Entailment in Argumentation

Mark WeinsteinInstitute for Critical ThinkingMontclair State University

The notion of entailment has a long and rich history, and has been at the center of

philosophical and practical logic for decades. This is true of recent work in informal logic and in

the theory of argumentation, where entailment relations have played a key role in discussions of

the analysis and reconstruction of arguments as well as in their assessment. Nevertheless,

discussions of the concept have tended to be limited to a number of characteristic concerns.

These include: the typology of arguments, particularly the distinction between deductive and

inductive arguments; the reconstruction of arguments, including the issue of missing premises;

and general issues in the assessment of argument adequacy and the related issue of deductivism.

Despite the richness of recent discussions, accounts of entailment in both informal logic

and the theory of argumentation exhibit significant omissions when contrasted with the literature

on entailment generated in recent decades within formal and philosophical logic. In particular, I

find missing a theory of entailment adequate to support its central role in a theory of argument

cogency, and an account of the essential distinction between entailments that rely on logical

relations alone (entailments whose associated conditional is a logical truth) and those that require

substantive extra-logical relations (entailments whose associated conditional is analytic in some

weaker sense, typically, in light of semantic or nomic considerations).

Such relations are essential to actual argumentation, since they express internal

connections between terms that are at the core of inference relations which are not explicitly

truth functional (extensional). Formal logicians sought to define univocal structures based on

formally articulated theories of implication to serve as analyses of particular kinds of natural

entailments. Frequently, as in the analysis of causal or other theory driven implications, formal

restrictions were placed upon the core notion of implication in first-order logic. Sometimes, as in

the case of deontic, epistemic or modal logics, additional logical apparatus was added.1.

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Informal logicians, perhaps pressed by their concern with fallacies, have offered little that plays

an analogous role. Nevertheless, their frequent appeals to deductive or other inferential relations

seem to indicate that they presuppose that something like the standard account of logical

implication is available as a background theory for their own analyses.2.

The persistent concern with logical implication may be motivated by the intuition that if

entailment could be reduced to implication, a univocal notion of argument assessment, and a

paradigm for argument reconstruction would be made available by reducing the array of actual

entailments to some well understood account of deductive operations. Recommendations to treat

deductive validity as central to the analysis of argument have been met with charges of

"deductive chauvinism."3. Yet deductivism remains attractive, if only because deductions

abound in argument, either explicitly or through readily available enthymematic reconstructions.

1.Deductive Validity

Deductive validity is crucial in the assessment of arguments, at least if we mean the basic

apparatus, modes ponens, modes tollens, principles of substitution, generalization, and the like.

For all arguments, whether inductive, analogical or whatever, require that premises be presented

and that conclusions be supported. Whence conditionalization is guaranteed, and so is

detachment, whether in the name of asserting the conclusion or denying the conjoined premises,

in any system of inference for which the deduction theorem can be proved.4. It is the deduction

theorem that seems to lie behind the insight that maintains the trivial deductivization of

arguments by including the minimal conditional as a missing premise. The position requires that

something like the deduction theorem be provable for the natural or stylized language within

which argumentation occurs, something easier said than done.6. Nevertheless, the assumption of

something that is functionally equivalent to the deduction theorem is attractive, for it makes the

standard theory of validity available for relevant aspects of argumentation, offering a model of

argument reconstruction and permitting formal fallacies to be identified.

This much is relatively obvious: deductive validity serves as a scaffold that structures

argument by warranting the management of premise-conclusion relationships in the most

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general way. More relevant to my concerns, it forces decisions about supporting analytic

constituents, constituents that, after Carnap, might be called "meaning postulates," as well as

nomic relations that furnish "inference tickets" as proposed by Toulmin.7. These, to take the

physical sciences as a clear example, include differential equations (physical laws), chemical

formulas, theories of measurement and applications of the mathematical theory of probability.

The meaning postulates and inferential apparatus extends the a priori mathematical theories so

that substantive and contingent claims about the domain can be seen as logical consequences of

theories and generalizations, under appropriate substitutions and acceptable operations. These

govern the substance of deductions in the field, extending the purely logical framework, so that

scientifically relevant conclusions can be derived. This complex of deductive apparatus,

warranting both the overall structure and crucial particulars in argumentation, is sufficiently

central to the identification and assessment of claims that it justifies the meta-logical claim that

sees deductive validity as among the essential criteria available for argument assessment. But the

deductive scaffolding is not the tissue of argumentation. This is furnished by the complexes of

claims and counter-claims that require much more context sensitive logical elements than

standard notions of implication provide.

To support this last point we must make a number of side excursions: first, to logical

empiricism and the dispute centered around Carnap's account, then, to some recent foundational

work of Harvey Siegel, and finally, to a summary discussion of the issue of missing premises

and hidden assumptions by Trudy Govier. What we find there will prompt us to sketch the

beginnings of a general account of entailment in argumentation. But, as we shall see, the general

account will point to the need for context specific elements that play an essential role in

argumentation, context specific elements that are necessary components of the notion of

entailment itself.

2. Carnap and meaning postulates.

The cluster of issues associated with Carnap's introduction of meaning postulates into the

analysis of entailment generated a complex dispute that included such central issues as the

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analysis and status of the analytic/synthetic distinction and reflected traditional concerns with the

distinction between empirical truths and truths of reason. An initial concern was with Carnap's

postulating the existence of meaning postulates.The more durable dispute focused on his

seeming willingness to permit them to have no clear epistemic status other than being

postulated.8. The discussion was complex and varied, including a deep concern with the status of

modalities and the theory of probability. Nevertheless, it was limited by the then pervasive

assumption that arguments kinds were, broadly speaking, either deductive or inductive, and

more often then not, centered on deductive connections and particularly the the distinction

between logical truths as against truths whose status was a function of the meanings of extra-

logical symbols.

Two outcomes of this dispute are of special interest. The first was the realization that

arguments about the status of various aspects of the apparatus that support entailments were

themselves structured by the standard logical apparatus itself. Thus, despite the misgivings of

analytic philosophers about the necessity of positing some fundamental and intuitive logic

available for meta-logical discourse, quite unexceptional elements of logic were used throughout

the philosophical discussion and seemed ineliminable as a precondition for reasoned discourse,

no matter how fundamental the focus of the inquiry.9. The second was, that despite the apparent

ineliminability of fundamental logical apparatus, a rigorous distinction between statements that

functioned inferentially (analytic statements), and merely contingent statements could not be

sustained.10.

