SCHOOL OF HISTORY, CLASSICS AND ARCHAEOLOGY

EUROPE AS A RATIONAL PRINCIPLE

The idea of Europe, European identity and the history of European integration

Dissertation length: 12,535 words

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of therequirements for the degree of Master of Arts in theHistory of Ideas at Birkbeck, University of London

2010 year of submission

SCHOOL OF HISTORY, CLASSICS AND ARCHAEOLOGY

EUROPE AS A RATIONAL PRINCIPLE

The idea of Europe, European identity and the history of European integration

Vincent Cassidy

Dissertation length: 12,535 words

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of therequirements for the degree of Master of Arts in theHistory of Ideas at Birkbeck, University of London

2010 year of submission

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Name (Print clearly): Vincent CassidyMA Programme: History of IdeasTitle of Dissertation: Europe as a Rational PrincipleSupervisor: Jessica ReinishWord Count: 12,535

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ABSTRACT

Europe’s period of hegemony, from the late 1490s until 1945,saw the emergence of an idea of Europe that was tautologicallybound to an idea of history and historicism itself. From theseventeenth century the idea of historical progress becameassociated with the idea of pan-national European institutionsin projects that failed, due to the imperial growth of, and thecompetition between, Europe’s nation states. This dissertationwill examine how the creation of pan-national Europeaninstitutions following the Second World War was driven by theeconomic and political needs of the United States, the newhegemon, but still relied on the origin myths of the idea ofEurope and the concept of historical destiny for theirjustification. This ‘imposed destiny’ created a fracture pointbetween the concept of identity and the rational principle ofprogress inherent in the idea of a pan-European construct.This fracture in the concept of European integration is arguedto be one of subject and object and a review of thehistoriographic models is used to demonstrate how thisconceptual divide runs through the idea of history as it doesthe idea of Europe, bound as they are.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction page 1

Chapter 1 page 4

Chapter 2 page 17

Chapter 3 page 39

Conclusion page 44

References page 46

Bibliography page 52

EUROPE AS A RATIONAL PRINCIPLE

The idea of Europe, European identity and the history of European integration

Introduction

‘We plan the way forward for European

institutions …yet no one has any idea how to

recreate the soul of Europe. i’

Romano Prodi, Europe as I See It

Romano Prodi’s purposeful, and yet quite mournful, assessment

of the progress of European integration neatly incorporates the

major themes of this dissertation. While the political and

economic history of European integration is relatively

straightforward to research, review and discuss the underlying

ideologies and myths that support the process of integration

are more difficult to both fix, and also to reconcile with a

coherent theory of Europe in the second half of the twentieth

century. Prodi balances the idea of progress and rational

intent inherent in the political and economic acts of

constructing the institutions of Europe with an aching sense of

a lost identity and a loss of direction. Prodi’s paradox is

that in the process of fulfilment the subject has lost its

identity. The issues radiating from this paradox are the

substance of what follows.

iReferences

? Romano Prodi, Europe as I See It, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 5

The primary aim of this dissertation is to analyse the tension

between the formal political and economic acts of European

integration and the theory of identity supporting it in the

period from 1945 leading up to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and

to evaluate the dynamics and consequences of this relationship

for those looking for an appropriate historiography of the

period.

The greatest challenge of this dissertation is the management

of such a large and complex set of themes and connections in

such a relatively short format. In order to assess the

relationship between the idea of Europe and the process of

European integration this dissertation requires an

understanding of the history of the idea of Europe, an analysis

of the development of the post-war European institutions and

their internal and external drivers, an understanding of the

function and role of nationalism in the integration of Europe,

together with the ability to critique the historiographic tools

available for those seeking to understand and position Europe

in the post-war era.

The central questions for discussion are the origin of the

history of the idea of Europe; the development alongside the

Enlightenment idea of progress of the concept of history as a

new discipline in itself; the relationship of European nation

states to the emergence of the European institutions, and the

function of both in a re-centred world following the Second

World War. As each of these topics is worthy of extended

treatment individually, this dissertation will attempt to

2

extract key issues and bring them together into an over-arching

pattern and argument.

This dissertation will have three major themes. Firstly, it

will argue that the idea of Europe that was the assumptive

ideological basis for the post-war integration of Europe is

tautologically bound to a particular idea of history that

emerged out of the Enlightenment and, consequently, is a strong

and silent influence on available historiographies for the

period. This requires a review of the history of the idea of

Europe and a demonstration, through the works of Karl Marx, of

the way in which a prevalent concept of European identity is

inherently bound to a particular idea of history itself.

Secondly, this dissertation will balance an analysis of the

myths and assumptions of the idea of Europe that became

crystallised in the treaties of European integration leading to

the Treaty of Rome in 1957, with an analysis of the political

and economic drivers that pushed European nations towards

integration. It will argue that the post-war period saw the

re-centring of the world order, including the conclusion of a

long period of European ascendancy and this, critically, was

the new context in which European integration was made

possible. Thirdly, it will review the historiographies

available to the historian of the integrated Europe, responding

to the question that, if the European idea of history is

intrinsically linked to a prescriptive idea of Europe, what are

the appropriate analytical tools to understand European

integration in a re-centred world? The experience of the ‘loss

of soul’ reported by many of the architects of European

integration is a rational divide between subject and object and

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will be compared to the rational divide mirrored in the

historiographic models themselves.

For clarity, the passage of the argument moves in three

chapters, beginning by establishing a conceptual and

theoretical basis for the proposition that the history of the

idea of Europe is related to a prescriptive idea of history,

moving on to an empirical treatment of the ‘real-world’

development of the institutions themselves, including a review

of the causal mechanisms driving the behaviours of the actors,

and continuing with a review of the historiographic tools

available for an analysis of the integrated Europe. Finally,

the goal of this dissertation is to illustrate the difficulty

for the historian of finding ‘objective’ tools to review the

history of European integration when the concept of historical

destiny is so bound up in the concept of Europe itself.

Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that a European creation of

‘historicism enabled European domination of the world’ii, and

following this the critical question for this dissertation is

how this conception of historicism stands up when the period of

European dominance passed.

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Chapter 1

‘…the European idea goes on; and no one seeing

it, and seeing how stable the Community

institutions are, can doubt that this is a deep

and powerful movement on a historic scale.’iii

Jean Monnet, Memoirs

Jean Monnet crisply articulates the notion that there exists a

European identity, institutionalised in a new integrated

Europe that is realising some ‘deep and powerful’ historic

progress, and furthermore, that this realisation of European

integration is a stabilising force for good. That this idea

of Europe is tightly bound to a particular idea of historical

destiny is the focus of this chapter, which will seek to

understand and position the assumptions underlying both Prodi

and Monnet’s statements, that within the concept of European

identity there is an idea of the progress of history. The

objective of this chapter is not only to demonstrate that this

link exists, but that this idea of Europe and the idea of

history it engendered are mutually dependent, contingent and a

relatively modern invention born in the Enlightenment. Before

demonstrating how fundamental this European view of historical

progress is in the works of Karl Marx, a review of the basic

premises is required.

Following Gerard Delanty’s observation that

iii Jean Monnet, Memoirs, (London, 1978), p. 523

5

‘it is not possible to see European history as

the progressive embodiment of a great unifying

idea since ideas themselves are products of

history’iv,

it is important first to unpack the compounded elements of this

idea of Europe and to understand their historical context. The

idea of Europe that crystallised in the Enlightenment has four

main threads; firstly, Europe, lacking ethnic, geographical and

cultural homogeneity, defined itself by its relationship to the

‘Other’ and so has tended to define itself by what it is not.

This took, and has taken, many forms, including ‘north versus

south’ and ‘Christian versus Muslim’, but the most prominent

manifestation is Orientalism, with Europe defining itself as

‘not Asia’. Secondly, Europe characterises itself as having a

single continuous historical span reaching forward from Ancient

Greece, through the Roman period, the Middle Ages and the

Renaissance and on to Modernity. This single narrative thread

suggests both temporal continuity of a single identity and the

notion of the inheritance of a common ‘Golden Age’, an

inheritance often experienced as something lost and, perhaps,

to be re-found. Thirdly, the enlightenment idea of Europe has

tended to universalise concepts such as rationality, progress,

individualism and more latterly democracy, on the assumption

that the ‘first in Europe and then elsewhere’v world-view

creates, alongside the historical arc, an arc of civilisation

from Europe to the rest of the world. Fourthly, and finally,

the amalgam of these three threads is realised in a messianic

sense of historicism, Europe being both the object and subject

of history, which, as Dipesh Chakrabarty comments, was

increasingly a dynamic function in European thought, as

6

‘Historicism…posited historical time as a

measure of the cultural distance…that was

assumed to exist between the West and non-

West,’vi

with Europe, particularly from the Enlightenment onwards in the

works of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Hegel and Marx, among others,

laying claim to the idea of history itself. Establishing this

basic framework is the first task of this dissertation.

