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Asian Journal of Communication

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How to play the game of intellectual propertyrights in China: the impact of party affiliation andmedia location on the use of media frames

Jing Liu & Zhengyu Yao

To cite this article: Jing Liu & Zhengyu Yao (2015) How to play the game of intellectual propertyrights in China: the impact of party affiliation and media location on the use of media frames,Asian Journal of Communication, 25:4, 371-392, DOI: 10.1080/01292986.2014.968593

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2014.968593

Published online: 10 Dec 2014.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

How to play the game of intellectual property rights in China:the impact of party affiliation and media location on

the use of media frames

Jing Liu* and Zhengyu Yao

Department of Media and Communication, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

(Received 17 July 2013; accepted 18 September 2014)

This paper explores the dynamic between media and social-political forces through acontent analysis of Chinese media coverage of intellectual property rights (IPRs) sinceChina’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. We examined how mediaattributes, such as party affiliation and media location, have influenced the use ofmedia frames. Three media frames were extracted from previous studies: (1) nationalinterest; (2) cost and benefit; and (3) legal/contractual. Our results demonstrate thatboth media attributes exert significant influence on the use of media frames in IPRscoverage: the closer a news organization is affiliated with the Chinese CommunistParty, the more likely it would adopt a national interest frame. Moreover, nationalpress and party newspapers are more likely to adopt the national interest frame incovering IPRs-related issues; whereas, regional/popular and professional press aremore likely to report the IPRs-related issues from economic and legal perspectives.

Keywords: content analysis; journalism; globalization studies; newspaper; framing

Since the reform and opening-up in 1978, the Chinese economy has undergonesignificant changes from a central planning system, in which private commerce andownership of private property were not allowed, to a highly commercialized economicsystem, in which the widened gap between the rich and poor has become a major socialconcern. Such a dramatic social and political transition within the larger context ofglobalization has made contentious trade issues, such as intellectual property rights(IPRs), highly sensitive and contextualized topics in China.

On the one hand, increases in trade and business economic activities, bothinternational and domestic, would naturally lead to the need for the protection of privateproperty, including intellectual property (IP). On the other hand, the core value in IPRsseems to contradict the socialist ideologies held, at least openly, by the ChineseCommunist Party (CCP). IPRs-related issues have also been highly politicized by theChinese Government as matters of conflicting national interest in the context ofglobalization. On one hand, the pressure on China to adopt strict IPRs protection stan-dards has been seen as an effort to restrict China’s economic development by developedcountries, while on the other as an effective tool to strengthen China’s role in the globaltrade system.

*Corresponding author. Email: echocityu86@gmail.com

Asian Journal of Communication, 2015Vol. 25, No. 4, 371–392, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2014.968593

© 2014 AMIC/SCI-NTU

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Parallel to the shifts in social and economic systems, China’s media system has beentransformed. A relatively more diverse media landscape has emerged in terms of content,products and orientation. While the media outlets generally remain under the strict controlof the central government, many media organizations, particularly regional ones, havebeen increasingly facing pressure from market demands. For instance, national newsoutlets, such as People’s Daily and CCTV, are closely tied to the central government andthe CCP, while many regional presses are becoming more market-oriented. Complex anddynamic interactions between changes in the media system and the social-economicconditions provide a unique opportunity to examine public discourse surrounding issuesrelated to IPRs. This paper aims to explore the recurring patterns in covering IPRs byanalyzing related news articles published in 10 major newspapers in China since 2001,after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). The influence of mediaattributes, including party affiliation and media location, on the use of media frames ofIPRs news are the particular focuses of this study.

The development and debates on IPRs protection

Conceptualizing IP

According to the official website of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),IP refers to ‘creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works, and symbols,names, images, and designs used in commerce’.1 The coinage of the term ‘IP’ aims toprotect the authorship of intangible knowledge and facilitates the commercial use ofknowledge. Promoted by the globalization of neoliberalism since 1990s, protecting IP astangible rights ‘laid foundations for expanding markets for new technologies andinformation economy’ (Maskus, 2000, pp. 184–185).

Generally, IPRs are divided into two categories: (1) industrial property, includinginventions (patents), trademarks, industrial designs and geographic indications of source;and (2) copyright, including literary and artistic works, such as novels, poems and plays,films, musical works, artistic works, i.e., drawings, paintings, photographs and sculpturesand architectural designs.

Development of the global IPRs system and the integration of China

In 1989, Washington Consensus was reached among a group of Washington-basedinstitutions (i.e., the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank and the USTreasury Department). As the most far-reaching neoliberal economic policies that haveshaped the global politic-economic structure (Harvey, 2007), Washington Consensusproposed legal security for property rights for the first stage policy reform.

First signed in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) expandedits scope of IPRs in the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round. Later, the accelerated globalizationprocess prompted a regime shift from WIPO to GATT, and then to Trade-related Aspectsof Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in the global trade system (Krasner, 1982). As afounding component of the WTO,2 TRIPs enhanced the substantive rules in thepreexisting agreements within WIPO, included them in a single treaty that imposed acomprehensive set of IPRs standards. The obligation to abide by the rules of IPRs ‘wasextended to the entire WTO membership, including many developing states whose

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previous commitment to IPRs protection was nonexistent or, at best, equivocal’ (Helfer,2004, p. 23).

TRIPs contained detailed and comprehensive rules and are linked to the WTO’s hard-edged dispute settlement system, in which treaty bargains are enforced throughmandatory adjudication backed up by the threat of retaliatory sanctions. For IPRsowners, TRIPs promised substantial enforcement rights within national legal systems,requiring states to adopt extensive changes to domestic judicial and administrativesystems. For states dissatisfied by the weak IPRs protection in their WTO fellowcountries, TRIPs promised high levels of treaty adherence through two institutions: theCouncil for TRIPs and the Dispute Settlement Body. Faced with the robust review andenforcement of IPRs rules, WTO members devoted significant time and resources totranspose TRIPs commitments into their national legal systems, and so was China.Having been increasingly integrated into the global trade system, China3 obtained GATTobserver status in 1984 and applied to restore its GATT contracting party status in 1986,after which it has made great efforts to gain access to the WTO.

In 1979, China and the USA signed the Agreement on Trade Relations (PRC-US,7 July 1979:31 UST 4652), calling for the reciprocal protection of copyrights, patents andtrademarks. In 1980, China joined the WIPO, after which China singed various IPRs-related treaties4. Meanwhile, a number of efforts have been made to improve IPRsprotection domestically. In August 1996, China issued Regulations on Certification andProtection of Famous Trademarks, confirming the laws with the agreement on TRIPs andthe new WIPO treaties. To facilitate research and training, China IP Training Center wasestablished in Beijing in January, 1997.

