Intergroup Friendship, the Far Right and Attitudes Towards Immigration and Islam

Intergroup Friendship, the Far Right and Attitudes toward

Immigration and Islam

David Cutts, Matthew Goodwin, Miles Hewstone and Simon Lolliot1

Abstract. Direct cross-group friendships have been widely found to

not only diminish prejudice but induce greater empathy, promote

tolerance, enable members of majority groups to feel at ease with

minorities as well as providing a gateway to wider cross-group

networks. Put simply, as the quality of cross-group friendships

increases, so does its prejudice-reducing effects. But do these

relationships exist among those with more extreme or less tolerant

views, such as supporters of parties on the extreme right of the

political spectrum? Using a unique sample of self-identified

supporters of three distinct types of right-wing groups, we examined

whether direct cross-group friendships with immigrants reduce

prejudice towards immigrants and Islam and whether diversity beliefs

mediate this relationship. Our findings provide further evidence

that building direct cross-group friendships is a highly effective

tool in reducing prejudice towards both immigrants and Islam, among

all three right-wing groups. While there were similar reductions

among those supporting radical and extreme right parties, counter-

Jihad movements experienced the largest decline in prejudicial

attitudes.

1 David Cutts, University of Bath. Matthew Goodwin, University of Kent, Miles Hewstone, University of Oxford. Simon Lolliot, University of British Columbia. The corresponding author for this version is Prof. Matthew Goodwin [email protected]

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It is well established that intergroup contact, especially direct

cross-group friendships, can have substantial positive effects on

reducing prejudice toward a wide range of ethnic, religious and

other outgroups. Numerous studies show that individuals who report

having direct cross-group friendships are less intolerant than those

who lack these relationships. But to what extent does this hold true

among supporters of right-wing parties and social movements that

across Western states continue to attract significant support by

overtly campaigning against migrants, ethnic minorities and,

increasingly, Islam? Our research builds on and expands the existing

psychological literature by investigating the effects of direct

cross-group friendships with members of ethnic minorities among

supporters of radical and extreme right-wing groups on their

attitudes toward immigrants and Islam. Based on a unique sample of

self-identified supporters of three distinct types of right-wing

groups, we contribute to this literature by undertaking a far

tougher test for intergroup contact theory than the traditional

reliance upon undergraduate samples with relatively mild attitudes.

To date, few studies examined these relationships and their

effects among ‘real world’ and self-identified supporters of right-

wing groups, and none have been able to compare the impact of cross-

group friendship among members of distinctive groups across the

right-wing political spectrum. Among these supporters, we explore

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whether and how this more substantive form of intergroup contact

does indeed reduce prejudice towards outgroups, and specifically

whether any impact of cross-group friendships on prejudice reduction

is mediated via so-called diversity beliefs, namely belief in the

perceived benefits of diversity for enriching economic and cultural

life (Tropp & Bianchi, 2006), which can function as individual-level

beliefs and also, when aggregated, social norms (Christ et al.,

2014). We explore whether these effects differ according to three

distinct types of supporters, who variously endorse the populist

radical right, extreme right-wing, and the so-called counter-Jihad

movement that exclusively campaigns against Islam. This

differentiation augments the existing literature by simultaneously

enabling us to disentangle the effects of cross-group friendships on

different types of movements that espouse prejudice. We contribute

to the extant literature by investigating whether contact is not

only a viable technique for reducing intergroup animosity among

general populations, but also for more highly-prejudiced people who

actively support movements that oppose to multiculturalism and

rising diversity.

Intergroup Contact and Friendships

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In social psychology, a large literature consistently stresses the

ability of intergroup contact to reduce prejudice towards out-groups

(Brown & Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Around six decades

of research lends impressive support to Allport’s (1954) contact

hypothesis—intergroup contact, especially under the conditions of

equal status, cooperative work towards a common goal, and authority

support will reduce prejudice. We now know that cross-group contact

affects a multitude of outcomes (i.e., not just prejudice) towards a

variety of out-groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Cross-group contact

is especially effective at reducing prejudice by lowering intergroup

anxiety and increasing empathy (for meta-analytic support, see

Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008), and by fostering a common group identity

that transcends original group boundaries (Brown & Hewstone 2005;

Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Not all forms of intergroup contact are

the same, however. Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-analysis of

over 500 intergroup contact studies found that as the quality of

contact increased, so did its ability to reduce prejudice, thus

highlighting the importance of contact quality over contact

quantity.

Cross-group friendships are regarded as a more substantive form

of interaction, as they denote sustained positive contact across

different social contexts that incorporate most of Allport’s

original facilitating conditions (Pettigrew, 1997). Since the

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reformulation of the ‘contact hypothesis’ (Pettigrew et al., 2011),

this literature has focused heavily on the perceived power of direct

cross-group friendship as a powerful conduit for maximizing the

beneficial effects on attitudes. Friendships are believed not only

to encourage prejudice reduction (Davies et al. 2011) but induce

greater understanding and empathy, enhance tolerance, trust, mutual

respect and cooperation (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Turner, Hewstone, &

Voci, 2007). Davies et al. (2011), in their meta-analytic review of

cross-group friendships and prejudice, replicated Pettigrew and

Tropp’s (2006) finding that as the quality of the cross-group

friendship increased, so did its prejudice-reducing effects. Their

meta-analysis, using a larger data base and including several

longitudinal studies, also confirmed that cross-group friendships

can have wider effects by providing a gateway to cross-group

networks (Pettigrew et al., 2007), or encouraging further contact

(Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, and Tropp, 2008).

The positive contact–lower prejudice relationship has been

found to be significant even after accounting for selection bias,

and existing evidence suggests that the contact-prejudice path is

stronger than the reverse path from prejudice to contact (Pettigrew

& Tropp, 2006). Moreover, these contact effects have been found to

hold over time (Van Laar et al, 2005) even when the possibility of

participant selection has been removed, and hardly vary across

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countries where intergroup contact research has been conducted

(Pettigrew et al., 2011). They also generalize to the entire groups

involved, new situations, and even to out groups not initially

engaged in the original contact situation (Lolliot, et al., 2013;

Pettigrew et al, 2011). Studies even show how indirect contact –

simply having in-group friends who have out-group friends – can

weaken prejudice (Wright et al. 1997; for a review see Vezzali et

al., 2014). This is of great significance to those individuals in

more segregated locations, with no (possibility for) out-group

contact, as such indirect influences may act as a mechanism

preparing these individuals for later contact (Christ et al., 2010;

Pettigrew et al, 2011).