The philosophical and psychological debate around personal

identity contains the argument that identity is created by a

manufactured polarity between the subject and the exterior

world. Jürgen Habermas outlines the process of identity

whereby ‘the opposition of the I and the ‘other’ by which the I

knows itselfvii creates the definition of self. This process of

identity creation is a key element in the idea of Europe under

consideration, and Edward Said has outlined how Asia was the

foundational ‘other’ necessary for the establishment of the

European ‘I’, suggesting that

‘European culture gained in strength and

identity by setting itself off against the

Orient as a sort of surrogate and even

underground self’.viii

Foremost in this search for identity was the need to seek and

define shape and a sense of unity where there was none, there

being no easily defined European continental landmass, no

homogenous European people and no common culture. Anthony

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Pagdenix describes how, in a Greek-centred world before the

‘invention’ of Europe, a world in which the Greeks turned away

from the European landmass to face Asia, what is now western

Europe was deemed itself as the barbarous and fragmented

‘other’ of a sophisticated Asian civilisation. Roman

civilisation, based on another re-centring of world power

around the Mediterranean, also considered what is now western

and northern Europe as the indistinct ‘Other’ ripe for imperial

and economic conquest. This process by which both Greek and

Roman civilisations created their own distinct identities

through aggressive economic and colonial expansion demonstrates

how it was, in this urge to dominate and control, that the idea

of Europe under discussion emerges. The economic and imperial

expansion of Europe from the 1490s onwards demanded the

development of a conquering ‘I’ and a conquered ‘other’.

As the imperium romanum merged into the imperium christianum in the

early Middle Ages, the base definitions of Europe began to take

shape. However, the Europe of Christendom was one of a

spiritual dimension, rather than one of political, geographical

and ethnic definition, and it was not until Charlemagne between

800 and 814 AD that both a political and geographical dimension

also began to be associated with Christendom. The first uses

of the term ‘Europe’ are introduced in the years of

Charlemagne, but as Jürgen Fischer notesx, these refer to a

Frankish identity signifying an independence from an opposition

and an ‘otherness’ to the Roman Mediterranean and do not

approximate to accepted definitions of Europe as understood

here.

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The first modern use of the word ‘European’ as a clear

signifier for a people was used by Sir Francis Bacon (‘nos

Europai’)xi in 1623, although the term was still used as a

collective noun without reference to specific geographies.

However, it is significant, for the purposes of this

dissertation, to focus on the period of world history when this

term becomes used. Enrique Dussel argues that the acceleration

of the self-other polarisation in Europe comes after 1492 when

Europe began its period of economic and imperial expansionxii.

That the development of an idea of Europe is linked to a period

of expansion will be a point of reference when the post-war

reconstruction of Europe is returned to in a later chapter.

Critically, though, it is in this development of a self-

realisation that the peoples of Europe, with no common culture,

no ethnic homogeneity and no defined continental landmass,

define themselves in relation to what they are not, so that, as

Paul Hazard notes,

‘In the course of the seventeenth century the

processes…were finally brought to a conclusion.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century it

is in terms of Europe that Europeans view the

world’xiii

This process of identity-building and self-awareness is a key

component of Enlightenment thinking and bound to a conception

of progress. As the momentum of imperialism and trade

dominance increased, so the authority and confidence with which

Europe viewed itself changed, with the polarity of self-to-

other becoming increasingly more value-laden. As Jürgen

Osterhammel comments,

9

‘In the eighteenth century Europe compared

itself with Asia, in the nineteenth century it

considered itself incomparable - and was alone

in itself’xiv.

The act of European integration is an internalising of this

imperative for rational progression when the period of European

expansion has passed. A theme for this dissertation is that,

following a re-centring of global power after the Second World

War, Europe can only express the resolution of this self-other

conflict through an internal process of integration. Michelle

Foucault underlines how this basic definition between Europe

and Asia is one of the primary intellectual and psychological

coordinates of the European ‘idea’, stating that

‘In the universality of Western Ratio there is

one dividing line, which is the Orient’.xv

Michael Herzfeld agrees that this duality in European thought,

a polarity driven by the ‘cogito’, is one of the driving

principles of European history:

‘the Cartesian agenda was adapted as the

touchtone of the differentiation between

colonising Europeans and colonised

‘natives’’xvi.

The second major facet of this idea of Europe is the creation

of the origin myth that Europe is the extension of a single

historical arc tracing back to the ‘golden age’ of the Greeks.

10

The invention of tradition, the process outlined by Eric

Hobsbawm and Terence Rangerxvii, whereby heritage and historical

continuity becomes a counterbalancing conservative value-point

in periods of accelerating social change, is a credible

explanation of the use of Greek and Roman image and metaphor

that radiated out from the Enlightenment during a period of

immense social, economic and technological transformation.

Enrique Dussel, reviewing this development of Enlightenment

thinking, argues that

‘the unilineal diachrony Greece-Rome-Europe is

an ideological construct that can be traced

back to the late eighteenth century’xviii.

The driver behind this fabrication of an intellectual and

cultural tradition in the idea of Europe was the theory of

history itself, for as Dipesh Chakrabarty comments,

‘it made possible completely internal histories

of Europe in which Europe was described as the

site of the first occurrence of capitalism,

modernity, or Enlightenment’xix.

The combination of a closed historical lineage and the

inheritance of a favourable ‘European’ cultural legacy gifted

the inheritors an authority, privilege and superior definition

that underscored the distinction between the European self and

the other. If Asia was the wild, mysterious and uncontrolled

other, then the Europe of classical antiquity, with all its

attendant philosophical and cultural associations, created an

idea of Europe, with not only geographical and historical

11

definition, but also the notion of it being the home of a ‘more

valuable’ cultural and ideological blueprint for mankind.

European culture with its concept of history developed,

consequently, with the inherent capacity and immanent need to

be exported around the world, creating the social and

ideological justification for colonial and imperial expansion.

Furthermore, the process contained its own acceleration

principle as the greater and more successful the colonial

expansion the greater the reinforcement of the entitlement of

Europe and its historical progress, leading to the concept of

destiny playing such a leading role in the framework of ideas.

This extension of the concept of historical lineage with the

notion of a teleological arc reaching into the future, led to

the emergence of the idea of history as progress and progress

as destiny. This was a particular theme of Enlightenment

social theory, exemplified by Saint-Everemond:

‘human kind is endlessly perfectible and

history is the story of its endless progress’xx.

The apogee of this conception of Europe as the locus of

progress as applied to the idea of Europe came in Hegel’s

revelation of the progress of history through the fulfilment of

the ‘world spirit’. In Hegel’s thesis Europe was the history

of progress, and as Hegel observes,

‘the history of the world…presents us with a

rational process’,xxi

12

however, and significantly for this essay, Hegel identified the

movement of history as the dialectical resolution of the

negativity and despotism of the Asian other. In the consequent

‘revealed freedom’ of rational government and civil society in

Enlightenment Europe, Hegel claimed that

‘The History of the World travels from East to

West, for Europe is absolutely the end of

History, Asia the beginning.’xxii

The Enlightenment created a European secular and rational

principle universalised beyond the nation-state, with Voltaire

positing Europe as

‘a kind of great republic divided into several

states all having the same principle of public

law and politics, unknown in other parts of the

world,’xxiii

and Rousseau identifying that

[there] are no more French, German, Spanish,

even Englishmen whatever one says, there are

only Europeans. They all have the same tastes,

the same passions, the same habits’xxiv.

In Rousseau’s homogenising of peoples and Hegel’s defining of

the common destiny of history the development of a mode of

thinking that universalised ideas and philosophy can be seen to

have created a ‘normalised’ European condition. This

conceptual turn to universalise, and extend scientific

13

descriptive rationality into prescriptive theory is one of the

defining elements of Enlightenment thought. For Hegel, the

progress of history as the fulfilment of the world spirit

involves the fulfilment of universal concepts, with the concept

of historical progress tautologically bound to the progress of

rational abstract forms:

‘The History of the World is nothing other but

the development of the Idea of Freedom’.xxv

The Hegelian idea of freedom as historical progress is

consequently explicitly embedded in emerging ideas of the

modern nation-state, with the development of secular democratic

nation states being a manifestation of a process of fulfilment

in world history. Max Weber neatly encapsulates this tendency

for the Enlightenment idea of history, and of Europe, to

universalise its own normative concepts:

‘A product of modern European civilisation,

studying any problem of universal history, is

bound to ask himself to what combination of

circumstances the fact should be attributed

that in Western civilisation, and in Western

civilisation only, cultural phenomena have

appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a

line of development having universal

significance and value’xxvi.

This leads to the concluding element of the idea, both of

Europe and of history that emerged from the Enlightenment, and

this cap-stone is that Europe gave itself the leading role in

14

World history and a messianic sense of destiny and progress.

Jacques Derrida characterises this as Europe casting itself at

the centre. For, positioned

‘... at the center of the world, the European

has the luck or power to be European and

everything else at the same time’.xxvii

The central issue for this dissertation is to understand how

European identity is reflected in an integrated Europe when

Europe is no longer central in the world-system. Furthermore,

as the concept of Europe is a compound created by a complex mix

of abstract ideas and categories, this work will seek to

understand how different aspects of this mix are modulated in

the post war integration of Europe.

