Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Easy Come, Easy Go: Smugglers on the Ganges

W i l l e m v a n S c h e n d e l *

The state dominates our lives. Countless studies have been devoted to the attempts of states to regulate the behaviour of their citizens. One aspect of life which all states seek to regulate is foreign trade. By doing so, they create the circumstances which make smuggling, or unregulated foreign trade, a profitable activity. Depending on the policy and strength of the state, smuggling may be marginalised or developed into a major economic activity. Because of its clandestine nature, it remains largely undetected and unrecorded. Nevertheless, it merits serious attention, as an underrated branch of international trade as well as a comment on the state, perhaps the most important organisation in the contemporary world.

It is for this last reason that any study of smuggling today is a delicate affair, providing insights into the inner workings of states and their relations with neighbour- ing states. Obviously, smuggling would not be possible without the connivance of some state officials, if not their active co-operation. The very existence of smuggling undermines the image of the state as a unitary organisation enforcing law and order within a clearly defined territory. This is exactly why the study of smuggling can throw light on the complexities and limitations of the state. Those who wish to understand contemporary states could do worse than to start with an exploration of smuggling.

This article deals with smuggling between India and Bangladesh, two states which differ enormously in size, structure and trade policies. They are both new states and there is no long tradition of smuggling between them. In 1947 the colony of British India disintegrated as it attained independence. New maps showed two new states, Pakistan and India, separated by international borders where none had ever existed before. The repercussions of this momentous change have been studied on the administrative and political level, but we know little about its economic and social effects. What did it mean for economic links that had crosscut these borders? For transportation networks? For networks of -kinship, friendship, religion, language?

My study focuses on trade links in one small area where the international border runs through the middle of the Ganges. The border separates a population that speaks one language, Bengali, and used to be united by all kinds of social and economic interdependence. In 1947 these ties were severed. Those to the east of thel border became (East) Pakistanis, 1 and those to the west, Indians. The two new states were on bad terms and worried about the safety of their borders which they patrolled

* Dept. of History, Erasmus University, Rotterdam Journal o f Contenrporary Asia Vol. 23 No. 2 (1993)

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

190 JCA 23:2/Schendel

assiduously° Contacts between local residents across the border became almost impossible? Cross-border trade was declared illegal, and age-old trade routes had to be given up. The Ganges itself had been a most important waterway, with large steamers, smaller launches and a host of country boats regularly plying between its many ports on both banks. After 1947 river trade had to be discontinued. The border security forces would allow only some small boats to lransport goods up or down the "domestic" bank of the river, but at times of heightened tension between India and Pakistan even this was too dangerous.

In December 1971 India and Pakistan fought their third war, which resulted in the establishment of the state of Bangladesh on the eastern bank of the Ganges. Tension at the border eased as relations between Bangladesh and India were more amicable. But this was not to last long. From 1975 successive Bangladesh governments sought to restrict cross-border contacts once again. Unlike their Pakistani predeccssors, how- ever, they were largely unsuccessful. Illegal cross-border trade grew, particularly after 1986, a few years after state power had been taken over by a government under General Ershad. 3

Cross-border Trade This article describes trade between two small ghats (landing places) on the Ganges in the 1980s? The border was closed here; the nearest official border crossings were some 30 kin. away° Before 1971, little trade had been conducted along this closed sector of the border. One of the villagers said that "not one in a thousand people" was involved in it then because the risks had been too high and profits uncertain. The paramilitary forces defending the local border prohibited traffic on the fiver as well as the movement of many goods from the border to the interior. Their vigilance made cross-border trade a very occasional and furtive affair in this area. Between 1971 and 1975 cross-border trade developed for the first time, but stricter controls curbed it somewhat later on. After the mid-1980s, however, these controls were lifted and unlawful cross-border trade, or smuggling, grew more than ever°

Smuggling is an important economic activity all along the India-Bangladesh border. The local press often carries reports about it but detailed studies have not been published? Yet from the existing evidence it is clear that certain goods pass the border at specific places, and some border areas are more involved in smuggling than others. The area which I studied was completely rural and located on a part of the border which, being a river, was easy to monitor. The volume of trade passing through it was unexceptional; many bulk goods passed the easier land border some 30 kin. to the south . 6

Nevertheless, a brisk trade was carded on at the two local ghats facing each other across the river. On the Indian side there was a good road connection and on the Bangladesh side there was a small railway station nearby, while an all-weather road was gradually being extended in ~ e 1980s. Much of the trade depended on transport by bicycle or on foot, which did not require a sophisticated infrastructure. People from

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smugglers on the Ganges 191

several other riverside villages came to these ghats to trade because at this point the river was relatively narrow and easy to cross. 7

In terms of goods, trade here was not specialised at all. A bewilderingly wide and unstable mix of goods passed back and forth across the border, and local people suggested that this was typical of most rural crossings in the region. In terms of bulk, the most important goods coming from India were sugar and salt which were much cheaper there than in Bangladesh. Other major items were cheap cotton saris, bicycle parts and tyres, animal hides, machine parts, spices~ onions, buffaloes and cows? The trade from Bangladesh was dominated by synthetic cloth, second-hand clothes, scrap- iron and brass, milk powder, fresh fish and gold2

Demand and supply were far from stable, and the mix of goods crossing the border was unpredictable. One of the standard topics of conversation in the border villages was the goods which had been spotted at the ghat earlier that day. Sudden local shortages on one side of the border might lead to a reversal of trade flows. Thus one day a consignment of cement, in sacks pronouncing it to be "a Gift of the People of the United States of America," arrived from Bangladesh and was bought by an Indian contractor. Two weeks later this same contractor was able to sell Indian cement to Bangladeshi buyers who were faced with a sudden drop in supply. Similar reversals occurred occasionally in the case of sesame, mulberry leaves, medicines, heroin and cow's hides. '°

The unpredictable nature of cross-border trade also had political causes. Quarrels over the division of the spoils were the most common° As certain commodities were being supplied by only one entrepreneur, his '~ disappearance from the scene would mean the end of trading in that commodity for some time.

For a while just before my period of fieldwork a roaring trade in fresh fish had been conducted by Anu, one of the villagers on the Bangladesh side. He would bring in fish by the truckload from as far away as Dhaka and ferry his perishable ware across the Ganges. Another track on the Indian side would whisk it away to Calcutta where it fetched a much higher price than in fish-rich Bangladesh. Unfortunately for Anu, he fell out with some of his associates~ was arrested, and had to spend a year in jail. As a result, the fish trade collapsed completely.

Trade Networks

Trade across the India-Bangladesh border was based upon many different partner- ships° The people involved had little in common except the fact that they despatched their merchandise via the same obscure border villages. Five types of partnership could be distinguished.

Providing raw materials to industries in the neighbouring country. Industrialists in search of cheap raw materials made active use of cross-border trade. Prominent among these were plastic manufacturers in India who were willing to pay handsomely for "elpi" from Bangladesh. "'Elpf' was the term used locally for brightly-coloured synthetic cloth, produced in Southeast Asia, Korea, Japan and Europe and exported to Bangladesh. 12 Daily large quantities of "elpl ~ would cross the river. The villagers

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

192 JCA 23:2/Schendel

explained that these would be tamed into plastic ornaments, buttons, plastic rope, and sometimes T-shirts, some of which would find their way back to Bangladesh. The industrialists were never seen in the border villages; trade was entrusted to a chain of intermediaries, stretching from importers and collecting agents in Dhaka through distributors, local despatchers, coolies (day labourers), boatmen, to female runners and mack drivers delivering the goods in Calcutta or elsewhere. Other raw materials which were sent to India by similar means were scrap-iron and broken brassware. Conversely, Bangladesh industry benefited from Indian dyes, animal hides, silk yam and jute. 13

Finding a market for industrial goods. Almost any factory goods that were available in the neighbouring country could pass the border. The most notable Indian manufactures were cheap cotton saris, t4 bicycle parts and tyres, machine parts and cosmetics° Bangladesh manufactures were much less sought after (some medicines and light bulbs crossed into India), but Bangladesh served as a transit-port for many foreign manufactures which were officially excluded from the Indian market. Milk powder, soybean oil, electronics and watches were among the most prominent. In these cases, too~ a long chain of intermediaries linked industrialists with their customers in the other country. Orders could be placed for special deliveries of any goods, and it was not uncommon for customers to demand a price indication before they placed their order.

Clandestine trade. Those who dealt in the above goods had little to fear outside the border region° But the trade in heroin and precious metals had to be hidden from the law throughout. Discretion was of the essence at this tail-end of international trade networks; the goods did not originate in either Bangladesh or India and had to cross two or more borders before they reached their customers. Consequently, the number of intermediaries was kept as low as possible, and the network showed the "double- funnel" shape often associated with hard-drug smuggling by large criminal syndi- cates) 5 Usually couriers, despatched by an urban dealer in one country, would cross the border and deliver the goods in person to an address in the other country. Gold "biscuits '~ and pure silver (chandi) travelled from Bangladesh to India in this way, and heroin went in the opposite direction. ~6 People in the border villages were kept out of this secretive trade, but occasional visits by u'aders from Bombay, Pakistan and Dhaka indicated heightened activity°

Agricultural marketing. Many spices, vegetables and fruits routinely crossed the border. The perishable nature of many of these foodstuff necessitated short lines of communication. ~r Local traders dominated here; they had to be present at the landing place to approve the quality and freshness of each delivery which was sent to, or received from, the other side. The trade in sugar and salt followed the same pattern. Although these were industrial goods, they were highly perishable and had to be checked continually°

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smu~lers on the Gan~..s 193

One-off trade. Tae smallest and mos t transient partnerships developed around irregular trade. For example, a sudden shortage of mulberry leaves among s i lkworm rearers on the Indian bank might lead to a request for a few boatloads of leaves f rom the opposi te side. S o m e owners o f mulber ry trees in Bangladesh would then be contacted i f their trees happened to be in leaf. One-off trade was, however, most com- monly associated with theft: someone might steal a sewing machine, abscond with a bicycle, or lift a few heads of cattle, and cross the r iver to f ind a buyer for them.

