r33

INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC VALUE AND VALUATION

Rsvr B. EownRos

There is an important difference between 'ovalue" and "valuation" in thevalue system developed by Robert S. Hartman. His formal definition of"value" is "the correspondence between the properties possessed by a subjectand the predicates contained in the intension of the subject's concept."lAlternatively,"A thing has value in the degree that itfuffills the intension oJ'itsconcept." 2 A value is thus a thing which fulfills a concept, the extension of anintension. " Valuation," on the other hand, is a human activity, or a personalactivity if there are non-human persons such as God. It is a way of relatingpersonally to values. The concept ol "valuation" is defined as "the com-binatorial arrangement of the thing's properties"3 and as "a play withproperties."a We are told that "Valuation thus arranges and re-arranges theproperties of things."s Seen in context, this means that valuation is theactivity of measuring the properties of things by intensions (sets of predicates)to see if they fulfill or fail to fulfill their concepts. The things thus measured,the objects of valuations. are values.

The difference between value, as the thing being conceptually measured,and valuation, as the activity of making such measurements, becomes es-

pecially important in what Hartman terms "value exponentation." He in-troduces such formulae as II. "the intrinsic valuation of an intrinsic va1ue"6and Is, "the systemic valuation of an intrinsic value."7 These formulaesymbolize specific kinds of value and valuation. They are intrinsic, extrinsic,and systemic values. and there are intrinsic, extrinsic. and systemic valua-tions. In this paper. I shall explore only the intrinsic and the extrinsicprimarily. Due to limitations of time and space, I shall have little to say aboutthe systemic, though I am convinced that there are serious ambiguities here as

well. I hope to show that Hartman actually packs a great deal more into hisnotions of intrinsic and extrinsic value and valuation than his lormal de-

1 Robert S. Hartman , Thc Structure of Value (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press,1969 (paperback edition), p. 15a. Referred to hereafter as SZ.

2 Robert S. Hartman, "The Value Structure of Creativity," The Journal oJ'Value Inquiry,Yol.VI, No. 4.1972, p. 250. Referred to hereafter as VSC.

3 SI,', p. 215.1 VSC, p.245.s lbid., p.252.6 SV, p. 260.1 Ibid., p.289.

134 The Journal oJ'Value Inquiry

finitions suggest, and that considerable confusion results fiom his lailure tokeep track of his formal commitments.

First, let us look at the diversity of meanings of "intrinsic value" and"extrinsic value." Then we shall turn to "intrinsic valuation" and "extrinsicvaluation." In my own symbolizing to follow, I shall use capital letters (I, E,S) for values, and lower case letters (i, e. s) for valuations.

I find at least four different meanings for the notion of an intrinsic yalue rnHartman's writings. To say that any given X is an intrinsic value might mean:

I1 that X is an entity with a non-denumerable infinity of properties, therebyfulfilling a concept with a non-denumerably rich intension (metaphors,unicepts).8

12 that X is a non-perceptible, non-spatio-temporal entity (such as thesoul, creativity. the floumenal ego, God).e

I3 that X is an individual or unique entity.I o

14 that X is an end in itself, valuable for its own sake.' 1

8 "A systemic value lulfills a connotation oi at most r? elements, an extrinsic value one ol'atmost Xo elements, and an intrinsic value one ol7" , elements. " S /, p. 267 . See also Footnote # 1 0

and SZpp. 113, ll6-119, 258,261, and 331, n.40.e It is difficult to know for sure what Hartman meant by his denials of the perceptability and

spatio-temporality of intrinsic values and valuations. In his Kantian moods. he seemed to belier,'e

that they were altogether beyond this world of process, but he does speak of "intrinsic space-

time." Some relevant quotes are: "On the other hand. neither ol the two (the empirical star. the

star of astrononiy) can be 'my good star,' lbr this is neither in empirical space and time nor in thephysical space-time continuum. but in intrinsic space-time - the space which includes paradise.