In summary, that both Monnet and Prodi refer to a duality

between the notions of identity and progress in their evocation

of Europe integration as a kind of loss is significant, for as

Gerard Delanty comments,

‘The European heritage was not just defined by

reference to an archaic and classical past that

was lost but by reference to other worlds. In

a sense the European self, the subjectivity of

modern Europe, was defined by reference both to

an Other (the non-European) and to its own self

(classical culture) which was experienced as

dissonant and often irrecoverable.’xxviii

15

This dissertation argues that this dialectic is inherent in the

Enlightenment tradition of thought and is a motif and signature

of the idea of Europe that has become institutionalised. There

is a tautology present when the idea of Europe is discussed as

a historical concept, as Dussel observes, for the notion of

history is tied to the idea of Europe and vice versa:

‘Modernity appears when Europe affirms itself

as the ‘center’ of a World history that it

inaugurates’xxix.

The next task of this work is to apply this materialist view of

the European idea of history to the theory of materialist

history presented by Marx. This dissertation will now use an

analysis of Marx’s work to show how implicit this idea of

Europe is in Marx, and moreover, how contingent it is for his

idea of history, and how

‘Europe is less the subject of history than its

product’xxx

16

Having argued that the Enlightenment was instrumental in

producing a particular identity of Europe, the next task of

this analysis is to demonstrate how this modern idea is

tautologically bound to a particularly powerful view of

history. This will be demonstrated by viewing Marx’s theory of

historical materialism through the prism of the idea of Europe

previously discussed. While this is not a dissertation with

focus on either Marx or historical materialism, Marx is,

however, a key figure through which to review the development

of Enlightenment thought. Although the content of Marx’s works

has clearly had a profound impact on European history, and

undoubtedly and obviously has numerous touch points on the

story of the integration of Europe, the immediate focus here is

on the structure and lineage of Marx’s philosophy of history.

Marx was a primary point of philosophical and intellectual

conjunction between the political radicalism of the French

Enlightenment, the economic theory of the Scottish/English

Enlightenment and, clearly, the Hegelian abstract rationalism

of the German Enlightenment, spending as he did substantial

periods of his life working in each country.

The concept of the ‘other,’ and notably the other expressed as

the oriental and Asiatic, is one of the theoretical foundations

of Marx’s historical materialism. For Marx, the dynamic forces

that govern the material world are the basis for a progressive

theory of history that accounts for all human society and

behaviour:

‘- in real life – there real, positive science

begins: the representation of the practical

17

activity, of the practical process of [the]

development of men’.xxxi

Marx takes the economic forces and relations of production as

the building blocks of material reality. If material reality

determines consciousness, then it follows that consciousness is

determined by the forces of production on society and, for man,

‘What they are, therefore, coincides with their

production, both with what they produce and

with how they produce. The nature of

individuals thus depends on the material

conditions determining their production’ xxxii.

Economic forces, therefore, are the basis upon which all other

social, individual and material forms of reality depend. Marx

outlines the discrete phases of societal development that are

implicit in the historical forms of property and ownership and,

critically for this thesis, Marx chooses to determine the most

underdeveloped form of human society as Asian. In the Preface to

a Critique of Political Economy, he states that

‘In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal,

and modern bourgeois modes of production can be

designated as progressive epochs in the

economic formation of society’xxxiii.

The ‘Asiatic’ mode of production is deemed to be so ‘other’

that it comes out of time and sequence before even the

‘ancient’ and the ‘feudal’. So, notwithstanding that it

appears almost surreptitiously, at the core of Marx’s theory of

18

universal society is a European self that is the beating heart

of historical progress. Marx’s theory of societal progress has

its intellectual home in an Enlightenment conception of

European identity. Anthony Brewer argues that non-European

history could not fit into Marx’s ‘Eurocentric’ stages of

societal succession and so he introduced a ‘catch-all’ Asiatic

mode to deal with a supposed conceptual problemxxxiv. In fact

the Asiatic models of society described by Marx do conform to

his theory of historical materialism, it was more that a

European sense of identity intervened and prevented Marx

postulating a truly global theory. It is important to note how

Marx and Engels transferred the concept of the Asiatic-other to

Russia, with Russia deemed to be outside the European modes of

societal development due to its ‘Oriental despotism’xxxv. Marx’s

theory of history is imbued with a sense of Europe as self.

Russia is, in this framework, part-other and this conception of

Russia will surface again in an analysis of the Cold War and

its impact on European integration.

The notion of linear progress is also fundamental to the theory

of historical materialism. For Marx the phases of societal

development exist in a temporal arc reaching back to the Greeks

and Romans, and in what is an odd passage of the Grundrisse in

which the subject is ostensibly economic theory, he makes a

notable reference to a European golden age:

‘although money begins to play its part

everywhere at an early stage, it plays in

antiquity the part of a predominant element

only in unidirectionally developed nations,

viz. trading nations, and even in the most

19

cultured antiquity, in Greece and Rome, it

attains its full development…’xxxvi

This demonstrates how the lineage of a lost heritage, if not

part of Marx’s theory of materialism, is part of a core sense

of identity that positions Europe as the custodian of a

historical destiny, and Siegfried Kracauer notes how, for Marx,

‘the historical process is tantamount to a

linear movement – a necessary and meaningful

succession of periods along a time continuum

indefinitely extending into the temporal

future’xxxvii.

Although Marx inverted Hegel’s abstract rationalism in favour

of materialism, what Marx inherits from Hegel is the desire to

universalise. The theory of historical materialism, although

based on the principle of European identity, is propounded as a

theory of universal significance. Marx’s urgency to

universalise empirical observations of the development of

capitalism in Europe into a global theory has its origins in

the urge in the Enlightenment notions of European hegemony.

Marx’s theory of history, then, can be seen to mirror the

Enlightenment idea of Europe, in that it contains the defining

duality of Europe contrasted against the orient, its basic

premise presumes a European lineage and it works from Europe

outwards with a set of rational scientific generalisations.

Finally, the whole movement of historical materialism proceeds

as a path of historical destiny, and it is significant that, as

20

Louis Althusser claims in a spirit of honour and respect, in

his theory of historical materialism,

‘Marx ‘opened up’ for scientific knowledge a

new ‘continent’, that of history’,xxxviii

when in fact, Marx’s idea of history was derived from the

European idea and a particular consideration of European

identity. The motor within Marx’s theory of historical

materialism was a culturally grounded and specific sense of

identity that included a sense of self, a sense of purpose and

a historical purview that encapsulated all human history. As

Gerard Delanty observes, not specifically about Marx but about

the Enlightenment in general,

‘The idea of progress allowed Europe to assert

its superiority over the Orient in the

philosophy of history it afforded: the notion

of a hierarchy of civilisations determined

according to a linear progress.’xxxix

This idea of Europe, and its history and destiny was, notably,

used as the basis for economic and imperial expansion

undertaken by the Enlightenment unit of rational and civil

government. As J.G.A. Pocock comments, the concept of European

history

‘is the product of the exceptionally self-

centred and world-dominating outlook developed

by a civilisation that took place in those

lands.’xl

21

22

Chapter 2

‘The idea of ‘Europe’ will reveal the common

basis of our civilisation to all, and

gradually, it will create a link, similar to

the one that in the past led to the creation of

countries. It will be the power that will

over-come all obstacles.’xli

Robert Schuman, For Europe

Robert Schuman, like Jean Monnet, one of the ‘European

saints’xlii of integration, writing shortly after the agreement

of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, paints a characteristically

epochal picture of events. He captures the core elements of

the idea of Europe discussed in the previous chapter, notably

the sense of cultural heritage and teleological destiny and

critically compares the emergence of an integrated Europe to

the emergence of nations.

As Alan Milward observes, however, much of the immediate

historical commentary of the post-war reconstruction of Europe,

like that offered by Schuman, was ‘written from above, not

below’xliii, and the objectives of this chapter are to assess the

different perspectives of European integration, taking into

account the motives and actions of those states taking part in

the process of integration and contrasting them with the

strategies of the United States and Soviet Russia, the newly

prominent super-powers. This necessitates a shift of focus

towards a more empirical and contextual review of post-war

history. This will begin with a short history of European

integration, providing a perspective from which to position the

23

origin myths embedded in the view of history used by the

‘founding fathers’ of integration. Following this will be a

detailed analysis of the historical events that unfolded

leading up to the integration process of post-war Europe.

The objective of this chapter is to reveal the substance and

the texture of Romano Prodi’s paradox, to show that the

conceptual framework behind the idea of Europe used by the

advocates of European integration fractures in the face of the

new world order that emerged following the Second World War.

The war was the fulcrum for a fundamental change in the axis of

world political and economic power, and the global balance had

shifted to such an extent that the idea of Europe no longer

supported the idea of history it was bound to, and consequently

the foundational idea of progress could no longer be easily

balanced against an idea of cultural destiny upon which it

depended.

The idea of an integrated Europe, one as a coherent historical,

cultural and geopolitical entity, capable of being

institutionalised, is not a concept born in the twentieth

century. That this idea of European integration is born in the

Enlightenment idea of European destiny is revealed in a review

of the history of European integration. It is interesting to

note that a dialectical pattern emerges, as the concept of a

united Europe has surfaced more prominently when Europe has been

at its most disunited and divided by conflict between its

adversarial nation states. The concept of an institutionalised

Europe is a familiar solution in times of war and crisis and

24

has been deployed almost every hundred years for the last four

hundred years, that is, since the first germination of secular

ideas of rationality and progress outlined previously, and

since the idea of Europe itself developed.