The Local Orgamsation of Smuggling All these trade networks came together at the two ghats on the Ganges. A casual visitor could have observed the fo l lowing scene.

It is a quiet February morning in a typical riverside village. A few small wooden boats are out on the immense river. They may be fishing or ferrying people across, as on any other river in Bengal. In the long grass on the river bank some youngsters are loitering. One is playing a bamboo flute, and the melancholy sound drifts away over the river and the fields. Another group is sitting in a circle, cracking jokes and sorting shiny cloth of many hues. A few men are talking quietly under a tree, shooing away some noisy urchins. An old woman gazes dreamily into the far distance.

Suddenly a boat is being punted to the bank. Two coolies materialise from behind a hut; they are carrying big tins of soybean oil, suspended from yokes. The men under the tree look up, and a tall one, holding a stick, walks to the waterside. The old woman arranges a cloth on her head and calls the urchins. The youngsters wrap up their cloths into enormous headloads, and come hurrying down to the beat. The flute player is wading through the water, calling to the men on the boat to hand him one of the many heavy jute bags.

Within five minutes the children are on their way, balancing assorted boxes on their heeds. They are followed by the woman whose head is almost invisible under a mass of brightly coloured quilts. The men under the tree are inspecting bags of sugar, a box of marbles, and two electric fans, while the tall man with the stick is suspiciously counting a consignment of goatskins. One of the men from the boat is crossing the field with three big white cows.

Meanwhile the boat is being loaded with bags, boxes, huge bundles and tins. One of the youngsters is quanelling with the boatman about the fate. The coolies with the yokes are standing by, sharing a smoke. In the distance a man is naming beside a bicycle piled high with yellow-and-red fins of Australian milk powder. Two goats and six men are jostling with each other for room on the boat when it pushes off. As it glides away, one of the goats falls off; the boamran hauls it out of the water by its scruff. On the bank, nobody notices the incident; everybody has mined away from the river. Soon a languid peace returns to the village°

In order to make sense of this scene it is necessary to understand how smuggl ing was organised at the vi l lage level. How did the different relationships come together? Let us begin by looking at the people who control the ghat.

Leaders. The entire India-Bangladesh border is d iv ided into sections which are under the control of var ious "b ig leaders" (Bengali : b o r e lidor) supported by "side leaders" (sa id / idor) . l e a d e r s h i p in smuggl ing is based on chaIaki (cleverness and the capacity to outwit others) and wealth. Another crucial element, acceptance by the local security forces, wil l be discussed below. Strong and stable leadership is essential because any uncertainty may lead to decl ining conf idence among traders (who wil l move their business to a more secure border crossing) , or even to a comple te suspension of trade.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

194 JCA 23:2/Sche~dei

At the time of fieldwork, the Bangladesh ghat was dominated by Lotif, supported by four side leaders from the same village. All of them were in their late twenties and early thirties. Lotif had been a side leader himself till two years ago, when the previous big leader, Anu, had gone to jailo Anu was a living legend. A very strong and guileful leader with a history of armed robbery and a reputation for personal violence~ he had dominated the ghat for eight years° He was well known all the way to Dhaka as Anu Goonda or Anu Leader. His side leaders were completely dominated by him, he used to "hold them in his hand" ( 'oder hater bhitore rakhto'). Anu's demise showed the eternal weak spot of smuggling tycoons° He fell out with some powerful business associates who then betrayed him to the police. After his spell in jail, he returned to the village and smuggling, but did not re-establish himself as the big leader. Not only had Lotif taken over, but the criminal case against Anu was still pending. As such he was a liability to the trade~ and he first had to make sure the case would be dropped. Reasoning that "government people are excused much" ( 'shorkarer lok onek map ~, he planned to become a member of the local government body (union porishod). During his campaign he distanced himself from smuggling, and his wife took care of the family business.

Lotif had taken over as the big leader just when cross-border trade began to flourish° He spent most of his time at the ghat, carrying out a leader's main task: checking on all goods passing back and forth, and collecting money for allowing them to cross the river. These collections were known locally as "duty fee," or even, ironically, as "duty free." When Lotif was not at the gha t, one of his lieutenants would stand in for him. The big leader and his side leaders took equal shares of the daily takings, which were collected around the clock.

The situation on the Indian side was quite similar. Here an old leader, Maksud, had been in command for over twenty years. In 1988, however, he ran for local political office (member of the gram ponchayot), won, and refused to step down as ghat leader. Tensions developed as many people thought the combination of tasks would be too risky, while others were worried that no new leader would be able to run the ghat so smoothly as Maksud had done all these years. Moreover, Maksud was the only Congress Party candidate to win a seat in the region among twenty successful candidates of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). It was rumoured that these others also wanted a piece of the action. Fights broke out in the local market. It took months of negotiations to work out a settlement: Maksud would formally step down as big leader but he and his side leaders would still get three-fifths of the ghat earnings.

Border guards. 1~ Leaders would have been nowhere without the connivance and support of the paramilitary forces stationed in the area. The fiver banks were dotted with small border security camps a few kilometres apart, and these played a vital role in cross-border trade. The relationship between leaders and border guards was complex and full of circumspection° It was based on protection: the border guards guaranteed the uninterrupted operation of cross-border trading in exchange for a fixed share of the proceeds, But the border guards were also instrumental in creating and

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smugglers on the Ganges 195

legitimising leaders. For example, when a new commander (ha v/ldar) arrived at the 15-man camp which was situated just outside the Bangladesh village, he summoned the ghat leaders to renegotiate the share. To this meeting he could invite other local persons, who might offer a higher share. The commander could instate these people as new side leaders, but not if this jeopardised the flow of trade by alienating the old leaders or undermining trust on the Indian side. After the share had been agreed, the ghat leadership would be protected by the camp. One of the border guards would always be present at the ghat, dressed as a villager, to monitor the trade and to make certain that the camp got its due.

An important difference between Bangladesh and India in this respect was a more distant relationship between Indian border guards and smugglers. The Indian Border Security Force (BSF) was made up of men from different parts of India° The language they used was Hindi, not Bengali, and they were not close to the local way of life; it was often more difficult for smugglers to come to an understanding with them. The Indian ghat had considerable trouble with one North Indian BSF officer. "lifts "Khan Saheb" had put fear into the minds of the local smugglers° He used to beat up Bangladeshis whenever he caught them, and sometimes sent them home covered in pitch. As he was impervious to bribes, the traders resorted to threats to his life. They heaved a sigh of relief at the news of his transfer, which contributed to a resurgence of trade at the ghat. This officer was a rare bird; smuggling depends heavily upon more accommodating border guards.

Runners. Leaders and border guards dominated smuggling at the village level but the largest group of participants was made up of the runners. They were the actual smugglers who ran the greatest physical risk. There were several categories of runners. First there were the labourers or coolies, local people whose task it was to transport goods from the roadside to the boat, or from the boat to traders' houses. They were paid by the load, and according to sex and age. They did not usually cross the river in the course of their work. A second group were the ferrymen, who helped everybody across. A third ~oup of runners consisted of people who linked the ghat with market towns in the interior, bus stops, or the railway station. Many of them covered long distances on foot (all-night trips were no exception at all) or on bicycle. In this category there were many who did not live in the riverside villages. If they did not work in team with a local trader, they usually crossed the river with their goods, and returned after having received a payment from a trader on the opposite side. Fourth, there were professional couriers who made long trips by public transport (buses, trains, launches) to deliver their goods in big cities like Dhaka, Calcutta and Bombay. These couriers also routinely travelled far into the other country.

Traders. Between the runners, who were wage workers rather than businessmen or businesswomen, and the ghat leaders, who would not always bother with trading on their own account, there was a large, varied and unstable group of villagers who were ernss-border traders. They could be small peasants or even labourers who sank a few hundred takas or rupees ~9 in the sad or salt trade during the agricultural off-

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

196 JCA 23:2/Schend~l

season. Or they could be substantial shopkeepers who acted as regular dealers in large quantities of milkpowder or sugar and whose working capital ran into hundreds of thousands of rupees or takas. The group of local traders was characterised by remarkable social mobility, both upwards and downwards, and their fortunes were the most sensitive indicator of market trends.

The men, women and children that could be seen at the gha t belonged to these categories° A leader was always around together with his shadow, a suspicious border guard in civilian clothes. Runners of different descriptions would be waiting near the ghat or arrive by boat from the other bank. Local traders were around to receive or despatch goods, check their quality, and distribute them to their runners. In view of its complex and illicit nature, the many goods involved, the unpredictability of supplies, and the poor infrastructure, the cross-border trading system ran remarkably smoothly° Smuggling certainly seemed one of the most efficient economic enterprises in the border region. Its weaknesses stemmed from politics rather than economics.

The Politics of Trust The fundamental problem for smugglers was to establish and maintain stable relations with their trading partners across the border. Networks of cross-border trade were inherently unstable° They were based on trust and brinkmanship, but not all partici- pants subscribed to the same rules and neither customary law at the village level nor the official laws of either country could be invoked to make transgressors toe the line. In the absence of a codified set of rules, smuggling was a favourite hunting-ground for tricksters and confidence men. Their involvement led to frequent disruptions and upheavals, often creating new re-alignments and sometimes forcing smaller traders out of business.

The leader of the Indian ghat, Maksud, was universally described as a "good man" who was remarkably generom with regard to his business associates across the border. He lent them large sums (rk.50,000 to 'rk.t00,000) to set up trade in clothes and other goods. Several of them, however, decided to cheat him° They did not repay their loans, and there was little Maksud could do about it. Of course, the defaulters could no longer visit the Indian side of the border, but they continued to trade happily from the Bangladesh side, albeit with new Indian partners.