Finally, after 15 years of efforts, China joined WTO as its 143rd member in 2001.

Debates on IPRs protection among developed and underdeveloped countries

TRIPs triggered intense debates on globalization and inequality, in which IPRs havealways been at the forefront. These debates revealed the inherent tensions amongdeveloped and underdeveloped countries.

Underdeveloped countries see TRIPs more as an interventionist agenda than as acompromise; while developed countries tend to equate it with democracy ‘for the purposeof promoting dominant ideologies befitting of their political agendas’ (Goeddertz, Kraidy,Artz, & Kamalipour, 2003, p. 86). Proponents defend IPRs protection as part of a WTOpackage deal, in which underdeveloped countries receive freer access to the markets ofdeveloped nations in exchange for their agreement to protect the IPRs of foreign nations.According to this rationale, governments importing IPRs products agree to suffer thewelfare losses engendered by strict IP protection in exchange for the immediate benefitsfrom other WTO agreements (Maskus, 2000). In home countries of firms that produce thevast bulk of internationally marketable technologies and goods (e.g., the USA, Japan anda few countries in Western Europe), policy-makers are interested in strong globalprotection and argue that a firm regime would facilitate considerable growth andinnovation for these countries. In underdeveloped countries that must import technologiesor products, it is worried that a strengthened system of IPRs protection would raise thecosts of medicines and critical agricultural inputs, therefore reducing their access to newinformation products (Hickman, 2012).

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Specifically, a host of prominent international economists (e.g., Bhagwati, 2001;Stiglitz, 2002) continuously questioned the role of TRIPs in the WTO system. Deere(2009) considered TRIPs implementation as a complex political game in which theeconomic and social stakes were high while the playing field was deeply unequal. TRIPswere conceived largely to protect IPRs exporters, its implementation frequently imposedburdens on developing nations that struggled to reform IPRs laws, administration andenforcement extensively, as they have to face mounting pressures from developedcountries to adopt even higher IPRs standards than what TRIPs required and to ‘abstainfrom using the flexibilities available in the Agreement’ (2009, p. 1). Chang (2007)described the introduction of IPRs protection laws in accordance with TRIPs as‘irrelevant or unsuitable’ and argued that TRIPs may ignore the diversity of nationalneeds and force developing countries to sacrifice the ‘policy space’ that richer countriesharnessed in the early stage of their growth.

Moreover, scholars noted other costs (e.g., health, human rights) in implementing theglobal IPRs protection system in underdeveloped countries. For instance, Juma (1999)observed that conventions on IPRs protection limited developing countries to developlocal technology and innovation, thus further hindering them from promoting publicinterest goals, such as health, nutrition and environmental conservation. Oloka-Onyangoand Udagama (2001) asserted that IPRs protection undermined human rights objectives inunderdeveloped countries. While Helfer (2004) noted that TRIPs brought aboutconflicts including:

impediments to the transfer of … the consequences for the enjoyment of plant variety rightsand the patenting of genetically modified organisms; ‘bio-piracy’ and the reduction ofcommunities; control over their own genetic and natural resources and cultural values; andrestrictions on access to patented pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment ofhealth right. (2004, p. 49)

Tensions on IPRs protection in China

Since China’s economy took off in the 1990s, trade conflicts were frequently accompaniedby IPRs-related disputes. During this process, two forces have constantly competed witheach other: (1) the international pressures to impose profound reform of the Chinese IPRsprotection laws through the fulfillment of the obligations that came with the accession tointernational IPRs protection conventions; and (2) the changing political-economic statusin China that demands revision of Chinese IPRs protection laws to meet changing needs.

Currently, China’s policy on IPRs protection and its enforcement faced some veryChina-specific challenges from its political, economic, cultural and ideological pursuits(Wechsler, 2008). China is clearly a fast developing country transitioning from a plannedeconomy system, based on public ownership, to a market economy system, in which theprotection of private property rights is crucial. On one hand, China pursues industrialinnovations/more value-laden industries and the development of its legal system;whereas, on the other hand, it has to protect local or nation-owned enterprises fromforeign competitors and manage to minimize the cost of IPRs protection.

Although the IPRs protection system has improved greatly in China with the effortsof education and implementation, it is fairly weak and has to be constantly rejuvenated byexternal ‘pushes’, such as ‘the threat of trade sanctions and Section 301 investigation’(Yu, 2000, p. 166). In January 2009, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body released a panel

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report on China, Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of IP Rights,concerning the inadequacy of protection and the enforcement of IPRs in China under theTRIPs. In that conference, Yu (2011) noted that infringement was facilitated by China’sdecentralized manufacturing and retailing structure, as well as a judicial system that is nottransparent enough.

As stated in the 2000 National Trade Estimate Report, ‘today, China has improved itslegal framework – and it has virtually shut down the illegal production and export ofpirated music and video CDs and CD-ROMS. Indeed, today it is an importer of suchproducts from third countries’.5 However, although the rate of software piracy has keptdecreasing for years, it has been reported that $7.8 billion of unlicensed software wasused in China in 2010, and that 78% of all software used in China is unlicensed,according to the Business Software Alliance’s report6. Even according to a report7

released by an agency entrusted by the State Intellectual Property Office of China, thegeneral rate of software piracy in China in 2010 is 41%. The problem of software piracyis still prevalent.

Media coverage of IPRs in China

As the foremost expression of social debates, news media play an important role incovering IPRs and reflect the tensions among various social forces. Before we examinehow Chinese media frame IPRs, we shall first understand the political economy thatstructures news production in China.

Media–politics relationship in China

Generally, two competing and intertwining forces structure news production in China:party control and market drive; the media has to serve them both.

Since the economic reform and opening-up in 1978, Chinese media has experiencedseveral waves of challenges coming from market forces. After the 14th Party Congress in1992, the CCP started to reduce government subsidies and staff members, as well as therestructuration of the whole culture sector as a policy goal (Brady, 2008); the market-ization and conglomeration progress accelerated among Chinese media. Under theprinciple of ‘public institution managed in an enterprise-style’, Chinese media has to earnits living through market competition, while still perform political tasks as the partyorgan. Therefore, various types of newspapers have been developed as subsidiaries ofparty newspapers, such as professional (e.g., business, entertainment, fashion) news-papers, evening newspapers, metropolitan newspapers, etc., to meet the market needs. In1996, the Guangzhou Daily Newspaper Group was founded as the first media group inChina, with its party newspaper (Guangzhou Daily) and subsidiary paper (SouthernMetropolis Daily) becoming leaders both in the fields of public opinion and profitability.

