, but carries them totheir full length; and as the Bishop undid the whole material world, thisauthor, upon the same grounds, undoes the world of spirits, and leavesnothing in nature but ideas and impressions, without any subject onwhich they may be impressed.

It seems to be a peculiar strain of humour in this author, to set out inhis introduction, by promising, with a grave face, no less than a completesystem of the sciences, upon a foundation entirely new, to wit, that ofhuman nature; when the intention of the whole work is to shew, thatthere is neither human nature nor science in the world. It may perhaps beunreasonable to complain of this conduct in an author, who neitherbelieves his own existence, nor that of his reader; and therefore could notmean to disappoint him, or to laugh at his credulity. Yet I cannot imag-ine, that the author of the Treatise of human nature is so sceptical as toplead this apology. He believed, against his principles, that he should beread, and that he should retain his personal identity, till he reaped thehonour and reputation justly due to his metaphysical acumen. Indeed heingenuously acknowledges, that it was only in solitude and retirementthat he could yield any assent to his own philosophy; society, like day-light, dispelled the darkness and fogs of scepticism, and made him yieldto the dominion of Common Sense. Nor did I ever hear him charged withdoing any thing, even in solitude, that argued such a degree of scepticismas his principles maintain. Surely if his friends apprehended this, theywould have the charity never to leave him alone.

Pyrrho the Elean, the father of this philosophy, seems to have carried itto greater perfection than any of his successors; for if we may believeAntigonus the Carystian, quoted by Diogenes Laertius, his life corre-sponded to his doctrine. And therefore, if a cart run against him, or a dogattacked him, or if he came upon a precipice, he would not stir a foot toavoid the danger, giving no credit to his senses. But his attendants, who,happily for him, were not so great sceptics, took care to keep him out ofharm’s way; so that he lived till he was ninety years of age. Nor is it to bedoubted, but this author’s friends would have been equally careful tokeep him from harm, if ever his principles had taken too strong a hold ofhim.

It is probable the Treatise of human nature was not written in company; yet it contains manifest indications, that the author every now

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and then relapsed into the faith of the vulgar, and could hardly, for halfa dozen pages, keep up the sceptical character.

In like manner, the great Pyrrho himself forgot his principles on someoccasions; and is said once to have been in such a passion with his cook,who probably had not roasted his dinner to his mind, that with the spitin his hand, and the meat upon it, he pursued him even into the market-place.

It is a bold philosophy that rejects, without ceremony, principleswhich irresistibly govern the belief and the conduct of all mankind in thecommon concerns of life; and to which the philosopher himself mustyield, after he imagines he hath confuted them. Such principles are older,and of more authority, than Philosophy: she rests upon them as herbasis, not they upon her. If she could overturn them, she must be buriedin their ruins; but all the engines of philosophical subtilty are too weakfor this purpose, and the attempt is no less ridiculous, than if a mechanicshould contrive an axis in peritrochio to remove the earth out of itsplace; or if a mathematician should pretend to demonstrate, that thingsequal to the same thing, are not equal to one another.

Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate the impossibility of motion;Hobbes, that there was no difference between right and wrong; and thisauthor, that no credit is to be given to our senses, to our memory, oreven to demonstration. Such philosophy is justly ridiculous, even tothose who cannot detect the fallacy of it. It can have no other tendency,than to shew the acuteness of the sophist, at the expense of disgracingreason and human nature, and making mankind Yahoos.

SECT. VI.

Of the Treatise of human nature.

There are other prejudices against this system of human nature,which, even upon a general view, may make one diffident of it.

Des Cartes, Hobbes, and this author, have each of them given us asystem of human nature; an undertaking too vast for any one man, howgreat soever his genius and abilities may be. There must surely be reasonto apprehend, that many parts of human nature never came under theirobservation; and that others have been stretched and distorted, to fill upblanks, and complete the system. Christopher Columbus, or SebastianCabot, might almost as reasonably have undertaken to give us a com-plete map of America.

There is a certain character and style in Nature’s works, which isnever attained in the most perfect imitation of them. This seems to be

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wanting in the systems of human nature I have mentioned, and particu-larly in the last. One may see a puppet make a variety of motions andgesticulations, which strike much at first view; but when it is accuratelyobserved, and taken to pieces, our admiration ceases; we comprehendthe whole art of the maker. How unlike is it to that which it represents!what a poor piece of work compared with the body of a man, whosestructure the more we know, the more wonders we discover in it, andthe more sensible we are of our ignorance! Is the mechanism of the mindso easily comprehended, when that of the body is so difficult? Yet bythis system, three laws of association, joined to a few original feelings,explain the whole mechanism of sense, imagination, memory, belief, andof all the actions and passions of the mind. Is this the man that Naturemade? I suspect it is not so easy to look behind the scenes in Nature’swork. This is a puppet surely, contrived by too bold an apprentice ofNature, to mimic her work. It shews tolerably by candle light, butbrought into clear day, and taken to pieces, it will appear to be a manmade with mortar and a trowel. The more we know of other parts ofnature, the more we like and approve them. The little I know of theplanetary system; of the earth which we inhabit; of minerals, vegetables,and animals; of my own body, and of the laws which obtain in theseparts of nature; opens to my mind grand and beautiful scenes, and con-tributes equally to my happiness and power. But when I look within,and consider the mind itself, which makes me capable of all theseprospects and enjoyments; if it is indeed what the Treatise of humannature makes it, I find I have been only in an inchanted castle, imposedupon by spectres and apparitions. I blush inwardly to think how I havebeen deluded; I am ashamed of my frame, and can hardly forbear expos-tulating with my destiny: Is this thy pastime, O Nature, to put suchtricks upon a silly creature, and then to take off the mask, and shew himhow he hath been befooled? If this is the philosophy of human nature,my soul enter thou not into her secrets. It is surely the forbidden tree ofknowledge; I no sooner taste of it, than I perceive myself naked, andstripped of all things, yea, even of my very self. I see myself, and thewhole frame of nature, shrink into fleeting ideas, which, like Epicurus’satoms, dance about in emptiness.

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SECT. VII.

The system of all these authors is the same and leads to scepticism.

But what if these profound disquisitions into the first principles ofhuman nature, do naturally and necessarily plunge a man into this abyssof scepticism? May we not reasonably judge so from what hath hap-pened? Des Cartes no sooner began to dig in this mine, than scepticismwas ready to break in upon him. He did what he could to shut it out.Malebranche and Locke, who dug deeper, found the difficulty of keep-ing out this enemy still to increase; but they laboured honestly in thedesign. Then Berkeley, who carried on the work, despairing of securingall, bethought himself of an expedient: By giving up the material world, which he thought might be spared without loss, and even withadvantage, he hoped, by an impregnable partition, to secure the worldof spirits. But, alas! the Treatise of human nature wantonly sapped thefoundation of this partition, and drowned all in one universal deluge.

These facts, which are undeniable, do indeed give reason to appre-hend, that Des Cartes’s system of the human understanding, which Ishall beg leave to call the ideal system, and which, with some improve-ments made by later writers, is now generally received, hath some origi-nal defect; that this scepticism is inlaid in it, and reared along with it;and, therefore, that we must lay it open to the foundation, and examinethe materials, before we can expect to raise any solid and useful fabricof knowledge on this subject.

SECT. VIII.

We ought not to despair of a better.

But is this to be despaired of, because Des Cartes and his followershave failed? by no means. This pusillanimity would be injurious to our-selves, and injurious to truth. Useful discoveries are sometimes indeedthe effect of superior genius, but more frequently they are the birth oftime and of accidents. A traveller of good judgment may mistake hisway, and be unawares led into a wrong track; and while the road is fairbefore him, he may go on without suspicion and be followed by others;but when it ends in a coal-pit, it requires no great judgment to knowthat he hath gone wrong, nor perhaps to find out what misled him.

In the mean time, the unprosperous state of this part of philosophyhath produced an effect, somewhat discouraging indeed to any attemptof this nature, but an effect which might be expected, and which time

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only and better success can remedy. Sensible men, who never will besceptics in matters of common life, are apt to treat with sovereign con-tempt every thing that hath been said, or is to be said, upon this subject.It is metaphysic, say they: Who minds it? Let scholastic sophisters intan-gle themselves in their own cobwebs: I am resolved to take my own exis-tence, and the existence of other things, upon trust; and to believe thatsnow is cold, and honey sweet, whatever they may say to the contrary.He must either be a fool, or want to make a fool of me, that would reason me out of my reason and senses.

I confess I know not what a sceptic can answer to this, nor by whatgood argument he can plead even for a hearing; for either his reasoningis sophistry, and so deserves contempt; or there is no truth in the humanfaculties, and then why should we reason?

If therefore a man find himself intangled in these metaphysical toils,and can find no other way to escape, let him bravely cut the knot whichhe cannot loose, curse metaphysic, and dissuade every man from med-dling with it. For if I have been led into bogs and quagmires by follow-ing an ignis fatuus, what can I do better, than to warn others to bewareof it? If Philosophy contradicts herself, befools her votaries, and deprivesthem of every object worthy to be pursued or enjoyed, let her be sentback to the infernal regions from which she must have had her original.

But is it absolutely certain that this fair lady is of the party? Is it notpossible she may have been misrepresented? Have not men of genius informer ages often made their own dreams to pass for her oracles? Oughtshe then to be condemned without any farther hearing? This would beunreasonable. I have found her in all other matters an agreeable com-panion, a faithful counsellor, a friend to Common Sense, and to the hap-piness of mankind. This justly entitles her to my correspondence andconfidence, till I find infallible proofs of her infidelity.

CHAPTER II.

OF SMELLING.

SECT. VI.

Apology for metaphysical absurdities. Sensation without a sentient, a consequence of the theory of ideas. Consequences of

this strange opinion.

Having considered the relation which the sensation of smelling bearsto the remembrance and imagination of it, I proceed to consider, what

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relation it bears to a mind, or sentient principle. It is certain, no man canconceive or believe smelling to exist of itself, without a mind, or some-thing that has the power of smelling, of which it is called a sensation, anoperation, or feeling. Yet if any man should demand a proof, that sensa-tion cannot be without a mind or sentient being, I confess that I can givenone; and that to pretend to prove it, seems to me almost as absurd asto deny it.

This might have been said without any apology before the Treatise ofhuman nature appeared in the world. For till that time, no man, as faras I know, ever thought either of calling in question that principle, or ofgiving a reason for his belief of it. Whether thinking beings were of anethereal or igneous nature, whether material or immaterial, was various-ly disputed; but that thinking is an operation of some kind of being orother, was always taken for granted, as a principle that could not possi-bly admit of doubt.

However, since the author above mentioned, who is undoubtedly oneof the most acute metaphysicians that this or any age hath produced,hath treated it as a vulgar prejudice, and maintained, that the mind isonly a succession of ideas and impressions without any subject; his opin-ion, however contrary to the common apprehensions of mankind,deserves respect. I beg therefore, once for all, that no offence may betaken at charging this or other metaphysical notions with absurdity, orwith being contrary to the common sense of mankind. No disparage-ment is meant to the understandings of the authors or maintainers ofsuch opinions. Indeed, they commonly proceed not from defect ofunderstanding, but from an excess of refinement: the reasoning thatleads to them, often gives new light to the subject, and shows real geniusand deep penetration in the author, and the premises do more thanatone for the conclusion.

If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitu-tion of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessi-ty to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without beingable to give a reason for them; these are what we call the principles ofcommon sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we callabsurd.

Indeed, if it is true, and to be received as a principle of philosophy,That sensation and thought may be without a thinking being; it must beacknowledged to be the most wonderful discovery that this or any otherage hath produced. The received doctrine of ideas is the principle fromwhich it is deduced, and of which indeed it seems to be a just and natur-al consequence. And it is probable, that it would not have been so late adiscovery, but that it is so shocking and repugnant to the commonapprehensions of mankind, that it required an uncommon degree of

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philosophical intrepidity to usher it into the world. It is a fundamentalprinciple of the ideal system, That every object of thought must be animpression, or an idea, that is, a faint copy of some preceding impres-sion. This is a principle so commonly received, that the author abovementioned, although his whole system is built upon it, never offers theleast proof of it. It is upon this principle, as a fixed point, that he erectshis metaphysical engines, to overturn heaven and earth, body and spirit.And indeed, in my apprehension, it is altogether sufficient for the pur-pose. For if impressions and ideas are the only objects of thought, thenheaven and earth, and body and spirit, and every thing you please, mustsignify only impressions and ideas, or they must be words without anymeaning. It seems, therefore, that this notion, however strange, is closelyconnected with the received doctrine of ideas, and we must either admitthe conclusion, or call in question the premises.

Ideas seem to have something in their nature unfriendly to other exis-tences. They were first introduced into philosophy, in the humble char-acter of images or representatives of things; and in this character theyseemed not only to be inoffensive, but to serve admirably well forexplaining the operations of the human understanding. But since menbegan to reason clearly and distinctly about them, they have by degreessupplanted their constituents, and undermined the existence of everything but themselves. First, they discarded all secondary qualities of bodies; and it was found out by their means, that fire is not hot, norsnow cold, nor honey sweet; and, in a word, that heat and cold, sound,colour, taste, and smell, are nothing but ideas or impressions. BishopBerkeley advanced them a step higher, and found out, by just reasoning,from the same principles, that extension, solidity, space, figure, andbody, are ideas, and that there is nothing in nature but ideas and spirits.But the triumph of ideas was completed by the Treatise of humannature, which discards spirits also, and leaves ideas and impressions asthe sole existences in the universe. What if at last, having nothing else tocontend with, they should fall foul of one another, and leave no exis-tence in nature at all? This would surely bring philosophy into danger;for what should we have left to talk or to dispute about?

However, hitherto these philosophers acknowledge the existence ofimpressions and ideas; they acknowledge certain laws of attraction, orrules of precedence, according to which ideas and impressions rangethemselves in various forms, and succeed one another: but that theyshould belong to a mind, as its proper goods and chattels, this they havefound to be a vulgar error. These ideas are as free and independent asthe birds of the air, or as Epicurus’s atoms when they pursued their jour-ney in the vast inane. Shall we conceive them like the films of things inthe Epicurean system?

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Principio hoc dico, rerum simulacra vagari,Multa modis multis, in cunctas undique parteisTenuia quæ facile inter se jungunter in auris,Obvia cum veniunt. Lucr.

Or do they rather resemble Aristotle’s intelligible species after they areshot forth from the object, and before they have yet struck upon the pas-sive intellect? But why should we seek to compare them with any thing,since there is nothing in nature but themselves? They make the wholefurniture of the universe; starting into existence, or out of it, withoutany cause; combining into parcels, which the vulgar call minds? and suc-ceeding one another by fixed laws, without time, place, or author ofthose laws.

Yet, after all, these self-existent and independent ideas look pitifullynaked and destitute, when left thus alone in the universe, and seem,upon the whole, to be in a worse condition than they were before. DesCartes, Malebranche, and Locke, as they made much use of ideas, treat-ed them handsomely, and provided them in decent accommodation;lodging them either in the pineal gland, or in the pure intellect, or evenin the divine mind. They moreover clothed them with a commission, andmade them representatives of things, which gave them some dignity andcharacter. But the Treatise of human nature, though no less indebted tothem, seems to have made but a bad return, by bestowing upon themthis independent existence; since thereby they are turned out of houseand home, and set adrift in the world, without friend or connection,without a rag to cover their nakedness; and who knows but the wholesystem of ideas may perish by the indiscreet zeal of their friends to exaltthem?

However this may be, it is certainly a most amazing discovery thatthought and ideas may be without any thinking being. A discovery bigwith consequences which cannot easily be traced by those deluded mor-tals who think and reason in the common track. We were always apt toimagine, that thought supposed a thinker, and love a lover, and treasona traitor: but this, it seems, was all a mistake; and it is found out, thatthere may be treason without a traitor, and love without a lover, lawswithout a legislator, and punishment without a sufferer, successionwithout time, and motion without any thing moved, or space in which itmay move: or if, in these cases, ideas are the lover, the sufferer, the traitor, it were to be wished that the author of this discovery had farthercondescended to acquaint us, whether ideas can converse together, andbe under obligations of duty or gratitude to each other; whether theycan make promises, and enter into leagues and covenants, and fulfil orbreak them, and be punished for the breach? If one set of ideas makes a

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covenant, another breaks it, and a third is punished for it, there is reason to think that justice is no natural virtue in this system.

It seemed very natural to think, that the Treatise of human naturerequired an author, and a very ingenious one too; but now we learn,that it is only a set of ideas which came together, and arranged them-selves by certain associations and attractions.

After all, this curious system appears not to be fitted to the presentstate of human nature. How far it may suit some choice spirits, who arerefined from the dregs of common sense, I cannot say. It is acknowl-edged, I think, that even these can enter into this system only in theirmost speculative hours, when they soar so high in pursuit of those self-existent ideas, as to lose sight of all other things. But when they conde-scend to mingle again with the human race, and to converse with afriend, a companion, or a fellow citizen, the ideal system vanishes; com-mon sense, like an irresistible torrent, carries them along; and, in spite ofall their reasoning and philosophy, they believe their own existence, andthe existence of other things.

Indeed, it is happy they do so; for if they should carry their closetbelief into the world, the rest of mankind would consider them as dis-eased, and send them to an infirmary. Therefore, as Plato required cer-tain previous qualifications of those who entered his school, I think itwould be prudent for the doctors of this ideal philosophy to do thesame, and to refuse admittance to every man who is so weak, as toimagine that he ought to have the same belief in solitude and in compa-ny, or that his principles ought to have any influence upon his practice:for this philosophy is like a hobby-horse, which a man in bad healthmay ride in his closet, without hurting his reputation; but if he shouldtake him abroad with him to church, or to the exchange, or to the play-house, his heir would immediately call a jury, and seize his estate.

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[Chapter title] 169

1 Transcription and introductory comments by M. A. Stewart appear in “CommonSense and Rational Religion,” Papers for Thomas Reid, J. Houston, ed.,(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 2000).

14THOMAS REID

Thomas Reid, manuscript of “Mr Humes notion of Causes,” AUL,MS.2131/6/III/3, fols. 1r–1v (c. 1764).Manuscript transcription by M.A. Stewart.1

This is an isolated and undated leaf among the manuscripts in Reid’shand held in Aberdeen University Archives. The heading shows,

first, that Reid planned to contest features of Hume’s critique of thefoundations of both natural and revealed religion; second, that he wasfinding his targets in Hume’s first Enquiry. While, therefore, it probablypostdates work for Reid’s own Inquiry, which was targeted entirely atHume’s Treatise, it nevertheless relates to Reid’s Logic lectures atAberdeen in the early 1760s. A derivative transcript of a previous stu-dent’s transcript of those lectures is held by Edinburgh UniversityLibrary. While not textually authoritative, it confirms that Reid dis-cussed testimony with regard to the character of historical persons injust this context. The Commonsense defence of testimony presented herewas originally evolved in opposition to Hume’s account in the Treatiseof the origin of belief.

Mr Humes notion of Causes, his Reasons why we cannot reason about aCause of the Universe, AnsweredHis Objections against the Evidence of Testimony when brought infavour of Miracles.

Let a Man consider the Actions & Conduct of the King of Prussia aMan of Common Sense without the least Hesitation will pronounce hima Prince of very Extraordinary Skill in the Arts of War & Peace ofIndefatigable Industry and of a Heroic Resolution & Magnanimity Onethat presently hears of his Conduct or hereafter reads his History with-out prejudice or even with any Ordinary Degree of Prejudice can no

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more doubt of this Character being due to him than he can doubt of aProposition in Euclid Indeed the Evidence of the one and the other is ofa very Different Nature but Humane Nature is equally satisfied withboth and rests upon them with Equal Security.

But now a Profound Philosopher like D. Hume comes to consider theCharacter of this Prince in a Philosophic Light. He tells us that Commonsense is a very fallacious Guide. That the common Sense leads us tobelieve the Testimony of our Senses and Memory. Philosophy showsthat we have no Reason to do so. That Sense Memory and Imaginationare all one and the Same Thing in different degrees. And that if we con-sider things Philosophically we shall see that for all the King of Prussia’sfine Exploits, It is as likely that he is a Poultron a Sot and a Blockheadas that he deserves the great Character we give him. Well Let us hearhow Mr Hume or one of his Principles would prove this. Why the Proofhe has favoured us with against the Being of a God is perfectly applica-ble to the present Case

All our Reasoning from Effects to Causes Says he are built onExperience & previous to Experience we should never guess but thatany thing might begin to be without a Cause therefore our Reasoning ofthis Kind can go no farther than our Experience. Now we who nevergoverned Kingdoms nor fought battles never hold any Experience toshew that great Actions must proceed from a great Mind or that thePreservation and Provision and Discipline of an Army depends upon theWisdom of the General. That their Success in Battle depends upon hisSkill and Conduct.

It is true we have always been accustomed to reason in this Way, andto conclude that a train of good Conduct and Success shews Capacityand Skill in a Commander but all this must be false Reasoning unless, inExperience we had actually in a continued Course of Experience seenthe Cause that goes before and the Effect following it in ConstantConjunction. But it is impossible that we can have this Experience forwe can see mens Actions but we cannot see their Minds we have there-fore reasoned all along fallaciously in Matters of this Kind and foolishlyconcluded that Alexander and Hannibal Scipio & Pompey & Cesarwere great men & possesed of extraordinary endowments of Mind wehave not the least Reason to conclude that they exceeded the meanest ofMankind in Sense or Courage or Capacity. Nor can we have Reason tojudge of any mans Character from his Conduct. – The same Principlefrom which we argue in concluding the Character of Men from theirConduct is that from which we conclude the Being and Perfections ofGod from his Works. Experience may shew us the Connexion betwixtour own Character and our Actions but can never shew us anyConnexion betwixt the Character of another Man and his Actions. Yet

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we reason from the Actions of Men to their Characters. And ifPhilosophy discredits this reasoning it must at the same time render usincapable of distinguishing a friend from an enemy a good from a badMan a wise man from an Ideot.

The best test of Philosophical Tenets which contradict common Senseis to apply them to the common Conduct of Life if it would be ridicu-lous folly to act upon them we may be sure the Principles are foolish &ridiculous which lead to such conduct.

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2 Monthly Review, July 1766, Vol. 35, pp. 7–10; Critical Review, 1766, Vol. 21, pp. 346–350.

15JOSEPH HIGHMORE

[Joseph Highmore], Essays, moral, religious, and miscellaneous. Towhich is added, a prose translation of Mr. Browne’s Latin poem, Deanimi immortalitate. London, B. White, 1766, 2 Vol.Complete essay; from Volume 2 (pp. 40–43) of the 1766 and only edition.

Joseph Highmore (1692–1780) was a painter and author of essays on avariety of literary and religious topics, many of which appeared in the

Gentleman’s Magazine. The Essays, Moral, Religious, and Miscel-laneous is a compilation of essays written at different periods of his life inhis leisure time. Volume two contains a brief essay, “On Mr. Hume’sIdea of Liberty and Necessity,” which attacks Hume’s claim that actionsare determined despite the fact that we have a feeling of liberty.Highmore argues that God would be deceiving us if he gave us a feelingof freedom while our actions were in fact determined. Hence, if actionsare truly determined, as Hume supposes, then we cannot feel free as wein fact do. Highmore then argues that we would lack feelings of remorse– or self-blame – if we did not feel free. Since we feel remorse and feelfree, it follows that our actions are not determined. In his review ofHighmore’s Essays in the Monthly Review, John Langhorne states thatthe author is “a man of sense and observation, though he is too muchattached to the hackneyed formality of argument, and is too destitute ofspirit and imagination to please.” The Critical Review stated that“Though these essays are not distinguished by any refinement of thought,or beauty of expression, they are by no means destitute of merit.”2

On MR. HUME’S IDEA OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

This author, in his third essay (printed at Edinburgh, 1751) beginningat p. 151, maintains absolute uncontroulable necessity, in the moral aswell as the natural world; but at the same time, allows an universal feel-

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ing of liberty, and free agency in man; and asserts, “that philosopherswho have discovered the truth of this (as well as the vulgar who havenot) act constantly upon this feeling of liberty, &c. though they are con-vinced, that it is delusive and deceitful.” He seems very acute, and a fairingenuous writer, not evading any plausible objections to either part ofhis system, though perhaps he will not generally be thought to haveanswered them satisfactorily. And, indeed, it does seem impossible toreconcile truth and falshood in the same mind, perceiving both; it isutterly inconsistent and unaccountable, that a man should blame him-self, and feel remorse, for having done what he is sure, he could no morehave avoided doing, than he could prevent the beating of his pulse in afever. Surely, he must, in these instances (which occasion his remorse),either believe himself free, or at least doubt of his being necessary, other-wise he could only feel grief or sorrow, in which the idea of self-blame isnot included, as it is in remorse. Unless he will assert, that the vulgaronly feel remorse, but that he, and his philosophers, never do. Besides,on his scheme, virtue appears founded on fallacy, and truth and goodseem incompatible; as if the Deity was reduced to the expedient ofdeceit, in order to establish morality among mankind. For if it be reallytrue, that we are absolutely necessary in all our actions, why should Godimplant or impose this universal feeling of freedom, but that it is pre-sumed, we should not otherwise think ourselves accountable?

Surely either man is free, feels and knows himself to be so, and thencearises remorse or self-blame, on his having acted against his judgmentand conscience; – Or, he is absolutely necessary, finds and knows him-self to be so; and therefore, cannot consistently blame himself, or sufferremorse, for any past action; – Or, lastly, it is matter of doubt with him,whether he is free or not; in which state of mind, he cannot be whollywithout anxiety, nor perhaps without some kind or degree of remorse.And one of these three must be the case of every man.

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16JAMES OSWALD

[James Oswald], An appeal to common sense in behalf of religion.Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1766, viii, 390 p.2.3 complete, and selections from 3.2; from 1766 edition.

James Oswald (1703–1793) was a Scottish minister and active partici-pant in Church controversies. Of his various writings, which include

sermons and discussions of Church politics, he is best remembered for hisAppeal to Common Sense, a work first published in two separate vol-umes in 1766 and 1772. The clear aim of the Appeal is to establish com-mon sense as the authority by which we perceive the primary truths ofmetaphysics, morality, and religion. Oswald believed that modernphilosophers had neglected common sense and wrongly attempted todeduce primary truths from sense experience or reasoning. In addition toHume, the principal philosophers that Oswald criticises are Descartes,Locke, Berkeley, Bolingbroke, and Kames. Hume he criticises in passingthroughout the Appeal, but he presents sustained criticisms of him in twosections.

In 2.3 Oswald lists a series of sceptical philosophical views held byHume and other philosophers, and argues that “common sense looksdown with disdain on such glaring absurdities.” In response to Hume’sclaim that cause and effect relations are grounded only in a habit ofthinking, Oswald contends that we might expect an uneducated peasantto limit causal explanations to his own experience. A peasant, for exam-ple, might say of a river that from “time immemorial it has beenobserved to run as it does.” However, according to Oswald, no one ofgood sense would hold this view. In 3.2 Oswald contends that Hume fol-lowed the “methods of investigation authorised by [traditional] philoso-phy” and drew the inevitable sceptical conclusion that we cannot discov-er causal power in external things. Hume’s mistake, Oswald argues, wasin failing to see the limits of traditional philosophy and the nonsense towhich it leads. Hume should have “supplied the defect in philosophyfrom the authority of common sense.” More specifically, Hume shouldhave recognized “the idea of that self-determining power” by which weall act. For Oswald, this notion of wilful power points to a “fixed princi-ple” of causality that we find in all physical causal relations.

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1 Critical Review, Vol. 23, pp. 100–112. The reviews of Oswald’s Appeal and other18th-century responses to that work are included in Early Responses to Reid,Oswald, Beattie and Stewart, ed. James Fieser, Volumes 3 and 4 of Scottish CommonSense Philosophy (forthcoming Bristol: Thoemmes, 2000).

2 Both volumes of Oswald Appeal are newly published in Volume 1 of the collectionScottish Common Sense Philosophy, ed. James Fieser.

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Oswald’s Appeal was favourably reviewed in the two scholarly journalsof the time. William Rose in the Monthly Review comments,

As to the merit of the work, we shall only say, that it contains manypertinent and judicious remarks in regard to the conduct of modernphilosophers and divines, which all who are conversant with moral andreligious subjects will read with pleasure; and that many of the author’sobservations upon the faculties and operations of the human mind areworthy of particular attention. [Monthly Review, February 1767, Vol.36, pp. 115–129]

The Critical Review concluded, “As we have the highest opinion of hisjudgment and ability, we heartily wish to see his design completed.”1 In1768 a second edition of the Appeal was published with Oswald’s nameon the title page. In 1772 the second volume appeared.2 This containsonly passing references to Hume. The following selections are from the1766 edition of the first volume of the Appeal.

BOOK II.

By setting aside the authority of common sense, modern philosophy givesoccasion to universal scepticism.

CHAP. III.

In consequence of the modern hypothesis, writers of distinguished charac-ter have run into the utmost licentiousness of reasoning, in contradic-tion to evident and important truths.

Doctor Berkeley, late Bishop of Cloyne, hath, with plausibility enough,demonstrated, that this system of matter which we inhabit, is a mere non-entity; that those houses, fields, rivers, trees, which we seem to see, andthose very bodies we are supposed to animate, have no existence, or noother than an ideal existence.

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3 [i.e., Henry Home, Lord Kames, whose Essays appeared anonymously.]

Mr Hume hath, with great power of argumentation and eloquence,proved, that we cannot, by reasoning, reach the connection betweencause and effect; and from hence concludes, dogmatically, that we haveno evidence at all of any such connection. The author of the Essaysupon the principles of morality and natural religion, publishedEdinburgh 1751,3 affirms, that the being and perfections of God are notcapable of proof from reason, or not of such proof as gives permanentconviction. The two last mentioned authors, with several others of dis-tinguished ability, have offered a chain of strict reasoning, in proof thatman hath, in no case, a power of self-determination; but is, in all hisactions, determined by what they call a moral necessity, which theyaffirm to be as real a necessity as any other. Lord Bolingbroke hathemployed the whole force of his faculties to satisfy the world, that thoseideas of the immateriality and immortality of the soul, of a future retri-bution, of the moral government, and of the moral perfections of God,entertained by divines and philosophers in ancient and modern times,are without all foundation in nature.

These are terrible doings; and were it not for the authority of commonsense, such as would go near to introduce an universal scepticism. Butcommon sense looks down with disdain on such glaring absurdities.Mere scholars, and those who found their faith on logical deductions,may well be alarmed with such bold paradoxes, supported as they areby writers of so great eminence. But all who trust to common sense, mayrest assured, that the great truths of natural philosophy, theology, andethics, will maintain their ground against all the attacks of the most sub-tile reasoning. These doctrines do hurt to raw minds and superficialthinkers, but can give no disturbance to men of sound understandingand solid judgment; for indeed they have no influence, or but little influ-ence, on those who adopt them.

It is probable, that the design of disproving the reality of matter, wasfirst entertained by the Bishop of Cloyne, in the gayety of his heart, andwith a view to burlesque the refinements of infidels. But the good Bishopwas caught in his own trap; and, like the infidels themselves, became thedupe of his own subtilty. Nevertheless, it is well known, that this excel-lent person was tenderly concerned for the temporal as well as the spiri-tual interests of his fellow-citizens, and no less zealous for promotingagriculture and manufactures in the kingdom of Ireland, than if he hadbelieved that corn, cattle, and linen, were realities. The bold and pene-trating genius of Mr Hume was exactly fitted to discover and expose theprevailing folly of the learned, in going about to prove by argument the

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4 That this author firmly believes the great truths of religion, and is warmly attachedto them, is not only known to those who are honoured with his friendship, but suffi-ciently manifest to all from his laudable behaviour in the high station which he fills.

primary truths of nature; and agreeably to that liberty which he takes onall subjects, he might also maintain, in the face of the world, that wehave no evidence at all for those truths. But Mr Hume at bottombelieves in the powers of nature; the power of fire, for instance, toscorch, and of water to suffocate living creatures, so far at least as not toventure too near those dangerous elements. The author of the MoralEssays professes his belief in the Deity and the divine perfections: nor isthere any ground to doubt his sincerity4; for his feelings, whatever hemeans by them, may be allowed to produce an effect in his mind equalto what is produced in the minds of others by a multiplicity of argu-ments. The advocates for necessity have, in spite of their hypothesis, thesame consciousness of good and evil desert, and do condemn or excusethemselves in much the same manner, as they would have done if theyhad believed themselves to be free agents. Lord Bolingbroke might haveavailed himself of his scepticism a little in the heat of youth, and in per-fect health; but we are told of his being driven from life with as littlecomposure and self-command, as the meanest sinner, who entertains thebelief of a place of darkness, where there is weeping and wailing andgnashing of teeth. It is in good earnest surprising, that men, otherwise ofso great discernment, should appear so insensible to the absurdity oftheir conduct. Such sort of speculations might pass as a pretty enoughplay of fancy in a circle of virtuosi; but to offer them with a serious airto the world, was too much. A philosopher ought, no doubt, to beabove vulgar prejudices; but he cannot, with safety to his own character,set himself above the common sense of mankind. His business is not toconfound the ignorant and the unthinking with paradoxical opinions,but to pursue his inquiries, until he arrive at an account of things inwhich men of judgment can rest.

To resolve, as Mr Hume has done, our belief of the connectionbetween cause and effect, and of course the conviction we have of all thepowers of nature, into custom, or habit of thinking, is extremelyunphilosophical. He ought to have known, that the world could not restin this account of things; that every one has a right to put some ques-tions about the origin, the cause, or the occasion of a way of thinking soprevalent, on a subject of so great consequence; and that no one wouldthink himself well used by a philosopher, who gave so lame and unsatis-fying an answer to queries so reasonable and just. Should a traveller,through curiosity, or with a view to some useful discovery, inquire of apeasant the source of the river that runs by his dwelling, he might from

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him put up with this simple answer, That he did not know it: But shouldhe put the same question to a man of education, and one too who hadtraversed those grounds, and be told, that he neither knew the source ofthe stream, nor whether it had any source at all; and that all the infor-mation that could be given of its origin is, that time immemorial it hasbeen observed to run as it does: such an answer from one of this charac-ter would be considered as unmannerly, if not a downright insult.

The author of the Essays blames the boldness of his learned friend; butbeing as much convinced as he of the impossibility of proving the realityof power by a medium, he resolves the universal belief of it into a feelingof truth, which he says belongs to the human mind. If by internal feelingthis author meant the simple judgment of reason, or common sense, weshould think ourselves bound to agree with him; but as there is groundto suspect, that by internal feeling he means something different, and insome instances seems to set his feelings in opposition to reason, we thinkourselves bound to differ from this ingenious author, as we do from hislearned friend.

To shew the unhappy effects of a false hypothesis on the minds, evenof those of good intention and distinguished ability, it is fit to observe,that the author of the Essays hath this strange assertion, p. 296. “It maybe possible; for any reason we have to the contrary, that a blind andundesigning cause may be productive of excellent effects:” such effectshe means as a fine piece of painting, a well-written poem, or a beautifulpiece of architecture. It is plain he had no idea of the authority of reasonitself, otherwise he could not have run into so gross an absurdity; for hemust have found, that instead of not having any reason, as he alledges,we have all the reason in the world against his supposition, and that allsuch suppositions are a flat contradiction to all rational conception, orto the common sense of mankind.

BOOK III.

To banish scepticism, and establish the belief of primary truths, it isnecessary to depart from the modern hypothesis, and to have recourse tothe authority of common sense.

CHAP. II.

Late writers of genius and industry have failed in their attempts toaccount for the natural sentiments of mankind, through a shiness toquit the modern hypothesis in favour of common sense.

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The opprobrious epithet of bigot has been so long appropriated to thereligious, that scarce will the use of language allow of an application ofit to others: though the narrowness of thought, and slavish submissionto authority, which constitute the character, are commonly found in allclasses of men, in the active as well as the speculative part of mankind,and in those who start aside from the common track, as well as in otherswho hold on in their course with quietness and uniformity. A horse ofhigh mettle, unbroken to the yoke, will leap and bounce, and alarm andterrify all about him with the irregularity and violence of his motions;but not being able to disengage himself altogether, is incapable of mov-ing with that ease and dignity which is natural to so noble an animal.Human creatures, in like manner, galled with the yoke of servitude, willmutiny, form cabals, raise dreadful commotions: but, if they are inca-pable of shaking off the yoke, cannot reduce themselves to that harmo-nious and beautiful order which belongs to well-regulated society. Justso, men of genius often make violent sallies, to the amazement and dis-quiet of the learned, without being able to reach the truth, through anunperceived attachment to some philosophical hypothesis, which checkstheir motions, and renders them extravagantly irregular.

One cannot read the philosophical works of Lord ViscountBolingbroke without sensible regret; because in them he sees those noblepowers designed by nature for discovering and enforcing truth, confinedin their exercise to the mean task of laying open the defects and fallaciesof a philosophical hypothesis; to which, however, his Lordship wasdevoted, within which he moves, and beyond the limits of which he doesnot adventure to make one step. By the impetuous force of his elo-quence, he seems to shake the foundations of philosophy, and, with anunrelenting hand, to level with the ground the venerable structures ofancient and modern times, without having it in his power to substitutein their place any hypothesis of his own that could give satisfaction tomen of sense. It is probable, that succeeding writers will retaliate uponhim the abuse he has thrown out on names the most respectable andvenerable; and posterity will see, that, amidst the wreck of characters, inwhich he delights, he has made shipwreck of his own reputation.

The spirit and course of this Noble writer is admirably set forth inthese lines of Mr Pope:

Or, meteor-like, flames lawless through the void, Destroying others, by himself destroy’d.

Any one the least acquainted with Mr Hume’s writings, will perceive agenius fitted for making discoveries; and few will doubt his havingcourage to quit the common track of philosophy in pursuit of truth: Yet

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Mr Hume hath not pushed his inquiries their due length, nor made thosediscoveries which might be expected from his penetration and spirit.

In his Philosophical Essays concerning human understanding, he givesa just and clear view of two kinds of philosophy, with the advantagesresulting from each; and, as a friend of truth, expresses his concern thatthe principles on which the one is founded, are not so well ascertainedas the principles of other sciences. He proposes the ascertaining of thoseprinciples as an attempt worthy of inquisitive minds; but seems rather towish than hope their success. He attempts the investigation of the con-nection between cause and effect, but with a visible timidity. He demon-strates the impossibility of discovering that connection a priori; and putsin a clear light the absurdity of proving the reality of that connection byreasoning: and after some fruitless attempts to give satisfaction to hisreader, or even to himself, he declares, that the truth in question cannotbe discovered, because it is neither an object of intuition, nor deducibleby reasoning from any known principle. But is this method of proceed-ing becoming Mr Hume? Does he entertain the same opinion of philo-sophic systems, which devotees of different churches have of their creedsand confessions? Must every deviation from the established system beaccounted heterodox? Is the philosophy in being absolutely perfect, andincapable of receiving any addition to its perfection by any new discov-ery? Has not Mr Hume the courage to venture one step beyond thatmagic circle drawn by Aristotle, by Mr Locke, and authorised by hispredecessors in philosophy? It is true, that the connection between causeand effect is not an object of intuition, taking intuition in the sense inwhich it is commonly understood in the schools: it is also true, and hehimself has demonstrated invincibly, that it is incapable of proof by rea-soning; and it is well known, that philosophers allow of no othermethod of investigation, besides what they call intuition, and the exer-cise of the discursive faculty in reasoning. Are we therefore to conclude,that there is no other possible method of coming at the knowledge of thetruth in question? And shall we indeed indulge a scepticism concerning atruth of such consequence, of which we are at the bottom of our mindsfully convinced, and about which it is impossible for us to entertain aserious doubt?

Mr Hume found himself incapable of discovering, with certainty, thatfire hath a power to consume combustibles, by those methods of investi-gation authorised by philosophy. But had he appealed to himself as aman of sense and judgment, he would have affirmed, upon the fullauthority of reason, that fire has undoubtedly this power. He could notindeed destroy his scepticism concerning this important truth by thosemethods of reasoning practised in the schools: but had he stopped amoment, and asked himself, whether doubting of the powers of nature,

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the power in fire to scorch, and in water to suffocate animals; the powerof elasticity in bodies that are elastic, and of self-determination in livingcreatures; – had he asked himself, whether doubting of the reality ofthese, and innumerable such like powers in nature, was not downrightnonsense? he would have found himself obliged to answer in the affirmative. Mr Hume then, by this method of inquiry, would have discovered, to his entire satisfaction, that the truth in question had, inde-pendent of reasoning, the full authority of reason or good sense; andthat the opposite error fell under the censure of nonsense; and thattherefore, by all the regard he owed to common sense, he was bound toadmit the truth, and to dismiss, with just contempt, the opposite suppo-sition. As a philosopher he might hesitate; but as a man of sense he mustbelieve: and which of the two ought to yield to the other, let any onejudge. Or, waving invidious comparisons and idle disputations on thissubject, Mr Hume might, and ought to have supplied the defect in phi-losophy from the authority of common sense.

Mr Hume’s observations on the connection of ideas are just; and allhe says on the particular connections he mentions, is worthy of atten-tion; but not to the present purpose. The question is not, Whether weactually believe the connection between cause and effect? for of thatthere can be no doubt; but, What reason we have to believe it? Throughcustom, and habitual association of ideas, we fall into many absurdways of thinking, and also of believing, in contradiction to the plainestevidence. This is the common source of bigotry of all kinds, the mostfrivolous, irrational, and pernicious. It is the business of reasonable men,to prevent and correct such ways of thinking and belief; and it is incum-bent on philosophers to assist them in so doing. By resolving the beliefof a truth so fundamental as is the connection between cause and effect,into habitual association of ideas, Mr Hume hath given countenance tothe dogmatism of bigots; which he ought not, and, we presume, he didnot intend, to give.

Never did school-divine perplex and puzzle himself more, or go far-ther from the standard of common sense, in defining the true faith, thanMr Hume has done in his account of the simple act of belief. Heemploys the whole force of his genius in avoiding all regard to truth, oreven probability; and seems to forget that he is describing the act of arational mind: and so, after a long apparatus of subtile reasoning,resolves the whole into vivid perception; which is often an adjunct, butwill never be allowed to constitute the essence of belief. Every oneknows that he hath, or may have, a vivid, lively, forcible, firm, andsteady, conception, of an object which he knows to be no reality, andwhich therefore he ought not, and cannot in consistency with reason,believe to be such. Every one is aware of the distinction between creduli-

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ty and rational belief, and of his obligation to guard against the one, inorder to a due exercise of the other. Truth, and nothing but truth, eithercertain or probable, can be the object of rational belief. When menbelieve at random, through the influence of prejudice, or habitual associ-ation of ideas, they may indeed have a vivid perception of the object oftheir belief, but cannot be said to act a rational part. The distinctionbetween credulity and rational belief is real and important, and oughtnot to be sacrificed to any new hypothesis.

These paradoxical opinions and reasonings are commonly imputed totoo great, but are indeed owing to too little, freedom of thought. MrHume either ought not to have departed so boldly from the commonway of thinking, or he ought to have had the courage to have madeanother bold step, by venturing beyond the limits prescribed by philoso-phers. He did well in pointing out the prevailing absurdity of resolvingour belief of primary truths into the force of reasoning: but he wouldhave done still better if he had resolved it into the authority of commonsense.

Mr Hume, throughout this inquiry, has overlooked that which bestdeserved his attention; the idea, to wit, of a fixed power or permanentprinciple of action, which we unavoidably get by attending to the opera-tion of causes in producing their effects. It is impossible for one who isnot an idiot, (for with regard to them, and inferior animals, the case isotherwise, as has been shewn above), to observe an elastic body act itspart again and again, without conceiving that power in nature calledelasticity, as the cause or fixed principle of action. It is impossible, inlike manner, to observe inferior animals move hither and thither by thedirection of their appetites, affections, and inclinations, without conceiv-ing the idea of that self-determining power by which they act. It is noless impossible to give attention to a course of action, wise or foolish,virtuous or vicious, in human creatures, without coming to the knowl-edge and belief of a fixed disposition, which we consider as the cause orprinciple of action. If any one hath attended to such operations withoutarriving at the knowledge and belief of such principles of action, we donot blame the dulness or slowness of his apprehension, but, withoutscruple, pronounce him a fool.

Though the prevailing disposition of the human mind cannot be per-ceived with the same quickness and certainty with which we perceiveelasticity in bodies that are elastic, yet if any one admits an uniformcourse of action in a human creature, and denies, at the same time, ordoubts of the fixed disposition which is the cause of the action, we pro-nounce him a fool. If one has again and again played the knave, I do notsay how often, but if with uniformity he has deceived and disappointedyou in a transaction where interest is concerned, you will be thought a

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fool to doubt of his being a knave; that is, to doubt his having a fixeddisposition to deceive and disappoint you in some subsequent transac-tions. If a man has done you repeated acts of friendship, or disinterestedgenerosity, it will not be in your power to doubt his having a friendlyand generous heart. Whatever difficulties philosophers may find in thesetruths, all men of sense admit them with the same ease, and with thesame certainty, with which they admit what they see with their eyes,hear with their ears, or feel by their hands.

This law of nature, then, or fixed principle, we immediately perceive isthat which connects the cause with the effect; and our perception andcertain knowledge of this principle is the true foundation of theundoubted belief we have of that connection. We believe that a spring ofsteel will recover its straightness whenever the external force whichbended it is taken off; not merely because we have seen it do so againand again, but because we are persuaded of its being possessed of apower called elasticity, which is the cause of the action. We believe aman to be a knave or generous, not on account of his having done somany generous or knavish actions, but because we know him to be pos-sessed of that disposition which constitutes the character. If, uponstricter inquiry, we find that the knavish or generous actions flowed notfrom any fixed disposition, but some foreign impulse, we change ourmind, and give the person a different character, and entertain differentexpectations from him. In like manner, if the body which seemed to actfrom elasticity is found to have been impelled by some foreign power,we no longer pronounce it elastic; nor can we any longer expect from itthe effects of elasticity. But it is impossible for us to admit the causewithout having an expectation of its natural effect; that is, we cannot, inany consistency with common sense, believe a man to be a knave with-out expecting that he will do knavish actions; or to be friendly or gener-ous, without expecting that he will do friendly and generous actions.Nor can we believe a body to be possessed of the power of elasticity, ofattraction, of electricity, without expecting that it will produce theeffects belonging to these principles, providing there is an opportunitygiven for their exertion, and no superior law of nature obstructs theirexercise. Our expectation of effects is inviolably connected with thebelief of the cause, or principle of action. Take away the one, the otherceases of course: but while the principle continues, the expectation ofthe effects must also continue. It is impossible to admit the one withoutadmitting the other.

Mr Hume, in conformity to the opinion of Aristotle, and his adher-ents, confines demonstrative evidence to the relations of ideas; andallows no more than probable evidence to the primary truths of theolo-gy, ethics, and even of physics; because, say they, there is no impossibili-

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ty of conceiving an idea opposite to the latter, as there is in conceivingthe opposite of the former truths. We willingly allow a differencebetween mathematical and other evidence, but not such as is commonlybelieved. It is indeed absolutely impossible to conceive that two andthree should make four and not five; and we allow it is not equallyimpossible to conceive that lead should swim, or cork should sink inwater: but affirm that it would be nonsense to expect it; nay, more, thatadmitting the continuance of the known laws of nature, it is absolutelyimpossible to form a conception of any such event. Mr Hume puts thequestion, Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, thatall the trees flourish in December and January, and decay in May andJune? We allow the proposition to be intelligible, and the assertion alsoto be rational upon the supposition of a change in the laws of nature:but without that supposition, we will hardly allow the event to be con-ceivable, or will at least pronounce the expectation of it to be absurd,foolish and nonsensical. Did philosophers pay that regard to the author-ity of common sense which is due, and stand as much in awe of theimputation of nonsense as reasonable men ought to do, they wouldacknowledge, that the difference between the evidence for mathematicalaxioms, and that which we have for other primary truths, is merely cir-cumstantial; and would be as shy of calling the last in question as theformer. But philosophers unhappily have been accustomed to considerthemselves as in a rank superior to men of sense, and so have indulgedthemselves in ways of thinking and speaking that expose them to theridicule of mankind.

Mr Hume affirms, that it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change; and that objects seemingly like those we haveexperienced, may be attended with different, or contrary effects. Wefrankly allow it. And what is yet more, that every atom in nature, andall the laws belonging to it, may vanish in an instant. But shall we foundany belief, any conjecture, any reasonings of any kind, upon supposi-tions so absolutely chimerical? There is an expostulation vulgarly usedon occasion of such extravagancies: What if the heavens should fall andsmother the larks? which ought to be considered as the only properanswer to objections of this kind.

...

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1 For Background on Hume’s communication with Balfour, see the selection fromBalfour’s Delineation in Early Responses to Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Essays ,Volume 1.

17JAMES BALFOUR

[James Balfour], Philosophical essays...., Edinburgh, J. Balfour, 1768,187 p.Selections from Essay 1 (pp. 36–62) and Essay 2 (pp. 63–81); from 1768edition.

James Balfour (1705–1795) was a member of the Scottish bar and in1754 was appointed professor of moral philosophy at the University

of Edinburgh. From 1764 to 1779 he was professor of the law of natureand nations. Balfour wrote three philosophical works: A Delineation ofthe Nature and Obligation of Morality (1753), Philosophical Essays(1768), and Philosophical Dissertations (1782).1 Balfour’s Philosophi-cal Essays consists of three essays: “Of the Academical Philosophy,”“Of Active Power,” and “Of Liberty and Necessity.” The first two ofthese include discussions of Hume.

In the essay “Of the Academical Philosophy” Balfour discusses thethrust of Academic philosophy in Plato and Arcesilaus. In the selectionbelow, he begins noting that there is a great difference between academ-ic philosophy and sceptical philosophy, a difference that Hume fails tonotice. According to Balfour, Hume’s treatment of scepticism involvesexposing the flaws of the senses, undermining the relation between causeand effect, and even casting doubt on mathematical truths. Hume’sobjections to mathematics derive from the claim of the geometers, name-ly, that space is infinitely divisible. In response, Balfour argues that nogeometrician ever attempted to demonstrate that matter was actuallyinfinitely divisible into real parts (although Hume would actually agreewith Balfour that none did). Hume attempts to reveal similar problemswith the infinite divisibility of time. Balfour concedes that the idea ofeternity is baffling, but this problem stems from the weakness of our fac-ulties, not from time itself.

For Balfour, there are clear consequences of scepticism that decisivelycount against it as a viable philosophy. It produces lethargy since itdestroys the basis for any distinction between truth and falsehood or

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2 Critical Review, 1768, Vol. 26 pp. 178–182.

good and evil. Hume argues that absolute scepticism leads to a mitigatedscepticism that inspires caution. In response, Balfour argues that cautionrequires a distinction between truth and falsehood, a distinction Humedenies. On Hume’s theory, our natural instinct frees us from Pyrrhonism innormal life, but, Balfour notes, this does not rescue our reason fromPyrrhonism. In any event, according to Balfour, true academic philosophy– which he believes is indeed sound philosophy – warns against hastyassent. For Balfour, though, Hume’s main interest in avoiding hasty assent“indeed appears to be, to banish religion altogether from our thoughts.”Citing philosophers from the past, Balfour explains how religion is impor-tant in our common lives and that we should not cast it aside as Hume rec-ommends. Religion is one of many objects of knowledge that we arrive atthrough the causal principle, and, in that regard it is on the same level asknowledge of the external world. True caution and modesty – as the acad-emics recommend – would have us immediately reject scepticism. The dif-ferences, then, between sceptical philosophy and academic philosophy arevery dramatic, and are in fact opposed to each other. Both reason andhuman nature will ultimately prevent us from accepting sceptical philos-ophy.

In the essay “Of Active Power,” Balfour examines Locke’s contentionthat all of our ideas come from either sensation or reflection on ourmental operations. Balfour specifically restricts his discussion to thenotion of power, by which he means the necessary quality that connectscause with effect. Balfour notes that we cannot perceive power throughour senses, and thus we must come to understand the notion of powerthrough our intellect. He concedes that our idea of power is imperfect,but this does not mean that we should deny it or misrepresent it as Hume does. More specifically, Hume’s view of causality entails that “things may have started up out of nothing without any causewhatever,” and Balfour opposes this implication. Balfour argues that wehave other imperfect ideas, such as God’s creative power, but the imper-fection of this idea does not allow us to deny its reality. Balfour contin-ues by arguing that divine intelligence is as necessary to cause and effectas is power, and especially so in view of the design that we see in naturalevents. The alternative is Hume’s absurd view that the natural eventsthat we see are simply a matter of chance.

Balfour’s Philosophical Essays was reviewed favourably in the CriticalReview.2

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3 Essay of the acad. or scept. Philos.

I.OF THE ACADEMICAL PHILOSOPHY.

...Of the modern writers who have patronised the sceptical philosophy,

none perhaps has wrote with more acuteness than Mr Hume. He hasfurnished us with an essay expressly upon this subject, intitled, OfAcademical or Sceptical Philosophy, confounding, by this title, twospecies of philosophy, essentially different from one another, and which,therefore, ought to be carefully distinguished.

But we shall proceed to make some remarks upon the reasonings andsentiments of this very subtile author. We do not, however, so muchmean to canvass these metaphysical arguments by which he endeavoursto subvert the foundations of all truth and science, but to point out theabsurd and even pernicious consequences of this species of philosophy.

With regard to the first, however, as he begins with discrediting theauthority of our external senses, we may observe, That these were givenus not so much to lead us directly into the internal nature and truth ofthings, as to intimate to us what was immediately useful and agreeableto our nature; and this excellent purpose they serve in a very remarkablemanner.

With regard to real existence, our reasoning is chiefly founded in thenecessary connection betwixt cause and effect. This connection heendeavours to break, not indeed in the essay under view, but in anotherplace, to which he tacitly refers: And as the topic well deserves a sepa-rate consideration, we shall not enter upon it here; but only observe,that all his efforts are but vain and fruitless attempts to root up the greatpillars of nature; and the engines he makes use of for this purpose haveno better support than an opinion of Mr. Lock’s, which is either mistak-en or erroneous.

He ventures further to attack the foundations even of mathematicaltruth; and is so bold upon this subject, that it will be proper to quote hisown words:3 “No priestly dogmas,” says he,

“invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason ofmankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of theinfinite divisibility of extension, with all its consequences, as they arepompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians, with akind of triumph and exultation: A real quantity, infinitely less thanany finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, andso on, in infinitum: This is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is

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4 M’Claurin on Sir Isaac Newton, lib. I. cap. 4.

too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support; because itshocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason.”

This very bold and peremptory decision, is a proof and specimen ofwhat was formerly observed. That the transition from the most deter-mined scepticism to the highest extravagance of dogmatism, is most natural and easy. It is impossible for any dogmatist to assume a highertone, or a bolder expression, than our author does upon this occasion;and yet, all this is founded on a great misapprehension of the subject heis considering; for no geometrician ever pretended to demonstrate, thatmatter was divisible into real or actual parts infinitely small. A realquantity infinitely small, is certainly absurd; for any one part of mattermust undoubtedly bear some proportion to any other part that may besupposed; and consequently, cannot be infinitely less than it. All thatgeometricians demonstrate is, that matter cannot be divided into partsso small but that these are further divisible; the consequence indeed is,that matter cannot be divided into actual or real parts, which are infi-nitely small, directly contrary to the supposition made by our author. Agreat mathematician expresses himself upon this subject in the followingwords:4

“Thus, (as we observed elsewhere), an absurd philosophy is the natur-al product of a vitiated geometry; for though it follows from ournotion of magnitude, that it always consists of parts, and is divisiblewithout end; yet an actual division in infinitum is absurd, and an infi-nitely little quantity (even in Mr Leibnitz’s judgement) is a mere fic-tion. Philosophers may allow themselves to imagine likewise, infiniteorders of infinitely small particles of matter, and suffer themselves tobe transported with the idea; but these illusions are not supported bysound geometry, nor agreeable to common sense.”

Our author proceeds to consider the nature of time, in which he fallsinto an equal absurdity. He makes the supposition of an infinite numberof real parts of time passing in succession. But an infinite number is aglaring absurdity; for nothing that is infinite can consist of finite parts,which can bear no proportion to it; and indeed an infinite number is anumber that cannot be numbered, that is to say, no number at all.

Indeed it must be confessed, that, in attempting to form an idea ofeternity, the mind is distressed with apparent contradictions. But, fromthis, shall we infer, that there is a contradiction in the thing itself? Themost natural inference is, That such contradictions are intirely the effect

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of our improper and imperfect conceptions of an object too big for ourweak faculties.

And a reflection upon this should lead us back to the principles of theold academy, which admonish us to be cautious and modest in our deci-sions with regard to matters intricate and sublime, where we find ourideas to be very imperfect.

But we shall now proceed to consider the consequences of this scepti-cal philosophy. The great consequence must indeed strike every one atfirst view. It must introduce an universal lethargy and insensibility; as itdestroys all distinction betwixt truth and falsehood, good and evil, therecan remain no principle to prompt us to action, nor any object to con-cern ourselves about: For though we should believe our own existence,we cannot believe the existence of any thing else. Thus each individualwould be abandoned to a state of total indolence and despair, and thewhole race of men would speedily be extinguished.

Our author is himself shocked with this frightful view of things, andflies with abhorrence from that miserable philosophy which produces it.But let us consider what expedient he falls upon to relieve himself. Inplace of this absolute scepticism, he substitutes what he calls a more mit-igated scepticism, and which he considers as partly the result of the for-mer, and as tending to inspire us with modesty, caution, and reserve.

But this is a palpable peace of sophistry; for modesty and cautionimply a distinction betwixt truth and falsehood; though not always easyto be discovered; but as absolute scepticism totally destroys such distinc-tion, what place can there be for these virtues, or, upon what objects canthey be exercised?

Our author, in reality leads us back imperceptibly to the old academy,whose principles indeed inspire us with modesty, and are at the sametime peculiarly calculated to guard us against Pyrrhonism, as has beenformerly observed.

But our author proceeds still to mention another species of mitigatedscepticism, and which he also considers as the result of Pyrrhonism, bywhich he distinguishes the objects of our knowledge. But it must be evi-dent, at first view, that such effect can never flow from a principle whichat once destroys all truth, and confounds every distinction whatever.

He allows, that nothing but the strong power of natural instinct canfree us from the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt: Now, instinct is not arational principle; and therefore reason never can overcome such doubt.It is vain, therefore, for a Pyrrhonist to talk of a correct judgement, asour author does; for Pyrrhonism excludes the judgement altogether, as itallows of no principles upon which it can proceed.

Nay, as Pyrrhonism represents the intellectual faculty as totallyunsound and disordered; it is therefore to be rejected altogether, not

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5 [Arcesilaus (c.316–c.240 BCE), third leader of the Academy who introducedscepticism to the Academy’s teaching.]

6 Essay 10. of miracles.

only in the admission of principles, but in every operation regarding them.It is impossible, therefore, to extricate ourselves from the embarassmentand distress which our author is so sensible we are thrown into byabsolute scepticism, but by returning to the deserted principles of the oldacademy.

Agreeably to these principles, we may ascribe to the human mind thefaculty of intelligence, or the power of discerning truth, as establishedupon a solid foundation, at least in some instances.

It is, and always will be perceived as true, That two and three are equalto five. It is, and always will appear a certain demonstration, if dulyattended to, That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones.The mind may acquire the possession of many truths attended with anequal evidence. But in our too eager pursuit of knowledge, we are apt torun a great risk, either by hastily assenting to propositions not duly exam-ined, or by stretching beyond our sphere in quest of objects too remote orsublime for our narrow faculties. The old academy warns us of this dan-ger, and prescribes proper rules to guard us against it. It admonishes us tokeep a firm guard against rash and hasty assent; and also carefully toexamine the strength, or perhaps rather the weakness of our intellectualfaculties, and the proportion they bear to the several objects which maybe presented to them. We may therefore consider the different objects ofour knowledge, in relation to this philosophy of Plato, but not that ofArcesilas,3 which excludes all difference and distinction whatever. Weshall accordingly make some observations upon our author’s opinion withregard to this matter.

His principal design indeed appears to be, to banish religion altogetherfrom our thoughts. Its best and most solid foundation he affirms to befaith and divine revelation: And how insufficient, in his opinion, this foun-dation is, he has very explicitely informed us elsewhere.6 He maintains,That the non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear anddistinct an idea as its existence: That it is vain to inquire into the origin ofworlds: That we should leave all distant and high inquiries to the arts ofpriests and politicians; and that we should confine ourselves to commonlife, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience.

But let us examine this matter upon the principles of the old academy.These principles, indeed, chiefly recommend to us an attention to com-mon life and practice. But to what purpose do we give this attention? Itmust surely be in order to regulate our lives in such a manner, as to pro-cure the greatest good to ourselves and others; that is, to live virtuously.

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7 [Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121–180), Stoic philosopher and Roman emperor.]

Now, the cause of virtue and religion are so intimately connected, thatthey cannot be separated: For a just sense of religion established in themind, is at once the surest guard against vice, and the noblest motive tovirtue. It bestows dignity and importance equally upon the objects andexertions of human conduct, and renders duty no less pleasing than nec-essary: So that, without it, all the transactions and atchievements ofmankind, and even life itself, have little or no value. And we must agreein opinion with that illustrious philosopher, the Emperor Antoninus,7

when he asserts, That without God and Providence, life is not worth theliving.

And further, those principles of religion which immediately influencevirtue are plain and obvious to the meanest capacities, and as sensibly feltby the vulgar as by the most profound philosopher. The natural move-ments of the heart carry us towards them, and the principle of conscience,with very little reasoning, binds them upon us in the strongest manner.Every thing without us and within us, leads to the acknowledgement of aGod; nor is it possible to form a clear and distinct idea of the non-exis-tence of a first cause of all things, a necessary and eternal Being.

So far was Plato, the first publisher of the academical philosophy,from thinking, that religion had little connection with common life, thathis sentiments were the very reverse; and he considered atheism andimpiety as having the most pernicious influence upon human conduct; inso much that, in his tenth book of laws, after distinguishing severalspecies of atheism and impiety, he proposes that a law should be made,that those persons who have been led to atheism, not from the wicked-ness of their lives, but some certain species of madness, should be con-fined to a house of correction for the space of five years; and, in themean time, proper care should be taken to recover them to a just way ofthinking; but that, if after this they should ever be found guilty of impi-ety, they should be punished with death; and that those who to theiratheism joined a wicked and flagitious life, should be shut up for life in adismal prison, and no free person should ever have access to them; andthat, after death, their bodies should be exposed, unburied, without theAttic territory.

All our author’s vain though subtile reasonings in relation to causeand effect, certainly never entered into the head of any man, so as toform the least opposition to the strength of that argument for the exis-tence of a Supreme Being, which naturally arises from the connection ofcause and effect.

It is this argument which alone proves the existence of every thingbesides ourselves, and which proves the existence of God with more

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certainty than that of any thing else; so that, before we reject the opinionof a Deity, we must deny the existence of every being but ourselves: Whentherefore we distinguish the objects of our knowledge, we must notexclude religion altogether, but ought to consider it carefully in its differ-ent lights.

Some parts of religion are so obvious and plain, and have such anessential influence upon the just conduct of life, that we will find it bothour wisdom and interest to embrace and cultivate them. But there areindeed other matters in religion which rise far above our scanty faculties.In vain do we pretend to trace the amazing perfections of an infiniteBeing, or to determine the nature and manner of his existence. It is arro-gance and presumption to censure any part of his universal administra-tion, when our ideas of it are so very obscure and imperfect. We haveoften reason to suspect, that in matters of such high speculation, the truthitself is very different from those specious appearances which wouldobtrude themselves upon us as such, and to which we are apt to give tooeasy a reception.

Here then is the field where we cannot too much exercise the virtues ofmodesty, caution, and reserve; and here we find the proper use of the wiseprinciples of the old academy, to which we cannot pay too great regard.But what an inconsistent and preposterous thing is human nature? For itis to be observed, that the sceptics themselves are often the most positiveand decisive with regard to matters of the most subtile and difficult specu-lation; they would reduce them to the standard of their own very imper-fect ideas, and from such improper premises, hesitate not to infer the con-clusion. This indeed they may do often speciously, whilst men are unwill-ing to attend to the weakness of their faculties and imperfection of theirideas, and are consequently led to give too hasty an assent. But it is herewhere true philosophy chiefly recommends modesty and doubt; and hadits precepts been duly listened to, and properly cultivated, they wouldhave shut the firmest door against scepticism, and also prevented manyuseless, if not hurtful, disputes among philosophers and divines.

From the observations already made upon the academical and scepticalphilosophy, these two species must appear not only different from, buteven contrary to one another. The first lets fall a gentle light upon thesetruths which are of the greatest importance: The last wraps up all thingsin total darkness. The one, inspiring us with modesty and caution, pre-serves us from error: The other, destroying all distinctions, leaves themind without any guard at all. The principles of the one are calculated toprevent rash assent, and positive opinion; but the other, having no foun-dation to fix upon, cannot secure us against even the highest dogmatism.But their difference is perhaps still more conspicuous in their effects uponthe heart, than those upon the mind.

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8 Fitzosborne’s letters, letter 8. [Thomas Fitzosborne, Letters on several subjects. Bythe late Sir Thomas Fitzosborne, bart London, Printed for R. Dodsley in Pall-mall,1749, 2 vol.]

Scepticism exhausts the native strength of the soul, by withdrawingevery thing that can cherish and support it: But the more auspicious acad-emy, by placing us under the guard of providence, inspires the heart withvigour, alacrity, and hope. The one leaves us weak and defenceless in aforlorn world: But the other acquaints us, That we act under the eye andprotection of an universal Parent.

With regard to conduct, scepticism confessedly cuts all the sinews ofaction, removes every connection with, or concern for others, and reducesus to a state of stupid indifference and sullen despair. But the better acade-my makes way for the exertion of all the active powers, under the influ-ence of virtue. Indeed, with regard to the intricate nature of things, it ismodest and cautious, both in its speculations and decisions. But, at thesame time, it cultivates those affections which connect us with those ofour own species, whilst we are engaged to consider all as united under thedivine administration, and that not merely from abstract reasonings, butfrom the perception of that universal and admirable order which strikesevery sense, and is felt by every faculty.

Can we hesitate, therefore, in our choice betwixt two such oppositespecies of philosophy? Reason and nature will not permit this.

Some truths are so plain and evident, that reason must assent to them;and self-love is so essential to the mind, that it will engage us in somecourse of action or other in pursuit of happiness.