Although the epistemological status of analytic statements seemed unclear as long as

their essential nature remained controversial, their logical status was unexceptionable, for they

played a role that was already well understood in axiom systems such as those constructable for

portions of mathematics and physical science.11. What seemed important was that although they

did not allow the body of purely logical theorems to be increased, their deductive closure was a

super-set of first-order logic. That is, they were conservative as to the total number of

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permissible logical operations and core theorems, thus permitting the application of the sort of

meta-mathematical techniques that had proved so useful in the foundations of mathematics.12.

Despite the lack of clarity of the epistemological status of analytic statements and other

extra-logical inferential apparatus, I maintain that Carnap's basic insight can serve as the basis

for a comprehensive theory of entailment, but only after it is disentangled from characteristic

positivistic presuppositions and strengthened by additional apparatus drawn from recent

discussions in informal logic and argumentation theory. But first, the Carnapian core. What I

take from Carnap is the conviction that entailment requires, in addition to the standard apparatus

of first-order theory, generative of a subset of the statements that he called "L-truths,"

additional elements sufficient to support a class of additional truths, conditional upon

substantive, extra-logical, statements: what I will call "A-truths."13. A-truths, although

distinguishable from the set of L-truths, extend the consequence closure of the theory to

statements that are functionally analytic, but only within particular inferential systems. The set

of A-truths can be seen as a set of implicit or explicit definitions that defined particular

inferential systems.14.

The philosophical quarrel with the epistemic status of A-truths was a consequence of

their functioning as analytic truths within the system that included them, but, as evidenced by

axiomatized scientific theories, were a posteriori. This violated the tradition, following Kant,

that saw no room for analytic a posteriori statements. Moreover, Carnap's apparent disregard of

the need for a principled account of their special status was particularly troublesome, since Kant

had placed at the center of his concern the status of just the sort of statements that distinguished

the most reliable extra-logical systems of thought, particularly mathematics and classical

physics, from less epistemologically robust explanatory schemes. Clearly, post-Kantian

philosophers could be hardly expected to accept as shallow an account as that of Carnap's, no

matter how clear and potentially relevant it was for the understanding of central examples of

inferential systems that transcended pure logic.

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Kantian presuppositions, however, had a price in two regards. First, they pointed to an

inflated epistemic status for inferential systems that were central to the discussion: mathematics

and physical science. This mimicked Kant's unsupportable intuition that core theories in physics

and mathematics were uniquely necessary. Second, they reinforced a deeply rooted

philosophical bias for accepting only the most general, abstract and content-neutral accounts of

epistemological concepts, a bias that was increasingly under attack by philosophers concerned

with accounts that were more sensitive to actual practice in science and elsewhere. If Carnap's

insight can be freed from such typically Kantian assumptions, its apparent weaknesses are

transformed into strengths. A-truths, functionally analytic within a posteriori theories, become

an indicator of the depth of commitment to such theoretic postulates, and the lack of an absolute

distinction between analytic and synthetic points to the ultimate contingency of extra-logical

statements in the face of the fluidity of conceptual advance. How can this be supported? There

seem to be two available strategies.

The first is to disentangle the insight that some intuitive logic, deeply a priori, is always

required at the highest available meta-level from a commitment to absolutisitic foundationalism

and the demand for certainty. Second, arguments must be offered that support the need for a

greater emphasis on descriptive adequacy as the most important criteria for the acceptance of a

theory of argument, even where descriptive adequacy results in loss of generality, clarity and

rigor. I will focus on the first strategy by drawing upon a recent discussion by Harvey Siegel.

Siegel's account, although support of a modest foundationalism that he contrasts with relativism,

permits the inclusion of extra-logical considerations in a way that invites the consideration of

substantive components of the discourse frames within which argumentation takes place. And

thus, the second concern, which I have explored in some detail elsewhere, will be addressed as

well.15.

3. Siegel and a modest foundationalism.

Siegel, offers a powerful critique of relativism, in his recent book Relativism Refuted.16.

He employs one of the oldest and deepest philosophical arguments, one of those few

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paradigmatic arguments in the history of philosophy that are reflected throughout the subsequent

history of the disputes for which they are germane. The argument is Plato's from the Theatetus.

17. It results in the trivialization of relativism: "If what every man believes...is indeed true for

him...to set about overhauling and testing one another's notions and opinions...is a tedious and

monstrous display of folly ."18. Further, if at least one person denies relativism, the relativist

"must acknowledge the truth of his opponent's belief about his own belief...(and

thus)...acknowledge his own belief to be false."19.

Siegel sees the first argument as demonstrating that relativism is "self-defeating" in that

"if it (relativism) is right, it cannot be right...(since) if it is right, the very notion of rightness is

undermined."20. The second argument shows that if at least one individual denies relativism,

relativism is false, since, "given conflicting beliefs, some beliefs must necessarily be false--in

which case relativism cannot be true )."21. After recasting Plato's arguments in precise terms,

Siegel uses them against contemporary epistemological relativism , against relativism in respect

of conceptual schemes and other broad frameworks, against Kuhn and his followers, against

other relativist tending accounts in the philosophy of science, and finally against Nelson

Goodman.22.

The upshot of Siegel's account is a modest foundationalism that requires no more than

"the possibility of objective, fair, neutral, non-question-begging evaluation of rival claims, in

accordance with criteria that themselves admit of critical assessment and improvement," Siegel

distinguishes his view from what he calls "vulgar" absolutism which includes a commitment to

certainty and to "an indubitable framework into which all knowledge-claims must fit (and) a set

of incorrigible criteria by which putative knowledge-claims must be judged."23. This, as we shall

see, is a useful stance from which a theory of entailment can be developed. But, Siegel's

position, although acceptable, points to issues that he does not discuss. For, I maintain that the

strength of his argument is not in what it proves, but rather, in where it draws the line.

Siegel shows how his argument, strengthened with only the most minimal account of

reason, permits us to "ask--and answer--questions concerning the (non-relativistic) epistemic

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worth of claims...that is, determine the extent to which reasons for some claim offer it

warrant."24. This mirrors his view, developed elsewhere, that critical thinking, conceived as

central to rationality, is aptly characterized as requiring that one is "appropriately moved by

reasons."25.

Siegel frees us from relativist fears and guarantees the reflexivity of the rational

enterprise in a way that yields foundational support. The closed, but indefinite, space of rational

argumentation is shown by its closure to be self-supporting. But of what moment is the

reassurance that the argument affords without some account of particulars. Rational argument

may very well be required at every stage of disputation, but what is the texture of rational

argument?. What is it to be "appropriately moved by reasons?"

