Leadership Structures in Afghanistan

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paper

Leadership Structures in Afghanistan

Introduction

Centuries of intertribal and international warfare combined with

unforgiving mountainous desert terrain, extreme poverty, and cultures

of isolationism and impunity have left Afghanistan with a legacy of

widespread, ongoing human rights abuses, lawlessness and ineffective

governance. The destabilizing and violent presence of the Taliban, Al

Qaeda and other anti-governmental groups, as well as the widespread

effects of corruption, graft and nepotism continues to inhibit

meaningful levels of discussion and action with regard to governmental

reforms. Dealing credibly with past and present leadership

deficiencies is essential in building national solidarity around just

and democratic government.

Institution-building and anti-corruption measures have been

emphasized in every post-2001 agreement and policy including the Bonn

agreement, the Afghan National Development Strategy, and the

recommendations within the Afghan Independent Human Rights

Commission’s (AIHRC) Action Plan. Yet even with a decade of focused

international attention, the resounding sentiment among Afghans is

13 December 2011 Page 1

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperthat there is no justice, no potential for reconciliation, no

effective central governance and no hope for any in the near future.

This paper discusses ten-plus years of nation-building initiatives and

the official government structures created under the auspices of the

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and makes

recommendations to improve progress towards responsible leadership in

Afghanistan which are motivated by high ideals yet bounded by the

constraints of reality and probability.

Background

Afghanistan is a landlocked country in South Asia, lying to the

west of Pakistan and to the east of Iran; to the north it shares a

border with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China. It is

one of the oldest and most continually conflicted areas of

civilization known, as it occupies a strategic territory just slightly

smaller than the state of Texas at the crossroads between Europe,

Asia, and the Middle East. A decade after the start of Operation

Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan is beginning to coalesce as a nation

with ambitious promises of institution building and reform,

anticorruption measures, and increased security for everyday Afghans.


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperYet in reality, human rights abuses continue unchecked, past

injustices fester into blood feuds, and the culture of impunity

throughout government is so pervasive as to leave most Afghans

hopeless for positive change.

The major ethnic groups and their relative representation

nationally are Pashtun (42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%), Uzbek (9%),

Turkmen (3%), Baloch (2%) and others (8%). Official national

languages spoken are Dari/Afghan Persian (50%) and Pashto (35%) while

30+ other minor languages are spoken by 15% of the population;

bilingualism is very common across Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s ethnic

makeup is a mosaic of dozens if not hundreds of subdivisions of

tribes1, each fiercely loyal to their clan or village, and each

suspicious of its neighbors. The political sphere is large and

complicated2, with many former warlords starting their own political

parties and attempting legitimacy. Ongoing dependency on NATO-ISAF

for logistical, security, training, and technical support simply adds

to the mileu of controversy and confusion.

1 See Appendix I: GIS Tribal Mosaic by Jill Kornetsky with Data from Anonymous at NPS2 See Appendix II: COIN Dynamics slide from Joint Chiefs of Staff PowerPoint. To describe the dynamics in this image in prose form would result in a conflict analysis far longer than the scope of this paper…13 December 2011 Page 3

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperBased on minimum standards set forth by the Sphere project3,

Afghanistan has been and remains in a near-perpetual state of

humanitarian crisis. The majority Muslim (99%4) population of

Afghanistan numbers just under 30 million as of July 2011, up from

18.4 million in 1995. Nearly 43% of the population is under the age

of 14, and life expectancy hovers around 45 years for both males and

females, ranking Afghanistan at a reflection of just how severely

underdeveloped Afghanistan is. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

number over 350,000 and over 3 million Afghan refugees currently

reside in Iran and Pakistan5.