Let us then comply with the modest philosophy of the old academy.This indeed will check the presumption of those men, who, from a conceitof their own genius; boldly decide in matters above their sphere, andthereby often lose truths which might be within their reach: But it will,however, furnish us with proper principles of action to discharge theduties we owe to God and man; in doing which we shall find ourselvesanimated by the agreeable persuasion of that constant and universal prov-idence of the Deity, which, (to use the words of an ingenious and elegantwriter),8

“gives strength to our hopes, and firmness to our resolutions, subduesthe insolence of prosperity, and draws out the sting of affliction: In aword, it is like the golden branch to which Virgil’s hero was directed,and affords the only secure passport through the regions of darknessand sorrow.”

We shall conclude just with observing, that the disciples of Socrates

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9 Ceb. Tab.10 [By “active power” Balfour simply means necessary connection between causes and

effects. He is not using this term to mean our mental faculties that prompt us toaction, as Reid and others used the term.]

made use of the principles of this excellent philosophy, not only to governand direct them in their inquiries after truth, but also to limit and confinethese inquiries to the most important objects of it. They observed the largefield of science to be too extensive for the weak and limited faculties ofman; this reflection naturally led them to give their chief application towhat most immediately tended to the perfection and happiness of theirnature; and this was undoubtedly the science of morals; a science whoseprovince it was to rectify the heart and regulate the conduct, whilst othersciences were directed to objects of a more external nature.

These philosophers, therefore, though they paid a proper regard to suchsciences as were useful or ornamental in life; yet, whenever they observedthese separated from virtue, (which was often the case), they accountedthem fallacious and vain,9 and exerted all their industry, not only to traceout the true path of virtue, but also to discover the most effectual motivesto inspire the mind with constancy and resolution proportioned to itsmost arduous atchievements. And indeed, they could derive motives ofthis importance from no other source than that of religion, which aloneopens up truths the most interesting and the most universally felt bymankind.

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, in particular, they appliedto this noble purpose; whilst, after the example of their great master, theytaught mankind, that it was vain to hope for happiness hereafter, withoutstudying at present to make all possible improvement in wisdom andvirtue.

II.OF ACTIVE POWER.10

The intimate nature of the soul is unknown to us; neither can we com-prehend how or in what manner it thinks. That it thinks, however, wehave the greatest certainty; that is, an intimate consciousness.

All the ideas which we naturally refer to things without us, appear to bederived from some kind of sensation or other, in the reception of whichthe mind is intirely passive. But, previous to the admission of such ideas,the mind appears to be possessed of some kind of consciousness, at leastof that of its own existence, without which we cannot comprehend how itcould be at all sensible of the impression of any thing external.

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Mr LOCKE derives all our ideas from sensation, or from reflectionupon the operations of the mind in relation to them. It may indeed beallowed, that the first notions of things are given to the mind by meansof some sensation or other: But then it may also be true, that after suchnotices are given, the mind, by the exertion of some inherent power,may be able to discover some remarkable qualities of such things, andeven things of a very different nature, which are not to be discoveredmerely by any sense whatever.

In the reception of our original ideas, the mind, as has already beenobserved, is intirely passive; but, in the reception of those subsequentones, it is manifestly active. In order to prove the truth of what we haveadvanced, it is not necessary to enter into a general examination of MrLocke’s doctrine; it will be sufficient to make trial of it in a particularinstance, which shall be that of active power, a quality of the greatestand most universal importance, upon which all the changes in natureabsolutely depend.

Mr LOCKE endeavours, agreeably to the principles he hath laid down,to trace the origin of our idea of active power up partly to some sensa-tion, partly to some reflection of the mind on its own operations. Thesum of his reasoning is, That the mind, observing the frequent changesmade upon things, considers in one thing the possibility of having anyof its simple ideas changed; and in another, the possibility of makingthat change; and so comes by that idea which we call power.

But let us consider this matter with accuracy and attention. If we sup-pose that matter has in itself a power to begin motion, and to act uponanother part of matter; yet, this power is not the object of any sensa-tion: All that our senses take notice of, is the mere motion of matter;but whether this motion is produced by matter itself, or some othercause, is what the understanding, not the senses, is the proper judge of.If we see a stone moving in the air, sense indeed perceives the motion,but cannot determine whether this motion was begun by the stone itself,or by something else very different from it. Our idea of power is there-fore an intellectual idea, and not perceivable by any sense whatever.

But let us next consider reflection as the source of our idea of power.If we suppose indeed, that the mind has in itself a power to act, andwhich it exerts upon proper occasions, it must acquire the clearest ideaof power by the immediate consciousness of its own operations: But, assome pretend to question such a power of the mind, in order to avoidany dispute upon this occasion, we shall proceed to try how the mindmay otherways acquire an idea of active power.

When we observe a change made upon any thing, it is natural for usto consider how this change has happened. In doing this, we immediate-ly perceive, that the change must be effected either by the thing changed

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itself, or by some thing else which may be connected with it: For, if wesuppose the thing itself to continue as it was, and likeways exclude theinfluence of every other being, we clearly perceive there can be nochange at all. Whilst the ground and reason of its existence continuesthe same, the thing itself must remain in the same state, without anychange whatever. There appears to be no proposition that carries alongwith it a stronger degree of evidence; and any reasoning we bestow upon itis no more than placing it in different points of light, in which it stillappears with an undiminished lustre.

But as abstract propositions may be apt to fatigue the mind, if we shalltry this matter by fact and experience, it will still receive the greatest confir-mation. Let us only consider the motions of the members of our bodies:Some of those are constantly obedient to the inclination of the will. Whenwe will to move our finger, for example, it immediately moves in whatmanner we please; we therefore justly infer, that there is a real and neces-sary connection betwixt the will and such motion of the finger. It may beobserved, that it is needless here to determine whether the mind is theproper cause of this motion, or some superior being effectually co-operat-ing with it; for that does not in the least affect the argument. Mr Humealledges, that in the case mentioned, and in all other similar cases, there isonly a constant conjunction of things without any real connection; whichconjunction must therefore be purely casual: That is, when I will to movemy finger, the motion that follows has no real connection with my will, buthappens only by accident, just at the time I willed the motion; and conse-quently would have taken place whether I had willed it or not. But this isquite inconsistent with that immediate consciousness I have of the motionalways taking place, and always varying according to every the least varia-tion of my will; a thing altogether incompatible with mere chance. Twothings indeed, that have no real connection, may exist together casually atthe same time; but when one thing constantly attends another, when all itsvariations perfectly correspond to the meaning and intention of that other;when it ceases to be, when that ceases; this is the strongest proof imagin-able of design and of real connection, whether mediate or immediate, andis quite beyond all the power of chance.

Thus, from a constant observation of the order and connection of things,as well as from the clearest intuitive perception, we acquire the idea ofactive power; that is, of a quality in some being, whereby it is able to pro-duce a change in relation to another, and to give existence to some newmode or thing which did not exist before. What produces the change wecall cause, the production itself we call effect; and we consider power asthe necessary quality which connects these.

There are indeed no ideas more universally acknowledged than thoseof cause and active power; even the lowest of the vulgar, upon the

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appearance of any new object, is ready to put the question, not if it hada cause, but what the cause of it is. And the antient philosophers, whoseldom agreed in any thing; yet all agreed in this, that every effect musthave a cause, as Cicero, in his book de fato, informs us, including evenEpicurus himself. And indeed, the idea of active power is the only meanswhereby we can with certainty come to the knowledge of the existenceof any being besides ourselves.

Our idea of active power, as has been already hinted, is not the effectof any sensible impression of external objects, in which the mind isintirely passive; but is acquired by the action of the mind in the exerciseof its intelligent faculty, whereby it discovers, by a necessary inference,or rather intuitive perception, that such a quality must be; and in thismanner also it discovers many other intellectual ideas. Mr Locke’s opin-ion as to the origin of these ideas, however respectable, is not decisive:For these are matters to be determined by reason, and not authority. MrLocke admits the idea of power as unquestionable; but if it is to bederived from reflection, this word is to be taken in a larger sense than inwhat that judicious writer seems to understand it.

Our idea of power, however certain and real, is yet imperfect; as wecannot justly conceive how an active being begins to exert this quality.But this is no reason for denying the quality altogether, any more than itwould be to deny that we think, because we cannot explain how and inwhat manner we think.

But, as Mr Hume and some other ingenious writers have taken anopportunity, from the imperfection of our idea of power, to take awaythat quality altogether, or grossly to misrepresent it; the subject is ofthat importance as to merit some farther examination.

The highest degree of power is that which can give being to whatbefore had no existence. That some things now exist which once did notexist, must be admitted, and seems to be so indeed by Mr Hume himself:But, upon pretence, that we can have no idea of power, he would leadus to believe that such things may have started up out of nothing with-out any cause whatever. But this reasoning contradicts and destroysitself; for most certain it is, that we can have no idea of any thing begin-ning to exist from nothing, without a cause; and therefore, if there is nocause, such thing, according to his reasoning, cannot exist. If, then, whatis allowed to begin to exist, can neither exist with nor without a cause; itmust necessarily follow, that what begins to exist does not exist at all.But if we will reason justly, we will never be involved in such a glaringcontradiction. We have indeed no proper idea of a creative power; butneither can we limit the perfections of an almighty Being, or bring themdown to the standard of our very weak faculties. For aught we know,such a Being may have a creative power; whereas, on the other hand, it

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must appear certain, that no being whatever could, of itself, begin toexist from nothing. Our clear perception of this truth is not liable to anyobjection arising from the imperfection of our faculties; for, let them beever so imperfect, they can clearly comprehend, that nothing has noqualities at all; and consequently, that it can have no qualities superiorto our conceptions, or that can be considered as the reason or ground ofany change whatever: And thus we may clearly avoid the above-men-tioned contradiction, by allowing a creative power; a thing which,though we cannot conceive, yet we have no reason to deny.

But we shall proceed to the consideration of another topic, which willnot only throw light upon the present argument, if it needed any, butwill also discover another material quality essential to any efficientcause, and that is intelligence.

Power alone is not sufficient for the production of any thing; for wecannot conceive how a being possessed of power, can exert this qualitywithout an intention and design so to do; and intention and design evi-dently imply thought and intelligence. This general argument we mayhave occasion to resume afterwards; and therefore at present we shallconfine our reasoning to a regular production.

The system of this universe discovers the most amazing order and reg-ularity in its whole contrivance; and it also every day produces newforms in which a like order and beauty is constantly observed. Thiscould never be the effect of mere power: It necessarily implies also intel-ligence and design; for no degree of power whatever, acting in a blindand causal manner, could produce any regular effect at all; much lessthat amazing order and proportion which are every where so conspicu-ous through this immense universe. Intelligence therefore is as necessaryas power to the production of such an effect; and it would be equallyimpossible to account for it if we should exclude either of these quali-ties.

And this is an additional proof (if such was necessary) of the necessityof a cause, in order to the production at least of a regular effect. Such aproduction requires intelligence as well as power. These qualities mustbe essentially united and jointly concur in demonstrating the necessity ofa cause. Upon this occasion, it is natural to remark the superlativeabsurdity of Mr Hume’s opinion, in supposing an effect, at least a regu-lar effect, to begin to exist without any cause at all: For, in the firstplace, this opinion supposes, that all the parts of the universe took theirregular station which they now occupy in a fortuitous and casual man-ner, which is much the same with Epicurus’s fortuitous concourse ofatoms; a ridiculous fiction now universally exploded.

But, further, it conjoins with this a notion still more absurd, if possi-ble, that every thing began to exist from nothing, without any cause at

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11 [Enquiry, Sect. 11.]

all; a strain of extravagance which never could enter into Epicurus’sthoughts: For he allowed some cause (though a very improper one) ofthe origin of this mundane system.

Having now demonstrated, that power is a real quality which con-nects cause and effect; and that consequently every effect must have acause, we shall make one general observation more upon another veryextraordinary opinion of Mr Hume. That subtile writer, where he ispleased to make the supposition of cause and effect, observes,

“That as the universe shows wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdomand goodness; as it shows a particular degree of these perfections, weinfer a particular degree of them precisely adapted to the effect weexamine; but further attributes, or further degrees of the same attrib-utes, we can never be authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules ofjust reasoning.”11

Now, with regard to the first cause, we certainly infer other attributesthan the effects themselves can show; attributes of which the effects cannot bear the least resemblance; such as eternity, necessary existence,immutability, independency, &c. If we therefore can infer these incommunicable attributes, then, by conjoining them with the formerattributes, we are led to form much higher ideas of these than the effectsthemselves would immediately lead us to, unless we should suppose thepresent universe, viewed in its full extent and duration, to be the mostperfect work of an infinite Being.

...

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18JAMES BEATTIE

James Beattie, Essay on the nature and immutability of truth in opposition to sophistry and scepticism. Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J.Bell, 1770, viii, 503 p.Introduction, 1.2.3, 1.2.5, 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.3, selections; from 1770 edi-tion.

Scottish philosopher James Beattie (1735–1803) held the chair ofmoral philosophy and logic at Marischal College, University of

Aberdeen, for most of his adult career. His Essay, first published in1770, was the best-known attack on Hume’s philosophy appearingduring Hume’s life. Beattie began the work around 1765 in response towhat he saw as a growing and unfounded interest in scepticism. Hegave special attention to Hume’s Treatise because of its sceptical repu-tation. Inspired in part by Thomas Reid, Beattie used common sense asa litmus test for determining true philosophical beliefs.

In the Introduction to the Essay, Beattie notes that he admires manyparts of Locke’s writings and some of Berkeley’s, but he regrets that hemust criticise aspects of these philosophers that contribute to scepti-cism. Although acknowledging Hume’s abilities as a political, econom-ic, and historical writer, Beattie says that he has much to criticise inthe Treatise of Human Nature, a work he believes to have completelymisdescribed human nature and to have caused much harm.

In 1.2.3 Beattie discusses the evidence that we get by means of ourinternal senses, and especially what we perceive about our own minds.He argues that Hume’s view of personal identity runs contrary to thedirect evidence of common sense. For example, if we did not naturallybelieve in the continued identity of ourselves over time, we would notexpress concern over the possibility of dying an hour hence. Althoughthe common words that we use to express identity are sometimesambiguous – and thus become targets of attack by metaphysicians –Beattie argues that the notion of identity itself is clear and universallyunderstood. Cultures around the world distinguish between the humanmind and body and believe that the soul can exist independently of thebody. No sane person ever truly denied the continued presence of athinking principle within himself. Although Hume argues that our

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identity is in perpetual flux, the principles upon which he bases thisargument are absurd and contradictory. Even though the concept of“identity” is undefinable, Beattie argues that an internal sense gives usan understanding of the meaning of the term. However, it is importantto note that my continued awareness of my existence does not in andof itself constitute the sameness of my identity. That is, my identitywould be unified whether I were aware of it or not, and even if I wereasleep. According to Beattie, riddles of identity, such as that regardingTheseus’s famous boat, are merely verbal disputes over the meaning ofthe word “same.” Everyone intuitively knows that the boat remainsthe same in shape while changing in substance. When one maintainsthat a human remains the same over time – in spite of obvious bodilychanges – this commonly means that the person is animated by thesame vital, thinking principle.

In 1.2.5 Beattie discusses reasoning from effects to causes, arguingthat common sense provides us with the axiom that whatever begins toexist proceeds from some cause. Beattie doubts whether this is anaxiom of reason demonstrable by proof, and in fact he accepts Hume’sarguments that show that the principle of causality cannot be proven.However, against Hume who holds that causality conveys no certainty,Beattie argues that the causal maxim is an axiom of common sense andthus intuitively certain. He also argues that we do not infer causal rela-tions from experience alone. Young children, for example, show acuriosity about causes that is not necessarily in proportion to theirexperience of cause and effect relations. The most noble use of ourintuitions about causality is as the basis of a proof for the existence ofGod as the first cause of everything. In “Of a Particular Providence”Hume argues that the singular and unparalleled nature of the universeprevents us from making cause-effect inferences about God as creator.Beattie objects that in normal life we make cause-effect inferencesabout things without considering the uniqueness of these things.Further, given that the universe itself is only a collection of the thingsthat we see around us, it follows that the causal relations applying toits components may reasonably apply to the universe itself. Not only isHume’s objection irrelevant to causal arguments for God’s existence,but it is also irrelevant to design arguments. That is, even if the uni-verse is unique, we may still infer that the creator of the universe isintelligent, just as we infer that the creator of a machine is intelligent.

In 2.1.1, Beattie contrasts the reliance of mathematicians on self-evi-dent axioms, with the denial of such axioms by sceptics such as Hume.For Beattie, modern sceptics are suspicious of our common sense intu-itions and succeed in doubting them because the public is entertainedby writings that hold unconventional views. By contrast, the field of

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mathematics does not lend itself to controversial and entertaining the-ories that undermine convention. If sceptics were in charge of mathe-matics, they would likely question the certainty of the axioms uponwhich it is founded.

In 2.2.1, Beattie describes the rise of modern scepticism, a movementhe believes to culminate in Hume’s philosophy. Criticising the basicprinciples of Hume’s philosophical system, Beattie first turns toHume’s view that ideas and impressions differ only in terms of liveli-ness. If this were true, according to Beattie, our idea of fire would pro-vide us with some warmth. Second, Hume holds that “since all ideasare derived from impressions, and are nothing but copies and represen-tations of them, whatever is true of the one must be acknowledgedconcerning the other” (Treatise, 1.1.7). This also implies that the ideaof red would be a red idea. Third, Hume believes that common peopletypically do not distinguish between an object and their perceptions ofthat object. Beattie argues that we do commonly distinguish betweenobject and perception, as when, for example, our perception of a dis-tant object is unclear, while we suppose that the object itself is clear.The greatest absurdity of Hume’s system is found in the conclusions towhich it leads. Hume argues, for example, that we have no ideasexcept those that derive from impressions. However, given that wehave no impression of our self, it would follow that we have no idea ofour self.

In 2.2.3 Beattie discusses liberty and necessity and returns to Hume’snotion of causation. According to Hume, there is no objective causalpower that connects causes with effects; instead, the connection restsin the imagination of the spectator who sees two events constantlyconjoined. As a counter instance to Hume’s account of causality,Beattie notes that the constant conjunction of day followed by nightshould imply that the one is the cause of the other, but this is absurd.Beattie argues further that we do have a distinct idea of causal power,one that comes to us when we experience our minds acting on ourbodies, or our bodies acting on other bodies. He concludes this sectionby pointing out the dangerous consequences of the doctrine of necessi-ty. He notes, though, that Hume challenged this general line of reason-ing on the grounds that “it is not certain that an opinion is false,because it is of dangerous consequence.” Hume also notes that thisapproach serves “nothing to the discovery of truth.” Contrary toHume, Beattie argues that, by exposing the dangerous consequences ofa view, we indeed promote the discovery of truth because we lead peo-ple to think attentively before adopting opinions.

Beattie’s Essay was exceptionally popular and went through six editionsduring his lifetime. Within two years of its appearance, it was favourably

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1 Monthly Review, June 1770, Vol. 42, pp. 450–457; October 1770, Vol. 43, pp. 268–283; Scots Magazine, 1770, Vol. 32, pp. 428–435; WeeklyMagazine or Edinburgh Amusement, 1770, Vol. 8, pp. 303–305; Scots Magazine,April 1771, Vol. 33, pp. 199–201; Annual Register for the year 1771, pp. 252–260;Critical Review, 1771, Vol. 32, pp. 453–459; 1772, Vol. 33, pp. 34–44. The reviewsof Beattie’s Essay and other 18th century responses to that work are included in EarlyResponses to Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Stewart, Volumes 3 and 4 of ScottishCommon Sense Philosophy, ed. James Fieser (forthcoming Bristol: Thoemmes, 2000).

2 [i.e., David Hume.]3 [Beattie probably means Hume’s two Enquiries which recast much of the material

in the Treatise. Hume’s Essays, moral, political, and literary contain Hume’swritings on politics and economics, and Beattie acknowledges that Hume may be anexcellent politician, financier, and historian.]

reviewed in six journals.1 The following is from the 1770 edition of theEssay.

INTRODUCTION...I am sorry, that in the course of this inquiry, it will not always be in my

power to speak of some celebrated names with that deference, to whichsuperior talents, and superior virtue, are always entitled. Every friend tocivil and religious liberty, every lover of mankind, every admirer of sincer-ity, and simplicity of manners, every heart that warms at the recollectionof distinguished virtue, must consider Mr LOCKE as one of the most ami-able, and most illustrious men, that ever our nation produced. Such he is,and such he always will be, in my estimation. The parts of his philosophyto which truth obliges me to object, are but few, and, compared with theextent and importance of his other writings, extremely inconsiderable. Iobject to them, because I think them erroneous and dangerous; and I amconvinced, that their author, if he had lived to see the inferences that havebeen drawn from them, would have been the first to declare them absurd,and would have expunged them from his works with indignation. DrBERKELEY was equally amiable in his life, and equally a friend to truthand virtue. In elegance of composition he was perhaps superior. I admirehis virtues: I can never sufficiently applaud his zeal in the cause of religion:but some of his reasonings on the subject of human nature I cannot admit,without renouncing my claim to rationality. There is a Writer now alive,2

of whose philosophy I have much to say. By his philosophy, I mean thesentiments he hath published in a book called, A Treatise of HumanNature, in three volumes, printed in the year 1739; the principal doctrinesof which he hath since republished again and again, under the title of,Essays Moral and Political,3 &c. Of his other works I say nothing; nor

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4 Seneca, Controv. lib. 3.

have I at present any concern with them. Virgil is said to have been a badprose-writer;4 Cicero was certainly a bad poet: and this author, thoughnot much acquainted with human nature, and therefore not well qualifiedto write a treatise upon it, may yet be an excellent politician, financier,and historian. His high merit in these three respects is indeed universallyallowed: and if my suffrage could add any thing to the lustre of such dis-tinguished reputation, I should here, with great sincerity and pleasure, joinmy voice to that of the public, and make such an encomium on the authorof the History of England as would not offend any of his rational admir-ers. But why is this author’s character so replete with inconsistency! whyshould his principles and his talents extort at once our esteem and detesta-tion, our applause and contempt! That he, whose manners in private lifeare so agreeable, should yet, in the public capacity of an author, havegiven so much cause of just offence to all who love virtue and mankind, isto me matter of astonishment and sorrow, as well as of indignation. Thathe, who succeeds so well in describing the fates of nations, should yethave failed so egregiously in explaining the operations of the mind, is oneof those incongruities in human genius, for which perhaps philosophy willnever be able fully to account. That he, who so impartially hath stated theopposite pleas and principles of our political factions, should yet haveadopted the most illiberal prejudices against natural and revealed religion;that he, who on some occasions hath displayed even a profound erudition,should at other times, when intoxicated with a favourite theory, have suf-fered affirmations to escape him, which would have fixed the opprobriousname of Sciolist on a less celebrated author; and, finally, that a moralphilosopher, who seems to have exerted his utmost ingenuity in searchingafter paradoxes, should yet happen to light on none, but such as are all,without exception, on the side of licentiousness and scepticism: these areinconsistencies perhaps equally inexplicable; at least they are such as I donot at present chuse to explain. And yet, that this author is chargeablewith all these inconsistencies, will not, I think, be denied by any person ofsense and candour, who hath read his works with attention. His philoso-phy hath done great harm. Its admirers, I know, are very numerous; but Ihave not as yet met with one person, who both admired and understoodit. We are prone to believe what we wish to be true: and most of thisauthor’s philosophical tenets are so well adapted to what I fear I may callthe fashionable notions of the times, that those who are ambitious to con-form themselves to the latter will hardly be disposed to examine scrupu-lously the evidence of the former. — Having made this declaration, whichI do in the spirit of an honest man, I must take the liberty to treat this

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author with that plainness, which the cause of truth, the interests of soci-ety, and my own conscience, require. The same candour that prompts meto praise, will also oblige me to blame. The inconsistency is not in me, butin him. Had I done but half as much as he, in labouring to subvert princi-ples which ought ever to be held sacred, I know not whether the friends oftruth would have granted me any indulgence; I am sure they ought not.Let me be treated with the lenity due to a good citizen, no longer than Iact as becomes one.

...

PART I.OF THE STANDARD OF TRUTH.

CHAP. II.All Reasoning terminates in first principles. All Evidence ultimately intu-

itive. Common Sense the Standard of Truth.

SECT. III.Of the Evidence of Internal Sense.

...We have no other direct evidence than this of consciousness, or internal

sensation, for the existence and identity of our own soul. I exist; I am thesame being to-day I was yesterday, and twenty years ago; this principle, orbeing, within me, that thinks and acts, is one permanent and individualprinciple, distinct from all other principles, beings, or things; – these aredictates of internal sensation natural to man, and universally acknowl-edged; and they are of so great importance, that while we doubt of theirtruth, we can hardly be interested in any thing else whatsoever. If I wereto believe, with Mr HUME, and some others, that my mind is perpetuallychanging, so as to become every different moment a different thing, theremembrance of past, or the anticipation of future good or evil, could giveme neither pleasure nor pain; yea, tho’ I were to believe, that a cruel deathwould certainly overtake me within an hour, I should be no more con-cerned, than if I were told, that a certain elephant three thousand yearshence would be sacrificed on the top of Mount Atlas. To a man whodoubts the individuality or identity of his own mind, virtue, truth, reli-gion, good and evil, hope and fear, are absolutely nothing.

Metaphysicians have taken some pains to confound our notions on thissubject; and, by establishing the currency of certain ambiguous phrases,have succeeded so well, that it is now hardly possible for us to explainthese dictates of our nature, according to common sense and commonexperience, in such language as shall be liable to no exception. The mis-fortune is, that many of the words we must use, though extremely well

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5 See his affecting story in the Adventurer, vol. 3. No. 88.

understood, are either too simple or too complex in their meaning, toadmit a logical definition; so that the caviller is never at a loss for anevasive reply to any thing we may advance. But I will take it upon me toaffirm, that there are hardly any human notions more clearly, or moreuniversally understood, than those we entertain concerning the identityboth of ourselves and of other things, however difficult we may some-times find it to express those notions in proper words. And I will alsoventure to affirm, that the sentiments of the generality of mankind onthis head are grounded on such evidence, that he who refuses to be con-vinced by it, acts irrationally, and cannot, consistently with such refusal,believe any thing.

1. The existence of our own mind, as something different and distinctfrom the body, is universally acknowledged. I say universally; havingnever heard of any nation of men upon earth, who did not, in their con-versation and behaviour, discover, by the plainest signs, that they madethis distinction. Nay, so strongly are mankind impressed with it, that therudest barbarians, by their incantation, their funeral solemnities, theirtraditions concerning invisible beings, and their hopes and opinions of afuture state, seem to be persuaded, that to the existence of the soul thebody is not at all necessary. All philosophers, a few Pyrrhonists except-ed, have acknowledged the existence of the soul, as one of the first andmost unquestionable principles of human science. Now whence could anotion so universal arise? Let us examine our own minds, and we shallfind, that it could arise from nothing but consciousness, a certain irre-sistible persuasion, that we have a soul distinct from the body. The evi-dence of this notion is intuitive; it is the evidence of internal sense.Reasoning can neither prove nor disprove it. DES CARTES, and his disci-ple MALEBRANCHE, acknowledge, that the existence of the human soulmust be believed by all men, even by those who can bring themselves todoubt of every thing else.

Mr Simon Browne,5 a learned and pious clergyman of the last age, isperhaps the only person on record of whom there is reason to think,that he seriously disbelieved the existence of his own soul. He imagined,that in consequence of an extraordinary interposition of divine power,his rational soul was gradually annihilated, and that nothing was nowleft him, but a principle of animal life, which he held in common withthe brutes. But where-ever the story of this excellent person is known,his unhappy mistake will be imputed to madness, and to a depravationof intellect, as real, and as extraordinary, as if he had disbelieved theexistence of his body, or the axioms of mathematics.

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6 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 438. &c. [Treatise, 1.4.6.]

2. That the thinking principle, which we believe to be within us, continues the same through life, is equally self-evident, and equallyagreeable to the universal consent of mankind. If a man were to speakand act in the evening, as if he believed himself to have become a differ-ent person since the morning, the whole world would pronounce him ina state of insanity. Were we to attempt to disbelieve our own identity,we should labour in vain; we could as easily bring ourselves to believe,that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be. But there is noreason to think, that this attempt was ever made by any man, not evenby Mr HUME himself; though that author, in his Treatise of HumanNature, hath asserted, yea, and proved, (according to his notions ofproof), that the human soul is perpetually changing; being nothing but“a bundle of perceptions, that succeed each other with inconceivablerapidity, and are (as he chuses to express it) in a perpetual flux.”6 Hemight as easily, and as decisively, with equal credit to his own under-standing, and with equal advantage to the reader, by a method of reasoning no less philosophical, and with the same degree of discretionin the use of words, have attacked the axioms of mathematics, and produced a formal and serious confutation of them. In explaining theevidence on which we believe our own identity, it is not necessary, that Ishould here examine his arguments against that belief: first, because thepoint in question is self-evident, and therefore all reasoning on the otherside unphilosophical and irrational; and, secondly, because I shall after-wards prove, that some of Mr HUME’s first principles are inconceivableand impossible; and that this very notion of his concerning identity,when fairly stated, is absurd and self-contradictory.

It has been asked, how we can pretend to have full evidence of ouridentity, when of identity itself we are so far from having a distinctnotion, that we cannot define it. It might with as good reason be asked,how we come to believe that two and two are equal to four, or that acircle is different from a triangle, since we cannot define either equalityor diversity: – why we believe in our own existence, since we cannotdefine existence: – why, in a word, the vulgar believe any thing at all,since they know nothing about the rules of definition, and hardly everattempt it. In fact, we have numberless ideas that admit not of defini-tion, and yet concerning which we may argue, and believe, and know,with the utmost clearness and certainty. To define heat or cold, identityor diversity, red or white, an ox or an ass, would puzzle all the logicianson earth; yet nothing can be clearer, or more certain, than many of ourjudgements concerning those objects. The rudest of the vulgar know

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7 The following case, which M. Crozaz gave in to the Academy of Sciences, is themost extraordinary instance of interrupted consciousness I have ever heard of. Anobleman of Lausanne, as he was giving orders to a servant, suddenly lost hisspeech and all his senses. Different remedies were tried without effect for sixmonths; during all which time he appeared to be in a deep sleep, or deliquium, withvarious symptoms at different periods, which are particularly specified in thenarration. At last, after some chirurgical operations, at the end of six months hisspeech and senses returned. When he recovered, the same servant to whom he hadbeen giving orders when he was first affected, happening to be in the room, he wenton with giving his directions just where he had left off, forgetting only the time thathad elapsed during his illness, and connecting the latter part of the sentence with theformer part, which had been pronounced half a year before, just as if no time hadintervened. He lived ten years after, and died of another distemper. Van Swietenrelates this story in his commentaries on Boerhaave’s aphorisms, under the headApoplexy. I mention it chiefly with a view to the reader’s amusement; he mayconsider the evidence, and then believe or disbelieve as he pleases. But thatconsciousness may be interrupted by a total deliquium, without any change in ournotions of our own identity, I know by my own experience. I am therefore fullypersuaded, that the identity of this substance, which I call my soul, may continueeven when I am unconscious of it; and if for a shorter space, why not for a longer?

most perfectly what they mean, when they say, Three months ago I wasat such a town, and have ever since been at home: and the convictionthey have of the truth of this proposition is founded on the best of evidence, namely, on that of internal sense; in which all men, by the lawof their nature, do and must implicitly believe.

It has been asked, whether this continued consciousness of our beingalways the same, does not constitute our sameness or identity. No more,I should answer, than our perception of truth, light, or cold, is the efficient cause of truth, light, or cold. Our identity is perceived by consciousness; but consciousness is as different from identity, as theunderstanding is different from truth, as past events are different frommemory, as colours from the power of seeing. Consciousness of identityis so far from constituting identity, that it presupposes it. An animalmight continue the same being, and yet not be conscious of its identity;which is probably the case with many of the brute creation; nay, whichis often the case with man himself. When we sleep without dreaming, orfall into a fainting fit,7 or rave in a fever, and often too in our ordinarydreams, we lose all sense of our identity, and yet never conceive that ouridentity has suffered any interruption or change: the moment we awakeor recover, we are conscious that we are the same individual beings wewere before.

Many doubts and difficulties have been started about our manner ofconceiving identity of person under a change of substance. Plutarch tellsus, that in the time of Demetrius Phalereus, the Athenians still preservedthe custom of sending every year to Delos the same galley which, about

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8 Plutarch, in Theseo. Plato, in Phædone.

a thousand years before, had brought Theseus and his company fromCrete; and that it then used to be a question in the schools, how thiscould be the same vessel, when every part of its materials had beenchanged oftener than once.8 It is asked, how a tree can be accounted thesame, when, from a plant of an inch long, it has grown to the height offifty feet; and how identity can be ascribed to the human body, since itsparts are continually changing, so that not one particle of the body Inow have, belonged to the body I had twenty years ago.

It were well, if metaphysicians would think more and speak less onthese subjects: they would then find, that the difficulties so much com-plained of are rather verbal than real. Was there a single Athenian, whodid not know in what respects the galley of Theseus continued the same,and in what respects it was changed? It was the same in respect of itsname, its destination, its shape perhaps, and size, and some other partic-ulars; in respect of its substance, it was altogether different. And whenone party in the schools maintained, that it was the same, and the other,that it was not the same, all the difference between them was this, thatthe one used the word same in one sense, and the other in another.

The identity of vegetables is as easily conceived. No man imagines,that the plant of an inch long is the same in substance with the tree offifty feet. The latter is by the vulgar supposed to retain all the substanceof the former, but with the addition of an immense quantity of adventi-tious matter. Thus far, and no farther, do they suppose the substance ofthe tree to continue the same. They call it, however, the same tree; andthe same it is, in many respects, which to every person of common senseare obvious enough, though not easily expressed in unexceptionable language.

Of the changes made in the human body by attrition, the vulgar haveno notion. They believe the substance of a full-grown body to continuethe same, notwithstanding its being sometimes fatter and sometimesleaner; even as they suppose the substance of a wall to be the samebefore and after it is plaistered. They therefore do not ascribe to it iden-tity of person and diversity of substance, but a real and proper identityboth of substance and person. Of the identity of the body while increas-ing in stature, they conceive, nearly in the same way, as of the identity ofvegetables: they know in what respects it continues the same, and inwhat respects it becomes different; there is no confusion in their notions;they never suppose it to be different in those respects in which theyknow it to be the same.

When philosophers speak of the identity of the human body, theymust mean, not that its substance is the same, for this they say is perpet-

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ually changing; but that it is the same, in respect of its having been allalong animated with the same vital and thinking principle, distinguished bythe same name, marked with the same or similar features, placed in thesame relations of life, &c. – It must be obvious to the intelligent reader,that the difficulties attending this subject arise not from any ambiguity orintricacy in our notions or judgements, for these are extremely clear, butfrom our way of expressing them: the particulars in which an object con-tinues the same, are often so blended with those in which it has becomedifferent, that we cannot find proper words for marking the distinction,and therefore must have recourse to tedious and obscure circumlocutions.

But whatever judgements we form of the identity of corporeal objects,we cannot from them draw any inference concerning the identity of ourmind. We cannot ascribe extension or solidity to the soul, far less anyincrease or diminution of solid or extended parts. Here, therefore, there isno ground for distinguishing diversity of substance from identity of person.Our soul is the very same being now it was yesterday, last year, twentyyears ago. This is a dictate of common sense, an intuitive truth, which allmankind, by the law of their nature, do and must believe, and the contraryof which is inconceivable. We have perhaps changed many of our princi-ples; we may have acquired many new ideas and notions, and lost many ofthose we once had; but that the substance, essence, or personality, of thesoul, has suffered any change, increase, or diminution, we never have sup-posed, nor can suppose. New faculties have perhaps appeared, with whichwe were formerly unacquainted; but these we cannot conceive to haveaffected the identity of the soul, any more than learning to write, or to playon a musical instrument, is conceived to affect the identity of the hand; orthan the perception of harmony the first time one hears music, is conceivedto affect the identity of the ear.

But if we perceive our identity by consciousness, and if the acts of con-sciousness by which we perceive it be interrupted, how can we know thatour identity is not interrupted? I answer, The law of our nature determinesus, whether we will or not, to believe that we continue the same thinkingbeings. The interruption of consciousness, whether more or less frequent,makes no change in this belief. My perception of the visible creation isevery moment interrupted by the winking of my eyes. Am I therefore tobelieve, that the visible universe, which I this moment perceive, is not thesame with the visible universe I perceived last moment? Then must I alsobelieve, that the existence of the universe depends on the motion of myeye-lids; and that the muscles which move them have the power of creatingand annihilating worlds.

To conclude: That our soul exists, and continues through life the same individual being, is a dictate of common sense; a truth which the lawof our nature renders it impossible for us to disbelieve; and in regard to

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which, we cannot suppose ourselves in an error, without supposing ourfaculties fallacious, and consequently disclaiming all conviction, and allcertainty, and disavowing the distinction between truth and falsehood.

SECT. V.

Of Reasoning from the Effect to the Cause.

I left my chamber an hour ago, and now at my return find a book on mytable, the size, and binding, and contents of which are so remarkable, that Iam certain it was not here when I went out, and that I never saw it before.I ask, who brought this book; and am told, that no body has entered myapartment since I left it. That, say I, is impossible. I make a more particularinquiry; and a servant, in whose veracity I can confide, assures me, that hehas had his eye on my chamber-door the whole day, and that no personhas entered it but myself only. Then, say I, the person who brought thisbook must have come in by the window or the chimney; for it is impossiblethat this book could have come hither of itself. The servant bids meremember, that my chimney is too narrow to admit any human creature,and that the window is secured on the inside in such a manner that it can-not be opened from without. I examine the walls; it is evident no breachhas been made; and there is but one door to the apartment. What shall Ithink? If the servant’s report be true, and if the book have not beenbrought by any visible agent, it must have come in a miraculous manner,by the interposition of some invisible cause; for still I must repeat, thatwithout some cause it could not possibly have come hither.

Let the reader consider the case, and deliberate with himself whether I have thought irrationally on this occasion, or expressed myself too strongly, when I spoke of the impossibility of a book appearing in mychamber without some cause of its appearance, either visible or invisible. Iwould not willingly refer such a phenomenon to a miracle; but still a mira-cle is possible; whereas it is absolutely impossible that this could have hap-pened without a cause; at least it seems to me to be as impossible, as that apart should be greater than the whole, or that things equal to one and thesame thing should be unequal to one another. And I presume the readerwill be of my opinion; for, in all my intercourse with others, and after acareful examination of my own mind, I have never found any reason tothink, that it is possible for a human, or for a rational creature, to conceivea thing beginning to exist, and proceeding from no cause.

I pronounce it therefore to be an axiom, clear, certain, and undeni-able, That “whatever beginneth to exist, proceedeth from some cause.” Icannot bring myself to think, that the reverse of any geometrical axiom

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9 Book 1. part 3. sect. 3.10 [Treatise, 1.3.3; Beattie’s quotation differs slightly from Hume’s original.]

is more absurd than the reverse of this; and therefore I am as certain ofthe truth of this, as I can be of the truth of the other; and cannot, with-out contradicting myself, and doing violence to my nature, even attemptto believe otherwise.

Whether this maxim be intuitive or demonstrable, may perhaps admitof some dispute; but the determination of that point will not in the leastaffect the truth of the maxim. If it be demonstrable, we can then assign areason for our belief of it; if it be intuitive, it is on the same footing withother intuitive axioms; that is, we believe it, because the law of ournature renders it impossible for us to disbelieve it.

In proof of this maxim, it hath been said, that nothing can produceitself. But this truth is not more evident than the truth to be proved, andtherefore is no rational proof at all. Nay, this last proposition seems tobe only a different and less proper way of expressing the same thing.Nothing can produce itself; – that is, every thing produced must be pro-duced by some other thing; – that is, every effect must proceed from acause; – and that is, (for all effects being posterior to their causes, mustnecessarily have a beginning), every thing beginning to exist proceedethfrom some cause. Other arguments have been offered in proof of thismaxim, which I think are sufficiently confuted by Mr HUME, in hisTreatise of Human Nature.9 This maxim therefore he affirms, and Iallow, to be not demonstrably certain. But he further affirms, that it isnot intuitively certain; in which I cannot agree with him.

“All certainty,” says he, “arises from the comparison of ideas, andfrom the discovery of such relations as are unalterable so long as theideas continue the same: but the only relations of this kind are resem-blance, proportion in quantity and number, degrees of any quality,and contrariety; none of which is implied in the maxim, Whateverbegins to exist, proceeds from some cause: – that maxim therefore isnot intuitively certain.”10 –

This argument, if it prove any thing at all, would prove, that the maximis not even certain; for we are here told, that it has not that character or quality from which all certainty ariseth.

But, if I mistake not, both the premises of this syllogism are false. Inthe first place, I cannot admit, that all certainty arises from a compari-son of ideas. I am certain of the existence of myself, and of the otherthings that affect my senses; I am certain, that “whatever is, is;” and yet

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11 See part 2. chap. 2. sect. 1. of this Essay.12 [Treatise, 1.3.3.]

I cannot conceive, that any comparison of ideas is necessary to producethese convictions in my mind. Perhaps I cannot long speak of them,without using words expressive of relation; but the simple act or percep-tion of the understanding by which I am conscious of them, implies nocomparison that I can discover. If it did, then the simplest intuitive truthrequires proof, or illustration at least, before it can be acknowledged astruth by the mind; which I presume will not be found warranted byexperience. Whether others are conscious of making such a comparison,before they yield assent to the simplest intuitive truth, I know not; butthis I know, that my mind is often conscious of certainty where no suchcomparison has been made by me.

Secondly, I apprehend, that Mr HUME has not enumerated all the rela-tions which, when discovered, give rise to certainty. I am certain, that Iam the same person today I was yesterday. Mr HUME indeed will notallow that this is possible.11 I cannot help it; I am certain notwithstand-ing; and I flatter myself, that I have on my side, not only the majority,but the whole of mankind, Mr HUME himself (if he would speak his realmind) not excepted. I say then, I am certain, that I am the same personto-day I was yesterday. Now, the relation expressed in this propositionis not resemblance, nor proportion in quantity and number, nor degreesof any common quality, nor contrariety: it is a relation different from allthese; it is identity or sameness.

Again, that the foregoing maxim is neither intuitively nor demonstra-bly certain, our author attempts to prove from this consideration, thatwe cannot demonstrate the impossibility of the contrary. Nay, the con-trary, he says, is not inconceivable: “for we can conceive an objectnonexistent this moment, and existent the next, without joining it to theidea of a cause, which is an idea altogether distinct and different.”12 Butthis I presume is not a fair state of the case. Can we conceive a thingbeginning to exist, and yet bring ourselves to think that a cause is notnecessary to the production of such a thing? If we cannot, (I am sure Icannot), then is the contrary of this maxim, when fairly stated, found tobe truly and properly inconceivable.

But whether the contrary of this maxim be inconceivable or not, themaxim itself may be intuitively certain. Of intuitive, as well as ofdemonstrable truths, there are different kinds. It is a character of some,that their contraries are inconceivable: such are the axioms of geometry.But of other intuitive truths, the contraries are conceivable. “I do feel ahard body;” – “I do not feel a hard body;” – these propositions are

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13 See Part 3, chap. 2 of this Essay.

equally conceivable: the first is true, for I have a pen between my fingers; but I cannot prove its truth by argument; therefore its truth isperceived intuitively.

Thus far we have argued for the sake of argument, and opposed meta-physic to metaphysic,13 in order to prove, that our author’s reasoning onthe present subject is not conclusive. It is now time to enter into the mer-its of the cause, and consider the matter philosophically, that is, accord-ing to fact and experience. And in this way we bring it to a very shortissue. The point in dispute is, Whether this maxim, “Whatever begin-neth to exist, proceedeth from some cause,” be intuitively certain, ornot? That the mind naturally and necessarily assents to it without anydoubt, I have already shown; the maxim, therefore, is certainly true.That it cannot, by any argument, or medium of proof, be rendered moreevident than it is when first apprehended by the mind, is also certain; forit is of itself as evident as any proposition that can be urged in proof ofit. If, therefore, this maxim be true, (as every rational being feels, andacknowledges), it is a principle of common sense: we believe it, notbecause we can give a reason, but because, by the law of our nature, wemust believe it.

Our opinion of the necessity of a cause to the production of everything which hath a beginning, is by Mr HUME supposed to arise fromobservation and experience. It is true, that in our experience we havenever found any thing beginning to exist, and proceeding from no cause;but I imagine it will not be found, that our belief of this axiom is found-ed on experience. For let it be remarked, that some children, at a timewhen their experience is very scanty, seem to be as sensible of the truthof this axiom, as many persons arrived at maturity. I do not mean, thatthey ever repeat it in the form of a proposition; or that, if they were tohear it repeated in that form, they would instantly declare their assent toit; for a proposition can never be rationally assented to, except by thosewho understand the meaning of the words that compose it: but I mean,that these children have a natural propensity to inquire after the cause ofany effect or event that engages their attention; which they would notdo, if the view of an event or effect did not suggest to them, that a causeis necessary to its production. Their curiosity in asking the reasons andcauses of every thing they see and hear, is often very remarkable, andrises even to impertinence; at least it is called so when one is not pre-pared to give them an answer. I have known a child to break open hisdrum, to see if he could discover the cause of its extraordinary sound;and that at the hazard of rendering the plaything unserviceable, and ofbeing punished for his indiscretion. If the ardor of this curiosity were

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always proportioned to the extent of a child’s experience, or to the carehis teachers have taken to make him attentive to the dependence ofeffects on causes, we might then ascribe it to the power of education, orto a habit contracted by experience. But every one who has had anopportunity of conversing with children, knows that this is not the case;and that their curiosity cannot otherwise be accounted for, than by sup-posing it instinctive, and, like all other instincts, stronger in some minds,and weaker in others, independently on experience and education, andin consequence of the appointment of that Being who hath been pleasedto make one man differ from another in his intellectual accomplish-ments, as well as in his features, complexion, and size. Nor let it beimagined, because some children are in this respect more curious thanothers, that therefore the belief of this maxim is instinctive in someminds only: the maxim may be equally believed by all, notwithstandingthis diversity. For do we not find a similar diversity in the genius of dif-ferent men? Some men have a philosophical turn of mind, and love toinvestigate causes, and to have a reason ready on every occasion; othersare perfectly indifferent as to these matters, being wholly ingrossed bystudies of another kind. And yet I presume it will be found, that thetruth of this maxim is felt by every man, though perhaps many mennever thought of putting it in words in the form of a proposition.

We repeat, therefore, that this axiom is one of the principles of com-mon sense, which every rational mind does and must acknowledge to betrue; not because it can be proved, but because the law of nature deter-mines us to believe it without proof, and to look upon its contrary asperfectly absurd, impossible, and inconceivable.

The axiom now before us is the foundation of the most importantargument that ever employed human reason; I mean that which, fromthe works that are created, evinces the eternal power and godhead of theCreator. This argument, as far as it resolves itself into this axiom, isproperly a demonstration, being a clear deduction from a self-evidentprinciple; and therefore no man can pretend to understand this argu-ment without feeling it to be conclusive. So that what the Psalmist saysof the atheist is literally true, He is a fool; as really irrational as if herefused to be convinced by a mathematical demonstration. Nay, he ismore irrational; because there is no truth demonstrated in mathematicswhich so many powers of our nature conspire to ratify, and with whichthe minds of the whole rational creation are so deeply impressed. Thecontemplation of the Divine Nature is the most useful and the mostennobling exercise in which our faculties can be engaged, and recom-mends itself to every man of sound judgement and good taste, as themost durable and most perfect enjoyment that can possibly fall to theshare of any created being. Sceptics may wrangle, and mockers may

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14 [Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. 11.]

blaspheme; but the pious man knows by evidence too sublime for theircomprehension, that his affections are not misplaced, and that his hopesshall not be disappointed; by evidence which, to every sound mind, isfully satisfactory; but which, to the humble and tender-hearted, is alto-gether overwhelming, irresistible, and divine.

That many of the objects in nature have had a beginning, is obvious toour own senses and memory, or confirmed by unquestionable testimony:these, therefore, according to the axiom we are here considering, must bebelieved to have proceeded from a cause adequate at least to the effectsproduced. That the whole sensible universe hath to us the appearance of aneffect, of something which once was not, and which exists not by anynecessity of nature, but by the arbitrary appointment of some powerfuland intelligent cause different from and independent on it; that the uni-verse, I say, has this appearance, cannot be denied: and that it is, what itappears to be, an effect, that it had a beginning, and was not from eternity,is proved by every species of evidence the subject will admit. And if so, weoffer violence to our understanding, when we attempt to believe that thewhole universe does not proceed from some cause; and we argue unphilo-sophically and irrationally, when we endeavour to disprove this naturaland universal suggestion of the human mind.

It is true, the universe is, as one may say, a work sui generis, altogether singular, and such as we cannot properly compare to otherworks; because indeed all works are comprehended in it. But that natural dictate of the mind by which we believe the universe to have pro-ceeded from a cause, arises from our considering it as an effect; a circum-stance in which it is perfectly similar to all works whatsoever. The singu-larity of the effect rather confirms (if that be possible) than weakens ourbelief of the necessity of a cause; at least it makes us more attentive to thecause, and interests us more deeply in it. What is the universe, but a vastsystem of works or effects, some of them great and others small, somemore, and some less considerable? If each of these works, the least as wellas the greatest, require a cause for its production; is it not in the highestdegree absurd and unnatural to say, that the whole is not the effect of acause? – Each link of a great chain must be supported by something, butthe whole chain may be supported by nothing: – nothing less than anounce can be a counterpoise to an ounce, nothing less than a pound to apound; but the wing of a gnat, or nothing at all, may be a sufficient conter-poise to ten hundred thousand pounds: – are not these assertions tooabsurd to deserve an answer?

The reader, if he happens to be acquainted with Mr HUME’s Essay ona particular providence and a future state,14 will see, that these remarks

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are intended as an answer to a very strange argument there advancedagainst the belief of a Deity.

“The universe,” we are told, “is an object quite singular and unpar-allelled; no other object that has fallen under our observation bearsany similarity to it; neither it nor its cause can be comprehendedunder any known species; and therefore we can form no rationalconclusion at all concerning the cause of the universe.” –

I appeal to any man of sound judgement, whether that suggestion ofhis understanding, which disposeth him to infer a cause from aneffect, has any dependence upon a prior operation of his mind, bywhich the effect in question is referred to its genus or species. When hepronounces concerning any object which he conceives to have had abeginning, that it must have proceeded from some cause, does thisjudgment necessarily imply any comparison of that object with othersof a like kind? If the new object were in every respect unlike to otherobjects, would this have any influence on his judgement? Would henot acknowledge a cause to be as necessary for the production of themost uncommon, as of the most familiar object? – If therefore Ibelieve, that I myself owe my existence to some cause, because there issomething in my mind which necessarily determines me to this belief, Imust also, for the very same reason believe, that the whole universe(supposed to have had a beginning) proceeds from some cause. Theevidence of both is the same. If I believe the first and not the second, Ibelieve and disbelieve the same evidence at the same time; I believethat the very same suggestion of my understanding is both true andfalse.

Though I were to grant, that, when an object is reducible to noknown genus, no rational inference can be made concerning its cause;yet it will not follow, that our inferences concerning the cause of theuniverse are irrational, supposing it reasonable to believe that the uni-verse had a beginning. If there be in the universe any thing which isreducible to no known genus, let it be mentioned: if there be any pre-sumption for the existence of such a thing, let the foundation of thatpresumption be explained. And, if you please, I shall, for argument’ssake, admit, that concerning the cause of that particular thing, norational conclusion can be formed. But it has never been asserted thatthe existence of such a thing is either real or probable. Mr HUME onlyasserts, that the universe itself, not any particular thing in the uni-verse, is reducible to no known genus. Well then, let me ask again,What is the universe? A word? No; it is a vast collection of things. –Are all these things reducible to genera? Mr HUME does not deny it. –

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Each of these things, then, if it had a beginning, must also have had acause? It must. – What thing in the universe exists uncaused? Nothing.– Is this a rational conclusion? So it seems. – It seems, then, thatthough it be rational to assign a cause to every thing in the universe;yet to assign a cause to the universe is not rational! It is shameful thusto trifle with words. – In fact, this argument of Mr HUME’s, so highlyadmired by its author, is no argument at all. It is founded on a distinc-tion that is perfectly inconceivable. Twenty shillings laid on a tablemake a pound, though you take up these twenty shillings, yet haveyou not taken up the pound; you have only taken up twenty shillings.If the reader cannot enter into this distinction, he will never be able toconceive in what the force of Mr HUME’s argument consists.

If the universe had a beginning, it must have had a cause. This is aself-evident axiom, or at least an undeniable consequence of one. Wenecessarily assent to it; such is the law of our nature. If we deny it, wecannot, without absurdity, believe any thing else whatsoever; becausewe at the same time deny the authenticity of those instinctive sugges-tions which are the foundation of all truth. The Atheist will never beable to elude the force of this argument, till he can prove, that everything in nature exists necessarily, independently, and from eternity.

If Mr HUME’s argument be found to turn to so little account, fromthe simple consideration of the universe, as existing, and as having hada beginning, it will appear (if possible) still more irrational, when wetake a view of the universe, and its parts, as of works curiously adapt-ed to certain ends. Their existence displays the necessity of a powerfulcause; their frame proves the cause to be intelligent, good, and wise.The meanest of the works of nature, (if any of Nature’s works may becalled mean), – the arrangement necessary for the production of thesmallest plant, requires in the cause a degree of power, intelligence,and wisdom, which infinitely transcends the sublimest exertions ofhuman ability. What then shall we say of the cause that produces ananimal, a rational soul, a world, a system of worlds, an universe? Shallwe say, that infinite power and wisdom are not necessary attributes ofthat universal cause, though they be necessary attributes of the causethat produces a plant? Shall we say, that the maker of a plant may beacknowledge to be powerful, intelligent, and wise, because there aremany other things in nature that resemble a plant; but that we cannotrationally acknowledge the maker of the universe to be wise, powerful,or intelligent, because there is nothing which the universe resembles, orto which it may be compared? Can the man who argues in this mannerhave any meaning to his words?

For an answer to the other cavils thrown out by Mr HUME, in thisflimsy essay, against the divine attributes, the reader is referred to the

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15 [Joseph Butler (1692–1752), The analogy of religion, natural and revealed, to theconstitution and course of nature. To which are added two brief dissertations: I. Ofpersonal identity. II. Of the nature of virtue. London, Printed for J., J., and P. Knapton, 1736, [8], x, 11–320 p. 27.]

16 See part 1. chap. 2. sect 1. of this Essay.

first part of Butler’s Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion.15 Itneeds not be matter of any surprise, that we name, on this occasion, abook which was published before Mr HUME’s essay was written. Withinfidel writers it has long been the fashion (less frequently indeed withthis author than with many others) to deliver as their own, and asentirely new, objections against religion, which have been repeatedlyand unanswerably confuted. This piece of craft gives no offence to theirdisciples; these gentlemen, if they read at all, generally chusing to con-fine their inquiries to one side of the controversy: to themselves it is aconsiderable saving in the articles of time and invention.

PART II.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRECEDING DOCTRINE, WITH INFERENCES.

CHAP. I.

Confirmation of this theory from the practice of Mathematicians andNatural Philosophers.

SECT. I.

That the distinction between reason and common sense, as hereexplained, is acknowledged by mathematicians, we have alreadyshown.16 They have been wise enough to trust to the dictates of commonsense, and to take that for truth which they were under a necessity ofbelieving, even though it was not in their power to prove it by argument.When a mathematician arrives, in the course of his reasoning, at a prin-ciple which he must believe, and which is of itself so evident that noarguments could either illustrate or inforce it, he then knows, that hisreason can carry him no further, and he sits down contented: and if hecan satisfy himself, that the whole investigation is fairly conducted, anddoes naturally terminate in this self-evident principle, he is persuadedthat his conclusion is true, and cannot possibly be false. Whereas themodern sceptics, from a strange conceit, that their feelings are fallacious,

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17 The author of the Treatise of Human Nature has actually attempted this in his firstvolume: but finding, no doubt, that the public would not take any concern in thatpart of his system, he has not republished it in his ESSAYS. [Treatise, 1.2]

18 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 3. p. 37. [Treatise, 3.2.1.]19 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 3. part 3. sect. 4.20 Hume’s Essays, vol. 2. p. 91. edit. 1767. [Enquiry, 7.1.]21 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 284. 302. 432. &c.

and that Nature hath her roguish emissaries in every corner, commis-sioned and sworn to play tricks with poor mortals, cannot find in theirheart to admit any thing as truth, upon the bare authority of a feeling orsentiment. It is doubtless a great advantage to geometry, that its firstprinciples are so few, its ideas so distinct, and its language so definite.Yet a captious and paradoxical wrangler might, by dint of sophistry,involve the principles of this science in confusion, provided he thought itworth his while.17 But geometrical paradoxes would not rouse the atten-tion of the public; whereas moral paradoxes, when men begin to lookabout for arguments in vindication of profligacy, become wonderfullyinteresting, and can hardly fail of a powerful and numerous patronage.The corrupt judge; the prostituted courtier; the statesman who enricheshimself by the plunder and blood of his country; the pettifogger, whofattens on the spoils of the fatherless and widow; the oppressor, who, topamper his own beastly appetite, abandons the deserving peasant tobeggary and despair; the hypocrite, the debauchee, the gamester, theblasphemer, – prick up their ears when they are told, that a celebratedauthor has written a book full of such comfortable doctrines as the fol-lowing: That justice is not a natural, but an artificial virtue, dependingwholly on the arbitrary institutions of men, and, previous to the estab-lishment of civil society, not at all incumbent:18 – That moral, intellectu-al and corporeal virtues, are all of the same kind; in other words, Thatto want honesty, to want understanding, and to want a leg, are equallythe objects of moral disapprobation; and that it is no more a man’s dutyto be grateful or pious, than to have the genius of Homer, or thestrength and beauty of Achilles:19 – That every human action is neces-sary, and could not have been different from what it is:20 – That whenwe speak of power as an attribute of any being, God himself not except-ed, we use words without meaning: – That we can form no idea ofpower, nor of any being endued with any power, much less of oneendued with infinite power; and that we can never have reason tobelieve, that any object, or quality of an object, exists, of which we can-not form an idea:21 – That it is unreasonable to believe God to be infi-nitely wise and good, while there is any evil or disorder in the universe;

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22 Hume’s Essay on a Particular Providence and Future State. 23 Berkeley’s and Hume’s works passim.24 Hume’s Essay on the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy, part 1. [Enquiry, Section

12]25 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 468. [Treatise, 1.4.7.]26 Hume’s Essays, vol. 2. p. 409. edit. 1767. [Treatise, 3.2.12.]27 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 434. [Treatise, 1.4.5.]28 Id. ibid.29 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 438. [Treatise, 1.4.6.]

and that we have no good reason to think, that the universe proceedsfrom a cause:22 – That the external material world does not exist;23 andthat if the external world be once called in doubt as to its existence, weshall be at a loss to find arguments by which we may prove the being ofGod, or any of his attributes:24 – That those who believe any thing cer-tainly are fools:25 – That adultery must be practised, if men wouldobtain all the advantages of life; that, if generally practised, it wouldsoon cease to be scandalous; and that, if practised secretly and frequent-ly, it would by degrees come to be thought no crime at all:26 – That thequestion concerning the substance of the soul is unintelligible:27 – Thatmatter and motion may often be regarded as the cause of thought:28 –That the soul of man becomes every different moment a differentbeing;29 so that the actions I performed last year, or yesterday, or thismorning, whether virtuous or vicious, are no more imputable to me,than the virtues of Aristides are imputable to Nero, or the crimes ofNero to the MAN OF ROSS.

I know no geometrical axiom, more perspicuous, more evident, moregenerally acknowledged, than this proposition, (which every manbelieves of himself), “My body exists;” yet this hath been denied, andvolumes written to prove it false. Who will pretend to set bounds to thisspirit of scepticism and sophistry? Where are the principles that can stopits progress, when it has already attacked the existence, both of thehuman body, and of the human soul? When it denies, and attempts todisprove this, I cannot see why it may not as well deny a whole to begreater than a part, the radii of the same circle to be equal to one another; and affirm, that two right lines do contain a space, and that itis possible for the same thing to be and not to be.

Had our sceptics been consulted when the first geometrical institutionswere compiled, they would have given a strange turn to the face ofaffairs. They would have demanded reasons for the belief of everyaxiom; and as none could have been given, would have suspected a fal-

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30 See Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 3. 4. [Treatise, Introduction.]31 “A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philo-

sophical conviction.” Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 474. [Treatise, 1.4.7.]32 “I dine, I play a game at back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends;

and when, after three or four hours amusement, I would return to these specula-tions, they appear so cold, so strained, and so ridiculous, that I cannot find in myheart to enter into them any further. Here then I find myself absolutely and neces-sarily determined to live, and talk, and act, like other people in the common affairsof life.” Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 p. 467. [Treatise, 1.4.7.]

“In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believethat fire warms, or water refreshes, ’tis only because it costs us too much pains tothink otherwise. Nay, if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon scepticalprinciples.” Id. p 469. [Treatise, 1.4.7.]

33 “If I must be a fool, as all those who reason or believe any thing certainly are, myfollies shall at least be natural and agreeable.” Id. p. 468. [Treatise, 1.4.7]The inaccuracy of the expression in this sentence renders the meaning indefinite. It

is not clear, whether Mr. HUME means, that all who believe any thing are certainlyfools, or that all who believe any thing as certain are fools.

lacy; and probably (for the art of metaphysical bookmaking is not ofdifficult attainment) have made books to prove a priori, that an axiom,from its very nature, cannot possibly be true; or at least that we cannotwith certainty pronounce whether it is so or not.

“Take heed to yourselves, gentlemen; you are going to lay the founda-tions of a science; be careful to lay them as deep as possible. Let thelove of doubt and disputation animate you to invincible perseverance.You must go deeper; truth (if there be any such thing) loves profundi-ty and darkness. Hitherto I see you quite distinctly; and, let me tellyou, this is a strong presumption against your method of operation. Iwould not give twopence for that philosophy which is obvious andintelligible.30 Tear up that prejudice, that I may see what supports it. Isee you cannot move it, and therefore am violently disposed to ques-tion its stability; you cannot pierce it, therefore who knows but it maybe made of unsound materials? There is no trusting to appearances. Itis the glory of a philosopher to doubt; yea, he must doubt, both whenhe is doubtful and when he is not doubtful.31 Sometimes, indeed, wephilosophers are absolutely and necessarily determined to live, andtalk, and act, like other people, and to believe the existence both ofourselves and of other things: but to this absolute and necessary deter-mination, we ought not to submit, but in every incident of life still topreserve our scepticism. Yes, friend, I tell you, we ought still to dowhat is contrary to that to which we are absolutely and necessarilydetermined.32 I see you preparing to speak; but I tell you once for all,that if you reason or believe any thing certainly you are a fool.33 –

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34 Verbatim from Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 464. 465. [Treatise, 1.4.7]Some perhaps may blame me for laying any stress on detached sentences, and for

understanding these strong expressions in a strict and literal signification. But it isnot my intention to take any unfair advantages. I should willingly impute theseabsurd sentences and expressions to the author’s inadvertency: but then I mustimpute the whole system to the same cause; for they imply nothing that is not againand again inculcated, either directly or indirectly, in Mr HUME’s book. It is truesome of them are self-contradictory, and all of them strongly display the futility ofthis pretended science. But who is to blame for this? They who allow themselves tocontradict matter of fact, either in conversation or writing, will find it no easymatter to avoid contradicting themselves. – Again, if this science be so useless, andif its inutility be sometimes acknowledged even by Mr HUME himself, why, it maybe said, so much zeal in confuting it? For this plain reason, Because it is immoraland pernicious as well as unprofitable and absurd.

Good Sir, how deep must we dig? Is not this a sure foundation? – Ihave no reason to think so, as I cannot see what is under it. – Then wemust dig downward in infinitum! – And why not? You think you arearrived at certainty. This very conceit of yours is a proof that you havenot gone deep enough: for you must know, that the understanding,when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entire-ly subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in anyproposition, either in philosophy or common life.34 You are no truephilosopher if you begin your inquiries with the belief of any thing. –Well, Sir, you may doubt and dispute as long as you please; but Ibelieve that I am come to a sure foundation; here therefore will I beginto build, for I am certain there can be no danger in trusting to the sta-bility of that which is immoveable. – Certain! Poor credulous fool!hark ye, sirrah, you may be what the vulgar call an honest man, and agood workman; but I am certain (I mean I am in doubt whether I maynot be certain) that you are no philosopher. Philosopher indeed! totake a thing of such consequence for granted, without proof, withoutexamination! I hold you four to one, that I shall demonstrate a priori,that this same edifice of yours will be good for nothing.”

I am well aware, that mathematical certainty is not to be expected inany science but mathematics. But I suppose, that in every science, somekind of certainty is attainable, or something at least sufficient to com-mand belief: and whether this rest on self-evident axioms, or on the evidence of sense, memory, or testimony, it is still certainty to me if Ifeel that I must believe it. And in every science, as well as in geometry, Ipresume it would be consistent both with logic and with good sense, totake that for an ultimate principle, which forceth our belief by its ownintrinsic evidence, and which cannot by any reasoning be rendered moreevident.

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35 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 131.36 Ibid. p. 41. [Treatise, 1.1.7.]

CHAP. II.

The preceding theory rejected by Sceptical Writers.

SECT. I.

General Observations. Rise and progress of Modern Scepticism...

Mr. HUME, more subtle, and less reserved, than any of his predeces-sors, hath gone still greater lengths in the demolition of common sense;and in its place hath reared a most tremendous fabric of doctrine; uponwhich, if it were not for the flimsiness of its materials, engines might eas-ily be erected, sufficient to overturn all belief, virtue, and science, fromthe very foundation. He calls this work, “A Treatise of Human Nature;being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoninginto moral subjects.” This is, in the style of Edmund Curll, a taking title-page: but, alas! “Fronti nulla fides!” The whole of this author’s system isfounded on a false hypothesis taken for granted; and whenever a factcontradictory to this false hypothesis occurs to his observation, he bold-ly denies it. This, it seems, in his judgment, is experimental reasoning: inmine, it is just the reverse.

