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Sonderdruck aus

Stephan Conermann (ed.)

Ubi sumus? Quo vademus?

Mamluk Studies – State of the Art

With numerous figures

V& R unipress

Bonn University Press

ISBN 978-3-8471-0100-0

ISBN 978-3-8470-0100-3 (E-Book)

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Contents

Stephan ConermannQuo vadis, Mamlukology? (A German Perspective) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Thomas BauerMamluk Literature as a Means of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Caterina BoriTheology, Politics, Society : the missing link. Studying Religion in theMamluk Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Albrecht FuessMamluk Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Syrinx von HeesMamlukology as Historical Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Thomas HerzogMamluk (Popular) Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Konrad HirschlerStudying Mamluk Historiography. From Source-Criticism to the CulturalTurn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Th. Emil HomerinSufism in Mamluk Studies: A Review of Scholarship in the Field . . . . . 187

Carine JuvinMamluk Inscriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Paulina B. LewickaDid Ibn al-H

˙ajj Copy from Cato? Reconsidering Aspects of

Inter-Communal Antagonism of the Mamluk Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Christian MüllerMamluk Law: a reassessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Lucian ReinfandtMamluk Documentary Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Bethany J. WalkerWhat Can Archaeology Contribute to the New Mamlukology? WhereCulture Studies and Social Theory Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

Torsten WollinaIbn T

˙awq’s Ta

˘

lıq. An Ego-Document for Mamluk Studies . . . . . . . . . 337

Contents6

Albrecht Fuess

Mamluk Politics

Introduction

What might the term politics mean in a Mamluk context? “Politics is concernedwith the administration of home or city in accordance with ethical and philo-sophical requirements, for the purpose of directing the mass toward a behaviorthat will result in the preservation and permanence of the species.”1 This ofcourse is a definition given by the well-known Mamluk scholar Ibn Khaldun, aninevitable expert in this context. Ibn Khaldun’s definition does not represent thestate of the art of the 21st century, but is familiar to a medieval Mamluk mind.Mamluk politics functioned in a twofold manner : The Masses (al-ra

˘

ıyah) wereguided or trained by the siyasah2 (the policy or the guidance) of the rulers tomaintain the prosperity and stability of the society. In return the ruler had to bejust and security providing towards his flock or, as Ibn Nubatah points out, theduty of the king is, “to construct the world and secure law and order”.3 The mainaspect of Mamluk siyasah seems therefore to guide the ruler and the masses inthe common goal to preserve the Muslim society as it is. In the following articlefive points of this interaction between ruler and flock and how it appears incontemporary research will be of special interest: 1) Legitimacy of the Mamluks2) succession of sultans 3) financial administration 4) foreign policy 5) military.4

In general one can remark a growing skepticism about the notion of theMamluk society as an exceptional case in the history of mankind. In particular,David Ayalon’s assessment of the “distinct Mamluk Phenomenon”5, coined inthe seventies, has increasingly been questioned. Recent research places the

1 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, 39.2 For the term siyasah, see: Bosworth et al. , Siyasa, 693.3 Ibn Nubatah, Suluk, Superius 29, fol. 2a here cited after : von Hees, Guidance, 372.4 The focus of this presentation will thereby mainly be on scholarship of the last decade. For a

discussion of the state of the art of roughly ten years ago, see: Irwin, Western Eyes ; Co-nermann, Es boomt.

5 Ayalon, Aspects I & II.

Mamluk Empire in a long continuity of military slavery in the history of theMiddle East and states that the Mamluk system, though having its peculiarities,was by no means the odd one out in the Muslim realm. But in judging Ayalon’sviews we have to contextualize him and his writings as well. When he startedresearching the Mamluks he was told by a leading Islamicist “Working on such asubject is similar in importance to working on the history of the Fiji Islands”.6

Legitimacy of the Mamluks

The Mamluks came to power after their assassination of the last Ayyubid SultanTuran Shah in 1250.7 As the Mamluk amirs seemed to have been unsure how toproceed and to consider, if as former slaves they were ripe to rule, we witness 10years of experimentations and three months of exceptional female rule underShajar ad-Durr, the widow of Sultan al-S

˙alih

˙Ayyub (1240 – 1249), as “queen of

the muslims” (malikat al-muslimın)8, an episode which was reconsidered someyears ago by Amalia Levanoni and Sabine Soetens.9 Then Stefan Heidemann hasexplained us in his “Das Aleppiner Kalifat” how the Mamluks netted free-floating Abbasid princes after the fall of Bagdad in 1258 and installed an Abbasidshadow caliph in Cairo in 1262.10 The Abbasid caliphate became one cornerstoneof the legitimacy of Mamluk amirs, but equally important for their prestige werethe military victories against the mighty Mongols and the Christian Crusaders.The victory of the mostly Turkish born Mamluks against their Central AsianMongol “cousins”, let Abu Shamah (d. 1268) say that against any (evil) thingthere is a cure from its own kind, (wa-li-kulli shay’in afatun min jinsihi).11 Still,the military threat of the Mongol cousins was not banned until the vanishing ofthe Ilkhanate by the mid-fourteenth century. Therefore the ideology of theMamluks was very much forged in the intellectual and military encountersagainst the Mongols, as Anne F. Broadbridge has shown in 2008 in her book“Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol World”, where she describesMamluk ideology as follows: “Unlike Chingizid or later Turko-Mongol notionsof kingship, however, this ideology hinged consistently and exclusively on an-tiquated Islamic concepts, on a vision of the Mamluk sultan as a martialGuardian of Islam and Islamic society. The Mamluks sultans used this outdated

