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From Economic Research to Policy in 32 Years1

Peter Bowbrick

ABSTRACT The European Commission has recently reformed its system of horticultural standards,

acting on economic research which was published 32 years previously and accepted

immediately by academic economists. The delay may have cost €10 to €15 billion a year in

higher costs and prices, reduced health and environmental damage. One reason for the

delay may have been that top government economists base their decisions on the

economics that was orthodox when they were undergraduates. Action was taken by

researchers and civil servants to suppress unwelcome research results. Key economic

decisions were made not by economists, but by civil service horticulturists and grading

inspectors who blocked reform, possibly because they felt their expertise was not valued or

their jobs were threatened. Action was taken to prevent a knowledgeable outsider from

carrying out a review because civil servants did not like a book he published 20 years earlier.

Such actions have a chilling effect: consultants or academics who say what they think can

have their careers destroyed. Systems used outside the EU could have speeded change: for

example, regular policy reviews using independent reviewers – academics, consultants or

international organizations. Strict selection procedures for consultants, strictly enforced, are

essential. Publication of reviews is important.

INTRODUCTION

The European Commission has recently acted on agricultural research published 32 years

ago, to change fruit and vegetable standards, so saving €10-15 billion a year in unnecessarily

high prices, environmental costs and health costs. The administrative policy and procedures

that caused this delay are deeply disturbing for our profession. Having worked on policy for

most of my career, as a civil servant in five countries and an international consultant in

thirty, I have never come across anything like this outside the EU. Generally action on

agricultural policy can be expected within four or five years, after a series of staff

economists and independent outside economists reach similar conclusions.

The European Commission standards for fruit and vegetables, which laid down what

1 Peter Bowbrick, ‘From Economic Research to Policy in 32 Years’, Eurochoices (2012) EuroChoices

11(3) p 44. Peter@Bowbrick.eu

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might be sold, and how it should be sorted, presented and labelled, were considered to be

self-evidently correct in the 1960s and 1970s. They were based on policies going back to the

1930s. It appeared obvious that they were necessary if traders were to buy and sell on

description rather than inspecting each consignment. It appeared obvious that there should

be one and only one set of standards, not different standards for each market. It appeared

obvious that all produce should meet minimum standards in order to push up the quality

offered to consumers and to keep up prices to farmers. It appeared obvious that anything

that did not meet these standards was rubbish and should be dumped.

I researched horticultural marketing in the four years before Britain and Ireland joined

the EEC in 1973 and the eight years afterwards. After accession minimum EC standards

meant dumping probably a third of the fruit and vegetables produced, even though it was

edible and saleable. It was dumped on cosmetic grounds - blotched fruit, oddly-shaped fruit,

packages that were not uniform and crooked cucumbers. The grading standards did not

correspond to market demand, and so reduced market efficiency. Those farmers who

produced fruit and vegetables that did not meet these particular standard specifications but

was cheaper, or fruit and vegetables which met the different standards that specific sub-

markets preferred, were forced out of business. UK farmers were handicapped when

competing with imports, as they had to cover costs when selling only two thirds of their

crop, while foreign producers could sell the export outgrades on their local markets, so

reducing unit costs. The British fruit industry collapsed. Pesticide use increased and

consumer prices rose. Two thirds of the greengrocers went out of business.

My analysis of the EC standards system was presented in 22 books and papers on the

economic theory of grades and standards, which I applied to the practicalities of the fruit

and vegetable market. I also published widely on marketing economics and horticultural

marketing. Two papers (Bowbrick, 1977 and 1982) instantly went onto reading lists in

universities around the world and stayed there for the next 25 to 30 years, then were partly

replaced by my book (Bowbrick, 1992). Other papers which brought the theory together

with the practical research on horticultural marketing reached horticultural economists

worldwide including the EC. I did not receive criticism from economists or my invisible

college. In 1981 I presented an analysis which used evidence and theory produced around

the world and was in much greater depth than I have seen in all but a few policy reports

(Bowbrick, 1981). It was damning, showing that there was no theoretical or practical

justification for the system, drawn up by a committee of grading inspectors in Geneva in

1947: on the contrary, theory and evidence showed that it harmed producers and

consumers. The report produced detailed recommendations, which were novel at the time,

but are what the European Commission has now adopted.

