EL CONFLICTO PALESTINO-ISRAELI: SOLUCIONES Y DERIVAS

Profesor David Noel Ramírez PadillaRector del Tecnológico de Monterrey

Lic. Héctor Núñez de CáceresRector de la Zona Occidente

Ing. Salvador Coutiño AudiffredDirector General del Campus Querétaro

Dr. Ricardo Romero GerbaudDirector de Profesional y Graduados enAdministración y Ciencias Sociales

Mtra. Angélica Camacho ArandaDirectora del Departamento de RelacionesInternacionales y Formación Humanística

Mtro. Kacper PrzyborowskiDirector de la Licenciatura en RelacionesInternacionales

Dr. Tomás Pérez VejoEscuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia INAH

Dra. Avital BlochUniversidad de Colima

Dra. Marie-Joelle ZaharUniversité de Montréal

Dra. Claudia Barona CastañedaUniversidad de Las Américas Puebla

Dr. Thomas WolfeUniversity of Minnesota, Twin-Cities

Dr. Janusz MuchaAGH, Cracovia

Dr. Ricardo Romero GerbaudDirección

Mtro. José Manuel Velázquez HurtadoMaría José Juárez BecerraEdición

Natalia Fernández, Alicia Hernández, Rodrigo PesceAsistentes de Edición

Retos Internacionales, ISSN: 2007-8390. Año 5, No. 11, Agosto-Diciembre 2014, publicación semestral. Editada por el Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Campus Querétaro, a través de la División de Administración y Ciencias Sociales, bajo la dirección del Departamento deRelaciones Internacionales y Humanidades, domicilio Av. Eugenio Garza Sada No. 2501, Col. Tecnológico, C.P. 64849, Monterrey, N.L. Editor responsable: Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud. Datos de contacto: rromero@itesm.mx, http://retosinternacionales.com, teléfono y fax: 52 (442) 238 32 34. Impresa por FORUM arte y comunicación S.A. de C.V., domicilio Av. del 57, número 12, Colonia Centro, C.P. 76000 Querétaro, Qro., México, teléfono: (442) 2158281. El presente ejemplar se terminó de imprimir en diciembre de 2014. Tiraje de 500 ejemplares. El editor no necesariamente comparte el contenido de los artículos y sus fotografías, ya que son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores. Se prohíbe la reproducción total o parcial del contenido, fotografías, ilustraciones, colorimetría y textos publicados en este número sin la previa autorización que por escrito emita el editor.

GRUPO FORUM

Dra. Marisol Reyes SotoUniversity of Queens, Ireland

Dr. Tamir Bar-OnTecnológico de Monterrey

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BREAKING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DEADLOCKPARAMETERS FOR TWO STATE SOLUTIONPor. Raphael Cohen-Almagor

WOMEN AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EASTPor: Carmen Corona Artigas

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE-MAKING: A PARADIGM SHIFTPor: James M. Dorsey

NEGLECTED NARRATIVES: THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE MIDDLE EASTPor: Andrea Galván Vélez

PRESENTE, PASADO Y FUTURO DEL CONFLICTO PALESTINO ISRAELÍ: UN DESAFÍO ANTE EL SISTEMA DE SEGURIDAD COLECTIVA DE LA ONUPor: Sergio García Magariño

PROTECTIVE EDGE AND HUMAN SHIELDSPor: Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini

RADICAL ISLAMISTS: ISLAM’S RASHIDUN OR HIJACKERS GROUPS?Por: María José Juárez Becerra

LA DIÁSPORA Y EL RECONOCIMIENTO AL ESTADO PALESTINO: LOS CASOS DE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADORPor: Sergio I. Moya Mena

THE APOCALYPTIC WAR AGAINST GOG OF MAGOG. MARTIN BUBER VERSUS MEIR KAHANEPor: Rico Sneller

ABDULLAH ÖCALAN’S THE ROAD MAP: FROM THE ARMED STRUGGLE TO A GRAMSCI OF OUR TIMES?Por: Dr. Tamir Bar-On

AMOR Y HUMOR PARA RUSIA Y DESDE RUSIAPor: Imelda Ibañez Guzmán

RESEÑA DEL LIBRO: THE WORLD THROUGH SOCCER: THE CULTURAL IMPACT OF A GLOBAL SPORT, DEL AUTOR TAMIR BAR-ONPor: Mary Carmen Peloche Barrera

TEMA CENTRAL EL CONFLICTO PALESTINO-ISRAELI: SOLUCIONES Y DERIVAS

Por varias décadas la comunidad internacional ha sido testigo de la crisis existente entre Israel y Palestina. Naciones con una tradición y cultura más entrelazada de lo que muchos creerían, han estado cerca de lograr la paz por medio del mutuo reconocimiento, pero a la vez, se han acrecentado los niveles de violencia cuando esta búsqueda de reconciliación ha fracasado. Los factores que afectan este proceso de acercamiento y entendimiento han sido tan diversos como los intereses en juego al declarar a Palestina como Estado.

Las bajas en ambas partes han sido notables; el odio inculcado y reproducido de generación en generación hace divisar un panorama en el cual se buscan respuestas de carácter diplomático pero no de carácter social. El mundo está ante un conflicto donde el reto más importante será sanar las heridas que los sentimientos antagonistas, los atentados y la intervención extranjera han dejado como estragos a su paso.

El escalamiento del conflicto ha creado la necesidad de llegar a acuerdos en cuestiones fundamentales y básicas para la supervivencia como los derechos

del agua, la libertad de movimiento y la legislación de los derechos de los refugiados. A esto se ha sumado la definición de las fronteras y el sensible tema del control de la ciudad de Jerusalén. Las soluciones propuestas vienen de muchas perspectivas, y quedan preguntas como ¿cuáles son las consecuencias futuras que surgen de cada una? ¿Están Israel y Palestina dispuestos a correr con los costos de sus intereses a fin de llegar a un acuerdo de paz y convivencia armoniosa entre ambos?

En este número de Retos Internacionales las áreas de investigación incluidas contemplan la cultura, la religión, la sociedad y la política como algunos de los suelos sobre los cuales se pueden plantar las ideas para entender el conflicto palestino-israelí. Los artículos revelan las variables inmersas como indicadores de que, de no haber un deseo por el reconocimiento del otro, por la cooperación y la colaboración, la resolución será imposible de formular: ¿cuánto tiempo es necesario para reconciliar a dos pueblos? Tal vez ya sea el momento de tender los puentes para hacerlo.

Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud

TEMA CENTRALEL CONFLICTO

PALESTINO-ISRAELI: SOLUCIONES Y

DERIVAS

Por: Raphael Cohen-Almagor University of Hull, England

Raphael Cohen-Almagor received his DPhil in political theory from Oxford University. He is Professor and Chair in Politics, University of Hull. He was member of the Israel Press Council; Founder and Director of the Center for Democratic Studies, University of Haifa, and (Acting) Associate Dean for Research, University of Hull. He is Founder and Director of the Hull Middle East Study Group. Professor Cohen-Almagor was Fulbright-Yitzhak Rabin Visiting Professor at UCLA School of Law, Visiting Professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Among his more recent books are The Right to Die with Dignity (2001), Speech, Media and Ethics (2001, 2005), and The Scope of Tolerance (2006, 2007). Web: http://www.hull.ac.uk/rca. Blog:http://almagor.blogspot.com

BREAKING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DEADLOCKPARAMETERS FOR TWO STATE SOLUTION

ABSTRACTSince 1977, the Israeli society has been split over the question of peace versus land. The aim of this paper is to outline the parameters for a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Drawing upon the Clinton Parameters, the Geneva Accord, the Arab initiative, and the Olmert-Abbas talks, the paper argues for a two-state solution and suggests a doable pathway to peace. If and when accepted, these suggestions will constitute the foundations for resolving all contentious issues.

PREFACEIsrael was established in May 1948. Ever since then its boundaries are disputed. The boundaries have been disputed both by Israelis and by foreigners. The major controversies relate to the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. These territories, conquered during the 1967 Six Day War, are claimed by Israel’s neighbours. The Palestinian Authority (PA) wishes to end the state of occupation in the West Bank, to lift the Israeli siege on Gaza, and also claims neighbourhoods in the eastern part of Jerusalem, whereas Syria claims the Golan Heights. The PA, like Israel, suffers from the land dispute as it does not have defined boundaries. The PA also lacks control over its territory and sovereignty. These are necessary preconditions for its declaration of independence and statehood.

KEYWORDSIsrael, Palestine, peace, security,

borders, Jerusalem, refugees,

Since 1977, the Israeli society has been split over the question of peace versus land. The main issue is: what price are we willing to pay for peace? Here we need to distinguish between peace en abstractum v. peace en practicum.

The Clinton Parameters, http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm

Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136

U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/UN+Security+Council+Resolution+338.htm

UN Security Council Resolution 1397 (March 12, 2002), http://www.rewordify.com/index.php?wpage=2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rt/11134.htm

Ben Birnbaum, “The End of the Two-State Solution: Why the window is closing on Middle-East peace”, The New Republic (March 11, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112617/israel-palestine-and-end-two-state-solution#

The Geneva Accord, http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/english

The Arab Peace Initiative 2002, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm

Aluf Benn, “Haaretz exclusive: Olmert’s plan for peace with the Palestinians”, Haaretz (December 17, 2009), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/haaretz-exclusive-olmert-s-plan-for-peace-with-the-palestinians-1.1970; Ehud Olmert interview to Stephen Sackur, BBC HARDtalk (2009), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:RhsmGjUhoY8J:www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00n4fw3/HARDtalk_Ehud_Olmert_Israeli_Prime_Minister_2006_2009/+Ehud+Olmert+talks+to+Stephen+Sackur+about+his+Palestinian+peace+proposals&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk

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In September 1993, Israel woke up to a new, dramatic reality. Out of the blue, Israel had a peace treaty with its foe. After eight months of secret negotiations and 14 meetings the enemy of yesterday became a partner for peace. There was jubilation amongst those in the left-wing peace camp. At the same time, there were fears and anxieties on the right where people realized that they now needed to grapple with the issue of the price: What price would Israel pay for the treaty?

What follows is an attempt, from the point of view of diplomacy and political science, to delineate the price by outlining the parameters needed to end the Israeli-Palestinian protracted and most bloody conflict. For such a momentous achievement of resolving a deep, entrenched conflict, three things are absolutely essential:a) An Israeli leader who is committed to bring peace to his people and is willing to pay the necessary price;b) A Palestinian leader who is committed to bring peace to his people and is willing to pay the necessary price;c) Shared belief by both leaders that the time is ripe for peace. By “time is ripe” it is meant that both leaders believe that enough blood was shed, that they need to seize the moment because things might worsened for their people, and that they have the ability to lead their respective people to accept the peace agreement and change reality for the better.

During the past two decades, at no given time the three ingredients coexisted. In 1993 and 2000, Prime Ministers Rabin and Barak were committed to peace and felt that the time was ripe, but that commitment and feeling was not shared by their Palestinian counterpart, Yasser Arafat. All three leaders did not have the full backing of their people, and were either unable or unwilling to instill in their people a sense of urgency and yearning for peace, which must come with a high price. It is argued that the way to escape the deadlock is to rely on the Clinton Parameters,1 the Geneva Accord,2 the Arab initiative,3 and the Olmert-Abbas talks.4 These documents contain the foundations for resolving all contentious issues.

To build genuine peace, it is essential to have trust, good will and mutual security. I believe that if there is a will, there is a way. Peace is a precious commodity and therefore it requires both parties to pay a high price for its achievement, reaching a solution that is agreeable to both. The peace deal should be attractive to both Israel and Palestine, equally. It cannot be one-sided, enforced or coerced. Of all the possible solutions presently on the table, a two-state solution is to be the most viable.

The Palestinians aspire to have an independent state in the 1967 borders, with Arab Jerusalem as its capital and a substantial return of refugees to Israel. The Israelis wish to retain the Jewish character of Israel, being the only Jewish state in the world. Both sides wish to enjoy life of tranquility and in security, free of violence and terror. Both parties should explicitly accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242,5 338,6 and 13977 and then begin their full implementation. The endgame will be based on the following parameters:

Palestinian sovereignty – will be declared and respected.

Mutual recognition – Israel shall recognize the State of Palestine. Palestine shall recognize the State of Israel.

Mutual diplomatic relations – Israel and Palestine shall immediately establish full diplomatic relationships with each other, installing ambassadors in the capital of the respective partner.

Capital – each state is free to choose its own capital.

Borders – These should be reasonable and logical for both sides. Former military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin explained: “Having a border is the best security arrangement.”8 Settling the conflict would give Israel greater international legitimacy to fight terrorism and enable it to deal with the more serious emerging threat from Iran.

Israel will withdraw to the Green Line, evacuating settlements and resettling the settlers in other parts of the country. The major settlement blocs − Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Gush Etzion, Modi’in Illit and Ariel − which account for approximately 70% of the Jewish population in the West Bank and for less than 2% of its size, may be annexed to Israel upon reaching an agreement with the PA of territory exchange that will be equal in size.9 Border adjustment must be kept to the necessary minimum and must be reciprocal. At the Taba talks, the Palestinians presented a map in which Israel would annex 3.1 percent of the West Bank and transfer to the PA other territory of the same size.10 Yossi Beilin said that they were willing to concede Israeli annexation of three settlement blocs of at least 4 percent of the West Bank.11 Prime Minister Olmert offered Palestinian President Abbas a similar or even slightly better deal but Abbas did not reply positively.

Territorial contiguity – a corridor would connect the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to allow safe and free passage. As long as peace is kept, the road will be permanently open and solely Palestinian. No Israeli checkpoints will be there. Palestinians will not be able to enter Israel from this corridor, nor shall Israelis enter Palestine from the corridor. Palestine will ensure that this safe passage won’t be abused for violent purposes. Such abuse would undermine peace and trust between the two parties.

The Separation Barrier creates a political reality. It should run roughly along the 1967 mutually agreed borders.

Security – Both Israel and Palestine will take all necessary measures to ascertain that their citizens could live free of fear for their lives. Security is equally important for both Israelis and Palestinians as this is the key for peace. Palestine and Israel shall base their security relations on cooperation, mutual trust, good neighborly relations, and the protection of their joint interests.12

For pertinent maps, see http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/static-maps/. See also West Bank “Settlement Blocs”, Peace Now, http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/west-bank-%E2%80%9Csettlement-blocs%E2%80%9D

Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva, p. 239.

Beilin, The Path to Geneva, p. 246.

The Geneva Accord, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5019.htm

Beilin, The Path to Geneva, p. 169.

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace, p. 240. Yossi Beilin tells the story of the Taba talks during which two Israelis were murdered in Tulkarem. The Palestinians, he writes, expressed their shock at the murder but they found it difficult to understand why “we always play into the hands of those who want to sabotage the talks”. Beilin, The Path to Geneva, p. 243.

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The Palestinian state will be non-militarized. This issue was agreed upon in 1995. Also agreed upon were joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols along the Jordan River, the installation of early warning posts, and the establishment of a permanent international observer force to ensure the implementation of the agreed security arrangements.13 The early warning posts will be periodically visited by Israeli security officers but they won’t be permanently present on Palestinian soil. If there is a need for a permanent presence, this would be trusted to an agreed-upon third party.

Terrorism and violence – Zero tolerance in this sphere. Both sides will work together to curb violence. Both sides will see that their citizens on both sides of the border reside in peace and tranquility. Zealots and terrorists, Palestinians and Jews, will receive grave penalties for any violation of peace and tranquility.

In the past, the Palestinians failed to understand the gravity of terrorism and were willing to accept it as part of life. Nabil Shaath said: “The option is not either armed struggle or negotiations. We can fight and negotiate at the same time, just as the Algerians and the Vietnamese had done”.14 Democracies, however, see things differently. On this issue there should be no compromise.

Jerusalem – What is Palestinian will come under the territory of the new capital Al Kuds. Al Kuds would include East Jerusalem and the adjacent Palestinian land and villages. Abu Dis, Al-Izarieh and Al-Sawahreh will be included in the Palestinian capital. The Israeli capital would include West Jerusalem and the adjacent Israeli settlements. To maintain Palestinian contiguity, Israel may be required to give up some of the settlements around Arab Jerusalem. The Old City will be granted a special status. Special arrangements and recognition will be made to honour the importance of the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter for Jews, and similarly special arrangements and recognition will be made to honour the importance of the Islamic and Christian holy places. The Old City will be opened to all faiths under international

custodianship. There will be Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in providing municipality services to both populations.

Haram al-Sharif – On March 31, 2013, a Jordan-Palestinian agreement was signed between the PA and Jordan, entrusting King Abdullah II with the defense of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem.15 While Jordan may be a party to any agreement concerning the site, a broader arrangement is welcomed. As agreed by Abbas and Olmert, it will be under the control of a five-nation consortium: Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Waqf will continue its administration. Jews will enjoy right of access. Excavation for antiquities may be undertaken only with the full agreement of both sides. Similarly, alterations to the historical structures and foundations can be made only upon the consent of both sides.

Water – The UN secretary-general has said that Palestinians “have virtually no control” over the water resources in the West Bank, with 86 percent of the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea under the de facto jurisdiction of the settlement regional councils.16 Israel and Palestine should seek a fair solution that would not infringe the rights of any of the sides and will assure that the Palestinian people will have the required water supply for sustenance and growth.17

Fishing – Israel and Palestine will enjoy fishing rights in their respective territorial waters.

Education – Israel and Palestine will institute a shared curriculum on good neighborhood, understanding cultures and religions, respect for others and not harming others. This education program will commence at the kindergarten and continue at primary and high schools. In every age group vital concepts for understanding the other will be studied. This program is critical for establishing peaceful relationships and trust between the two parties.

Analysts: Jerusalem deal boosts Jordan in Holy City, Ma’an News Agency (April 3, 2013), http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=581765

Briefing: Beyond the E-1 Israeli settlement, IRIN (March 18 2013), http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97676/Briefing-Beyond-the-E-1-Israeli-settlement

For further discussion, see Hillel Shuval, “Is the Conflict over Shared Water Resources between Israelis and Pal-estinians an Obstacle to Peace?,” and Amjad Aliewi, Enda O’Connell, Geoff Parkin and Karen Assaf, “Palestine Water: between Challenges and Realities,” both in Elizabeth G. Matthews (ed.), The Israel-Palestine Conflict (Lon-don: Routledge, 2011): 93-113, 114-138.

See Daniel Bar-Tal, “Challenges for Constructing Peace Culture and Peace Education”, and Salem Aweiss, “Cul-ture of Peace and Education”, both in Elizabeth G. Matthews (ed.), The Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Rout-ledge, 2011): 209-223, 224-246.

Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine (Cambridge: Polity, 2012): 243.

Bhikhu Parekh commented that there is no reason why all Palestinian children should learn Hebrew. Israeli Pales-tinians should but he does not see why this should be a requirement for all Palestinian Arabs. I think that requiring the children of both societies to learn both Arabic and Hebrew is vital for facilitating connections the two communi-ties, for promoting understanding of one’s other culture and for decreasing animosity and fear.

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Languages – Starting in primary schools, Arabic will be a mandatory language for pupils to study in Jewish schools. Similarly, Hebrew will be a mandatory language for pupils to study in Palestinian schools. Language is the most important bridge between different cultures and nations. Israelis will master Arabic to the same extent that they presently master English. Palestinians will master Hebrew as their second language.18

Incitement – Both sides need to clean up the atmosphere, fight bigotry, racism, incitement and hate on both sides of the fence/wall. This includes a close study of the education curricula in both the PA and Israel. Both sides need to overhaul their school books, excluding incitement, racism, bigotry and hate against one another.19 The curricula should reflect a language of peace, tolerance and liberty. Both sides should utilize the media to promote peaceful messages of reconciliation and mutual recognition.

Prisoners – As an act of good will, part of the trust-building process, Israel will release a number of agreed upon prisoners. With time, as trust will grow between the two sides, all security prisoners will return home.

Refugees and their right of return – This is a major concern for both Palestine and Israel. For Palestinians, this issue is about their history, justice and fairness. For Israelis, this is a debated issue, where many Israelis are unwilling to claim responsibility for the Palestinian tragedy and most Israelis object to the right of return as this would mean the end of Zionism. The issue is most difficult to resolve as the original refugee population of an estimated 700,000-750,000 has grown to 4,966,664 refugees registered with UNRWA at the end of November 2010. About 40% of the refugees live in Jordan, where they comprise about a third of the population; another 41% are in the West Bank and Gaza, 10% are in Syria, and 9% are in Lebanon. In the West Bank, refugees constitute about one-third of the population while in Gaza they comprise over 80% of the population.20

Israel and the PA have been arguing endlessly about this issue as a matter of principle without examining by surveys how many of the refugees and their families actually are intended to return to Israel if this option were to be available to them. What needs to be done is twofold: first, Israel needs to recognize that it has a shared responsibility with the Palestinians to solve the problem. Israel needs to honestly confront history, refute myths and acknowledge the role it played in the creation of the refugee problem. Second, there is a need to identify the population, establish the numbers, and after mapping the refugee population, conduct a survey among them that would include the following options:

• Return to Israel;• Return to the West Bank;• Return to the Gaza Strip;• Emigrate to third countries that would commit to absorbing a certain quota (appeal will be made to countries that receive immigration on a regular basis to participate in this settlement effort);• Remain where they are.

The 1948 Palestinian refugees will be able to settle in Palestine. The rest of the world is legitimate to set immigration quotas for absorbing Palestinians who apply for settlement in their designated choice of country. Unification of families should be allowed in Israel on a limited quota annual scale. But massive refugee return to Israel will not be allowed. This dream should be abandoned. When Abu Mazen was asked whether he would wish to have Safed, where he was born he replied: “It’s my right to see it, but not to live there”.21 I suspect that Abu Mazen’s view reflects the view of many Palestinians who seek recognition, apology and compensation, not the right of return. Thus Israel should recognize the Nakba, acknowledge Palestinian suffering, and compensate the 1948 refugees and their children (but not grandchildren) for the suffering inflicted on them. An international tribunal of reputable historians and international lawyers, including equal representatives of Israel and Palestine, will determine the level of compensation. If needed, Israel and Palestine may establish an international relief fund to which humanitarian countries that wish to see the end of the conflict contribute. I believe that between Israel,

Europe, the Moslem World, North America and other countries of good will (the Geneva Accord mentions Japan; I would add China, Australia and Brazil), the required funding can be secured. The United Nations and the World Bank may also be approached to offer assistance.

Economic Agreements - Israel and Palestine will consider opportunities for economic cooperation for the benefit of both societies, aiming to capitalize on the potential of both, to optimize resources and coordinate efforts. Israel would help Palestine develop independent economy and open doors for Palestine in the Western world and elsewhere. Palestine will pave the way for Israel’s integration into the Middle East as an equal member in the community of neighbouring countries. Palestine will help Israel develop economic, industrial, tourist and other relationships with the Arab and Muslim countries.International Commerce – Israel and Palestine will be free to conduct international commerce as they see fit. In order to develop trust between the two parties, some level of transparency about logs of commerce will be agreed and memorandums of understanding will be signed by the two parties.

Tourism – Israel and Palestine will coordinate efforts in promoting tourism to the region, this via collaboration with the neighboring countries in order to facilitate cultural and religious experiences that are unique to this region.

Communication and Media – Mutual channels of communication will be opened on television, radio and the Internet. These media channels will transmit their broadcast in two or three languages: Arabic, Hebrew and possibly also English. Communication and language are important for the development of good neighborly relations.

Termination of the conflict – following the signing of a comprehensive agreement covering all issues and concerns, an official statement will be issued declaring the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Four Party Permanent Team – Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Palestine will maintain a permanent organization that will meet periodically to discuss concerns and resolve problems amicably. This forum will discuss issues such as the Gaza ports, agriculture, economic development, water, fishing, tourism, security

Ben Birnbaum, “The End of the Two-State Solution: Why the window is closing on Middle-East peace”, The New Republic (March 11, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112617/israel-palestine-and-end-two-state-solution#

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REFERENCES

Al-bab. (2002). Arab Peace Initiative. Al-bab. Available at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm

Amjad, A., O’Connell, E., Parkin, G. and Assaf, K. (2011). Palestine Water: between Challenges and Realities. In Matthews, E. (ed.). The Israel-Palestine Conflict. London: Routledge.

Aweiss, S. (2011). Culture of Peace and Education. In Matthews, E. (ed.). The Israel-Palestine Conflict. London, England: Routledge.

Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Challenges for Constructing Peace Culture and Peace Education. In Matthews, E. (ed.). The Israel-Palestine Conflict. London, England: Routledge.

Benn, A. (2009, December 17). Haaretz exclusive: Olmert’s plan for peace with the Palestinians. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/haaretz-exclusive-olmert-s-plan-for-peace-with-the-palestinians-1.1970

Beilin, Y. (2004). The Path to Geneva. New York, United States: RDV Books.

Ben-Ami, S. (2005). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. London, England: Phoenix.

Birnbaum, B. (2013, March 11). The End of the Two-State Solution: Why the window is closing on Middle-East peace. The New Republic. Retrieved from: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112617/israel-palestine-and-end-two-state-solution#

Clinton Parameters. (2000, December 23). The Jewish peace lobby. Retrieved from: http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm

Dowty, A. (2012). Israel/Palestine. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity.Israel Ministry of Foreing Affairs.

IRIN. (2013, March 18).Briefing: Beyond the E-1 Israeli settlement. IRIN. Retrieved from: http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97676/Briefing-Beyond-the-E-1-Israeli-settlement

Ma’an News Agency. (2013, April 3). Analysts: Jerusalem deal boosts Jordan in Holy City. Ma’an News Agency. Retrieved from: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=581765

controls along the Jordan River, security concerns in Sinai, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalism. All four parties can build on the strengths of their societies and together ensure a better future for their children.

International Arbitration – Difficult issues that won’t be resolved by direct negotiations will be delegated to a special arbitration committee. This special committee will have an equal number of Israeli and Palestinian delegates plus an uneven number of international experts. Only experts approved by both parties will be invited to serve on the arbitration committee. The committee will include lawyers, economists, human rights experts and experts on the Middle East. Their resolutions would be final, without having the right of appeal. Both Israel and Palestine will commit to accept every decision of the arbitration committee. One model to follow might be the arbitration committee comprised to resolve the Taba dispute between Israel and Egypt.

CONCLUSIONTo resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there is a need for courageous leaders on both sides who seize the opportunities presented to them and make the most for their peoples. To erect peace, it is essential to have trust, good will and security. It would be far-fetched at present to hope for peace in the short term. We should have little illusions about peace, at least so long as Hamas is determined to wipe Israel off the map. Israel does not even appear on Hamas maps. Israel should aspire to enter a long-term interim agreement; to build trust; evacuate isolated settlements; consolidate economic conditions for Palestinians; bolster security on both sides; stop enlarging existing settlements; dismantle checkpoints to make the lives of Palestinian civilians easier; develop the nautilus Iron Dom against rockets and other anti-rocket mechanisms. Finally, international cooperation is required to lift the existential Iranian threat.

Por: Carmen Corona ArtigasITESM, Campus Querétaro, México

Carmen Corona is a student of International Relations at the ITESM Campus Querétaro. She did a certificate in Event Management at Victoria University in Melbourne, Australia and studied at Foxcroft School in Virginia, USA. She also did her Professional Practices in the Mexican Embassy at Lisbon, Portugal, at Periódico Am (a local newspaper), and volunteered for VICDA Organization at El-Shadaii Orphanage in Gadanji, Kenya. Contact: ccoronaa@gmail.com

WOMEN AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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ABSTRACTThis article discusses the greater role played by women from the Middle East not as a submissive gender but rather as a force of change that has lead the way through revolutions. The participation of women during the revolts of the Arab Spring and their activism thereafter has stated that a fight for dignity is just the same as a fight for power. Women in the region have struggled to integrate into society; they have been discriminated and rejected. However, the mobilization of women into the work force will demonstrate that they are active and capable members of society, as they have proven to be during the revolts.

KEYWORDSWomen, Activism, Leadership,

Middle East, Discrimination, Submission, Arab revolution

“The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is not usually associated with women’s movements.

In the popular imagination shaped by media accounts, the region is better known for Islamist

movements, authoritarian governments, and unending conflicts.” (Moghadam, 2010:19)

Women have power in the Middle East and North Africa region, not as a submissive gender, but as a movement with incredible force that is able to change the course of the world forever. The testimonies and stories of brave women from the Middle East will be presented as evidence of the changes that have occurred in the world as a result of their activism. Also, the participation of women in different conflicts of the region will also serve to understand the extent of women’s involvement as a main force of change in all sectors of society. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that this struggle is a common struggle: it involves the participation of women without discrimination or fear of rejection. The international community should pay close attention to this growing force in the region, for it is a display of fearless citizens seeking due recognition. Women throughout the world have always played a basic role in society. Some have become important political and economic leaders in today’s hectic world. However, little is know about the women that are always portrayed as submissive in the Arab world. In the West, these women seem to have little to do with the issues of their countries and of their own lives. In some cases, it is believed that they are even told how to dress and how to behave, always under the careful watch of suppressive men. So why is it that women in the West are so different from women in the Middle East? Are there women born to be submissive to a higher authority, whether Allah or the government? And, is it really the case that these women are truly that different, or is it only the perception of the West?

Amanda Riggs form the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the Middle East recalls how some of her colleagues felt like in Egypt in 2011: “The Arab Spring signalled opportunity, new beginnings, possibility, and most of all hope. My friends and colleagues were so proud to be Egyptian −they stood with their heads high for achieving the unthinkable.” (2012) During the Arab Spring people protested with equality− men, women, children and elders, they all stood up for their rights. Then shouldn’t they all deserve the same rewards for fighting the same way everyone else did? If women were involved in the public demonstrations, it means that they are not weaker or that they have fewer rights than men do. In conjunction with women, the rest of society were able to attain results, this could be a signal of the strength and power that this gender has.

Isobel Coleman, Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Affairs, says that women were at the heart of the struggle for freedom by participating in the front lines of change. Women protested, led demonstrations, transmitted and organized society via media, relayed information, and even smuggled munitions. During that period women became icons of a revolution that demanded not only

political reforms but for basic human rights as well. Coleman wrote about women during the Arab revolts and explained that,

From Tunis and Cairo to Riyadh and San’a, female protesters have become the iconic image of the Arab revolutions. Their defiance has surprised many in the West who have long viewed Arab women as oppressed victims of conservative patriarchy and religion. Yet young Arab women today are significantly better educated, marry later, have fewer children, and are more likely to work outside the home than their mothers’ generation. Their demands for greater freedom have been building for years. (Coleman, 2011:215)

Although women have advanced in comparison to their mothers’ generations, there is still a lot to be done, especially in countries ruled by the Shari’a law, where the participation of women in any public realm is rather limited, if not non-existent. Coleman mentions how women in these countries have been pushed to the sidelines and been cheated of their support, promising a bright future for them. This was the case of the women that supported the Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iranian Revolution. Events such as the Islamic Revolution, call for a regeneration of principles in societies as a whole.

Zainab Salbi is the founder of Women for Women International, an organization that helps women form marginalized countries affected by war and conflict, to attain economical stability and self-sufficiency. Zainab is an Iraqi-American humanitarian that has made it to the list of the 100 Most Influential Women of 2011 (Newsweek and The Guardian) and 2012 (Fast Company), one of the most inspirational women in 2011 (The Economist Intelligence Unit). She has also received several other recognitions for her dedication to serving women. In her article Women and the ‘Third Way’, she is determined to demonstrate the political weight of women in the transformation of the Middle East. She begins by analysing the case of the Arab Spring and the following: “God is at the heart of how this ideological war is being expressed and women have become the battlefield. Whoever controls the landscape of their whole will set the future direction of the Middle East.” (2013: 235) Once again she verifies the fact that women have been actively struggling for the imposition of new democracies, a functioning state, and most of all, to attain their rights.

Zainab interviewed several women, with different nationalities and ideologies. However, they all share the same passion for justice and recognition. She narrates the story of a Tunisian woman that was imprisoned when she was accused of ‘unlawful gathering’ when she started wearing her hijab. Another revolutionary mentioned by Zainab is Han’a, a Libyan civil rights lawyer, that when asked about the revolution she described: everyone worked together in the revolution—Everyone: Islamists, women, men, secular folks, it didn’t

matter. If the Devil himself was against Qaddafi, then he was our friend.” (2013: 236) Another blogger called Fatima told Zainab that:

Tunisian women were never in the middle, they were at the front. When Tunisian women were on the street for protest or demonstrations, they were not females, they were citizens. We were all citizens in the street trying to achieve our goals, because it is our battle to live without restrictions or limitations. (2013: 236)

And a Libyan political female activist, called Jamila, told Zainab that: “Women were everywhere. In every place there was a woman. Women were organizing the protests; we were also burying and cleaning the death. We were getting charity and donations together.” (2013: 237) Never has been the participation of women clearer during the revolts, to have women at the very front of these protests only reassures their ability to lead the way to change. These battles gave people hope and a chance to start a fresh beginning. It gave women a voice that had been stolen because of the abuse of power by authoritarian governments and other ideologies. Nevertheless, women who participated in the Arab Spring are unknown and unrecognized heroes of their revolutions. But how were these brave women repaid? Soon, after the revolutions had ended, the political institutions that were once filled with dictators were once again occupied by suppressive leaders that returned to degrading women to the traditional roles that they once played. These women were being portrayed as an inactive and submissive sector of the society again. According to Zainab, in Egypt:

They also took away the quota or women´s representation in the parliament, which single-handedly reduced women’s representation from sixty-four seats to nine. Furthermore, women political activists were targets of sexual assault in the streets and in prisons. They were also subject to virginity test—a horrifying violation of a woman’s identity. This became a major issue for female political activists and led to the realization that they had not had when they first participated in the revolutions: that the political response to their activism was sexist and gendered, even though women saw themselves as citizens. This led to a new awakening about their specific gendered identity, leading some to call for a women’s revolution in the regions. (2013: 237-238)

They go beyond the confinement of political parties and are pushing for a true meaning of citizenship− freedom beyond gender, religion, or politics. They include women from all diverse religions and socioeconomic backgrounds in this new community of activists. The scene is far more inclusive than the political division that is happening in there three counties (Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia). (…) They are carving a third way, a middle ground where they accept each other´s differences with no judgement and unite their call for personal freedom. (2013: 240-241)

Zinab suggests that in order to maintain peace in the Middle East, this group of activists should be given a political and social platform. She continues to explain that since they hold the only true voice in the region, “they are the only real hope for a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Middle East.” (2013: 241) Therefore, it is time to give these women a chance to speak for them and for us to listen to what they have to say.

Zinab insists that women should rise in a revolution again, and to make the world listen to the injustices and the repeated abuses of their rights. This story is the repetition of many, and it is time to stop the cycle and change the course of history, however this possess a challenge especially in this region. As Bar-On (2014) explained in his lecture about the Origins of the Middle East, what the region has in common are the following elements: Islam, tribalism, Arabic language and culture, and a recent history of colonialism. In the case of women from the Middle East, Islam is the major source of the denial for their recognition and participation in the public sphere.

Radical Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, “(…) undermined women’s scholarly knowledge and credibility through character assassination, leaving little space for any compromise of ideologies on how to address the role of women in a contemporary way and within the framework of the spirit of Islamic laws.” (Zinab, 2013: 239) With radical movements or parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in power the status of women and their recognition will hardly be improved or attained. The radical ideologies view women as a submissive gender, not as the clearly strong and active one as it is. In any respect, this is a post revolution era in the Middle East, in which women and men have had a taste of their strength and impact that can be attained when one fights for a common cause. Although there is a political and ideological struggle, the subject of women is still an issue of main concern to any in the political sphere.

Women from the Middle East are the only ones that will fully comprehend what it feels like to be in their situation. This paper does not aim to describe their feelings towards oppression by men because of their ideologies, to be used, or to have their rights taken from them, rather than to explain that despite the misfortunes they have been able achieve their goals. Zainab explains that there is an emergence of a renewed, empowered, and frankly exhausted group of women is in itself their very own hope. She describes them as a generation of women activists that is identified with the youth and that are “more responsive to honesty and consistency on what is happening in the political transitions.” (2013:240). It is basically a group of female activists of a wide range of sectors, beliefs, and nationalities that fight for one same cause. They represent a threat to the Middle Eastern system, which has tried for so long to silence them, because they have mastered different tools that will organize and mobilize masses. The international community is now listening to this group that was once silenced because of their gender. In the words of Zinab:

Carla Power in The Price of Sexism (2011) insists that having women sitting at home in the Middle East, rather than working in the market can prove to be a devastating decision for any ruler. She points out that women’s rights and economy are issues that have continuously been studied separately. However this needs to be analysed again. Addressing this issue Power mentions that:

The economy and women’s rights have long been separate issues in the Middle Eastern public debate. But sexism is a costly business, holding back not just women but entire economies. This is true the world over but particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, which have the lowest rate of female participation in the global workforce. Only a quarter of Middle Eastern and North African women participate in the labor market, compared with over 50% in other developing regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. (2011)

While it is encouraging that the countries of the Middle East and North Africa region have invested impressively in women´s education in recent years, increasing their productive potential and earning capacity, it is clear from the low ranks of these countries on labour force participation—among the lowest in the world—that the region is not benefiting from the potential returns on this investment. (2005)

Allowing women to work and providing jobs for them is a control tactic that leaders in the Middle East should be analysing. By proving them with the possibility of employment the government would also tackle some of the problems in the recognition with subjects such as human rights; all this, while boosting the national economy to a new sector that has not been known because of the narrow job areas that have been opened before. Besides, if women work, they don’t only produce, but they are more likely to spend their salaries promoting economic participation. Still governments of the Middle East have failed to improve their opportunities. Statistics from the study: Women’s Empowerment: Measuring Global Gender Gap, from the World Economic Forum, have shown that women from the Middle East and Africa have the lowest overall score of women’s empowerment. The study stated that:

The study covers seven Muslim nations; the bottom four ranks are attributed to Middle Eastern countries, Jordan (55), Pakistan (56), Turkey (57), and Egypt (58). The study suggests that these nations conservative attitudes have been the reason why it has been hard for women to integrate the world of public decision-making. The new Arab governments should definitely give access to proper education and employment to women if they want to improve their competitiveness in relation to the other nations. The 2014 Global Gender Gap Index Rankings shows a general study of 142 countries; economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment were considered for the realization of the study. The overall results show that out of the 142 new countries included, countries of the Middle East such as Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

Oman, Turkey are ranked among the last 17 countries of the list. The report quantifies the magnitude of gender-based disparities and tracks their progress over time. It also seeks to measure the aspect of gender equality. The results easily demonstrate that the indignant inequality in the Middle East is greater than in any other region of the world. Governments need to commit to their societies and provide the due recognition to women and empower them to become active members of the society and the economy, if they want their countries to prosper.

Dr. Moghadam has analysed the impact that urbanization has had in women’s activism. She suggests that urbanization has created favourable conditions for women to engage in collective action because it includes the access education and to information. Moghadam uses the example of Iranian women after the revolution and she quotes Golnar Mehran who says that “education provided a platform for women’s increased gender consciousness and political awareness. Indeed, the feminization of higher education in Iran has been accompanied by the growth of advocacy for women’s rights in Iran.” (2010: 22) Educated women are more aware of what is happening in their countries and therefore are the ones that are taking action against the submission that has had them controlled for ages. Women are now conscious that they are not created only to stay at home and care for the family. Women know that they are capable to choose what they want to do with their lives. Urbanization, as stated by Moghadam, has brought to the region questions about society, their advances and inequalities; these have served as platform for the creation of women’s groups that search for equality. These groups strive for power through their participation in civil society, for it is through power that they will obtain safely the protection of women’s rights.

Lucy Nusseibeh is the founder and director of Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND), which is an organisation that promotes nonviolent alternatives throughout Palestine, and the director of the Institute for Modern Media al Al-Quds University. In her article entitled Women and Power in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Nusseibeh suggests that women are the soul-driving force that could bring peace and stability to the conflict:

If women are included at all levels of peace talks, and there is a truly gendered approach—with equal representation and respect for the concerns of all members of society—perhaps we could at least be on our way to a sustainable future. (2011: 46)

Lucy Nusseibeh continues to explain that the continuous conflict is a result of the different narratives that exist regarding the circumstances. Therefore it has not been possible to reach a resolution, for it has always been seen with the same predetermined ideas as ever. In order to achieve peace, all people involved should look and analyse the conflict form different perspectives that will allow for a better

understanding of the situation as a whole, and in order to propose different solutions to the conflict. Nusseibeh argues that women are often credited with being more peaceful than man, thus she proposes to analyse a possible solution to the conflict through women’s perspective.

There are different reasons why women should be consulted and should actively participate in the drafting of peace resolutions. They are more understanding to the priorities for public policy, such as the well being of society as a whole. Women have insight to for policy-making, and their perspective is maintained even when leadership positions have been reached. Women’s empathy to humanity can be the answer to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. One of the main issues that should be first dealt with is the fact that there are military armaments everywhere, so no one in the society can be safe. Nusseibeh analyses as well the security dilemma of the region, and proposes that women should reframe the concept to include the need for human dignity and self-respect, issues that have been taken away from women throughout the suppressive regimes of the Middle East. In order to achieve this level of recognition and to assure that they are heard, the Nusseibeh suggests the following:

One crucial point is that women in the peace process should not be seen only in the context of women as “victims of war and conflict” or as needing “protection and empowerment” but as women playing a proactive role in the process of peace negotiations and long-term peace building. Women are agents and can have power; in fact they simply need to assert that power to really start to make a change towards peace. (2011: 50)

As women start to find their voices around the world, the voices of women peacemakers among Palestinians and Israelis can carry more weight as they resonate with all those, women and men, who sincerely want lasting peace for the region. (…) If women leaders, especially from the mid- and grassroots levels, can be engaged by the leadership so that the gap between young and old, social and political, as well and Palestinian and Israeli, starts to be bridged, they can help bring peacemaking back to the streets. (2011: 54)

The Middle East is a region with women that are deeply committed to the fight for women’s rights. A powerful 17-year-old girl form Pakistan made the whole world turn heads in disapproval towards the violation of basic human rights. Malala Yousafzai was born in MIngora, Pakistan on July 1997. At the age of 17 she was awarded with the Nobel Peace Price of 2014 for her active fight for the right of education for girls. During her youth, her hometown was a popular tourist destination but soon, the area was taken over by the Taliban. On the year 2008, Malala delivered her first speech, “How dare the Taliban take away my basic right of education?”, and soon, she after began to blog for the BBC about the difficulties of girl’s education under Taliban watch. BBC News states that, “she first came to public attention through that heartfelt diary (…) which chronicled her desire to remain in education and for girls to have a chance to be educated.” Fearless, she challenged the Taliban for taking away her chance to be educated at a school, but made it clear that it did not matter that her chance to attend to a school was taken away but no one will ever be able to stop her from learning. In an interview given to Rick Westhead on October 2009, Malala stood clear on her opinion about education and said: “Education is not a gift for children, it should be their right, (…) hopefully, out country’s leaders will give us the rights we deserve. This is their responsibility”.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on for decades and has undergone a series of peace negotiations that have not been able to stop the conflict and end in disasters. Entire families have been torn apart and thousands have died in the struggle for recognition. Women however have not ceased to work for a peaceful nation and for the protection of their families and society. In Palestine, in the year 1980, the Union of Palestinian Women Committees (UPWC) was founded with the objective to empower women of all sectors of society to defend their rights and to: “contribute in the Palestinian national struggle against the Israeli military illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories.” (UPWC, 2014) Israeli women are also a motor of change in the conflicts of their societies, because no matter which nationality, ethnicity, or religious belief each has, they are all targeted as the weaker sex that cannot speak up for their rights. This is a completely wrong belief and whoever holds this view should be ware because, as the author Nusseibeh points out, “Women can use the fact of their being weak or victims or in the receiving end of oppression in effect change—both as the reason to insist on inclusion and as the way to unite and gain traction toward inclusion.” (2011: 52)

It is rather important the objectives of women’s fights that are stated before they execute their plans to attain them, because a fight for dignity is just the same as a fight for power. Those who are more prepared and have the complete desire for change, can only obtain success. In the relation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and women, this change involves the security and statehood for both nations, the recognition and protection of women’s rights and dignity and, once again, it can only be reached if women from both nationalities work together. Nusseibeh suggests that Palestinian and Israeli women would have the desired change more easily if they join international organizations in order to have the international community’s support and counsel, in addition she mentions:

Although the Taliban are determinant on their view about the participation of women and girls on any public realm, Malala has shown great courage and has set an example for all the international community, because while many applaud her determination, many radical Taliban think that she would be better of death for criticizing the Islamic religion. “When she was 14, Malala and her family learned that the Taliban had issued a death threat against her.” (Bio, 2014) She was targeted for assassination on 2012 and received three gunshots; one went straight through her head, then she received medical attention in England. The attempt of the Taliban to silence Malala only made her voice sound stronger. For soon after she got better, she delivered a speech for the United Nations in 2013 and also wrote a memoir titled, I Am Malala: The Girl Who Stood Up for Education and Was Shot by the Taliban. Even though Malala is now living in England with her family and attends school there, the echoes of her fight are still visible. Even more so after the Pakistani Taliban spokesman Shahidullah Shahid told the ABC News as seen in The Free Thinker News that:

We targeted Malala Yousafzai because she attacked Islam and make jokes of Islam, if we found her again then we would definitely try to kill her and will feel proud on her death. We didn´t target her for spreading education in her area, we targeted her for making jokes of Islam, and that was enough reason for attacking her.

