Upload
tilburguniversity
View
0
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
1
GEOENGINEERING
Revisiting the Economics of Climatic Change*
Juan B. Moreno Cruz** and Sjak Smulders***
This version: October 31, 2008
PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE, Please do not quote
Abstract
There is a serious possibility that simple and reversible measures exist that cool global
temperature and could combat global warming at low cost. Spreading SO2 particles in the
atmosphere is the most promising example, but there are other ones. They all involve
intentional large-scale manipulation of the environment, which is labeled
"geoengineering".
We introduce the concept of “geoengineering” into an analytical model of climate
change. Our small partial equilibrium model simultaneously considers mitigation
(traditional abatement policies) and geoengineering.
We model the technical and economic characteristics of geoengineering in line with the
recent geoengineering literature from physical and environmental management sciences.
We interpret the key economic implication of engineering to be its potential to reduce the
temperature-related damages of climatic change. We investigate (i) under which
circumstances geoengineering makes traditional abatement and mitigation strategies
redundant, (ii) whether geoengineering and mitigation are substitutes or complements in
the reduction of damages, and (iii) whether geoengineering allows for postponing
mitigation (“buying time”).
* We thank David Keith, Timo Goeschl, Mark Jaccard, Robert Oxoby, Scott Taylor and participants at the Grenoble Workshop on Innovation and the Environment, the IEW 2007 meeting at Stanford, and the UNU-MERIT research seminar for comments on a previous version. All mistakes remaining are our own. ** Department of Economics and ISEEE-EESG, University of Calgary. [email protected] . *** Department of Economics, Tilburg University. Department of Economics and ISEEE-EESG, University of Calgary. [email protected]
2
1. Introduction
Scientists have recently worked on, discussed, and experimented with several
technologies that can relatively easily alter global environmental systems. Elements of
these technologies, which come under the label of “geoengineering”, have been put in
practice already, e.g. weather modification at a local scale to boost agricultural
productivity. Geoengineering technologies sometimes appear to be taken from a Jules
Verne book: they range from giant mirrors in the space to block the sun to human
volcanoes that mimic the idea of a giant volcano eruption releasing huge amounts of
sulfur into the atmosphere (as Monte Pinatubo did in 1991 with a three-degree-Celsius
cooling effect for two years (A. Robock, 2005, T. M. L. Wigley et al., 2005)). However,
the scientific principles behind geoengineering technologies are well established.
Moreover, on the economics side, it has been suggested that the cost of geoengineering
could be so low compared to traditional mitigation strategies that they will make climate
change irrelevant (D. W. Keith, 2000)
In this paper we analyze the economics of geoengineering and its implications for climate
change policies that follow from what we consider -from the natural sciences literature-
to be the main characteristics of a geoengineering technology. Before answering the
pressing questions about geoengineering implementation, we adjust the model to include
the idea of geoengineering into the traditional elements of economic models of climate
change, where we stress the differences between the stock of greenhouse gases (GHG)
and the effects of this stock on temperature. This turns out to be the most important
difference given the fact that geoengineering technologies could affect global mean
temperature, but cannot do anything about the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere.
Following this discussion we investigate (i) under which conditions we adopt
geoengineering, (ii) once geoengineering is adopted, under which conditions is abatement
redundant, (iii) whether geoengineering and mitigation should be considered as
complements or substitutes, and finally (iv) whether geoengineering allows for
postponing mitigation (“buying time”).
The uncertainties surrounding the implementation of geoengineering, as well as the
ethical questions around large scale manipulation of the environment, have kept
3
geoengineering technologies under the radar of the climate change scientific community.
Nonetheless lately, scientists have argued that geoengineering needs to be considered as a
potentially serious player in the climate change arena. The series of commentaries on
Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen's article in Climatic Change (P. J. Crutzen, 2006)
revealed the multiple questions surrounding geoengineering. It comes across that
whenever defended, research on geoengineering is only proposed as an insurance against
an abrupt climate change happening in the future (see for example (S. H. Schneider,
1996) and (R. J. Cicerone, 2006)). But before we can discuss the risk and uncertainties
over possible scenarios, we need to know what are the qualitative effects of that will be
common in these scenarios. It is this question on the nature of the economic implications
of geoengineering that we want to address in this paper, which is of independent interest
of (and should be addressed before) the question of insurance.