Most member states of the EEC (which expanded into the EU) opposed reform, and

the eventual decision to reform was taken despite fierce opposition by the majority of

states. Conceivably, this was because senior government economists made decisions based

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on what was economically orthodox when they were undergraduates. The time frame fits.

Civil servants who have not tried to influence policy, or have tried but failed, or have

fought behind the scenes to prevent policy changes frequently use ‘political constraints and

pressure groups’ as an excuse. It does not seem credible in this case, however, that those

farmers who benefited from the legislation should exert the decisive influence rather than

those who were bankrupted by it; or that the interests of the supermarket chains should

override those of the friendly local greengrocers who were bankrupted; or that the

consumer interest should be ignored. Certainly there was no public outcry when the EC

reversed its policy. In my experience top decision makers do not base policy decisions on

such trivial political issues, and indeed they frequently make decisions which they believe

are in the best interest of the country, even when they know that these decisions will

infuriate powerful groups. So some other influence must have been at work.

From my own experience of UK and Irish Government officials at the time, it appears

that the internal politics of the civil service and the role of non-economists were of

paramount importance. When I started publishing my research, I was working in an Irish

agricultural research institute. My results caused a violent emotional reaction in non-

economists there, notably horticulturists and soil scientists. They chose to believe that I

wanted growers to produce rubbish – diseased, damaged and misshapen produce – in spite

of my repeated denials, and my insistence that growers should produce what the market

wanted, not what officials in Geneva had decided they should. I was also informed that

there was strong pressure, particularly from Government inspectors and horticulturalists,

for my views to be suppressed. It is understandable, perhaps, that horticultural researchers

who have devoted their careers to producing the ‘perfect’ cucumber should react strongly

to a suggestion that it might not be economically rational to dump everything that they did

not consider ‘perfect’. It is understandable that a Grading Inspector who has spent his

career deciding whether a box of cabbages is Class I or Class II should react strongly to the

suggestion that this is, at best, a waste of time. But I do not understand the reaction of the

soil scientists. I would not suppress or alter my results, so I resigned and changed my career.

Only then was I able to publish two key documents (1981, 1982).

It was not until 2002 that I was able to get information about the internal workings of

the British ministry, using the Freedom of Information Act. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food

and Fisheries (MAFF, now incorporated in Defra) called for tenders for a consultant to do an

Economic Evaluation of Marketing Standards for Horticulture and Eggs, as part of its ongoing

reviews of policy. I registered an interest. Soon E-mails were circulating in the Ministry;

these can be interpreted as an attempt to change the terms of reference in order to exclude

me from the contract on the grounds that some civil servants did not like a report that I had

written in another country 20 years previously. One message claimed that I had a

commitment to ‘an anti-marketing standards position’. This was false: on the contrary, I had

written books and papers on making grades and standards work as an effective marketing

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tool.

The Ministry did indeed act to ensure that the review would not be carried out by

anyone prejudiced by previous knowledge of the subject. They awarded the contract to a

team with no noticeable academic or practical qualifications or experience in the economics

of quality, horticultural marketing, agricultural policy making or agricultural policy

administration. Their literature review identified just 20 publications; in my personal

collection I had 1156 books, papers and monographs on quality, grades and standards,

many of them on horticulture. Most of the 20 publications had no relevance – pride of

place was given to Akerlof’s (1970) long discredited paper on the market for second-hand

cars. The large literature on horticultural and egg marketing was ignored. While Kohls

(1998) and I are cited, there was no mention of Kohl’s trenchant criticisms of badly designed

or researched government standards systems, nor was there any mention of the fact that I

was critical of the EC system. MAFF also explicitly made the decision to ignore my advice,

based on years of experience, that one survey methodology – the one that the successful

bidder proposed using – would not work in this instance. It failed miserably, with virtually no

response. The resulting report would not, in my judgement, have been accepted by

international agencies or Third World governments. The panel awarding the tender had few

economists. It did include grading inspectors though, which is rather like asking a traffic

warden to determine transport policy.