utopia, the Kingdom of God, and heaven (not the sky,'theological space';and the tintewhichincludes eternity, the millennium. the 'lullness ol time,' Hoch;eiten. honeymoons, vacations,gestations and births. Bergsonian durations." S l'. p. 255. In VSC he treated creativity both as an

intrinsic good and as a process 1" ('reut ivit t is itrtr insit pr'(r.'esr. p. 259) whtch suggests sequential

change and temporality, while at the same time den-ving its temporality 1"ln a word, creativity as

we have discussed it takes place essentially in a realm outside of space and time. outside the

extrinsic, in the intrinsic," p. 265). One of Hartman's clearest statements concerning the non-spatio-temporality of intrinsic values is in "The Logic of Value," The Review oJ Metaphrsics.Vol. XIV, No. 3, 1961). Hereafter referred to as LV. Here he wrote. p.422, that: "The subject ofintrinsic valuation are non-empirical things. or rather, empirical things in their non-empiricalaspects. They are, as such, neither in time nor in space. When a thing is regarded as unique, allthere is is this thing. Since time and space are defined as succession and interrelationship of things,where there is only one thing there is no time and no space in this sense. The thing itself is the

world."1 o "Nondenumerably infinite sets of intensional predicates (descriptions or depictions) define

singular coilcepts (also, as we have seen, axioms). Things corresponding to such concepts are

unique. Uniqueness is the intensional counterpart to extensional singularity." Sl', p. I 13. "Theindividual is then defined as the extension of an intension with content 1,. Such an extension must

be singular for X, signifies a nondenumerable continuum. that is, a Gestalt." Str/, p.331."Uniqueness"istreatedasthedistinctivevaluetermoltherealmofintrinsicvalueinStr/.pp. 113.

r9s. 199. 248, 308-309.11 Hartman almost never employs the traditional definitions ol an intrinsic value as some-

thing which is an end in itsell or desilable tbr its own sake. This makes one rvonder at timcs

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation 135

Hartman probably assumed that each of these four definitions of "intrinsicvalue" somehow meant the same thing, in something like the way in whichKant seemingly assumed that each of his diverse formulations of the categori-cal imperative somehow meant exactly the same thing. This assumption is notwarranted, however. For many important purposes, we may find it desirableto keep track of these diverse meanings and perhaps even to drop out some ofthem altogether. We may want to keep some parts of Hartman's axiologywhile rejecting the accompanying metaphysics which he built into the system.For example, we may wish to hold that certain human activities and ex-periences, such as those of loving, enjoying and creating, are intrinsicallygood in sense 14 without subscribing to Hartman's metaphysical views whichplaced them altogether outside of space and time in sense 12. And we maywish to believe that individual human persons are intrinsic goods in sense 14

without believing that they literally possess a non-denumerable infinity ofproperties in sense Il, i.e. without believing that during their very f,nite threescore and ten years they are literally capable of thinking a non-denumerableinfinity of thoughts or making a non-denumerable infinity of choices.l2

Similar complexities and ambiguities of meaning attach to the notion ofextrinsic value in Hartman's works. To say that any given X is an extrinsicvalue might mean any of the following:

E1 that X is an entity with a denumerable inflnity of properties, therebyfulfllling a concept with a denumerably rich intension (the class con-cepts of ordinary language).t'

E2 that X is a perceptible. spatio-temporal object, such as a stone or ananimal.la

E3 that X is a member of a class and possesses the properties which make iteligible for class membership.is

whether his non-spatio-temporal entities with a non-denumerable infinity of properties really are

intrinsically good in this traditional sense ! The closest that he comes to it in S Z is his ref'erence toG. E. Moore's "defining good in itself or intrinsic value." SZ. p. 140.