Since its inception, intergroup contact has proved effective

at reducing prejudice towards a host of outgroups, including groups

based on racial and ethnic distinctions, sexual orientation,

physically and mentally disabled, and the elderly (Pettigrew &

Tropp, 2006). A few studies have looked at the relationship between

intergroup contact and attitudes towards Muslims. These provide a

demanding test of the contact hypothesis, given that prejudice and

discrimination against Muslims has increased dramatically in the

last decade (Halliday, 1999) and they suffer worse discrimination

than members of other religious (Pew Forum on Religion and Public

Life, 2009) or immigrants (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). For instance,

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Pettigrew et al. (2007), basing their findings on a probability

sample of German respondents aged 16 or older, found that contact

with foreigners as friends and good acquaintances was significantly

correlated with lower Muslim-prejudice. They also found that

respondents who had friends that had foreigners as friends (i.e.,

extended contact, Wright et al., 1997), also reported less Muslim

prejudice than those who did not. Pettigrew (2009), using data from

two national probability telephone surveys, reported that contact

with foreigners was significantly negatively correlated with

prejudice towards Muslims. Savelkoul et al. (2011), using a Dutch

sample survey from the Social and Cultural Developments in the

Netherlands survey, found that contact with ethnic minorities as

colleagues was associated with less Muslim antipathy. Finally,

Hewstone and Schmid (2014), in a neighbourhood-level analysis of a

random sample of English respondents, tested both direct and

indirect (via intergroup contact) effects of diversity on outgroup

orientations toward Muslims. They found that individuals living in

more ethnically diverse areas - regardless of whether they are White

British members of the majority or non-Muslim members of ethnic

minorities - had more positive contact with Muslims, with positive

consequences for intergroup relations with Muslims.

Thus, research has investigated and confirmed the effect of

intergroup contact, especially cross-group friendships, on anti-

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Muslim sentiment. These studies, however, investigated the effects

of contact on anti-Muslim prejudice amongst the general population.

A stricter test of contact theory would be to see if it still has

prejudice-reducing effects for samples that are overtly prejudiced.

Intergroup Friendship and Supporters of Prejudiced Groups

To what extent, if at all, do intergroup friendships improve

attitudes among people who belong to openly intolerant political

movements? As Hodson (2011) summarised, early contributors to

intergroup contact theory were initially pessimistic about the

potential for contact to benefit ideologically-oriented, intolerant

and highly-prejudiced persons, whether because these strongly

‘negative’ personalities would overshadow the positive benefits of

contact, or that more highly prejudiced people would inflame

prejudices in face-to-face contact settings, or such bigots would

avoid opportunities for intergroup contact (Allport 1954; Amir

1969). However, building on more recent work (Dhont & Van Hiel 2009;

Hodson, Harry & Mitchell 2009), Hodson (2011) argued that there is

strong reason to anticipate positive contact effects among the

highly prejudiced because contact diminishes anxiety and enhances

empathy, while simultaneously increasing inclusion-of-other-in-the-

self (“psychological closeness”). Indeed, based on a review of nine

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studies, Hodson (2011) concluded that respondents high on prejudice-

related individual difference variables clearly benefitted from

increased contact quantity and from positive contact experiences in

eight of the nine studies, whereas individuals who were equivalently

high in intolerant ideologies but who did not experience the same

level and contact quality (i.e., fewer friendships) held more

negative attitudes toward out-groups. Other studies also note how

cross-group friendships can be forged among highly prejudiced

people, who in some cases exhibit significantly less out-group bias

as a linear function of the number of direct and indirect

friendships with members of an out-group (Hodson et al., 2013).

While most of these tests have been performed using self-reported

and explicit measures of intolerance, Page-Gould et al. (2008)

showed that cross-group friendships had a stronger effect at

reducing cortisol activity—a physiological measure of anxiety—during

cross-group interactions for individuals who scored high on implicit

measure of prejudice relative to those less implicitly prejudiced.

In a related study of imagined, rather than actual, intergroup

contact, one study has also found that right-wing authoritarians

show less negative emotions toward out-groups and are more willing

to engage with out-groups after imagined positive contact (Asbrock,

Gutenbrunner & Wagner 2013).

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Much of the research investigating the beneficial effects of

intergroup contact has primarily focused on student or adult samples

(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) in relatively benign settings (Hewstone et

al, 2014). While a growing body of research has started to

investigate the effects of intergroup contact in settings that are

still characterised by conflict (Maoz, 2004) or with groups who have

recently emerged from protracted conflict (Hewstone et al., 2014),

these studies are in the minority. While the research reported above

finds stronger prejudice-reducing effects of intergroup contact for

prejudiced individuals, they were also conducted on samples drawn

from the general population. Hodson’s (2008) study represents one of

the few, if not the only, investigations into the effectiveness of

contact with an atypical sample. He utilized a group of White Class

B and C inmates (i.e., inmates that are moderate risk to public

safety; 40% of the sample in Study 1 reported having committed a

violent crime) at one small (Study 1) and one large (Study 2) UK

prison. Hodson asked white inmates about their contact with and

attitudes towards Black inmates; he also obtained Social Dominance

Orientation (SDO) scores for the inmates (SDO assesses people’s

desire to promote intergroup hierarchies, and for their in-groups to

dominate their out-groups; see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In Study 1,

Hodson found that contact with Black inmates was associated with

reduced intergroup bias, even after controlling for SDO. He also

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found that the contact-intergroup bias relationship was significant

only for inmates high in SDO and not for those low in SDO. This

study is one of the only studies to our knowledge that tests contact

as a means of prejudice reduction in an atypical sample. The

research we present here investigates whether cross-group friendship

is associated with a reduction in prejudice towards immigrants and

Muslims amongst three samples that are overtly prejudiced, namely,

members of the (a) English Defence League, (b) British National

Party, and (c) the UK Independence Party.

Right-Wing Movements and Islam

Exploring the effects of cross-group friendships on supporters of

right-wing political groups is particularly intriguing given recent

developments. Across Europe, the rise and continued success of

populist radical right political parties has been one of the most

noticeable developments in recent years. There has emerged a new

consensus among political scientists that the defining features of

the populist radical right are a combination of (at least) nativism,

authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007). The populist radical

right is often hostile to Islam but this intolerance is part of a

broader exclusionary platform that encompasses opposition to

multiculturalism and rapid social change, including the arrival of

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migrants, asylum-seekers, and religious minority groups, of which

Muslims are only one, and often sexual minorities (Betz & Johnson

2004; Rydgren 2008). For example, Zúquete (2008) notes how such

parties infused their existing discourse with anti-Muslim prejudice,

with ‘opposition to visions of a Muslim takeover’ leading them to

often stress Christian identity themes and embrace pro-Jewish and

pro-Israel positions. Influenced by politicians like Pim Fortuyn and

Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Mayer (2013: 163) observes how

parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Front frame their supporters

as ‘the defenders of equality, liberty and tolerance against their

main enemy, Islam, described as a religion of fanaticism and

intolerance, incompatible with democratic values and Western

culture’. However, while some political scientists have sought to

explore the role of intergroup contact on electoral support for

populist radical right parties, very few, if any studies have been

able to systematically investigate the effects of cross-group

friendships on self-identified supporters of these parties.