Generally, newspapers in China can be differentiated as: (1) professional vs. compre-hensive; (2) national vs. regional; and (3) party vs. popular. Comprehensive newspaperscover almost all news topics, instead of one with which the general public is concerned;whereas, professional newspapers refer to newspapers that focus on specific topics inwhich only a specific group of people would be interested. Party newspapers targetreaders working in government offices or public institutions, while the popularnewspapers target those concerned more about the vital interests in their daily life, rather

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than the party line or national interests. Professional newspapers mostly target thenational market in order to maximize its audience size; whereas, the popular press ismostly regional, and focuses on local interests and trends.

Although 30 years of marketization has moved China’s media beyond pure monism,the Chinese press is still a public enterprise controlled by the State Administration ofPress, Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People’s Republic of China8 and itsboss, CCP’s Central Publicity Department (CPD)9. The media has been transformed fromcommand mouthpieces to profit-making propaganda units. Party ideology is now beingexpressed through the marketized media, whereas the media’s profit-making privilege ispredicated on fulfilling its political functions. Lee, He, and Huang (2006) refer to thesemedia as the ‘Party Publicity Inc.’, which wear a socialist face with a capitalist body.Furthermore, political control is uncertain in China, due to the in-transparency of China’spolitical system. As Hassid (2008) argued that the increasing economic liberalization ofthe Chinese media has not resulted in proportional political liberalization, noting that asonly CPD has the arbitrary power to determine – post hoc – what is appropriate mediacoverage. It is hard to know the extent to which power is shared among the CPD andlocal or provincial propaganda departments; thus, the political control of Chinese media isactually a ‘regime of uncertainty’.

While Lee, He, and Huang (2007) developed the term ‘party-market corporatism’ toaccount for the party–market–media relationship in China, noting media clientelism isone of the three major patterns of party-market corporatism (such as in Shanghai andShenzhen), in contrast with Guangzhou (the second prototype of party-market corporat-ism, which is driven by market competition within the party-state ideological limits) andBeijing (the third prototype of party-market corporatism: ‘managed diversity’ through aprecarious balance of the emerging interest politics among counterbalancing powerbases). Here the term ‘clientelism’ is drawn from Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002),referring to the kind of media–politics in which social resources are controlled by patronsand delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various kinds of support. As amatter of fact, media clientelism is a national phenomenon in China, which is particularlydominant in Shanghai owing to a critical lack of power plurality and market competition.Political control of Chinese media has been worked out through patron–client relations,which ‘place the primary emphasis on propaganda, defying the market logic of newscompetition and commercial profitability’ (Lee et al., 2007, p. 21). Nothing altered thefact that CCP remains, ultimately, the paramount patron in China. Although the aims ofmarket drive and political concerns are not always hostile to each other, they neverthelesslead to an emphasis on different aspects (frames) when covering IPRs, as intensifiedmarket pressure may sometimes defy the political logic as well.

Framing IPRs in the Chinese media

Frames, according to Goffman (1974), help audiences to ‘locate, perceive, identify andlabel’ (1974, p. 21) the flow of information around them. As a set of ‘interpretativepackages’ (Wolfsfeld, 1997), frames ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and makethem more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particularproblem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recom-mendation for the item described’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

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Based on the elaborations of tensions on IPRs protection in China and the media–politics relationship of Chinese media, we developed three media frames of IPRs, whichare theoretically inspired by Yu (2006a). Yu (2006a) described four different narratives ofTRIPs in China: (1) the bargain narrative considers TRIPs as the product of acompromise between developed and less developed countries, although the bargainingpower between them was far from equal; (2) the coercion narrative considers TRIPs as anunfair trade document that developed countries imposed upon their less developedcounterparts without consideration of their goals and interests; (3) the ignorance narrative,which portrayed less developed countries as those did not understand the importance andconsequences of IPRs protection during TRIPs negotiations; and (4) the self-interestnarrative takes a pro-development prospective and posited that the less developedcountries agreed to strict IPRs protection because they found it in their self-interest.

In the context of Chinese media, three frames of IPRs have been developed: thenational interest frame, the cost and benefit frame and the legal/contractual frame.

National interest frame

Corresponding to the coercion narrative of TRIPs in Yu (2006a), the national interestframe refers to the national perspective that considers IPRs in the context of internationalcompetition, concerning the political, economic, cultural, ideological and symbolicinterests of one nation. For example, news concerns: (1) the country’s politic-economy,such as sovereignty autonomy, economic prosperity, etc.; (2) the country’s internationalimage, honor and other symbolic interests; (3) the country’s international status in theglobal politic-economic system; and (4) the country’s cultural interests, such as culturalheritage, traditions, diversity, etc.

For instance, news described IPRs as crucial for ‘establishing high-tech industrieswhich should be highly competitive in the world’ and ‘leading to a prosperous China’10,or that ‘the IPRs of traditional Chinese medicine has started the new war between aconsiderable number of foreign companies which tried to seize the market and Chinesecompanies which tried to defend their own rights’.11

Although IPRs disputes occurred mostly in trade conflicts, it can be a political issuewhen associated with the political sovereignty, national interests, national culture, etc.Actually, as discussed previously, the establishment and expansion of internationalconventions on IPRs protection are exactly achieved through struggle and negotiationsamong different countries. For example, the USA repeatedly threatened China in the1990s with a series of economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of Most FavoredNation status and opposition to entry into the WTO, ‘such threats eventually led tocompromises by the Chinese government and the signing of IP agreements in 1992, 1995,and 1996’ (Yu, 2000, p. 133). However, these economic sanctions not only led to China’scountersanctions (starting the trade war), but also stirred up the adoption of a nationalinterest frame among Chinese media when covering IP news, especially in the party-affiliated media outlets.

Many wonder whether the USA took China as a convenient scapegoat for its largetrade deficit for years. Cynical observers even frame IPRs as a political attempt by theWest to interfere with China’s sovereignty and blatantly infringe on its national interests,which has been particularly justified when the USA singled out China among the manyother countries that infringed on US IPRs. To these observers, ‘Americans are disguising

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a political dispute as a trade dispute and are bringing unfair trade pressure to bear in orderto undermine China’s political system’ (Overholt, 1993, p. 384); such a use of tradepressure not only interferes with China’s sovereignty, but also violates the principles ofcustomary international law. Realizing the importance of unhampered influx ofknowledge to national development and the huge cost of importing patented pharmaceu-ticals and high-tech machines, China stressed its national interest on IPRs-related issuesspecifically in the domains of education and public health.

Further, in an authoritarian state with intensive censorship on information flow, IPRsprotection in China was, and still is, closely related by ideological controls. The ChineseGovernment is concerned about the threats posed by the proliferation of pirated mediaproducts infused with Western ideologies on its political regime and the value system ofits people. Meanwhile, the piracy business generates so much economic activity in Chinathat a strict IPRs protection of such activities would have an immediate and direct adverseeffect on the Chinese domestic economy. Furthermore, some market forces would alsopromote knowledge piracy as an issue of diffusion of information and profits rather thanan ideological problem. For instance, it has been argued that China deliberately delayedeffective IPRs enforcement in order to ‘allow for the maximum knowledge diffusionthrough piracy’ (Ross, 1996, p. 19).