Implications and alternative systems

In the examples I have quoted it seems possible that policy change or resistance to

policy change in agriculture and the environment is driven by the micropolitics of the civil

service, rather than by economic analysis. It would be surprising if the same was not true in

other sectors. In this one instance I estimate the cost to the EU to be of the order of €10-15

billion a year, so the effect on the economy as a whole is likely to be measured not in

billions but in percentage of the GNP. This also has serious implications for our profession if

it simultaneously undermines the ways in which research is commissioned by government

and delivered by the research community.

In agricultural policy we expect that, if we are to change behaviour, we must change

systems and incentives. Exhortation is not enough. For example, the British Treasury has

guidelines that tenders for the review of policy are to be handled at arm’s length from those

making and administering the policy; and that people whose careers might be affected by

the conclusions should not take part in selecting the reviewers. These guidelines, however,

appear to have little impact in practice.

In my experience there are arrangements in non-EU countries which do limit the

problems identified here (which is not to suggest that their systems do not have their own

inefficiencies and corruptions). This shows that solutions are possible, though it is not

suggested that systems developed for other countries can be imported without change to

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the EU. In most of the countries I work in it is believed that there should be regular, usually

annual, reviews of policy by recognized experts. It is believed that where policies have a

significant impact, the reviews should be duplicated or triplicated, preferably by people with

a range of viewpoints – the cost of a review is negligible compared to the cost of a policy

that is not working well, or that is producing the opposite effect to the one intended. There

are reviews by the civil service, but there are also reviews by international organizations,

such as FAO, the World Bank, the EC, UNDP, ADB and by bilateral organizations. The input of

international organizations does, of course, raise its own problems (Griffiths, 2003).

However, it does prevent some of the problems identified here.

No doubt civil servants in other countries would like to select researchers and

consultants who would come up with the results they want, but there is limited opportunity,

as the international organizations select consultants by different criteria, and the single

consultant who produced a paean of praise for the civil servants would have little credibility.

International organizations and countries can, of course, select consultants according to

their biases, and blacklist those who produce inconvenient results, but this still leaves the

consultants with alternative employment, so the chilling effect is not as great as in the UK

for instance. To some extent the biases of the host country, the World Bank, FAO, etc cancel

each other out; although those of the agencies may reinforce each other, as with the

Washington Consensus. It is not unusual for foreign consultants or agency staff to sit in on

government tender selection boards, providing technical expertise and confirming the

openness and adherence to the rules of the selection procedure.

The multi-agency approach also means that there are a lot of reports produced, which

are freely available. These can be reviewed by the local and agency economists One of my

proposals for a major policy change was extremely unpopular with a section of the civil

service, but happened to be reviewed, and approved, by teams from the World Bank, FAO,

EC, and USAID over the following two or three months; so it was accepted and

implemented. As the reviewers have access to all the reports written over the last few

years, the bad reports stand out.

In any civil service, people think they may damage their careers, or worse, by speaking

up against a policy espoused by senior civil servants, powerful groups in the Ministry or

politicians. However, these frightened civil servants are eager to speak to a consultant they

believe to be ‘safe’, often a foreigner, often paid by an international organization rather

than the civil service. I find them to be a vital source of fact, analysis and political guidance.

And an important role of the consultant is to be a scapegoat, saying out loud what everyone

knows but is afraid to be the first to say.

It would not be a simple matter to introduce these changes, doing serious policy

review, removing the chilling effect on a researcher’s career, removing pressures to change

results, cleaning up the selection procedure, publishing the results and encouraging serious

professional criticism. But we know that it is possible; it has been done elsewhere. If there is

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the political will, it can be done. In the present economic situation we cannot afford not to

act.

Bibliography

Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market

mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 489-500.

Bowbrick, P. (1992), The Economics of Quality, Grades and Brands, Routledge, London.