'2 I have developed this objection to the Hartman axiology in some detail in my article "TheValue of Man in the Hartman Value System," The Journal oJ'Value Inquiry, Vol. VII, No. 2,

1973, pp. 141-147.13 "Extrinsic value has the properties of 1o; it is the actual infinity of discursive (denumerable)

properties." SV, pp. 221-222, See also Footnotes 8 and 29.1a InVSC,p.254,Hartmanwrote:"Denumerableinfinitesetsofintensionalpredicatesdeflne

abstract concepts. Abstraction draws off properties common to at least two things. Theseproperties are denumerable, for they must be abstracted one by one . . . ; but there is an infinity ofsuch possible properties. The things to which such concepts refer are the things of the everydayworld, chairs and tables, cars and lampposts, horses and applecakes." One of the most disturbingthings about the Hartman system to me is that there seems to be no place for the value of animalsin it, except in the realm of extrinsic value. But there is surely a great difference in worth between ahorse and an applecakel On the connection between extrinsic value and the empirical, spatio-temporal, see further Footnotes # 15 and 30 and SV,pp. ll3,194-195,199,227,255,262-263.

" "Only particular empirical things, then, can have the values of axiological Goodness,Badness,elc..extrinsicvalue,thatis,valueofathingasamemberofitsclass." SV,p. 195.On

136 The Journal o./'Value Inquiry

E4 that X is a means to an end.16

Again, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which we might want to resistcollapsing these meanings into one another by resisting the built-in meta-physics. We might wish to hold, as Whitehead did for example,lT that allspatio-temporal actualities arefinite, thus refusing to accept the Hartmanianmetaphysical assumption that the extension of E 1 is the same as the extensionof E2. Or we might recognize that spatio-temporal objects are also unique intheir own way, thus refusing to accept the suggestion that the extension of E2is always the same as the extension of E3. I shall not explore this further, butmuch work remains to be done in this area.

If we turn to the notions of intrinsic valuation and extrinsic valuation, we areconfronted once more by a surprising and bewildering diversity of meanings.Let us recall that a valuation is a personal way of relating to a given X, butthere are many such ways of relating, even within the one realm of intrinsicvaluation. All intrinsic valuations of a given X would be symbolized XI inHartman's value exponentation, though I will use lower case letters forvaluations. To say that a person intrinsically'valuates X might mean any of thefollowing:

i1 that he relates conceptually to X through concepts with non-denu-merably rich intensions. 1 8

i2 that he relates conceptually andlor emotionally to the non-perceptual,non-spatio-temporal aspects of X. 1e

i3 that he "emphatically and empathetically" identifies himself with X.2o

extrinsic value and class membership, see aiso SI,'. pp. 113. 194-95. 210,219,252,255,262,26'7.272.306-308.

16 Just as Hartman almost never uses the tradrtional definition of an intrinsic value as an end initself, so he almost never employs the traditional definition of an extrinsic value as a "means to anend." There are a few places (Sr/, pp 218,294) where he speaks of extrinsic values as "functions"or "tools." but this is just about as explicit as he ever gets about extrinsic values as means to ends.

Healsospeaksofextrinsicvaluationas"pragmatic."(SL'.p. ll3,buthedoesnotexplainexactlywhat he means by that.

17 Whitehead held that "Continuity linfinitv) concerns what is potential; whereas actuality is

incurably atomic (finite)." Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York, TheMacmillan Co.,1929), p. 95. See the entire chapter on "The Extensive Continuum," and p. 53.

18 "Finite intensional sets measure systemic value, denumerable infinite intensional sets

measure extrinsic value, non-denumerably rnfinite intensional sets measure intrinsic value." SZ,p. 19. Concepts with non-denumerably infinite intensions are metaphors or "singular concepts" -See S4 pp. I I 3, 266-67 and related discussions on pp. 210,250,252,256,258,262,266-67 ,272,306-07.