Yet the populist radical right has not been the only movement

to target public anxieties over rising ethnic and religious

diversity. Two other types of movements also campaign on these

issues. Further along the spectrum are traditional extreme right-wing

political parties, such as Golden Dawn in Greece and the National

Democratic Party of Germany that are often rooted in overtly neo-

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Nazi or neo-fascist currents. Unlike the populist radical right, the

extreme right is defined by its adherence to so-called ‘classical’

or ‘biological’ racism, its complete rejection of human equality and

hostile stance toward liberal democracy (Carter, 2005). Meanwhile,

since 2009 several states have also witnessed the rise of more

explicitly anti-Islam social movements, which are single-issue in

focus. Unlike the populist radical right and the extreme right,

these so-called counter-Jihad movements like the ‘defence leagues’

shunned electoral politics in favour of confrontational

demonstrations and marches against the perceived ‘Islamification’ of

Western states (Goodwin, 2013). Their obsession with the single

perceived threat from Islam was reflected in one small-scale

qualitative study (Busher, 2013), which found that self-identified

counter-Jihad activists heavily emphasised the perceived threat from

‘militant Islam’, noting: ‘It is in these broader narratives that

some activists make use of concepts such as a ‘clash of

civilizations’ between Islam and the West (Huntingdon, 1993) or make

reference to ‘Eurabia’ theories (Ye’or, 2005) and the on-going

‘Islamification’ of Europe through immigration and through higher

birth rates among Europe’s Muslim populations’.

Such groups offer an interesting opportunity to test the

potential prejudice-ameliorating effects of intergroup friendship.

In Britain, these three distinct varieties of right-wing politics

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are represented by three groups. Founded in 1993, the populist radical

right UK Independence Party (UKIP) was originally a Eurosceptic party

that campaigned exclusively to end Britain’s continuing membership

of the European Union. However, since 2010 the party broadened its

ideological message to include the populist radical right’s

opposition to immigration and a populist critique of the established

parties (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). In 2010, UKIP steered closer to

overt hostility to Islam by calling for a ban on the burqa or veiled

niqab in public buildings and for deporting radical Muslim clerics,

although such policies stood alongside its broader call for a five-

year freeze on immigration and an end to the ‘active promotion of

the doctrine of multiculturalism by local and national government’

(UKIP 2010). While the party would move away from these explicitly

anti-Islam policies, in the aftermath of the ‘Charlie Hebdo attacks’

in Paris in 2015 the UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, claimed that a

‘fifth column’ was living in Britain, a reference to perceived

threats from some settled British Muslims.

The extreme right-wing British National Party (BNP) was founded in

1982, and is rooted not in Euroscepticism but an undercurrent of

neo-Nazism (Goodwin, 2011). Unlike UKIP, the BNP advocated a more

openly racist and Islamophobic programme, calling for the voluntary

repatriation of all migrants and going further in its opposition to

Islam, issuing a call to ‘outlaw all overt signs of Islamic

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colonisation such as the burka, ritual slaughter, mosques and

minarets (which are little more than symbols of territorial

conquest’ (BNP 2010). In its literature the BNP, whose leader was

charged for inciting racial hatred in 2006 after describing Islam as

‘a wicked and vicious faith’, presents the religion as being

incompatible with modern secular western democracy and as ‘one of

the most deadly threats yet to the survival of our nation’. Between

2010 and 2015 the BNP suffered a sharp decline in support although

the party continues to campaign against child sexual exploitation in

northern towns, which it traces to settled Muslim communities (BNP,

2010).

The counter-Jihad English Defence League (EDL) emerged in 2009

and in response to protests by radical Islamic extremists at a

homecoming parade for military forces returning from Iraq. Over the

next three years the mainly working-class movement became one of the

most significant counter-Jihad groups in Western states, with around

80,000 followers on Facebook and more than fifty demonstrations that

attracted between one and three thousand supporters. Such activity

sought to rally public opposition to Islam, and Islamic

institutions, and claimed that ‘Muslim gangs’ were coordinating the

sexual exploitation of young children; the EDL generally portrayed

the religion of Islam as a threat to Britain and its people. Unlike

the extreme and radical right, however, the EDL focused exclusively

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on Islam and claimed allegiance to ethnic and sexual minorities,

such as Hindus, Sikhs and LGBT groups that opposed the spread of

Islam. The EDL presented itself as a ‘human rights organization’

that wanted ‘to protect the inalienable rights of all people to

protest against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives of non-

Muslims’.1

Hypotheses

In summary, we extend previous research on intergroup contact and

prejudice by systematically examining the effects of intergroup

friendship on blatant prejudice towards immigrants and attitudes

toward Islam among a sample of self-identified supporters of radical

and extreme right-wing groups. Because we were interested

specifically in attitudes towards two outgroups targeted by right-

wing ideology, immigrants and Muslims, and to avoid shared method

variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) between

predictor (contact measure of cross-group friends) and outcomes

(prejudice towards imigrants and Islam), we used a measure of cross-

group friendships with ethnic minorities in general. Then, we

examine whether this relationship is mediated by diversity beliefs.

Lastly, we innovate further by investigating whether these effects

vary according to whether people belong to a more ‘moderate’

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populist radical right political party, a hard-line extreme right

party or an extra-parliamentary anti-Islam street movement. To

recap, our hypotheses are as follows:

1) Direct cross-group friendships with ethnic minorities will have a

significant negative direct effect on prejudice to immigrants and

attitudes to Islam. More precisely, there is an expectation that

supporters from all three groups who report cross-group

friendships will experience reductions in prejudice to Islam and

migrants.

2) Direct cross-group friendships with ethnic minorities will be

associated with more favourable beliefs regarding ethnic and

cultural diversity. More precisely, supporters from all three

groups who have cross-group friendships are significantly more

likely to view migrants as enriching the economic and cultural

life of Britain; the direct effect of diversity beliefs will in

turn be negatively associated with blatant prejudice towards

migrants and Islamic threat.

3) Direct cross-group friendships will significantly reduce blatant

prejudice towards immigrants and Islamic threat via the indirect

effect of diversity beliefs. More precisely, among supporters of

these right-wing political groups diversity beliefs will mediate

the effect between cross-group friendships and prejudice toward

immigrants and Muslims. However, we would expect the size of

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these mediated effects to differ according to whether supporters

self-identify with populist radical right, extreme right, or a

counter-jihad street movement. Our expectation is that supporters

of the more extreme neo-Nazi BNP and counter-Jihad EDL, which

have made opposition to Islam its guiding mission, who have

direct cross-group friendships, will be the most likely to report

larger reductions in overall prejudice toward minorities. In

particular, we would expect supporters of the EDL, whether as a

result of direct effects or of mediated heightened beliefs in

diversity, to report the sharpest reductions in prejudice toward

Islam.

Data and Methods

Participants

The sample was drawn from the YouGov online panel and was collected

in 2012. It consisted of N = 2152 self-identified right-wing

supporters. Of this total, 186 identified themselves as supporters

of the EDL (Mage = 45.96, SD = 16.23, 63.4% male); 626 as supporters

of the BNP (Mage = 50.71, SD = 14.67, 70.9% male); and 1340 as

supporters of UKIP (Mage = 58.97, SD = 12.92, 72% male). All analyses

were conducted in MPlus 6.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) using the

maximum likelihood estimator with robust standard errors. We used

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bootstrapping with 5000 re-samples and bias corrected confidence

intervals to test for mediation given its ability to handle skewed

data while returning accurate Type I and II error rates (Fritz &

MacKinnon, 2007). Evidence of a mediated effect is indicated by the

95% (or 99%) confidence interavals not including zero.

Measures

Respondents from the three groups completed an online YouGov survey

from which we derived the following measures to test our key

hypotheses. Intergroup contact was measured with one item.