Legal/contractual frame

Corresponding mostly to the self-interest and bargain narratives of TRIPs in Yu (2006a),the legal/contractual frame emphasizes the legal dimension of IPRs protection, i.e.,regardless of the embedded economic or moral concerns in IPRs, since it has beenlegitimized by the laws or international conventions/agreements, it should be followed,and any kind of violation should be punished. For example, it concerns: (1) IPRsprotection as an obligation that must be fulfilled; (2) IPRs as legitimized by the law,policy and government regulations, etc.; (3) IPRs as a right that should be exercised bycompanies (e.g., IPRs applications and registrations of independent innovations andnational brands.); and (4) IPRs protection should be enforced by penalizing those whoconducted IPRs infringement/crime, including illicit trade, piracy, plagiarism, forgery ofmarks, as well as counterfeit (clone) products.

Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the most urgent challenge it has beenfacing is the amendment and enforcement of IP protection policies, as most of thelegislation on IPRs was finished before 1993.12 Chinese Government’s amendments ofthe IPRs system in the last decade ‘were necessitated by China’s rapidly-changing localconditions, such as the emergence of the socialist market economy, the growingconstituency of domestic rights holders, and the need for economic stimulus to accelerateChina’s modernization efforts’ (Yu, 2006b, p. 914).

Therefore, the legal/contractual frame provides an analysis of IPRs laws and legalcases, and makes specific recommendations for policies and regulations. For instance,there is news stating that ‘according to the rules of WTO and the practical needs in China,we should develop comprehensive laws for IPRs protection’,13 or that ‘counterfeitproducts which violated the IPRs of others, should be detected and cracked down, inorder to build a regulated market order’.14

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Cost and benefit frame

Corresponding weakly to the self-interest narrative on TRIPs in Yu (2006a), the cost andbenefit frame is actually based on the very basic rational reasoning of human beings,focusing on the economic and social consequences of IPRs. For example, the newsconcerns: (1) economic losses and gains, especially in the material dimension (e.g., costof importation, foreign investment and barriers to exports); (2) pros and cons of IPRsprotection for local industries’ future, in consideration of international competitivenessand industrial prospects in the global market; (3) the pros and cons of IPRs for the freeinflux of knowledge and information; and (4) the costs and benefits that one has to payand receive for IPRs development.

The cost and benefit frame has mostly been observed in economic news media, whichanalyzes IPRs news in terms of their pros and cons (e.g., money required for IPRsimplementation, penalties for IPRs infringement, time and population influenced bycertain IPRs programs), rather than other dimensions. For instance, news stated that ‘withmore innovative IPRs, our products can make more added values’15, or that ‘Chinesefarmers will face the pressures brought by the increasing cost of the seeds if we don’thave our own IPRs’.16

There are consistent tensions between the tough reality of unequal economicdevelopment among different regions in China and its desire to build an adequate systemof IPRs protection and more value-added industries. Actually, weighing the pros andcons of IPRs protection in China is exactly based on the cost and benefit frame. Thecreation of the IPRs protection system has been criticized as ‘transplantation’ (Chow,2003) of Western legal concepts in China, which has led to tensions and resistance inthe acceptance and implementation of those laws, which is complicated due to thecontradictions between China’s desire to be integrated into the global system and the needfor self-protection when facing economic pressures from foreign countries. Problems alsoexist in the enforcement of IPRs laws at the grassroots level, including ‘localprotectionism and corruption, reluctance or inability on the part of enforcement officialsto impose deterrent level penalties, and a low number of criminal prosecutions’ (Yu,2000, p. 152), as knowledge piracy is still an effective way for companies inunderdeveloped regions to gain a competitive edge in the market. Supporting a positiverelationship between IPRs and development, Maskus, Dougherty, and Mertha (1998)recognized three problems in relation to the Chinese market: (1) the limitation ofincentives to develop products and brands due to inadequate enforcement; (2) thestructural difficulties in commercializing the results of inventions; and (3) the insuffi-ciency of stronger IPRs alone to establish effective conditions for further technologicaland economic development.

Kong (2008) described the Chinese approach to building a legal system for IPRs withthe term ‘gradualism’ to capture the process of adapting the IPRs protection standards tothe level of economic development and enforcement. Along with the transformation ofindustry structure and the rapid growth of domestic IPRs holders, China reached a turningpoint at which it found ‘stronger IP protection in its self-interests’ (Yu, 2007, p. 220). TheChinese Government started to recognize the value of IPRs protection in benefitingindustrial development in both the domestic and international market, and the urgency topursue a more value-laden and ‘pro-innovation’ (Wechsler, 2008) economic paradigm.

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Impact of party affiliation and media location on the use of IP frames

Before we compare the use of these media frames within different media groups, we posea general research question: To what extent is the media framing of IPRs in Chinesenewspapers affected by the national, economic and legal concerns discussed above?

The use of media frames in IPRs coverage is expected to be influenced by twofactors, which we termed as media attributes: party affiliation and media location.

Influence of party affiliation on the use of media frames of IPRs

Party affiliation refers to the degree of closeness that the press is tied to the party. Thecloser the press is affiliated with the party, the closer it is expected to follow the partyideology, and the less it would be exposed to the free market. In our sample, partyaffiliation was constructed as a ordinal variable with a three-point scale: (1) national partypress, which refers to newspapers that are directly supervised by the Central Committeeof the CCP, including People’s Daily and Global Times; (2) regional party press, whichrefers to newspapers that are supervised by the Provincial Committee of the CommunistParty of China, including Beijing Daily, Southern Daily and Wen Hui Bao; and (3)regional popular newspapers, which refer to three regional metropolitan newspapers,including Southern Metropolis Daily, Beijing Youth Daily and Xinmin Evening News.Two professional newspapers are selected as the baseline model.

Specifically, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H1a: newspapers with a stronger party affiliation will be more likely to adopt a nationalinterest frame in reporting IPRs-related issues;

H1b: newspapers with a stronger party affiliation will be less likely to adopt the cost andbenefit frame in reporting IPRs-related issues;

H1c: newspapers with a stronger party affiliation will be less likely to adopt the legal/contractual frame in reporting IPRs-related issues.

As interest conflicts between the nation and regions are inevitable, consideringthe very unequal development among different regions in China, we expect that there aredifferences in the use of media frames between national and regional media. Thus, wepredict:

H2a: compared with regional presses, the national interest frame will more likely be used inarticles published by national presses;

H2b: compared with regional presses, the cost and benefit frame will less likely be used inarticles published by national presses;

H2c: compared with regional presses, the legal/contractual frame will less likely be used inarticles published by national presses.