The first clearly defined and rationally articulated blueprint

for supra-national European integration came with the Duc de

Sully’s ‘Grand Design’ in 1620. Against a backdrop of the

continual warring of ambitious dynastic states, the ‘Grand Design’

was a utopian vision of a new Europe, composed of 15 equal

states, under the direction of a ‘Christian Council for Europe’,

essentially constituting a Christian republic.xliv De Sully’s

idea resonates with its twentieth century inheritor, being based

on the concept of a customs-free zone promoting the free passage

of goods and materials.

In 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht concluded the War of Spanish

Succession, announcing a period of European history governed by

accelerating overseas expansion, unprecedented economic growth

and technological advancement. Abbé de Saint-Pierre had

negotiated for the French at the Treaty of Utrecht, during

which experience he developed ideas for a new organisation of

Europe, a Europe beyond the nation-state. His 1713 Projet de paix

perpetuelle combined de Sully’s concept of the open European

market with provisions for free public education, improved

European transport networks and an international court. This

project became a reference point for the Enlightenment idea of

a Europe organised on rational principlesxlv, an integrated

Europe beyond that of a free market and a Europe with a common

judicial and public administration.

25

Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace was written in 1795, a key year in

the French Revolutionary Wars marked by widespread outbreaks of

warfare and skirmishing across Europe, from the French invasion

of Spain, the British invasion of the Vendée, the Prussian

invasion of Poland and the Batavian Revolution in The

Netherlands. Kant, like de Sully and Saint-Pierre before him,

surveyed the destruction and disruption of war around him and

envisioned a new Europe based on Enlightenment principles of

civilisation, rationalism and progress. He imagined

‘a federal league of nations, in which even the

weakest member looks for its rights and

protection – not to its own power, or its own

adjudication, but to the great confederation…to

the united power, and the adjudication of the

collective will.’xlvi

Kant brings to bear the full weight of reason to his

proposition, in that he not only anticipates the cool reception

of his utopia within the realpolitik of the eighteenth century,

but asserts its inevitability, for as

‘Visionary as this idea may seem, and as such

laughed at…it is notwithstanding the inevitable

resource and mode of escape…[for states] to

seek peace and security in a civil constitution

founded on law. All wars therefore are so many

tentative essays (not in the intention of man,

but in the intention of nature) to bring about

new relations of states…’.xlvii

26

Kant then argues that the development of a new European

institution is not only a theoretical possibility but also the

conclusion of ‘natural’ laws that will result in civil

progress. This is one of the high-water marks of the idea of

European integration, linking the single historical arc with

the inevitability of a destiny supported by natural scientific

laws. The French Revolutionary Wars, of course, led to the

French Revolution itself and triggered a new wave of what Kant

called ‘lawless and uncontrolled liberty’xlviii across Europe and

around the world.

In the nineteenth century the idea of Europe is, it can be

argued at least for the purpose of this dissertation, defined

by two narrative themes. While the major European seafaring

powers of France, Britain, The Netherlands and to a lesser

degree Spain, were fulfilling their historical destiny in

building empire and commerce by mastering the distant ‘Other’,

meanwhile the Europe of the Hapsburg Empire, of Prussia and

Russia, of the ‘self-Other’ of the European-East, was

increasingly feeling the pressure of a failing identity.

Russia, conferred with a debatable inheritance of a European

identity from Peter the Great onwards, was increasingly pulled

westwards towards the gravity of European culture and economic

prosperity, while the growing Prussian state looked eastward

for its own imperial expansion. The historian Halford

Mackinder, writing in 1904, summarised the mounting tensions:

‘Who rules eastern Europe, commands the

Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland, commands the World-island;

Who rules the World-island, commands the World’xlix.

27

That the nineteenth century was the apogee of European power is

demonstrated in the description of Europe as ‘the World-

island’, and Mackinder perceptively uncovers the fracture point

that would open up in the post-war period and shift Europe from

its central position in world-history. The tensions mounting

in Europe led to the organisation of two significant peace

conferences in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and it was at these

conferences that, not only the visions of total European war

were countenanced and foretold, but also an alternative

proposition of a new continental organisation to ensure a

harmonious future was mooted. However, as Norman Davies

comments, the prospects for a move towards an integrated Europe

were undermined at these conferences as ‘the ethos of

unrestrained state power was deeply rooted’.l To both

commentators and statesmen Europe seemed set on an inevitable

course of war, a prophesy that would subsequently be fulfilled

in the twentieth century.

In Europe’s phase of international expansion the individual

interests of nation-states had been a persistent blockage to

the ideal of integration. Following the Second World War it

xx Charles de Saint-Evremond, Reflexions sur le divers genie dupeuple romaine, quoted in Roberto M. Dainotto, Europe (in theory), (Duke, 2007), p.49

xxi George W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, (Whitefish, 2004), p. 9

xxii Ibid., p. 103

xxiii Voltaire, Le Siècle de Louis XV, quoted in Denys Hay, Europe, The Emergence of an Idea, (Edinburgh, 1968), p. 25

28

would be the same national interests that would create the

impetus towards integration, driven by motives of survival

rather than expansion. Such was the fundamental shift in world

power between 1939 and 1945.

xxiv Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne,quoted in Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia ‘European Nationalism andEuropean Union’, in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union ed. Anthony Pagden (New York, 2002). p. 174

xxv George W. F. Hegel, op. cit., p. 456

xxvi Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (New York, 1958), p. 13

xxvii Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, (Baltimore, 1976) p. 223

xxviii Gerard Delanty, The European Heritage: History, Memory andTime, p. 38 in The Sage Handbook of European Studies (London, 2009)

xxix Enrique Dussel, ‘Eurocentricism & Modernity’, in The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America, (Durham, 1993) p. 65 xxx

? Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (London, 1995), p. 3

xxxi Karl Marx, in Karl Marx’ Selected Writings, (Oxford, 2000),p. 9xxxii

? Ibid., p. 5

xxxiii Ibid., p. 426

xxxiv Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, (London, 1980) p. 14

xxxv Tom Bottomore, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, (Oxford, 1983) p. 37

29

If the desire to create an integrated Europe had tended to

surface following periods of warfare amongst European states,

it is no surprise that following the most destructive war in

world history, the 1940s saw the idea of an integrated Europe

once again come to prominence. The Second World War was

unprecedented, both in its level of destruction with over fifty

million deaths, significantly with the majority beingxxxviKarl Marx, op. cit., p. 388

xxxvii Siegfried Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last (New York, 1995) p. 38

xxxviii Louis Althusser, For Marx, (London, 1969) p. iii

xxxix Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (London, 1995), p. 95

xl J.G.A Pocock, Some Europes in Their History, in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 2002), p. 57

xli Robert Schuman, For Europe, (Geneva, 2010), p. 13xlii

?A.S. Milward, The Lives and Teachings of the European Saints, in The European Rescue of the Nation State (London, 1994), pp.318 - 344

xliii Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, (London, 1984), p. 463

xliv Michael O’Neill, The Politics of European Integration, (NewYork, 2006), p. 7

xlv Anthony Pagden The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, (Cambridge, 2002), p. 14

xlvi Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in The Portable Enlightenment Reader, ed. Isaac Kramnick, (New York, 1995), p.552

xlvii Ibid., p. 553

30

civilianli, but also with the introduction and development of

new forms of industrialised killing and murder, from the

Holocaust to the atom bomb. Tony Judt observes the consequence

of this, how in the late 1940s a new impetus rose ‘to forget

the recent past and forge a new continent’lii. Judt

perceptively reveals an aspect of Romano Prodi’s paradox, that

following the horror of both world wars there was something toxlviii Ibid., p. 552

xlix Halford Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, in Norman Davies, Europe: A History, (London, 1997), p. 872

ii Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe, (Princeton, 2007), p. 7

iv Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe (London, 1995), pg. 2

v Dipesh Chakrabarty, op. cit., p. 5

vi Ibid., p. 7

vii Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, (Boston, 1974), p. 145viii

? Edward Said, Orientalism, (London, 1978), p. 3

ix Anthony Pagden, Europe: Conceptualising a Continent in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden, (Cambridge, 2002)

x Jürgen Fischer, Oriens, Occidens, Europa: Begriff und GedankeEuropa in der späten Antike und im frühen Mittelalter, (Wiesbaden, 1957) quoted in Roberto M. Dainotto, Europe (in theory), (Duke, 2007), p. 25xi

?Francis Bacon, quoted in John Hale, The Civilisation of Europein the Renaissance, (London 1993), p. 3

xii Enrique Dussel, ‘Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentricism’, Neplanta: Views from South, 1, No. 3 (2000), pp. 265 – 478

xiiiPaul Hazard, The European Mind: The Critical Years, 1680 – 1715 (New Haven, 1953), p. 53

31

be forgotten and sublimated in the idea of a Europe relying

heavily on its own cultural superiority for its sense of

destiny and progress. This sense of destiny and progress

towards a higher ideal was highly questionable in 1945. In

addition, the authority of the nation-state, which had so

palpably failed to uphold individual rights and support a

lasting peace from the end of the First World War, was

discredited and devalued. These twin failures of Enlightenment

heritage were central to the immediate post-war ideation of a

new Europe.