6 Ayalon, Mamluks, 89.7 Al-Maqrızı, Al-Suluk, 1/2:360.8 Ibid, 362.9 Levanoni, Sagarat ad-Durr ; Soetens, Sagarat ad-Durr.

10 Heidemann, Aleppiner Kalifat.11 Abu Shama, Al-Dhayl, 208.

Albrecht Fuess96

model because they suffered from two serious, linked problems: the institutionof slavery and the lack of lineage”.12

The second source of Mamluk military prestige was the victory against theCrusaders. Unfortunately we lack in the field of Mamluk-Crusader relations thesame amount of new studies which we have for Mamluk-Mongol encounters. Inthe content list of fifteen years of Mamluk Studies Review the term crusader doesnot figure once. For the time being we have to content our self with the book“Mamluk and Crusaders” which was published in 2010 and contains a collectionof selected articles of Robert Irwin.13

To know more about the ideological side of Mamluk – Crusader relationsseems to be vital for the modern discussion about Islam and Christianity.Moreover, as the Mamluk scholar of the fourteenth century Ibn Taymıyah (d.1328), so popular among contemporary Islamists, has shaped an enduringtheological frame of the Mamluk jihad concept against Mongols and Cru-saders.14 For Ibn Taymıyah the Mamluks are God’s chosen people to fight for theMuslim ummah the enemies of Islam. “If the Mongols would become theirmasters, there would be no more power in Islam.”15 It seems vital therefore torelook at Ibn Taymiyya and contextualise his writings with his personal biog-raphy. An important step in that direction was undertaken by Yossef Rapoportand Shahab Ahmad in 2011 by editing the volume “Ibn Taymiyya and histimes”.16 Catarina Bori has contributed an article on “Ibn Taymiyya wa Ja-ma’atuhu. Authority, Conflict and Consensus in Ibn Taymiyya’s Circle” in thesame volume.17

When the Mamluks expelled the last Crusaders from the Holy Land in 1291,Ibn al-Furat praised them with the following words: “Praise be to God, the nationof the cross has fallen. Through the Turks the religion of the chosen Arabs hastriumphed.”18 This brings us to the question of ethnicity. The early Mamlukarmy was composed of Kurds, Mongols, Kiptchaq Turks and others. Anne-MarieEdd� has shown that for Kurds ethnic bonds played an important role, but latelyReuven Amitai has called for caution in this respect, suggesting that there is “noindication that these Mongol-Mamluk amirs ever acted politically on the basis of

12 Broadbridge, Kingship, 12.13 Irwin, Mamluks. The main articles on the crusaders date thereby from the 80s and 90s. In

recent years Robert Irwin published more on literary figures, firearms and the last decades ofMamluk rule.

14 Ibn Taymıyah, Majmu

˘

at fatawa. A series of French translations of the fatwas againstMongols is found in the journal “Le Musulman”, see Michot, Textes spirituels.

15 Michot, Textes, (1995), 28.16 Rapoport, Ahmed, Ibn Taymiyya.17 Ibid., 23 – 52.18 Ibn al-Furat, Tarıkh, 8:115.

Mamluk Politics 97

ethnic solidarity”.19 He calls for further case studies to find out more about anethnic factor in Mamluk society. In general we can assume that the perception ofethnicity in the Mamluk Empire was certainly quite different from modernconceptions.

There was, nonetheless, a clear distinction among the Turkish, Kurdish orMongol military lords and their Arab subjects. Although one can identify, asUlrich Haarmann has shown, a Turkish-Arab antagonism for many periods ofMuslim history,20 Berkey has argued that it would be misleading to over-emphasize the Mamluks’ alienation from native Egyptian society, because ofnumerous links which bound them together to Islamic culture.21 One shouldacknowledge, though, that with the Mongols and subsequent central Asian no-madic waves, the Turkish element in the Muslim realm was strengthened. JulienLoiseau did lately even speak for the fifteenth century of a “Turkish century” (“lesi�cle turc”).22

As outlined above, Mamluks had to be in the eyes of their subjects strongwarriors and just and accessible rulers. Therefore they rode personally at thehead of their army into battle and paraded regularly in town. Moreover they heldthe maz

˙alim (injustice) sessions were they would hear twice a week legal com-

plaints of their subjects. The sultan then decided whether a case should be lookedat in scrutiny by the judges in sharı

˘

ah affairs or by other Mamluk officials, ifworldly matters and civil administration (siyasah) were concerned. And it wasagain Ibn Taymıyah who argued in his work al-siyasah al-shar

˘

ıyah that if thesharı

˘

ah is observed, the siyasah of rulers can never conflict with the fiqh (Islamicjursipridence) of the Islamic scholars, the

˘

ulama’.23

But, in order to show this justice to the people the public display of themaz

˙alim session was very important. Maybe, as I have argued in a paper on the

Mamluk maz˙

alim-practice in 2009, the Mamluks thought, they needed thisadditional legitimacy as just rulers as they had been only slaves at the beginningof their lives.24 The Ottomans did not go public this way.