I have always believed that resistance against repression and violence is possible without relying on similar repression and violence. I have always believed that human civilization is the fruit of the effort of both women and men. So, when women are treated unjustly and are deprived of their natural right in this process, all social deficiencies and cultural illnesses will be unfolded, and in the end the whole community, men and women, will suffer. The solution to women’s issues can only be achieved in a free and democratic society in which human energy is liberated, the energy of both women and men together. Our civilization is called human civilization and is not attributed only to men or women.

There is no wonder she is known as the ‘iron woman’ or the ‘Mother of the Revolution’, she has fought with her life to achieve a state of equality and safety for both men and women. She has encouraged and given voice to other women to speak out for the rights of other who have been suppressed, and has demanded the government to fulfil its duty in bringing peace and safety to its people. In her lecture she mentioned that with the help of millions of Yemeni citizens they were able to achieve through non-violent means their demands. Tawakkol Karman said: “We were able to efficiently and effectively maintain a peaceful revolution in spite of the fact that this great nation has more than seventy million firearms of various types.” (2011) Karman also emphasized that the Revolutions that started with the Arab Spring were the result of the people’s demand of their rights and general dissatisfaction. This is a plea that should not be forgotten; it stated the beginning of people fighting for their dignity. She finalized her lecture by thanking all the women who have made sacrifices for their society, who have stumbled with no social justice or equal opportunities, because they represent the motor of the battles that are yet to be fought.

The group who attacked this young activist claim that the attacks are “against her ideology” (The Telegraph, 2013) and that she will be considered as a target as long as she continues with her secular ideology and with her campaigns against the religion of Islam. Despite the horrors that Malala has faced and the constant threats that she has received, she continues to play an important role in the defence of women and children`s rights. “The shooting resulted in a massive outpouring support for Yousafzai, which continued during her recovery.” (Bio, 2014) It would be a shame that after the struggles that she has been through, she had not been recognized. Nevertheless, it is terrible that a young girl had to go through such a terrible experience in order for the rest of the international community to demonstrate their support for her cause. Malala represents an enormous segment of society, not only in Pakistan or in her hometown, but also throughout the Middle East. On one side, it is a positive fact that she has now the international community on her back because hopefully it will keep her safe, but, on the other side it is also now the responsibility of the community to provide help for the rest of the women and children that have had their rights stolen.

Another Nobel Peace Prize winner is Tawakkol Karman, who was awarded the in 2011 for her activism in building a safe environment for women in Yemen. She witnessed the unification of the State of Yemen in 1990 and, four years later, the war that was fought because of this. During this time she organized a group of journalists who reported the human rights abuses that were occurring during the struggles. Nobel Women Initiative Organization reported that “In 2005, she founded the organization Women Journalists Without Chains, (WJWC) which advocates for the rights and freedoms and provides media skills to journalists.” Together with her team she has outspoken corrupt regimes and mobilized society into supporting the Arab Spring. Tawakkol has been imprisoned several times for her peaceful protests, and still today continues to support the movement against corruption and injustice. On her Nobel Lecture delivered on December 2011 in Oslo, Tawakkol said:

CONCLUSION

A year after the Arab Spring facilitated for a series of changes to occur, “the events of the past year in the Middle East have not only upended political order, but are also unleashing new social, religious, and cultural dynamics.” (Coleman, 2011: 226) This is the time for women to raise and speak for their own gender, fight against submision and stand up for their rights. If women were to engage in this fight together as they have done recently it will be just a matter of time until the whole world bows in awe at what they have been able to achieve.

Women are the motor of society since the beginning of times in all civilizations, therefore they play an essential role in the continuation of humankind. The world has witnessed the extraordinary power women have,the extents to where their influence can reach. Therefore it is time for the intenational community to empower women from the Middle East regardless of their political or religious views, ethnic background, place of birth, and all the other characteristics that have so far prevented these wome from fighting.

Througout the paper the accounts of different women from the region have been presented as examples of their dailylife struggles and how their participation has been able to change the course of the world. Many have helped to outrule oppresive regimes, others have fought for the preservation of rights. These women exemplify the fact that no matter what the contribution is, if it is for the right cause it will echo and create a change. Hopefully, by the end of this paper the idea that women from the Middle East are submissive members of their society has been diminished of the mind of the reader, for they are the ones that have supported the waves of change. Therefore, the fact that these women are different from the women of the West, is only a misconseption and a lack of information. It is in fact the exact opposite, for they have lived through oppression and have risen to stand for their rights as citizens of the world.

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(2013). Pakistan Taliban issues fresh threat to kill Malala Yousafzai. The Telegrapher. Retrieved on October 15, 2014 from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10360502/Pakistan-Taliban-issues-fresh-threat-to-kill-Malala-Yousafzai.html

UPWC. (2014). Union for Palestinian Women Committees. Retrieved on October 17, 2014 from: http://www.upwc.org.ps/

Westhead, R. (2012). ‘You will not stop me from learning’: Teen activist awes us with her courage. The Star. Retrieved on October 15, 2014 from: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/10/09/you_will_not_stop_me_from_learning_teen_activist_awes_us_with_her_courage.html

(2014). Zainab Salbi. Women for Women International. Retrieved on October 16, 2014 from: http://www.womenforwomen.org/about-us/leadership/zainab-salbi

Riggs, A. (2012). What Role for Women After the Arab Spring?. Forbes. Obtained on October 13, 2014 from: http://0-search.ebscohost.com.library.vu.edu.au/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=70347331&site=bsi-live

Salbi, Z. (2013). Women and the ‘Third Way’. Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 67 Issue 1, p. 235-241

(2014). Malala was shot for ‘attacking Islam’, rather than for supporting girls’ education in Pakistan. The Free Thinker. Obtained on October 15, 2014 from: http://freethinker.co.uk/2013/10/07/malala-was-shot-because-for-attacking-islam-rather-than-for-supporting-girls-education-in-pakistan/

(2013). Pakistan Taliban issues fresh threat to kill Malala Yousafzai. The Telegrapher. Obtained on October 15, 2014 from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10360502/Pakistan-Taliban-issues-fresh-threat-to-kill-Malala-Yousafzai.html

UPWC. (2014). Union for Palestinian Women Committees. Recuperated on October 17, 2014 from: http://www.upwc.org.ps/

Westhead, R. (2012). ‘You will not stop me from learning’: Teen activist awes us with her courage. The Star. Obtained on October 15, 2014 from: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/10/09/you_will_not_stop_me_from_learning_teen_activist_awes_us_with_her_courage.html

Lopez-Claros A. and Zahidi, S. (2005). Women’s Empowerment: Measuring the Global Gender Gap. World Economic Forum.

(2014). Global Gender Gap Report 2014: Ranking. World Economic Forum. Recuperated on November 10, 2014 from: http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2014/rankings/

(2014). Zainab Salbi. Women for Women International. Recuperated on October 16, 2014 from: http://www.womenforwomen.org/about-us/leadership/zainab-salbi

Por: James M. Dorsey Nanyang Technological Universit

Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Co-director, Institute of Fan Culture, University of Wuerzburg jmdorsey@questfze.com

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE-MAKING: A PARADIGM SHIFT

ABSTRACTWars inevitably spark change. That is no truer than with the war in Gaza in 2014, no matter what Hamas and Israel say. The signs of changing attitudes of Israel and Hamas towards one another go significantly beyond the fact that the two sworn enemies who refuse to recognize one another are negotiating even if only indirectly. They also go beyond the fact that the road to the Cairo talks was paved in part on indirect negotiations between Hamas and the United States, which like Israel has declared Hamas a terrorist organization.

KEYWORDSIsrael, Palestine, Middle East,

Peace, Military

For much of Israel’s existence, Israelis believed that their security depended on achieving full-fledged peace with the Jewish state’s Arab neighbours. That notion was refined in the 1980s and 1990s with Israeli and Palestinian realization that peace would have to entail the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.For Palestinians, this meant acceptance of painful compromises involving surrender of claims to pre-1967 Israeli territory and the effective surrender of the right of 1948 refugees to return to their homes. Palestinian difficulty in translating that acceptance into policy allowed Israel to evade taking the painful decisions peace would require such as a withdrawal from the West Bank and some form of sharing of sovereignty in Jerusalem. Unwittingly, the Palestinian inability to grab opportunity by the horn enabled Israel to instead tighten its grip on the West Bank and Jerusalem and make any partition increasingly difficult.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace-making paradigm has shifted three decades later. After peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan; historic agreements with the Palestinians on mutual recognition, cooperation in a variety of sectors; various failed roadmaps to peace; and multiple wars between Israel and non-state actor such as Lebanese Shiite Muslim Hezbollah militia and Islamist Hamas, peace is no longer perceived in Israel as a must. For Israelis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become an issue of management rather than solution.

Changed Israeli perceptions of peace-making were long mirrored on the Palestinian side. A debilitating feud between Hamas and the Palestine Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ Al Fatah movement that put the Islamists in control of Gaza coupled with Israeli intransigence effectively stymied Abbas’ ability to achieve peace. In effect, Israel and Hamas shared tacit common interests. Neither wanted a final solution but both favoured a long-term ceasefire provided that enabled them to further social and economic development. That prospect however was undermined by a debilitating Israeli land, sea and air blockade of Gaza designed to prevent Hamas from arming itself – a policy that ultimately failed with the Islamist group’s use of underground smuggling tunnels.

Abbas’ helplessness coupled with Israeli and Hamas intransigence nonetheless reaffirmed a long-standing fact of life of the Israeli-Palestinian equation: hardliners can serve each other’s needs to mutual benefit without making the kind of wrenching concessions that thwart the ambitions of peacemakers and moderates on both sides. A prisoner swap in 2011 in which Israel bought freedom for Staff Sergeant Gilad Shalit after five years in Palestinian captivity in exchange for the release of 1,027 prisoners − many of whom were responsible for deadly attacks on Israelis – highlighted the fact that sworn enemies found it easier to do business than those who advocate compromise and living in peace and harmony side by side.Underlying, the swap was a belief on the part of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas that there is no realistic chance for an agreement on peace terms that would be acceptable to both Palestinians and Israelis. Given the nature of his coalition government, Netanyahu has been unwilling or unable to give Abbas the bare minimum he would need to push forward with peace without at least the tacit backing of Hamas.

While Netanyahu officially refused to negotiate with Hamas, for its part, Hamas refused Israeli conditions for its inclusion in a peace process, including the recognition of Israel’s right to exist, abandonment of its armed struggle, and acceptance of past Israeli-Palestinian agreements. If anything, the prisoner swap and its military performance in military confrontations with Israel reinforced the Islamist movement’s conviction that its hard line is paying off. Netanyahu strengthened Hamas in its conviction not only by excluding Abbas from the prisoner swap, but also by his decision at the time to build a new Jewish settlement on the southern edge of Jerusalem and the

granting of legal status to settlements established without his government’s approval. Netanyahu’s move flew in the face of Abbas’ efforts to make an Israeli freeze on settlements a core pre-condition for peace talks with the Israelis.

The paradigm of a tacit Israel-Hamas understanding bolstered intransigence on both sides and neutered Abbas shifted in 2014 with the military coup in Egypt of Hamas’ foremost ally, Islamist President Mohammed Morsi; a rift between Hamas and Iran over Hamas’s refusal to back the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; the Israeli blockade’s increasing destruction of the Gaza economy; and mounting international criticism of Israel fuelled by its brutal assault on the Gaza Strip. If Israel was long the proponent of peace, Hamas has opened the door to Palestinians replacing it in that role.

Indirect ceasefire talks in Cairo designed to end the 2014 Israel-Hamas war and achieve a lasting ceasefire and post-cease fire negotiations effectively constitute discussions about the parameters of a potential future peace agreement. Israeli rhetoric notwithstanding, signs of changing attitudes of Israel and Hamas towards one another went significantly beyond the fact that the two sworn enemies who refuse to recognize one another were negotiating even if only indirectly. They also went beyond the fact that the road to the Cairo talks was paved in part on indirect negotiations between Hamas and the United States, which like Israel has declared Hamas a terrorist organization.

Netanyahu announced changed Israeli attitudes towards Hamas when he defined Israel’s goal in the Gaza war as the weakening of Hamas military capability, if not the demilitarization of the group, rather than his long standing objective of total destruction of the organisation. While Israel seemed to be indiscriminate in its risking of civilian casualties during the war, Hamas’ senior leadership in the Strip emerged from the fighting unscathed.The negotiations despite their cyclical breakdowns did not only acknowledge Hamas as a key player in any long lasting arrangement with Israel but also constituted a recognition of the fact that the Islamist group looks a lot better than other militant Palestinian groups in Gaza, such as Islamic Jihad, which has often played the role of an agent provocateur trying to force conflict in an environment in which both Hamas and Israel would have wanted to avoid military confrontation. Even if Hamas does not comprise the moderate Palestinians that Israel and its western backers prefer to deal with, it looks better than the Islamic State which occupies significant chunks of Syria and Iraq.

Israel’s acknowledgement of Hamas as the best of a bad bunch was evident in the substance of the Cairo talks: the building blocks of a future state and a two-state resolution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict −rule by a Palestinian national unity government, open borders, a sea port, extended territorial waters, and an airport −in exchange for military and security arrangements that ensure the security of both Israel and the Palestinians.

Anat Kurz, director of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for national security studies, which has close ties to Israel’s government and security establishment, reflected the changed attitudes in official Israeli thinking: “Israel does not want to destroy Hamas. There’s a shift in the Israeli position (…) Israel wants to leave Hamas enough capability because it is the most organised force in the Gaza Strip,” Kurz told The Guardian. She acknowledged that the labelling of a group as terrorist often served as a way of avoiding negotiations that could involve painful compromises. (Fraser, 2014)

Ironically, Kurz’s articulation of changed Israeli attitudes mirrored statements by Hamas leader Khaled Mishal, including his assessment of Israel’s demand that Hamas first recognize the Jewish state and denounce armed struggle before any potential direct talks. In a lengthy interview with Al Jazeera, Mishal described the Israeli demands as a tool to evade negotiations, noting that the United States and the Vietcong negotiated an end to the Vietnam War while the fighting continued. “The argument throws the ball into the Palestinian court (…) We will not surrender to Israeli blackmail,” Mishal said. He noted further that a quarter of a century after Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat first renounced violence and then recognized Israel Palestinians have yet to secure their rights. (Khaled, 2014)

More importantly, both in his explicit remarks and in the tone of his interview Mishal made clear that Hamas had signed on to a two-state resolution that would end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.” We accept a state with the 1967 borders but Israel doesn’t. That makes a solution difficult to achieve,” Mishal said referring to the borders before the 1967 Middle East war in which Israel conquered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.(Khaled, 2014)

Changed Israeli and Hamas attitudes however do not automatically lead to a solution. Nevertheless they are a sine qua non for any longstanding arrangement whether a ceasefire or a final peace agreement. So far neither Israel nor Hamas have demonstrated the political will to build on the change in the way they eye each other. Intractable hostility suited both Israel and Hamas until the last Gaza war.

The change is nonetheless significant. Hamas has clearly stated what it has long been signalling: Israel is there to stay. Mishal has downplayed the Hamas charter that calls for Israel’s destruction, saying that it is “a piece of history and no longer relevant, but cannot be changed for internal reasons.”His number two, Mousa Abu Marzouk, noted that

“the charter is not the Quran. It can be amended.” Their statements echo the words of the late Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizman, who stood in front of his Likud Party emblem that showed Jordan as part of Israel and said with regard to the charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization that at the time called for Israel’s demise: “We can dream, so can they.”

The changing Israeli and Hamas attitudes reflect the fact that the most recent Israeli destruction of Gazan infrastructure failed to prevent the Islamist group from inflicting significant political and psychological damage on Israel. Hamas’ refusal to bow to Israeli military superiority as well as its uncompromising insistence on a lifting of the eight-year old Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip and the right to furnish it with an airport and sea port caught Israel by surprise. Hamas’ steadfastness left Israel with few good options.

The effects of Hamas’ strategy were evident on the ground. Beyond having been forced into a war of attrition, Israeli towns and settlements adjacent to the Gaza Strip turned a majority of their residents into internal refugees. “This is a strategic achievement on a par with Hamas’ success in closing (Tel Aviv’s) Ben Gurion international airport for a couple of days” during the war, commented DEBKAFile, a news website with close ties to Israel’s military and intelligence establishment. (2014, August 28) In addition, Israel’s international standing was significantly dented highlighted by US and British suggestions that they may review arms sales to the Jewish state more stringently and stepped up calls for sanctions against Israel. An Israeli newspaper headline read: After seven weeks of Gaza war, Hamas: 1, Israel: 0 (Oren, 2014, September 12)

The Israeli-Palestinian conflagration in Gaza constituted a watershed with Israel struggling to counter mounting international criticism of its disproportionate use of force and Palestinians’ increasingly united refusal of agreements that do not take into account their interests. The new Palestinian resolve was rooted in a measure of reconciliation between Hamas and Abbas; Hamas’ transition from an embattled group, unable to pay public sector salaries prior to the Israeli assault, into a resistance movement with street credibility; and in the absence of Arab support in the Gaza war, a realisation that Palestinians will have to rely on their own resources.

Palestinian resolve was further strengthened by the performance of Palestinian fighters on the ground. Palestinian rockets were able to target urban centres deep inside Israel even if they were unable to defeat the Jewish state’s Iron Shield anti-missile system. Moreover, Palestinian fighters several occasions reached Israel through their tunnels killing

a significant number of Israeli soldiers on Israeli soil. In addition, international public opinion was turning against Israel as casualties in Gaza mount and the recognition seeped in that Hamas will have to be a party to any lasting ceasefire or credible effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Similarly, many Arab governments saw whatever street credibility they had reduced because of their silent endorsement of the Israeli assault on Hamas which they view as an extension of their effort to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood; at the same time Qatar was gaining popularity with its support of Hamas, an offshoot of the Brotherhood.

The newly-found resolve has translated into Palestinians across the board demanding that any lasting ceasefire be linked to their political demands, first and foremost among which a lifting of the seven-year old Egyptian-Israeli blockade of Gaza. The demands were endorsed not only by Hamas but also the Palestine Authority, which, incapable of coming to the aid of the embattled population in Gaza, had been weakened and appeared helpless as Hamas fighters took on the Israelis.

With mass protests in support of Gaza across the West Bank, both Hamas and the Authority needed to be watchful that the demonstrations did not turn against them given that their seven-year old feud has rendered Palestinians ineffective in peace efforts and effectively played into Israel’s divide-and-rule strategy.While some analysts believe that economic progress on the West Bank makes it unlikely that its residents will want to risk their well-being with a third Intifada or popular revolt, both Hamas and the Authority may see a civil disobedience campaign as a way to keep Palestinian anger focussed on Israel.

Gaza may have aligned the interests of Hamas and the Authority and this was reflected in the little-noticed Palestinian demand that Israel recognise the reconciliation between the two groups as part of any lasting ceasefire. Israel had denounced a reconciliation agreement that earlier this year created the basis for the formation of a national unity government backed by both Hamas and Al Fatah, the backbone of Mr. Abbas’ Palestine Authority. The primary motive of Israeli assault on Gaza is widely believed to have been the undermining of the reconciliation. That effort has clearly backfired and, if anything,

strengthened the basis for a greater degree of Palestinian unity. “Hamas is no longer a terror group carrying out attacks, it’s a mini-army in a mini-state,” said Amir Oren, a columnist for Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz(2014, August 31).

The turning of international public opinion against Israel; the private, if not public, dismay in Western capitals at the heavy handedness of the Israelis in Gaza; Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s potentially politically damaging post mortem of the war; as well as the strengthened Palestinian resolve; all had the makings of a paradigm shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. How the shift plays out will depend on whether the war in Gaza sparks a third Intifada as well as on developments in Israel, including the fallout of the post-mortem and the impact in Israel of the loss of significant empathy in international public opinion as well as among its most important allies, the United States and Europe.

In a bid to manage a unilateral Israeli end to the fighting in Gaza, Netanyahu and other Israeli officials have already embarked on their ‘victory campaign’ claiming significant damage to thousands of alleged terror targets; the destruction of dozens of tunnels; a strengthening of ties with Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and a warning that if Hamas continues to attack Israel Palestinians will pay an intolerable price. This narrative could be easily punctured by a Palestinian attack with the guns having fallen silent. As Ha’aretz columnist Yossi Verter warned:

The dangers facing (Netanyahu) are immeasurable: if the rocket fire on the south continues even after IDF (Israel Defence Forces) forces withdraw from the (Gaza) Strip, he is likely to be held responsible for national humiliation, which would cause him to lose support from within his coalition, his party, and ultimately, the Prime Minister’s Office as well. (2014)

Post-ceasefire talks have bought Netanyahu time but would only eliminate the threat if agreement is reached on Palestinian demands.

Whether the fall-out of the Gaza war ultimately leads to an Israeli government more inclined to make the painful concessions necessary for an Israeli-Palestinian peace − or one that is even more intransigent and hard line than the one Netanyahu heads. Whichever way, it would together with the newly-found Palestinian resolve, constitute a paradigm shift.

Interviews with the authorAmos Harel. August 5 2014. Gaza war taught IDF: Time to rethink strategies, Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.608896 1 2

The initiative in Hamas’ hands and Israel ignorantly navigating its military moves towards a ceasefire instead of winning the war. Despite its inferiority in fighting strength and weaponry, Israel’s enemy uses this ambivalence to retain the element of surprise and keep the IDF moving without direction.

These phenomena show that the IDF, especially the ground forces, needs to think hard and plan anew. Israel’s technically advanced forces found an enemy playing in a different field, thus eroding its advantages. The Israel Air Force, with the assistance of MI (military intelligence) and the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security service), can strike its targets with great precision. But against Hamas or Hezbollah, this may not be enough to win decisively… If the IDF wants to preserve its ability to win using manoeuvres, quite extensive changes must be considered.2 (Harel, 2014)

While Israel and Hamas were negotiating the 2014 ceasefire, says DEBKAFile (2014), the intelligence failure left, as

It has also made Netanyahu more vulnerable to criticism that Israel would be unable to militarily defeat Hamas in a war of attrition that takes an increasing toll on Israel’s population and limited his freedom to manoeuvre in the post-ceasefire negotiation with the Palestinians. As a result, some of the prime minister’s critics, including former defence minister Moshe Arens, appeared willing to concede to some of Hamas’ demands in the absence of Israel’s ability to wage a military campaign aimed at complete disarmament of Hamas on condition that the government prepared for another round of fighting which they view as inevitable at some point in the future (Arens, 2014).

Criticism in Israel focuses on the military’s politically mandated strategy and its failure in recent years to reorganize and review its doctrine and strategy in a world in which Israel is more likely to confront unconventional rather than conventional forces. Israel’s last four wars were against the Hezbollah, and Hamas rather than conventional Arab armies.

Said Amos Harel, one of Israel’s most respected military commentators stated:

The fall-out is also likely to impact Israeli military and intelligence strategies and focus. Israeli military and intelligence sources attributed their failure to predict Hamas’ ability to stand up to punishing military strikes to a decision in the last decade to focus the country’s intelligence resources on gathering tactical intelligence and its military on ensuring weapons and training superiority rather than on understanding the enemy’s strategy, mindset and evaluation of the local and international environment in which it operates. As a result, Israeli intelligence and security agencies had cut back on personnel seeking to understand the broader picture in which Hamas and other groups operate.1

Proponents of the shift in focus pointed to Israeli successes in recent years including the 2008 assassination in Damascus of Imad Mughnieyh, a widely respected Hezbollah and Iranian operative, who masterminded attacks on Israeli and US targets as well as a host of kidnappings of foreigners in Lebanon, including the CIA’s station chief. They also listed the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists in Iran and elsewhere, the Stuxnet cyber-attack on Iranian computer systems related to the Islamic republic’s nuclear program, and the 2007 destruction of a Syrian plutonium reactor built with the help of Iran and North Korea. They further argued that Israeli forces involved in Gaza benefitted from superior tactical knowledge.

Those successes notwithstanding Israeli intelligence was unable to provide Netanyahu and members of his security cabinet with the necessary strategic analysis to pre-empt what had become a classic example of Machiavelli’s pursuit by Hamas of diplomacy by other means. Israeli intelligence’s inability was already evident in faulty analysis of the popular Arab revolts that toppled the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen as well as of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s strategy of allowing the Islamic State, the jihadist group that controls a swath of Syria and Iraq, to emerge as the major rebel group so that he could substantiate his claim that he was fighting a terrorist phenomenon that threatens not only his regime but also the region as a whole and the West.

The debate about the Israeli military came against the backdrop of its changed demography. Israel’s military today is not what it was in the late 1980s when it told then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during the first Intifada or Palestinian popular uprising against Israeli occupation: “We can solve this militarily but not on terms that would be politically or morally acceptable to the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) or the government (…) you, Mr. Prime Minister have to solve it politically.” A few years later Rabin engaged in the failed Oslo peace process with Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Nor is the Israeli government similar to that of Rabin. Netanyahu’s government in the first week of the assault on Gaza turned down a proposal to conduct lightning strikes inside Gaza that would have destroyed Hamas’ command and control centres and other military infrastructure. It also refused to entertain a proposal for a full re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Debkafile suggested that had Israel opted for lightning strikes “at an early stage in the conflict, instead of ten days of air strikes, it might have saved heavy Palestinian losses and property devastation, the extent of which troubles most Israelis too.” (DEBKAFile, 2014, August 6).

Israel’s liberal Ha’aretz newspaper added in an editorial: When you’re too heavy, big or bloated, it’s hard to move, run or even bend down. Your arm is so fat it can’t reach into a tunnel. It gets stuck and you stand there helplessly. That’s precisely the situation with the Israel Defence Forces. It’s a King Kong of an army — big and cumbersome; every move unintentionally knocks down a house, bridge or UN school in Gaza... The top brass has forgotten that line in the Book of Proverbs: ‘with wise advice thou shalt make thy war.’ (Shtrasler, 2014).

With analysts predicting increased differences between the military and Israel’s political leadership in the wake of the Gaza war, both entities are coping with very different political and demographic constituencies. Israel’s right-wing has moved further to the right forcing Netanyahu to fend off pressure from coalition partners like Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman whose Yisrael Beytenu (Israel is our Home) Party ended its alliance with the prime minister’s Likud early in the war, and economy minister Naftali Bennett’s Habait Hayehudi (The Jewish Home) Party that both advocated reoccupation.

Similarly, religious and conservative forces have become more prominent in the Israeli military. The commander of Israel’s elite infantry Givati Brigade Col. Ofer Winter, that suffered high casualties in the last month, declared holy war on the Palestinians in a message to his troops at the beginning of the Gaza war that went on to say: “The Lord God of Israel, make our way successful (…) We’re going to war for your people Israel against an enemy that defames you.” (Misgrav, 2014).

Reorganizing the military and revamping its doctrine and strategy is no mean task. It involves a debate that by definition will have to also include Israel’s broader policies towards the Palestinians at a time that popular anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian sentiment is running high.

REFERENCESArens, M. (2014, August 25). A war of attrition is not an option in Gaza. Haaretz. Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.612178

DEBKAFile. (2014, August 6). Iran, Al Qaeda took note of curbs on IDF vanquishing Hamas, which now has core of a Palestinian army. DEBKAFile. Retrieved from: http://www.debka.com/article/24166/Iran-Al-Qaeda-took-note-of-curbs-on-IDF-vanquishing-Hamas-which-now-has-core-of-a-Palestinian-army-

DEBKAFile. (2014, August 28). Though militarily inferior, Hamas has hit Israel strategically with attrition and population flight. DEBKAFile. Retrieved from: http://www.debka.com/article/24215/Though-militarily-inferior-Hamas-has-hit-Israel-strategically-with-attrition-and-population-flight

Fraser, G. (2014, August 15). Sometimes it’s good to talk - even to ‘terrorists’. The Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2014/aug/15/good-to-talk-terrorists

Harel, A. (2014, August 5). Gaza war taught IDF: Time to rethink strategies. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.608896

Khaled, M. (2014, August 17). Not a war of choice. [Video]. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from:http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/08/khaled-meshaal-not-war-choice-201481516939516479.html

Misgav, U. (2014, August 15). Israel should get God out of the army. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.609495

Oren, A. (2014, August 31). Israel’s defense establishment recommends easing Gaza restrictions. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.613239

Oren, A. (2014, September 12). After seven weeks of Gaza war, Hamas 1, Israel 0. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-gaza-conflict-2014/.premium-1.612437

Shtrasler, N. (2014, August 5). The IDF has put its brain in storage - or lent it to Hamas. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.608859

Verter, Y. (2014, August 6). Top brass sees Gaza diplomacy as an opportunity, not a threat. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-gaza-conflict-2014/.premium-1.609213

NEGLECTED NARRATIVES: THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE MIDDLE EASTPor: Andrea Galván Vélez ITESM, Campus Querétaro, México

Andrea Galván is an International Relations student at the Tecnológico de Monterrey in the city of Querétaro, Mexico and she has just concluded a term as a visiting student at King’s College in London, England. She has also worked as an intern at the Mexican General Consulate in New York City and she currently works at the Coordination for International Relations and Governmental Innovation of the Government of the State of Querétaro.

ABSTRAC Armed conflict and war in the region known as the Middle East has occupied news headlines and international agendas for the pas fifty years at least. Often discussed and analyzed is the impact of this constant state of war on economics, energy, military and technological capabilities, and of course, the losing of millions of lives; however, the discussion of the impact of war on cultural heritages of the peoples of the region and of the world as whole is little to almost inexistent. It is of vital need to address the issue of heritage destruction and degradation as a result of war in the Middle East or future generations will inherit a broken history with no symbols to represent it. By analyzing the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, a picture can be drown of how whether deliberately or as collateral damage, cultural heritage in Middle Eastern countries is another victim of armed conflict in the region; and differently to most victims of the conflict, it has no advocate: it is neglected and silenced.

KEYWORDSMiddle East, Cultural Heritage,

World Heritage, war, degradation, destruction.

Heritage is our legacy from the past,what we live with today and

what we pass on to future generations.(World Heritage Information Kit, Paris: UNESCO)

Often missing from the mainstream narratives and even from the Middle Eastern ‘metanarratives’, the impact of armed conflict on the cultural heritage of the region must be addressed immediately. The systematic degradation of cultural heritage in the Middle East due to armed conflict is a rarely told tale, a neglected narrative competing for the spotlight with several others and it is very rare that light in fact shines on the issue since attention is often diverted towards economic and political perspectives and more so now towards narratives concerning gender issues and environmental concerns, among others. Cultural heritage has been the silent victim, the unknown soldier lost in battle, of the seemingly never ending conflict in the Middle East; whereas as collateral damage or intentionally carried out, the systematic looting and destruction of heritage sites1 in the region needs to be stopped immediately as it is a non-re-buildable component of Middle Eastern societies and a founding pillar of the history and identity of humanity as a whole. It is after all, the Middle East where the first civilization sprung between rivers Tigris and Euphrates2 and where too, it could be argued, history may have started since according to Carr (1987): “History begins with the handing down of tradition; and tradition means the carrying of the habits and lessons of the past into the future. Records of the past begin to be kept for the benefit of future generations.” (p.108). Cultural heritage, represents precisely that: the history of a people, of a nation, and of humankind as a whole. The urgency of the need for action and protection in the region commonly known as the Middle East is rooted in the notion of cultural heritage itself.

See Kramer, N. (1969). Cradle of Civilization. Little Brown & Co.

Cultural Heritage may also refer to/include intangible components such as language, religion, traditions, etc. The aim of this paper however is to analyse the impact of conflict on tangible representations of cultural heritage; for further reading please see: Silverman, H; Fairchild, D. (2007) Cultural Heritage and Human Rights. New York City: Springer. And Blake, J. (2008) On defining the Cultural Heritage. International and comparative Law Quarterly; Vol 49, Pp 61 to 85.

2

1

On Cultural Heritage

Part of the problem that represents the lack of attention to the damaging and destruction of cultural heritage is agreeing on a definition for what cultural heritage actually is. Constantine Sandis in his book Cultural Heritage Ethics: Between Theory and Practice (2014), defines heritage as “what has been or may be inherited regardless of its value.” (p.11). Boswell (2008) classifies it more as a construction, defining it as irreplaceable ‘points of reference’ and ‘our identity’. (p.4), while J. Blake (2008) somehow combines both these notions by defining it as “a form of inheritance to be kept is safekeeping and handed down to future generations” (p.80). The definition that will be referred to for the purposes of this paper will be the one agreed on by the caucus of nations in the Article 1 of the 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage:

The following shall be considered as “cultural heritage”:

Monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;

Groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;

Sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view. The first indications of a joint global interest in cultural heritage under a legal framework surfaced after WWII. During the aftermath, the pillaging of museums, confiscation of collections and desolation of spaces made evident the necessity of a regulatory framework for the protection of cultural heritage in times of war. In the 1954 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, the parameters of action during wars in regards to the protection of cultural heritage were set. For instance, the requirement to indoctrinate soldiers in time of peace to “a spirit of respect for the culture and cultural property of all peoples” (Article 7) and to establish persecution and punishment mechanisms to whoever party fails to do so. (Article 28). Nearly 20 years

later, in an effort to broaden the protection of cultural heritage, another UNESCO convention would be held declaring a collective responsibility of humankind as a whole to protect all forms of cultural and natural heritage because of the inherent relation between heritage and civilization:

The convention in question sought out to institutionalize a permanent framework for active protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage including the establishment of an overlooking committee and the funding of conservation projects by ratifying states.3 The convention also attributed to the committee the task of doing an inventory of World Heritage sites and to publish when required the ‘List of World Heritage in Danger’.4 As with most UN legislation, enforceability is hard, especially since each State’s sovereignty ‘entitles’ it with rights over its land and whatever is in it, including heritage; yet simultaneously a sense on collective ownership coexists: “Thus, cultural heritage remains under the legislation and sovereignty of the territorial State while also representing a universal value towards whose protection the whole international community should co-operate”. (Blake, 2008: p.71). The Convention came into force on December 17th, 1975; and as of 2014, it has been ratified by 191 states, which includes 187 UN member states plus the Cook Islands, the

(…) deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world,

Considering that parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole (UNESCO, 1972)

According to Article 11 of the 1972 Convention: “Every State Party to this Convention shall, in so far as pos-sible, submit to the World Heritage Committee an inventory of property forming part of the cultural and natural heritage, situated in its territory and suitable for inclusion in the list”.

According to Article 11, fraction 4: “a list of the property appearing in the World Heritage List for the conser-vation of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance has been requested under this Convention. This list shall contain an estimate of the cost of such operations. The list may include only such property forming part of the cultural and natural heritage as is threatened by serious and specific dangers, such as the threat of disappearance caused by accelerated deterioration, large- scale public or private proj-ects or rapid urban or tourist development projects; destruction caused by changes in the use or ownership of the land; major alterations due to unknown causes; abandonment for any reason whatsoever; the outbreak or the threat of an armed conflict; calamities and cataclysms; serious fires, earthquakes, landslides; volcanic eruptions; changes in water level, floods and tidal waves. The Committee may at any time, in case of urgent need, make a new entry in the List of World Heritage in Danger and publicize such entry immediately”

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Holy See, Niue, and the Palestinian territories.5 The evolution of the concept and framework for cultural Heritage is of a notable significance for the Middle East as it has as a region, partly because of the significant number of Heritage sites it possesses and partly because of the alarming number of these sites listed as ‘in danger’ by the UNESCO.

On Cultural Heritage and the Middle East

The Middle East, according to Abdullah Ocalan (2007), is not only the birthplace of civilization, as the first urban civilizations appearing nearly 5,000 years ago in the valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates, but also the birthplace of the three major monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. These conditions are sufficient alone to deduce the vast presence of ancestral sites, monuments, artefacts all across the Middle East representing National Heritage but World Heritage as well due to their civilization-founding nature. It is, therefore, especially alarming the amount of sites currently listed in the UNESCO List of World Heritage in Danger.6

Available (updated) from http://whc.unesco.org/en/danger. Referred to by UNESCO as the ‘Arab States’ region. Statistics available from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/stat/#d1

Ratifying states and treaty status is available fromhttp://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13055&language=E

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Figure 1.1. UNESCO. Map of sites listed as World Heritage in Danger. (October 2014.)

The region of the Middle East, as shown by the map in Figure 1.1, currently has several sites in danger. Of the 46 sites included in the list, 13 are located in the Middle East,7 representing the 28% of the list and the highest concentration of cultural World Heritage Sites in danger in the world as reflected by Figure 1.2:

Figure 1.2 List of World Heritage in Danger by Region. UNESCO (November 2014)

Moreover, the latest (2013) cultural additions to the list are sites in fact located in the Middle East, in the territories of Palestine and Syria. Syria is in fact the country with the most Cultural Heritage sites in danger on the whole list, with six. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Palestine have each two sites listed and Yemen, with one site, rounds up the list. Reports emitted by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in regards to the status of sites on the list, reflect how almost in every case for the sites located in the Middle East armed conflict and war is to blame for the endangering of the site. In Afghanistan for example, the report for the Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley cites military occupation and the presence of antipersonnel mines as responsible for the “risk of imminent collapse of the Buddha niches with the remaining fragments of the statues”. (UNESCO WHC, 2013). In Iraq, specifies the report, the Samarra Archaeological City, a once very important capital for Islam, is subject to the state of conflict in the country that “does not allow the responsible authorities to assure the protection and management of the

property” (UNESCO WHC, 2007) And still, rarely is it present in the news the immediate need for action to protect these sites.

Looking deeper into the relation between war and the damaging of cultural heritage it becomes evident that is not the same everywhere or in every case. More often than not, heritage sites are ‘collateral damage’ to military attacks, air strikes and used as military bases; yet in the case of the Middle East, the deterioration of cultural heritage serves as well an underlying yet very specific purpose: attack specific identities. That is why this continuous mutilation and looting of sites; in the case of the Middle East the desecration of cultural heritage is not only collateral damage of war, it has been “weaponized” and deliberately used as explained by J. Blake (2008):

The role of cultural heritage as a vehicle for the expression and even the construction of a nation group’s cultural identity (…) can lead to an aggressive assertion of identity, whether national or ethnic, which may cause and certainly foster armed conflict in which the destruction of cultural monuments-the symbols of the cultural identity of one of the parties to the conflict- often becomes a weapon of war. (p.70)

Such cleansing began in the very early days of the invasion, with the wide scale looting of all of the symbols of Iraqi historical and cultural identity. Museums, archeological sites, places, monuments, mosques, libraries and social centers all suffered looting and devastation. They did so under the very watchful eyes of the occupation troops. (p.26)Looking through this prism, from this perspective, several

pieces start falling into place.

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria: War and Cultural Heritage

The Iraqi case is an excellent example of how the destruction of cultural heritage is utilized to attack a specific identity, in this case, pre-invasion pro-Saddam Iraqi identity. Iraq has always been appealing to power because of its geopolitical and historical significance: “Mesopotamian antiquities became a focus of international interest in the 19th century, when British and French commercial representatives and diplomats began to explore Iraq.”(Nafzinger & Nicgorski, 2009: p.185) The vast archaeological richness of the region and the continuous unearthing of ancient artefacts made Iraq a target for looting and trafficking. During Saddam Hussein’s administration, the Iraqi government continuously funded conservation and protection projects as a way of preserving the physical representation of Iraqi nationalism embodied in Cultural Heritage. However after the 2003 US invasion, the systematic looting of museums and theft of antiques became a problem in Iraq, a problem so serious that according to

Lebanese archaeologist, Joanne Farchakh, who assisted in the investigation of the stolen historical wealth from Iraq after the invasion, “Iraq may soon end up with no history.” (Baker, Shereen & Tareq, 2009: p.25)

According to Baker, Shareen, and Tareq (2009) under US factual ruling, Iraq suffered the theft of “no less than 15000 invaluable Mesopotamian artifacts from the National Museum in Baghdad, and many others from the 12000 archeological sites that the occupation forces, unlike even Saddam’s despotic regime, left unguarded. While the Museum was robbed of its historical collection, the National Library that preserved the continuity and pride of Iraqi history was destroyed by deliberate arson.” (p.26).The authors explain that the allowing, better yet, the enabling, of these atrocities by the US government because it was a tactic for what they call the ‘cleansing of Iraq’:

Terminating with the State, according to Baker, Shareen, and Tareq, was the goal of the American occupation; troops were to allow the looting and destruction to destroy the Iraqi nation as it existed up to that point “because strong Iraq was an impediment to American imperial designs and Israeli insistence on un-impedimental regional hegemony.” (p.xii) The authors’ argument was that “in willful violation of international law against preventive war and complete disregard for its responsibilities as an occupying power, the Unites States and its allies have failed to protect Iraq’s incomparable cultural treasures.” (p.xii). When asked about the well-documented failure to protect Iraq’s cultural heritage during US occupation, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld replied: “stuff happens”. Yet in many cases the US made it happen: “Since the invasion in March 2003, the US-led forces have transformed at least seven historical sites into bases or camps for the military. The desecrated sites include Ur, one of the most ancient cities in the world, which is said to be the birthplace of Abraham.”8 (P.29). And yet, it is not

See UNESCO.(1999).Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, when an amendment was made to reserve the right to attack when site is occupied and being used as military base.

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very often that the impact, whether collateral or fully intentional of conflict on the sites, is seldom part of most narratives. It is absolutely imperative for it to be since, as Baker, Shareen, and Tareq conclude, these “ancient sites are not Sunni, Shi’ite, Yazidi, or Christian, nor are they Turkoman, Kurdish or Arab. These historical sites are Mesopotamian historical patrimony of all Iraqis. (p. 29) and one should argue for mankind as a whole.

