Mexican Drug Cartels and their Australian Connections: Tracking and Disrupting Dark Networks

The Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence

Offi cers

a national journal

Volume 24, Number 1 | 2016 | ISSN 1039-1525

The AIPIO Journal

Managing EditorMs Rebecca Vogel | Intelligence Lecturer, Department of Security Studies and Criminology (SSC), Macquarie University

Editorial BoardMr Jeff Corkill | Edith Cowan UniversityDr William Costanza | Department of Forensic and Legal Psychology, Marymount University, VirginiaProfessor Anthony Glees | Director, Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS), The University of BuckinghamDr Joseph Gordon | National Intelligence University, Washington, DCDr Victoria Harrington | Australian Institute for Police ManagementProfessor William Hutchinson | Edith Cowan UniversityDr Jolene Jerard | International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research, Nanyang Technological University, SingaporeDr Philip Kowalick | AIPIO President, Adjunct Senior Lecturer, Law School, University of New England, Armidale, NSWDr Mark M Lowenthal | President of the Intelligence and Security Academy, Arlington, VirginiaAssociate Professor Stephen Marrin | James Madison University, VirginiaDr Stephen McCombie | Advanced Cyber Defense Practice, RSAAssociate Professor Nick O'Brien | Head of School, Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt UniversityAssociate Professor Felix Patrikeff | Adelaide UniversityAdjunct Professor Brett Peppler | Department of Security Studies and Criminology (SSC), Macquarie UniversityDr Hank Prunckun | Charles Sturt UniversityProfessor Karl Roberts, Chair and Professor of Policing and Criminal Justice | University of Western SydneyAssociate Professor James A Veitch | Massey UniversityDr Grant Wardlaw | Australian National UniversityDr Patrick F Walsh | Charles Sturt UniversityDr Ian Wing | The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and ResearchDr Caroline Ziemke-Dickens | Intelligence and global security analyst, Wellington, New Zealand

Editorial correspondence and all manuscripts should be emailed to the managing editors. Manuscripts should be emailed as Word or RTF attachments. Email: [email protected]

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Journal of the AIPIO | 2016 | Volume 24, Number 1

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ISSN 1039-1525

The Journal ofthe Australian Institute ofProfessional Intelligence Offi cersa national journal

Volume 24, Number 1 2016

Contents

ArticleLeading and Managing Intelligence OrganizationsPeter C. Oleson and Tony Cothron . . . . . . . 3

Mexican Drug Cartels and their Australian Connections: Tracking and Disrupting Dark NetworksDr Anthea McCarthy-Jones, University of Canberra and Dr Daniel Baldino, University of Notre Dame, Fremantle . . . . . 19

Practitioner’s perspectiveAnalysis and Infl uence in Combat IntelligenceJames Ellis-Smith . . . . . . . . . 34

Book ReviewUnderstanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past experience, future outlook, and response strategiesReviewed by Douglas Fry . . . . . . . . 43

AIPIO Journal Instructions to Authors . . . . . . . . . 48


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Leading and Managing Intelligence OrganizationsPeter C. Oleson and Tony Cothron

AbstractOur focus is on the special characteristics of leading and managing an intelligence organization. Not only must intelligence leaders provide timely, relevant and predictive intelligence, they must navigate the incredible complexity of laws, global technology, interagency politics, an evolving workforce, and dynamic threats. Intelligence is employed by many constituencies, including law enforcement and private sector corporations. In any organization, it is a specialized function that adds value by providing decision advantage to leaders and members of the organization.

Leaders must both shape an organization and simultaneously manage the work of an organization. The intelligence leader must anticipate change and how to adapt to new tasking while still working on existing tasks. Large organizations are highly resistant to change. Effective intelligence leaders must motivate the organization to evolve and decide what old tasks cannot be done, and convey the consequent risk to intelligence users.

Leadership is often confused with management to the detriment of both. This article examines the various functions of management — the multiple aspects of planning; organizing, especially the human capital; directing the many interdependent parts; and controlling operations — and how they must be done holistically, addressing not only the organization, but also the people and resources, processes, and organizational culture.

Keywords: Intelligence, leadership, management

IntroductionOnce the exclusive purview of the nation state, intelligence is now employed by many constituencies, including law enforcement and private sector corporations. Intelligence, from a policy maker or operational user standpoint, can only provide positive infl uence on decision making when it is timely, relevant and predictive. Any successful intelligence organization must possess individuals who understand not only the threats, but the special needs of leading and managing the dynamic processes of organizations, technologies, and people involved in collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence.


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Intelligence, in any organization, is a specialized function that adds value by providing leaders decision advantage (MacGaffi n and Oleson, 2015). Leadership is often confused with management to the detriment of both, according to business professor J. Thomas Wren (Wren, 1995).

Intelligence leaders must guide an organization's development, manage its work, and simultaneously "sell" the value of intelligence to customers, An old, but true, saying among senior intelligence professionals is that everyone wants great intelligence but no one wants to pay for it or has time for it. The intelligence leader must develop close relationships with his managers and customers, anticipating their needs while continuously shaping and evolving the capacity of his organization to produce timely, relevant intelligence for decision makers. Effective intelligence leaders recognize the need to transition to new tasks ahead of demand and to motivate the organization to change. An important element of the intelligence leader’s role is also in deciding, after adjusting tasking, what old tasks cannot be done and conveying that risk to superiors.