Still, how should a ruler know what is right? Well, this is written in the adviceliterature of the “Mirror of princes” (nas

˙ıhat al-muluk). In this context I would

like to mention Paulina Lewicka’s paper “What a king should care about?” Ontwo memoranda for the son of Sultan Qalawun25 and Syrinx von Hees recentarticle on “the guidance for kingdoms” focusing on the writings of Ibn Nubatah

19 Amitai, Mamluks ; Edd�, Kurdes.20 Haarmann, Ideology ; See as well: Fuess, Legends, 141 – 152; Loiseau, Soldiers, (forthcoming).21 Berkey, Culture, 392.22 Loiseau, De l’Asie centrale, 33 – 35.23 Bosworth et al. , Siyasa, 693.24 Fuess, Z

˙ulm.

25 Lewicka, King.

Albrecht Fuess98

al-Mis˙rı (d. 1366), where she describes that Ibn Nubatah, despite being a devout

Muslim, handed out very worldly advice to the prince of Hamah.26 This factearned Ibn Nubatah as well much prominence in Thomas Bauer’s book “DieKultur der Ambiguität”, comparing him more than once with the sixteenthcentury Italian author Niccol� Machiavelli (d. 1527).27

Succession of sultans

Whether a sultan should be chosen on the basis of dynastic line or merit pre-sented a very heavily disputed question in Mamluk times. However, recentpublications have shed more light about the development of this issue. I there-fore propose the following schedule of succession phases during the Mamluksultanate:

Succession Phases of the Mamluk Sultanate:1. “Law of the Turk” phase (1250 – 1310)2. Qalawunid dynastic phase (1310 – 1382)3. Mixed dynastic and meritocratic phase (1382 – 1412)4. Mulk

˘

aqım – phase (regency is infertile) (1412 – 1517)

By law of the Turk (asat al-turk), is meant that the murderer of the old Sultanbecomes the new sultan.28 This is what happened to the Mamluk sultan Qut

˙uz (r.

1259 – 1260), when he was looking for recreation and went on a hunting partyafter the tiresome Mamluk victory against the Mongols in 1260. He was killed inhis tent. “Afterwards the amirs assembled in the royal tent and amir Aqt

˙ay asked:

‘Who did actually kill him’. Baybars replied ‘I killed him’, and then Aqt˙ay said:

‘Oh Lord. Sit down on the throne and take the (sultan’s) place.’”29 This story of amurder in the royal tent (dihlız) narrated by al-Maqrızı does highlight theproblem of public accessibility of Mamluk rulers in the early period of theirreign. It seems thereby that the murder in the royal tent did provide an additionallegitimacy and hence the role of the dihlız as theatre for royal murder or attemptof murder.30 Until the abolishment of the institution of the dihlız as royal tentunder Sultan al-Nas

˙ir Muh

˙ammad b. Qalawun (r. 1293, 1299 – 1309, 1310 – 1341),

three sultans had been killed in the dihlız and two further attempts on sultans’lives, one against al-Nas

˙ir himself, had been made there. For the benefit of

survival, accessibility had to be better canalised and formalised at least to limit

26 Von Hees, Guidance.27 Bauer, Kultur, see here especially 337 – 339 .28 See on the “Law of the Turks” in the Early Mamluk period: Haarmann, Regicide.29 Al-Maqrızı, Al-Suluk, 1/2:435 – 436.30 See for further murders in the dihlız: Fuess, Dihlız.

Mamluk Politics 99

the danger. Yehoshua Frenkel has shown that royal etiquette of the subsequentMamluk period always had the aspect to it to distance the sultan from his peerswhile at court or during travel.31 The succession of Sultan al-Nas

˙ir Muh

˙ammad,

one of the greatest Mamluk sultans, despite being a sultan’s son, marks thebeginning of the Qalawunid dynastic phase. After his rule nine of his sons, twograndsons and two great grandsons were to succeed him in 41 years; this line ofsuccession came to end with Sultan Barquq (r. 1382 – 1389; 1390 – 1399) whodared to declare himself sultan in 1382 without having a Qalawunid legacy. Thesultans of the Qalawunid phase were frequently mere puppets in the hands oftheir powerful elder amirs, though the young sultans at times ruled in-dependently. This was, then, a period of checks and balances between the sultanswho came to power through family line and the different fractions of Mamlukemirs who drew their claim from their personal merits and accomplishments.