Ali was a small trader. He used to buy saris in India and sell them to shopkeepers in nearby market towns in Bangladesh. His working capital was TkAO,O00, and he traded strictly on the basis of cash payment. But once, when some shopkeepers whom he trusted were not at home, he left goods worth Tk.6,700 at their shops, expecting to collect the money the following day. The shopkeepers did not repay, however, although they kept on promising to do so soon, and Ali was forced out of business. "There's nothing I can do about it," he grumbled, "Telling the police makes no sense, it'll only mean paying mole money. But I 'm planning to steal a bike of one of those bastards, just to teach them...."

In these villages smuggling was essentially "disorganised crime," in which individual entrepreneurs or small groups operated in a competitive illicit market. The barriers to entry were low because no large criminal organisation monopolised the market° As a result, the turnover rate of operators was high, and smugglers were forever exiting and re-entering the field. Transitory parmerships of convenience prevailed because the small smuggling rings depended on the charisma of their leader

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smugglers o~ the Ganees 197

rather than on a formal organisational structure. Such groups would not endure when the leader was caught, had to go into hiding, was ripped off, or fell out with his associates. 2e

Apart from the collapse of trust between individual partners, cross-border trade was sometimes threatened or even stopped because of a breakdown of trust between groups of participants. The most fragile link in the system was that between border security forces, represented by the local camp, and the waders, represented by the local ghat leaders. We have seen that their relationship was something of an armed truce, involving an agreed share of the earnings in return for protection from outside interference. Both groups regarded each other with misgiving, but their day-to-day dealings would not have been possible without a modicum of trust. 21 Whenever this trust was betrayed, a swift reaction could be expected. The traders protested loudly whenever a raid was held on their village, while the border guards made heavy weather of any cheating at the ghat.

The border security forces sometimes carried out raids on smugglers. This outraged the traders, who considered it an infringement of their agreement. The villagers understood that raids could not be avoided, as they were initiated not by the local camp but by officers at the regional headquarters ("sector") or higher levels. What the traders objected to was the fact that some of these raids occurred without prior notice from the local camp. In most cases they got advance information so that they could remove all contraband. Usually, when a border security "raiding party" of Landrovers and trucks was seen leaving the "sector" camp or passing a local camp, the news was passed on to camps down the line by radio or telephone. These phone calls reputedly involved a pay-off. But sometimes the local camp did not inform the local traders. This could be because it did not receive correct information in time or because it wanted to take the local traders down a peg. A true surprise raid occurred when "sector" officers made a detour to find out the real state of affairs at a local camp, or when the warning system broke down. One day the local camp heard that a sergeant- major was going to stage a raid, but not that it would be in their own village. The raiding party took the smugglers unaware, and they could he seen fleeing pell-mell from the village as border guards recovered several truckloads of goods from shops and private houses. Two weeks later, a night raid led to a severe clash between traders and local camp on the Bangladesh side.

Late at night 17 BDR (Bangladesh Rifles) men arrived at the local camp, took most of the local BDR men with flaem and drove inland. There they intercepted runners coming towards the fiver with hendlonds of "elpi." They arrested and ~ them, and confiscated their goods. The same fate befell the driver of a van full of"elpi." News travelled to the village, and most smugglers rushed to the rice- fields, climbed tall t~es, or hid in a n e a t ~ government enclosing. Meanwhile the women were busy hiding the goods, dropping bundles of clothes and animal hides in the neighbouthood ponds or in the holes which surround all houses that are involved in smuggling. Some women hid in kitchen sheds, bat others challenged the border guards: ~Why are y o u doing this to us?" To which one of the local guards replied: "It is our duty to look, if w e w a n t to keep our job...." The search party found s o m e sacks of sugar and clothes, and surprised two cyclists from another village who approached the ghat to take away goods. The men ran away, leaving their bicycles to be confiscated.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

198 JCA 23:2]Schendel

The BDR men were dissatisfied with the small catch until they came upon Razzak's hut. Here no fewer than eight Indians were hiding. It would be a disaster ff they were arrested: not only were they smugglers but also illegal immigrants without passports. Their Bangladeshi hosts locked them inside the hut and told the BDR men to take anything they liked as long as they did not force their way into the hut. The border guards then demanded Tk.30,0000 ostensibly as a fine for four sacks of goods which they had found near the hut. This large amount was paid on the spot, in cash.

By the time the raid was over and the outsiders had left, it was early morning. Four of the ghat leaden now went to the local camp. They complained about the unfaimess of what had happened. They argued that they paid their weekly Tk.30,O00 to the camp on the understanding that the village would be secure against sudden raids and further impositions. They threatened to close the ghat, which of course would stop payments to the camp. The local border guards replied that it was not their fault that these outsiders had arrived unannounced in the middle of the night. They apologised for not having been able to warn the leaders in time, but they made it clear that if the leaders closed the ghat, the camp would make sure that trade was resumed or else would drive the leaders from the village. Smuggling was not interrupted, and for a short while border guards in civilian clothes walked around the village two or three times a day to show how they protected and assisted trade.

The confidence of the local traders in their "insurance contract" with the camp had been badly shaken, and the border guards had to make an extra effort to demonstrate its efficacy. The threat of closing the ghat was a very real one. Local leaders quite often used this weapon to keep the border guards in line. 22 Ultimately, the camp was the more dependent party~ Traders could easily redirect their trade to another border cross- ing or hold it up for a few days. A camp was, however, dependent on income from its local ghat-- deflected tlade would benefit another camp. It was also risky for border guards to use force against the smugglers because the latter gready outnumbered them? 3 Finally~ it was impossible for border guards to cut out the local traders and conduct trade on their own. As non-locals, newcomers and border guards, they could not hope to inspire the trust on which cross-border trade partnerships depended. The weapon of ghat closure was, however, only effective as long as trust between local leaders and local camp had not broken down completely. Otherwise it was dangerous for the leaders because the border guards were much better armed and could mobilise the state apparatus against them° "Don't forget we're dealing with caged tigers...," one villager remarked? 4

The politics of trust was also threatened by attempts to cheat the border guards out of their agreed share. For example, a group of traders in animal hides had agreed t.o pay 7'k 5 tn the border guards for each sack of 40 goatskins° Rut they ruined their ~ust rating (and thereby diminished their profit) by putting up to 120 skins in each sack° A diligent border guard found out about this and confiscated the "excess" skins. The camp now demanded a fee of Tk.2 on each skinY Trickery of this kind was very common, If the border guards detected several cases of cheating, their trust in the ghat leaders, whom they held responsible, plummeted, and they would unilaterally renounce their agreement with them~ The ghat would remain closed till the leaders offered a higher commission to the camp) 6

The basis of cross-border Wade was obviously shaky. It was not regulated by any code of law, nor could it be enforced by those who controlled the means of violence. The murky world of ~muggling pivoted around the semblance of trust. Smugglers

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smugglers on the Ganges 199

were perennially looking for more trustworthy business partners, z7 But the ideal partner had to be both trustworthy (bishhosto) towards his associates and devious (chalak) towards outsiders. Not surprisingly, trust was often betrayed in the pursuit of profit, leading to collapsing personal relations, transient business arrangements, and, frequently, a disruption of all trade.

Smuggling and Social Structure

The black economy which underlay cross-border trade played an important role in everyday life in both West Bengal and Bangladesh) 8 It had a major impact on social structure in the entire border region and beyond. Villages right on the border were sometimes overwhelmed by its effects° Here I look only at the two research villages, and changes in social mobility and relations of authority. Most established powerhold- ers in these villages had looked down upon smuggling as dui nombor bebsha (di~eputable business) when it began expanding by 1986. But others, including several poor and powerless villagers, had taken full advantage of the new opportuni- ties. Some of them turned out to be extremely successful, and they gained so much power that the entire system of social control came under increasing pressure.

The situation was different on either side of the border. In the Bangladesh village, public opinion and social relations had been controlled by eight "men of position" tmawn as matbors (also morols or mondols). These village leaders, mostly middle- aged, represented "respectable" and well-to-do lineages; their positions were semi- hereditary and reflected the local balance of power between two Muslim denomina- tions, Hanafis and Faraizis. They operated in the time-honoured way of rural Bengal, acting as moderators in conflicts and calling a village meeting (bichar onusthan) if a crime needed to be investigated and judged. As far as intra-village conflicts were concerned, the matbors were the final authority, and "everybody felt compelled to abide by their decisions."

But the matbors had little or no control over the new wealth that smuggling brought to the community, and their system of social control sustained a serious blow. The struggle between old respectability and upwardly mobile "disreputables" took on the form of a generation conflict. 29 The most influential smugglers were considerably younger and somewhat better educated than the matbors, who might belong to the same lineage, and they began to act more and more independently. After two years of roaring business, the range of matbor jurisdiction had become restricted. The matbors lacked the power to impose their will on the smugglers. When smuggling parmerships broke down, violent retribution sometimes followed. These fights, robberies, occa- sional manslaughter and murder were not tried by the matbors ~ nor, indeed, by anybody else. On the other hand, the leading smugglers were keen to run their business as smoothly as possible, and they made an effort to suppress petty crime in the village itself. Villagers attributed the sudden end to thefts and burglaries to an agreement between Anu and the neighbourhood thieves: he provided them with lucrative eross- border trade in return for an undertaking not to commit burglaries in this village.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

21~ JCA 23:2/Schendel

The power structure in the Indian village reflected the different political realities of West Bengal. Here the matbor system had been decaying over a longer period. Especially after the Left Front government took over in 1977, the old leaders~ whose position was based on age, land, "respectability" and religious sanctions, had been pushed aside by a new generation. The new leaders were in their early thirties and dominated the gram ponchayot (village council). Their power was based not only on local resources but also on outside support, especially by the CPM (Communist Party of India (Marxist)). They were fairly well-educated party men with little time for religion, some knowledge of Marxism, and a commitment to social change° Most of them objected to smuggling because they saw it as unpatriotic and a threat to their party's future. Naturally~ they came into conflict with the leading smugglers who were sometimes supported by the old, deposed leaders.