This specification of what, in particular, it means to be "appropriately moved by reasons"

may very well be of little concern to abstract epistemologists, although Siegel, at least judging

by the amount of time he spends on the view, seems to accept some sort of account in the style

of Robert Ennis.26. Such an account, characterized by the enumeration of discrete inferential

components and analytic skills, is common to most of the theoretic and practical work in

informal logic. But what is required, if the project is to have any substance, is a an adequate

account of entailment compatible with such an approach.

I have offered arguments elsewhere, relying heavily on examples, that develop the

considerations that prompt me to maintain that no array of general and topic neutral categories of

the sort available from recent work in informal logic is, in itself, adequate to the task of

argument analysis and assessment.27. Our discussion of Carnap , above, and recent unresolved

issues in informal logic discussed below, will point to a deep reason why this is the case. But, as

I will maintain, a unified theoretic account is still possible; Siegel offers us a clue.

Siegel take a prudent posture in regards to the consequences of his rationalistic

foundationalism, seeing his position as independent of vulgar absolutism with its requirement of

incorrigibility and certainty. Instead, he accepts fallabilism and pluralism.28. Given his concern

to set a limit beyond which relativism cannot go, his stance has the virtue of blocking deeply

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relativistic positions, while opening the door for the appreciation of, for example, the recent

rejection of formalism in philosophy of science, and the emphasis on actual practice. It also

invites acknowledgement of the deep theoretic issues raised by hermeneutics, even if it stops

short of thorough-going linguistic relativity sometimes associated with hermeneutic theory.

Similarly, his view limits the extreme consequences to be drawn from the social, political or

cultural critique of knowledge and reason, but permits the incorporation of socio-political

critiques that point to the role of social, cultural and political components in actual

argumentation. The task for us is to make some sense of this wealth of opportunity. Relativism

in the deepest sense may not be a concern for those of us who find Siegel's arguments

compelling, but the relativity of arguments to frameworks, de facto, must be addressed if an

adequate theory of argument is to be forthcoming. For the theory of argument requires that an

account of the role of frameworks in supporting arguments be available for both the criticism of

frameworks unjustifiably used in support of particular claims, as well as for some sense of how

justificatory frameworks succeed in offering rational foundations for the positions in whose

support they are appropriately put forward. This is especially true for those of us who do not

scorn the outcomes of actual human inquiry, and see the social construction of knowledge

through disciplines and in well-functioning discourse communities as furnishing the paradigms

for cogency from which a theory of argument is to be drawn.

4. Informal logic and the problem of reconstructing arguments.

Trudy Govier's analysis of recent work in informal logic in Problems in Argument

Analysis and Evaluation offers a comprehensive image of central issues of concern to us.29. The

aspect of Govier's account that we will focus on is her discussion of missing premises and

unstated assumptions within the context of reconstructing arguments preliminary to their

assessment.30. The relevance of the discussion to our concerns is apparent once we realize that

analytic and nomic assumptions (A-truths) are often implicit in argumentation, forming a

background for the discourse communities within which argumentation occurs. This is most

apparent with classes of assumptions that play roles that Govier characterizes as being: "... a

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necessary condition for the terms used to have a referent...for properly inferring the conclusion

from stated premises... for the appropriacy of the methodology used by the arguer when he or

she cites the premises as support for the conclusion...for words used in stating the premises and

conclusion to have the meaning which they do have, and on which proper understanding of the

argument depends."31.

Such assumptions, as she points out, our indefinitely numerous, and may be of such

obviousness that their explicit mention would be "infinitely cumbersome" to fill out in real

argumentation.32. Such ground level assumptions are distinguished from missing premises which

she, following Ennis, sees as filling "inference gaps." 33. But even these more narrowly defined

items are indefinitely many in that "there is considerable room for disagreement about them.

Some people see gaps where others don't, due to disagreements about the theory of

argument."34.

Govier concludes her discussion by pointing to the complexity of the problems associated

with articulating a policy on the reconstruction of arguments that includes missing premises and

unstated assumptions. Such reconstructions involve such issues as: "Interpretation of the

discourse as contained in an argument...Classification of the stated argument as being of some

particular type...Logical judgment that the stated argument is not inferentially sound...(and)

would be...if one of a candidate of supplementary premises were

added...Logical/epistemic/interpretive judgment that the argument is an enthymeme rather than a

fallacy or non sequitor ...(and)... Selection of one candidate (missing premise) from others..."35.

The pervasive sense of indefiniteness in the discussion of missing premisses and unstated

assumptions that underlie putative entailments must be spoken to. The solution that Govier

recommends, balancing considerations of charity with interpretative accuracy, tends towards

pragmatism in the selection of strategies for the reconstruction and assessment of arguments, and

through its particularistic approach, relativism.36. Summarizing her discussion, she states:

"Confident statements to the effect that such and such argument clearly has some statement as its

missing premise are inappropriate. Whether a statement is a missing premise in some argument

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depends on our theory of argument, our purpose in analyzing the argument, and much else."37.

But how are we to decide in particular cases, is there no general apparatus available that will

move us closer to the goal of a reasonable and general theory of entailment? Concern with

particulars can lead to a proliferation of unanalyzed detail that sheds little light on the functional

relations among the elements of arguments that support entailment relations. Generality and

analytic rigor are required if an account is to be theoretically illuminating, detail and richness of

structural apparatus are required if an account is to be descriptively adequate.38. This raises a

deep issue.

The issue, in the most abstract sense, is the weight assigned to particular degrees of

philosophical clarity and generality as a determiner of saliency. Informal logicians, like formal

logicians, have striven after accounts that are general in particular ways. Concepts are to be

analyzed in the most bareboned fashion, and held accountable to counter-examples, including

extreme cases. This has a natural place in formal logic where the perspicuity of proofs about

systems requires brevity of characterization, and so considerations of elegance are highly valued.

This is paralleled in the level of rigor with which arguments are scrutinized, a degree of rigor, it

should be noted, not often found outside of physics and mathematics. But the question for both

clarity and rigor is their place in the total scheme of analysis and explanation. For what is won

through rigor is often won at the expense of realism and relevance. This accounts for the paucity

of accounts of argument that are adequate to both criteria inherited from formal logic and an

intuitive sense of argument cogency based on well-functioning arguments in real contexts,

arguments crucial for the adequacy of theoretic analyses in that they furnish the data from which

our sense of intuitive logic and of the cogency of arguments is drawn.