Participants were asked, “When thinking about your friends, would

you say you have many friends, some friends, or no friends at all

among people from ethnic minority groups?” and they indicated their

answer on a three point rating scale (1 = Many, 2 = Some, 3 = No

friends). This item was reverse coded so that higher scores indicate

more friendships with people from ethnic minority groups. Two items

were used to tap diversity beliefs. On two 11-point scales ranging

from 0 (Cultural life undermined / Extremely bad for economy) to 10 (Cultural life

enriched / Extremely good for economy), participants were asked, “On a scale

of 0 to 10, would you say that Britain’s cultural life is generally

undermined or enriched by migrants” and “On a scale of 0 to 10,

would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain’s economy that

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migrants come to Britain from other countries.” These two items were

strongly and significantly correlated with each other in all three

samples (EDL r = .73, p < .001, α = .84; BNP r = .58, p < .001, α

= .73; UKIP r = .59, p < .001, α = .74).

We used four items to assess blatant prejudice towards

immigrants. On a 5-point rating scale, participants indicated the

degree to which they disagreed / agreed with the following

statements, “Immigrants should be sent back to their home country

whether or not they break the law”, “Family members of immigrants

who were born in the UK should be sent back to their country of

origin”, “Immigrants are the main cause of crime in society”, and

“Immigrants are the main source of disease in society” (1 = Strongly

Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). These four items displayed good reliability

in all three samples (EDL α = .89; BNP α = .83; UKIP α = .80).

Higher scores reflect more prejudice towards immigrants. Islamic

threat was measured using two items. On a 5-point rating scale,

participants indicated their agreement with the following two items:

“Islam does not pose a serious danger to Western civilization”

(reverse scored) and “There will be a ‘clash of civilizations’

between Islam and the West” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree).

Following re-coding of the first item, these two items correlated

significantly with each other in all three samples (EDL r = .48, p

< .001, α = .64; BNP r = .52, p < .001, α = .67; UKIP r = .49, p

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< .001, α = .65). In our full models we controlled for respondent

age, gender (-1 = Male, 1 = Female), social grade (1 = AB, 2 = C1, 3

= C2, 4 = D), and terminal age of education (1 = 15 years or under to 5

= 20+).

All participants reported having some cross-group friendships

(EDL, BNP, and UKIP Mode = 2). BNP participants scored significantly

above the scale middle with regards to their blatant prejudice

towards immigrants (M = 3.68, SD = 1.02, t(622) = 16.70, p < .001)

whereas UKIP respondents reported attitudes equal to the scale

middle (M = 3.00, SD = 0.98, t(1334) = 0.14, p > .05). EDL

participants, on the other hand, scored significantly below the

scale mid-point (M = 2.66, SD = 1.09, t(185) = -4.20, p < .001). A

between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that the

blatant prejudice scores for all three samples were significantly

different from each other, F(2, 2141) = 122.78, p < .001, partial η2

= .10. All three groups reported high levels of Islamic threat with

each sub-sample scoring significantly above the scale mid-point (BNP

M = 4.48, SD = 0.81; UKIP M = 4.37, SD = 0.80; EDL M = 3.66, SD =

1.02; all ts > 8.87, all ps < .001). A between-subjects ANOVA

indicated that all three mean Islamic threat scores were

significantly different from each other, F(2, 2141) = 72.58, p

< .001, partial η2 = .06. With regards to diversity beliefs, EDL

respondents reported the most favourable diversity beliefs, that

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were significantly above the scale mid-point (M = 5.40, SD = 2.45,

t(184) = -3.35, p = .001). Both UKIP and BNP respondents reported

diversity beliefs that were below the scale midpoint (UKIP M = 3.80,

SD = 2.11, t(1336) = -38.19, p < .001; BNP M = 2.77, SD = 2.00, t(623)

= -40.34, p < .001). A between-subjects ANOVA indicated that all

three diversity belief scores were significantly different from each

other, F(2, 2143) = 121.78, p < .001, partial η2 = .10.

Factorial Invariance of the Measurement Model

We performed a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to

assess if the factor structure of the three latent variables -

diversity beliefs, attitudes towards immigrants, and attitudes

towards Islam - was invariant between the populist radical right

party (UKIP), the extreme right-wing party (BNP) and the counter-

Jihad political movement (EDL). First, we first tested for

configural invariance (i.e., do the latent variables have the same

underlying factor structure between the two samples) for the extreme

right (UKIP; Model 1a), radical right (BNP; Model 1b), and counter-

Jihad movement (EDL; Model 1c) respondents. We then tested for

configural invariance for all samples combined (Model 2). Second, we

tested for metric invariance between the samples (see below) by

constraining the factor loadings of the respective items to equality

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(Model 3). Partial metric invariance is the minimum requirement when

wanting to compare the structural parameters between groups

(Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). If (at least) partial metric invariance

is achieved we will then test for scalar invariance (Model 4;

Meredith, 1993). This level of model equivalence tests the

tenability that the item intercepts are invariant across the two

samples (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). If (at least) partial scalar

invariance is achieved, we will then test for uniqueness invariance

(Model 5). Tests for uniqueness invariance determine whether the

explained variance for every item is the same for both groups (Model

5; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000; van de Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012).

We tested the assumptions for metric, scalar, and uniqueness

invariance in a multi-group CFA whereby we compared the chi-square

statistic for the more restrictive model to the chi-square statistic

for the less constrained model using the scaled chi-square

difference test (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). The latent variables were

scaled using the reference-group method whereby all factor loadings

were allowed to be freely estimated; the latent variance was

constrained to 1; and the latent mean was constrained to 0.

Satisfactory model fit will be taken to be indicated by a x2/df ratio

≤ 3-4; a comparative fit index (CFI) ≥ .95, a root mean square error

of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ .06; and a standardized root mean square

residual (SRMR) ≤ .08.

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We first tested to see if we could collapse across the BNP and

EDL samples given that they both represent the more extreme right

wing whereas UKIP is a more of a conventional populist radical right

party. Collapsing across the BNP and EDL samples would also give us

a more comparative sample size (combined N = 812) to the 1340 UKIP

sample. All three tests for configural invariance indicated that we

met this assumption (see Model 1a, 1b, 1c). Next, the model

constraining all factor loadings to equivalence between the BNP and

EDL samples (Model 2.1) resulted in a significant drop in model

fit, (Δx2(8) = 24.70, p = .002). We next tested to see if we could

obtain at least partial metric invariance between the two samples.

We could achieve partial metric invariance for the Islamic threat

and blatant prejudice scales, but neither of the factor loadings for

the diversity beliefs items could be successfully constrained to

equality, both Δx2(1) ≥ 5.79, both ps < .02. Further evidence

suggesting that we could not combine the two groups together comes

from the ANOVA results reported above; BNP participants reported

significantly higher levels of blatant prejudice towards immigrants

and more Islamic threat than EDL participants. Furthermore, EDL

respondents reported significantly more favourable diversity beliefs

when compared to BNP participants (Model 2.2).2

Comparing the factor loadings between the BNP and UKIP samples

resulted in a chi-square statistic that was statistically equivalent

25

to the unconstrained model, Δx2(8) = 9.10, p = .33 (Model 2.3; for

all subsequent model fit indices, see Table 3). Given that we could

satisfy metric invariance between BNP and UKIP participants, we

continued to test for scalar and uniqueness invariance between these

two samples. We also continued the multi-group analysis of the

structural relationships between these two samples. However, we will

report the structural model for the EDL sample, but because we were

not able to demonstrate metric invariance, we cannot be sure that

the questionnaire items were interpreted similarly by the BNP and

UKIP samples and thus we will not be able to confidently compare the

structural relationships for EDL respondents to BNP and UKIP

respondents.