We define geoengineering as an action in which the primary objective is the modification
of the climate system at a large scale (D. W. Keith, 2000). Although this definition is
broad and apply to several technologies, we have a particular one in mind for the sake of
concreteness, viz. the alteration of the reflectiveness of the stratosphere, aiming to
counter effect the increases in the radiative force (leading to increasing temperature) due
to the increase in CO2 concentrations.1 Given the varying tradeoffs between up-front
costs, effectiveness, and adverse environmental consequences, this technology appears to
be optimal in a scientific sense (M. C. MacCracken, 2006).
From a technology perspective geoengineering is distinct from traditional climate change
mitigation strategies (abatement, for short) because its results are immediate and because
rather than reducing greenhouse gases emissions it reduces the impacts of the
concentration level of these gases in the atmosphere. From an economics perspective, two
characteristics make geoengineering special. First, geoengineering is much less costly
than abatement and a single country could easily undertake enough geoengineering to
protect the entire planet against the damage from global warming. In contrast, traditional
abatement strategies are riddle with international coordination and free-riding problems
(T. C. Schelling, 1996). Second, while the marginal cost of any abatement technology
1 This type of intervention is referred to as Solar Radiation Management, but we will refer to it as geoengineering in general.
4
increases exponentially, the cost of geoengineering is almost constant on the amount of
“cooling” that has to be done.
Geoengineering sometimes has the connotation of fixing the climate change problem at
zero (or very low) cost and thus making climate change irrelevant (cf the scenario that
(William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, 2000) label geoengineering). In contrast, in our
model we acknowledge the fact that geoengineering is not a perfect substitute for
traditional mitigation measures: it does not affect the level of concentration of GHG in
the atmosphere, but cools down the planet and reduces the temperature-related damages,
while other problems derived from GHG concentration are not corrected (i.e. ocean
acidification).
We agree with TML Wigley (T. M. L. Wigley, 2006) on his conclusion that
geoengineering works as an instrument that allows us to buy more time, letting
technology evolve to a point in which investments in abatement are achieved at a
relatively low cost. Our model differs from that of TML Wigley in that he assumes
exogenous trajectories for the climate policy, while in this model the interaction between
geoengineering and abatement is the result of an endogenous dynamic optimal decision.
Barrett (2008) can be seen as the first paper dealing with the economics of
geoengineering. He argues that it is essential to study free-riding issues and governance
systems that deal with the question who should be allowed to start using geoengineering,
when and under which conditions. He shares with the community of scientists and of the
general public that geoengineering is potentially very risky (or even immoral) as it
involves the earth system as a whole. We ignore the free-riding, governance and
uncertainty aspects for now, not because we think they are not important (to the
contrary), but because we think we should first clearly set out the concept of
geoengineering, define its characteristics and explore its fundamental impacts on the
economy before we can deal with the more complex issues mentioned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains which of the
canonical elements of traditional climate change models needs to be changed in order to
incorporate geoengineering. We then present a simple static model of climate change in
which we analyze the static effects of geoengineering in environmental policy. Finally we
5
present a dynamic version of the model in which we analyze the transitional path towards
an environmentally sustainable equilibrium, and we highlight the differences with the
traditional results of the environmental economics literature.
2. How Geoengineering affects the Climate-Economy Link
Geoengineering activities are aimed at reducing the intensity with which the sun warms
the planet. Traditional models of climate change correctly assume that there is a
proportionality factor that correlates concentration of GHG and mean temperature in the
globe. However, once we consider geoengineering we have to disentangle the damages
from temperature (e.g. sea level raise) from those of CO2 concentration (e.g. ocean
acidification), because now the proportionality relation between GHG concentrations and
temperature is affected.
2.1. Damages and Geoengineering Intervention.
Damages caused by increases in temperature come in the form of increased precipitation,
more unpredictable weather patterns and storms, sea-level rise, desertification and loss of
fertile soils, etcetera. The key feature of geoengineering that makes it so promising to
combat climate change problems is that it produces a cooling effect: by increasing
reflectivity (albedo) of the atmosphere, incoming sunlight is reflected back and
temperature on earth is reduced. Hence, geoengineering can undo damages from climate
change. However, this is not to say that geoengineering neutralizes all effects of GHG
concentrations. Although it can keep the temperature below dangerous levels and thus
address climate change damages, it cannot, for example, avoid the effects on the
acidification of the oceans caused by GHG accumulation.