An influx of aid and reconstruction dollars since 2001 has

boosted the economy and provided some work, however unemployment has

only dropped from 40% in 2005 to 35% in 2008, and 36% of Afghans live

below the poverty line today. Much of the rural population relies on

subsistence agriculture for survival, and agriculture accounts for 80

percent of the workforce in Afghanistan. Expansion of the economy

beyond industries of labor such as agriculture is further hampered by

widespread illiteracy. In 2008, male literacy rates by province 3 Sphere Project. (2011).4 99% Nationally with 90% Sunni, 19% Shia and 1% Other. CIA. (2011)5 These first paragraphs synthesized with material from Blood (1994), the CIA World Factbook (2011), Library of Congress (2005), the National Vulnerability and Risk Assessment or NVRA (2008), the Afghanistan National Development Strategy or ANDS (2010), and UNHCR (2011). 13 December 2011 Page 4

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperranged from 14-64% and female from 1-17% and 31% in Kabul6. Beyond

the burdens of poverty and deprivation, Afghanistan is a nation with a

bellicose history. From tribal warfare and the perennial troubles of

falling at a geographical crossroads between multiple continents,

serving as a proxy battleground during the Cold War, enduring a brutal

form of Sharia law enforced by the Taliban government, and an

international military movement to eliminate terrorist enclaves from

the region, it is understandable that a culture of violence and

militarism has arisen among Afghans.

According to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the

U.S. Department of State’s 2010 Human Rights Report, Afghanistan

continues to face myriad human rights abuses including “extrajudicial

killings; torture and other abuse; poor prison conditions, widespread

official impunity; ineffective government investigations of abuses by

local security forces; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged

pretrial detention; judicial corruption; violations of privacy rights;

restrictions on freedom of the press; limits on freedom of assembly;

restrictions on freedom of religion including religious conversions;

limits on freedom of movement; official corruption; violence and

societal discrimination against women; sexual abuse of children; 6 Afghanistan National Surveillance System and ICON Institute. (2008). 13 December 2011 Page 5

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperabuses against minorities; trafficking in persons; abuse of worker

rights, and child labor.7”

Constant violence and abject poverty maintain Afghanistan in a

cycle of despair and conflict; past battles were fought over

community-level or national sovereignty, to retain the national

heritage of Islam within a secularizing government, and other issues

of high importance to survival and identity. Insurgent forces in

central Asia today rely upon a combination of impoverished desperation

and brutal treatment of civilians to ensure subservience and adherence

to fundamentalist rule; vulnerable locals get a wad of cash or the

threat of pain and death in exchange for their victimization. If the

international community has any gift to give the Afghan people, it

will be aiding them in their quest for the security and capacity

required to achieve justice.

Formal Leadership Structures: National

Based on the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

as ratified in 2004 and based on the Constitution of 1964, there are

several tiers of government which are centrally controlled. In many 7 Taken from 2010 U.S. Department of State’s Report on Human Rights, Afghanistan. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160445.pdf 13 December 2011 Page 6

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160445.pdf

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperways the Constitution of Afghanistan resembles that of the United

States, and includes aspects reminiscent of the British Parliamentary

system, though the preamble clearly designates Afghanistan as a Muslim

nation. The government is structured around three branches:

executive, legislative and judicial.

In the Executive Branch of government, the head of state is the

Afghan President and he has two Vice Presidents. A Presidential term

lasts for five years, and no President shall serve for more than two

terms. The President shall be “a citizen of Afghanistan, Muslim, born

of Afghan parents and not a citizen of another country.” Eleven

articles in the Constitution dictate the rights and responsibilities

of the Presidency. Article 64 describes the authorities an duties of

the President which include appointing Ministers (for approval of the

National Assembly), the Attorney General, the Head of the Central

Bank, the National Security Director, and the Head of the Red Cross.

So far, the National Assembly has rejected many of Karzai’s

appointees, and seven of the Ministries are being led by interim

Ministers as they await approved candidates to take over the roles of

Minister.


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperInterestingly, the Constitution makes provision for the president

not being convicted of “crimes against humanity, a criminal act, or

deprivation of civil rights by a court” and if he is accused of such

crimes, a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) shall be convened to determine

the legitimacy of the claim. If the Loya Jirga determines by two

thirds majority that the President is guilty of these crimes, he will

be released from his office. For a country with a history of warfare,

and ongoing human rights abuses, this clause is important and

idealistic yet one must wonder if such accusations would actually

result in the impeachment of the president, given the lack of

accountability and transparency which plagues Afghanistan today.