Influence of media location on the use of media frames of IPRs

Due to the complexity of Chinese media’s organizational affiliation and its relationshipwith the party, the typology of media location here is not a referential analysis. We need

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to rely on qualitative analysis of the politic-media nexus in China to show how the mediadiscourse is structurally influenced by the distance from the political epicenter. It isnotable that media location refers both to the physical location of the media company andthe location of its targeted audience. The newspapers at the national level are composedof newspapers with two constraining forces. For example, the People’s Daily and GlobalTimes are affiliated with the People’s Daily Press Group, directly supervised by theCentral Committee of CCP; whereas, the Intellectual Property News is issued by the StateIntellectual Property Office, the 21st Century Business Herald is affiliated with SouthernMedia group in Guangzhou, which is the vanguard of media marketization and takes ananalytical and critical approach to the power structure.

Further, variance of use of frames in covering IPRs is expected to occur within thenational and regional level. We compared the differences in the use of media frames ofIPRs between party and professional press on the national level; while within the regionallevel, we compared the difference among newspapers in three typical cities: Beijing,Shanghai and Guangzhou, each representing a different media-politics pattern in China.

The choice of press in the three most developed cities in China is made according tothe following two concerns.

First, compared with press in economically less vigorous cities, press (or the public)in these three cities will pay more attention to IPRs-related news. According to China’sPorts of Entry Yearbook from 2001 to 201017, the import and export value in GuangDong province is the highest in China, occupying over 30% of the total; Shanghai takessecond place, accounting for over 23% of the total per year; while it is much less inBeijing, taking around 3% of the total per year. These data indicated Guangzhou enjoysthe most economic rigor, while Beijing the least.

Second, media location concerns not only the distance from the epicenter of powerand market drive, but also the specific media–politics relationship. Given the geographicdistance from the epicenter of power (the central government), press in the most distantcity has been hypothesized to be least submissive to the party control; whereas, press inBeijing, the capital of China, is hypothesized to be the most submissive. In this sense,Guangzhou press enjoys the most economic rigor and least political constraints; Beijingpress is under the closest political control and with least economic rigor in terms ofexportation; while Shanghai press lies in the middle of the two.

However, the influence of political geographic distance is moderated by economicconcerns and specific media–politics relationship in which each newspaper operates. Forinstance, Shanghai, the most developed city in China, has a more timid media systemthan its sibling cities, such as Beijing and Guangzhou. As Lee et al. (2007, p. 21)observed, ‘by comparison, more media groups in Beijing compete for a smaller pool ofadvertising revenue. Professional respectability of the Shanghai media is not commen-surate with their coveted financial wealth’, Shanghai is ‘a resource-rich city governed byone layer of power authority, hence the distance from the epicenter of power to variousmedia organizations is so short and direct as to make media control through clientelismvery effective and powerful’. While Beijing’s media ecology represents a model of‘managed diversity’ arising from relative heterogeneity of power bases, Guangzhou’smedia offers contending perspectives, within limits, through intense market competitionand role differentiation (Lee et al., 2007).

In contrast with media submission in Shanghai marked by political silence andeconomic prosperity through clientelism, the first prototype of party-market corporatism,

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Guangzhou represents a second prototype of party-market corporatism that is driven bymarket competition within the party-state ideological limits. Guangzhou is China’s mostcompetitive press market, where three major press groups – despite their differentadministrative rank – join fierce battles, pursue overlapping goals and develop separatecontent or marketing strategies. For instance, Guangzhou Daily, though a city-leveloutlet, is China’s first press group and top revenue earner, with considerable mass appealof daily-life relevance (Cao, 1999, pp. 110–138).

Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekend, two maverick subsidiaries ofSouthern Daily, have been at the national forefront of investigative reporting, exposingofficial wrongdoing and advocating liberal ideas, often incurring the wrath of officials inBeijing and elsewhere and resulting in frequent replacement of senior editors. Latham(2000) noted the proliferation of contending ideologies in Guangzhou as evidence ofincreasing fragility and fragmentation of official ideology. However, his description istotally inapplicable to Shanghai. Furthermore, a survey (Pan & Chan, 2003) shows thatolder and more orthodox Chinese journalists prefer Shanghai’s politics-weary XinminEvening News; whereas, younger and reform-minded journalists looked up to SouthernWeekend for inspiration.

Beijing represents a third prototype of party-market corporatism: ‘managed diversity’through a precarious balance of the emerging interest politics among counterbalancingpower bases. As the capital city of China, Beijing has been posited not only as thepolitical center, but also the economic and cultural center. In Beijing, various mediaoutlets are hierarchically and rigidly structured in parallel to national, ministerial andmunicipal levels of administrative authorities, all competing for power and markets onbehalf of their patrons and constituencies. In addition to the vertical administrativestructure, media under various ministries, departments or functional bodies (e.g., theCommunist Youth League) are subservient to different lines of command. They alsocompete horizontally. For instance, there emerged two leaders in the popular newspapermarket: Beijing Youth Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Youth League ofChina, is the first for-profit newspaper in China. Its weekly supplement, Freezing Point,was well known for its outspokenness and critical thinking. Moreover, The Beijing News,a local metropolitan newspaper co-found by Guangming Daily Newspaper Group andSouthern Daily Newspaper Group in 2003, became a pioneer in investigative reporting18

with most of its editorial staff from Southern Daily and Southern Metropolis Daily.Thus, within the regional press, we expect that Shanghai has a more politically timid

media than the other two cities, with Beijing occupying second place, and Guangzhoubeing the most liberal. Hypotheses are proposed as follows:

H3a: within the national level, the national interest frame is more likely to be used in theparty press rather than the professional press;

H3b: within the national level, the cost and benefit frame is more likely to be used in theprofessional press rather than the party press;

H3c: within the national level, the legal/contractual frame is more likely to be used in theprofessional press rather than the party press;

H4a: within the regional level, the national interest frame is most likely to be used in theShanghai press;

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H4b: within the regional level, the national interest frame is least likely to be used in theGuangzhou press;

H4c: within the regional level, the cost and benefit frame is most likely to be used in theGuangzhou press;

H4d: within the regional level, the legal/contractual frame is most likely to be used in theGuangzhou press.

Methods

A sample composite that compares professional economic newspapers with comprehens-ive newspapers has been built up. News articles from the following 10 newspapers during2001–2010 have been selected to compose a sample for the content analysis: People’sDaily, Global Times, Beijing Daily, Beijing Youth Daily, Wen Hui Bao, Xin Min EveningNews, Southern Daily, Southern Metropolis Daily, China Intellectual Property News and21st Century Business Herald each representing a typical press in certain region andmedia type. As a baseline model, two professional newspapers, China IntellectualProperty News and 21st Century Business Herald have been selected for comparison withthe comprehensive newspapers.