Management of intelligence The various functions of management – planning, organizing, directing, and controlling – must be done holistically.

Whether one defi nes intelligence as knowledge, a process, a product, an organization, or an activity the management of intelligence is similar to management in other fi elds. A manager sets out to accomplish his goals by orchestrating the resources s/he has available. These include fi nancial, physical, and human resources. The basic functions of management are well documented (Shell, 2002) and include:

Planning. This includes determining the vision and identifying the functions of the organization (the what) and planning how they will be performed (the how). Included are also the where and when of the organization’s activities. At more senior levels of management planning for the resources and manpower needed is a major responsibility (the wherewithal).

Organizing. This involves establishing the structure of the organization and who does what, including the boundaries of responsibilities, and procedures.

Directing. This involves guiding (and in some cases steering) the organization’s collaborative activities through communication, development of policies and guidelines.

Controlling. The mechanisms for a manager to control organizational activities involve oversight, feedback and evaluation.


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Thomas Edison is often quoted as saying that “leadership without execution is hallucination”. Within an organization, execution must be led and managed. One model that incorporates the role of leadership and management and used by one of the authors in leading large intelligence organizations is in Figure 1. The four quadrants represent all the elements of a typical organization with the circle representing the mission. The leader’s key role is to set the vision, the direction for the organization and then manage and align each of the quadrants towards that vision. The utility of this model is in reminding the leader not to fall in to the trap of just focusing on the organizational diagram and people. The capacity of the organization for output is refl ected in the bottom two quadrants. Process is how work actually gets done and Culture is best understood as the sum of “Standard Operating Procedures” carried out over time. Any leader intending to “change the culture” and who does not cause activities to change, is not affecting the culture of an organization. Process and Culture are at the core of how any organization works and what it believes in, and these change only over time.

For intelligence leaders, the dynamics of new threats, new technology, new collection sources, “big data” and the new tools of advanced information technology, as well as the ever changing needs of decision makers, result in the need for frequently adjusting course and paying close attention to all four quadrants to ensure success.

Figure 1. A leadership model: taking a comprehensive view. (Source: US Naval War College.)


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The four functions of intelligence managementLeadership without management will fail. Management without leadership is also unlikely to succeed. The four fundamental functions of management (planning, organizing, directing, and controlling) are both sequential and looped; that is controlling, which involves feedback mechanisms, should infl uence subsequent planning for change, as necessary.

Planning for intelligencePlanning has many aspects. It can be the most complex and diffi cult of functions because of its multiple parameters.

While planning is the initial function to be accomplished, a manager at any level in an organization must know where he is headed in order to plan effectively. He must know his mission and his goals and, with a vision of how he wants to organization to evolve, the leader develops a strategy. The focus on strategy must be not on the goals, but on understanding available resources and determining how they can best be used to meet the goals. The best way to look at strategy is to use the defi nition “Ends, Means and Way” where ends are the goals, means are the resources and way is what you do with what you have. The most successful organizations focus on and adjust what they are doing with what they have and with a constant focus on goals. Former professor William Manthorpe wrote:

Accomplishing or achieving “goals” means something beyond accomplishing the daily mission. Goals are where the organization or people want to be or what they want to be doing in the future. The goals are set well in advance. For example, in the [US] Intelligence Community, goals must be set to guide the planning, programming and budgeting process, which has a 2-5 year lead-time. The military planning process is likewise long term. Goals imply aspiring to something beyond that which now exists – i.e., preparing the organization to accomplish the mission against new challenges in a way that is different or better than that which is being done now. So to achieve goals means leading change. Leaders must recognize the need for change and lead people to accept the need to change and bring change to the organization. Change is hard but not impossible to accomplish. To successfully lead change a leader should recognize that, although it is a common belief, it is not true that people hate change and always resist it. By way of example, consider how we have all accepted and adopted great changes in technology. We have done so because those changes have brought us the benefi ts of making our lives more secure and our daily lives easier


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or better and we have been able to accommodate to those changes on our own terms and schedule and with fairly good certainty that once we buy the product we can get it to work. Thus, actually people:

• Just hate and resist change when they don’t know what the outcome will be.• Just hate and resist change imposed from above.• Just hate change that brings them no benefi ts.• Just hate and resist drastic, rapid change.• Just hate and resist change that seems to be change for change sake (Manthorpe, 2010).

Machiavelli advised the leaders of his day in The Prince, writing:

It must be considered that there is nothing more diffi cult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profi t by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in those who would profi t by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly....from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything until they have had actual experience from it.

Ron Heifi tz and Lawrence Lindsey have warned leaders of today:

To lead is to live dangerously because when leadership counts, when you lead people through diffi cult change, you challenge what people hold dear—their daily habits, tools, loyalties and ways of thinking—with nothing more to offer perhaps than a possibility. People push back when you disturb the personal and institutionalized equilibrium they know. And people resist in all kinds of creative and unexpected ways that can get you taken out of the game, pushed aside, undermined or eliminated (Heifi tz and Lindsay, undated)1

So the initial step of planning is a challenging one.