We were not able to meet the requirement for full scalar

invariance (Model 3, Table 3), Δx2(5) = 13.55, p = .02; the intercept

for the item “Islam does not pose a serious danger to Western

civilization” was significantly larger for UKIP participants (4.55)

than it was for BNP participants (4.42), Δx2(1) = 7.46, p < .01.

Allowing this item to be freely estimated while constraining the

other intercepts to equality resulted in a model (Model 3.1) that

fit the data statistically equivalently to the metric invariance

model, Δx2(4) = 6.43, p = .17. Lastly, constraining the two groups to

uniqueness invariance (Model 4) did not result in a significant drop

in model fit when compared to the model specifying scalar

26

invariance, Δx2(8) = 6.29, p = .62. Thus, we met the assumptions for

metric, (partial) scalar, and uniqueness invariance between BNP and

UKIP supporters (see Table 4 for the unconstrained factor loadings

for each of the latent variables by sample).

Insert Table 1 about here

Results: Structural Equation Modelling and Multi-group

Comparisons

We tested for three types of structural invariance. First, we tested

for structural invariance between the two samples for the control

variables and, second, we tested for differences in the structural

paths between the two samples excluding diversity beliefs; this

second model would allow us to test hypothesis 1. We did so by first

specifying a model in which no structural constraints were placed

(Model 5; see Table 3) and then where the relationships between the

control variables and the outcomes variables were constrained to

equality between the two samples (Model 6). Next, we specified a

model whereby the remaining structural paths were constrained to

equality between the two samples (Model 7). We then included

diversity beliefs as a mediator and tested for structural invariance

by comparing the freely estimated model (Model 8) to one where all

the structural paths for the control variables were constrained to

27

equality between the two samples (Model 9). Lastly, we specified a

model whereby the remaining structural paths were constrained to

equality between the two samples (Model 10). As with the measurement

model, we tested for the various levels of structural invariance by

comparing the chi-square statistic for the less constrained models

to the chi-square statistic for the more constrained model. Because

we are not interested in the group differences in the effects of our

covariates, we do not report them here, but their fit statistics can

be found in Table 3, and the corresponding regression weights can be

found in Table 5.

For BNP participants, the model explained 64% (95% CI

[.61, .67]) of the variance in blatant prejudice towards immigrants,

17% (95% CI [.13, .21]) of the variance in diversity beliefs, and

38% (95% CI [.34, .42]) of the variance in Islamic threat. For the

UKIP participants, the model explained 61% (95% CI [.56, .66]) of

the variance in blatant prejudice towards immigrants, 9% (95% CI

[.05, .13]) of the variance in diversity beliefs, and 33% (95% CI

[.27, .39]) of the variance in Islamic threat. For the EDL

respondents, the model explained 56% (95% CI [.47, .65]) of the

variance in blatant prejudice towards immigrants, 25% (95% CI

[.14, .36]) of the variance in diversity beliefs, and 49% (95% CI

[.39, .59]) of the variance in Islamic threat.

28

Hypothesis 1: Cross-Group Friendship reduces prejudice towards immigrants and Muslims

Constraining the paths between the independent and dependent

variables to equality between samples (Model 7) and comparing the

resultant fit statistics to those for Model 6.1 indicated a

significant drop in model fit, Δx2(2) = 7.44, p < .05. The

relationship between cross-group friendships and blatant prejudice

towards immigrants could not be constrained to equality, Δx2(1) =

6.11, p = .013. The relationship between cross-group friendships and

blatant prejudice towards immigrants was significant and negative

for BNP participants (b = -.63, SE = .109, β = -.32, p < .001) whereas

it was also negative but significantly weaker for UKIP participants

(b = -.37, SE = .06, β = -.20, p < .001). The direct relationship

between cross-group friendships and Islamic threat was significant

and negative for both samples (b = -.24, SE = .05, β = -.13, p

< .001). For the EDL participants, the structural model showed

adequate model fit, χ2 (27) = 57.890, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.14, SCF =

0.952, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .08 [.05, .11], SRMR = .04. Cross-group

friendships were directly negatively associated with blatant

prejudice towards immigrants (b = -.48, SE = .17, β = -.24, p < .01)

but were not directly associated with Islamic threat (b = -.14, SE

= .18, β = -.08, p > .05). Our findings mostly support hypothesis 1

that direct cross-group friendships were associated with reduced

prejudice among EDL, BNP and UKIP supporters toward immigrants

29

whereas direct cross-group friendships were only directly associated

with lower Islamic threat for BNP and UKIP supporters.

Next, we ran the same set of models but this time included diversity

beliefs as a mediator. Constraining the paths between the

independent, mediator, and dependent variables to equality between

samples (Model 10) and comparing the resultant fit statistics to

those for Model 9.1 indicated a significant drop in model fit, Δx2(5)

= 13.62, p < .02. The relationship between cross-group friendships

and blatant prejudice towards immigrants, once again, could not be

constrained to equality, Δx2(1) = 8.75, p = .003. The relationship

between cross-group friendships and blatant prejudice towards

immigrants remained significant and negative for BNP participants (b

= -.53, SE = .12, β = -.18, p < .001) once the mediator was entered

into the model. The relationship between cross-group friendships

remained negative but was non-significant for UKIP participants (b =

-.11, SE = .08, β = 04, p > .05). The direct relationship between

cross-group friendships and Islamic threat also became non-

significant for both samples (b = -.05, SE = .06, β = -.02, p > .05).

For the EDL participants, the structural model showed adequate model

fit, χ2 (41) = 73.525, p < .002, χ2/df = 1.79, SCF = 0.980, CFI = .96,

RMSEA = .07 [.04, .09], SRMR = .04. The association between cross-

group friends and blatant prejudice towards immigrants became non-

significant (b = -.19, SE = .20, β = -.07, p > .05) once diversity

30

beliefs was entered into the model. The relationship between cross-

group friendships and Islamic threat remained non-significant (b

= .23, SE = .19, β = .09, p > .05).

When the mediator is added to the model, our findings suggest that

direct cross-group friendships did not directly reduce prejudice

among UKIP and EDL supporters toward immigrants and Islam. However,

supporters of the BNP, who reported direct cross-group friendships

reported lower prejudice toward immigrants but not Islam. In sum,

direct cross-group friendships with out-groups did not reduce

prejudice for those on the radical and extreme ends of the political

spectrum, while attitudes towards Islam may well be exempt from

these effects among supporters of the traditional extreme right.

However, we might expect these relationships to become non-

significant when the mediator is added, as our expectation is that

contact still reduces prejudice for all three groups but just

through the mechanism of diversity beliefs. We test whether this is

the case below.