Within the 10 newspapers, a total of 45,636 news articles were identified with akeyword search (‘IPRs’) in the Wise Search database, with time span controlled from2001 to 2010. Based on this population, stratified sampling has been conducted withinthe 10 newspapers, with 100 articles selected from each (10 for each newspaper per year).Therefore, a total of 900 articles (with 100 pieces missing) were selected to represent thecoverage of IPRs in the 10 newspapers. Despite the considerably small sample size (2%of the population), it is considered to be adequate, as the main purpose of the paper is tocompare the use of media frames of IPRs across just two categories, i.e., party affiliationand media location.

Three frames are developed based on the literature on discourse of IP: nationalinterest, cost and benefit and legal/contractual; 12 indicators are developed, as listed inthe coding scheme. Two steps are set up to measure the degree of the media framesimposed on the topic of IPRs. First, coders are asked whether the article contains any ofthree frames below. If no, the content will be coded as 0; if yes, the coder was asked toselect from 1 to 7 to specify how strong the frame was as they perceive. 1 means not atall, 7 means very much. At least four questions were developed for each frame. Twocoders were trained to answer the 12 questions on a seven-point scale to measure thedegree of visibility of each item in the news stories. The inter-coder reliability, conductedon a sub sample of 50 news stories for each of the 12 framing questions, was in arelatively acceptable level in Scott’s Pi (.74).

A maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax rotation on the 12 indicators isconducted to investigate the latent factors, which yield a factor solution in which the 12indicators clustered into three distinguishable frames: national interest, cost and benefitand legal/contractual. The three factors, which together explained 85.0% variance of theindicators (KMO = .834), are presented in Table 1.

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Results

To address the general research question, i.e., how often these different media framesare used, a descriptive analysis has been conducted. The result revealed that 83.9% of theoverall sample has used at least one of the three media frames that we proposed, with thenational interest frame used in 54.7% of the total, the cost and benefit frame used in55.2% and the legal/contractual frame used in 51.7%.

A three-level General Linear Model (GLM) analysis was performed to examine thedifference in the use of media frame across different types of media coming fromdifferent regions.

On the first level, we generally compared the mean difference between national pressand the regional press; on the second level, we divided the sample into four groups of

Table 1. Varimax-rotated factor solution for the 12 framing indicators.

Factors

NationalInterestframe

Legal/contractual

frame

Cost andbenefitframe

F1a Suggestion of concern onthe national politic-economy such as sovereignty autonomy, economicprosperity.

.807 –.439 –.276

F1b Suggestion of concern onthe country’s nationalimage such as national honor and other symbolicinterests.

.785 –.476 –.278

F1c Suggestion of concern on the country’sinternational status in the global politic-economicsystem.

.822 –.417 –.269

F1d Suggestion of concern onthe country’s culturalinterests such as cultural heritage, traditions,diversity, etc.

.726 –.396 –.281

F2a Suggestion of concern on the economic lossesand gains, especially in the material dimension.

.303 –.143 .769

F2b Suggestion of concern on the pros and cons ofIPRs protection for local industries’ future.

.431 –.314 .796

F2c Suggestion of concern on the pros and cons ofIPRs for the free influx of knowledge andinformation.

.403 –.280 .801

F2d Suggestion of concern on the costs and benefitsthat one has to pay and get for IPRs development.

.351 –.171 .771

F3a Suggestion of concerning IPRs as a treaty/obligation that must to be fulfilled.

.504 .836 .028

F3b Suggestion of concerning IPRs is legitimized bythe law, policy and government regulations, etc.

.498 .825 –.003

F3c Suggestion of concerning IPRs is a right thatshould be exercised by the corporate.

.483 .728 .075

F3d Suggestion of concern on the IPRs enforcementcases such as penalties on IP infringement or crime.

.434 .765 .015

Note: Extraction method: maximum likelihood; three factors extracted; six iterations required.

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newspapers by their levels of closeness to the political center, and then examined thedifferences in the use of media frames across the four layers of media groups to see howdistance from the power center affects the use of media frames of IPRs.

Furthermore, as almost all professional dailies in China are circulated throughout thecountry, almost all popular presses are distributed regionally, thus, regional professionalpress and national popular press are left blank in the sample. Therefore, the third-levelanalysis contrasts party press with professional press at the national press layer to see theimpact of media type on the use of media frames of IPRs, and contrasts party press withpopular press at the regional press layer to see the difference in the use of media frames ofIPRs across different regions, particularly Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.

Use of media frames across different media types and locations

An univariate GLM on each of the three frames with media group as a between-storyfactor is conducted, which shows a significant main effect of media location on the use ofnational interest frame, F(1,898) = 22.822, p < .001, g2p = .025, while the impact on thecost and benefit frame and legal/contractual frame was not significant.

As demonstrated in Table 2, the national interest frame occurs higher in nationalpress, with the mean value of 2.76, higher than that in the regional press; thus, hypothesis2a, that ‘compared with regional presses, a national interest frame will more likely beused in articles published by national presses’, is well supported. The cost and benefitframe and legal/contractual frame are observed to higher in the regional press, with meanvalues of 2.60 and 2.58, respectively. Thus, hypothesis 2b, that ‘compared with regionalpresses, the cost and benefit frame will less likely be used in articles published bynational presses’ and hypothesis 2c, that ‘compared with regional presses, the legal/contractual frame will less likely be used in articles published by national presses’, areboth sustained. As there are fewer than three groups in the media, a post-hoc pair-wisetest with Bonferroni adjustment was performed to test the significance of the meandifference between the two groups.

An univariate GLM on each of the three frames with media group as a between-storyfactor is conducted, which shows a significant main effect of location and type on the useof national interest frame, F(3,896) = 19.993, p < .001, g2p = .063; whereas, for the othertwo frames, the effect was not significant. As shown in Table 3, the post-hoc pair-wisetests with Bonferroni adjustment revealed that the national interest frame in the nationalparty press differed significantly from all other four types of press at p < .001 with themean value of 3.32. Moreover, the post-hoc test showed that the lowest value nationalinterest frame occurred in the popular press with the mean value of 2.17, significantlydifferent from that in the party press at p < .001. Thus, hypothesis 1a, that ‘newspaperwith a stronger party affiliation will be more likely to adopt a national interest frame in

Table 2. Mean degree of media frames in national and regional press, 2001–2010.

Media group National interest frame Cost and benefit frame Legal/contractual frame N

National press 2.76 (1.84) 2.52 (1.81) 2.45 (1.89) 320Regional press 2.19 (1.62) 2.60 (1.87) 2.58 (1.88) 580Total 2.40 (1.72) 2.57 (1.85) 2.53 (1.86) 900

Note: Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.