xiv

? Jürgen Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft Jenseits des Nationalstaats. Quoted in Helmut Walser Smith, ‘Review for a Differently Centred European History’, Central European History, 37, No 1 (2004), pp. 115-136

xv Michelle Foucault, The History of Madness, (Oxford, 2006), p. 57

xvi Michael Herzfeld, The European Self in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 2002), p.149

xvii Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983)

xviiiEnrique Dussel, op. cit., pp. 265 - 478

xix Dipesh Chakrabarty, op. cit., p. 7

l Norman Davies, Europe: A History, (London, 1997), p. 875

li Charles Tilly, Europe Transformed, in the Sage Handbook of European Studies (London, 2010), p. 19

lii Tony Judt, The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe Daedalus, Vol 121 (1992), pp. 83-118

32

Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment offers a

philosophical underpinning of this crisis of destiny, and a

sobering assessment of the influence of the Enlightenment idea

of Europe and progress on history. They suggest that there is a

dialectical contradiction within Enlightenment thought that

ultimately leads to the universal ideals of reason and progress

destroying their own basis. They argue that the totalitarian

ideologies of the twentieth century, played out in full in the

terror and abuses of Nazi and Soviet regimes, represent a

twisted becoming and resolution of Enlightenment social

philosophy, as the individual, whose natural rights and

entitlements have been raised to the universal, is

simultaneously discarded and dismissed as an individual in the

process of being made universal:

‘The Enlightenment consumed not just the

symbols but their successors, universal

concepts, and spared no remnant of metaphysics

apart from the abstract fear of the collective

from which it arose’,liii

with fellow traveller from the Frankfurt School Walter Benjamin

agreeing, suggesting that

‘There is no document of civilization, which is

not at the same time a document of

barbarism.’liv

Benjamin concurred with Adorno and Horkheimer that

Enlightenment thought, the rational secular world-view that

primed the idea of Europe with a sense of destiny, identity and

33

purpose was the same intellectual framework that supported the

totalitarian vision and its resolution in extremism and

absolutism. This view is, to a degree, borne out in the

theorising of the German Reich by both Hitler and Goebbels.

Hitler’s forays into historical analysis reveal that he had a

conception of Europe as a single entity, and even if within his

ideology there were racial divisions that were irreconcilable

with ideas of freedom and justice, Europeans, particularly

northern Europeans, shared a common European destiny. His

vision fully embraced the concept of the Asiatic other and the

single arc of historical destiny. For example, in a 1941

reportage he claimed:

‘The future did not belong to the ridiculously

half-civilised America, but to the newly arisen

Europe that would definitely prevail with her

people, her economy and her cultural values, on

condition that the East was placed in the

service of the European idea and did not work

against Europe.’lv

Equally, Goebbels in his ‘Das Jahr 2000’lvi, a vision of a Nazi

future, exhorts Germans to understand their ‘European mission’

in saving ideas and cultures of a continent from the Asiatic

other. Ultimately though, as Mark Mazower suggests, the German

Reich’s European project is largely distinguished by its warped

focus on Germany’s needs and German’s destiny as a singular,

imperial nation-state,lvii although it does exhort a basic

version of the idea of Europe under discussion.

34

Following the Second World War, there was a growing sense that

the nation-state system had failed to effectively deal with the

international crisis predicted in The Hague at the turn of the

century, and Michael O’Neill traces the effect of this failure

of the European state system as a spur to the integration

movement, suggesting that

‘The shortcomings of Europe’s nation states in

failing to resist dictatorship or invasion did

enhance the appeal of the idea of a Pan

European antidote to the atavism of

nationalism’lviii.

The question must now be asked, that if the Second World War

did mark a fundamental caesura in the role of Europe in world

history, and Europe had lost its claim to spiritual and

cultural leadership, how did the European integration process

gain momentum towards a new political configuration in an

integrated Europe? Which idea of Europe supported the desire

for integration, and would this be a pan-national or a supra-

national system? To understand the economic and political

elements of these questions it is important to review the

complex path towards integration that was taken as Europe began

its process of reconstruction in 1945. To understand the

questions of identity this process will be reviewed through the

prism of the thoughts of the architects of the process, Jean

Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer.

35

Chapter 2

The Americans want an integrated Europe looking

like the United States of America – ‘God’s own

country.’’

Robert Hall, British Treasury Official, 1947lix

The reconstruction and integration of Europe took place in the

context of a radically reordered world. The war that resulted

in a disordered, destitute, depressed and fractured European

continent was also the catalyst for, arguably, the most

significant tectonic shift in the world order for over five

hundred years, since the beginning of European commercial and

imperial expansion. A new geopolitical dimension emerged from

the war with two significant dynamic forces; firstly an

ideological polarity had come into play with the United States

assuming leadership of the system of free market capitalism

opposing the revolutionary communism advocated in Soviet

Russia; and secondly, this ideological divide had led to the

partition of Europe. It is impossible to review the

development of European integration without understanding this

context for, while up to the First World War European history

was world history, as J.M Roberts notes, ‘European History is

difficult to separate from World History in the years after

1945’lx.

lix Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe (Cambridge, 1987), p. 419

lx J.M. Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe, (London, 1996),p. 579

36

That the founding fathers of European integration continued to

use the metaphor and imagery of an Enlightenment idea of

Europe, despite it being tarnished in the aftermath of the war,

is a theme of this section. An issue for this dissertation is

how it was, in the moment of Europe’s relegation from the

position of world primacy that the Enlightenment idea of

European integration as destiny and fulfilment came into being.

To tackle this question the analysis needs to separate into two

streams. One stream is the story of European integration from

within, told from inside the perspective of the framework of

Europe's nation-states as they surveyed their options in the

post-war period. The second stream is an account of European

integration from without, particularly taking into account the

role of the United States, for as Roberts comments,

‘after 1945 the decisive choices settling

Europe’s destiny for decades were taken in

Washington.’lxi

It is in the synthesis of this dual account that a fuller

appreciation of Romano Prodi’s paradox can be approached, that

in the formal integration of Europe there is a sense of a loss

of identity and soul, emerging from a keenly felt lack of

autonomy and self-determination.

lxi Ibid., p. 586

37

The rationale and justification for the integration of Europe

given by Monnet, Schuman and Adenauer illustrates the limited

value of the account of this history from within. Martin

Conway observes that ‘historical explanations that dwell on

origins…have their natural limits’lxii, and this is demonstrated

in the way that, following the significant post-war shift in

the axis of the world order, the politicians of Western Europe

were forced further into explanations that looked back to the

recovery of a mythical ‘golden age’ and forward to an immanent

destiny. These justifications were used to mitigate Europe’s

new ‘down-stream’ position in the changing world order, as

Western European nation-states began the process of trading

independent sovereignty for, in the short term, security, and

in the longer term the opportunity for Europe to retain a

position of some influence in the reordered world. Significant

for this thesis, however, is the argument that the internal

rationalisation of the movement towards integration also came

with a historical purview that was increasingly redundant. As

Philip Rutley suggests,

‘If…one had asked any of the leading European

figures about their vision for Europe at

various critical periods of the postwar era,

one would have received rather different

answers, largely conditioned by the

geopolitical scene’lxiii.

lxii Martin Conway, The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945-1973 Contemporary European History, Vol 13 (2004), pp. 67-88

38

The memoirs, notes and diaries of Jean Monnet, the prime

conceptual architect of integration, Robert Schuman, French

Foreign Minister between 1948 and 1952, and Konrad Adenauer,

West German Chancellor between 1949 and 1963, deal in detail

with the factual process of integration. All three were

conservative, Catholic and pragmatic thinkers and this is borne

out in their description of the integration process. Both

Schuman and Adenauer are primarily concerned with their

national interests, respectively the recovery of France and the

restitution of a German state, while it was Monnet, the non-

politician ordained as a businessman-statesman, who had assumed

a position of increasing international influence in a very

fluid period after 1945, and who was capable of suggesting the

unthinkable with regard to national sovereignty.

Significantly, it was also Monnet, both an outsider and an

insider, who could operate as a conduit between the interests

of Europe, more particularly French interests, and the

interests of the United States.

This ‘history from within’ of post-war European integration

needs to be assessed in two overlapping periods, from 1945 to

1948 and from 1947 to 1957. The first period contained

embryonic attempts at international coordination, with the

customs related Benelux Union of 1947, followed by the Western

European Union on mutual defence in March 1948 and then, in

April of the same year, the founding of the Organisation for

European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Monnet was dismissive of

these initiatives considering them as not conducive to peace as

they required no binding commitment on their members.lxiv These

39

attempts at international cooperation all assumed the primacy

of the existing nation-states and involved no exchanges of

sovereignty. Historians and commentators who argue that the

integration of Europe was a fulfilment of a deep historical

narrative often find it difficult to explain this early period

of cooperation as a collection of smaller states in the Benelux

countries and Scandinavia looked to secure their immediate

security while France and Britain looked inwards to consolidate

their economic position following the rigours of war. Germany

was a fractured and fragmented state without definition.