The Qalawunid dynastic phase had long been classified as era of decline andchaos due to endemic factional strives among powerful amirs. However, Jo vonSteenbergen has recently shown in his book “Order Out of Chaos” that while acertain degree of disorder was prevailing, the Empire as a whole still continued tofunction rather well on the basis of personal networks.32 When Sultan Barquqfinally ascended the throne in 1382, thereby bringing to an end the Qalawuniddynasty, he, too, tried to establish a family line, his son al-Nas

˙ir Faraj (r. 1399 –

1405; 1405 – 1412) trying his very best to hang on to the power for a decade, untilhis efforts were thwarted by the amirs. He was sentenced to death in 1412, andthis meant the end of the mixed dynastic and meritocratic phase.The slogan “al-mulk

˘aqım” (regency is infertile), which had been used already propagand-

istically against Sultan al-Nas˙ir Muh

˙ammad b. Qalawun at the beginning of the

fourteenth century, became now commonplace.33 The sons of Mamluk sultanscould no longer aspire to real political power. They were just placed on the throneas place holder until the leading amirs had decided upon who should become thenext real sultan from among their peers.

The exact processes behind the sultan-making of the fifteenth century are welldescribed by Henning Sievert in his “Der Herrscherwechsel im Mamlu-kensultanat”. According to Sievert the following three elements were importantfor the legitimacy of a Mamluk sultan in the fifteenth century. First of all was theofficial recognition through the Abbassid puppet caliph of Cairo, secondly the“Islamic” legitimacy as Muslim warrior and keeper of the Holy cities Mecca andMedina and thirdly the legitimacy as an army king (“Heerkönigslegitimation”),which was expressed through the “election of the most successful” (“Wahl des

31 Frenkel, Public Projection, 39.32 Van Steenbergen, Order. See as well: Van Steenbergen, New Era.33 Haarmann, Arabische Osten, 229.

Albrecht Fuess100

Erfolgreichsten”) by his peers.34 This system was carried through to the end ofthe Mamluk sultanate with the exception of one young Sultan’s son, i. e. Sultan al-Nas

˙ir Muh

˘ammad II (r. 1496 – 1498). Already the choice of regal name was

telling. al-Nas˙ir Muh

˙ammad II challenged the authority of the old emirs im-

mediately by introducing new lighter clothing styles which were deemed in-appropriate by the establishment. The old amirs soon responded by wearingeven greater turbans and putting horns into it, thereby trying to resembleAlexander the great (Iskandar) who is often associated with the Dhu al-Qarnaynof the Quran. Finally the old emirs succeeded. The young sultan was killed nearGiza on 31 October 1498.35

Sultan Qans˙uh al-Ghawrı (1501 – 1516), Sultan al-Nas

˙ir Muh

˙ammad II (1496 – 1498)

(Sources: Jean Jacques Boissard, Abbildungen der Türkischen Kayser und PersischenFürsten, Frankfurt 1648, fig. 20 (Qans

˙uh al-Ghawrı)/ Die Pilgerfahrt des Ritters Arnold

von Harff, wie er sie in den Jahren 1496 – 1499 vollendet und durch Zeichnungen erläuterthat, Hildesheim: Olms 2004, 90. (al-Nas

˙ir Muh

˙ammad II))

The sultans’ sons-in-law also played an important role in determining suc-cession. As Mamluk sultans knew that their own male offspring would probablynever rule, it appears to me that they regarded their sons-in-law in some sense astheir political heirs. Through marriage they established strong bonds to leadingrepresentatives of the next generation of Mamluks. We know for example thatSultan Lachin (r. 1296 – 99) was the son-in-law of the great Sultan Baybars.36

Sultan Barsbay (r. 1422 – 1438) was married to Princess Fat˙imah daughter of

34 Sievert, Herrscherwechsel, 81.35 Fuess, Sultans.36 Holt, Crusades, 102.

Mamluk Politics 101

Sultan T˙at

˙ar (r. 1421).37 Sultan Qaytbay (r. 1468 – 1496) and Ah

˙mad (r. 1461) the

son of Sultan Inal were according to Ibn Taghrıbirdı brothers in law,38 but al-Sakhawı states that Qaytbay’s wife Fat

˙imah was in fact the sister of Sultan Inal’s

wife Zaynab.39 And although the exact family bonds in most of these familynetworks still have to be clarified, even with the help of these few examples, onecan assume that marriage networks were apparently of considerable importancein a context where male heritage was not allowed to play the leading role.

Financial administration

Agricultural income was the driving force of Mamluk economy ; according toStuart Borsch, “annual exports to the northern Mediterranean accounted for lessthan two percent of Egypt’s GDP (…) Long-distance trade played a subordinaterole in the overall development of Egypt’s economy.”40 However, agriculturesuffered a considerable blow in the fourteenth century as a result of the BlackDeathl Stuarts Borsch’s comparative study of 2005, “The Black Death in Egyptand England”, offers considerable insights on the different ways that Englandand Egypt coped with the plague. “Where English landholders failed in theirefforts to collectively confront a scarce rural labor market, Egyptian landholderstriumphed brilliantly. The consequences were a disaster for Egypt’s ruraleconomy, the backbone of its economic power.”41 In the fifteenth century Egyptstill suffered from this decay in agricultural output and this was vital for its lackof competitiveness with the Ottomans.