The power struggle between the big smugglers and the CPM leaders had not been resolved. While some party men voiced a fear that they would have to vacate their village within five to ten years because it was "turning into a second Punjab," others were confident that the smugglers would be no match for a determined government. The election of smuggling leader Maksud and the CPM boycott against him (see above) was just one episode in this ongoing battle.

Smuggling certainly brought a new social dynamism to these villages. Ordinary villagers either took advantage of the new opportunities, or learned to "watch the wall" while the smugglers went by. But for reasons of prestige (in the Bangladesh village) or ideology (in the Indian village) it was impossible for the village leaders to play a leading role in smuggling. This had allowed new leaders to emerge, and these now posed a direct challenge to the authority of the old village leaders. Although the "old" leaders in the Indian village were newcomers themselves, they found themselves much in the same quandary as the matbors in the Bangladesh village. They had a choice between sticking to theh guns and losing power, or joining the racket and losing credibility.

ll~e Wages of Sin? Profits in Smuggling Why do people take to smuggling? Generally speaking, "in view of the risks taken by al} parties, smuggling only takes place when it is highly profitable to all concerned; and it is profitable only when goverim2ent is interfering with the free movement of goods or the free adjustment of prices. ''3° It is therefore important to explore the profitability of smuggling. Along the India-Bangladesh border, profitability was clearly high in the case of one of the commonest commodities in cross-border trade, sugar. Although Bangladesh was a sugar-producing country, the price of sugar was much lower in India~ A sack of 100 kg. fetched Rs.600 in Calcutta and Rs.900 (= Tk.2,000) in border towns in Bangladesh. Despite the risks involved, big sugar merchants trading from Calcutta could expect a profit of tens of thousands of takas, equal to at least 25 percent of their investment) ~ Bulk wading in other goods (salt, "elpi," saris, milk powder, etc.) yielded similar profits.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smur.Rler$ on the Gan~e~ 201 , i

For those who lacked the capital to go in for smuggling in bulk, profits were lower. Those with a capital of at least Rs.6,000 or Tk.10,000 could set themselves up as small or middling traders.

Jalal and Hakim were bruther~in-law. Jalal lived in India and Hakim in Bangladesh. They pooled their resources and started smuggling with a capital of about Rs.10,000. They invested in whatever fetched the highest price - - salt, sugar, clothes. Jalal accompanied the goods across the river about once a day. ~z They bought and sold their goods for cash, even though it was more profitable to exchange goods (because you paid "duty fee" only on one side of the river, the other party would pay the "duty fee" on the opposite side). But their capital was too small to have much of it tied up in goods. For the same reason they could not retail, although profits were higher than in wholesale trade. Village customers expected to pay in instalments, which took too long. Wholesalers and retailers, however, paid cash, if you insisted. To keep down transport costs and to get the best possible price for their goods, Jalal and Hakim would take them far into the interior by bicycle or on foot. These trips had to he taken at night, for fear of local people robbing them, or informing the police. It was not at all unusual for them W walk twelve hours with a heavy heMlced in order to earn a few extra takas or rupees. Earlier, goods had been taken by boat at night all the way to Aricha and Dhalm in central Bangladesh, and to Krislmanagar in West Bengal, because it was more difficult for outsiders to detect the movemem of goods that way. But these mutes were no longer considered safe because of armed robberies (dacoities). If they were not cheated by trade partners, Jalal and Hakim made a deily profit of about Tk.l,200 (or 12 percent~S), which they split between them.

Many other small traders did not take the considerable risk that middling traders like Jalal and Hakim took. They acted as agents of big merchants (mohajons), working on commission and sometimes on a basic salary as well. They agreed to sell goods for a bottom price, keeping any extra money extracted from the customers for themselves. Much retailing was done in this way and women were prominent in this trade. They retailed in nearby villages and market towns, and also peddled their goods further inland, where customers had no access to the rock-bottom prices of the ghat. Their rates of profit were lower than those of middling traders, and so was their net income? 4

Smugglers with little or no capital could participate only as wage labourers. Young, mong men could earn up to Tk.100 or Rs.60 as day labourers, carrying sacks back and forth between the ghat and the marketplace. 35 Those with a bicycle earned Rs.15 or Tk.30 for a single trip to or from an interior village. Women could earn slightly more by accompanying consignments of contraband on buses and trains. Often a group of women, surreptitiously chaperoned by a male trader, boarded a local vain. The women carried enormous loads of firewood, cowdung, gut (molasses), or other cheap or dirty goods that were not likely to be searched on the way. Valuable illicit merchandise would be hidden inside. In this way, women could travel long distances. For example, it was not uncommon for Indian women to travel all the way to Dhaka with loads of expensive silk saris. Finally, some villagers earned their wages on the small boats that were continually crossing the Ganges with goods and people? 6

Smuggling and Economic Development Smuggling had given the local economy an undeniable boost. Goods worth at least Tk.l~500,O00 were estimated to pass through these ghats d~ajly, a7 Although the biggest

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

202 JCA 23:2/Schendei

profits were made by absentee merchants, much money was made by smaller traders who lived in the border villages. These invested locally, partly in shops that provided them with legitimate business fronts (e.g. groceries, clothes, medicines and station- ery), and partly in other enterprises (e.g. minibus companies, rice mills, ice-lolly factories and rickshaws). Much money was also spent on building brick or concrete houses, and on luxuries such as flashy motorcycles, expensive clothes and ornaments, and electric gadgets. On both sides of the river, smuggling had become big business with a string of booming market centres to show for i t . For example, the local bazar on the Indian side, now boasting several dozens of brick shops and five rice mills, had been no more than a single tea stall and one brick building hack in 1950. It had not grown much till the early 1980s, and the present building boom had started in 1986 - - wholly a result of the roaring cross-border trade, according to all informants. 3s

Local smugglers invested in smuggling, legitimate trade and consumer goods, but they also sank some of their money in the education of their younger relatives, and in land, contributing to a steep rise in land prices around both ghats? 9 Relatively little money was invested in agriculture itself, even though this was the most important local means of livelihood. As a result, agriculture and smuggling remained two separate sectors: agriculture did not benefit directly from the smuggling boom, and little money was sunk into innovations that might lead to new crops or higher agricultural productivity.

Smuggling did, however, have a major impact on the labour market. The Bengal counm/side is plagued by a chronic lack of employment opportunities but in the border villages many people found relatively well-paid work in smuggling. For many households which were dependent on labour wages, employment in smuggling made all the difference between seasonal or chronic starvation and basic subsistence. Many people concurred with a labourez who said, "We were all dirt poor and hungry before, but now each family can get a square meal a day." The role of smuggling in alleviating poverty was threefold. First, it provided employment which was independent of agriculture. Agricultural off-seasons (together about six months a year) had been times of widespread hunger and deprivation, but now many households had other jobs to turn to?o Second, the higher wages in smuggling had improved the general wage level in the area, and even labourers who were not involved in cross-border trade felt this effect. Third, prices of many goods had come down. The local poor were visibly better dressed than their counterparts in the interior (Bangladeshis in cheap Indian saris, *~ Indians in foreign T-shirts). Poor Bangladeshis also benefited from the low price of salt, an important part of the local diet, and many could afford some sugar, which is a luxury article elsewhere in Bangladesh. On the Indian side, poor people used smuggled cooking oil and sometimes milk powder for their children.

Views on S~nugg]Julg

Smuggling is cross-border trade without the consent of the state. States outlaw this activity and naturally take a dim view of it. It undermines state authority and robs the

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smu~zlers on the Ganges 203

state of revenues. Much of the literature stresses the state view. Smuggling is referred to as an economic offence, economic sabotage, ant i , rate behaviour, an evil influence, and an anti-social act. An opposite view is also widespread. It pictures the smuggler as a rowa~mic figure in a cloak-and-dagger act, a lone fighter against restrictions on free trade, a symbol of private enterprise, and an adventurer with a mission.' 2

Much less is known about the views which are held by people who are themselves involved in smuggling, or witness it at close range. In the border villages most people had mixed feelings. These were brought out in the standard term for smuggling, "dui nombor bcbsha," or "second-rate trade," which stressed its disreputable character as well as the fact that it was regular trade rather than a purely criminal activity. People often expressed different views of smuggling in different social contexts. Many smugglers were not proud of their trade and felt bad about it "from a human point of view" (manushik d/k thek~). On the other hand, they described the most prominent smugglers as "good men.'44Paradoxicaily, wealth earned by "disreputable" means could establish a person's reputation.

Some expressed anger at official restrictions to cross-border trade. One smuggler exclaimed: "Why should Bengalis be barred from trading with each other7" Another argued: '~he government has no right to block trade between Muslims on both sides of the border." Many of the smaller traders, runners and coolies said that international borders were no doubt fine for gentlemen, but what was their use for lowly people (chhotolok) fike themselves? "This may be our only chance to get rich, so who are they to tell us to throw it away?" Finally, a few smugglers expressed pride in their craft, especially in the art of "cha la~ ~" (cleverness, dissimulation) it required, the personal freedom and material rewards it brought them, and the sheer glamour and excitement of it.