Working under the President and at his appointment is a Council of

Ministers. The following Ministries currently operate in Afghanistan:

Foreign, Defense, Interior, Finance, Economic, Justice, Information

and Cultural Affairs, Education, Higher Education, Trade and Commerce,

Water and Energy, Transportation and Aviation, Communications and

Technology, Public Works, Women’s Affairs, Haj and Islamic Affairs,

Public Welfare, Public Health, Agriculture, Mines, Telecommunications,

Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Boreder and Tribal Affairs,


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperUrban Development, Counter-Narcotics, Refugees and Repatriation, and

Work, Social Affairs, Martyred and Disabled.

The Legislative Branch of government, also known as the National

Assembly or Parliament contains an Upper and a Lower House and there

must be 25% female representation, a percentage which exceeds most

other countries including the United States. The Lower House is the

House of the People or the Wolesi Jirga. Members of the Wolesi Jirga

are elected for a five year term by the people in direct, free and

secret elections with single non-transferrable votes such that the

lower house truly is meant to be the house of the people. There is

one representative per district (currently recognized as numbering

249) and each serves a five-year term. The Wolesi Jirga is the body

tasked with establishing laws.

The Upper House is the House of Elders or the Meshrano Jirga.

Members of the Meshrano Jirga are appointed in a somewhat convoluted

manner, with the 102 member House being elected in thirds: one third

are elected for a 4-year term by provincial councils who provide one

representative each, one third are elected by district councils for a

3-year term providing one more member per province, and one third are

appointed directly by the president for a 5-year term. Of the


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperPresident’s appointees, 50% must be women and there must be two

representatives of the disabled community and one representing the

nomadic Kuchi people. Currently, however, there is no mechanism set

up for elections at the district level; instead, the provincial

councils send one additional member each to sit in Parliament

temporarily until the mechanism for district elections is established.

The Meshrano Jirga is not a lawmaking body but is instead seen as an

advisory body to the President and Wolesi Jirga.

The Judicial Branch of government is comprised on the Supreme Court

of Afghanistan. Each justice, including the Chief Justice, is

appointed by the President for a single, non-renewable ten year term.

The Wolesi Jirga has the power to reject a President’s candidate for

Justice, and in the case that a justice is accused of crimes by at

least one third of the Wolesi Jirga, he or she can be impeached by a

vote of two-thirds of the same.

The final part of national government is the Loya Jirga, or Grand

Assembly. Not a standing body with constant duties, but rather a

large gathering of stakeholders when extraordinary events call for it,

the Loya Jirga is considered the “highest manifestation of the people


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperof Afghanistan.8” It is an ancient tradition of the tribal Pashtuns

which has been adopted by greater Afghanistan, bringing together

representatives from across the country and debate matters of national

importance. Decisions are made by consensus, after lengthy and

sometimes heated discussion. In the past decade three important Loya

Jirgas have been convened and given international attention. The

first two came during Afghanistan’s transition in the post-Taliban

era. In the summer of 2003, the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) brought

together 1600 Afghans, 10% female, to debate the transitional process

and determine the structure of the transitional government. The next

year, and by the auspices of the ELJ, a Constitutional Loya Jirga was

convened with 500 people, 89 of whom were female, to determine the

language and parameters of the new Constitution. This was also called

the Loya Jagra or “Big Fight” as issues of religious and secular

values, power, responsibility and language were hotly debated. Most

recently, in June 2010, a Peace Jirga was held to determine how and to

what extend the Taliban should be included in discussions, in the

interest of peace and reconciliation within Afghanistan.

8 Quote taken directly from the Constitution and posted at: http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/government.html13 December 2011 Page 11

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperFormal Leadership Structures: Local

The Afghan Nation is divided into 34 Provinces, which are each

then further divided into Districts which vary in number due to

merging and division of the existing districts, currently numbering

398. Each province has a Governor who is tasked with representing and

leading the province or “local administrative unit” whose size and

location are regulated by law on the basis of “population, social and

economic conditions, as well as geographic location.” The

Constitution dictates that powers should be transferred to these

Provincial Governors to accelerate the processes of development,

national unification and social or cultural matters. These Governors

are advised by Provincial Councils whose members are elected by “free,

general, secret and direct elections.”