rn See Footnote # 9.2o Intrinsic valuation "is emphatic and empathetic valuation." SV,p.1 14. It "involves the

valuer completely." Str', p. 260. When a value system is intrinsically valuated, "the valuer gi ues

himselftothetheoryasarationalbeing,andisassuchfullyinvolved."sLp 299.Whenaperson,such as the woman I marry, is intrinsically valuated, "my total being is joined with hers in acommon intrinsic Gestalt." SV. p.224.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation

This seems to take many different forms, as when Hartman writes that"At its maximum, intrinsic value means the interpenetration of thevaluer and the valued, as in love, in artistic creation and appreciation, inmystic rapture, in the sartori experiences of Zen, and others."2lThus weoef'b"..i3a that he enjoys, appreciates, or takes satisfaction in X.22i3b that he has an intense positive emotional involvement (love, com-

passion, sympathy, etc.) with X.23i3c that he experiences mystical union with X.2ai3d that he creatively produces or generates X.2si3e that his conscience approves or disapproves of X.26

" LY, p.420.22 EnjoymenriscitedasaformofintrinsicvaluationinS4pp. 114.25l.Appret'iationappears

as a form of intrinsic valuation in S Z, pp.29l ,299 and in LV, pp. 1 14, 251. Satis"facrion appears inLV, p. 411.

23 Love is cited as a form of intrinsic valuation in S Z, p. 1 i 3 and is implicit in the discussion on

pp. 259-60. It also appears in LV, pp. 411,420. Compassion is best presented in an unpublishedmanuscript entitled "The Value Structure of Personality" in these words: "Only saints can fullylive this infinite range of the Self. A saint is a person who puts his whole power. all the resources olhimseli into his own goodness, a man who has discovered his oneness with all creation, all men,

all animals, even all things. He lives within the depth of everybody and everything. He is a man ofinfinite compassion. The deepest intrinsic goodness is to live so deeply and transparently withinourselves that we live deeply and compassionately within every human being, indeed every livingbeing - indeed, every being. As St. Francis said to Brother Leo when he tried to extinguish the fireon St. Francis'coat: Brother Leo, be careful with Brother Fire. "Or as Albert Schweitzer, whofelt pain at having to kill the bacteria when he did an operation. Contpassion is one touchstone o.[

moral value." mss p. 23.2a Mystical unionis cited in LV, p. 420.In SZ, Hartman mentioned onp.224 "experiences of

mystic exaltation, of higher and higher, wider and wider expansions of awareness" as instances ofintrinsic valuation. Other refcrences occur in Sr/, pp. 251,212,274, and 352, n. 30.

2s Creativit) as a form o[ intrinsic valuation is the subject of the entire article, VSC. See

Footnote # 2for bibliographical details. It is mentioned in SZ, p.272, and the associated "Aha

experience" is cited in Sl', pp. 9, 325 n. 53.26 ConscienceasaformofintrinsicvaluationisimplicitintheremarkinVSC,p.256,that"All

the words of ethics mean this very same thing, this identification of myself with myself; being

sincere, being honest, being genuine, being authentic, being true to myself, having integrity.having self-respect - all these words mean that I am as I am, that I am myself ." Conscience is best

discussed explicitly in the unpublished manuscript entrtled "The Value Structure of Personality"in these words: "Compassion is one touchstone oJ'moral value. Anolher is conscience. As

compassion, it is a symptom of the infinity of the Self. We have done a bad thing, nobody saw us,

not a soul was there. And when we come back among people we do leel everybody knows the bad

thing we have done. A bad conscience means we are afraid everybody knows with us - con-science-

The classic on this feeling-that-everybody-knows is Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment . . .

Why do we have the feeling that everybody, indeed, that everything knows? Because, iikecompassion, in conscience our Self lives in every one and in every thing. Conscience exhorts us

negatively to what compassion impels us positively." mss pp.23-24.

r37

138 Th.e Journal of Value Inquiry,

i4 that he regards X as unique.2'i5 that he regards X as an end in itself.28

Similarly, to say that a person extrinsicalll,,traluorrs X might mean any of thelollowing:

e1 that he relates conceptually to X through concepts with denumerablyrich intensions.2e

e2 that he relates conceptually or emotionally only to the public, empiri-cal, spatio-temporal aspects of X.3o

e3 that he has only a "pragmatic" or "everyday interestedness" level ofinvolvement with X.31

27 The contrast between regarding a given X as unique (intrinsic valuatron) and regarding it as

a member of a class (extrinsic valuation) is expressed in SZ, p.294 in these words: "Since.

however, anything can be considered in all three value dimensions, a value theory can also be

regarded as an extrinsic and as an intrinsic value. In the former case, it is seen as a tool functioningin the space-time world among similar such tools, or a member of the expositional class of value

theories. In the latter case, it is regarded as unique and incomparable. and some person as fullyinvolved with it." See also Footnote # 32.

" See Footnote # 11.2e "The logical analysis of the value dimensions showed that to each of them - systemic,

extrinsic, intrinsic - belongs a specific language: the technical. the ordinary, and the metaphori-cal, respectively; and that each meaning or connotation of the language shares the characteristicnumber of the language. Thus, a systemic connotation has the characteristic number n. . . . an

extrinsic connotation the characteristic number 1o, and an intrinsic connotation the characteris-

tic number Xr." 5V,p.267. See also Footnotes # 8,13, and S/. pp. 113, 194-95,210,219.252,254,255.262.

30 In S4 p.255, Hartman wrote: "Thus, since extrinsic valuation presupposes a class of atleast two things, and two things presuppose empirical coeristence in spacc or succession in time,the subjects of extrinsic valuation include all spatio-temporal objects - objects, that is, withinempirical, rather than systemic, space and time. as such." On p. 318, n. 8 of S Z, Hartman refers to"the foundation . . . of all analytic thought in sense experience. " In discussing abstracted class

concepts, he tells us in SL p. 113 that: "Referents of such concepts are the things of the everyday

world." See similar references to the connection of the extrinsic with the empirical, spatio-temporal in SZ, pp. 194-195. 196. 199, 22'7.262-63,294.

3' The expression "everyday interestedness" is my own. not Hartman's. I introduce it to lill a

gap which he does not explicitly fill. Hartman does tell us that extrinsic valuation lies somewhere

between the "objective and detached" valuation of "systemic measurement" and the "exalted

experience, enjoyment, involvement in the thing valued" of "intrinsic measurement." SZ, pp.

250-51. He also tells us that intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic valuation share the "commondenominator" of degrees of emotional distance or involvement, SZ, p. 260. What I call"everyday interestedness" would fall somewhere between the superficial involvement of the

systemic valuator and the intense personal involvement of the intrinsic valuator. This may be

part of what Hartman had in mind when he wrote in SIl, p. 251 that "This kind of measurement(extrinsic) is acted out, thought through, judged. in short, is lived in everyday life." See also SZ, p.

252.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation t39

uniquee4 that he regards X only as aindividual.32

e5 that he regards X as a means

member of a class, but not as a

to an end.33

If confusion is to be avoided, it seems to me that Hartman's three symbols (I,E, and S) for his three realms of value and valuation are woefully in-adequate. Without exploring the systemic, or the realm of disvaluation, atall, I have shown that at least lour distinct symbols are required for the notionof an intrinsic value, four more for the notion of an extrinsic value, nine more(not counting i3 separately from its instances - a through e) for intrinsicvaluation, and five more for extrinsic valuation. And I don't claim that myanalysis is exhaustive! As I see it, one of the most serious difficulties with theHartman system as a formal axiology is that it is far too crude an instrument!