He begins his book with affirming, That all the perceptions of thehuman mind resolve themselves into two classes; impressions, and ideas;that the latter are all copied from the former; and that an idea differsfrom its correspondent impression only in being a weaker perception.Thus, when I sit by the fire, I have an impression of heat, and I can forman idea of heat when I am shivering with cold; in the one case I have astronger perception of heat, in the other a weaker. Is there any warmthin this idea of heat? There must, according to Mr HUME’s doctrine; onlythe warmth of the idea is not quite so strong as that of the impression.For this profound author repeats it again and again, that an idea is by itsvery nature weaker and fainter than an impression, but is in every otherrespect (not only similar, but) the same.35 Nay, he goes further, and says,that whatever is true of the one must be acknowledged concerning theother;36 and he is so confident of the truth of this maxim, that he makesit one of the pillars of his philosophy. To those who may be inclined toadmit this maxim on his authority, I would propose a few plain ques-tions. Do you feel any, even the least, warmth in the idea of a bonfire, aburning mountain, or the general conflagration? Do you feel more real

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37 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 1. 2. 362.38 Ibid. p. 416. 417.

cold in Virgil’s Scythian winter, than in Milton’s description of theflames of hell? Do you acknowledge that to be true of the idea of eating,which is certainly true of the impression of it, that it alleviates hunger,fills the belly, and contributes to the support of human life? If youanswer these questions in the negative, you deny one of the fundamentalprinciples of Mr HUME’s philosophy. We have a livelier perception of afriend when we see him, than when we think of him in his absence. Butthis is not all: every person of a sound mind knows, that in the one casewe believe, and are certain, that the object exists, and is present with us;in the other we believe, and are certain, that the object is not present.This, however, Mr. HUME must deny; for he maintains, that an idea dif-fers from an impression only in being weaker, and in no other respectwhatsoever.

That every idea should be a copy and resemblance of the impressionwhence it is derived; – that, for example, the idea of red should be a redidea; the idea of a roaring lion a roaring idea; the idea of an ass, a hairy,long-eared, sluggish idea, patient of labour, and much addicted to this-tles; that the idea of extension should be extended, and that of soliditysolid; – that a thought of the mind should be endued with all, or any, ofthe qualities of matter, – is, in my judgement, inconceivable and impos-sible. Yet Mr HUME takes it for granted; and it is another of his funda-mental maxims. Such is the credulity of Scepticism!

If every idea be an exact resemblance of its correspondent impression,(or object; for these terms, according to this author, amount to the samething37) – if the idea of whiteness be white, of solidity solid, and ofextension extended, as the same author allows,38 – then the idea of a linethe shortest that sense can perceive, must be equal in length to the lineitself; for if shorter, it would be imperceptible; and it will not be said,either that an imperceptible idea can be perceived, or that the idea of animperceptible object can be formed: – and the idea of a line a hundredtimes as long, must be a hundred times as long as the former idea; for ifshorter, it would be the idea, not of this, but of some other shorter line.And so it clearly follows, nay it admits of mathematical demonstration,that the idea of an inch is really an inch long; and that of a mile, a milelong. In a word, every idea of any particular extension is equal in lengthto the extended object. The same reasoning holds good in regard to theother dimensions of breadth and thickness. All ideas, therefore, of solidobjects, are (according to HUME’s philosophy) equal in magnitude andsolidity to the objects themselves. Now mark the consequences. I am justnow in an apartment containing a thousand cubic feet, being ten feet

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39 [Treatise, 1.4.7.]

square, and ten high; the door and windows are shut, as well as my eyesand ears. Mr HUME will allow, that, in this situation, I may form ideas,not only of the visible appearance, but also of the real tangible magnitudeof the whole house, of a first-rate man of war, of St Paul’s cathedral, oreven of a much larger object. But the solid magnitude of these ideas isequal to the solid magnitude of the objects from which they are copied:therefore I have now present with me an idea, that is, a solid extendedthing, whose dimensions extend to a million of cubic feet at least. Thequestion now is, where is this thing placed? for a place it certainly musthave, and a pretty large one too. I should answer, In my mind; for I knownot where else the ideas of my mind can be so conveniently deposited.Now my mind is lodged in a body of no extraordinary dimensions, andmy body is contained in a room ten feet square and ten feet high. It seemsthen, that, into this room, I have it in my power at pleasure to introduce asolid object a thousand, or ten thousand, times larger than the room itself.I contemplate it a while, and then, by another volition, send it a packing,to make way for another object of equal or superior magnitude. Nay, inno larger vehicle than a common post-chaise, I can transport from one endof the kingdom to the other, a building equal to the largest Egyptian pyra-mid, and a mountain as big as Etna, or the peak of Teneriffe. – Take care,ye disciples of HUME, and be very well advised before ye reject this mys-tery as impossible and incomprehensible. It is geometrically deduced fromthe principles, nay from the first principles, of your master. By denyingthis, you give his system such a stab as it cannot possibly survive.

Say, ye candid and intelligent, what are we to expect from a logical andsystematic treatise, founded on a supposition, that a part may be ten or ahundred thousand times greater than the whole? Shall we expect truth?Than it must be inferred by false reasoning. – Shall we expect legitimatereasoning? Then surely the inferences must be false. – Indeed, though Icannot much admire this author’s sagacity on the present occasion, I mustconfess myself not a little astonished at his courage. A witch going to seain an eggshell, or preparing to take a trip through the air on a broomstick,is really a surprising phenomenon; but it is nothing to Mr HUME, on sucha bottom, “launching out (as he well expresseth it) into the immensedepths of philosophy.”39

To multiply illustrations for the confutation of so glaring an absurdity,is really ridiculous. I therefore leave it to the reader to determine, whether,if this doctrine of solid and extended ideas be true, it will not follow, thatthe idea of a roaring lion must emit audible sound, almost, if not altogeth-er, as loud, and as terrible, as the royal beast in person could exhibit; –that two ideal bottles of brandy will intoxicate as far at least as two gen-

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40 [Treatise, cf. 1.1.1, 1.1.7.]41 See Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 353. 365 [Treatise, 1.4.2]. The word

perception (and the same is true of the words sensation, smell, taste, and manyothers) has, in common language, two, and sometimes three, distinct significations.It means, 1. The thing perceived. Thus we speak of the taste of a fig, the smell of arose. 2. The power or faculty perceiving; as when we say, “I have lost my smell by asevere cold, and therefore my taste is not so quick as usual.” 3. It sometimes denotesthat impulse or impression which is communicated to the mind by the externalobject operating upon it through the organ of sensation. Thus we speak of a sweetor bitter taste, a distinct or confused, a clear or obscure, sensation or perception.Most of our sceptical philosophers have either been ignorant of, or inattentive to,this distinction: MALEBRANCHE, indeed, (liv. 1. ch. 10.), seems to have had somenotion of it; but either I do not understand this author, or there is a strangeobscurity and want of precision in almost every thing he says. Mr HUME’sphilosophy does not allow this to be a rational distinction; so that it is impossible toknow precisely what he means by the word perception in this and many otherplaces. I have proved, however, that his assertion is false, whatever sense (consistentwith common use) we affix to the word.

uine bottles of wine; – and that I must be greatly hurt, if not dashed topieces, if I am so imprudent, as to form only the idea of a bomb burstingunder my feet. For hath not our author said, that “impressions and ideascomprehend all the perceptions (or objects) of the human mind; that what-soever is true of the one must be acknowledged concerning the other; nay,that they are in every respect the same, except that the former strike withmore force than the latter?”40

The absurdity and inconceivableness of the distinction between objects and perceptions, is another of our author’s capital doctrines.“Philosophers,” says he, “have distinguished between objects, and percep-tions of the senses: but this distinction is not comprehended by the gener-ality.”41 Now how are we to know, whether this distinction be conceivedand acknowledged by the generality? If we put the question to any ofthem, we shall find it no easy matter to make ourselves understood, and,after all, perhaps be laughed at for our pains. Shall we reason a prioriabout their sentiments and comprehensions? This is often Mr HUME’smethod; but it is neither philosophical nor fair. Will you allow me to reck-on myself one of the generality? Then I declare, for my own part, that I docomprehend and acknowledge this distinction, and have done so ever sinceI was capable of reflection. I remember, when a child, to have had my fin-gers scorched with burning coals, and stung by bees: but I never confound-ed the object with the perception; I never thought that the pain I felt couldeither make honey or melt lead. – The instance, you say, is somewhatequivocal. – Well, then, I hope the following is explicit enough. – Supposeme to address the common people in these words: “I see a strange sight alittle way off; but my sight is weak, so that I see it imperfectly; let me gonearer, that I may have a more distinct sight of it.” – If the generality be at

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42 Mr HUME is not always consistent with himself in affirming, that the vulgar do notcomprehend the distinction between perceptions and objects. “It is not,” he says,vol. 1. p. 337 [Treatise, 1.4.2]. “by arguments, that children, peasants, and thegreatest part of mankind, are induced to attribute objects to some impressions, anddeny them to others.” – So! it seems the greatest part of mankind do acknowledge adistinction between objects and perceptions. “Accordingly we find, that all the

all incapable of distinguishing between the object and the perception, thisincapacity will doubtless discover itself most, when ambiguous words areused on purpose to confound their ideas; if their ideas on this subject arenot confounded even by ambiguous language, there is reason to think, thatthey are extremely clear, distinct, and accurate. Now I have here proposeda sentence, in which there is a studied ambiguity of language; and yet Imaintain, that every person of common sense, who understands English,will instantly, on hearing these words, perceive, that by the word sight Imean, in the first clause, the thing seen; in the second, the power, or per-haps the organ, of seeing; in the third, the perception itself, as distin-guished both from the percipient faculty, and from the visible object. Ifone of the multitude, on hearing me pronounce this sentence, were to replyas follows; “The sight is not at all strange; it is a man on horseback: butyour sight must needs be weak, as you are lately recovered from sickness:however, if you wait a little till the man and horse, which are now in theshade, come into the sunshine, you will then have a much more distinctsight of them:” – I would ask, Is the study of any part of philosophy neces-sary to make a man comprehend the meaning of these two sentences? Isthere any thing absurd or unintelligible either in the former or in the lat-ter? Is there any thing in the reply, that seems to exceed the capacity of thevulgar, and supposes them more acute than they really are? If there be not,and I am certain there is not, here is an unquestionable proof, that the gen-erality, and indeed all men whom metaphysic hath not deprived of theirsenses, do distinguish between the object perceived, the faculty perceiving,and the perception or impulse communicated by the external object to themind through the organ of sensation. What though all the three are some-times expressed by the same name? This only shows, that accuracy of lan-guage is not always necessary for answering the common purposes of life.If the ideas of the vulgar are sufficiently distinct notwithstanding, whatshall we say of that philosopher, whose ideas are really confounded by thisinaccuracy, and who, because there is no difference in the signs, imaginesthat there is none in the things signified! That the understanding of such aphilosopher is not a vulgar one, will be readily allowed; whether itexceeds, or falls short, let the reader determine.42

This author’s method of investigation is no less curious than his fun-damental principles. There are many notions in the human mind, ofwhich it is not easy perhaps to explain the origin. If you can describe in

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conclusions which the vulgar form on this head, are directly contrary to those whichare confirmed by philosophy.” – The more shame to that philosophy! say I. – “Forphilosophy informs us, that every thing which appears to the mind, is nothing but aperception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind; whereas the vulgarconfound perceptions and objects,” – that is, I suppose, do not distinguish theformer from the latter. – How! in the last sentence it was said, that the greatest partof mankind do distinguish between impressions (which are a species of perceptions)and objects, – and attribute a distinct continued existence to the very things they feelor see.” – So, now again the objects have a distinct continued existence; that is, aresomething different from perceptions, which every body knows have no continuedexistence. Here Mr HUME, within the compass of half a page, contradicts himself,and contradicts that contradiction, and finally acquiesces in the first contradiction.To hunt such a writer through so many shiftings and doublings, is not worth thereader’s while nor mine. I hope we both know how to employ our time to betterpurpose. How often our author may affirm and deny, and deny and affirm, thisdoctrine, in the course of his work, I neither know nor care: it is certain, that, uponthe whole, he holds the distinction between objects and perceptions to be unrea-sonable, (p. 338.), unphilosophical, (ibid.) and unsupported by the evidence ofsense, (p. 330. – 337.) – And indeed, when this distinction, as we have explained it,is acknowledged, and attended to, all BERKELEY’s pretended demonstration of thenon-existence of matter, and all HUME’s reasonings against the existence both ofmatter and spirit, appear to be no better than a play upon words. For this keyunlocks that whole mystery of sophistry and quibble.

43 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 123.44 Ibid. p. 282.45 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 437. 438. [Treatise, 1.4.6.]

words what were the circumstances in which you received an impressionof any particular notion, it is well; Mr HUME will allow, that you mayform an idea of it: but if you cannot do this, then, says he, there is nosuch notion in your mind; for all perceptions are either impressions orideas, and it is not possible for us so much as to conceive any thingspecifically different from ideas and impressions:43 now all ideas arecopied from impressions; therefore you can have no idea nor conceptionof any thing of which you have not received an impression. – Allmankind have a notion of power or energy. No, says Mr HUME; animpression of power or energy was never received by any man, andtherefore an idea of it can never be formed in the human mind. If youinsist on your experience and consciousness of power, it is all a mistake;his hypothesis admits not the idea of power, and therefore there is nosuch idea.44 – All mankind have an idea of self. That I deny, says MrHUME; I maintain, that no man ever had, or can have, an impression ofself; and therefore no man can form any idea of it.45 If you persist, andsay, that certainly you have some notion or idea of yourself: – My dearSir, says he, you do not consider, that this assertion contradicts myhypothesis of impressions and ideas; how then is it possible it should betrue! This, it seems, is experimental reasoning!

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46 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 434. 435. [Treatise, 1.4.6.]47 Ibid. p. 361. 362. [Treatise, 1.4.2.]48 [The bracketed word here is inserted by Beattie.]49 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 438. 439. 440. [Treatise, 1.4.6.]

But though Mr HUME deny, that I have any notion of self, surely theman does not mean to affirm, that I do not exist, or that I have no notionof myself as an existent being. In truth, it is not easy to say what he meanson this subject. Most philosophical subjects become obscure in the handsof this author; for he has a notable talent at puzzling his readers and him-self; but when he treats of consciousness, of personal identity, and of thenature of the soul, he expresseth himself so strangely, that his words eitherhave no meaning, or imply a contradiction. “The question,” says he,“concerning the substance of the soul is unintelligible.”46 – Well, Sir, if youthink so, you may let it alone. – No; that must not be neither. “What wecall a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions (orobjects) united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely,to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity.47 – If any one, uponserious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion ofhimself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer. All I can allowhim is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentiallydifferent in this particular. He may perhaps perceive something simpleand continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is nosuch principle in me. But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind,”– that is, who feel and believe, that they have a soul, – “I may venture toaffirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collec-tion of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivablerapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. – There is properly nosimplicity in the mind at one time, nor identity in different [times]48, what-ever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and iden-tity. – They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind.”49

If these words have any meaning, it is this: My soul (or rather thatwhich I call my soul) is not one simple thing, nor is it the same thing to-day it was yesterday; nay, it is not the same this moment it was the last; itis nothing but a mass, collection, heap, or bundle, of different perceptions,or objects, that fleet away in succession, with inconceivable rapidity, per-petually changing, and perpetually in motion. There may be some meta-physicians to whose souls this description cannot be applied; but I (MrHUME) am certain, that this is a true and complete description of my soul,and of the soul of every other individual of the human race, those fewmetaphysicians excepted.

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That body has no existence, but as a bundle of perceptions, whose exis-tence consists in their being perceived, our author all along maintains. Henow affirms, that the soul, in like manner, is a bundle of perceptions, andnothing else. It follows, then, that there is nothing in the universe butimpressions and ideas; all possible perceptions being comprehended inthose two classes. This philosophy admits of no other existence whatsoev-er, not even of a percipient being to perceive these perceptions. So that weare now arrived at the height of human wisdom, that intellectual emi-nence, from whence there is a full prospect of all that we can reasonablybelieve to exist, and of all that can possibly become the object of ourknowledge. Alas! what is become of the magnificence of external nature,and the wonders of intellectual energy, the immortal beauties of truth andvirtue, and the triumphs of a good conscience! Where now the warmth ofbenevolence, the fire of generosity, the exultations of hope, the tranquilecstasy of devotion, and the pang of sympathetic delight! All, around,above, and beneath, is one vast inanity, or rather an enormous chaos,encompassed with darkness universally and eternally impenetrable. Bodyand spirit are utterly annihilated; and there remains nothing (for we mustagain descend into the jargon of metaphysic) but a vast collection, bundle,mass, or heap, of unperceived perceptions.

Such, if Mr HUME’s words have any meaning, is the result of his system. And what is this result? If he or his admirers can prove, that thereis a possibility of expressing it in words which do not imply a contradic-tion, I will not call it nonsense. If he or they can prove, that it is compati-ble with any one acknowledged truth in philosophy, in morals, in religionnatural or revealed, I will not call it impious. If he or they can prove, thatit does not arise from common facts misrepresented, and common wordsmisunderstood, I shall admit that it may have arisen from accurate obser-vation, candid and liberal inquiry, perfect knowledge of human nature,and the enlarged views of true philosophic genius.

SECT. III.

Of Liberty and Necessity.

The second instance to which I propose to apply the principles of thisdiscourse, by showing the danger of carrying any investigation beyondthe dictates of common sense, is no other than the celebrated questionconcerning liberty and necessity: a question on which many things havebeen said, and some things, I presume, to little purpose. To enter into allthe particulars of this controversy, would be foreign to my presentdesign; and I would not wish to add to a dispute already too bulky. My

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intention is, to treat the doctrine of necessity as I treated that of the non-existence of matter; by inquiring, whether the one be not, as well as theother, contrary to common sense, and therefore absurd.

1. That certain intentions and actions are in themselves, and previousto all consideration of their consequences, good, laudable, and meritori-ous; and that other actions and intentions are bad, blameable, and wor-thy of punishment, – hath been felt and acknowledged by all reasonablecreatures in all ages and nations. We need not wonder at the universalityof this sentiment: it is as natural to the human constitution, as the facul-ties of hearing, seeing, and memory; it is as clear, unequivocal, andaffecting as any intimation from any sense external or internal.

2. That we cannot do some things, but have it in our power to do oth-ers, is what no man in his senses will hesitate to affirm. I can take up mystaff from the ground, but I cannot lift a stone of a thousand weight. Ona large common, I may walk southward or northward, eastward orwestward; but I cannot ascend to the clouds, nor sink downward to thecentre of the earth. Just now I have power to think of an absent friend,of the peak of Teneriffe, of a passage in Homer, or of the death ofCharles I. When a man asks me a question, I have it in my power toanswer to be silent, to answer softly or roughly, in terms of respect or interms of contempt. Frequent temptations to vice fall in my way; I mayyield or I may resist: if I resist, I applaud myself, because I am consciousit was in my power to do otherwise; if I yield, I am filled with shame andremorse, for having neglected to do what I might have done, and oughtto have done. My liberty in these instances I cannot prove by argument;but there is not a truth in geometry of which I am more certain.

Is not this doctrine sufficiently obvious? Must I quote Epictetus, orany other ancient author, to prove that men were of the same opinion informer times? No idea occurs more frequently in my reading and con-versation, than that of power or agency; and I think I understand myown meaning as well when I speak of it, as when I speak of any thingelse. But this idea has had the misfortune to come under the examina-tion of Mr HUME, who, according to custom, has found means so todarken and disfigure it, that, till we have cleared it of his misrepresenta-tions, we cannot proceed any further in the present subject. And we arethe more inclined to digress on this occasion, that he has made his theo-ry of power the ground of some atheistical inferences, which we wouldnot scruple at any time to step out of our way to overturn. Perhaps thesefrequent digressions are offensive to the reader: they are equally so tothe writer. To remove rubbish is neither an elegant nor a pleasant work,though often necessary. It is peculiarly necessary in the philosophy ofhuman nature. The road to moral truth has been left in such a plight bysome modern projectors, that a man of honesty and plain sense must

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50 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 282. [Treatise, 1.3.14.]51 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 272. – 300. [Treatise, 1.3.14.]

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either, with great labour, and loss of time, delve his way through, or beswallowed up in a quagmire. The metaphysician advances more expedi-tiously. His levity, perhaps, enables him, like Camilla in Virgil, to skimalong the surface without sinking; or, perhaps, the extreme subtlety ofhis genius can, like Satan in Paradise Lost, penetrate this chaos, withoutbeing much incumbered or retarded in his progress. But men of ordinarytalents have not those advantages, and must therefore be allowed toflounce along, though with no very graceful motion, the best way theycan.

All ideas, according to Mr HUME’s fundamental hypothesis, arecopied from and represent impressions: But we have never any impres-sion that contains any power or efficacy: We never, therefore, have anyidea of power.50 In proof of the minor proposition of this syllogism, heremarks, That

“when we think we perceive our mind acting on matter, or one pieceof matter acting upon another, we do in fact perceive only two objectsor events contiguous and successive, the second of which is alwaysfound in experience to follow the first; but that we never perceive,either by external sense, or by consciousness, that power, energy, orefficacy, which connects the one event with the other. By observingthat the two events do always accompany each other, the imaginationacquires a habit of going readily from the first to the second, and fromthe second to the first; and hence we are led to conceive a kind of nec-essary connection between them. But in fact there is neither necessitynor power in the objects we consider, but only in the mind that con-siders them; and even in the mind, this power or necessity is nothingbut a determination of the fancy, acquired by habit, to pass from theidea of an object to that of its usual attendant.”51 –

So that what we call the efficacy of a cause to produce an effect, is nei-ther in the cause nor in the effect, but only in the imagination, whichhath contracted a habit of passing from the object called the cause, tothe object called the effect, and thus associating them together. Has thefire a power to melt lead? No; but the fancy is determined by habit topass from the idea of fire to that of melted lead, on account of our having always perceived them contiguous and successive; – and this isthe whole matter. Have I a power to move my arm? No; the volitionwhich precedes the motion of my arm has no connection with that

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motion; but the motion having been always observed to follow the voli-tion, comes to be associated with it in the fancy; and what we call thepower, or necessary connection, has nothing to do, either with the voli-tion or with the motion, but is merely a determination of my fancy, oryour fancy, or any body’s fancy, to associate the idea or impression ofmy volition with the impression or idea of the motion of my arm. – I amsorry I cannot express myself more clearly; but I should not do justice tomy author, if I did not imitate his obscurity on the present occasion:plain words will never do, when one has an unintelligible doctrine tosupport.

What shall we say to this collection of strange phrases? or what nameshall we give it? Shall we call it a most ingenious discovery, illustratedby a most ingenious argument? This would be complimenting the authorat a very great expence; for this would imply, not only that Mr HUME isthe wisest of mortal men, but also that he is the only individual of thatspecies of animals who is not a fool. Certain it is, that all men have in allages talked, and argued, and acted, from a persuasion that they had avery distinct notion of power. If our author can prove, that they had nosuch notion, he can also prove, that all human discourse is nonsense, allhuman actions absurdity, and all human compositions (his own notexcepted) words without meaning. The boldness of this theory will,however, pass with many, for a proof of its being ingenious. Be it so,Gentlemen; I dispute not about epithets: if you will have it, that geniusconsisteth in the art of putting words together so as to form absurdpropositions, I have nothing more to say. Others will admire this doc-trine, because the words by which the author means to illustrate andprove it, if printed on a good paper and with an elegant type, would ofthemselves make a pretty sizable volume. It were pity to deprive thesepeople of the pleasure of admiring; otherwise I might tell them, thatnothing is more easy than this method of composition; for that I wouldundertake, at a very short warning, (if it could be done innocently, andwithout prejudice to my health), to write as many pages, with equalappearance of reason and argument, and with equal advantage to phi-losophy and mankind, in vindication of any given absurdity; providedonly it be expressed in words of which one at least is ambiguous.

In truth, I am so little disposed to admire this extraordinary paradox,that nothing could make me believe its author to have been in earnest, ifI had not found him drawing inferences from it too serious to be jestedwith by any person who is not absolutely distracted. It is one of MrHUME’s maxims, That we can never have reason to believe, that anyobject, or quality of an object, exists, of which we cannot form anidea.52 But, according to this astonishing theory of power and causation,we have no idea of power, nor of any being endowed with any power,

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52 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 302.53 Some readers will smile, perhaps, at the phraseology of this sentence; but I quote the

author’s own words. See Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 432.54 Ibid. p. 284. 291. 306. 431. e&.

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MUCH LESS of one endowed with infinite power.53 The inference is –what I do not chuse to commit to paper. But our elegant author is not sosuperstitious. He often puts his readers in mind, that this inference, orsomething very like it, is deducible from his doctrine:54 – for which, nodoubt, every friend to truth, virtue, and human nature, is infinitelyobliged to him!

But what do you say in opposition to my theory? You affect to treat itwith a contempt which hardly becomes you, and which my philosophyhas not met with from your betters: pray let us hear your arguments. –And do you, Sir, really think it incumbent on me to prove by argument,that I, and all other men, have a notion of power; and that the efficacyof a cause (of fire, for instance, to melt lead) is in the fire, and not in mymind? Would you think it incumbent on me to confute you with argu-ments, if you were pleased to affirm, that all men have tails and clovenfeet; and that it was I who produced the earthquake that destroyedLisbon, the plague that depopulates Constantinople, the heat thatscorches the wilds of Africa, and the cold that freezes the Hyperboreanocean? Truly, Sir, I have not the face to undertake a direct confutationof what I do not understand; and I am so far from comprehending thispart of your system, that I will venture to pronounce it perfectly unintel-ligible. I know there are some who say they understand it; but I alsoknow, that there are some who speak, and read, and write too, withvery little expence of thought.

These are all but evasions, you exclaim; and insist on my coming tothe point. Never fear, Sir; I am too deeply interested in some of the con-sequences of this theory of yours, to put you off with evasions. To cometherefore to the point, I shall first state your doctrine in your ownwords, that there may be no risk of misrepresentation; and then, if Ishould not be able directly to prove it false, (for the reason alreadygiven), I shall demonstrate, indirectly at least, or by the apagogicalmethod, that it is not, and cannot possibly be true. “As the necessity,”says Mr HUME,

“which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of the understand-ing by which we consider and compare these ideas;55 in like manner,the necessity or power which unites causes and effects, lies in the

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55 What! is it my understanding that makes two and two equal to four! Was it not sobefore I was born, and would it not be so though all intelligence were to ceasethroughout the universe! – But it is idle to spend time in confuting what every childwho had learned the very first elements of science, knows to be absurd.

56 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 291. [Treatise, 1.3.14.]57 Speaking of it in another place he says, “A conclusion which is somewhat extraor-

dinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence beweakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion,concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions canbe more agreeable to scepticism, than such as make discoveries concerning theweakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.”Hume’s Essays, vol. 2. p. 87. edit. 1767. [Enquiry, 7.2.]

I know not what discoveries this conclusion may lead others to make concerningour author’s reason and capacity; but I have ground to think, that the discoveriesmade by himself on the occasion, have not improved his modesty to any extraor-dinary pitch; otherwise he would not have asserted, with so much confidence, whathe acknowleges to be a most violent paradox, and what is indeed contrary to theexperience and conviction of every person of common sense. See Treatise of HumanNature, vol. 1. p. 291. 299. [Treatise, 1.3.14.]

determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. The effi-cacy, or energy, of causes, is neither placed in the causes themselves,nor in the Deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; butbelongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or moreobjects in all past instances. It is here that the real power of causes isplaced, along with their connection and necessity.”56

To find that his principles lead to atheism, would stagger an ordinaryphilosopher, and make him suspect his fundamental hypothesis, and allhis subsequent reasonings. But the author just now quoted is not stag-gered by considerations of this kind. On the contrary, he is so intoxicat-ed with his discovery, that, however sceptical in other points, he seemswilling to admit this as one certain conclusion.57

If a man can reconcile himself to atheism, which is the greatest of allabsurdities, I fear I shall hardly put him out of conceit with his doctrine,when I show him, that other less enormous absurdities are implied in it.We may make the trial however. Gentlemen are sometimes pleased toentertain unaccountable prejudices against their Maker; who yet, inother matters, where neither fashion nor hypothesis interfere, conde-scend to acknowledge, that the old distinction between truth and false-hood is not altogether without foundation.

On the supposition, that we have no idea of power or energy, and thatthe preceding theory of causation is just, our author gives the followingdefinition of a cause; which seems to be fairly enough deduced from histheory, and which he says is the best that he can give.

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58 Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 298. [Treatise, 1.3.14.]59 [In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers (1785), 6.6., Reid also uses the same

counterexample of night constantly following day.]60 Non sic causa intelligi debet, ut quod cuique antecedat id ei causa sit, sed quod

cuique essicienter antecedat.Cicero, De Fato, cap 15.

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“A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and sounited with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to formthe idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a morelively idea of the other.”58

There are now in my view two contiguous houses, one of which wasbuilt last summer, and the other two years ago. By seeing them constant-ly together for many months, I find, that the idea of the one determinesmy mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one toform a more lively idea of the other. So that, according to our author’sdefinition, the one house is the cause, and the other the effect! – Again,day and night have always been contiguous and successive; the imagina-tion naturally runs from the idea or impression of the one to the idea ofthe other: consequently, according to the same profound theory and def-inition, either day is the cause of night, or night the cause of day, just aswe consider the one or the other to have been originally prior in time;that is, in other words, light is either the cause or the effect of darkness;and its being the one or the other, depends entirely on my imagination!59

Let those admire this discovery who understand it.Causation implies more than priority and contiguity of the cause to

the effect. This relation cannot be conceived at all, without a supposi-tion of power or energy in the cause.60 Let the reader recollect twothings that stand related as cause and effect; let him contemplate themwith a view to this relation; then let him conceive the cause divested ofall power, and he must at the same instant conceive, that it is a cause nolonger: for a cause divested of power, is divested of that by which it is acause. If a man, after examining his notion of causation in this manner,is conscious that he hath an idea of power, then I say he hath that idea.If all men, in all ages, have used the word power, or something synony-mous to it, and if all men know what they mean when they speak ofpower, I maintain, that all men have a notion, conception, or idea ofpower, in whatever way they came by it: and I also maintain, that notrue philosopher ever denied the existence or reality of any thing, merelybecause he could not give an account of its origin, or because the opin-ion commonly received concerning its origin did not happen to quadratewith his system.

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61 ... Marc. Aurel.

When Mr HUME says, that the efficacy or energy of causes is notplaced in the causes themselves, he says neither less nor more than this,that what is essential to a cause is not in a cause; or, in other words, –that a cause is not a cause. – Are there any persons who, upon theauthority of this theorist, have rashly adopted atheistical principles? Iknow there are such. Ye blinded followers of a blind guide, ye dupes ofunmeaning words and incomprehensible arguments, behold on what achampion ye have placed your confidence! All the comfort I can giveyou is, that if it be possible for the same thing at the same time to be andnot to be, you may possibly be in the right.

It follows from what hath been said, that we cannot admit this theoryof power and causation, without admitting, at the same time, the gross-est and most impious absurdities. Is this a sufficient confutation of it? Ithink it is. If any person think otherwise, I take a shorter method, andutterly deny all the premises from which this strange conclusion is sup-posed to result. I deny the doctrine of impressions and ideas, as theauthor has explained it; nay, I have already affirmed, and proved, it tobe not only false, but incomprehensible. And I maintain, that though itcould be shown, that all simple ideas are derived from impressions orintimations of sense, it is true notwithstanding, that all men have an ideaof power. They get it by experience, that is, by intimations of sense,both external and internal. Their mind acting upon their body givesthem that notion or idea; their body acting on other bodies, and actedon by other bodies, gives them the same idea; which is also suggested byall the effects and changes they see produced in the universe. So thoroughly are we acquainted with it, that we can, in cases innumerable,calculate, with mathematical precision, the degree of power necessary toproduce a given effect.

I repeat therefore, notwithstanding all our author hath said, or cansay, to the contrary, that some things are in our power, and others arenot; and that we perfectly understand our own meaning when we say so.– That the reader may not lose any chain in our reasoning, he will pleaseto look back to the second and third paragraphs of this section.

... It hath been said, That philosophers are unanswerable, not for theconsequences, but only for the truth, of their tenets; that if a doctrine betrue, its being attended with disagreeable consequences will not render itfalse. We readily acquiesce in this remark; but we imagine it cannot bemeant of any truth but what is certain and incontrovertible. No genuinetruth did ever of itself produce effects inconsistent with real utility.61 Butmany principles pass for truth, which are far from deserving that hon-ourable appellation. Some give it to all doctrines which have been

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62 Essay on Liberty and Necessity, part 2.

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defended with subtlety, and which, whether seriously believed or not,have never been logically confuted. But to affirm, that all such doctrinesare certainly true, would argue the most contemptible ignorance ofhuman language, and human nature. It is therefore absurd to say, thatthe bad consequences of admitting such doctrines ought not to be urgedas arguments against them. Now, there are many persons in the world,of most respectable understanding, who would be extremely averse toacknowledge, that the doctrine of necessity hath ever been demonstratedbeyond all possibility of doubt; I may therefore be permitted to considerit as a controvertible tenet, and to expose the absurdities and dangerousconsequences with which the belief of it may and must be attended.

Mr HUME endeavours to raise a prejudice against this method of refu-tation. He probably foresaw, that the tendency of his principles wouldbe urged as an argument against them; and being somewhat apprehen-sive of the consequences, as well he might, he insinuates, that all suchreasoning is no better than personal invective. “There is no method ofreasoning,” says he,

“more common, and yet none more blameable, than in philosophicaldebates to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretenceof its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When anyopinion leads into absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certainthat an opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence. Suchtopics therefore ought entirely to be forborn; as serving nothing to thediscovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist odi-ous.”62

If your philosophy be such, that its consequences cannot be unfoldedwithout rendering your person odious, pray, Mr HUME, who is toblame? You, who contrive and publish it; or I, who criticise it? There isa kind of philosophy so salutary in its effects, as to endear the person ofthe author to every good man: why is not yours of this kind? If it is not,as you yourself seem to apprehend, do you think, that I ought toapplaud your principles, or suffer them to pass unexamined, eventhough I am conscious of their pernicious tendency? or that, out ofrespect to your person, I ought not to put others on their guard againstthem? Surely you cannot be so blinded by self-admiration, as to think itthe duty of any man to sacrifice the interest of mankind to your interest,or rather to your reputation as a metaphysical writer: if you do think so,I must take the liberty to differ from your judgement in this, as in manyother matters.

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Nor can I agree to what our author says of this method of reasoning,that it tends nothing to the discovery of truth. Does not every thing tendto the discovery of truth, which disposeth men to think for themselves,and to consider opinions with attention, before they adopt them? Andhave not many well-meaning persons rashly adopted a plausible opinionon the supposition of its being harmless, who, if they had been aware ofits bad tendency, would have proceeded with more caution, and made amuch better use of their understanding?

This is truly a notable expedient for determining controversy in favourof licentious theories. An author publishes a book, in which are manydoctrines fatal to human happiness, and subversive of human society. If,from a regard to truth, and to mankind, we endeavour to expose themin their proper colours, and, by displaying their dangerous and absurdconsequences, to deter men from rashly adopting them without exami-nation; our adversary immediately exclaims, “This is not fair reasoning;this is personal invective.” Were the sentiments of the public to be regu-lated by this exclamation, licentious writers might do what mischief theypleased, and no man durst appear in opposition, without being hootedat for his want of breeding. It is happy for us all, that the law is not tobe browbeaten by insinuations of this kind; otherwise we should hearsome folks exclaim against it every day, as one of the most ungenteelthings in the world. And truly they would have reason: for it cannot bedenied, that an indictment at the Old Bailey has much the air of a per-sonal invective; and banishment or burning in the hand amounts nearlyto a personal assault; nay, both have often this express end, to make theperson of the criminal odious: and yet, in his judgement perhaps, therewas no great harm in picking a pocket of a handkerchief, value elevenpence, provided it was done with a good grace. Let not the majesty ofscience be offended by this allusion; I mean not to argue from it, for it isnot quite similar to the case in hand. That those men act the part ofgood citizens, who endeavour to overturn the plainest principles ofhuman knowledge, and to subvert the foundations of all religion, I amfar from thinking; but I should be extremely sorry to see any otherweapons employed against them, than those of reason and ridicule chas-tised by decency and truth. Other weapons this cause requires not; nay,in this cause all other weapons would do more harm than good. And letit still be remembered, that the object of our strictures is not men, butbooks; and that they incur our censure, not because they bear certainnames, but because they contain certain principles. These remarks relaterather to the doctrines of scepticism in general, than to this of necessityin particular; which I am not ignorant that many men, respectable both for their talents and principles, have asserted. I presume, however,they would have been more cautious, if they had attended to the

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63 Essay on Liberty and Necessity, sub sin.

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consequences that may be drawn from it. – To which I now return.Some of the Fatalists are willing to reconcile their system with our nat-

ural notions of moral good and evil; but all they have been able to do is,to remove the difficulty a step or two further off. But the most consider-able of that party are not very solicitous to render these points consis-tent. If they can only establish necessity, they leave natural religion toshift for itself. Mr HUME in particular affirms, that on his principles it isimpossible for natural reason to vindicate the character of the Deity.63

Had this author been possessed of one grain of that modesty which herecommends in the conclusion of his essay; had he thought it worth hiswhile to sacrifice a little pittance of ignominious applause to the happi-ness of human kind; he would have shuddered at the thought of incul-cating a doctrine which he knew to be irreconcilable with this great firstprinciple of religion; and of which, therefore, he must have known, thatit tended to overturn the only durable foundation of human happiness.

...

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1 This and the letter below from Monboddo are from William Knight’s LordMonboddo and Some of his Contemporaries, London, John Murray, 1900.

19LORD MONBODDO

[James Burnett, Lord Monboddo], Of the origin and progress of language. Edinburgh, J. Bell, 1773–1794, 6 Vol.Selection from 1.1.9; from 1774 second edition, pp. 119–120.

James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714–1799), was a judge of theScottish Court of Session and a devotee of classical Greek philosophy.

An eccentric character, Monboddo was the author of two monumentalsix-volume works, both of which appeared over a period of 25 years: Ofthe Origin and Progress of Language (1773–1794) and AncientMetaphysics (1779–1799). Monboddo’s Origin is an anthropologicalwork on rhetoric, infamous for its claim that primitive humans had tails.Monboddo writes that everything that he learned on the subject ofRhetoric came from Plato and Aristotle, and he believes that theancients were the model and culmination of rhetorical style. The firstvolume of this work discusses the development of reason and speech,beginning with the origin of ideas, and briefly attacks the view of ideasoffered by both Berkeley and Hume. In a letter of 1769, Monboddomentions Hume while describing his first acquaintance with Berkeley’sviews:

... I inquired about a book that I had heard much of, but never read; Imean Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne’s book against the existence ofMatter. I found it in London, and have read it, and I cannot help say-ing that it is as poor a piece of sophistry as ever I saw composed by aman who seems to be in earnest; though I remember to have heardDavid Hume say that his arguments are absolutely unanswerable.[Monboddo to James Harris, June 18, 1769]1

In the Origin, Monboddo argues that Berkeley and Hume both denythat ideas are substances insofar as ideas are merely less lively copies ofimpressions that are stored in our memories. Since all ideas are tied toindividual perceptions, this implies that we have no general ideas. As a

252

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2 Boswell writes: “Two particulars [that illustrate Hume’s clearness of mind] Iremember: Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which he recommended much, andMonboddo’s Origin of Language, which he treated contemptuously.”

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consequence, there can be no “religion, morals, philosophy, or science”since these disciplines rely on general notions. A second consequence isthat humans have no intellects, but merely faculties of sense, memory,and imagination, which simply process ideas. And this places us on thesame level as animals.

Hume did not have a high opinion of Monboddo, and in a letter toAdam Smith he gives a mixed judgment of Monboddo’s Origin:

There are two late Publications here which I advise you to commis-sion. The first is Andrew Stuarts Letters to Lord Mansfield which theysay have met with vast Success in London: Andrew has easd his ownMind, and no bad Effects are to follow: Lord Mansfield is determindabsolutely to neglect them. The other is Lord Monboddo’s Treatise onthe Origin and Progress of Language, which is only part of a largerwork. It contains all the Absurdity and malignity which I expected;but is writ with more Ingenuity and in a better Stile than I look’d for.[Hume to Adam Smith, 1773]

Around the same time, Hume concluded a letter to Andrew Stuartwhimsically noting “Lord Monboddo, who maintains that all men hadoriginally Tails, asserts, that you have likewise horns” (March 22,1773). Three years later, James Boswell noted that Hume, in his finalinterview with Boswell, had treated Monboddo’s Origin contemptuous-ly.2 Monboddo’s view of Hume’s philosophy was equally contemptuous,as we see in this letter of 1780:

The great obstruction to this Philosophy [of Plato’s], and to allAncient Philosophy, in this country, is first the want of the knowledgeof the language of it; and secondly the hold which the wretched philosophy of David Hume has got of the minds of men here.[Monboddo to Samuel Horsley, July 24, 1780]

William Rose in the Monthly Review gave a largely favourable review ofVolume 1 of the Origin, and suggested that its merits outweighed itsfaults:

... the Author is, in several respects, well qualified for the difficult task he has undertaken. He appears to have studied the powers,habits, and faculties of human nature with great care; he shews a very

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3 Critical Review, Vol. 35, pp. 366 ff. The reviewer focuses largely on Monboddo’sclaim that language is acquired, and not natural. Monboddo responds to some ofthe reviewer’s points in a letter to John Pringle, June 16, 1773.

considerable degree of learning and critical acumen; he writes withgreat perspicuity and his stile and manner are well suited to his sub-ject. Some strange and fanciful things he has undoubtedly advanced;but not so many as may appear from a slight and superficial perusal;the candid Reader, however, will be disposed to make favourableallowances for whatever he meets with of this kind. [Monthly Review,September 1773, Vol. 49, pp. 166–173]

The Critical Review was also receptive to Monboddo’s work.3

VOLUME IBOOK I

CHAPTER IX...The very reverse of this opinion of Plato is the notion of certain

philosophers of our own time concerning ideas. For as Plato maintains,that ideas are substances, which have a separate existence by themselvesout of any mind, these philosophers, on the other hand, assert, that theyhave no existence at all, not even in the mind; that all our conceptionsare perceptions of sense, being nothing else but impressions made uponthe mind by external objects, through the medium of the organs ofsense. These impressions being preserved in the memory, are what wecall ideas; which therefore are nothing but fainter perceptions of sense.This doctrine was first advanced by Dr Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, andafterwards supported, and much enlarged upon, by a later philosopher,in a work, entitled, A treatise of Human Nature; to which, as he has notput his name, nor ever publicly acknowledged it, so far as I know, Ithink he has a right not to be named. That this later writer, who profess-es the sceptical philosophy, and whose intention appears to be, to over-turn all science and evidence of every kind, should be fond of a doctrinethat suits so well with his purpose, is no wonder at all: But I do wonderthat Dr Berkeley, whose intentions were certainly good, however erro-neous his philosophy may be, should have advanced it; more especiallyas it does not appear to me to have any connection with his favouritedoctrine of the nonexistence of matter, which he maintained with thepious design of striking at the very root of Atheism, then entirely found-ed upon the doctrine of materialism. For he thought that, if he could

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show that matter did not exist, it would follow of necessary conse-quence, that there was nothing in the universe but mind; not foreseeing,that a philosopher was to arise, who should deny the existence of mindas well as body.

The consequence of the opinion of these gentlemen, concerning ideas,certainly is, that there is no science, demonstration, nor general truth ofany kind; nay, there cannot be so much as a general proposition, norindeed any proposition, as one term at least of a proposition must be ageneral term, expressing some general notion. If, therefore, these gentle-men are in the right, there is an end of all belief in religion, morals, phi-losophy, or science of any kind. 2ndly, There is no such faculty of thehuman mind as intellect; the business of which, as we have shewn, is, toabstract, and to consider separately, what is joined in nature, and in thatway is presented to the senses. For, if we have no perception of things inany other way, it is evident, that we have no intellect, nor any thingbesides sense, memory, and imagination. These are all the powers ofhuman nature, according to those philosophers; and these the brutespossess as well as we. So that this philosophy, at the same time that itdestroys all science and certainty of every kind, degrades us to a levelwith the brute, by stripping us of that intellect which, by the antientphilosophers, was thought to be the distinguishing characteristic ofhuman nature.

...

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20GILBERT STUART

[Gilbert Stuart], reviews in Edinburgh Magazine and Review, January1774, Vol. 1, pp. 141-150, August, Vol. 2, pp. 588-597.Selections.

Son of an Edinburgh Latin professor, Gilbert Stuart (1742–1786)studied law at the University of Edinburgh. He made his career as an

author, though, writing for review journals and authoring severalhistorical works on the subjects of Scotland, European society, and theEnglish constitution. In 1773 Gilbert Stuart and printer William Smelliefounded the Edinburgh Magazine and Review, which for three years wasan important forum for the Scottish literati. Stuart’s and Hume’s profes-sional lives overlapped for eight years. Stuart criticized the Tory slant ofHume’s History (see Early Responses to Hume’s History), and the twolocked horns in a controversy surrounding a review that Hume submittedto the Edinburgh Magazine and Review (see Early Responses to Hume’sLife and Reputation). In spite of their differences, Stuart had high regardfor Hume’s philosophical abilities, and in two articles in the EdinburghMagazine and Review he praises Hume’s account of the association ofideas. The first is a review of Alexander Gerard’s Essay on Genius(1774). Gerard offers an account of the association of ideas, which wasinspired by Hume’s; Stuart disputes Gerard’s version, noting “the diffi-culty of throwing new light on any philosophical subject which has beenillustrated by Mr Hume.” The second is a review of Charles Crawford’sDissertation on the Phaedon of Plato (1773). Stuart notes here thatHume’s account of the association of ideas – which is “one of the mostingenious discoveries in metaphysics that has been made in the presentage” – has parallels in Plato. Articles in the Edinburgh Magazine andReview appeared anonymously. However, Smellie’s personal copy of thejournal contained annotations indicating the authorship of many of thearticles. Unfortunately his copy is now lost, but Robert Kerr, in hisMemoirs of the Life, Writings, and Correspondence of William Smellie(Edinburgh, 1811), lists some of these attributions. Kerr records Stuart asthe author of the article on Gerard’s Essay on Genius. Although no nameappears for the article on Crawford’s Dissertation, the similarity of the

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comments on Hume – as well as Stuart’s active role as editor and frequentauthor – make it likely that he authored this too.

REVIEW OF ALEXANDER GERARD’S ESSAY ON GENIUS.January 1774, Vol. 1, pp. 141-150,

...The author [i.e., Gerard] proceeds to consider the sources of the variety

of genius, particularly the qualities of ideas which produce association.This will appear to a few readers the most curious part of his performance.The generality of them, however, will consider the detail into which heenters as too minute, and they will regret, that he has not illustrated hissubject, naturally dry and abstruse, by a greater variety of agreeable andentertaining examples.

‘Among these qualities or relations of ideas, says he, which fit them forbeing associated, there is an obvious distinction: Some of them are simple,others are compounded. The simple principles of association may bereduced to three, resemblance, contrariety and vicinity.’ He reduces thecompound also to three, co-existence, the relation of cause and effect, andorder. The celebrated Mr Hume is the first philosopher, who, as far as weknow, has handled this subject; and, without making any distinctionbetween the simple and compound principles of association, he reducesthem all to the three following, resemblance, contiguity in time or place,and cause or effect. He observes also, in a note (Hume’s Essays, p. 31),‘That contrast or contrariety is a connection among ideas which may,perhaps, be considered as a mixture of causation and resemblance. Wheretwo objects are contrary, the one destroys the other, i.e. is the cause of itsannihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the ideaof its former existence.’ Our author has made considerable alterations onthis theory. He expresses by one word, vicinity, what Mr Hume calls conti-guity in time or place. But vicinity, though it very properly denotes conti-guity or nearness in place, is never used in the English language to expresscontiguity or nearness in time. We must regard Mr Hume’s language,therefore, as more proper and expressive than that of the author. We mustobserve also, that it by no means escaped that great and originalphilosopher, that the principles of association might be regarded either assimple or compounded; and, were the latter to be fully investigated, it isprobable there would be found several others besides those which theauthor as mentioned. Nor do we see any good reason for considering therelation of cause and effect as a compounded principle of association; for,upon contemplating a cause, we are naturally led to think of its effect,without paying attention to any other circumstance concerning either the

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one or the other. The same may be said of co-existence: And as to order,which the author mentions as the last compounded principle of associ-ation, it must be always referred to contiguity, resemblance, or causation.By this stricture, however, we mean not to depreciate the performance ofour author, which contains many ingenious observations, but to show thedifficulty of throwing new light on any philosophical subject which hasbeen illustrated by Mr Hume. ...

____

REVIEW OF CHARLES CRAWFORD’S DISSERTATION ON THE PHAEDON OF

PLATO.August 1774, Vol. 2, pp. 588-597

...We must indulge ourselves in one observation more on this passage of

Plato, an observation which tends to show, that even his dreams weregolden ones, and not always without advantage to philosophy. The firstpart of his reasoning, in order to show that all knowledge is remembrance,regards the connection or association of ideas called up to the memory:And it is not improbable that his hints on this subject may have givenoccasion to one of the most ingenious discoveries in metaphysics that hasbeen made in the present age. It is that of the celebrated Mr Hume, in hisessay on the association of ideas, where he reduces the principles of theirconnection to the three following heads, 1. Contiguity in time or place, 2.Resemblance, 3. Cause or effect: We do not positively assert, that MrHume must have had Plato in his eye; all we pretend is, that, whoever willattentively consider the above passage in Plato, and the examples therequoted, and compare them with the theory of Mr Hume, will be disposedto think that the one might very naturally have given occasion to the other....

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21THOMAS BLACKLOCK

[Thomas Blacklock], review of Priestley’s Examination (1774) EdinburghMagazine and Review, November 1774, Vol. 2, pp. 771–779, December,Vol. 3, pp. 33–37, January 1775, pp. 96–102, February, pp. 146–154,March, pp. 199–209, April, pp. 260–275.Selections from installment of December 1774, Vol. 3, pp. 33–37.

Born in Dumfriesshire, Scotland, the son of a brick layer, ThomasBlacklock (1721–1791) lost his eyesight in infancy from smallpox. A

sympathetic physician supported him through grammar school, afterwhich he attended the University of Edinburgh. Blacklock became intimatefriends with Hume in the early 1750s, although their relationship wasstrained some years later (see Early Responses to Hume’s Life andReputation). Blacklock was a regular contributor to Gilbert Stuart’sEdinburgh Magazine and Review. His reviews are stylistically unique forthe time, consisting almost entirely of commentary, with few quotations.One of these was a six-part review of Joseph Priestley’s Examination(1774). Although Blacklock’s review appeared anonymously, Robert Kerrlists him as the author (see the selection by Gilbert Stuart earlier in thiscollection). In his Examination, Priestley attacked the common sensephilosophy of Reid, Oswald and Beattie. Blacklock valiantly comes to thedefence of his countrymen, at times showing contempt for Priestley. In oneinstalment Blacklock includes a characterization of Hume’s scepticalphilosophy: all mental events are only variable and ambiguous impressions– including those of an external world and our own identity – which shouldincline us to doubt their existence. In a letter to Blacklock around this time,James Beattie thanks him for his review of Priestley’s work: “Your stric-tures on Priestley are very curious, and I am greatly obliged to you forthem. You have left little for Dr Reid to do; and if you continue your stric-tures, you will leave me an easy task” (March 19, 1775, AberdeenUniversity Library MS30/1/091).

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...My dear Sir [i.e., Priestley], cries Mr Hume, you reason like an angel; but

still you are guilty of the same fault which you reprove in Mr Locke: Youstop short. I will, I think, be admitted by that philosopher and his votaries,that sensation and reflection are the sources of all our ideas. I shallpresently show, that what he calls reflection will be found to be nothingelse but a different mode of sensation; and therefore sensation must be theonly source of our ideas. In the mean time, it will be granted, that the firsteffects of objects upon the mind are impressions; these, when recalled intheir absence, whether by choice or accident, have been called ideas; butmay really be termed impressions of impressions; for they differ as much, inforce and vivacity, from the original impression, as that is supposed todiffer from the real object which it is imagined to represent. Whentherefore the mind examines the relations and differences between itsprimary or secondary impressions, what are the results of its various delib-erations, but different impressions alternately imbibed and effaced,according as they seem congruous or dissonant? And what is her ultimateconclusion, but an impression more permanent and satisfactory than therest? Thus, I think, it appears, that intellect is nothing else but a series ofimpressions. And if this be granted, what other idea have we of memory orimagination? Are these any more than mere concatenations of impressions,associated one with another in a more or less arbitrary manner? Thatvolitions are nothing else but impressions, you will evidently perceive,when you consider that, in all their varieties, they are determined bypleasure or pain. Thus it is clear, that understanding and will with all theirmodes and affections, are nothing under heaven but regular successions ofdifferent impressions. And what else is the human mind, in the mostcomprehensive idea which we can form of it, but a voluntary and intel-ligent being? You tell me, you feel your own existence. Descartes was moremodest; he inferred it from thought. In effect, the premisses and conclusionwere equally fallacious. Still you assert the reality of this feeling. Let us thenanalyse it; let us try of what it consists. Is it any more than a sense ofpersonality, protracted during the continuance of certain impressions, and,though distinct from these sensations, yet felt in consequence of them? Tellme, then, where is your protracted sense of personality after a keendebauch, a sound sleep, or a deep faint? Allowing it, however, to beinvariably permanent and uniform, is it any more than an impression?Nay, is it any more than a succession of impressions? For it has beenadmitted only to be felt in consequence of other impressions, which areallowed to be successive. Now, do we know any more of duration, than asit is measured by the succession of our own ideas, or by sensible revolu-tions of things without us? Besides these, what remains of duration but anabstract idea; and what is an abstract idea, but a modification of mind? If

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then we know nothing of the essence of duration, but the perception ofcontinued existence, during certain external or internal revolutions; and ifthe perception of these revolutions be different in different minds, and evenin our own in different circumstances, where can be the reality of thatexistence whose only evidence is a successive impression, when successionand duration are only discoverable and only known by circumstanceswhich admit of such variety, as to render their real and positive existenceambiguous? But, if the proofs for your own existence are so inconclusive,even to your own reason, what data have you for extrinsic existences? Theonly reason why you conclude any impression real or fallacious, is thedifferent degree of vivacity and distinctness with which it is attended. Now,if the clearest and strongest impressions which you have, be absurd andunaccountable, what must be the effect of those which are more secondaryand remote? In short, through our whole scrutiny of the mind, nothing hasappeared but a variable succession of variable feelings. Had there been anything real in its existence, we should certainly have found some vestiges ofan object impressed; but all our testimony of this is another impression, avariable and ambiguous impression. Tell me, then, what are impressions,without an object impressed? Till you can make the last appear, by directand invariable evidence, I shall beg leave to doubt the first.

This, cries Dr Priestley, is all sophistry. He has our full assent: But wemust affirm, that, in order to prove such reasoning sophistical, otherconnections must be established in our ideas than those which result fromvibration and association, connections supported by the irreversiblesanctions of God and nature, connections so inseparably interwoven withthe texture, so indispensibly essential to the nature of an intellectual frame,that, without the reality of the former, the exertions, and even subsistenceof the latter, are inconceivable. Those ligatures, which bind the frame ofmaterial and intelligent nature as it were with adamantine chains, andconciliate order, unity, system, amongst our ideas, are not always immedi-ately perceived: Their extent is so immeasurable, and their juncture sosubtile, as frequently to elude the keenest research. ...

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22JOSEPH PRIESTLEY

Joseph Priestley, The doctrine of philosophical necessity illustrated; beingan appendix to the Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit. To which isadded an answer to the Letters on materialism, and on Hartley’s Theory ofthe mind. By Joseph Priestley. London: printed for J. Johnson, 1777,xxxiv, [2], 206, [2] p.Selections from Section 10; from 1777 edition.

Born in Fieldhead, Yorkshire, Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) was adissenting minister, an influential scientist, and a prolific author of

philosophical, theological, and educational books. Many of Priestley’swritings contain references to and critical discussions of Hume. HisDoctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (1777) became the mostprominent defence of determinism in the late 18th century. In Section 10 ofthis work, Priestley discusses the question of whether God is the author ofevil since all human evil traces back to God through a necessary causalchain of events. On the one hand, he concedes that God is indeed theultimate cause of all events in the universe, including human conduct. Onthe other hand, he argues that moral culpability rests in the motive behindactions, and God’s motives are always good, irrespective of how his actionsmay appear to us. Priestley applauds Hume’s general treatment of deter-minism in the Enquiry, but criticises Hume’s suggestion that God is thecause of human evil. Priestley contends that Hume fails to recognize the rolethat motive plays in morality, and that God’s motives are pure. God’sultimate aim, Priestley argues, is general utility, and he has “adopted suchmeasures as are best calculated to secure that great and glorious end.”Writing for the Monthly Review, William Bewley gives a neutral account ofPriestley’s work: “We have declined making any observation with respect tothe question itself; – especially as we learn that Dr. Price and the Authorhave entered into an amicable controversy on the subject, the result ofwhich will soon be presented by them jointly to the Public” (May 1778,Vol. 58, pp. 354–362). Priestley’s Doctrine appeared again in 1782, and isincluded in his Works (1817–1832). The following is from the 1777 edition.

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SECTION X.

In what sense GOD may be considered as the AUTHOR OF SIN, and of theObjection to the Doctrine of Necessity, on that Account.

When it is considered that the distinction between things natural and moralintirely ceases on the scheme of necessity, the vices of men come under theclass of common evils, producing misery for a time; but, like all other evils,in the same great system, are ultimately subservient to greater good. In thislight, therefore, every thing, without distinction, may be safely ascribed toGod. Whatever terminates in good, philosophically speaking, is good. Butthis is a view of moral evil which, though innocent, and even useful inspeculation, no wise man can, or would choose to act upon himself,because our understandings are too limited for the application of such ameans of good; though a being of infinite knowledge may introduce it withthe greatest advantage.

Vice is productive not of good, but of evil to us, both here and hereafter,and probably during the whole of our existence; though good may resultfrom it to the whole system. While our natures, therefore, are what theyare, and what association has necessarily made them, and so long as we seeevery thing in its true light, we must shun vice as any other evil, and indeedthe greatest of all evils, and choose virtue as the greatest good. Nay we shallcultivate good dispositions with more care and attention, since, accordingto the fixed laws of nature, our present and future happiness necessarilydepends upon it. And as to the good of the whole universe, or of allmankind, it can be no object, except to a mind capable of comprehendingit. Whether we be virtuous or vicious, and consequently happy ormiserable, it will be equally a necessary part of the whole, so that thisconsideration, were we so absurd as to pretend to govern our conduct by it,would not bias us one way more than another.

Our supposing that God is the author of sin (as, upon the scheme ofnecessity, he must, in fact, be the author of all things) by no means impliesthat he is a sinful being, for it is the disposition of mind, and the design thatconstitutes the sinfulness of an action. If, therefore, his disposition anddesign be good, what he does is morally good. It was wicked in Joseph’sbrethren to sell him into Egypt, because they acted from envy, hatred, andcovetousness; but it was not wicked in God, to ordain it to be so; becausein appointing it he was not actuated by any such principle. In him it wasgracious and good, because he did it, as we read, to preserve life, and toanswer other great and excellent purposes in the extensive plan of hisprovidence.

If it was proper upon the whole (and of that propriety God himself iscertainly the only judge) that so important an event should be brought

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about by the low passions, and interested views of men, it was right andwise in him to appoint that it should be brought about in that very manner,rather than any other; and if it be right and wise that those vices, when theyhave answered the great and good purposes of him who appoints andoverrules all things for good, should be restrained, the sufferings which heinflicts for that purpose, are right and just punishments. That God mighthave made all men sinless, and happy, might, for any thing that we know,have been as impossible, as his making them not finite, but infinite beings,in all respects equal to himself.

Mr. Hume, who, in general, discusses the question concerning libertyand necessity with great clearness, intirely abandons the doctrine ofnecessity to the most immoral and shocking consequences; a conductwhich must have tended to create a prejudice against it: but how illfounded has, I hope, been sufficiently shewn.

He says (Philosophical Essays, p. 157) that “upon the scheme ofnecessity, human actions can either have no turpitude at all, as proceedingfrom so good a cause (the Deity) or if they can have any moral turpitude,they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledgedto be their ultimate cause and author.” It is not possible” says he again, (p.262) “to explain distinctly how the Deity can be the mediate cause of allthe actions of men, without being the author of sin, and moral turpitude.”But did not this writer know, what is known to all the world, that themotive, or intention, with which a thing is done, is the circumstance thatprincipally constitutes its morality? Men who act from a bad intention arecertainly vicious; but though God may be the ultimate cause of that baddisposition, yet, since he produces it from a good motive, in order to bringgood out of it, he is certainly not vicious, but good, and holy in thatrespect.

... I would observer farther, with respect to this question, that the properfoundation, or rather the ultimate object, of virtue is general utility, since itconsists of such conduct, as tends to make intelligent creatures the mosttruly happy, in the whole of their existence; though, with respect to theagent, no action is denominated virtuous that is not voluntary, and thatdoes not proceed from some good motive, as a regard to the will of God,the good of others, or the dictates of conscience. If, therefore, the DivineBeing be influenced by a disinterested regard to the happiness of hiscreatures, and adopt such measures as are best calculated to secure thatgreat and glorious end, this end will certainly sanctify the means that arereally necessary to accomplish it, with respect to him, who chooses thosemeans only with a view to that end, and who cannot be mistaken in hisapplication of them. The reason why it is wrong in man, a finite creature,to do any evil that good may come of it, is that, our understandings beinglimited, the good that we project may not come of it, and therefore it is best

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that we, and all finite creatures, should govern our conduct by certaininviolable rules, whatever advantage may seem to us to be derived fromoccasional deviations from them. ...

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23LORD MONBODDO

[James Burnett, Lord Monboddo], Ancient metaphysics, or the scienceof universals. Edinburgh, J. Balfour, 1779–1799, 6 Vol.Selections from 1.3.21, 1.5.6, 1.5.9, 2.2.2; from Volume 1 of 1776 andVolume 2 of 1782.

In addition to his Origin and Progress of Language (1773–1794), discussed above, James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714–1799)

authored a second epic work titled Ancient Metaphysics, or the Science ofUniversals (1714–1799). In this six-volume work, Monboddo attempts toreintroduce Plato and Aristotle into philosophy, establishing mind as themoving principle of all bodies. As in his Origin, Monboddo attacks Humefor claiming that ideas and impressions differ only in liveliness, andMonboddo believes that all of Hume’s problems stem from this.Monboddo has several comments on Hume scattered throughout his vol-umes, but especially in Volume 1. Four of his more sustained discussionsare presented below.

In the first of these, from 1.2.21, Monboddo discusses the theologicalimplications of Hume’s view of necessity. According to Monboddo,Hume sees human nature as a kind of passive machine that is acted on byexternal impulses. Hume draws from this the blasphemous conclusionthat, since all causal chains of events trace back to God, then God is thesource of all moral evil. In a note, Monboddo continues to explain howHume makes his point indirectly, and covers “this shocking impiety withthe veil of mystery.” Noting that some writers such as Bayle hold thatthere is both a good and evil governing principle of the universe,Monboddo believes that Hume is the only one who asserted that there isonly an evil governing principle.

In 1.5.6 Monboddo attacks Hume’s denial of the external world,which, he argues, is part of Hume’s design to overturn all certainty.Monboddo believes that the problem regarding the external world wouldnot even arise if philosophers adequately distinguished between the object,sense organ, and sensation. Monboddo examines two common ways ofrefuting Hume’s denial of the external world. The first way simply pointsout the absurdity of such a view; however, Monboddo believes that thismethod fails since an opinion is not necessarily false “because it leads to

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dangerous consequences.” The other common way of refuting Hume is tohold that we have a natural instinct to believe in the external existence ofthings, and we should inquire no further. Monboddo denies, however,that we have such an instinct and he argues that most people simply actaccording to appearances without having any opinion about the reality ofthe objects in question. Monboddo notes parenthetically that Hume’sview is both unique and strange insofar as Hume denies both matter andmind, leaving only perceptions. This, for Monboddo, is illogical since itasserts an accident without a substance.

Setting aside common attacks on Hume, Monboddo offers his ownproof of the external world. He begins with the postulate that “The evidence of consciousness is infallible,” and, following Descartes, con-cludes that his own consciousness shows that he (Monboddo) exists.Examining consciousness, we cannot help but see that we have sensoryperceptions. The key question, then, is to determine their source, andspecifically whether they arise from “the phantasia” (that is, illusion) orsome reality. According to Monboddo, the phantasia derives its materialsfrom sense and is also subject to acts of our will. This implies that oursensory perceptions do not arise from the phantasia. And, since everythingthat moves requires a mover, the movement of our sense organs requiressomething to move them. Monboddo sees three options for the source ofthis movement and the ideas represented by our moving sense organs: (1)they are innate, (2) they are communicated by another mind, or (3) theyare from external objects. Monboddo rules out the first two since theycannot adequately explain why blind people lack specific perceptions. Weare left, then, with the option that endorses external objects. Monboddorecognizes, though, that our perceptions do not necessarily resemble theexternal objects themselves, any more than the sensation from a prick of asword resembles the sword itself. Thus, Locke’s distinction between pri-mary and secondary qualities is justified, and the job of the intellect is todetermine the nature of the objects that cause our sensations.

In 1.5.9, Monboddo discusses Hume’s view of causality, a view hebelieves is a unique discovery of Hume’s. Monboddo agrees with Humethat we must initially understand causes in terms of the conjunctionbetween to objects, and not in terms of a connection between them thatwe experience. However, Monboddo points out that, by means of thistheory, Hume sought to undermine the causal proof for God insofar as the production of the world is a single unique event. According toMonboddo, we can infer a connection between causes and effects when we understand causes as premises in a deductive syllogism, premisesthat lead to an effect as a conclusion. Based on this syllogistic notion,Monboddo offers his own definition of causality: a cause is that without which another thing, called the effect, could not exist.

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Volume 2 of Monboddo’s Antient Metaphysics was published in1782. In 2.2.2 he argues that, without properly distinguishing betweenideas and sensations, we cannot properly distinguish between humanand animal. The problem began with Locke, who used “idea” to refer toall mental events, including sensations. Hume adopted Locke’s viewand, according to Monboddo, drew the conclusion that “as our Mindcan only operate by the organs of the Body, it must perish with theBody.”

John Gillies in the Monthly Review harshly criticized the first volumeof Monboddo’s work, and took issue especially with Monboddo’sattack on Hume for the unauthorized publication of the essays on sui-cide and the immortality of the soul.