The main impact of geoengineering on the economy therefore involves the damage from
temperature change and other climate-related sources. To clarify our argument, we
specify these damages in a way that separates temperature effects from other effects. In
particular, we assume that damages D depend on greenhouse gas concentration S and
geoengineering G in the following way:
1 2 3( , ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ),D S G d S d T S G d G= + − + (D)
6
1 1
2 2
3 3
( )0 for ( ) ; 0;
( )0 for ( ) ; 0;
0, 0, 0.
d S S d
d T T d
d d T
′′′ < > < > >
′′′ < > < > >
′′′ ′> > >
The first term at the right-hand side of (D) represents the idea that CO2 concentrations
have other effects than just on temperature, which are on balance positive for small
concentration levels and negative for large ones (H. D. Matthews et al., 2005). The
positive effects stem from a fertilization effect: more CO2 enhances plant growth and thus
boosts productivity in agriculture2 (A. W. King et al., 1997). The negative effects stem
from acidification of oceans and other ecological disruptions which ultimately harm
productivity of the economy (K. Caldeira and M. E. Wickett, 2005). Since the marginal
fertilization effect is decreasing (M. K. Cao and F. I. Woodward, 1998, A. W. King, W.
M. Post and S. D. Wullschleger, 1997), and the marginal acidification effect is likely to
be increasing in S, we assume a critical level S at which a CO2 increase at given
temperature turns from a benefit into a damage.
The second term at the right-hand side of (D) captures the effect of global warming.
Global average temperature is denoted by T. Excessive increases in temperature (as well
as excessive cooling, i.e. temperature below T ) increase damages. CO2 concentrations
increase temperature, which we interpret as the global warming effect of GHG
accumulation, TS>0, while geoengineering produces a cooling effect, TG < 0.3 By
measuring G in terms of CO2 radiative forcing potential, we may write temperature as a
function of S – G, rather than as a seemingly more general function with S and G as
separate arguments.4 [Our choice of units implies T = Θ(S,G) = Θ(S – G,0) and ΘS = –
ΘG. Further it is understood that the increase in the temperature is more or less
proportional to the increase in radiative force.]
2 An experiment carried out by Govindasamy et. Al. (2002) shows that doubling CO2 increases temperature by 2.42 oK. Reducing solar flux by 4.17 W/m2 reduces temperature by 2.40oK, reduces precipitation by 5.8% and increases global biomass from 631.6 Gt-C to 1212.9 Gt-C . Govidasamy et al 2002 3 Supranote 2. 4 Changes in solar flux and atmospheric CO2 content may be considered to be roughly additive and independent of its effects on NPP. Govidasamy et al 2002.
7
The benefits from fertilization are assumed to be lower than the damages caused by the
global warming effect, ( )2 1d T T d′ ′ ′> − , so that GHG accumulation is harmful in the
absence of geoengineering.
The third term at the right-hand side of (D) captures the damages caused by
geoengineering alone. Recent numerical simulations on the use of geoengineering show
that geoengineering will affect precipitation patterns and volumes, causing a decrease in
precipitations over land and an increase in precipitations over the ocean (H. D. Matthews
and K. Caldeira, 2007), possibly causing droughts in large regions of the planet.5 It is
expected that the benefits from the cooling effect of geoengineering outweigh the costs
from changes in droughts and precipitation. Although this outcome is extremely
uncertain, since it is based on computer simulations rather observed in real data, we
assume that the marginal benefits of geoengineering exceed the marginal damages (i.e.
we assume 3 2d d T′ ′ ′< ), because this is the only case in which geoengineering can
potentially contribute to climate change policy.
2.2. Carbon Uptake and Geoengineering Intervention.
We now turn to the absorption of carbon from the atmosphere, to be denoted by δ, which
is the second main variable that is affected by both CO2 and geoengineering. Like we did
for climate-related damages, we distinguish between temperature-related, CO2-related,
and geoengineering-related changes in carbon uptake. In particular, we assume the
following:
1 2 3( , ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )S G S T S G Gδ δ δ δ= + − + (δ )
1 2 3( ) 0, ( ) 0, ( ) 0, 0.S T G Tδ δ δ′ ′ ′ ′> < < >
The earth’s biosphere and atmosphere balances the incoming short wave solar radiation
with long wave energy leaving the earth. This process is the combination of, on the one
5 Supranote 2.
8
hand, carbon sequestration by plants and oceans, and, on the other hand, heterotrophic
respiration. Oceans and plants take up more CO2 the more of it there is in the atmosphere.