Rigor, clarity and generality only add to the debate, if the rigorously scrutinized, clearly

articulated, and generally applicable analyses are illuminating to particulars with which we are

concerned. Criteria elaborating from formal logic are most nearly sufficient for domains within

which formal arguments predominate. In such domains, mathematics is the clearest example,

conceptual and theoretic advancement is a function of the conceptual dynamics themselves,

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whence formal analysis is relevant to most of the actual argumentation. This is decreasingly true

as argumentation includes more and more non-formal components, new concepts and inference

relations that expand the available domain of argumentation through new ideas and creative

definitions: that is, argumentation in which new ideas and creative definitions increase the set of

consequences included in the field. This is the insight behind the distinction between L-truths

and A-truths. Fields that add to their core concepts and acceptable operations by including more

statements in the consequence closure of their basic statements over time, can not be captured by

accounts that are limited to purely logical operations. They require an account of how one

justifies extra-logical elements that function in logical ways, that is extra-logical elements that

support acceptable entailments in the field.

The remainder of this paper will attempt to sketch out a direction in which an account of

entailment should go, if a reasonable balance between generality and descriptive adequacy is to

result. The beginnings of a solution is to reintroduce the seminal work of Toulmin, whose

structural account will take as far in the direction of argument assessment.39. There is, however,

a price to pay. For the direction Toulmin takes us leads away from the sufficiency of the sort of

abstract and topic-neutral accounts favored by many informal logicians. Toulmin takes us into

the disciplines: areas of human cognitive practice that support the most deeply structured and

effective argumentation available for analysis.

5. Toulmin and the functional analysis of argument.

Toulmin's analysis of argument, including backing, warrants, grounds and claims is too

well known to need recounting. What is essential to my understanding of Toulmin is that the

categories that Toulmin assigns to argument components are functional; they are not structural,

that is, general and syntactic. This may seem like an overstatement, for there are characteristic

linguistic markers for basic argument structures, premises and conclusion most notably. But

inference indicators, and even sentential connectives, are rich and subtle in meaning and

function. There seems little reason to suppose that reductive analyses borrowed from formal

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logic or developed informally with an eye to full generality will succeed in capturing the

richness of use found in actual argumentation.40.

Despite the difficulty of a purely structural account, functional categories of inference

moves are discernable in naturally occurring arguments. The beginnings of a theoretic account is

available in Toulmin's seminal account, even though some elaboration is required even if it is to

serve as a first step.41. The value of Toulmin's work, however, extends beyond the particulars.

What is most essential is the direction it takes, pointing to the specifics of argumentation in

particular domains of discourse, through functional relations that order and illuminate essential

discipline-specific components.21. Toulmin's account enables us to organize the most crucial

elements required for judgments of argument cogency, by giving us general probes into the

surrounding problematic within which arguments are offered, and the history of the discourse

frames in whose terms arguments are couched.43.

Toulmin's analysis has a number of features consistent with our previous discussion. His

analysis in terms of claims, grounds, warrants and backing has an apparent deductive, even

syllogistic, structure. This supports the intuition that deductive criteria serve as a scaffolding for

argumentation by warranting the management of premise-conclusion relations, essential for

truth preservation and more elaborate model-theoretic properties.44. Such over-arching structures

are, however, insufficient for a theory of entailment, since they do not include essential relations

between the terms in the argument, as well as other substantive and particular inferential

apparatus. Such relations whether analytic or nomic require some theoretic account. The solution

that Toulmin affords, like Carnap's, places the context into the foreground. But unlike Carnap,

Toulmin does not offer a purely abstract account. Rather, he points to the dialogical contexts

within which warrants are called for in support of premise-conclusion linkages. Such warrants,

although relative to linguistic or theoretic frames, are not arbitrary, but rather rest on the body of

propositions, including definitions and other inferentially relevant apparatus, that a protagonist

sustains as a background for his argument.

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Toulmin's solution eludes the problem of indefiniteness that is at the center of Govier's

account. Not all assumptions need to be brought forward, for many of these will form the

common body of accepted beliefs about meanings and other inferential relationships. All that is

required are those assumptions that support aspects of the argument that are challenged, and all

that need to be defended are those brought into question during dialogical exchanges.

This does, however, create a problem for the favorite examples of arguments as

represented in informal logic texts and theoretic discussions. Arguments, construed as fragments

of discourse taken out of context, make it difficult, if not impossible, to choose between the

many plausible reconstructions that creative argument analysis permits. Thus, informal logic

creates for itself the dilemma of hermeneutics, exaggerated to the extent that the argument

fragments to be analyzed are both brief and abstracted from the textual context from which they

have been drawn.45. But this is no problem for real arguments, where requests for clarification

of intended meanings or general principles are specific and relative to the discourse frame

common to the interlocutors, and either tacitly or explicitly identified in the opening stage of

argumentation.46.

Carnap's problem, the seeming arbitrariness of A-truths, like the indefiniteness of

argument reconstruction seen in Govier's account, need not be seen as intrinsic to argument.

Rather, it is an artifact of positivistic assumptions common in formal logic and, apparent in

much of informal logic as well. In informal logic practice it results from the focus on micro-

arguments, by analogy to the simplified constructions common to logic texts of the previous

generation. In theory it draws from an unexamined assumption, rooted in the logical atomism

and fundamental to formal logic, that takes complex arguments to be reiterations of simple

inference patterns, reiterations that are seen as sufficient without remainder. Arguments,

construed as dialogical exchanges, point away from the sufficiency of micro-arguments. For

dialogical exchanges broaden micro-arguments by calling for the principled identification of

assumptions of all kinds. Neither the interpretation, nor the strength of micro-arguments of

substance, can be ascertained in abstraction from supporting frameworks typified by analytic and

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nomic relationships. These are particular, and relative to discourse frames, but nonetheless, not

arbitrary. Toulmin's notion of backing plays the role of substantiating explicitized warrants by

bringing forward the broad epistemological concerns upon which the warrants are based. These,

once identified, can be challenged as well, with the resultant broadening of the scope of

argumentation. But they are neither indefinite nor arbitrary. They are specific within

argumentative exchanges, and rationally defensible to the extent that they reflect acceptable

methodological practices and dialectically defensible procedures.

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Endnotes

1. See Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) for a classic account of scientific inference in terms of

restricted implication relationships; Eberle, et. al. (1961) is an example of the sort of discussions

that followed. Lewis and Langford (1951); Hintakka (1962) and von Wright (1968) offer

seminal accounts of modal, epistemic and deontic entailments, respectively, that involve

enriched logical apparatus. See Bradley and Swartz (1979) for an introductory yet

comprehensive survey.