Accessed at http://www.bowbrick.org.uk/Quality/peter_bowbrick_on_quality.htm on

31/1/2012

Bowbrick, P. (1981). An Economic Appraisal of the EEC Fruit and Vegetable Grading

System. Dublin. Accessed at

http://www.bowbrick.org.uk/Quality/peter_bowbrick_on_quality.htm on 31/1/2012

Bowbrick, P. (1976). Compulsory grading and the consumer. Acta Horticulturae , vol

55.

Bowbrick, P. (1977). The case against compulsory minimum standards. Journal of

Agricultural Economics, 28: 113-117.

Bowbrick, P. (1982). The Economics of Grades. Oxford Agrarian Studies , 11, 65-92.

Griffiths, P. (2003). The Economist's Tale: a consultant encounters hunger and the

World Bank. London and New York: Zed Books.

Kohls, R., & Uhl., J. (1998). Marketing of Agricultural Products,. Purdue University:

Macmillan Publishing Company, Eighth Edition.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS BY PETER BOWBRICK

These are available on www.Bowbrick.eu, www.academia.edu,

www.researchgate.net or by e-mailing Peter@Bowbrick.eu

On Quality, Grades and Brands Bowbrick, P., The Economics of Quality, Grades and Brands, Routledge Revivals, 2014.

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http://www.sponpress.com/books/details/9781138793224/ Peter Bowbrick, ‘From Economic Research to Policy in 32 Years’, Eurochoices (2012)

EuroChoices 11(3) p 44. Bowbrick, P., “The case against compulsory minimum standards”, Journal of

Agricultural Economics. 28: 113-117, May. 1977. Bowbrick, P., “The Economics of Grades”, Oxford Agrarian Studies. 11, 65-92. 1982.

Bowbrick, P., An Economic Appraisal of the EEC Fruit and Vegetable Grading System. Dublin. 1981. DOI: 10.13140/2.1.3424.9762

Bowbrick, P., A Refutation of Lancaster’s theory of Consumer Demand, PhD Thesis, Henley Management College, 1994.

Bowbrick, P., “Quality theories in agricultural economics”, Presented at EAAE Seminar Agricultural Marketing and Consumer Behaviour, 1996.

Bowbrick, P., “Limitations of non-behavioural approaches to the economics of quality” Conference of International Association for Research on Economic Psychology and the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, Rotterdam, 1994.

Bowbrick, P., “The conceptual basis of Quality in marketing” Bowbrick, P., “A critique of economic man theories of quality” Bowbrick, P., The Economics of Quality, Grades and Brands, Routledge, London 1992.

http://www.bowbrick.org.uk/Publications.htm Bowbrick, P., 1992. A refutation of (most) hedonic models, Oxford: s.n. Bowbrick, P., 1992. A refutation of The Cost of Quality, Oxford: s.n. Bowbrick, P., “Justifications for compulsory minimum standards” British Food Journal,

92 (2) 23-30, 1990. Bowbrick, P., “Stars and Superstars”, American Economic Review. June. p459 vol 73

1983. Bowbrick, P., “Pseudo-research in marketing - the case of the price:perceived quality

relationship”, European Journal of Marketing. 14(8) 466-70. 1980 Bowbrick, P., “Compulsory grading and the consumer”, Acta Horticulturae. 55. 1976. Bowbrick, P., “A perverse price-quality relationship”, Irish Journal of Agricultural

Economics and Rural Sociology. 6 93-94. 1976. Bowbrick, P., “Evaluating a grading system”, Irish Journal of Agricultural Economics

and Rural Sociology. 7 117-126. 1979. Bowbrick, P., “A new approach to the economics of grading”, Paper to Irish

Agricultural Economics Society. 1974. Griffiths, P., Codes of Practice, Ethics and the Law – the Case of Fairtrade Coffee.

pending Griffiths, P., 2015 Marketing by Controlling Social Discourse: the Fairtrade Case (In

Press) Griffiths, P., 2014. Fairtrade in Schools: teaching ethics or unlawful marketing to the

defenceless?. Ethics and Education, DOI:, 9(3 DOI 10.1080/17449642.2014.978122), pp. 369-384.