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reporting IPRs-related issues’, was well supported. The cost and benefit frame occurredhighest in the regional party press with the mean value of 2.61, while the legal/contractualframe also occurred highest in the regional party press at the mean value of 2.76. Thedifference of these two frames in the other press types was not significant. Therefore,hypothesis 1b and 1c are not well supported.

An univariate GLM on the three frames with media group as a between-story factor wasconducted, which showed a significant main effect of location and type on the use of mediaframes. The specific statistical indicators are: for the national interest frame, F(4,895) =17.419, p < .001, g2p = .072; for the cost and benefit frame, (4,895) = 5.517, p < .001,g2p = .024; and for the legal/contractual frame, F(4,895) = 40.182, p < .001, g2p = .152.

As shown in Table 4, the national interest frame in national party press differssignificantly from all other four types of press at p < .001, the highest value of whichoccurred in the national party press with a mean value of 3.32 and the lowest occurred inthe Beijing press at the mean value of 2.00. Thus, hypothesis 3a, that ‘within the nationallevel, party press concerns more about the national interest frame than the professionalpress’, is supported. Within the regional layer; hypothesis 4b, that Guangzhou press,which enjoys the most freedom and is least concerned about the national interest frame, isnot supported. It has been observed that the highest value of the national interest frameoccurred in the Shanghai press at the mean value of 2.50, which is significantly differentfrom the Beijing press at p < .05. This demonstrated that Shanghai has a quite political

Table 3. Mean degree of media frames in press with different party affiliation, 2001–2010.

Media groupNational interest

frameCost and benefit

frameLegal/contractual

frame N

National professionalpress

2.20*** (1.60) 2.55 (1.85) 2.55 (1.82) 160

National party press 3.32*** (1.89) 2.49 (1.78) 2.34 (1.96) 160Regional party press 2.22*** (1.66) 2.61 (1.87) 2.76 (1.93) 290Regional popular press 2.17*** (1.59) 2.60 (1.88) 2.40 (1.81) 290Total 2.40 (1.72) 2.57 (1.85) 2.53 (1.89) 900

Note: Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.***p < .001.

Table 4. Mean degree of media frames in press across different types and regions, 2001–2010.

Media groupNational interest

frameCost and benefit

frameLegal/contractual

frame N

National Party press 3.32*** (1.89) 2.49 (1.78) 2.34 (1.96) 160National professionalpress

2.20*** (1.60) 2.55 (1.85) 2.55 (1.82) 160

Beijing press 2.00*** (1.49) 2.14*** (1.45) 1.70*** (1.29) 200Shanghai press 2.50* (1.75) 2.69* (1.83) 2.19*** (1.59) 180Guangzhou press 2.12*** (1.60) 2.98*** (2.17) 3.80*** (1.99) 200Total 2.40 (1.72) 2.57 (1.85) 2.53 (1.89) 900

Note: Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.***p < .001; *p < .05.

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timid press compared with its sibling cities. Hypothesis 4a, that ‘within the regional level,national interest frame are most likely to be used in Shanghai press’, is well supported.

The cost and benefit frame occurred most in the Guangzhou press at the mean valueof 2.98, differing significantly from that in the Beijing press at p < .001, but notsignificantly from the Shanghai press. Thus, hypothesis 4c, that ‘within the regional level,the cost and benefit frame is most likely to be used in the Guangzhou press’, is wellsupported. Within the national level, the difference in the mean value of the professionalpress and party press is not significant, although the professional press is concerned morewith the cost and benefit frame at the mean value of 2.55. Therefore, hypothesis 3b is notwell supported.

As for the legal/contractual frame, within the regional layer, the highest valueoccurred in the Guangzhou press at the mean value of 3.80, differing significantly fromall other types of press at p < .001; the lowest value of the legal/contractual frameoccurred in the Beijing press at the mean value of 1.70, differing significantly from theGuangzhou press at p < .001. Within the national layer, the mean value of the legal/contractual frame in the professional press is significantly higher than that in the partypress with the mean value of 2.55 at p < .01. Thus, both hypothesis 3c, that ‘within thenational level, legal/contractual frame is more likely to be used in the professional pressrather than the party press’, and hypothesis 4d ‘within the regional level, legal/contractualframe is most likely to be used in Guangzhou press’ are well supported.

Change of the use of media frames of IPRs from 2001 to 2010

We further delineated a trend line of the change of the uses of three media frames acrossboth the national press and regional press from 2001 to 2010. As demonstrated inFigure 1, the national interest frame reached its peak at 3.05 in 2006, the same year thatthe peak of the legal/contractual frame was reached at 3.00. Thereafter, the two linesdeclined steadily until 2010. The cost and benefit frame reaches its peak value of 3.07 in2003, thereafter declined until 2008.

Figure 2 shows the rise of the national interest frame in the national party press since2001, reaching its peak value of 4.55 in 2005 and then declining; whereas, its peak value inthe national professional press is 2.912 in 2007 and then declines sharply to 1.6 in 2010.Within the regional level, the degree of the national interest frame in the Shanghai press has

1.501.701.902.102.302.502.702.903.103.303.50

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

National interest frame

Cost and benefit frame

Legal/contractual frame

Figure 1. Change of the mean of media frames of IPRs in Chinese press, 2001–2010.

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been consistently higher than the other two regional presses (an exception occurred in 2006and 2010), reaching its peak value of 2.95 in 2006 and then declining, which confirms thenotion that Shanghai has a more politically timid press than its sibling cities.

Figure 3 reveals the changing trajectory of the mean degree of the cost the benefitframe across the five media types from 2001 to 2010, in which the cost and benefit framein the Guangzhou press surged from 2001 at 2.99 to 2003 at 4.68. After that, it declined;whereas, in the national professional press, it rose steadily to 4.14 in 2007, and thendeclined.

Figure 4 demonstrates the changes in the mean value of the legal/contractual frame, inwhich we can see that in the Guangzhou press, the legal/contractual frame is generallyhigher than any other type of press, with the peak value of 4.21 occurring in 2008. On theother hand, that in the national professional press rose from 1.68 in 2001 to the peakvalue of 4.13 in 2009. It is noticeable that the drastic reduction in 2010 may have resultedfrom the missing data of China Intellectual Property News in both 2009 and 2010.

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

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3.50

4.00

4.50

5.00

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Na�onal party press

Na�onal professional press

Beijing press

Shanghai press

Guangzhou press

Figure 2. Change of the mean of national interest frame across five media types, 2001–2010.

0.00

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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Na�onal party press

Na�onal professional press

Beijing press

Shanghai Press

Guangzhou press

Figure 3. Change of the mean of cost and benefit frame across five media types, 2001–2010.