Another example of cultural heritage desecration as a result or as a part of armed conflict in the Middle East is the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001. According to Comiteau for TIME magazine (2008), “The Taliban’s dynamiting of the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan in March 2001 was only the most dramatic expression of their mission to obliterate all “idolatrous” images from Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic past. They also destroyed 2,500 other cultural artifacts from Kabul’s National Museum of Afghanistan, many of them priceless.” Destruction of Cultural Heritage in this case was openly deliberate as the Taliban army dynamited the 1400 year old Buddhas to destroy the non-Muslim identity they embodied. According to Morgan (2012) “The men who ordered the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001 claimed it as an impeccably Islamic act. The statues were idols; Islam repudiated idol-worship; their demolition was thus the duty of any true Muslim. Many Muslims disagreed, including that delegation of senior Islamic scholars, led by Yusuf al-Qaradawi (not exactly a liberal himself), who travelled to Qandahar to try to persuade Mullah Omar not to pursue a course of action that (the scholars insisted) was contrary to Islamic law. (p. 85) In the case of Afghanistan, however, the outrage from the international community was evident and widely expressed; it even prompted the World Heritage Committee to issue a declaration (UNESCO WHC; 2003) “Recalling the tragic destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan that affected the international community as a whole”. In this declaration, some sanctions were established:

Nonetheless, armed conflict in the Middle East is still threatening and actively destroying cultural heritage. Recent upheaval in Syria has caused the inclusion of numerous sites located within its boundaries in the List of World Heritage in Danger. According to Salam Al Quntar (2013):

Now, Syria is fighting a two-front war: it is not anti-Assad rebels anymore, but also ISIS militia engaging in armed conflict with State military. Damage is not collateral anymore, but intended, as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is systematically destroying any representation of non-Muslim beliefs. In 2013, the shrine and burial site of Yemeni Muslim Martyr Owais al- Qarani in al-Raqqah, official capital of ISIS, was blown up because it belonged to a different strand of Islam. Other sites destroyed by ISIS include the reliefs carved at the Shash Hamdan, a Roman cemetery in Aleppo province. Also in the Aleppo countryside, statues carved out of the sides of a valley at al-Qatora have been deliberately targeted by gunfire and smashed into fragments. (Cockburn, 2014)

It may seem justifiable to some extent that the destruction of cultural heritage due to armed conflict in the Middle East is not considered ‘as important’ or is as present in the mainstream narratives of the region. As Stone (2011) explains “it is often judged ‘ridiculous’ to bring up issues of heritage and archeology when the very existence of the country itself is under threat. During the long years of [war] it is forbidden to raise the question of heritage, looting, or the use of archeological sites as military bases.” (p.182) Yet, how will a country still exist if all the traces and testimonies of its past are gone? The

Damage to cultural heritage sites in Syria, including World Heritage sites, museums, and cultural landscapes, has been taking place for over two years. Both the regime army and the armed rebels have exchanged accusations of the destruction of Syria’s heritage sites and used it for propaganda purposes. The regime blames the “terrorists” of the Free Syria Army (FSA) and jihadi groups for the looting, while the opposition emphasizes the regime’s indiscriminate use of heavy artillery against historic sites where rebels are hiding. (P 349)

States should take all appropriate measures, in accordance with international law, to establish jurisdiction over, and provide effective criminal sanctions against, those persons who commit, or order to be committed, acts of intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or another international organization. (Article 8)

REFERENCES

Al Quntar, S. (2013). Syrian Cultural Property in the Crossfire: Reality and Effectiveness of Protection Efforts. Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology & Heritage Studies, Vol. 1(4), 348-351

Baker, R; Shereen, T; Tareq, Y. (2009).Cultural cleansing in Iraq: Why Museums Were Looted, Libraries Burned and Academics Murdered. London: Pluto Press.

Blake, J. (2008). On defining the Cultural Heritage. International and comparative Law Quarterly, 49(1), 61-85.

Boswell, R. (2008). Challenges to Identifying and Managing Intangible Cultural Heritage in Mauritius, Zanzibar and Seychelles. Senegal: CODESRIA.

Carr, E.H. (1987). What is History?. England: Penguin.

Cockburn, P. (2014). The destruction of the idols: Syria’s patrimony at risk from extremists. The Independent Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/archaeology/news/the-destruction-of-the-idols-syrias-patrimony-at-risk-from-extremists-9122275.html

Comiteau, L. (2008). Saving Afghanistan’s Art. TIME. Retrieved from http://content.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1701306,00.html

Morgan, L. (2012).The Buddhas of Bamiyan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Nafziger, J.A. Nicgorski, A.M.(2009).Cultural Heritage Issues : The Legacy of Conquest, Colonization and Commerce. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.

Sandis, C. (2014). Cultural Heritage Ethics: Between Theory and Practice. United Kingdom & United States: OpenBook Publishers.

Silverman, H; Fairchild, D. (2007). Cultural Heritage and Human Rights. New York City: Springer.

Smith, L. (2006). Uses of Heritage. Oxon: Routledge

impact of conflict on cultural heritage on the Middle East needs to be prioritized and included in the big picture because it is an expression of the nations that compose the region. It needs to be known what was to figure out what is going to be, and only by preserving the heritage can these peoples know it. Furthermore, as Stone (2011) later reflects: “Every region and every nation knows or recognizes its heritage. Every community seeks to keep its history alive, to maintain or rediscover their roots: the guarantor of the community’s future. In this context, no one nation’s heritage is more important or more attractive than another’s. All aspects of heritage belong to humanity as a whole, and all, therefore, should be protected.” The caucus of nations should provide and enforce a working mechanism for the active protection of cultural heritage and really sanction the failure to doing so. The impact of war on the cultural heritage of the region needs to be brought out of the shadows and inscribed in the dominant narratives because it matters, not only to the Middle East or UNESCO, but to mankind and its future generations.

Stone, P; Farchakh J. (2011). The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq. UK: Boydell Press.

Stone, P. (2011). Heritage Matters. Volume 4: Cultural Heritage, Ethics, and the Military. Suffolk: Boydell Press.

Ocalan, A. (2007). Prision Writings Vol. 1: The Roots of Civilisation. London: Pluto Press.

UNESCO.(1954) Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention. The Hague, Neatherlands. Retrieved from http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

UNESCO. (1972). Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/

UNESCO. (2014). List of World Heritage in Danger. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/danger

UNESCO. (1999). Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The Hague, Neatherlands. Retrieved from http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15207&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

UNESCO. (2003). Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage. Paris, France. Retrieved from http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17718&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

UNESCO World Heritage Committee. (2007). Samarra Archaeological City. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/276/indicators/

UNESCO World Heritage Committee. (2013). Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208/indicators/

PRESENTE, PASADO Y FUTURO DEL CONFLICTO PALESTINO ISRAELÍ: UN DESAFÍO ANTE EL SISTEMA DE SEGURIDAD COLECTIVA DE LA ONUPor: Sergio García Magariño Think Tank Globernance

Doctor en Sociología; Investigador Asociado del Instituto de Gobernanza Democrática, coordinador de la oficina de asuntos públicos de la comunidad bahá’í de España: área de investigación y discurso; miembro de distintos grupos de investigación en la Universidad Pública de Navarra, Universidad Jaume I de Castellón y la Universidad Camilo José Cela. Ha sido publicado en numerosas ocasiones por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Universidad de Oviedo, entre otros.

Las razones para adoptar esta perspectiva metodológica son similares a las esgrimidas por Séverine Deneulin y Carole Radodi en “Revisiting religion: development studies thirty years on”, World Develpment, Vol. 39, 2011, pp. 45-54.

En este artículo no definiremos el sistema de seguridad colectivo, dado que ya lo hicimos en uno previo: Sergio Garcíá, “Evolución de la noción de seguridad colectiva a la luz de ciertas circunstancias históricas”, en Seguridad y Defensa en el actual marco socio-económico, Instituto General Gutiérrez Mellado, 2011.

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RESUMEN Este artículo puede dividirse en tres partes. La primera ofrece un análisis causal, holístico, del conflicto palestino-israelí. La segunda utiliza este conflicto como estudio de caso que, por un lado, pueda dar luz sobre la necesidad de un sistema de seguridad colectiva1 imparcial y efectivo para estabilizar conflictos de esta índole, y por otro, muestre la utilización arbitraria de diferentes principios a la hora de implementar medidas –sanciones en particular– dependiendo del Estado y los intereses en cuestión, con los concomitantes problemas que esto suscita en términos de legitimidad del sistema y de eficacia. Por último, se exploran algunas posibles vías de actuación para su resolución. A pesar de no renunciar al recurso de enfoques empíricos y críticos, el estudio, dado que presta bastante atención al factor religioso, adopta una perspectiva principalmente hermenéutica2.

PALABRAS CLAVEIsrael, Palestina, conflicto,

religión, justicia internacional, sistema de seguridad colectiva

IntroducciónPara lograr los objetivos expuestos en el resumen, haremos una exploración relativamente profunda del conflicto palestino-israelí y de los factores en juego, por resaltar su complejidad y la imposibilidad de ser resuelto a menos que haya una mediación internacional efectiva. Además, haciéndonos eco de un estudio empírico acerca del uso del derecho a veto por parte de EEUU en las propuestas de resolución del Consejo de seguridad en las que ha estado involucrado Israel desde 1973, elaborado por el profesor pakistaní Dr. Masoor Akbar Kundidel, y de otras bases de datos similares, ejemplificaremos el trato ambivalente que desde el Consejo de Seguridad –supuesto garante imparcial de la paz y seguridad internacionales– se le ha dado a este caso. Por último, tomando algunos datos de la “Operación Plomo Fundido”, se ofrecerá un ejemplo concreto del desvío de atención por parte del Consejo de Seguridad cuando Israel efectúa comportamientos que violan el derecho internacional. Estos dos últimos puntos servirán de simple indicador general de la sistematicidad con la que el Consejo de Seguridad, dependiendo los Estados en cuestión, sigue diferentes principios, produciéndose regularmente una situación que no puede sino menoscabar la legitimidad y efectividad del sistema de seguridad colectiva3.

Antes de comenzar con la primera parte anunciada, cabrían unas palabras acerca de lo que supone el conflicto palestino-israelí para el sistema de seguridad colectiva. Para poder objetivar las respuestas de este sistema, valoraremos la atención y relevancia que se le da a un caso en materia de seguridad colectiva con base en las resoluciones que se emiten sobre él desde el Consejo de Seguridad. En esta línea, el conflicto palestino-israelí ha supuesto desde 1948 el caso que más atención ha recibido por parte del Consejo de Seguridad hasta 20114. Analizando los temas de resolución del Consejo de Seguridad durante ese período, observamos que todos los años, exceptuando 1952, 1954, 1957, 1959, 1960, 1963 y 1964, este caso ha estado presente en las resoluciones del Consejo bajo denominaciones diversas como “la cuestión palestina”, “la situación en Oriente-Medio”, “Israel-Líbano”, “Israel-Egipto”, “Israel-Irak”, o “Israel-Siria”5. Con muchísima diferencia, ha sido el más presente

Por sistema de seguridad colectiva se hace referencia a un acuerdo entre Estados por medio del cual se com-prometen a no utilizar la guerra en sus relaciones internacionales. Los miembros de tal pacto, además, acuerdan responder concertadamente ante un Estado que decide utilizar la guerra contra otro. Este sistema vendría a reemplazar el anterior sistema de equilibrio de poderes, donde la guerra es un recurso más a utilizar en las rela-ciones internacionales. La Liga de Naciones fue el primer intento serio de crear un sistema tal. La Organización de las Naciones Unidas, finalmente encarna ese ideal. Además de lo dicho, hoy día el sistema de seguridad col-ectiva no sólo pretende evitar la amenaza de la guerra entre Estados, sino que aspira a responder colectivamente ante aquellas amenazas que trascienden los ámbitos nacionales, como el terrorismo internacional, la pobreza y los problemas económicos, la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva, el crimen organizado, el cambio climático y las guerras civiles y otras atrocidades a gran escala.

http://www.un.org/es/documents/sc/

Para simplificar el análisis, so pena de ser poco preciso con la categoría palestino-israelí, he incluido dentro de la misma las relaciones del Estado de Israel con otros países árabes aledaños, así como con los territorios palestinos.

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en las discusiones del Consejo de Seguridad desde la constitución de las Naciones Unidas, así que como corolario se podría afirmar que es visto como una amenaza persistente a la paz y seguridad internacional. Es por ello que representa un caso idóneo para analizar el sistema de seguridad colectiva. Además, a pesar de esta atención desmesurada, la carencia de una solución definitiva –sin menospreciar su extrema complejidad– es a su vez un indicador de la poca efectividad con la que se ha dirimido este conflicto.

El problema del excesivo uso del veto

Además, este conflicto ha puesto de manifiesto ciertas paradojas concernientes al derecho de veto. El derecho a veto puede ser visto como un mecanismo de protección para asegurar que los esfuerzos por establecer un sistema de seguridad colectiva no menoscaben el interés nacional de las cinco potencias que salieron victoriosas tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial: EEUU, China, Inglaterra, Francia y Rusia. Esta cuestión, como ya hemos analizado, que pudo ser comprensible en un momento histórico, hoy puede suponer un lastre e incluso reducir significativamente la capacidad del sistema de seguridad colectiva para combatir las amenazas comunes. De hecho, el ejercicio indiscriminado de este derecho, puede ser uno de los factores que hagan que surjan nuevas amenazas, por los resentimientos que hace despertar en muchos actores internacionales.

Hasta el año 2009, en el Consejo de Seguridad se había ejercido el derecho a veto en 261 ocasiones: Rusia 123, EEUU 82, Inglaterra 32, Francia 18 y China 6. Rusia lidera el uso del veto, aunque muchos de ellos se dieron entre 1950 y 1960 en relación a la admisión de otros países en la ONU. EEUU, a su vez, de las 82 veces en que lo utilizó, 42 fueron en cuestiones concernientes a Israel o Medio Oriente. El profesor pakistaní Mansoor Akbar, intenta demostrar que el factor israelí en la utilización del derecho a veto en la ONU por parte de EEUU desde 1972, desafiando el derecho internacional, ha supuesto un ataque a los principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, cuyo objetivo era mantener la paz y seguridad internacional, salvaguardar los derechos humanos, proveer un mecanismo de regulación internacional, promover el progreso social y económico, mejorar los estándares de vida y luchar contra las enfermedades. De hecho, asevera que esta utilización ha sido la misma negación de los principios para los que la ONU fue creada (Akbar Kundi, 2009).

Hemos tomado este estudio porque conecta cabalmente con el hecho que queremos resaltar. El sistema de seguridad colectiva intenta abordar aquellas cuestiones que afectan a la seguridad y paz internacionales, pero el encargado de ponerlo en acción es el Consejo de Seguridad, institución donde algunos países, como EEUU, ejercen un dominio sobresaliente gracias a su derecho al veto. Sin entrar en las razones por las que EEUU apoya a Israel, utilizaremos los datos del estudio del Dr. Akbar Kundi así como de otras fuentes de las Naciones Unidas e incluso del Departamento de Estado de EEUU, para constatar que ese comportamiento imparcial, no de EEUU, sino del sistema en sí, es recurrente. Tal como he señalado reiteradamente, esto puede hacer que la misma forma en que está configurado el sistema de seguridad colectiva genere otras amenazas mayores de las que pretende combatir. Pero sigamos desglosando algo más los vetos de EEUU en relación a Israel.

Hemos señalado que de las 82 ocasiones en que EEUU ha utilizado el veto, 42 hacen referencia a Israel y al Medio Oriente. Los temas específicos en torno a los que se ejerció dicho veto son: la situación en los territorios ocupados tras medidas israelíes, quejas del Líbano o de Siria contra Israel, violaciones de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y del derecho internacional y la expansión de asentamientos judíos en Gaza y Jerusalén Este. Muchas de estas resoluciones truncadas iban encaminadas a llamar la atención de la opinión pública y las organizaciones internacionales para presionar a Israel a que flexibilizara sus medidas.

En una tabla extraída de la “American-Israeli cooperative enterprise”6, aparecen detalladas de manera pormenorizada las propuestas de resoluciones al Consejo de Seguridad llamando la atención a Israel que fueron objeto de veto por parte de EEUU.

Como se refleja en los datos recogidos en esa tabla, EEUU vetó en 42 ocasiones las propuestas de resoluciones contra Israel. Esto genera grandes resentimientos dentro del mundo islámico y de otros sectores amplios de la comunidad internacional, ya que demuestra la parcialidad del funcionamiento del sistema de seguridad colectiva. Estos hechos nutren el odio y recelo hacia las mismas Naciones Unidas, y sirven de justificación

www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html6

y de acicate para el surgimiento de grupos terroristas como Al-Qaeda. El sistema pierde legitimidad con este tipo de comportamientos.

Para finalizar cabe mencionar que el propósito de utilizar los datos sobre EEUU e Israel referentes al veto dentro del Consejo de Seguridad, no ha sido criticar a ninguno de esos Estados, sino utilizarlos de indicador de un fenómeno más amplio que empaña el sistema de seguridad colectiva; y es que, ante casos de seguridad internacional o violaciones de derechos humanos similares, no se siguen los mismos principios debido al papel que siguen desempeñando los intereses nacionales en un sistema que pretende trascenderlos en aras del bien colectivo. Esta utilización arbitraria de diferentes principios dependiendo del tipo de actores e intereses nacionales en juego, como hemos aseverado repetidamente, menoscaba la legitimidad del mismo sistema, dificulta su funcionamiento e incluso puede generar amenazas casi igual de dramáticas pero más difíciles de resolver que las que pretende abordar.

Naturaleza del conflicto

La literatura sobre el conflicto palestino-israelí abunda en las bibliotecas. Sin embargo, ésta suele consistir en una serie de hechos de naturaleza bélica, en su mayoría, ordenados diacrónicamente. Pero, ¿es eso suficiente para comprender este problema anquilosado? También existe mucha bibliografía que aborda esta problemática desde enfoques más comprensivos e interpretativos, pero suelen ser arbitrarios –claramente pro-palestinos o pro-israelís–, reduccionistas –esbozando un único factor omnicomprensivo– o ambas cosas. En este trabajo, en aras de comprender con mayor profundidad la naturaleza de este conflicto y de, por tanto, observar su complejidad y difícil resolución a menos que el sistema de seguridad colectiva funcione eficazmente, se ha considerado preciso recurrir a otros factores que no aparecen en el relato más aséptico de los hechos, prestándole especial atención al factor religioso-simbólico, por considerarlo una de las claves actuales para el entendimiento del caso –sin eludir el reconocimiento de que en sus orígenes puede que hubiera una cuestión más claramente territorial. No obstante, el enfoque elegido para analizar esta problemática será holista, ya que sólo a través de la revisión sistémica de una multiplicidad de factores, que parecen reforzarse mutuamente para acrecentar la complejidad del problema, puede que sea posible hacer

una exploración seria del conflicto en cuestión. Es cierto que algunos autores pretenden que desde las ciencias sociales sólo se hagan análisis explicativos, intentando buscar una variable clara, pero la realidad social normalmente es siempre demasiado compleja e impredecible como para retratarse mediante métodos que en ocasiones se asemejan a los de las ciencias naturales7.

Cosmovisiones religiosas

Si nos remontamos a las tradiciones de judíos y árabes-musulmanes, nos encontramos con un relato que los entronca familiarmente. Tanto los árabes-musulmanes, como los judíos religiosos –es importante hacer esta distinción ya que el judaísmo ha sufrido una fuerte secularización– se consideran hijos de Abraham, unos por parte de Isaac (judíos), y otros por parte de Ismael (beduinos nómadas). Ismael parece que fue el primer hijo de Abraham, fruto de la unión de Abraham y una esclava egipcia llamada Agar. La verdadera esposa de Abraham, Sara, ante su imposibilidad de concebir, animó a éste para que mantuviera relaciones con Agar. Posteriormente, Sara pudo quedar embarazada a edad avanzada y dio a luz a Isaac. Entre estas dos mujeres surgió una animadversión, viéndose así Abraham obligado a expulsar a Agar y a su hijo Ismael. Éstos se establecieron en Arabia e Ismael tuvo doce hijos de los que surgieron las tribus árabes. De Isaac brotaron las tribus judías. Se dice que Isaac e Ismael se veían regularmente, aun después de la muerte de su padre. Sin embargo, el desarrollo cultural de ambos grupos, especialmente a partir del año 622 d.C. con el surgimiento del Islam, tomó caminos dispares. El conflicto palestino-israelí puede tener sus raíces en la supuesta oposición virulenta que, según los musulmanes, los judíos mostraron a Muhammad, el profeta del Islam.

Sobrevolaremos brevemente la cosmovisión judía y la islámica para comprender un poco el universo simbólico que puede estar contribuyendo de manera relevante al conflicto geopolítico y económico que enfrenta a palestinos e israelíes. Según la tradición de la Torá que es aceptada por judíos y musulmanes, a los hijos de Isaac se les prometió una tierra

No se pretende ahondar en este debate candente sobre la naturaleza de las ciencias sociales. Baste mencionar que el autor tiene una concepción cercana a los planteamientos de Richard Bernstein. Para una exploración muy interesante y asequible de este debate ver: Bent Flyvberg, Makind social science matter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.

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fértil donde vivirían en paz y prosperidad. Tras la dominación egipcia de los judíos, Moisés guiaría a su pueblo a esa zona (Scheindlin, 1998). Los judíos sostienen que el Israel de hoy es esa tierra. Después de que los descendientes de Isaac se asentaran en Israel, este pueblo tuvo momentos de gran prosperidad y brillantez. Se sucedieron una serie de reyes-profetas que permitieron hacer que su civilización floreciera. Sin embargo, en el año 70 d.C., el emperador romano Tito expulsó definitivamente a los judíos de Jerusalén. Desde entonces, los judíos han estado dispersos por distintas partes del mundo y han sido objeto de desprecio y persecución reiterados, sin un Estado ni territorio propios hasta 1948. Esta animosidad de otros pueblos por diferentes motivos –envidias, desprecio…–, junto con un sentido fuerte de comunidad y una autoimagen de pueblo escogido, forzó a los judíos a replegarse hacia dentro de su comunidad en una especie de endogamia colectiva, permitiendo mantener parte de su cultura a través de los siglos. Durante todo este tiempo, los líderes religiosos judíos mantuvieron en la memoria colectiva la idea encerrada en su libro sagrado de que al final de los tiempos les sería devuelta su Tierra Sagrada. Las facciones más ortodoxas del pueblo judío hoy día ven en el asentamiento judío en Israel el cumplimiento de sus promesas ancestrales. Esta convicción, junto con una memoria histórica de naturaleza victimista, sirve de legitimidad para mantener las posturas más radicales frente a los palestinos musulmanes (Culla, 2005). Hace cuatro años y medio, cuando visité Israel por primera vez, asombrado por la capacidad de ese pueblo que consiguió mantener su cultura a pesar de estar disperso por más de 1800 años, fascinado por el desarrollo económico y tecnológico alcanzado en sólo 60 años, y sorprendido por su poder militar, pregunté a una judía bien educada nacida en Alemania y ciudadana israelí qué mecanismos colectivos habían utilizado durante esos siglos para alcanzar esos logros. Su corta respuesta en inglés me descolocó: “You know. We are the chosen people” (Ya sabes. Somos el pueblo elegido).

La cosmovisión que anima a los palestinos musulmanes, si bien tiene los mismos orígenes que la de los judíos, es de una naturaleza distinta. Este universo simbólico tomó un curso diferente al de los judíos, como se mencionó antes, a partir del siglo VII después de Cristo con la aparición de Muhammad y del Islam. Las enseñanzas de Muhammad llamaban a los pueblos de Arabia a crear una nueva nación fiel al mismo Dios hebreo que hizo un pacto o alianza con Abraham, renovado por Moisés, posteriormente por Jesús, y ahora revitalizado por el “sello de los Profetas”, Muhammad. Esta concepción ha conducido a los musulmanes a creer también que son el pueblo escogido, que son objeto de la gracia de Dios a través de la más reciente revelación divina inscrita en el Corán y que los judíos, al no reconocer al “Profeta”, siguen unas creencias anacrónicas.

Sin duda, el desenvolvimiento del Islam en Arabia y su posterior extensión mediante un espíritu de conquista es en sí un objeto de investigación muy complejo y profundo como para abordarlo en este trabajo. Baste mencionar dos cosas relativas a la relación de la nueva nación musulmana y el pueblo judío, basadas en interpretaciones hechas del Corán: 1. Hubo serios conflictos debido a la asociación de los judíos con algunas tribus beligerantes árabes hostiles a Muhammad y al Islam. La memoria de esta “traición” de los judíos se ha ido transmitiendo generación tras generación. 2. La tradición musulmana comenzó a considerar a Jerusalén como ciudad sagrada íntimamente ligada al “Profeta” ya que, según las tradiciones islámicas, en su famoso sueño nocturno –que algunas facciones musulmanas consideran un viaje real–, Muhammad voló desde la Meca hasta el Templo de Salomón en Jerusalén, lugar hacia donde primeramente se volvían en oración los árabes-musulmanes, siguiendo claramente la tradición judía.

Si hemos hecho este repaso por el universo simbólico judío y musulmán, es porque lo consideramos un elemento imprescindible para comprender la naturaleza del conflicto palestino-israelí. En ocasiones se pasa por alto este factor por centrarse exclusivamente en otras causas –también fundamentales– de índole política, económica, y de reconocimiento.

Lo mencionado anteriormente tiene que ver con las cosmologías tradicionales de ambos pueblos. Esta cosmovisión nutre el conflicto haciendo imposible que, a no ser que ambas sociedades se secularicen completamente8 (y ésta no parece ser la tendencia, como se analizará más adelante) o se genere una nueva cosmovisión compartida, la lucha simbólica se resuelva, por mucho que traten de lograrse acuerdos territoriales. Pero observemos cómo han evolucionado las concepciones religiosas en tiempos más recientes.

Como vimos al principio, el sionismo nació como un movimiento secular socialista. Intelectuales judíos alemanes y norteamericanos bastante influenciados por el espíritu ilustrado y, en algunos casos, por la utopía comunista, diseñaron el proyecto. A principios del siglo XX, la posición de la mayor parte de los religiosos ortodoxos judíos con respecto el sionismo era clara. Para ellos (representados por las primeras agrupaciones de Polonia) el regreso de los judíos a la tierra de Israel sería posible sólo como parte del proceso de “redención”, por intervención divina. Por tanto, estaban en contra del sionismo y del establecimiento del Estado de Israel. De hecho, algunos asentamientos judíos en la antigua Palestina, tras la constitución del Estado de Israel, no quisieron siquiera tener ciudadanía. No obstante, esta concepción fue reformulándose, fruto de las reinterpretaciones del Rabino Kook. Rabí Kook, símbolo del movimiento sionista religioso creado por su padre, afirmaba que la conquista del ejército israelí secular contribuía al propósito divino (Perlmutter, 1987), ya que después de la Guerra de los Seis días el territorio del Estado de Israel coincidía casi con la Tierra de Israel (Bíblica). Pocas semanas después se conquistó Jerusalén occidental. Esta nueva visión propiciaba una nueva interpretación sobre la actitud apropiada del religioso judío hacia el Estado de Israel. Antes se rechazaba este Estado por ir en contra del judaísmo que debía esperar la llegada del Mesías para

El tema del retorno de la religión es un debate abierto. Algunos autores proclamaban al principio del siglo XX la pronta desaparición de la religión, a medida que las sociedades se modernizaran. Los hechos parecen descartar esta hipótesis, mostrando que la religión y la sociedad siempre están unidas. La religión puede que adopte naturalezas distintas, pero es un elemento de la vida social, sin el cual, como dice Durkheim, sería imposible comprender la sociedad misma. Para más información sobre este tema véase: Daniel Bell, “The return of the Sacred”, British Journal of Sociology, 27 (4):419-449, 1977. O también el libro que ya hemos referido anteriormente de Ignacio Sánchez de la Yncera y Marta Rodríguez Fouz (edits.), Dialécticas de la postsecularidad.

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establecer el Estado judío. Ahora, la creación del Estado de Israel y la ocupación de la totalidad de Palestina acelerarían la venida del Mesías.

Esta nueva visión fue enardecida por las victorias sorpresivas del 67 y del 73. Un movimiento juvenil fuerte fue aún más allá, anunciando que la venida del Mesías era inminente y que esos últimos acontecimientos habrían sido claves a la hora de apresurar la Redención de Israel. Estos hechos tienen gran calado en la resolución del conflicto, ya que estas facciones se niegan a la cesión de Cisjordania, la franja de Gaza y Jerusalén Este. Es más, iniciaron un fuerte movimiento de colonización de esos territorios, impulsados por esa reinterpretación legitimadora.

Las ideas de Kook cristalizaban en el ámbito político en el grupo Gush Emunim (Bloque de fieles). Formado en 1974 con el propósito de influenciar en la política, cuestionaba tenazmente el modelo de sociedad laica y socialista y abogaba por la rejudaización de Israel. En 1984 se detuvo a varios terroristas judíos que habían asesinado a jóvenes de la universidad islámica de Hebrón. Sorprendentemente, pertenecían al núcleo dirigente del Gush Emunim. Este grupo extremista, reconocido legalmente, se mantiene hasta hoy día y parece tener bastante influencia en la política israelí (Fraser, 2004).

Gush Emunim inició en 1977 la ocupación de Gaza y Cisjordania, apoyado por el partido del gobierno elegido ese mismo año, empresa en la que no ha cejado hasta ahora. Esta situación es muy preocupante de cara a la resolución del conflicto ya que la influencia en el gobierno de este grupo, que no descarta acciones terroristas, como hemos señalado, es considerable. Han unido nacionalismo y judaísmo, y sustituyeron la idea de que el Estado de Israel está en contra del pueblo judío por otra que dice que los sionistas, inconscientemente, están contribuyendo al plan mesiánico de Dios para el pueblo judío. Además, su lema es afianzar la soberanía israelí sobre toda la Tierra de Israel, rechazando el desalojo de los territorios ocupados. Curiosamente, no se organizan en un partido político sino que tratan de influenciar a distintos partidos afines a sus ideas, sin sacrificar su pureza ideológica.

Ésta era la rama política –y terrorista– pero también se había iniciado en Israel y en EEUU un movimiento de rejudaización más amplio. Crecían notablemente los grupos ultraortodoxos entre jóvenes universitarios, el mundo sefardí y entre los inmigrantes de países árabes. En el parlamento israelí los partidos políticos que representaban los jaredim (temerosos de Dios) crecieron hasta convertirse en componente necesario de cualquier coalición electoral. En los 70 surge también, dentro del mundo judío, el movimiento teshuvá, que designa “el retorno al judaísmo” y el “arrepentimiento”. Este movimiento exige la práctica de las leyes de la Torá exclusivamente y la separación de judíos y gentiles para evitar la asimilación. Por esas fechas comienzan a abrirse institutos talmúdicos para arrepentidos; asciende al poder en 1977 la coalición conservadora religiosa liderada por Menahem Begin (quien apoyó considerablemente al Gush Emunim); viejos militantes que se habían formado en la contracultura o el izquierdismo del 68 se pasaron a la ortodoxia. En el mundo intelectual, brotan textos de académicos ateos que redescubren el judaísmo y cuestionan la modernidad y su secularización. Éstos afirman que la fe y la rigurosidad de la práctica religiosa son compatibles con la técnica y el saber científico. En América, judíos americanos escriben sobre la diferencia abismal entre la auténtica cultura judía (religiosa) y la cultura occidental. Científicos, profesores universitarios e intelectuales judíos reconocidos internacionalmente, como Herman Branover (autoridad mundial en el complejo campo de la magnetohidrodinámica) se convierten en exponentes del movimiento y apoyan la creación de comunidades cerradas que ponen en práctica al pie de la letra los preceptos de la Torá. Esto es la rejudaización desde abajo que Gush Emunim pretende desde arriba (Patiño, 2006).

En el flanco palestino también han ocurrido transformaciones significativas relacionadas con el posicionamiento religioso y con la modificación de la cosmovisión islámica; siendo esta última línea producto de un fenómeno global más que particular. La Organización para la Liberación de Palestina, simbolizada por Yasser Arafat, fue un movimiento de corte nacionalista, sin mucho peso religioso. Sin embargo, en 1983, cuatro años después de la revolución islámica en Irán, fue fundado Hamas. A partir de entonces Hamas ha venido desarrollándose hasta llegar a su clímax con la victoria en

las elecciones del 2006. Hamas, organización considerada terrorista por las Naciones Unidas y la Unión Europea, niega el Estado de Israel. Sin duda9, en la “Operación Plomo Fundido”, la intransigencia de Hamas ha tenido gran parte de responsabilidad. Podríamos decir que la toma de la Franja de Gaza por parte de Hamas en junio del 2007 simboliza la islamización del conflicto10.

El fortalecimiento de la posición religiosa en Palestina está relacionado, además de con una decepción respecto de Al-Fatah y la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, incapaces de una negociación eficaz y objeto de ciertos escándalos, con una transformación más amplia que se ha ido produciendo dentro del mundo islámico. Quizá la primera gran transformación, como pondré de relieve en el capítulo sobre el terrorismo de Al-Qaeda al analizar el surgimiento del islamismo político, se remonte a Arabia Saudí en el siglo XVIII con el wahabismo, movimiento que pretendía limpiar al Islam del sufismo y aplicar estrictamente la ley islámica en las leyes del gobierno. Posteriormente, en Egipto, con la sociedad de Hermanos Musulmanes, esta línea se desarrolló aún más, ya que se planteaba la necesidad de tomar el poder en los países islámicos, contaminados, por culpa de sus políticos, del individualismo y materialismo occidental. La figura de Sayyid Qutb, condenado y ejecutado en su país, Egipto, despunta como la del gran ideólogo de este nuevo islamismo. De este movimiento surge el que podría ser considerado primer movimiento terrorista islámico, la Yihad Islámica, actuando en Egipto (Kepel, 2003).

Inspirados en esta nueva concepción que pretendía restaurar el brillo islámico aplicando las leyes del Corán a la política y la ciencia y tecnología a los procesos sociales, los voluntarios musulmanes que auspiciados por EEUU lucharon en Afganistán contra los comunistas rusos, se organizaron y declararon la guerra a Occidente configurando la Yihad Islámica Internacional. Su nuevo análisis, que abordamos posteriormente en profundidad, era que el verdadero problema de los países islámicos radicaba en Occidente (Kepel, 2003). Consideraban que sus políticos –los de Occidente– estaban

Diciembre 2008-enero 2009.

Otros autores ya habían hecho referencia a este proceso de islamización del conflicto años antes. Ver: Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the case of Hamas”, en Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 34, Issue 1, 1998, pp. 148-163.

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destruyendo los pueblos musulmanes. Por tanto, la idea de atacarlos comenzó a tomar cuerpo. Además, sus ciudadanos también se convertían en blanco, ya que eran corresponsables por el hecho de elegir a esos líderes incompetentes.

El último impulso transformador puede tener que ver con la Revolución Islámica iraní. Al igual que el triunfo comunista en Rusia se vio como el cumplimiento de las profecías marxistas, y se convirtió en el ideal a seguir por todos aquéllos que veían en esta ideología una salvación secularizada inspirando movimientos revolucionarios en casi todo el mundo, la revolución iraní, criticada actualmente, supuso un nuevo horizonte a emular por los grupos islámicos más tradicionalistas.

Estos cuatro acontecimientos están muy ligados a lo ocurrido en Palestina, especialmente en relación a dos organizaciones consideradas terroristas. Por un lado, Hamas está vinculada, y parece que financiada, por los Hermanos Musulmanes de Egipto. Y por otro, hay serios indicios de que Hezbollah –organización libanesa involucrada en el conflicto y que apoya a grupos radicales palestinos– tiene fuertes vínculos con Irán (Gleis, 2012). Estos dos grupos que legitiman el uso de la violencia en la persecución de sus intereses, y que rechazan cualquier forma de Estado judío, nutren, como dijimos al principio, una cosmovisión evolutiva que ve a los judíos como un problema.

La pugna por un territorio

En el plano más obvio, el conflicto es de naturaleza territorial. Se inicia con la entrada progresiva de judíos en la llamada Palestina a partir de 1844, cuando el imperio otomano emite un edicto de tolerancia que permite a éstos entrar en la zona. A partir de entonces comienza a aumentar la comunidad judía en ese territorio, llegando el proceso a su punto álgido tras la conquista de esta parte del imperio otomano por parte de Inglaterra.

Durante el mandato inglés, y debido a la parcialidad de algunos agentes internacionales –y de la misma Inglaterra– en pro de judíos o palestinos dependiendo de intereses cambiantes, la situación se tornó insostenible. Tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial sucedió lo previsible: Inglaterra tuvo que salir de escena. Este país miró más por sus propios intereses que

por la estabilidad y paz de la región, abandonando el territorio y liberándose de lo que se había convertido en una carga. Agentes internacionales occidentales, movidos por cierta compasión hacia los judíos –no fue el caso de Inglaterra–, mediaron para la creación de dos Estados diferentes (Ben-Ami, 1991). Los judíos aceptaron. Sin embargo, los países árabes musulmanes, al menos en primera instancia, no. Este hecho es de gran relevancia, ya que el primer pueblo decidió por sí mismo qué quería hacer, pero los palestinos –concepto que analizaremos después– no quisieron seguir el mismo camino, ya que rechazaban toda posibilidad de compartir el territorio con un Estado judío adyacente. Por ello, tras la proclamación del Estado de Israel en parte del territorio, los palestinos apoyados por los países árabes circundantes se levantaron en armas con la esperanza equivocada de poder derrotar a Israel.

Las guerras y conflictos posteriores han contribuido a agravar más el problema, pero la raíz geopolítica puede estar en lo mencionado en el párrafo anterior. Debido a la negativa de los países árabes musulmanes a aceptar la repartición territorial en dos Estados, y a la hoy constante negación a reconocer el Estado judío por parte de algunos actores musulmanes, se hace muy difícil que haya un acuerdo sólido. No obstante, lo ocurrido tras 1948 con la autoproclamación de Israel como Estado, es importante a la hora de comprender el presente. En las guerras posteriores que se desataron en la región, Israel se apropió de más territorios de los que le asignaba la hoja de ruta de las Naciones Unidas en 1947. Especialmente notorios son los casos de Gaza y Cisjordania, desencadenantes recurrentes de luchas armadas, y la ciudad “doblemente sagrada” de Jerusalén (Lorck, 1986).

El territorio que la carta de partición de las Naciones Unidas otorgaba a Israel en 1947, como hemos dicho, es bastante menor al que actualmente ocupa. Tras la primera guerra árabe-israelí, Israel tomó un 26% más de territorio del que le correspondía. Posteriormente, tras la guerra de los seis días llevada a cabo en 1967 entre Israel por un lado y Egipto, Siria e Irak por otro, el primero se apropió de la Franja de Gaza, de Cisjordania, de Jerusalén Este (recordemos que Jerusalén y Belén, según la carta de partición, debían ser ciudades internacionales administradas por la ONU), de la Península del Sinaí y de los Altos del Golán.

Luego de conflictos recurrentes con Jordania, Egipto, Siria y Líbano principalmente, y de la recuperación de varios territorios por otros países, Gaza, Cisjordania y Jerusalén Este se convierten en los “territorios ocupados”. En 1993, mediante el tratado de Oslo, se pretendía que Israel se retirara de ellos, pero esta retirada nunca se ha podido consumar. A pesar de que el ejército de Israel haya salido de algunos de estos territorios, los controles militares son tan férreos que la comunicación entre estas ciudades es casi imposible, y la creación de instituciones palestinas operativas, por tanto, casi un sueño.

La llamada “Hoja de Ruta” del 2003 para la pacificación de la zona en el 2005 incluía tres fases que no han llegado a culminar (Fraser, 2004). Lo ocurrido entre diciembre de 2008 y enero 2009 habla por sí solo. Israel, en una acción militar desproporcionada, haciendo oídos sordos a la presión internacional y a las resoluciones de la ONU, dejó, en sólo 23 días, según estimaciones de varios observatorios internacionales, más de 1300 muertos (al menos 300 niños) y alrededor de 5500 heridos.

Es sabido además, que las facciones más ortodoxas dentro de Israel, no sólo no abogan por la salida de esos territorios, sino que promueven planes de colonización para incrementar la población judía en dichos territorios ocupados, y así, en virtud del elevado índice de reproducción de los judíos ortodoxos, superar en proporción a la población palestina en la zona. Estas facciones tampoco aceptan la posibilidad de tener un Estado palestino, complicando también las posibilidades de negociación.

El recurso de la violencia de dos pueblos

Un factor añadido del conflicto es la desproporción con la que uno y otro bando se atacan mutuamente11. A medida que Israel ha ido desarrollando una capacidad militar más amplia y los países musulmanes han reconocido su imposibilidad de llegar a buen puerto por medio de la lucha armada, las acciones de Israel, llamadas “represalias”, contra los palestinos han ido tomando una envergadura desmesurada. Esto ha conducido a la opinión pública internacional a solidarizarse

Para un análisis detallado de la desproporcionalidad del uso de la violencia entre estos dos colectivos ver: Ste-phen Graham, “Bulldozers and bombs: the latest Palestinian-Israeli conflict as asymmetric urbizide”, en Antipode, Volume 34, Issue 4, septiembre 2002, pp. 642-649.

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con el pueblo palestino, poniéndose así del lado del más débil. Estas sobreactuaciones de Israel han servido para enconar aún más el resentimiento de grupos pro-palestinos, que cada vez asocian más el poder de Israel con el apoyo occidental (aunque no consideramos que esto sea totalmente cierto como veremos en un punto posterior). Durante las dos Intifadas, por ejemplo, mientras que el ejército israelí atacaba al pueblo palestino con su armamento moderno, los palestinos, muchos de los cuales eran adolescentes, se armaron con piedras, palos, cócteles Molotov y neumáticos quemados. La acción militar israelí mencionada anteriormente, la “Operación Plomo Fundido”, también constituye un ejemplo paradigmático. Mientras que los palestinos lanzaban cohetes Qazzam con muy poca capacidad destructiva y precisión12, el ejército israelí hizo un despliegue de medios sobrecogedor, utilizando tecnología militar punta. Durante la operación, el número de bajas israelíes fue 13 y el de palestinas, como ya hemos dicho, más de 1300.

Por otro lado, a pesar de las desmedidas respuestas israelíes, hay que observar el potencial desestabilizador de los ataques terroristas. Éstos se han sucedido desde los tiempos del mandato británico y, de hecho, fueron uno de los motivos que condujeron a Inglaterra a salir del llamado entonces territorio palestino. Los judíos estaban muy bien organizados, y existían varios grupos terroristas que atacaban con fuerza. Los musulmanes árabes situados en aquel territorio también se valían del terrorismo en aquel entonces. Esto muestra que el terrorismo ha sido un elemento presente desde el inicio del conflicto. Aunque por parte del pueblo judío hoy día parece no haber terrorismo organizado13, el Gush Emunim, al que ya prestamos atención anteriormente, ejerce una presión muy amplia en el gobierno, influyendo en la instrumentación de la violencia por parte de éste. En cambio, los palestinos, en parte alentados por la frustración y desesperación, en los últimos años han recurrido al terrorismo en mayor medida como elemento de presión. Ataques suicidas y lanzamiento permanente de cohetes se suceden de forma continuada, sin causar normalmente muchas víctimas, pero generando

Un dato que se suele obviar es que entre 2008 y 2009 se lanzaron más de 3000 cohetes Qassam al territorio israelí.12Algunos autores como Noam Chomsky se atreven a denominar “terrorismo de Estado” a las acciones despro-porcionadas utilizadas por un gobierno que, aunque se reserva el derecho legítimo de utilizar la violencia, ha de ejercerla responsablemente. Sin embargo, nos hemos abstenido de referirnos así a la violencia desproporcio-nada por parte del Estado judío, ya que podría provocar confusión innecesaria.