Long distant-trade revived considerably in the fifteenth century, but agri-culture remained the backbone of the economy and was through the iqt

˙a

˘

systemresponsible for the payment of the Mamluk soldiers. Looking at the iqt

˙a

˘

system,Tsugitaka Sato’s work “State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam” from 1997 isstill the main reference on Mamluk agriculture, as it traces the fortunes of theindustry through the land reforms (sg. rawk) of Sultan al-Nas

˙ir Muh

˙ammad I.42

In the fifteenth century former iqt˙a

˘

land was transformed on a large scale intowaqf (endowment)-land.43 Modern research has classified the growing numberof waqf as a de-facto hollowing out of the old iqt

˙a

˘

system, as the privatization of

37 Ibn Taghrıbirdı, Al-Nujum, 6:731; Popper, History, 4:124.38 Ibn Taghrıbirdı, Al-Nujum, 7:684; Popper, History, 7:31.39 Al-Sakhawı, Al-D

˙aw’, 11:245.

40 Borsch, Black Death, 19.41 Ibid., 113.42 Tsugitaka, State.43 For a new publication on waqf in the Mamluk period, see: Reinfandt, Administration.

Albrecht Fuess102

the land developed fast, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, almost halfof the overall cultivatable land was already transformed into waqf-property.44

While the process in itself is undisputed, one cannot help but wonder aboutthe rationale behind the changes driving it. Direct taxation of agriculturalproducts of waqf land meant more cash for the sultans, whereas through the iqt

˙a

˘

system less cash was generated for the royal treasury, as the income went to theMamluk emirs and not the sultan. Moreover the treasury profited in the shortrun from sales of iqt

˙a

˘

land, because an owner had to possess the land beforeturning it into waqf. By the mid-fifteenth century Mamluk sultans would learnthat the successful Ottoman army was paid directly for its services. Financialreforms were mainly undertaken by the last two important sultans Qaytbay (r.1468 – 1496) and Qans

˙uh al-Ghawrı (r. 1501 – 1516) at a time when the Ottoman

threat became virulent. Daisuke Igarashi has shown in a 2009 article on “TheFinancial Reforms of Sultan Qaytbay”, how Qaytbay tried to increase his cashreservoir by removing all unproductive people from the payroll, for example byletting them draw a bow to prove their military abilities.45 In his 2009 book,Francisco Appelaniz has argued as well that Qaytbay was looking for alternativefunding for the military, as the iqt

˙a

˘

-system seemed less and less appropriate forhis military needs. He wanted a greater hand in the army and its financing andneeded more cash for new arms like canons and firearms.46 When Sultan Qans

˙uh

al-Ghawrı took office after an interregnum of five years in 1501, he seemed tocontinue the path outlined by Qaytbay in financial affairs. He used extra tax-ation, large scale confiscations and the sales of offices.47 In the light of this newresearch a question which was posed by Carl Petry already in 1994 might beanswered in the affirmative: “Do all these disparate phenomena, once piecedtogether, reveal a budding master plan by which the iqt

˙a

˘

-system would bescrapped outright once the sultan garnered the means to replace it?”48

Foreign policy

As already stated above, there are recent studies about Mamluk-Mongol rela-tions, whereas for those of the Mamluks with the Crusader states and Byzantiumwe rely mainly on Holt’s “Early Mamluk Diplomacy” from 1995.49 Angus Stewart

44 Reinfandt, Sultansstiftungen, 32 – 36.45 Daisuke, Financial Reforms.46 Apell�niz, Pouvoir et finance, 172.47 Daisuke, Financial Reforms, 50.48 Petry, Protectors, 208 – 209.49 Holt, Mamluk Diplomacy.

Mamluk Politics 103

wrote on the the relations of the Mamluks with the Armenian kingdom.50 Un-fortunately the only book about the Mamluks and Timurids I know of is Su-layman al-Madanı’s “Tımurlank fı Dimashq”.51 The relations among the Mam-luks, Ottomans and Safawids are clearer to me, as I am preparing a studycomparing the three Empires in different aspects of their systems of gover-nance.52

After 1453 and the conquest of Constantinople, Ottoman-Mamluk relationsturned sour, as the Ottomans displayed increasingly their military might. In1464 an Ottoman envoy arrived at the Citadel in Cairo who, acting in a rudemanner, openly challenged Mamluk authority : “And this was the reason for theend of the friendship between the Sultan of Egypt and the Son of ‘Uthman” statesIbn Iyas.53 Further diplomatic quarrels arose. Infamous was the episode of theMamluk exile of Cem, the brother of the Ottoman sultan Bayezıd (r. 1481 – 1512).In 1481 Cem took refuge with the Mamluks. He tried to return to Ottomanterritory with some troops, again sought succour with the Mamluk Sultan, andultimately became the hostage of the pope, who received an annual paymentfrom Bayezıd in order to keep him. Ralph Hattox and Nicolas Vatin have bothwritten some time ago on this episode, making use of Mamluk and Ottomansources, respectively.54 In recent years the Ottoman advance of 1516 and 1517 hascome under scholarly scrutiny. Benjamin Lellouch in 2006 analysed the accountsof Ottoman historians of the conquest of the Mamluk Empire and the beginningof Ottoman rule in Egypt.55 Together with Nicolas Michel he is moreover pre-paring an edited volume under the title: “ConquÞte ottomane de l’�gypte (1517).Impacts et �chos d’un �v�nement majeur.”56