This causes the net primary productivity to increase. Hence, given temperature, carbon
uptake increases with CO2 concentration, which we capture by the term 1( )Sδ , which is
increasing in S. However, at higher temperatures more carbon is released from plants due
to an increase in heterotrophic respiration (Matthews et al. 2005). Hence, given the CO2
stock, carbon uptake reduces with temperature, which we capture by the term 2 ( )Tδ ,
which is decreasing in T. Computer experiments using general circulation models have
shown that the combined effect of an increase in concentration is positive, due in
particular to the fact that the increase in the net primary productivity due to increase in S
is greater than then increase in heterotrophic respiration caused by an increase in T.6
Formally, this requires us to assume 1 2Tδ δ′ ′ ′> .
Lower short wave radiation as caused by geoengineering could reduced reduce carbon
uptake as well, which effect is captured by the term 3( )Gδ , however this effect is very
small compared to the direct temperature effects (B. Govindasamy et al., 2002). This
allow us to impose the condition 3 0δ ′ .
2.3. Implications.
We now combine our assumptions from the previous sections to derive the implications
of changes in CO2 concentrations and geoengineering for damages and carbon uptake.
Lemma 1: If the conditions in section (2.1) hold, then:
0, 0, 0, 0, 0S SS G GG SGD D D D D> > < > < .
If the conditions in section (2.2) hold, then:
0, 0, 0, 0, 0S SS G GG SGδ δ δ δ δ> < > < > .
6 Govidasamy et al 2002 show that Doubling CO2 increases Net primary productivity from 56 to 100 Gt-C/yr, while it associated increase in heterotrophic respiration increases from 50 to 87.5, leaving a net increase in capture of 6.3 Gt-C/yr.
9
Proof in the Appendix
3. A Static Model of Abatement and Geoengineering Intervention
We now combine the damage function (D) and absorption function (δ ) with assumptions
on the costs of emissions reduction and geoengineering to build a benchmark model of
climate change economics. To provide the simplest possible benchmark model, we ignore
timing issues and dynamic aspects. The static model of this section allows us to
concentrate on the basic trade-offs in the most elementary framework. The dynamic
version of the model follows in the next section.
To avoid climate and GHG related damage, two strategies stand out. First, environmental
deterioration in general and climate change in particular (increases in S) can be mitigated
by reducing reductions in emissions into the atmosphere (mitigation, or abatement for
short). Second, counteracting measures in the form of geoengineering, G, can be taken.
The differences in impact between changes in S (mitigation) and in G (geoengineering)
on damages are already set out above. Different from abatement, geoengineering
intervention G does not affect the level of environmental services directly; it does,
however, decrease damages in the economy by reducing the radiative force with the same
level of environmental services. We now need to model the economic costs of these two
strategies.
Our assumptions on the cost of abatement will be standard: we assume that the marginal
cost of abatement is a strictly increasing, strictly convex function of abatement, ( ),C A
wtih 0,AC > 0.AAC > 7
With respect to the costs of geoengineering, we allow for fixed costs and variable costs.
The fixed cost of geoengineering, to be denoted by IG, concerns the cost of developing
and testing geoengineering technologies. Moreover, the operating cost of geoengineering
is likely to be independent of the intensity of geoengineering, so this should be included