The key feature of this early period is that the impetus behind

much of the reconstruction activity between 1945 and 1948 was

driven by a wave of socialist politics that spread across

Europe as a reaction to the war and was aimed at containing

pure market forces and an ‘unconstrained individualism’lxv that

was seen to be symptomatic of the liberal politics that had

held sway in the pre-war period. These politics were typically

expressed in a national welfare policy, and directed at social

infrastructure such as the founding of the National Health

Service in the UK. Alan Milward confirms that the

experimentation of this period did not respond to the evident

European problems on a European level, as

‘seen at a national level Western Europe was a

bold patchwork of distinct national

experiments’,lxvi

lxv Donald Sassoon, Politics, p 20, in Europe Since 1945, ed Mary Fulbrook, (Oxford, 2001)

40

and that the immediate post-war Europe was dominated by

national responses to national problems.

It was with the introduction of the United States’ Marshall

Plan, or European Recovery Plan (ERP), of 1947 that the real

initiative towards European integration began. The Marshall

Plan is one of the key narrative threads to the history of

European integration ‘from without’, however it was also

signifies a significant shift in gear towards integration in

the accounts of the ‘founding fathers’. Notwithstanding that

the myth of a common European destiny was used as a narrative

for European integration, the real impetus for integration came

from the ideological conflict between the United States and the

rapidly forming Soviet empire. There was still a very real

sense from 1947 onwards that the crisis had not yet passed and

that another European war was imminentlxvii, and this might come

either from the partition of Europe and the emerging Cold War,

or from a resumption of the centuries-long conflict between

Germany and France. In the face of the latter, Monnet recounts

‘ceaselessly trying to revive the old federalist traditions of

Europe.’lxviii Monnet understood that the unequal peace of the

Treaty of Versailles in 1919 could not be replicated and

reached back to the principles of European rationalism for a

solution. Francois Fontaine comments that

‘With the Monnet Plan, Descartes’ Discourse on

Method was to have its first socio-economic

try-out on a human scale’lxix.

It was Monnet who mediated the compromise between the interests

of the nation-states of Germany and France and the supra-

41

national institution favoured by the United States. The

situation for the Europe appeared bleak. As Schuman noted,

‘We had come to a cross-roads in a time when in

the space of just one generation, we had

witnessed upheavals of unprecedented, far

reaching violence...the threat of new conflict

now weighed over the whole of mankind’lxx.

Schuman, like Monnet, noted that the early treaties from 1945

to 1947 had not solved the fundamental European issue of the

relationship between France and Germany. Monnet saw that this

historical problem was the key to unlocking the problem of

integration and that ‘the Franco-German problem must become the

European problem’lxxi. Finding a resolution to this issue was

the common ground around which the pragmatic Christian

democratic exchange of sovereignty for security was secured in

the May 1950 declaration, leading to the formation of the

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Paris Treaty of

1952.

Monnet’s notes from 1950 reveal how the central focus of one of

the key architects of Europe was the parochial interests of

France. As he commented,

‘In the present world situation we see nothing

but deadlock – whether it be the increasing

acceptance of a war that is thought to be

inevitable, the problem of Germany, the

lxxi Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 294

42

continuation of France’s recovery, the

organisation of Europe, or the place of France

in Europe and the world’lxxii.

For Monnet and Schuman the integration of Europe was to ensure,

first and foremost the security of France, and the idea of a

common European heritage provided a useful and convenient

narrative. Schuman, in his account of events, laid claim for

France of the idea of an integrated Europe:

‘Such an idea is definitely a French one…a

people who have always striven towards

universalism’lxxiii.

For West Germany the path to European integration also relied

heavily on summoning the idea of the European ideal reaching

back through Charlemagne to the ‘Golden–age’, and in Adenauer’s

first meetings with British army administrators in 1945, when

he argued for an independent Rhine-Ruhr state to emerge

independently from the ruins of Germany, he was eager to

demonstrate that the Rheinlanders were ‘Western Europeans’ with

whom they shared a heritagelxxiv. His belief in a common

European destiny is apparent:

‘Unless the European nations learn to recognise

and cultivate that which is common to all

European civilisation…unless in this way we

shall be able to prevent a new war among the

lxxiii Robert Schuman, op. cit., p. 16

lxxiv Terence Prittie, Adenauer, (London, 1972), p. 105

43

nations of Europe, European leadership will be

lost forever.’lxxv

In addition, Adenauer represented a German mind-set that viewed

European integration as an act of atonement for the crimes of

the Nazi period, and a means by which a more noble and

untarnished European heritage could be recovered for the German

people. As Ernst Haas comments,

‘The triptych of self-conscious anti-Nazism,

Christian values and dedication to European

unity as a means of redemption for past German

sins has played a crucial ideological role.’lxxvi

Following discussions with Schuman, the advocate and political

instrument for Monnet’s May 1950 ECSC proposal to the French

government, Adenauer was quick to connect the Franco-German

project with the idea of European heritage as destiny. In an

interview with the International News Service in May 1950, he

proposed:

‘The idea of a Franco-German Union in

historical terms – [to] revive and perpetuate

the bygone Empire of Charlemagne and could

bring together again those Franks, Gauls and

Romans who had defeated Attila the Hun and who

were now confronted by a new menace to European

civilisation’lxxvii.

lxxvii Terence Prittie, op. cit., p. 190

44

It is interesting to note how, at this critical juncture for

the six nation states participating in the ECSC, the first

truly supranational European institution, that the leaders of

Europe looked back to the mythology of a manufactured European

heritage for direction. The ‘other’ so necessary for the

concept of the European idea now became Soviet Russia,

representing one of the conceptual turns that permitted the

legitimisation of the experiment of pooling and ceding

sovereignty. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia acknowledges how the

polarity of the other, combined with the sense of historical

destiny embedded in the mythology of Europe was used, as

‘The founding fathers therefore presented their

initiatives as so many steps in a crusade for

the defense of the Western world’lxxviii.

Norman Davies’ critical observation that the history of post-

war Europe is ‘far more easily described than explained’lxxix is

very much a judgement on this history of Europe as told from

within. The ‘rational actor’ justifications of Monnet, Schuman

and Adenauer supported by their belief in a progressive theory

of European history do not sit easily with a view of the world

in which Europe no longer played the leading role. The

argument that European integration was an internally driven

process justifying some historical destiny has been made, not

just by the participants in that process, but also by

historians of the period, and Alan Milward observes that

lxxviii Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, European Nationalism and European Union, in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 2002), p. 179

45

‘those who explain the movement towards

integration as essentially a victory of higher

ideals see it also as a progression towards

political virtue’lxxx

and cautions taking credence in histories written in

hindsight.lxxxi The European ‘project’ has increasingly relied

upon a metaphor of continuity and heritage to support its

beginnings. In reality this reliance on the myth of a European

progression was really a convenient and acceptable mythology to

cover the underlying reasons for European integration,

specifically that there was no alternative, as the United

States demanded the pooling of sovereignty in return for much

needed aid it offered Europe.

As previously mentioned, the two main features of the new world

order in 1945 were the arrival of the United States as a global

superpower and the advent of the Cold War that split Europe

down an ideological divide. Rather than see the European

reaction to these events from the narrow perspective of the

European nation-states, it is from the position of a reordered

world that the integration of Europe will now be reviewed.

The United States had shed its isolationism of the 1920s-30s,

profited significantly from the war and was using this moment

of opportunity, as Michael J. Hogan has it, ‘to remake Western

Europe in the image of the US’lxxxii. From the inception of the

Marshall Plan the United States was seeking to create open

European markets within a federal structure. The Marshall Plan

was instrumental in creating a position of hegemony for the

46

Unites States, one that would see its interests benefit from

post-war integration of Europe. There was logic for peace

behind this imperialistic intent, as Cordell Hull, US Secretary

of State in 1944 remarked,

‘When countries cannot get what they want by

normal processes of trade, they will continue

to resort to the use of force’lxxxiii,

and, accordingly, the export of American productionist and

industrial models were used to ensure that the total global

market would expand for the United States while creating a

stable system in Western Europe, without recourse to aggressive

imperialist strategies. This hegemony through economic

imperialism represents one of the defining characteristics of

the re-centred world order.

For this analysis the years between 1945 and 1948 are crucial,

for it was in this period, with socialism in the ascendance,

that the US administration developed its economic strategy to

control Europe. Under-Secretary William Clayton noted in 1947

that the ‘disintegration’ of Europe into socialism was a threat

to America and would result in

‘markets for our surplus production gone,

unemployment, depression, a heavily unbalanced

budget on the background of a mountainous war

debt’.lxxxiv

From George Marshall’s announcement of his proposal in June

1947 it was clear that the aid was directed at a new global

47

view of the world and was a mechanism for the reworking of

European institutions:

‘the revival of a working economy in the world

so as to permit the emergence of political and

social conditions in which free institutions

can exist’lxxxv.

In an editorial of the time, The Economist commented:

‘The Marshall Plan must be retrieved from the

realm of normal day-to-day developments in

international affairs and be seen for what it

is – an act without peer in history’,lxxxvi

and this is a prescient observation, for the Marshall Plan

signalled an effective commencement of the new world order.