Vision and Mission statements The critical fi rst step in planning is the determination and articulation of a vision. Without this it is impossible to communicate to managers or subordinates what the overarching goals of the organization are. This is a challenge at all organizational levels. General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), has stated that it is important to convince your subordinates that your vision is their vision. That means giving them a stake,


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creating ‘buy-in’ so they also have personal ownership of the policy. This is how to get results without ‘micromanaging’ (Woodward, 2010).2

Planning Organizational Missions and FunctionsOne important aspect of planning an organization’s mission and functions is to ensure their uniqueness. If an organization is perceived to be similar to another, even in another agency, it may be viewed as duplicative and, therefore, wasteful of taxpayer’s dollars. This is true at all levels of government. In times of constrained budgets, fi nancial managers may act without full understanding of the circumstances or rationale underlying an organization’s existence. The leader should ensure that his organization’s mission is well justifi ed, well publicized (at least to those who have a need-to-know, if classifi ed), and well differentiated from other’s missions. While private sector organizations are not dependent upon taxpayer dollars, the same principal holds true. A dollar of cost is not a dollar of profi t. Overlap in missions and functions can lead to managerial challenges related to collaboration, sharing, de-confl iction of operations, and other activities.

Planning operationsPlanning operations requires considering many factors: objectives, capabilities, resources, constraints, legal issues, and more. Perhaps the two most challenging aspects are (a) determining options to achieve one’s objectives most effectively and/or effi ciently, and (b) developing implementation plans to guide all the disparate players who are involved in the operation.

In most intelligence organizations the principal operation is analysis. Planning for analysis involves many unknowns. Analysis is an intellectual endeavor that often defi es deadlines and leads in unanticipated directions. As analysis is an intellectual process, imagination and innovation are important qualities for a manager to foster.

Resource PlanningResources involve physical assets, money, and people. Physical assets already exist. Money can purchase future assets or capabilities. People can perform future tasks. As a manager is expected to accomplish his goals or objectives through coordinating the efforts of others, one of the principal responsibilities of a manager is to obtain the necessary resources. In all venues this requires careful planning. “One of the prerequisites for effective intelligence analysis anywhere and for any purpose is the availability of necessary resources – appropriately trained personnel, funds, and equipment” (McDowell, 2009).

A manager must know what resources exist and what is required to accomplish his mission. If a resource defi cit exists, the impact on the mission and the resulting


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On a Saturday morning in January 2002 at RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom, as Commander of the US European Command’s (USEUCOM) Joint Analysis Center (JAC), and a Navy captain, I was working through a backlog of emails when I ran across an oblique reference to discussions of changes to the Department of Defense Unifi ed Command Plan (UCP) (DoD, April 17,2002). While aware of the proposed UCP changes and the implication that they would give important new operational responsibilities to USEUCOM, in the hectic months since taking command a few weeks prior to the attacks of 9/11 I had not focused on the implications of the UCP change on intelligence responsibilities.

What followed that early January “wakeup call” was an immediate action plan and months of energetic work to get approval for the resources that would be needed to implement the work required by the new responsibilities.

My key concern was not the scope or size of the intelligence tasks. Intimately familiar from previous tours and experience with the substance of the work, my concern was that I was late to the “budget game” of getting approval for the resources – people, dollars, equipment – needed to accomplish the new mission. While supporting existing missions, I had to develop and brief the resource needs for the new mission and implement a plan to begin all new the tasks well before 1 October. There was a very short window – only a couple of months – and a long list of key decision makers to convince in order to have any chance of getting new resources and to ensure readiness for the new tasks.

In mid-September, came the offi cial notifi cation. Nearly all of the requested resources and new billets had been approved! After a few minutes to congratulate the team for its important victory in the resources battle, I reminded everyone that they would not actually see any of these new resources for at least six months.

The next day, I returned to the preparations for support to a different Combatant Commander, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and what would be the invasion of Iraq. Where would the resources come from for those new combat support tasks? When would I pull people from existing tasks and what level of risk would I have to convey to my boss at USEUCOM, his peers and other superiors in the U.S. and, most importantly, the supported operational commanders, who were counting on the JAC for intelligence support?

operational risk must be made known to the customers. Every organization has a budget planning process. Understanding the managerial process of allocating funds (or reallocating them during the budget period) is essential as illustrated in the following actual practical example.

Table 1. A “War Story” from Rear Admiral Cothron.


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Besides planning for resources a manager must be prepared to defend the resources already allocated to his activities at any moment. Financial managers (e.g., comptrollers) are always seeking unused, and therefore available, funds to apply to higher priorities in the organization. This often occurs quickly. If the operational manager is unprepared to defend his resources his ability to affect the decision is forfeited.

Often before funds will be approved for an activity or operation senior managers want to understand precisely how funds will be spent. This requires the development of an implementation plan and an accompanying spending plan.

Knowing what resources already exist that could apply to one’s mission extends beyond the boundaries of a manager’s own agency. This is true in government and the private sector. Senior fi nancial managers will question requests for resources that appear to duplicate a capability that exists in another program or agency. Resource planners conduct “crosswalks” across programs to identify and eliminate (or justify) apparent duplication of efforts. A manager who advocates for a duplicative capability is often disappointed when fi nal budget decisions are made. Therefore, a manager should seek how he can leverage another’s existing capability to his own mission’s benefi t.

Planning for Human CapitalPlanning for human capital is fundamental for management, especially in fi elds like intelligence that depend upon a skilled and trained workforce. Managers must plan for recruitment of new talent, the retention of existing, trained personnel, and for succession of expertise in critical jobs to account for personnel loss or turnover. Education and training often are highlighted as necessary investments for intelligence personnel. The opportunity for advanced training is an important incentive for retaining talent in an organization.