13Para comprender mejor la relación entre el uso del terrorismo –especialmente el de los terroristas suicidas– y la violencia de Estado ver: Barder Araj, “Harsh Sate repression as a cause of suicide bombing: the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”, en Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 284-303.

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un clima de tensión permanente dentro de Israel que favorece la utilización de la violencia por parte del gobierno14.

El miedo, sin duda, es un elemento con gran influencia movilizadora dentro de Israel. Este pueblo ha sido sometido durante cientos de años a persecuciones, desprecios, intentos de genocidio, etc. Estas condiciones han desarrollado en la cultura judía una actitud a la defensiva, un ostracismo que quizá no haya sido más que un mecanismo de defensa para poder sobrevivir. De otro modo, tras más de 1800 años en el exilio, probablemente no habría sido posible mantener la cultura. Esta actitud se ha enardecido últimamente por la llamada amenaza iraní, por Hezbollah, Hamas y Al Qaeda. Estas organizaciones suscitan miedo, pero este miedo, en mi opinión, perjudica al pueblo palestino. Si el pueblo judío tiene miedo y se siente amenazado, siempre va a ser más proclive a apoyar la violencia de su gobierno. Pero a pesar de que dentro del mundo judío a nivel internacional parece haber cierto rechazo a las políticas de Israel, cuando se vive dentro de un Estado donde el miedo y la amenaza son una constante, la situación varía.

El deseo de reconocimiento y la división palestina pueden ser otro elemento que enquista el problema. En este conflicto se dice que los actores directos son los judíos y los palestinos. Pero, ¿qué significan esos dos términos? Cuando exploramos el universo simbólico de los judíos, se observaba con claridad que su proceso de construcción nacional ha sido largo y tiene fuertes raíces. Tras la expulsión de los judíos de Israel, en el año 70 d. de C., el futuro de este pueblo era incierto, siendo imposible la formación de un Estado judío que sirviera para reconocer a esta nación hasta el año 1948. Podría decirse que este acto de constitución representa simbólicamente el reconocimiento universal de la nación judía, a pesar de la negación de algunos musulmanes.

¿Pero qué ocurre con los palestinos? ¿Son un pueblo? ¿Qué significado tiene ese nombre?

Volviendo a tiempos presentes, durante el mandato británico, en esa región confluyeron judíos y árabes musulmanes. Los árabes musulmanes no ciudadanos de Egipto, Siria, Arabia Saudí, Irak ni Líbano, y asentados en su mayor parte en lo que se conocía por territorios palestinos, comenzaron a llamarse palestinos. Algunas interrogantes que brotan de esta afirmación son: ¿cuándo y cómo surge el sentimiento nacional palestino?, ¿desde 1948 hasta 1967, cuando los territorios palestinos fueron anexionados a Egipto y Jordania, el sentimiento nacional palestino seguía existiendo o se ha desarrollado con la ocupación israelí? ¿Qué habría ocurrido si estos países árabes hubieran nacionalizado a los palestinos, en vez de considerarlos refugiados? Estas preguntas no son centrales para nuestra investigación, pero sí necesarias a la hora de conocer mejor a uno de los actores del conflicto. Para poder avanzar consideraré a Palestina como una unidad nacional, a pesar de que esa categoría puede ser algo problemática.

El que Palestina no tenga una voz unánime acrecienta la complejidad de las relaciones entre ambos colectivos. La identidad nacional judía, salvaguardada por un Estado fuerte es reconocible. Los procesos políticos democráticos del gobierno de Israel hacia sí misma permiten que haya una voz que represente sus intereses. En los diálogos y procesos de paz, Israel, a pesar de las diferencias políticas que conviven en su interior, habla con una sola voz. El pueblo palestino, en cambio, tiene problemas para poder articular una voz unánime, por varios motivos. Por un lado, el pueblo palestino, debido a su fragmentación territorial y a sus limitaciones en términos de comunicación, tiene muy difícil verse como uno. Por otro, dentro del pueblo palestino existen sectores casi autónomos que se arrogan el derecho de representar a su

Palestina es el nombre con el que los romanos designaron a la antigua tierra de Canaán o del antiguo Reino de Israel a partir de la revuelta judía (132-135) en que la antigua Judea, que formaba parte de la provincia romana de Siria, pasó a denominarse Siria-Palestina o simplemente Palestina, en honor a los filisteos, antigua civilización enemiga de Israel. Los romanos esperaban que con esta nueva denominación territorial se desvinculara toda relación histórica del pueblo judío con esta tierra (Culla, 2005).

pueblo. Es significativa la división entre Hamas y al Fatah. Esta división cristalizó en la toma del poder en Gaza por Hamas. El pueblo palestino, supuestamente representado por la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, pero gobernado también en Gaza por Hamas, no tiene una clara representación.

La situación presentada se agrava aún más por dos factores. Hamas es una facción extremista que no reconoce al Estado de Israel; e Israel, la ONU y ciertos Estados occidentales mediadores, consideran a Hamas una organización terrorista y, por lo tanto, en muchas ocasiones, no se plantea siquiera la posibilidad de dialogar con dicha organización.

Otro ingrediente que dificulta la representación de Palestina –y el proceso de resolución del conflicto– es que algunos países musulmanes como Irán y Siria, apoyan más o menos explícitamente a las facciones más extremistas que no reconocen la existencia de un estado judío, financiando incluso a grupos terroristas como Hezbollah (Gleis, 2012).

Mediación internacional

El aval de Estados Unidos y de otros países occidentales, por un lado, y el apoyo de la antigua Unión Soviética durante la guerra fría a los países árabes, por el otro, no pueden ser considerados la causa del conflicto palestino-israelí, pero sí una condición que ha contribuido en parte al enconamiento de la relación. La política exterior de EEUU, además, ha sido siempre favorable a Israel por diversos motivos. En una encuesta del 2006 del Anuario Judío Norteamericano, publicada por el American Jewish Committee y realizada por el Profesor Ira Sheskin de la Universidad de Miami y el Profesor Arnold Dashefsky de la Universidad de Connecticut, calculaba que había 6,4 millones de judíos en Estados Unidos, estando especialmente concentrados en Nueva York (1.618.000), California (1.194.000), Florida (653.000), y New Jersey (480.000). Además, las posiciones de poder económico, político e intelectual que ostentan los judíos en el país norteamericano son tan considerables que no pueden dejar a ningún gobierno de la Casa Blanca imparcial frente a este tema. De hecho, algunos autores, como John Mearsheimer y Stephen Walt en El lobby de Israel y la política exterior de Estados Unidos, consideran que el respaldo de Estados Unidos a Israel no está basado en cuestiones estratégicas, sino que se explica por la presión de los ‘lobbies’

judíos de derecha y los grupos de cristianos fundamentalistas o conservadores favorables al sionismo (Mearsheimer, 2006). Este argumento, aunque fuertemente criticado15, muestra el grado de influencia que estos grupos sionistas pueden llegar a tener en la política exterior de EEUU y, específicamente, en lo relativo a Oriente Medio.

Aparte de lo mencionado anteriormente, para Occidente, Israel, a pesar de estar situado en Oriente Medio, es un país cercano, un país considerado casi occidental. Esta condición, junto con la localización geográfica de Israel, convierte a este país en un lugar estratégico desde el cual poder defender los intereses norteamericanos –pero también europeos– en Oriente medio. Desde ahí se puede contener mejor el terrorismo islámico, se puede tener mayor acceso a las ricas fuentes petrolíferas de la zona, se puede controlar –o al menos vigilar– el eje energético Rusia-Irán y se puede supervisar la situación de Irak, por mencionar algunas razones. Lo ocurrido en octubre de 2011 entre EEUU, la UNESCO y Palestina es representativo. La UNESCO reconoció a Palestina como miembro de la organización, haciendo un guiño al reconocimiento de éste como Estado, e inmediatamente EEUU, como medida de presión, suspendió su financiación a esta entidad, que suponía el 22% de sus ingresos totales. El analista social Noam Chomsky –aunque lingüista de formación– recurre constantemente a explicaciones del conflicto centradas en la consideración de Israel como lugar estratégico para los intereses nacionales de EEUU (Chomsky, 2004). Las críticas a esta argumentación sostienen que el sector industrial-militar, y las grandes compañías petrolíferas norteamericanos no se benefician en absoluto de las incursiones militares norteamericanas en la zona, ni de la tensión generada en la misma, quejándose incluso de la política exterior estadounidense.

Sin este peso relevante de la comunidad judía en EEUU (donde, como hemos dicho, existe un fuerte movimiento sionista) las sobreactuaciones de Israel no se habrían producido con tanta frecuencia. Sin embargo, la argumentación simplista que trata de explicar a Israel sólo desde la perspectiva de dependencia de EEUU, parece ser poco seria. La estratégica situación

Véase: Abraham H. Foxman, The Deadliest Lies: The Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control, Palgrave, Macmillan, January 2009.15

Para una mayor exploración de las barreras que suponen entre estos dos colectivos las representaciones este-reotipadas a veces presentes en la literatura, estereotipos que nutren posturas racistas, leer: Toine Van Teeffelen, “Racism and Metaphor: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in popular literature”, en Discourse and Society, Volume 5, nº 3, julio 1994, pp. 381-405.

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Reportaje de Público.es, publicado el 12 de enero de 2009.16

geopolítica de Israel para EEUU y Occidente en general, y el peso judío en la política exterior de EEUU en relación a Oriente Medio, son dos elementos más, pero no los únicos, que arrojan luz sobre esta compleja problemática.

Lo mencionado anteriormente no debería llevarnos a la conclusión de que todos los judíos, especialmente aquellos que no viven en Israel, están a favor de las medidas militares que el país está tomando. Intelectuales, historiadores e individuos judíos residentes fuera de Israel se han manifestado mostrando el rechazo a las políticas de dicho país hacia Palestina. En EEUU, mientras que las organizaciones judías pro sionistas apoyaban al candidato McCain, un 77% de los votantes judíos apoyaron a Obama, quien abogaba por una relación con Israel más basada en el derecho internacional que en la hermandad. Parece existir una apatía generalizada dentro de esta comunidad fuera de Israel hacia las políticas de ese gobierno. El problema reside en que los moderados, a pesar de ser mayoría, no se movilizan tanto como los extremistas, quienes sí están muy bien organizados y están teniendo más peso en la política de Israel16.

El antisemitismo sigue siendo un problema añadido17. Un sector fundamentalista del mundo islámico se niega a reconocer la existencia de un Estado judío. Como se apuntó, alrededor de 1947, las Naciones Unidas y otros agentes internacionales estaban mediando para que, tras el fin del mandato británico en Palestina, hubiese una división del territorio en dos Estados. Una vez llegado el momento y definidos los términos, en 1948 los representantes judíos proclamaron la creación del Estado de Israel aceptando las disposiciones del documento de repartición. En ese momento, los países árabes circundantes, como muestra máxima de rechazo frente a tal proclamación, declararon la guerra a Israel, con nefastas consecuencias para los intereses árabes (Morris, 1989). Desde entonces, la actitud de algunos de esos Estados frente a Israel ha cambiado, pero siguen existiendo poderosas fuerzas que se resisten a aceptarlo y que dificultan las negociaciones.

Dentro del pueblo palestino tenemos a Hamas, organización que ya hemos dicho es considerada terrorista por la ONU pero que tiene mucho poder y arraigo popular. Hamas ha adoptado una postura bastante radical –aunque en los últimos años está variando– no aceptando bajo ningún término a Israel. Ésta es una posición insostenible, ya que Israel ya es un hecho insoslayable, y esa postura sólo puede constituir un escollo más para que haya un avance certero hacia la resolución final.

Otras organizaciones terroristas islámicas también son enemigas declaradas de Israel y del sionismo. Por un lado tenemos al mentado Hezbollah, que bien podría ser considerado el máximo representante del fundamentalismo chiíta. Por otro lado tenemos la Yihad Internacional y la Yihad Palestina. Todas estas organizaciones, algunas con gran acogida en las bases, sostienen posiciones muy hostiles hacia Israel. Las acciones militares desmesuradas, o sobre-reacciones (depende desde qué posición se mire, Israel actúa o reacciona) de Israel hacia los palestinos, alimentan la legitimidad de la existencia de estos grupos entre la opinión pública musulmana.

Dos países especialmente reacios a Israel son Siria e Irán, especialmente este último. Irán, a pesar de su campaña pública por Occidente, no esconde su aversión por Israel. La influencia de Irán, que aspira a convertirse en el máximo exponte del mundo islámico, es considerable en este entorno, por lo que sus planteamientos tienen fuerte influencia entre los voceros diversos que en nombre de Palestina negocian los procesos de paz. La posición de Irán con respecto Israel es extremadamente controvertida. Su presidente, en repetidas ocasiones, ha afirmado que Israel debería ser borrado del mapa18, a pesar de haberse descubierto que Ahmadineyad proviene de familia judía.

En la Conferencia Mundial contra el racismo auspiciada por las Naciones Unidas en abril del 2009, nueve países –entre ellos EEUU– invitados se abstuvieron de participar por el espíritu antisemita que parecía im-pregnar el evento. Uno de los motivos era la participación del presidente de Irán, quien había hecho las declaraciones antisemitas mencionadas arriba.

18 Para un estudio pormenorizado de las fatalidades generadas por el conflicto a partir del año 2000, ver: David A. Jaeger y M. Daniele Paserman, “The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, Volume 98, nº 4, septiembre de 2008, pp. 1591-1604.

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El planteamiento de algunos grupos fundamentalistas islámicos en torno a Israel varía. Algunos consideran la eliminación de Israel como un objetivo secundario. Estos grupos abogan por una transformación del mundo islámico, de modo que en las instituciones de gobierno –como es el caso de Irán– se apliquen las leyes del Corán. Los grupos que consideran la eliminación de Israel como objetivo principal de su lucha, ven en este Estado y en el sionismo la raíz de los problemas del mundo islámico y, por tanto, consideran su destrucción necesaria para el avance de los países musulmanes. La defensa de la causa palestina por parte de estos últimos gobiernos y grupos enemigos acérrimos de Israel parece ser algo instrumental. Debido a las consecuencias terroríficas que podría desencadenar una guerra directa con Israel –podemos volver a recurrir al mencionado caso de Irán–, hace que se actúe en Israel a través de Palestina. Palestina así se convierte no en un fin, sino en un medio para atacar a Israel y, si es posible, destruirlo. Estas posiciones, sin ningún tipo de dudas, obstaculizan severamente el proceso de paz que pueda conducir a la convivencia pacífica de Israel y Palestina.

La cuestión de la memoria y la desigualdad económica

Otro factor que acrecienta el fragor del conflicto es el resentimiento que una historia de violencia ha tatuado en ambos bandos. Tanto israelíes como palestinos se sienten víctimas de una historia de guerra que ha acabado con amigos y familiares19.

En algunos casos la violencia ha producido un odio enquistado difícil de extirpar. En otros, los muertos se sacralizan y son convertidos en mártires que no pueden ser traicionados. Este argumento es extensamente utilizado en otros conflictos. Los muertos se utilizan como justificación para defender posiciones parciales, haciendo aún más complicado un análisis objetivo de la situación.

En un tren que iba de Tel Aviv a Haifa, en febrero del 2007, escuché con sorpresa e interés a un judío boliviano de nacionalidad israelí. Mientras me explicaba con progresiva agresividad cómo los palestinos querían matar a sus familias me increpó: “¿Tú qué harías si viniesen a matar a tu madre, a tu mujer, a tu familia? Sólo podemos defendernos. Si van a matar a los nuestros, mejor matarles a ellos”.

Esta violencia y odio conduce a la estigmatización del otro pueblo, y a la naturalización mutua de su maldad. Los judíos más ortodoxos afirman que los árabes son gente mala, deshonesta, violenta. Algunos musulmanes, especialmente aquellos influenciados por Mullás, prejuiciosos, desprecian la naturaleza del judío, utilizando grandes categorías homogéneas para referirse a cualquier individuo de este colectivo.

Estos últimos análisis sobre el resentimiento y los estereotipos no son de ningún modo aplicables a la generalidad del pueblo judío ni palestino, sino aspectos relevantes aplicables a ciertas facciones que enturbian el eventual diálogo.

El abismo en términos de desarrollo económico y social entre Israel y Palestina es uno de los principales motivos por los que la balanza del conflicto, desde el punto de vista de número de víctimas, parece siempre decantarse positivamente a favor de Israel. El ejército israelí es considerado uno de los mejores del mundo, si no el mejor en términos de eficiencia. Su servicio de inteligencia está también entre los tres mejores del mundo. Y su mecanismo de control de vuelos es el mejor. Estos indicadores no reflejan su grado de desarrollo económico ni social, pero de ellos se puede inferir el nivel de desarrollo tecnológico de Israel. Esta gran diferencia ha hecho que Israel lleve el control del conflicto. Mientras que los grupos terroristas pro-palestinos realizan actos con armas casi caseras, el ejército israelí reacciona de tal forma que amenaza la supervivencia digna de un pueblo.

En el Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano20 (IDH) del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) publicado en 2008, haciendo referencia al 2006, Israel aparece en el número 24. Los territorios palestinos, sin embargo, están situados en el puesto 106. En un informe del 2005 de la ONG

internacional Social Watch, se muestra que la ocupación israelí de los territorios palestinos está teniendo graves consecuencias en las condiciones sociales de la gente de dicha zona, especialmente en las mujeres (Social Watch, 2005). Una Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para asuntos humanitarios publicó en el 2004 otro informe resaltando las condiciones precarias en las que se vivía en Cisjordania y Gaza (Naciones Unidas, 2005). Baste mencionar que un 22% de los niños palestinos sufre desnutrición crónica o aguda debido, exclusivamente, al hambre. Tras la última gran intervención militar de Israel a la que hemos hecho referencia (la “Operación Plomo Fundido”), comenzada en diciembre del 2008, la situación se ha agravado mucho más. La ocupación impide que el pueblo palestino emprenda un sendero de sólido desarrollo.

Israel, en cambio, ha logrado desarrollar una cultura científica y técnica fuerte, convirtiendo a este Estado relativamente joven en un ejemplo de capacidad militar y agrícola, por mencionar algunas áreas donde sobresale. El pueblo judío fue desarrollando, a través de sus vicisitudes en su condición de errante, una memoria histórica fuerte que se transmitía generación tras generación y que les impulsaba a esforzarse por progresar, les solicitaba que no se dejaran arrastrar por la corriente, les decía que debían resistir y, ante todo, les conducía a adoptar una mirada crítica hacia su alrededor. A este factor, como se dijo al principio, se une el hecho de que la religión judía instaba a este pueblo a distinguirse por encima de la muchedumbre. Hoy día estos rasgos han quedado impresos en su cultura, sirviendo de acicate para todo su avance. Lo mencionado no es óbice para reconocer que las desigualdades en el interior de Israel, como desvela el informe publicado en diciembre de 2011 por la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico, Este indicador toma en consideración el Producto Interior Bruto, la esperanza de vida y la tasa de escolarización.20

crecen a un ritmo superior que el resto de países de la organización (OECD, s.f.).

Lo expuesto con anterioridad muestra un conflicto entre un David y un Goliat. Por ello, sin intervención internacional, la superioridad de Israel podría convertir este caso en una gran tragedia.

Es conocido en el mundo del desarrollo socioeconómico, que la interacción de dos pueblos nunca es saludable si no se da en condiciones de igualdad. Palestina debería ser apoyado para que alcance niveles de desarrollo social y económicos dignos. Éste es un derecho que la comunidad internacional debería salvaguardar. Como ha mostrado la historia reciente de los países en vías de desarrollo, cuando un colectivo siente que está siendo oprimido y no ve ninguna solución, recurre a la violencia. Es menester que se establezcan instituciones internacionales con poder suficiente para evitar estas situaciones y para apoyar el desarrollo de cada pueblo, especialmente de los menos favorecidos. Sin un sistema de seguridad colectiva que atienda a todos los elementos que contiene, muy difícilmente se podrían cumplir estos objetivos.

Conclusiones

Trayendo a colación algunos puntos del apartado anterior sobre la historia reciente del conflicto armado y algo de lo dicho en esta sección, procedamos a resumir algunas de las causas posiblemente más relevantes de esta pugna: el factor religioso; una mala transición tras el mandato británico; la ocupación extra de territorios por parte de Israel tras varias guerras; ataques terroristas de grupos pro-palestinos y las medidas draconianas del gobierno de Israel; la pugna entre Hamas y Al Fatah que impide la representación unánime de Palestina; el apoyo a Israel por parte de EEUU y otros países occidentales; el antisemitismo existente en algunos círculos –incluso gobiernos, como el de Irán– que instrumentalizan la causa palestina para canalizar este prejuicio; y diferentes grados de desarrollo social y económico. El giro que tras las últimas elecciones a principios del 2009 parece estar sufriendo Israel, hace que la situación sea aún menos halagüeña y se incorporen nuevos elementos en la trama del conflicto. La coalición entre el Likud y partidos ultraderechistas parecía haberse suavizado tras unir en el grupo al partido socialista. Algunas declaraciones iniciales parecían mostrar que existía disposición para seguir con el plan para la creación de un Estado palestino, pero, en unas declaraciones recientes, el presidente Netanyahu ha dejado entrever que no está dispuesto a comprometerse con ningún plan anterior. Sólo el curso de los acontecimientos mostrará la posición final del nuevo gobierno de Israel, pero, como ya aparecía en los titulares de algunos diarios (El País, 2009) tras las primeras negociaciones entre EEUU e Israel acerca de la situación de Oriente Medio, el Estado judío puede pasar de ser un aliado en la zona a un problema. Lo mismo parece comenzar a ocurrir en relación a la UE, institución que está tratando de presionar al actual gobierno de Israel –sin ningún resultado– para que se abra a negociar la creación de un Estado palestino21. La tensión que desde principios del 2012 se vive con Irán por causa de su supuesto programa nuclear con fines bélicos, que ha logrado en mayo formar una coalición de todos los partidos, tampoco favorece el clima que se vive en la región.

El sábado 24 de abril de 2009, en un artículo del diario El País, se lee este titular: “Israel rechaza toda imposición de la UE para negociar la paz”. Netanyahu rechaza aceptar los compromisos adoptados por los gobiernos ante-riores. La UE proporciona 1000 millones de euros anuales a la Autoridad Palestina, pero algunos líderes ya están cuestionando esta estrategia si no se enmarca en un plan institucional para crear un Estado palestino.

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Todos los factores señalados con anterioridad probablemente no constituyen las causas primigenias del conflicto, pero todos han sido condimentos que han contribuido a enconarlo. Otros elementos a tener en cuenta a la hora de explorar el conflicto son los apoyos internaciones que reciben ambos bandos y sus intereses; la presión de la opinión pública; la actuación de los organismos internaciones no gubernamentales; la mediación impotente de las Naciones Unidas; el rol de los medios de comunicación; y la utilización de un lenguaje demagógico y sutil por parte de las diferentes partes que imposibilita comprender la realidad de los acontecimientos.

Este análisis causal, como se ha podido observar, es multifactorial y, como todo problema social complejo, requiere un tratamiento sistémico. Por ello no hemos buscado causas últimas, sino que hemos señalado una plétora de factores que en diferentes grados impiden la resolución del entramado palestino-israelí. Cada factor requiere unas acciones distintas, pero siempre dentro de un plan global coherente.

En conclusión, si tuviésemos que destilar las causas mencionadas en un esfuerzo por encontrar la quintaesencia de la razón de ser del conflicto, diríamos que la injusticia está en el corazón del problema. Esta injusticia tiene dos dimensiones. La primera está relacionada con el análisis del problema. Analizar una problemática implica liberarse de prejuicios, de nociones preconcebidas, de posiciones parciales, y exige pureza de intención para llegar al fondo del asunto. Según lo que hemos podido observar, las diferentes miradas que enfocan esta problemática están teñidas de posicionamientos parciales y tan cargadas de emociones que nublan la posibilidad de observar con claridad. Esta afirmación que parece un tanto abstracta es fundamental aunque tiene un componente filosófico ineludible. Mi postura teórica es que detrás de cada asunto hay una realidad alcanzable. Este asunto debe explorarse por parte de varios actores que dialogan sobre sus descubrimientos. En esta situación, los diferentes observadores retratan una parte, pero eso no implica que la realidad se haya multiplicado. Un esfuerzo compartido por abordar un problema requiere el reconocimiento de esta postura. Una vez reconocida dicha posición, el análisis sería mucho más fiel. Los diferentes aspectos del conflicto extraídos por parte de diferentes investigaciones deberían tomarse para dibujar un retrato completo (casi completo), lo más fiel posible a la realidad.

La siguiente dimensión de la falta de justicia que exacerba esta problemática está en el plano social y es bastante compleja. Tanto judíos como palestinos sufren opresión, porque no pueden dar expresión a su verdadera identidad colectiva que exige colaboración, confianza y reciprocidad, y tienen que adoptar posturas defensivas, agresivas e interesadas que no se corresponden con su nobleza inherente. En unos casos unos más que los otros. Hasta que la solución que se esboce no siga el principio rector de la justicia, y todos los actores se aferren a ella, será imposible una resolución satisfactoria. Sin justicia, la armonía y la paz son imposibles. Esta noción de justicia social es muy amplia y algunos podrían afirmar: “Cada uno tiene una concepción de justicia diferente”. Para resolver este asunto me remito al mismo planteamiento filosófico del principio, existe un ideal de justicia, muy amplio con significados infinitamente profundos, pero uno al fin y al cabo. Los implicados necesitan de un agente externo, imparcial, que se comprometa con este principio. De este modo se buscará el mejor cauce de acción que beneficie a ambas partes. Este agente puede ser el sistema de seguridad colectiva implementado por la ONU. Con esto no estamos diciendo que la resolución del conflicto descansa en el incremento de la efectividad del sistema de seguridad colectiva, sino que es un factor sin el cual difícilmente se podrían implementar las medidas que serían necesarias para un proceso de paz efectivo y que en breve pasaremos a enumerar.

Esta noción social de justicia tiene que ver también con los diferentes grados de desarrollo social y económico del que disfrutan ambos pueblos. Cualquier acuerdo, para que sea justo, ha de darse entre iguales. Mientras uno esté en una condición de desventaja –en este caso, económica, social y militar– es muy difícil que pueda haber colaboración y coexistencia pacífica, especialmente cuando una de las partes es corresponsable de la condición del otro.

Lo dicho en los párrafos anteriores es un desafío a la complejidad del concepto de justicia, ya que es amplísimo y en sí mismo ya requeriría un trabajo de conceptuación largo. Habría que traer a colación a Marx, Habermas, Rawls, Dworckin, hablar de formas de desarrollo socioeconómico de nuevo, de derechos humanos, de tribunales de justicia y de cuerpos legislativos que emitan leyes… pero éste no es el espacio idóneo para ese asunto. Lo que sí mencionaré es que la justicia sólo se puede aplicar cuando existen cuerpos

que velan por ella. En el escenario internacional todavía no ha cuajado un sistema con fuerza suficiente, ni con legitimidad y representatividad, como para velar por la aplicación de la justicia en el ámbito interestatal. Ése ha de ser un foco de atención para los comprometidos con los procesos conducentes a un orden internacional justo y armonioso. Las Naciones Unidas con sus agencias, encarnando el principio de seguridad colectiva, como hemos venido señalando, quizá sean la semilla que debe ser nutrida para que adquiera la envergadura necesaria para poder liderar y regular las acciones internacionales.

Con el fin de observar con mayor claridad la dificultad de resolver este conflicto sin un sistema de seguridad colectiva sólido e imparcial, a continuación enumeraremos algunas posibles medidas parciales, realmente necesarias, que se deberían introducir para la pacificación del caso. Estas medidas podrían constituir –de hecho muchas están en marcha– los factores principales para la solución del conflicto, pero tendrían que ser apoyadas desde mediación exterior, ya que la experiencia ha demostrado que, sin ella, los acuerdos no se cumplen:

o La creación de un Estado palestino. Esta línea abre todo un mundo. Desde 1947 se ha intentado crear un Estado palestino. La ONU, como vimos, asignó territorios para un Estado judío y para otro palestino. Sin embargo, diferentes circunstancias han hecho imposible que esto se materializara. Actualmente el problema es todavía más complejo, ya que Israel se ha apropiado de mucho más territorio del que le había asignado la ONU, y existen sectores influyentes de la población que se niegan a hacer concesiones. El proceso de colonización de Gaza, Cisjordania y Jerusalén Este, por parte de judíos ortodoxos, debería detenerse. La mayoría de los países árabes circundantes tampoco quisieron nacionalizar a los palestinos refugiados y hoy día ése es uno de los grandes obstáculos para el proceso de paz: casi cinco millones de palestinos viven como refugiados. Lo único claro es que se requiere un Estado palestino. El proceso de negociación entre Palestina e Israel ha sido muy tortuoso, entre otras causas, por la exigencia de ciertos requisitos previos para la negociación, como la detención de asentamientos en Gaza y Cisjordania por parte de Israel.

o Apoyo al desarrollo social y económico y al establecimiento de un gobierno democrático en Palestina. Hasta que ambos pueblos no se encuentren en igualdad de condiciones, el odio, el rencor serán inevitables, y las relaciones saludables entre ambas poblaciones seguirán siendo imposibles. Siguiendo el modelo teórico de Ignacio Aymerich para el desarrollo de un indicador de

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efectividad de los derechos humanos, basado en las condiciones sociales que permitieron la constitución del Estado moderno, diríamos que el apoyo al desarrollo podría partir por asegurar que en Palestina se dieran las siguientes condiciones: el monopolio legítimo de la violencia por parte de una autoridad central, la autosuficiencia fiscal, la unificación de las funciones legislativas así como de las jurisdiccionales, y unas pretensiones de legitimidad efectivas (Aymerich, 2001).

o La implementación de un programa educativo consensuado entre palestinos e israelíes moderados, auspiciado por la ONU, que se centre en trabajar con las bases. Los objetivos de este programa, que ha de tener a los niños, adolescentes y jóvenes como principales destinatarios, podrían ser, por un lado, educar en el concepto de unicidad de la humanidad, a pesar de su diversidad y en el principio de la libre e independiente investigación de la realidad, y, por otro, eliminar todo tipo de prejuicios. Para ello, un equipo interdisciplinario serio y competente debería desarrollar el programa. Los medios de comunicación y las escuelas principalmente, pero también grupos formados por voluntarios de barrio, podrían ser los espacios de socialización. El proyecto de las Naciones Unidas de la “Alianza de civilizaciones”, como estaba concebido en sus inicios, pretendía algo similar entre los diferentes pueblos y culturas, aunque ha sido objeto de profusas críticas por sus fútiles resultados.

o La creación de un grupo compuesto por líderes religiosos judíos y musulmanes, dispuestos a explorar todos aquellos elementos comunes de sus religiones. Esa parte quizá también podría incorporarse dentro del programa educativo que hemos mencionado antes y los medios también deberían prestarle atención para socializar los avances. Los proyectos de diálogo interreligioso, que desde hace unos años se han ido implementando en cada vez más lugares, son un buen ejemplo de la dinámica que habrían de adoptar los líderes religiosos palestinos y judíos comprometidos con este proceso. El diálogo interreligioso busca encontrar elementos comunes dentro de las diferentes tradiciones religiosas. En una época en que el fanatismo y las identidades basadas en la religión parecen estar tomando fuerza, resulta importante tomar con seriedad esta línea de trabajo.

o Fomentar proyectos colectivos de base que permitan trabajar, actuar, colaborar y relacionarse a palestinos y judíos. De este modo, los estereotipos irían desapareciendo mediante la amistad y el acercamiento. Algunos proyectos ya en marcha podrían servir de modelo: “Open House”, “Neve Shalom”, y “Promesas”.

o Proyectos para trabajar la memoria histórica y la reconciliación, dirigidos a víctimas directas de ambos bandos y a sus familiares22.

Hay numerosos ejemplos de este tipo de proyectos en los que las víctimas dispuestas a avanzar en el proceso de reconciliación se juntan para compartir sus experiencias para crear lazos. En relación al conflicto palestino israelí se puede extraer un buen ejemplo de un proceso llevado a cabo en Alemania para judíos víctimas del nacional-socialismo y otros alemanes. Su posible aplicación al conflicto palestino-israelí se explora en el artículo: Dan Bar-On y Fatma Kassem, “Storytelling as a way to work through intractable conflicts: the German-Jewish experience and its relevance to the Palestinian-Israeli Context”, en Journal of Social Issues, Volume 60, Issue 2, junio 2004, pp. 289-306.

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Para que cualquiera de las líneas de acción mencionadas pudiera acometerse sistemáticamente, se requeriría una institución internacional con peso que monitorizase y supervise el proceso. El fortalecimiento paulatino de la ONU y de su sistema de seguridad colectiva parecería ser un paso decisivo para que este conflicto pueda alcanzar resolución. Sin una institución internacional que vele por la justicia en el orden internacional y que esté respaldada por un ejército mundial y por el respeto de la sociedad civil, las pugnas entre Estados son muy difíciles de resolver, especialmente cuando uno de ellos es mucho más poderoso que el otro. En este caso sólo existe un Estado, el de Israel, pero Palestina puede verse como una entidad similar.

El sistema de seguridad colectiva, tal como está configurado actualmente, no puede mediar efectivamente ante este conflicto, por lo que su reestructuración, como sugeríamos, si se aspira a incrementar su efectividad, es un imperativo. Unos datos bastarán para poner esto de relieve. UNISPAL, el sistema de información de la ONU sobre la cuestión palestina, contiene una base documental en la que se publican las resoluciones de la ONU, tanto de la Asamblea General –de carácter simbólico– como del Consejo de Seguridad sobre este caso. Existen cerca de cien resoluciones, muchas aludiendo a los capítulos VI y VII de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, llenas de admoniciones, recomendaciones, llamamientos a cumplir los acuerdos, etc. El incumplimiento de las mismas por parte de Israel y Palestina, pero especialmente del primero, es notorio. La ONU también tiene múltiples programas y proyectos para mediar en este conflicto y su Comisión de derechos humanos trata este caso de forma recurrente. No obstante, a pesar de toda la atención que se le presta, la efectividad es muy baja. Tras haber explorado la naturaleza del conflicto, pasemos al siguiente apartado.

Dado que el fortalecimiento del sistema de seguridad colectiva de la ONU exigiría una serie de reformas que en el corto plazo no se pueden acometer23, tampoco se puede supeditar el proceso de paz a ello. En el corto plazo, habría que encontrar un conjunto de interlocutores internacionales

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que apoyaran a ambas partes a materializar el proceso de paz impulsado desde la Conferencia de paz de Madrid en 1991, pero dentro del marco de las resoluciones 242 y 338 del Consejo de Seguridad, para darle a la negociación un cariz legal. EEUU ha querido jugar siempre un papel importante como mediador, pero su proximidad excesiva a los intereses israelíes lo delata como un mediador poco imparcial. Un Estado que podría hacer de contrapeso en este proceso es el nuevo Egipto, donde los hermanos musulmanes en el poder –moderados por otras fuerzas políticas–, ideológicamente cercanos a Hamas y conectados a los intereses palestinos, podrían hacer de contrapeso. Sin embargo, los antiguos problemas de Egipto con Israel pueden hacerse sentir aún hoy día. China, si no fuera por sus reticencias a intervenir en asuntos domésticos, también podría ser un buen anfitrión del proceso de paz. La razón por la que se buscan interlocutores es porque estas negociaciones entre Israel y Palestina, que parecieron llegar a su clímax en los acuerdos de Oslo, han sido muy tortuosas y sus condiciones no se han respetado. Los asentamientos en Jerusalén Este y Cisjordania por parte de Israel y la seguridad en tierra israelí parecen ser los elementos más escurridizos de cara a efectuar la solución concerniente a los dos Estados.

El posible reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado observador por parte de la Asamblea General el 29 de noviembre de 2012 podría contribuir en el proceso de mediación internacional, ya que Palestina accedería a ciertos privilegios como someter a Israel al tribunal penal internacional por acciones como el posible envenenamiento de Yaser Arafat, actualmente investigado. No obstante, Israel considera este movimiento de Palestina como una deslealtad con dichos acuerdos de Oslo que todavía se utilizan como referencia. El paso de Palestina es unilateral y no negociado, pero la experiencia parece haber mostrado que la vía legal no ha conducido a nada definitivo. Pero este movimiento de Palestina que a corto plazo puede parecer un avance, a largo plazo podría traerle más problemas, ya que la negociación se truncaría por completo y probablemente Israel recurriría a represalias también fuera del marco legal. Y si a alguien le favorece el recurso a la fuerza es a Israel, ya que la diferencia de poder entre ambos es tal, que solo la vía diplomática, con mediación internacional, parece ser la mejor estrategia para llegar a una solución determinante, aunque fuera a largo plazo.

Existen múltiples documentos que abordan esta cuestión, pero resultan notorias las propuestas que Kofi Annan elaboró como consecuencia de las dificultades que vivenció como secretario general de la ONU y que se pu-eden descargar en la siguiente página: http://www.cinu.org.mx/onu/reforma.htm#rkofi

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Akbar Kundi, M. (2009). Israel Factor in US veto behaviour, en Margalla Papers. Islamabad: National Defence University.

Araj, B. (2008). Harsh Sate repression as a cause of suicide bombing: the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Volume 31, (4).

Aymerich, I. (2001). Sociología de los derechos humanos: un modelo weberiano contrastado con investigaciones empíricas. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.

Bar-On, D. y Kassem, F. (Junio 2004). Storytelling as a way to work through intractable conflicts: the German-Jewish experience and its relevance to the Palestinian-Israeli Context. Journal of Social Issues. Volume 60 (2).

Bell, D. (1977). The return of the Sacred. British Journal of Sociology. 27 (4), 419-449.

Ben-Ami, S. y Medin, Z. (1991). Historia del Estado de Israel. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp

Chomsky, N. (2004). Piratas y Emperadores: Terrorismo Internacional en el mundo de hoy. Barcelona: Ediciones B.

Culla, J. B. (2005). La tierra más disputada: el sionismo, Israel y la tierra de Palestina. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Deneulin, S. y Radodi, C. (2001). Revisiting religion: development studies thirty years on. World Development. Vol. 39.

El País (2009). 18 de abril de 2009. Recuperado de http://elpais.com/tag/fecha/20090418/

Flyvberg, B. (2002). Makind social science matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foxman, A. H. (2009). The Deadliest Lies: The Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.

Fraser, T. G. (2004). The arab-israeli conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmilan.

García, S. (2001). Evolución de la noción de seguridad colectiva a la luz de ciertas circunstancias históricas. Seguridad y Defensa en el actual marco socio-económico. Instituto General Gutiérrez Mellado.

Gleis, J. L. y Berti, B. (2012). Hezbollah and Hamas: a comparative study. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Graham, S. (Septiembre 2002). Bulldozers and bombs: the latest Palestinian-Israeli conflict as asymmetric urbizide. Antipode. Volume 34 (4).

Jaeger, David. A. y Paserman, M. D. (Septiembre 2008). The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. American Economic Review. American Economic Association, Volume 98, (4).

REFERENCIAS

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Jewish Virtual Library. (s.f.). U.N. Security Council: U.S. Vetoes of Resolutions Critical to Israel. Recuperado de www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html

Kepel, G. (2003). La Yihad: expansión y declive del islamismo. Barcelona: Pirámide.

Litvak, M. (1998). The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the case of Hamas. Middle Eastern Studies. Volume 34 (1).

Lorck, N. (1986). Las guerras de Israel. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés.

Mearsheimer, J. J. y Walt, S. M. (2006). El lobby israelí y la política exterior estadounidense. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Harvard.

Morris, B. (1989). The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Naciones Unidas. Centro de información (s.f.). Reformas propuestas por el Sr. Kofi Annan. Recuperado de http://www.cinu.org.mx/onu/reforma.htm#rkofi

Naciones Unidas. Documentos. (s.f.). Resoluciones del consejo de seguridad. Recuperado de http://www.un.org/es/documents/sc/

Naciones Unidas. Oficina de la ONU para la coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios. (2005). Review of the humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian Territory for 2004. Recuperado de http://unispal.un.org/Unispal.Nsf/cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/de9906e4d567199a85256fda00549d88?OpenDocument

OECD. (s.f.). Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Recuperado de www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/58/49170768.pdf

Patiño, C. A. (2006). Guerras de religiones: transformaciones sociales en el siglo XXI. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Perlmutter, A. (1987). Israel. Madrid: Espasa Calpe S.A.

Rodríguez Fouz, M. y Sánchez de la Yncera, I. (eds.) (2012). Dialécticas de la postsecularidad. Pluralismo y corrientes de secularización. Barcelona: Anthropos.

Sánchez-Bayón, A. (2011). Sistema de Derecho Comparado y Global. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.

Scheindlin, R. P. (1998). A short history of the Jewish people: from legendary times to modern statehood. New York: Oxford University Press.

Social Watch. (2005). Informe anual. Recuperado de www.socialwatch.org/es/node/10025

Van Teeffelen, T. (Julio 1994). Racism and Metaphor: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in popular literature. Discourse and Society. Volume 5 (3), pp. 381-405.

PROTECTIVE EDGE AND HUMAN SHIELDSPor: Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. Brown University, Rhode Island, United States.

Neve Gordon is a member in the department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. He is the author of Israel’s Occupation (California University Press 2008) and the co-author (with Nicola Perugini) of The Human Right to Dominate (Oxford University Press 2015). He is currently working on a book on human shields.Nicola Perugini is an anthropologist and Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Brown University. He is the author (with Neve Gordon) of The Human Right to Dominate (Oxford University Press, 2015) and has published articles on law and spatial practices, embedded anthropology, asylum seekers, humanitarianism, politics of the gaze, and trauma and settler colonialism in a number of international journals and edited volumes.The authors appear in alphabetical order and acknowledge equal contribution.

ABSTRACT One of the most prominent claims repeated by the Israeli government throughout the 2014 Gaza war is that Hamas uses human shields and therefore it is to blame for the killing of hundreds of civilians during the military campaign. The constant reiteration of this trope—the use of civilians as human shields—is fascinating particularly due to its relative absence in the coverage of other contemporary theatres of violence where civilians are caught in the midst of urban warfare. Why is human shielding a prominent topic of discussion in relation to Israel/Palestine and almost completely absent when analyzing violence in its neighboring countries? What does the legal concept human shield do? And why does the accusation of using human shields apply only to certain actors? The article addresses such questions by providing an overview of the use of human shields in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

KEYWORDSHuman Shields, International Law, Israel, Palestine, Urban

Warfare.

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Hamas attacks Israelis indiscriminately and does so from residential areas and even from mosques, hospitals, and schools. It produces ammunition on a university campus and stores its rockets in mosques and UNRWA schools. Its commanders and their command-and-control system often operate out of the basement of a hospital, and its fighters do not fight in uniform (except, when useful, the IDF uniform). Hamas unscrupulously violates every norm in the book.

Asa Kasher, “The Ethics of Protective Edge,” Jewish Review of Books, Fall 2014.