Hypothesis 2: Cross-group friendships will have a significant positive effect on diversity

beliefs

For the BNP and UKIP samples, cross-group friendships were

positively associated with diversity beliefs (b = .39, SE = .05, β

31

= .20, p < .001). More favourable diversity beliefs, in turn, were

significantly associated with lower blatant prejudice towards

immigrants (b = -1.12, SE = .09, β = -.74, p < .001) and lower levels

of Islamic threat (b = -.35, SE = .06, β = -.56, p < .001). For EDL

participants, cross-group friendships were positively associated

with more favourable diversity beliefs (b = .51, SE = .17, β = .25, p

= .003). Diversity beliefs were, in turn, associated with lower

blatant prejudice towards immigrants (b = -.94, SE = .23, β = -.72, p

< .001) and Islamic threat (b = -.86, SE = .20, β = -.71, p < .001).

These findings suggest that direct cross-group friendships have a

significant and positive effect on beliefs in diversity among all

three groups of supporters, indicating that when followers of right-

wing political groups have friendships with members of out-groups

they are more likely to think positively about the economic and

cultural contributions that migrants make to life in Britain. While

we cannot draw direct comparisons between the samples because of the

metric inequality, it is interesting to note that contact was more

strongly related to diversity beliefs for EDL supporters than it was

for BNP and UKIP respondents; relatedly, contact accounted for more

variance in diversity beliefs for EDL respondents than it did for

the other two samples. This is interesting given that EDL

respondents scored the highest on the diversity beliefs scale. This

suggests that, compared to the other right-wing parties, their claim

32

to be a ‘multicultural group’ that is open to the ethnic and

cultural diversity of modern Britain (excluding Islam) appears to

have some validity.

Hypothesis 3: Cross-group friendships significantly reduce prejudice towards immigrants

and Muslims by increasing diversity beliefs

Testing for a mediated effect - which is present when the bias

corrected bootstrap confidence intervals do not include zero -

revealed that diversity beliefs mediated the relationships between

cross-group friendships and blatant prejudice towards immigrants

(point estimate (PE) = -.44, 99% CI [-.64, -.28]; standardized PE =

-.15, 99% CI [-.20, -.10]) and cross-group friendships and Islamic

threat (PE = -.25, 99% CI [-.37, -.16]; standardized PE = -.11, 99%

CI [-.15, -.07]) for both BNP and UKIP respondents. For EDL

participants, diversity beliefs also mediated the relationships

between cross-group friendships and blatant prejudice towards

immigrants (point estimate (PE) = -.48, 99% CI [-1.25, -.03];

standardized PE = -.18, 99% CI [-.34, -.02]) and immigrant

friendships and Islamic threat (PE = -.44, 99% CI [-1.35, -.04];

standardized PE = -.18, 99% CI [-.34, -.01]). Cross-group

friendships reduced prejudice towards immigrants and Muslims by

increasing the view that immigrants contribute positively to the

33

country’s economic and cultural life. Across all three groups,

diversity beliefs mediate the relationship between cross-group

friendship and prejudice towards immigrants and Muslims. When

comparing the standardised coefficients we found that the largest

reduction was for EDL supporters in terms of their attitudes toward

Islam and immigrants. But both the BNP and UKIP reported similar

reductions in prejudice towards the two out-groups although not as

sharply as supporters of the counter-Jihad English Defence League.

Discussion

This study provided a unique investigation of the effects of direct

cross-group friendships on a sample of people who support radical

and extreme right-wing groups that are known for their xenophobic

and anti-Islam political campaigns. Our sample of actual, self-

identified supporters makes an important contribution to the

existing literature that often leans heavily on undergraduate

students, who tend to have less extreme views (Sears, 1986). To our

knowledge there have been few studies that explore such a large

sample of ‘real world’ supporters of prejudiced groups. Given our

unique sample, the study represents a tougher test for intergroup

contact theory than the traditional undergraduate samples in benign

settings (Hewstone et al, 2014). We now summarize the main findings,

34

highlighting some specific issues for further consideration, and

acknowledge some limitations of the research.

We found that, among supporters of right-wing groups, there

was extensive support for our three hypotheses. First, our findings

mostly support hypothesis 1 that direct cross-group friendships with

members of ethnic minorities were associated with reduced prejudice

among all three groups of supporters toward immigrants; however,

direct cross-group friendships were only directly associated with

lower Islamic threat for BNP and UKIP supporters. Second, consistent

with hypothesis 2, direct cross-group friendships were associated

with more favourable beliefs regarding diversity. Our findings

suggest that cross-group friendships have a significant and positive

effect on beliefs in diversity among all three groups, indicating

that when followers of right-wing groups have friendships with

members of ethnic out-groups they are more likely to think

positively about the economic and cultural contributions that

migrants make to life in Britain. In turn, the direct effect of

diversity beliefs is negatively associated with blatant prejudice

towards migrants and Islamic threat. Finally, turning to hypothesis

3, cross-group friendships reduced prejudice towards immigrants and

Muslims by increasing the view that immigrants contribute positively

to economic and cultural life. Across all three groups, diversity

beliefs mediated the relationship between cross-group friendship and

35

prejudice towards immigrants and Muslims. These findings add

substantially to a growing body of research indicating that contact

is a viable technique for reducing intergroup animosity, including

for more highly prejudiced people who need it most, and confirm

prior research on the significance of diversity beliefs as a

mediator of contact effects (Christ et al., 2014; Tropp & Bianchi,

2006).

One interesting finding was that, for BNP and UKIP supporters,

only one path could not be constrained to equality; specifically,

the relationship between cross-group friendships with ethnic

minorities and blatant prejudice toward migrants. This indicates two

possible outcomes. Diversity beliefs as a mediator could not explain

the prejudice-reducing effect of cross-group friendships on

prejudice towards immigrants for supporters of the extreme right

BNP. This suggests that there is another process that our model did

not account for.3 Taking this finding into consideration with the

lower proportion of variance explained in the outcome measures,

especially diversity beliefs, contact may have a stunted effect for

UKIP respondents. While some studies have reported a greater effect

of contact on those who are less tolerant, or more prejudiced (Dhont

& Van Hiel 2009; Hodson, Harry & Mitchell 2009), there is also some

evidence that contact is more strongly associated with reduced

prejudice for more tolerant individuals (Schmid, Hewstone, Küpper,

36

Zick, & Wagner, 2012) and in settings where contact is sanctioned by

authorities (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Furthermore, Pettigrew (1958)