For four years from 1947, the Marshall Plan provided $13

billion of aid, both cash and kind, into the failing European

economies and had two key elements of control. Firstly its

ideological component, promoting free market exchange based on

growth ensured that the Western European beneficiaries were

committed to the US model of capitalism. In this sense, the

Marshall Plan was not a response to the Soviet threat but

actually created and defined the face-off between East and West

as a conflict between planned economies and market

economies.lxxxvii Secondly, and importantly for the question of

European integration, the Marshall Plan came with strings

attached. The beneficiary countries were obliged to put in

place the necessary controls and structures of a market

48

economy, including exchange rate controls, the relaxation of

customs controls and international agreements to control

commodity and raw material prices. In addition to financial

conditions it was made clear that US state officials who were

administering the scheme were reluctant to grant aid to

Socialist and left leaning governments. This illustrates a

critical point in the story of European integration, that the

principal driver was not the historical fulfilment of political

ideals germinated in the Enlightenment but an economic fait

accompli imposed from without. David Ellwood reflects on this

watershed in world events:

‘while the Europeans…tended to make their

calculations in terms of recent history, the

Americans looked to the future, to a world

remade according to the designs which they were

busy drawing up.’lxxxviii

If economic reconstruction was the primary driver for the

European states, this was only part of the rationale for the

creation of a federated Europe for the United States, which had

more immediate global-political aims in the Cold War conflict

with Russia. In this narrative of the history of integration

from without, the introduction of the Marshall Plan represents

a masterstroke in binding so many fragmented issues together

into one powerful, and considering it lasted only for four

years, limited programme. For a brief moment the global

political and economic issues became contingent on the critical

and problematic relationship between France and Germany, and

the Marshall Plan through its economic tools achieved major

political goals for US foreign policy. Central to the Marshall

49

Plan was the recognition of the crucial role of France, as the

‘hinge’ of Europe.lxxxix Robert Schuman was happy to recall the

‘sacred’ role of France in fulfilling this European destiny,

and looking back to a single self-contained narrative of

history to rationalise the immense changes that Europe was

undergoing:

‘In 1798 France was the pioneer of a new regime

of Freedom…(which) opened up a decisive new

stage with regard to personal fulfilment…Again

in 1950 France was a forerunner of a new

ideal’xc.

That the United States, through the offices of federalists like

Monnet and Schuman, was able to tackle the problem of European

reconstruction, and solve the nagging problem of German

industrial power reflected in the mirror of French insecurity

and economic frailty, by awaking a discredited idea of European

identity speaks testimony, both to the power of the idea of

Europe and to the weakness of Europe in the immediate post war

era.

The Marshall Plan is a critical element in the process of

European integration as it concluded this first phase of

European reconstruction up to 1948, and represented the real

watershed in the transition from a period of European

ascendancy to a period of American hegemony. Greg Behrman

notes how it was designed to

‘Transform Europe, dramatically reconfigure the

international political landscape, and launch

50

America forward as a modern superpower with

global responsibilities’xci.

With the full emergence of the Cold War’s ideological conflict

between the United States and Soviet Russia in the early 1950s,

the European federal integrators were able to further rely on

the mythology of the ‘other’ to justify the ceding of national

sovereignty to a federal organisation. If the agreement of the

ECSC in Paris in 1952 represented an economic imperative, then

the acceleration of the European integration project between

1952 and 1957 was based on a hardening of this economic

principle into a political rationale. The absolute divide of

the Cold War allowed the founding fathers of integration, as

Elizabeth de Réau comments, to posit the transition towards a

pan-European political entity as

‘a moral and spiritual organisation of Europe

in the face of Communist threat that could

endanger the European democratic system’.xcii

The myths of destiny and authority were used to justify the

very same democratic system that had been so discredited in the

previous three decades of boom and bust economics leading up to

the chaos of war. Robert Schuman, treaded a narrow line in

seeking, both a recourse to historical legitimacy for an

integrated Europe in its providing ‘a collective defence

against any possible aggression’xciii coming from the east, and

in his exhortation that national interests should be ceded for

pan-Europeanism.

51

The balancing of this duality became a feature of the progress

towards truly pan-European institutions, as the Council of

Europe, set up in 1948 as part of the Marshall Plan package,

developed the framework that eventually became formalised in

the Treaty of Rome and the European Economic Community (EEC) in

1957. The rationale for the ceding of national sovereignty was

justified by fear of the other, contrasted by a justification

based on the progress of destiny. Schuman, in purple prose,

exhorts that

‘Rome and Byzantium, undermined by their

internal rifts, died because of their stupid

rivalries…the European issue is there,

regardless of the communist or the Asian danger…

Europe has led to the fulfilment of humanity.

It must now show a new way, diametrically

opposed to subjection, by accepting a plurality

of civilisations.’xciv

Schuman exhibits, once again, the substance of the duality

inherent in the comments of Roman Prodi. The powerlessness of

Europe in the Cold War and the loss of identity that European

states and statesmen felt, following the advent of a new world-

order, was compensated by a dependence on a rational process of

integration that called upon the mythologies of progress that

had sustained the earlier period of European ascendancy.

Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia sums this up:

‘In the image of the nationalist

historiographers, the partisans of European

nationalism have always had a tendency to

52

reconstruct the history of their doctrine …as a

rectilinear trajectory in order to justify the

theory of a linear evolution over the centuries

of the linear idea’xcv.

Simply put, the idea of a federated Europe was based on a

European idea of history.

53

Chapter 3

Europe is searching for an identity, it is

aware that it has its own future in hand. It

has never been so close to the goal. May God

not let Europe miss the hour of its destiny,

its final chance of salvation.’xcvi

Robert Schuman, For Europe

The previous chapter has illustrated how European nations,

caught in the tectonic shift of global events, locked in a

state system that thrived on enmity and competition, looked

back to a mythology of self-determination supported by a sense

of history as destiny to rationalise the pooling of sovereignty

into new supra-national institutions. Seeking an appropriate

historiography for this moment in history is problematic, for

this story has multiple and competing narrative threads. At a

national level the story of European integration is one of

differences, and this requires a comparative history based on

the unit of the nation state, while at the pan-national level

this is a story of similarities and convergence, requiring a

trans-national or perhaps a systems-theory approach. A brief

review of each approach will demonstrate their relative appeal,

suitability, and their common flaws.

A comparative historiography of European integration would tend

to echo many of the facets of the European idea of history

outlined earlier. This takes a typically static view of the

world occupied by nation-states as the basic notional unit of

history. The concept of history as a discipline, built on the

54

European idea of historical progress stems from this method.

As Helmut Walser Smith comments,

‘The professional discipline of history

emerged…when borders hardened, culture more

easily assumed national attributes, and place

more self-evidently defined its location’,xcvii

and accordingly history, certainly in the nineteenth century as

it evolved as a discipline, tended to evaluate historical

progress by comparing the competing fortunes of nation-states.

One of the features of comparative history is that it tends to

compare peoples and nations as if they were not connected.

Similarities in national trends or events are evaluated to

maintain the distinction between nations, or to underscore the

shared motive, but crucially these distinctions are viewed

within a closed system, and as has been demonstrated this

system was, for European nations, increasingly obsolete after

1945. Philip Ther concurs and asks pointedly:

‘…is the comparative method adequately

developed as a tool for researching and writing

the many histories of Europe?’xcviii

Nevertheless this dissertation has relied upon a comparative

methodology for some parts of its analysis, particularly those

concerning the strategies of those European states that adopted

a centre-right consensus and pooled certain aspects of

sovereignty to secure national interests. This dissertation

has demonstrated, however, that there is only limited viability

55

in this method of analysis, for there was a strong element of

coercion in the movement towards integration and this is not

adequately explained by a simple comparative method. In this

context, Ian Tyrell identifies the

‘failure of comparative history to transcend

the boundaries of nationalist

historiography’xcix.

A transnational history of European integration is one that

wants to break out of a simple or singular comparison of

nation-states. A transnational approach, in a more fluid

analysis of the transitions and changes involving the

interfaces between nation-states, will give a sense of

movement, development and historical progression. Tyrell

advocates a transnational approach, as its

‘Comparison of…particular movements and issues

is absolutely essential to an

internationalizing project. Comparative

history must be set within broader themes of

transnational history, so as to demonstrate the

contingent and ever-changing nature of the

nation’c.

Taking into account this dissertation’s emphasis on change and

development, the transnational approach offers a useful

framework. The common themes of a fading colonialism and the

dependence on a common elite cultural heritage to justify the

common pooling of sovereignty represent key coordinate points

for a transnational approach. A transnational approach helps

56

to isolate the changes in Europe over a longitudinal view, and

as Michael Miller suggests, this approach

‘would allow [him] to stitch together the two

halves of twentieth century history and to

place modern European history within its proper

global setting’.ci

This historiographic model is a useful tool for considering how

cross-national themes such as cosmopolitanism and the impact of

elite groups, like those represented by Monnet, Schuman and

Adenauer were able to influence the development of European

integration. Again, this dissertation has used a transnational

approach to review the extent to which the integration of

Europe involves an intersection of national histories. This is

a powerful and engaging approach to a large degree,

particularly in dealing with dynamic common issues such as the

retraction of colonialism and the transfer of the idea of

progress towards a common institutionalised rational goal.