While Asa Kasher blames Hamas for violating every norm in the book, the norm he is referring to in the above quote is the principle of distinction between civilian and combatant as it is formulated in international humanitarian law (IHL). Kasher, an emeritus professor of philosophy at Tel-Aviv University and the co-author of the IDF code of ethics goes on to query: “What is Israel supposed to do in this situation? Does the presence of large numbers of non-combatants in the vicinity of a building that is directly involved in terrorist assaults on Israelis render that building immune to Israeli attack?” His response is unequivocal. “The answer,” he insists, “is, and must be, no. Israel cannot forfeit its ability to protect its citizens against attacks simply because terrorists hide behind non-combatants.”1

According to preliminary data gathered by the UN, at least 2,133 Palestinians were killed during Israel’s military campaign in Gaza (July 2014), dubbed “Protective Edge.” This figure includes 362 people who, at the time of writing, could not be identified or their status established. Of the initially verified cases, 1,489 are believed to be civilians, including 500 children (187 girls and 313 boys), 257 women and 282 members of armed groups. Many fatalities involved multiple family members, with at least 142 Palestinian families having three or more relatives killed in the same incident, for a total of 739 deaths.2 Notwithstanding this information, in Kasher’s view there is no doubt that the culpability for the hundreds of civilians killed in the Gaza Strip “lies with Hamas, which first sacrificed their well-being (building attack tunnels rather than schools and so on) and then their lives in its unremitting war against Israel.” (Kasher, 2014)

Indeed, Kasher’s major publications in recent years focus on the relationship between ethics and warfare. His work in this field can be defined as an attempt to articulate a systematic philosophical and moral shield for Israeli violence and colonial occupation. He argues, for instance, that, ethically, Israel was left with no other choice but to kill civilians; it followed both the principles of just war theory and

Asa Kasher, “The Ethics of Protective Edge,” The Jewish Review of Books, Fall, 2014. Michael Schmitt, “Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law,” Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 38 (2008), 17-59.

United Nations, Gaza: Initial Rapid Assessment (East Jerusalem: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory,[2014]).

Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, Article 28.

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the principles of International Humanitarian Law. In terms of just war theory, Israel has the right to self-defense and has a duty to protect its own citizens before it protects non-citizens; in terms of IHL, Israel was following both the principles of distinction and proportionality. “The commander in charge of a particular military mission,” he notes, “is usually the person best equipped to evaluate the military advantages of accomplishing it. In the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the commander is assisted by a staff ‘population officer’ in assessing the extent of probable collateral damage. Human shields may be attacked together with the terrorists, but attempts should be made to minimize collateral damage among them...” (Kasher, 2014) In this way Kasher basically repeats the argument made by the Israeli government and military, which claimed that throughout “Protective Edge” Hamas deliberately used human shields as a warfare technique and therefore it was to blame for the hundreds of civilian deaths.

As Kasher’s justifications underscore, human shields discourse has come to the fore in the latest Gaza war and is one of the sites where the ethics of violence is negotiated. In what follows, then, we analyze how the legal concept human shield has been used in the 2014 Gaza war. We begin with a concise definition of human shields according to international law, followed by a brief overview of how the discourse of human shields emerged in the context of Israel/Palestine. Next, we examine the way Israel used the concept human shield in the latest Gaza war by analyzing a series of posters distributed by the IDF on its twitter account, Facebook and blog. By way of conclusion, we argue that the deployment of the phrase human shield helps liberal regimes both constitute the legality and morality of slaying civilians while simultaneously shielding those who carry out the killing.

Human Shields in International Law Human shielding involves the use of persons protected by international humanitarian law (IHL), such as prisoners of war or civilians, to deter attacks on combatants or military sites.3 Placing civilians on train tracks, in airports or in any site that is considered to be a legitimate enemy target in order to prevent the latter from striking is illegal according to IHL. Along similar lines, carrying out military operations from within civilian spaces, particularly schools, hospitals, religious sites, civilian neighborhoods and even industrial areas is illegal due to the inevitable transformation of the non-combatant populations into human shields. Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.”4 The 1977

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The presence or movement of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.5

Additional Protocol I to the Convention explains in Article 51(7) that,

More recently, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court characterized the use of human shields as a war crime.6 The significance of human shield clauses in international law cannot be overstated considering that urban settings are rapidly becoming the most prominent arenas of contemporary warfare. Urban areas, as Stephen Graham proposes, “have become the lightning conductors for our planet’s political violence,” while “warfare strongly shapes quotidian urban life.” (2011, p. 16). The dramatic increase in urban warfare entails that civilians inevitably occupy the front lines of the fighting. Insofar as this is the case, then practically all fighting within cities involves warfare practices that, according to IHL, include the use of human shields.

The Development of the Human Shields Discourse in Israel Civilians have often been at the forefront of violence in Israel/Palestine. Yet, it was only in the midst of the second Intifada that several liberal human rights NGOs decided to use International Humanitarian Law clauses pertaining to human shields to criticize practices deployed by the Israeli military. In a report entitled Human Shield, the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem describes how, during the 2002 military operation “Defensive Shield,” Israeli soldiers would randomly take Palestinian civilians and force them to enter buildings suspected of being booby-trapped, made them remove suspicious objects from roads, stand inside houses where soldiers had set up military positions, and walk in front of soldiers to shield them from gunfire. Just a few months earlier, Human Rights Watch had published a similar report, In a Dark Hour, which documented how within the same military operation the Israel Defense Forces routinely coerced Palestinian civilians into performing life-endangering acts that assisted its military operations.7 These liberal human rights organizations condemned Israel for violating the fundamental principle of civilian immunity inscribed in IHL.

Miranda Sissons, In a Dark Hour: The use of Civilians during IDF Arrest Operations (New York: Human Rights Watch,[2002]).

Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998). Art. 8(2) (b)xiii.

Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and others vs. GOC Central Command and others, HCJ 3799/02.

Reuven Erlich, Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shields: The Extensive Military Infrastructure Positioned and Hidden in Populated Areas. from within the Lebanese Towns and Villages Deliberate Rocket At-tacks were Directed Against Civilian Targets in Israel (Tel-Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies,[2006]).

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, Art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and others vs. GOC Central Command and others, “HCJ 3799/02,” Adalah, http://www.adalah.org/features/humshields/decision061005.pdf. (accessed 05/01, 2014).

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In an attempt to stop this form of state violence, seven liberal Israeli human rights NGOs submitted a petition against the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Israeli military, asking the High Court of Justice to ban the use of human shields.8 In 2005, the Court reached a decision. Citing Jean Pictet (1958), who wrote the official commentary on the Four Geneva Conventions, Chief Justice Aharon Barak characterized the use of people as human shields as a “cruel and barbaric” act. He noted that “a basic principle, which passes as a common thread running through all of the law of belligerent occupation, is the prohibition of use of protected residents as a part of the war effort of the occupying army.” In addition, he claimed that according to humanitarian law, everything possible must be done to separate the civilian population from military activity; this rule, in turn, indicates that local residents are not to be brought, even with their consent, into a combat zone because the notion of consent is meaningless within a situation of inequality between the occupying force and the local resident.9 In this instance, the High Court of Justice took into account the asymmetrical context in which violence was being deployed and ruled that people cannot be used as military shields.

One year after the High Court ruling, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), a conservative Israeli think-tank whose offices are located in the Ministry of Defense, published a 305-page report about Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese civilians as human shields during the 2006 Lebanon War.10 In this report, the arguments originally made by Israeli and international human rights organizations against the IDF, and which were validated by the High Court of Justice, were slightly reframed. Appropriating the same logic advanced by the liberal human rights NGOs, the anti-terrorism think-tank accused Israel’s enemies of human shielding. Yet, the think-tank also reasoned that Hezbollah’s violation served to legitimize Israel’s killing of Lebanese civilians.

The military think-tank pointed out that such an “exploitation” of a civilian population is “considered a war crime and gross violation of international laws governing armed conflict” and went on to argue that “the IDF’s air strikes and ground attacks against Hezbollah targets located in population centers were carried out in accordance with international law, which does not grant immunity to a terrorist organization deliberately

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hiding behind civilians, using them as human shields.” (Erlich, 2006: 8-10) Hence, the use of human shields is not only a violation, but, in contemporary asymmetric urban wars, can also help validate the claim that the death of “untargeted civilians” is merely collateral damage. A few years later, in the aftermath of the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, called Cast Lead (winter 2008-2009), the same conservative think-tank published a report entitled Evidence of the Use of the Civilian Population as Human Shields.11 In this and other reports released in subsequent months, the ITIC provided a series of images and testimonies as evidence of how Hamas and other militant groups had used homes, schools and mosques for military-operational purposes.12

ITIC’s descriptions help corroborate Eyal Weizman’s claim that cities are not simply the site but the very medium of warfare as urban spheres increasingly become primary theatres of violence. Accordingly, within urban warfare the noncombatant and combatant as well as civilian and military edifices overlap. But since the non-combatant and the civilian are protected according to IHL this overlapping creates a problem for liberal regimes which insist on the legality of their actions in order to underscore the ethics of the violence they deploy. As Laleh Khalili points out in a different context, the insistence on legal action “goes hand in hand with the will to improve that is inherent to liberal imperial invasions, occupations, and confinements.” “If,” she continues, “our intent is to better the condition of living of the ‘lesser’ people (by making a gift of our civilization, or development, or modernization, or democracy), then what happens in the process matters little, even if what happens in the process is cruelty, torture, or indefinite confinement. A virtuous intent to improve is one of the strongest characteristics of liberal [warfare] and is what distinguishes it from its illiberal kin.” (Khalili, 2012, p. 41).

Khalili’s analysis of liberal warfare and the desire to frame its deployment of violence as legal and therefore ethical, helps to explain why the discourse of human shields is prominent within the Israeli context, but nearly absent in relation to regimes that−at least at this point in time−do not claim to adhere to liberal humanitarian and human rights principles, such as Syria. Moreover, human shielding provides a concrete

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Using Civilians as Human Shields (Tel-Aviv: Intelligence and Terror-ism Information Center,[2009b]).

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Evidence of the use of the Civilian Population as Human Shields (Tel-Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,[2009a]).

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example of how the liberal logic of contemporary warfare operates. Therefore, analyzing how it has been deployed during Israel’s 2014 Gaza war provides us with some insight into the subtle ways liberal ethics helps to shape violence, and violence helps to shape liberal ethics.

Protective Edge

During Israel’s operation “Protective Edge,” human shielding became a central trope in the “semiotic warfare” (to use the phrase of Edward Said (1980, p. xix) surrounding the military campaign. An analysis of the series of posters disseminated by the Israeli military on its twitter account, Facebook and blogs provides an unparalleled illustration of how Israel strived to provide legal and moral justification for the killing of hundreds of civilians.

The poster “Where do Gaza Terrorists Hide Their Weapons?” (Figure 2) is a paradigmatic example, where the subtext does the speaking: houses, mosques, schools, and hospitals are legitimate targets because they are presumed to be weapon depositories. This is also the message in “When is a House a Home?” (Figure 3) −which simply zooms in on one of the images in the previous poster−showing how Palestinians presumably hide rockets in civilian homes. The logic is straightforward: insofar as Hamas hides weapons in houses (illegitimate), Israel can bomb them as if they were (legitimate) military targets. Within this semiotic warfare about the meaning of architectural structures, a single function (hiding weapons) out of many existing functions (home, shelter, intimacy, etc.) determines the status of an urban site (in our case the house), so that the edifice’s form loses its traditional signification.

Figure 2 Figure 3

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It is precisely the inevitable overlapping of civilian and military functions in urban warfare alongside the re-signification of the urban architectural structures (as well as human subjects) that creates new challenges for international law and the articulation of ethical violence for liberal regimes. Accordingly, the question posed in Figure 3: “When does it become a legitimate military target?” should be understood as merely rhetorical. The answer the Israel Defense Forces expect is: “All houses in Gaza can be legitimate targets since, all houses are potentially non-homes.” In this way, the IDF resolves the ethical dilemma of bombing civilian sites.

Israel’s warfare is, however, not only about the re-signification of architectural structures, but also about the transformation of human beings into collateral damage, subjects who can be killed without violating international law. The legitimization for its indiscriminate bombing is premised upon a profound moral disjuncture between Israelis and Palestinians. In the poster “Israel uses weapons to protect its civilians. Hamas uses civilians to protect its weapons” (Figure 4) Palestinians are depicted as barbarians who ignore the elementary grammar of international law. This trope was also reiterated by Elie Wiesel, who during Protective Edge published –in collaboration with the US based “This World: The Values Network”—an advertisement in The Guardian entitled “Jews rejected child sacrifice 3,500 years ago. Now it’s Hamas, turn.”13 The thinly veiled racist statement included an analogy between Hamas and the SS brigades: “In my own lifetime,” Weisel wrote, “I have seen Jewish children thrown into the fire. And now I have seen Muslim children used as human shields.” The equation between Palestinians and Nazis is explicit.

This is also the subtext of the poster featuring Israel’s Chief of Staff saying: “Even as we carry out strikes, we remember that there are civilians in Gaza. Hamas has turned them into hostages” (Figure 5). Again, the logic is clear. All civilians in Gaza are being held hostage by Hamas, which is considered a war crime and a gross violation of international law governing armed conflict. This, then, provides legal and moral justification against the accusation that Israel is the one killing civilians. Presumed human rights violations carried out by Palestinians against Palestinians –taking hostages and human shielding–

Elie Weisel, “Jews rejected child sacrifice 3,500 years ago. Now it’s Hamas turn.” Ad published in The Guardian, September 10, 2014 online at http://www.algemeiner.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Elie-Wiesel-Hamas-Child-Sacrifice.pdf (accessed 10/10, 2014).

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thus become the legitimization of lethal and indiscriminate violence on the part of the occupying force.

Figure 4

Figure 6

Figure 5

Hence, the use of human shields is not only a violation. In contemporary asymmetric urban wars, accusing the enemy of using human shields helps validate the claim that the death of “untargeted civilians” is acceptable “collateral damage.” When all civilians are potential human shields, when each and every civilian can become a hostage of the enemy, then all enemy civilians become killable. In order for all this to be convincing, the Israeli military depicts the asymmetric context in which it unleashes its violence against a whole population as symmetric. This is carried out, for instance, through the poster “Some bomb shelters shelter people, some shelter bombs” (Figure 6). Here a radically disproportionate situation is presented as if it were balanced. The residents of Gaza are bombed by cutting edge F-16 fighter jets and drones, yet they do not have bomb shelters, and they have nowhere to flee. Israel’s residents are bombed mostly by makeshift rockets, many of which have been intercepted by Iron Dome missiles. The majority of the population in Israel has access to shelters and can flee out of the rocket’s range.

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These powerful images, spread by the Israeli military through social media, attempt to transform the very presence of civilians as suspect in the areas it bombards, regardless of the fact that these areas are urban centers. For Palestinians living in Gaza, simply spending time in their own homes, frequenting a mosque, going to a hospital or to school became a dangerous enterprise since any one of these architectural edifices could become a target at any moment. One can no longer safely assume that the existence of masses of human bodies in civilian spaces can serve as defense against the lethal capacity of liberal hi-tech states. Thus, in Israel, the deployment of the legal concept human shield helps the liberal state authorize and legitimize its extensive civilian killings and in this way to preserve its place among “civilized nations.”

Adalah (2014). The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and others vs. GOC Central Command and others, “HCJ 3799/02”. Retrieved on January 5, 2014 from http://www.adalah.org/features/humshields/decision061005.pdf.

Erlich, R. (2006). Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shields: The Extensive Military Infrastructure Positioned and Hidden in Populated Areas. from within the Lebanese Towns and Villages Deliberate Rocket Attacks were Directed Against Civilian Targets in Israel. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies.

Graham, S. (2011). Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. London, UK: Verso Books.

Kasher, A. (2014). “The Ethics of Protective Edge”. The Jewish Review of Books.

Pictet, J. (1958). The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.

Schmitt, M. (2008). “Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law”. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol. 38. 17-59.

Sissons, M. (2002). In a Dark Hour: The use of Civilians during IDF Arrest Operations. New York: Human Rights Watch. Stein, Y. (2002). Human Shield: Use of Palestinian Civilians as Human Shields in Violation of High Court of Justice Order. Jerusalem: B’tselem.

REFERENCES

RADICALISLAMISTS: ISLAM’S RASHIDUN OR HIJACKERS GROUPS?Por: María José Juárez Becerra ITESM, Campus Querétaro, México

María José Juárez is an International Relations student at the ITESM Campus Querétaro. In 2014 she received the UAM-Santander scholarship in order to study a term on anthropology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain. She has been part of the editorial board of Grupo Retos Internacionales since 2010. She has also collaborated as a volunteer in migration-NGOs at Querétaro and Madrid. Various articles of María José have been published by the ITESM Querétaro and the Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA. Contact: mari.juarezb@gmail.com

ABSTRACT Are Islamists truly representing Islam’s nature? Or are they, in the end, hijacking Islam? Does Islam foster violence more than any other religion in the world? There are several narratives around these debates which had their peak during the 9/11 attacks. The first part of this essay will analyze how Islam has been hijacked by Islamists groups, arguing that Islam is a religion of peace. The second part, will examine the current Islamist scenario in the Middle East, focusing on ISIS as a main character, which raises the question again about Islam’s nature as this group claims to be following the right path of Islam because of the several achievements that it has reached so far. In addition, the essay argues that through the erroneous use of concepts such as Islam, Islamism, jihad and terrorism the prestige of Islam is being damaged.

KEYWORDSIslamism, Islamists movements,

ISIS, Terrorism, Islam, Jihad

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Every region in the world has its own everlasting debates, in relation to the Middle East Region one of these debates (besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is that associated to radical Islamists’ nature: are they a Rashidun (Rightly Guided) group in representing Islam? Or are they, in the end, hijacking Islam? This debate also underlies the question about the nature of Islam, whether if it is a religion of Sword or peace1. This essay will be divided into two main topics by comparing different narratives in order to respond to these questions. The first part will explain why radical Islamists are hijacking Islam while the second part will focus on ISIS as an example of the radical Islamists organizations and how it claims to be the Rashidun Islamist group.

I. Hijacking Islam

The globe was deeply alarm about the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center in September 2001, discourses about this major event overrun media, some blamed Islam’s nature, others al-Qaeda’s suicide bombers among others. In addition, everyone was too affected by the events that they did not notice that the terms Arabs, Muslims, Islamists, jihadists and terrorists were used carelessly as synonyms. Nevertheless, there were some profound analysis of the tragedy. Martin Kramer, in September 19, 2001 wrote for the National Review: “Islam, the religion of more than a billion believers, has been hijacked”. Following the same argument, Thomas Friedman argued in his article World War III published in the New York Times:

Bar-On, T. (2014). The spread of Islam in the Arab world and beyond. Middle East Politics. Questions were discussed by Bar-On, T. (2014) in the lecture of the week #5 in the Middle East politics course: Expansion of Islam.1 2

Where are the Muslim leaders who will tell their sons to resist the Israelis-but not to kill themselves or innocent non-combatants? (…) Surely Islam, a grand religion that never perpetrated the sort of holocaust against the Jews in its midst that Europe did, is being distorted when it is treated as a guidebook for suicide bombing. (September 13, 2001)

Where, after all, is the Muslim outrage at these events? As their ancient, deeply civilized culture of love, art and philosophical reflection is hijacked by paranoiacs, racists, liars, male supremacists, tyrants, fanatics and violence junkies, why

One year after, Salman Rushdie also wrote in relation to the hijacked Islam:

are they not screaming?...Muslims in the West, too, seem unnaturally silent on these topics. If you’re yelling, we can’t hear you. (2002)

These three authors, among others, emphasized the positive nature of Islam. They argued that Islam had been hijacked provoking the association of Islam with the terrorism within the Western social imaginary. But what is Islam’s nature?

The nature of Islam

Islam as a monotheistic religion “and as an ideology of change and societal living, is akin to the two other main revealed religions: Christianity and Judaism” (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri, 2007, p. 14). Islam officially emerged when Muhammad, the Prophet, migrated (hijrah) from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, having Allah as the only god and Quran as its holy book. But besides these important facts, one of Islam’s main characteristic is that it is “monolithic at a doctrinal level”, Islam in fact “does not recognize compartmentalization of life in terms of racial, political, social, cultural and territorial divisions, and essentially calls for the creation of a unified source of earthly power and authority as a reflection of those of God. (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri, 2007, p. 15) As Islam establishes that there should not be a division between politics and religion, this causes diverse interpretations among its adepts on how these aspects should be put together, some of these interpretations attempt peaceful ways while others, like ISIS, sustain that the only way to achieve this is through jihad or violent techniques.

Disputes about the nature of Islam have remained through history, one of the debates relates to the question: “is it a religion of peace or a religion of the sword?”2 Evidently, this discussion gained importance since the events of 9/11 in New York. After 13 years of these attacks, Islam (as a religion) has been losing its legitimacy because of the terrorist tactics that the Islamist group Al-Qaeda applied. This, at the same time, has caused confusion among people (especially in the western hemisphere) about the differences between Islam and Islamism, or even, in an extreme position, confusing Islam with terrorism. Some academics sustain that Islam, because its history, is a religion of sword while others may argue that

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this statement responds to the orientalism3 perspective and interests.

On one hand, authors like Bale sustain that Islam “due to its peculiar and in many respects extraordinary pattern of historical growth, has often been more prone to adopt a hostile and belligerent attitude towards on-believers even than other missionary monotheistic religions (…) For this very reason, it is likewise arguably more prone to produce violent extremists, as is painfully obvious in the preset era. (Bale, 2009, p. 77) Even well-known discourses like The clash of civilizations? by Samuel Huntington, have contributed to this debate. Huntington mentions that the relationships between the Western and Islamic civilizations are conflictive. Javier Cordán and Luis de la Corte (2007) affirm that indeed, there have been conflicts between these civilizations and that Huntington did well in emphasizing the role of religion on the political conflicts because religion has been usually undermined.

Nevertheless, Cordán and de la Corte sustain that in his discourse, Huntington oversimplifies Islam by exalting the jihad phenomenon. (2007, p. 19) In fact, jihad does not represent the majority of Islam’s adepts, within Islam there is a clash among its different branches (just like happens within Judaism, for instance, between Orthodox and Non-orthodox Jews). Following the same line, Mustapha Chérif (2008) argues that discourses like The clash of civilizations? seeks to confirm the idea that violence could be inherent to the Muslim culture and that the Quran could be one of its sources (2008, p. 139). In addition, authors like Akbarzadeh and Mansouri mention that the main three monotheist religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, are “rich in fundamental moral and social principles from which strong notions of universal ethics, justice and dignified existence can be drawn, and in relation to which a virtuous life can be organized on earth”. (2007, p. 14). Thus, Martin Kramer (September 19, 2001) rejects the Islam as a religion of sword argument by stating that “Islam is no more inclined to terrorism than any other monotheistic faith. Like its sisters, Christianity and Judaism, it can be both merciful and stern in practice; (…) Islam has served as the bedrock of flourishing, tolerant, and peaceful orders”. So Islam, just as any other religion in the world, is susceptible to be hijacked by

Orientalism, criticized by Edward Said, for providing a Western colonialist study on the Middle East, describing it as different and inferior and thus justifying the Western intervention on the region.3

extremist adepts. Nevertheless, no other religion in the world has been so demonized like Islam.

Islam, Islamism, jihad, terrorism: how come they have been treated as synonyms?

Islam’s negative perception around the globe responds to the fact that the concepts of Islam, Islamism (including its radical versions such as jihad) and terrorism have been unjustly seen as interchangeable concepts. This confusion (or intended plan?) occur as result of various reasons, some of them have been appointed by Johns and Lahoud: “because Islamism constantly reiterated claim to authenticity, a superior commitment to the Islamic revelation” and also because of “the political configuration of the world, and the popularity of expressions such as “Islam and the West”, has resulted in the general use of the word of Islam as an abstract noun which phonetically is suggestive of Islamism”(2005, p. 17) This misunderstanding on those concepts is one way in which Islam is being hijacked.

But then, what is Islamism and what is its relation with jihad and terrorism? For Mozzafari, “Islamism is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means.” (2007, p. 21) According to the same author, Islamism have different variations, the “division inside the universe of Islamism is around two axial pillars: division determined by sub-religious affiliations” which he divides into Sunni, Shi’a and Wahhabi, “and division emanating from the diverse scope of claims and ambitions” relating to national and global Islamism. Nevertheless, “Islam itself is not necessarily the prime reason or eve the catalyst for [Islamism]” (Johns and Lahoud, 2007, p. 19) it can be argued that the political context in which Islamists groups emerge and the external factors that surround them take also an important role for establishing their origins. For instance, Graham Fuller considers that US’ policies have contributed to the radicalization of Islamist movements. (Johns and Lahoud, 2007, p. 20)

When Mozzafari talks about the final aim of the Islamists: to conquest the world by all means he sustains that the Islamists’ “spectrum of means to reach the goal is quite wide, expanding from propagation, peaceful indoctrination and political struggle to violent methods such as assassination, hostage taking, terrorist and suicide actions” (2007, p. 24)

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and he emphasizes that the use of violence by Islamists is not a golden rule. In fact, Bar-On (2014) argues that there are three types of Islamists: Takfiris, who declare other Muslims as impure and excommunicate them from the faith; nationalists, like Hamas who seek the independence of Palestine and pragmatics, such as the Muslim Brotherhood who−in a non-violent way− are part of the civil society and politics of their countries. The use of violence depends on what the strategy of the Islamist group is. For the purpose of this essay, I will focus only on the branch of the radical Islamists groups which claim that the only way to achieve their objectives is through jihad and therefore recur to violence.

Nevertheless, it is important to mention three aspects about jihad. First, it is not one of the five pillars of Islam but it is also an important element for the religion. Second, Jihad “literally, means ‘exertion’. For the individual believer, it is a spiritual exertion that makes him better and more pious; for the mystic it is the ecstasy that leads towards a fusion with God.” (Kepel, 2003, p. 92) Third, jihad traditionally has a distinction between:

Offensive jihad – giving a religious cover to the military expansion of the Islamic world, to conquest and then exploitation of the land of the unbelievers – and a defensive jihad, proclaimed by the ulama (the Islamic religious establishment) and jurists: a general mobilization for the ‘homeland under threat’, whenever the country is under attack from the infidels.(Kepel, 2003, p. 92).

While the offensive jihad is “within the realm of political authority and has no relevance for Muslims as a whole” (Kepel, 2003, p. 93), Islamists usually proclaim defensive jihad, so then “fighting becomes the supreme virtue, and regulates the mobilization of all energies. All means justify the end, the safeguarding of the community.” (Kepel, 2003, p. 93) These last meanings of jihad are the ones that prevail in the media, while the exertion jihad −which, as mentioned before, is a peaceful and personal path to become a better Muslim− has been mostly neglected.

According to Fregosi, jihad is not a recent phenomenon:

The Jihad has had a long presence on our planet, going back to the early 600s when Muhammad preached the Quran, ruled over Medina and sent his followers to fight against the pagan Arab tribes of the peninsula, demanding they acknowledge his suzerainty and convert to Islam. (…) the terrorism called

jihad we know today I linked, with these Muslim holy wars which began more than 1300 years ago in Arabia and spread during the next 13 centuries to the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Asia, and which are now also part of the North and South American scene. (1998, p. 14)

Also, terrorists in the 11/S for example, had their own interpretations of Islam, as Hotaling said: “neither the Quran nor any other Muslim teaching gave Bin Laden or Al Qaeda the right to conduct a jihad, or holy war” (2003, p. 152) actually the mission of imposing an Islamic regime goes against the Quran’s “no coercion in religion” Hotaling keeps arguing that some terrorists “have based on the hadith: I have been commanded to fight against the people till they testify that there is no God but Allah”. (2003, p. 153) Other of the most appealed suras from the Quran by the radical Islamists are the following ones:

The pagans wherever ye find them,And seize them, beleaguer them,And lie in wait for themIn every stratagem (of war) (Quran: 9:5)Fight in the cause of GodThose who fight you,But do not transgress limits: For God loveth not transgressors. (Quran: 2:190)

In fact these radical groups (terrorists or not) can justified their violent actions by interpreting any sura or hadith from the tradition of Islam. Tony Blair said days after the terrorist attacks in New York: “It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a peaceful and tolerant religion, and these people are contrary to the teachings of the Quran”4. This is very important because not all the terrorist acts are related to Islamists groups. There are different types of terrorism that can even be applied by States to its own citizens. So terrorism is neither Islam nor, necessarily, jihad.

II. ISIS a Rashidun group

In the first part of this essay, I have analyzed what the academics sustain about Islam and how it has been hijacked by radical

Retrieved from: Hotaling (2003, p. 55).4108 109

Islamists. Now I would like to examine how ISIS5, considers itself as a rightly-guided group. For doing so I am going to first, consider briefly the history of ISIS and then analyze its arguments through their official magazine Dabiq.

What is ISIS?

Aaron Zelin (2014, p. 1) sustains that since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) took Mosul -one of the richest oil-areas in the region- invading at the same time the news worldwide, many people have been confused over how to describe ISIS per se and what its relation to al-Qaeda is. For Zelin, ISIS and al-Qaeda “are now in an open war for supremacy of the global jihadist movement. ISIS holds an advantage, but the battle is not over yet”. (2014, p. 1) So in order to have a better understanding about ISIS, a brief analysis of ISIS history and its relation with al-Qaeda will be provided in this essay. Zelin points out that:

On one side, bin Laden grew up in the upper middle class and did receive university education, on the other side Zarqawi grew up in a poor and uneducated background.(Zelin, 2014, p.2)

JTWJ was the first name of what nowadays we know as ISIS. Zelin has provided a historical research of ISIS’ names that can be consulted in the Chart 1 annexed to this essay.

I have chosen ISIS because it has been the most “successful” radical Islamist group and for its importance in today’s international affairs.

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Both Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad6(JTWJ) in 1999 and al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden came of age during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but their respective organizations have distinct genetic material, attributable in part to their different backgrounds7, leadership styles, and aims. (2014, p. 2)

This ideological division between the leaders: bin Laden and Zarqawi, was determinant for al-Qaeda and ISIS’ divorce. Brian Fishman explains that:

part of this was because Zarqawi felt that the only way to save the umma (global Islamic community) from itself was through purging it, whereas bin Laden’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, believed that Muslims were not the problem, but that instead the “apostate” institutions needed to be changed (Zelin, 2014, p. 3).

In addition, Zelin sustains that another important division is the generational one, because some of the jihadists were trained al-Qaeda during the 1980s and 1990s in Afghanistan while other jihadists were trained within AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq, another of the historical name of ISIS) so these jihadists have different strategies, aims, and leaders.

When during the last decade both sides were still working together, the group headed by Zarqawi (AQI) “controlled resources and the flow of foreign fighters, helping it gain loyalty from individual fighters” in Iraq (Zelin, 2014, p.2). So those new loyalties are meaningful to understand how ISIS was able to consolidate itself and stablish a different agenda with its own followers. In fact, the formal divorce act was signed on February 2, 2014, when “al-Qaeda’s general command (AQGC) released a statement that said: ISIS is not a branch of the Qaidat al-Jihad [al-Qaeda’s official name] group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions”. (Zelin, 2014, p. 5)

Only two months later of the divorce, the fitna (state of discord) started between al-Qaeda and ISIS when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (ISIS’ current leader) announced that he was “extending the Islamic State of Iraq into Syria and changing the group’s name to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. He also noted an open secret that ISIS and JN [Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria] were one and the same”. (Zelin, 2014, p. 5) But the true is that JN was not consulted for this expanding plan of the Islamic state into Syrian territories8.

Since then, the dispute among ISIS and al-Qaeda is about who has more authority in the region and which methodology is the best to achieve their Islamists goals. In this fitna, or warfare, some Islamists groups such as “Ansar al-Sharia in both Tunisia and Libya as well as jihadists in Gaza/Sinai and Indonesia have posted pro-ISIS propaganda” while many “other independent jihadist ideologues, such as Abu Qatada al-Filistini, Iyad Qunaybi, and Hani al-Sibai, have disavowed ISIS”.(Zelin, 2014 , p.4).

ISIS explaining itself through Dabiq

In order to complement its religious, political and military strategies, ISIS has been publishing the Dabiq magazine during wartime. Beyond being an ordinary magazine, Dabiq is a great tool of propaganda for ISIS.

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The first edition was published on July 5, 2014 only after ISIS overtook Mosul. Within Dabiq the reader can find the religious base of the Islamic Caliphate that ISIS is aiming to implement and at the same time it provides social, religious and military arguments that legitimize this group as the Rashidun (rightly guided) group for implementing an Islamic State, moreover it calls all Muslims to support ISIS and to execute hijrah9 from their homes (within the Middle East or abroad) to the Islamic State.

ISIS tries to demonstrate that it is the religiously rightly-guided Islamist group. “ISIS’s global expansion likely depends on its ability to wrest religious authority from rival organizations such as al-Qaeda by demonstrating that its own methodology is both more successful and more justified” Gambhir (2014, p. 2) In addition, Gambhir mentions that ISIS aims to have solid religious authority as it “takes care to use only either Quranic verses or hadiths from the major and most trusted collections”(Gambhir, 2014, p. 6) these verses are wisely selected and used in Dabiq to legitimize the Islamic Caliphate, leaded by Baghdadi, as the correct government that unites political and religious power. In the first publication of Dabiq the reader can find the following:

The Islamic State, Dabiq argues, has been “blessed” with victory, which means Allah approves ISIS as the only one fighting His cause. So beyond ISIS military strategies and Baghdadi’s leadership, Allah’s desire and support are the reason why they have been so successful on implementing the Islamic State. And as they have Allah’s unquestionable blessing, those who fight ISIS, or do not support it, are infidels that must be punished. In addition, ISIS’s Dabiq in its second edition mentions that they will stop following Baghdadi only when he orders them to disobey Allah, and they will punish anyone who attempts to usurp his leadership.

Isis is currently demanding the implementation of hijrah (migration) especially of well-prepared Muslims such as doctors or scientists.

The reader can even find corpse-pictures on the defeated in the magazine.9 10

[The Islamic State] “has carried out the command of Allah – as much as it can – in the best possible manner. It established the religion in the areas where it exists and continues to pursue this effort vigorously. All this, after Allah had granted the imam of The Islamic State the blessing of performing hijrah and fighting jihad in His cause, on top of already having been characterized by his noble lineage, sound intellect, and a prestigious level” (2014:1, 27,)

Dabiq also appeals to an apocalyptic vision in order to gain the support of many Muslims. Its second edition has “The Flood” in the cover and narrates the story of the Ark of Noah, where The Islamic State is the ark who will save the good Muslims and those infidels will die in the flood. Dabiq, as a propaganda weapon, emphasizes the virtues of ISIS and of its members (its leader, administrative groups and adepts) while on the other hand completely rejects those non-supporters and repel them by threatening them, making clear that they will be chastised10.

ISIS claims that it is not only a military/terrorist organization, but also that it has its own political façade. ISIS “is a proto-state that is testing out the best ways to get the world’s attention, and broader support from the Muslim community abroad” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 2) and for this proto-state ISIS has implemented its own political institutions supported on religious justifications and not only that, ISIS is even including minority groups such as tribes:

Doesn’t Islam calls for unity? This could be an argument for ISIS to demonstrate that, under Baghdadi’s leadership, the organization has the right political system which includes minorities groups and that aims to be home to those loyal Muslims.

Following the same political line, ISIS proposes a welfare society. As the representatives of ISIS go around convincing people to support ISIS, they explain to the tribal audiences that “the Islamic State would enforce

ISIS seeks to demonstrate that it can win the allegiance of popular tribal leaders in Iraq and Syria, both in order to persuade other groups, and to retain control of territory. To initiate and maintain tribal relationships in Syria’s Aleppo Wilayat, or governorate, ISIS set up a public affairs office. An ISIS tribal affairs representative works underneath the Wilayat’s head of Public Relations, indicating that the group has a sophisticated, hierarchical infrastructure set up to interact with different local groups. (Gambhir, 2014, p. 5)

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property rights, provide security, distribute aid, and ensure the availability of food and goods for civilians.” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 5). For instance, in the first edition of Dabiq, the report “Halab tribal assemblies” (1, 12-15) shows that once the leaders of the tribes have pledge bayat (alliegancie) to ISIS, the Islamic State asks for the collection of zakat in order to help the less fortunate within the communities.

ISIS’ scope is global (following Mozaffari’s proposal for Islamism division). On one side through e-Sword –using modern tools such as the internet− ISIS is recruiting immigrants abroad to populate the Islamic State, besides it is gaining the support of the regional and tribal groups -as I have mentioned before-. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has emphasized the global nature of the Caliphate, even he invites Muslims around the globe to perform hijrah to the Islamic State with their whole families: “There are homes here for you and your families. You can be a major contributor towards the liberation of Makkah, Madīnah, (...) Would you not like to reach Judgment Day with these grand deeds in your scales” (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 3). Again, by appealing to salvation and propaganda ISIS seek to consolidate itself as the Rashidun organization.

In relation to a plan to expand the Islamic State to the near neighbors-like Palestine- ISIS’ Dabiq mentions: “massacres taking place in Gaza against the Muslim men, women, and children, then the Islamic State will do everything within its means to continue striking down every apostate who stands as an obstacle on its path towards Palestine” (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 4). If ISIS keeps accumulating victories and occupying territories, “it is only a matter of time and patience before it reaches Palestine to fight the barbaric Jews and kill those of them hiding behind the gharqad trees – the trees of the Jews”. (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 4). ISIS declares itself as the most successful Islamist group, son in consequence, it has the moral and military legitimacy to protect Muslim land from those who are attempting Muslims’ rights. This, nevertheless, doesn’t mean that ISIS will unite forces with Hamas. In fact, ISIS seems to be struggling for power among other Islamist organizations.

One strategy for ISIS to gain religious, political, economic and military power is through discrediting of the opponent Islamist movements (or political parties). ISIS, for instance, criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Dabiq’s first edition for implementing a weak methodology, after the old jihadi leaders’ death, which “never fuel the jihad caravan on its path to Khilafah (Caliphate), rather it only brings indecision and fear, thus ruining the caravan’s ability to persist, and naively filling the road with obstacles that only serve the tawaghit”. (2014: 2, 39) In addition, ISIS accuses them of “abandoning Shari’a “fundamentals” in an effort to gain popularity” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 9) so these movements can be attacked by ISIS at any moment. If ISIS keeps growing, and its attitude in relation to other Islamists movements remains the same, there can hardly exist an alliance with other ones, so as Gambhir points out, “If ISIS refuses to interact with any organization or leader it deems impure, then it will likely have to pursue military, rather than political forms of expansion in the region”, which is very worrying for the West and the near neighbors of ISIS.

What does ISIS says about Jihad? It’s an essential question for this research. According to Dabiq’s first edition: “Jihad would be based upon hijrah [migration], bay’ah, sam’ (listening), ta’ah (obedience), and i’dad (training), leading to ribat and qital (fighting), then Khilafah [Caliphate] or shahadah [Islamic creed]”. (Dabiq, 2014: 1, 35) In ISIS’ strategy, military and violent forces play an important role. We can even notice this violent philosophy in ISIS’ Dabiq. At the end of the magazine, they emphasize the military victories of the period adding some illustrative pictures that can appeal to its readers-target support and enthusiasm easily. In fact, Gambhir (2014, p. 10) declares that this tactic within the magazine is coherent because one part of ISIS’ Caliphate vision claims that this religious authority is “based upon military success and the ability to retain control in held territories”.

Future scenarios for ISIS

As I have explained before, ISIS and al-Qaeda (AQ) have different strategies, “even Al-Qaeda considers ISIS’ tactics as extremely violent” (Bar-On, 2014). ISIS’ success to implement a proto-state, its triumphs over some regions in Iraq and Syria,

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the economic power11 that it has and the increasing number of followers and jihadist combatants it is gaining represent a difficult time for al-Qaeda and those who oppose to ISIS around the world. In fact, Zelin points out that:

In addition, we are facing a different historic context which is full of technology and military facilities but at the same time lacks of a “force like the United States on the ground [like in Iraq in the 1990s] to consolidate insurgent gains against ISIS” (Zelin, 2014, p. 7). And as long as ISIS keeps collecting victories in the region, and continues investing in effective propaganda it would be difficult to impose a counterforce to ISIS.

Conclusion

Radical Islamists organizations will always found their way to justify its existence within the Quran and hadiths, nevertheless, these groups did not emerged independently to their political -regional and international context, so they are not a merely result of Islam. In fact, we as students and as academics share certain responsibility on the hijacking of Islam as we don’t raise our voices when the leaders or the media use wrongly the concepts of Islam, Islamism and terrorism as if they had the same meaning. A new wave of radical Islamism has begun, and this is the right moment to stop the demonization of Islam. Today, the world media is infested of news related to ISIS and, with the participation of the social media, it is easy to interchange those concepts at any time by anyone, damaging Islam´s image. Gambhir (2014) stated: “ISIS wants to be seen as the jihadist group that will lead the Muslim community into worldwide domination”. In the case that ISIS continues succeeding and it can achieve its goal of implementing the Islamic Caliphate, we should pay attention on how badly this would affect Islam and its adherents. If ISIS succeeds, would Islam be hijacked to a point of no return?

The composition of foreign fighter flows to Syria (and now to Iraq again) indicates that the movement’s future is being decided by Saudis, Libyans, Tunisians, and Jordanians. In terms of Westerners, most of whom come from European Union countries (three thousand–plus), most are now with ISIS. Any plots or attacks in the West will thus more likely emanate from ISIS than from al-Qaeda. (2014, p. 7)

Some sources like CNN, mention that ISIS’ oil sales are rated between $1 million and $2 million per day.11

Annex:

Akbarzadeh, S., Mansouri, F. (2007) Islam and Political Violence. London, Great Britain: I.B. Tauris. Retrieved on 25 October 2014, from ProQuest ebrary.

Bar-On, T. (2014). Lecture: Islamists movements in the Middle East. Middle East politics course. México: ITESM Campus Querétaro.

Chérif, M. (2008). Tolerancia e intolerancia en el Islam. Barcelona, España: Bellaterra.

De la Corte, L., Jordán, J. (2007). La yihad terrorista. Madrid, España: Síntesis.

Fregosi, P. (1998). Jihad in the west. Muslim conquests from the 7th to the 21st centuries. New York, United States: Prometheus books.

Friedman, T. (2001). World War III. Retrieved on October 24, 2014, from: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/opinion/foreign-affairs-world-war-iii.html

Gambhir, K. (2014). Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State. Retrieved on October 25, 2014, from https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/dabiq-strategic-messaging-islamic-state

Hotaling, E. (2003). Islam without illusions. Its past, its present, and its challenge for the future. United States of America: Syracuse University Press.

Huntington, S.(1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs (72) 3, p. 22

REFERENCES

Source: Zelin, A. (2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement.

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ISIS. (2014). Halab tribal assemblies. Dabiq, 1, pp. 12-15.------. (2014). A call to Hijrah. Dabiq, 1, p. 17.------. (2014). Part five: The Islamic State is a true Imamah. Dabiq, 1, pp. 27-29.------. (2014). From Hijrah to Khilafah. Dabiq, 1, pp. 34-41.------. (2014). Foreword. Dabiq, 2, pp. 3-4.------. (2014). It’s either Islamic State or the flood. Dabiq, 2, pp. 5-8.

Kepel, G. (2003). The origins and development of the Jihadist movement: from anti-comunism to terrorism. Asian Affairs, (34):2, pp. 91-108

Kramer, M. (2011). Hijacking Islam. A religion in danger of deteriorating into a manifesto for terror. Retrieved on October 22, 2014, from http://www.meforum.org/76/hijacking-islam

Lahoud, N., Johns, A. (2005). Islam in world politics. New York, United States: Routledge.

Mozaffari, M. (2007). What is Islamism? History and Definition of a concept. Totalitarian movements and political religions. Retrieved on October 2, 2014, from http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/22326292/What_is_Islamism_Totalitarian_Movements_article.pdf

Roy, O. (1995). Geneología del islamismo. Barcelona, España: Bellaterra.

