Grounds by NatureOlivier Massin,

Truths and Grounds 24-29 May 2015, Ascona

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Rooting grounding in essences

• What accounts for the fact that A grounds B?

• Assumption: A grounds B because of the essence of something. All metaphysical grounding is grounded in some essence(s). The essential because is always followed by a because of essence (Mulligan, 2006).

• So A grounds B, because of the essence of what??

• Two main answers to be contrasted :

• « The nature of B » : Husserlian Grounding

• « The nature of A » : Reinachian Grounding

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Husserlian Grounding• « A content of the species [B] is founded upon a content of the species

[A], if a [B] can by its essence (i.e., in virtue of its specific nature) not exist, unless a [A] also exists. » (Husserl, LI, III, §21)

• Husserlian Grounding: (A grounds B) because B’s nature is A-involving.

• Foundational version: A grounds B because… it lies in the nature of B to be grounded in A (Fine, 2012)

• Definitional version: A grounds B =df … it is part of the nature of B that if A obtains, B obtains. (Correia, 2013)

➡ In the same way that the source of metaphysical dependence lies in the nature of the dependent object, the roots of grounding, lies in the nature of the grounded facts.

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what explains the ground-theoretic connection is something concerning the nature of the [grounded] fact […] and not of the grounding facts themselves. Thus what explains the ball’s being red or green in virtue of its being red is something about the nature of what it is for the ball to be red or green (and about the nature of disjunction in particular) and not something about the nature of what it is for the ball to be red. It is the fact to be grounded that “points” to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may ground. (Fine, 2012)

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Promises • Promises ground claims and obligations. In terms of facts:

• [a promises b to φ] grounds [a has an a obligation to φ] & [b has a claim to a’ φ-ing]

• Could it be in virtue of the nature of obligations and claims?

• Counterintuitive

• Even granting that it is in the nature of normative entities to have some natural grounds, that explanation would be too generic to capture the specificity of the grounding fact above.

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« it lies in the essence of [promising] to bring forth claim and obligation. »

(A. Reinach, The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law, 1913)

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Reinachian Grounding• Reinachian grounding: (A grounds B) because A’s

nature is B-involving.

• Foundational version: A grounds B… because its lies in A’s nature to ground B.

• Definitional version: A grounds B =df… it is part of the nature of A that if A obtains, B obtains.

➡ By contrast to Husserlian Grounding, the roots of grounding lies in the nature of the grounds, not in the nature of the grounded.

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Reinach on Grounding(1) • Grounding relata:

• « On the Theory of Negative Judgment » (1911): « only states of affairs stand in relation of ground and consequent ». Note that for Reinach, being warm, is a state of affairs.

• A priori foundation of the civil law (1913): more liberal about the grounding relata. Two mains kinds of grounding relations :

• (i) between object of a certain species: Fs grounds Gs (Reinach also uses « generate », « ‘cause’ », « produces », « give rise to » interchangeably and speaks of the « ground-consequent » relation.). The objects are temporal objects (acts, relations, obligations, claims/rights), they can be natural or normative.

• (ii) between facts and essences : « that p is grounded in the essence of  Fs»

• Grounding grounding: The relation between (i) and (ii) : ground-consequent states of affairs are –nearly always– grounded he in essence of the grounds:

• (Fs ground Gs) in virtue of the nature of Fs

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Reinach on Grounding(2) • Grounding vs. causation: causation, by contrast to grounding, is not grounded in essences:

« The coming into being of a claim or obligation needs a sufficient reason, just as the occurrence of a change in nature does. […] only in the first case is there a self-evident and necessary relation of essence between "ground" {Grund} and « consequent »{Folge}.» (15) 

•Grounding & constitution: the grounded entities are not parts or constituent of the groundings ones.

« If something is grounded with essential necessity in another, this other can never consist in the thing. » (56) (against the view that ownership is a bundle of rights.)

•Grounded entities (often) generically dependent on grounded one, but specifically independent from them. (10,16)

• Grounding claims are wordly, by contrast to conceptual. synthetic a priori (9)

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Reinachian grounding vs. superinternal grounding

• deRosset(2013): A grounds (A grounds B)

• Bennett(2011):The intrinsic nature of A grounds (A grounds B)

• Reinach(1913): The extrinsic nature of A grounds (A grounds B)

➡ Reinach, Bennett and deRosset agree that A, or its nature, is fully responsible for A grounds B.

➡ But unlike Reinach, Bennett & deRosset have to assume that A (deRosset) or the nature of A (Bennett) is not B-involving. Superinternal grounds are not essentially dependent on what they ground (were it the case, the reply to Sider, and physicalism, would be in jeopardy).

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Reinachian Grounding is horizontal

• HG associated the idea that what grounds is more fundamental that what it grounds.

• RG incompatible with this idea. For what is more fundamental: promises or the obligations they ground?

• Promises, to the extent that they ground/essentialy generate obligations.

• Obligations, to the extent that they figure in the nature of promises.

• Yet no violation of the asymmetry of grounding in claiming «  (promising ground obligation) because it lies in the nature of promises to ground obligations ». (Perhaps some virtus dormitiva objection lurking in the behind, which would affect HG as well).