But both smugglers and non-smugglers agreed that smuggling brought "eco- nomic peace but no peace of mind." All the time, smugglers had to beware of raids, cheating parmers, theft and informers. The women of their households always worry when their sons or husbands crossed the border because "anything could happen." Smuggling also disturbed the routine of daily life in these households: at least one person had to stay awake at night to guard goods concealed in the house, and strangers were forever dropping in from across the border. One smuggler's wife expressed her continuous anxiety in this way:

I always feel nervous and uneasy. When I see a border guard, even out on the road, l get scan~ ~ I see a stranger in the village, I worry that he may be an hffonner. When the father of [my sou] leaves for the other bank, I become sick with worry. And when he remms with goods, I imagine that the border guards will raid our house. I am always tense. At t imes I can't sleep.

Non-smugglers objected to smuggling on moral grounds ("they steal from the state;" "they give the neighbourhood a bad name'~ but also because of the turmoil it caused in the entire border region. They felt that life had become more difficult and dangerous because of smuggling. "You have to look the other way or they will

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

204 JCA 23:2/Schendel

challenge you openly. Try to oppose them, and you'll find the [border guards] protect the smugglers ." S o m e older m e n expressed anxiety about their inability to protect the honour of their families now that the village had become the stamping ground of so many disreputable outsiders:

These people have no shame. They a ~ now "direct party" [do not hide their business at all], eve~ though many criticise them. When smuggling was done at night, we did not notice it so much but now it really interferes with our lives. They do not care. They treat our women without ~spect...they berber our daughters on their way to school.'

Younger men tended to have fewer qualms about smuggling. Some of them criticised the older generation for being greedy and hypocritical. "They tell their sons to cam a fast rupee by smuggling, and then pretend to be shocked by the decline of the village!" Most young non-smugglers were alive to the atlractions of smuggling: easy m o n e y and glamour, which were very hard to obtain in any other way in the border region. They explained that they were not involved because they lacked the where- withal to enter smuggling at a fitting level, were too nervous, needed to stay at home to take care of the crops or ailing parents, had an uncle who was a shadhu (holy man), had a quarrel with the leaders, or earned a stable income from other sources.

Smuggling and the "Porous Sta re" There would be no point in smuggling if cross-border trade were not prohibited. The states of India and Bangladesh had adopted restrictive trade policies without being able to enforce them. Thereby they themselves had created opportunities for smug- gling. There were two ways for these states to put an end to smuggling. The first was to impose severe legal penalties combined with vigilant enforcement; the second was to remove the restrictions that had led to smuggling in the first place and made it so profitable. The governments of both Bangladesh and India were committed to the first course of action, but their instruments of enforcement and punishment were clearly inadequate? 5 Smugglers and villagers perceived border security personnel as moti- vated more by personal gain than by national interest? 6 As for legal penalties, the bigger smugglers seemed undeterred by the possibility of a fine or a jail sentence. After a raid they would typically brag to their neighbours that they could spend hundreds of thousands of takas or rupees on bribes, if it ever came to a court case?' Historically, effective vigilance appears to have been a more important deterrent to smuggling than grave punishment.

Widespread smuggling can be seen as a comment on the weak grip of the state upon economic life. Smuggling represents just one nexus in a vast network of relationships that escapes state control and is therefore dubbed the "unofficial" or "black" economy. My exploration of smuggling at two small rural ghats suggests that the economic importance of the black economy was very much greater than is generally realised by economists and policy-makers? s This is a question of magnitude as well as of structural significance. It involved the "informal sector," but also played

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smu~lers on the Gangs 20~

a crucial role in the '~formal" sector. It supplied crucial raw materials and capital goods to important "legitimate" industries and it created vast external markets for certain industrial goods. Smuggling on this scale makes a mockery of any restrictive policies based on conceptualisations of the national economy as a bounded unit under the full command of the national government. To describe smuggling as the "economic sabotage" of such ill-conceived policies is beside the point. Traders, industrialists and consumers all indicate, by means of their actions, that they consider these policies a form of "political sabotage" of free trade.

Smuggling also demonstrated another weakness of the state: the inability to inspire sufficient loyalty in many of its servants, even among those who were entrusted with its very security. Although many state servants tried to maintain the state's laws and carry out its policies, 5° so many others used their position in the state swacture for personal gain that the inhabitants of the border region perceived a "porous" state structure which was easily infiltrated by private citizens. The main dividing line was not that between "state" and "civil society. ''s* Private citizens combined to pillage the state and frustrate state policies that went against their personal interests? ~ In this game, a secure position in the state system was much sought after? s First, it provided a person with an ascendancy over others because he or she was protected by the bureaucratic and military powers of the state, which could be used to great personal advantage in setting up parmerships to block the flow of funds towards the state. And second, a state position brought a person closer to the funds flowing outwards from the centre of state power. The parameters of this game changed over time. At the time of fieldwork people on both sides of the border perceived the state in Bangladesh as more porous than the state in West Bengal, whereas twenty years previously the situation had been reversed.

Conclusion: Smugglers as the Rank and File o f "Mostanocracy"

In the late 1980s neither India nor Bangladesh was waging an open war on smuggling. Far from it: smuggling on an enormous scale went on quite openly, with the active protection and support of armed state officials on both sides of the border. Although raids and misunderstandings might occur, there was no systematic suppression of smuggling, and smugglers operated in extraordinarily easy, safe circumstances. This made the reality of smuggling along the India-Bangladesh border quite different from that described for other borders. Here there was ordinarily no need for smugglers to outwit surveillance teams with sophisticated gear, and the whole operation remained remarkably low-tech. No passports or visas were needed; few smugglers had fu'earms; telecommunications did not extend beyond shouting warnings, lighting fires, and touching off firecrackers; and the speed-boats, cars and airplanes that have become commonplace elsewhere were completely unknown here. ~ The social organisation of smuggling was equally low-key. The low level of state suppression allowed many small local groups to operate successfully, and large eriminzl syndicates remained relatively -nim[~rtant. 5s

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

206 JCA 23:2/Schendel

Restrictions on cross-border trade, combined with a lack of surveillance, led to a specific spatial pattern of economic development. The economy of the border belt was more dynamic than that of other rural areas. Its lower prices, higher wages and superior opportunities for entrepreneurs attracted labour and capital. The border region was linked directly with a network of important u_dyan markets in the ldnterland and, often through them, with rural markets? 6 The economic outcome of the actual policies of India and Bangladesh regarding smuggling was to make cross-border trade extremely profitable and fairly safe, to give a fillip to the entire border belt, and to enrich groups of politically powerful financiers, traders and state servants. In purely economic terms, smuggling was a godsend.

But its social and political costs were very high. The criminalisation of cross- border trade removed all legal protection from this very important sector of the economy and attracted various kinds of shady dealers whose networks were spread all over the two countries. Smuggling was at the heart of the black economy which was flourishing in both Bangladesh and India. It undermined legitimate trade as it under- mined the state itself. It was hardly a coincidence that, in both West Bengal and Bangladesh, the 1980s saw the rise of "mostanocracy," or "gangster rule. "57 The worlds of crime, trade, administration and politics moved much closer together, and their figure-head became the "mostan," who terrorised a neighbourhood or town, had access to (or even controlled) political leaders at the local and state levels, and derived his power from black money. Large-scale smuggling was a corner-stone of the mnstanocracy, together with the plunder of important state revenues, appropriation of foreign aid and extortion of protection money. 58 "Mostanocratic" morals had made rapid inroads on the older system of morality. Ideas about "respectability" were changing: old indicators such as landed property, pedigree, piety and paternalism were fading into the background. Increasingly, respectability came with the flaunting of wealth, with no questions asked about its provenance.

The restrictive foreign llade policies of India and Bangladesh were quite unrealistic because they were not enforced. The two states had clearly overreached themselves. Seeking to regulate the behaviour of their citizens, they had instead opened a Pandora's box of disobedience, not only among private citizens, but also among public servants. Their credibility suffered, and they were perceived as porous and easy to plunder rather than as solid, domineering organisations. The rise of the "black economy" and its concomitant, "mostanocracy," reinforced this perception. Both India and Bangladesh had started out as states with unusually high degrees of citizen support, based on hard struggles for statehood. By the 1980s, both had gambled away much of this support. Smugglers on the Ganges were merely one symptom of this deeper-seated malady. Evidently, it is not enough to suppress or legitimise cross- border wade. Such a decision can be effective only if it is part of an operation in which the states of Bangladesh and India extricate themselves from ~mostanocracy." Failure to do so will inevitably sap these states further, possibly to the point of collapse.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smu~lers on the Gances

N o ~ s

1. East Pakistan (1947-1971), the Bengali-speaking eastem wing of Pakistan, attained complete independence as Bangladesh in 1971. It shares a 2,200 km land border with India.

2. For example, many women who were born in what was now India had married into families in what had now become Pakistan. For them it become almost impossible to follow Jm important social custom: making veguLr visits to their parents and other relatives hack home. Before 1947 they had simply crossed the river in a small country boat once or twice a year, but now the river was patrolled day and night by border security forces who were unsympathetic. Manywomen told me that it took them 15 or 20 years to get permission to visit their panmts. And then they were allowed to take only one sail, and no ornaments or anything else. They were not allowed to bring anything from India. Their parents would give them a new sari as a customary gift, but the women had to make sure thin it looked old by the time they returned home.

3. For an impression of the "openness" of the Bangladesh-West Bengal border, see Special Correspon- dence, "Influx from Bangladesh: No Solution in Offing," Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) (7 June 1986), 997-998. This article focuses on cross-border migration rather than trade.

4. In 1988 1 carried out fieldwork on both sides of the border. The topic of my research was not cross- border trade; the pervasiveness of smuggling, however, made it impossible to ignore. This article presents a local view of smuggling, based as it is on information provided by local smugglers, day labourers (coolies), traders and other villagers. For obvious reasons, I have used pseudonyms in the case studies. I thank my informants as well as those who assisted me in collecting the information.