Griffiths, P., 2011. Ethical Objections to Fairtrade. Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 357-373. http://www.griffithsspeaker.com/Fairtrade/why_fair_trade_isn.htm

Griffiths, P., 2013. Ethical Objections to Fairtrade. In: New Directions in Critical

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Marketing Studies. s.l.:SAGE. Griffiths, P., 2013. Fairtrade: comment on Tedeschi and Carlson. Journal of

International Development, p. DOI: 10.1002/jid.2965. http://www.griffithsspeaker.com/Fairtrade/why_fair_trade_isn.htm

Griffiths, P., 2010. Lack of rigour in defending Fairtrade: a reply to Alastair Smith. Economic Affairs, pp. 45-49. http://www.griffithsspeaker.com/Fairtrade/why_fair_trade_isn.htm

Griffiths, P., 2010. Rejoinder: False Statements, Misrepresentations and distortion in defending Fairtrade. http://www.griffithsspeaker.com/Fairtrade/Rejoinder%2026%20Jun%202010%20full.pdf

Griffiths, P., 2011. Rejoinder: False Statements, Misrepresentation and Distortion in Defending Fairtrade. Economic Affairs, pp. 103-4.

Griffiths, P., 2010. Refutation: Does Fair Trade deliver on its Core Value Proposition?. Available at: http://www.griffithsspeaker.com/Fairtrade/Arnould%20et%20al%20web.doc

ON MARKET MARGINS AND MARKETS Bowbrick, P., “Marketing Board inefficiency and farmers’ incomes”, Conference on

African Marketing Boards. African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands. 1983. Bowbrick, P. & Feeney, P., 1981. “The impact of cost-saving innovations with

traditional margins”, Journal of Agricultural Economics. May. 1981. Bowbrick, P., “Price stabilization funds”, Agricultural Economics Society of Tanzania

Conference. 1981. Bowbrick, P. & Feeney, P., 1981. The impact of cost-saving innovations with

traditional margins. Journal of Agricultural Economics.. Bowbrick, P. & Twohig, D., Pick-your-own fruit marketing. Dublin, An Foras

Taluntais. 1977. Bowbrick, P., “Distributive margins - a rejoinder”, Oxford Agrarian Studies. 6

168-170. 1977. Bowbrick, P., “Price control and market margins for fruit and vegetables”, Acta

Horticulturae. 55. 1976. Bowbrick, P., “Determining distributive margins”, Oxford Agrarian Studies. 5 124-

129. 1976. Bowbrick, P., “Market-margin investigations and price control of fruit and

vegetables”, Irish Journal of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. 6 9-20. 1976. Bowbrick, P., “Commission sales or firm-price sales - a conflict of interest”, Irish Journal of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. 5 229-238. 1975.

Bowbrick, P., “Some limitations of market-margin analysis”, Irish Journal of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. 4(2) 23-28. 1974.

Bowbrick, P., “Retail mark-ups and distributive margins - a critical analysis of Professor Allen’s theory”, Irish Journal of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. 4(2) 1-23. 1973.

Bowbrick, P., “Price stabilization in a two-sector industry”, Acta Horticulturae. 40. 1972.

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MISUSES OF PRICE AND OTHER STATISTICS See also discussions of the unreliability of statistics, doing economics when the data is not available and

doing economics when the data are wrong in The Art and Practice of the Economist. Major problems with market

price data are also shown in the papers on market margins.

Bowbrick, P., 2015. Interpreting Statistics in an English Team Based Evaluation. In:

P. Smeyers, D. Bridges, N. Burbules & M. Griffiths, eds. International Handbook of Interpretation in Educational Research. s.l.:Springer, pp. 1347-1381.http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-017-9282-0_66

Bowbrick, P., “Are price reporting systems of any use?”, British Food Journal. 90(2) 65-69 March/April. 1988.

Bowbrick, P., 1985. On the total irrelevance of cost-of-production figures for subsistence agriculture.