Among those innumerable insects of a day, Lord Monboddo singlesout one, and condescends to deliver down to posterity, in his immortalwork, the perishing name of Mr. Hume, author of the EnglishHistory, Essays, &c. ‘which have gained reputation among certainpersons.’ His Lordship is not satisfied with attacking the performancesgenerally ascribed to that gentleman, but he ventures to ascribe to himsome anonymous productions, published since Mr. Hume’s death, anddisavowed by his friends. Lord M. however, ‘is convinced that theybelong to him, not only from the impiety of the matter, but from thestyle, which is dry, inanimate, and without the least colouring of clas-sical elegance.’ We are not called upon to enter into this controversybetween Lord M. and the friends of the late Mr. Hume; but, we hope,it will not be imagined that we exceed the bounds of our province, bysuggesting that the known animosity which prevailed between Mr.Hume and Lord Monboddo may have rendered the latter too precipi-tate in venturing to ascribe to Mr. Hume, works which that gentlemannever acknowledged, and which his friends disavow. – We may bepermitted farther to suggest to my Lord, that he might have learnedfrom the pious ancients to respect the ashes of a deceased adversary;and that it may be worth his while to consider whether the conqueringof an unruly temper, and subduing the passions of resentment, envy,and malevolence, be not a better preparation for the world of spiritsthan the most profound study of Aristotle’s metaphysics. [MonthlyReview, September, 1779, Vol. 61, pp. 191–200]

Gilbert Stuart opens his review of Volume 2 by echoing the MonthlyReview’s assessment of Volume 1: “Of this uncommon Writer, we havedelivered our opinion in a former Article; and upon the present occasionwe find no reason to depart from the sentiments which, at that time we

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1 Monthly Review, November 1782, Vol. 67, pp. 340–345.2 Critical Review, 1782, Vol. 54, pp. 339–348, 421–430.

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submitted to our readers.”1 The Critical Review gave a mixed assess-ment of Volume 1 of Antient metaphysics, but concluded, however, withserious doubts about Monboddo’s central claim that mind is the activat-ing principle of all motion:

To imagine, that a planet, a tree, a flame, a river, a magnet needle, anda watch, are actuated by mind, is a chimerical hypothesis; and theadvantage, which the author gains by it is not so considerable, as heseems to think. For there does not appear to be any difference,whether we ascribe all the motion of unorganized bodies to the estab-lishment of mechanical laws by an almighty fiat, or to the appoint-ment of subordinate minds; as the operation of either of them mustentirely depend on the will of the Creator. [Critical Review, 1779,Vol. 48, pp. 293–301]

The Critical Review gave a similarly mixed review of Volume 2 and stated that “in a very few years, this laborious performance will probablybe ‘as if it had never been.’”2

VOLUME IBOOK II

CHAP. XXI

... I totally disagree with the late author above mentioned [i.e., Hume],who, as I have observed, puts an end to all science of mind, by distin-guishing sensations and ideas no otherwise than by the greater or lessliveliness of the impression they make upon the mind. And accordingly,in treating this subject of liberty and necessity, he makes no differencebetwixt ideas and sensations, betwixt sense and intellect, appetite andwill, betwixt material necessity, by which any body is moved contrary toits natural tendency by external force, and that internal necessity bywhich the mind is determined. And, as he proceeds in this manner, it isno wonder that his conclusion is, that there is no such thing as liberty orwill or action, and that we are nothing but a kind of automates, ormachines, merely passive, and acted upon by external impulse,

– Ut nervis mobile lignum.

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One should have thought, that the author might have been satisfiedwith the glory of maintaining a paradox so contrary to the commonsense and feelings of mankind; but he desired to be as impious and blasphemous as he is paradoxical; and, therefore, the conclusion of hisargument is, That, as there is a continued chain of necessary causes pre-ordained and pre-determined, influencing the volitions of men, in thesame manner as the operations of matter; and, as this chain of causesreaches from the Original Cause of all, that cause must be mediately theAuthor of all moral evil, as well as natural; consequently cannot be thatGood and Beneficent Being, which we suppose him to be, but a Being ofa very different kind, wicked and malignant, being ultimately the authorof guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures, and, by consequence,the cause of all their misery.

{[Note:] This author is less sceptical in a conclusion of such daringimpiety, than he usually is in his conclusions. That I may not appear tohave misrepresented his meaning, I will give his words, taken from theLondon edition of his works, published in four volumes, under the titleof ‘Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, by David Hume Esquire.’ Inthe third volume is contained his treatise upon liberty and necessity;where, after having laid it down, that the liberty of human actions, andtheir merit and demerit, is founded upon nothing else but their proceed-ing from the internal dispositions of the mind, and having also laid itdown, that the dispositions and volitions of the human mind are deter-mined in the same manner as the operations of matter, by a continuedchain of necessary causes, reaching from the Original Cause of all, toevery single volition of every single creature, (p. 141.) he states thisalternative,

‘Either that, if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain,to the Deity, they can never be criminal, on account of the infinite per-fection of that Being, from whom they are derived, and who canintend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable; Or, if theybe criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection which weascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimateauthor of guilt and moral turpitude, in all his creatures;’ p. 142.

Then, having rejected the first alternative, and having shown that humanactions are criminal ,the second alternative, according to his method ofreasoning, is unavoidable. And, accordingly, he concludes his argumentin these words:

‘The second objection, (viz. that the Deity is ultimately the author ofguilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures,) admits not of so easy

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and satisfactory an answer. Nor is it possible to explain distinctly,how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men,without being the author of sin and moral turpitude.’

Then, desiring to cover this shocking impiety with the veil of mystery, headds,

‘These are mysteries which mere natural and unassisted reason is veryunfit to handle; and, whatever system it embraces, it must find itselfinvolved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at everystep which it takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indif-ference and contingency of human actions with prescience, or todefend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the authorof sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the skill of philosophy.’

It was to have been wished that this author had kept to the philosophythat he had the honour first to import into this country from theContinent, which teaches,

Naturam rerum haud divina mente coortam, Lucretius.

and that there is nothing in the universe besides matter and motion.Who maintains this doctrine, however impious he may be thought, can-not be said to blaspheme a Being whose existence he denies; But he whosupposes that there is a God, and, at the same time, maintains, that he iswicked, malignant, and the author of the misery of his creatures, is bothimpious and blasphemous in the highest degree.

The doctrine of the Manicheans, that there were two governing princi-ples in the universe, one good, the other evil, which, of late, has beenattempted to be revived by Mr Bayle, was thought the most dangerousheresy that ever was in the Christian church. But, before Mr DavidHume, I believe there never was a heretic or philosopher, antient ormodern, nor, I believe, any mortal man, who maintained that there wasbut one governing principle in the universe, and that this principle wasevil and malignant in the highest degree; – in short, that the God of theuniverse was a devil. Suppose, what I think can hardly be conceived,that a man was firmly persuaded of a system so absurd, as well as impi-ous, there is nothing but the most extravagant vanity, regardless alto-gether of the good of society, or quiet of mens minds, that could inducehim to publish it.

As to the perplexities and absurdities on both sides, which this authorpretends to find in the question concerning liberty and necessity, I con-sider them only as some kind of apology for the side he has chosen to

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take in this question; but, if they were real, it is not to be wondered at,that an author, who has not learned to distinguished betwixt sense andintellect, appetite and will, and who, consequently, is ignorant of thefirst principles of the philosophy of mind, should be puzzled and per-plexed in a question, which, no doubt, requires very just thinking, andexact discrimination of things that seemingly very much resemble oneanother.}

BOOK V.CHAP. VI.

The doubt concerning the existence of the material world was firststarted in modern times by Dr Berkeley, and greedily catched at by theauthor of the Treatise upon Human Nature, and of the Essays, as veryfavourable to his design of overturning all science and certainty, and evi-dence of every kind. In antient times, it was first advanced by Pyrrho,who, finding no other way to distinguish himself, and to get a nameamong the great philosophers that had gone before him, did, as Ibelieve, out of mere vanity, (the prevailing passion of sceptics in all ages,whatever their pretensions to modesty may be,) first broach this extrava-gant paradox, which, however, if it were true, would not answer MrHume’s purpose, of putting an end to all science and certainty; for,though there were no material geometrical figures extant in the universe,as indeed there is none that answers to the definition of them, everydemonstration in Euclid would be equally true, though geometry wouldnot be, as I shall afterwards show, that real science, which it truly is.But, if there be no ideas neither, as Mr Hume maintains, there can be noscience nor knowledge of any kind.

It appears, therefore, that this controversy about the existence of bodywas, like the controversy above mentioned, concerning freewill,unknown in the better days of philosophy, that is, in the days of Plato or Aristotle, or even before their time, but only in later times, when phi-losophy became frivolous and paradoxical, and, at the same time, notaccurate in making proper distinctions of things; for, if Pyrrho had accurately distinguished, in the matter of sensation, as Plato does in theCratylus, betwixt the object, the organ, and the perception of the mind,I think it is impossible that he could have thought of advancing such adoctrine, which plainly confounds the object with the perception, making sensation to be only perception, and so nothing more but aphantasm or spectre of the mind.

Mr Locke has been blamed for giving occasion to this error, by making the distinction betwixt the primary and secondary qualities ofbodies, maintaining, that the former had a real existence in the bodies,

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while the latter existed only in our Minds. That Mr Locke did notmean to give a handle to such an extravagant scepticism, any morethan to several other absurd, as well as impious notions, that havebeen grafted upon his philosophy, I hold to be certain. Nor do I thinkthat he was much mistaken, as I shall show afterwards, in making thedistinction, that he has made, betwixt the primary qualities of body,such as extension and solidity, and those he calls secondary, such ashot and cold, sweet and bitter. But he was certainly to blame, for notmaking more explicitly the distinction with respect to those last sensa-tions, which he makes with respect to the former, viz. betwixt the sen-sation itself, and the external object which produces it.

There have been two answers given to Dr Berkeley and Mr Hume,but neither of which, I must own, satisfies me. The first is of thedeclamatory kind, setting forth, with a great deal of wit and ridicule,the absurdity of such an opinion, showing, at the same time, that itleads to universal scepticism, and a disbelief of the most importanttruths of religion and morality; asserting likewise, what I am persuad-ed is true, that no man ever sincerely believed that matter does notexist. But a philosopher is not convinced by declamation: Nor isridicule a philosophical argument, whatever influence it may haveupon the people; and it no doubt has a great deal. Neither is an opin-ion necessarily false, because it leads to dangerous consequences. Andthere may be many things true which are believed by nobody.

The other answer is more philosophical; but neither is it satisfying tome at least. It asserts, that the perception of every sensible object isnecessarily accompanied with a belief of its existence; that this is theconstitution of our nature, and that we are to inquire no more aboutit. But this belief is a matter of fact, which cannot be easily grantedwithout proof. And, that it is constant and universal, I do absolutelydeny. And I aver, that by far the greater part of mankind act accordingto the appearances the sense presents to them, without consideringwhether these appearances are from without or from within; or, inother words, whether the object have any real existence. In short, theyhave no opinion upon the subject, any more than the brute-animalshave, who act in consequence of these sensations, as well as we do.And, as to the thinking few, who have formed opinions upon this andmany other subjects, that the vulgar never think of, if they say thatthey believe that the objects of sense are real existences, they must givesome reason for their belief; for I have no conception of what is calleda natural or instinctive belief; instincts, in the way I have explained it,3

and as I believe the word is generally understood, is a principle of

3 See, above, pages 138. 221.

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action, directing all the appetites and inclinations of the brute-animals,and many of ours: But it has nothing to do with opinion or belief; and,accordingly, the brute-animals have neither: It is only the intelligent ani-mal who forms opinions, and believes. Now, it is impossible that intel-lect can believe any thing without a reason. And of this no man can havethe least doubt, who has learned his logic, and who knows how ideasare formed, and how they are put together in propositions, in which themind either gives a direct and immediate assent, upon the grounds Ihave mentioned, or is convinced of the truth of them by ratiocination.

All, therefore, that can be made of this argument, in favour of theexistence of matter, is, that none of the vulgar have any doubt of it. Butthis general belief will not satisfy the philosopher, who will say, that, inour dreams, we see and hear most distinctly, and have other very strongimpressions of the objects of sense. These objects, however, have no realexistence, or, at least, do not operate upon our senses; and yet, whileour dreams continue, we have no more doubt of the existence of them,than we have of the existence of the like objects when we are awake;and, even when we are awake, we have conceptions of objects which weare sure do not exist, such as the images we conceive of mountains ofgold, Hippocentaurs, Gorgons, Chimaeras, and the like. Now, thedefenders of this sceptical philosophy will say, Why may not our percep-tions of sense be such as our dreams, and very often our wakingthoughts are – mere fancies and creatures of the mind, without any realobjects? Nor, indeed, have I yet heard any good answer to this argu-ment; for, that we have a phantasia, in which things, that have no realexistence, are pictured in the most lively manner, and have not onlyshape and colour, but voice and action given to them, is a fact that can-not be denied.

Thus, it appears, that the arguments hitherto used to prove the exis-tence of a material world are not satisfactory; and the reason may be,what is somewhere observed by Aristotle, that the nearer any thing is toa first principle, and a self-evident truth, the more difficult it is to beproved, though it be that which every body believes. But, as it is thebusiness of metaphysics to explain the first principles of science, so itbelongs also to it to prove the truth of the most immediate deductionsfrom those principles, especially if they be controverted.

But, before I begin this proof, I cannot help observing, that it is mostextraordinary that Mr Hume, who denies the existence of the humanmind, or of any mind in the universe, should deny, at the same time, theexistence of matter; for, if he had admitted the existence of mind, itmight have appeared possible that our minds should have produced allthose illusions that we call objects of sense, and believe to be real, in thesame manner as it actually does produce them in our sleep; and it might

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have been said, with some colour of reason, that our whole life was buta dream. But how such illusions should be produced, without eithermatter or mind, is to me altogether inconceivable: Nor, do I think, can itbe believed by any man, who does not, at the same time, believe thatany thing may be produced without a cause. There were, no doubt,antient philosophers, as well as there are modern, who denied the exis-tence of mind, and therefore were called materialists. There have beenothers who, admitting the existence of mind, denied the existence ofmatter. Such was Dr Berkeley. Nor does it appear that Pyrrho, howeversceptical he was in other things, ever called in question the existence ofhis own mind, or even of a mind in the universe; for I do not rememberthat ever he was branded with the name of Atheist. The glory, therefore,appears to be reserved for Mr Hume, to dispute the existence of bothmind and body, and to differ in this respect, not only from the vulgar,but from all the philosophers that had been before him. But I do notthink that he has shown abilities or learning sufficient to support hispretensions to so much superior wisdom. Thus much, at least, mighthave been expected of him, that he should have said something to recon-cile the two opinions, the one with the other, and to convince us howthings could go on in the world as they do, supposing all to be a dream,without either mind or body; for all the philosophers before his time,who were Atheists, were, at the same time, Materialists, and endeav-oured to account for every thing in nature, and all the operations ofmen, our waking thoughts as well as our dreams, from mere matter andmotion. Whereas Mr Hume, taking away matter, and, by consequence,motion, denying the existence of mind also, has left nothing in the uni-verse, besides his own perceptions, which are produced by no cause thathe assigns, and are an accident without a substance. What a strange faceof nature is this! and what an extraordinary philosophy must thisappear to any man who has but learned the elements of logic!

A man who maintains opinions so very singular, and which lead tosuch extraordinary consequences, should be able to bring the clearestproof of them; such as, that it is impossible, or implies a contradiction,that the contrary opinion should be true: And particularly, with regardto this question concerning the existence of matter, he should be able toshow, that the idea of a substance having solidity, impenetrability, resis-tance, extension also, and figure, implies a contradiction. But this he hasnot so much as attempted to prove; and therefore it must be supposedthat it is at least possible that body may exist; from which a philosophyaltogether different from Mr Hume’s would infer, that it does actuallyexist. But it would be vain to use such an argument against Mr Hume,because it supposes a first cause, in the mind of which the idea of everything possible exists, and, for that reason, is actually produced, as we

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cannot conceive any idea in the mind of such a being that is not broughtinto energy and actuality; for otherwise it would be there in vain. But thisis a philosophy altogether out of sight of such philosophers: We must,therefore, in arguing with them, endeavour to prove, in some other way,that there is something material existing, which produces our sensations.

But what sort of proof are we to use against men who deny that thereis such a thing as truth, or even that there is one thing more probablethan another? But, I think, I can convince others, if not them, from aprinciple which they themselves have unwarily admitted, namely, theprinciple of consciousness, by which they say they are convinced thatthey have perceptions; for, if Mr Hume had carried his scepticism so far,as to dispute that he had even perceptions, it would have been impossibleto have proved, at least upon his principles, that there was such a thingas body. But he admits that he is a bundle of perceptions. And the argu-ment from those perceptions against him, for the existence of matter, isso much the fairer, that, from those very perceptions, he argues againstthe existence of matter; for, says he, we know nothing of materialobjects, but by our ideas of them. Now, our ideas are not solid, extended,or figured; therefore it is impossible that we can know that there are anysuch substances. And he adds, that our own philosophy, meaning MrLocke’s, admits, that our perceptions of the secondary qualities of exter-nal objects, such as white and black, bitter and sweet, have no existencein the objects themselves. And, for the same reason, what we call primaryqualities, such as extension and solidity, have likewise no existence in theobjects.

My only postulatum, therefore, in this case, is such, that the greatestsceptic must grant it, namely, ‘That the evidence of consciousness is infal-lible.’ It is upon this evidence that Des Cartes was convinced of his ownexistence; ‘For,’ says he, ‘I think; therefore I am.’ Now, that he thought,he could not know otherwise than by consciousness. And one shouldhave imagined the same argument might have convinced Mr Hume of hisexistence, though it seems it did not; for I do not think so meanly of thisargument as some do: But, on the contrary, I am persuaded that we can-not be sure of the existence of any thing but from its operations. And theonly difference in this matter, betwixt our own existence and that ofother things, is, that we know our own operations by consciousness:Whereas, the operations of other things, we know only by the informa-tion of our senses. And he is so far, likewise, in the right, that he lays thefoundation of his philosophy upon this clearest of all evidence, being thatwithout which there would be no demonstration or proof of any kind:For, if we were not conscious of having perceived the truth of the pre-misses, we never could infer the conclusion. – But, to proceed in ourargument.

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It is then admitted, that, by consciousness, we know that we have per-ceptions of sense: By the same means we know the difference of those per-ceptions; that the perception of seeing, for example, is not the same withthe perception of hearing. And, further, we know, in the same way, the dif-ference of the same perception in different circumstances. I see, for exam-ple, a fire at some distance. This I call the perception of the sense. I shut myeyes, and I still have the perception of fire; but it is a perception, I say, notfrom the sense, but from the phantasia. And the difference betwixt thetwo, I know, is, that the one is from within, and the other from without.That the one is from within, I know with the same certainty that I know Ihave the perception, and, by the same means, by consciousness. And, in thesame manner, I know that, when I open my eyes, I have a different percep-tion; and my reason tells me that the difference must arise from somethingthat comes in at my eyes, which I have opened, and, thro’ that channel,affects my mind. It is in this way that, when I am in a dark place, and opena hole, I have thro’ it, the perception of light that I had not before. If itwere possible to doubt that the perception of the fire, when the eyes areopen, was from without, a man might soon convince himself, by goingnear, and putting his hand into it; for then he would feel most sensibly thedifference betwixt the image of the fire which he had before from within,by means of the phantasia, and the perception he now has of it from with-out: So that, if our feeling, as well as our other perceptions, be real, as MrHume acknowledges, it must be admitted that there is a perception of fire,and, for the same reason, of other objects of sense from without. And,indeed, if all were from within, and that we might have perceptions with-out those five inlets to the mind we call senses, then a man, who, from hisbirth, was deprived of all his senses, might nevertheless have all the percep-tions we have, and, for any thing I know, many more: Whereas, the fact is,that a man, deprived from his birth of one of these senses, such as seeing orhearing, has not the least perception or notion of the objects of that sense:Nor can a man of the liveliest imagination have the least perception of anycorporeal thing, but what resembles the perceptions of some one or otherof the senses: So that the phantasia, tho’ a faculty of wonderful power,which performs such extraordinary things, both when we are asleep andawake, supplying, in some measure, the use of our senses, is neverthelessconfined in all its operations to objects such as we have perceived by thesenses. And all the fairy scenes that it represents to us are nothing but somany images of the material world, very often, indeed, strangely and wild-ly put together.

Moreover, it is to be considered, that the appearances in the phantasiaare, for the greater part, voluntary; for we can, by an act of our will, callup any image in the phantasia that we please; but, as to the perceptions ofsense, they do not depend upon our will.

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4 Page 67. et sequen.5 It is in this way that Aristotle argues against certain philosophers before his time, such

as Heraclitus and Protagoras, who, as he says, maintained, that we were not sure of theexistence of any thing except our sensations; and that, therefore, they were the onlystandard of truth and falsehood. According to this doctrine, says Aristotle, if therewere no animals, nothing would exist, because there would be no sensation, which isan affection of an animal. Now, we may suppose that no animal exists, and thereforeno sensation, the consequence of which would be, according to the notion of thosephilosophers, that no sensible object, that is, object perceived by the sense, exists. Butit is impossible to suppose, that the things which produce the sensation should notexist, even without the sensation; for the sensation does not produce itself; but therenecessarily must be something besides the sensation, which, in the order of nature, isprior to the sensation; for what moves is, by nature, prior to what is moved. ...

These arguments are, I think, sufficient to convince even such as are notphilosophers, of the existence of things without us. But, with respect to thephilosopher, who knows the nature of sensation, and how it is produced,one single argument is demonstrative; for, in the perceptions of sense, everyman is conscious that he is passive, and that he is moved or excited to sen-sation by something. Now, wherever there is a patient, there must of neces-sity be an agent. And, wherever any thing is moved, there must of necessi-ty, as I have elsewhere demonstrated,4 be something that moves. As, there-fore, the organ of sense is moved, and sometimes in the most sensible man-ner – and, as nothing can move itself, there must needs be something dif-ferent from the organ, and which is the thing that moves it. The motion,we are conscious, is produced by impulse upon the organ; and as nothingcan impel body but what has solidity and resistence; therefore I conclude,that what acts upon the organ is body as well as the organ itself.5

Further, that we have ideas, as well as perceptions by the sense, of sensi-ble objects, I think it is impossible to deny. A geometer, for example, hasundoubtedly the idea of lines and figures, concerning which he demon-strates so many things. Now, I would desire to know of those scepticalphilosophers from whence we got these ideas. The common account givenof them is, that they are abstracted by the mind from sensible objects.Now, if that be not the true account, I desire to know of those philoso-phers in what other way we come by them? If they cannot answer thisquestion, they must acknowledge that their philosophy is very defective, asthey cannot assign any cause for so common a phaenomenon, of which itis impossible to deny the existence. The only answer, that I think it is possi-ble to make, is one or other of these two; either, that those ideas are innate,and born with us, or, that they are communications made to us by superiorminds. But I answer both these hypotheses by asking another very simplequestion, Why has not the blind man the idea of colours, or the deaf manof sounds, either innate, or by communication with other minds?

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As to what is said, that, if the objects of the perceptions of our senseswere any thing external, our perceptions, which Mr Hume chooses tocall ideas, would necessarily resemble the objects which we perceive,otherwise we could not know that we perceive them: And therefore ourperception of a solid, extended, a sweet or bitter object, must be solid,extended, sweet, or bitter. This argument, I say, when attended to,proves nothing at all, and is really altogether unintelligible; for, when weconsider that the perceptions of sense are produced by the pressure ofexternal objects upon the organs of sense, which being from thoseorgans communicated to the mind, causes therein a certain perception,that we call sensation, it is impossible to conceive how the perception oraffection of the mind should resemble the object by which it is affected.We might as well conceive, that the sensation that we have from theprick of a sword should resemble the sword.

But, if Mr Hume had not confounded, as he every where does, theperceptions of sense with the ideas of intellect, he would have seen thatthere was a very great difference betwixt the perceptions themselves, andthe ideas thence formed, and that there is some ground for Mr Locke’sdistinction betwixt the primary and secondary qualities of body; for it isthe business of intellect to investigate the nature of things, and to findout the species or idea in the material form. Now, in certain objects per-ceived by the sense, it can do that with great accuracy. For example,with respect to its perception of extension and figure, it can distinguishlength, breadth, and depth; and all the several figures, by which body isbounded, it can separate and discriminate one from another; and therecan be no reason to doubt but that these ideas, thus formed, have theirmodels and archetypes in the nature of things, and that the bodies thusbounded are the very objects which affect our senses of seeing andtouching. And accordingly, we find that the science which we form ofthose ideas, applies perfectly well to all bodies. It is the same with regardto the ideas which we form from the perceptions of the sense of hearing;for of sounds we form a science and art, which we call music, and whichalso applies to the nature of things as they exist; so that neither is therehere any reason to believe that the intellect is deluded by false appear-ances. But, as to the other three senses, of touching, tasting, andsmelling, we have not hitherto been able to discover the nature and constitution of the objects which produce them, so as to be able to formideas concerning them, of which science can be made. They continue,therefore, only to serve the purpose of animal life, and of observationand experience, without being reduced to science. Now, those qualitiesof body, such as solidity and extension, of which the mind can form dis-tinct ideas, and which are so far of the nature and essence of body, thatwe cannot conceive body without them, Mr Locke calls primary quali-

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6 See vol. 3d of his Essays, § 4. and 5.

ties, and says that they have a real existence in the bodies; whereas theother qualities, of which we cannot form such clear ideas, he says, areonly perceptions of the mind: And, if he had said more expressly, whatit is evident he meant, that these perceptions are produced by certainqualities in the body, as well as those of which we can make science, andhad added the reason why we can make science of the one set of percep-tions, but not of the other, his philosophy would have been nowiseimperfect or defective, and he would have sufficiently established his dis-tinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities of bodies; the firstbeing those of which we form clear ideas, the other those of which weknow no more than that they affect our senses in a certain way.

...

CHAP. IX.

In the preceding chapters, I have shown that, upon the supposition ofthere being no material world, human knowledge has no solid founda-tion; and, that even those sciences which seem to have the greatest cer-tainty, such as geometry and arithmetic, are like our dreams, in whichour reasonings are sometimes very just and conclusive, but unsupportedby fact and reality.

The doctrine of the non-entity of matter was not, as I have observed, adiscovery of our Scots philosopher [i.e., Hume]. But what I am now tospeak of in this chapter, he gives as a discovery of his own; and a mostwonderful discovery it is, I know, thought to be by his followers. It isthis, ‘That we have no idea of cause and effect;’ ‘for,’ say he, ‘what wecall a cause, is nothing more than an event, which, by experience andobservation, we have always found to precede another that we call theeffect; but, that the one produces the other, that is, is the cause of theother, we have no knowledge at all. We perceive that the two events areconjoined, but not connected.’ From his reasonings on this subject, andthe particular instances to which he applies the general proposition,6 weshould imagine that he carried it no farther than to facts, and natural andhuman events. But, considered in this view, it is certainly no discovery ofMr Hume’s; for every philosopher knows that we can only reason con-cerning such events from induction; and, that such reasoning is notdemonstrative, for the cause which I have assigned in the chapter uponthe subject of that sort of reasoning, but only probable. And this MrHume acknowledges. But, in the end of his dissertations upon this subject,he seems to have carried the matter further; for he has given us a general

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7 Vol. 3, sect. 7. p. 111. The definition is, ‘An object followed by another, and whereall the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second.’

8 Essay upon a Providence and a Future State, vol. 3. p. 207.9 Analytica, Post lib. 1. cap. 22 ....

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definition of cause and effect, which may comprehend every matter of sci-ence.7 And I know that several of his followers carry his doctrine so far; theconsequence of which is, to overturn all science and demonstration. Butthis, I am persuaded, was not intended by Mr Hume, at least, not in thispart of his work. And the principal reason, as appears to me, why he hasinsisted so much upon this notion of cause and effect, is, that he mightdraw the notable conclusion, which he draws in the end of one of hisEssays,8 viz. ‘that, as the production of the world by the Deity is a ‘singleevent, to which we, by experience, know nothing similar; therefore we canhave no idea of God’s being the author of the universe.’

To refute this so impious assertion, does not belong to this part of mywork; nor is it necessary, I would fain hope, for the greater part of myreaders. But some of Mr Hume’s school having, as I said, carried his doc-trine of our having no idea of cause and effect, so far as to overturn theprinciples, not only of theology, but of every other science, and of alldemonstration, I think it is proper, in this place, to vindicate those princi-ples, and to defend them against such an attack, which is grounded, as Ithink I shall be able to show, upon absolute ignorance of the nature of sci-ence and demonstration.

That, in all demonstration and reasoning a priori, we argue from generals to particulars; as, on the contrary, in reasoning by induction, weargue from particulars to generals, is a fact that cannot be denied. And fur-ther, it is equally certain, that the particulars which are inferred from thegenerals are some way or another connected with them; so that they arenot only conjoined but connected. Here, therefore, is that connectionwhich Mr Hume desiderates with respect to facts or events; for which rea-son, he denies that we have any idea of the one being the cause of theother. The only question, therefore, is, Whether the connection, whichundoubtedly is betwixt the generals and particulars from them inferred, or,in other words, betwixt the premisses and conclusion, in demonstrativereasoning, in such a connection as that upon which we bestow the name ofcause and effect?

That the two first propositions in a syllogism are the cause of the conclusion, has been the opinion of all philosophers ever since there was asystem of logic known; and, particularly, it is the opinion of Aristotle, theauthor of the Syllogism, most explicitly declared.9 But, as the authority ofAristotle is now become obsolete, and, as we live in an age when the clear-est principles are called in question, I will endeavour to prove it in form.

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10 [Antient metaphysics: or, the science of universals. containing a further examinationof the principles of Sir Isaac Newton’s astronomy. London: printed for T. Cadell, inthe Strand; and J. Balfour and Co. Edinburgh, 1782.]

And, in the first place, I will give a definition of cause, which shall beshorter than that of Mr Hume’s, and, I think, fully as clear. Cause, I say,is, ‘That without which another thing, called the effect, could not exist.’This is a definition which, I think, cannot be controverted; and, if so, I askany geometer, Whether the idea of a triangle, as contained in its definition,is not the cause of all its properties, as being that, without which, thoseproperties could not exist. If it be asked, How those properties do thusdepend for their existence upon the definition of a triangle? the answer is,that the idea of a triangle is more general than that of any of its properties,as it virtually comprehends them all; so that they all flow from it, and areproduced, as it were, out of it; for that is the nature of this causation. Forthe same reason, any of Euclid’s axioms is the cause of the propositionwhich he proves by them. As, for example, the axiom, ‘That, if any twothings are equal to a third, they are equal to one another,’ is the cause,that any two particular lines being equal to a third, they are equal to oneanother; for the lines or figures could not be equal if the axiom were nottrue: And the axiom being the more general proposition, virtually containsin it the particular proposition concerning these lines which flows from it,and is educed out of it. And the effect, in this cause, has that dependentexistence which every effect must have upon its cause; for the two lineswould not be equal if the axiom were not true: Whereas, on the otherhand, the axiom would have been true, if these particular lines had neverexisted; so that there is no mutual or reciprocal dependence in the case.

And it is the same with ideas that it is with propositions; for the moregeneral idea is the cause of the particular idea under it, because it compre-hends it. Thus, the idea of animal comprehends man; the consequence ofwhich is, that man could not have existed without animal, but animalmight have been without man. Therefore animal is the cause of man,according to the definition that I have given of cause, but not man of ani-mal: So that, in the whole process of the human mind, the formation ofour ideas, as well as our reasonings, what is general is prior in excellenceand dignity to what is particular, which is included in it, and produced outof it.

...VOLUME II.10

BOOK II.CHAPTER II.

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Lord Monboddo 273

...

In the preceding Volume, I have endeavoured to show, that it is byideas that the Intellectual Nature operates, whereas the Sensitive oper-ates only by Sensation; so that, if we cannot rightly distinguishbetwixt Sensations and Ideas, we can never properly make the distinc-tion betwixt Man and Brute.

I do not know that these two were confounded by any antientphilosopher; I am sure, at least, they are not in the philosophy ofPlato and Aristotle. The word Idea comes from the most antientschool of philosophy in Europe, I mean the Pythagorean, and, if wesuppose it, as I do, to be the same with the Egyptian School, the mostantient in the world; for it is used by Timaeus the Locrian, in thatmost valuable work of his, still preserved to us, De Anima Mundi.The sense in which it is used by that author is the true etymologicalsense of the word, denoting the form of the thing, not that formwhich is seen by the corporeal eye, but what is seen by a much purerand nobler eye, the eye of the Mind. In this sense it is used by all thephilosophers of the Schools of Plato and of Aristotle; and it has beenso used by me throughout this whole work, and in my other workupon the Origin and Progress of Language. The more antient Englishwriters, even as late down as Bishop Wilkins, who writes that grandphilosophical work upon Language, do not use the term at all, but, inplace of it, the word notion. Mr Locke was the first author inEngland, as far as I know, that made use of it; but, not being a schol-ar, and altogether unlearned in antient philosophy, he has used itmost absurdly, to denote the perceptions of Sense, which are commonto us with the Brute: And in this manner he has confounded the Brutewith Man, in the very beginning of his work upon the human Mind;nor does he appear to me ever to have rightly distinguished them, orformed a just notion of what an idea was, though it be mentioned inevery page of his book. Since his time, ideas and sensation have beenconfounded in all our philosophical writings; and the strange lan-guage, of ideas of sensation, has been introduced into philosophy; – aconfusion of terms which the French have avoided; for they distin-guish betwixt les idees and les sensations.

Mr Hume, following the footsteps of Mr Locke, (and, indeed, I can-not help saying that Mr Locke has laid the foundation, though, Ibelieve, without intending it, of all the Atheistical philosophy that hasbeen broached since his time), has told us that ideas are but weakersensations. If so, there will be no difference betwixt Man and Brute,except in favour of the Brute, who has commonly acuter sensationsthan we have.

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11 In one of the valuable legacies he has left to the public, which I have seen printed,but I believe is not yet published. [Monboddo is referring Hume’s essays on suicideand the immortality of the soul which was removed from Hume’s FiveDissertations, later to become Four Dissertations (1757). The essays were unoffi-cially published in 1777 (Two essays. London, 1777. [2], 41, [1] p.), and againmore widely as Essays on suicide, and the immortality of the soul, ascribed to thelate David Hume, Esq. Never before published. With remarks, intended as anantidote to the poison contained in these performances, by the editor. To which isadded, two letters on suicide, from Rosseau’s [sic] Eloisa. – London: printed for M.Smith; and sold by the booksellers in Piccadilly, Fleet-street, and Paternoster-row,1783. iv, 107.]

One consequence, which Mr Hume has drawn from this doctrine,11

is, that, as our Mind can only operate by the organs of the Body, it mustperish with the Body. And, indeed, admitting the premise, it is not easyto deny the conclusion, or to prove philosophically that the Mind, neveracting but in conjunction with the Body, can have a separate existence.And there is another consequence, which, perhaps, Mr Hume did notforesee, or, if he did, I believe he would not have been much alarmed,that, as there must be Ideas in the Divine Mind, if Ideas be Sensations,then Matter, from which they are derived, must be at least coeval withthe Deity; and the Deity must be so far dependent upon it, as to derivefrom it all his knowledge.

...

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[Chapter title] 275

24JOSEPH PRIESTLEY

Joseph Priestley, Letters to a philosophical unbeliever. Part I. Con-taining an examination of the principal objections to the doctrines ofnatural religion, and especially those contained in the writings of Mr.Hume. Bath, Printed by R. Cruttwell, and sold by J. Johnson, 1780, 212 p. Letters 13 and 14 complete; from The Theological and MiscellaneousWorks (1817–1832), Vol. 4.

Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) was a Unitarian minister, an influentialscientist, and a prolific author of philosophical, theological, and

educational books. Priestley’s Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever(1780) are addressed to someone who, during his travels, read somebooks which left his “mind unhinged with respect to the first principlesof religion, natural as well as revealed.” Throughout this collection of14 letters Priestley attacks Hume’s writings on religion, and in the concluding two Letters focuses on Hume’s metaphysical views. In Letter13 Priestley considers the common charge that Hume’s view of causalityundermines the causal proof for God’s existence, and thus promotesatheism. Priestley argues that, whatever explanation we give of thenotion of causality, we are all ultimately led to the view that “nothingcan begin to be without a cause foreign to it.” In Letter 14 Priestleybriefly comments on each of the 12 sections of the Enquiry, showingthat Hume’s fame as a metaphysician is overrated. Priestley resolvesHume’s missing shade of blue problem (Section 2) by noting how thenerves and the brain may be capable of producing internal impressions.He argues that the true basis of the association of ideas (Section 3) simply involves a train of thought that emerges when we continuallyhave two distinct experiences in close relation with each other. Hume’sthree principles of association, then, can be explained with this morebasic notion. Turning to Sections 4 and 5, Priestley argues that the infer-ence from cause to effect is as safe as any reasoning, even though Humedoes not ascribe it to reasoning. Priestley criticizes Hume’s explanationof belief and notes that we learn to annex the idea of truth to events,independently of the strength of our feelings. In his discussion of Section8, Priestley notes that, although Hume clearly illustrates the doctrine of

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necessity, he nevertheless “abandons it to the most shocking andimmoral consequences.” Priestley believes that Hume’s account of thehuman mind is substantially inferior to Hartley’s, and that Hartleyoffers detailed explanations of mental phenomena that Hume simplyascribes to instinct.

In a favorable review of Priestley’s Letters, the Critical Reviewdescribes Priestley’s assessment of Hume in Letter 14:

The last letter is a critical review of Mr. Hume’s Philosophical Essays.In the course of this examination, the author gives his reasons for thegeneral censure which he has passed upon him in a former letter; and, before he takes his leave, brings him down from that eminence to which, in his opinion, he has been undeservedly raised;strips him of his laurels, lays him prostrate at his feet, and thus, likesome of the heroes of antiquity, triumphs over his fallen adversary.[Critical Review, October, 1780, Vol. 50, pp. 241–247]

The Monthly Review similarly voiced approval of Priestley’s treatmentof Hume:

[Priestley concludes] with a general examination of the metaphysicalwritings of Mr. Hume; in which a succinct and regular analysis isgiven of such of his philosophical essays as relate to the present sub-ject. On all these heads, as well as on the subjects before treated of,the Reader, who may have entertained doubts concerning the funda-mental doctrines of natural religion, will here meet with a satisfactorysolution of these doubts, and an elucidation, at least, of the difficultieswhich attend the subject, from the very nature of it. [Monthly Review,June 1781, Vol. 64, pp. 409–412]

Shortly after the publication of Priestley’s Letters, Matthew Turner’sbrief critique, Answer to Dr. Priestley’s Letters to a Philosophical unbeliever (1782), appeared. In 1787 Part II of Priestley’s Letters was published; this attacked Edward Gibbon’s History. An edition combining Parts I and II also appeared that year. In 1795 Part III was published; this attacked Thomas Paine’s Age of Reason. The following is from Priestley’s Works, which uses the second edition of1787 of the Letters. References to Priestley’s other writings within thistext have been added by John Towill Rutt, the editor of Priestley’sWorks, to indicate their location within Priestley’s Works. Bracketednotes are Rutt’s.

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LETTER XIII.

Of the Ideas of CAUSE and EFFECT and the Influence of Mr. Hume’sOpinion on this Subject, in the Argument for the Being of a GOD.

DEAR SIR,

As some persons have imagined that the cause of atheism has derivedconsiderable advantage from Mr. Hume’s ideas concerning the nature ofcause and effect, I shall, in this letter, endeavour to shew that the apprehension is without foundation.

Mr. Hume says, that all we can pretend to know concerning the connexion of cause and effect, is their constant conjunction; by the obser-vance of which the mind is necessarily led from the one to the other. Fromthis the friends of religion have supposed that if this representation bejust, the connexion is merely arbitrary, and, therefore, that such things aswe have usually called effects may take place without any thing that wehave usually observed to correspond to them, as their causes.Consequently, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the uni-verse itself may have existed from eternity without any superior cause.

To guard against this, some of the friends of religion deny that ouridea of power or causation is derived from any thing that we properlyobserve. But, imperfect as Mr. Hume’s ideas on the subject are,(notwithstanding his laborious and tiresome discussion of it, and itsbeing evidently a favourite topic with him,) I think I have sufficientlyshewn in the third of the Essays prefixed to my edition of Hartley’sTheory of the Mind, (Vol. III. p. 189), that there is nothing in the idea ofpower or causation, (which is only the same idea differently modified,)that is not derived from the impressions to which we have been subject,this being to be ranked in the class of abstract ideas, where it does notappear that Mr. Hume ever thought of looking for it. In the Essay I hererefer to, p. 191, I have shewn that the idea of power is far from being,what some take it to be, a simple idea, but that, on the contrary, it isone of the most complex ideas that we have, consisting of what is com-mon to numberless impressions of very different kinds.

Besides, if the idea of power be any thing that cannot be acquired byexperience, it comes under the description of other innate principles orideas, which have been so long, and, I think, so justly exploded, that Ithink myself at liberty to take it for granted that there is no suchthing.

But I shall proceed to observe that, in whatever manner we come bythe idea of power or causation, it is an idea that all men have, and corresponds to something real in the relation of the things that suggest

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it. It is true that all we properly see of a magnet, and a piece of iron, isthat, at certain distances, they approach to one another, and of a stone,that, in certain circumstances, it invariably tends towards the earth, andwe cannot give any proper or satisfactory reason why either of theseeffects should take place in these circumstances. Yet we have alwaysfound that in a similar constant conjunction of appearances, we havenever failed to discover, whenever we have been able to make any dis-covery at all, that the event could not have been otherwise. Andthough, in these cases, we have only discovered a nearer, and never theultimate cause of any appearance, yet there is an invariable experiencein favour of some real and sufficient cause in all such conjunctions.

In consequence of this experience, it is indelibly impressed upon theminds of all men, that all events whatever, and all productions whatever, must have a necessary and adequate cause, so that nothingcan begin to be without a cause foreign to itself. And let any person pre-tend what he will, he must himself (in consequence of the impressions towhich he, together with the rest of mankind, has uniformly beenexposed) have come under the influence of it, and of course, have thesame persuasion.

Though, therefore, by means of some secret bias, and sophistical argu-mentation, a man may come to be persuaded that the universe has hadno superior cause, he cannot deny but that all other things, (which thetheist must shew to be in the same predicament with the universe,) musthave had such a cause, so that nothing is to be apprehended from hisidea of the nature of causation in general. Whatever that idea be, (and,in fact, it will be the same with that of the rest of mankind, let any person give whatever account of it he pleases,) he will necessarily expecta superior cause in those circumstances in which mankind in general willbe satisfied that a cause is requisite.

Different persons feel, and are persuaded differently enough in somecases; but where the influences, to which their minds have been subject,have necessarily been nearly the same, the impressions made on themcannot be materially different. In this case, I should sooner imagine thatthe ideas annexed to the words hunger and thirst, should be different indifferent persons, than the ideas annexed to the words power and causation, or that they should have different effects in their serious argumentations.

I am, &c.

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LETTER XIV.

An Examination of Mr. Hume’s Metaphysical Writings.

DEAR SIR,

You are surprised, you tell me, that Mr. Hume, so great a master ofreasoning, so cool and dispassionate a writer, and so subtle a meta-physician, should have written so loosely and unguardedly, as you arenow convinced he has done in this posthumous work of his, a work ofwhich, it is evident, he made great account, by his taking such effectu-al measure for its publication after his death. But you cannot wellsuppose, having always entertained a different idea, that I can be suf-ficiently well–founded in the censure I have passed on his metaphysi-cal writings in general in my ninth letter, and, therefore, you wish Iwould enter on the proof of what I have advanced, by a distinct exhi-bition of all that Mr. Hume has done in this way; that when all theobservations he has advanced shall be seen without the imposition ofhis style and manner, its real merit, its solidity or futility, may plainlyappear.

Now I am ready to give the fullest satisfaction on this subject, and Ishould not have ventured to throw out that general censure, withoutbeing prepared to justify it in all the particulars, if you should callupon me to do it. Besides, I am not without hopes, that when you seeon how narrow a foundation Mr. Hume’s fame as a metaphysicianstands, his authority as a reasoner will not weigh, so much as it hashitherto done, with you and others who have only a general and indis-tinct notion of his being a great philosopher, and an acute and guard-ed writer. This I shall do in as succinct a manner as I can, in a regularanalysis of all his Essays that are in the least to our present purpose.

In the first of his Philosophical Essays, “Of the different Species ofPhilosophy,” which is only an introduction to the rest, it appears thathe had no idea of the connexion of the different faculties of the mind,and their dependence upon one principle, as that of association. Forhe says, “The mind is endowed with several powers and faculties,”and “these powers are totally distinct from each other.” P. 14. But wemay “hope that philosophy – may carry its researches still farther,and discover, at least, in some degree, the secret springs and principlesby which the human mind is actuated in its operations.” P. 15. Hesays, however, “it is probable that one operation and principle of themind depends on another, which again may be resolved into one moregeneral and universal.” P. 16. What that principle is, it is evident Mr.Hume has no idea.

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In his second Essay, “Of the Origin of our Ideas,” I find nothing thatcould have been new, but an ill-founded suspicion, “that the simpleideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondingimpressions,” p. 27; merely because, having had ideas from actualimpression of the extremes of any particular colour, we are able, with-out any farther assistance from actual impression, to raise the idea of theintermediate shades of the same colour; not considering that thisamounts to nothing more than a difference of greater or less, and, there-fore, is not properly any new idea at all. It is no more than forming anidea of a middle sized hill, after having seen small hillocks and largemountains.

Let a tender eye be strongly impressed with a luminous object ofwhite, or any other colour, and if the eye be immediately shut, theimpression will of itself change into various other colours, as well asshades of the same colour; and there can be no doubt but that thiswould have been the case originally, though no such colours had beenknown before. Now the substance of the brain being the same with thatof the retina, and of the other nerves, it must be capable of such changesof affection as these, from causes within itself, but still the necessaryconsequence of external impressions.

In the third Essay, he reduces all the cases of the connexion or associa-tion of ideas to three, viz. resemblance, contiguity in place or time, andcause and effect, without attempting at a conjecture how ideas, thusrelated to each other, come to be associated, or what circumstances theyhave in common; though it was so easy to perceive that in all of them,the immediate cause is nothing more or less than joint impression; theuniversal and simple law of association being this, that two sensationsor ideas present to the mind at the same time, will afterwards recall eachother, which was well understood by Mr. Locke, and all who had treated of association before Mr. Hume. Let us now see how easily thisobservation will explain Mr. Hume’s three cases.

Things connected in time and place are generally considered together,or so near to each other, that the remains of one of the ideas is not goneout of the mind before the other has entered it. This is the reason whywe so readily repeat numbers in their progressive order, and are not sowell able to do it in a retrograde order. We have been most accustomedto repeat them in that order.

Resemblance is a partial sameness, and when that part of any ideawhich is the very same with part of another, is excited, it is evidently inconsequence of a former joint impression that the remainder of the sameidea is revived also.

Mr. Hume says, that contrariety may perhaps be considered as aspecies of resemblance, for a reason for which I must refer the reader to

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1 [“Contrast or contrariety is a species of connexion among ideas, which may,perhaps, be considered as a species of resemblance. Where two objects are contrary,the one destroys the other, i.e. is the cause of its annihilation; and the idea of annihi-lation of an object implies the idea of its former existence.” Essay III. P. 44. Note. –JTR]

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the Essay itself.1 But things opposed to one another are frequently compared and considered together. It is, therefore, from frequent jointimpression that their easy association is most naturally to be accountedfor.

Things that are causes and effects to each other are also often contem-plated together, and by habit we do not consider our knowledge of anything to be complete, without knowing the cause, if it be an effect, orthe effect, if it be a cause. We think the idea to be as incomplete as thatof the head of a man without his body, or of his body without his head.We feel them as different parts of the same thing.

Little and imperfect, as what Mr. Hume has advanced on this subjectmanifestly is, he seems to have imagined that he had done somethingvery great, when he concludes the Essay with saying, “the full explication of this principle, and all its consequences, would lead us intoreasonings too profound and too copious for these Essays. It is sufficientat present to have established this conclusion, that the three connectingprinciples of all ideas are the relations of resemblance, contiguity andcausation.” P. 46.

The fourth Essay, entitled “Sceptical Doubts,” relates to our inferringan effect from a cause, asserting, that it is by a process that is not properly reasoning, because all that we observe is the two separateideas, and we are altogether ignorant of their connexion; and in his fifthEssay, entitled, quaintly enough, “Sceptical Solution of these Doubts,”he says, p. 73, that we make the inference by the principle of “Customor Habit,” which comes to this, that the two ideas have always beenassociated together, so that, as he expresses it, the mind is naturally ledfrom one of them to the other, or, as he should have said more properly,one of them will necessarily introduce the other.

Leaving the question in this state, he may, with superficial readers,have weakened the foundation of our reasoning from effects to causes,as if it was properly no reasoning at all (which is language that he frequently uses), but only an arbitrary, and perhaps ill-founded, associa-tion of ideas. Whereas he would only have done justice to his subject, tohave added, that, having found, in all such constant conjunctions ofideas, with respect to which we have been able to make any discoveryat all, that the conjunction was really necessary, we conclude that theconjunction, if constant, is equally necessary, even when we are notable distinctly to perceive it. We, therefore, presume it, and securely act

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upon it. Indeed, without having made any discovery at all, we couldnot but be sensible, that if two events always follow one another, theremust be some sufficient reason for it.

As almost every pretension to discovery, or novelty, is contained inthis observation of Mr. Hume’s, I shall consider it a little more strictly.When we say that two events, or appearances, are necessarily connect-ed, all that we can mean is, that some more general law of nature mustbe violated before those events can be separated. For example, I findthat the sounding of one musical string will make another string that isin unison, &c. with it, to sound also; and finding this observationinvariable, I call the sounding of the first string the cause, and that ofthe second the effect, and have no apprehension of being disappointedin my expectation of the consequence. But I do not see what shouldmake this conjunction necessary, till I discover that sound consists of avibratory motion of the air, and that the air being put into this vibrato-ry motion by the first string, communicates the same to the second byits pulses, in the same manner as the first string itself was made tovibrate.

In like manner, it was always known (and mankind have alwaysacted on the persuasion) that respiration is necessary to animal life,and that air frequently breathed, &c. is fatal to it, though it is only oflate that we have discovered the connexion of those effects with thecause. In due time we may discover the cause of this cause, &c.

The idea annexed to the term cause or necessary agency, is not a simple idea, or what could originally have been formed in the mind bythe perception of any two other ideas, as Mr. Hume seems to haveexpected (and which notion alone could suggest any difficulty in thecase), but it represents the impression left in the mind by observingwhat is common to numberless cases in which there is a constant con-junction of appearances or events, in some of which we are able to seethe proximate cause of the conjunction, but with respect to the rest weonly presume it from the similarity of the cases. Notwithstanding,therefore, a definite idea, corresponding to the words cause, or power,does not occur to the mind on the original comparison of any two par-ticular ideas, the inference from effects to causes, whether Mr. Humewill call it reasoning or not, is, in many cases, as safe as any reasoningwhatever, so that no sceptic can derive the least advantage from thisconsideration.

The latter part of this Essay (which I dare say Mr. Hume consideredas the first in importance in the whole work) contains a very imperfectand manifestly false account of the difference between belief and imagi-nation. “Belief,” he says, “is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forceable,firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone

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is ever able to attain.” “P. 82. And to account for this manner of con-ception, he says, that whenever we are led from one idea to another, bythe connexion of resemblance or contiguity, and therefore, probably,by that of causation too, we at the same get a stronger conception of itthan we should otherwise attain. Unable to account for this, heascribes the fact to an instinct of nature. But he might just as well havedone what Drs. Reid, Beattie and Oswald, did afterwards, viz. ascribethe sentiment of belief itself, as well as that which is the cause of beliefto an arbitrary instinct of nature.

In reality, nothing can be more evidently false than what he here supposes. For how often does it happen that we are more affected by arepresentation of fictitious distress, in a novel, or on the theatre, thanby instances of real distress in common life? It is true that, cæterisparibus, reality makes a stronger impression than fiction; and, there-fore, when an impression is, by artificial means, made stronger thanusual, it sometimes imposes upon us for truth. But the idea annexed tothe word truth is of a very complex nature, and is the impression thatis left in the mind by thousands of cases in which real existence hasbeen discriminated from that which has none.

A child hears a tale of distress, and having always had the truth toldhim, he, of course, believes it, and, according to his previously acquiredsensibility, is affected with it; but he inquires farther, and finds that hehas been imposed upon. Either no such person existed, or such andsuch things did not happen to him. He also reads tales of distress, &c.in books, but finds, by comparing them with other books, and otheraccounts, that they had no existence. From much observation of thiskind, a complex idea, formed by a number of circumstances, is left inthe mind, and to this he gives the name of truth, an idea which helearns to respect more and more every day, and which he acquires ahabit of affixing, with all its secondary ideas of respect, with justnessand effect, as he advances in life; so that, independently of the strengthof our feelings, or imagination, we act very differently, according as wesee reason to annex this idea of truth to a story, or not.

Mr. Hume says, “When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not theidea of wounds and pain strike me more strongly than when a glass ofwine is presented to me, even though, by accident, this idea shouldoccur after the appearance of the latter object?” P. 90. But let an exe-cutioner, whom he believes to have a commission to run a swordthrough his body, be at the distance of a hundred miles from him, andthough there be neither a sword, nor the figure of a sword, near him,he would, I doubt not, by only thinking of a sword, in those circum-stances, feel very differently, and more strongly, than if he should takea real sword in his own hand, and hold the point of it to his naked

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2 [Such, however, as a Necessarian, expecting no future retribution, can scarcely refuseto admit. See Essay VIII., the Second Objection, and the Answer, pp. 159, 162. – JTR]

breast, when he had no apprehension of any design to hurt himself withit. But how does this tally with Mr. Hume’s account of the differencebetween belief and fiction?

It is evident that Mr. Hume had no idea of the extent of the power ofassociation in the human mind, by means of which a single idea may con-sist of thousands of parts, being a miniature of numberless trains of ideas,and of whole successive states of mind, and yet be perfectly distinct fromother ideas, consisting of as many parts, every such complex idea retain-ing its separate character and powers. The very names of persons famousin history excite in our minds an epitome of all that we know concerningthem, the particulars of which we may have forgotten. How complex alsoare the ideas belonging to words expressive of national customs, ranks,and orders of men, which, however, when pronounced ever so slightly,excite ideas perfectly distinct from each other, as much as those denotingthe most simple ideas.

Now the ideas of cause, effect, reason, instinct, probability, contin-gency, truth, falsehood, &c. &c. &c. are of this nature, requiring defini-tions of some extent; and the ideas they in fact excite are miniatures ofmuch more than enters into the shortest possible description of them; forthey were not attained in that manner; and yet all the parts perfectly coa-lesce, and form distinct and permanent ideas. I have endeavoured to givesome account of this business in the third of the Essays prefixed to myedition of Hartley’s Theory of the Mind. (Vol. III. P. 189.)

Mr. Hume, in his sixth Essay, “Of Probability,” says, that the “concur-rence of several views in a particular event begets immediately, by an inex-plicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief.” P. 94. “Let anyone try,” he says, “to account for this operation of the mind upon any ofthe received systems of philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficul-ty.” P. 97. On the system of Hartley there is no difficulty in it at all.

In the seventh Essay, “Of the Idea of Power,” he only more particu-larly insists upon it, that we know of no connexion between the idea ofany cause and that of any effect, though we suppose there is some con-nexion. Of this I have given, I presume, a sufficient account already.

In his eighth Essay, “Of Liberty and Necessity,” he very clearly illus-trates some of the arguments in favour of Necessity; but not having anycomprehension of the great system, of which that doctrine is a part, he,without the least reason, and without the least concern, abandons it tothe most shocking immoral consequences.2 Whereas, in reality, nothingis more favourable to the most sublime sentiments of virtue, in all itsbranches, as I have shewn at large in my Illustrations of that doctrine.

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His ninth Essay, “Of the Reason of Animals,” contains very littleindeed. He only asserts, that “it is custom alone which engages animals,from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant,and carries their imaginations from the appearance of the one, to con-ceive the other, in that strong and lively manner which we denominatebelief.” P. 169. This, unable to give any better account of, he callsinstinct, and says, that man avoids fire by instinct also. Whereas, if byinstinct be meant any thing different from the association of ideas(which certainly were not born with us), nothing is more contrary tofact. A child knows nothing of a dread of fire, but acquires it in conse-quence of the sensation of pain from it. He can even hardly be preventedfrom putting his finger into the flame of a candle. How Mr. Hume couldreconcile this well-known fact with a proper instinctive dread of fire, isnot easy to say.

The tenth Essay, “Of Miracles,” is intended to support a principle,according to which the relation of no appearance whatever, not evident-ly similar to former appearances, can be credible; a principle which wesee refuted every day in experimental philosophy, and which nothingcould have given the least countenance to, or have entitled to any con-sideration, but its affecting the credit of the miracles recorded in theScriptures. On this account it has been refuted by many persons, and Ihave considered it in my “Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion.”(Vol. II. Pp. 114–116.)

The eleventh Essay, “Of a Particular Providence and of a FutureState,” I have examined in my tenth Letter.

In his twelfth Essay, “Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy,”Mr. Hume maintains that, because all we know of any object is the ideaof it in our minds, we can never prove, that those ideas, or perceptions,“could not arise from the energy of the mind itself, or from the sugges-tion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause stillmore unknown to us.” P. 241. And that the supposition of a connexionbetween those perceptions of the mind and external objects is withoutany foundation in reasoning; not considering that we have just the samereason for believing the existence of external objects, that we have forthe truth of the Copernican system. They are the easiest hypotheses foracknowledged facts, as I have shewn at large in the Introduction to myExamination of the Writings of Drs. Reid, Beattie and Oswald. (Vol. III.Pp. 22–24.)

His observation, p. 243, that all sensible qualities (and, therefore,extension itself,) are in the mind, and not without us, is trifling. Hemight as well have said, that because sound is a thing formed within amusical instrument, and not without it, there is nothing without it thatproduces the sound.

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To his objection to the infinite divisibility of matter, p. 246, to someangles being infinitely less than others, and those again divisible ad infini-tum, which he allows to be demonstrable, and yet says, is big with contra-diction and absurdity, at the same time that he acknowledges that “noth-ing can be more sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than thisscepticism itself,” I surely need say nothing. This does not amount to somuch as a sceptical solution of a sceptical doubt. It may rather be calledthe sceptical proposal of a sceptical doubt.

In the conclusion of this last Essay, we find the outline of all the scepti-cism of his posthumous work, with the same paltry cover, viz. that “allreasoning from the relation of cause and effect” is founded on “a certaininstinct of our nature, which – may be fallacious and deceitful.” P. 251.That we can never “satisfy ourselves concerning any determination wemay form with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of naturefrom and to eternity.” P. 255. That “divinity or theology, as it proves theexistence of a Deity, &c., has a foundation in reason, so far as it is sup-ported by experience,” (which support in a former Essay he absolutelydenies it to have,) “but its best and most solid foundation is faith anddivine revelation.” P. 259.

In the first of these Essays, Mr. Hume had said, “We have, in the follow-ing Essays, attempted to throw some light upon subjects, from whichuncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant.” P.18. How very small is the light that he has thrown, and mixed with howmuch darkness, I need not repeat. “Happy,” says he, “if we can unite thedifferent species of philosophy, by reconciling profound inquiry with clear-ness, and truth with novelty; and still more happy, if, reasoning in this easymanner, we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy,which seems to have served hitherto only as a shelter to superstition, and acover to absurdity and error.” Pp. 18, 19.

Now, I neither see the profundity nor the clearness of his reasoning,except in things with respect to which he is far from being original,notwithstanding his advantage of a command of language and a greatpower of perspicuity, where his argument would admit of it. As to theabstruse philosophy which he meant to undermine, it could be nothing butthe doctrine of certainty, and a steady persuasion concerning truth, andespecially the truths of natural and revealed religion; and what kind of amind must that man have had, to whom this could give any satisfaction!

All men by no means judge of the value of publications by the same ruleswith Mr. Hume, or perhaps his own Essays would be in more danger than he himself imagined. “When we run over libraries, persuadedof these principles,” says he, “what havock must we make? If we take inhand any volume; of Divinity, or School Metaphysics, for instance; let usask, Does it contain any abstract reasonings concerning quantity or num-

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ber? No. Does it contain any experimental reasonings concerning matter offact, or existence? No. Commit it then to the flames. For it can containnothing then but sophistry and illusion.” P. 259. It is happy for us all, thatwe are not judges for one another in these cases, but that a wise Providenceoverrules all things. The Scriptures were certainly not meant to come undereither of Mr. Hume’s characters of books to be saved from the flames.

In the preceding observations, I think I have descanted upon every thingof Mr. Hume’s, in which it can be pretended, or in which he himself would have pretended, that he had made any advances in theknowledge of the human mind. I need not now say how inconsiderablethose advances were. All that he has observed relates to the power of asso-ciation, and his ideas on that subject were much confined, going very little,if indeed, on the whole, any thing at all, beyond those of Mr. Locke, andothers who had preceded him.

Mr. Hume had not even a glimpse of what was at the same time execut-ing by Dr. Hartley, who, in an immense work of wonderful comprehensionand accuracy, has demonstrated, that this single principle of association isthe great law of the human mind, and that all those which Mr. Hume, aswell as others, had considered as independent faculties, are merely differentcases or modifications of it; that memory, imagination, judgment, the will,and the passions, have the same, and no other origin; so that by means ofthis one property, and the circumstances in which we are placed, we all ofus come to be every thing that we are.

In his Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Mr. Hume very wellillustrates what I fancy he himself would not pretend to be new, though, Ibelieve, it had not been sufficiently attended to by metaphysicians, viz. that“utility is the foundation of virtue;” and this being the most considerableand the most elaborate work of Mr. Hume’s, I have referred to it as a spec-imen of analytical reasoning, in my Lectures on Criticism. But in this workMr. Hume refers the pleasing feelings, annexed to the perception of virtue,to an instinct of nature, confessedly unable to trace them any farther. “It isneedless,” he says, “to push our researches so far as to ask why we havehumanity, or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient that this is experi-enced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in ourexamination of causes, and there are in every science some general princi-ples beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general.” P.85. Dr. Hartley, however, not resting where Mr. Hume did, has, withwonderful sagacity, discovered the origin of benevolence, of the moralsense, and of every other principle before though to be instinctive, shewinghow they are derived from association, affecting us in our infant state, andas we advance in life; and he has shewn the diversity that we find in humanaffections to arise from a diversity of influences, operating on us in thesame general manner.

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3 [Conclusion of Adam Smith’s Letter annexed to Hume’s Life. See p. 325. “Insupport of this high encomium no proper evidence has ever been produced. Of Mr.Hume’s fortitude in adversity, of great generosity displayed by him, or of anyuncommon benevolence, no instances are recorded; but these virtues have beeneminently and illustriously conspicuous in many Christian characters. If thecharacter of David Hume be compared with that of Bernard Gilpin, a countryclergyman, or with that of Thomas Firmin, a tradesman of London, but both actingunder the influence of the great truths of Christianity, the striking inferiority of thiscelebrated sceptic will be apparent to every impartial man. But these men wereformed by the sublime views of Christianity; and such men were never produced byscepticism or infidelity.” Essay on Johnson’s Life, 1786, in Tracts, 1796, III. pp.417, 418, by Joseph Towers, L.L.D. He died in 1799, after having maintainedthrough life, a christian and truly independent character. Dr. Towers’s ardour, inadvocating the great interests of mankind, I have often witnessed. – JTR]

4 [First published, 1778. See Dr. Towers’s Tracts, 1796, I. P. 233. – JTR]5 [“He acknowledged it to Mr. Griffith, the bookseller.” Mr. J. Priestley’s Note to the

Memoirs. See also Mr. Tytler’s Strictures on the Style of Hume’s Essays, in Mem. ofLord Kames, 8vo. I. pp. 236, 237. – JTR]

In this work, Mr. Hume classes humility among the vices, with no otherview, that I can perceive, but to shew his contempt for the christian system,in which it makes a principal figure as a virtue. And he has wholly over-looked all the virtues of the devotional kind, when, in fact, they may beshewn, by arguments independent of the peculiar doctrines of revelation,to be, in their own nature, the most truly valuable, as well as the most sub-lime of all others, and to form what may be called the key-stone of everytruly great and heroic character. Without the virtues of this class (thoughDr. Smith considers Mr. Hume as “approaching as nearly to the idea of aperfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty willpermit”3), his character must have been as imperfect as his views (lookingto nothing beyond the grave) were narrow.

I have thus given you my reasons, as briefly as I well could, for placingMr. Hume so low as I do in the class of metaphysical writers, or moralphilosophers. As to Natural Philosophy, or Mathematics, I never heardthat he had any pretensions to merit; and of that which constitutes an his-torian, you will not, I imagine, think that much remains to him, besidesthat of a pleasing compiler, after reading Dr. Towers’s judiciousObservations on his History of England.4 His Miscellaneous and PoliticalEssays always pleased me, but they by no means entitle him to the firstrank among writers of either class. As to his style, notwithstanding itsexcellence in some respects, I have shewn in my English Grammar (and, asI have been informed, to Mr. Hume’s own satisfaction)5 that he has depart-ed farther from the true idiom of the English language, than perhaps anyother writer of note in the present age.

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Submitting all my observations to your own judgment, and sincerelywishing the happiest issue to your laudable pursuit of truth, I remain,

Dear Sir,Your very humble Servant,

J. PRIESTLEY.Calne, March, 1780.

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290

25AN ANSWER TO DAVID HUME

An answer to David Hume, and others, on the subject of liberty and necessity,providence, and a future state, London: printed for T. Hookham, 1785,[3]–66 p.Complete pamphlet; from 1785 edition.

This pamphlet criticizes the materialistic and deterministic view of humannature that Hume presents in Section 7 of the Enquiry, “Of Liberty and

Necessity.” According to the anonymous author, Hume’s views “may withreason be considered as disavowing the Deity.” The author begins by criti-cising Beattie’s negative rhetoric against Hume and, in contrast with Beattie,the author expresses his admiration with Hume and pledges to treat thesceptical philosopher more diplomatically. He next summarizes Hume’s viewsin the Enquiry – on ideas and impressions, causality and determinism. Tocombat the anti-theistic implications of Hume’s views, the author offers a “firstcause” argument for God’s existence. The author next describes a chain ofbeing, from inert material things, to plants, to animals, to humans, andultimately to an immaterial God. Even plants, he argues, do not always complywith rigid physical laws. Humans, which are closer to God than plants, aredirected by both instinct, which allures us, and reason which informs us of theconsequences of our actions. If we could foresee all the consequences of ouractions, this would create a “moral necessity of action” in our quest forhappiness. “Now man is, in this intermediate state, between an extrinsicallyimposed physical, and a self-imposed moral necessity of action, and in thisdoes his liberty consist.” He concludes taking issue with Hume’s contentionthat the chain of determined causes behind human actions ultimately tracesback to God, who is thus the cause of human evil. The author argues that Godforesees our conduct, but does not determine our choices.