5. In 1990, however, the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies carried out an extensive general study of the economics of smuggling in Bangladesh. The results were not yet available in final form at the time of writing this article, but see the two draft reports: Abdul Ghafur, Muinul Islam and Naushad Faiz, "Illegal Intemational Trade in Bangalesh: Impact on the Domestic Economy (Phase 1)" (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1990), and "Illegal Intamationel Trade in Ban- gladesh: Impact on the Domestic Economy (Phase II)" (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1991).

6. Smuggling on this border was the topic of a brief unpoblished paper by Mookerjee. He explained that ordinary people were not even clear about the exact location of the land border at Banpur (on the Nadia- Kushiia border between India and Bangladesh, some 60 km to the south) because of the absence of boundary marks. Shyamal Mookerjee, "Unusual' business in a border village: A case study ~ how does the young generations [sic] acquire an economic footing?" (Unpublished research paper, Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, n.d.), 5 pp. See also "India-Bangladesh Border:. Dangerous Situation," Economic and Political Weekly(30 March 1991), 796-797; "Video Villainy,"/ndia TodayOl March 1990), 49. A press report lamenting the lack of factual information is Kazi Ali Toufique, "Politics, Economics and Effect of Smuggling," Holiday- The National Weekend Newspaper (Dhaka) (11 July 1989), 5. For a description of rural smuggling from Nepal to India, see: "Indo-Nepal Border - Smuggler's Paradise: Markets for Foreiga Goods are Mushrooming," India Teday (30 June 1988), 80- 82.

7. This is the main channel of the Ganges, known as the Padma. In 1975 the Farakka barrage was opened upstream to divert Ganges waters towards Calcutta. Since then, water levels in the Padma have fallen. facilitating smuggling. At this point, the river was several kilometres across, and during most of the year boats had to follow a circuituurs mute between the many shoals and sandbanks.

8. Many other Indian goods passed the border here on their way to customers in Bangladesh. They included finished products oflndian inthtstries, such as plastic toys, bangles, motorcycle parts, radio parts, cosmetics, candy, china and earthenware, sandals, spectacles, books, fans, sewing machines, mosquito nets, razor blades, woollen shawls and sweaters, printed cotton cloth and quilts. In addition there were senti-fin/shed products or raw mater/a/s fx~r Bang/adesh/ndus~'ies, e.g. dyes, medicine powders, silk yam and jute. There was also a brisk trade in agricultuse l ~ from India, e.g. pulses (muslmri dal), wheat, sago, oranges, apples, grapes, came gut and oil-cakes; among the spices the most popular were cimmmon, ~ l a m o o , tej/~t~, oamin~ dried chillies and beteinuta. And fmally, this border crossing was used occasionally to impost from the Golden Crescem. For a general overview of goods smuggled from- India to Banglade~ i . 1990, see the detailed list in Ghafur et nl., Olllegal Imemationnl Trade," 1990.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

208 JCA 23:2/Schendel

9. In addition~ the trade from Bangladesh included foreign industrial goods, e,g, electronics (cassette recorders~ video recorders (VCRs), televisions, calculators), watches, luxury soap, T-shins, cement and soybean oil. Some Bangladesh industrial goods were also traded to India, notably plain cotton cloth (often re-imported after printing in India), medicines and light bulbs. Agricultural produce from Bangladesh which found a market in India included fresh chillies, pigeon peas and sesame. In addition to gold, pure silver was also smuggled to India.

Of a quite different order was the illegal trade in human beings which occta~ intermittently at this 8hat. Groups of up to 30 Bangladeshi girls and young women were sold across the border, presumably as prostitutes or house servants. The price quoted for young girls was TL3,000-5,000. Trafficking in women was quite distinct from the substantial illegal emigration of Bangledeshis to India. Cf. "Flesh Trade," Hotline - Justice and Peace Newsletter (Dhaka), 64 (Decemher 1991 - Janua W 1992), 3. An account of the trade in Nepali women across the Indian border can be found in "Prostitution - - The Border Trafficking: Bordellos Battle Police,"/nd/a Today(15 August 1989), 72. 73,

Mookerjee mentioned some other items from Bangladesh which passed the land border at Banpur. peas, torches, pornographic films Dhakai saris, cameras, binoculars and music casseRes. Mookerjee '"Unusual' business," 1-3o For a general overview of goods smuggled from Bangladesh to India in 1990, see the detailed list in Ghafur et ai., "Illegal Intemationai Trade," 1990.

10. The flow of heroin was a case in point. At the time of fieldwork, heroin from the Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan) was in good supply and, according to local people, relatively cheap. For that reason drug smugglers brought it into Bangladesh. Sudden squeezes were said to lead regularly to a reversal, with heroin from the Golden Triangle (the production region in Burma~ Thailand, China and Laos) flowing westwards to India through Bangladesh. According to the representative of the World Health Organisation in Dhala, cited in a recent newspaper article, the quality of the heroin coming from the Golden Triangle was higher than that entering Bangladesh from across the western border. Cf. S.K. Ghosh, 7he Tra~c in Narcotics and Drug Add/ct/on (N~w Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1987): "Smuggling: The Gold Rush,"/odla Today (31 October 1988), 78-80; "West Bengal - Vigilante Justice: Citizens Take on Drug Peddlers and Bootleggers," India Today (15 July 1989), 53- 54; Ali Mtmaza, "Roaring Drug Market," Holiday- The National Weekend Newspaper (8 December 1989), 2; ~Heroin Addicts," Hotline - Justice and Peace Newsletter (Dbaka, June/July 1992), 3 (quoting an article in the Da//y Star, 18 May 1992).

1 I. [ did not come across any independent female entrepreneurs in smuggling. 12. Most villagers did not know whet the term "elpi" meant bat a few informants thought that it stood for

"ladies' pants," hence "l.p." Elpi consisted of unused "cut as well as used clothes. 13. The Indian jute industry was in a depressed state in 1988, and many West Bengal jute growen tried

to get a better price for their product in Bangladesh. 14. Some Indian saris (e.g. the ones sold under the brand name Rajarani) were mmoured to be made

especially for the Bangladesh market. Their quality was too poor for them to have much of a market in India despite their low price (Ps.30), but in Bangedesh they sold like hot cakes for Tk. 100-120. In 1988, 100 Bangladesh takas (Tk.100/-) equalled about US$ 3.00 and 100 Indian rupees (Rs.100/-) about US$ 5,70, On the border the exchange ~te was Tk. 100 = Rs.45.

15. The double-funnel pattern is characterised by an abuj~dm~ce of people involved at the points of origin (growing/mining and packing) and disbursement (distribution and consumption, but by relatively few at the delicate and dangerous point of importation. Such trade is usually organised by large criminal syndicates. See Patricia A. Adler, Wheeling and Dealing: An Ethnography of an Upper-Level Drug Dealing and Smuggling Community (New York: Columbia University I~ess, 1985), 33.

16. Some information on the drag trade in Dheka can be fotmd in Siddiqui et al., who estimated that there were about 3,000 heroin retailing outlets in Dhaka city in 1989. In August and September, 1988 alone the police seized drags (mostly heroin) valued at Tk.50 million. Obviously, the quantity seized is but a small proportion of the quantity bmeght to the city." Kamul Siddiqui et al., Social Formation in Dba/m C/ty: A Studyin lh/rd Worm Urban Soc/o/ogy (Dtmka: University l~ess Limited, 1990), 308. Cf. 192-3, 307-345, For some insights into the orgonisation of gold smuggling in Bangladesh, see Enayetullah Khan, "The Shades of Medelline," Ho//day- The National Weekend hbws/~per (27 July 1990), 1, 8: "Ministers Not Yet Implicated," Holiday - The National Weekend Newspaper (2 August

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

SmuJu~rs m the ~ 209

1990), 1, 8; M.H. Munik, "Gold Case: Detectives Will Visit 9 Cotmuiet," Holiday - The National Weekend Newspaper (10 August 1990), 1, 8; and other snicks in these issues.

17. About a year after I conducted fieidwork, another crop became prominent, according to press reports. M.U. Ahined, "Now the Potato Smnggling;' Holiday - Tae National W ~ e v d Newspaper (1 Septem- be~ 19S9)~.

18. On the Indian side the,-" ave known •s the BSF (Bonier Security Force) md at the Bangladesh side as the BDR (Ben8•desh Rifles).

19. See foomote 14. 20. Cf. Peter Renter, D/•organ/zeal Cr/me (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983). 21. This tnm was also reflected in • shift to daytime smuggling some two yean •adler. Before that time,

cruss-border trade had been a more furtive affair, carried on during the night. But once a faidy stable agreement had been negotiated beiween the ghat leaden and the security forces on both sides of the border, smuggling could be done during the day. This was much more convenient for everybody con- cemed, not only from the point of view of monitoring the trade but also because it cut out the risk of goods being robbed by dacoits in n~id-river.

22. Ghats on either side of the river c|osed regularly for anything between a few hours and • few weeks. When the ghat on one side closed, its counteq3art on the other side had to close down, too. Closures were caused by 1) conflicts among the leaders of a ghat; 2) raids; and 3) nmegotiatious between traders and border forces (often in combimfion with 1) and 2)). The stakes were always high, end violence leading to fatal accidents was not uncommon during these conflicts. Many leaders had firearms, but the border security forces were more heavily armed.

The closing of a ghat by the traders was instantly communicated to the other side of the river and within hours all trade moved to the neighbouring ghats. When a raid caused • sudden suspension of trade, people tried to communicated this by waving a red gamchba (cloth) to alert boats approaching the ghat, of by tying • red cloth to a tree. At night, they attempted to give the same message by lighting a fire or setting off firecrackers. They were not always successful, as the following incident shows. Around 3 A.M. on a July morning, a boat stacked with Rs. 18,000 in cheap saris left the Indian side. As it approached the Bangladesh bank, the BDR treated it to a volley of bullet& The boat overturned, its valuable cargo dropped into the Ganges, and the four men were swept ovedmard. Three of them swam •shose unharmed but 18-year-old Jyoti disappeared in the muddy water. His death (and the fact that be left behh~ a 10-year-old widow) was the talk of the village that day. People recalled the deaths of thn~ other village boys in similar incidents. Miraculously enough, Jyoti was washed ashore down- stream, and he returned to the village the next evening.