2. But see Hitchcock (1987) for an attempt at utilizing deductive apparatus for a related purpose.

3. The phrase "deductive chauvinism," is commonly used to refer to the policy of seeing

deductive validity as the only criteria by which arguments are to be assessed.

4. Even though non-deductive relations support different configurations of premise and

conclusion, they prescribe certain patterns and proscribe others. So inductive arguments permit

detachment of the antecedent and conductive arguments permit non-analytic relations between

terms. Nevertheless, both support conditionalization in the sense that, although the internal

structure of premise conclusion relations may be distinct, the minimal conditional yields a

deductively valid argument, and so the management of premises using the standard deductive

apparatus is still an issue (See f.n. 5, below).

Take, as an example, the following blatantly non-deductive argument: Fa & Fb & ... & Fc,

therefore (x) Fx. The associated conditional is "If Fa & Fb & ... & Fc then (x) Fx" which with

the premise deductively implies the conclusion. Or take the following confirmation of a general

law which, on the surface, commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent: (x) Fx

(generalization to be confirmed); If (x) Fx then Fa (experimental consequence, deductively

generated), Fa (consequence experimentally verified), therefore (x) Fx (is

confirmed).Conditionalized as: "If, If (x) Fx then Fa, & Fa, then (x) Fx)," which again, given the

premises, deductively implies the conclusion. Naturally, none of these are either good or bad

arguments because of the availability of conditionalization

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There are other connections between non-deductive arguments and deductive forms; for

example, strong inductive relations, such as Baysian or other axiomatic treatments of

probability, essentially include deductive relations, their quantitative conclusions being logical

consequences of the mathematical theory involved.

5. By the minimal conditional I mean a sentence of the form " If p1 and ... and pn, then q" which

is constructed parasitic upon an argument with premises p1 through pn and conclusion q. This

has an obvious, although perhaps misleading. structural analogy with the Deduction Theorem

which can be stated as: If p1,...,pn |- q then |-p1&...&pn then q. The problem with the deduction

theorem is that its proof relies on the standard account of the conditional and canonical models

as the basis for the underlying theory of truth. Neither of these have clear enough analogues in

non-formal languages sufficient to support the unargued application of the deduction theorem to

arguments that occur outside of formal systems.

6. By "stylized language" I mean technical languages in which stylized arguments occur. The

latter notion is developed in my paper "Towards An Account of Argumentation in Science,"

(Weinstein, 1990a) and is exemplified by the languages of the various mature sciences, most

characteristically physics and chemistry. It draws a distinction between such languages and

natural languages on the one hand and artificial languages on the other.

7. Carnap (1956, Supplement B); for "inference ticket see Toulmin (1953).

8. The lack of clarity of the epistemological status of Carnap's meaning postulates created a

persistent concern. (See Pap 1953, for a summary presentation of the issues). This is, in part

because of the common interpretation of Tarskian semantics as relating meaning and some

univocal notion of truth, and in part because the debate was centered around general distinctions

that became increasingly harder to sustain in the face of objections. The central text for the

dispute is Quine's notorious "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," (Quine, 1953) where concerns with

demarcating analytic and synthetic statements was pressed to the point at which a whole host of

related distinctions, empirical/theoretic, nomic/ and merely general, essential/ accidental, were

increasingly seen as problematic.

17

This complex of issues has formed a resistant web, yielding neither plausible and

comprehensive analyses, nor convergence of judgment among those scholars who have explored

aspects of the phenomena. Still, I believe that clarification is possible by strengthening the

apparatus through which entailment is to be analyzed. In particular, as we shall sketch below,

what is needed is a functional analysis of argument, of the sort offered by Stephen Toulmin

(Toulmin, 1969; Toulmin et. al. 1979). An additional requirement is acceptance of the stance

that Toulmin has consistently advocated, that is, that the notion of argument requires attention to

the particulars of the context within which argument takes place. This is best illustrated by

stylized argumentation within special domains of discourse, for example, those favored by

Toulmin himself: law and the sciences.

What cannot be included in this paper is a model that incorporates a relativized notion of

truth, true in a model, and a particularized theory of meaning that develops Carnap's intuition in

a fashion that is productive of a formal analysis of theory change and acceptability. (See,

Weinstein, 1976 for a preliminary account.)

9. Pap (1953), see chapter 14 for a summary account; see Belnap (1967) for the argument in

relation to logical connectives themselves.

10. The classic discussion is, of course, found in Quine (1953). the literature that followed is

voluminous.

11. A particularly rich example is Suppes (1969).

12. Mostowksi (1966).

13. Carnap calls these latter statements "L-truths" as well, but distinguishes them as relative to a

particular language, a "semantic system," Carnap (1942), especially paragraph 17.

14. See the Beth Definability Theorem for the relationship between implicit and explicit

definitions in formal systems, for example, Robbin (1969), p. 65.

15.Weinstein (1989; 1990a; 1990b).

16. Siegel (1987).

17. Plato, (1961).

18

18. Plato, 162a.

19. Plato, 171a and 171c.

20. Siegel, op. cit., p. 4.

21. ibid., p.5 &p. 6.

22. ibid., pp 6ff; chapters 2 through 7 for the, respectively, for the views in order.

23. ibid., p. 167.

24. ibid., p. 168.

25. Siegel (1988).

26. Siegel (1988), pp. 5ff; for a recent version of Ennis' position, see Ennis (1987).

27. Weinstein (1989; 1990a, 1990b).

28. Siegel (1987), chapter 8; (1988), pp. 108ff. and p. 144n.

29. Govier (1987).

30. ibid., chapter 5.

31. ibid., p. 93.

32. ibid.

33. ibid, pp. 94ff., citing Ennis (1982).

34. ibid., pp.94-5; and see pp. 85ff. for some examples and f.n. 12, pps. 103-4

35. ibid., p. 102.

36. ibid. pps 99ff.

37. ibid, p. 103.

38. Short of a turn about in the fortunes of formal analysis, informal logicians have few

paradigms upon which to draw that illuminate a most pressing concern, a theory of validation for

inferences. For although much of the apparatus developed so far is useful for the identification

of argument components, on some relevant levels of analysis, the assessment of arguments has

been limited to judgments of their inadequacy in light of traditional, and newly defined, informal

fallacies. This places a severe limitation on informal logic as a general theory of argument, even

when restricted to logical aspects of argumentation, for there is no significant account of

19

argument cogency that extends beyond the core notions drawn from formal logic. Naturally, if a

formal account of entailment were to be available, the issue would be resolved. The main thrust

of the discussion here is that although aspects of formal logic are reasonable and available to the

assessment of argumentation, rich and complex issues in the theory of entailment must be faced

if progress in an account of argument cogency is to result.