The Constitution further stipulates that within each Province

should be municipalities or districts which themselves should have

councils and governors elected by the people. Shortfalls in capacity

and possibly the will of those up the chain, however, have caused

failures in the process of these elections being carried out, and thus

have prevented District Election in the decade of Afghanistan’s new

Constitution and leadership. This means that the 398 District


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperGovernors and their respective 4 District Council member have been

appointed, and often distributed on the basis of illegal payments, by

the Provincial leadership. This unconstitutional practice has

resulted in the District leadership, through which most development

activities and projects are funneled, have become rife with

corruption, graft, nepotism, and incompetence. A system, with its

leaders numbering in the thousands per the Constitution, that was

designed for the distribution of power to the people has thus been

turned against them as the powerbrokers of the past have gone on to

become the “legalized” power brokers of today. That is not to say that

progress and shining examples of positive leadership don’t exist in

Afghanistan today, only that the potential for and presence of

problems creates enough static to drown out the positive changes

underway.

Informal Leadership Structures

A more historical and culturally relevant leadership structure

exists in the form of Tribal and Village Governance. With some 40,000

villages mostly left to fend for themselves, reliance upon the

historical and deeply rooted systems of governance dictated by the


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperJirga and Shura, the advice and wisdom of tribal elders, the

protection and quasi law enforcement capabilities of local warlords

and the influence of powerful and longstanding family leaders.

Warlords in the context are indeed men who have proven themselves in

physical battle including former mujahideen, however the international

community should be careful to not label all such military leaders as

fundamentalists and antigovernment agents. Many of these warlords,

who for decades fought to keep Soviet power from absorbing the Afghan

nation, later found against the radical influence of the Taliban and

Al Qaeda. There is wisdom to be found in the unofficial rule of

battle hardened and well-respected leaders.

The official Provincial and District councils created by the new

Constitution often work in concert with these structures which are so

well-respected and trusted by the Afghan people. Often the influence

of powerful (and therefore wealthy) warlords finds something

resembling legitimacy. By being elected into, or buying into, the

government as dictated by the Constitution, leaders and leadership

structures of the past are attempting to reconcile the contradiction

of the functional if militant and violent structures of yore with the

ineffective if idealistic and more internationally acceptable systems


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperof today. One example of how this mileu of systems and prominent

village figures is producing effective results lies in the creation of

Community Development Councils through the National Solidarity

Program, the Afghan led, Afghan driven development framework filtered

to the Village level through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and

Development to provide individual communities the funding and

expertise to individually choose and implement development activities

in their villages or districts.

Discussion

A 2004 conference in Berlin outlined a “Workplan for the Afghan

Government” which included provisions to improve electoral processes,

political rights, security, good governance and public administration,

rule of law and human rights. Since then successful if controversial

elections have been held twice, and the AIHRC continues to operate

diligently. Even seven years later, however, good governance is

something of a farce, security conditions continue to vacillate

locally, and the rule of law itself can be used to violate human

rights, evidenced by a 2009 law stating that Shiite men are allowed to

starve their wives to death should she refuse him sex. Some actually


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperconsidered this revised law a step up from one that legalized marital

rape9.

Since 2005, the issue of prosecutions for past crimes including

crimes against humanity was debated widely and hotly, all across

Afghanistan. While a conference on Rule of Law was being organized in

early 2007, legislation officially called the National Stability and

Reconciliation Resolution was being written in Afghanistan, and

quietly left on Karzai’s desk. After 15 days without a veto, proposed

legislation is considered law. That March saw what later would be

called the Amnesty Law, legislation granting blanket amnesty for any

crime committed before 2001. Perhaps the new Afghan Government was

doing to the international community in 2007 what the warlords were

doing to NATO forces in 2001; making promises publicly while

maintaining their modus operandi behind the scenes.