23. Cf. the life tineaVt ngaimt the incorruptible "Khan Shaheb" mentioned above. Cf. the murder attempt, gher•o (surrounding) and t~.alppmpdafice of goods by smnggicrs related in "Indo-Nepal Border," 80- 82.

24. For • few example of relations between BDR and local villagers in a border region in northern Bangladesh, see The Net: Power Stmctu~ in Ten Villages (Dhaka: Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, 1983).

25. Confiscated goods were supposed to be up for public ruction after been handed over to the customs authorities. However, traders were often able to buy back their confiscated goods from the border guards immediately, against • mutually agreeable rate. One fanfily estfinated that in an average week they paid Tk.10,000 to the camp for animal hides worth Tk.300,000 which they imported from India. A regular goatskin sold for TIL 70-80 (including transport and fees) on the Indian side, and Tk. 110. 150 in Bam81adesh. For • good cowski the prices were Tk. 550-600 and Tk. 700-750, respectively. The trader, inenned costs in treating the skins with (smuggled) salt to preserve them. Additional costs involved bus fasus, ~ to bum penumael (Tk. 10 per sack) and policemen and the rent of a storage room in • Islge II~vincial town. Despite wild fluctuations in the trade and occasional large losses owing to spoiled goods, cheating, coafiscation, excessive demands for bribes, and arrest, they calenlated a resnlar net profit of between 16 md 20 per:era. Tbey sotd to an ent~--lmmenr in Dhaka who phced orden to the ",he of Tk. 600,~30 at • time. Tbe ~ were reputedly pmce.~ed in tbe Be~giadash kmher indmtry, or exported to Chim, Russia and Itaty.

26. In this way, villagers informed us, the weekly cx'm~miuiert to the BDR (Bangladesh Rifles) camp had ri~m from TIL 2,000in 197g to Tk.5,0~ in 1983,Tk. lO,000in 1986, and TL30,000 at the time of

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

210 JCA 23:21Schendel

fieldwork. Village sources indicated that the weekly commission to the BSF (Indian Border Security Force) camp had climbed from Rs. 5,000 in 1985 to Rs. 10,000 in 1987, and that in 1988 the camp demanded Rs. 15,000.

27. Oneway of maximising trust was to set up a businesss partnership with a brother or other close relative across the border, the ethic of kinship made these partnerships more stable. Others were eager to establish links of fictive kinship with their partners. The role of kinship in smuggling has also been noted in other cases, e.g. among Huguenot smugglers across the English Channel in the 17th century, among cocaine and marijuana smugglers in Southern California in the 1970s, and among lower-class smugglers in Grenada in the 1970s. See Mary Waugh, Smuggling in Kent and Sussex 1700-1840 (Newbury: Countryside Books~ 1985), 12; Adler, Wheeling and Dealing, 66-67, 79; and Peter M. Tobias, "The Socioeconomic Context of Grenadian Smuggling," 1oumal of Anthropological Re. search, 38:4 (1982), 383-400, esp. 391.

28. Guestimates of the value of smuggling are extremely difficult to verify. In the early 1970s~ government officials in India thought that goods being smuggled into India had a value of several (tens of ) billions of rupees. These figures seem to refer mostly to the activities of criminal syndicates, not small-time peasant smugglers. Since then smuggling, not only along the India-Bangladesh border, has expanded enormously. S.IC Ray, Economies of the Black Market (Boulder, CoL: Weatview Press, 1981), ix 47- 61.

29. Mooker~ee also repoaed smuggling as the occupation of the yonnger generation, between 18 and 34 years old. Mookerjee, "'Unusual' business." 1-2.

30. F. F. Nicholls, Honest Thieves: The Violent Heyday of English Smuggling (London: Heinemann, 1973), 2.

31 On the basis of information given by villagers and traders, the following calculation can be made. A trader at Calcutta bought 200 sacks of sugar, each containing 100 kg, for Rs. 120,000. He could sell them at a border in Bangladesh for Tk. 400,000 (=Rs. 180.000), making a gross profit of 50 percent. However, on the way he incurred the following costs. The lorry driver demanded Rs.2,200 to take the sugar to the border village. From there labourers on bicycle took the sacks down to the ghat; their rate was Rs. 2,000-3,000 (Rs. 10-15 per sack), For the crossing the trader had to pay Rs. 2,000 (Rs. 10 per sack) to the boatman. Labourers then carried the sacks to the market town for Tk.2,000 (= Rs.900; rk.10 per sack). These "regular" transport costs added up to some Rs. 8,100.

In addition, however, there were the pay-offs. On the way from Calcutta to the border various impositions could be expected. My informants routinely mentioned government agents (traffic police in the three districts through which the lorry tmvelled, and the local police, customs and intelligence authorities ) and armed rowdies (mostan, gunda). The outcome of this cat-and-mouse game was always uncertain, but an unlucky shipment might lose as much as Rs, 15,000 in this way. Consequently, the sugar sold for Rs. 140,000 at the border. Finally, there was the "duty fee" at the ghat, shared by ghat leaders and border guards, which came to Rs. 4,000 (Rs.20 per sack). A sugar smuggler therefore had to reckon with at most Rs. 19,000 in "extra" costs, bringing the total transport costs to Rs. 27,100. This meant that the minimum net profit on a successful shipment was Rs. 32,900, or 27 percent

32. He might make up to three or four crossings a day when there was an exceptional demand for certain go~-ls, but there were also times when a sluggish nmrket would cut his crossings down to two or three a week. Ghat closure would lead to suspension of activity because trading through adjacent landing places involved higher "duty fees" and was less convenient for him. Some small traders attempted to avoid paying "duty fees" by disembarking away from the ghat, or swimming ashore. It proved difficult, however, to escape the notice of the leaders and the border guards because informers were likely to give the game away soon. Small traders did not have the money to buy the informers' silence. A fellow villager, Yanns, reportedly tried to hoodwink the leaders. But he was informed upon and had to drop his goods overboard when he found armed border guards waiting for himashore. Three times he incurred large losses m this way, until he was forced to retire: the fourth time he lost all his goods again buw also his loincloth (lung 0 when he had to dive into the river to avoid detection, be had to wald in the shallow river for hours till he could sneak ashore after dark. By that time he had decided that it was nol worth ~t, after all.

33. In india a hundred saris could be bought for Rs. 3,400 (Rs. 34 each). At the Indian ghat Rs. 200 had to be paid (Rs 2 per san - unless a good friend was guarding the ghat, when the "dtRy fee" could drop

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smugglers on the G~m~es 211

to Rs. 0.50). The boat fate was Ok. I0 per person and Tk. 30 for three headloads. At the Bangladesh that. Tk. 150 had to be paid Tk.l.50 per sad - but sometimes Tic. 2 or Tk.1, depending on the whim of the leader on duty; unfamiliar traders had to pay TL 3 per sari).Total cost (excluding own labour): Rs. 200 (= TE470) + TEl90 = Tk.660. The saris were sold to a local pa/k, sr (wholesaler) forTE 10,000 Ok. 100 per sail). The net profit was Tk. 10,000 - (Tk.660 + Rs.3,400 (=Tk. 8,100)) = Tk. 1.240, or 12 percent.

34. These hawkers would sell smaller quantifies, e.g. tea saris a day. If they sold them for Tk. 120 each against a commission of Tk.2 per piece priced at Tk. ! 15, they earned Tk. 70 per day, or a profit of 6 percent.

35. This rate was much higher than agricultural wages in the area ok .20 plus a light meal (nusta) in Bangladesh; Rs. 12 in India). Not all local labourers paaicipated in smuggling, partly because they preferred the less nerve-racking and physically exhausting agricultural work, and partly because smug- gling labourers tended to form closed groups and did not always allow outsiders to participate. Agricultural labour also required different skills, and allowed labourers to maintain relations with different patrons. In the agricultural off-seasons, however, local agricultural laboorers could support themselves with some smuggling work- but non-loeals were not tolerated. Conversely, when the that closed, it was hard for smuggling labourers to free work in agriculture.

36. Most boats were in coufinnoos use. They were worked in four shifts. The owner took one shift, and three otLer villagers (majhis) took the others. Owners invested between Tk. 3,000-5,000 in their boat, which was expected to last for two to three years. Whenever the that closed, these boats wele used for fishing. The Bangladesh ghat was home to ten boats, and the Indian one to many more. Obviously, daily income per boat was highly dependent upon the flow of trade. On a good day a boat could earn some TE 600, ofwhichTk. 100went te the that leaders, Tk. 300 to theboat owuer, and Tk. 100 to each majhi.

37. Or Tic. 550 million per year. No informant was certain about the total value of goods smuggled through these two local ghats. The best estimates did not go beyond five large and stable items. The average daily turnover was thought to be Tic. 2C0,000 to 300,000 in "elpi" and TIc. 100,000 in milkpowder from Bangladesh, and TL 1,000,000 in sugar (500 sacks), Tk. 200,000 in salt (1,000 sacks), and Tk. 100,000 in animal hides. This gave an indication of the scope, but there was no way of crosschecking this information. If these figures are correct, the "duty fees" amounted to only a few percent of the remover, In view of the many items not accounted for, these estimates certainly cannot be used for any statement about the local "trade balance."

38. I have no reliable information on the remittances or investments made by border guards. The received opinion in the villages was that the guards sent most of their earnings from smuggling to their home villages.