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Discussion

The paper outlines the use of three different media frames – national interest, cost andbenefit and legal/contractual – in newspapers with different party affiliations andlocations across the last 10 years in China, exploring how media with differentpolitical-economic constraints cover IPRs-related issues, whether they focus theeconomic aspects or legal aspects of IPRs, or regard it as a political issue.

The study finds that the national interest frame is a recurring theme that continuouslyplays a salient role in media discourse, especially in the party press, indicating that thecloser a media outlet is affiliated with the party, the more likely it is to be concerned withthe political aspect of IPRs. Moreover, the national interest frame was observed to occurfrequently in the Shanghai press within the regional press, confirming that Shanghai has amore politically-timid press that is not commensurate with its economic rigor. The legal/contractual frame, cost and benefit frame are mostly observed in the Guangzhou presswithin the regional level, indicating that media located in cities with more economic rigortend to focus more on legal aspects. Their occurrence in the professional press within thenational level is higher than that in the national party press, although the difference is notsignificant. This indicates that all newspapers targeting a nationwide audience are tightlyconstrained by the political center. These findings have implications for both tradepractices and research on the political-economic nexus in which Chinese media operate.

The limitations of the study mainly lie in the following dimensions:First, the missing value and the time span of the data. As there are considerable data

missing in newspapers in Shanghai in 2001 and national party press in 2009 and 2010,the result may be partially influenced, especially in the historical comparison by year.Moreover, as China transited from trade deficit to trade surplus in the early 1990s, thecomparison may be more meaningful if we construct a 30-year sample. However, theWise Search database is the most comprehensive Chinese news database so far that wecan access, which provides news from almost all media outlets since 1998.

Second, the selection of regional newspapers in the sample cannot reflect the impactof unequal development on the regional level on the use of media frames of IPRs, as allof the three cities selected are first-tier cities leading regional, and even national,economy. However, the regional disparities in economic development, as the most

0.00

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3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

National party press

National professional press

Beijing press

Shanghai press

Guangzhou press

Figure 4. Change of the mean of legal/contractual frame across five media types, 2001–2010.

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debatable consequence of Deng Xiaoping’s policy, in which ‘some regions have beenpositively encouraged to become wealthy before others’ (Goodman, 1994), deserves moreacademic attention. Further studies may compare the use of media frames of IPRs in thesethree cities with those from certain underdeveloped cities (e.g., coastal city press vs.inland city press) to see the influence of regional disparities in terms of wealth andincome on the use of media frames of IPRs.

Third, more detailed coding is needed to capture the attitudinal change within thethree frames. The study just partly explored the reasons for the declining use of thenational interest frame in both the national and regional press in mid-to-late 2000s in thechange of the state’s attitude toward IPRs protection in regard to national interest: frompassive conformity to TRIPs in which IPRs protection was seen as an effort of thedeveloped countries to restrict China’s economic development, to active promotion ofIPRs protection and using it as policy tool to protect national interest, marked by therelease of National Intellectual Property Strategy19 by the State Council in 2008.However, as we did not code the attitudinal orientation within the national interest frame,this cannot fully explain the declining use of the national interest frame, or the decline inboth the legal/contractual frame and cost and benefit frame at the same time.

Fourth, the study design. The study concerned the influence of two media factors, i.e.,party affiliation and media location, upon the use of media frames of IPRs. More extra-media factors, such as trade surplus, number of IPRs registration or number of IPRs lawcases can be included to form a hierarchical model to examine factors that influence theuse of media frames of IPRs. However, due to the mismatch of the unit of analysisbetween these extra-media data (accessible data are year-based) and media frame (article-based), the hierarchical model has not been proposed in this paper, and could be adirection for future studies.

Notes1. See definitions of ‘IP’ in the WIPO website: http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/, WIPO is

established in 1970.2. WTO has 159 registered country members till now.3. As one of the first few contractors of GATT, China has been separated into two political

entities since 1949: (1) the Republic of China (ROC), dominated by the Kuomintang (KMT)party, which later transformed into a democratic society; and (2) the People’s Republic ofChina (PRC), controlled by the CCP. After 22 years of denial of recognition by the UnitedNations, on 25 October 1971, PRC was recognized as ‘the only legitimate representative ofChina to the United Nations’, while Taiwan representatives were expelled ‘from the placewhich they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations’ (United Nations General AssemblySession 26 Resolution 2758). For simplicity, we still use China to refer to PRC only, whilereferring to ROC as Taiwan.

4. In 1982 China promulgated a new trademark law and in 1984 a new patent law. Further, Chinajoined the Paris Convention in 1985, the Washington Treaty in 1994, the Berne Conventionand the Universal Copyright Convention in 1992, the Geneva Phonograms Convention in 1993and the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1994.

5. Office of United States Trade Representative, 2000 National Trade Estimate Report on ForeignTrade Barriers, 2000.

6. Business Software Alliance and International Data Corp., Eighth Annual BSA Global Software2010 Piracy Study, May 2011.

7. Chinalabs, Report of China’s Software Piracy Rate in 2010, May 2011.8. On 14 March 14 2013, two departments, the General Administration of Press and Publications

and the State Administration of Radio Film and Television, merged into the State

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Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People’s Republic ofChina.

9. Media ownership, even after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, has remained exclusivelyin the hands of the Party and off limits to private or foreign capital.

10. See ‘肩負民族的希望──中國科學院國家知識創新工程試點紀實’, People’s Daily, 8 January2001, page 4.

11. See ‘土洋中藥競爭的關鍵在於知識產權’, Beijing Youth Daily, 27 January 2005.12. The most recent law on IP is the Regulations for the Protection of Computer Software

promulgated in 2002.13. See ‘李鵬在全國人大常委會第十九次法制講座上強調完善有中國特色的知識產權法律制

度’, People’s Daily, 1 March 2001, page 4.14. See ‘韓正市長作的政府工作報告（摘要）’, Wen Hui Bao, 13 January 2004, page 5.15. See ‘冷靜看待高新技術產品出口增長’, People’s Daily, 1 February 2002, page 5.16. See ‘轉基因水稻：威脅糧食安全？’, Beijing Youth Daily, 9 March 2009, C04.17. The data is extracted from the official website of the China Association of Port of Entry,

Accessible data include 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008.18. Since 1 September, 2011, The Beijing News has been supervised by Beijing Municipal

Publicity Department.19. See the document, URL: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-06/10/content_1012269.htm.

Notes on contributors

Dr Jing Liu is currently a post-doctoral fellow in Department of Media and Commun-ication, City University of Hong Kong.

Dr Zhengyu Yao is an associate professor in Department of Media and Communication,City University of Hong Kong.

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