39. Toulmin, 1969; Toulmin, et. al., 1979.

40. This, perhaps, explain why critics of Toulmin (Johnson, 1981, van Eemeren, et, al., 1987)

felt justified in questioning the naturalness with which his categories applied to the typical range

of argument samples found in his and other informal logic textbooks. The fault, however, is not

with Toulmin's model, rather it is with the sorts of examples characteristic of logic texts and the

underlying philosophy of argument that these examples reflect. Why "philosophy" of argument.

The word calls attention to an echo of a common philosophical history that has led theorists of

argument astray: logical atomism, implicit in the standard account that sees complex

argumentation as analyzable, without remainder, into simple arguments. For, as this discussion

begins to display, arguments are not molecules whose identity is in their decomposition, rather

they are concretations in a field, whose essence can only be seen in their relations to a

surrounding context. Arguments, like all intentional objects, reach outward to the systems of

thought within which they occur. Their strength is in their external relations, relations that may

be reflected in their internal structure, but that are necessary of the force of the internal structure

is to be identified and assessed.

Once this is realized, there is little wonder in the fact that looking at the fragments of

argumentation in isolation yields a pervasive sense of arbitrariness in practice and indefiniteness

in theory.

41. Weinstein, 1989; 1990a.

42. The issue of sensitivity to specific disciplinary contexts within which arguments occur, and

the concomitant particularity with which arguments need to be analyzed and assessed has been a

perennial concern within discussions in informal logic and the related field of critical thinking.

20

In a number of recent papers I have argued that the current conception informal logic is

insufficiently sensitive to the need for discipline specific elements in argument analysis and

assessment. This is in part, because of the lack of an adequate theory of the fundamental

structures that underlie actual inferences, and in part because of a bias towards generality typical

of philosophers and universal among logicians (Weinstein, 1990a; 1990b). In doing so I have

sided with McPeck (1981) in his criticism of the vapid neutrality that has characterized recent

work in the field, relying on decontextualized arguments, presumably available to common

sense, as the domain of application for informal logic. My championing Toulmin is part of this

process, for Toulmin's apparatus enables us to differentiate functional aspects of argument in

ways that illuminate context and discipline specific particulars. What my recent efforts point to

is a theoretic and pragmatic reorientation of the field. Away from proto-formal intuitions, and

quasi-formal analyses, and towards enriched analytical apparatus and descriptive adequacy.

Entailment is one of the issues that speak to my concerns, and a particularly telling one,

because of its centrality in theories of inference and its connection with formal logic. What is

most telling about entailment is its tacit employment in the informal logic apparatus offered in

theory and practice: an instance of the pervasive tendency of informal logicians, perhaps

motivated by the production of textbooks in advance of the development of theory, to act as if

everything is in place.

43. It should not be surprising, given my emphasis on the context of argumentation, that

Toulmin's historical work is, for me, the best indicator of the value of his approach.The

historical works with Goodfield (Toulmin and Goodfield, 1961; 1963; 1965) gives the practice;

the, unfortunately aborted, Toulmin (1972) the begininngs of a theory. The task for the theory of

entailment is to provide apparatus for the understanding of argumentation of the sort that

Toulmin describes. Adequacy to descriptions at those two levels of abstraction seems a

desiderata for the theory of argument in science.

One way to point to what lies behind my high estimation of Toulmin's work is to contrast

my view of Toulmin with that of his critics. I have already alluded to differences between

21

myself and Johnson, and van Eeemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (f.n. 39). The contrast

between myself and Harvey Siegel is indicative as well. Siegel (1987) draws the following

gloomy picture of Toulmin's Human Understanding .

a. "Toulmin consistently conflates "concept" with proposition," particularly in relation to the key

issue of the explanatory ideals in terms of which the current capacities of scientific practices are

to be judged, pp. 125-6.

b. Toulmin claims that "Absolutism...avoids the problem of relativism at the cost of irrelevance",

whereas "alternative concepts...can be compared with the absolute standards...(and)... the

possibility of "comparing the merits of alternatives... depends on there being some alternative-

neutral conception of merit, which itself must count as an absolute standard," p. 126. In addition,

"Toulmin adopts an absolutist account of rationality of exactly the sort that he dooms to

irrelevance (furthering the ability of the discipline to achieve its disciplinary goals)," p. 126.

c."Toulmin's analysis of absolutism suffers form the defects inherited from his argument that

rationality cannot be understood in logical and formal terms," p. 126. Whereas, "criteria such as

fertility (or progressiveness), predictive power, explanatory power, simplicity and the like, while

not being narrowly deductive (though even in these deduction plays some role), are nevertheless

logical and formal in that they speak to the relationship between hypothesis and evidence, and

moreover, function as means of evaluating hypotheses and theories," p. 128; further, "strict

deductive relationships can hold across rival conceptual systems," p. 128.

d."Toulmin's positive account of rationality ...(rationality is a matter of the conditions under

which a person changes his point of view)...does not necessarily conflict with the account that he

opposes, namely that rationality is a function of logicality," pp. 128-9.

e. "Toulmin's discussion of rationality in "intrinsically cloudy cases... (cases in which a

disciplines's explanatory ideals are themselves in dispute)... faces severe difficulties," p.129.

Toulmin, Siegel claims, argues that "such cases are to be settled, not by appeal to disciplinary

ideals, but to "broader arguments involving the comparison of alternative intellectual strategies,

in the light of historical experience and precedents," p. 128. Siegel asks "Why should such

22

search for historical precedents serve as a guide to rational choice in cloudy cases?" since "the

rebels argue that the historical course should no longer be followed," p. 130. Further, Toulmin's

examples (Supreme Court decisions) are based on "general ideals, which are agreed upon by all

disputants in such judgments, (which ) destroys the analogy Toulmin tries to draw, for ex

hypothesi, such ideals do not exist in cloudy cases," p. 130. Finally, "the analogy that Toulmin

draws between such legal judgment and scientific judgments in cloudy cases leaves the

rationality of the latter in circumstances as desperate as those of the former," since "the only

constraint on such decisions is that the court uses its judgment. Thus, any decision based on

judgment is rational," p. 130.

f. "Toulmin's account of rationality in clear cases (i.e. cases where disciplinary ideals are not in

dispute) seems to force him into an absolutist position, in that rational choice in clear cases is

simply a matter of choosing so as to fulfill disciplinary ideas--this latter being an absolute

standard," pp. 131-2.