The Answer was favourably reviewed in the Monthly Review as asuccessful attack on atheism:

It is candid, sensible, and ingenious. The argument against the prevailingsystem of atheism which maintains the eternity of the world, and an infinitesuccession of animal beings, is managed with singular acuteness; and wewill lay it before our Readers as a happy specimen of the Writer’s talent forreasoning on the à posteriori ground. [Monthly Review, May 1785, Vol.72, pp. 394–395]

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After presenting a short excerpt from the pamphlet, the reviewer concludes,“There is no metaphysical sophistry that can overcome those plain andobvious deductions of reason and experience.” The pamphlet was lessfavourably received in the English Review. The reviewer begins by defendingBeattie against the attack made on him in the opening paragraph of theAnswer:

Dr. Beattie is too acute a logician not to know that in controverting anydoctrine or opinion, he must attack either the premises or the conclusion ofthe argument, or syllogism on which it is founded. Accordingly, Dr. Beattiehas attacked Mr. Hume’s premises, and the principles of Locke upon whichthey are founded: insisting that reasoning holds of common sense, notcommon sense of reasoning: and that by the very force of natural consti-tution we are led as certainly to believe the permanent existence of things,and certain connections among them, as we are to be sensible of certainimpressions and ideas. This therefore is the point in question: which ourauthor has not so much as touched. He has not, therefore, of course,observed, that Mr. Hume allows all that Mr. Beattie contends for, and yetpresses his own conclusions. Hume admits that when he leaves the studiousshade where all things appear loose, unconnected, an enigma, a dream, andcomes into the busy world, he feels the power of nature which makes him infact, feel, and think, and act, like other men. But he still insists that byreasoning he cannot see any necessary connexion between cause and effect,and as this relation is that on which we found the belief of permanentexistence, that the permanent existence of every thing is dubious anduncertain.

The reviewer continues maintaining that, although the Answer presents a fairaccount of Hume’s views, the pamphlet nevertheless presents a weakargument for free will and a future state:

At the same time that our author has by no means entered into the viewsand reasoning of Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Reid of Glasgow, the father of thatphilosophy which Beattie adopts, he has given a very faithful abstract of thereasonings of Mr. Hume which he thinks unanswerable, and thereforeleaves it to speak for itself.

He proceeds to prove, by the common arguments, the existence of free-will or liberty, a providence and a future state. He lays great stress on aweak argument, taken from the short period that lies within the reach ofhistory and tradition. Here he reasons on Hume’s principles, that as we hadno experience of such deluges or other natural convulsions as might havedestroyed more antient traces of human kind, therefore we have not

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1 The ancients imagined them to be the habitation of the blessed.

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evidence that they ever existed. [English Review, 1785, Vol. 6, pp.284–286]

The following is from the 1785 and only edition of the Answer.

AN ANSWER TO DAVID HUME, &c.

Being some time since in company with persons who highly praised the Essayon the Immutability of Truth, in answer to the Sceptical Opinions of Hume, Iwas induced to read a treatise on which men of sense had lavished suchencomiums. Looking into it, however, I was surprised to observe, that insteadof reasoning, the author had merely cavilled against his opinions; that insteadof refuting, he had never met him in argument; that he had established anarbitrary tribunal of his own erection, and tried his adversary by laws withwhich he was unacquainted. Now, as I had ever deemed it to be the first lawof argumentation, that the respondent should shew a fallacy either in thepremises or the conclusions of his antagonist, I was vastly disappointed atperceiving that Dr. Beattie had neglected the system of Hume, and had, bydeclamations, attempted to prejudice mankind against it, as containingdoctrines pernicious to society.

Having ever respected Mr. Hume for his uncommon abilities, having everloved the man for the known goodness of his heart, and being prepossessed infavour of his principles, as generally coinciding with those of Mr. Locke, I satdown to take a review of his Essays, without the least prejudice against them.If, said I, he prove that I am merely an Ephemeris, let me know and be contentwith my humble destination; let my bark glide smoothly through the sea oflife, its steady course not being impeded by the alternate tides of contrariantopinions, and let Hume pilot the vessel into the harbour of hopelesstranquillity, since Dr. Beattie has proved incapable of conducting her to theFortunate Islands.1

Thus disposed, I began to read Hume’s Essays, studious of truth alone, inwhatever form it appeared; but, though devoid of all prejudice against him, Iproceeded with caution, convinced by my own experience that he was anacute, and assured by others that he was a sophistical reasoner. Advancing,however, in the work, I was pleased to find that a continued chain ofargument pervaded the whole, and to observe that he laid down his principleswith the utmost clearness and precision, proving them by arguments whosegenuine force disclaimed the paltry assistance of delusion: I therefore speedily

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began to conceive, not only that his principles were well founded, but thatthey were the only basis of sound reasoning on those subjects.

Having paid this tribute of well-deserved applause to the memory of a manequally distinguished by wisdom and virtue, I may now, without appre-hension of imputed annoyance or malevolence, take the liberty of supposing(a liberty which, were he alive, he would readily allow me) that in drawing hisconclusions, certain circumstances escaped him, which ought to have beenconsidered in the discussion of such important questions, and from a properattention to which he would have deduced consequences diametricallyopposite to those which he has laboured to establish..

In order to prosecute the present disquisition which all possible candor, Ishall, in the first place, offer to the reader, a short extract from the principlesof Mr. Hume, and, in the next, shall attempt to shew that different conclu-sions naturally flow from them. In the whole of this enquiry, I shall treat himwith that proper respect and delicacy which should subsist between friends;shall never carp at his terms, but investigate his meaning; and shall strive togive his arguments the utmost degree of force, which they are capable ofreceiving.

Principles laid down by Hume.

This elegant and ingenious author begins his system, by remarking thestriking difference which subsists between the first lively effects, excited inthe mind by the presence of such objects as act immediately on the senses,and that more faint recollection of them, which is treasured up in the memo-ry; to the former of these he gives the name of impression, (though percep-tion might perhaps be more applicable to it)2 marking the latter by the oldterm, Idea: in this instance, he must be allowed to have acted like a soundphilosopher and a judicious critic. It is absurd to assert that our first impres-sions, or perceptions, are real images of surrounding objects, and of coursethe term (idea) is improperly applied to them: it is certain that the recollectednotion, though not so lively, is an exact resemblance of the first impressionor perception, and consequently this word most happily expresses it, being alikeness to the thought, not to the thing which excited it. He then deducesthe origin of our ideas from the source of sensation, evincing the truth of hisposition by two unanswerable arguments: in the first place, however com-pounded they may at a transient view appear, they are all capable of being

2 As this expression conveys no distinction between the various processes of the mind inacquiring her notions of things, I shall take the liberty of defining terms for myself. Theaction of the object on the sentient extremities, may be denominated an impression; thecommunication of this impression to the brain by the nerves, and the effect producedthen, may be called a sensation; and the subsequent operation of this in the mind, maybe deemed a perception.

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resolved into such simple ideas as were copied from a preceding feeling orsentiment; in the second, if you find any person who was deprived from hisbirth of any organ of sense, you will perceive the impossibility of communi-cating to him those ideas, with which the minds of men, enjoying the use ofit, are furnished.

He proceeds from this to consider the association of our ideas, establishingthree principles of connection between them, viz. resemblance, contiguity,and causation.3

Our author next divides all objects of the human intellect into relations ofideas and matters of fact.

The former of these retain their evidence, independent on any matter offact which is conformable to them; the latter are by no means ascertained inthe same manner, nor is our conviction of their truth similar to that whichaccompanies the foregoing.4

In consequence, therefore, of this seeming uncertainty, with regard to mat-ters of fact, he thinks it necessary to enquire into the nature of that evidence,on which we depend for the truth of such things, as are beyond the presenttestimony of our senses, or the records of our memory.

Now all reasoning, concerning matter of fact, seems to be founded on therelation of cause and effect: if therefore we would wish to satisfy ourselvesconcerning the nature of the evidence afforded by the former, we mustenquire how we arrive at the knowledge of the latter. He insists that theknowledge of this relation is not, in any in stance, acquired by reasoning apriori, evincing the truth of it by the most irresistible arguments: it will not,however, be necessary, at present, to repeat them, as all reasoning a priori,turns on the properties of things which have no real existence, and whoseessence is formed by the intellect alone. To habit5 then, we must attribute allour conclusions concerning matters of fact, enforcing the cause from a cus-tomary connection between it and the effect. From this we are led to the con-

3 That these three principles serve to connect ideas, will not, I believe, be doubted; a pic-ture naturally leads our thoughts to the original, the mention of one apartment in abuilding, naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the other; and if wethink of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.

4 The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it never can imply a contra-diction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if it wereever so conformable to reality.

5 Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which rendersour experience useful to us, and makes us expect for the future a similar train of eventsto those which have appeared in the past. But here it may be proper to remark, thatthough our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, andassure us of matters of fact, which happened in the most distant places and the mostremote ages; yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from whichwe may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A man who should find, in a desartcountry, the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude that the country had, in

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sideration of verisimilitude. All reasoning is, by Hume, divided into demon-strations, proofs, and probabilities – by proofs, meaning such argumentsfrom experience, as leave no room for doubt or opposition.6 Whenever,therefore, the cause and effect have been constantly conjoined, we expect thelatter from the former with the utmost assurance: but when, at several times,the former is found disjoined from the latter, we are then obliged to comparethe instances on the one side and the other, judging of the event according tothe majority.

Our author next asserts, that there is, in no particular instance of causeand effect in external objects, any thing which could suggest the idea ofpower or necessary connection between them.7 When we reflect on the oper-ations of our own mind, he shews, in like manner, that we are incapable ofderiving any such idea from that source, since the connection between voli-tion and voluntary motion in ourselves, is equally the result of experience,with that which subsists between cause and effect in every other part ofnature.

He also elucidates each position by a variety of instances; but it will not benecessary to offer them to the reader, as the truth of each must clearlyappear from what has been already observed, with respect to the ideas, con-cerning which our reasoning, a priori, must be exercised.

He proceeds, in the last place, to enquire into the nature of Liberty andNecessity, establishing as a principle that the conjunction between motivesand voluntary actions, is as constant and uniform, as that between cause andeffect in external objects, and that of course Liberty consists in the power of

ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this natureoccur to him, he could never form such an inference. What, then, is the conclusion of thewhole matter? a simple one; though it must be confessed pretty remote from the com-mon theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact, or real existence, is derived fromsome object present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between thatand some other object.

6 There are some causes which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particulareffect, and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their oper-ation. Fire has ever burned, and water suffocated, every human creature: the productionof motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto admitted of noexception. But there are other causes which have been found more irregular and uncer-tain; nor has rhubarb proved always a purge, or opium a soporific to every person whohas taken these medicines. Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the futurein all our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect theevent with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. Butwhere different effects have been found to follow from causes which are to appearanceexactly similar, all those various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past tothe future, and enter into our consideration whenever we determine the probability ofthe event.

7 Any quality which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible conse-quence of the other; we only find that the one does actually in fact follow the other.

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acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will, which deter-minations are founded on the motives.8

The ingenious author next glides from the establishment of his principlesinto other opinions, which he introduces in the following manner: I pretendnot, says he, to have obviated or removed all objection to this theory, withrespect to Liberty and Necessity. I can foresee other objections, derived fromtopics which have not been here treated of. – It may be said, for instance,that if voluntary actions be submitted to the same laws of necessity with theoperations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all, toevery single volition of every human creature: no contingency any where inthe universe – no indifference – no liberty: while we act, we are, at the sametime, acted upon. The ultimate author of all our volitions is the Creator ofthe World, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placedall things in that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by aninevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either can haveno moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they haveany turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he isacknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author.

Now as this argument tends to deny the goodness of God, and as he, whorefuses to allow any one attribute of the Divine Nature, may with reason beconsidered as disowning the Deity, I shall attempt to evince the existence andattributes of this august Being, a posteriori, the only mode of reasoningwhich our present plan admits, before I examine the conclusiveness of it.

Our experience convinces us, that all animals are of a short lived and per-ishable nature, and that generation continually supplies a new race to fill upthe places which their parents had occupied: either then this chain of beingsmust have continued through the eternity past, or there must have beensome extrinsic cause of their existence.

Now I demand, in the first place, if mankind has existed from eternity,how comes it to pass that we have never heard of him till within these fewthousand years? How can we conceive that the same reason has lain intirelydormant thro’ an eternity past, which awaking at length, and without anyassignable cause from its slumber, has, within a few thousand years, per-formed such wonders? Push back the existence of our species as far as theEgyptians, Persians, Chaldeans, Chinese, or Indians, have dreamed it, still do

8 For what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions? Surely we cannot sup-pose actions to have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances,that the one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and thatthe one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. By lib-erty, then, we can only mean the power of acting or not acting according to the determi-nations of the will. If liberty be opposed to necessity, and not to constraint, it is the samething with chance, which is universally allowed to have no existence.

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you make such an inconsiderable addition to the date of man’s origin, asbears the same proportion to an eternity past, that a mathematical pointdoes to the universe? If it be said that the world has undergone a variety ofchanges, similar to the occasioned by the deluge, which destroyed the greaterpart of its inhabitants, and reduced the remainder to the state of savages,equally unacquainted with arts and sciences; I reply that by such a supposi-tion, the followers of Hume intirely deviate from his principles, which tiethem down to acknowledge no event to have taken place, unless their ownexperience, or that of others perfectly well authenticated, has furnished themwith an instance of a similar nature. Now no history, except the Jewish, hasmentioned an universal, or even general deluge, and the inspired writer ofthis has announced the existence of God with the same authority that he hasasserted the destruction of mankind; consequently, if you give credit to it inthe one respect, you are, by the same reason, bounden to believe it in theother, and if you deny the testimony of it, there is no foundation on whichyou can ground you hypothesis. The reveries of natural historians will littleavail in the present dispute. The strata of shells, found in several hills at adistance from the sea, might perhaps, as Goldsmith imagines, have been pro-duced in the fresh water, or if that may seem a contradiction to commonexperience, still do our antagonists derive no advantage from it, since bothreason and observation constantly announce, that there has ever subsisted anexact equilibrium between the sea and land; and that, if at any time the for-mer has inundated a particular country, it has left bare a proportional part,which had been formerly subject to its dominion.

Our opponents may next assert, that barbarous nations like the Goths,Heruli and Huns, may have ravaged the earth, and have totally destroyedevery vestige of science; but this supposition is equally inconsistent with theprinciples of Hume, since no history has mentioned an universal conquest tohave been made by any people, and consequently, as the cause was but par-tial, the effects must have been but partial, and science must have been butpartially injured. But not content with negative, history furnishes us with posi-tive proofs in contradiction ot this opinion, uniformly asserting, that as sciencedecayed in one part, it flourished in another: as it declined in the West, itreared up its head in the East; and, as it was extinguished by the religious dis-putes which subsisted between the Emperors and the Monks atConstantinople, it revived under the tolerating government of the Caliphs orBagdat.

Thus it appears, that if men have existed from eternity, their reason haslain dormant till within a few thousand years; that we cannot impute thiseffect to any sufficient cause, since history warrants no general destruction ofthe human species, either by physical or moral agents, consequently manmust, within these few thousand years, have arisen without cause, or musthave been indebted to some other Being for his existence.

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That the world derived its origin from the same cause which gave exis-tence to man, is also perfectly evident, since otherwise you must allow twoself-existent independent principles, one of which, notwithstanding, givesnew modifications and qualities to the other,9 which is a palpable contradic-tion in terms. That this Being cannot, with reason, be deemed the soul of theworld, admits not a doubt, since on this supposition the connexion betweenthem must have been necessary and eternal; consequently all the effectswhich this mind, God, acting on this body, Matter, is capable of producing,must have taken place from an eternity past, and of course mankind musthave eternally existed, the absurdity of which has been already evinced.

Now into these two suppositions may the opinions of all the philosophers,whether ancients, who never dreamed of, or moderns, who have ventured todeny, a creation, be ultimately resolved; the existence of a God, the Creatorof the Universe, must therefore be acknowledged. We need but open oureyes to be convinced of some of the attributes of God; we have alreadyevinced that wisdom and action were properties of the Deity, and this wasshewn from observation of the powers we possess; I shall now, therefore,prove them from a contemplation of the Universe.

If we examine this earth, our own immediate habitation, we shall find themost regular uniformity in her general and specific productions, joined to themost pleasing variety in them, when contrasted with each other; at one timewe are amazed at the vast objects which surround us, and the next instantfind ourselves equally astonished at the no less admirable minuteness of cre-ation; who then can reflect on this without confessing the wisdom andpower of the Author? If we extend our inquiries to the planetary system, weshall perceive those vast bodies to observe the utmost regularity in their revo-lutions round the common center of attraction, the first visible dispenser oflife and light. But how are we lost in amazement when we find that thosestars, which to our eyes appear as mere sparks, are in reality so many suns?when analogy points out that they are surrounded by their attendant worlds,and that each is furnished with a variety of creatures widely different, per-haps, in their nature and properties from those which our earth is observed

9 We see nothing in this world but matter, and we prove the Deity from the absolutenecessity there is for such a Being, in order to produce the effects which we perceive. Weobserve certain kinds of matter to be inert, and also find, that by death and corruptioneven men may be resolved into such matter; hence we fairly infer this property to beessential to it, and that action and knowledge are the effects of man’s modification.These effects we must ascribe to the modifier, as their cause, since that which is inertcannot produce action; we must consider knowledge and action as attributes of thismodifier, for the reason now assigned, and of course must establish two Beings essential-ly different. These must either be independent, or one of them must be derived from theother. But a perfect Being cannot proceed from imperfection, and therefore they areeither independent, or God has created matter.

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to support? Can we then doubt that the august Being, who, by the energy ofhis will gave existence to such vast variety of worlds, who preserves theirinterior œconomy with the utmost exactness, and regulates their motions,with regard to external objects, by laws which are equally invariable withtheir Author, must be possessed both of wisdom and power infinite? But ifthe Deity has been pleased to afford us, a posteriori, the most evident proofsof some of his attributes, he has in appearance drawn, either partially or gen-erally, a veil over others, and denied to us the power of investigating them bythe senses. Thus has it fared with the goodness and justice of God: butthough we have no sufficient evidence of these attributes, a posteriori, I shallnow attempt to shew, that a little reflection offers to us a demonstration oftheir existence.

Here I must observe that, though Hume’s mode of reasoning does notallow us to deduce any quality in the cause, unless from the effect; yet havingestablished any attribute of the Deity in this manner, we may fairly infer thatnothing, inconsistent with it, can possibly exist. The First Cause of all thingsmust possess his attributes by a necessity of nature, since there is no otherBeing from whom he could derive them, and of course he must either beessentially benevolent or malevolent; by Omniscience and Omnipotence nec-essarily include perfect felicity in the Being who possesses them, since InfiniteWisdom must point out, and Infinite Power must enable him to attain, what-ever most effectual conduces to his happiness. If supreme gratitude flowsfrom those attributes, it also supposes them as its origin; of course, therefore,where the cause cannot be found, the effect cannot possibly be supposed tosubsist. Hence it follows that the Deity, though infinitely benevolent, couldnot communicate supreme felicity to any being, without rendering it, at thesame time, Omniscient and Omnipotent. It is, however, very certain, that ifthe Deity were infinitely malevolent, he could inflict perfect misery on hiscreatures, without divesting himself, in any degree, of his sole title to theabove-mentioned attributes. The Deity therefore must be acknowledgedessentially benevolent, though he has not bestowed perfect felicity on hiscreatures, since that could not be effected without rendering them Gods.Justice is also connected by an absolute necessity with the nature of theDeity; for his benevolence having inclined him to give, to certain creatures,reason, as a rule directing them to the attainment of good, and the avoidanceof evil, his Omniscience must enable him to perceive each compliance with,and each infraction of it, while his Omnipotence must render him capable ofrewarding the one, and of punishing the other: we may therefore, with thestrictest reason conclude that he is just, since no Being, even of commonunderstanding, would give laws to another, merely with the view of havingthem transgressed. Having proved certain attributes of the Divinity, a poste-riori, and having demonstrated others, by a necessary connection with them,I proceed now to shew that human actions cannot be traced by a necessary

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chain to the Deity as their cause, and in order to evince it, am obliged tomake some more particular inquiries, concerning the Nature of God, ofMatter, and of the different kinds of material beings existing in this world.

I have already proved the Omniscience of the Deity; and it must appearvery evident to any person, who reflects for a moment on this attribute, thatthe knowledge possessed by this august Being, of every thing, in every por-tion of infinite duration, must be, both in its nature and mode of acquisition,essentially different from the knowledge of man; for he must actually, and atevery moment, comprehend each action and consequence thereof; since ifthere was a succession of ideas in the Divine mind, while one train was pre-sent, another must be absent, and thus the universality of his perceptionmust be destroyed. The Omnipotence of the Deity has been also evinced, butthis attribute implies the power of acting on every thing in nature at the samemoment of time, otherwise he could not effect all purposes. Infinite knowl-edge and energy are therefore adherence in the Divine Nature, nor can theyadmit any limitation, unless with respect to things, which would involve acontradiction. That the Deity is not material is exceedingly apparent: ifallowed independent principles, they cannot be the same thing; if God hasgiven existence to matter, the Creator cannot be one entity with his creature:but waving all this, if we can suppose for a moment the Divinity to be corpo-real, from that moment we shall have two bodies possessing the same space.Since God is not material, we are obliged to oppose to and contract witheach other, these two only beings existing in the universe, asserting thatwhatever property is found constantly in the latter, must every prove incom-patible with the former, Now we find every thing material to be extended, toconsist of solid and separable parts, with certain passive capacities: the Deitytherefore must not consist of solid and separable parts, must possess certainactive energies. Such a Being then we denominate a Spirit, and though inca-pable of conceiving any thing of this kind, from the many absurdities whichfollow the negation of it, we with the greatest certainty infer its existence.This Being (as has been already shewn) possessing an intuitive knowledge ofall things in every portion of eternity, so far as it does not imply a contradic-tion; and his infinite power enabling him to effect whatever appears to be theobject of his volition, he is obliged, by his perfections, to act in conformitywith a moral necessity.

Inert matter, on the other hand, is in a state of absolute imperfection,devoid of life, of sensation, of energy, and receiving such laws as the Deityhas prescribed. These laws are ever invariably obeyed: never does impulsefail to communicate motion in proportion to the momentum of the impellingbody; nor does action fail to produce, on every occasion, its contrariant re-action, and thus do its defects compel it to conform to an extrinsicallyimposed physical necessity. – Between inert matter and man, there are foundan immense variety of beings, gradually ascending each above the other, and

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exhibiting different, though almost imperceptible degrees of perfection.Between man and God, imagination has continued the same visionary chain,and filled the heavens with a vast number of intelligences, each species supe-rior to the other in endowments. Now, in whatever degrees these perfectionsare superadded to all material creatures, until we pass man, in the same shallwe perceive them to deviate from the unerring obedience of the caput mortu-um, and not conform to the purposes for which they seem designed. If, forinstance, we attend to such things as are endued with vegetable life, we shallfind that they do not invariably obey their laws, and that certain conditionsare necessary to enforce their compliance with them: not every tree naturallyfructiferous, produces fruit at the accustomed season; not every grain, whensown in the ground, pullulates into life, and gratifies our hopes of a plen-teous increase; and thus is a contingency substituted for an absolute con-straint.

If we examine beings endowed with animal life, in proportion to the addi-tional perfections which they possess, shall we find a still greater infractionof their general laws? Instinct was given brutes in order to direct them toproper objects of appetite, yet do they sometimes contradict nature in thismost essential point, and thereby bring into existence a variety of monsters.But instinct is not the only principle perceivable in these creatures; for we canobserve one of an opposite nature, which frequently contradicts it; the for-mer generally prompts them to the pursuit of the same object, but experi-ence, notwithstanding, has power to correct and regulate the violence of theimpulse. Thus the setting dog is instinctively inclined to run in on his game,and attempt to catch it, but let frequent sufferings impress on his memorythat a severe beating is to be the consequence of this action, and he will standobedient at the distance he is commanded.

I shall not dispute about the name which should be given to this faculty; butit is indubitably contrary to instinct, which hurries on those creatures to actlike inorganic matter, according to an extrinsically imposed necessity. In manwe may perceive powers superior to those of beasts: in him, as in them,instinct is very forcible, and directs him to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain;but whereas they are capable of having their appetites directed by a limitedexperience, and in a few instances only he possesses the faculty of tracingeffects to their causes, through a long series of events, of foreseeing things tocome in the past, and of sacrificing his desire of present gratification to thishopes of future good. Instinct or passion, then, directs us, by the allurement ofpleasure, to the pursuit of present and apparent good; reason or experiencefrequently restrains us from obeying the impulse, by representing that it maybe attended with evil in future, or may prevent us from the attainment of astill greater advantage.

Were man, therefore, capable of perceiving, by intuition, all the conse-quences of his actions, he would derive from this knowledge a moral necessity

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10 By rendering God the immediate author of evil.

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of action, since all beings covet what is good and avoid what is evil; were he,on the contrary, at all times hurried into action by his passions, he would thenobey an impetus equally blind with that of matter. Now man is, in this inter-mediate state, between an extrinsically imposed physical, and a self-imposedmoral necessity of action, and in this does his liberty consist; for, as Humejustly observes, liberty should ever be opposed to constraint, and not tonecessity; one species of necessity should ever, indeed, be opposed to theother, and liberty be considered as the intermediate state. What does it consistin? in what Hume has made it consist, viz. in the power of acting, or notacting, according to the determinations of the will, which determinations arefounded on the motives derived from the contrariant principles of passion andreason. As we find that each of these principles acquires strength by exercise,and that if we indulge our passions for a long time, they finally obtain analmost absolute dominion over us; but that, if we cultivate our reason, it gainsforce every day, and enables us to abolish the tyranny of passion. As the onedebases, and the other elevates mankind, it is exceedingly evident that theperfection of liberty consists in an approach to a moral, and the degradationof it in a tendency to a physical necessity of action. Now, I think, this expla-nation of liberty affords an answer to the supposition of Mr. Hume,concerning the physical necessity of human actions, and also to his conclusionconcerning the imputableness of them to God. The hypothesis is false, sincehuman actions have been shewn to acknowledge the dominion of no kind ofnecessity, and the premises overturned, the inference must necessarily fall tothe ground.

But before I quit this subject, I am obliged to observe, that by imputingcriminality to the ultimate author, Mr. Hume has fallen into a very notableerror: for there is a wide difference between asserting God to be immediately,and maintaining him to be ultimately, the author of our volitions. – That wehave derived the power of willing from God is exceedingly evident; but it is atthe same time no less contrary to reason, to make the Deity our immediatedirector in each particular exertion of it.

Pere Malebranche, wishing to exalt the power of the Deity, asserts thatevery thing proceeds immediately from him; that our very ideas are in him,and independent on his action, cannot be the modification of a created mind:this opinion is, however, exceedingly derogatory from the Divine Majesty,and ultimately tends to consequential Atheism,10 from which it seems to havebeen originally derived.

The Stoics, who maintained God to be the fatal necessity of all things,denied however that he was the immediate author of evil, but Malebranche

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represents him as immediately engaged in every act of moral turpitude: for asall our ideas are immediately derived from God, it is evident that we cannotprevent the reception of them; but, according to Malebranche, while the ideaexists in the mind, it absolutely modifies it in such a manner, that the lattercould no more exist without such an inclination, than the human body couldexist, as such, without a particular form. This opinion appears to have arisenfrom the system of Democritus, who maintained that the world was composedof atoms; and to obviate the necessity of a first mover, independent on matter,and to avoid the absurdity of asserting that life and sensation proceeded fromthe senseless mass, supposed each atom to be endued with an animatingprinciple. When he therefore announces the images conveyed by our senses,and the ideas in our minds to be gods, he only acts in conformity with hishypothesis; since these sensations and notions were the immediate effect ofaction in the animæ, to which he gave the appellation of the Divinity. Havingshewn both the absurdity and origin of Malebranche’s doctrine, I shall insertan extract from Hume, in order to prove that he perfectly coincides with me inrejecting this opinion.

“Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God. Notcontent with the principle that nothing exists by his will, that nothing possessesany power but by his concession, they rob nature and all created beings ofevery power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity more sensibleand immediate. They consider not, that by this theory, they diminish thegrandeur of those attributes which they affect so much to celebrate. It arguessurely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain portion of it to inferiorcreatures, than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition. It arguesmore wisdom to contrive, at first, the fabric of the world with such perfectforesight, that of itself, and by its own proper operation, it may serve all thepurposes of Providence, than if the great Creator were obliged, every moment,to adjust its parts, and animate by his breath the wheels of that stupendousmachine.”

It is very evident from this passage, that Mr. Hume did not consider theDeity as immediately interfering in the government of the world; God,therefore, must be deemed the author of our actions ultimately, or so far onlyas he has given us the power of volition and action, and not as he has in anyshape influenced us in either operation, since this supposition would substituteconstraint for liberty, would render the will impertinent and motives nugatory.But Mr. Hume clearly perceived that the consideration of the Divinity, as theultimate cause and author of human actions, would by no means prove suffi-cient to render him a partaker in their criminality; he therefore changes hisexpression afterwards, demanding how the Deity can be the mediate cause ofall the actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude.

Now here I must observe, that our author has not used the terms, mediatecause, with his accustomed accuracy; and the person who recollects that

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11 Essentia rei nec intenditur nec remittitur salvo subjecto, is a maxim.12 This is sufficiently clear to persons who are tolerably acquainted with metaphysics; but

as prejudice may incline many men to suppose the human soul a spirit, as this opinionmay be fostered by Mr. Locke’s definition of real Essences, and may be confirmed by hisassertion, that we derive our idea of spirit from a recollection on the operations of ourown minds. I shall attempt to shew that both are ill founded. Mr. Locke, in the firstplace, very improperly defines real essence to be that internal unknown constitution ofthe parts, on which the properties depend; the real essence of spirit being thereforeunknown, we can determine what is spiritual by the nominal essence alone, or that col-lection of properties evinced by experience, and marked by a name. This great philoso-

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liberty consists in the power of acting, or not acting, according to the determi-nations of the will, that these determinations are founded on the motives, andthat these motives are derived from the opposite principles of passion andreason, will clearly perceive that the Deity is only the ultimate cause of ouraction, that the choice is immediate, and the motives the mediate, cause. Butthe followers of Hume may perhaps still assert, that, though God is notactually the author of evil, yet must he be considered as such by permission.They may demand, why a Being, infinitely good and powerful, did not giveexistence to such creatures only as were capable of perfect freedom fromnatural or moral evil? Now to gratify these gentlemen, quitting my usualmode of reasoning, and the world of realities, I shall venture to follow theminto the fairy land of hypothesis; but though I accompany them in thisexcursion, I shall answer their suppositions on such principles alone as arederived from a knowledge of the two kinds of beings in nature, material andspiritual, the former of which our senses announce, and the latter is deduced,as a sine qua non, by our reason. These creatures must then be pure spirits,something between spirit and matter, intelligences superior to humanity, yet,notwithstanding, material or men: for I presume that no person will supposeit an act of benevolence in God to have excluded all evil, by creating onlysenseless and inert matter. If we suppose them pure spirits, we must ascribe tothem all the attributes that are essential to spirit.

I have already shewn that the Deity is not extended, that he does not consistof parts, and that he possesses certain active powers: I have also evinced thatthe qualities of thought, knowledge, and action, which we perceive inourselves, are in us mere faculties, granted to us by God, who possesses aknowledge of all things, not by thought but intuition; – who acts on everything, not inconsequences of his will, but his energy and volition form one act.This then is the essence of spirit: but the essential qualities of any thing areperfectly incapable of intention or remission, of increase or diminution:11 sucha being therefore must be capable of knowing and acting on all things; conse-quently every pure spirit must be a God.12

I am next to inquire, whether God could have entirely excluded evil, bycreating beings which were intermediate between spirit and matter. Now it is

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pher, in the next place, maintains, that by reflection we acquire a notion of spirit;according to which assertion, if well founded, knowledge and action, such as they existin us, must be properties of spirit; and as in man they are capable of increase anddiminution, so would it follow that they are in spirits, and of course that the latter couldbe limited. Now the definition of a real essence is perfectly inapplicable to unmodifiedmatter, or the Materia Prima, and to spirit, nor is it suited to any thing, unless in a stateof generation or corruption; for instance, inorganic matter exhibits no properties byextension, solidity, and gravity, with some passive capacities; these are not the conse-quence of any arrangement of its parts, since none has taken place, but seem to be thefirst laws of its existence, imposed by its Creator. It is equally absurd when applied tospirit, since one of the attributes which necessity evinces it to possess, is, that it does notconsist of parts; to suppose, then, that the properties depend on the unknown constitu-tion of parts which do not exist, must be allowed to be a palpable contradiction; and yetGod must be a substance, or the unknown something which supports known qualities.The reader must recollect, that I have already shewn knowledge and action in the Deityto be essentially different from those properties in man, though Mr. Locke, to favour hisassertion, maintains, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, a sensi-tive of external objects, and a demonstrative of God; but a little reflection will evince,that our knowledge of our own existence is derived from the senses; for these beingdestroyed, what perception of our existence will remain? We may, indeed, according tothe manner of reasoning used by Des Cartes – (I think therefore I am) obtain a demon-strative knowledge of our existence; But I shall appeal to any person, whether it addsany force to our conviction: nay, what can be a stronger argument against the possibilityof our conceiving intuition than this, that so great a man has confounded it with sensa-tion. From this we may conclude that God and pure spirit imply the same thing; and ofcourse, if there are two pure spirits, there must be two Gods: but exclusive of this contra-diction, how could the Deity unite the contrariant principles of spirit and matter in man,or how could he punish the former for the defects of the latter? But suppose a pure spiritcreated, and at the moment of its existence united with matter, allowing also that thelaws of their union prevented it from displaying its essential properties, still must thisunion cease at death, and every spirit then became a God. Is it not more consistent withpiety to suppose the Deity a single being in the universe, and essentially different from allhis creatures, than to imagine that he created a number of pure spirits, even were thisnotion devoid of contradiction, which differed from him in the degree of possessing theiressential properties, but not in their essence.

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very evident, from what has been observed, that God cannot communicateperfect felicity, without granting at the same time Omniscience andOmnipotence: here then would be a being, which was not God, with theessential attributes of the Divinity. I shall now examine the nature of interme-diate material creatures, beginning with that species which makes the nearestapproaches to the qualities of inert matter.

There is such a creature as Man, whose body consists of perishablematerials, and wants constant supplies: this body is also liable to variousinjuries from external objects, and is threatened with dissolution from everything that surrounds it. Now to such a creature, I assert, that natural evil, orpositive pain, is absolutely necessary. I shall not, however, attempt to shew,that man was requisite, as a link in the great chain of Plato, reaching from inertmatter up to the throne of God, but shall conclude, from his existence, that itwas fit he should be. Were not man then, excited by the disagreeable sensation

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attendant on emptiness, to procure a support for his perishable body in a fewdays after the creation of the species, it must have most certainly waisted todeath. Were not the action of such external objects as threaten destruction tous, attended with pain, we should leap into either the fire or the sea, with thesame indifference that we walk across the floor. Were not indulgence in thosethings which, though not immediately destructive to life, are still found to beprejudicial to health, attended with uneasiness, we should spend our short livesin constant gratifications, and never arrive at the age of maturity. Paintherefore is the guardian of all human creatures; and were it not annexed to thereception of injuries, we could not exist even for a single moment; to say, then,that men should live, and yet should be deprived of that which was necessaryto their existence, is a contradiction in terms; and no person imagines thatOmnipotence can perform things which involve this as a consequence. Norcould power and goodness infinite have excluded moral evil.

I have already proved that man was a free agent, and have likewise shewn inwhat liberty consisted; now to suppose that a creature, endowed withimperfect powers of reason, and solicited to action by very ardent passions,should on every occasion reflect, in any degree, that he should ever form justconclusions, and that he should ever prefer contingent and future, to certainand present good, must be acknowledged as absolute impossibility, and conse-quently it could not have been effected by Omnipotence.

I am, in the last place, to inquire whether Omnipotence could have excludedevil by creating intelligences superior to humanity, yet notwithstandingmaterial. Now no body can avoid being acted on by others, according to theknown properties of matter; pain therefore must, in some degree, be necessaryto the preservation of every material being. Nor is moral evil less necessary tosuch creatures.

We already observed, that passion was the property of every sentient being,as composed of matter, and that intuition was essential to pure spirits; but nocreature can divest itself of its essential properties, and acquire those of anopposite nature; consequently, in every material and animated being passionmust exist, error must take place, and moral evil must ensue. Yet does not thenecessity of either natural or moral evil militate against a state of future felicity,since pleasure may be so predominant as to render the admixture of painmerely the mean of enhancing it: what man, for instance, would conceive thatdegree of it which attends on loosening the zone of a beautiful virgin, calcu-lated for any purpose but that of converting delight into rapture. Theadmission of moral evil, in a small degree, will not be found more incompatiblewith a state of beatitude, since our greatest happiness consists in the hope ofarriving at a still superior degree of perfection; now, did we never err, this hopewould be cut off, and consequently a source of pleasure would be dried up.

It may be demanded, in the last place, since evil could not be entirelyavoided, why were not such beings only created as were capable of the utmost

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degree of material felicity: Now, we already demonstrated that justice formedapart of the divine essence, but justice allows not exaltation without merit, andconsequently the state of liberty or probation must precede that of angelicbeatitude. This explanation of the origin of evil, a subject so often litigated andso little understood, will, I conceive, throw light on another topic of equalobscurity, I mean that of prescience and predestination.

The reader must recollect that God has given us passions, which impel us towhat is apparently, and reason which directs us to what is really good, leavingthe decision entirely to ourselves. Now the schoolsmen asserted, thatOmnipotence could not make a stick without two ends, a supposition that hecould, implying a contradiction in terms; but surely it implies no less to assert,that the divinity foreknows the consequences of man’s voluntary actions,which depend on his determination between opposite motives.

The intuitive knowledge, indeed, which the Deity possesses of the physicalworld, and his exact acquaintance with the characters of all moral agents,enable him generally to determine, both how the species and the individual willact; this perception is, however, acquired in no shape by intuition, and,according to our comprehensions, must still retain some shadow of that imper-fection which prevails in the reasoning of men, when it relates to such actionsas are likely to proceed from certain characters and motives. But if this mayseem too hardy an assertion, I shall allow the Omniscience of the Deity,maintaining only, that it is acquired a posteriori, and not by intuition; in whichcase it includes no predestination, as proceeding from a knowledge of thecharacters of men, and not in any shape determining them. For instance, froman intimate and perfect acquaintance with the dispositions of moral agents, hecertainly knows how each being, whose character is formed, will act whenassailed by particular motives; but he cannot positively determine what will bethe character of the embrio in the womb, and at best can form but a mereaccurate judgement of it.

In the present acceptation of it, Omniscience means a knowledge of everything which is to be known; and if any person wishes to make it extend beyondthis, he must also desire that it should involve contradictions. The Deity knowsby intuition whatever concerns the physical world, because he has given itimmutable laws; but reason, the law of man, does not alway insure an exactconformity to it. There is, of course, no pre-ordination in the moral world, nordoes the Divinity deserve praise for our good, or blame for our bad actions.

I now proceed to Mr. Hume’s last argument against Providence and a futurestate. Does justice exert itself in this world, then it is satisfied; does it not, yourexperience does not allow you to infer it? But must premise a few observationsconcerning the import of the first term. This expression indeed is veryimproperly applied with respect to human actions, as it has been alreadyshewn that the Deity cannot foresee, or cannot have an intuitive knowledge ofthem. But Providence is of two kinds, general and especial; the one supposing

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laws laid down for inert matter, instinct given to brutes, reason to man, and anattention paid by the Deity to the good or evil use of the talents granted by himto rational creatures, without the interference of reward or punishment in theirpresent state of existence; the other maintaining that God is immediatelyemployed in the government, both of the physical and moral worlds, revengingevil, and rewarding good actions. The former is the providence of aphilosopher, the latter of an old woman; nor shall I argue against it, as thesuccessful villainies of men are a too evident proof of the monstrous absurditiesattending on the opinion. Now the former species of providence is necessarilyconnected with the Omniscience of God; since if he were ignorant of humanactions at the time of performance, he must be ignorant of things which werecapable of being known, and thus is a superintendance clearly established: thejustice of the divinity, and his grant of reason to us as a law, have also beenheretofore proved. Why then does the Omniscient and Omnipotent Beingallow the infraction of it? I reply, because prevention is impossible. Nowimpossibilities are of two kinds; the one implying a negation of power in thebeing, which is to perform it, and the other a contradiction in the thing to beeffected. Now to say that a matter is impossible in the latter sense, conveys notthe smallest reflection on Omnipotence: but did God interfere by a specialProvidence, this would be attended with a moral constraint. Thus if the man,who in obedience to passion, and in contradiction to reason, walked out of hisdoor, should break his leg at the very first step; and if the whole of ourexperience, both with respect to our own conduct, and to that of others,informed us that punishment immediately followed each act of disobedience tothis divine law, we should be obliged to act by an extrinsically imposed, moralnecessity, and equally immutable with that which regulates the motions of theplanets.

Since then the interference of God, though essentially just, in eitherrewarding or punishing men at present, must evidently be attended with amoral necessity of action, or of restraint in them, it evidently follows that thestate of recompense, or of punishment, must be in future. How this may takeplace, can be clearly discerned by enlightened divines with the eye of faith; butunassisted reason can only perceive that, by obedience to her dictates, weimitate the perfections of the Deity, which oblige him to a moral necessity ofaction; that by subserviency to passion, we degrade ourselves to the level of thebeasts, and ultimately tend to an imitation of matter, acting by a blind necessityof nature; that consequently in whatever degree we have courted elevation ordepression, is the author of our existence bounden, by his justice, to second ourwishes.

FINIS.

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26THOMAS REID

Thomas Reid, Essays on the intellectual powers of man. Edinburgh, J.Bell, 1785, xii, 766 p.Selections from 1.1, 2.12, 2.14, 3.7, 4.4, 5.6, 6.5, 6.6, 7.4; from 1785edition.

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was the author of Inquiry into the HumanMind (1764), selections from which are included earlier in this vol-

ume. In that work, Reid criticized Hume for pushing the theory of ideasto its logical and sceptical conclusion. Reid continued this line of attackin his next major philosophical work, Essays on the Intellectual Powersof Man (1785). This text rests on a distinction between active and intel-lectual mental powers. Human “intellectual powers” are mental facul-ties of reasoning, judging and conceiving. This stands in contrast tohuman “active powers,” which are mental faculties of inclination anddesire that prompt action. Reid takes up the theme of the active powersin his third and final major work, Essays on the Active Powers of Man(1788).

About 100 pages of Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers containscritical discussions of various parts of Hume’s philosophy. The moresustained of these discussions are presented here. In Essay 1, which ispreliminary, Reid discusses notions that he believes are assumed in allphilosophical discussions, such as terminology, foundational principles,and methods of reasoning. In Chapter 1, he attacks Hume’s use of theterm “perception” on three grounds. First, Hume uses the term toobroadly to refer to every mental operation. Second, insofar as Humeholds that ideas and impressions differ only in terms of liveliness, hewrongly holds that they differ only in degree, but not in kind. Third,Hume does not tell us whether “impressions” refer “to the object seen,or that act of my mind by which I see it....” In either case, according toReid, it is a distortion of language to call mental events or objects“impressions,” for this word has essentially to do with one thing makinga mark on another. For Reid, these are all instances in which Hume haswarped “the common language into a conformity with his principles.”

In Essay 2, Reid discusses different philosophical theories of externalperception. In Chapter 12 he criticizes Hume for adopting the erroneous

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“theory of ideas,” namely, the view that ideas are copies of externalobjects, and that these ideas are the ultimate objects of our thoughts.Reid notes that, for Berkeley, physical objects were not needed for thepresence of ideas. However, Reid argues that Hume goes further and“adopted the theory of ideas in its full extent; and, in consequence,shows that there is neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing butimpressions and ideas. What we call a body, is only a bundle of sensations; and what we call the mind, is only a bundle of thoughts, pas-sions, and emotions.”

In Chapter 14 Reid argues that the theory of ideas fails for 5 reasons.First, it is “contrary to the universal sense of men” to hold that ideas,rather than external things themselves, are the objects of perception.Second, proponents of the theory of ideas typically assume that suchideas exist without adequately justifying this view. Reid examines argu-ments by Clarke and others for the theory of ideas, but he rejects them.An erroneous assumption in some of these arguments is that externalthings act on the mind, or the mind acts on external things. Reid nextexamines Hume’s argument for the theory of ideas, namely, that I donot directly perceive the table in front of me since the image I have ofthe table changes size as I move away from it – and the table itself clear-ly does not change size. Following Berkeley, Reid resolves this problemby distinguishing between visible and tangible magnitude. Visible magni-tude is measured by an angle and changes as our distance from theobject changes. By contrast, tangible magnitude is measured by a lineand does not change as our distance from the object changes. Accordingto Reid, we learn to judge tangible magnitude from visible magnitude.Reid argues further that, through the rules of geometry, we can predictan object’s visible magnitude from its tangible magnitude, and thisimplies that we indeed see the real table. Reid’s third criticism againstthe theory of ideas is that proponents disagree about details having todo with these ideas – they do not agree, for example, about where suchideas reside. However, according to Reid, we are all intimately familiarwith the objects that we perceive, and this familiarity is itself an argu-ment against the theory of ideas. Fourth, the theory of ideas fails to helpclarify the details of our mental operations. Fifth, Reid argues that thetheory of ideas is rejected by those who endorse common sense – partic-ularly insofar as the theory of ideas prompts philosophers to prove theexistence of external objects.

Essay 3 describes the faculty of memory, and the notion of durationthat we get from it. Reid opens Chapter 7 with a criticism of theoriesthat ascribe memory to impressions made on the brain. Reid argues that,even if this is the cause of memory, we still do not know precisely howthis contributes to memory and its various features. Nevertheless, Reid

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recognizes that a specific brain state may be necessary for memory. Reidcriticizes Locke’s view of memory as reviving perceptions; according toReid, this at best gives us a similar perception, but, even here, to call it“similar” requires an ability to raise up the original for any comparison.Reid next criticizes Hume’s theory that memory involves a reappearanceof an idea that retains some of its original vivacity. Reid first argues thatHume implicitly relies on a common notion of memory to establish hisphilosophical account of memory. Second, since, on Hume’s own theory, perceptions are fleeting and perishable, they cannot reappear ashis theory of memory requires. Third, on Hume’s theory, impressionsare the causes of ideas, yet, in his explanation of memory, we are theefficient causes of reappearing ideas. Reid goes on to argue that the theory of ideas leads Hume to scepticism regarding memory as well asabout external objects. Specifically, ideas of memory are isolated frompast events, and we cannot conclude that events that correspond withour memories really happened. Hume’s view of memory also has impli-cations for the notion of belief. For Hume, memory cannot justify abelief, but, instead, it produces belief by modifying – or intensifying – anoriginal idea. For Reid, “it is to no purpose to trace the absurdities thatfollow from this doctrine, for none of them can be more absurd than thedoctrine itself.”

Essay 4 discusses conception; Reid argues that the theory of ideas alsoaffects the notion of conception. In Chapter 4 he criticizes Hume’s principles of association on several grounds. First, he argues thatHume’s list is inadequate. According to Reid, the associative principle ofcause and effect is unnecessary since causality is included in the principleof contiguity – insofar as causality for Hume amounts to contiguity inplace and time. Also, according to Reid, Hume’s list is too short;Kames’s Elements of criticism, and Gerard’s Essay on genius include amore complete enumeration. Second, although Hume maintains that theprinciples of association are instincts, Reid argues that they are in factgrounded in habit. For Reid, associations take place not only betweenideas, but also between ideas and emotions.

Essay 5 is on abstraction. Reid argues that general concepts arise bothfrom combination and analysis. In Chapter 6 he criticizes Hume’s accountof abstraction, namely, the view “that all general ideas are nothing butparticular ones annexed to a certain term.” Hume defends his theory byarguing that we cannot conceive of any quantity or quality without form-ing a precise notion of its degrees. Hume offers three arguments for thisview, and Reid rejects them all. First, Hume argues that we cannot distin-guish things unless they are actually separable; for example, the preciselength of a line is not distinguishable from the line itself. According toReid, we can in fact conceptually distinguish the precise length of the line

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from the line itself. Second, Hume argues that all impressions are individ-uals, and thus all ideas must also be individuals since ideas and impres-sions differ only in vivacity. For Reid, the fault in this argument rests inthe erroneous assumption that ideas and impressions differ only in liveli-ness. Hume’s third argument is this: if something is impossible in reality,then the idea of that thing is impossible; it is impossible in reality for a tri-angle to exist without precise proportions of sides and angles; thus it isimpossible to have an idea of a triangle without precise proportions ofsides and angles. In response, Reid argues that we can in fact conceive ofabsurd things, such as mathematicians typically do in reductio ad absur-dum arguments. Reid continues by briefly noting other errors in Hume’sposition on abstraction.

Essay 6 is on judgment; here Reid introduces common sense as a type ofjudgment. In Chapter 5 he lists several first principles of contingent truths.The first of these is “the existence of everything of which I am conscious.”According to Reid, even Hume acknowledges the reality of the percep-tions of which he is conscious. Reid believes that we have immediateknowledge of our conscious perceptions. This immediacy is in conflictwith Hume’s view that belief involves having a strong or lively conceptionof a thing. The second of these first principles concerns personal identity:“That the thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a beingwhich I call myself, my mind, my person.” Accordingly, Reid disputesHume’s view that the mind – and one’s identity – is only a succession ofimpressions and ideas. For Reid, this leads to the absurd view that either“impressions remember and are conscious of the ideas, or the ideasremember and are conscious of the impressions.” In Chapter 6 Reid dis-cusses first principles of necessary truths. The first grouping of theseincludes principles that are grammatical in nature, such as that every com-plete sentence must have a verb. The second grouping includes principlesthat are logical in nature – that no proposition can be true and false at thesame time, for example. The third grouping includes mathematical princi-ples. Reid notes that Hume doubts the certainty of mathematical demon-strations. According to Hume, such demonstrations rest on definitionssuch as “equality” or “straight line,” and these ideas are no more accuratethan the imprecise impressions on which these ideas are based. Reid coun-ters that astute mathematicians in fact have accurate ideas of these thingsand, so, he concludes, such definitions are not based on impressions. Thefourth group of principles involves matters of taste, or aesthetics, and thefifth involves moral principles. Although Reid’s discussion of these doesnot mention Hume by name, in both cases he opposes theories advancedby Hume.

The fourth and final group of principles are metaphysical. Reid notesthree specific metaphysical principles, the certainty of which Hume

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opposes. The first is that the qualities that we perceive belong to somebody, and thoughts belong to some mind. According to Hume, giventhat we have no impression of such bodies or minds, it follows that wedo not have ideas of either. The second principle is that “whateverbegins to exist, must have a cause which produced it.” Reid creditsHume with being the first philosopher who opposed this view, andgrants that Hume successfully refutes the arguments supporting thisview by Hobbes, Clarke, and Locke. But Reid believes that causality is aself-evident axiom that needs no proof. Hume objects to the view thatthis causal principle is intuitive; Reid argues that Hume should haveoffered a psychological explanation for why people universally believethis erroneous view. According to Reid, Hume offers three argumentsagainst the claim that the causal principle is known by intuition. First,for Hume, certainty arises from one of seven philosophical relations,none of which imply this causal principle. Second, whatever we can conceive is possible, and we can conceive that something may come toexist without a cause. Third, a cause is only something prior to but con-joined with an effect. Against this last view, Reid notes that night alwaysoccurs prior to day – a counterexample that Beattie also used in hisEssay (2.2.3). On Hume’s theory, this leads to the absurd view thatnight is the cause of day. Reid’s third metaphysical principle is that,from signs of design in an effect we may infer intelligence in the cause.Reid notes that Hume also denies this principle.

In Essay 7 Reid discusses types of reasoning and the applications ofreason. In Chapter 4 he discusses Hume’s sceptical views regarding reason as found in Treatise 1.4.1. According to Reid, Hume aims toshow two things: first, that, given human fallibility, all demonstrativeknowledge is in fact only probable, and, second, that the evidence fromprobability progressively diminishes. Reid argues that the first ofHume’s claims wrongly links demonstration with infallibility. Accordingto Reid, demonstration does not degenerate into probability because ofthe imperfection of our faculties; instead, a faulty demonstration is, infact, no proof at all. Hume’s second claim Reid sees as a modern versionof Zeno’s paradox insofar as Hume, by “subjecting every judgment toan infinite number of successive probable estimations, reduces the evi-dence to nothing.” In response, Reid argues that the examination of aproof involves only one inescapable uncertainty, namely, the fallibilityof the person judging. Further, according to Reid, a successful re-exami-nation of a proof will in fact strengthen its evidence. On the matter ofHume’s claim that unfavourable examinations will cumulatively annihi-late the initial judgment, Reid argues that each successive examinationhas a smaller weight than the previous one, so the total is only of finiteweight. Reid concludes that Hume relies on demonstrations in daily life,

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and this disproves his scepticism. He also notes that Hume himself con-cedes that nature does not permit us to live out such scepticism, and thatthe point of his argument is to show that belief is a matter of feeling, notof reasoning. Reid agrees that first principles are not a matter of reason-ing, but disagrees that they are a matter of feeling.

Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers was favourably received bythe leading review journals. Michael Arthur in the Monthly Review pre-dicted that Reid’s Intellectual Powers would spark a revolution in thephilosophy of mind:

... we consider these Essays as forming a system of eminent merit withregard to the operation of the human understanding: and we have nodoubt but that the new views which are here laid open will occasion aconsiderable revolution in the philosophy of mind. [Monthly Review,September 1786, Vol. 75, pp. 195–203; October 1786, pp. 241–252;November 1786, pp. 331–342]

The Critical Review similarly praises Reid’s work. The reviewer alsosuggests that Hume purposefully confused his sceptical writings in orderto prevent those deficient in understanding from reading them:

Dr. Reid, in his illustrations, often contends with Mr. Hume; but wehave much reason to suspect, that this sceptical enquirer purposelyconfused some parts of his reasoning. The man who would substitutedoubts for certainty, and perplexity for order, may often, in thethreshold, prepare for the subsequent confusion; and there is somereason too, for supposing, that he wished to preclude those from read-ing his works, whose deficiencies rendered it probable that they wouldmistake the application. From some of these causes it has certainlyhappened that Mr. Hume’s works, whatever he might have intended,have really done less injury to religion than many laboured injudiciousdefences of it. [Critical Review, October 1785, Vol. 60, pp. 241–248]

The English Review concludes by contrasting Reid’s dispassionate styleto Beattie’s “embittered declamation”:

Although we are of opinion that Dr. Reid’s theory has not in generaladded to the stores of human knowledge, yet it would be unjust towith-hold from him the praise of a very learned, acute, subtle, andtemperate writer. If his doctrine cannot be established by his genius orinvention, his precision, and most perspicuous, dispassionate, andpleasing eloquence, it will never be recommended to the assent andapprobation of speculative minds by the desultory and embittered

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1 [Enquiry, 2.]

declamation of Dr. Beattie, and the whole herd of popular and passionate (popular indeed because passionate) writers who have followed him in the paths which he has marked out. [English Review,September 1785, Vol. 6, October, pp. 192–201, October, pp.241–245, November, pp. 329–338, December pp. 448–457]

The following is from the 1785 and most authoritative edition of Reid’sEssays on the Intellectual Powers.

ESSAY I. PRELIMINARY.

C H A P. I.

Explication of words.

...11. The word impression is used by Mr HUME, in speaking of the

operations of the mind, almost as often as the word idea is by MrLOCKE. What the latter calls ideas, the former divides into two classes;one of which he calls impressions, the other ideas. I shall make someobservations upon Mr HUME’s explication of that word, and then con-sider the proper meaning of it in the English language.

“We may divide, (says Mr Hume, Essays, vol. 2. page 18.), all the perceptions of the human mind into two classes or species, which aredistinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The lesslively and forcible are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. Theother species want a name in our language, and in most others; let ustherefore use a little freedom, and call them impressions. By the termimpressions, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when wehear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. Ideas are theless lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect onany of those sensations or movements above mentioned.”1

This is the explication Mr HUME hath given in his Essays of the termimpressions, when applied to the mind; and his explication of it, in hisTreatise of human nature, is to the same purpose.

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Disputes about words belong rather to Grammarians than toPhilosophers; but Philosophers ought not to escape censure when theycorrupt a language, by using words in a way which the purity of the language will not admit. I find fault with Mr HUME’s phraseology in thewords I have quoted,

First, Because he gives the name of perceptions to every operation ofthe mind. Love is a perception, hatred a perception. Desire is a percep-tion, will is a perception; and, by the same rule, a doubt, a question, acommand, is a perception. This is an intolerable abuse of language,which no Philosopher has authority to introduce.

Secondly, When Mr HUME says, that we may divide all the percep-tions of the human mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their degrees of force and vivacity, the manner ofexpression is loose and unphilosophical. To differ in species is one thing;to differ in degree is another. Things which differ in degree only must beof the same species. It is a maxim of common sense, admitted by allmen, that greater and less do not make a change of species. The sameman may differ in the degree of his force and vivacity, in the morningand at night; in health and in sickness: But this is so far from makinghim a different species, that it does not so much as make him a differentindividual. To say, therefore, that two different classes, or species of per-ceptions, are distinguished by the degrees of their force and vivacity, isto confound a difference of degree with a difference of species, whichevery man of understanding knows how to distinguish.

Thirdly, We may observe, that this Author, having given the generalname of perception to all the operations of the mind, and distinguishedthem into two classes or species, which differ only in degree of force andvivacity, tells us, that he gives the name of impressions to all our morelively perceptions; to wit, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate,or desire, or will. There is great confusion in this account of the meaningof the word impression. When I see, this is an impression. But why hasnot the Author told us, whether he gives the name of impression to theobject seen, or to that act of my mind by which I see it? When I see thefull moon, the full moon is one thing, my perceiving it is another thing.Which of these two things does he call an impression? We are left toguess this; nor does all that this Author writes about impressions clearthis point. Every thing he says tends to darken it, and to lead us tothink, that the full moon which I see, and my seeing it, are not twothings, but one and the same thing.

The same observation may be applied to every other instance theAuthor gives to illustrate the meaning of the word impression. “Whenwe hear, when we feel, when we love, when we hate, when we desire,when we will.” In all these acts of the mind there must be an object,

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which is heard, or felt, or loved, or hated, or desired, or willed. Thus,for instance, I love my country. This, says Mr HUME, is an impression.But what is the impression? Is it my country, or is it the affection I bearto it? I ask the Philosopher this question; but I find no answer to it. Andwhen I read all that he has written on this subject, I find this wordimpression sometimes used to signify an operation of the mind, some-times the object of the operation; but, for the most part, it is a vagueand indetermined word that signifies both.

I know not whether it may be considered as an apology for such abuseof words, in an Author who understood the language so well, and usedit with so great propriety in writing on other subjects, that Mr HUME’ssystem, with regard to the mind, required a language of a different struc-ture from the common; or, if expressed in plain English, would havebeen too shocking to the common sense of mankind. To give an instanceor two of this. If a man receives a present on which he puts a high value;if he see and handle it, and put it in his pocket, this, says Mr HUME, isan impression. If the man only dream that he received such a present,this is an idea. Wherein lies the difference between this impression andthis idea; between the dream and the reality? They are different classesor species says Mr HUME: so far all men will agree with him. But headds, that they are distinguished only by different degrees of force andvivacity. Here he insinuates a tenet of his own, in contradiction to thecommon sense of mankind. Common sense convinces every man, that alively dream is no nearer to a reality than a faint one; and that if a manshould dream that he had all the wealth of Crœsus, it would not put onefarthing in his pocket. It is impossible to fabricate arguments againstsuch undeniable principles, without confounding the meaning of words.

In like manner, if a man would persuade me that the moon which Isee, and my seeing it, are not two things, but one and the same thing, hewill answer his purpose less by arguing this point in plain English, thanby confounding the two under one name, such as that of an impression:For such is the power of words, that if we can be brought to the habit ofcalling two things that are connected, by the same name, we are themore easily led to believe them to be one and the same thing.

Let us next consider the proper meaning of the word impression inEnglish, that we may see how far it is fit to express either the operationsof the mind, or their objects.

When a figure is stamped upon a body by pressure, that figure is calledan impression, as the impression of a seal on wax, of printing-types, orof a copperplate, on paper. This seems now to be the literal sense of theword; the effect borrowing its name from the cause. But by metaphor oranalogy, like most other words, its meaning is extended, so as to signifyany change produced in a body by the operation of some external cause.

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A blow of the hand makes no impression on a stone-wall; but a batteryof cannon may. The moon raises a tide in the ocean, but makes noimpression on rivers and lakes.

When we speak of making an impression on the mind, the word iscarried still farther from its literal meaning; use, however, which is thearbiter of language, authorises this application of it. As when we saythat admonition and reproof make little impression on those who areconfirmed in bad habits. The same discourse delivered in one way,makes a strong impression on the hearers; delivered in another way, itmakes no impression at all.

It may be observed, that, in such examples, an impression made onthe mind always implies some change of purpose or will; some newhabit produced, or some former habit weakened; some passion raisedor allayed. When such changes are produced by persuasion, example,or any external cause, we say that such causes make an impressionupon the mind. But when things are seen or heard, or apprehended,without producing any passion or emotion, we say that they make noimpression.

In the most extensive sense, an impression is a change produced insome passive subject by the operation of an external cause. If we suppose an active being to produce any change in itself by its own activepower, this is never called an impression. It is the act or operation of thebeing itself, not an impression upon it. From this it appears, that to givethe name of an impression to any effect produced in the mind, is to sup-pose that the mind does not act at all in the production of that effect. Ifseeing, hearing, desiring, willing, be operations of the mind, they cannotbe impressions. If they be impressions, they cannot be operations of themind. In the structure of all languages, they are considered as acts oroperations of the mind itself, and the names given them imply this. Tocall them impressions, therefore, is to trespass against the structure, notof a particular language only, but of all languages.

If the word impression be an improper word to signify the operationsof the mind, it is at least as improper to signify their objects; for wouldany man be thought to speak with propriety, who should say that thesun is an impression, that the earth and the sea are impressions?

It is commonly believed, and taken for granted, that every language, ifit be sufficiently copious in words, is equally fit to express all opinions,whether they be true or false. I apprehend, however, that there is anexception to this general rule, which deserves our notice. There are certain common opinions of mankind, upon which the structure andgrammar of all languages are founded. While these opinions are common to all men, there will be a great similarity in all languages thatare to be found on the face of the earth. Such a similarity there really is;

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for we find in all languages the same parts of speech, the distinction ofnouns and verbs, the distinction of nouns into adjective and substantive,of verbs into active and passive. In verbs we find like tenses, moods, per-sons and numbers. There are general rules of grammar, the same in alllanguages. This similarity of structure in all languages shews an uniformity among men in those opinions upon which the structure oflanguage is founded.

If, for instance, we should suppose that there was a nation whobelieved that the things which we call attributes might exist without asubject, there would be in their language no distinction between adjec-tives and substantives, nor would it be a rule with them that an adjectivehas no meaning, unless when joined to a substantive. If there was anynation who did not distinguish between acting and being acted upon,there would in their language be no distinction between active and pas-sive verbs, nor would it be a rule that the active verb must have an agentin the nominative case; but that, in the passive verb, the agent must be inan oblique case.

The structure of all languages is grounded upon common notions,which Mr HUME’s philosophy opposes, and endeavours to overturn. Thisno doubt led him to warp the common language into a conformity withhis principles; but we ought not to imitate him in this, until we are satis-fied that his principles are built on a solid foundation.

...

ESSAY II. OF THE POWERS WE HAVE BY MEANS OF OUREXTERNAL SENSES.

C H A P. XII.

Of the Sentiments of Mr HUME.

Two volumes of the Treatise of human nature were published in 1739,and the third in 1740. The doctrine contained in this Treatise was pub-lished anew in a more popular form in Mr HUME’s philosophical Essays,of which there have been various Editions. What other authors, from thetime of DES CARTES, had called ideas, this author distinguishes into twokinds, to wit, impressions and ideas; comprehending under the first, allour sensations, passions, and emotions; and under the last, the faintimages of these, when we remember or imagine them.

He sets out with this, as a principle that needed no proof, and of whichtherefore he offers none, That all the perceptions of the human mindresolve themselves into these two kinds, impressions and ideas.

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As this proposition is the foundation upon which the whole of MrHUME’s system rests, and from which it is raised with great acutenessindeed, and ingenuity, it were to be wished that he had told us upon whatauthority this fundamental proposition rests. But we are left to guess,whether it is held forth as a first principle, which has its evidence in itself;or whether it is to be received upon the authority of Philosophers.

Mr LOCKE had taught us, that all the immediate objects of humanknowledge are ideas in the mind. Bishop BERKELEY, proceeding upon thisfoundation, demonstrated very easily, that there is no material world. Andhe thought, that, for the purposes both of philosophy and religion, weshould find no loss, but great benefit, in the want of it. But the Bishop, asbecame his order, was unwilling to give up the world of spirits. He sawvery well, that ideas are as unfit to represent spirits as they are to repre-sent bodies. Perhaps he saw, that if we perceive only the ideas of spirits,we shall find the same difficulty in inferring their real existence from theexistence of their ideas, as we find in inferring the existence of matterfrom the idea of it; and therefore, while he gives up the material world infavour of the system of ideas, he gives up one half of that system in favourof the world of spirits; and maintains, that we can, without ideas, think,and speak, and reason, intelligibly about spirits, and what belongs tothem.

Mr HUME shows no such partiality in favour of the world of spirits. Headopts the theory of ideas in its full extent; and, in consequence, shewsthat there is neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing but impres-sions and ideas. What we call a body, is only a bundle of sensations; andwhat we call the mind, is only a bundle of thoughts, passions, and emo-tions, without any subject.

Some ages hence, it will perhaps be looked upon as a curious anecdote,that two Philosophers of the 18th century, of very distinguished rank,were led by a philosophical hypothesis; one, to disbelieve the existence ofmatter; and the other, to disbelieve the existence both of matter and ofmind. Such an anecdote may not be uninstructive, if it prove a warning toPhilosophers to beware of hypotheses, especially when they lead to con-clusions which contradict the principles, upon which all men of commonsense must act in common life.

The Egoists, whom we mentioned before, were left far behind by MrHUME; for they believed their own existence, and perhaps also the existence of a Deity. But Mr HUME’s system does not even leave him a selfto claim the property of his impressions and ideas.

A system of consequences, however absurd, acutely and justly drawnfrom a few principles, in very abstract matters, is of real utility in science,and may be made subservient to real knowledge. This merit Mr HUME’smetaphysical writings have in a great degree.