In July of 2007 an international conference on rule of law was

held in Rome on Rule of Law. Two years after deciding on the Key

Actions to bring the nation back to unity in the Netherlands, the

Joint Recommendations from Rome identified those same actions as

essential to achieving key goals of national reconciliation and unity.

9 Boone, J. (2009). 13 December 2011 Page 16

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperIn June of 2008 another conference in Paris focused yet again on the

“Three Pillars:” Security; Governance/Rule of Law/Human Rights; and

Development. After another year in March of 2009 the international

community came together again at The Hague to discuss “rededication

efforts” of the United Nations to the Afghan cause. It is evident at

this point that little definitive progress has been made in

Afghanistan “transitioning” into a democratic and salient nation with

functional institutions and physical security since 2001.

Recommendations for Governmental Progress: Justice, Reforms, Controls

The culture of impunity10 that continues even today in

Afghanistan finds its roots in ineffective and often corrupt

leadership; national conciliation is impossible while criminals are

left unprosecuted and promises of government reform aren’t realized.

Successful Transitional Justice in Afghanistan must be rooted in

reformation of the judiciary and other state institutions, enforcing

rule of law and international standards. With such a long and

intensive history of violent conflict, the central government will

10 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. (2003). Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan.13 December 2011 Page 17

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Papernever have the trust and support of greater Afghanistan if the past is

not put effectively and justly to rest. Government and tribal leaders

should pursue a process of Transitional to not only address the

Taliban regime, but the historical record of conflict that underlies

ethnic tensions, power struggles, and even current patterns of

violence. The Afghan people want a holistic approach to Transitional

Justice, as shows in the statistics of A Call for Justice. In that

report the AIHRC made recommendations to the Afghan government about

how best to shape a Transitional Justice Framework:

- Design and implement a series of symbolic acts to acknowledge the

victims

- Commit publicly to a strategy that includes vetting, criminal

justice, truth-seeking and reparations

o Short-term and Long-term approaches to vetting are provided

for Afghan policy

o A three-year initial proposal for restructuring criminal

justice systems is offered

o Truth-seeking bodies and reparations are presented as areas

needing “more work”


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paper- Urge local leaders and mullahs to support efforts at Transitional

Justice, reconciliation, and unity

According to that same report 69% of Afghans surveys report themselves

or their family members as victims of direct violence, 76% believe

that justice for war criminals will increase stability and security in

Afghanistan, 61% reject the possibility of amnesty for war criminals

and human rights violators and 95% of Afghans believe it is important

to establish the truth about war-time violations. It is clear that any

successful governmental framework must pursue both retributive and

restorative justice mechanisms. Restorative mechanisms such as a

truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) will be essential given

their popularity and potential for catharsis, while retributive

mechanisms will be required to remove criminals from power and

establish anti-corruption measures if there is a hope for legitimate

and representative governance.

Of course, there are complications. Many of those currently in

the government are the same warlords who perpetuated violence against

their fellow Afghans in the past, and continue to control large swaths

of the country with their militias. Convincing current legislators

and ministers to advocate for their own lustration, penalty or arrest


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperis simply not feasible, nor is the potential to build enthusiasm and

support for a TRC if the results have the potential to send warlords

to some future International Criminal Court prosecution or Tribunal.

Afghans are a fiercely independent people who have been losing the

fight to maintain stable sovereignty for millennia; issues of national

sovereignty will not be easy to overcome in any creative solution, but

they cannot trump the needs of the international community or the

needs of humanity. For the centralized system of governance to attain

even moderate levels of acceptance and legitimacy, it must focus on

anti-corruption efforts, transitional and everyday systems of Justice,

transparency, and fulfilling the promises made in every international

compact and treaty, including those conventions and other

international agreements overseen by the United Nations.

Restorative Justice, one half of transitional justice, includes

some measures which are monetarily and politically cheap to employ.

Statements issued with messages of sympathy for victims of past

injustice present little risk of blowback, provided language is

carefully chosen so as to appear neutral. The AIHRC has been working

since 2001 to collect evidence and testimony, a truth-seeking mandate

which collects materials that may be used in retributive mechanisms or


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperin TRCs. Further education for the public regarding TRCs and their

purpose will also be key, as AIHRC’s experience reveals a lack of this

understanding; once informed of a TRCs nature and past successes, a

majority of Afghans indicated their support for the approach.