Bowbrick, P., “Errors in horticultural cost-of-production surveys”, Irish Journal of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. 6 21-29. 1976.

Bowbrick, P., “A note on the prices of food sold to wage earners in Zambia”, Monthly Economic Bulletin. October and November. 1966.

Bowbrick, P., “A note on vegetable statistics”, Monthly Economic Bulletin. April. 1966.

THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE ECONOMIST How economists work once they graduate – or how they should if they want to make an impact. Griffiths, P., 2003. The Economist's Tale: a consultant encounters hunger and the

World Bank.. London and New York: Zed Books. Bowbrick, Peter, The Art and Practice of the Economist. Morwenna Griffiths, Tony Cotton, Peter Bowbrick, “Educational researchers

doing research on educational policy: Heroes, puppets, partners, or…?” Paper presented to the British Educational Research Association Annual Conference, Warwick 2006.

Mal Leicester, Roger Twelvetrees, Peter Bowbrick, “Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning – insights from education, engineering and economics,” in David Aspin (Ed.) Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning (Kluwer Press)

Griffiths, P., 2008. Working abroad with a degree of scepticism. Sunday Times, 8 June. http://www.griffithsspeaker.com/Other%20publications/Short%20articles.htm

Bowbrick, P., “Maximizing consultancy income” Journal of Management Consulting. Spring 1995.

Bowbrick, P., The use of Counseling Skills in Consultancy, MA dissertation, Nottingham University, 1993

Bowbrick, P., n.d. Thesis Fodder – a new role for the Third World. Times Higher Education Supplement.

Bowbrick, P., 1990. Profitable Consulting: Collected Papers. Nottingham: s.n.

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Bowbrick, P., Effective Communication for Professionals and Executives. London/ Dordrecht /Boston, Graham and Trotman. ISBN 1-85333-081-7. 1988.

Bowbrick, P., Practical Economics for the Real Economist. London/Dordrecht/Boston, Graham and Trotman. ISBN 1-85333-076-0. 1988.

Bowbrick, P., “The role of the economist in applied biological research”, Agricultural Administration. 3 11-15. 1976.

Bowbrick, P., “The use of voice recorders in agricultural economics research”, Journal of Agricultural Economics. 26(2) 261-263. 1975.

ON FAMINES Griffiths, P., 2003. The Economist's Tale: a consultant encounters hunger and the

World Bank.. London and New York: Zed Books. Bowbrick, P., “A refutation of Sen’s theory of famine”, Food Policy. 11(2) 105-

124. 1986. Bowbrick, P., “Rejoinder: an untenable hypothesis on the causes of famine”,

Food Policy. 12(1) 5-9, February. 1987. See also George Allen “Famines: the Bowbrick-Sen dispute and some related issues,” Food Policy, 11(3) 259-263, 1986, Amartya Sen “Reply: famine and Mr Bowbrick”, Food Policy 12(1) 10-14, and Amartya Sen “The causes of famine: a reply”, Food Policy 11(2) 125-132, 1986.

A refutation of Professor Sen’s theory of famines. Institute of Agricultural Economics, Oxford. 1986 updated 2009.

“How Professor Sen’s theory can cause famines”, Agricultural Economics Society Conference. March. 1985.

“Why Professor Sen’s theory is wrong”, Development Studies Association Conference. September. 1985.

Bowbrick, P., “Five Famine Fallacies” in Julian Morris and Roger Bate (eds.) Fearing Food: risk, health and environment, Butterworth Heineman, Oxford. ISBN 0-7506-4222-x, 1999

Bowbrick, P., “Are famines caused deliberately?: the politics and micro-politics influencing decisions” Development Studies Association Conference, Dublin 1995.

MISCELLANEOUS Peter Bowbrick and Morwenna Griffiths (Eds), Boys' Schooldays in Ruddington

Remembered,, Nottingham Trent University, 2007. Peter Bowbrick and Morwenna Griffiths (eds), Girls’ Schooldays in Ruddington

Remembered Nottingham Trent University, 2007.