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We had occasion before to observe, that, since the time of DES CARTES,Philosophers, in treating of the powers of the mind, have in manyinstances confounded things, which the common sense of mankind hasalways led them to distinguish, and which have different names in alllanguages. Thus, in the perception of an external object, all languagesdistinguish three things, the mind that perceives, the operation of thatmind, which is called perception, and the object perceived. Nothingappears more evident to a mind untutored by philosophy, than thatthese three are distinct things, which, though related, ought never to beconfounded. The structure of all languages supposes this distinction,and is built upon it. Philosophers have introduced a fourth thing inthis process, which they call the idea of the object, which is supposedto be an image, or representative of the object, and is said to be theimmediate object. The vulgar know nothing about this idea; it is acreature of philosophy, introduced to account for, and explain themanner of our perceiving external objects.

It is pleasant to observe, that while Philosophers, for more than acentury, have been labouring, by means of ideas, to explain percep-tion, and the other operations of the mind, those ideas have by degreesusurped the place of perception, object, and even of the mind itself,and have supplanted those very things they were brought to explain.DES CARTES reduced all the operations of the understanding to percep-tion; and what can be more natural to those who believe that they areonly different modes of perceiving ideas in our own minds. LOCKE

confounds ideas sometimes with the perception of an external object,sometimes with the external object itself. In BERKELEY’s system theidea is the only object, and yet is often confounded with the perceptionof it. But in HUME’s, the idea or the impression, which is only a morelively idea, is mind, perception, and object, all in one: So that, by theterm perception in Mr HUME’s system, we must understand the minditself, all its operations, both of understanding and will, and all theobjects of these operations. Perception taken in this sense he dividesinto our more lively perceptions, which he calls impressions, and theless lively, which he calls ideas. To prevent repetition, I must here referthe reader to some remarks made upon this division, Essay I. chap. I.in the explication there given of the words perceive, object, impression.

Philosophers have differed very much with regard to the origin ofour ideas, or the sources whence they are derived. The Peripateticsheld, that all knowledge is derived originally from the senses; and thisancient doctrine seems to be revived by some late French Philosophers,and by Dr HARTLEY and Dr PRIESTLY among the British. DES CARTES

maintained, that many of our ideas are innate. LOCKE opposed thedoctrine of innate ideas with much zeal, and employs the whole first

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book of his Essay against it. But he admits two different sources ofideas; the operations of our external senses, which he calls sensation,by which we get all our ideas of body, and its attributes; and reflectionupon the operations of our minds, by which we get the ideas of everything belonging to the mind. The main design of the second book ofLOCKE’s Essay, is to show, that all our simple ideas, without excep-tion, are derived from the one or the other, or both of these sources. Indoing this, the author is led into some paradoxes, although, in general,he is not fond of paradoxes: And had he foreseen all the consequencesthat may be drawn from his account of the origin of our ideas, hewould probably have examined it more carefully.

Mr HUME adopts LOCKE’s account of the origin of our ideas, andfrom that principle infers, that we have no idea of substance corporealor spiritual, no idea of power, no other idea of a cause, but that it issomething antecedent, and constantly conjoined to that which we callits effect; and, in a word, that we can have no idea of any thing butour sensations, and the operations of mind we are conscious of.

This author leaves no power to the mind in framing its ideas andimpressions; and no wonder, since he holds that we have no idea ofpower; and the mind is nothing but that succession of impressions andideas of which we are intimately conscious.

He thinks, therefore, that our impressions arise from unknown caus-es, and that the impressions are the causes of their correspondingideas. By this he means no more but that they always go before theideas; for this is all that is necessary to constitute the relation of causeand effect.

As to the order and succession of our ideas, he holds it to be deter-mined by three laws of attraction or association, which he takes to beoriginal properties of the ideas, by which they attract, as it were, orassociate themselves with other ideas which either resemble them, orwhich have been contiguous to them in time and place, or to whichthey have the relations of cause and effect.

We may here observe by the way, that the last of these three lawsseems to be included in the second, since causation, according to him,implies no more than contiguity in time and place.

It is not my design at present to show how Mr HUME, upon the principles he has borrowed from LOCKE and BERKELEY, has with greatacuteness, reared a system of absolute scepticism, which leaves no rational ground to believe any one proposition, rather than its con-trary: My intention in this place being only to give a detail of the senti-ments of Philosophers concerning ideas since they became an object of speculation, and concerning the manner of our perceiving externalobjects by their means.

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... C H A P. XIV.

Reflections on the common Theory of Ideas.

After so long a detail of the sentiments of Philosophers, ancient andmodern, concerning ideas, it may seem presumptuous to call in questiontheir existence. But no philosophical opinion, however ancient, howevergenerally received, ought to rest upon authority. There is no presump-tion in requiring evidence for it, or in regulating our belief by the evi-dence we can find.

To prevent mistakes, the reader must again be reminded, that if byideas are meant only the acts or operations of our minds in perceiving,remembering, or imagining objects, I am far from calling in question theexistence of those acts; we are conscious of them every day, and everyhour of life; and I believe no man of a sound mind ever doubted of thereal existence of the operations of mind, of which he is conscious. Nor isit to be doubted, that, by the faculties which God has given us, we canconceive things that are absent, as well as perceive those that are withinthe reach of our senses; and that such conceptions may be more or lessdistinct, and more or less lively and strong. We have reason to ascribe tothe all-knowing and all-perfect Being distinct conceptions of all thingsexistent and possible, and of all their relations; and if these conceptionsare called his eternal ideas, there ought to be no dispute amongPhilosophers about a word. The ideas, of whose existence I require theproof, are not the operations of any mind, but supposed objects of thoseoperations. They are not perception, remembrance, or conception, butthings that are said to be perceived, or remembered, or imagined.

Nor do I dispute the existence of what the vulgar call the objects ofperception. These, by all who acknowledge their existence, are calledreal things, not ideas. But Philosophers maintain, that, besides these,there are immediate objects of perception in the mind itself: That, forinstance, we do not see the sun immediately, but an idea; or, as MrHUME calls it, an impression, in our own minds. This idea is said to bethe image, the resemblance, the representative of the sun, if there be asun. It is from the existence of the idea that we must infer the existenceof the sun. But the idea, being immediately perceived, there can be nodoubt, as Philosophers think, of its existence.

In like manner, when I remember, or when I imagine any thing, all menacknowledge that there must be something that is remembered, or that isimagined; that is, some object of those operations. The object remem-bered must be something that did exist in time past. The object imaginedmay be something that never existed. But, say the Philosophers, besides

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these objects which all men acknowledge, there is a more immediateobject which really exists in the mind at the same time we remember orimagine. This object is an idea or image of the thing remembered orimagined.

The first reflection I would make on this philosophical opinion is, Thatit is directly contrary to the universal sense of men who have not beeninstructed in philosophy. When we see the sun or moon, we have nodoubt that the very objects which we immediately see, are very far distantfrom us, and from one another. We have not the least doubt that this isthe sun and moon which God created some thousands of years ago, andwhich have continued to perform their revolutions in the heavens eversince. But how are we astonished when the Philosopher informs us, thatwe are mistaken in all this; that the sun and moon which we see, are not,as we imagine, many miles distant from us, and from each other, but thatthey are in our own mind; that they had no existence before we sawthem, and will have none when we cease to perceive and to think ofthem; because the objects we perceive are only ideas in our own minds,which can have no existence a moment longer than we think of them.

If a plain man, uninstructed in philosophy, has faith to receive thesemysteries, how great must be his astonishment. He is brought into a newworld where every thing he sees, tastes, or touches, is an idea; a fleetingkind of being which he can conjure into existence, or can annihilate inthe twinkling of an eye.

After his mind is somewhat composed, it will be natural for him to askhis philosophical instructor, Pray, Sir, are there then no substantial andpermanent beings called the sun and moon, which continue to existwhether we think of them or not?

Here the Philosophers differ. Mr LOCKE, and those that were beforehim, will answer to this question, That it is very true, there are substan-tial and permanent beings called the sun and moon; but they neverappear to us in their own person, but by their representatives, the ideas inour own minds, and we know nothing of them but what we can gatherfrom those ideas.

Bishop BERKELEY and Mr HUME would give a different answer to thequestion proposed: They would assure the querist, that it is a vulgarerror, a mere prejudice of the ignorant and unlearned, to think that thereare any permanent and substantial beings called the sun and moon; thatthe heavenly bodies, our own bodies, and all bodies whatsoever, arenothing but ideas in our minds; and that there can be nothing like theideas of one mind, but the ideas of another mind. There is nothing innature but minds and ideas, says the Bishop, nay, says Mr HUME, there isnothing in nature but ideas only; for what we call a mind is nothing but atrain of ideas connected by certain relations between themselves.

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2 [Enquiry, 12.1.]

In this representation of the theory of ideas, there is nothing exagger-ated or misrepresented, as far as I am able to judge; and surely nothingfarther is necessary to shew, that, to the uninstructed in philosophy, itmust appear extravagant and visionary, and most contrary to the dic-tates of common understanding.

There is the less need of any farther proof of this, that it is very amplyacknowledged by Mr HUME in his Essay on the academical or scepticalPhilosophy.

“It seems evident, says he, that men are carried by a natural instinct,or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that without anyreasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always supposean external universe, which depends not on our perception, but wouldexist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilat-ed. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and pre-serve this belief of external objects in all their thoughts, designs, andactions.

It seems also evident, that when men follow this blind and powerfulinstinct of nature, they always suppose the very images presented bythe senses to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other.This very table which we see white, and feel hard, is believed to existindependent of our perception, and to be something external to themind which perceives it; our presence bestows not being upon it; ourabsence annihilates it not: It preserves its existence uniform and entire,independent of the situation of intelligent beings who perceive or con-template it.

But this universal and primary notion of all men is soon destroyed bythe slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever bepresent to the mind, but an image or perception; and that the sensesare only the inlets through which these images are received, withoutbeing ever able to produce any immediate intercourse between themind and the object.”2

It is therefore acknowledged by this Philosopher, to be a naturalinstinct or prepossession, an universal and primary opinion of all men, aprimary instinct of nature, that the objects which we immediately per-ceive by our senses, are not images in our minds, but external objects,and that their existence is independent of us, and our perception.

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In this acknowledgment, Mr HUME indeed seems to me more gener-ous, and even more ingenuous than Bishop BERKELEY, who would per-suade us, that his opinion does not oppose the vulgar opinion, but onlythat of the Philosophers; and that the external existence of a materialworld is a philosophical hypothesis, and not the natural dictate of ourperceptive powers. The Bishop shows a timidity of engaging such anadversary, as a primary and universal opinion of all men. He is ratherfond to court its patronage. But the Philosopher intrepidly gives a defi-ance to this antagonist, and seems to glory in a conflict that was worthyof his arm. Optat aprum aut fulvum descendere monte leonem. After all,I suspect that a Philosopher, who wages war with this adversary, willfind himself in the same condition as a Mathematician who shouldundertake to demonstrate, that there is no truth in the axioms of mathe-matics.

A second reflection upon this subject is, That the authors who havetreated of ideas, have generally taken their existence for granted, as athing that could not be called in question; and such arguments as theyhave mentioned incidentally, in order to prove it, seem too weak to sup-port the conclusion.

Mr LOCKE, in the introduction to his Essay, tells us, that he uses theword idea to signify whatever is the immediate object of thought; andthen adds, “I presume it will be easily granted me that there are suchideas in mens minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, andmens words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others.” I amindeed conscious of perceiving, remembering, imagining; but that theobjects of these operations are images in my mind, I am not conscious. Iam satisfied by mens words and actions, that they often perceive thesame objects which I perceive, which could not be, if those objects wereideas in their own minds.

Mr NORRIS is the only author I have met with, who professedly putsthe question, Whether material things can be perceived by us immediate-ly? He has offered four arguments to show that they cannot. First,“Material objects are without the mind, and therefore there can be nounion between the object and the percipient.” Answer, This argument islame, until it is shown to be necessary that in perception there should bea union between the object and the percipient. Second, “Material objectsare disproportioned to the mind, and removed from it by the wholediameter of Being.” This argument I cannot answer, because I do notunderstand it. Third, “Because, if material objects were immediateobjects of perception, there could be no physical science; things neces-sary and immutable being the only object of science.” Answer, Althoughthings necessary and immutable be not the immediate objects of percep-tion, they may be immediate objects of other powers of the mind.

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Fourth, “If material things were perceived by themselves, they would bea true light to our minds, as being the intelligible form of our under-standings, and consequently perfective of them, and indeed superior tothem.” If I comprehend any thing of this mysterious argument, it follows from it, that the Deity perceives nothing at all, because nothingcan be superior to his understanding, or perfective of it.

There is an argument which is hinted at by MALEBRANCHE, and byseveral other authors, which deserves to be more seriously considered.As I find it most clearly expressed, and most fully urged by Dr SAMUEL

CLARKE, I shall give it in his words, in his second reply to LEIBNITZ,sect. 4.

“The soul, without being present to the images of the things perceived,could not possibly perceive them. A living substance can only thereperceive, where it is present, either to the things themselves, (as theomnipresent God is to the whole universe), or to the images of things,as the soul is in its proper sensorium.”

Sir ISAAC NEWTON expresses the same sentiment, but with his usualreserve, in a query only.

The ingenious Dr PORTERFIELD, in his Essay concerning the motionsof our eyes, adopts this opinion with more confidence. His words are:

“How body acts upon mind, or mind upon body, I know not; butthis I am very certain of, that nothing can act, or be acted upon,where it is not; and therefore our mind can never perceive any thingbut its own proper modifications, and the various states of the senso-rium, to which it is present: So that it is not the external sun andmoon which are in the heavens, which our mind perceives, but onlytheir image or representation impressed upon the sensorium. How thesoul of a seeing man sees these images, or how it receives those ideas,from such agitations in the sensorium, I know not; but I am sure itcan never perceive the external bodies themselves, to which it is notpresent.”

These, indeed, are great authorities; but, in matters of philosophy, wemust not be guided by authority, but by reason. Dr CLARKE, in the placecited, mentions slightly, as the reason of his opinion, that “nothing canany more act, or be acted upon, when it is not present, than it can bewhere it is not.” And again, in his third reply to LEIBNITZ, sect. II. “Weare sure the soul cannot perceive what it is not present to, because nothing can act, or be acted upon, where it is not.” The same reason wesee is urged by Dr PORTERFIELD.

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That nothing can act immediately where it is not, I think must beadmitted; for I agree with Sir ISAAC NEWTON, that power without sub-stance is inconceivable. It is a consequence of this, that nothing can beacted upon immediately where the agent is not present: Let this thereforebe granted. To make the reasoning conclusive, it is farther necessary,that, when we perceive objects, either they act upon us, or we act uponthem. This does not appear self-evident, nor have I ever met with anyproof of it. I shall briefly offer the reasons why I think it ought not to beadmitted.

When we say that one being acts upon another, we mean that somepower or force is exerted by the agent, which produces, or has a tendencyto produce, a change in the thing acted upon. If this be the meaning ofthe phrase, as I conceive it is, there appears no reason for asserting, that,in perception, either the object acts upon the mind, or the mind upon theobject.

An object, in being perceived, does not act at all. I perceive the walls ofthe room where I sit; but they are perfectly inactive, and therefore act notupon the mind. To be perceived, is what Logicians call an externaldenomination, which implies neither action nor quality in the object per-ceived. Nor could men ever have gone into this notion, that perception isowing to some action of the object upon the mind, were it not, that weare so prone to form our notions of the mind from some similitude weconceive between it and body. Thought in the mind is conceived to havesome analogy to motion in a body: And as a body is put in motion, bybeing acted upon by some other body; so we are apt to think the mind ismade to perceive, by some impulse it receives from the object. But rea-sonings, drawn from such analogies, ought never to be trusted. They are,indeed, the cause of most of our errors with regard to the mind. And wemight as well conclude, that minds may be measured by feet and inches,or weighed by ounces and drachms, because bodies have those properties.

I see as little reason, in the second place, to believe, that in perceptionthe mind acts upon the object. To perceive an object is one thing; to actupon it is another: Nor is the last at all included in the first. To say, that I act upon the wall, by looking at it, is an abuse of language,and has no meaning. Logicians distinguish two kinds of operations ofmind; the first kind produces no effect without the mind; the last does.The first they call immanent acts, the second transitive. All intellectualoperations belong to the first class; they produce no effect upon anyexternal object. But without having recourse to logical distinctions, everyman of common sense knows, that to think of an object, and to act uponit, are very different things.

As we have therefore no evidence, that, in perception, the mind actsupon the object, or the object upon the mind, but strong reasons to the

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contrary; Dr CLARK’s argument against our perceiving external objectsimmediately falls to the ground.

This notion, that, in perception, the object must be contiguous to thepercipient, seems, with many other prejudices, to be borrowed fromanalogy. In all the external senses, there must, as has been beforeobserved, be some impression made upon the organ of sense by theobject, or by something coming from the object. An impression supposescontiguity. Hence we are led by analogy to conceive something similarin the operations of the mind. Many Philosophers resolve almost everyoperation of mind into impressions and feelings, words manifestly bor-rowed from the sense of touch. And it is very natural to conceive conti-guity necessary between that which makes the impression, and thatwhich receives it; between that which feels, and that which is felt. Andthough no Philosopher will now pretend to justify such analogical rea-soning as this; yet it has a powerful influence upon the judgment, whilewe contemplate the operations of our minds, only as they appearthrough the deceitful medium of such analogical notions and expres-sions.

When we lay aside those analogies, and reflect attentively upon ourperception of the objects of sense, we must acknowledge, that, thoughwe are conscious of perceiving objects, we are altogether ignorant how itis brought about; and know as little how we perceive objects as how wewere made. And if we should admit an image in the mind, or contiguousto it, we know as little how perception may be produced by this imageas by the most distant object. Why therefore should we be led, by a the-ory which is neither grounded on evidence, nor, if admitted, can explainany one phænomenon of perception, to reject the natural and immediatedictates of those perceptive powers, to which, in the conduct of life, wefind a necessity of yielding implicit submission?

There remains only one other argument that I have been able to findurged against our perceiving external objects immediately. It is proposedby Mr HUME, who, in the Essay already quoted, after acknowledgingthat it is an universal and primary opinion of all men, that we perceiveexternal objects immediately, subjoins what follows.

“But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soondestroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothingcan ever be present to the mind but an image or perception; and thatthe senses are only the inlets through which these images are received,without being ever able to produce any immediate intercoursebetween the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems todiminish as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which existsindependent of us, suffers no alteration. It was therefore nothing but

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its image which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dic-tates of reason; and no man who reflects, ever doubted that the exis-tences which we consider, when we say this house, and that tree, arenothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies and represen-tations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent. Sofar then, we are necessitated, by reasoning, to depart from the primaryinstincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to theevidence of our senses.”

We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opin-ions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand all thevulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided bythe uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand allthe Philosophers ancient and modern; every man without exception whoreflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classedwith the vulgar.

The passage now quoted is all I have found in Mr HUME’s writingsupon this point; and indeed there is more reasoning in it than I havefound in any other author; I shall therefore examine it minutely.

First, He tells us, That “this universal and primary opinion of all menis soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, thatnothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception.”

The phrase of being present to the mind has some obscurity; but I con-ceive he means being an immediate object of thought; an immediateobject, for instance, of perception, of memory, or of imagination. If thisbe the meaning, (and it is the only pertinent one I can think of), there isno more in this passage but an assertion of the proposition to be proved,and an assertion that philosophy teaches it. If this be so, I beg leave todissent from philosophy till she gives me reason for what she teaches.For though common sense and my external senses demand my assent totheir dictates upon their own authority, yet philosophy is not entitled tothis privilege. But that I may not dissent from so grave a personage with-out giving a reason, I give this as the reason of my dissent. I see the sunwhen he shines; I remember the battle of Culloden; and neither of theseobjects is an image or perception.

He tells us in the next place, “That the senses are only the inletsthrough which these images are received.”

I know that ARISTOTLE and the schoolmen taught, that images orspecies flow from objects, and are let in by the senses, and strike uponthe mind; but this has been so effectually refuted by DES CARTES, byMALEBRANCHE, and many others, that nobody now pretends to defendit. Reasonable men consider it as one of the most unintelligible andunmeaning parts of the ancient system. To what cause is it owing that

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modern Philosophers are so prone to fall back into this hypothesis, asif they really believed it? For of this proneness I could give manyinstances besides this of Mr HUME; and I take the cause to be, thatimages in the mind, and images let in by the senses, are so nearlyallied, and so strictly connected, that they must stand or fall together.The old system consistently maintained both: But the new system hasrejected the doctrine of images let in by the senses, holding, neverthe-less, that there are images in the mind; and, having made this unnatur-al divorce of two doctrines which ought not to be put asunder, thatwhich they have retained often leads them back involuntarily to thatwhich they have rejected.

Mr HUME surely did not seriously believe that an image of sound islet in by the ear, an image of smell by the nose, an image of hardnessand softness, of solidity and resistance, by the touch. For, besides theabsurdity of the thing, which has often been shown, Mr HUME, and allmodern Philosophers maintain, that the images which are the immedi-ate objects of perception have no existence when they are not per-ceived; whereas, if they were let in by the senses, they must be, beforethey are perceived, and have a separate existence.

He tells us farther, that philosophy teaches, that the senses areunable to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind andthe object. Here, I still require the reasons that philosophy gives forthis; for, to my apprehension, I immediately perceive external objects,and this I conceive is the immediate intercourse here meant.

Hitherto I see nothing that can be called an argument. Perhaps it wasintended only for illustration. The argument, the only argument follows:

The table which we see, seems to diminish as we remove fartherfrom it; but the real table which exists independent of us suffers noalteration: It was therefore nothing but its image which was presentedto the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason.

To judge of the strength of this argument, it is necessary to attend toa distinction which is familiar to those who are conversant in themathematical sciences, I mean the distinction between real and appar-ent magnitude. The real magnitude of a line is measured by someknown measure of length, as inches, feet, or miles: The real magnitudeof a surface or solid, by known measures of surface or of capacity.This magnitude is an object of touch only, and not of sight; nor couldwe even have had any conception of it, without the sense of touch; andBishop BERKELEY, on that account, calls it tangible magnitude.

Apparent magnitude is measured by the angle which an object sub-tends at the eye. Supposing two right lines drawn from the eye to theextremities of the object making an angle, of which the object is thesubtense, the apparent magnitude is measured by this angle. This

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3 [Cf. Reid’s Inquiry, 6.2 and 6.11.]

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apparent magnitude is an object of sight, and not of touch. BishopBERKELEY calls it visible magnitude.3

If it is asked, what is the apparent magnitude of the sun’s diameter?the answer is, that it is about thirty-one minutes of a degree. But if it isasked, what is the real magnitude of the sun’s diameter? the answermust be, so many thousand miles, or so many diameters of the earth.From which it is evident, that real magnitude, and apparent magnitude,are things of a different nature, though the name of magnitude is givento both. The first has three dimensions, the last only two. The first ismeasured by a line, the last by an angle.

From what has been said, it is evident that the real magnitude of abody must continue unchanged, while the body is unchanged. This wegrant. But is it likewise evident, that the apparent magnitude must con-tinue the same while the body is unchanged? So far otherwise, that everyman who knows any thing of mathematics can easily demonstrate, thatthe same individual object, remaining in the same place, and unchanged,must necessarily vary in its apparent magnitude, according as the pointfrom which it is seen is more or less distant; and that its apparent lengthor breadth will be nearly in a reciprocal proportion to the distance ofthe spectator. This is as certain as the principles of geometry.

We must likewise attend to this, that though the real magnitude of abody is not originally an object of sight, but of touch, yet we learn byexperience to judge of the real magnitude in many cases by sight. Welearn by experience to judge of the distance of a body from the eye with-in certain limits; and from its distance and apparent magnitude takentogether, we learn to judge of its real magnitude.

And this kind of judgment, by being repeated every hour, and almostevery minute of our lives, becomes, when we are grown up, so ready andso habitual, that it very much resembles the original perceptions of oursenses, and may not improperly be called acquired perception.

Whether we call it judgment or acquired perception is a verbal differ-ence. But it is evident, that, by means of it, we often discover by onesense things which are properly and naturally the objects of another.Thus I can say without impropriety, I hear a drum, I hear a great bell, orI hear a small bell; though it is certain that the figure or size of thesounding body is not originally an object of hearing. In like manner, welearn by experience how a body of such a real magnitude, and at such adistance appears to the eye: But neither its real magnitude, nor its dis-tance from the eye, are properly objects of sight, any more than the formof a drum, or the size of a bell, are properly objects of hearing.

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If these things be considered, it will appear, that Mr HUME’s argumenthath no force to support his conclusion, nay, that it leads to a contraryconclusion. The argument is this, the table we see seems to diminish aswe remove farther from it; that is, its apparent magnitude is diminished;but the real table suffers no alteration, to wit, in its real magnitude;therefore it is not the real table we see: I admit both the premises in thissyllogism, but I deny the conclusion. The syllogism has what theLogicians call two middle terms: Apparent magnitude is the middle termin the first premise; real magnitude in the second. Therefore, accordingto the rules of logic, the conclusion is not justly drawn from the premis-es; but, laying aside the rules of logic, let us examine it by the light ofcommon sense.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that it is the real table we see: Must notthis real table seem to diminish as we remove farther from it? It isdemonstrable that it must. How then can this apparent diminution be anargument that it is not the real table? When that which must happen tothe real table, as we remove farther from it, does actually happen to thetable we see, it is absurd to conclude from this, that it is not the realtable we see. It is evident therefore, that this ingenious author hasimposed upon himself by confounding real magnitude with apparentmagnitude, and that his argument is a mere sophism.

I observed that Mr HUME’s argument not only has no strength to sup-port his conclusion, but that it leads to the contrary conclusion; to wit,that it is the real table we see; for this plain reason, that the table we seehas precisely that apparent magnitude which it is demonstrable the realtable must have when placed at that distance.

This argument is made much stronger by considering, that the realtable may be placed successively at a thousand different distances; andin every distance, in a thousand different positions; and it can be deter-mined demonstratively, by the rules of geometry and perspective, whatmust be its apparent magnitude, and apparent figure, in each of thosedistances and positions. Let the table be placed successively in as manyof those different distances, and different positions, as you will, or inthem all; open your eyes and you shall see a table precisely of thatapparent magnitude, and that apparent figure, which the real table musthave in that distance, and in that position. Is not this a strong argumentthat it is the real table you see?

In a word, the appearance of a visible object is infinitely diversified,according to its distance and position. The visible appearances are innu-merable, when we confine ourselves to one object, and they are multi-plied according to the variety of objects. Those appearances have beenmatter of speculation to ingenious men, at least since the time ofEUCLID. They have accounted for all this variety, on the supposition,

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that the objects we see are external, and not in the mind itself. The rulesthey have demonstrated about the various projections of the sphere,about the appearances of the planets in their progressions, stations, andretrogradations, and all the rules of perspective, are built on the supposi-tion that the objects of sight are external. They can each of them be triedin thousands of instances. In many arts and professions innumerable tri-als are daily made; nor were they ever found to fail in a single instance.Shall we say that a false supposition, invented by the rude vulgar, hasbeen so lucky in solving an infinite number of phænomena of nature?This surely would be a greater prodigy than philosophy ever exhibited:Add to this, that upon the contrary hypothesis, to wit, that the objectsof sight are internal, no account can be given of any one of thoseappearances, nor any physical cause assigned why a visible objectshould, in any one case, have one apparent figure and magnitude ratherthan another.

Thus I have considered every argument I have found advanced toprove the existence of ideas, or images of external things, in the mind:And if no better arguments can be found, I cannot help thinking, thatthe whole history of philosophy has never furnished an instance of anopinion so unanimously entertained by Philosophers upon so slightgrounds.

A third reflection I would make upon this subject is, That Philoso-phers, notwithstanding their unanimity as to the existence of ideas,hardly agree in any one thing else concerning them. If ideas be not amere fiction, they must be, of all objects of human knowledge, the thingswe have best access to know, and to be acquainted with; yet there isnothing about which men differ so much.

Some have held them to be self-existent, others to be in the DivineMind, others in our own minds, and others in the brain or sensorium; Iconsidered the hypothesis of images in the brain, in the fourth chapter ofthis Essay. As to images in the mind, if any thing more is meant by theimage of an object in the mind than the thought of that object, I knownot what it means. The distinct conception of an object may, in ametaphorical or analogical sense, be called an image of it in the mind.But this image is only the conception of the object, and not the objectconceived. It is an act of the mind, and not the object of that act.

Some Philosophers will have our ideas, or a part of them, to be innate;others will have them all to be adventitious: Some derive them from thesenses alone; others from sensation and reflection: Some think they arefabricated by the mind itself; others that they are produced by externalobjects; others that they are the immediate operation of the Deity; otherssay, that impressions are the causes of ideas, and that the causes ofimpressions are unknown: Some think that we have ideas only of mater-

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ial objects, but none of minds, of their operations, or of the relations ofthings; others will have the immediate object of every thought to be anidea: Some think we have abstract ideas, and that by this chiefly we aredistinguished from the brutes; others maintain an abstract idea to be anabsurdity, and that there can be no such thing: With some they are theimmediate objects of thought, with others the only objects.

A fourth reflection is, That ideas do not make any of the operations ofthe mind to be better understood, although it was probably with thatview that they have been first invented, and afterwards so generallyreceived.

We are at a loss to know how we perceive distant objects; how weremember things past; how we imagine things that have no existence.Ideas in the mind seem to account for all these operations: They are allby the means of ideas reduced to one operation; to a kind of feeling, orimmediate perception of things present, and in contact with the percipi-ent; and feeling is an operation so familiar, that we think it needs noexplication, but may serve to explain other operations.

But this feeling, or immediate perception, is as difficult to be compre-hended, as the things which we pretend to explain by it. Two things maybe in contact without any feeling or perception; there must therefore bein the percipient a power to feel or to perceive. How this power is pro-duced, and how it operates, is quite beyond the reach of our knowledge.As little can we know whether this power must be limited to things pre-sent, and in contact with us. Nor can any man pretend to prove, that theBeing, who gave us the power to perceive things present, may not giveus the power to perceive things that are distant, to remember thingspast, and to conceive things that never existed.

Some Philosophers have endeavoured to make all our senses to beonly different modifications of touch; a theory which serves only to con-found things that are different, and to perplex and darken things thatare clear. The theory of ideas resembles this, by reducing all the opera-tions of the human understanding to the perception of ideas in our ownminds. This power of perceiving ideas is as inexplicable as any of thepowers explained by it: And the contiguity of the object contributesnothing at all to make it better understood; because there appears noconnection between contiguity and perception, but what is grounded onprejudices, drawn from some imagined similitude between mind andbody; and from the supposition, that, in perception, the object acts uponthe mind, or the mind upon the object. We have seen how this theoryhas led Philosophers to confound those operations of mind, which expe-rience teaches all men to be different, and teaches them to distinguish incommon language; and that it has led them to invent a language incon-sistent with the principles upon which all language is grounded.

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The last reflection I shall make upon this theory, is, That the naturaland necessary consequences of it furnish a just prejudice against it toevery man who pays a due regard to the common sense of mankind.

Not to mention, that it led the Pythagoreans and PLATO to imaginethat we see only the shadows of external things, and not the thingsthemselves, and that it gave rise to the peripatetic doctrine of sensiblespecies, one of the greatest absurdities of that ancient system, let us onlyconsider the fruits it has produced, since it was new-modelled by DES

CARTES. That great reformer in philosophy saw the absurdity of the doc-trine of ideas coming from external objects, and refuted it effectually,after it had been received by Philosophers for thousands of years; but hestill retained ideas in the brain and in the mind. Upon this foundation allour modern systems of the powers of the mind are built. And the totter-ing state of those fabrics, though built by skilful hands, may give astrong suspicion of the unsoundness of the foundation.

It was this theory of ideas that led DES CARTES, and those that fol-lowed him, to think it necessary to prove, by philosophical arguments,the existence of material objects. And who does not see that philosophymust make a very ridiculous figure in the eyes of sensible men, while it isemployed in mustering up metaphysical arguments, to prove that thereis a sun and a moon, an earth and a sea: Yet we find these truly greatmen, DES CARTES, MALEBRANCHE, ARNAULD, and LOCKE, seriouslyemploying themselves in this argument.

Surely their principles led them to think, that all men, from the begin-ning of the world, believed the existence of these things upon insufficientgrounds, and to think that they would be able to place upon a morerational foundation this universal belief of mankind. But the misfortuneis, that all the laboured arguments they have advanced, to prove theexistence of those things we see and feel, are mere sophisms: Not one ofthem will bear examination.

I might mention several paradoxes, which Mr LOCKE, though by nomeans fond of paradoxes, was led into by this theory of ideas. Such as,that the secondary qualities of body are no qualities of body at all, butsensations of the mind: That the primary qualities of body are resem-blances of our sensations: That we have no notion of duration, but fromthe succession of ideas in our minds: That personal identity consists inconsciousness; so that the same individual thinking being may make twoor three different persons, and several different thinking beings makeone person: That judgment is nothing but a perception of the agreementor disagreement of our ideas. Most of these paradoxes I shall have occa-sion to examine.

However, all these consequences of the doctrine of ideas were tolera-ble, compared with those which came afterwards to be discovered by

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BERKELEY and HUME. That there is no material world: No abstract ideasor notions: That the mind is only a train of related impressions andideas, without any subject on which they may be impressed: That thereis neither space nor time, body nor mind, but impressions and ideasonly: And, to sum up all, That there is no probability, even in demon-stration itself, nor any one proposition more probable than its contrary.

These are the noble fruits which have grown upon this theory of ideas,since it began to be cultivated by skilful hands. It is no wonder that sen-sible men should be disgusted at philosophy, when such wild and shock-ing paradoxes pass under its name. However, as these paradoxes have,with great acuteness and ingenuity, been deduced by just reasoning fromthe theory of ideas, they must at last bring this advantage, that positionsso shocking to the common sense of mankind, and so contrary to thedecisions of all our intellectual powers, will open mens eyes, and breakthe force of the prejudice which hath held them entangled in that theory.

...

ESSAY III. OF MEMORY.

C H A P. VII.

Theories concerning Memory.

The common theory of ideas, that is of images in the brain or in themind, of all the objects of thought, has been very generally applied toaccount for the faculties of memory and imagination, as well as that ofperception by the senses.

The sentiments of the Peripatetics are expressed by ALEXANDER

APHRODISIENSIS, one of the earliest Greek Commentators on ARISTOTLE,in these words, as they are translated by Mr HARRIS in his Hermes,

“Now what fancy or imagination is, we may explain as follows: Wemay conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our senses about sensible objects, some impression, as it were, or picturein our original sensorium, being a relict of that motion caused withinus by the external object; a relict, which when the external object is nolonger present, remains, and is still preserved, being as it were itsimage, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of ourhaving memory: Now such a sort of relict, and as it were impression,they call fancy or imagination.”

Another passage from ALCINOUS of the doctrines of PLATO chap. 4.shews the agreement of the ancient Platonists and Peripatetics in this

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theory, “When the form or type of things is imprinted on the mind bythe organs of the senses, and so imprinted as not to be deleted by time,but preserved firm and lasting, its preservation is called memory.”

Upon this principle ARISTOTLE imputes the shortness of memory inchildren to this cause, that their brain is too moist and soft to retainimpressions made upon it: And the defect of memory in old men heimputes, on the contrary, to the hardness and rigidity of the brain,which hinders its receiving any durable impression.

This ancient theory of the cause of memory is defective in tworespects: First, If the cause assigned did really exist, it by no meansaccounts for the phænomenon: And, secondly, There is no evidence, noreven probability, that that cause exists.

It is probable, that in perception some impression is made upon thebrain as well as upon the organ and nerves, because all the nerves termi-nate in the brain, and because disorders and hurts of the brain are foundto affect our powers of perception when the external organ and nerveare found; but we are totally ignorant of the nature of this impressionupon the brain: It can have no resemblance to the object perceived, nordoes it in any degree account for that sensation and perception whichare consequent upon it. These things have been argued in the secondEssay, and shall now be taken for granted, to prevent repetition.

If the impression upon the brain be insufficient to account for the per-ception of objects that are present, it can as little account for the memo-ry of those that are past.

So that if it were certain, that the impressions made on the brain inperception remain as long as there is any memory of the object; all thatcould be inferred from this is, that, by the laws of Nature, there is a con-nection established between that impression, and the remembrance ofthat object. But how the impression contributes to this remembrance, weshould be quite ignorant; it being impossible to discover how thought ofany kind should be produced, by an impression on the brain, or uponany part of the body.

To say that this impression is memory, is absurd, if understood literal-ly. If it is only meant that it is the cause of memory, it ought to beshown how it produces this effect, otherwise memory remains as unac-countable as before.

If a Philosopher should undertake to account for the force of gunpow-der, in the discharge of a musket, and then tell us gravely, that the causeof this phænomenon is the drawing of the trigger, we should not bemuch wiser by this account. As little are we instructed in the cause ofmemory, by being told that it is caused by a certain impression on thebrain. For supposing, that impression on the brain were as necessary tomemory as the drawing of the trigger is to the discharge of the musket,

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we are still as ignorant as we were how memory is produced; so that, ifthe cause of memory, assigned by this theory, did really exist, it doesnot in any degree account for memory.

Another defect in this theory is, that there is no evidence, nor proba-bility that the cause assigned does exist; that is, that the impressionmade upon the brain in perception remains after the object is removed.

That impression, whatever be its nature, is caused by the impressionmade by the object upon the organ of sense, and upon the nerve.Philosophers suppose, without any evidence, that when the object isremoved, and the impression upon the organ and nerve ceases, theimpression upon the brain continues, and is permanent; that is, thatwhen the cause is removed the effect continues. The brain surely doesnot appear more fitted to retain an impression than the organ andnerve.

But granting that the impression upon the brain continues after itscause is removed, its effects ought to continue while it continues; that is,the sensation and perception should be as permanent as the impressionupon the brain, which is supposed to be their cause. But here again thePhilosopher makes a second supposition, with as little evidence, but of acontrary nature, to wit, that, while the cause remains, the effect ceases.

If this should be granted also, a third must be made, That the samecause, which at first produced sensation and perception, does after-wards produce memory; an operation essentially different, both fromsensation and perception.

A fourth supposition must be made, That this cause, though it be per-manent, does not produce its effect at all times; it must be like aninscription which is sometimes covered with rubbish, and on otheroccasions made legible: For the memory of things is often interruptedfor a long time, and circumstances bring to our recollection what hadbeen long forgot. After all, many things are remembered which werenever perceived by the senses, being no objects of sense, and thereforewhich could make no impression upon the brain by means of the senses.

Thus, when Philosophers have piled one supposition upon another, asthe giants piled the mountains, in order to scale the heavens, all is to nopurpose, memory remains unaccountable; and we know as little how weremember things past, as how we are conscious of the present.

But here it is proper to observe, that although impressions upon thebrain give no aid in accounting for memory, yet it is very probable, that,in the human frame, memory is dependent on some proper state or tem-perament of the brain.

Although the furniture of our memory bears no resemblance to anytemperament of brain whatsoever, as indeed it is impossible it should;yet Nature may have subjected us to this law, that a certain constitution

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or state of the brain is necessary to memory. That this is really the case,many well known facts lead us to conclude.

It is possible, that, by accurate observation, the proper means may bediscovered of preserving that temperament of the brain which isfavourable to memory, and of remedying the disorders of that tempera-ment. This would be a very noble improvement of the medical art. But ifit should ever be attained, it would give no aid to understand how onestate of the brain assists memory, and another hurts it.

I know certainly, that the impression made upon my hand by the prickof a pin occasions acute pain. But can any Philosopher show how thiscause produces the effect? The nature of the impression is here perfectlyknown; but it gives no help to understand how that impression affectsthe mind; and if we knew as distinctly that state of the brain which caus-es memory, we should still be as ignorant as before how that state con-tributes to memory. We might have been so constituted, for any thingthat I know, that the prick of a pin in the hand, instead of causing pain,should cause remembrance; nor would that constitution be more unac-countable than the present.

The body and mind operate on each other, according to fixed laws ofNature; and it is the business of a Philosopher to discover those laws byobservation and experiment: But, when he has discovered them, he mustrest in them as facts, whose cause is inscrutable to the human under-standing.

Mr LOCKE, and those who have followed him, speak with morereserve than the ancients, and only incidentally, of impressions on thebrain as the cause of memory, and impute it rather to our retaining inour minds the ideas, got either by sensation or reflection.

This, Mr LOCKE says, may be done two ways;

“First, by keeping the idea for some time actually in view, which iscalled contemplation. Secondly, by the power to revive again in ourminds those ideas, which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or havebeen, as it were, laid out of sight; and this is memory, which is, as itwere, the storehouse of our ideas.”

To explain this more distinctly, he immediately adds the followingobservation:

“But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind,which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, thislaying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory, signifies nomore but this, that the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive per-ceptions which it once had, with this additional perception annexed to

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4 [Essay, 2.10.1–2.]

them, that it has had them before; and in this sense it is, that our ideasare said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere; but only there is an ability in the mind, when it will, to revivethem again, and, as it were, paint them anew upon itself, though somewith more, some with less difficulty, some more lively, and othersmore obscurely.”4

In this account of memory, the repeated use of the phrase, as it were,leads one to judge that it is partly figurative; we must therefore endeav-our to distinguish the figurative part from the philosophical. The firstbeing addressed to the imagination, exhibits a picture of memory,which, to have its effect, must be viewed at a proper distance, and froma particular point of view. The second being addressed to the under-standing, ought to bear a near inspection, and a critical examination.

The analogy between memory and a repository, and between remem-bering and retaining, is obvious, and is to be found in all languages, itbeing very natural to express the operations of the mind by images takenfrom things material. But in philosophy we ought to draw aside the veilof imagery, and to view them naked.

When therefore memory is said to be a repository or storehouse ofideas, where they are laid up when not perceived, and again broughtforth as there is occasion, I take this to be popular and rhetorical. Forthe author tells us, that when they are not perceived, they are nothing,and no where, and therefore can neither be laid up in a repository, nordrawn out of it.

But we are told, “That this laying up of our ideas in the repository ofthe memory signifies no more than this, that the mind has a power torevive perceptions, which it once had, with this additional perceptionannexed to them, that it has had them before.” This I think must beunderstood literally and philosophically.

But it seems to me as difficult to revive things that have ceased to beany thing, as to lay them up in a repository, or to bring them out of it.When a thing is once annihilated, the same thing cannot be again pro-duced, though another thing similar to it may. Mr LOCKE, in anotherplace, acknowledges, that the same thing cannot have two beginnings ofexistence; and that things that have different beginnings are not thesame, but diverse. From this it follows, that an ability to revive our ideasor perceptions, after they have ceased to be, can signify no more but anability to create new ideas or perceptions similar to those we had before.

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They are said “to be revived, with this additional perception, that wehave had them before.” This surely would be a fallacious perception, sincethey could not have two beginnings of existence; nor could we believethem to have two beginnings of existence. We can only believe, that wehad formerly ideas or perceptions very like to them, though not identicallythe same. But whether we perceive them to be the same, or only like tothose we had before, this perception, one would think, supposes a remem-brance of those we had before, otherwise the similitude or identity couldnot be perceived.

Another phrase is used to explain this reviving of our perceptions. “Themind, as it were, paints them anew upon itself.” There may be somethingfigurative in this; but making due allowance for that, it must imply, thatthe mind, which paints the things that have ceased to exist, must have thememory of what they were, since every painter must have a copy eitherbefore his eye, or in his imagination and memory.

These remarks upon Mr LOCKE’s account of memory are intended toshow, that his system of ideas gives no light to this faculty, but rather tendsto darken it; as little does it make us understand how we remember, andby that means have the certain knowledge of things past.

Every man knows what memory is, and has a distinct notion of it: Butwhen Mr LOCKE speaks of a power to revive in the mind those ideas,which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laidout of sight, one would hardly know this to be memory, if he had not toldus. There are other things which it seems to resemble at least as much. I seebefore me the picture of a friend. I shut my eyes, or turn them anotherway; and the picture disappears, or is, as it were, laid out of sight. I have apower to turn my eyes again towards the picture, and immediately the per-ception is revived. But is this memory? no surely; yet it answers the defini-tion as well as memory itself can do.

We may observe, that the word perception is used by Mr LOCKE in tooindefinite a way, as well as the word idea.

Perception, in the chapter upon that subject, is said to be the first facultyof the mind exercised about our ideas. Here we are told that ideas arenothing but perceptions: Yet I apprehend it would sound oddly to say, thatperception is the first faculty of the mind exercised about perception; andstill more strangely to say, that ideas are the first faculty of the mind exer-cised about our ideas. But why should not ideas be a faculty as well as per-ception, if both are the same?

Memory is said to be a power to revive our perceptions. Will it not fol-low from this, that every thing that can be remembered is a perception? Ifthis be so, it will be difficult to find any thing in nature but perceptions.

Our ideas, we are told, are nothing but actual perceptions; but inmany places of the Essay, ideas are said to be the objects of perception,

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and that the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, has no otherimmediate object which it does or can contemplate but its own ideas.Does it not appear from this, either that Mr LOCKE held the operationsof the mind to be the same thing with the objects of those operations, orthat he used the word idea sometimes in one sense and sometimes inanother, without any intimation, and probably without any apprehen-sion of its ambiguity? It is an article of Mr HUME’s philosophy, thatthere is no distinction between the operations of the mind and theirobjects. But I see no reason to impute this opinion to Mr LOCKE. I ratherthink, that, notwithstanding his great judgment and candour, his under-standing was entangled by the ambiguity of the word idea, and thatmost of the imperfections of his Essay are owing to that cause.

Mr HUME saw farther into the consequences of the common systemconcerning ideas than any author had done before him. He saw theabsurdity of making every object of thought double, and splitting it intoa remote object, which has a separate and permanent existence, and animmediate object, called an idea or impression, which is an image of theformer, and has no existence, but when we are conscious of it.According to this system, we have no intercourse with the externalworld, but by means of the internal world of ideas, which represents theother to the mind.

He saw it was necessary to reject one of these worlds as a fiction, andthe question was, Which should be rejected? Whether all mankind,learned and unlearned, had feigned the existence of the external worldwithout good reason? or whether Philosophers had feigned the internalworld of ideas, in order to account for the intercourse of the mind withthe external? Mr HUME adopted the first of these opinions, andemployed his reason and eloquence in support of it.

Bishop BERKELEY had gone so far in the same track as to reject thematerial world as fictitious; but it was left to Mr HUME to complete thesystem.

According to his system, therefore, impressions and ideas in his ownmind are the only things a man can know, or can conceive: Nor arethese ideas representatives, as they were in the old system. There is nothing else in nature, or at least within the reach of our faculties, to berepresented. What the vulgar call the perception of an external object, isnothing but a strong impression upon the mind. What we call theremembrance of a past event, is nothing but a present impression oridea, weaker than the former. And what we call imagination, is still apresent idea, but weaker than that of memory.

That I may not do him injustice, these are his words in his Treatise ofHuman Nature, page 193.

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“We find by experience, that when any impression has been presentwith the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and thisit may do after two different ways, either when in its new appearanceit retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhatintermediate betwixt an impression and an idea, or when it entirelyloses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty by which werepeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the memory, andthe other the imagination.”5

Upon this account of memory and imagination I shall make someremarks.

First, I wish to know, what we are here to understand by experience?It is said, we find all this by experience; and I conceive nothing can bemeant by this experience but memory. Not that memory which ourauthor defines, but memory in the common acceptation of the word.According to vulgar apprehension, memory is an immediate knowledgeof something past. Our author does not admit that there is any suchknowledge in the human mind. He maintains that memory is nothingbut a present idea or impression. But, in defining what he takes memoryto be, he takes for granted that kind of memory which he rejects. Forcan we find by experience, that an impression, after its first appearanceto the mind, makes a second, and a third, with different degrees ofstrength and vivacity, if we have not so distinct a remembrance of itsfirst appearance, as enables us to know it, upon its second and third,notwithstanding that, in the interval, it has undergone a very consider-able change?

All experience supposes memory; and there can be no such thing asexperience, without trusting to our own memory, or that of others: Sothat it appears from Mr HUME’s account of this matter, that he foundhimself to have that kind of memory, which he acknowledges anddefines, by exercising that kind which he rejects.

Secondly, What is it we find by experience or memory? It is, “Thatwhen an impression has been present with the mind, it again makes itsappearance there as an idea, and that after two different ways.”

If experience informs us of this, it certainly deceives us; for the thing isimpossible, and the author shews it to be so. Impressions and ideas arefleeting perishable things, which have no existence, but when we areconscious of them. If an impression could make a second and a thirdappearance to the mind, it must have a continued existence during theinterval of these appearances, which Mr HUME acknowledges to be agross absurdity. It seems then, that we find, by experience, a thing which

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is impossible. We are imposed upon by our experience, and made tobelieve contradictions.

Perhaps it may be said, that these different appearances of the impres-sion are not to be understood literally, but figuratively; that the impres-sion is personified, and made to appear at different times, and in differ-ent habits, when no more is meant, but that an impression appears atone time; afterwards a thing of a middle nature, between an impressionand an idea, which we call memory, and last of all a perfect idea, whichwe call imagination: that this figurative meaning agrees best with the lastsentence of the period, where we are told, that memory and imaginationare faculties, whereby we repeat our impressions in a more or less livelymanner. To repeat an impression is a figurative way of speaking, whichsignifies making a new impression similar to the former.

If, to avoid the absurdity implied in the literal meaning, we under-stand the Philosopher in this figurative one, then his definitions of mem-ory and imagination, when stripped of the figurative dress, will amountto this, That memory is the faculty of making a weak impression, andimagination the faculty of making an impression still weaker, after acorresponding strong one. These definitions of memory and imaginationlabour under two defects; first, That they convey no notion of the thingdefined; and, secondly, That they may be applied to things of a quite dif-ferent nature from those that are defined.

When we are said to have a faculty of making a weak impression aftera corresponding strong one, it would not be easy to conjecture that thisfaculty is memory. Suppose a man strikes his head smartly against thewall, this is an impression; now he has a faculty by which he can repeatthis impression with less force, so as not to hurt him; this, by MrHUME’s account, must be memory. He has a faculty by which he canjust touch the wall with his head, so that the impression entirely loses itsvivacity. This surely must be imagination; at least it comes as near to thedefinition given of it by Mr HUME as any thing I can conceive.

Thirdly, We may observe, that when we are told that we have a facul-ty of repeating our impressions in a more or less lively manner, thisimplies that we are the efficient causes of our ideas of memory andimagination; but this contradicts what the author says a little before,where he proves, by what he calls a convincing argument, that impres-sions are the cause of their corresponding ideas. The argument thatproves this had need indeed to be very convincing; whether we make theidea to be a second appearance of the impression, or a new impressionsimilar to the former.

If the first be true, then the impression is the cause of itself. If the sec-ond, then the impression after it is gone, and has no existence, producesthe idea. Such are the mysteries of Mr HUME’s philosophy.

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It may be observed, that the common system, that ideas are the onlyimmediate objects of thought, leads to scepticism with regard to memo-ry, as well as with regard to the objects of sense, whether those ideas areplaced in the mind or in the brain.

Ideas are said to be things internal and present, which have no exis-tence but during the moment they are in the mind. The objects of senseare things external, which have a continued existence. When it is main-tained, that all that we immediately perceive is only ideas or phantasms,how can we, from the existence of those phantasms, conclude the exis-tence of an external world corresponding to them?

This difficult question seems not to have occurred to the Peripatetics.DES CARTES saw the difficulty, and endeavoured to find out argumentsby which, from the existence of our phantasms or ideas, we might inferthe existence of external objects. The same course was followed byMALEBRANCHE, ARNAULD, and LOCKE; but BERKELEY and HUME easilyrefuted all their arguments, and demonstrated that there is no strengthin them.

The same difficulty with regard to memory naturally arises from thesystem of ideas; and the only reason why it was not observed byPhilosophers, is, because they give less attention to the memory than tothe senses: For since ideas are things present, how can we, from our hav-ing a certain idea presently in our mind, conclude that an event reallyhappened ten or twenty years ago corresponding to it?

There is the same need of arguments to prove, that the ideas of memo-ry are pictures of things that really did happen, as that the ideas of senseare pictures of external objects which now exist. In both cases, it will beimpossible to find any argument that has real weight. So that thishypothesis leads us to absolute scepticism, with regard to those thingswhich we most distinctly remember, no less than with regard to theexternal objects of sense.

It does not appear to have occurred either to LOCKE or to BERKELEY,that their system has the same tendency to overturn the testimony ofmemory as the testimony of the senses.

Mr HUME saw farther than both, and found this consequence of thesystem of ideas perfectly corresponding to his aim of establishing univer-sal scepticism. His system is therefore more consistent than theirs, andthe conclusions agree better with the premises.

But if we should grant to Mr HUME, that our ideas of memory affordno just ground to believe the past existence of things which we remem-ber, it may still be asked, How it comes to pass that perception andmemory are accompanied with belief, while bare imagination is not?Though this belief cannot be justified upon his system, it ought to beaccounted for as a phænomenon of human nature.

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6 [Treatise, 1.2.7.]

This he has done, by giving us a new theory of belief in general; a the-ory which suits very well with that of ideas, and seems to be a naturalconsequence of it, and which at the same time reconciles all the beliefthat we find in human nature to perfect scepticism.

What then is this belief? It must either be an idea, or some modifica-tion of an idea; we conceive many things which we do not believe. Theidea of an object is the same whether we believe it to exist, or barelyconceive it. The belief adds no new idea to the conception; it is thereforenothing but a modification of the idea of the thing believed, or a differ-ent manner of conceiving it. Hear himself:

“All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, impressions andideas, which differ from each other only in their different degrees offorce and vivacity. Our ideas are copied from our impressions, andrepresent them in all their parts. When you would vary the idea of aparticular object, you can only increase or diminish its force andvivacity: If you make any other change upon it, it represents a differ-ent object or impression. The case is the same as in colours. A particu-lar shade of any colour may acquire a new degree of liveliness orbrightness, without any other variation: But when you produce anyother variation, it is no longer the same shade or colour. So that asbelief does nothing but vary the manner in which we conceive anyobject, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivaci-ty. An opinion, therefore, or belief, may be most accurately defined alively idea, related to or associated with a present impression.”6

This theory of belief is very fruitful of consequences, which Mr HUME

traces with his usual acuteness, and brings into the service of his system.A great part of his system indeed is built upon it; and it is of itself suffi-cient to prove what he calls his hypothesis, “that belief is more properlyan act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures.”

It is very difficult to examine this account of belief with the same grav-ity with which it is proposed. It puts one in mind of the ingeniousaccount given by MARTINUS SCRIBLERUS of the power of syllogism, bymaking the major the male, and the minor the female, which being cou-pled by the middle term, generate the conclusion. There is surely no sci-ence in which men of great parts and ingenuity have fallen into suchgross absurdities as in treating of the powers of the mind. I cannot helpthinking, that never any thing more absurd was gravely maintained byany Philosopher, than this account of the nature of belief, and of the dis-tinction of perception, memory, and imagination.

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The belief of a proposition is an operation of mind of which everyman is conscious, and what it is he understands perfectly, though, onaccount of its simplicity, he cannot give a logical definition of it. If hecompares it with strength of vivacity of his ideas, or with any modifica-tion of ideas, they are so far from appearing to be one and the same,that they have not the least similitude.

That a strong belief and a weak belief differ only in degree, I can easi-ly comprehend; but that belief and no belief should differ only in degree,no man can believe who understands what he speaks. For this is in reali-ty to say that something and nothing differ only in degree, or that noth-ing is a degree of something.

Every proposition that may be the object of belief, has a contraryproposition that may be the object of a contrary belief. The ideas ofboth, according to Mr HUME, are the same, and differ only in degrees ofvivacity. That is, contraries differ only in degree; and so pleasure may bea degree of pain, and hatred a degree of love. But it is to no purpose totrace the absurdities that follow from this doctrine, for none of them canbe more absurd than the doctrine itself.

Every man knows perfectly what it is to see an object with his eyes,what it is to remember a past event, and what it is to conceive a thingwhich has no existence. That these are quite different operations of hismind, he is as certain as that sound differs from colour, and both fromtaste; and I can as easily believe that sound, and colour, and taste, differonly in degree, as that seeing, and remembering, and imagining, differonly in degree.

Mr HUME, in the third volume of his Treatise of Human Nature, issensible that his theory of belief is liable to strong objections, and seems,in some measure, to retract it; but in what measure, it is not easy to say.He seems still to think that belief is only a modification of the idea, butthat vivacity is not a proper term to express that modification. Instead ofit he uses some analogical phrases to explain that modification, such as“apprehending the idea more strongly, or taking faster hold of it.”

There is nothing more meritorious in a Philosopher than to retract anerror upon conviction; but in this instance I humbly apprehend MrHUME claims that merit upon too slight a ground: For I cannot perceivethat the apprehending an idea more strongly, or taking faster hold of it,expresses any other modification of the idea than what was beforeexpressed by its strength and vivacity, or even that it expresses the samemodification more properly. Whatever modification of the idea hemakes belief to be, whether its vivacity, or some other without a name,to make perception, memory, and imagination, to be the differentdegrees of that modification, is chargeable with the absurdities we havementioned.

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Before we leave this subject of memory, it is proper to take notice of adistinction which ARISTOTLE makes between memory and reminiscence,because the distinction has a real foundation in nature, though in ourlanguage I think we do not distinguish them by different names.

Memory is a kind of habit which is not always in exercise with regardto things we remember, but is ready to suggest them when there is occa-sion. The most perfect degree of this habit is, when the thing presentsitself to our remembrance spontaneously, and without labour, as oftenas there is occasion. A second degree is, when the thing is forgot for alonger or shorter time, even when there is occasion to remember it, yetat last some incident brings it to mind without any search. A thirddegree is, when we cast about and search for what we would remember,and so at last find it out. It is this last, I think, which ARISTOTLE callsreminiscence, as distinguished from memory.

Reminiscence, therefore, includes a will to recollect something past,and a search for it. But here a difficulty occurs. It may be said, that whatwe will to remember we must conceive, as there can be no will without aconception of the thing willed. A will to remember a thing, therefore,seems to imply that we remember it already, and have no occasion tosearch for it. But this difficulty is easily removed. When we will toremember a thing, we must remember something relating to it, whichgives us a relative conception of it; but we may, at the same time, haveno conception what the thing is, but only what relation it bears to some-thing else. Thus, I remember that a friend charged me with a commis-sion to be executed at such a place; but I have forgot what the commis-sion was. By applying my thought to what I remember concerning it,that it was given by such a person, upon such an occasion, in conse-quence of such a conversation, I am led, in a train of thought, to thevery thing I had forgot, and recollect distinctly what the commissionwas.

ARISTOTLE says, that brutes have not reminiscence, and this I think isprobable; but, says he, they have memory. It cannot, indeed, be doubtedbut they have something very like to it, and in some instances in a verygreat degree. A dog knows his master after long absence. A horse willtrace back a road he has once gone as accurately as a man; and this isthe more strange, that the train of thought which he had in going mustbe reversed in his return. It is very like to some prodigious memories weread of, where a person, upon hearing an hundred names or unconnect-ed words pronounced, can begin at the last, and go backwards to thefirst, without losing or misplacing one. Brutes certainly may learn muchfrom experience, which seems to imply memory.

Yet I see no reason to think that brutes measure time as men do, bydays, months, or years, or that they have any distinct knowledge of the

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interval between things which they remember, or of their distance fromthe present moment. If we could not record transactions according totheir dates, human memory would be something very different fromwhat it is, and perhaps resemble more the memory of brutes.

...

ESSAY IV.OF CONCEPTION.

CHAP. IV.Of the Train of Thought in the Mind.

...I shall now make a few reflections upon a theory which has been

applied to account for this successive train of thought in the mind. Itwas hinted by Mr HOBBES, but has drawn more attention since it wasdistinctly explained by Mr HUME.

That author thinks that the train of thought in the mind is owing to akind of attraction which ideas have for other ideas that bear certain rela-tions to them. He thinks the complex ideas, which are the common sub-jects of our thoughts and reasoning, are owing to the same cause. Therelations which produce this attraction of ideas, he thinks, are thesethree only, to wit, causation, contiguity in time or place, and similitude.He asserts that these are the only general principles that unite ideas. Andhaving, in another place occasion to take notice of contrariety as a prin-ciple of connection among ideas, in order to reconcile this to his system,he tells us gravely, that contrariety may perhaps be considered as a mix-ture of causation and resemblance. That ideas which have any of thesethree relations do mutually attract each other, so that one of them beingpresented to the fancy, the other is drawn along with it, this he seems tothink an original property of the mind, or rather of the ideas, and there-fore inexplicable.

First, I observe with regard to this theory, that although it is true thatthe thought of any object is apt to lead us to the thought of its cause oreffect, of things contiguous to it in time or place, or of things resemblingit, yet this enumeration of the relations of things which are apt to leadus from one object to another, is very inaccurate.

The enumeration is too large upon his own principles; but it is by fartoo scanty in reality. Causation, according to his philosophy, impliesnothing more than a constant conjunction observed between the causeand the effect, and therefore contiguity must include causation, and histhree principles of attraction are reduced to two.

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But when we take all the three, the enumeration is in reality veryincomplete. Every relation of things has a tendency, more or less, to leadthe thought, in a thinking mind, from one to the other; and not onlyevery relation, but every kind of contrariety and opposition. What MrHUME says, that contrariety may perhaps be considered as a mixture “ofcausation and resemblance,” I can as little comprehend as if he had saidthat figure may perhaps be considered as a mixture of colour and sound.

Our thoughts pass easily from the end to the means; from any truth tothe evidence on which it is founded, the consequences that may bedrawn from it, or the use that may be made of it. From a part we areeasily led to think of the whole, from a subject to its qualities, or fromthings related to the relation. Such transitions in thinking must havebeen made thousands of times by every man who thinks and reasons,and thereby become, as it were, beaten tracks for the imagination.

Not only the relations of objects to each other influence our train ofthinking, but the relation they bear to the present temper and disposi-tion of the mind; their relation to the habits we have acquired, whethermoral or intellectual; to the company we have kept, and to the businessin which we have been chiefly employed. The same event will suggestvery different reflections to different persons, and to the same person atdifferent times, according as he is in good or bad humour, as he is livelyor dull, angry or pleased, melancholy or cheerful.

Lord KAMES, in his Elements of Criticism, and Dr GERARD in hisEssay on Genius, have given a much fuller and juster enumeration of thecauses that influence our train of thinking, and I have nothing to add towhat they have said on this subject.

Secondly, Let us consider how far this attraction of ideas must beresolved into original qualities of human nature.

I believe the original principles of the mind, of which we can give no account, but that such is our constitution, are more in number thanis commonly thought. But we ought not to multiply them withoutnecessity.

That trains of thinking, which by frequent repetition have becomefamiliar, should spontaneously offer themselves to our fancy, seems torequire no other original quality but the power of habit.

In all rational thinking, and in all rational discourse, whether seriousor facetious, the thought must have some relation to what went before.Every man, therefore, from the dawn of reason, must have been accus-tomed to a train of related objects. These please the understanding, andby custom become like beaten tracks which invite the traveller.

As far as it is in our power to give a direction to our thoughts, whichit is undoubtedly in a great degree, they will be directed by the activeprinciples common to men, by our appetites, our passions, our affec-

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tions, our reason, and conscience. And that the trains of thinking in ourminds are chiefly governed by these, according as one or another pre-vails at the time, every man will find in his experience.

If the mind is at any time vacant from every passion and desire, thereare still some objects that are more acceptable to us than others. Thefacetious man is pleased with surprising similitudes or contrasts; thePhilosopher with the relations of things that are subservient to reason-ing; the Merchant with what tends to profit; and the Politician withwhat may mend the state.

A good writer of comedy or romance can feign a train of thinking forany of the persons of his fable, which appears very natural, and isapproved by the best judges. Now, what is it that entitles such a fictionto approbation? Is it that the author has given a nice attention to therelations of causation, contiguity, and similitude in the ideas? This sure-ly is the least part of its merit. But the chief part consists in this, that itcorresponds perfectly with the general character, the rank, the habits,the present situation and passions of the person. If this be a just way ofjudging in criticism, it follows necessarily, that the circumstances lastmentioned have the chief influence in suggesting our trains of thought.

It cannot be denied, that the state of the body has an influence uponour imagination, according as a man is sober or drunk, as he is fatiguedor refreshed. Crudities and indigestion are said to give uneasy dreams,and have probably a like effect upon the waking thoughts. Opium givesto some persons pleasing dreams, and pleasing imaginations whenawake, and to others such as are horrible and distressing.

These influences of the body upon the mind can only be known byexperience, and I believe we can give no account of them.

Nor can we, perhaps, give any reason why we must think withoutceasing while we are awake. I believe we are likewise originally dis-posed, in imagination, to pass from any one object of thought to othersthat are contiguous to it in time or place. This, I think, may be observedin brutes and in idiots, as well as in children, before any habit can beacquired that might account for it. The sight of an object is apt to sug-gest to the imagination what has been seen or felt in conjunction with it,even when the memory of that conjunction is gone.

Such conjunctions of things influence not only the imagination, butthe belief and the passions, especially in children and in brutes; and per-haps all that we call memory in brutes is something of this kind.

They expect events in the same order and succession in which theyhappened before; and by this expectation, their actions and passions, aswell as their thoughts, are regulated. A horse takes fright at the placewhere some object frighted him before. We are apt to conclude fromthis, that he remembers the former accident. But perhaps there is only an

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association formed in his mind between the place and the passion offear, without any distinct remembrance.

Mr LOCKE has given us a very good chapter upon the association ofideas; and by the examples he has given to illustrate this doctrine, Ithink it appears that very strong associations may be formed at once;not of ideas to ideas only, but of ideas to passions and emotions; andthat strong associations are never formed at once, but when accompa-nied by some strong passion or emotion. I believe this must be resolvedinto the constitution of our nature.

Mr HUME’s opinion, that the complex ideas, which are the commonobjects of discourse and reasoning, are formed by those original attrac-tions of ideas, to which he ascribes the train of thoughts in the mind,will come under consideration in another place.

To put an end to our remarks upon this theory of Mr HUME, I thinkhe has real merit in bringing this curious subject under the view ofPhilosophers, and carrying it a certain length. But I see nothing in thistheory that should hinder us to conclude, that every thing in the trainsof our thought, which bears the marks of judgment and reason, has beenthe product of judgment and reason previously exercised, either by theperson himself, at that or some former time, or by some other person.The attraction of ideas will be the same in a man’s second thoughtsupon any subject as in his first. Or if some change in his circumstances,or in the objects about him, should make any change in the attractionsof his ideas, it is an equal chance whether the second be better than thefirst, or whether they be worse. But it is certain that every man of judg-ment and taste will, upon a review, correct that train of thought whichfirst presented itself. If the attractions of ideas are the sole causes of theregular arrangement of thought in the fancy, there is no use for judg-ment or taste in any composition, nor indeed any room for their opera-tion.