A leader’s principal organizing responsibility is the selection and training of subordinate leaders. One problem highlighted by a former chief personnel offi cer is the tendency to equate technical competence (that is, subject matter expertise) with leadership potential. This is hardly a recipe for success. Leading and management skills as well as knowledge of the intelligence discipline are key qualities to identify in any potential candidate to fi ll key organizational positions.

Acquisition PlanningUnderstanding and managing the acquisition process is critical to ensuring future success of an organization. The U.S. Intelligence Community today, and even more so in the future, is highly dependent upon contractor support for everything from highly technical sensors and applications to analysts and maintainers of the complex


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information technology environment. Progress and key breakthroughs in diffi cult or fast developing intelligence problems are always best obtained when the intelligence operations, systems and acquisition personnel are working closely together with industry. Leadership is critical for acquisition. Leaders and managers at all levels need to plan carefully to bring to bear the right skilled personnel and the resources necessary for the envisioned program. Discipline needs to be imposed and enforced on the system requirements process. And strict controls need to be designed and implemented to ensure that managers know quickly of technical or resource problems that will affect success.

OrganizingThis involves establishing the structure of the organization and who does what, including the boundaries of responsibilities, and procedures.

There are many organizational models. Depending on mission, the leader of an organization will choose one or another model. The fundamental choice is between a centralized or decentralized model. A centralized model tends to push decision making up the chain of command. The opposite is true for a decentralized model.

One model is the unitary organization. That is the traditional hierarchical structure best illustrated by a corporation with a chief executive offi cer to whom senior vice presidents report. Vice presidents report to senior vice presidents. Directors report to vice presidents (VP), and so forth. The structure is formal with defi ned lines of responsibility. The hierarchy of managers is often described as a “ladder.” Historically the military services had such a structure. Automotive manufacturing companies are another example.

The second model is the matrix organization, which is a more horizontal structure, and is characteristic of many large engineering fi rms. In such fi rms the VP for engineering may be in charge of all engineers, but assigns them to work on various programs according to the needs of the individual programs. Matrix organizations have become more prevalent with the Information Age.

The third is a hybrid approach, which may exhibit characteristics of both a hierarchical organization and a matrix organization or neither.

Some organizations can have a very fl uid management model. Google is described as an “adhocracy.” As an entrepreneurial organization, which has had rapid growth, it would be impossible for Google to have a management structure like a government organization (nor could the government emulate Google). One fundamental point to keep in mind is that being a private entity a corporation measures its success


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or failure by its profi t and losses (P&L). P&L is a wonderful, universal metric for companies. Government organizations obviously don't have the same. Of course, because the Intelligence Community is a government entity, its organization, mission, and functions, as well as many policies and procedures, are determined by politics.

Another successful organizational model developed and highlighted by General Stan McChrystal in his book Team of Teams is worthy of consideration for intelligence missions.3 McChrystal analyzes the history of modern management and organization in the context of his own efforts to respond to the threat from the new and highly dynamic Al Qaida in Iraq that resulted in dramatic changes in Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operations and in how his command leveraged, utilized and integrated with the Intelligence Community. McChrystal realized that the availability and reach of 21st Century information technology and the Al Qaida organizational model were enabling the enemy to move faster and have greater strategic impact than his highly trained and equipped special forces. His solution focused on exceptional levels of cross-organizational sharing and integration while also pushing responsibility far down the chain of command (McChrystal, 2015)

Deciding whether a centralized, decentralized or a more modern “Team of Teams” model is best for the mission is a fundamental choice a leader and manager must make.

DirectingThis involves guiding (and in some cases steering) the organization’s collaborative activities through communication, development of policies and guidelines.

Clear written and oral communication is critical to effective direction. This is the function essential to the implementation of both plans and organizational guidelines. As Professor Manthorpe states: “[T]o successfully introduce and lead change, the leader must describe the intended results of the change in specifi c terms and set goals that are clearly achievable [emphasis added]” (Manthorpe, 2010).

The leader will set and affect the culture of the organization through the direction of activities over time. The policies for the organization should be explicit as to what is expected of the workforce in terms of ethics, behavior, priorities, and approaches to accomplish the mission. This includes setting and communicating the standards for teamwork, safety and security, among other topics. A common military practice when assuming command is to publish a Commander’s Philosophy or Command Guidance. Typically only a single page, the Commander’s Philosophy sets the tone and lets everyone know what the new leader believes is important. For a Commander’s published Philosophy to be of any value, of course, the leader’s actions and activities have to refl ect the published words.


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ControllingControlling an organization is like steering a sailboat. When wind conditions change the skipper has to adjust the rudder to stay on course. To do this, of course, the skipper has to sense what has changed. This requires that the manager in an organization maintain oversight of his domain and develop feedback mechanisms that allow him to know when to adjust the rudder or sails. Communication channels must function both ways – down the organization from the manager and feedback up the organization. This requires that a manager be open to listening to subordinates and especially to bad news.

An interesting aspect of feedback is its motivational factor. Subordinates often yearn for recognition that they are doing their jobs well. For a manager (and especially a leader) providing positive feedback is important. Positive feedback is important even if the subordinate has screwed up. He or she will already know that. What they need to know is how to do better in the future. Feedback focused on lessons learned is useful for the subordinate. It is also motivating.