7 The notation YX represents the partial derivative of X with respect to Y.
10
in the fixed cost IG as well. For example, while the amount of particles to be put into the
atmosphere depends on the amount of cooling to be geoengineered, the cost of operation
is almost independent of the amount of particles to be spread (“sending the plane to the
stratosphere”). The technical operation costs are small and largely independent of the
amount of cooling to be produced (D. W. Keith, 2000). Nevertheless, there may be non-
zero increasing marginal costs associated with geoengineering, mainly outside the realm
of operating costs. These costs arise from the effects that geoengineering can have other
than those on temperature. We think these are mainly health effects, following Crutzen
(2006), who warns for the health and air quality effects of SO2 concentrations at low
levels, and assuming that this can be extended to any type of particles used for the
geoengineering. We denote the variable cost of abatement by M , with M = 0 for G = 0,
and assume that the marginal costs of geoengineering are increasing and convex,
0,GM ≥ 0.GGM ≥
3.1. The structure of the model
We now study optimal abatement and geoengineering. Consider an economy in which a
benevolent social planner minimizes the costs of climate change to society by choosing
the flow of atmospheric CO2 equivalent emissions (S), the amount of abatement (A), and
the level of geoengineering, (G). The social planner's problem is given by the following
minimization program:
{ }
( ) ( ), ,
min ( ) , 1( 0) GA G SC A M G D S G G I+ + + > (OF)
subject to
( )0 ,A E S Gδ= − (SD)
where IG represents the fixed cost of geoengineering and 1(.) is an indicator function
which take the value 1 if G > 0. In the current static model, carbon uptake variable
( , )S Gδ should be interpreted as the emissions that do not enter the atmosphere due to
natural absorption processes, therefore equation (SD) imposes environmental
sustainability as an equilibrium condition, such that emissions net of abatement are equal
11
to the absorption capacity level of the atmosphere. Recall that the absorption capacity of
the environment is a function of the CO2 concentrations (S) and the level of
geoengineering (G) as explained in the previous section.
3.2. The impact of geoengineering on optimal abatement and CO2 concentrations
Using traditional optimization techniques, we find that the optimal choice of abatement
(A) and CO2 concentration (S) requires the following equilibrium conditions (see
appendix for details):
( )( , )AC a S Gτ = (MAC)
( )( )
,,
S
S
D S GS G
τδ
= (MD)
where
( )0( , ) ,a S G E S Gδ≡ − (SD’)
is the level of abatement needed to satisfy the sustainability constraint (SD), and τ is the
Lagrange multiplier associated to the sustainability constraint. As usual, τ has the
interpretation of the pollution tax to which firms equate the marginal abatement cost, as
in equation (MAC). In the optimum, the pollution tax has to equal marginal damages net
of the contribution of increased CO2 concentration to the absorption capacity, as in
equation (MD).
Equations (MAC) and (MD) determine the optimal CO2 concentration, S, and pollution
tax, τ, for a given level of geoengineering. Figure 1 depicts this optimum. We are
interested in comparing a situation with and without geoengineering so as to analyze the
effects of the introduction of geoengineering in the economy. We analyze the experiment
in which we move form no geoengineering to an exogenous level of geoengineering G >
0, that we assume to be small. We report the results from this experiment in our first
proposition.
12
Proposition 1: Suppose an interior optimum choice of abatement and CO2 concentration
exist, then, in comparison to the optimum without geoengineering, the introduction of
geoengineering induces
(i) a lower optimal pollution tax,
(ii) less abatement in the optimum, and
(iii) higher (lower) CO2 concentration in the optimum if the following inequality holds (is
violated):
SG A SGG
AA S
D CC
δ δδ
− +> . (*)
Proof . Total differentiation of (MAC) and (MB) gives 2A SG SG AA S G
SS AA S A SS
dS C D CdG D C C
δ δ δδ δ
− −=
+ −,
2
( ) ( ) 0S A SG SG G SS A SSAA
SS AA S A SS
d C D D CCdG D C Cτ δ δ δ δ
δ δ− + −
= − <+ −
and 1 0AA
dA ddG C dG
τ= < . Existence of
an interior solution requires the second order condition to be satisfied, which requires that the denominator term, 2
SS AA S A SSD C Cδ δ+ − , is positive. QED
To illustrate these results we can use a standard diagram of pollution versus taxes. We
can depict equations (MAC) and (MD) in the S vs. τ space.
13
Figure 1. Geoengineering effects on the Static Equilibrium
Initially the economy is in an equilibrium where there is no geoengineering intervention
(Point A). Geoengineering shifts the marginal damage cost curve down, since the cooling
effect of geoengineering reduces marginal damages. It also shifts the marginal abatement
cost curve down: the cooling effect of geoengineering boosts carbon uptake (through
reduced heterotrophic respiration) and implies that less abatement costs have to be
incurred to neutralize emissions. Natural abatement (δ) substitutes for human made
abatement (A). With both curves shifting down, the overall impact is that the pollution tax
falls, so that abatement activities fall, but the effect on CO2 is ambiguous.