Given the harsh initial stance of the Mamluks against the Crusaders onewould not expect the Mamluks to conclude alliances with a Christian power, butin the second half of the fourteenth century Venice emerged as the main tradingpartner of the Mamluks.57 As I have argued in an article about the Mamluks andCyprus, I would consider the Mamluk Venetian relationship in the fifteenthcentury as a political, and sometimes even military, alliance.58 Cyprus could nothave been possibly subdued during the years 1424 to 1426 without active

50 Stewart, Armenian Kingdom.51 Al-Madanı, Tımurlank. I have not read it myself but it was reviewed by Antrim, Review. The

review, however, is very skeptical about the academic usefulness of the book.52 Fuess, Clash, (forthcoming); For direct Mamluk-Safavid relations we have few scholarly

works apart from the article of Clifford from 1993, see: Clifford, Observations, 245 – 278.53 Ibn Iyas, Bada’i

˘

, 2:420.54 Hattox, Qaytbay’s ; Vatin, Sultan.55 Lellouch, Ottomans.56 Michel, Lellouch, ConquÞte ottomane.57 Fuess, Verbranntes Ufer, 386 – 405.58 Fuess, Cyprus.

Albrecht Fuess104

Venetian “neutrality”, and when Venice inherited Cyprus in 1489 it continued topay the annual tribute and defended Mamluk shores against Frankish piracy.59 Inthe field of commerce, mutual trade agreements and commerce practices be-tween Venice and the Mamluks led Francisco Appelaniz to speak of “une alliancepolitique (des Mamlouks) conclue avec Venise pour subvenir aux besoins fin-anciers.” (“a political alliance of (the Mamluks) concluded with Venice to satisfymutual financial needs”).60

Military

Mamluk rule cannot be understood without reference to its military. Mamlukrulers understood themselves first and foremost as soldiers. To maintain socialstability, they were prepared to invest heavily in the military. By far the largestportion of the budget of the Mamluk treasury went into the military, either bydirect payment, allotment of iqt

˙a

˘

land or by modernizing the military infra-structure and technology.

Important work has been carried out lately on the Mamluks’ military forcesby Israeli scholars. In 2011 Kate Raphael has published a book on Muslimfortresses in the Early Mamluk period.61 It is a detailed account on the archi-tectural settings of twelve fortresses and their sites in the thirteenth century.Moreover, it provides valuable insights into the siege warfare of the period andthe defensive techniques of the Mamluk sultanate vis-�-vis their Mongol andCrusader foes. As I have pointed out in my dissertation “Verbranntes Ufer” andsome subsequent publications, the main aim of the Mamluks after the expulsionof the Crusaders from the Syro-Palestinian coast in 1291 was to prevent theirreturn, and to that end they destroyed the harbours there and transferred the lineof defence inland.62 I classified this strategy as a cornerstone of the overall navalpolicy of the Mamluks, who acknowledged their inferiority on the seas, espe-cially in the first 150 years of their reign. In this context Sultan Baybars wrote toHugh III of Lusignan, the king of Cyprus: “Your horses are ships, but our shipsare horses”.63 I have been recently criticized by Vasilios Christides, who hasdescribed the later Mamluk period, specifically the Mamluk expeditions againstCyprus of the 1420s and following interventions in Cypriot internal affairs to1460, as a period of “formidable sea power”. He bases his analysis on the alleged

59 Fuess, Cyprus, 19 – 21.60 Apell�niz, Pouvoir et Finance, 239.61 Raphael, Muslim Fortresses.62 Fuess, Verbranntes Ufer ; Idem, Rotting Ships.63 Ibn

˘

Abd al-Z˙ahir, Al-Rawd

˙, 376 – 377.