There are other reflections of a more practical nature, and of higherimportance, to which this subject leads.

I believe it will be allowed by every man, that our happiness or miseryin life, that our improvement in any art or science which we profess, andthat our improvement in real virtue and goodness, depend in a verygreat degree on the train of thinking, that occupies the mind both in ourvacant and in our more serious hours. As far therefore as the directionof our thoughts is in our power, (and that it is so in a great measure,cannot be doubted) it is of the last importance to give them that direc-tion which is most subservient to those valuable purposes.

What employment can he have worthy of a man, whose imagination isoccupied only about things low and base, and grovels in a narrow fieldof mean unanimating and uninteresting objects, insensible to those finer

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and more delicate sentiments, and blind to those more enlarged andnobler views which elevate the soul, and make it conscious of its dignity.

How different from him, whose imagination, like an eagle in herflight, takes a wide prospect, and observes whatever it presents, that isnew or beautiful, grand or important; whose rapid wing varies the sceneevery moment, carrying him sometimes through the fairy regions of witand fancy, sometimes through the more regular and sober walks of sci-ence and philosophy.

The various objects which he surveys, according to their differentdegrees of beauty and dignity, raise in him the lively and agreeable emo-tions of taste. Illustrious human characters, as they pass in review,clothed with their moral qualities, touch his heart still more deeply.They not only awaken the sense of beauty, but excite the sentiment ofapprobation, and kindle the glow of virtue.

While he views what is truly great and glorious in human conduct, hissoul catches the divine flame, and burns with desire to emulate what itadmires.

The human imagination is an ample theatre, upon which every thingin human life, good or bad, great or mean, laudable or base, is acted.

In children, and in some frivolous minds, it is a mere toy-shop. And insome, who exercise their memory without their judgment, its furniture ismade up of old scraps of knowledge, that are thread-bare and worn out.

In some, this theatre is often occupied by ghastly superstition, with allher train of Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimeras dire. Sometimes it ishaunted with all the infernal demons, and made the forge of plots, andrapine, and murder. Here every thing that is black and detestable is firstcontrived, and a thousand wicked designs conceived that are never exe-cuted. Here, too, the Furies act their part, taking a severe though secretvengeance upon the self-condemned criminal.

How happy is that mind, in which the light of real knowledge dispelsthe phantoms of superstition: In which the belief and reverence of a per-fect all-governing Mind casts out all fear but the fear of acting wrong: Inwhich serenity and cheerfulness, innocence, humanity, and candour,guard the imagination against the entrance of every unhallowed intrud-er, and invite more amiable and worthier guests to dwell!

There shall the Muses, the Graces, and the Virtues, fix their abode; forevery thing that is great and worthy in human conduct must have beenconceived in the imagination before it was brought into act. And manygreat and good designs have been formed there, which, for want ofpower and opportunity, have proved abortive.

The man, whose imagination is occupied by these guests, must bewise; he must be good; and he must be happy.

...

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7 [Treatise, 1.1.7.]

ESSAY V.OF ABSTRACTION.

CHAP. VI.

Opinions of Philosophers about Universals.

...5. Having considered the sentiments of Bishop BERKELEY on this sub-

ject, let us next attend to those of Mr HUME, as they are expressed, partI. sect. 7. Treatise of Human Nature. He agrees perfectly with theBishop,

“That all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to acertain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, andmakes them recal upon occasion other individuals which are similar tothem. A particular idea becomes general, by being annexed to a gener-al term; that is, to a term, which, from a customary conjunction, has arelation to many other particular ideas, and readily recals them in theimagination. Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual,however they may become general in their representation. The imagein the mind is only that of a particular object, though the applicationof it in our reasoning be the same as if it was universal.”7

Although Mr HUME looks upon this to be one of the greatest and mostvaluable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic ofletters, it appears to be no other than the opinion of the Nominalists,about which so much dispute was held from the beginning of the twelfthcentury down to the reformation, and which was afterwards supportedby Mr HOBBES. I shall briefly consider the arguments, by which MrHUME hopes to have put it beyond all doubt and controversy.

First, He endeavours to prove, by three arguments, that it is utterlyimpossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precisenotion of its degrees.

This is indeed a great undertaking; but if he could prove it, it is notsufficient for his purpose; for two reasons.

First, Because there are many attributes of things, besides quantity andquality; and it is incumbent upon him to prove, that it is impossible toconceive any attribute, without forming a precise notion of its degree.Each of the ten categories of ARISTOTLE is a genus, and may be an

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attribute: And if he should prove of two of them, to wit, quantity andquality, that there can be no general conception of them; there remaineight behind, of which this must be proved.

The other reason is, because, though it were impossible to conceive anyquantity or quality, without forming a precise notion of its degree, it doesnot follow that it is impossible to have a general conception even ofquantity and quality. The conception of a pound troy is the conception ofa quantity, and of the precise degree of that quantity; but it is an abstractgeneral conception notwithstanding, because it may be the attribute ofmany individual bodies, and of many kinds of bodies. He ought thereforeto have proved, that we cannot conceive quantity or quality, or any otherattribute, without joining it inseparably to some individual subject.

This remains to be proved, which will be found no easy matter. Forinstance, I conceive what is meant by a Japanese as distinctly as what ismeant by an Englishman or a Frenchman. It is true, a Japanese is neitherquantity or quality, but it is an attribute common to every individual of apopulous nation. I never saw an individual of that nation, and, if I cantrust my consciousness, the general term does not lead me to imagine oneindividual of the sort as a representative of all others.

Though Mr HUME, therefore, undertakes much, yet, if he could proveall he undertakes to prove, it would by no means be sufficient to shewthat we have no abstract general conceptions.

Passing this, let us attend to his arguments for proving this extraordi-nary position, that it is impossible to conceive any quantity or quality,without forming a precise notion of its degree.

The first argument is, that it is impossible to distinguish things that arenot actually separable. “The precise length of a line is not different ordistinguishable from the line.”

I have before endeavoured to shew, that things inseparable in theirnature may be distinguished in our conception. And we need go no far-ther to be convinced of this, than the instance here brought to prove thecontrary. The precise length of a line, he says, is not distinguishable fromthe line. When I say, this is a line, I say and mean one thing. When I sayit is a line of three inches, I say and mean another thing. If this be not todistinguish the precise length of the line from the line, I know not what itis to distinguish.

Second argument. “Every object of sense, that is, every impression, isan individual, having its determinate degrees of quantity and quality: Butwhatever is true of the impression is true of the idea, as they differ innothing but their strength and vivacity.”

The conclusion in this argument is indeed justly drawn from thepremises. If it be true that ideas differ in nothing from objects of sensebut in strength and vivacity, as it must be granted that all the objects of

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sense are individuals, it will certainly follow that all ideas are individuals.Granting therefore the justness of this conclusion, I beg leave to drawtwo other conclusions from the same premises, which will follow no lessnecessarily.

First, If ideas differ from the objects of sense only in strength andvivacity, it will follow, that the idea of a lion is a lion of less strength andvivacity. And hence may arise a very important question, Whether theidea of a lion may not tear in pieces, and devour the ideas of sheep, oxen,and horses, and even of men, women, and children?

Secondly, If ideas differ only in strength and vivacity from the objectsof sense, it will follow, that objects, merely conceived, are not ideas; forsuch objects differ from the objects of sense in respects of a very differentnature from strength and vivacity. Every object of sense must have a realexistence, and time and place: But things merely conceived may neitherhave existence, nor time nor place; and therefore, though there should beno abstract ideas, it does not follow, that things abstract and general maynot be conceived.

The third argument is this:

“It is a principle generally received in philosophy, that every thing innature is individual; and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a trianglereally existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. Ifthis, therefore, be absurd in fact and reality, it must be absurd in idea,since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurdor impossible.”

I acknowledge it to be impossible, that a triangle should really existwhich has no precise proportion of sides and angles; and impossible thatany being should exist which is not an individual being; for, I think, abeing and an individual being mean the same thing: But that there can beno attributes common to many individuals, I do not acknowledge. Thus,to many figures that really exist, it may be common that they are trian-gles; and to many bodies that exist, it may be common that they are fluid.Triangle and fluid are not beings, they are attributes of beings.

As to the principle here assumed, that nothing of which we can form aclear and distinct idea is absurd or impossible, I refer to what was saidupon it, chap. 3. Essay 4. It is evident, that in every mathematical demon-stration, ad absurdum, of which kind almost one half of mathematicsconsists, we are required to suppose, and consequently to conceive athing that is impossible. From that supposition we reason, until we cometo a conclusion that is not only impossible but absurd. From this weinfer, that the proposition supposed at first is impossible, and thereforethat its contradictory is true.

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As this is the nature of all demonstrations, ad absurdum, it is evident,(I do not say that we can have a clear and distinct idea,) but that we canclearly and distinctly conceive things impossible.

The rest of Mr HUME’s discourse upon this subject is employed inexplaining how an individual idea, annexed to a general term, may serveall the purposes in reasoning, which have been ascribed to abstract gen-eral ideas.

“When we have found a resemblance among several objects thatoften occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whateverdifferences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quali-ty, and whatever other differences may appear among them. After wehave acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing of that name revivesthe idea of one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceiveit, with all its circumstances and proportions.”8

But along with this idea, there is a readiness to survey any other of theindividuals to which the name belongs, and to observe, that no conclu-sion be formed contrary to any of them. If any such conclusion isformed, those individual ideas which contradict it, immediately crowd inupon us, and make us perceive the falsehood of the proposition. If themind suggest not always these ideas upon occasion, it proceeds fromsome imperfection in its faculties; and such a one as is often the sourceof false reasoning and sophistry.

This is in substance the way in which he accounts for what he calls“the foregoing paradox, that some ideas are particular in their nature,but general in their representation.” Upon this account I shall makesome remarks.

I. He allows that we find a resemblance among several objects, andsuch a resemblance as leads us to apply the same name to all of them.This concession is sufficient to shew that we have general conceptions.There can be no resemblance in objects that have no common attribute;and if there be attributes belonging in common to several objects, and inman a faculty to observe and conceive these, and to give names to them,this is to have general conceptions.

I believe indeed we may have an indistinct perception of resemblance,without knowing wherein it lies. Thus, I may see a resemblance betweenone face and another, when I cannot distinctly say in what feature theyresemble: But by analysing the two faces, and comparing feature withfeature, I may form a distinct notion of that which is common to both.A painter, being accustomed to an analysis of this kind, would have

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formed a distinct notion of this resemblance at first sight; to anotherman it may require some attention.

There is therefore an indistinct notion of resemblance when we comparethe objects only in gross; and this I believe brute animals may have. Thereis also a distinct notion of resemblance, when we analyse the objects intotheir different attributes, and perceive them to agree in some, while theydiffer in others. It is in this case only that we give a name to the attributeswherein they agree, which must be a common name, because the thingsignified by it is common. Thus, when I compare cubes of different mat-ter, I perceive them to have this attribute in common, that they are com-prehended under six equal squares; and this attribute only, is signified byapplying the name of cube to them all. When I compare clean linen withsnow, I perceive them to agree in colour; and when I apply the name ofwhite to both, this name signifies neither snow nor clean linen, but theattribute which is common to both.

2. The author says, that when we have found a resemblance among sev-eral objects, we apply the same name to all of them.

It must here be observed, that there are two kinds of names which theauthor seems to confound, though they are very different in nature, and inthe power they have in language. There are proper names, and there arecommon names or appellatives. The first are the names of individuals. Thesame proper name is never applied to several individuals on account oftheir similitude, because the very intention of a proper name is to distin-guish one individual from all others; and hence it is a maxim in grammar,that proper names have no plural number. A proper name signifies noth-ing but the individual whose name it is; and when we apply it to the indi-vidual, we neither affirm nor deny any thing concerning him.

A common name or appellative is not the name of any individual, but ageneral term, signifying something that is or may be common to severalindividuals. Common names therefore signify common attributes. Thus,when I apply the name of son or brother to several persons, this signifiesand affirms that this attribute is common to all of them.

From this it is evident, that the applying the same name to several indi-viduals, on account of their resemblance, can, in consistence with gram-mar and common sense, mean nothing else than the expressing by a gen-eral term something that is common to those individuals, and whichtherefore may be truly affirmed of them all.

3. The author says, “It is certain that we form the idea of individuals,whenever we use any general term. The word raises up an individual idea,and makes the imagination conceive it, with all its particular circum-stances and proportions.”

This fact he takes a great deal of pains to account for, from the effect ofcustom.

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But the fact should be ascertained before we take pains to account forit. I can see no reason to believe the fact; and I think a farmer can talk ofhis sheep, and his black cattle, without conceiving, in his imagination oneindividual, with all its circumstances and proportions. If this be true, thewhole of his theory of general ideas falls to the ground. To me it appears,that when a general term is well understood, it is only by accident if itsuggest some individual of the kind; but this effect is by no means con-stant.

I understand perfectly what Mathematicians call a line of the fifth order;yet I never conceived in my imagination any one of the kind in all its cir-cumstances and proportions. Sir ISAAC NEWTON first formed a distinctgeneral conception of lines of the third order; and afterwards, by greatlabour and deep penetration, found out and described the particularspecies comprehended under that general term. According to Mr HUME’stheory, he must first have been acquainted with the particulars, and thenhave learned by custom to apply one general name to all of them.

The author observes, “That the idea of an equilateral triangle of an inchperpendicular, may serve us in talking of a figure, a rectilinear figure, aregular figure, a triangle, and an equilateral triangle.”

I answer, The man that uses these general terms, either understandstheir meaning, or he does not. If he does not understand their meaning, allhis talk about them will be found only without sense, and the particularidea mentioned cannot enable him to speak of them with understanding.If he understands the meaning of the general terms, he will find no use forthe particular idea.

4. He tells us gravely, “That in a globe of white marble the figure andthe colour are undistinguishable, and are in effect the same.” How foolishhave mankind been to give different names, in all ages and in all lan-guages, to things undistinguishable, and in effect the same? Henceforth, inall books of science and of entertainment, we may substitute figure forcolour, and colour for figure. By this we shall make numberless curiousdiscoveries, without danger of error.

...

ESSAY VI.OF JUDGMENT.

CHAP. V.The First Principles of Contingent Truths.

...As the minds of men are occupied much more about truths that are

contingent than about those that are necessary, I shall first endeavour topoint out the principles of the former kind.

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1. First, then, I hold, as a first principle, the existence of every thing ofwhich I am conscious.

Consciousness is an operation of the understanding of its own kind,and cannot be logically defined. The objects of it are our present pains,our pleasures, our hopes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, ourthoughts of every kind; in a word, all the passions, and all the actionsand operations of our own minds, while they are present. We mayremember them when they are past; but we are conscious of them onlywhile they are present.

When a man is conscious of pain, he is certain of its existence; whenhe is conscious that he doubts, or believes, he is certain of the existenceof those operations.

But the irresistible conviction he has of the reality of those operationsis not the effect of reasoning; it is immediate and intuitive. The existencetherefore of those passions and operations of our minds, of which weare conscious, is a first principle, which Nature requires us to believeupon her authority.

If I am asked to prove that I cannot be deceived by consciousness; toprove that it is not a fallacious sense; I can find no proof. I cannot findany antecedent truth from which it is deduced, or upon which its evi-dence depends. It seems to disdain any such derived authority, and toclaim my assent in its own right.

If any man could be found so frantic as to deny that he thinks, whilehe is conscious of it; I may wonder, I may laugh, or I may pity him, but Icannot reason the matter with him. We have no common principlesfrom which we may reason, and therefore can never join issue in anargument.

This, I think, is the only principle of common sense that has neverdirectly been called in question. It seems to be so firmly rooted in theminds of men, as to retain its authority with the greatest Sceptics. MrHUME, after annihilating body and mind, time and space, action andcausation, and even his own mind, acknowledges the reality of thethoughts, sensations and passions of which he is conscious.

No Philosopher has attempted by any hypothesis to account for thisconsciousness of our own thoughts, and the certain knowledge of theirreal existence which accompanies it. By this they seem to acknowledge,that this at least is an original power of the mind; a power by which wenot only have ideas, but original judgments, and the knowledge of realexistence.

I cannot reconcile this immediate knowledge of the operations of ourown minds with Mr LOCKE’s theory, that all knowledge consists in per-ceiving the agreement and disagreement of ideas. What are the ideas,from whose comparison the knowledge of our own thoughts results? Or

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what are the agreements or disagreements which convince a man that heis in pain when he feels it?

Neither can I reconcile it with Mr HUME’s theory, that to believe theexistence of any thing, is nothing else than to have a strong and livelyconception of it; or, at most, that belief is only some modification of theidea which is the object of belief. For not to mention, that propositions,not ideas, are the object of belief; in all that variety of thoughts and pas-sions, of which we are conscious, we believe the existence of the weak aswell as of the strong, the faint as well as the lively. No modification ofthe operations of our minds disposes us to the least doubt of their realexistence.

As therefore the real existence of our thoughts, and of all the opera-tions and feelings of our own minds, is believed by all men; as we findourselves incapable of doubting it, and as incapable of offering anyproof of it, it may justly be considered as a first principle, or dictate ofcommon sense.

But although this principle rests upon no other, a very considerableand important branch of human knowledge rests upon it.

For from this source of consciousness is derived all that we know, andindeed all that we can know, of the structure, and of the powers of ourown minds; from which we may conclude, that there is no branch ofknowledge that stands upon a firmer foundation; for surely no kind ofevidence can go beyond that of consciousness.

How does it come to pass then, that in this branch of knowledge thereare so many and so contrary systems? so many subtile controversies thatare never brought to an issue, and so little fixed and determined? Is itpossible that Philosophers should differ most where they have the surestmeans of agreement? where every thing is built upon a species of evi-dence which all men acquiesce in, and hold to be the most certain?

This strange phænomenon may, I think, be accounted for, if we distin-guish between consciousness and reflection, which are often improperlyconfounded.

The first is common to all men at all times, but is insufficient of itselfto give us clear and distinct notions of the operations of which we areconscious, and of their mutual relations, and minute distinctions. Thesecond, to wit, attentive reflection upon those operations, makingthem objects of thought, surveying them attentively, and examiningthem on all sides, is so far from being common to all men, that it is thelot of very few. The greatest part of men, either through want ofcapacity, or from other causes, never reflect attentively upon the oper-ations of their own minds. The habit of this reflection, even in thosewhom Nature has fitted for it, is not to be attained without muchpains and practice.

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We can know nothing of the immediate objects of sight, but by thetestimony of our eyes; and I apprehend, that if mankind had found asgreat difficulty in giving attention to the objects of sight, as they find inattentive reflection upon the operations of their own minds, our knowl-edge of the first might have been in as backward a state as our knowl-edge of the last.

But this darkness will not last for ever. Light will arise upon thisbenighted part of the intellectual globe. When any man is so happy as todelineate the powers of the human mind as they really are in nature,men that are free from prejudice, and capable of reflection, will recog-nise their own features in the picture; and then the wonder will be, howthings so obvious could be so long wrapped up in mystery and darkness;how men could be carried away by false theories and conjectures, whenthe truth was to be found in their own breasts if they had but attendedto it.

2. Another first principle, I think, is, That the thoughts of which I amconscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, myperson.

The thoughts and feelings of which we are conscious are continuallychanging, and the thought of this moment is not the thought of the last;but something which I call myself, remains under this change ofthought. This self has the same relation to all the successive thoughts Iam conscious of, they are all my thoughts; and every thought which isnot my thought, must be the thought of some other person.

If any man asks a proof of this, I confess I can give none; there is anevidence in the proposition itself which I am unable to resist. Shall Ithink, that thought can stand by itself without a thinking being? or thatideas can feel pleasure or pain? My nature dictates to me that it isimpossible.

And that Nature has dictated the same to all men, appears from thestructure of all languages: For in all languages men have expressed think-ing, reasoning, willing, loving, hating, by personal verbs, which from theirnature require a person who thinks, reasons, wills, loves, or hates. Fromwhich it appears, that men have been taught by Nature to believe thatthought requires a thinker, reason a reasoner, and love a lover.

Here we must leave Mr HUME, who conceives it to be a vulgar error,that besides the thoughts we are conscious of, there is a mind which isthe subject of those thoughts. If the mind be any thing else than impres-sions and ideas, it must be a word without a meaning. The mind there-fore, according to this Philosopher, is a word which signifies a bundle ofperceptions; or, when he defines it more accurately, “It is that successionof related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memoryand consciousness.”

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I am, therefore, that succession of related ideas and impressions ofwhich I have the intimate memory and consciousness.

But who is the I that has this memory and consciousness of a succes-sion of ideas and impressions? Why, it is nothing but that successionitself.

Hence I learn, that this succession of ideas and impressions intimatelyremembers, and is conscious of itself. I would wish to be fartherinstructed, whether the impressions remember and are conscious of theideas, or the ideas remember and are conscious of the impressions, or ifboth remember and are conscious of both? and whether the ideasremember those that come after them, as well as those that were beforethem? These are questions naturally arising from this system, that havenot yet been explained.

This, however, is clear, that this succession of ideas and impressions,not only remembers and is conscious, but that it judges, reasons, affirms,denies; nay, that it eats and drinks, and is sometimes merry, and some-times sad.

If these things can be ascribed to a succession of ideas and impres-sions, in a consistency with common sense, I should be very glad toknow what is nonsense.

The scholastic Philosophers have been wittily ridiculed, by represent-ing them as disputing upon this question, Num chimæra bombinans invacuo possit comedere secundas intentiones? and I believe the wit ofman cannot invent a more ridiculous question. But, if Mr HUME’s philosophy be admitted, this question deserves to be treated more grave-ly: For if, as we learn from this philosophy, a succession of ideas andimpressions may eat, and drink, and be merry, I see no good reason whya chimera, which if not the same, is of kin to an idea, may not chew thecud upon that kind of food, which the schoolmen call second intentions.

...

C H A P. VI.First Principles of necessary Truths.

About most of the first principles of necessary truths there has been nodispute, and therefore it is the less necessary to dwell upon them. It willbe sufficient to divide them into different classes; to mention some, byway of specimen, in each class; and to make some remarks on those ofwhich the truth has been called in question.

They may, I think, most properly be divided according to the sciencesto which they belong.

1. There are some first principles that may be called grammatical; suchas, that every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive

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expressed or understood; that every complete sentence must have a verb.Those who have attended to the structure of language, and formed

distinct notions of the nature and use of the various parts of speech, per-ceive, without reasoning, that these, and many other such principles, arenecessarily true.

2. There are logical axioms; such as, that any contexture of wordswhich does not make a proposition, is neither true nor false; that everyproposition is either true or false; that no proposition can be both trueand false at the same time; that reasoning in a circle proves nothing; thatwhatever may be truly affirmed of a genus, may be truly affirmed of allthe species, and all the individuals belonging to that genus.

3. Every one knows that there are mathematical axioms. Mathema-ticians have, from the days of EUCLID, very wisely laid down the axiomsor first principles on which they reason. And the effect which thisappears to have had upon the stability and happy progress of this sci-ence, gives no small encouragement to attempt to lay the foundation ofother sciences in a similar manner, as far as we are able.

Mr HUME hath discovered, as he apprehends, a weak side, even inmathematical axioms; and thinks, that it is not strictly true, for instance,that two right lines can cut one another in one point only.

The principle he reasons from is, That every simple idea is a copy of apreceding impression; and therefore, in its precision and accuracy, cannever go beyond its original. From which he reasons in this manner: Noman ever saw or felt a line so straight, that it might not cut another,equally straight, in two or more points. Therefore there can be no idea ofsuch a line.

The ideas that are most essential to geometry, such as, those of equality,of a straight line, and of a square surface, are far, he says, from being dis-tinct and determinate; and the definitions destroy the pretended demon-strations. Thus, mathematical demonstration is found to be a rope of sand.

I agree with this acute author, that, if we could form no notion ofpoints, lines, and surfaces, more accurate than those we see and handle,there could be no mathematical demonstration.

But every man that has understanding, by analysing, by abstracting, andcompounding the rude materials exhibited by his senses, can fabricate, inhis own mind, those elegant and accurate forms of mathematical lines,surfaces, and solids.

If a man finds himself incapable of forming a precise and determinatenotion of the figure which Mathematicians call a cube, he not only is noMathematician, but is incapable of being one. But, if he has a precise anddeterminate notion of that figure, he must perceive, that it is terminatedby six mathematical surfaces, perfectly square, and perfectly equal. Hemust perceive, that these surfaces are terminated by twelve mathematical

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lines, perfectly straight, and perfectly equal, and that those lines are termi-nated by eight mathematical points.

When a man is conscious of having these conceptions distinct and deter-minate, as every Mathematician is, it is in vain to bring metaphysicalarguments to convince him that they are not distinct. You may as wellbring arguments to convince a man racked with pain, that he feels nopain.

Every theory that is inconsistent with our having accurate notions ofmathematical lines, surfaces, and solids, must be false. Therefore it fol-lows, that they are not copies of our impressions.

The Medicean Venus is not a copy of the block of marble from which itwas made. It is true, that the elegant statue was formed out of the rudeblock, and that too by a manual operation, which, in a literal sense, wemay call abstraction. Mathematical notions are formed in the understand-ing by an abstraction of another kind, out of the rude perceptions of oursenses.

As the truths of natural philosophy are not necessary truths, but contin-gent, depending upon the will of the Maker of the world, the principlesfrom which they are deduced must be of the same nature, and thereforebelong not to this class.

4. I think there are axioms, even in matters of taste. Notwithstandingthe variety found among men, in taste, there are, I apprehend, some com-mon principles, even in matters of this kind. I never heard of any manwho thought it a beauty in a human face to want a nose, or an eye, or tohave the mouth on one side. How many ages have passed since the daysof HOMER! Yet, in this long tract of ages, there never was found a manwho took THERSITES for a beauty.

The fine arts are very properly called the arts of taste, because the prin-ciples of both are the same; and in the fine arts, we find no less agreementamong those who practise them than among other artists.

No work of taste can be either relished or understood by those who donot agree with the author in the principles of taste.

HOMER, and VIRGIL, and SHAKESPEARE, and MILTON, had the sametaste; and all men who have been acquainted with their writings, andagree in the admiration of them, must have the same taste.

The fundamental rules of poetry and music and painting, and dramaticaction and eloquence, have been always the same, and will be so to theend of the world.

The variety we find among men in matters of taste is easily accountedfor, consistently with what we have advanced.

There is a taste that is acquired, and a taste that is natural. This holdswith respect both to the external sense of taste and the internal. Habit andfashion have a powerful influence upon both.

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Of tastes that are natural, there are some that may be called rational,others that are merely animal.

Children are delighted with brilliant and gaudy colours, with rompingand noisy mirth, with feats of agility, strength, or cunning; and savageshave much the same taste as children.

But there are tastes that are more intellectual. It is the dictate of ourrational nature, that love and admiration are misplaced when there is nointrinsic worth in the object.

In those operations of taste which are rational, we judge of the realworth and excellence of the object, and our love or admiration is guidedby that judgment. In such operations there is judgment as well as feeling,and the feeling depends upon the judgment we form of the object.

I do not maintain that taste, so far as it is acquired, or so far as it ismerely animal, can be reduced to principles. But as far as it is foundedon judgment, it certainly may.

The virtues, the graces, the muses, have a beauty that is intrinsic. Itlies not in the feelings of the spectator, but in the real excellence of theobject. If we do not perceive their beauty, it is owing to the defect or tothe perversion of our faculties.

And as there is an original beauty in certain moral and intellectualqualities, so there is a borrowed and derived beauty in the natural signsand expressions of such qualities.

The features of the human face, the modulations of the voice, and theproportions, attitudes, and gesture of the body, are all natural expres-sions of good or bad qualities of the person, and derive a beauty or adeformity from the qualities which they express.

Works of art express some quality of the artist, and often derive anadditional beauty from their utility or fitness for their end.

Of such things there are some that ought to please, and others thatought to displease. If they do not, it is owing to some defect in the spec-tator. But what has real excellence will always please those who have acorrect judgment and a sound heart.

The sum of what has been said upon this subject is, that, setting asidethe tastes which men acquire by habit and fashion, there is a naturaltaste, which is partly animal, and partly rational. With regard to thefirst, all we can say is, that the Author of Nature, for wise reasons, hasformed us so as to receive pleasure from the contemplation of certainobjects, and disgust from others, before we are capable of perceiving anyreal excellence in one, or defect in the other. But that taste which wemay call rational, is that part of our constitution by which we are madeto receive pleasure from the contemplation of what we conceive to beexcellent in its kind, the pleasure being annexed to this judgment, andregulated by it. This taste may be true or false, according as it is founded

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on a true or false judgment. And if it may be true or false, it must have firstprinciples.

5. There are also first principles in morals.That an unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one: That

a generous action has more merit than a merely just one: That no manought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder: That weought not to do to others what we would think unjust or unfair to bedone to us in like circumstances: These are moral axioms, and manyothers might be named which appear to me to have no less evidencethan those of mathematics.

Some perhaps may think, that our determinations, either in matters oftaste or in morals, ought not to be accounted necessary truths: That theyare grounded upon the constitution of that faculty which we call taste, andof that which we call the moral sense or conscience; which faculties mighthave been so constituted as to have given determinations different, or evencontrary to those they now give: That as there is nothing sweet or bitter initself, but according as it agrees or disagrees with the external sense calledtaste; so there is nothing beautiful or ugly in itself, but according as itagrees or disagrees with the internal sense, which we also call taste; andnothing morally good or ill in itself, but according as it agrees or disagreeswith our moral sense.

This indeed is a system, with regard to morals and taste, which hathbeen supported in modern times by great authorities.9 And if this system betrue, the consequence must be, that there can be no principles, either oftaste or of morals, that are necessary truths. For, according to this system,all our determinations, both with regard to matters of taste, and withregard to morals, are reduced to matters of fact. I mean to such as these,that by our constitution we have on such occasions certain agreeable feel-ings, and on other occasions certain disagreeable feelings.

But I cannot help being of a contrary opinion, being persuaded, that aman who determined that polite behaviour has great deformity, and thatthere is great beauty in rudeness and ill breeding, would judge wrongwhatever his feelings were.

In like manner, I cannot help thinking, that a man who determined thatthere is more moral worth in cruelty, perfidy, and injustice, than in gen-erosity, justice, prudence, and temperance, would judge wrong whateverhis constitution was.

And if it be true that there is judgment in our determinations of taste andof morals, it must be granted, that what is true or false in morals, or inmatters of taste, is necessarily so. For this reason, I have ranked the firstprinciples of morals and of taste under the class of necessary truths.

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6. The last class of first principles I shall mention, we may call meta-physical.

I shall particularly consider three of these, because they have beencalled in question by Mr HUME.

The first is, That the qualities which we perceive by our senses musthave a subject, which we call body, and that the thoughts we are con-scious of must have a subject, which we call mind.

It is not more evident that two and two make four, than it is that fig-ure cannot exist, unless there be something that is figured, nor motionwithout something that is moved. I not only perceive figure and motion,but I perceive them to be qualities: They have a necessary relation tosomething in which they exist as their subject. The difficulty which somePhilosophers have found in admitting this, is entirely owing to the theo-ry of ideas. A subject of the sensible qualities which we perceive by oursenses, is not an idea either of sensation or of consciousness; thereforesay they, we have no such idea. Or, in the style of Mr HUME, from whatimpression is the idea of substance derived? It is not a copy of anyimpression; therefore there is no such idea.

The distinction between sensible qualities, and the substance to whichthey belong, and between thought, and the mind that thinks, is not theinvention of Philosophers; it is found in the structure of all languages,and therefore must be common to all men who speak with understand-ing. And I believe no man, however sceptical he may be in speculation,can talk on the common affairs of life for half an hour, without sayingthings that imply his belief of the reality of these distinctions.

Mr LOCKE acknowledges, “That we cannot conceive how simple ideasof sensible qualities should subsist alone; and therefore we suppose themto exist in, and to be supported by, some common subject.” In his Essay,indeed, some of his expressions seem to leave it dubious, whether thisbelief, that sensible qualities must have a subject, be a true judgment, ora vulgar prejudice. But in his first letter to the Bishop of WORCESTER, heremoves this doubt, and quotes many passages of his Essay, to shew thathe neither denied, nor doubted of the existence of substances, boththinking and material; and that he believed their existence on the sameground the Bishop did, to wit, “on the repugnancy to our conceptions,that modes and accidents should subsist by themselves.” He offers noproof of this repugnancy; nor, I think, can any proof of it be given,because it is a first principle.

It were to be wished that Mr LOCKE, who enquired so accurately andso laudably into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge,had turned his attention more particularly to the origin of these twoopinions which he firmly believed; to wit, that sensible qualities musthave a subject which we call body, and that thought must have a subject

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which we call mind. A due attention to these two opinions which governthe belief of all men, even of Sceptics in the practice of life, would prob-ably have led him to perceive, that sensation and consciousness are notthe only sources of human knowledge; and that there are principles ofbelief in human nature, of which we can give no other account but thatthey necessarily result from the constitution of our faculties; and that ifit were in our power to throw off their influence upon our practice andconduct, we could neither speak nor act like reasonable men.

We cannot give a reason why we believe even our sensations to be realand not fallacious; why we believe what we are conscious of; why wetrust any of our natural faculties. We say, it must be so, it cannot beotherwise. This expresses only a strong belief, which is indeed the voiceof Nature, and which therefore in vain we attempt to resist. But if, inspite of Nature, we resolve to go deeper, and not to trust our faculties,without a reason to shew that they cannot be fallacious, I am afraid,that seeking to become wise, and to be as gods, we shall become foolish,and being unsatisfied with the lot of humanity, we shall throw off com-mon sense.

The second metaphysical principle I mention is, That whatever beginsto exist, must have a cause which produced it.

Philosophy is indebted to Mr HUME in this respect among others, that,by calling in question many of the first principles of human knowledge,he hath put speculative men upon enquiring more carefully than wasdone before, into the nature of the evidence upon which they rest. Truthcan never suffer by a fair enquiry; it can bear to be seen naked and inthe fullest light; and the strictest examination will always turn out in theissue to its advantage. I believe Mr HUME was the first who ever calledin question whether things that begin to exist must have a cause.

With regard to this point, we must hold one of these three things,either that it is an opinion, for which we have no evidence, and whichmen have foolishly taken up without ground; or, secondly, That it iscapable of direct proof by argument; or, thirdly, That it is self-evident,and needs no proof, but ought to be received as an axiom, which cannotby reasonable men be called in question.

The first of these suppositions would put an end to all philosophy, toall religion, to all reasoning that would carry us beyond the objects ofsense, and to all prudence in the conduct of life.

As to the second supposition, that this principle may be proved bydirect reasoning, I am afraid we shall find the proof extremely difficult,if not altogether impossible.

I know only of three or four arguments that have been urged byPhilosophers, in the way of abstract reasoning, to prove, that thingswhich begin to exist must have a cause.

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10 [Treatise, 1.3.3.]

One is offered by Mr HOBBES, another by Dr SAMUEL CLARKE, another by Mr LOCKE. Mr HUME, in his Treatise of Human Nature, hasexamined them all;10 and, in my opinion, has shewn, that they take forgranted the thing to be proved; a kind of false reasoning, which men arevery apt to fall into when they attempt to prove what is self-evident.

It has been thought, that, although this principle does not admit ofproof from abstract reasoning, it may be proved from experience, andmay be justly drawn by induction, from instances that fall within ourobservation.

I conceive this method of proof will leave us in great uncertainty, forthese three reasons:

1st, Because the proposition to be proved is not a contingent but anecessary proposition. It is not, that things which begin to exist com-monly have a cause, or even that they always in fact have a cause; butthat they must have a cause, and cannot begin to exist without a cause.

Propositions of this kind, from their nature, are incapable of proof byinduction. Experience informs us only of what is or has been, not ofwhat must be; and the conclusion must be of the same nature with thepremises.

For this reason, no mathematical proposition can be proved by induc-tion. Though it should be found by experience in a thousand cases, thatthe area of a plane triangle is equal to the rectangle under the altitudeand half the base, this would not prove that it must be so in all cases,and cannot be otherwise; which is what the Mathematician affirms.

In like manner, though we had the most ample experimental proof,that things which have begun to exist had a cause, this would not provethat they must have a cause. Experience may shew us what is the estab-lished course of nature, but can never shew what connections of thingsare in their nature necessary.

2dly, General maxims, grounded on experience, have only a degree ofprobability proportioned to the extent of our experience, and oughtalways to be understood so as to leave room for exceptions, if futureexperience shall discover any such.

The law of gravitation has as full a proof from experience and induc-tion as any principle can be supposed to have. Yet, if any Philosophershould, by clear experiment, shew that there is a kind of matter in somebodies which does not gravitate, the law of gravitation ought to be limit-ed by that exception.

Now it is evident, that men have never considered the principle of thenecessity of causes, as a truth of this kind which may admit of limitation

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or exception; and therefore it has not been received upon this kind ofevidence.

3dly, I do not see that experience could satisfy us that every change innature actually has a cause.

In the far greatest part of the changes in nature that fall within ourobservation, the causes are unknown; and therefore, from experience,we cannot know whether they have causes or not.

Causation is not an object of sense. The only experience we can haveof it, is in the consciousness we have of exerting some power in orderingour thoughts and actions. But this experience is surely too narrow afoundation for a general conclusion, that all things that have had orshall have a beginning must have a cause.

For these reasons, this principle cannot be drawn from experience anymore than from abstract reasoning.

The third supposition is, That it is to be admitted as a first or self-evi-dent principle. Two reasons may be urged for this.

Ist, The universal consent of mankind, not of Philosophers only, butof the rude and unlearned vulgar.

Mr HUME, as far as I know, was the first that ever expressed anydoubt of this principle. And when we consider that he has rejected everyprinciple of human knowledge, excepting that of consciousness, and hasnot even spared the axioms of mathematics, his authority is of smallweight.

Indeed, with regard to first principles, there is no reason why the opin-ion of a Philosopher should have more authority than that of anotherman of common sense, who has been accustomed to judge in such cases.The illiterate vulgar are competent judges; and the Philosopher has noprerogative in matters of this kind; but he is more liable than they to bemisled by a favourite system, especially if it is his own.

Setting aside the authority of Mr HUME, what has philosophy beenemployed in, since men first began to philosophise, but in the investiga-tion of the causes of things? This it has always professed, when we traceit to its cradle. It never entered into any man’s thought, before thePhilosopher we have mentioned, to put the previous question, whetherthings have a cause or not? Had it been thought possible that they mightnot, it may be presumed, that, in the variety of absurd and contradictorycauses assigned, some one would have had recourse to this hypothesis.

They could conceive the world to arise from an egg, from a strugglebetween love and strife, between moisture and drought, between heatand cold; but they never supposed that it had no cause. We know notany Atheistic sect that ever had recourse to this topic, though by it theymight have evaded every argument that could be brought against them,and answered all objections to their system.

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11 [Treatise, 1.3.3.]

But rather than adopt such an absurdity, they contrived some imagi-nary cause; such as chance, a concourse of atoms, or necessity, as thecause of the universe.

The accounts which Philosophers have given of particular phænome-na, as well as of the universe in general, proceed upon the same princi-ple. That every phænomenon must have a cause, was always taken forgranted. Nil turpius physico, says CICERO, quam fieri sine causa quic-quam dicere. Though an Academic, he was dogmatical in this. AndPLATO, the Father of the academy, was no less so. “P£nti g¢r ¢dÚnatoncwrˆj a„t…ou g7nesin ™ce‹n. TIMÆUS.” It is impossible that any thingshould have its origin without a cause.

I believe Mr HUME was the first who ever held the contrary. This,indeed, he avows, and assumes the honour of the discovery.

“It is, says he, a maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist,must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for granted inall reasonings, without any proof given or demanded. It is supposed tobe founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims, which,though they may be denied with the lips, it is impossible for men intheir hearts really to doubt of. But, if we examine this maxim by theidea of knowledge, above explained, we shall discover in it no mark ofsuch intuitive certainty.”11

The meaning of this seems to be, that it did not suit with his theory ofintuitive certainty, and therefore he excludes it from that privilege.

The vulgar adhere to this maxim as firmly and universally as thePhilosophers. Their superstitions have the same origin as the systems ofPhilosophers, to wit, a desire to know the causes of things. Felix quipotuit rerum cognoscere causas, is the universal sense of men; but to saythat any thing can happen without a cause, shocks the common sense ofa savage.

This universal belief of mankind is easily accounted for, if we allowthat the necessity of a cause of every event is obvious to the rationalpowers of a man. But it is impossible to account for it otherwise. It can-not be ascribed to education, to systems of philosophy, or to priestcraft.One would think, that a Philosopher who takes it to be a general delu-sion or prejudice, would endeavour to show from what causes in humannature such a general error may take its rise. But I forget that Mr HUME

might answer upon his own principles, that since things may happenwithout a cause, this error and delusion of men may be universal with-out any cause.

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A second reason why I conceive this to be a first principle, is, Thatmankind not only assent to it in speculation, but that the practice of lifeis grounded upon it in the most important matters, even in cases whereexperience leaves us doubtful; and it is impossible to act with commonprudence if we set it aside.

In great families there are so many bad things done by a certain per-sonage called nobody, that it is proverbial, that there is a nobody aboutevery house who does a great deal of mischief; and even where there isthe exactest inspection and government, many events will happen ofwhich no other author can be found: So that, if we trust merely to expe-rience in this matter, nobody will be found to be a very active person,and to have no inconsiderable share in the management of affairs. Butwhatever countenance this system may have from experience, it is tooshocking to common sense to impose upon the most ignorant. A childknows, that when his top, or any of his play-things are taken away, itmust be done by somebody. Perhaps it would not be difficult to per-suade him that it was done by some invisible being, but that it should bedone by nobody he cannot believe.

Suppose a man’s house to be broke open, his money and jewels takenaway. Such things have happened times innumerable without any appar-ent cause; and were he only to reason from experience in such a case,how must he behave? He must put in one scale the instances wherein acause was found of such an event, and in the other scale, the instanceswhere no cause was found, and the preponderant scale must determine,whether it be most probable that there was a cause of this event, or thatthere was none. Would any man of common understanding haverecourse to such an expedient to direct his judgment?

Suppose a man to be found dead on the highway, his skull fractured,his body pierced with deadly wounds, his watch and money carried off.The coroners jury sits upon the body, and the question is put, what wasthe cause of this man’s death, was it accident, or felo de se, or murderby persons unknown? Let us suppose an adept in Mr HUME’s philoso-phy to make one of the jury, and that he insists upon the previous ques-tion, whether there was any cause of the event, and whether it happenedwithout a cause?

Surely, upon Mr HUME’s principles, a great deal might be said uponthis point; and, if the matter is to be determined by past experience, it isdubious on which side the weight of argument might stand. But we mayventure to say, that, if Mr HUME had been of such a jury, he would havelaid aside his philosophical principles, and acted according to the dic-tates of common prudence.

Many passages might be produced, even in Mr HUME’s philosophicalwritings, in which he, unawares, betrays the same inward conviction of

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12 [Treatise, 1.3.5.]13 [In his Essay (1770), 2.2.3, Beattie uses the counterexample of night constantly

following day.]

the necessity of causes, which is common to other men. I shall mentiononly one, in the Treatise of Human Nature, and in that part of it wherehe combats this very principle.

“As to those impressions, says he, which arise from the senses, theirultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human rea-son; and it will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whetherthey arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the cre-ative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of ourbeing.”12

Among these alternatives, he never thought of their not arising fromany cause.

The arguments which Mr HUME offers to prove that this is not a self-evident principle, are three. First, That all certainty arises from a com-parison of ideas, and a discovery of their unalterable relations, none ofwhich relations imply this proposition, That whatever has a beginningmust have a cause of existence. This theory of certainty has been exam-ined before.

The second argument is, That whatever we can conceive is possible.This has likewise been examined.

The third argument is, That what we call a cause, is only somethingantecedent to, and always conjoined with the effect. This is also one ofMr HUME’s peculiar doctrines, which we may have occasion to considerafterwards. It is sufficient here to observe, that we may learn from it thatnight is the cause of day, and day the cause of night: For no two thingshave more constantly followed each other since the beginning of theworld.13

The last metaphysical principle I mention, which is opposed by thesame author, is, That design, and intelligence in the cause, may beinferred, with certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect.

Intelligence, design, and skill, are not objects of the external senses,nor can we be conscious of them in any person but ourselves. Even inourselves, we cannot, with propriety, be said to be conscious of the nat-ural or acquired talents we possess. We are conscious only of the opera-tions of mind in which they are exerted. Indeed, a man comes to knowhis own mental abilities, just as he knows another man’s, by the effectsthey produce, when there is occasion to put them to exercise.

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A man’s wisdom is known to us only by the signs of it in his conduct;his eloquence by the signs of it in his speech. In the same manner wejudge of his virtue, of his fortitude, and of all his talents and virtues.

Yet it is to be observed, that we judge of mens talents with as littledoubt or hesitation as we judge of the immediate objects of sense.

One person, we are sure, is a perfect idiot; another, who feigns idiocyto screen himself from punishment, is found upon trial to have theunderstanding of a man, and to be accountable for his conduct. We per-ceive one man to be open, another cunning; one to be ignorant, anothervery knowing; one to be slow of understanding, another quick. Everyman forms such judgments of those he converses with; and the commonaffairs of life depend upon such judgments. We can as little avoid themas we can avoid seeing what is before our eyes.

From this it appears, that it is no less a part of the human constitu-tion, to judge of mens characters, and of their intellectual powers, fromthe signs of them in their actions and discourse, than to judge of corpo-real objects by our senses: That such judgments are common to thewhole human race that are endowed with understanding; and that theyare absolutely necessary in the conduct of life.

...

ESSAY VII.OF REASONING.

C H A P. IV.Of Mr HUME’s Scepticism with regard to Reason.

In the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1. part 4. sect. 1. the authorundertakes to prove two points: First, That all that is called humanknowledge (meaning demonstrative knowledge) is only probability; and,secondly, That this probability, when duly examined, evanishes bydegrees, and leaves at last no evidence at all: So that, in the issue, thereis no ground to believe any one proposition rather than its contrary, and“all those are certainly fools who reason or believe any thing.”

According to this account, reason, that boasted prerogative of man,and the light of his mind, is an ignis fatuus, which misleads the wander-ing traveller, and leaves him at last in absolute darkness.

How unhappy is the condition of man, born under a necessity ofbelieving contradictions, and of trusting to a guide who confesses herselfto be a false one!

It is some comfort, that this doctrine can never be seriously adoptedby any man in his senses. And after this author had shown that “all therules of logic require a total extinction of all belief and evidence,” he

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himself, and all men that are not insane, must have believed manythings, and yielded assent to the evidence which he had extinguished.

This indeed he is so candid as to acknowledge. “He finds himselfabsolutely and necessarily determined, to live and talk and act like otherpeople in the common affairs of life. And since reason is incapable ofdispelling these clouds, most fortunately it happens, that Nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures him of this philosophical melancholyand delirium.” See sect. 7.

This was surely a very kind and friendly interposition of Nature; forthe effects of this philosophical delirium, if carried into life, must havebeen very melancholy.

But what pity is it, that Nature (whatever is meant by that personage),so kind in curing this delirium, should be so cruel as to cause it. Doththe same fountain send forth sweet waters and bitter? Is it not moreprobable, that if the cure was the work of Nature, the disease came fromanother hand, and was the work of the Philosopher?

To pretend to prove by reasoning that there is no force in reason, doesindeed look like a philosophical delirium. It is like a man’s pretending tosee clearly, that he himself and all other men are blind.

A common symptom of delirium is, to think that all other men arefools or mad. This appears to have been the case of our author, whoconcluded, “That all those are certainly fools who reason or believe anything.”

Whatever was the cause of this delirium, it must be granted, that if itwas real and not feigned, it was not to be cured by reasoning: For whatcan be more absurd than to attempt to convince a man by reasoningwho disowns the authority of reason. It was therefore very fortunatethat Nature found other means of curing it.

It may, however, not be improper to enquire, whether, as the authorthinks, it was produced by a just application of the rules of logic, or, asothers may be apt to think, by the misapplication and abuse of them.

First, Because we are fallible, the author infers that all knowledgedegenerates into probability.

That man, and probably every created being, is fallible; and that a fal-lible being cannot have that perfect comprehension and assurance oftruth which an infallible being has, I think ought to be granted. Itbecomes a fallible being to be modest, open to new light, and sensible,that by some false bias, or by rash judging, he may be misled. If this becalled a degree of scepticism, I cannot help approving of it, being per-suaded, that the man who makes the best use he can of the facultieswhich God has given him, without thinking them more perfect than theyreally are, may have all the belief that is necessary in the conduct of life,and all that is necessary to his acceptance with his Maker.

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14 [Treatise, 1.4.1.]

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It is granted then, that human judgments ought always to be formedwith an humble sense of our fallibility in judging.

This is all that can be inferred by the rules of logic from our being fal-lible. And if this be all that is meant by our knowledge degenerating intoprobability, I know no person of a different opinion.

But it may be observed, that the author here uses the word probabilityin the sense for which I know no authority but his own. Philosophersunderstand probability as opposed to demonstration; the vulgar asopposed to certainty; but this author understands it as opposed to infal-libility, which no man claims.

One who believes himself to be fallible may still hold it to be certainthat two and two make four, and that two contradictory propositionscannot both be true. He may believe some things to be probable only,and other things to be demonstrable, without making any pretence toinfallibility.

If we use words in their proper meaning, it is impossible that demon-stration should degenerate into probability from the imperfection of ourfaculties. Our judgment cannot change the nature of the things aboutwhich we judge. What is really demonstration, will still be so, whateverjudgment we form concerning it. It may likewise be observed, that whenwe mistake that for demonstration, which really is not, the consequenceof this mistake is, not that demonstration degenerates into probability,but that what we took to be demonstration is no proof at all; for onefalse step in a demonstration destroys the whole, but cannot turn it intoanother kind of proof.

Upon the whole, then, this first conclusion of our author, That the fal-libility of human judgment turns all knowledge into probability, ifunderstood literally, is absurd; but if it be only a figure of speech, andmeans no more, but that, in all our judgments, we ought to be sensibleof our fallibility, and ought to hold our opinions with that modesty thatbecomes fallible creatures, which I take to be what the author meant,this, I think, nobody denies, nor was it necessary to enter into a labori-ous proof of it.

One is never in greater danger of transgressing against the rules oflogic, than in attempting to prove what needs no proof. Of this we havean instance in this very case: For the author begins his proof, that allhuman judgments are fallible, with affirming that some are infallible.

“In all demonstrative sciences, says he, the rules are certain and infal-lible; but when we apply them, our fallible and uncertain faculties arevery apt to depart from them, and fall into error.”14

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15 [Treatise, 1.4.1.]

He had forgot, surely, that the rules of demonstrative sciences are dis-covered by our fallible and uncertain faculties, and have no authoritybut that of human judgment. If they be infallible, some human judg-ments are infallible; and there are many in various branches of humanknowledge which have as good a claim to infallibility as the rules of thedemonstrative sciences.

We have reason here to find fault with our author for not being scepti-cal enough, as well as for a mistake in reasoning, when he claims infalli-bility to certain decisions of the human faculties, in order to prove thatall their decisions are fallible.

The second point which he attempts to prove, is, That this probability,when duly examined, suffers a continual diminution, and at last a totalextinction.

The obvious consequence of this is, that no fallible being can havegood reason to believe any thing at all; but let us hear the proof.

“In every judgment, we ought to correct the first judgment derivedfrom the nature of the object, by another judgment derived from thenature of the understanding. Beside the original uncertainty inherentin the subject, there arises another, derived from the weakness of thefaculty which judges. Having adjusted these two uncertainties togeth-er, we are obliged, by our reason, to add a new uncertainty, derivedfrom the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truthand fidelity of our faculties. This is a doubt, of which, if we wouldclosely pursue our reasoning, we cannot avoid giving a decision. Butthis decision, though it should be favourable to our preceding judg-ment, being founded only on probability, must weaken still fartherour first evidence. The third uncertainty must in like manner be criti-cised by a fourth, and so on without end.

Now, as every one of these uncertainties takes away a part of theoriginal evidence, it must at last be reduced to nothing. Let our firstbelief be ever so strong, it must infallibly perish, by passing through somany examinations, each of which carries off somewhat of its forceand vigour. No finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated ininfinitum.

When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have lessconfidence in my opinions, than when I only consider the objects con-cerning which I reason. And when I proceed still farther, to turn thescrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, allthe rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a totalextinction of belief and evidence.”15

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16 [i.e., Zeno of Elea (fl. 450 BCE).]

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This is the author’s Achillean argument against the evidence of reason,from which he concludes, that a man who would govern his belief byreason, must believe nothing at all, and that belief is an act, not of thecogitative, but of the sensitive part of our nature.

If there be any such thing as motion, (said an ancient Sceptic)16 theswift-footed ACHILLES could never overtake an old man in a journey.For, suppose the old man to set out a thousand paces before ACHILLES,and that while ACHILLES has travelled the thousand paces, the old manhas gone five hundred; when ACHILLES has gone the five hundred, theold man has gone two hundred and fifty; and when ACHILLES has gonethe two hundred and fifty, the old man is still one hundred and twenty-five before him. Repeat these estimations in infinitum, and you will stillfind the old man foremost; therefore ACHILLES can never overtake him;therefore there can be no such thing as motion.

The reasoning of the modern Sceptic against reason is equally inge-nious, and equally convincing. Indeed, they have a great similarity.

If we trace the journey of ACHILLES two thousand paces, we shall findthe very point where the old man is overtaken: But this short journey, bydividing it into an infinite number of stages, with corresponding estima-tions, is made to appear infinite. In like manner, our author, subjectingevery judgment to an infinite number of successive probable estimations,reduces the evidence to nothing.

To return then to the argument of the modern Sceptic. I examine theproof of a theorem of EUCLID. It appears to me to be strict demonstra-tion. But I may have overlooked some fallacy; therefore I examine itagain and again, but can find no flaw in it. I find all that have examinedit agree with me. I have now that evidence of the truth of the proposi-tion, which I and all men call demonstration, and that belief of it, whichwe call certainty.

Here my sceptical friend interposes, and assures me, that the rules oflogic reduce this demonstration to no evidence at all. I am willing tohear what step in it he thinks fallacious, and why. He makes no objec-tion to any part of the demonstration, but pleads my fallibility in judg-ing. I have made the proper allowance for this already, by being open toconviction. But, says he, there are two uncertainties, the first inherent inthe subject, which I have already shown to have only probable evidence;the second arising from the weakness of the faculty that judges. Ianswer, It is the weakness of the faculty only that reduces this demon-stration to what you call probability. You must not therefore make it asecond uncertainty; for it is the same with the first. To take credit twicein an account for the same article is not agreeable to the rules of logic.

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Hitherto therefore there is but one uncertainty, to wit, my fallibility injudging.

But, says my friend, you are obliged by reason to add a new uncertain-ty, derived from the possibility of error in the estimation you make ofthe truth and fidelity of your faculties. I answer,

This estimation is ambiguously expressed; it may either mean an esti-mation of my liableness to err by the misapplication and abuse of myfaculties; or it may mean an estimation of my liableness to err, by con-ceiving my faculties to be true and faithful, while they may be false andfallacious in themselves, even when applied in the best manner. I shallconsider this estimation in each of these senses.

If the first be the estimation meant, it is true that reason directs us, asfallible creatures, to carry along with us, in all our judgments, a sense ofour fallibility. It is true also, that we are in greater danger of erring insome cases, and less in others; and that this danger of erring may,according to the circumstances of the case, admit of an estimation,which we ought likewise to carry along with us in every judgment weform.

When a demonstration is short and plain; when the point to be proveddoes not touch our interest or our passions; when the faculty of judging,in such cases, has acquired strength by much exercise, there is less dan-ger of erring; when the contrary circumstances take place, there is more.

In the present case, every circumstance is favourable to the judgment Ihave formed. There cannot be less danger of erring in any case, except-ing perhaps when I judge of a self-evident axiom.

The Sceptic farther urges, that this decision, though favourable to myfirst judgment, being founded only on probability, must still weaken theevidence of that judgment.

Here I cannot help being of a quite contrary opinion, nor can I imag-ine how an ingenious author could impose upon himself so grossly, forsurely he did not intend to impose upon his reader.

After repeated examination of a proposition of EUCLID, I judge it to bestrictly demonstrated; this is my first judgment. But as I am liable to errfrom various causes, I consider how far I may have been misled by anyof these causes in this judgment. My decision upon this second point isfavourable to my first judgment, and therefore, as I apprehend, muststrengthen it. To say, that this decision, because it is only probable, mustweaken the first evidence, seems to me contrary to all rules of logic, andto common sense.

The first judgment may be compared to the testimony of a crediblewitness; the second, after a scrutiny into the character of the witness,wipes off every objection that can be made to it, and therefore surelymust confirm and not weaken his testimony.

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But let us suppose, that, in another case, I examine my first judgmentupon some point, and find, that it was attended with unfavourable cir-cumstances, what, in reason, and according to the rules of logic, oughtto be the effect of this discovery?

The effect surely will be, and ought to be, to make me less confident inmy first judgment, until I examine the point anew in more favourablecircumstances. If it be a matter of importance I return to weigh the evi-dence of my first judgment. If it was precipitate before, it must now bedeliberate in every point. If at first I was in passion, I must now be cool.If I had an interest in the decision, I must place the interest on the otherside.

It is evident, that this review of the subject may confirm my first judg-ment, notwithstanding the suspicious circumstances that attended it.Though the judge was biassed or corrupted, it does not follow, that thesentence was unjust. The rectitude of the decision does not depend uponthe character of the judge, but upon the nature of the case. From thatonly, it must be determined whether the decision be just. The circum-stances that rendered it suspicious are mere presumptions, which haveno force against direct evidence.

Thus, I have considered the effect of this estimation of our liablenessto err in our first judgment, and have allowed to it all the effect that rea-son and the rules of logic permit. In the case I first supposed, and inevery case where we can discover no cause of error, it affords a pre-sumption in favour of the first judgment. In other cases, it may afford apresumption against it. But the rules of logic require, that we should notjudge by presumptions, where we have direct evidence. The effect of anunfavourable presumption should only be, to make us examine the evi-dence with the greater care.

The Sceptic urges, in the last place, that this estimation must be sub-jected to another estimation, that to another, and so on in infinitum; andas every new estimation takes away from the evidence of the first judg-ment, it must at last be totally annihilated.

I answer, first, it has been shown above, that the first estimation, sup-posing it unfavourable, can only afford a presumption against the firstjudgment; the second, upon the same supposition, will be only the pre-sumption of a presumption; and the third, the presumption that there isa presumption of a presumption. This infinite series of presumptionsresembles an infinite series of quantities decreasing in geometrical pro-portion, which amounts only to a finite sum. The infinite series of stagesof ACHILLES’s journey after the old man, amounts only to two thousandpaces; nor can this infinite series of presumptions outweigh one solidargument in favour of the first judgment, supposing them all to beunfavourable to it.

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Secondly, I have shown, that the estimation of our first judgment maystrengthen it; and the same thing may be said of all the subsequent estima-tions. It would, therefore, be as reasonable to conclude, that the first judg-ment will be brought to infallible certainty when this series of estimations iswholly in its favour, as that its evidence will be brought to nothing by sucha series supposed to be wholly unfavourable to it. But, in reality, one seriousand cool re-examination of the evidence by which our first judgment is sup-ported, has, and, in reason, ought to have more force to strengthen orweaken it, than an infinite series of such estimations as our author requires.

Thirdly, I know no reason nor rule in logic, that requires that such aseries of estimations should follow every particular judgment.

A wise man who has practised reasoning knows that he is fallible, andcarries this conviction along with him in every judgment he forms. Heknows likewise that he is more liable to err in some cases than in others. Hehas a scale in his mind, by which he estimates his liableness to err, and bythis he regulates the degree of his assent in his first judgment upon anypoint.

The author’s reasoning supposes, that a man, when he forms his firstjudgment, conceives himself to be infallible; that by a second and subse-quent judgment, he discovers that he is not infallible; and that by a thirdjudgment, subsequent to the second, he estimates his liableness to err insuch a case as the present.

If the man proceed in this order, I grant, that his second judgment will,with good reason, bring down the first from supposed infallibility to fallibil-ity; and that his third judgment will, in some degree, either strengthen orweaken the first, as it is corrected by the second.

But every man of understanding proceeds in a contrary order. Whenabout to judge in any particular point, he knows already that he is not infal-lible. He knows what are the cases in which he is most or least liable to err.The conviction of these things is always present to his mind, and influencesthe degree of his assent in his first judgment, as far as to him appears rea-sonable.

If he should afterwards find reason to suspect his first judgment, anddesires to have all the satisfaction his faculties can give, reason will directhim not to form such a series of estimations upon estimations, as thisauthor requires, but to examine the evidence of his first judgment carefullyand coolly; and this review may very reasonably, according to its result,either strengthen or weaken, or totally overturn his first judgment.

This infinite series of estimations, therefore, is not the method that reasondirects in order to form our judgment in any case. It is introduced withoutnecessity, without any use but to puzzle the understanding, and to make usthink, that to judge, even in the simplest and plainest cases, is a matter ofinsurmountable difficulty and endless labour; just as the ancient Sceptic, to

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make a journey of two thousand paces appear endless, divided it into aninfinite number of stages.

But we observed, that the estimation which our author requires mayadmit of another meaning, which indeed is more agreeable to the expres-sion, but inconsistent with what he advanced before.

By the possibility of error in the estimation of the truth and fidelity of ourfaculties, may be meant, that we may err by esteeming our faculties true andfaithful, while they may be false and fallacious, even when used accordingto the rules of reason and logic.

If this be meant, I answer, first, That the truth and fidelity of our facultyof judging is, and must be taken for granted in every judgment and in everyestimation.

If the Sceptic can seriously doubt of the truth and fidelity of his faculty ofjudging when properly used, and suspend his judgment upon that point tillhe finds proof, his scepticism admits of no cure by reasoning, and he musteven continue in it until he have new faculties given him, which shall haveauthority to sit in judgment upon the old. Nor is there any need of an end-less succession of doubts upon this subject, for the first puts an end to alljudgment and reasoning, and to the possibility of conviction by that means.The Sceptic has here got possession of a strong hold which is impregnableto reasoning, and we must leave him in possession of it, till Nature, by othermeans, makes him give it up.

Secondly, I observe, that this ground of scepticism, from the supposedinfidelity of our faculties, contradicts what the author before advanced inthis very argument, to wit, that “the rules of the demonstrative sciences arecertain and infallible, and that truth is the natural effect of reason, and thaterror arises from the irruption of other causes.”

But perhaps he made these concessions unwarily. He is therefore at liber-ty to retract them, and to rest his scepticism upon this sole foundation, Thatno reasoning can prove the truth and fidelity of our faculties. Here hestands upon firm ground: For it is evident, that every argument offered toprove the truth and fidelity of our faculties, takes for granted the thing inquestion, and is therefore that kind of sophism which Logicians call petitioprincipii.

All we would ask of this kind of Sceptic is, that he would be uniform andconsistent, and that his practice in life do not belie his profession of scepti-cism with regard to the fidelity of his faculties: For the want of faith, as wellas faith itself, is best shown by works. If a Sceptic avoid the fire as much asthose who believe it dangerous to go into it, we can hardly avoid thinkinghis scepticism to be feigned, and not real.

Our author indeed was aware, that neither his scepticism, nor that ofany other person, was able to endure this trial, and therefore enters acaveat against it.

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17 [Treatise, 1.4.1.]

“Neither I, says he, nor any other person, was ever sincerely and con-stantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollablenecessity, has determined us to judge, as well as to breathe and feel.My intention, therefore, says he, in displaying so carefully the argu-ments of that fantastic sect, is only to make the reader sensible of thetruth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes andeffects, are derived from nothing but custom, and that belief is moreproperly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of ournature.”17

We have before considered the first part of this hypothesis, Whetherour reasoning about causes be derived only from custom?

The other part of the author’s hypothesis here mentioned is darklyexpressed, though the expression seems to be studied, as it is put inItalics. It cannot surely mean that belief is not an act of thinking. It isnot, therefore, the power of thinking that he calls the cogitative part ofour nature. Neither can it be the power of judging, for all belief impliesjudgment; and to believe a proposition means the same thing as to judgeit to be true. It seems, therefore, to be the power of reasoning that hecalls the cogitative part of our nature.

If this be the meaning, I agree to it in part. The belief of first principlesis not an act of the reasoning power: For all reasoning must be groundedupon them. We judge them to be true, and believe them without reason-ing. But why this power of judging of first principles should be called thesensitive part of our nature, I do not understand.

As our belief of first principles is an act of pure judgment without rea-soning; so our belief of the conclusions drawn by reasoning from firstprinciples, may, I think, be called an act of the reasoning faculty.

Upon the whole, I see only two conclusions that can be fairly drawnfrom this profound and intricate reasoning against reason. The first is,That we are fallible in all our judgments and in all our reasonings. Thesecond, That the truth and fidelity of our faculties can never be provedby reasoning; and therefore our belief of it cannot be founded on rea-soning. If the last be what the author calls his hypothesis, I subscribe toit, and think it not an hypothesis, but a manifest truth; though I con-ceive it to be very improperly expressed, by saying that belief is moreproperly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature.

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[Chapter title] 387

1 The bulk of Essay 5, “Of Morals” is an attack on Hume’s moral theory. The relevant portions of that Essay are contained in Early Responses to Hume,Volume 1.

27THOMAS REID

Thomas Reid, Essays on the active powers of man. Edinburgh: J. Bell,1788, vii, 493 p.Selections from Essay 1.4 and 4.9; from 1788 edition.

In addition to his comments on Hume in Essays on the IntellectualPowers of Man (1785), presented above, Thomas Reid (1710–1796)

continued his attack in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788).The work, which consists of five Essays,1 focuses on the human mentalfaculties of inclination that prompt human action. The first of theseEssays, which discusses causal power in general, contains a chapter onHume’s theory of causality. Reid begins this chapter by noting Hume’sview that all ideas are derived from impressions of either sensation orreflection. According to Reid, Hume establishes this rashly and unphilo-sophically, without allowing any exception to that principle. UnlikeLocke who uses this principle moderately, Hume submits all philosophi-cal notions to this test, including the idea of causal power. Reid notesthat Hume dismisses Locke’s notion of power as popular, rather thanphilosophical. Reid has two reactions to Hume’s view. First, popularviews concerning causality should be taken more seriously by philoso-phers, especially since Hume seems to be the only person who ever heldthat something can begin to exist without a cause. Second, even if thepopular opinion of causal power is false, it nevertheless is an idea ofpower. Hume, though, contradicts this popular opinion when he claimsthat reason cannot give rise to any original idea, and that it can neverlead us to conclude that a cause is necessary for an effect. Reid also givestwo reasons why, contrary to Hume, we do not arrive at the idea ofcausality through experience. First, causality is a necessary truth, andexperience cannot give us necessary truths. Second, we have experienceof causality in only a fraction of changes that we see, and, thus we seethat experience cannot tell us that there are causes of all of these. InEssay 4 Reid defends free will and takes issue with necessitarians such as

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2 See the Editor’s introduction to the selection from Reid’s Active Powers in Volume1 of Early Responses to Hume.