Without the inappropriate incorporation of a review of Siegel's account of Toulmin

within a footnote, here are the positions that I believe Toulmin ought to sustain in respect of the

issues that Siegel identifies. It remains to each reader to see if these positions are adequate to

Toulmin's account, and to Siegel's challenges.

a. Explanatory ideals and the power of particular scientific conceptions require consideration of

both the concepts and propositions that comprise any particular scientific theory or program of

research. The relation between the two is indicated by the function of the set of A-truths in the

sense developed in the text. A-truths define key concepts and other relevant inferential apparatus

that, under the initial conditions of a theory, yield the set of empirical propositions that the

theory contains. Such implicit or explicit definitions, and relationships among them, support the

set of nomic consequences of the theory. The consequences, which are the explananda of a

theory, are sometimes so important that they constitute a significant increase in the power of the

theory. (Siegel offers such an example on p. 126.) Frequently, specific consequences are not at

issue, but rather deep theoretic items that require new concepts (Kepler's laws; Dalton's atomic

23

theory are two familiar instances of this is at different levels of abstraction.) Which elements,

and at which historical juncture, are most fruitful in increasing explanatory power, or satisfying

other epistemological ideals, requires examination of cases. We look for, among other things,

which items are productive of useful analogies; which point to new, and increasingly fertile,

approaches; which are relevant to the resolution of recalcitrant problems; which result in

broadening the experimental base; which are indicative of new theoretic relationships; which

result in an increase in practical applications of importance, and etc.

Any account of scientific adequacy must include considerations of the adequacy of

concepts as well as the facticity of propositions . My sense is that Toulmin's historical work is

replete with significant instances of both. I find it hard to believe that, short of difficult border-

line cases, Toulmin's accounts are confused. Siegel does not support his charge with examples,

nor does Toulmin's inclusion of both sorts of items in the equation that Siegel cites, "Scientific

Problems = Explanatory Ideals - Current Capacities," point to anything other than a, perhaps,

unhappy tendency to construct epigrams as summary statements of complex analyses.

b. Siegel never explains what "problems of relativism" Toulmin claims absolutists must confront

on pain of irrelevance. Take the following as the beginning of such an account: Actual theory

choice occurs against a background of characteristic practices, central problems as well as

assumptions and presuppositions of various kinds. This is true of any theory, including abstract

epistemological theories. The problem that relativists bring to the fore is just this "situatedness"

of discourse. Historically sensitive epistemologists and philosophers of science see the

identification and assessment of such framework beliefs and methodological stances as essential.

The absolutist, if insensitive to such concerns, fails to address the role that such particulars play

in the analysis and assessment of disputes. Moreover, if the absolutist is insensitive to his own

assumptions, the result is indifference to possible alternatives to his own point of view. This is

especially true of absolutists who rely on a priori intuitions, who, like Kant for example, can not

conceive of alternatives to the necessities that they posit. This includes, of course, alternatives to

a prior epistemology itself.

24

Such sensitivity to relativist insights does not require the denial of the minimal sort of

"absolutism" that Siegel recommends, "non-vulgar absolutism or pluralism," that requires no

more than the "possibility of objective, non-question begging judgments," p. 162. But neither

does it require that the criteria that support such objective, non-question begging judgments are

absolute in the sense of unique, incorrigible or more than merely typical of particular points of

view or historic eras. It is my sense of Toulmin's work that he sees the identification of the

reasons that underlie actual scientific judgments as an essential outcome of his work. Given his

historic reconstruction, he may very well see "furthering the ability of the discipline to achieve

its disciplinary goals," as a frequent basis for comparative theoretic judgments, without taking

that criterion, or any other, as the court of last resort. The requirement, that for all rational

disputes there is some objective, non-begging set of criteria employed, does not imply, that there

is some objective, non-question begging set of concepts employed for all rational disputes.

c. As far as Toulmin's rejection of formalism is concerned, this seems no more than good

philosophical sense in light of the fact that concepts of the sort Siegel enumerates (fertility,

progressiveness, predictive power, explanatory power and simplicity) have resisted attempts at

formal reconstruction. When Siegel says that such concepts can be seen to be, "logical and

formal in that they speak to the relationship between hypothesis and evidence, and moreover,

function as means of evaluating hypotheses and theories," p. 128, one wonders just what Siegel

has in mind, especially in light of his use of a scientifically irrelevant construction from first -

order logic to illustrate his claim that, "strict deductive relationships can hold across rival

conceptual systems," p. 128. He identifies "rival conceptual systems" with distinct predicate

letters, and utilizes addition to fudge a connection that yields comparable consequences. It is just

such logical constructs that prompted the abandonment of formalist philosophy of science.

Siegel must show a great deal more than facts about derivations in elementary logic, if he is to

convince philosophers of science aware of the literature generated by, for example, Hempel's

attempts at formal reconstruction, that formalism has something important to say about key

scientific concepts.

25

d. The preceding serves us for this point as well. Toulmin's positive view is, indeed, not

inconsistent with logic playing some role in the reasoning that underlies "change of belief." In

fact, as we argue in the text above, formal deductive structures underlie all arguments. Toulmin

need not deny that logic plays a role in rational theory choice, and my sense is that he does not,

he merely needs to point up the limited role that logical analysis plays in accounting for the

salient details of actual scientific disputes. Toulmin could very well argue that short of premise-

conclusion management, pure logic does very little. A question that might be asked is: What role

would Toulmin see for a reconstruction of the sort presented here, that is, the enrichment of the

logical basis of a theory with meaning postulates and "inference tickets," and the formalist

possibilities that it affords? My sense is, that short of a renewed formalist research program that

resulted in some interesting and plausible analyses, he would be unimpressed. Despite my

championing of Toulmin, I would not agree, since I feel that there is a real use of sophisticated

formal analysis, if reflective of the sort of complexity and context sensitivity that characterizes

Toulmin's best efforts.

e. Siegel's critique of the epistemologically central "cloudy cases" seems to miss what Toulmin's

discussion ought to high-light. That is, that in inter-theoretic disputes of a deep and foundational

sort, reasons must be sought after outside of the frameworks of the disputant themselves. This

seems to be a point that Siegel endorses. The issue than is the claim that history, rather than, say

philosophy, is the domain towards which disputants should look. I see no way of resolving the

dispute short of the careful analysis of examples. To where do theorists look for productive

analogies, relevant practices, over-arching concepts? The answer is, most plausibly, anywhere

they can. Is there some set of privileged concepts to which theorists should look? An advocate of

philosophical epistemology might certainly make that claim. Could this claim be substantiated

by an enumeration of significant scientific debates resolved through philosophical arguments?