These appear to be genuinely pan-national developments that a

simple comparative account cannot effectively contain.

One of the limitations of this method is that it is very much

based on casual explanations from within the nations or units

that are its subject, and this dissertation has demonstrated

how the primary impetus towards integration came from outside

the European states. The frailty of this theory is that it can

rely too heavily on causal explanations for change from within

a contained system.

57

Finally, a world-systems theory of the process of European

integration focuses on the meta-systemic causes that eclipse

and contain the national dynamics that are the basic unit of

both the comparative and transnational theories. As its name

suggests, a world-systems analysis takes the view that the

system itself, rather than the nation-state, is the unit of

exchange and analysis. The basic tenet of world-systems theory

is fundamentally Marxist and historical materialist, as it

explains the progress of history through the development of a

global capitalist cycle. Nations and regions are classified

into Core (democratic, high wage, high investment), Semi-

Periphery (authoritarian, low wage, low investment) and

Periphery (non-democratic, below subsistence wage, no welfare

services)cii. The progress of history relates to the

differential relationship between these three entities,

creating a ‘forward’ movement of historical direction.

This dissertation has used a world-systems approach to suggest

that one of the key drivers for European integration, leading

to the crisis of identity of Europe, was its transition across

phases of the systems theory, as Europe lost its position of

hegemony to the United States. This has been posited as the

primary cause for the loss of identity that Europe faced as it

sought to fulfil its historical destiny and the ultimate source

of Prodi’s, Monnet’s and Schuman’s disquiet.

The world-systems approach is satisfactory in providing an all-

embracing theory of historical transition, incorporating

national, transnational and meta-theoretical contexts.

However, at its core, relying as it does on a Marxist theory of

history it carries the imprint of a European world-view.

58

Although Emmanuel Wallerstein, the theory's primary architect,

was looking to revise Marxism itself,ciii much of the Eurocentric

ideology that is embedded in Marxism remains, notably in the

notion of core and periphery which amounts to an abstracted and

rationalised self/other distinction and clearly in the

Enlightenment idea of history and progress itself.

As this review of available historiographies demonstrates, each

one requires a unit of currency upon which to operate, and

there is a sense in which rather than there being one

historiography that is applicable to the process of European

integration, the issue is more how different historiographies

reflect the perspective of the historian in positioning and

valuing the unit of exchange for that theory. Underlying these

analytical models, the motor of historical progress runs

silently driving the basic European myth of destiny and

enlightenment. Hayden White argues that the units of exchange

are contingent and malleable and that it is not that the theory

of history is not contingent on Europe, but that the idea of

Europe is contingent on the idea of rational progress, as

‘‘Europe’ has never existed anywhere except

in discourse’,civ

and, accordingly, rather than a historiography the historian

requires appropriate historiographies to chart the emergence of

European integration through a multi-faceted process of world

historical change.

To this extent the concept of Europe as a unit of exchange

becomes one of the key issues for a historian. Ariane Chebel

59

d’Appollonia examines the degree that a historiography of a

pan-European institutionalism requires the creation of a

foundational ‘European nationalism’ to embody the European idea

of history, as,

‘Europeanism…can be understood either as the

continuity of the eternal dream of a European

federation or as a modest attempt to make the

European states collaborate more closely’cv.

If the historian believes that the integrated Europe is the

summation of its nation-states, then a comparative

historiography is appropriate. However, if the historian can

conceive of a pan-European nationalism, then a supra-national

approach is required.

60

Conclusion

The ‘whole’ cannot and must not remain an

economic and technical enterprise: it needs a

soul, the conscience of its historical

affinities.cvi

Robert Schuman, For Europe

In conclusion, having reviewed how an idea of Europe supported

five hundred years of European expansion up to 1945, and how

both the mythologies behind the idea of Europe and the

philosophy of history it supported were both increasingly

irrelevant in a re-ordered world, it is now time to answer the

questions set out in the introduction. What is the substance

of the paradox between identity and fulfilment so clearly felt

by Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Romano Prodi, a quest for

the soul of Europe, lost even in the moment of the creation of

European institutions?

In the post-war world, both the idea of Europe and its

supporting historiographies were revealed as out of time and

out of context. The western European industrial nations that

had promoted and profited from their own messianic sense of

destiny were broken and bankrupt. Europe was divided both

physically and ideologically and, as its empires dissembled, it

was forced into a process of retrenchment and consolidation.

Nevertheless the idea of progress, the pure driving force of

Enlightenment thinking was used to refigure and recast the

European national landscape. Jean Monnet’s account of

integration acknowledges this, stripping the idea of Europe

back down to a process of incremental progress:

61

‘Europe will not be built all at once, or as a

single whole: it will be built by concrete

achievements which first create de facto

solidarity’cvii.

The loss of soul, therefore, is partly the loss of the other by

which Europe has created its identity, but critically, it is

also the recognition that the coordinates around which the

European idea of self had been constructed were fundamentally

changed. The sense of destiny, internalised into a process of

bureaucratic progress established in the slow unfolding of the

liii Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1972), p. 23

liv Walter Benjamin, Thesis on the Philosophy of History, in Illuminations (London, 1999), p. 248

lv DGDP, 13, No. 424 (Record of conversation between the Führerand Count Ciano at Headquarters on 25th October 1941), quoted in Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, (London, 2008), p. 559

lvi http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb49.htm (downloaded 26th August 2010)

lvii Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, (London, 2008), p. 554

lviii Michael O’ Neill, op. cit., p. 9

lxiii Philip Rutley, The Long Road to Unity, in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden, (Cambridge, 2002) p. 228

lxiv Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 275

lxvii Robert Schuman, op. cit., p. 11

lxviii Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 273

62

process of European integration, is not one aimed at a ‘higher

ideal’ of a European ideal now discredited, but one aimed at

the concept of progress as a rational principle. This is the

rational principle of progress that is evident in the idea of

history that has supported European identity.

lxx Robert Schuman, op. cit., p. 11

lxxii Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 289

lxxv Ibid., p. 171

lxxvi Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford, 1958) p. 127

lxxix Norman Davies, Europe a History, (London, 1996)

lxxx Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945 – 1952, (London, 1984), p. 493

lxxxi Ibid., p. 495

lxxxii Michael J. Hogan, op. cit., p. 427

lxxxiii Thomas J. McCormick, United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War, in Charles S. Maier, The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent, (New York, 1991) p 30

lxxxiv William Clayton, FRUS, 3 (1947) pp. 230-32

lxxxv George Marshall, Address of Harvard Commencement 5th June 1947, in Appendix B, S. Hoffman, C. Maier, The Marshall Plan, A Retrospective (New York, 1984)

lxxxvi Greg Behrman, The Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of Post-War Europe, (London, 2008), pp. 224-225

lxxxvii Barry Eichengreen, Economy, p. 105 in Europe Since 1945, ed. Mary Fulbrook, (Oxford, 2001)

63

Following half a millennium of externalising the other for its

own sense of historical destiny, Europe was forced by the facts

of post-war history to internalise the idea of rational

progress, so that, as Susan Sontag remarks, the act of European

integration amounts, in the final reckoning, to

lxxxviii David Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, (Harlow, 1992), p. xiii

lxxxix Greg Behrman, op. cit., p. 219

xc Robert Schuman, op. cit., p. 20-21

xci Greg Behrman, The Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of Post-war Europe (London, 2008) p. 2

xcii Ibid., p. 245

xciii Robert Schuman, op. cit., p. 24

xciv Ibid., p. 132

xcv Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, European Nationalism and European Union, in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 2002), p. 180

xcviRobert Schuman, op. cit., p. 144

xcvii Helmut Walser Smith, Review for a Differently Centred European History, Central European History, 37, No 1 (2004) pp. 115-136

xcviii Philip Ther, Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe, Central European History, 36, No. 1 (2003) pp 45 - 73

xcix Ian Tyrell, American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History, American Historical Review, 96 (1991), pp. 1031-1055

64

‘The Europeanisation, not of the rest of

the world, but of Europe itself’cviii.

c Ian Tyrell, Beyond the View from Euro-America: Environment, Settler Societies, and the Internationalisation of American History, in Rethinking American History in a Global Age, ed. T. Bender (Berkeley, 2002) p. 176

ci Michael Miller, Comparative and Cross-National History, in Comparison and History, ed. Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (New York, 2004) p. 117

cii Stephen Hobden and Richard Jones, Marxist Theories of International Relations, in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford, 2001) p. 207

ciii http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/WorldSystem.pdf (downloaded September 21st 2010)

civ Hayden White, The Discourse of Europe and the Search for European Identity, in Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other ed. Bo Strath, (Oxford, 2000) p. 67

cv Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, European Nationalism and European Union, in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 2002), p. 172

cvi Robert Schuman, op. cit., p. 58

cvii Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 295

65

lxvi Alan Millward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945 – 1952, (London, 1984) p. 464

lxix Francois Fontaine, Forward with Jean Monnet, in Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity ed. Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (New York, 1991) p. 40

cviii Susan Sontag, ‘L’idée d’Europe (une élégie de plus), Les Temps Modernes, 80 no. 510 (1989) p. 80 quoted in David Morleyand Kevin Robbins, No Place like Heimat: Images of Home(land) in European Culture, New Formations, 12 (1990), pp. 1-23

66