Hartman's three symbols (I, E, and S) conceal far more than they reveal. Asvaluations, such diverse things as enjoyment, appreciation, love, compassion,mystical union, creativity, conscience, etc., are all symbolized by the singlesymbol I. Yet, it is often most important that we keep track of these distinc-tions. For example, I find it quite possible to deeply love my wife (i3b) withouthaving anything that could properly be called an experience of mystical unionwith her (i3c), without sharing Hartman's peculiar Kantian metaphysical be-liefs that her real noumenal self exists entirely outside of space-time (I2), andwithout subscribing to his highly eccentric belief that underneath all surface orphenomenal appearances to the contrary, I and my wife (and all other humanbeings for that matter) really are or have one and the same noumenal ego orself (I2).3aHartman assumed that space and time are required for plurality,and that outside of space and time all is one. In regarding my wife as unique(i4) and as an end in herself (i5), I do not flnd it necessary or even helpful tobelieve that she can literally think each of the denumerable infinity of proper-ties exemplified by the world, then think about thinking each ol thoseproperties an inflnite number of times, thereby acquiring an actualized non-denumerable infinity of properties (I1).ts I even find it possible, believe it ornot, to love my wife most consistently and intensely (13b) w,ithout havingpoetry and metaphors running constantly through my mind (i1). Ilwe all had

32 In extrinsic valuation, "What is valued is not the thing in itself but its possession of the class

predicates. Fulfilment by a thing of an abstract concept constitutes extrinsic value. Extrinsicvaluation is the model oleveryday pragmatic thinking." SZ, p. 113.

ri See Footnote # 16.3a One expression ol this belief is in the unpublished manuscript, "The Value Structure of

Personality." Here Hartman wrote: "The inner self, we said. is not in space and time. Where then

is it? Everywhere. In other words, in the inner core of our Self we are intrinsically one with every

other Self. The cones of our Selfhood all meet at the vertex. There is one community, one core, ofall mankind. This realm Jesus called The Kingdom of God that is within us, Kant called it the

Kingdom of Ends, Royce and others called it by other names. [n it, intrinsically, we are all one;

and when we do a bad thing everybody /uas done it with us and through us." mss p. 24.3s The reference here is to Hartman's "epistemological proofl'for the infinite value of man,

which presumably also applies to woman, in SIr-, pp. 116-119.

t40 The Journal of Value Inquirv

to be poets in order to be lovers, there would be far fewer lovers than there arenow!

This brings me to another problem which I have with the Hartman valuesystem. It seems to me that Hartman inadequately treated the respective rolesof conceptualization versus feeling and emotion in valuation. I shall restrict mydiscussion to the realm of intrinsic valuation. Let us recall that according toHartman's formal definition, valuation is the activity of measuring entities byconcepts, and a value is an entity so measured. This definition makes valueand valuation to be totally dependent upon conceptualization, whether in therealms of the intrinsic, the extrinsic, or the systemic. On the other hand, ouranalysis of the many forms of intrinsic valuation has disclosed that emotionand feeling are also heavily involved in at least some if not all intrinsic valua-tions (I3, a through e). Against Hartman, I would hold that intrinsic valua-tion is primarily a matter of emotion and feeling, and that conceptualizationactually plays little or no role at all. This is most obvious in the case ofmystical experience, which mystics tell us lies altogether beyond the realm ofconceptualization, even that of metaphor and poetry.36 In many discussions,intrinsic valuation is presented by Hartman himself as being primarily emo-tional and affective, with no mention of conceptualization. The emphasis isclearly non-conceptual in the expression "emphatic - and empathetic -valuation."3' The emotional side of intrinsic valuation comes out most clear-ly in Hartman's analysis of Ortega's story of the dying man, and the degrees ofemotional involvement or non-involvement experienced by the man's wife, hisdoctor, a reporter, and a painter, who view the scene. In Hartman's words,"Ortega measures these aspects of the situation by a common denominator:"the emotional distance between each person and the event they all w,itness."This measure coincides with our value hierarchy: the intrinsic valuationinvolves the valuer completely."38 Involvement here is clearly emotionalinvolvement. We must not confuse concept lulflllment with emotional fulfill-ment. In intrinsic valuation, a person may be united "in a common intrinsicGestalt" with the object valued. He may "interpenetrate" or "compenetrate"with it, but there is no literal sense to the claim that he applies to it a conceptcontaining a non-denumerable infinity of predicates. and checks off a non-denumerable infinity of properties. Hartman actually admitted that con-ceptuahzation plays no role in intrinsic valuation when he wrote that "almostall our articulate valuation is extrinsic. Intrinsic valuation is inarticulate,"3eand when he explained elsewhere that "The intensions of such singularconcepts, e.9.,'trty wifle,' 'my baby' are not series of words but Gestalten. In