The U.S. is a nation of laws, which apply to the intelligence fi eld as they do to every other endeavor. For managers of intelligence activities at every level understanding the boundaries established by laws and regulations is an important component of controlling the organization. A challenge for the manager or overseer of business intelligence activities is the myriad of laws and regulations at all levels of government and across jurisdictions that may apply to corporate activities. What may be acceptable in Delaware may not be in San Jose, California. What may be acceptable in the U.S. may not be in the Republic of Korea or China. Failure to adhere to the law is a management failure to properly control the activities of an organization and is rarely excusable.

Oversight is a managerial control mechanism. At the federal level it is an important check and balance mechanism between the branches of government. In government and business it is a fundamental tool for managers to understand progress, detect problems, and be able to re-plan, reorganize, and re-direct an organization’s activities, as necessary.

A leader or manager must know if he is succeeding. How can he know if his vision is achievable or plan is being met? Measuring effectiveness is not easy. Many activities do not lend themselves to easy quantifi cation or measurement. A good example of setting a goal that could be measured came from President John F. Kennedy in his speech before a joint session of Congress on May 25, 1961: “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man


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on the moon and returning him safely to the earth” (NASA (May 24, 2004). Kennedy established three metrics – landing on the moon, returning safely, and within a specifi c timeframe. The resulting Apollo program at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was noted for its quantitative management metrics.

How does one measure the effectiveness of intelligence? A former executive director for the Intelligence Community wrote:

Intelligence is the simplest job in government. Our sole job is to know what our enemies don’t want us to know. Data are fi ne, information is better; if knowledge can’t be produced from the information we have failed… If the nation / leaders / decision makers are surprised we have failed… If intelligence knows what is going to happen but is unable to tell the story in a convincing enough manner that the decisions makers do something about it, we have failed (Haver, 2010).

Haver’s standards are fi ne, but how does one measure them? Are they quantifi able? This is the fundamental problem in measuring intelligence. Its benefi ts often are observable only indirectly. In counterterrorism the detention or elimination of a known terrorist or the foiling of a specifi c plot are easy metrics. A successful terrorist attack is also an easy metric of failure. Certain intelligence coups are metrics of success. For instance, a penetration of one’s adversary by an agent, or infi ltration of a gang by a confi dential informant, is a metric of success, especially as the deep penetration of the enemy is the prime objective of any intelligence service.

As intelligence can be viewed as a process, metrics can and should be employed at every step of the process (i.e., the “intelligence cycle”) to understand where the resources and assets are being used. Output from sensors must be evaluated to determine what requirements are not being met. The number and levels of analysts assigned to various problem sets must be determined and continuously reassessed based on the prioritization of customer demands, available sensor collection and the ability of the analysts. Short and long term storage of data must be constantly measured and the need for additional or newer information technology must be identifi ed, programmed for, and installed.

The most important set of metrics must be focused on the decision makers. How, when and where is the organization “touching” the customer? Are we infl uencing decisions? What feedback is being received? The constant question to be answered revolves around how can the entire organization’s capacity for providing decision advantage be expanded to meet the highest number and most important problems? In an article entitled “Determining measures of success,” Neil Simon, a business consultant, writing


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for intelligence professionals posits “the point to remember is that your sponsors and customers determine your success: being successful as a unit means identifying their expectations and meeting their needs (Simon, 1998). The ultimate assessment of intelligence as to its value has to come from clients and consumers of intelligence.

Understanding "outcomes" through measures of effectiveness or performance is important for operational managers. Without these, there is no rational basis for applying resources to competing needs. There is always greater demand for intelligence than there is capability. Partly, this is due to the fact that the clients and consumers of intelligence do not have to pay for it directly. The costs are indirect and largely invisible to those who demand to receive intelligence support. The manager of intelligence, therefore, has to allocate his resources (or capability) judiciously and with agility. Rationing scarce resources requires understanding where one can get the “most bang for the buck.” Generally, in the intelligence business, people are the most important resource and tracking closely what, where and how people are affecting intelligence capacity is critical. Metrics are also important in answering the question “when is enough enough?”

The real impact of metrics is that they impose a discipline on managers that is important. Remember Warren Buffett's observation: "Lacking ... standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands” (Matthews, 2011). Over time this is a recipe for failure.

Protecting sources and methods versus opennessFor a leader and manager in intelligence, security is and must be a central issue. Failure to maintain security for sensitive activities can lead to their failure, and worse. Sharing of information requires a measure of openness. Security, on the other hand, requires protecting the identity of sources and the methods used for information gathering and analysis. There is a fundamental friction between security and sharing. The classifying of information and restricting its dissemination are two age-old approaches to ensuring secrecy.

One of the long-standing cultural issues that have impeded intelligence sharing is the ownership concept. Agencies that collected intelligence data exercised close supervision over its dissemination, sharing and use. CIA controlled human source intelligence through a caveat of “Originator Controlled,” or ORCON, which meant that CIA had to give permission for the intelligence to be disseminated further or shared with persons not previously approved to receive the intelligence. NSA also employed similar techniques for communications intelligence. The FBI also has been reluctant to share intelligence it gathered with other law enforcement entities. How much this reluctance is due to security concerns or ownership issues is open to debate.