Mamluk Politics 105

size and the different ship types described in the Arabic sources.64 However,while I am willing to re-discuss the use of the term “hydrophobic”, which Iemployed previously in the context of Mamluk naval policy, I still would like touphold that this active period of Mamluk naval activity, which dates roughlyfrom 1420 to 1460, does not allow to speak of an overall Mamluk maritimesuccess story, as the conquest of Cyprus and the attacks against Rhodes couldnot have happened without the complaisant neutrality of the Italian seafearingnations (especially Venice). I also would classify the descriptions of ships incontemporary Arab sources as exaggerated and relying on older passages ofclassical works on seafaring: one contemporary European source describes theMamluk fleet of 1426 as consisting of better nutshells.65 In the context of themilitary furusıyah exercises of the Mamluk soldiers Shihab al-Sharraf discussesMamluk furusıyah literature in an article of Mamluk Studies Review from 2004.66

Recently Amalia Levanoni has asked, why the Mamluk auxiliary force of theh˙

alqah was not completely disbanded when it largely fell out of use in thefourteenth century?67 She then explains this phenomenon by the flexible func-tion the h

˙alqah had even in later periods. While there were the poor and un-

trained soldiers in the h˙

alqah, it also included full Mamluk soldiers who mightcome from defeated factions of the Mamluk establishment and could be assignedto the h

˙alqah before re-entering other army units. The h

˙alqah even served as a

tool to balance the relationship of Mamluk sultans towards their amirs. At timesMamluks of amirs were excluded from the h

˙alqah. Therefore the halqah rep-

resented an important buffer zone of Mamluk military patronage.

64 Christides, Mamluk Navy, 371, 385.65 Piloti, L’Egypte, 108 – 109.66 Al-Sharaf, Furusıyah.67 Levanoni, H

˙alqah.

Albrecht Fuess106

Mamluks practicing the qabaq (pumpkin) game, Egypt, 1470 (Source: Paris, Biblioth�que Na-tionale, MS Arabe 282, Ibn Akhı Khuzam, Kitab al-makhzun jami

˘

al-funun, fol. 28.)

Mamluk Politics 107

Ottomans and Mamluk horseriders fighting at Marj Dabiq (1516) (Source: Khodja Efendi, Selimnama, Paris, Biblioth�que Nationale, suppl�ment turc 524, fol. 159.)

Albrecht Fuess108

For the remainder of this section, I will briefly discuss military aspects of mycurrent research which concerns firearms and wagenburgs.68 The Mamlukmilitary downfall is often explained away by the Mamluks’ refusal to use fire-arms. This line of interpretation can be clearly traced back to David Ayalon andhis classical work “Gunpowder and Firearms”.69 He bases his affirmation es-pecially on the Egyptian author of the 16th century Ibn Zunbul, who died in 982/1574. Ibn Zunbul cites, for example, the Mamluk amir Kurtbay, who exclaims tothe Ottoman Sultan Selım (r. 1512 – 1520) after his capture: “How dare you shootfire at those who profess the unity of god and the sending of Muh

˙ammad.”70

However, Robert Irwin has already challenged the Ayalon thesis based on the factthat Ibn Zunbul is more of a literary than a historical source. Moreover, Ayalonignored, or downplayed, the frequent reference to firearms in Mamluk sources atthe beginning of the sixteenth century.71

Ayalon further argued that one never finds a high ranking Mamluk in the listof those who fight with firearms.72 Of course, at the beginning of the sixteenthcentury no cavalry in the world fought with firearms. These arms were ex-clusively reserved for the infantry. Guns were simply not suited to be carried andloaded on horses at that time. It would constitute a considerable waste of moneyand manpower to have the highly trained professional Mamluk cavaliers leavingtheir bows, to descend from their horses just to take up firearms which any mencould cope with after some initial training.73 When horsemen fought at thebeginning of the sixteenth century they did not use firearms.

And although Ayalon downplays the emergence of canons and firearms in theMamluk army, canons were well known in the Mamluk Empire since the four-teenth century. Still, no signs of Mamluk guns can be traced until the Ottoman-Mamluk war of 1485 – 1491, when the Mamluks met for the first time largenumbers of Ottoman Janissary musketeers in military encounters in Cilicia.74

The immediate results of the war were the appearances of infantry units carryingguns in the Mamluk army. Ibn Iyas attributes the first use of rifles (al-bunduq al-ras

˙as˙) to the reign of Sultan Qaytbay (r. 1468 – 1496), during the Ottoman-

Mamluk conflict of 1490, when Qaytbay did send awlad al-nas and other soldiersequipped with guns to the front. After having shown in a public display to the

68 See therefore as well: Fuess, Janissaires, 209 – 227.69 Ayalon, Gunpowder.70 Ibn Zunbul, Akhirat, 139 – 140, 217; See for Ibn Zunbul as well: Moustafa-Hamouzova,

Ottoman, 187 – 206.71 Robert Irwin, Gunpowder, 117 – 139; Petry, Protectors, 195.72 Ayalon, Gunpowder, 69, 73.73 Chase, Firerarms, 24.74 See for the Ottoman-Mamluk war of 1485 – 1491: Har-El, Struggle.

Mamluk Politics 109

sultan their newly acquired expertise, they were sent off to the North.75 There-after guns are increasingly mentioned by Mamluk authors. Famous are theefforts to build infantry units using firearms like the infantry corps of blackslaves by Sultan al-Nas

˙ir Muh

˙ammad II (r. 1496 – 1498)76 and the well known “al-

t˙abaqah al-khamisah” (“the fifth troop”) under Sultan Qans

˙uh al-Ghawrı (r.