36 Incidentally, they also tell us that it lies entirely beyond emotion and feeling, but I shall notdebate that pointhere.

3, See Footnote # 20.38 5V,p.260. For furtherdata on the emotional side of intrinsic valuation, see Footnotes 20

through 23..n SIz. p.252.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation

comprehending them we are completely involved, we form a continuum withthem."ao

As I see it, one of the most unfortunate consequences of Hartman's con-ceptualistic emphasis or bias is that it makes it impossible for there to be anyvaluation at all in the animal world and for animals to have any valuewhatsoever which is not conferred upon them by human (or divine) valua-tions. The system merely perpetuates the exclusively humanistic prejudices ofwestern civilization which sees the non-human world as existing to be exploit-ed but as having no value to or for itself. With the possible exception ofeducable chimpanzees, etc. animals presumably speak neither poetry norprose, and they do not create formal systems. Most animals do not con-ceptualize at all, and thus they are not capable of measuring things by con-cepts. Consequently, they are totally incapable of valuation, if valuation isconceptual measurement. Furthermore, if value is concept fulfillment, itshould follow that animals have no value to themselves, no value not con-ferred upon them by conceptualizers such as man. What Whitehead wouldhave called their "immediacy of self-enjoyment" involves neither value norvaluation, given Hartman's formal definitions of these terms.

If we recognize, however, that Hartman did not always stick by his ownformal deflnitions himself (and I suggest that we should not either), if weacknowledge that he did count feeling, emotion, and non-conceptual modesof involvement as forms of intrinsic valuation, then we can say that there isintrinsic value and valuation in the animal world alter all. All we have to do isabandon the formalities of the system! There do seem to be times whenanimals experience intense enjoyment, appreciation, and something ap-proaching even love and compassion (i3a and b). They also experience intensesuffering and frustration as forms of disvalue at times. Although not capableof conceptualization (i1), animals seem to find their immediate enjoymentsand involvements to be intrinsic values to themselves (tn sense 14) and theirown pains and frustrations to be intrinsic disvalues to themselves, quite apartfrom our human notice of such things.

A final difficulty which I wish to explore pertains to the connection betweensingularity of uniqueness (I3) and the other defining characteristics of in-trinsic value (Il,12, and I4). What exactly is uniqueness? How is it related tothese other characteristics? Is uniqueness really restricted to the realm ofintrinsic value?

In The Structure of Value, "uniqueness" is often used and discussed, but it isnever once defined. We must search elsewhere for his formal definition of thiscrucial concept, which is that:

40 VSC, p. 254.In yet another article entitled "Value Theory as a Formal System," Kart-Studien, Vo1. L. 1958-59, Hartman conceded on p. 300 that in intrinsic valuation the "thing is notthought at all but experienced in the actuality of its total being."

t4r

t42 The Journal ql'Value Inquirv

the uniqueness of a thing means the thing's having all the properties it has. but that "havingall the properties it has" is not one of the properties it is said to have. lt is a property o/theseproperties;and it is. precisely. the property that all unique things have in common.al