Compensation of victims is a much harder sell; in a country of 30

million people, 69% report being direct victims of violence or related

to those victims. Neither Afghanistan nor the international community

is prepared to compensate 21 million Afghans, never-mind compensation

for those who lost their lives, regardless of the amount or nature of

that compensation.

Retributive Justice, the other half of transitional justice, is

where the situation gets hairier, given the power dynamics afflicting

the Afghan government. If competent, rights-promoting institutions

are to be established in Afghanistan, the international community must

be willing to enforce international law when Afghanistan is unable to

do so within her own borders. Half of all Afghans support a hybrid

court system in Afghanistan that employs both national and

international judges. This presents an opportunity for the

international community under the auspices of the United Nations to

create a court system with checks and balances for corruption,


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Papermilitancy and criminality. A hybrid court might act as a temporary

judiciary while larger-scale, off-line reforms are being planned,

implemented and tested. Concomitant use of a system while it is being

reformed is difficult when all parties get along; attempting to fix

the Afghan judicial system as it is being used nearly guarantees that

corruption will continue. Wholesale reform of the justice system

should take place while an interim court system processes cases,

handling cases at the federal level, passing them along to the ICC for

especially heinous crimes, or referring to mediation by jirga for

petty crimes and nonviolent disputes. This reform should include

legislative language unification with the principles of the

Constitution of Afghanistan, reviewing qualifications and criminal

histories, purging staff as needed, thorough vetting of all potential

candidates. Simultaneously, a national system must be established to

build the skills of potential future leaders through vetting,

educating, training, and mentoring, as well as recruitment of vetted

Persian speaking foreign staff.

Overall, cross-cutting recommendation would be: revise

expectations and timelines, making them more realistic given the

complex situation, and providing back-up mechanisms operated by


Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final Paperneutral bodies to fill in the gaps of governmental capacity; rely on

global scholars and jurists to help pick up the slack while a new

justice system is being built and primed; don’t rely on individuals

from a militaristic and isolationist social fabric to fall on their

swords for the greater good, as we all act on behalf of our own

physical or social survival; accept the inevitability of biology and

the psychologies of war and scarcity. There can be no progress

without reliable and trusted governance, and there is basically no

chance of U.S. and NATO forces abandoning this hotbed of conflict

soon; accept that so long as the anti-government groups are

perpetrating violence there will be international troops on the

ground, and design all plans around it. And finally, this is a

process that is going to take a generation or longer; the move towards

effective and transparent governance will require sustained if scaled

back efforts from the international community as well as ongoing

commitments of Afghan officials to improve their own country from

within.


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http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN016659.pdf

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf

http://www.usip.org/files/file/sr117.pdf

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf

http://www.usip.org/files/file/usaid_afghanistan.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6

http://www.sphereproject.org/content/view/720/200/lang,english/

http://books.google.com/books/about/Afghanistan_s_systems_of_justice.html?id=ycn2ZwEACAAJ

http://books.google.com/books/about/Afghanistan_s_systems_of_justice.html?id=ycn2ZwEACAAJ

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/effort0704.pdf

http://ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/afghanistan





Appendix I: Human Development Index (HDI) and Components of HDI



Appendix II: GIS Map of Tribal Mosaic by Jill Kornetsky

Data from Anonymous at the Naval Postgraduate School: Overlaid Tribal

Subdivisions




Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperAppendix III: Afghanistan Provinces and Districts11

11 Map of the Provinces and Districts within Afghanistan: http://www.aims.org.af/National-Maps.html 13 December 2011 Page 29

http://www.aims.org.af/National-Maps.html


Appendix XX: Afghanistan COIN Dynamics Chart from Joint Chiefs of

Staff PPT12

12 This Chart is Gorgeous… Presented in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff13 December 2011 Page 30



Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Leadership Final PaperAppendix XX: Afghanistan 2001 to 2010: The Evolution of Top-Down

Governmental Reforms


Documents

Leadership Structures in Afghanistan