1501 – 1516).77 These efforts were modeled around the janissary troops of theOttomans. Moreover, Miura Toru has counted 45 references to Mamluk infantryunits conscribed from the residents of Damascus in the works of the Damascenehistorian Ibn T

˙ulun. Although in only two cases are guns specifically mentioned,

Toru argues that in that period the Mamluk army included more and moreinfantry elements, and guns had become a common weapon for the infantrycorps.78

What is remarkable in this context is that successful military technology wasadopted as soon as it was encountered in battle. A case in point is the wagenburg.The first to use these tactics were the famous Hussites in Czechia in the 1420sagainst German and Hungarian imperial troops. The wagenburg protection wasessential for soldiers using the first generation of guns and cannons, as they hadto be defended from attacks of the cavalry and archers of the enemy : firearmswere still very slow to prepare and fire. In Middle and Western Europe gun menwere usually protected by large infantry units using pikes, the famous “Land-sknechte”.79

The Hungarians used it then against the Ottomans. The Mamluks perceivedthe Ottoman wagenburg the first time in the Battle of Marj Dabiq. The Ottomanwagenburg, with its chained chariots, presented for the Mamluks a formidableobstacle. Ibn T

˙ulun counted thirty wagons (

˘

arabah) and twenty fortresses onwheels (qal

˘

atun

˘

ala

˘

ajalin), when the Ottomans entered Damascus the autumnof 1516. He remarked that the chariots were chained together and resembled afortified wall. For him this clearly showed the might of the Ottoman sultan, andwhen all canons were fired at the same time the inhabitants of Damascus thoughtthat the sky would fall on their heads.80

The Mamluks apparently made use of guns and canons for defense but did notpossess armed chariots in order to build a wagenburg. However, just after theMamluk defeat in Syria, the new Sultan T

˙uman Bay tried to imitate the Ottoman

75 Ibn Iyas, Bada’i

˘

, 3:269.76 Holt, Crusades, 198.77 According to Ayalon the name “fifth troop” is related to the fact that its members received

their payments on another day then the four usual days of payments of the Mamluk troops,Ayalon, Gunpowder, 71 – 83.

78 Toru, Urban, 170.79 Jones, Art of war, 191.80 Ibn T

˙ulun, Mufakahat, 2:30, 31, 34.

Albrecht Fuess110

tactics. He ordered that 100 chariots and canons be brought to the battlefield atal-Raydanıya, where the Mamluks waited for the Ottomans but lost anotherbattle in January of 1517.81 Tuman Bay fled, but was apprehended later andhanged in the April of 1517.82 One has to remark in that context that the wa-genburg was one of the most successful military technology transfers of the 15th

and 16th centuries. The Safavids and Mamluks copied the Ottoman wagenburg.Sultan Tuman Bay, immediately after the defeat of Marj Dabiq, and Shah Isma

˘

ılordered the construction of fifty chariots with canons after the Ottoman modelthat had fallen into the River Araks during the Ottoman Safavid war of 1514.83 In1528 the Safavid wagenburg was used to conquer their Eastern foe, the Uzbeks, atthe battle of Cam.84 In 1526 the Mughal Emperor Babur inflicted with the wa-genburg a great defeat on his Indian enemies at the battle of Panipat. His militarycommander, a man called Mus

˙t˙afa Rumı, arranged the chained chariots in the

“Ottoman style”.85

Hussite wagenburg, 15th century (Source: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, VienneCod. 3062, in: Bert S Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe. Gunpowder, Tech-nology, and Tactics, Baltimore 1997, 109.)

81 Ibn Iyas, Bada’i

˘

, 5:87, 134, 145 – 148.82 Ibid., 176.83 Bacqu�-Grammont, Les Ottomans, 165 – 166.84 Ibid., 174.85 Babur, Baburnama, 323, 379.

Mamluk Politics 111

In about a century the Hussite wagenburg had made its way from CentralEurope to South Asia. Successful technology wanders around and is transferred.The early sixteenth century is just a case in point. It was not beyond the chiv-alrous sensitivities of the Mamluks to use firearms, as Ayalon has argued. TheMamluks had a military mind which was trained to defend the Empire at any costand so they did. Therefore the problem of the Mamluks was not that they wouldnot introduce the new weapons, but due to the scarcity of resources and othergeopolitical factors they just could not obtain enough of them to compete withtheir great Ottoman foe.

Conclusion

The last decade has witnessed a growing interest among Mamluk specialists inthe Mamluk polity. There are noticeable gaps in the scholarship, but they mightbe closed as paradigms of research shift and new questions raised. One area ofpotential growth is in Mamluk-Crusader relations, which would still benefitfrom new impulses. For too long, the waning years of Mamluk rule received littleattention. Today, however, the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries are at-tracting many scholars, who are challenging traditional assumptions aboutMamluk decline and decadence, and demonstrating ways in which the Mamlukswere active in reforming their realm and administration in order to fulfill theirduty as a ruler, i. e. preserving the status quo for their flock. That was the mainaim of their policy.

Albrecht Fuess112

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