Now, if we take this definition seriously, just as it stands, and without furthermodiflcation, it should be readily apparent that uniqueness has no logical orontological connection with any of the other defining characteristics ofintrinsic value. An emphasis on uniqueness does not commit us to any of theother characteristics (Il,12, or 14). An entity has all the properties that it hasno matter whether the number of such properties is non-denumerably in-finite (I1), denumerably infinite (E1) or flnite (systemic). Even constructedsystemic entities have all the properties that they have ! Furthermore, anentity has all the properties that it has, no matter whether it be non-empiricaland non-sp.atio-temporal (I2), or spatio-temporal, empirical (82), or for-mally constructed (systemic). Whitehead pointed out that "every so-called'universal' is particular in the sense of being just what it is."42 If intrinsicuniqueness (I3) is a matter of having all the non-spatio-temporal propertiesthat a thing has, then we must add two additional kinds oluniqueness to thesystem - extrinsic uniqueness (E5) - having all the spatio-temporal propertiesthat a thing has, and systemic uniqueness (S5?) - having all the constructedproperties that a thing has.

Finally, we should reahze that a thing has all the properties that it has nomatter whether it be an end in itself (I4) or a means to an end (E4). Thus,uniqueness is not limited to the realm of intrinsic value at all. This situation isnot much remedied even if we go on to hnd still other definitions of"uniqueness" in Hartman's writings. There is a passage in The Structure oJ'

Value in which Hartman suggests that in order to count as unique, an entitymust have at least some (an inf,nity of) properties not possessed by any otherentity. He wrote:

The singular fact has the properties ol fact in general, namely being, plus the properties of aparticular class, plus an infinity of properties which the individual has uniquely.a3

If we now limit our discussion to this second quite distinct notion of "unique-ness," I should like to conclude by pointing out that Hartman is quite uniquein the history of ethics or axiology in attempting to tie that which is desirablefor its own sake, that which is an end in itself (I4), to uniqueness. Traditionalanswers to the question of "What things are intrinsically good?" have alwaysbeen given in terms of repeatable, universal kinds of things, such as know-

a1 This definition appears in Hartman's footnote on p. 235 of Abraham H. Maslow, ed., 1y'ew

Knowledge in Huntan Values (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1959). The same definition appearsin Robert S. Hartman. "Sputnik's Moral Challenge," Texas Quarter11,.Yol.III, No. 3, 1960), p.

15.42 Whitehead, Process and Reulity, p.76.a3 SV, p.96.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation 143

ledge, virtue, friendship, love, pleasure, etc.-bttnot in terms of uniqueness lnthe sense of having properties that nothing else has. Such experiences andactivities have intrinsic value (I4) because they are the kind of thing that theyare, not because particular instances have properties which other instances donot have. Saying that pleasure, for example, is valuable for its own sake, has

meant that it is worthwhile as that kind of thing, and all relevantly similarinstances have the same intrinsic worth. Kant would have said that any twoinstances of promise keeping for the sake of promise keeping are "goodwithout qualiflcation" simply because they are that kind of thing, not because

one instance possessed properties not possessed by the other, such as being apromise made to Jack rather than to Jill. The hedonist such as Benthamwould have said that any intense and prolonged pleasure is just as goodintrinsically as another that is equally intense and prolonged simply because

it is that kind of thing. He would not have thought that the possession by one

such pleasure of additional non-hedonic properties such as being derivedfrom pushpin rather than poetry made any real difference to their intrinsicworth. For Aristotle, contemplation was an intrinsic good simply because itwas that kind of thing, not because one instance of it possessed properties notpossessed by another instance of it, such as being the contemplation ofmetaphysics rather than physics. G. E. Moore thought that "the pleasures ofhuman intercourse" and "the enjoyment of beautiful objects" were intrinsicgoods simply as that kind of thing, not because one instance ol them pos-

sessed properties not possessed by another instance. Even where persons

have been regarded as intrinsic goods or ends in themselves, it has been

because of our common humanity or sentience, and not because of ourabsolute differences from one another. The tradition has thus answered thequestion of "What things are intrinsically good?" in terms of repeatableproperties, experiences and activities, not in terms of non-repeatable in-dividualities. My own inclination is to go with the tradition and againstHartman on this issue.

University of Tennessee