Rushdie, S. (2002). No More Fanaticism as Usual. Retrieved on october 24, 2014 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/27/opinion/27RUSH.html

Scott, B. (2014, October 7). Self-funded and deep-rooted: How ISIS makes its millions. CNN. Consulted on October 23, 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-funding/

Tibi, B. (2008). Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad. New York, United States: Routledge.

Zelin, A. (2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (20) pp. 1-11.

LA DIÁSPORA Y EL RECONOCIMIENTO AL ESTADO PALESTINO: LOS CASOS DE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADORPor: Sergio I. Moya Mena Escuela de Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nacional, Costa Rica

Teólogo, licenciado en relaciones internacionales y candidato a doctor en filosofía. Profesor e investigador de las Escuelas de Relaciones Internaciones de la Universidad Nacional y Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad de Costa Rica. Coordinador del Centro de Estudios de Medio Oriente y África del Norte CEMOAN. Autor y co-autor de 17 libros sobre relaciones internacionales, entre ellos: Medio Oriente Imagen y Conflicto, 2009; El programa nuclear iraní y los desafíos políticos geoestratégicos: tres enfoques, 2014 y El Islamismo en Túnez: de la independencia al renacer salafista, 2014. Dirección de correo electrónico: cemoan@cemoan.org

ABSTRACT In 1947 the votes of Central American countries were fundamental in the approval of Resolution 181 which called for the partition of Palestine. From that year, many countries in the region reaffirmed their support for the Zionist project. However, in the last years, there has been a substantial change in the approach toward the Arab–Israeli conflict, and some countries have as a consequence recognized Palestine as a State. One of the reasons for this shift in the foreign policy of Central American countries has been the intensive lobbying conducted by the Palestinian National Authority. However, this article demonstrates the importance of another factor that has so far received little attention from analysts, i.e. the role of the Palestinian diaspora.

RESUMENEn 1947 los votos de los países centroamericanos fueron fundamentales para la aprobación de la Resolución 181 que recomendaba la partición de Palestina. A partir de ese año, muchos países de la región reafirmaron su apoyo a Israel. Sin embargo, en los últimos años se ha producido un cambio sustancial en el enfoque hacia el conflicto árabe-israelí, y en consecuencia, varios países han reconocido a Palestina como Estado. Una de las razones de este cambio en la política exterior de los países de América Central ha sido el intenso cabildeo realizado por la Autoridad Nacional Palestina. Sin embargo, este artículo demuestra la importancia de otro factor que hasta ahora ha recibido poca atención por parte de los analistas: el papel de la diáspora palestina.

KEYWORDSforeign policy - Central America - Palestine - Israel - Palestinian

diaspora.

PALABRAS CLAVEpolítica exterior - Centro América

- Palestina - Israel - diáspora palestina.

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Introducción

A la hora de asumir posicionamientos frente al conflicto árabe-israelí, los países centroamericanos se contaron durante mucho tiempo entre los aliados más incondicionales de Israel. No obstante, en los últimos años una mayoría significativa de países en la región ha reconocido a Palestina como Estado, y apoya su ingreso como observador en la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU). Una de las razones que explican este giro en la política exterior de los países latinoamericanos es la intensa labor de lobby llevada a cabo por la Autoridad Nacional Palestina (ANP) en la región. Sin embargo, hay un factor que hasta el momento no ha recibido suficiente atención: el papel de la diáspora palestina. En los casos analizados: Honduras y El Salvador, se muestra que, a pesar de haber sido culturalmente asimiladas dentro de sus países de acogida, las comunidades palestinas en El Salvador y Honduras han experimentado en los últimos años un redescubrimiento de su identidad y una creciente identificación política con las aspiraciones nacionales palestinas. Se concluye que este redescubrimiento de la identidad, junto a la influencia económica y política de la diáspora en estos dos países, han ejercido una influencia significativa en el cambio de una política exterior marcadamente favorable a Israel, a una política exterior de apoyo a las aspiraciones palestinas y que se expresa de manera diáfana en el reconocimiento oficial del Estado Palestino por parte de estos dos países.

El conflicto palestino-israelí a través de los ojos centroamericanos

En 1947, el voto de los países centroamericanos fue decisivo en la aprobación de la Resolución 181 de la Asamblea General de la ONU que propuso la partición de Palestina. A partir de ese año, el conflicto árabe-israelí fue considerado por los países del istmo como una confrontación enmarcada dentro de la Guerra Fría, y casi todos -alineados por los Estados Unidos- reafirmaron su apoyo al proyecto sionista, hecho que fue fundamental en la incipiente legitimación internacional de Israel. Los países de la región se destacaron por ser algunos de los más entusiastas aliados del Estado de Israel, y formaron parte del abrumador apoyo latinoamericano que durante mucho tiempo fue crucial, aportando votos para asegurar la aprobación de resoluciones de la ONU favorables a Israel y bloqueando resoluciones hostiles a este (Sharif, 1977, p. 99). Aun cuando los patrones de apoyo a Israel empiezan a cambiar a mediados de los años setenta y varios países latinoamericanos asumen posiciones anti-israelíes, no fue este el caso de los países centroamericanos.

La sólida relación que sostuvo Israel con América Central entre los años setenta y ochenta se fundamentó en buena medida en el apoyo militar a las dictaduras de derecha. Hacia inicios de los años ochenta, Israel se convirtió en el principal proveedor de armas de El Salvador, Guatemala y Nicaragua. Israel llegó a proveer a la dictadura de Anastasio Somoza en Nicaragua el 98% de sus importaciones de armas, un hecho que, como lo dijo Israel Shahak, profesor de la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, resulta muy significativo si se toma en cuenta que en sus últimos años el régimen asesinó casi a 50.000 personas (Shahak, 2007, p. 47). En los casos de Honduras y El Salvador, la “cooperación” israelí implicaba, además de la provisión de armas y equipo electrónico de comunicaciones, adiestramiento militar en contrainsurgencia y asesoramiento a escuadrones de la muerte que fueron responsables de numerosas violaciones a los derechos humanos. La agencia de inteligencia israelí MOSSAD operaba desde su base regional en Tegucigalpa (Beit-Hallahmi, 1988: 77-90), y en El Salvador asesores israelíes entrenaban a la Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Salvadoreña (ANSESAL) y a militares, a los que más tarde se señaló como responsables de masacres de civiles (Cockburn et al. 1991, p. 238).

Por su dependencia de los EE.UU., y como resultado de la cooperación en el campo militar, los gobiernos de Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica y Guatemala se convirtieron en algunos de los más fervientes aliados de Israel. Hacia mediados de los años ochenta, Guatemala y Nicaragua no habían apoyado una sola resolución crítica hacia Israel en la ONU, mientras que Honduras sólo había apoyado cuatro y El Salvador siete. Honduras, El Salvador y Costa Rica incluso trasladaron sus embajadas de Tel Aviv a Jerusalén, decisión que irrespetaba una gran cantidad de resoluciones sobre esa ciudad adoptada por el Consejo de Seguridad o la Asamblea General y que provocó la ira de los países árabes (Bahbah & Butler, 1986, p. 144).

Por otro lado, aunque las primeras vinculaciones entre América Central y la lucha de los palestinos por su autodeterminación se remontan a los años treinta (Moya, 2013, p. 69), es en el marco de la lucha de las guerrillas izquierdistas que surgen a partir de los años setenta que se generan contactos directos entre la Organización para la Liberación de Palestina (OLP) y organizaciones como el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, (FSLN) o el Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), (Norton, 1989, p. 183). Varios guerrilleros sandinistas tomaron parte en operativos de distintas facciones palestinas. Uno de estos fue Patricio Argüello Ryan, que participó junto a la famosa guerrillera palestina Leila Khaled en un fallido intento del Frente Popular para la Liberación de Palestina (FPLP), para secuestrar un avión de la aerolínea israelí El Al que seguía la ruta Tel Aviv-Nueva York. Khaled fue capturada y Argüello Ryan asesinado. Por otro lado, Jorge Schafik Handal, líder histórico del FMLN, viajó en varias ocasiones a Medio Oriente y estableció vínculos con Yasser Arafat y otros líderes palestinos como Nawef Hawetmeh, comandante del Frente Democrático para la Liberación

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de Palestina, (FDLP). (Hoffman, 1988, p. 32). Más adelante, con el triunfo de los sandinistas, la OLP abrió una oficina en Managua, y Arafat visitó el país para participar en el primer aniversario de la Revolución Sandinista.

Influencia y activismo

Mientras se desarrollaban estos contactos, el progreso alcanzado por muchas familias palestinas en El Salvador y Honduras se hacía cada vez más notable. Actualmente, los palestinos se han consolidado como una comunidad comercial y económica sumamente influyente de Honduras. De hecho, la mayoría de los grandes empresarios del país son de origen palestino.

Originalmente dedicados a las actividades comerciales y algunas incursiones en la actividad industrial hondureña, familias palestinas como los Facussé, Andoine, Bendeck, Kafati, Kattan, Larach, Canahuati, Hasbun, Sikafy, Handal y Kafie, han incursionado también en el campo de las finanzas (Romero, 2009, p. 73), la generación de energía y los medios de comunicación. Por ejemplo, Jorge Canahuati Larach es presidente de dos de los diarios de más tiraje en el país, La Prensa y El Heraldo, que representan los intereses de los sectores empresariales más conservadores (Torres, 2009, p. 173).

También en El Salvador, familias como los Sablah, Siman o Bahaia han llegado a constituir negocios bastante prósperos. Algunas de estas familias integran sectores económicos que han registrado un proceso de modernización y diversificación que los ubica en los sectores más dinámicos de la economía local, como los servicios, las exportaciones no tradicionales (incluyendo la maquila), el turismo y el comercio (Segovia, 2005, p. 24).

El poder económico de las comunidades palestinas se ha venido expresando también en una creciente influencia política. En Honduras, los palestinos empezaron a abrirse paso entre las élites políticas desde los años ochenta, pero es la elección de Carlos Flores Facussé como Presidente de la República en 1998 el hecho que muestra con más contundencia el peso de esta comunidad. Flores Facussé es sobrino de Miguel Facussé Barjum, uno de los hombres de negocios más ricos de Honduras, y que representa claramente los intereses del grupo empresarial que controla la economía del país (Amaya, 2012, p. 3). A partir de este significativo hecho, los palestinos-hondureños han acrecentado su influencia política, ocupado cargos a nivel ministerial o en el parlamento. Tal es su poder económico y político que, según Jorge Amaya, profesor de la UNAH y autor de Los Árabes y Palestinos en Honduras 1900-1950, el apoyo de algunas de las familias palestinas más influyentes como los Facussé, Canahuati, Nasser y Atala fue decisivo en el golpe de Estado que derrocó al presidente Manuel Zelaya en junio de 2009.

En El Salvador, durante la Guerra Civil (1979–1992), algunos palestinos decidieron exiliarse en la ciudad de Miami, mientras que otros participaron activamente en las guerrillas izquierdistas. Es el caso del ya mencionado Schafik Handal, hijo de inmigrantes palestinos, que fue candidato presidencial del FMLN en las elecciones de 2004. Como un caso inédito en la diáspora palestina a nivel mundial, en las elecciones de ese año, Handal enfrentó a otro descendiente de palestinos, Elías Antonio Saca, candidato de la ultraderechista Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), quien a la postre fue electo presidente. Curiosamente, tanto Handal como Saca pertenecen a familias que emigraron juntas de Belén en 1913. Actualmente muchos palestinos-salvadoreños participan activamente en la política, ocupando escaños en el parlamento, puestos ministeriales y dirigiendo alcaldías.

El activismo de la diáspora y la diplomacia palestina

Las comunidades palestinas en El Salvador y Honduras han experimentado en los últimos años un redescubrimiento de su identidad cultural y una creciente identificación política con las aspiraciones nacionales palestinas. En El Salvador, se constituyó en 2009 la Asociación Palestina Salvadoreña (APS), con el objetivo de cohesionar a los salvadoreños de origen palestino, contribuir a profundizar su integración con el resto de la sociedad salvadoreña y difundir la cultura árabe-palestina. La APS ha convocado actos de protestas contra la ocupación israelí y eventos ecuménicos de solidaridad con los palestinos en los territorios ocupados en los que han tomado parte líderes religiosos como Munib Younan, presidente de la Federación Luterana Mundial. Los palestinos-salvadoreños han demandado también la aplicación de las resoluciones de la ONU, y han denunciado las violaciones a la libertad de culto impuesta por Israel en los territorios ocupados, especialmente contra los palestinos cristianos (el 98% de los palestinos-salvadoreños son cristianos). Desde su fundación, APS pidió al Gobierno el reconocimiento del Estado Palestino con sus fronteras de 1967, el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas y el apoyo a Palestina para ingresar en la ONU. Esta labor de lobby ejercida por los palestinos-salvadoreños ante el poder ejecutivo y el parlamento, fue un factor decisivo en el reconocimiento del Estado Palestino por parte del Gobierno de El Salvador el 25 de agosto de 2011. En esa ocasión, el presidente Mauricio Funes afirmó que la decisión de reconocer a Palestina como Estado libre, soberano e independiente buscaba “saldar una deuda histórica”, y elogió la “activa e importante” diáspora palestina en El Salvador.

Un día después de que El Salvador reconociera al Estado Palestino, el Gobierno de Honduras, encabezado por el presidente Porfirio Lobo, tomó la misma medida, reconociendo a Palestina como “Estado libre, soberano e independiente”. En esta decisión igualmente fue determinante el apoyo de la influyente comunidad palestina, bien

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representada en el Gobierno por Mario Canahuati, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores. Cabe decir que, el apoyo de la comunidad palestina local al reconocimiento del Estado Palestino no se remitía únicamente a factores políticos, algunos analistas señalan que había un interés por atraer inversión de los países árabes (Colbert, 2011).

La diplomacia palestina en acción

A partir del reconocimiento, la diplomacia palestina incorporó a América Central dentro de las prioridades de su política hacia Latinoamérica. En este esfuerzo participaron activamente, tanto el Canciller palestino Riad Al-Malik, como el embajador palestino en la ONU Riyad Mansour y el embajador en Nicaragua, Mohamed Saadat. Unos días antes del reconocimiento, Al-Malik participó en la III Cumbre de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) y de la Comunidad del Caribe (CARICOM) con el fin de abogar por el reconocimiento al Estado Palestino. En sus declaraciones el Canciller palestino hizo referencia a la diáspora afirmando que: “si bien Palestina está ubicada en otro continente, nuestras historias no son tan diferentes y nuestros conciudadanos forman parte hoy de la vida de sus pueblos” (citado por Hasfura, 2011, p. 10). Aunque el asunto no fue tratado formalmente durante la Cumbre, Al-Malik tuvo la oportunidad de hablar bilateralmente con todas las delegaciones participantes para pedir su apoyo a Palestina.

Dos meses después, en octubre de 2011, el presidente de la Autoridad Palestina, Mahmud Abbas visitó El Salvador para agradecer al presidente Funes el reconocimiento que El Salvador otorgara al Estado palestino, y para reunirse con la comunidad palestina local. Unos días después, El Salvador, Honduras y el resto de países centroamericanos (con la excepción de Panamá), apoyaron el ingreso de Palestina a la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura (UNESCO), y en noviembre de ese año, ambos países otorgaron un voto a favor de la resolución para incluir al Estado palestino como observador de la ONU, lo cual condujo directamente al establecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas.

En mayo de 2013 el canciller palestino Al-Malik llevó a cabo una gira por América Central. Con Honduras y El Salvador, se firmaron acuerdos encaminados al establecimiento de embajadas permanentes. En Honduras, los cancilleres de ambos países firmaron un comunicado conjunto para el establecimiento formal de relaciones diplomáticas y el fomento de relaciones de entendimiento, amistad y cooperación, que favorezcan el progreso humano, cultural y técnico, así como el desarrollo económico de ambas naciones. Al terminar la gira, Al-Malik afirmó que había percibido un apoyo muy fuerte y claro “de América Latina y el Caribe para el reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado”.

La reacción de Israel y los sectores cristianos-sionistas

El acercamiento a Palestina, su reconocimiento como Estado y el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas, han implicado una transformación histórica en las estrechas relaciones que Honduras y El Salvador mantenían con Israel, cuyo gobierno reaccionó con sorpresa e indignación ante la nueva relación establecida con Palestina. En el caso de Honduras, a pesar de que el gobierno de este país declaró que “seguía reconociendo el derecho de Israel, a un territorio propio y a poder convivir en paz dentro de fronteras estables y seguras”, Israel reaccionó con resentimiento ante el giro diplomático. Cuando Honduras abogó en agosto de 2011 para que Palestina fuera reconocida ante la ONU, el embajador israelí, Elihau López, dijo:

(…) recibir de un país y de un presidente amigo una decisión sin consultar con nosotros, eso no se hace, son cosas que no se hacen entre gobiernos amigos. (…) Nosotros no merecemos recibir una decisión de esta naturaleza, es un obstáculo para la paz. Es como un cuchillo al corazón de Israel, (El Heraldo, Tegucigalpa).

En Jerusalén, el Director General Adjunto para América Latina, Dorit Shavit, llamó al embajador hondureño para expresarle la “sorpresa” y “decepción” del gobierno israelí y para recordarle que “Israel había estado junto a Honduras hace dos años, cuando pasó por una crisis institucional que llevó a la condena generalizada en todo el mundo”, aparentemente una referencia al golpe militar de junio de 2009 que derrocó al ex presidente José Manuel Zelaya (Keinon, 2011). En efecto,

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Israel fue uno de los primeros cinco países en reconocer al régimen de facto tras el golpe de Estado. Después de estas reacciones, iniciales, las autoridades israelíes minimizaron el masivo reconocimiento a Palestina como algo meramente “simbólico”. El Viceministro de Exteriores israelí, Danny Ayalon afirmó “que era muy fácil para los palestinos ganar el apoyo de países que han tenido poca influencia en el Medio Oriente”1. En términos generales Tel Aviv atribuyó este giro diplomático a la “falta de acción” de EE.UU. hacia América Latina y la “creciente influencia de Irán” en la región.

Quizás uno de los aspectos más interesantes y novedosos en el proceso de reconocimiento del Estado Palestino ha sido la irrupción de los grupos evangélicos de orientación cristiano-sionista que, en el caso de Honduras, han sido los sectores de la sociedad civil que se han opuesto con más virulencia al reconocimiento y en general a las aspiraciones nacionales palestinas. Después de la participación del Canciller Al-Malik en la Cumbre del SICA, dirigentes evangélicos hondureños invitaron al embajador israelí, Eliahú López, a un acto de solidaridad con Israel en el que le manifestaron “el apoyo total de los más de dos millones quinientos mil hondureños evangélicos a Israel”2. Más adelante, en ocasión del establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Palestina en mayo de 2013, Alberto Solórzano, presidente de la Confraternidad Evangélica de Honduras (CEH), manifestó que “la iglesia evangélica se oponía al establecimiento de relaciones con Palestina”, advirtiendo que se cumplía la promesa bíblica de que “aquellos que bendijeren a Israel, serían benditos, y los que lo maldijeren, serían malditos”3.

Iglesia evangélica critica establecimiento de relaciones con Palestina, Proceso Digital (2013). Autor anónimo.

En Evangélicos de Honduras respaldaron a Israel en el conflicto con los palestinos, Agencia Judía de Noticias, 24 agosto 2011

Some sources like CNN, mention that ISIS’ oil sales are rated between $1 million and $2 million per day.

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Conclusiones

La diáspora palestina en Honduras y El Salvador presenta un caso sui generis de progreso y éxito económico, elementos que en las últimas décadas están vinculados a un redescubrimiento de la identidad cultural y una creciente influencia política. El reencuentro con las aspiraciones nacionales palestinas ha convergido con una intensa labor de lobby diplomático llevada a cabo por la ANP en la región y una pérdida de influencia de los EE.UU. en América Latina, factores que han posibilitado un cambio significativo en el enfoque tradicional de estos dos países hacia el conflicto palestino-israelí y que les ha hecho pasar de ser unos de los más incondicionales aliados de Israel, a apoyar decididamente las aspiraciones nacionales del pueblo palestino, reconocer oficialmente al Estado Palestino y establecer relaciones diplomáticas.

Aun cuando el impacto de este giro diplomático en el marco general del conflicto palestino-israelí es limitado, sí se trata de un cambio significativo para las relaciones internacionales entre América Latina (y América Central en particular) y Medio Oriente. Por un lado, la activa diplomacia palestina en América Latina ha logrado el reconocimiento de 18 de los 21 países de la región. En el caso de Honduras y El Salvador, se ha aprovechado el papel de una diáspora económicamente poderosa y políticamente influyente, para restar espacios diplomáticos a Israel e incrementar su creciente aislamiento internacional. Por otro lado, este giro diplomático es señal de que Latinoamérica quiere expresar independencia frente a los EE.UU. en un conflicto que durante décadas quedó enmarcado dentro de los parámetros de la Guerra Fría y de paso, aprovechar los crecientes lazos económicos de la región hacia el Mundo Árabe.

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REFERENCIAS

Amaya, J. (2006). Los árabes y palestinos en Honduras (1900-1950). Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras.

---------(2012): Los árabes en Honduras. Reportes del CEMOAN No. 2. Centro de Estudios de Medio Oriente y África del Norte. Universidad Nacional, Heredia.

Bahbah, B. & Butler, L. (1986). Israel and Latin America: the military connection. New York: St. Martin´s Press.

Beit-Hallahmi, B. (1988). Israel Connection. Barcelona: Ediciones B.

Cockburn, A. et al. (1991). Dangerous Liaison. New York: Harper Perennial.

Colbert, J. (2011). Honduras y el voto palestino – no sin la abdicación americana. Heritage

Faroohar, M. (2011). Palestinians in Central America: from temporary emigrants to a permanent diaspora. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol, XL, (No.3).

Hasfura, R. (2011). Palestina, ¿un Estado independiente? Revista Usul, (No. 8).

Hoffman, B. (1988): The PLO and Israel in Central America: The Geopolitical Dimension. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.

Hunter, J. (1987). Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America. Boston: South End Press.

Jamail, M. & Gutiérrez, M. (1986). Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica. MERIP Middle East Report (No. 140).

Kaufman, E. & Shapira, Y. (1979). Israel-Latin American Relations. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Keinon, H. (2011). J’lem protests Honduran support for PA statehood bid. The Jerusalem Post.

Khoury, S. (2011). Posición de los cristianos sobre las restricciones a sus derechos religiosos. Revista Usul, (No. 8).

Mesa, V. et al (2009): Honduras: poderes fácticos y sistema de partidos. Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras.

---------(Coordinador) (2004): Democracia, legislación electoral y sistema de partidos en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras.

Moya, S. (2013). Los árabes y el poder económico y político en Centroamérica: los casos de Honduras y El Salvador. En Baltar, E, & Marroni, M. Viejas y nuevas migraciones forzadas en el sur de México, Centroamérica y el Caribe. México: Universidad de Quintana Roo.

Norton, R. & Greenberg, M. (1989). The international relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Romero, R (2009). Los grupos financieros y el poder político. En Meza, V, (2009). et. al Honduras: poderes fácticos y sistema de partidos. Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras.

Segovia, A. (2005): Integración real y grupos de poder económico en América Central. Implicaciones para la democracia y el desarrollo de la región. San José: Fundación Friedrich Ebert,

Shahak, I. (2007). El Estado de Israel armó las dictaduras en América Latina. Buenos Aires: Editorial Cannán.

Sharif, R. (1977). Latin America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Journal of Palestine Studies, ( 7), pp. 98-122.

Torre, M. (2009). El poder de los señores mediáticos de Honduras. En Meza, V, (2009). et. al Honduras: poderes fácticos y sistema de partidos. Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras.

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THE APOCALYPTIC WAR AGAINST GOG OF MAGOG. MARTIN BUBER VERSUS MEIR KAHANEPor: Rico Sneller Leiden University, the Netherlands

Rico Sneller is Assistant Professor of Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Culture, Institute for Philosophy, Faculty of the Humanities, Leiden University (Netherlands). He recently published with two colleagues Wild Beasts of the Philosophical Desert. Philosophers on Telepathy and Other Exceptional Experiences, Cambridge Publishing 2014. Corresponding Author’s Email: h.w.sneller@hum.leidenuniv.nl

ABSTRACT In this article a confrontation on the classic Gog/Magog motive (end time battle between God and evil) is enacted between two opposite Jewish thinkers: Martin Buber and Meir Kahane. It shows how and on what conditions the biblical text can be interpreted so differently. The article also tries to shed a more general light on the chances and risks at stake in end-of-time accounts.

KEYWORDSapocalypticism, Gog and Magog,

Martin Buber, Meir Kahane, religious extremism

Introduction

Apocalyptic end of time speculations and assumptions about concomitant violence have always existed. One of these speculations can be identified as the Gog of Magog prophecy in the Hebrew bible (Ezekiel 38-39). It is referred to in the Greek New Testament in the Book of Revelation. In the Gog of Magog prophecy, a final battle between Israel’s God and a Prince of Evil is described, a certain king Gog of Magog. Gog is finally to be slain on Israel’s plains, after he will have attempted to destroy Israel.

One can imagine that this sort of prophecies displaying a conclusive war between God and Evil at the end of times, have attracted variegate interpretations all throughout history. Some of these interpretations seem to have legitimized sacred violence, others have strictly forbidden this, arguing that God alone will fulfill our world’s messianic destiny. Violence as such, though, had seemed unavoidable to all interpreters. It was supposed to be an eschatological necessity anyhow. In this chapter I will confront two radically opposed views of the Gog prophecy, viz. Martin Buber’s approach in his novel Gog und Magog. Eine Chronik (1949) (Cf. Martin Buber, 2009, 278f.), and Meir Kahane’s, in his Or hara’ ayon (The Jewish Idea), a two-volume book that was published posthumously in 1998.

Martin Buber (1878-1965) was a German Jewish author who had collected many Hasidic tales and traditions among Jews in pre-War Eastern Europe. By doing so, he has preserved them for posterity, as most of the Hasidic story-tellers have been slaughtered by the Nazis. Buber’s general spiritual orientation was mystical, he sought for connections between Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu mystical traditions. Peace-minded as Buber was, he not only paid many efforts to reconcile post-War Germany and the State of Israel, but he also made a hard case for a mutual recognition of Jews and Palestinians on Israel’s territory.

Meir Kahane (1932-1990) was a radical American-Israeli rabbi who created the Jewish Defense League in the US to protect Jewish interests all over the world, especially in the USSR. After his emigration to Israel he launched the Kach-party, a party that promoted the mandatory expulsion of Arabs from Israeli territory. This party was banned and delegitimized by the Israeli Supreme Court after a few years. In 1990 Kahane was killed by an Egyptian activist in New York.

The Gog of Magog prophecy

Let’s have a short look at the prophetic text of Ezekiel itself. In the Jewish liturgy, the Gog of Magog chapters are publicly read at the end of the feast week starting with Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), followed by Sukkot (Feast of Tabernacles) and ending with Simhat Torah (Rejoicing of the Torah) on the “eighth day”. The Tanakh lectionary already indicates the mutually implicative relation, one could say, between ‘atonement’ on the one hand, and the inevitable struggle against and the victory over the forces of Evil, on the other.

I will briefly mention here some elements of Ezekiel 38-39. Gog of Magog, the Prince of a northern nation, is aiming to besiege the people of Israel. To do so he will gather many other peoples and their kings.

(Ch. 38) 8. From many days you [i.e. Gog] will be remembered; at the end of the years you will come to a land [whose inhabitants] returned from the sword, gathered from many peoples, upon the mountains of Israel, which had been continually laid waste, but it was liberated from the nations, and they all dwelt securely. 9. And you will ascend; like mist you will come; like a cloud to cover the earth you will be; you and all your wings and many peoples with you.

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10. So said the Lord God: It will come to pass on that day that words will enter your heart and you will think a thought of evil.11. And you will say, “I shall ascend upon a land of open cities; I shall come upon the tranquil, who dwell securely; all of them living without a wall, and they have no bars or doors. 12. To take spoil and to plunder loot, to return your hand upon the resettled ruins and to a people gathered from nations, acquiring livestock and possessions, dwelling on the navel of the earth.

The people of Israel are living in ignorance about these plans, they are dwelling without any defense. God himself, however, will finally slay Gog of Magog and its armies, in order to sanctify his name among the nations:

Finally, all nations will know that God had exiled his people for its iniquity and betrayal of God:

(Ch. 38) 21. And I will call the sword against him [i.e. Gog] upon all My mountains, says the Lord God: every man’s sword shall be against his brother.22. And I will judge against him with pestilence and with blood, and rain bringing floods, and great hailstones, fire, and brimstone will I rain down upon him and upon his hordes and upon the many peoples that are with him. 23. And I will reveal Myself in My greatness and in My holiness and will be recognized in the eyes of many nations, and they will know that I am the Lord.

(Ch. 39) 24. According to their defilement and according to their transgressions I did to them, and I hid My face from them.25. Therefore, so said the Lord God: Now I shall return to the captivity of Jacob, and I shall have compassion on the House of Israel, and I shall be zealous for My Holy Name.26. And they shall bear their disgrace and all their treachery that they committed against Me when they dwell on their land securely with no one frightening them.27. When I return them from the peoples and gather them from the lands of their enemies, I shall be sanctified through them before the eyes of many nations.28. And they will know that I am the Lord their God when I exile them to the nations, and I shall gather them to their land, and I shall no longer leave any of them there.29. And I shall no longer hide My face from them, for I shall have poured out My spirit upon the House of Israel,” says the Lord God.

While the Ezekiel text can be seen as the root text of the Gog of Magog tradition, its distorted echoes can be found not only in the Revelation of John in the New Testament (cf. Rieuwerd Buitenwerf, 2007), but also in the Sibylline Oracles, and the Qur’an (Sura 18, 83-98). The Qur’an describes how an enigmatic ruler called Dhul Qarnayn is called upon to liberate a defenseless people from the mischief of Ya’juj and Ma’juj. The iron wall he builds to protect it hereafter will, however, be removed at the end of times. Sura 21 speaks about a “prohibition upon [the people of] a city which We [i.e. Allah] have destroyed that they will [ever] return, until [the dam of] Gog and Magog has been opened and thou shall see them, from every higher ground, descending.” A hadith called Al-Bukhari claims that the city of Jerusalem is referred to in this Sura.

Who is this ‘Gog’? Though it is not my aim here to engage in a separate exegesis of this mysterious text, it is perhaps worth mentioning that history has shown diverse explanations, varying from king Gyges – Gugu ¬– of Lydia (historically the most probable exegesis) to Babel, the Romans, Attila, the Khazars, the Eastern European Jews (sic!), Napoleon, etc. Any enemy could be filled in, so it seems. The XV Century Spanish-Portuguese rabbi Abarbanel identifies Gog in his biblical commentaries with the ‘Ishmaelites’, i.e. the Arabs. Levinas tends to connect Gog and Magog with Hitler and Stalin.1 Old English traditions have it that a giant called Goemagog, an original inhabitant of the Island, was conquered and thrown into the sea. Michael Drayton (1563-1631) writes in his Poly-Olbion:

A few miles south of Cambridge the Gog Magog Downs can be found, which name can be tracked down to the old tradition. An Irish tradition even claims that the Irish people are the offspring of a Magog (Japhet’s son, according to the biblical book of Genesis, 10, 2-3).

Obviously all these explanations are hardly more than folklore. Unless one reinterpret the concept of the ‘apocalyptic’ itself, but that would lead us astray here. Explanations of Gog-like prophesies are always hazardous undertakings (which does not mean that they are necessarily false). As Buber observes in his commentary to Gog und Magog, three Hasidic rabbis who speculated on Gog’s identity died in the same year (see below).

“La guerre de Gog et Magog, le XXe siècle et son avenir ou sa crainte nucléaire, achèveront-ils notre maturité ou notre vieillesse de modernes façonnées par les promesses et les philosophies de l’histoire et du progrès et du messianisme, ou se laisseront-elles se consoler par la bonté invincible, mais désarmée, des justes et des saints, prétendument meilleure que le « souvenir de la sortie d’Egypte » ?” E. Levinas, 1988, 103.

1

Amongst the ragged Cleeves those monstrous giants sought: Who (of their dreadful kind) t’appal the Trojans brought Great Gogmagog, an oake that by the roots could teare;

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Messianic tensions

The explanations of ‘Gog’ in the Jewish tradition can hardly be dissolved from messianic expectations. Although Ezekiel itself does not refer to a coming messiah, the text nonetheless refers to a divine deliverance of the Jewish people from harm and threat. This deliverance, so the prophecy suggests, can only take place once the Jews have been brought back to their land. We will see that this element, the so-called ‘ingathering of the exiles’, plays a key role in Meir Kahane’s approach of the text.

The importance of the ingathering of the Jewish exiles was central to all different forms of Zionism that arose by the end of the XIX Century. In order to provide a background to the apocalyptic Gog of Magog prophecy I will first give a brief overview here of some noteworthy religious Jewish attitudes towards Zionism. A very good study on this subject on which I am largely dwelling here has been written by Aviezer Ravietzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. (Also cf. Kriegel, 2000, pp. 153-165) It goes without saying that the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was a major, astounding event that influenced the already extant ideas among the Diaspora Jews about a future Jewish state.

Anti-Zionism: Neturei Karta

Anti-Zionism prior and subsequent to the creation of the State of Israel (if not the holocaust) clearly makes much of a difference. However, anti-Zionism has not altogether disappeared and become extinct after 1948, as the fanatically anti-Zionist Neturei Karta movement has shown. Anti-Zionist movements in contemporary Jewry reach back by and large to Hasidic traditions originating in Eastern Europe. It is self-evident, though, that anti-Zionist sentiments only resurge at times in which certain Jewish circles actively promote settlement in the holy land. Be this as it may, none of the Jewish voices either promoting or prohibiting such settling had expected the actual establishment of a truly Jewish state in 1948.

The Lubavitcher Rebbe Rabbi Shalom Dov Baer Schneerson was one of the main castigators of XIX Century Zionism. Drawing on the so-called ‘three oaths’ he strictly declined any human effort to autonomously re-establish an independent Jewish state, as such would be the sole Messiah’s responsibility. These three oaths refer to a Talmudic passage which 1) defends the Jews from “ascending the wall” (i.e. to massively settle in the holy land), 2) adjures Israel “not to rebel against the nations of the world”, and 3) adjures these nations “not to oppress Israel too much” (cf. Babylonian Talmud

Ketubbot 111a). These oaths (or vows) have been subject to frequent debates as to their authoritative (‘halakhic’) status. Anti-Zionists have at least insisted on their binding character: Jews, so they maintained, are not allowed to massively settle in the holy land, let alone establish their own independent Jewish state (cf. Ravietzky 1996, 211-234; Firestone, 2006, pp. 954-982). By doing so, they would “force the end”, or bring about a self-willed human redemption, which would be a grave wrongdoing against God’s plans. Ravietzky quotes the anti-Zionist Rabbi Kahane-Shapira (1871-1943), who stated:

Post-war rabbis such as Joel Teitelbaum (1887-1979) do not hesitate to see the creation of the State of Israel as a catastrophe of the same order as the holocaust. They consequently downgrade any moderate form of redemption realized by human means (viz. the fallible State of Israel created in 1948). The only acceptable form, to them, is radical, full redemption, which can only be realized by God himself. Jewish visitors of the recent Iranian ‘holocaust conference’ for the most part come from these circles (e.g. Neturei Karta).

Haredi Jewry

Radical though the contemporary opposition may seem between orthodox anti-Zionists (such as Neturei Karta) and orthodox Zionists (such as mainstream Haredi Jewry), they share common Hasidic roots. The majority of the orthodox Jews today have accepted, albeit not always wholeheartedly, the existence of the State of Israel. However, such acceptance has only become possible at the price of a neutralization of this State’s religious significance for them. For just as well as the Neturei Karta ‘fanatics’, they believe in the sole divine agency in matters of human redemption. The Jews themselves, they think, should remain purely passive and just persevere in the daily observance of the halakhic rules.

Ravietzky distinguishes in fact two Haredi responses to the reality of the Jewish State of Israel: one of them corresponding to the aforementioned “religious indifference to the political-historical dimension”, whereas the other is “moved by the

Heaven forbid that we walk in the ways of these sinful people, who strive for natural redemption. The striving is forbidden… The act of teshuvah (repentance) alone is a legitimate means to hasten the End, but acts of ingathering [the exiles] and of bringing [Israel to their land] depend solely upon the hand of God: ‘Unless the Lord builds the house, its builders labor in vain on it; unless the Lord watches over the city, the watchman keeps vigil in vain’ [Ps. 127:1].2

A.B. Steinberg, Da‘at ha-rabbanim (Warsaw, 1902), p.39, in: Ravietzky, 18.2134 135

ways of Providence in current history”. “They share a common consciousness of exile”, Ravietzky continues, “that does not allow an effective place for mundane Jewish activity, for collective national initiative that shapes the course of history.” (Ravietzky, p.161).

Haredi circles have always taken extremely seriously traditional notions such as the “birthpangs of the Messiah” or the “footsteps of the Messiah”, which refer to events generally supposed to precede divine redemption, and frequently identified with the Gog of Magog prophecy. The Haredis apply these notions to the increased suffering and persecution of Jews on the one hand, and to wide-spread religious transgression on the other. Shortly before the holocaust Rabbi Elhanan Bunem Wasserman writes in his Ikveta de-meshiha (Footsteps of the Messiah): “In our days, which are the footsteps of the Messiah, in which the heretics are the leaders of the generation, and do not permit Torah scholars to raise their heads, and wage open war upon the Torah… [there is] a terrible situation the likes of which we have not experienced since Israel became a people.” (Ikveta di-meshihah, pp. 6ff., in Ravietzky, p. 171). It is striking that similar quotations can be found by post-war thinkers such as Rabbi Schach. In a harangue addressed to ‘secular’ Jewish leaders he contends: “We see a terrible and frightening sight. A collective revolt against the kingdom of heaven. […] According to our own conviction and faith, those who presume to maintain the state are those who endanger it”. (Mikhtavim u-ma’amarim, pp. 6, 13, in Ravietzky, 178, 179.)

Religious Zionism: Rav Kook

The contemporary Israeli Settler’s Block, Gush Emunim, overtly claims loyalty to Rav Kook, both son (Zvi Yehuda, 1881-1981) and father (Avraham, 1865-1935). Whether this claim is always justified cannot be answered here. Only their religious Zionism puts such a tremendous weight upon the ongoing colonization of the Land that it takes this colonization to be a precondition, rather than the upshot, of the future redemption. Avraham Kook draws here upon the Talmudic notion of the athalta de-ge’ulah, the beginning of redemption. Only collective human activity, so Kook claims, can bring about this beginning, which will only be completed by the Messiah. According to Kook, “Zionism is a heavenly matter”. “The State of Israel is a divine entity, our holy and exalted state!” (Z.Y. Kook, Le-hilkhot tzibbur pp. 244, 246, in Ravietzky, 82; also cf. A.I. Kook, 1978)

The Kooks continue older traditions dating from the 19th Century, e.g. those upheld by the ‘Harbingers of Zion’. These idealistic-minded rabbis saw redemption as closely linked to settling in the holy land. As opposed to the Kooks, they did not see this as a process also requiring severe crises (‘birthpangs’). If one would go further back into history, one could also think of the Nahmanides (13th Century) or Judah he-Hasid (1700), who already actively stimulated Jewish immigration in the Land of Israel.

Religious Zionism differs from the two previously mentioned approaches (i.e. Neturei Karta and the Haredis) in that it makes redemption conditional; human agency is required to prepare for the coming of the Messiah. As opposed to what we will find in Kahane, however, it also sees a positive role for ‘secular’ or ‘political’ Zionism. As a Hegelian philosopher in disguise, Kook the Elder would affirm that, “if the secularists represented the unconscious workings of the Jewish spirit, the religious Zionists […] would raise this spirit to the level of conscious choice.” (Ravietzky, p. 122)

Martin Buber and immanent redemption

Let us return to the Gog prophecy more explicitly. Martin Buber has dedicated the only novel he wrote to this prophetic-apocalyptic text. Gog und Magog is a ‘chronicle’ (cf. Friedman 2002, 1955, Ch. 18, and HaCohen, in Buber, 2009, pp. 9-35), a record of discussions between Hasidic zaddikim, roughly between 1793 and 1815. Hasidism is a XVIII Century Jewish mystical revival movement, born in Eastern Europe with the teachings of the Baal Shem Tov, the ‘great teacher’ (magid gadol) or the Besht (an acrostic). Hasidic communities are generally centered around a zaddik, a holy rabbi whose religious and moral injunctions are considered to be binding for all his followers.

The chronicle’s protagonists are the ‘Seer of Lublin’ (Yaacov Yitzak), his disciple, ‘the Jew’ (Yehudi, der Jude) of Pžysha (whose proper name is, as a matter of coincidence, also Yaakov Yitzak), and some other rabbis. The ‘Seer’ and Yehudi represent two religious positions that together undoubtedly make up for Buber’s own inner struggle. (Friedman 2002, Ch. 18 and HaCohen 2009, p. 22f) These two positions do not just regard the interpretation of the Gog of Magog prophecy but, more generally, two opposite tendencies within Hasidism

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as such. Even a third position can be distinguished, i.e. Rabbi Menachem Mendel’s. Though in the wider context of the book Menachem Mendel plays a smaller role, I think his views can be seen as a ‘shadow’ (to use a Jungian term) of the Seer’s. It can even be defended that they virtually anticipate to Meir Kahane’s approach, as we will see. However, these views rely upon the more basic ones which are held by the Seer of Lublin himself. Actually, in the wake of Gog und Magog Buber published another, similar though non-narrative text: Bilder von Gut und Böse (‘Images of Good and Evil’), in which especially Yehudi’s views return but now assimilated to Buber’s own. (Buber 1952)

According to Yaakov Yitzhak the Seer of Lublin, ‘Gog’ refers to Napoleon, someone who also comes from the ‘North’ or the ‘Northwest’ (of Israel) and who destroys many countries. Yaakov Yitzhak ‘the Jew’, however, internalizes the Gog prophecy, applying it to the so-called yetzer hara, the traditional Hebrew name for the ‘evil inclination’ in the human heart.

More generally speaking, the Seer represents a line in Hasidism which has a magic, if not theurgist orientation. The zaddik is taken as a vessel or an intermediary between God and the religious community. By means of magical ‘incantations’ he intends to accelerate or hasten the end. For if Napoleon is indeed the announced ‘Gog’, as the Seer claims, the final redemption is near.

We have already met with the notion of “hastening the end” before, in Rabbi Kahane-Shapira. This rabbi had warned against Zionism, which he saw as a dangerous hastening of the end of times. A more general caveat in the Jewish tradition has it that he who “hastens the end” by eliciting the forces of evil, risks to bring about unprecedented catastrophes. Had not Maimonides already emphasized that the future messianic redemption would come as a natural process, independent of human interference? However, despite such warnings, a certain strand in Hasidism still attempted to hasten the end by magical practices and procedures. This magical strand has often been neglected in Hasidism research, due to the ‘romantic’ conception invigorated by thinkers as Martin Buber himself. The Israeli Kabbala expert

Moshe Idel does not hesitate to compare the role of the zaddik to the shaman, who also functions as a vessel to convey divine influxes. (Idel, 1995, pp. 214, 218, 225; Idel, 2005, pp. 148-150) In the introduction to Der grosse Magid und seine Nachfolge Buber writes about the Seer of Lublin:

He was filled with ceaseless waiting for the hour of redemption and finally initiated and played the chief part in the secret rites [jener geheimnisvollen Handlung] which he and certain other zaddikim … performed with the purpose of converting the Napoleonic wars into the pre-Messianic final battle of Gog and Magog. The three leaders in this mystic procedure all died in the course of the following year. They had ‘forced [bedrängt] the end,’ they died at its coming. The magic, which the Baal Shem had held in check, broke loose and did its work of destruction. (Buber, 1927, 395)3

The German original lacks the final sentence (“they died at its coming. The magic, which the Baal Shem had held in check, broke loose and did its work of destruction”), it just reads “Sie hatten das Ende bedrängt; sie verbrannten in seinem Anhauch.“ Trans. 1948, p. 33.