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The WikiLeaks revelations by Private Bradley Manning and the exposure of signals intelligence and other secrets by Edward Snowden are the consequences of not understanding and not managing closely enough the risks from advanced information technology. Both cases refl ect leadership and managerial failures. Manning downloaded and leaked a half million military messages and 250,000 diplomatic cables from diplomatic facilities in 180 countries when assigned to Forward Operating Base Hammer, near Baghdad, in 2010. The lack of adequate controls, oversight and awareness of the signifi cant damage potential from an insider threat allowed a disturbed person access to classifi ed information far beyond his need-to-know (the long standing basic principle for access to classifi ed information). Manning had been identifi ed as unstable and a risk to deploy to Iraq, but with a shortage of intelligence specialists, management in the 10th Mountain Division ordered him to deploy nonetheless (Sellers, 2015). One management failure relates to the decision maker being ignorant of the personnel and potential security issue. The equally, if not more important, issue is the continued lack of leadership focus on the risk and the absence of adequate security controls.

The Snowden affair reveals multiple managerial failures regarding security. His background investigation was faulty, conducted by a contractor which cut corners to increase revenue and for whom oversight was defi cient. An adverse CIA personnel report (for trying to access unauthorized information) was not shared with National Security Agency security clearance adjudicators who provided Snowden high-level access to compartmented information. Snowden’s practice of “borrowing” passwords was either undetected or ignored by his managers in Japan and Hawaii. And his undeclared and unauthorized travel to India in 2010 failed to register with counterintelligence personnel (Oleson, 2015). In each instance these were failures to adhere to existing policy and were unnoticed or dismissed by relevant managers within various agencies. The consequences of both Manning’s and Snowden’s leaks have been devastating to U.S. intelligence, U.S. diplomatic relations, and to U.S. allies.

Both the Manning and Snowden cases, as well as the persistent penetration of U.S. government and contractor networks by adversary nation states (and their proxies), all share as a root cause a breakdown by people, not technology. The advanced capabilities of today’s cyber hackers/spies have signifi cantly increased the impact of these cases, but the problems – and the solutions – are most dependent upon organizational leadership and effective management which recognizes mission risk and the fact that human beings and technical systems all will have failures. Leaders and subordinate managers must always assess risk versus gain in everyday decisions and there must be a high level of engagement and thinking to mitigate the damage from failures related to information technology systems.


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ConclusionsThe leader / manager of any organization must take a holistic view. Managing only a portion of an organization or activity is a recipe for failure. A core principle of intelligence mission management is leading all parts of an organization to maximize the timeliness, relevancy, and decision impact of the intelligence it produces. To be effective and gain infl uence with the decision makers, the director or commander of an intelligence organization cannot lead OR manage – s/he has to do both, at the same time, all the time. Leadership and management are inseparable.

The U.S.’s future national security is highly dependent upon the capacity of the Intelligence Community to support decision making at every level, from the White House to the foxhole. Sensors, systems, organizations and processes must be continuously evaluated and improved at the most effi cient cost. Intelligence personnel and contractors must all be simultaneously supported and challenged to produce more quantity while maintaining the quality of intelligence. There has never been a more important task than improving leadership and management of intelligence.

ReferencesBooksMachiavelli, Nicolo. The prince. (Numerous translations available.)

McCrystal, Stanley (2015). Team of teams. New York: Penguin Publishing.

McDowell, Don (2009). Strategic intelligence: a handbook for practitioners, managers, and users (Rev. Ed.). Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, pp. 59–60.

Shell, Richard L. (2002). Management of Professionals, 2nd. Ed. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.

Woodward, Bob (2010). Obama’s wars. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Wren, J. Thomas (1995). The leader’s companion. New York: Free Press.

Journal articlesMacGaffi n, N. John and Oleson, Peter C. (2015). Decision Advantage: the why of intelligence. Intelligencer, Journal of U.S. intelligence studies, 21(3), pp.41–46.

Oleson, Peter C. (2015). Assessing Edward Snowden: whistleblower, traitor, or spy? Intelligencer, Journal of U.S. intelligence studies, 21(2), pp.15–23.

Simon, Neil (1998). Competitive intelligence magazine, 1(2), p.47.

Government documentsDepartment of Defense (April 17, 2002). Unifi ed command plan, news release No. 188-02.

Heifi tz, Ronald and Lindsay, Lawrence (undated). Leadership on the line. Address to the Navy’s Executive Business Course at the Naval Postgraduate School. Quoted by Manthorpe.


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Newspaper articlesSellers, John (May 8, 2015). Why insider threats keep succeeding. Federal Computer Week. Retrieved from http://fcw.com/Articles/2015/05/08/comment-why-insider-threats-keep-suceeding.

Web documentsHaver, Rich (August 2, 2010). Email to Peter C. Oleson. In private library.

Manthorpe, William (August 6, 2010). Learn to lead. Retrieved from http://learntolead.net (No longer available). Copy in private library of Peter C. Oleson.

Matthews, Jeff (Feb. 28, 2011). Buffett vs. Lampert: a tale of two shareholder letters. Business Insider. Retrieved from www.businessinsider.com/warren-buffett-eddie-lampert-shareholder-letters-2011-2

NASA (May 24, 2004). Excerpt from the ‘special message to the Congress on urgent national needs.’ Retrieved from www.nasa.gov/vision/space/ features/jfk_speech_text.html#.VzaANmPCTVw

Endnotes1 Ronald Heifi tz is the founding director of the Center for Public Leadership at the John F. Kennedy

School of Government at Harvard University. Lawrence Lindsay was director of the National Economic Council in the White House, 2001–2002, and previously was on the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1991–1997.