3 [Treatise, 1.1.1.]

Hume and Priestley. He attacks Hume's view of cause that underlies hisdeterminism, and notes four absurd consequences that follow from it.

Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers was favourably reviewed in fourleading review journals.2 The work is criticized by Alexander Crombie inAn Essay on Philosophical Necessity (1793), excerpted later in this col-lection. The following is from the 1788 and most authoritative editionof this work.

ESSAY I.OF ACTIVE POWER IN GENERAL.

CHAP IV.Of Mr HUME’s Opinion of the Idea of Power.

This very ingenious author adopts the principle of Mr LOCKE beforementioned, That all our simple ideas are derived either from sensationor reflection. This he seems to understand, even in a stricter sense thanMr LOCKE did. For he will have all our simple ideas to be copies of pre-ceeding impressions, either of our external senses or of consciousness.

“After the most accurate examination,” says he, “Of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without anyexception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression whichresembles it, and every simple impression a correspondent idea. Everyone may satisfy himself in this point, by running over as many as hepleases.”3

I observe here, by the way, that this conclusion is formed by the authorrashly and unphilosophically. For it is a conclusion that admits of noproof, but by induction; and it is upon this ground that he himself foundsit. The induction cannot be perfect till every simple idea that can enterinto the human mind be examined, and be shewn to be copied from aresembling impression of sense or of consciousness. No man can pretendto have made this examination of all our simple ideas without exception;and, therefore, no man can, consistently with the rules of philosophising,assure us, that this conclusion holds without any exception.

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The author professes, in his title-page, to introduce into moral subjectsthe experimental method of reasoning. This was a very laudableattempt; but he ought to have known, that it is a rule in the experimen-tal method of reasoning, That conclusions established by inductionought never to exclude exceptions, if any such should afterwards appearfrom observation or experiment. Sir ISAAC NEWTON, speaking of suchconclusions, says, “Et si quando in experiundo postea reperiatur aliquid,quod a parte contraria faciat; tum demum, non sine istis exceptionibusaffirmetur conclusio opportebit.” “But,” says our author, “I will ventureto affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception.”

Accordingly, throughout the whole treatise, this general rule is consid-ered as of sufficient authority, in itself, to exclude, even from a hearing,every thing that appears to be an exception to it. This is contrary to thefundamental principles of the experimental method of reasoning, andtherefore may be called rash and unphilosophical.

Having thus established this general principle, the author does greatexecution by it among our ideas. He finds, that we have no idea of sub-stance, material or spiritual; that body and mind are only certain trainsof related impressions and ideas; that we have no idea of space or dura-tion, and no idea of power, active or intellective.

Mr. LOCKE used his principle of sensation and reflection with greatermoderation and mercy. Being unwilling to thrust the ideas we have men-tioned into the limbo of non-existence, he stretches sensations andreflection to the very utmost, in order to receive these ideas within thepale; and draws them into it, as it were by violence.

But this author, instead of shewing them any favour, seems fond to getrid of them.

Of the ideas mentioned, it is only that of power that concerns our pre-sent subject. And, with regard to this, the author boldly affirms, “Thatwe never have any idea of power; that we deceive ourselves when weimagine we are possessed of any idea of this kind.”4

He begins with observing, “That the terms efficacy, agency, power,force, energy, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore it is an absurdityto employ any of them in defining the rest. By this observation,” says he,“we reject at once all the vulgar definitions which Philosophers havegiven of power and efficacy.”

Surely this author was not ignorant, that there are many things ofwhich we have a clear and distinct conception, which are so simple intheir nature, that they cannot be defined any other way than by synony-mous words. It is true that this is not a logical definition, but that there

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5 [Treatise, 2.1.2.]6 [Treatise, 1.3.14.]

is, as he affirms, an absurdity in using it, when no better can be had, Icannot perceive.

He might here have applied to power and efficacy what he says, inanother place, of pride and humility. “The passions of pride and humili-ty,” he says, “being simple and uniform impressions, it is impossible wecan ever give a just definition of them. As the words are of general use,and the things they represent the most common of any, every one, of him-self, will be able to form a just notion of them without danger of mis-take.”5

He mentions Mr LOCKE’s account of the idea of power, That, observingvarious changes in things, we conclude, that there must be somewhere apower capable of producing them, and so arrive at last, by this reasoning,at the idea of power and efficacy.

“But,” says he, “to be satisfied that this explication is more popularthan philosophical, we need but reflect on two very obvious principles;first, That reason alone can never give rise to any original idea; and, secondly, That reason, as distinguished from experience, can never makeus conclude, that a cause, or productive quality, is absolutely requisite toevery beginning of existence.”6

Before we consider the two principles which our author opposes to thepopular opinion of Mr LOCKE, I observe,

First, That there are some popular opinions, which, on that veryaccount, deserve more regard from Philosophers, than this author is will-ing to bestow.

That things cannot begin to exist, nor undergo any change, without acause that hath power to produce that change, is indeed so popular anopinion, that, I believe, this author is the first of mankind that ever calledit in question. It is so popular, that there is not a man of common pru-dence who does not act from this opinion, and rely upon it every day ofhis life. And any man who should conduct himself by the contrary opin-ion, would soon be confined as insane, and continue in that state, till asufficient cause was found for his enlargement.

Such a popular opinion as this, stands upon higher authority than thatof philosophy, and philosophy must strike sail to it, if she would not ren-der herself contemptible to every man of common understanding.

For though, in matters of deep speculation, the multitude must be guid-ed by Philosophers, yet, in things that are within the reach of every man’sunderstanding, and upon which the whole conduct of human life turns,the Philosopher must follow the multitude, or make himself perfectlyridiculous.

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Secondly, I observe, that whether this popular opinion be true or false,it follows from mens having this opinion, that they have an idea ofpower. A false opinion about power, no less than a true, implies an ideaof power; for how can men have any opinion, true or false, about athing of which they have no idea?

The first of the very obvious principles which the author opposes toMr LOCKE’s account of the idea of power, is, That reason alone cannever give rise to any original idea.

This appears to me so far from being a very obvious principle, that thecontrary is very obvious.

Is it not our reasoning faculty that gives rise to the idea of reasoningitself? As our idea of sight takes its rise from our being endowed withthat faculty; so does our idea of reasoning. Do not the ideas of demon-stration, of probability, our ideas of a syllogism, of major, minor andconclusion, of an enthymeme, dilemma, sorites, and all the variousmodes of reasoning, take their rise from the faculty of reason? Or is itpossible, that a being, not endowed with the faculty of reasoning, shouldhave these ideas? This principle, therefore, is so far from being obviouslytrue, that it appears to be obviously false.

The second obvious principle is, That reason, as distinguished fromexperience, can ever make us conclude, that a cause, or productive qual-ity, is absolutely requisite to every beginning of existence.

In some Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, I had occasion totreat of this principle, That every change in nature must have a cause; and,to prevent repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader to what is said uponthis subject, Essay VI. chap. 6. I endeavoured to shew that it is a first prin-ciple, evident to all men come to years of understanding. Besides its hav-ing been universally received, without the least doubt, from the beginningof the world, it has this sure mark of a first principle, that the belief of it isabsolutely necessary in the ordinary affairs of life, and, without it, no mancould act with common prudence, or avoid the imputation of insanity.Yet a Philosopher, who acted upon the firm belief of it every day of hislife, thinks fit, in his closet, to call it in question.

He insinuates here, that we may know it from experience. I endeav-oured to shew, that we do not learn it from experience, for two reasons.

First, Because it is a necessary truth, and has always been received as anecessary truth. Experience gives no information of what is necessary, orof what must be.

We may know from experience, what is, or what was, and from thatmay probably conclude what shall be in like circumstances; but, withregard to what must necessarily be, experience is perfectly silent.

Thus we know, by unvaried experience, from the beginning of theworld, that the sun and stars rise in the east and set in the west. But no

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man believes, that it could not possibly have been otherwise, or that itdid not depend upon the will and power of him who made the world,whether the earth should revolve to the east or to the west.

In like manner, if we had experience, ever so constant, that everychange in nature we have observed, actually had a cause, this mightafford ground to believe, that, for the future, it shall be so; but noground at all to believe that it must be so, and cannot be otherwise.

Another reason to shew that this principle is not learned from experi-ence is, That experience does not shew us a cause of one in a hundred ofthose changes which we observe, and therefore can never teach us thatthere must be a cause of all.

Of all the paradoxes this author has advanced, there is not one moreshocking to the human understanding than this, That things may beginto exist without a cause. This would put an end to all speculation, aswell as to all the business of life. The employment of speculative men,since the beginning of the world, has been to investigate the causes ofthings. What pity is it, they never thought of putting the previous ques-tion, Whether things have a cause or not? This question has at last beenstarted; and what is there so ridiculous as not to be maintained by somePhilosopher?

Enough has been said upon it, and more, I think, than it deserves. Butbeing about to treat of the active powers of the human mind, I thoughtit improper to take no notice of what has been said by so celebrated aPhilosopher, to shew, that there is not, in the human mind, any idea ofpower.

ESSAY IV.OF THE LIBERTY OF MORAL AGENTS.

CHAP IX.Of Arguments for Necessity.

...Another argument that has been used to prove liberty of action to be

impossible is, That it implies “an effect without a cause.”To this it may be briefly answered, That a free action is an effect pro-

duced by a being who had power and will to produce it; therefore it isnot an effect without a cause.

To suppose any other cause necessary to the production of an effectthan a being who had the power and the will to produce it, is a contra-diction; for it is to suppose that being to have power to produce theeffect, and not to have power to produce it. ...

With regard to this point, we may observe, first That this definition of

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a cause [i.e., “such previous circumstances as are constantly followed bya certain effect,” as advocated by Priestley], bating the phraseology ofputting a cause under the category of circumstances, which I take to benew, is the same, in other words, with that which Mr Hume gave, ofwhich he ought to be acknowledged the inventor; for I know of noauthor before Mr Hume, who maintained that we have no other notionof a cause but that it is something prior to the effect, which has beenfounded by experience to be constantly followed by the effect. This is amain pillar of his system; and he has drawn very important conse-quences from this definition, which I am far from thinking this author[i.e., Priestley] will adopt.

Without repeating what I have before said of causes in the first ofthese Essays, and in the second and third chapters of this, I shall heremention some of the consequences that may be justly deduced from thisdefinition of a cause, that we may judge of it by its fruits.

First, It follows from this definition of a cause, that night is the causeof day, and day the cause of night. For no two things have more con-stantly followed each other since the beginning of the world.

Secondly, It follows from this definition of a cause, that, for what weknow, anything may be the cause of anything, since nothing is essentialto a cause but its being constantly followed by the effect. If this be so,what is unintelligent may be the cause of what is intelligent; folly may bethe cause of wisdom, and evil of good; all reasoning from the nature ofthe effect – to the nature of the cause, and all reasoning from final caus-es, must be given up as fallacious.

Thirdly, From this definition of a cause, it follows that we have noreason to conclude that every event must have a cause; for innumerableevents happen, when it cannot be shewn that there were certain previouscircumstances that have constantly been followed by such an event.And, though it were certain that every event we have had access toobserve had a cause, it would not follow that every event must have acause; for it is contrary to the rules of logic to conclude, that, because athing has always been, therefore it must be – to reason from what iscontingent to what is necessary.

Several of these consequences were fondly embraced by Mr Hume, asnecessarily following from his definition of a cause, and as favourable tohis system of absolute scepticism. Those who adopt the definition of acause, from which they follow, may choose whether they will adopt itsconsequences, or shew that they do not follow from the definition. ...

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28GEORGE GLEIG

[George Gleig], “Metaphysics,” Encyclopædia Britannica; or, A dictionaryof arts, sciences, and miscellaneous literature. 3d. ed. Edinburgh, A. Belland C. Macfarquhar, 1797. 18 v. “Metaphysics,” Chap. 6, selections; from 3rd edition, Vol. 11, pp.520–524.

George Gleig (1753–1840) was a Scottish Episcopalian minister andlater Bishop of Brechin. Gleig wrote several articles on philosophy

and theology for the third edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, andedited the final six volumes of that edition upon the death of the previ-ous editor.1 In the selection below from his article on Metaphysics, Gleigdiscusses Hume’s view of causal power. He opens noting that the notionof power is a central metaphysical concept that concerns the source ofevidence of things. He argues that the notion of power originates in ourobservations of the changes that take place around us, and in our real-ization that we have wilful command over the movement of our bodilylimbs and the ideas in our minds. We then transfer this idea of mentalpower to external objects. Gleig agrees with Hume that we cannotderive the notion of power from contemplating bodies after their firstappearance to us. We need, he says, to first be conscious of the causalpower in our minds. However, Gleig objects to Hume’s claim that wehave no idea of power because we have no impression of power uponwhich to base the idea. More specifically, he attacks Hume’s generalposition that all thoughts are copied from impressions: according toGleig, we have conceptions of points and lines in geometry, but noimpressions of them. Further, following Reid, Gleig argues that somethings, such as physical objects, can be objects of thought even thoughwe have no “ideas” (insofar as an idea is an appearance of an object inthe memory or imagination) of them. Similarly, points and lines ingeometry are thoughts, and not ideas strictly speaking. Thus, Hume’sgeneral theory fails for wrongly maintaining that all thoughts are ideas,and also for wrongly maintaining that all thoughts derive from impres-sions. Power, according to Gleig, is a thought, which – like our thoughtsof points and lines – is not an “idea” per se, and cannot be traced backto a specific impression.

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CHAP. VI. Of CONSCIOUSNESS and REFLECTION.... 108. There are things which we know partly by sensation and partly by

reflection, &c.2 As we acquire ideas of external objects by means of oursenses; and notions of perceiving, remembering, reasoning, and willing,&c. by reflecting on the operations of our own minds; so are there otherthings of which we acquire notions, partly by sensation, partly by reflec-tion, and partly by means of that faculty of which it is the more peculiaroffice to compare ideas and to perceive truth. Such are substance, body,mind, with their several qualities, adjuncts, and relations; the knowledgeof which, as has been already observed, constitutes what in strictness ofspeech is termed the science of metaphysics. These shall be considered inorder, after we have investigated the nature of truth, and inquired into theseveral sources of evidence; but there is one notion, about the origin andreality of which there have been so many disputes, which in itself is of sogreat importance, and which will be so intimately connected with all oursubsequent inquiries, that it may not be improper to consider it here. –The notion to which we allude is of POWER.

109. Our notion of power, how acquired. Among the objects aroundus we perceive frequent changes, and one event regularly succeedinganother. Gold thrown into the fire is changed from a fixed to a fluidbody. Water exposed to a certain degree of cold is changed from a fluidto a fixed body. Night succeeds to day, and summer succeeds to winter.We are conscious of new sensations in ourselves every hour. We are like-wise conscious of reasoning, willing, and desiring; and we know that byan exertion of will we can rise or sit, stand still or walk, call one ideainto view, and dismiss others from our contemplation. Experience teach-es us, that it is not occasionally, but always, that gold is changed into afluid by being thrown into the fire, and water into a fixed body by beingexposed to a certain degree of cold; that night succeeds to day, and sum-mer to winter. These changes have regularly taken place since the cre-ation of the world; and it has never once been observed that water wasfixed by fire, or gold rendered liquid by cold. Were we not assured byexperience that our own voluntary motions are produced by exertions ofour minds, of which we are conscious, and that without such exertionsthose motions would never have taken place, we should probably haveconsidered the liquefaction of gold as an event equally independent offire, though uniformly conjoined with it, as night is independent of day,

2 [In the original, all paragraph titles are located in the right and left margins in non-italic type.]

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and day of night. But having experienced that we can move or not moveour bodies as we please; that when it is our will to sit, we never get upto walk: and that when we wish to walk, we always do it except pre-vented by external violence; having likewise experienced, that by athought, by some internal and inexplicable exertion of our minds, wecan call up in our memory or imagination one idea and dismiss othersfrom our mental view; we are led to believe with the fullest conviction,that all those motions of our bodies which in common language aretermed voluntary, and that successions of ideas which follows a con-scious exertion of the mind, depend upon ourselves. In other words, weare necessitated to believe that we have a power to move or not moveour bodies in many cases, and a power to turn our attention to one ideain preference to others.

It is thus that we acquire the notion of power in ourselves, which weeasily transfer to other objects. Knowing that the various motions of ourbodies thus effected proceed from power, we are naturally led to inquirewhether the changes which we perceive in other bodies may not proceedfrom power likewise, i.e. from something analogous to that power, ofthe exertions of which we are conscious in ourselves. Now uniformexperience teaching us that gold is liquefied by being thrown into thefire, and that water is fixed by being exposed to cold; we infer with theutmost certainty that there are powers in fire and cold to produce thesechanges, and that without the exertion of such powers these changeswould not be produced. We cannot indeed say of external powers, as wecan of our own, in what substance they inhere. We know with theutmost certainty that the voluntary motions of our hands, &c. are pro-duced by a power not inherent in the hands but in the mind, for of theexertion of that power we are conscious; but we do not know whetherthe power which liquefies gold be inherent in that sensible object whichwe call fire, or in something else to which fire is only an instrument. Welearn by observation, that the minute particles of fire or heat insinuatethemselves between the particles of gold, and, if we may use the expres-sion, tear them asunder; but whether they do this in consequence of apower inherent in themselves, or only as instruments impelled by anoth-er power, is a question which observation cannot enable us to answer.

Were we not conscious of the exertion of our own powers, it seemsnot conceivable that we could ever have acquired any notion of powerat all; for power is not an object of sense, nor, independent of its opera-tions, is it indeed an object of consciousness. In external operations, allthat we perceive is one thing, in which we suppose the power to reside,followed by another, which is either the change or that on which thechange is produced; but the exertion of the power itself we do not perceive. Thus we perceive gold, after it has been some time in the fire,

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3 Essays [Enquiry, 5.1.]

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converted from a fixed to a fluid body; but we perceive not by our senseseither the power or the energy of the power which operates to this con-version. In the exercise of our own powers, the case is otherwise. Whena man puts his hand to his head, and afterwards thrusts it into hisbosom, he not only perceives by his senses the change of position, but isalso conscious of the energy or exertion by which the change was pro-duced.

“Suppose (says Mr Hume3) a person, though endowed with thestrongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a suddeninto this world; he would indeed immediately observe a continual suc-cession of objects, and one event following another, but he would not beable to discover any thing farther. He would not at first by any reason-ing be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particularpowers by which all natural operations are performed never appear tothe senses. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion inthe second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. Themind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession ofobjects; consequently there is not, in any single particular instance ofcause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or nec-essary connexion. From the first appearance of an object, we never canconjecture what effect will result from it: but, were the power or energyof any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect evenwithout experience; and might at first pronounce with certainty concern-ing it by the mere dint of thought and reasoning. It is impossible, there-fore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation ofbodies in single instances of their operations; because no bodies ever dis-cover any power which can be the original of this idea.”

There is a sense in which this reasoning is unquestionably just. A manwho had never been conscious of exerting power in himself, would certainly not acquire the notion of power from observing a continualsuccession of external objects. The impulse of one billiard ball being followed by the motion of another, would no more lead him to thenotion of power in the former, than the succession of night to daywould lead him to the notion of a power in light to produce darkness.When Mr. Hume says, “that from the first appearance of an object wecan never conjecture what effect will result from it,” he uses languagethat is ambiguous, and utters an assertion which is either true or falseaccording to the sense in which it is understood. If it be meant, that afterhaving reflected on the operations of our own minds, and learned byexperience that motion is communicated by impulse from one ball ofivory to another, we could not conjecture whether a similar effect would

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be produced by the impulse of balls made of other hard bodies which wehad never before seen, the assertion is manifestly false. A man who hadbut once seen motion communicated in this manner from one ivory ballto another, would certainly conjecture that it might be communicatedfrom one wooden ball to another; and if he had seen it repeatedly com-municated from one ball to another of different substances, he wouldinfer, with the utmost confidence, that it might be communicated fromball to ball of whatever substance composed, provided that substance behard, or of a similar texture with the balls to the impulse of which hehad formerly paid attention. If by this ambiguous phrase the author onlymeans, as is probably the case, that from the first appearance of anobject to which we had never before observed any thing in any respectsimilar, we could not conjecture what effect would result from it; or ifhis meaning be, that a man suddenly brought into the world, who hadnever acquired such a notion of power as may be had from attention tothe energies and operations of our own minds, would not, by observingan effect to result from one body, conjecture from the first appearanceof another similar body what effect would result from it; in either ofthese cases his assertion is certainly true, and tends to prove that with-out the consciousness of the operations of our own minds we couldnever acquire a notion of power from the changes perceived by our senses in external objects.

110. Mr Hume attempts to prove that we can have no notions what-ever of power. But Mr Hume, not contented with denying, which hemight justly do, that we could ever have derived the idea of power merely from observing the continual succession of external objects,labours hard to prove that we have no notion of power at all, and thatwhen we use the word power, we do nothing more than utter aninsignificant sound. To pave the way for the arguments by which soextravagant a paradox is to be supported, he lays it down as a “proposi-tion which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothingbut copies of our impressions; or, in other words, that it is impossiblefor us to think of any thing that we have not antecedently felt either byour external or internal senses.” As this proposition, however, willadmit, it seems, of some dispute, he takes care, before he applies it to thepurpose of demolishing all power, to support it by two arguments.“First (says he), when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however com-pounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves intosuch simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment.Those who would assert, that this position is not universally true norwithout exception, have only one, and that an easy, method of refutingit; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived fromthis source. Secondly, If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a

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4 [Enquiry, 2.]5 [Enquiry, 7.1.]6 Thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation of

the mind about its ideas wherein the mind is active; where it, with some degree ofvoluntary attention, considers any thing. – Locke. [Essay, 2.9.1.]

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man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that heis as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can formno notion of colours, a deaf man of sounds. And though there are fewor no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person hasnever felt, or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongsto his species; yet we find the same observation to take place in a lessdegree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revengeor cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friend-ship and generosity.”4

111. His reasoning sophistical. As these propositions are the enginesby which all power is banished from the world, it may not be improper,before we proceed to inquire by what means they perform so arduous atask, to consider their own inherent strength; for if they be weak inthemselves, their work, however dexterously they may be employed, canhave no stability. We have already noticed the perverseness of thiswriter’s language, when it confounds sensations with impressions; buthere it is still more perverse, for passions, sentiments, and even con-sciousness, are styled impressions. When sensations are confounded withimpressions, the effect is only mistaken for the cause, it being universallyknown that sensations proceed from impressions made upon the organsof sense. When consciousness is confounded with an impression, onething is mistaken for another, to which it is universally known to haveneither resemblance nor relation. But, not to waste time upon these fallacies, which, though dangerous if admitted, are yet too palpable toimpose upon a reader capable of the slightest attention, let us examinethe propositions themselves. The most important, and that for the sakeof which alone the others are brought forward, is, that [“]it is impossi-ble for us to think of any thing that we have not immediately felt, eitherby our external or internal senses.”5 Did Mr Hume then never think of amathematical point, or a mathematical line? Neither of these things iscapable of being felt either by making an impression upon the organs ofsense or as an object of consciousness; and therefore it is impossible thathe should ever have had ideas of them such as he doubtless had of sensible objects; yet in the most proper sense of the word think,6 he cer-tainly thought of both points and lines; for he appears to have made con-siderable progress in the science of geometry, in which he could not haveproceeded a single step without a perfect knowledge of these things, on

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which the whole science is built. It is not therefore true, that our thoughtsor ideas, when analyzed, always resolve themselves into such simple ideasas were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment; for every mathemat-ical figure of which we can think resolves itself into a point and motion;and a point having no parts and no magnitude, cannot possibly be theobject of feeling to any of our senses. If, therefore, ideas alone be theobjects of thought, we have refuted Mr Hume’s position by the verymethod which he himself lays down; for we have produced an idea whichis not derived either from a precedent feeling or a precedent sentiment. Bysentiment, we suppose to be here meant that which by other philosophersis denominated consciousness; and of consciousness it is undeniable thatnothing is the object but the actual energies of our own minds.

112. Things of which we can have no ideas may themselves be objectsof thought. But ideas are not the only objects of thought. We have already given our reasons for restricting the word idea to that appearancewhich an object of sense, when reflected on, makes either in the memoryor imagination. Such was undoubtedly its original signification; and had itnever been used to denote other and very different objects, much errorand perplexity would have been avoided, which now disgraces the scienceof metaphysics. Things may themselves be the objects of thought; andwhen that is the case, to think of their ideas, were it possible to do so,would be worse than useless; for we may certainly know a man better bylooking at himself than by looking at his picture. Of things which arethemselves the objects of thought, we have either a direct or a relativeknowledge. We know directly the actual operations of our own minds bythe most complete of all evidence, that of consciousness: and we have arelative notion of mathematical points and lines: but neither of mentalenergies nor of these external things7 can we possibly have any idea.

113. We have only relative notions of some things. It is well observedby Dr Reid,8 that our notions both of body and mind are nothing morethan relative. “What is body? It is, say philosophers, that which isextended, solid, and divisible. Says the querist, I do not ask what theproperties of body are, but what is the thing itself? let me first know

7 By calling mathematical points and lines external things, we do not mean toattribute to them any corporeal existence. We know well that they are merelycreatures of the mind, and that if there were no mind, they could have no existence.But twenty men may at the same instant have a notion of the same lines and thesame points; and therefore these lines and points have an existence independent of,and external to, any one mind, at least to any one human mind. The objects,however, of which a man is conscious, are in no sense whatever external, for theyare present to no human mind but his own.

8 Essays on the Active Powers of Man.

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9 The opinions of philosophers concerning corporeal and spiritual substances shall beconsidered more fully hereafter. In quoting from Dr Reid on another subject, wehave been obliged to anticipate his opinion, which will be found to be not moremodest than just.

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directly what body is, and then consider its properties. To this demand Iam afraid the querist will meet with no satisfactory answer; because ournotion of body is not direct, but relative to its qualities. We know that itis something extended, solid, and divisible, and we know no more.Again, If it should be asked, what is mind? It is that which thinks. I asknot what it does, or what its properties are, but what it is? To this I canfind no answer; our notion of mind being not direct, but relative to itsoperations, as our notion of body is relative to its qualities.”9

114. About which however, we can reason with the utmost precision.Our notion of a mathematical point is of the very same kind. What is apoint? It is, says Euclid, that which hath no parts and no magnitude.Replies the querist, I ask not either what it has or what it has not, let mefirst know what it is? To this second question, it might perhaps beanswered, that a mathematical point is that which by motion generates aline. But, rejoins the querist, I am not inquiring what it generates; giveme a direct idea of the point itself? or, if that cannot be done, as surely itcannot, tell me what its offspring a line is? A line, says Euclid, is lengthwithout breadth. I have no idea, replies the querist, of length withoutbreadth. I never felt an impression from a sensible object which did notsuggest length, breadth, and thickness, as inseparably united; and I canhave no idea which is not the copy of a former impression. To assist thequerist’s conception, it may be said that lines are the boundaries of asuperficies, and that superficies are the boundaries of a solid body; butof a solid body every man has a clear and direct idea, in the most propersense of the word. Here then are several things, viz. points, lines, andsuperficies, of not one of which is it possible to form a direct notion; andyet we know them so thoroughly, from the relation which they bear toother subjects, that we can reason about them with a precision and certainty which only the mathematical sciences admit.

115. And such is power. The great advantage of these sciences abovethe moral, Mr Hume himself expressly admits: but he attributes it to awrong cause, when he says it consists in this, that the “ideas of the former being sensible are always clear and determinate;” for we see thatthe notion of a point or of a line is merely relative, and cannot possiblybe the copy of a sensation, or, in his language, of a sensible impression.If then we have clear and determinate notions of points and lines, andmay reason about them without ambiguity, as he acknowledges we may,what is there to hinder us from having an equally clear and determinate

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notion of power, or from reasoning about it with as little ambiguity?10

Why says he, we are not conscious of power. And to prove this position,which needs no proof, he makes many observations that, however just,might certainly have been spared. Of these one is, that “a man suddenlystruck with a palsy in the leg or arm, or who had now lost these mem-bers, frequently endeavours at first to move them, and employ them intheir usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of power to commandsuch limbs, as a man in perfect health is conscious of power to actuateany member which remains in its natural state and condition. But con-sciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in the one case nor inthe other are we ever conscious of any power.”11 This is true; we neverare conscious of any power; but we are frequently conscious of actualenergies: and the man who, after being suddenly struck with a palsy,endeavours in vain to move is leg or arm, is as conscious of energy as hewho in health makes the attempt with success. Nor let it be imaginedthat his consciousness deceives him; for, as Mr Hume justly observes,consciousness never deceives. He is certain of the energy, but finds by experience that the instrument of his energy has suddenly becomedisordered and unfit for its usual office. In this and this alone consiststhe difference between the paralytic and the man whose limbs are sound.The one may be as conscious of energy as the other, and his conscious-ness may be equally infallible. What then is this energy? Mr Hume willnot say that it is an idea, for it is not the copy of an antecedent impres-

10 “There are some things of which we can have both a direct and relative conception.I can directly conceive ten thousand men, or ten thousand pounds, because both areobjects of sense, and may be seen. But whether I see such an object, or directlyconceive it, my notion of it is indistinct; it is only that of a great multitude of men,or of a great heap of money; and a small addition or diminution makes no percep-tible change in the notion I form in this way. But I can form a relative notion of thesame number of men or of pounds by attending to the relations which this numberhas to other numbers greater or less. Then I perceive that the relative notion isdistinct and scientific; for the addition of a single man, or a single pound, or even ofa penny, is easily perceived. In like manner, I can form a direct notion of a polygonof a thousand equal sides and equal angles. This direct notion cannot be moredistinct when conceived in the mind, than that which I get by sight when the objectis before me; and I find it so indistinct that it has the same appearance to my eye, orto my direct conception, as a polygon of a thousand and one, or of nine hundredand ninety–nine sides. But when I form a relative conception of it, by attending tothe relation it bears to polygons of a greater or less number of sides, my notion of itbecomes distinct and scientific, and I can demonstrate the properties by which it isdistinguished from all other polygons. From these instances it appears, that ourrelative conceptions of things are not always less distinct, nor less fit materials foraccurate reasoning, than those that are direct; and that the contrary may happen ina remarkable degree.”Reid’s Essays on the active Powers of Man.

11 [Enquiry, 7.1.]

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12 Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of Man.

sion; besides, he has somewhere allowed that ideas are never active. It isthen a substance? Impossible! for it is not permanent: and we believe noman will venture to affirm, or even to suppose, that the same substancecan be repeatedly annihilated, and as often created. Is it then the occa-sional exertion of some substance? This must be the truth; for no othersupposition remains to be made. If so, that substance must be possessedof power; for a capacity of exerting actual energy is all that is meant bythe word power. – “Wherever there is a capability of energy or exertion,there must be power; for though there can be no exertion withoutpower, there may be power that is not exerted.12 Thus a man may havepower to speak when he is silent; he may have power to rise and walkwhen he sits still. But though it be one thing to speak and another tohave the power of speaking, we always conceive of the power as some-thing which has a certain relation to the effect; and of every power weform our notion by the effect which it is able to produce. Nor is it onlyin speaking and moving his limbs that a man is conscious of energy.There is as much energy, though of a different kind, in thinking as inacting. Hence the powers of the human mind have been divided intoactive and speculative. By the former we move the body; and by the lat-ter we see, hear, remember, distinguish, judge, reason, and performupon our notions and ideas every other operation which is comprehend-ed under the general word to think.”

...

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404

29JAMES GREGORY

James Gregory, Philosophical and literary essays. By Dr Gregory, ofEdinburgh, Edinburgh: sold by T. Cadell, London, and W. Creech,

Edinburgh, 1792, 2 v. (cccxxxi, 704 p.).Selections from sections 1–4, 6, 9; from 1792 edition.

Born in Aberdeen, James Gregory (1753–1821) was chair of thePractice of Medicine at the University of Edinburgh. Gregory corre-sponded regularly with his relative Thomas Reid, and in 1785 heinformed Reid of his plan to mathematically demonstrate free will.Reid looked at and commented on drafts of Gregory’s work, whichfinally appeared in two volumes in 1792. The entire work is anextended critique of Hume’s “Of Liberty and Necessity” in theEnquiry; only the central sections of it are presented below. Gregorybegins by attacking three specific claims by Hume – that averagepeople are necessitarians in their behavior, that nothing exists withouta cause of its existence, and that the notion of liberty is inconsistentwith fact. In depicting the necessitarian position, Gregory introducesthe notion of “the inertia of mind,” which most simply means thatmind must act in accord with motives, and neither in opposition tothem or in the absence of them. Gregory’s principal attack on Humeandeterminism is the following reductio ad absurdum argument:

(1) According to Hume, motives and wilful actions are constantlyconjoined in the same way that causes and effects are constantlyconjoined in physics.

(2) Constant conjunctions in physics have predictable outcomes inone of three ways.

(3) Wilful actions do not have predictable outcomes in the abovenoted three ways.

(4) Therefore, it is not the case that wilful actions are constantlyconjoined in the same way that causes and effects are constantlyconjoined in physics.

According to Gregory, the three sorts of constant conjunctions(premise 2) in physics are these: (a) When causes X and Y concur,

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effects A and B will concur. (b) When causes X and Y are opposed,effects A and B will be opposed. (c) When causes X and Y neitherconcur nor are opposed, effects A and B will neither concur nor beopposed. Gregory continues arguing that these three kinds of constantconjunction do not hold for wilful activity; consequently, actions arenot causally determined as events are in physics. Gregory’s mainargument in support of premise 3 above is this. Suppose that a porterwas offered a guinea a mile for carrying a letter in one direction, and atthe same time was offered half a guinea a mile for carrying it inanother direction. According to Gregory, if the doctrines of the inertiaof mind and the constant conjunction of motive and action are true,then the porter will go in neither of these directions, but will instead goin a diagonal directly between the two. However, in reality the porterwould not take this diagonal path. Consequently, wilful actions do nothave predictable outcomes in the above noted three ways.

Gregory’s Philosophical and Literary Essays met with mixedreception in the leading review journals. The Analytical Review took aneutral stance towards the work:

Having thus laid before our readers an analytical view of theargument of this original work, our limits will not permit us to enterinto an examination of its merits; we therefore leave it to theadvocates for the doctrine of necessity, either to acknowledge itsvalidity, or detect its fallacy. [Analytical Review, July 1792, Vol. 13,pp. 241–248, August, 489–497]

Writing for the Monthly Review, William Enfield notes two weak linksin Gregory’s argument. First, a necessitarian would deny the strictanalogy between physical cause-effect and motive-action. Second, anecessitarian would assume the existence of a self-governing power,but understand that power as an irresistible – and somewhatmechanical – mental impulse towards the greater good:

If the necessarian should deny this perfect analogy [between physicalcause and effect, and motive and action], and should be able to shewthat, while a body impressed by mechanical force is passive, the mindimpressed by motive possesses within itself an active principle ofvolition, which is as truly a self-governing power on the scheme ofnecessity as on that of liberty, then the reasoning of this essay will beinvalidated. [Monthly Review, December 1792, Vol. 9, pp. 361–373]

The review of Gregory in the Critical Review concludes by questioningthe use of mathematical-type demonstrations in the study of the mind.

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They also censure Gregory’s arrogant tone: “throughout the wholework he assumes an air of insufferable arrogance and self-importance,for which we can see no reason, and his contempt for other philoso-phers who think differently from him, is equally disgusting, anddeserving of censure” (August 1793, Vol. 8, pp. 377–386, February1794, Vol. 10, pp. 199–212). Gregory’s work is discussed in AlexanderCrombie’s Essay (1793), John Allen’s Illustrations (1795), and GeorgeGleig’s article in the Encyclopædia Britannica (1797), selections fromwhich are contained in this collection.

SECT. I

Among all the various relations that have engaged the attention eitherof philosophers or of mankind in general, there is none which hascommonly been thought to bear a closer and more striking resem-blance and affinity to that of cause and effect in physics, than thefamiliar and well-known relation between the ordinary voluntarydeterminations and actions of men, and the motives or principles ofaction to which they are referred, and from which they are conceivedin some measure to proceed: yet there are none which the vulgardistinguish more readily and uniformly, in point of thought at least,however they may express them in words; nor any which philosophershave more industriously and more successfully laboured to confound.

The popular persuasion of what is called the Liberty of humanactions implies a conviction, that there is an important and well-under-stood difference between those two relations.

The philosophical doctrine of Necessity implies and consists in thepersuasion, that the two relations in question are either precisely orvery nearly the same. ...

For my own part, after the strictest attention that I have been able topay to the subject, both by careful reflection on my own thoughts, andby examining other men with respect to theirs, I am perfectlyconvinced, that the doctrine of Necessity, even as explained andasserted by Mr HUME, in what he calls his Reconciling Project, isaltogether repugnant, not merely in words, but in thought andprinciple, to the natural suggestions of the human faculties, and to thegeneral, and, if I mistake not, the irresistible conviction of mankind.

Indeed Mr HUME himself, notwithstanding the assertion which Ihave been considering, seems to have been sensible that there was somedifference, in thought as well as in words, between the assertors of thedoctrine of Necessity and the vulgar, with respect to the relation of

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Motive and Action. He pays no regard to the vulgar persuasion, as aprinciple in philosophy, or as having any weight in deciding the pointin question; but he plainly admits it as a phænomenon, or matter offact, and even acknowledges it to be a curious one, by offering anelaborate explanation of it on his own principles.

“I have frequently considered (says he) what could possibly be thereason why all mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation,acknowledged the doctrine of Necessity, in their whole practice andreasoning, have yet discovered such reluctance to acknowledge it inwords, and have rather shewn a propensity to profess the contraryopinion. ... Let any one define a cause, without comprehending, as apart of the definition, a necessary connection with its effect; and lethim shew distinctly the origin of the idea, expressed by the definition,and I shall readily give up the whole controversy.”

These few paragraphs of Mr HUME’s Essay appear to me to containmany of the first principles of a system of false science; and to one whowas disposed, and thought himself qualified for such a work , theywould afford an opportunity for almost endless discussion. I shall begleave to offer a few observations on those parts of them only which aremost immediately connected with the subject of my Essay.

In the first place, There is a manifest ambiguity in the phraseNecessary connection. This indeed is acknowledged by Mr HUME

himself; but is not sufficiently considered and explained by him.The phrase Necessary connection may be supposed to mean a

connection which from the nature of things must take place, or, moreaccurately speaking, according to the laws of human thought, must beconceived by us to take place; the contrary of it, or any suppositioninconsistent with it, being not merely false, but either intuitively ordemonstrably impossible and absurd. Of this nature are all therelations in geometry; and many relations in various other subjects;several of which necessary relations, though of the highest importancein scientific investigations, have never yet been considered with thatattention which they deserve.

If Mr HUME meant that mankind have a propensity to believe, thatthey perceive something like a necessary connection of this kindbetween the cause and the effect in the material world, he was certainlymistaken, and deceived by the ambiguity of a word.

The bulk of mankind, far from having such a belief, never heard norever dreamed of such a question or such a supposition; and I suspect itwill be found no easy matter to make them comprehend the question,or understand the difference between a strictly necessary truth and amerely contingent truth of arbitrary appointment, which might havebeen otherwise if it had so pleased God.

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That a few individuals have held that the ultimate facts or laws ofphysics with respect to the relation of cause and effect are necessarytruths, as much as those of geometry, cannot be disputed. But this is oflittle consequence in the present question: For, besides the smallness ofthe number of those who have thought that the ultimate facts inphysics were either self-evident, or demonstrable a prior as necessarytruths, there can be no doubt, that such an opinion, whether right orwrong, is the result of deep inquiry and reasoning: but the bulk ofmankind have never been accustomed to inquire or reason on suchsubjects.

Though we have no reason to believe, we may for once, and for thesake of the argument to which the hypothesis leads, suppose, with MrHUME, that mankind in general have conceived some strictly necessaryconnection between particular causes and their effects in physics, andthat, feeling no such necessary connection between their ownvoluntary determinations and actions and the motives of them, theyhave thence been led to think, that the relation of Cause and Effect andthat of Motive and Action were different, and that the former beingnecessary, and the latter not, voluntary agents had a kind of power orliberty in their actions which bodies had not with respect to thechanges which occur in them.

It must be observed, that this would be a very strange and falseinference from the supposed premises: For surely snow would meltwith heat, a stone, when unsupported, would fall to the ground, and abilliard-ball would move on being struck, with equal certainty, andwith equally little pretensions to liberty, whether the three physicallaws alluded to in these three instances of cause and effect be necessarytruths, like those of geometry, or only contingent truths of positiveappointment, according to the will of the Supreme Being, orderingwhat he saw to be best. Nor would the case be different with respect toMotives and Actions, if the same relation, not of necessity, but onlyconstant conjunction, were conceived to subsist between them.

But admitting, in compliment to Mr HUME, that all mankindbelieved what not one in ten thousand of them ever thought of, andthat all of them with one consent drew from what they so believed aninference so palpably false, that it is scarce credible that any oneindividual should have drawn it, or thought of it; then I think itfollows necessarily, that when ever a person is satisfied that there isnot, or even that he has no reason to think that there is, any suchnecessary connection between particular physical causes and theireffects, he must instantly become a convert to the doctrine of Necessityas explained and asserted by Mr HUME, in his reconciling project. Forthere would then be left no difference perceptible to him, or even

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conceivable by him, between the two relations which he was wont todistinguish. But this conclusion, which is an evidently necessaryinference from Mr HUME’s doctrine on this point, is experimentallyfalse; therefore the doctrine of which it is a necessary inference must beerroneous.

The disavowal of any belief of a necessary connection, perceptible orintelligible to us, between particular physical causes and their effects,seems to be very fully implied in the modern and only successful way ofconducting physical inquiries; I mean, by observation, experiment, andinduction. This method has been followed by the most eminentphilosophers who have flourished since the days of GALILEO andBACON; yet it will scarce be pretended that they have all beenconvinced of the necessity of human actions as maintained by MrHUME, and consisting in the sameness of the two relations of cause andof motive; nor yet will it be said, by any reasonable man, that theyhave in general been so stupid as not to judge that things were the samebetween which they neither know nor supposed that there was anydifference. ...

SECT. II.

Another argument urged by Mr HUME on this point appears to me todeserve particular attention; not as being new, or peculiar to him, butas being commonly insisted on by those philosophers who haveespoused the same side of the question that he has done; which impliestwo things with respect to it: 1st, That it has very generally appeared tophilosophers plausible at least, if not absolutely satisfactory andconclusive; 2dly, That no complete answer or refutation has yet beengiven to it by those men of more vulgar understandings, for whoseinstruction and conviction it was intended, and has often been urged,but in vain.

“It is universally admitted” says Mr. HUME , “that nothing existswithout a cause of its existence.” ...

According to this meaning of the term Cause [as used in physics], theproposition or principle supposed to be universally admitted amountsprecisely to this: “That nothing exists, that no event comes to pass,that no action is done, that has not, or had not at least, somethingstanding in the very same relation to it that any cause in physics standsin to its effect: For instance, impulse to the motion of a body that wasfree to move, or heat to expansion, to fusion, or to evaporation.”

From the general tenor of all Mr HUME ’s reasonings on this subject,from the ultimate conclusions that he seems to have believed he had

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established, from the examples and illustrations which he hath given,and above all from the mention of the specific circumstance of constantconjunction, so often and so strongly insisted on by him as the chief oronly thing that we knew, or from the nature of our faculties couldknow, with respect either to the relation of physical cause and effect,or of motive and action, I think it cannot reasonably be doubted, thathis meaning by the proposition in question was precisely that which ismore fully and clearly stated in the preceding paragraph.

If such be the meaning of it, the answer to it must be very plain andeasy: That assumed principle, far from being universally admitted, hasnot even been heard or thought of by one in ten thousand of the humanrace. And when it is clearly stated to them, it may reasonably bedoubted, whether one in ten thousand of them will admit it; and itcannot be doubted by those who attend accurately to the differentrelations among things and events which we are able to perceive andjudge of, that it ought not to be admitted by any person. Mankindnaturally conceive the relations of agent, motive, and physical cause, tobe very different in some respects, though the same in others. And, inparticular, they seem very generally to have believed, that their ownvoluntary determinations and actions (in one sense of the term Action)do not stand in that relation to any person or thing whatever. Theformer of these points appears very clearly from the evidence oflanguage, even setting aside all regard to consciousness, or all faith inmens direct attention to their own thoughts. The latter of them appearsvery plainly from the general repugnance of men to admit, when firststated to them, the philosophical doctrine of Necessity, as consisting inthe perfect sameness of the relation of motive with that of physicalcause. ...

SECT. III.

Though I can by no means acquiesce in Mr HUME’s opinions andreasonings concerning the nature of the relation between motives andactions, and the perfect resemblance between it and the relation of causeand effect in physics, and can never admit the philosophical doctrine of thenecessity of human actions as explained and asserted by him; yet I must doMr HUME the justice to own, that I have found in his Essay on Liberty andNecessity one general proposition or principle, which appears to me suchplain and obvious good sense, that I shall without scruple adopt it as thefundamental principle of my own reasonings on the same subject,convinced that no man of sense can ever seriously call it in question, or everthink of dissenting from those conclusions to which it leads.

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“Whatever definition we may give of Liberty, (says this celebratedphilosopher), we should be careful to observe two requisite circum-stances: First, That it be consistent with plain matter of fact; secondly,That it be consistent with itself. If we observe these circumstances, andrender our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind willbe found of one opinion concerning it.”

I confess I have not penetration enough to discover, in the commonnotion of the liberty of human actions, either that inconsistence withplain matter of fact, or that inconsistence with itself, to which MrHUME seems to allude so confidently. And I am very sure that he hathpointed out no such inconsistence; and that it was scarce possible heshould have done so, even if there were an inconsistence between them;for this reason, among others, that he does not seem to have known,nor ever to have taken the trouble to inquire, what the common notionof Liberty is. But there can be no doubt, that a philosopher, even of thegreatest genius, especially if he were disposed and accustomed todisregard the common opinions and notions of mankind, might, inconsequence of careless or prejudiced observation, form to himself anotion, and give an account or definition of the popular conceptionand belief of the liberty of human actions, which should obviouslylabour under one or both of those grievous defects.

Such undoubtedly would be the case with any definition of Libertythat should correspond to what Mr HUME, in the following passages,insinuates, for I observe he does not directly assert it, to be thecommon notion on that subject.

“For what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions? Wecannot surely mean, that actions have so little connection withmotives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow witha certain degree of uniformity from the other: for these are plain andacknowledged facts.” – They surely are so; and there would be goodreason to call in question the veracity, as well as the understanding, ofany person who should venture to deny them.

“Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from thepeople in this particular... A man who at noon leaves his purse full ofgold on the pavement at Charing-Cross, may well expect that it shallfly away like a feather, as that he will find it untouched an hour after.”

The case of the prisoner endeavouring to make his escape, is put byMr HUME very ingeniously, but I think not quite fairly, even for hisown side of the question. A wretch who has neither money nor interesthas not the proper instruments to work upon an obstinate gaoler, evenaccording to Mr HUME’s own system; but setting aside this nicety, andsupposing a felon to have both money to work on his gaoler, and files,and chissels, and hammers, to work on his fetters, and on the walls of

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his prison, I will venture to say, though at first it must appear aparadox, that he shews more knowledge of the relation of cause andeffect and of that motive and action, nay that he even reasons moreclosely and justly from the principle of the constant conjunction ofcause and effect in physics, than ever Mr HUME did, when, all othercircumstances being equal, he endeavours to employ the file and thechissel on the iron and stone, rather than the gold on the gaoler: For,knowing the conjunction of cause and effect to be constant, he is surethat every stroke of his file and of his chissel will have its effect, and ofcourse bring him nearer to his purpose. If he has time enough, and isnot interfered with, nor opposed in any other way, he is certain ofaccomplishing his escape; but knowing, or at least believing, that therelation of motive and action is not a constant, but an occasional andseparable conjunction, and that it depends on the person to whom amotive is applied, whether it shall be conjoined with its action or not,he is uncertain of gaining his purpose by offering to bribe his gaoler;and he knows that he may make a thousand offers without advancingin the least his desired escape. But this important difference betweenthe two relations in question is to be illustrated more fully in thesequel. ...

SECT. IV

... I have occasion often to consider the supposed want of any such

attribute of mind [i.e., active power], as the fundamental principle ofthe doctrine of Necessity. And for the sake of brevity, and theopposition to what has been often termed Activity, and Force of Mind,I call it the Inertia of Mind; limiting, however, the signification of thephrase to denote merely the incapacity of acting optionally or discre-tionally, without motives, or in opposition to all motives, or in anyother way but just according to the motives applied; and expresslyexcluding from the meaning of the phrase the circumstance of mindremaining or preserving in any state into which it once gets, as bodydoes in a state, either of rest or of uniform progressive rectilinearmotion, into which it is once put. Such permanency of state does notappear to be any part of the constitution of the human mind withrespect to any of its operations. ...

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SECT. VI

After so many preliminaries, it is time at last to state the chief propo-sition which I mean to prove with respect to the difference between therelation of motive and action and that of cause and effect in physics,and to proceed to the argument by which it may be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION. There is in mind a certain independent self-governingpower, which there is not in body; in consequence of which there is agreat difference between the relation of motive and action and that ofcause and effect in physics; and by means of which a person, in allcommon cases, may, at his own discretion, act either according to or inopposition to any motive, or combination of motives, applied to him;while body, in all cases, irresistibly undergoes the change corre-sponding to the cause, or combination of causes, applied to it.

To demonstrate this, I assume the direct contrary supposition withrespect to mind, and suppose it to have no such self-governing power,any more than body has; and that all our volitions, determinations,and actions, come to pass in consequence of the motives applied to us,as irresistibly on our part as the changes or effects in body do from theapplication of physical causes; and trace the necessary consequences ofthis supposed inertia of mind, and influence of motives, to conclusionsthat are either false or absurd, in the following manner.

The relation of motive and action must be either a constantconjunction, as that of cause and effect in physics seems to be, or not aconstant conjunction, that is an occasional and separable conjunction.

If the relation of motive and action and that of cause and effect inphysics be a constant conjunction, the most obvious and generalnecessary consequences of it must be such as may be assertedaccurately by the following algebraical formulæ, or canons, oruniversal application.

X _ A.Y_ B.Z _ C.

X+Y _ A + B.X – Y _ A –B.X@Y _ A@B.

As this mode of expression must be new to every person, it may benecessary to point out how the preceding formulæ are to be read. It isthus:

If a certain cause or motive X is constantly conjoined with a certaineffect or action A, and if another cause or motive Y is constantly

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conjoined with a certain effect or action B, of the same kind with theaction or effect A, and if no other cause or motive Z constantlyconjoined with a certain effect or action C, of the same kind with Aand B, interfere; then when X and Y are applied at the same time to thesame subject or person, and directly concur, the effect or action conse-quent upon them, or, in the language of the system, constantlyconjoined with them, must be A and B jointly, concurring or addedtogether, and more than either of them singly, by the whole amount ofthe other: When X and Y directly oppose and counteract one another,the effect or action constantly conjoined with them must be A opposedand counteracted by B, and less than ether of them singly by the wholeamount of the other: And when X and Y applied at the same time tothe same subject or person, neither directly concur, nor yet directlyoppose one another, they must be constantly conjoined with the effector action A, combined with or modified by the effect or action B, anddifferent from either A or B taken singly. And the difference betweenthe result of such a combination of causes or motives, and that resultwhich would have taken place if only one of them had been applied,must be equal to the full effect of the other.

The peculiar advantage of these general algebraical expressions, orformulæ, which I shall frequently have occasion to make use of, andrefer to as a sort of canons, is, that they are not only more distinct,accurate, and concise, but more comprehensive, than expressions ofthe same thoughts or conclusions in common language could easily bemade; and at the same time carry most distinctly their own evidencealong with them. They are in truth, like other algebraical formulæ, akind of distinct short hand. ...

SECT. IX.

Any man of tolerable ingenuity, or even industry, who will take thetrouble to search for instances of the analogy and resemblance betweenthe relation of cause and effect and that of motive and action, willeasily find many thousands of cases, which may be construed intoinstances of the assumed principles with respect to the latter relation,and regarded as good illustrations of the necessary inferences whichhave been drawn from those principles. But every man of observationand candour must know and acknowledge, that there are thousands offamiliar instances in direct contradiction to those inferences andprinciples, any one of which is sufficient to prove them false: for as theinferences are all strictly necessary, if the principles from which theyare deduced be just, they must be universally true; and an exception to

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them is a refutation of one or other, or both, of the principles assumed.And it is chiefly on this account that the principle of inertia of mind,

and that of the constant conjunction of motive and action, areexpressed separately in this argument: for though the former is fullyimplied in the latter, this is not mutual; the inertia of mind may beconceived, even though the relation of motive and action should be,not a constant, but an occasional separable conjunction.

I shall consider, successively, instances of all the three cases of thecombination, opposition, and concurrence of physical causes, and ofmotives, respectively, in order to shew the difference between theseemingly constant conjunction of causes and effect in physics, and themanifestly occasional separable conjunction of motive and action.

If any cause be applied to a body, in consequence of which it wouldmove with a certain velocity in the direction A B, and no other cause beapplied, which might either accelerate or retard its motion, or alter thedirection of it, it will describe the line AB in a certain time. But ifanother cause be at the same time applied to the body, in consequenceof which, if applied singly, it would have moved in the direction AC,with such a velocity as to describe AC in the same time that it woulddescribe AB in consequence of the other cause; then, as Sir ISAAC

NEWTON has proved, it will, nay it must, move in the direction AD,

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and describe the whole diagonal AD, in the same time that it wouldhave described either AB or AC separately, if only one of the causes ofmotion had been applied.

But will the same result take place in the case of a similar combi-nation of motives prompting to different actions?

If a porter is offered a guinea for every mile that he will carry a letterin the direction A B, and no other cause or motive, either physical ormoral, occur, he will probably go on in that direction, till either themotive cease, by his desire of wealth being fully gratified, or else somenew motive, or some physical cause occur, to stop, or retard, or alterhis course; such as fatigue, or hunger, or thirst, or some river, or sea,or mountain, which he cannot pass.

If the same porter were at another time offered either a guinea or halfa guinea for every mile that he should carry the letter in the directionAC, and no other cause or motive were applied, he would go in thedirection AC, with just the same limitations and exceptions as in theformer case.

And the evident facts, or general result, to be expected in both thesecases, will be admitted as true by those who deny, as well as by thosewho assert, the philosophical doctrine of Necessity; and especially thatof the constant conjunction of motive and action. For it has never beensaid, nor can it without the most glaring folly ever be said, that there isno relation between motives and actions, or that there is no analogy orresemblance between this relation and that of cause and effect inphysics, or that motives are never conjoined with their proper actions:it is only the nature of the former relation, and the degree or extent ofthe resemblance between it and the latter, and the precise point of theconstancy of the conjunction of motive and action, that are thesubjects of dispute between philosophers and the vulgar. It might evenappear probable, from a superficial view of such instances of therelation of motive and action, that the conjunction between them wasconstant, like that between cause and effect in physics. I mean, thatthis might appear probable to men who either had not the usualnatural consciousness of self-governing power and independentactivity in themselves, or who, having such consciousness, should thinkfit to disregard it as a foolish vulgar prejudice, But let those twomotives, prompting to different actions, be applied at once, and theerror and the folly of such an opinion will soon appear.

Let our porter be offered a guinea a mile for carrying the letter in thedirection AB; and at the same time let him be offered half a guinea amile for carrying it in the direction A C; and let him be assured, that ifhe earn the guineas, he cannot earn the half-guineas, and that if heearns the half-guineas, he cannot earn the guineas.

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Will he go in the direction AB, or in the direction AC, or in thedirection AD, or in any other direction, or will he remain at rest at thepoint A?

I say, that if the doctrine of the inertia of mind, and the constantconjunction of motive and action, be true, he will go in the diagonalAD; and that it is folly for him to make a pretence of thinking, andridiculous to make any words about it; for go he must in that precisedirection, as sure as ever a projectile moved in a curve; and prettynearly for the same reasons. And this he must do, though he cannotearn, and knows that he cannot earn, one farthing by doing so: for thecircumstance of earning, or not earning, any thing by his work, relatesmerely to the vulgar notion of motive, “that for the sake of which,”and has nothing to do with the philosophical notion of motive, whicheither consists in, or at least comprehends, the specific principle ofconstant conjunction. Now, my purpose is to shew, that those twonotions are inconsistent: for though this appears to me self-evident,and has been generally acknowledged by mankind, at least by thevulgar; yet as philosophers of such eminence as Mr HUME and DrPriestly have not seen it, nor thought of it, it must be owned, that itrequires a rigorous proof. And further I say, that if the porter do not goin that direction, the doctrine in question must be false. ...

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30ALEXANDER CROMBIE

Alexander Crombie, An essay on philosophical necessity. ByAlexander Crombie, A.M., London, printed for J. Johnson, 1793, [2],viii, 508 p.Selections from 2.13, and 3.1; from 1793 edition.

Born in Aberdeen and educated at Marischal College, AlexanderCrombie (1762–1840) had early plans for the ministry, but devoted

his life to running a private school in London. He wrote on a variety oftopics including philosophy, education, and Latin grammar. His firstpublished work, An Essay on Philosophical Necessity (1793), defendsdeterminism, attacking the free will positions of Richard Price,Thomas Reid, and James Gregory. A former follower of Beattie and anadvocate of libertarianism, Crombie states in the Preface that he waslater converted to necessitarianism by Priestley’s writings. Aftercomposing his Essay, Crombie sent the manuscript to Priestley, whopraised the work and arranged for its publication. Crombie’s principalposition is that, of the various motives that influence our wills at agiven moment, the most prominent motive will in fact determine ouractions. In the selections below, Crombie defends Hume againstattacks by Reid and Gregory. Reid attacks Hume’s notion of cause thatunderlies his determinism; Crombie contends that Reid misunderstoodHume’s notion. Gregory opposes Hume’s concept that nothing existswithout a cause; Crombie responds that it is indeed a universal law.Crombie’s work was favourably reviewed in the major review journals.The Analytical Review expresses its obligation to Crombie “for thepleasure and improvement he has afforded us, and the interestingmanner in which it is treated” (1794, Vol. 18 pp. 20–30). The CriticalReview concludes, “Upon the whole, we must, however, allow Mr.Crombie to be an able champion in the cause of the doctrine ofnecessity; but he seems to possess more ingenuity than solidity ofjudgment or strength of reasoning” (September 1795, Vol. 15, pp.95–99). Writing for the Monthly Review, William Enfield states, “Mr.Crombie appears to be completely master of the subject, and to possessthe essential qualifications of an able disputant” (October 1794, Vol.15 pp. 128–136). Crombie’s Essay was criticized by Reid in a 1793

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letter to James Gregory, and later by Gregory himself in Letters fromDr. James Gregory of Edinburgh (1819). The following is from the1793 and only edition of Crombie’s work.

CHAP. II.SECT. XIII.

Dr. Reid’s Enquiry into the principal Arguments for Necessity,examined.

...Our Author, in order to overturn this principle, that for every effect

there must be a sufficient cause, proceeds next to apply it “to events ofanother kind.” His observations, however, on this part of the subject, Imust take the liberty to say, appear to me wholly unworthy of Dr.Reid’s acknowledged learning and sagacity.

“Another argument,” continues he, “that has been used to prove,liberty of action impossible, is, that it implies an effect without acause.” In his examination of this argument, he endeavours to shew,that Mr. Hume’s definition of a cause, namely, such previous circum-stances, as are constantly followed by a certain effect, is essentiallyerroneous. His two first objections to this definition proceed soobviously from a misapprehension of Mr. Hume’s meaning, as torequire no answer.

His third objection is, “that, from this definition it follows, that wehave no reason to conclude, that every event must have a cause; forinnumerable events happen, when it cannot be shewn, that there werecertain previous circumstances, that have been constantly followed bysuch an event.”

I interrupt the quotation to observe, that Mr. Hume’s definitioncannot be understood to mean, that when new combinations takeplace, the result was not the offspring of the previous circumstances, orthat they did not bear to each other the relation of cause and effect,merely because the combination was unprecedented. It implies simply,that constant conjunction establishes the relation, and that till thisuniform connection is ascertained, the relation cannot be regarded ascertain.

“And, though it were certain,” says he, “that every event we havehad access to observe had a cause, it would not follow, that every eventmust have a cause. For it is contrary to the rules of Logic to conclude,that, because a thing has always been, therefore it must be: to reasonfrom what is contingent, to what is necessary.”

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Answer. If it be possible, that an effect may be produced without acause, or that any circumstances may occur, when an uncaused effectcan take place, then it follows, that these circumstances may havealready existed. For if it be possible hereafter, it must have beenpossible in time past. If so, the universe itself may be an effect withouta cause.

His fourth reason for rejecting the definition he expresses thus: –“From this definition of a cause, it would follow, that we have noreason to conclude, that there was any cause of the creation of theworld: for there were no previous circumstances, that had beenconstantly followed by such an effect. – And for the same reason, itwould follow from the definition, that whatever was singular in itsnature, or the first thing of its kind, could have no cause.” – Thisobjection, which is founded in a misconstruction of Mr. Hume’smeaning, I have already answered.

After endeavouring to overturn Mr. Hume’s definition of the termcause, our Author proceeds to offer his own. “Why may not,” says he,“an efficient cause be defined to be, a being, that hath power and willto produce the effect.” To this definition no Necessarian, I believe, willobject; but it will not subserve Dr. Reid’s hypothesis, unless he canprove, that the will, in its volitions, is governed by no laws. ...

CHAP. III.SECTION I.

Dr. Gregory’s Essay in Defence of Philosophical Liberty analized andanswered.

...From page 16 to 26, he combats the opinion of Mr. Hume, who

affirms, that all mankind are Necessarians in practice, thoughLibertarians, in words; asserting, in opposition to this sentiment, thatthe bulk of mankind have no conception of a necessary connectionexisting between motives and actions. He observes, that the phrasenecessary connection is manifestly ambiguous. He says, it may besupposed to mean a connection, which, from the nature of things, musttake place, and the contrary of which would imply an impossibility; –such as are “the relations in geometry, and many relations in variousother subjects.”

A necessary connection of this kind, he observes, was never by anyperson supposed to exist between cause and effect in the materialworld. He acknowledges, however, that this phrase has been employedto denote also the relation between a physical cause and its effect. But,as this relation is merely the appointment of the Deity, and might have

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been otherwise, if he had so determined, he chuses to denominate thisconnection, in the phraseology of Mr. Hume, not a necessary, but only“an uniform, regular, constant, or inseparable connection orconjunction.” This connection, he says, mankind have always believedto take place between physical causes and their effects, and in hisjudgment, “very rightly,” but not in the relation of motive and action.

Section II. is employed in examining the truth of the universallyreceived maxim, that nothing exists without a cause. After stating,what he conceives to be the popular meaning of the term cause, heoffers an objection to the use of this term, as the correlate of mereexistence; and charges Mr. Hume, without the semblance of rationalargument, with being guilty of an error, in having thus employed it.The proposition, as stated by that sagacious philosopher, requires noelucidation to any man of common discernment.

He proceeds then to inform his reader, that he candidly supposes,that the proposition implies only, “that there is no event, that is nobeginning of existence, no end of existence, no change of the state ormode of existence, not even the action of a living sentient intelligentbeing, without a cause.” The proposition, however, as thus explained,he says, cannot be, with any propriety, either admitted or denied, tillthe import of the word cause be precisely and accurately defined, orexplained, by ample illustration.

Having enumerated the various meanings of the term in question,and having fixed the sense in which only, as he conceives, it can beused, in the proposition as stated by Mr. Hume, he observes, that themaxim supposed to be universally admitted, amounts to this, “thatnothing exists, that no event comes to pass, that no action is done, thathas not, or had not at least, something standing in the very samerelation to it, that any cause in physics stands in to its effect.”

The proposition, as thus explained, he affirms, is so far from beinguniversally admitted, that not even one of ten thousand of the humanrace has ever heard of it; and he charges Mr. Hume, who assumes it asan axiom, and hence deduces the Necessarian hypothesis, with apetitio principii. This proposition he himself rejects as inadmissible;1st, Because it is a begging of the question; and 2dly, Because it issupported by no evidence.

In answer to the first reason, I observe, that the proposition, asstated by Mr. Hume, must be admitted as a metaphysical universality;for a change produced by nothing, is inconceivable and impossible.Wherever a change takes place, there must have been something previ-ously existing to produce that change. In every possible instance, thedenial of this axiom involves the most palpable absurdity. Everychange, every effect, necessarily implies a pre-existing cause. As the

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422 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

universality then is obviously not a moral, but a metaphysical one, Iam warranted by every rule in the dialectic art, to reason from thatwhich is true, simply and absolutely, to prove the same true in everypossible instance; or, as Logicians have termed it, to argue a dictosimpliciter, ad dictum secundum quid, without being chargeable withcircular argument. I will apply these observations to the point inquestion.

A Necessarian affirms, that every change of circumstances, whetherin animate or inanimate nature, in other words, whatever exists, musthave a cause. Ex nihilo nihil fit, is an incontrovertible truth. Everyaction implies a change of circumstances: therefore, every action musthave a cause. Every volition, which is the antecedent to an act, implieslikewise a change of circumstances; therefore every volition must havea cause. This cause we term motive, in which we include the externalobject presented to the mind, together with the affection therebyexcited, by producing a definite and correspondent volition. Is this toreason in a circle, or to beg the question? Is it not the fair applicationof an universal axiom to a particular case? If from the establishedposition, that every square is right angled, I draw this conclusion, thatthis or that square is right angled, is the reasoning circular? If in thesame manner, from the undeniable axiom, that every change must havea cause, I infer, that every volition, which is a change, must have acause, is the inference illegitimate? Or does the reasoning involve apetitio principii? The meanest novice in the dialectic art would notassert it. To affirm, therefore, that every volition, which is theantecedent to an action, must have a cause, is an assertion which everyNecessarian has a right to advance. ...

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[Chapter title] 423

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424 Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings

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