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As stated previously, the Seer’s position is radicalized by Rabbi Menachem Mendel, a rigorous rabbi who is very restrained in matters of exuberant clothing and of giving in to life’s pleasures. Just as other rabbis, so it is said, he believes in “the influence of the Zaddikim on the course of events”. Like the Seer of Lublin, he thinks it is “the duty of the Zaddikim to make Napoleon into Gog. Yet his meaning and our Rabbi’s meaning are not identical. He interprets it as praying and taking spiritual risks that Napoleon may be the universal victor [Beten und Sich-Einsetzen, dass Napoleon alles besiege].” (Buber, 2009, p. 205; trans. p. 222) In a discussion with Yehudi, Mendel even remarks: “God […] is with us, wherever we are and however we are constituted. But the dawn of His kingdom can arise only among us, only in Israel, when, and not before there exists this ‚in‘, this place within us [nicht eher als bis es dieses ‘in’, diesen Ort gibt].“ (Buber, 2009, p. 213; trans. p. 232) Mendel’s logic, we could add here, reminds us of some of the Russian revolutionaries who wanted to await Russia’s becoming an industrialized nation with a proletariat of its own before starting the revolution itself. It manifests certain Gnostic traits already inherent, though less clearly, to the Seer’s views.

The other protagonist in Gog und Magog, Yaakov Yitzak ‘the Jew’ (Yehudi), however, interprets Gog as the “evil inclination” within, the yetzer hara. “The Yehudi kept on the other side of

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the realm of magic”, Buber writes in his introduction to Der grosse Magid, “which the Seer and his friends entered at that time in an attempt to reach the Messianic sphere by affecting current events; he did not wish to hasten the end [das Ende bedrängen], but to prepare man for the end.” (Buber, 1927, p. 398; trans. p. 35)

The oral traditions that have inspired Buber’s chronicle relate that Yehudi was sacred on a perhaps even more profound, if not an altogether different level. Being the Seer’s disciple, Yehudi was supposed to have reached spiritual altitudes that made him even long for physical death. The Seer himself, so these traditions assert, was not able to understand his disciple’s views from the latter’s own viewpoints. Yehudi was inspired by a sense of urgency which made him call for immediate repentance: ““Turn! [Kehret um]“, he cried to them, “Turn quickly for the day is near [denn die Zeit ist kurz: ‚time is short’]. There is not time for new migration of souls [keine Frist mehr verbleibt für neue Wanderung], redemption is close.“ (Buber 1927, p. 398; trans. p. 373) In more general terms, one could say that Yehudi, when compared to his master, showed a tendency towards internalizing faith.4 Doctrine and prayer, in his teachings, were to fuse into one service. ‘Magic’, then, would be a mere outward means of living one’s faith, the use of it as an instrument. To put this in still other terms, extending the drift of the argument: in the Seer’s eyes even evil can be used by the zaddik in order to achieve the good, for God will transform the effects of his actions or ‘manipulations’ into the opposite. Yehudi, however, contends that such attempts run the risk of assimilating good to evil. Evil must simply be endured, just as God himself endures it. Only God can finally transform evil into good; in man’s hands it will only get worse.

The following passage is taken from a dialogue between Yehudi and his master, the Seer: “Rabbi”, he said in an almost failing voice, “what is the nature of this Gog? He can exist in the outer world only because he exists within us.” He pointed to his own breast. “The darkness out of which he was hewn [geschöpft] needed to be taken from nowhere else than our own slothful and malicious hearts. Our betrayal of God has made Gog grow so great [so gross gepäppelt].” (Buber 2009, p. 82; trans. p. 54)

In medieval Jewish mystical traditions this internalization is called kawanna, the art of directing or concentrating one’s consciousness while praying.

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Redemption, in his view, means a delivery from evil. This does not come down to the destruction of evil but to the delivery of evil from itself (“Does not redemption primarily mean the redeeming of the evil from the evil ones that make them so [Erlösung der Bösen vom Bösen]?” Buber 2009, p. 132; trans. p. 121) Battling inexorably against evil should not consist in solidifying the “seven times walled citadel of their soul” [i.e. of the evil ones] but in “conquering” it; and it should also consist of “battl[ing] against ourselves”. “If we were to forget that, if we were to take the contradiction and, instead of annihilating it, let it cleave to the very depth of the primordial [bisins Urfeuer hinein vertieften], would we not in the very midst of combat against Satan have become his followers?” (Buber 2009, p. 132; trans. p. 121)

Full redemption, Yehudi claims almost at the end of the chronicle, will consist of uniting God with his Shekhina (his “indwelling”). We cannot unite God with his Shekhina unless we carry it to him. (Buber 2009, p. 212; trans. p. 231) In so far, we could say that in this vein of thinking, the world’s redemption depends on us, i.e. on our repentance and acceptance of God’s kingship. (ib.) It also depends on us in the Seer’s views; however, whereas Yehudi wants us to fully submit to God, to prepare divine agency by being passive ourselves, by being actively passive so to speak, the Seer requires a far more active effort of man. Yehudi paves ways for divine agency within the soul, the Seer for it in the outside world.

Nonetheless, the moment of redemption, according to Yehudi, cannot be predicted whatsoever: “For this reason all calculations concerning the end of time are false and all attempts to calculate it to bring nearer the coming of the Messiah must fail. In truth all such things deflect us from the one thing needful, which is this, to reunite Him and the Shechinah by virtue of our return to good.” […] Redemption is at the door. It depends only and alone upon our return to good, our teshuvah. “(Buber 2009, p. 213; trans. p. 231)

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The opposition between the extreme positions becomes most clear in a final discussion between Yehudi and rabbi Mendel: “”It were well”, cried Rabbi Mendel, “that Jewish blood flow until one can wade therein up to the knees from Prystyk to Rymanow, if thereby our exile be brought to an end and our redemption dawn.“ “But supposing”, said the Yehudi, “that this fire is nothing but a fire of destruction? God can kindle such a fire and blow upon it, too, and know what He does. But we? What gives us the right to wish the evil an increase of power and lend it such increase, if we may? Who tells us whom we serve thereby, the Redeemer or the adversary. Who dare be bold enough to speak today in the words of the prophet: ‘The word of the Eternal came unto me’?” (Buber 2009, p. 228; trans. p. 255) The Yehudi replied: “Never will a work of man have a good issue if we do not think of the souls whom it is given us to help, and of the life between soul and soul, and of our life with them and of their lives with each other. We cannot help the coming of redemption if life does not redeem life.” (Buber 2009, p. 228f; trans. p. 256)

On the eve of his death, Yehudi is once more seized by a profound religious ecstasy. He explains to one of his disciples that, between the final battle with Gog and Magog and the Messiah’s coming, three hours of “silent horror” (stummen Grauens) will occur. These hours will be much heavier to bear than this battle itself. Only (s)he who sustains them will see the Messiah. But he immediately adds: “But all the conflicts of Gog and Magog arise out of those evil forces which have not been overcome in the conflict against the Gogs and Magogs who dwell in human hearts. And those three mirror what each one of us must endure after all the conflicts in the solitariness of his soul”. (Buber 2009, p. 248f; trans. p. 284)5

Meir Kahane and the imminent redemption

“Hasidism”, Moshe Idel writes, “namely, the way to reach mystical experiences and the possibility of operating on the material level characteristic of the Besht and of later Hasidic masters, is immanently redemptive, and not imminently, as in what are conceived by scholars to be acute forms of messianism.” (Idel, 1998, p. 219) We have seen in what I have

Also cf. Martin Buber, 1952. In the preface of this book Buber quotes Yehudi from Gog und Magog (“Rabbi”, sagte er mit fast versagender Stimme, „was ist es mit diesem Gog? Es kann ich doch da draußen nur geben, weil es ihn da drinnen gibt.“, p.11)

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described above that this rather applies to Yehudi’s than to the Seer’s and Menachem Mendel’s approaches. For whereas the latter tended to ‘conjure up’ all Gog’s darkness in Napoleon’s historical presence such as to “hasten” the end, Yehudi made a case for inward struggle and self-purification. It should not surprise that both Buber and Hasidism have been inspiring many later existential psychologists. (cf. Rotenberg, 2004, 1983; Buber, 1997; Neumann, 1968)

Let us now turn to a 20th Century rabbi who in many respects seems to be comparable to the Seer of Lublin’s and Menachem Mendel’s “imminent” redemption. In the following I will draw on Kahane’s Or hara’ayon / The Jewish Idea, a series of Biblical and Talmudic commentaries with a view to the actuality of Israeli politics and the question of Arabic presence within Israel’s borders. The penultimate chapter of his book is entitled ‘Gog’. One could say that Kahane’s explanation of this prophecy more or less belongs to his very last published words – although this was not intended, obviously (Kahane was murdered). Anyway, all the chapters of the second volume of his book deal with the notion of redemption. They betray a growing eschatological awareness. (Cfr. Sneller, 2011) The chapter which is entitled ‘Gog’ (Ch. 38) is not even the chapter that pays most attention to a scriptural exegesis of Ezekiel 38-39; such an exegesis can rather be found in the previous chapters which have titles such as ‘The Final Redemption’, ‘Atchalta De’Geula (The Beginning of Redemption)’, ‘The Time of Redemption’, ‘Signs of the Redemption’, and “‘I will hasten it”’.

Kahane’s main thesis goes as follows: the Jewish people have a choice. Either they can try to bring divine redemption “in haste”, to accelerate it (viz. by collectively repenting, by showing full obedience to Torah, and by completely separating from the nations of the world, and by purging the land of Israel from non-Jewish elements), or to do nothing and await for divine redemption to come “in its time”, i.e. the time determined by God, which will bring with it “Messianic birth pangs”: war, violence, huge catastrophes etc. (cf. Kahane, 1998, pp. 844, 866, 969 and passim)

Interestingly, Kahane interprets the Gog prophecy (in which Gog together with all the nations of the world prepares for a war against Israel) as something that might or could happen. It refers to the option of a redemption coming “in its time”, with

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Messianic birth-pangs. “If redemption comes ‘in its time’, there will be troubles such as have never been, and only afterward will come redemption. […] And even ritual observance will not save Israel from Messianic birthpangs, unless we demonstrate our faith and trust in G-d through bold deeds without fear of the nations.”(Ib., p. 839) If Israel does not repent, the suffering will be longer and redemption will come “in its time”. (Ib., p. 841) “The trouble and grief of Gog and Magog will surpass all the troubles and holocausts of the past, Heaven help us.” (Ib., p. 932)

However, the coming of redemption “in its time”, with the messianic birthpangs, can be avoided. The war against Gog can be avoided and so, the Ezekielic prophecy need not necessarily come true. For the other option which Kahane shows enhances that God will “hasten” redemption. “Israel will then suffer briefly”, “according to Israel’s merit”. (Ib., pp. 839, 841)

We have encountered the notion of God “hastening” the end earlier, but then in a negative sense. Anti-Zionists such as Rabbi Kahane-Shapira had warned against “hastening” the end, for in their view, this would bring with it giant catastrophes. However, the terminology may be confusing here. The anti-Zionists primarily base their admonitions upon a passage from the Song of Songs (2, 7): “I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles or by the hinds of the field, that you neither awaken nor arouse the love while it is desirous.” Kahane, on the other hand, rather has in mind the following verses from Isaiah (60, 21-22): “21. And your people, all of them righteous, shall inherit the land forever, a scion of My planting, the work of My hands in which I will glory. 22. The smallest shall become a thousand and the least a mighty nation; I am the Lord, in its time I will hasten it (be‘itto achishenna)”.

It is precisely the option which Kahane sees as being offered to the Jewish people which gives his call such an urgent, apocalyptical bent. The cruel final battle with Gog need not take place, if the Jewish people but repent and purify their land from all non-Jewish residents, remnants and remainders.

I will now describe some general elements of Kahane’s Gog account as they appear mainly from the remarkably lengthy Chapter on ‘The Beginning of the Redemption’ (Atchalta De’Geula, Ch. 28).

As follows from Ezekiel 38-39, Kahane writes, the war against Gog will only take place after “the ingathering of the exiles” (i.e. the creation of the State of Israel). (Ib., p. 849) It belongs to Ikevot De-Meshicha (“the footsteps of the Messiah”, Messianic birth-pangs); it is part of Atchalta De’Geula, the ‘beginning of the Redemption’. (Ib., p. 851) Relative to this, it will not surprise to see that Kahane does not make much trouble about the “three oaths”, which had inspired anti-Zionists from all ages. He claims that the nations have not kept their part of the deal, i.e. of not subjugating Israel too much. (Ib., Ch. 26 ‚The Three Oaths‘) As they have done far worse, so Kahane claims, the Jewish people are fully entitled to accept the land of Israel as God’s gift, moreover, to interpret it as a sign of the coming end. One could say that, out of the abovementioned Jewish orthodox groups, Kahane’s position most resembles the religious Zionists’ pretending to safeguard the heritage of Rabbi Kook. The main difference, though, lies in Kahane’s all-determining emphasis upon the need to ‘purge’ the land from non-Jewish traces.

“The Reign of Gog”, Kahane continues, “constitutes the end of this world as we know it and symbolizes the pinnacle of blasphemous pride.” (Ib., p. 851) “Through Gog’s war on the People of Israel, G-d will begin his punishment and revenge against all the rest of the nations who profaned his name and that of Israel.” (Ib., p. 846) If Gog repents, Kahane remarks, if it “is accepting the yoke of Heaven and submitting to G-d, and subjugates himself to G-d and Israel, thereby bringing the world the great and final Kiddush Hashem, G-d will certainly let him repent in this way. Yet, as long as he does not do this, as long as he and the world continue in arrogant Chilul Hashem, G-d will set the time for His revenge and, then, will entice him into receiving his punishment.” (Ib., p. 853)

It may surprise here, in light of the rest of his theology, that Kahane leaves open the possibility that Gog repents at all. Nonetheless, it is not altogether clear what particular chance is offered to Gog, in Kahane’s eyes. It is highly unlikely that Kahane is aiming at the classical Origenist doctrine of an apokatasasis pantoon (according to which God would finally redeem each and every creature, even the wicked). “G-d will certainly let him repent in this way” is a very vague and reticent formula in this respect. Even so, what is sure is that Israel will be alone with nobody to rely on except God. But “Israel’s isolation”, so Kahane continues in italics, “is an immutable

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precondition for final redemption.” (Ib., p. 991) Concretely, Israel should purge the land of “the false religion called Islam” and of “idolatrous churches and cults which are to be ‘shunned totally’ (Deut. 7:26), which arrogantly seek to influence the holy Jewish People to abandon the true faith.” (Ib., pp. 908, 997) This ‘purging’ is an act which is similar to divine Creation as recorded in Genesis, for Creation also rested upon an act of separation and division (viz. between light and dark, or between sea and land, etc.).

Almost at the last page, Kahane affirmatively refers to the book of Numbers 25, 1-18. Here we find a narrative in which a man called Pinchas zealously kills another Israelite man who neglects God’s prohibition to “yoke” with foreign idolaters: “Who shall rise up like Pinchas and, spear in hand, execute zealous judgment against the alien culture and abominable concepts which have destroyed the uniqueness, holiness and separateness of the chosen, supreme people?” (Ib., p. 996) I mention this reference to the (not so well-known) Pinchas story because in his book The Secular Outlook, the Dutch legal philosopher Paul Cliteur extensively dwells on it. Cliteur takes the Pinchas story to be paradigmatic for the risks of both organized and unorganized religion. It should be noted, though, that the adopted stance in Cliteur’s rejection of religious influence is the state’s, and the perspective taken is the raison d’état.6

Buber versus Kahane

Let us take stock of what have hitherto seen.First, Kahane, by repeating Ezekiel’s prophecy and actualizing it, claims for himself prophetical vision (‘the end-time is near’). Buber’s account, on the other hand, is a narrative. Although Buber’s sympathy clearly lies with Yehudi’s existential account, at least some weight is given to other positions simply by rendering them at some length. One could say that the chronicle’s narrative character makes its ‘argument’ far more cautious. But even if we would fully identify Buber’s position with Yehudi’s, we must realize that Buber seems to make any actualization of the prophecy dependent on man’s repentance and his or her preparation for God’s coming. This complicates

Cliteur, 2010, 105-108 and passim. Cf. “It is clear that this attitude and the whole worldview connected with it is hard to reconcile with modern freedom of religion, freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, free inquiry and other fundamental rights ingrained in the concept of liberal democracy.” (107)

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any prophecy, in Buber, as it cannot be predicted in principle. (Buber, 2009, p. 213; trans., p. 231)

Next, both Buber and Kahane put apocalyptic weight on Jewish repentance. In Buber, repentance implies a personal activity, in Kahane it also entails a (violent) collective purging of the land of Israel from alien residents.

Thirdly, in Buber, God’s kingdom will not come without repentance; in Kahane, it will come anyhow, albeit “in its time”, with a lot of suffering and violence, and a final war with Gog.

Fourthly, Buber takes into account a psychological or existential level, which makes his ‘argument’ in my view stronger than Kahane’s: fighting evil, so Buber’s suggestion goes, may ultimately contribute to this very evil itself.

Fifthly, in Kahane, repentance requires separation and elimination of evil, or (sic!) foreign elements (mark the equation of ‘evil’ and ‘foreign’). This procedure is given a religious dimension (God’s creation also rests upon a separation etc).

Finally, in Buber, repentance requires an assumption of the ‘evil’, the ‘alien’ or the ‘foreign’. They must all be “seized by the drive of the soul” (vom Schwung der Seele ergriffen) and brought to a full decision. (Buber, 1952, p. 93) If we would apply this Buberian precept to Israeli-Palestinian peace process (which is not impossible, as Buber himself was very concerned with this process during his lifetime): Israelis should persevere in trying to entice Palestinians to a common decision for peace.

Conclusive remarks

So we have two extremely opposed approaches of the Gog end-time prophecy. Buber (supposed we can identify his position with Yehudi’s) internalizes Gog by equating it to the jezer hara or the evil inclination each human is endowed with. By doing so, he de-historicizes the prophecy, or at least, he brings predicted violent apocalyptic scenarios more or less within human reach. A similar approach we find, as a matter of fact, in Franz Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung: “Eternity, that is to say, must be hastened [beschleunigt], it must always be capable of coming as early as “today”; only through it is it eternity. If there is no such force, no such prayer that can hasten the coming of the Kingdom, then it does not come

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eternally, but—eternally does not come.” (Rosenzweig, 1990, 1921, p. 321; trans., p. 306)

Kahane also brings them within human reach, but to a certain degree only. Final redemption will come at any rate, preferably “in haste” (if the Jews but repent), otherwise it will come “in its time”, unpredictably and beyond human interference. The last option, so we have seen, enhances a final battle with Gog, accompanied by a huge suffering.

Another interesting element is that Kahane only addresses the Jewish people, whereas Buber is at least ambiguous here. Of course, the Gog und Magog chronicle contains discussions between Jewish rabbis, but the reminiscences of these dialogues in Buber’s Bilder von Gut und Böse, especially of Yehudi’s views, suggest the possibility that these views apply just as well to mankind as such. Buber’s mystical, existentializing and psychologizing approach enabled him to enlarge his scope. One may remind Buber’s famous conversations with Carl Rogers, the famous psychotherapist, on therapeutic dialogues.7 While the non-Jewish reader of Kahane will all to easily find himself in the position of ‘Gog’, (s)he will be more able to positively acknowledge the Buberian struggle with an inward ‘Gog’.

One could emphasize here a certain incommensurability between both Jewish thinkers. While Buber has assembled pre-War materials from Hasidic traditions, Kahane is a post-holocaust author whose main drives are the concrete possibility that peoples of the world can unite and be relatively successful in eradicating millions of Jews. He is aware that the terrifying phenomenon of historical anti-Semitism can lead to much more than ‘limited’ pogroms; much worse, that not even the recent holocaust, nor the creation of the State of Israel, have not been enough to put an end to persecution of Jews once and for all. Against Buber, Kahane would probably argue that a generalization or a psychologization of Jewish morality runs the risk of neglecting a profound ‘exteriority’ inherent to the Jewish people. The Jewish people have a special, world historical role to play in history that cannot be fully ‘mastered’ philosophically, psychologically, not even mystically.

Buber, 1997. Cf. “there is not as we generally think eh in the soul of a man good and evil opposed. There are –eh, there is again and again in different manners a polarity, and the poles are not good and evil, but rather [4.2] yes and no, rather eh acceptance and eh refusal. […] And we can strength-, we can strengthen, we can help him strengthen, the one positive […] pole. […] And even, perhaps, we can strengthen the force of direction in him because this polarity is very oft, uh often directionless. It is a chaotic eh state. We could bring in a cosmic note into it. Eh, we can help put order, eh, put a shape into this. Eh, because I think the good, or what we may call the good, is always only direction. […] Not a substance.” Op. cit., 84f.

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Kahane’s arguments here are as strong as the historical evidence of the Jewish people is. They lack, however, philosophical or psychological evidence. Buber’s insights, on the other hand, rest upon the latter. This does only give them a harder time than Kahane if one would take empirical or rational consciousness as a sole basis for normativity. However, it is essential for Buber that this be avoided, as such a form of consciousness (which is so dominant in today’s ‘scientific’ worldviews) may itself be subservient to an inner ‘Gog’. If this is the case, an inner ‘purification’ and ‘struggle’ are the only condition upon which Buber’s argument can be ‘tested’.

Is it relevant that Buber’s materials are pre-holocaust based and that they have been collected prior to the establishment of the State of Israel? I don’t think so. Not only did Buber first publish his Hasidic tales in ‘Israel’ in 1941, after having escaped Nazi-Germany; not only did he publish the German original a few years later. He even proceeded to give their subject matter a more ‘doctrinal’ form in his Bilder von Gut und Böse published in 1952. Moreover, his post-war efforts to reconcile Israel with Germany, and his laboring for a peaceful coexistence between Jewish and Arab Israelis testify to the weight his approach of Gog had for him, despite the holocaust.

In this article I have tried to present two extreme interpretations of one and the same apocalyptic end-time prophecy. Such prophecies also exist in other religious traditions, in which they receive equally opposite interpretations. It is my hypothesis that an explanation of these oppositions is not altogether unfamiliar to the one proposed in this article. For I think that, just as the metaphysical basis of end-time war may be said to lay within the human mind, the metaphysical basis of inner war of the human mind can be said to lay outside; they mutually presuppose each other. Furthermore, should one wish to speculate on the identity of an end-time Prince of Evil, of any such Prince, it would be my claim that the truth value of these speculations is to be experienced in the defeat of ‘apocalyptic’ enemies (i.e. “enemies that tend to destroy defenseless people”); it cannot be ‘rationally’ argued for. Finally, the previous claim entails another hypothesis (which I cannot elaborate here), according to which the ‘apocalyptic’ may be a repetitive structure, the apocalyptic end-time war repeating itself time and again, probably with increasing intensity and on an increasing scale.

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REFERENCES

Buber, M. (1927). Die chassidischen Bücher. Berlin: Schocken Verlag. Trans. (1991, 1947) Tales of the Hasidim, The Early Masters. New York: Schocken Books.

– –. (1952). Bilder von Gut und Böse. Köln/Olten: Jakob Hegner.

– –. (1997). The Martin Buber-Carl Rogers Dialogue: A New Transcript with Commentary. New York: SUNY.

– –. (2009). Werkausgabe 19. Gog und Magog. Eine Chronik. Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Ran HaCohen. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 278f. Trans. For the Sake of Heaven, by Ludwig Lewisohn, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953 (1945). First published in the Hebrew newspaper Davar between 10 January and 24 October 1941, first Hebrew book publication in 1943 (Jerusalem 1943), first German publication in 1949 (Heidelberg, L. Schneider), several reprints.

Buitenwerf, R. (2007). The Gog and Magog Tradition in Revelation 20:8. In Henk Jan de Jonge and Johannes Tromp (ed.) The Book of Ezekiel and its Influence. London: Ashgate.

Cliteur, P. (2010). The Secular Outlook. In Defense of Moral and Political Secularism. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

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ABDULLAH ÖCALAN’STHE ROAD MAP: FROM THE ARMED STRUGGLETO A GRAMSCI OF OUR TIMES?Por: Dr. Tamir Bar-On ITESM, Campus Querétaro, México

Dr. Tamir Bar-On is a Full Professor and Researcher in the Department of International Relations and Humanities at the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education (Tec de Monterrey), Campus Querétaro, Mexico. He is a member of the SNI – Sistema Nacional de Investigadores – Mexico’s National System for Researchers. He is the author of Where Have All The Fascists Gone? (Ashgate, 2007), Rethinking the French New Right: Alternatives to modernity (Routledge, 2013), and The World through Soccer: The Cultural Impact of a Global Sport (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). Bar-On received his Ph.D. in political science from McGill University (Montreal, Canada) in 2000, while he attained his M.A. and B.A. in political science from York University (Toronto, Canada) in 1991 and 1990 respectively.

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes Abdullah Öcalan’s The Road Map from a Gramscian perspective. The Road Map cements the transition of the PKK leader from the armed struggle towards the importance of key ideas in civil society and “democratic autonomy,” which began in the early 1990s. Furthermore, The Road Map proposes a non-violent resolution of the Kurdish “problem” in Turkey, which could have ramifications for Kurds throughout the Middle East and other ethnic problems in the region. Yet, the radical solutions advanced in The Road Map challenge both the Turkish state and the PKK’s former communist and nationalist ideology.

KEYWORDSAbdullah Öcalan; Antonio

Gramsci; democratic autonomy; communism; civil society;

intellectuals.

Abdullah Öcalan is the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).1 A former practitioner of terrorism,2 Öcalan reflected on his organization’s changing fortunes after his arrest by the Turkish state. He continued a dramatic turn, which began in the 1990s, from the lionized leader of the PKK to an intellectual who largely eschews the violence of his past. The transition is remarkable, as Öcalan was enemy number one in Turkey from 1984, the year he began the PKK’s violent uprising, until his spectacular kidnapping in Nairobi and subsequent arrest by Turkish authorities in 1999. Öcalan currently resides in the Turkish prison of Imrali, where he penned his three-volume Prison Writings (Öcalan, 2007, 2011, 2012).

For almost 15 years Öcalan has languished in a Turkish prison as the only inmate guarded by 1500 Turkish soldiers. Abdullah Öcalan is a solitary figure, sitting in a remote Turkish prison off the Sea of Marmara. He thus had lots of time to re-think the strategies of the struggle for Kurdish rights and independence. He also reflected on other key issues: the violent guerrilla and terrorist tactics and strategies of his Marxist-inspired PKK (including suicide bombings, the brutal killings of “collaborators” within his own ranks, and indiscriminate killings of civilians),3 the nature of the Turkish state and its ideological foundations, the divisions and feudal structures of the Kurds, the history of civilization, and new models to resolve the Kurdish question and the problems of

My definition of terrorism is the following: “The use of violence against civilians or other non-combatants, or wan-ton disregard for their lives, in pursuing political objectives.” This definition applies to state and non-state actors alike. For the aforementioned definition of terrorism, see Tamir Bar-On and Howard Goldstein, “Fighting Violence: A Critique of the War On Terrorism,” International Politics 42 (2005), p. 239.Using this definition, the PKK and the Turkish state have at times committed acts of terrorism. For a full list of PKK terrorist attacks on non-combatants (civilians), see the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&success=yes&country=209&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=110&count=20. Using the database in question and my definition, not all the PKK’s actions can be deemed terrorism, especially when they target police or military targets. The Global Terrorism Database disagrees and lists all PKK actions again civilians and soldiers (or police) as acts of terrorism.

For a list of these attacks, type in PKK in the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&success=yes&country=209&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=110&count=20.

In 2002, the PKK changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) and insisted that the PKK fulfilled its historic mission. In 2003, the PKK changed its name again to KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan Peoples’ Con-gress). Despite the name changes, the leading members of the PKK remain the same and the PKK/KONGRA-GEL is headed by Abdullah Öcalan. The Turkish state views the name changes as legitimisation schemes designed to win international favour, while it points out the PKK could boast 5,000 fighters in 2006. See Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PKK/KONGRA-GEL,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-gel.en.mfa, accessed October 24, 2013.

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humanity at large. “The PKK launched most of its attacks on Turkish security forces, but also attacked other Turkish sites at home and abroad, as well as Kurdish civilians who would not cooperate with the group,” wrote Greg Bruno (2007) of the Council of Foreign Relations.

Robert Pape (2003, p. 361) has pointed out that in the 1980s and 1990s the use of the tactic of suicide terrorism rose worldwide “largely because terrorists have learned that it pays.” Despite their secular credentials, Öcalan’s PKK engaged in suicide terrorism. Yet, suicide terrorism was not central to the PKK’s operations. The PKK’s campaign of suicide attacks began on 30 June 1995 and ended on 5 July 1999. About two-thirds of the attacks --eleven of its fourteen attacks--were undertaken by women and led to less than 20 deaths (Kurth Cronin, 2003, p. 17). Rather the PKK had a preference for guerrilla warfare, a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants such as armed civilians or irregulars use military tactics such as ambushes, raids, and, hit-and-run tactics, as well as great mobility to fight a larger, traditional military. In 1984, the PKK guerrilla warfare operations began and included a raid on a police station in Skirt on 17 August, which was followed by an attack that killed three of General Kenan Even’s Presidential Guards in Yüksekova, and an ambush which killed 8 Turkish soldiers in Çukurca. Despite the PKK’s guerrilla warfare tactics, it did not mean that terrorist attacks were not committed against civilians as the primary targets. Although the majority of PKK activities are focused on village guards, police, and military posts, they have employed suicide bombing tactics on tourist sites and commercial centers in Western Turkish cities, especially during the tourism season. In addition, the PKK has engaged in non-suicide terrorist attacks against civilians, including in Istanbul on December 25, 1991 (11 deaths and 20 injuries) and a suspected PKK attack on July 27, 2008 (17 deaths and 154 injuries).

Suicide terrorists use the “strategic logic” of suicide terrorism because it can extract political concessions such as the expulsion of “occupying forces” from one’s territory or limited autonomy. Suicide terrorists sought to get Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in the 1980s and quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the 1990s, while they pressured the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990 onwards. Yet, Pape (2003, p. 361) insists on the failure of the PKK once it adopted the tactic of suicide terrorism: “In all but

the case of Turkey, the terrorist political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before.” That is, the tactic of suicide bombing did not yield concrete gains such as autonomy or independence for the Kurds, while ironically Öcalan’s capture by the Turkish state has set the stage for a historic resolution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

For a man that lived by the gun, Öcalan devotes very few pages to violence in his three-volume Prison Writings. Öcalan’s novelty is his historical approach to the Kurds and more broadly Middle Eastern civilizations. This paper advances a Gramscian interpretation of Öcalan based on his numerous writings after his capture by the Turkish state, but argues that the PKK leader has moved to a more radical “democratic autonomy” position superseding the former Italian Communist leader. I especially focus on Öcalan’s The Road Map because it set the stage for historic negotiations between Öcalan and the Turkish state in order to resolve the long-standing Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

Born in Ales, Sardinia (Italy) in 1891, Antonio Gramsci, was a political theorist and former leader of the Italian Communist Party. A hero for Marxists in Italy and around the world for his resistance to the Fascist rule of Benito Mussolini, Gramsci wrote his own prison writings while in jail and died in a government-controlled clinic in Rome in 1937 (Gramsci, 1971, 1992, 1996, 2007). I utilize Antonio Gramsci to help us understand cultural-civilizational sea changes that allow political space for new ideological syntheses (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 445; 506-507). Following Gramsci, I use Öcalan’s writings to stress the role of intellectuals in history. Intellectual ideas play a key role in shaping history and moulding consensus among the people in civil society in favour of or against a reigning ideological framework. An intellectual is a person whose profession is centred on the production and dissemination of ideas. Antonio Gramsci (1971, pp. 131-133) distinguished between “organic” and “traditional” intellectuals, with the former wedded to a particular social class (bourgeoisie or proletariat) and the latter connected to the older socio-economic order and “hegemonic project.” Öcalan is neither an agent of the bourgeoisie and not the proletariat in the dogmatic Marxist sense because he has criticized the one party dogmatism of Communist states and the PKK’s narrow-minded socialism of the past. So, for example, in Prison Writings I, Öcalan (2007, pp. 234-236) stated that socialist and national liberation movements “made excessive

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use of violence”; the Communist One-party state was a “tool for the strict implementation of a totalitarian understanding of government”; the “dictatorship of the proletariat” slogan was “largely motivated by propaganda purposes”; and there can be “no socialism without democracy.”

Öcalan’s theoretical influences are diverse. Democratic theory, ecological anarchist Murray Bookchin, Immanuel Wallerstein, the New Left, feminist theory, Marx, and Hegel influence Öcalan’s thought. So, for example, Öcalan’s focus in recent years on democratic-confederalism and democratic-autonomy beyond the state is influenced by the ecological anarchist Murray Bookchin (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013). His goal is a new civilizational model in which “democratic civilization” will be merely one component of a still emerging global, civilizational synthesis. Öcalan favours “contemporary democracy” and federalist principles, while longing for a new historical synthesis of world civilizations (2007, pp. 255-256). A new “democracy of the people,” argues Öcalan (2007, p.237), will fail in the Middle East if it is not “superior” to Western democracy. This bold assertion reinforces the Hegelian idea that history unfolds towards universal, civilizational progress and that “contemporary democracy” is for now the highest expression of this progress. If a new civilizational synthesis emerges, sustains Öcalan, it will need to build on the real historical progress made as a consequence of the emergence of “democratic civilization”: individualism, the rule of law, rule by the people, secularism, and women’s rights.

Whether in his days as a practitioner of the armed struggle or in his jail cell, Abdullah Öcalan is a unique figure that the world knows little about. The same cannot be said about Menachem Begin and Yasser Arafat, two prominent Middle Eastern leaders that used the armed struggle to “liberate” their peoples. Moreover, while Öcalan is an indisputable voice of conscience of the Kurdish people, why is the Kurdish question relegated to a secondary international status compared to, say, the Palestinian, Tibetan, Basque, Kosovar, and even Quebecois national questions? In an epoch that Zbigniew Brzezinski (2007, pp.205-208) has dubbed an “anti-imperial age” (that is, an era of “global geopolitical awakening” and de-colonization where it is no longer acceptable to rule over other peoples because of the principles of national self-determination and sovereignty), it appears rather strange that the Kurds have been left off the list of nations deserving a state.

According to an expert on the Kurds, David Romano (2008, pp. 346), “the Kurds are often described as ‘the world’s largest stateless nation,’” and about half of the 28 million Kurds in the Middle East come from within the territory controlled by Turkey. Another prominent specialist on the Kurds, Michael Gunter (2000, pp. 849), points out that Kurds comprise as much as 20 per cent of the total population in Turkey and that Öcalan’s capture “signalled a whole new beginning in the attempt to solve Turkey’s continuing Kurdish problem.” The tragedy of the Kurds has been a history of brutal state repression, as well as practical complications in seeking cultural rights or statehood from four sovereign states: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

Linking Gramsci and Öcalan

As highlighted above, the aim of this paper is to analyze Abdullah Öcalan’s Prison Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations (The Road Map) from a Gramscian perspective. I use Gramsci’s writings in prison, his example, and his theoretical insights in order to explain the transformation of Öcalan’s thinking. In addition, I suggest that The Road Map’s contents offer the Kurds, Turks, and other peoples in the Middle East a way out of the blind alleys of authoritarianism, uncritical nationalism, and statist assimilationism. The Turkish state and PKK have a historic opportunity offered by The Road Map and could seize the moment in order to radically change Turkish-Kurdish relations. Should this historical moment be seized, the fate of the Kurds beyond Turkey might also be transformed. In addition, The Road Map offers us a model for the resolution of long-standing ethnic conflicts in the region, although no two conflicts can be solved similarly. In Prison Writings I, Öcalan (2007, pp. 296-297) argues that we have reached a historic moment in which we can “attempt a solution of the Kurdish question by democratic and peaceful means,” while insisting that the Kurds will be “a fundamental power of peace and democracy” for the entire Middle East.

Moreover, I argue that The Road Map is a text linked to a Gramscian metapolitical vocation. “Metapolitical vocation” here implies the following: (1) intellectuals rejecting direct and activist parliamentary or extra-parliamentary political interventions and focusing their energies on changing hearts and minds and the “conquest” of civil society; (2) a fixation on what Robert Nozick (1974 in Zaibert, 2004, p. 113) argued was the “the fundamental question of political philosophy,

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one that precedes questions about how the state should be organized”; and (3) a sophisticated form of politics that is not a flight from politics, but a continuation of “war” through “non-violent” means (Bar-On, 2013, p.3). In order to distance himself from fascist or Bolshevik strategies of a “frontal assault on the state,” Öcalan advanced Gramsci’s notion of a “war of position,” or the centrality of a politics of ideological struggle (Bar-On, 2013, p. 3).

Gramsci (1971, p. 481) pointed out that political struggle is “enormously more complex” than war because it includes both elements of consensus and force. Furthermore, Gramsci (1971, pp. 479-480) insisted that “the greater the mass of the apolitical, the greater the part played by illegal forces has to be,” or conversely “the greater the politically organised and educated forces, the more it is necessary to ‘cover’ the legal State.” Gramsci (1971, p. 481) pointed out that there were “three forms of war”: war of movement, war of position, and underground warfare. He explains that Gandhi’s passive resistance is “a war of position, which at certain moments becomes a war of movement, and at others underground warfare.” (Gramsci, 1971, p.481) He also underscores that boycotts fall under the ambit of war of position, strikes are a type of war of movement, and the secret preparation of weapons and combat troops are considered underground warfare (Gramsci, 1971, p. 481).

Öcalan’s understanding of the “war of position” has indeed changed since his capture by the Turkish state. We should remember that a number of terrorist groups from the PLO to IRA and ETA have “increasingly renounced violence and maximalist goals in light of the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Marxist–Leninist Soviet Union, and cycles of terrorist violence that have reinforced the power of states.” (Bar-On, 2009, p.257) Öcalan’s call for the global spread of democratic civilization, scathing criticisms of narrow nationalism and dogmatic Marxism, and rejection of the utilization of violence should be viewed in the context of these global changes. Öcalan’s “conversion” process should be analyzed with respect to external forces (that is, the armed struggle that did not work and did not allow the Kurds to attain full cultural autonomy or independence) combined with internal reflections precipitated by his prison experiences (Bar-On, 2009, p. 258). What Öcalan shares with the Hegelian and Marxist perspectives is that history progressively unfolds towards more rational and

higher spiritual, socio-economic, or political frameworks on a universal scale (Bar-On, 2009, p. 258).

Like Gramsci, Öcalan posits a less dogmatic view of history in which there is no “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3-18) and political struggles remain perpetually open and subject to constant movement and change. He is also, like Gramsci, a proponent of the importance of the conquest of civil society because this is where revolutionary activity should be directed in the contemporary world. For Öcalan, civil society “comprises the tool of democratic possibilities - that opens the door to developments hitherto impossible.” (Öcalan, 2007, p. 227) It is through the terrain of culture, including the media, Internet, education system and popular consciousness, which Öcalan hopes to lead the Kurdish people to their “promised land” of liberation in a manner that was impossible through the armed struggle.

Öcalan’s ceasefire call from Imrali Prison in the spring of 2013 continued his faith in the possibilities of radical change through civil society and the “war of position.” In the historic ceasefire call, Öcalan stated: “We have a new era starting upon us. A door is opening from a process of armed resistance to a process of democratic politics.” (21 March, 2013) He emphasized that a “new mentality” is emerging based on the trinity of democratic rights, freedoms, and equality. Öcalan reiterated his rejection of violence in the ceasefire announcement: “We have come to a point where we say ‘let the arms silence, opinions and politics speak’.” (21 March, 2013)

Yet, like Gramsci, for Öcalan the option of armed force is not completely taken off the table. Military and police targets were attacked regularly by the PKK in 2012. The use of PKK armed force will depend on whether the Turkish state fulfills its commitment to the Kurds in terms of the agreed upon road map, respects individual rights such as free expression and equality, and guarantees Kurdish collective rights, including legal, linguistic, educational, and broadcasting rights. Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU) led it to change many of its laws, including Öcalan’s death penalty, as well as its laws on political parties, the press, and association (Alexander et al., 2008, pp. xvii). Yet, in a move that was seen as directed at the PKK and its terrorist camps in Iraq, in 2007 the Turkish Parliament revised the Law to Fight Terrorism, “essentially broadening crimes punishable as terrorism offenses.”

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(Alexander et al., 2008, p. xxii) In October 2007, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire, while it simultaneously engaged in terrorist attacks against Turkey from its bases in Northern Iraq. These PKK attacks led to Turkish air strikes against Kurdish targets in Iraq.

Öcalan (2008) argues that independence is not a necessary precondition for respecting Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights: “Equal rights within a democratic Turkey” is the slogan. As Öcalan (2008: 39) wrote, “I offer the Turkish society a simple solution. We demand a democratic nation. We are not opposed to the unitary state and republic. We accept the republic, its unitary structure and laicism [secularism]. However, we believe that it must be redefined as a democratic state respecting peoples, cultures and rights.” Recall that Gramsci’s “war of position” contained non-violent elements such as boycotts, while the use of force could also be an option through “underground warfare.”

Analysis of Prison Writings III: The Road Map

In this section, I comprehensively analyze Öcalan’s Prison Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations. I argue that The Road Map is wedded to a Gramscian metapolitical vocation, but that the contents of the document are more radical proposals than the ideas of the former leader of the Italian Communist Party. As Öcalan (2007, 2011, 2012) has pointed out in his three-volume Prison Writings, the Kurds have faced a double historical tragedy: 1) the legacy of nationalist and statist assimilation at the hands of the Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian states; and 2) the continued failure to solve the Kurdish question in a way that would grant the Kurds independence, autonomy, confederalism, or equal civil, political, and cultural rights within the four main nation-states inhabited by the Kurds. The legacy of nationalist and statist assimilation even threatened the Kurds with extinction in Turkey in the early 20th century and more recently in Iraq. In her A Problem from Hell, Samantha Power (2003) examines the major genocides of the 20th century, including the little-known Anfal campaign launched by the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein from 1986-9, which it is estimated killed about 180,000 Kurds.4 The grotesque pictures of chemical gas attacks against defenceless women

and children in Halabja shocked the international community, but few in the West called for action against the brutal Ba’athist regime at a time when the West worried about the spread of another Iranian-style Islamist theocracy in the Middle East in the context of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). In Turkey, the Kurds as well as Turks also paid a heavy price. From 1984-1999, the period of the PKK’s insurgency, there were 31,000-37,000 dead (the majority Kurdish), 3,000 villages destroyed, and about 3,000,000 people internally displaced (Gunter, 2000, p.849; 2007, pp. 166-167).