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Other Reinachian examples of RG

2.(b’s granting to a the right to revoke his promise grounds a’s right to revoke his promise) in virtue of the nature of granting. (34,68)

3.(a’s obligation to φ, grounds a’s moral duty to fulfill this obligation) in virtue of the nature of obligations. (45)

4.(a’s owning a thing grounds a’s absolute right to behave as he likes with it) in virtue of the nature of ownership. (56)

5.(a’s having created a thing grounds a’s ownership of that thing) in virtue of the nature of creation. (73)

6.(a’s enacting a norm grounds the existence of that norm) in virtue of the nature of enactments. (110)

7.(b’s submitting to a grounds a’s power to enact norms holding for b) in virtue of the nature of submitting. (111)

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Other non-Reinachian examples of RG

8. (laws of nature ground the holding of the corresponding regularities) in virtue of the nature of laws.

« it lies in the nature of (strong) lawhood that when a law holds, the corresponding regularity holds in virtue of that law. » (Rosen, 2010, 131)

9. (a’s being acted on by a force ground a’s acceleration) in virtue of the nature of forces.

10. (volitions ground the the obtaining of their content) in virtue of the nature of volitions

« volition is a species of mental act which is by its very nature (normally) causally efficacious with respect to its own intentional content. » (Lowe, 1996, 157)

12. (actions ground their product/result –by contrast to their consequences) in virtue of the nature of actions. (Twardowski, 1999?; Von Wright, 1963?)

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RG not metaphysical because normative/natural?

• Objection: promises ground obligations, property ground absolute rights: =normative grounding (and normative necessitation).

• Answer:

• Yes, to the extent that we move from the natural to the normative.

• No, if normative grounding (& necessitation) is meant to be non-metaphysical: these grounding connections stems from the nature of grounds. (likewise, the corresponding necessitations are metaphysical not normative, Mulligan, 2009).

• Objection: forces ground accelerations: natural grounding (and natural necessitation)?

• Same answer, mutatis mutandis.

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RG not metaphysical because contingent?

• Objection. Some forces do not generate acceleration; some promises do not generate claims & obligation; some property do not generates rights.

• Two (compatible) answers to be found in Reinach:

• the grounded entities are pro tanto (moral duties can « outweight » the obligation grounded in promises »41)

• property grounds absolute pro tanto rights on things (which can combine with e.g. moral rights.)

• forces ground component accelerations, which have yet to sum up.

• grounding holds only ceteris paribus: « We can in general distinguish two kinds of essential laws: those which hold under all circumstances, and those which hold only if certain definite factors are absent. »(113)

• property grounds absolute rights on things only if these rights are not transferred or granted to someone else.

• forces grounds accelerations only if no other forces counteract them (in absence of other forces).

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A grounds B

Reinachian Grounding Husserlian Grounding

promises<obligation property<rights

net forces<accelerations

Socrates<{Socrates} p<pvq

red<colored

The nature of A bears responsibility for the grounding

The nature of B bears responsibility for the grounding

A is essentially dependent on B B is essentially dependent on A

A has an extrinsic nature: essentially grounds B

B has an extrinsic nature: is essentially grounded in A

forwards backwards

generative non-generative

horizontal vertical

one-many many-one

active passive17

Grounding pluralism• Are Husserlian and Reinachian grounding rival conception of

grounding in general, or do they account for different species of grounding?

• Quick case for grounding pluralism:

• that promising grounds getting obligation cannot plausibly be grounded in the nature of obligation; but is plausibly grounded in the nature promising.

• that promising grounds promising or dancing, cannot plausible be grounded in the nature of promising, but is plausibly grounded in the nature or promising or dancing.

➡ We need both, and perhaps others.

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Conclusion: Some upshots

1.failing to notice that grounds might be so by nature might lead to erroneously diagnose some grounding claims to be non-metaphysical (promises grounds obligation, forces grounds accelerations).

2.Reinachian Grounding might preclude some analysis of grounding: that a owns b is not a disjunctive part of the fact that a has rights on b. (Correia & Skiles, ms)

3.Two ways of distinguishing kinds of grounding relations: through the kinds of their relation; through the kinds of their grounds.

4.Other possible kinds of metaphysical grounding:

• (A grounds B) grounded in the nature of A, B, and of ground. (Rosen, 2010; Dasgupta, forthcoming)

• (A grounds B) grounded in the nature of C (Rabinowicz & Rasmussen, 2000)

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References• Bennett K., (2011) “By Our Bootstraps”, Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):27-41, 2011. • Correia, F., (2013) « Metaphysical grounds and essence », in M.Hoeltje, B.Schnieder and A.Steinberg (eds),

Varieties of Dependence, Philosophia, München, pp. 271–296. • Correia, F & Skiles, A., ms.,, « Identity Generalized ». • Dasgupta, S., « The possibility of physicalism », Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming • deRosset, Louis, “Grounding Explanations”, Philosophers' Imprint 13 (7), 2013. • Fine, K. (2002). The Varieties of Necessity. Conceivability and Possibility, 253--281. • Fine, K. (2012). « Guide to ground ». Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality, 37-80. • Fine, K. ms, « Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground », on academia.edu. • Lowe, E. J. (1996). Subjects of experience. Cambridge University Press. • Mulligan, K. (2009). Value. In R. Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal, \& R. Cameron (Eds.), The Routledge

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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100(1), 33-51. • Reinach, A. (1983). The apriori foundations of the civil law. Aletheia, 3, 1-142. • Reinach, A. (1982). « On the Theory of the Negative Judgment. » Parts and Moments–Studies in Logic and

Formal Ontology, Philosophia Verlag, München, 315-377. • Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. \emph{Modality: Metaphysics, logic,

and epistemology,} 109-136. • Twardowski, K. (1999). On actions, products and other topics in philosophy. Rodopi.

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