found that sociocultural factors, such as a norm of intolerance,

affect outgroup attitudes over-and-above strong personality

predictors of prejudice, like right-wing authoritarianism. Given

that UKIP has a xenophobic and, at times, Islamophobic agenda (Ford,

Goodwin & Cutts, 2012), this strong norm towards intolerance may

stunt the effects of intergroup contact rather than boost it. It

could be the case, then, that there is a quadratic effect where the

relationship between contact and prejudice increases as prejudice

increases until a tipping point is reached where, in the very

prejudiced, attitues become more solidified. It should be noted,

however, that this interpretation is speculative, given that only

one path differed between BNP and UKIP respondents. Furthermore,

although 8 per cent more variance was explained in diversity beliefs

for BNP respondents than for UKIP respondents, this difference is

not statistically significant given that the confidence intervals

for the R2 values did not overlap.4

The findings reported here are encouraging as they show that

contact is even an effective prejudice-reduction technique for

highly prejudiced, even xenophobic, individuals (for blatant

prejudice towards immigrants, the sample mean for BNP respondents

was significantly above the scale mid-point, and for UKIP and EDL

37

respondents, it was equal to and below the scale mid-point,

respectively; all three groups reported high levels of Islamic

threat, each sub-sample mean being significantly above the scale

mid-point). This study goes beyond the often-used sample of

undergraduate students to test the effectiveness of contact and adds

to the scant body of research that tests contact theory on samples

that are unlikely to meet the conditions underwhich positive contact

is said to have its most beneficial impact. Another important

finding relates to diversity beliefs as a mediator for a sample of

the population who generally hold unfavourable attitudes towards

diversity, individuals on the political far right (whereas student

samples are typically positive, only our EDL respondents reported

diversity beliefs that were significantly above the scale mid-point,

and both UKIP and BNP respondents reported diversity beliefs that

were below the scale midpoint). Holding favourable attitudes towards

diversity has been implicated as a mediator of the effect of

intergroup contact specifically because it is a group-level variable

and is not necessarily group-specific (Lolliot, et al., 2013).

Favourable diversity beliefs should affect attitudes towards many

outgroups as the very notion of diversity should not / cannot be

limited to one or two outgroups. This concept relates closely to

Pettigrew’s (1997) notion of deprovincialization, whereby intergroup

38

contact leads people to hold a less provincialized outlook about

their ingroup in relation to outgroups.

Notwithstanding our robust findings, we acknowledge some

limitations of this research, of which we highlight two main ones

here. First, although for all other main constructs we had multi-

item measures, we only measured contact with a single item tapping

cross-group friendships. Moreover, this item asked about cross-group

friends “among people from ethnic minority groups”, rather than

immigrants or Muslims. Although, as we noted earlier, choice of this

item has an advantage in terms of avoiding shared method variance

between predictor and outcome (Podsakoff et al., 2003), it is likely

that the lack of correspondence between measures of contact and

prejudice will result in an underestimate of the true association between

outgroup contact and outgroup prejudice. The second limitation refers to our

survey yielding only cross-sectional, correlational data. This, of

course, limits our ability to draw inferences about causality. In

other words, we have not been able to demonstrate that contact

promotes prejudice reduction, rather than vice versa. Although the vast

majority of studies on intergroup contact rely on cross-sectional

data ( Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), a burgeoning number of studies

attest to longitudinal (as well as experimental) effects of contact,

but do also acknowledge that evidence exists for the reverse or

self-selection path, although it is typically weaker. Future

39

research should thus use longitudinal (panel) data to allow for

testing of bi-directional relationships, and greater confidence in

inferring causality.

To conclude, this research provides highly-original evidence

of the benefits of intergroup contact for more tolerant social

attitudes, even in sample of right-wing voters, whose chosen parties

espouse intolerant beliefs, including opposition to immigrants and

Islam, both of which were included as outcome variables in our

survey. We do not, of course, argue that positive intergroup contact

is a panacea in any case, let alone for holders of such intemperate

views, but the supportive evidence adds to an already impressive

evidence base showing that where prejudice is the problem,

intergroup contact should form part of the solution.

40

Figures

Cross-group

Friendships

Blatant Prejudi

ce Immigrants

Islamic Threat

Diversity

Beliefs

.20***

-.18*** / -.04

-.74***

-.56***

R2 = .64 / .61

R2 = .38 / .33

R2 = .17 / .09

Figure 1. Structural equation model showing the relationships between the variables under investigation. Regression coefficients (reported before the / for BNP participants and after the / UKIP respondents; reported in bold for constrained values) are standardized. The control variables have been left out of the figure for the sake of clarity (see Table 2). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (UKIP denotes United Kingdom Independence Party; BNP denotes British National Party).

41

Cross-group

Friendships

Blatant Prejudice Immigrant

s

Islamic Threat

DiversityBeliefs

.25**-.72***

-.71***

R2 = .56

R2 = .49

R2 = .26

Figure 2. Structural equation model showing the hypothesised relationships between the variables under investigation for the EDL sample. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. The control variables have been left out of the figure for the sake of clarity (see Table 2). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (EDL denotes English Defence League).

42

Tables

Table 1. Pearson product-moment correlations between composite variables, means, and standard deviations.

1 2 3 4

UKIPMeans(SD)

1. Ethnic minority friendships

- .20*** -.20*** -.15*** 2a

2. Diversity beliefs

.23*** - -.56*** -.36*** 3.80(2.11)

3. Immigrant attitudes

-.31*** -.52*** - .32*** 3.00(0.98)

4. Islam attitudes

-.14*** -.47*** .31*** - 4.37(0.80)

BNP Means (SD) 2a 2.77(2.38)

3.68(1.02)

4.48(0.81)

Correlation coefficients below the diagonal are for BNP (British National Party) participants whereas the correlation coefficients above the diagonal are for UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) respondents. SD = standard deviation. a = mode. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

43

Table 1 cont.

Pearson product-moment correlations between composite variables, means, and standard deviations.

1 2 3 4

1. Ethnic minority friendships

-

2. Diversity beliefs

.29*** -

3. Immigrant attitudes

-.26*** -.60*** -

4. Islam attitudes

-.15* -.53*** .40*** -

EDL Means (SD) 2a 5.40(2.45)

2.66(1.09)

3.66(1.01)

SD = standard deviation. a = mode. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. EDL denotes English Defence League.

44

Table 2.Comparisons of the Nested Multigroup Models.

Model Model Fit

Model

Compariso

n

Δ χ2

(df)

1a χ2 (16) = 54.855***, χ2/df = 3.43, SCF = 1.099, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .06[.05, .08], SRMR = .03

1b χ2 (16) = 63.703***, χ2/df = 3.98, SCF = 1.152, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06[.05, .08], SRMR = .03

1c χ2 (16) = 28.545***, χ2/df = 1.78, SCF = 1.003, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .07[.02, .10], SRMR = .04

2.1

Unconstrained χ2 (30) = 67.993***, χ2/df = 2.27, SCF = 1.082, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05 [.04, .07], SRMR = .03

Constrained χ2 (38) = 93.027***, χ2/df = 2.45, SCF = 1.097, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .06 [.05, .08], SRMR = .08

24.70**(8)

2.2Unconstrained χ2 (30) = 68.770***, χ2/df = 2.29, SCF = 1.095, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .04 [.03, .05], SRMR = .02

Constrained χ2 (38) = 95.227***, χ2/df = 2.51, SCF = 1.088, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05 [.05 .06], SRMR = .06

26.66***(8)

45

2.3

Unconstrained χ2 (30) = 84.079***, χ2/df = 2.80, SCF = 1.184, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04 [.03, .05], SRMR = .02

Constrained χ2 (38) = 92.147***, χ2/df = 2.43, SCF = 1.209, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .03 [.03 .05], SRMR = .03 9.10 (8)

SCF = Scale Correction Factor; this was used in comparing the chi-square values of the different models.Model Key: Model 1a = configural invariance for UKIP, Model 1b = configural invariance for BNP, Model 1c= configural invariance for EDL, Model 2.1 = Metric invariance for BNP and EDL samples, Model 2.2 =metric invariance for UKIP and EDL samples, Model 2.3 = metric invariance for BNP and UKIP samples. * p< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; (UKIP denotes United Kingdom Independence Party; BNP denotes BritishNational Party; EDL denotes English Defence League).