Geoengineering reduces the need to tax emissions for three reasons. The cooling effect of
geoengineering makes increases in temperature through CO2 accumulation less harmful,
first through lowering marginal damages ( 0SGD < ) and, second, through increasing the
marginal rate of carbon absorption ( 0SGδ > ). Third, the cooling effect of geoengineering
increases total carbon uptake through diminished heterotrophic respiration ( 0Gδ > ). All
these effects lower the social cost of carbon and result in a optimal lower carbon tax.
With lower carbon taxes, traditional mitigation measures are less needed.
14
The effect of geoengineering on CO2 concentration itself is ambiguous. On the one hand,
the lower social cost of carbon induces lower abatement and thus increases CO2
concentration. On the other hand, improved carbon uptake from the atmosphere decreases
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. Indeed, according to the inequality in (*), if the
change in carbon uptake as a result of geoengineering (δG) is small, the first effect
dominates and geoengineering makes it optimal to allow for higher CO2 concentrations
than without geoengineering.
3.3. The optimal level of geoengineering
We now confront costs and benefits of geoengineering to discuss its optimal level. The
first order condition for optimal choice of geoengineering activities G is given by:
( ) ( ) ( ), ,G G GD S G S G M Gτδ− + = (OG)
The left-hand side of this equation represents the marginal benefits from geoengineering:
cooling reduces damages ( 0GD < ) and improves the absorption of carbon ( 0Gδ > ),
which has a social cost τ. The right-hand side of the equation represents the marginal
costs of geoengineering.
Eliminating τ between equations (OG) and (MD), we can find an implicit function that
relates the optimal value of G as a function of S, which implies the following:
Lemma 2: If geoengineering is worthwhile to be introduced, the optimal level of
geoengineering increases with CO2 concentration: that is ( )*G g S= with ( )g S
increasing in S.
Proof in the Appendix
An increase in the CO2 concentration raises the benefits of geoengineering since CO2-
induced higher temperature is associated with higher marginal damages, which
geoengineering can offset. Hence, higher CO2 justifies more geoengineering.
15
We can now substitute G = g(S) into (MAC) and (MD), and depict the resulting
expressions in the (S, τ ) plane, as in Figure 1. Point B in the figure represents the
optimum with optimized geoengineering, and can be compared to the optimum without
geoengineering, point A.
It should be noted that when geoengineering is optimized, the optimal tax level is greater
than zero, which implies as positive level of abatement. As is clear from (MAC) and
(MD), this follows from our assumptions 0, 0, 0A S SC D δ> > > . In our framework, a zero
optimal carbon tax would result only if marginal abatement costs would be zero (CA = 0),
but then climate change would have been costless even without geoengineering. A zero
optimal tax (i.e. no social cost of carbon) would also appear because of geoengineering if
geoengineering perfectly offset the damages from GHG accumulation, i.e. if DS = 0. For
zero (or small) levels of geoengineering, we have assumed DS > 0. However, with
intensive geoengineering, we could have 0SD ≤ . We formalize this in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. With optimum levels of geoengineering, the pollution tax is strictly
positive if and only if 1 2( ) ( ( ( ))) ( ( )) 0d S d T S g S T S g S′ ′ ′+ − − > .
The possibility of a non-positive tax can no longer ruled out, since geoengineering can
offset the damage from global warming: after stabilizing temperature (at T so that
2 0d ′ = ), increases in CO2 concentration improve welfare (i.e. reduce damages) through
the fertilization effect ( 1 ( ) 0d S′ < provided S S< ). The surprise is perhaps that with
optimized geoengineering the cost of carbon can still be positive. Indeed, since
geoengineering is subject to increasing marginal cost, stabilizing temperature for a large
CO2 level might be too costly. Moreover, too large a stock of CO2 makes acidification
problems dominate the fertilization effect.
16
3.4. Geoengineering adoption and Pollution Saving Technical Change Interaction
So far we have ignored the fixed cost of geoengineering, IG. This cost can be interpreted
as the cost of introducing geoengineering. Once introduced, it is optimal to choose G =
g(S) and to choose τ and S corresponding to point B in Figure 1. The area OBI represents
the total flow cost (M+C+D) in the optimum with geoengineering. Without
geoengineering, total flow cost is represented by area OAI. Hence the welfare gains from
the adoption of geoengineering are given by boomerang shaped area ODACIB.
Geoengineering is optimally introduced in the economy if and only if the benefits from
its implementation exceed its costs, including fixed costs, or equivalently, IG < ODACIB.