Only a program like Toulmin's can give us the answer, that is, absent a philosophical argument

that demonstrate the sufficiency of philosophical concepts. Siegel has no such argument. The

26

argument that he does have, that rational comparison requires objective standards yields nothing

about the nature of the standards themselves.

f. Whether Toulmin's analysis of "rationality in clear cases" commits him to absolutism, depends

on an analysis of absolutism. Siegel's absolutism, requiring no more than the necessity of

"objective, non-question begging" criteria, and including a commitment to pluralism and

fallibilism, is certainly one that Toulmin can accept. The question is: what does such a version of

absolutism rule out, and what relationship does it have to the traditional foundationalist project

in epistemology and philosophy of science? And more important, what does a project such as

Toulmin's add to the philosophical tradition that is unique and worthwhile? My sense is that

Toulmin has a great deal more to offer than critics such as Siegel have realized, but that, of

course,awaits the development of Toulmin's ideas in efforts such as the one this paper represents.

44. The yield afforded by quasi-deductivist accounts of central aspects of scientific argument has

been increasingly see as unsatisfactory by philosophers of science. The relevance of

constructions based on formal constructions has been questioned on two counts. First, it is been

argued that analyses of explanation and reduction in terms of restricted consequence relations

have led to counter-intuitive instances, through the promiscuous use of the rich variety of

transformations available within the theory of first order logic. (See Eberle, et. al., 1961 for a

classic instance.) As crucial have been the claims that scientific theories, even where

mathematical, furnish many examples of appropriate, although not formally valid, derivations.

This is most apparent when approximations are "deduced" from theories, that is, where

conclusions are closely identifiable with, but not identical to, formally valid conclusions derived

from explanatory premises.(Feyerabend, 1961, offers an essential first discussion.)

The notion of validity, as ordinarily construed in terms of truth preservation does not

exhaust the relevance of deductive connections in the sciences.To see this it must be realized that

truth is not the only property conserved under deductive relations. The key notion for validity

( of which truth preservation is a limiting instance) is the model theoretic analysis that shows

27

that models are transmitted under deductive relations, so that if p implies q then for any model M

of p, M is a model of q as well.

This to me is the more useful notion, for as I cannot argue here in any detail, it seems to

me that the core explanatory notion in science is the transfer of theoretic models as possible

interpretations of the phenomena in a domain (Weinstein, 1976). This subject has exorcized

formalist philosophers of science in the last decade, and although the last word is not in, it seems

to me apparent that much of the strength of theoretic explanations (and the relevance of warrants

in Toulmin's sense) is derived from their ability to furnish unified models (interpretations) of

data based on the hereditary property of deductive relations in respect of models. The reason that

deductive validity is crucial in science is, to me, a result of the basic model theoretic result just

cited, since it justifies theorists in unifying diverse aspects of empirical phenomena by showing

how they can be rationally explained on the supposition that the phenomena represented by the

data brought forward are models of the theoretic postulates the science proposed. Model

relations, unlike truth relations, permit of clear and definable approximations and thus can

capture the various demands that grow out of scientific practice. ( See, Apostel (1961) for an

early attempt that, unfortunately was not, to my knowledge, developed further.)

45. Govier sees one of the apparently available policies on argument interpretation to be

governed by the protagonist's "implied beliefs and intentions." (Govier, 1987, p. 100). Such

intentionalist accounts, seem to me to be incredibly naive, nevertheless they are frequently put

forward, or presupposed in the informal logic practice of looking closely at text fragments for

clues. It is interesting to note what informal logicians look for, at least as evidenced by the

council they offer their students. A major focus is on inference markers, reduced all to often to

the identification of key words. In addition, considerations of consistency are raised, although it

is rare that any significant amount of information is offered in the light of which consistency is

to be ascertained; plausibility, often key, rests upon common sense.

Certainly key words are crucial to micro-argmentation, plausibility an essential concern,

and consistency a virtue, but what is needed for the identification and elaboration of any

28

substantive argument is the context: the issues, the background assumptions; the interlocutors's

knowledge of previous argumentation; criteria for relevance; degrees of probity; and standards

for accuracy.

Intentionalist accounts of argument interpretation must also respond to the array of

difficulties that intentionalists theories of meaning face. In recent times, these difficulties have

generated whole fields in literary criticism, and are reflected in linguistics, semiotics,

hermeneutics and social critique. In practice, few philosophers would be willing to make an

interpretative claim without a rich basis in primary and secondary literature, and other

information of all sorts--and neither would any body else, if serious. What is the point of

teaching students to reconstruct and assess micro-arguments in example after example, without

helping them to confront arguments as they occur everywhere except in logic texts? And more

tellingly, why should this practice, even if pedagogically efficient, constitute an unargued

assumption about argument structure and analysis in informal logic?

46. The notion of opening stage of argument comes from model of van Eemeren and

Grootendorst (1983).The opening stage includes: "arrangements about the division of roles, the

rules governing the discussion and the manner of its termination" p.158.

29

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32

Abstract of: Entailment in Argumentation

Mark WeinsteinInstitute for Critical ThinkingMontclair State College

The notion of entailment has a long and rich history, and has been at the center of philosophical

and practical logic for decades. This is true of recent work in informal logic and in the theory of

argumentation, where entailment relations have played a key role in discussions of the analysis

and reconstruction of arguments as well as in their assessment. Nevertheless, discussions of the

concept have tended to be limited to a number of characteristic concerns while omitting

significant elements required if an adequate theory of argument is to be forthcoming

. To support this last point we make a number of side excursions: first, to logical

empiricism and the dispute centered around Carnap's account of meaning, then, to some recent

foundational work of Harvey Siegel, and finally, to a summary discussion of the issue of

missing premises and hidden assumptions by Trudy Govier. What we find there will prompt us

to sketch the beginnings of a general account of entailment in argumentation, using the work of

Stephen Toulmin. The general account will point to the need for context specific elements that

play an essential role in argumentation, context specific elements that are necessary components

of the notion of entailment itself.

33