Table 3. Metric, scalar, uniqueness, and structural fit indices for the different levels of invariance between the BNO and UKIP samples.

Model Number Fit StatisticsModel

Comparison

Change inchi-square

(df)2.3 (Metric

Invariance)

χ2 (38) = 92.147***, χ2/df = 2.43, SCF = 1.209, CFI = .98, RMSEA= .03

46

[.03.05],SRMR= .03

3

χ2 (43) = 105.468***, χ2/df = 2.45, SCF = 1.184, CFI = .98, RMSEA= .04[.03, .05],SRMR= .03

3 vs.

2.313.55*(5)

3.1


3.1 vs.

2.36.43(4)

4 χ2 (50) = 98.403***, χ2/df = 1.97, SCF = 1.330, CFI = .98, RMSEA= .03[.02, .04],

4 vs.

3.1

6.29(8)

47

SRMR= .04

5


5 vs 4 16.71(17)

6


6 vs. 5 26.37***(8)

6.1


6.1 vs.

54.78(6)

48

7


7 vs.

6.17.44*(2)

7.1


7.1 vs.

6.10.20(1)

8

χ2 (100) = 176.993***, χ2/df = 1.77, SCF = 1.212, CFI = .98, RMSEA =.03[.02, .04],SRMR= .04

9 χ2 (112) = 229.111***, χ2/df = 2.05, SCF = 1.186, CFI = .97, RMSEA =.03[.03, .0

9 vs. 8 59.02***(12)

49

4],SRMR= .04

9.1


9.1 vs 8 12.68(10)

10


10 vs.

9.113.62*(5)

10.1

χ2 (114) = 195.006***, χ2/df = .171, SCF = 1.186, CFI = .98, RMSEA =.03[.02, .03],SRMR= .03

10.1 vs.

9.14.17(4)

50

Model key: Model 3 = scalar invariance, Model 3.1 = partial scalar invariance, Model 4 = uniqueness invariance, Model 5 = freely estimated structural model without diversity beliefs, Model 6 = group-invariant structural model for control variables (without diversity beliefs), Model 6.1 = partial group invariance for the structural model for control variables (without diversity beliefs), Model 7 = group-invariant structural equation model for independent- and control variables (without diversity beliefs), Model 7.1 = partial structural invariance between samples for independent- and control variables (withoutdiversity beliefs), Model 8 = freely estimated structural model with diversity beliefs included, Model 9 = group-invariant structural equation model for control variables with diversity beliefs included, Model 9.1 = partial group invariance for the structural model for control variables with diversity beliefs included, Model 10.1 = structural invariance between samples for independent-, mediator-, and control variables, Model 10.1 = partial structural invariance between samples for independent-, mediator-, and control variables

51

Table 4.Factor loadings from the unconstrained configural invariance model (Model 2) by sample group.

Item

Construct and Sample

Blatant Prejudicetowards Immigrants Islamic Threat Diversity Beliefs

EDL UKIP BNP EDL UKIP BNP EDL UKIP BNP

Immigrants should be sent back to their home country whether or not they break the law

.81 .73 .71 -- -- -- -- -- --

Family members of immigrantswho were born in the UK should be sent back to theircountry of origin

.71 .66 .66 -- -- -- -- -- --

Immigrants are the main cause of crime in society .86 .65 .74 -- -- -- -- -- --

Immigrants are the main source of disease in society .76 .62 .66 -- -- -- -- -- --

Islam does not pose a serious danger to Western civilization

-- -- -- .52 .62 .71 -- -- --

There will be a ‘clash of -- -- -- .92 .82 .75 -- -- --

52

civilizations’ between Islamand the West

Britain’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants

-- -- -- -- -- -- .86 .75 .74

Britain’s economy that migrants come to Britain from other countries.

-- -- -- -- -- -- .84 .78 .78

All factor loadings are significant at the p < .001 level; (UKIP denotes United Kingdom IndependenceParty; BNP denotes British National Party; EDL denotes English Defence League)..

53

Table 5. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between the controlvariables and the mediator and outcome variables.

BNP and UKIP Samples

Control

Variable

DiversityBeliefs

b (SE)

BlatantPrejudicetowards

Immigrants

b (SE)

Islamic Threat

b (SE)

Age

.004 / -.02***

(.003) /

(.004)

.02*** /

-.02***

(.004) /

(.005)

.01***

(.003)

Sex-.13*

(.06)

.10

(.08)

-.09

(.07)

Social Grade-.06*

(.03)

.06†

(.03)

-.06†

(.03)

Education.12***

(.02)

-.05

(.03)

.01

(.02)

EDL Sample

Control

Variable

DiversityBeliefs

b (SE)

BlatantPrejudicetowards

Immigrants

b (SE)

Islamic Threat

b (SE)

Age-.004

(.006)

-.02**

(.007)

.01

(.008)

Sex.22

(.20)

.07

(.20)

.03

(.20)

54

Social Grade-.18*

(.08)

-.11

(.08)

.02

(.09)

Education.22**

(.07)

-.09

(.08)

.03

(.08)

Regression coefficients separated by a / could not beconstrained to equality. Those that appear before the / arefor the UKIP sample and those after the / are for the BNPsample. † p < .06, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; (UKIPdenotes United Kingdom Independence Party; BNP denotes BritishNational Party; EDL denotes English Defence League).

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Notes

66

1 ‘The English Defence League: About Us’, available at http://englishdefenceleague.org/about-us (accessed 20 June 2012)2 Constraining all the factor loadings to equivalence for the EDL and UKIP resulted in a significantly drop in model fit, Δx2(8) = 26.66, p < .001but we could obtain partial metric invariance for the blatant prejudice and Islamic threat scales. The diversity beliefs scale showed signs of partial metric invariance. The item DB2 could not be constrained to equivalence, Δx2(1) = 14.09, p < .001. Item, DB3, however, showed marginally different factor loadings, Δx2(1) = 3.82, p = .051. Given this pattern of results is largely consistent with the comparisons between the BNP and EDL sample; the significant differences in the overall scale means for all three items under question; and the patterns of comparisons between the BNP and UKIP samples, we chose to keep these two samples separate. 3 We are not suggesting that diversity beliefs is the only mediator of contact effects for UKIP and EDL respondents. Other variables could explain the indirect of contact on both Islamic threat and blatant prejudice. While we agreewith many methodologists that a lack of a direct effect means there are no othermeaningful indirect effects, the remaining direct effect for BNP participants isinteresting. 4 There was nearly a statistically significant difference. For brevity, BNP variance explained in diversity beliefs: 17% (95% CI [.13, .21]); UKIP variance explained in diversity beliefs: 9% (95% CI [.05, .13]).

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Intergroup Friendship, the Far Right and Attitudes Towards Immigration and Islam