We can now identify forces that reduce the welfare gains of geoengineering introduction.
Any force that shifts down the MAC or MD curve reduces the gains from
geoengineering. We focus on technical change that reduces marginal abatement costs.
To do this, we introduce a technology parameter in the cost function, C(A,H). The
technology-shift parameter H allows us to study pollution-saving technological change.
We assume that technological changes decreases the marginal abatement cost, 0AHC < .
Obviously, this technological change is always beneficial, so to allow for the possibility
of endogenous technology, we assume that the economy can only implement the
technological change if it incurs a fix cost, IH.
The social planner problem is given by
{ }( ) ( )
, ,min ( , ) , 1( 0) 1( 0)G HA G S
C A H M G D S G G I H I+ + + > + > (OF’)
Think of an economy in which geoengineering and pollution saving technological change
are available. A central planner decides whether to adopt zero, one or two technologies.
This decision comes to comparing the welfare gain and the fixed costs of adoption.
Figure 2, shows the situation we describe.
17
Figure 2. Results of the static model of geoengineering and technical change
Society will choose the option that maximizes welfare gains net of fix costs between four
possibilities. It either adopts geoengineering, adopt the new technology or adopt both. It
can also decide to adopt none of them. Each option carries different levels of welfare
gains and costs. The adoption of both technologies comes with welfare gains “OAIG”,
and costs IH + IG. Adopting only geoengineering comes with welfare gains “OAIB” and
costs IG. Adoption of the pollution saving technology brings welfare gains “FAI” and
costs IH.
Our assumptions about geoengineering are that the benefits from its implementation are
proportional to the damages of the economy, as well as the indirect effects described
above. Therefore, when a pollution saving technology is adopted by the economy, there is
a reduction on the welfare gains of geoengineering. The opposite is also true, when
geoengineering is implemented in the economy, some fraction of the benefits from
abatement are already being ripped off. Assuming that society is shortsighted and do not
see that the pollution saving technology is available then society might choose the option
of only geoengineering, but it might be possible that “FAI” - IH > “OAIB” - IG.
We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition:
18
Proposition 3. Geoengineering is worthwhile to be introduced if and only if IG <
ODACIB. Lower costs of abatement ceteris paribus reduce the desirability of
geoengineering introducion. Geoengineering ceteris paribus reduces the desirability of
introducing a pollution-saving technology.
Proof. In text.
4. A Dynamic Model of Abatement and Geoengineering Intervention
We now study the dynamics and timing issues. The dynamic model that we propose in
this section has a steady state that coincides with the static model of the previous section,
but also has transitional dynamics towards this steady state that allow us to draw
conclusion about the effect of geoengineering on the timing of abatement and the time
profile of the optimal carbon tax.
Damages depend on the stock of GHGs which accumulates over time as long as net
emissions, 0E A− , exceed absorption ( ),S Gδ . The problem is
{ }
( ) ( ) ( )( ),
0
min , t
A GC A M G D S G e dtρ
∞−+ +∫ (DOF)
Subject to
( )0 ,S E A S Gδ= − − given S(0) = S0 (DRC)
Baseline emissions, denoted by 0E , are exogenously given and assumed to be constant
over time for simplicity (but it is straight forward to allow for asymptotically constant
baseline emissions). Notice that now the variables are functions of time; however, we do
not make explicit reference to time dependence to avoid notation clutter.
19
4.1. Geoengineering and abatement interaction
Using the maximum principle to solve for the optimal behavior of this dynamic system,
we find the following conditions:
( )AC A τ= (MAC)
( ) ( ) ( ), ,G G GD S G S G M Gτδ− + = (OG)
( )( ) ( ), ,S SS G D S Gτ δ ρ τ= + − (MDD)
where τ λ= − , and λ is the co-state variable of the CO2-stock accumulation equation
(DRC). It should be noted that the optimality conditions for the flow variables, abatement
and geoengineering, as given by equations (MAC) and (OG), are the same as in the
previous section. As a result, τ has the same interpretation of the carbon tax and social
cost of carbon, as above. The new condition is (MDD), which can be interpreted as an
arbitrage rule for the investment in a cleaner atmosphere. For a constant pollution tax,
(MDD) reduces to its counterpart in the static model, (MD), apart from the constant
discount rate. Hence, we can conclude the following:
Lemma 3 In a steady state with 0Sτ = = , the steady state of the dynamic model and the
static model coincide if ρ = 0. For constant ρ, the qualitative properties of the steady state
and the static model are the same.