2 General Jones made these comments to President Obama when interviewed to be the national security advisor.

3 McChrystal served for fi ve years, from 2003 to 2008, as Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

Peter C. OlesonPeter Oleson is the former assistant director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, senior intelligence policy advisor to two secretaries of defense, chief executive offi cer of a technology consulting fi rm, and associate professor of management in the graduate school of the University of Maryland University College. He is a member of the board of the Association of Former Intelligence Offi cers and editor of its Guide to the Study of Intelligence (www.afi o.com/40_guide.htm).

Tony CothronTony Cothron (Rear Admiral, USN, Ret.) was a career Naval Intelligence Offi cer and the 63rd Director of Naval Intelligence. He commanded the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence and the USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center and led operational intelligence operations during combat in Desert Storm and Kosovo.

ooOoo


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Mexican Drug Cartels and their Australian Connections: Tracking and Disrupting

Dark NetworksDr Anthea McCarthy-Jones, University of Canberra

Dr Daniel Baldino, University of Notre Dame, Fremantle

AbstractFor Australia, the emergence of Mexican drug cartels presents signifi cant policymaking, intelligence and strategic challenges. The size of these operations, their resource base and the fl uid nature of dark network structures makes these enterprise syndicates a highly versatile and resilient opponent. This paper will provide an analysis of the organisational levels of dark networks in dealing with Mexican drug cartels and explores how these profi t-seeking transnational actors form and operate including their motivations and modus operandi. It will also address the problematic nature of dark networks and the importance of robust intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to better prioritise border protection responses as well as to increase the ability of the security sector to target dispersed ‘webs’ of illicit affi liations, with a focus on the Asia-Pacifi c region.

Keywords: Mexican drug cartels, transnational organised crime, intelligence-led policing, national security.

IntroductionOver the past few decades, the schemes of many organised crime groups have developed into sophisticated networks with common purpose that have increasingly taken on a highly adaptive dimension to their planning and co-ordination activities. Partly due to new developments in travel, technology and communications, they are no longer limited to local or traditional geographical locations in which to conduct illicit business activities. Accordingly, the globalisation of crime has meant that nation states faced with identifying and confronting threats that are posed by transnational organised crime (TOC) must strengthen their ability to conduct and co-ordinate investigations and work with international partners to tackle joint problem areas such as reducing the global supply of (and demand for) illegal drugs.

Yet identifying and fi ghting such linked threat actors and entrepreneurial criminal organisations creates many diffi cult challenges for Australian policy-makers and practitioners when deciding on the best course of multi-jurisdictional action.


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A variety of practical considerations from cost effectiveness, to issues regarding sovereignty to criminal infi ltration of law enforcement, to the time-intensive nature of broad-based surveillance approaches (that do not necessarily produce instant results) all remain central concerns in steps towards the installation of best practice policy formulation. Additionally, a bulk of law enforcement in Australia continues to spotlight only single modes of traffi cking or drug product (Bright et. al., 2012).

In light of such considerations, we argue that social network analysis — in particular analysis of cross-border ‘dark networks’ — can help cover critical gaps in addressing the fl uid and convergent nature of TOC networks while offering some pathways for potential solutions to overcome these types of diversifi ed challenges that link suppliers with consumers. This will be demonstrated by fi rstly reviewing the literature on social network analysis, with particular attention paid to recent work on dark networks. The article will then present a case study of Mexican cartels in order to demonstrate the way in which these independent criminal organisations have evolved their operations into multifaceted network structures that utilise linkages with ad hoc criminal groups operating in the Asia-Pacifi c region. The case study highlights the way in which Mexican cartels have created and sustained a dark network of drug-coordinated production and supply channels that are now capable of penetrating large markets, with Australia becoming an increasingly lucrative target. Finally, this article considers the implications for Australia and its security sector. It outlines some ways in which network analysis can be used to inform current and future approaches to border protection that includes the role of enhanced intelligence to help combat dark networks, transit hubs and related implications.

Dark NetworksA wide variety of illegally operating organisations, including in drug traffi cking, people smuggling and money laundering, comprise profi t-driven dark networks. These elastic networks are characterised as being sets of ‘social entities linked directly or indirectly by various ties…characterized by a predominance of informal and communicative relations’ (Raab & Milward, 2003, p.417). Because dark networks operate in the shadows and function through the use of mobile and dispersed sub-groups, such a dynamic has make it diffi cult “…to develop any single, elegant theory of dark networks” (Wood, 2006, p.252). But in general terms, they exploit network forms of organisation, have buffers between people, are typifi ed by divisions of labour and retain fl uid arrangements between multiple groupings ‘where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate in some larger hierarchical arrangement’ (O’Toole, 1997, p45).


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Several distinctions can be made between open and trusting interconnected networks that are legal as opposed to the rise of dark networked enterprises. Covert dark network forms repeatedly operate on a ‘need-to-know basis’ symbolised by compartmentalised cells. As Raab (2003, p.420) has summarised, dark networks which operate in the global drug trade resemble ‘…a chain of bilateral contracts; a group or a person will only know his or her immediate predecessor or successor in the supply chain. Moreover, these distribution chains lack exclusivity; individuals at one level contract with individuals at of levels.’ This type of layered organisational structure makes them far more diffi cult to detect and eliminate as well as highly resilient through wide dispersions of resources and operations. These illegal enterprise syndicates have proven able to adapt to law enforcement pressures by quickly fi nding, for example, new approaches for managing their funds, selling drugs and expanding transhipment routes.