39. Mookerjee suggested that smuggling was linked to a particular phase in the life-cycle of men. Smugglers graduated from "newcomer" status (age: I8 to 24) with little capital and an income of Rs. 400-600 a month, to "professional" status (age: 25 to 34) dealing with more expensive goods and earning Rs. 500-t.200 per month, to "established" slams (age: 35 and over) when they retired from smuggling to live off their investment in land, shops, and various kinds of legitimate business, some of these established businessmen, who we~ now regarded as respectable and houourable men, would help "newcomers" with interest-free loans and legal or political suppo~ in times of need. The "established" also served as role models for the young unemployed who went in for smuggling. In the area I studied, such an age-related career pattern was not (yet) clear, but here smuggling had not developed in a big way till two years previously. See Mookerjee, '"Unusual' business," 3-4.

40. New jobs of many kinds, connected with smuggling or its spin-offs, were available now. The most visible were the straightforward coolie and maj'hi jobs at the that. These jobs were also the most risky and unreliable because of raids and that closure. In addition, the influx of easy money now allowed many smuggling enUepreneurs to keep house servants (mostly women and children from the poorest village households), and many of them also needed assistants in their shops and workshops, messengers to contact trade pmmers, etc. Finally the new rickshaws had to be manned, and the building of houses and shops provided many labourers with jobs.

41. As one poor woman in the Bangladesh village put it: "We used to wear clothes till they were at thin as mosquito nets before, and always one-coioured saris. Now we have pretty printed saris of good quality from India."

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

212 JCA 23:2/Seh~del

42. According to Tobias, the "average man" on Grenada would agree; he "sees the smuggler as a modem Robin Hood who steals customers and profits from the rich and gives lower prices and employment to the poor." Tobias, "Socioeconomic Context," 393-394.

43. Other terms for smuggling were " ei pnr oi par" (from this side to the other), "kalobazar," "chorabazar," or "belake" (all:black market), and "moushumi bebsha"(seasonal trade). In Banpur (Nadla, West Bengal), smu~ling was known as "bhnshimaF or "useless goods" (lit.: rice husks); this term was also heard occasionally on the banks of the Ganges. See Mookerjee, '"Unusual' business," 1-2.

44.For example, the old mother of one of the smugglers said of the Bangladeshi leader:. "Anu is a good man now. He is involved in smuggling but no longer in robberies." See also the description of the Indian leader, Maksud, above.

45. By contrast, the government of the Caribbean state of Grenada followed the second course with considerable success between 1973 and 1976. Tobias, "Socioeconomic Context," 392.

46. Only one important exception was brought to my notice by villagers. Smugglers reported that the Indian Bonier Se _~_,rity Force (BSF) would not sllow the expowt of basic foodgrains (predominantly rice, but also wheat) to Bangladesh, In fact, only very small quantities appeared to figure in cross- border trade at these ghats,

47, The border guards were supposed to hand over arrested persons to the police, Abdul Ghafur et al. found that, among the smuggling operators whom they studied, arrests had been quite common. Along the Indian-Bangladesh land border a majority had been arrested at least once during 1985-1990, but only a minute fraction had ever been convicted. Abdul Ghafur et al., "Illegal International Trade" (1990), Chapter 3.

48. And the role of smugglin 8 in the black economy is also larger than usually suspected. A telling episode ocenred when the Bangladesh government annotmced an anti-smuggling drive in late 1991. Dhaka s h o l ~ r s and businessmen responded by coming out into the streets in protest, and the Shop Owners Association negotiated successfully with the government for a settlement, despite pressure from the textile industry to ban Indian saris. In a comment, Khasm said: "trading capital is...stronger than...industrial capital. In the city itself one witnesses the growth of shopping arcades while industrial investments are plummeting...Smuggling, or the underworld economy, in Bangladesh is certainly manifold stronger today than what it was even a de,-ade ago. Big money, big people and big influence are involved in it." Hmsaln KhasruL, "Anfi-Smugglin8 Drive: People Watching Govt. Move," HoLiday - The Nkfiona/Weekend Newspaper (22 November 1991), 1; Amalesh Serkar, "Raids on Markets Shopt Put Off," HoLiday- The Na6onal Weekend Newspaper (13 December 1991),1.

49. For e ~ i e , official statistics on foreign trade ignore amugglin 8 and are therefore wildly mueliable as sources of information. How to square official expo~ from India to Bangladesh Ok. 107 million in 1988-89) with the fact that Tk. 50 million in drags alone (mostly imported through India) were sei~0ed by police in Dhaka in only months of 19887 Ormy estimate that goods worth at least T1L 0.7 million were impoaed from India through one insignificant border ghat daily? And yet, trade poli~ies in both Bangladesh and West Bengal are routinely based on these totally misleading statistic& SOtt/s6cal Poc/~ Book o, ¢Banglade~ 1990 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Busenu of Statistics, 1990), 196. For a 8enend discussion of discrepmcies and errors concealed in trade data, see Jagdish N. Bhaswati (ed). ~legal Transactions in International Trade: Theory and Measurement (Amsterdam/Oxford / New York: North-Holland / American Elseview, 1974).

50. E.g. the case of the NotCh Indian BSF officer mentioned above. 51. Smuggling or the black economy in general, shows that deep divisions nm through these categories.

The interaction between state and "civ/I society" cannot be understood without a careful analysis the diverse interest groups which make up thean categories. At the bonier, it is certainly not a case of "traders against the state," because the state in its local manifestation (border socmity forces pofim) is in collusion with the treders. Here the main confrontation appenn to be between loeal asents of the gate and stone of their bureacrafic and political mperiors at the centre. Many smugglers, however, state and some of their bureaucratic and political superiors at the centre. Many amugslers, however, intetpratod the free hand they were given as proof of the fact that most higher state servartts were aim punishments for b ~ law. For some case stud/es of traders and the black econemy, see Gmcia Chuk (nd.), Traders Versus tlw State: Anthropological ApproacheJr to Umoffici~d F, coaoraius (Boulder and London: Westview Pless, 1988).

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[UV

A U

nive

rsite

itsbi

blio

thee

k S

Z] A

t: 18

:51

30 J

une

2007

Smueelers On the Gan~.s21~;

52. For a more general discussion, see Willem van Schandel, Three Deltas: Accumulation and Poverty in Berate, Bengal and South India (Delhi / Newbury Park/London: Sage, 1991)o 180-201,271-297.

53. The two big ghat leaden who campaigned for local government positions were a case in point, but the popularity of jobs in the border security forces can be seen in the same light

54. This is not to say that smuggling could not be more sephistieated, and there are repom of more highly organised and better armed smugglers at other points along the India-Bangladesh border. Generally speaking, smuggling is thought to have become more SOl;histicatod in recent ye, an. In the words of Siddiqui et al., "in the years immediately following independence [1971], smuggling mostly meant operations between India and Bangladesh at a scale dictated generally by the normal laws of supply and demand. On the other hand, in recent years, smuggling has taken on a genuinely international dimension involving also air and sea mutes, goods such as narcotics, gold, electronic goods, liquor, cigarettes, ete (in addition to traditional items transacted through the land route, for example, jute, rice, feniliser, saris, biri, etc) [,] highly organised groups, artificial crisis created to facililate smuggling, etc." Siddiqui et al., Social Formation. 193. Cf. "Gold Smugglers - - Taking to the Air: Airline Staff Become Favourite Carriers," Ind/a Today (15 April 1990), 50. Foran indication of the various methods used by African (drag) smugglers, see Patrick Edobor lgbinovis," Tactics used by African Smugglers and Trafficken to Avoid Detection and Prosecution;' Australian Police Journal, 38:3 (1984), 115- 117.

55. Writings on smuggling tend to concentrate on the more spectacular large criminal syndicates and their more spectacular merchandise, e.g. hard drugs and precious metals. Tobias, however, provides a rme insight into smuggling based on a similarly "disorganised" pattern of organisation. Tobias, "So- cioeconomic Context."

56. As I have indicated, marketing networks differed for various goods. Most "elpi," animal skins, jute and machine pens went straight to the largest urban markets in Caltcuna and I)haka, while cheap saris, sugar, milk powder and salt fanned out all over the urban bazars and meal markets (hat) of Bengal.

57. From mostan = gangster, rowdy. I take the term from the Holiday editorial. Dasgupta uses the term "mastanism." See: "Democracy or 'Mastanecracy'?" Holiday- 7he National Wee/~.end Newspaper (29 November 1991), 2; Subodh Dasgupta, "Gouribari: What Next7" Economic and Political Wee/dy (29 September 1984), 1696.

58. An editorial on the Bangladesh economy was entitled, with perhaps only slight exaggeration, "In the Grip of the Smugglers" (Holiday - The National Weekend Newspaper (1 September 1989), 2).

P O W E R A N D E C O N O M Y I N S U H A R T O ' S I N D O N E S I A

By Richard Robison This selection of articles spans a twelve-year period in the development of a new distinct approach to the question of political and economic power in Indonesia. Confronting both the conservative and dependency, orthodoxies, the central theme is that of a gradual maturing of capitalism, in which a capitalist class (indigenous, Chinese and foreif,,n) grows in strength and influence in both the economic and political arenas. This process is set in the context of a changing international economy and the studies bring to bear the latest theoretical perspectives on class, state and power. The Anther Richard Robison is Associate Professor in Asian Politics and Director of the Asia Research Centre at Murdcch University, Western Australgs. He is the author of Indonesia: The Rise of Capital three edited collections and numerous articles in international journals. His works have been translated in Chinese, Japanese, French, Malay and Indonesia.

P/b ISBN 971-8639-03-9 207 pages US$10.00

Journal of C m t e m p o r u r y Asia Publkhe t s P.O. Box 592, Manila, Philippine~ 1099