Intuitively, with a zero discount rate, short run costs and long-run benefits gets equal
weights in the optimization problem so that the trade-offs occur as if the timing of costs
and benefits does not play a role, exactly like in the static model.
As a result, we can apply propositions 1 and 2 to the steady state: we find that in the
steady state, geoengineering reduces the carbon tax and abatement and has an ambiguous
effect on S (as in proposition 1) and that the tax can still be positive (but does not need to
be).
20
We analyze the dynamics of the system in three different situations. First, we have the
system in the absence of geoengineering. Second, we add geoengineering to the system at
date T1, when the economy does not foresee the arrival of geoengineering. Third, the
economy knows of the arrival at date T1 of geoengineering at a given future date T2. The
dynamics of the system are depicted in Figure 3, which is the phase diagram that directly
follows from the dynamic system. This system is saddle point stable. In the absence of
geoengineering, the saddle path leads to a steady state like “1”.
Proposition 4: Unexpected introduction of geoengineering leads to a reduction of the
short-run tax and an increasing tax after introduction. The announcement of a future
introduction of geoengineering leads to a drop in the tax rate at the time of
announcement, and to a phase of declining taxes between announcement and
introduction.
Proof. directly follows from phase diagram.
Figure 3. Dynamics of the Optimal System in the Presence of Geoengineering.
21
REFERENCES
Caldeira, K. and Wickett, M. E. "Ocean Model Predictions of Chemistry Changes from
Carbon Dioxide Emissions to the Atmosphere and Ocean." Journal of Geophysical
Research-Oceans, 2005, 110(C9).
Cao, M. K. and Woodward, F. I. "Dynamic Responses of Terrestrial Ecosystem Carbon
Cycling to Global Climate Change." Nature, 1998, 393(6682), pp. 249-52.
Cicerone, R. J. "Geoengineering: Encouraging Research and Overseeing
Implementation." Climatic Change, 2006, 77(3-4), pp. 221-26.
Crutzen, P. J. "Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution
to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?" Climatic Change, 2006, 77(3-4), pp. 211-19.
Govindasamy, B.; Thompson, S.; Duffy, P. B.; Caldeira, K. and Delire, C. "Impact of
Geoengineering Schemes on the Terrestrial Biosphere." Geophysical Research Letters,
2002, 29(22).
Keith, D. W. "Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect." Annual Review of
Energy and the Environment, 2000, 25, pp. 245-84.
King, A. W.; Post, W. M. and Wullschleger, S. D. "The Potential Response of
Terrestrial Carbon Storage to Changes in Climate and Atmospheric Co2." Climatic
Change, 1997, 35(2), pp. 199-227.
MacCracken, M. C. "Geoengineering: Worthy of Cautious Evaluation?" Climatic
Change, 2006, 77(3-4), pp. 235-43.
Matthews, H. D.; Weaver, A. J. and Meissner, K. J. "Terrestrial Carbon Cycle
Dynamics under Recent and Future Climate Change." Journal of Climate, 2005, 18(10),
pp. 1609-28.
Matthews, H. D.; and K. Caldeira, “Transient climate-carbon simulations of planetary
geoengineering,”PNAS, 104, 9949-9954, 2007.
Nordhaus, William D. and Boyer, Joseph. Roll the Dice Again. Economic Models of
Global Warming. MIT Press, 2000.
Robock, A. "Comment On "Climate Forcing by the Volcanic Eruption of Mount
Pinatubo'' by David H. Douglass and Robert S. Knox." Geophysical Research Letters,
2005, 32(20).
22
Schelling, T. C. "The Economic Diplomacy of Geoengineering." Climatic Change, 1996,
33(3), pp. 303-07.
Schneider, S. H. "Geoengineering: Could or Should We Do It?" Climatic Change, 1996,
33(3), pp. 291-302.
Wigley, T. M. L. "A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate
Stabilization." Science, 2006, 314(5798), pp. 452-54.
Wigley, T. M. L.; Ammann, C. M.; Santer, B. D. and Taylor, K. E. "Comment On
"Climate Forcing by the Volcanic Eruption of Mount Pinatubo'' by David H. Douglass
and Robert S. Knox." Geophysical Research Letters, 2005, 32(20).