In reading The Road Map, one gets the distinctive sense that the Kurds and Turkey are on the precipice of a historic solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. As Öcalan (2012, p. 14) writes in the Foreword to The Road Map, the spirit of optimism even permeated the Turkish state, with Turkish President Abdullah Gül stating the following in respect of the Kurdish question in 2009: “It shall be resolved – there is no other way.” The guerrilla war between the Turkish state and PKK has killed many innocent people. Yet, peace is indeed made between former enemies. Who would have imagined the Oslo Accords between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat and former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin? Who would have dreamed of secret negotiations between the Turkish state and Abdullah Öcalan? For many Turks, Abdullah Öcalan is a terrorist and war criminal; a man that ordered gruesome suicide bombing attacks against Turkish civilians and soldiers; a traitor to the Turkish nation. For many Kurds, on the other hand, the Turkish state aims at the extermination of the Kurds and Abdullah Öcalan is a hero for fighting for the Kurdish cause.

The Road Map is a unique historical document. It tells the story of the secret dialogue process between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state. These negotiations began in 2009, but were broken off in mid-2011. The Road Map’s proposals for the resolution of the conflict have little to do with the Marxism or nationalism of the PKK’s past. These solutions certainly do not threaten the nationalist, secular, and Islamist-oriented government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the same way as an independent Kurdish state. Yet, the question remains: Is Turkey prepared to cede to Öcalan’s Road

180,000 deaths is the figure given by Iraqi prosecutors for civilians killed during the Anfal campaign. See Omar Sinan, “Iraq to hang ‘Chemical Ali’,” Associated Press (June 25, 2007), Tampa Bay Times, available online at: http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/25/Worldandnation/Iraq_to_hang__Chemica.shtml, Accessed May 29, 2012.

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Map proposals for a “democratic nation” and a “common homeland” for Kurds? Are these more moderate proposals, which reject the armed struggle, Marxism, and call for equal political, civic, and cultural rights for Kurds within Turkey, still too frightening for the Turkish state? Are these proposals also troubling for the other states in the region with a “Kurdish problem”? Are they threatening for the major powers?

The Road Map is split up into six sections: Introduction, Concepts, Theoretical Framework and Principles, The Problem of Democracy and the Solution of a Democratic Constitution in Turkey, the Kurdish Question and the Prospects for its Solution, Action Plan, and Conclusion. The book also contains useful Editorial Notes by the International Initiative, the Cologne-based organization responsible for the publication of The Road Map. Finally, the Preface to The Road Map is written by Immanuel Wallerstein (b. 1930), a world-renowned world systems theorist who combines the insights of Marxism/neo-Marxism, the French historian Fernand Braudel (1902-85), and dependency theory.

The Editorial Notes penned by the International Initiative notes that Öcalan’s harsh Imrali Island prison conditions (for example, Öcalan cannot write or receive letters; he can neither make phone calls, nor receive visits, save from his lawyer and siblings) have earned the prison “the nickname ‘the European Guantanamo.’” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 5) We are also told that a Turkish state delegation “assured Öcalan that Prime Minister Erdoğan agreed with ‘95 percent of the Road Map.’” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 7) After the June 2011 parliamentary elections, the Erdoğan -led Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) won its third term, while the PKK was preparing its disarmament and Öcalan drafted short protocols on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the creation of a democratic constitution (Öcalan, 2012, p. 7). The Turkish government gave no written or verbal responses to Öcalan’s measures, thus leading the PKK leader to withdraw from the talks in July 2011 (Öcalan, 2012, p. 7). The Turkish state re-started their military operations against Kurdish areas (including claims of the use of chemical weapons) leading to the loss of more civilian lives, while mass arrests targeted Kurdish political parties, writers, academics, and the press. In addition, Öcalan’s isolation increased as 36 of Öcalan’s lawyers were arrested, while none of his lawyers could visit him (Öcalan, 2012, p. 7). As a result, the

International Initiative writes sardonically about Öcalan’s prison conditions: “Strictly speaking, no one knows if he is still alive.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 8) Nonetheless, the Editorial Notes end on a more hopeful note, suggesting that although “Islamo-nationalism will become an intrinsic part of Turkish society,” Öcalan “embodies the voice of reason”; “the Road Map is still valid”; and they insist that “it is the only non-military solution that has been proposed by anyone.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 8)

Wallerstein’s Preface is a good starting point for Öcalan’s The Road Map. The Preface introduces us to the main theoretical concerns of The Road Map, which are broader than the Kurdish question. A scholar of the capitalist world-economy with its roots in 16th century Europe and the emergence of a modern world-system, Wallerstein sees four contradictions in such a system: 1) the search for state sovereignty; 2) the desire of all states to become nations; 3) the demands that states are democratic; and 4) the ways that capitalism maintains its equilibrium in order to survive (Wallerstein in Öcalan, 2012, p.10). Like Karl Marx, Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), and Öcalan, Wallerstein is convinced that “political action will affect the worldwide struggle about what kind of system will replace the now doomed capitalist world-system.” (Wallerstein in Öcalan, 2012, p. 13) Yet, before that capitalist world-system falls, Wallerstein insists that the solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey will depend on the powerful drive of the Turkish state to reinforce its sovereignty both from within and outwards; the desire of many in Turkey in the state and civil society to re-assert a dogmatic Jacobinism that does not recognize national or ethnic pluralism; and the way worldwide struggles will affect the Kurdish drive for democratic rights and autonomy. In this respect, it is possible that the financial crisis of 2008-9, Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados (Indignants) movement in Spain and Portugal, popular anti-government protests in Greece, and the Arab Spring all have the potential to impact on the Kurdish struggle. Indeed, Öcalan’s solutions for the resolution of the Kurdish question echo the concerns of the aforementioned protesters in terms of the desire for direct rather than representative democracy, criticism of the disproportionate power of money in the political process, and the more radical demand to democratize

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society by going “beyond earlier modernist political projects” and thus end the division between rulers and ruled (Gill, 2008, p.245). Whereas Gramsci and Öcalan once saw the Communist Party as a key agent in the counter-hegemonic struggle, today Öcalan is a prophet of a more radical, popular democracy that challenges both states and dogmatic leftist elites. Öcalan is a proponent of “democratic autonomy,” which is a form of democracy that takes citizens in civil society as its starting point; moves beyond elections as central to democracy; and challenges representatives as the key agents of the democratic process (e.g., party leaders, politicians, state officials, etc.).

As a supporter of “democratic autonomy,” Öcalan opines that civil society (including minorities, cultural groups, religious communities, etc.) and direct forms of democracy replace “representative” political elites as the main agents of democracy and social change. As Öcalan (2008,p. 32) wrote in War and Peace in Kurdistan in 2008 in respect of “democratic autonomy,” “the agents of this kind of self-government are not state-based authorities,” but the sovereign people seeking to attain democratic self-governance in all aspects of their lives. This position echoes a long-standing democratic tradition, which argues that there are “different roads towards democracy”; democracy does not entail merely formal elections; and direct democracy is more representative and fair compared to “elitist” forms of representative democracy (Rosanvallon, 2008). Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya and Joost Jongerden (2012) confirm the “radical democracy” orientation of Öcalan, which they argue led to a profound ideological transformation of the PKK in the 2000s. These authors argue that the project for radical democracy is based on the conception of “politics beyond the state, political organisation beyond the party, and political subjectivity beyond class.” As a result, this conception of politics can conceivably undermine the centralist tradition in the Turkish political system, as well as challenge the statist and dogmatic class perspective of the Left in Turkey.

Whereas in the past the goal of the PKK was a “national liberation struggle” with the aim of an independent

Kurdish state in Turkey, its aim today is a project of “radical democracy.” Radical democracy, argue Akkaya and Jongerden (2013), connotes the concept of democracy beyond nation and state. In addition, radical democracy can be developed along three dimensions: the democratic republic (of Turkey), democratic-confederalism (linking the Kurds in Turkey with Kurds in the rest of the Middle East), and democratic-autonomy (Both Kurdish and non-Kurdish communities promoting a democratic civil society beyond the state) (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013). In his attempts to supersede a sterile and dogmatic Marxism, Öcalan sought to think of democratic practices outside the state, the PKK (the movement or party), and a narrow class focus (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013). This “radical democracy” not only attempts to struggle against existing political institutions and Old Left thinking, but offers an alternative to the neo-liberal project where market civilization increasingly supplants democracy. The project of “radical democracy” is not only changing the PKK, but also influencing radical, leftist social and political movements, from the “liberation movements” of Latin America to the anti-globalization demonstrations in North America and Europe (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013).

Cengiz Gunes (2012, pp. 463-464) points out that the PKK has played a role in the democratization processes in Turkey. The PKK’s ceasefire announcement in 1999, asserts Gunes (2012, p. 463), “brought about a significant reduction in the political violence in the region. The occasional eruption of violence in the past decade has neither been continuous nor as severe as past violence.” Although political violence has not disappeared between the PKK and Turkish state, the democratic opening has been important in limiting violence between the two entities. “The success of any democratic initiative to end the conflict rests on Turkey’s ability to generate a national consensus to recognize and accommodate Kurdish national demands and rights, such as education in Kurdish language, the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, and the extension of broadcast rights,” writes Gunes (2012, p. 468). He also points out that a Truth and Reconciliation commission might be necessary once the violence has stopped in order to deal with Turkish violence against Kurds, including extrajudicial murders during the 1990s of an estimated 17,500 people, as well as the violence of the 1980 coup d’état and the 1938 Dersim uprising (2012, p. 468).

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The Introduction to The Road Map makes it clear that democracy and democratization are not merely Western, but universal tendencies “intrinsic to all beings” and societies (Öcalan, 2012, p. 15). Yet, in contrast to the universal drive for democracy, Turkey has been plagued by “severe nationalism” and “a bureaucratic oligarchic dictatorship” dating back to the Constitutional period in the Ottoman Empire from 1908-1922 (Öcalan, 2012, p. 16). Öcalan makes the claim that in Turkey “for a century an oligarchic autocracy has nested within the state.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 17) He insists that the Ergenekon trials will “determine the fate of Turkish democracy.”5 (Öcalan, 2012, p. 17) The Ergenekon represents a state within a state, or what Öcalan calls “a clandestine, kemalist, ultranationalist organization in Turkey with ties to the military, security forces, politicians, and media.” (Öcalan, 2012 p. 17) This state within a state, argues Öcalan, used coups and other political maneuvers in order to undermine human rights, Kurdish rights, and the struggles of “oppressed classes.” For Öcalan (2012, p. 17), the aim of the state within the state has been to crush democracy and more ruthlessly “to eradicate everything related to being Kurdish and to Kurdistan.”

Historically, the Kurds were viewed by the Turks as “Mountain Turks.” (Gunter, 2000, p. 854) Kurdish communal identity was completely negated or denigrated, while nationalist assimilation was in general the rule in Turkey from the 1920s to the 1990s. The PKK was a product of the harsh assimilationist policies of the Turkish state. As Ertan Efegil (2011, pp. 27-28) argues, these policies can be traced back to the founder of the Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) who pursued a policy of “cultural unity” in the 1920s, which led to the emergence of Kurdish uprisings; the branding of the Kurds as “ethnic separatists”; and largely military measures to suppress these rebellions. This position continued until 1992 when Turkish President Turgut Özal criticized this assimilationist policy

The Ergenekon trials are being conducted by the Istanbul Heavy Penal Court 13, which accepted a 2,455 page indictment against 86 defendants in the first case against alleged members of the clandestine organization Er-genekon (which it is claimed sought to overthrow the existing government and install an authoritarian state) on 28 July 2008 and 14 more indictments were prepared until February 2011. More indictments were added to the initial lists, including more controversially numerous journalists. By April 2011, over 500 people were in custody and almost 300 formally charged with membership of what prosecutors dubbed “the Ergenekon terrorist organization,” which they claimed had been responsible for virtually every act of political violence, as well as controlled all militant group in Turkey over the last 30 years. Critics of the ruling AKP government say that that they are using the Ergenekon trials as a pretext to undermine democracy, press freedoms, and the rule of law. Many Turkish intellectuals want the trials to continue in order to determine the degree of state involvement, including key politicians, security, and military of-ficials, in subverting Turkish democracy. See Gareth Jenkins, “THE FADING MASQUERADE: ERGENEKON AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE IN TURKEY,” Turkey Analyst, Vol. 4, No. 7 (4 April 2011).

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pursued by state elites; described the growing issue as the Kurdish “question”; and called for the improvement of the conditions of Kurds in Turkey (Efegil, 2011, p. 28). The opening to the Kurds was continued in August 2005 in a speech in Diyarbakır, in which Prime Minister Erdoğan argued in favour of more democratic rights for the Kurdish people.

Yet, the hopes for democratization in Turkey have been recently assisted by key powers such as the United States of America (USA) and the EU, which see their interests threatened and are “now more receptive to democratic solutions.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 18) Öcalan’s perspective has been corroborated by Cuma Çiçek who argues that “the new geopolitical conditions,” as well as the regional aspirations of the neo-liberal, pro-Islamist AKP, facilitates “the ending of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey” and the re-building of relations between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds (Çiçek, 2011, p. 15). Nonetheless, Öcalan argues that Turkey will need to shake off the shackles of the Ergenekon and adopt a new civilian constitution that guarantees fundamental rights (for example, the freedoms of expression and association), while safeguarding “the democratic, social, secular, and juridical attributes of the Republic.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 18) Öcalan is adamant that such a constitution would help find solutions for all of Turkish society and would not lead to Kurdish secession since Kurdish individual and social rights will be guaranteed.

In Part II, Öcalan outlines his key concepts, theoretical frameworks, and principles, which presumably would allow for the democratization of Turkey and the Middle East at large. Öcalan (2012, p. 19) is adamant that “constitutional solutions” are required in Turkey in order to solve the Kurdish question. He also notes that while the notion of Kurdistan “still inspires fear,” it was recognized by both the Seljuks and Ottomans (Öcalan, 2012, p. 19). Any Turkish attempts to deny the use of the words Kurd or Kurdistan would only lead to an impasse, insists the PKK leader.

Like Gramsci in another age, Öcalan has left the world of dogmatic Marxism. He argues that democratization is not merely “the dictatorship of the proletariat” or class war, but the protection of free speech and free association for all individuals, irrespective of their class position, culture, language, ethnicity, or faith (Öcalan, 2012, p. 20). Moreover, while he insists that the Kurdish problem can be resolved within the context of a Turkish, secular republic, Öcalan rejects the idea that it can

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be definitively decided through the project of the nation-state (Öcalan, 2012, p. 20). For Öcalan, a nation-state represents homogenization, assimilation, and at its worst the spectre of genocide. Öcalan (2012, p. 21) insists that Turkey could even become a “nation of nations.” He is adamant that the collective rights of Kurds or Turks must be balanced with a respect for individual rights.

In Part II, Öcalan (2012, p. 28-35) outlines ten principles for a more democratic political system in Turkey: 1) the democratic nation principle, 2) a common homeland principle, 3) democratic republic principle, 4) democratic constitution principle, 5) democratic solution principle, 6) the union of individual and collective rights and freedoms principle, 7) ideological independence and freedom principle, 8) the principle of historicity and present, 9) morality and conscience principle, and 10) the principle of self-defense in democracies.

A democratic nation connotes “open cultural identities and flexible nationalities;” it is not constructed forcefully by rulers; and respects both citizens and civil society (Öcalan, 2012, p. 28). This sounds rather similar to the state-sanctioned multiculturalism in Canada. Yet, Öcalan is interested in going beyond representative democracy as it relates to the state and towards the flowering of democratic activism at the lowest levels of civil society.

A common homeland would negate the “fascist” notion of a “uniform citizenry,” while it would be “multilingual, multinational, and multireligious.” (Öcalan, 2012, p.28) This position is obviously designed to undermine the near religious veneration of Turkish and Tukishness within the modern, secular Turkish republic.

Öcalan’s (2012, p. 29) ideal state is a republic that is not a nation-state, but rather a democratic state. The democratic republic cannot be tied to an ethnicity, argues Öcalan. Turkishness, Kurdishness, and Islam would be respected in civil society, but could not be part of the constitutional parameters of the state (Öcalan, 2012, p.29).

A democratic constitution would protect civil society from the assimilationist tendencies of the state, as well as from “the enormous concentration of power in the state.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 29) Here Öcalan focuses on the power of the people and society against the hegemonic power of the state. He reiterates the importance of the notion of “democratic autonomy.”

The democratic solution principle will attempt to democratize civil society, while civil society will not aim to topple the state (Öcalan, 2012, p. 30). The democratic solution springs from the forces of civil society rather than state-driven engineering. It seeks to protect civil society; constitutionally safeguard democratic institutions; and would not negate the existence of the state. Öcalan’s focus on civil society as the key motor for historical change echoes Gramsci, but also Rosanvallon and other proponents of more direct forms of democracy.

No political solution will work, argues Öcalan, without the appropriate balance between collective rights (state, civil society, Kurds, etc.) and individual rights. In a Gramscian tone, Öcalan (2012, p. 31) argues that the “ideological hegemony” of what he calls “capitalist modernity” and “positivism” must be superseded. In this respect, civil society can play a key role in undermining the prevailing pro-statist and pro-capitalist ideological hegemony.

The principle of historicity and the present refers to the notion that “capitalist modernity tries to destroy human memory and presents the present as if it were eternal or, rather, the end of time.” (Öcalan, 2012, p.33) Consequently, democratic solutions will take into consideration present society and the history of past experiences.

The morality and conscience principle entails the importance of religion and morality in democratic decision-making. Abstract reason and administrative solutions will merely aggravate problems, or at worst lead to genocides (Öcalan, 2012, pp. 33-34). Here Öcalan indirectly pays homage to The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) written by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2002). Modernity was a dialectical process consisting of both cultural advances and barbarism, argued Adorno and Horkheimer. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the modern Enlightenment’s attempts to counter myth with reason led to the “mythology” of a modern world dominated by excessive faith in “instrumental reason.” From this perspective,

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the horrors of the Holocaust can be interpreted as merely a continuation of the project of modernity with its extreme, utopian faith in “instrumental reason” and technological progress. For Öcalan, “capitalist modernity” also entails contradictory progressive and barbaric processes in which the Kurds’ conservatism and feudalism can be superseded and yet new structures of domination are imposed through the universal spread of capitalism.

Finally, the principle of self-defense in democracies means challenging capitalist modernity, industrialism, “the monopolist oppression and exploitation of the nation-state,” and the “war” against the environment (Öcalan, 2012, p.34-35). In the future, free individuals will need to resist capitalism and the state by living in “self-defense units” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 35). Presumably these “self-defense units” would be led by civil society organizations rather than the PKK, which Öcalan has criticized for the armed struggle, dogmatism, and socialist principles blind to historical realities (for example, the fall of the Communist Soviet Union).

Despite the Turkish government’s greater openness towards the Kurdish issue, there has not been “any considerably positive development towards a solution of the Kurdish issue.” (Çiçek, 2011, p.15) In 2009 and 2010, the Turkish state arrested 1,500 Kurdish politicians, including mayors, vice presidents, former MPs, and directors of the central and local branches of the Democratic Society Party (DTP). The Constitutional Court also banned the DTP for alleged ties to terrorist organizations and for questioning the “indivisible integrity” of the state. There were also arrests of members of the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), a PKK “self-defense unit,” as well as prosecution of children aged between thirteen and eighteen in adult courts under the Counterterrorism Law for throwing stones at members of the police force. Some children have been sentenced to imprisonment for several years (Çiçek, 2011, p.16).

Part 3 deals with the problem of democracy and the solution of a democratic constitution. Öcalan argues that modern, representative democracies, including the EU, are advances in human history, but “the monopolist state maintains its domination from the top.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 36) Individual freedoms have been paradoxically reduced in the era of modernity due to the trinity of capitalism, industrialism, and

the monopoly of state-led bureaucratic power. This is why Öcalan insists that new freedoms can be gained through the “democratic autonomy” of civil society voices.

Turkey’s democracy problem stems from the adoption of Islam, insists Öcalan. On the one hand, the military and religious aristocracy received privileges from the monopoly of state power. On the other hand, the poor in cities and villages were excluded from state power. While Sunni Islam became the official ideology of the ruling classes, very few in civil society could resist against the ideological hegemony of Sunnism.

The modern Turkish state combined the ideological power of older historical civilizations (for example, Islam), as well as capitalist modernity. For Öcalan, the Turkish state thus became “capitalist, fascist, and bourgeois.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 39) Moreover, he insists that the Committee of Union and Progress became the prototype of the Italian Fascist Party and German National Socialist Party. Brutal class wars and genocides against Armenians and Kurds were the stock-in-trade of the Turkish state. Öcalan provides no evidence for how the Turkish state was the prototype for Fascist and Nazi regimes. Moreover, while the Turkish state has historically been monopolist and authoritarian, Öcalan’s claim that the Turkish state became fascist begs the question when? For if Fascism in its regime form was created in Italy in 1919, when did Fascism make its appearance in Turkey? And it begs a few other questions: Is Turkey still a Fascist state? Or, is it merely a semi-authoritarian state? Or, is it a democracy? How do historians of Fascism classify the Turkish state both in the early 20th century and more recently? Does Öcalan have a tendency common to Marxist (or former Marxist) scholars to see all capitalist and modernist regimes as fascist, thus obscuring real differences between fascists and non-fascists, as well as totalitarians and authoritarians? (Payne, 1995)

Turkey’s democracy problem was histotrically aggravated by Mustafa Kemal and the foundation of a Turkish Republic, as well as the Jacobin tendency of the Turkish state. Öcalan argues that Jacobinism advanced the interests of the bourgeoisie, but was a popular movement that had dictatorial tendencies and made its mark in diverse regimes from modern Turkey to the French Revolution, and even the Bolshevik Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

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Despite the authoritarian nature of the Turkish state, Öcalan cites missed opportunities in respect of the Kurdish problem. He argues that both Mustafa Kemal and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey accepted Kurdish autonomy in 1924 and 1922 respectively. He points out that the British Empire played a key role in undermining Kurdish autonomy in conjunction with the Turkish state. The British sought to exclude Kurd, Socialist, and Islamist representation in the new Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal, while Kemal was a realist that accepted the new bargain. From 1950 to 2007, Turkey was under the sphere of influence of the USA and Gladio.6 Is Öcalan trying to win favour with his Turkish interlocutors by stating that foreign powers rather than Turkey are principally to blame for the historical oppression of the Kurds? In addition, does not Öcalan overstate the powers of foreign forces in undermining the autonomy and self-governance desires of the Kurds?

When the Communist Soviet Union fell, Öcalan argues that “there was a plan to use it [Turkey] as a model for the modernization of the Islamic tradition.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 51) It is true that an Islamist party, The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP), has governed Turkey since 2002 and it maintains a secular, republican tradition with expansive ties to the West. The PKK’s struggle is not for socialism or independence, insists Öcalan, but with the anti-democratic tendencies of the Jacobin, Turkish Republic. In addition, the PKK leader points out that Mustafa Kemal sought to counter the Italian Fascist inspiration of the Republican Peoples’ Party. Is this not again an attempt to win Turkish favour from Turks that consider Mustafa Kemal the Turkish hero of the 20th century? When he was captured by Turkish authorities, Öcalan surprisingly stated the following: “I really love Turkey and the Turkish people. My mother was Turkish. Sincerely, I will do all I can to be of service.” (In Gunter, 2000, p. 852) Öcalan’s various writings insisted on maintaining the unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Turkey. As far back as 1993 when he declared a unilateral ceasefire, Öcalan’s position evolved from outright separation of the Kurds towards a rejection of separation and a focus on the historical “brotherhood” between Kurds and Turks.

Gladio is an Italian codename for a clandestine North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Italy and nu-merous other European countries (including Turkey) after World War Two. Gladio’s aim was to prevent a Communist takeover of Western and Southern Europe, while making contingency plans in the event of Communists coming to power in the region. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) role in Gladio is disputed, but Öcalan is adamant in respect of the CIA’s involvement in Gladio operations in Turkey.

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Yet, Öcalan argues that the Turkish state must be situated within the context of larger hegemonic powers: the imperatives of the British Empire from 1925 to 1945, the USA from 1945 to 2010, and global capitalist structures (for example, the IMF and World Bank) in conjunction with NATO’s Gladio, which Öcalan dubs “the real ruler” of Turkey (Öcalan, 2012, p. 55). As a result of the assimilationist, Jacobin tendencies of the Turkish state and the influence of external hegemonic powers, Turkey “annihilated” members of the Communist Party in the Cold War period (Öcalan, 2012, p. 55). Islamists were also targeted with arrests and deportations, but an Islamist modernization process led to the creation of the Erbakan movement in 1969 and eventual participation in government under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) in 1996-97. Erdoğan’s government cemented Turkey as a model for a secular Islamism in the Middle East. It was assumed that the Kurdish question was “terminated” after the rebellion period from 1920 to 1938, but the PKK began the process of highlighting the existence of the Kurds through violent and later more non-violent methods from 1980 to 2010 (Öcalan, 2012, pp. 56-57).

In section four, Öcalan highlights the key questions surrounding the Turkish problem and the prospects for resolving the Turkish question. Öcalan once thought that a state was the answer to the woes of the Kurds, but now opines that “the state is the greatest source of troubles.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 63) Again, this position should be viewed in light of Öcalan’s rejection of representative democracy and support for “democratic autonomy” from the bottom-up. In short, the assimilationist state denied the existence of the Kurds, while cultural protection was sought through the preservation of Kurdish lifeways, their focus on agriculture and animal husbandry, and the “shelter” of the mountains (Öcalan, 2012, p. 64). In short, Kurdish culture was maintained outside of the state in civil society. He insists that Kurds want to overcome the periods of near “cultural genocide” at the hands of the Turkish state, while becoming a “strategic friend” or “partner” of the Turks (Öcalan, 2012, pp. 68-69).

Öcalan maintains that he has learned from the Turkish state and his incarceration. For Öcalan, the armed struggle is identified as “a fight for truth.” (Öcalan, 2012, p.78) Did not Gramsci also learn from prison through his writings and the re-thinking of strategies in order to defeat capitalism? The “truth” that the

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armed struggle revealed is not that the Kurds need a state (as this state may replicate the assimilationist Turkish state), but rather “the existence of the Kurds.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 78) The PKK is today more concerned with finding democratic solutions within Turkey rather than the armed struggle, attaining a nation-state, or socialism. In this respect, Öcalan has superseded Gramsci’s attachment to the Italian Communist Party. Yet, questions remain about Öcalan’s authoritarian personality and the sexual repression associated with the organization. For example, Romano points out that in the 1990s “while a Kurdish National Assembly would have helped to develop Kurdish autonomous institutions and the legitimacy of Kurdish group demands, Öcalan soured on the idea as soon as it became clear that such institutions would not remain under his full control.” (Romano, 2008, p. 347; Marcus, 2007) The “democratic autonomy” and civil society-based solutions Öcalan proposes in The Road Map would undermine the power of the Turkish state, PKK, and all so-called “democratic” representatives of the Kurds.

Three main solutions have been proposed for the Kurdish question: national assimilation (or annihilation), a Kurdish federalist nation-state that encompasses Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and a democratic nation solution. Öcalan calls for the latter option within the context of the ten principles highlighted earlier.

The name Öcalan gives for the “democratic autonomy” solution is KCK. The KCK stands for the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (Komo Civaken Kurdistan), an umbrella of democratic Kurdish organizations in civil society. As pointed out earlier, arrests of KCK members intensified in 2009 and 2010. It is the KCK that will supposedly replace the PKK once the armed struggle is no longer necessary. It is in this crucial section that Öcalan insists unambiguously that the democratic solution means that he accepts “the institutions and present borders of the Republic of Turkey as legitimate.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 93) He also rejects a unitary, federal, or confederal Turkey. Instead, he argues that “the democratic, equal, and free aspects of Republic of Turkey’s citizenship be not just defined in the constitution and regulations but institutionally implemented.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 93) The solution must respect both individual and collective cultural rights, but also involve the entire society rather than a top-down, state-centric approach. Moreover, the Kurds should have their place within the “People” or “Nation” of Turkey constitutionally defined (Öcalan, 2012, p.94).

As part of the KCK solution, Öcalan points out that the army must be used for external threats alone rather than against the Kurds. Moreover, the KCK can be expanded to include other cultural communities in Turkey from Armenians and Assyrians to Turkomans, while a flexible confederation can include Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey must take a leading role in the KCK solution.

Section five outlines the action plan for implementing Öcalan’s Kurdish solution. It is interesting that Öcalan comes out against the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq because its aim is “in controlling Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 102) In the first phase, Öcalan is prepared to reign in his PKK fighters in order to attain a democratic solution. In the second phase, A Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be conducted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In a third phase, Öcalan (2012, p. 104) argues that a resort to arms will not be necessary, Kurds can return from exile, and ex-PKK fighters and refugees can attain full citizenship status in the context of the KCK. Öcalan insists that the USA, EU, and United Nations can all assist in the transition to a democratic solution.

Yet, Öcalan (2012, p. 104) points out that if there is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he should be released. Will Turks who view Öcalan with suspicion because of his previous support for the armed struggle, suicide bombings, Kurdish nationalism, and Marxism, be ready to make such a leap of faith?

In the Conclusion, Öcalan (2012, p. 107) declares that should the current AKP government solve the Kurdish question, “Turkey has a chance to be a model” for the entire Middle East. Kurds and Palestinians, as well as other minorities in the Middle East from Copts in Egypt to Assyrians in Iraq, rightfully ask where is their Arab Spring? Those hitherto neglected groups insist that democratization processes must also grant them equal status politically. Öcalan (2012, p. 108) argues that a window of opportunity has been opened to solve the Kurdish problem as Turkish Gladio operations linked to NATO, the USA, Israel, and EU ended in 2007. Should this window be left open, the secret negotiations begun between the Turkish state and Öcalan will lead the Kurds away from a history of occupation, assimilation, colonialism, and invasion towards democracy, equality, and freedom.

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Concluding thoughts

This paper analyzed Abdullah Öcalan’s The Road Map from a Gramscian perspective. I argued that The Road Map is infused with numerous influences from “democratic autonomy” and feminism to Immanuel Wallerstein and Hegel. Yet, a Gramscian reading of The Road Map allows us to see how changes in mentalities and civil society are preludes to revolutionary political change. Gramsci stressed the role of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic ideas in civil society rather than merely the repressive apparatus of the state in the maintenance of liberal, capitalist democracies. Öcalan is convinced that for the first time in history the Kurdish-Turkish conflict can be solved through discussions and without arms. This position strengthened as a result of Öcalan’s incarceration in 1999, but it has its genesis in Öcalan’s turn towards “democratic autonomy” in the early 1990s. His claim is that “democratic civilization” is spreading worldwide and this will assist the Kurds in their struggle for their rights.

What is remarkable about Öcalan’s Road Map is that he has presented the Turkish state a framework for the resolution of the “Kurdish problem.” For all his defense of the Palestinians, Prime Minister Erdoğan has not similarly defended the Kurds within his own country and could miss a historic opportunity by not taking Öcalan’s proposals seriously. The Turkish state continues to deny the existence of the Armenian genocide. This too does not bode well for the recognition of cultural and minority rights by the Turkish state. The Turkish state’s recent failure to seriously support the Kurds in Kobani (Syria) against the genocidal Islamic State (IS) further provokes Kurdish-Turkish tensions. Öcalan, on the other hand, comes off as a peacemaker. This is a remarkable transition for a man that once lived by the gun; a man that for a period of time valorized the deadly tactic of suicide bombing; a man that engaged in the armed struggle and executed “traitors” within his own ranks. Imrali prison is a bitter pill for Öcalan to swallow, but it has perhaps transformed the lionized PKK leader into a veritable Gramsci of our times.

Öcalan’s ceasefire call in the spring of 2013 further cemented his evolution from the armed struggle towards non-violence and the importance of “democratic autonomy”. Öcalan has been championing a Middle Eastern “renaissance” away from statism and authoritarianism long before the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010. Öcalan’s The Road Map offers hope for Kurds, Turks, and all “subaltern” forces in the Middle East. Öcalan is a new breed of organic intellectuals of “subaltern forces helping to organize workers, peasants and indigenous peoples,” as well as other hitherto neglected groups in civil society from women and Kurds in the Middle East (Gill, 2008, p. 182). Öcalan represents a larger wave of movements in the new millennium, which Gramsci scholar Stephen Gill has called “the post-modern Prince”. “a set of progressive political forces in movement.” (Gill, 2008, p. 182) These movements, including an array of indigenous movements in Latin America, Occupy Wall Street, and some elements in the Arab Spring, are proposing more innovative forms of political agency, which question the division between rulers and ruled (Gill, 2008, p. 237-248). While Öcalan’s attention to the importance of civil society echoes Gramsci, his proposals in The Road Map for a more plural, inclusive, and flexible form of politics that rejects neo-liberal globalization, statist nationalism, and the Communist Party transforms the ideas of the Italian Communist hero. This transformation contradicts the picture Marcus (2007, p. 181) paints of Öcalan: A self-absorbed, flawed, and ruthless leader, determined to eliminate any activity “that would remove the Kurdish fight out of his direct control.” Despite his incarceration, Öcalan has “singlehandedly shaped the Kurdish issue within the Turkish republic.” (Kiel, 2011, p. 1) Yet, his radical democratic proposals for the resolution of the Kurdish “problem,” if implemented, will lead to the loss of real power for Öcalan, the PKK, and leaders and states throughout the Middle East. In his embrace of “democratic autonomy” from the bottom-up and rejection of the dogmatism of the party or state, Öcalan is perhaps more revolutionary than Gramsci.

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AMOR Y HUMOR PARA RUSIA Y DESDE RUSIAPor: Imelda Ibañez Guzmán Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales UNAM, México

Maestra en Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales por la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la UNAM. Ha sido profesora invitada para impartir la clase de Rusia y las Relaciones Internacionales en la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales. Ha participado en diversos encuentros académicos organizados por el Seminario de Geopolítica de la misma facultad así como por el departamento de Derecho y Relaciones Internacionales del ITESM-CEM. Su área de estudio es la Rusia postsoviética vista desde el enfoque de la escuela geopolítica rusa. Sus líneas de trabajo son la seguridad euroatlántica, la relación Estados Unidos-Rusia y Unión Europea-Rusia. imelda_25_05@yahoo.com.mx

ABSTRACT A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov, escrita por Daniel Utrilla Vizmanos, es una apreciación distinta acerca de la historia de Rusia. Una lectura que muestra a través del trabajo periodístico los diferentes momentos por los que ha pasado el autor en la búsqueda del misticismo que encierra el alma rusa. Al mismo tiempo es la historia de la nación que ha resurgido en la región euroasiática desde inicios del siglo XXI.

A Moscow sin Kaláshnikov, written by Daniel Utrilla Vizmanos is assessed differently about the history of Russia. A reading that shows through journalism different moments that the author has gone in search of mysticism enclosing the Russian soul. At the same time it is the history of the nation that has emerged in the Eurasian region during the first decade of the XXI century.

KEYWORDSMoscú, Rusia, humor, cultura,

periodismo

180 181

A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov de Daniel Utrilla Vizmanos

«Mi destino son las letras»León Tolstói

Rusia y su pueblo son especiales, misteriosos e intrigantes, tanto por su forma de ser como por su historia. Paisajes nevados, héroes, pasión, valentía, personajes que buscan el sentido del mundo en el destino, son tópicos inagotables en la literatura rusa, estos temas ocupan miles de páginas en relatos, novelas, cuentos y poesía. Para conocer a Rusia es preciso explorar el entramado de su alma.

Daniel Utrilla ha evocado a los grandes autores rusos para contar su historia que inicia desde la tierna infancia en Alcorcon, España. La curiosidad de aquel niño por saber qué se encontraba allende la cortina de hierro fue la semilla de una vocación que lo llevaría tiempo después a descubrir el idioma de Tosltói y Navokov, a cubrir el proceso electoral en el que Vladimir Putin ganó la presidencia en el año 2000, con tal fortuna que durante el verano de ese año recibió el cargo de corresponsal para Rusia. Así, Utrilla despegó de España para aterrizar en la Rusia que transformaría Putin. Desde ese momento, sus vivencias se balancearon entre el oficio del periodista y el amor por la tierra de zares: “Yo aún no podía creer que sería testigo directo de noticias, de transformaciones de calado mundial y de tragedias que han marcado la entrada en el siglo XXI de Rusia” (Utrilla, 2013, p. 90)

A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov logra inquietar al lector desde el índice, es un viaje de recuerdos y al mismo tiempo es un singular itinerario para conocer desde otra forma la capital rusa: Moscú. El lector va descubriendo y entrelazando personajes, lugares históricos y actuales como Tolstoi, Rasputín, Lenin, Gagarin, Navokov, héroes de guerra, nostálgicos de la URSS, ‘emvodkadas’, Tula, la estética soviética, la belleza de la mujer moscovita, Putin, etcétera que han dado vida a la historia rusa y que son descritos de una manera muy amena y divertida. Así, mientras Daniel va delineando cada una de sus anécdotas a lo largo de la obra, logra que el lector no pueda ocultar una sonrisa y por supuesto la risa.

Es así como en la lectura, el humor desempeña un papel importante, el choque cultural que se presenta para un occidental al descubrir a los habitantes de Moscú, sus costumbres y tradiciones, debe verse con humor. De este modo, el autor tomó como un desafío presentar al país más grande del mundo desde una forma amable y explicar que existen dos Rusias, la real y la imaginaria en un paisaje donde la temperatura suele rondar hasta -25°

También es una lectura acerca del oficio del periodismo. Daniel relata cómo es que en medio de su amplia oficina de 17 millones de km2 y con vistas a Eurasia, vivió el fin de la era dorada del periodismo, del reporterismo de primera mano, aquel oficio que lo llevó a descubrir el país de los extremos, el lugar que donde menos se espera salta lo imposible y así lo real y lo ficticio en personajes tan variados se unen para provocar sorpresas en la mirada de un extranjero, como le ocurrió al escritor y periodista Gabriel García Márquez cuando llegó a Moscú en 1957 y cuyo legado en el autor es mencionado también a lo largo de esta historia.

Editado por Libros del K.O., A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov. Una Crónica sentimental de la Rusia de Putin envuelta en papel de periódico, es una invitación tanto para quienes nos hemos dedicado a estudiar la inmensidad de Rusia en el orden internacional, así como para quienes quieran tener una noción para recorrerla y descubrirla a través de paisajes literarios, históricos y geográficos desde otra forma: la no occidental; es un saludo al pueblo ruso, muestra de una pasión tan grande del mismo tamaño o quizá mayor de la nación que asomó en el horizonte europeo del siglo XVIII.

Creo que he encontrado la clave del misterio: conciliar la Rusia imaginaria y la Rusia real. Para mí las dos son igual de importantes, y cuando falla la segunda, me voy unos días a Yásnaia Poliana, la finca de Tolstoi que es uno de los pocos lugares donde ambas Rusias coinciden y se funden en el espacio y el tiempo con la nieve como elemento aglutinador. (Utrilla, 2013, p. 325)

Utrilla, D. (2013). A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov. Una crónica sentimental de la Rusia de Putin envuelta en papel de

periódico. Madrid, España: Libros del K.O.182 183

RESEÑA DEL LIBRO: THE WORLD THROUGH SOCCER: THE CULTURAL IMPACT OF A GLOBAL SPORT, DEL AUTOR TAMIR BAR-ONPor: Mary Carmen Peloche Barrera ITESM, Campus Puebla, México

Maestría en Gestión Pública Aplicada por el Tecnológico de Monterrey (2012). Licenciatura en Relaciones Internacionales por el Tecnológico de Monterrey Campus Puebla (2010). Profesora de tiempo completo del Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política de la Escuela de Derecho y Diplomacia del Tecnológico de Monterrey Campus Puebla. Profesora de Ciudadanía y Democracia de la Universidad Virtual del Tecnológico de Monterrey. Asesora Académica del Modelo de Naciones Unidas de la Universidad de Harvard.

Imagine poder analizar la historia de los siglos XIX, XX y lo que va del XXI a través del fútbol. Las dictaduras militares en América Latina, la época imperialista británica, el fascismo en Italia y España, la Alemania de Hitler, la Unión Soviética de Stalin, entre otros; son momentos históricos radiografiados por Tamir Bar-On en su más reciente obra The World Through Soccer: The Cultural Impact of a Global Sport (El Mundo a través del Soccer: El Impacto Cultural de un Deporte Global).

Tamir Bar-On nació en Beersheba, Israel pero emigró con su familia a Toronto, Canadá desde muy joven. Es doctor en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad de McGill de Toronto y actualmente es profesor del Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales del Tecnológico de Monterrey en Querétaro, México. Bar-On es también autor de los libros Where Have all Fascist Gone? (¿A dónde se han ido todos los fascistas?) así como Rethinking The French New Right: Alternatives to Modernity (Repensando la Nueva Derecha Francesa: Alternativas hacia la Modernidad), publicados en 2007 y 2013, respectivamente.

A través de once capítulos, Tamir Bar-On nos muestra la influencia que el fútbol soccer tiene como forjador de identidades nacionales; como herramienta para el control ideológico y/o político; como catalizador para la transformación social;

KEYWORDSFútbol, Soccer, Política, Historia,

Deporte, Identidad, Ideología.

como parte ya inherente de nuestras creencias y fe, así como promotor de liderazgos. Además, explica certeramente la relación intrínseca que el fútbol soccer tiene con la ética, con las artes, con la mercadotecnia y con la política. Cada capítulo representa una lección a aprender a través de lo que el cronista deportivo Luis Omar Tapia llama el deporte más hermoso del mundo. Para cada una de las lecciones, Bar-On ha elegido con escrutinio una lista de futbolistas que ayudan a ejemplificarlas, como los contemporáneos Cristiano Ronaldo (Portugal), Xavi (España) y Neymar Jr. (Brasil); otros ya retirados como Hugo Sánchez (México), Franz Beckenbauer (Alemania) y Elías Figueroa (Chile); y otros ya fallecidos como José Leandro Andrade (Uruguay) e Igor Netto (URSS).

La bibliografía revisada por el autor para su investigación es rica en libros, artículos (tanto impresos como en línea), páginas web, videos, entrevistas, blogs, noticias, entre otras. ¡El total de fuentes consultadas y citadas suma 480! Lo que se traduce en una obra adecuadamente referenciada. Así por ejemplo, Bar-On se apoya en autores como Eduardo Galeano, Carlos Monsiváis, Albert Camus y Juan Villoro para introducir interpretaciones maravillosas sobre lo que para muchos significa el fútbol. Otros autores como Joseph Nye, George Orwell y Martin Heidegger salen a relucir en el análisis del mundo que el autor realiza a partir del soccer. Finalmente, se vale de entrevistas y experiencias propias de futbolistas como Clint Dempsey (E.E.U.U.), Pelé (Brasil) y Jorge Valdano (Argentina).

La manera en la que el autor presenta cada una de las once lecciones es fascinante, ya que existe una perfecta relación entre el tema, el futbolista elegido y la argumentación. Para los amantes del fútbol, The World Through Soccer nos ofrece conocer historias nunca antes imaginadas relacionadas con este deporte, ya sea de manera directa (jugadores, clubes y selecciones nacionales) o indirecta (contextos políticos, sociales, económicos, culturales, nacionales e internacionales). Para quienes no gustan de este deporte, el libro representa una oportunidad interesante de estudiar el mundo desde otra visión. Es así que en cada capítulo nos sumergimos en un nuevo aprendizaje.

Si bien se han escrito con anterioridad libros que relacionan el fútbol con la política internacional, ninguno ofrece tantos enfoques o líneas de análisis como lo hace Bar-On en su más reciente obra. The World Through Soccer, tiene el potencial para convertirse en un referente obligado en la bibliografía del fútbol. Un libro exquisito, entretenido y proveedor de historias fantásticas.

Bar-On, T. (2014). The World Through Soccer: The Cultural Impact of a Global Sport.

(1ra Edición). Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.184 185

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