Dark networks do come in various forms and shapes. For example, in Jackson’s (2006) analysis of terrorist groups, a distinction is drawn between chain-networks (sequential links in a single line), spoke networks (links radiating from a single node), and all-channel networks in which units are coupled to all other units. This is similar to Grint’s (2005) use of network hierarchy wherein there is just enough structural coherence and coordination to maintain the network but there are no strictly defi ned limits on intermingled roles or incumbents. Grint (2005, p.156) also distinguishes between two network types when dealing with dark networks: the random type in which power and leadership are ‘evenly spread throughout an organisation’ and the scale-free model in which a few people have ‘enormous numbers of contacts’. Similarly, in dealing in comparable areas like remarketed prescription drugs, there are many so-called ‘gray’ networks – networks are not illegal per se but can nevertheless be troublesome because actors trade commodities through distribution channels that are unoffi cial or unintended by the original manufacturer.

Another way of understanding dark networks is to ask ‘how much strategic, operational and tactical infl uence specifi c components of the organisation have over others?’ (Jackson, 2006, p.245). Jackson (2006) underlines the need to distinguish between tightly coupled groups, coupled networks and loosely coupled movements. The tightly coupled group is like the classic hierarchical organisation, for example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The coupled network has greater plasticity in managing risks that leads to a greater autonomy of human agents (and replaceable lower-level players), although there still appears to be a ‘network core’ to provide direction. This core might include a pre-existing group with expertise and management knowhow and the ability to recruit or inspire new members. In the loosely coupled and vertically integrated movement, no individual or component group can make binding decisions for other actors in the network.


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This might incorporate freelance elements such as the hiring of operators like neighbourhood gangs to protect and procure transportation corridors (Williams 1998). Such a dynamic of coupled or loosely coupled networks with separated ‘outsourced’ services best represent many of these alternative forms of modern criminal entrepreneurship.

The Rise of Mexican CartelsMexico remains at the centre of the global drug trade. Drug traffi cking organisations (DTOs) have operated in Mexico for over one hundred years. During the twentieth century, many of these groups established themselves as the key suppliers of marijuana and heroin. Throughout Mexico’s period of one-party rule (1929–2000) via the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), various criminal groupings acquired signifi cant wealth and power and were able to consolidate their illicit networks, safe havens and transit routes by spreading corruption within government circles and taking advantage of inadequate border security.

Due to an overall policy of accommodation by the federal government, offi cials guaranteed various degrees of impunity for certain DTOs in exchange for a limited regulation of illicit market and its profi t-making activities (Beittel, 2015, p.8). Such an informal agreement rested on a continuity of criminal production, protection and assets that had been fundamentally underwritten by the PRI during its period in government. However, by the end of the twentieth century, Mexico’s transition to democracy presented some opposition to this informal pact partially due to the subsequent infl ux of new political fi gures like former President Felipe Calderón. Calderón had based his campaign themes around policy issues like eliminating corruption and supported drug crop reduction as well as more aggressive approaches along the intervention and enforcement spectrum.

Calderón formally declared a ‘war against the cartels’ in 2006. Calderón’s military-led crackdown saw the deployment of over 50,000 troops to various regions with a particular concentration in the territories that border the US. Unfortunately, the Mexican government severely underestimated the extent to which the cartels had amassed large arsenals to defend their territories and lucrative drug routes — and an accompanying willingness to use torture, assassination and brutal domestic terrorist tactics — as well as the large-scale and wide-spread infi ltration by the cartels into Mexican government institutions and law enforcement agencies to assist ongoing impunity. For example, the extent of brazen violence and corruption in Mexico was featured in the national and international coverage of the mass murder of 43 students that allegedly occurred due to the collusion and at the behest of a local mayor and his wife, the corrupt local police and a local criminal gang (Dudley & Gagne, 2014).


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Over the past decade, every state in Mexico, with the exception of the Federal District (Mexico City) and parts of Oaxaca and Chiapas, has become a claimed territory by a cartel or in some cases, disputed territory by several DTOs (DEA, 2015). During this time, various cartels have fractured, different cartels have emerged (like the hyper-violent La Familia Michoacana) and new coalitions have been formed in attempt to control a larger share of supply routes into the US and beyond. As Beittel (2015, p.5) highlighted ‘…the splintering of the large DTOs into competing factions and gangs of different sizes took place over several years. The development of these different crime groups, ranging in scope from transnational criminal organisations to small local mafi as with certain traffi cking or other crime specialties, has made the crime situation even more diffuse and their criminal behaviour harder to eradicate.’

Such developments in Mexico have taken place in the backdrop of a number of joint policy initiatives between the US and partners like Colombia aiming to target the cocaine industry operating in the Andean region. Ironically, the rise of the Mexican cartels and their increased power in the global illicit drug market can be explained due to some of the initial policy successes of the US and Colombian governments’ actions (e.g. Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative) to dismantle Colombian DTOs. These included the closure of traditional drug corridors, such as the Florida route, during the 1990s and early 2000s (Miami Herald, 24 June, 2004). But although these efforts had some success in destroying the monopoly previously enjoyed by Colombian cartels, they simultaneously created a power vacuum and an opportunity for the Mexican cartels to expand their profi ts and interests in the global illicit drugs trade. This is known as the ‘balloon effect’ whereby pressure (via various resources) that is applied to a specifi c area to eradicate a problem, instead, results in the problem being relocated to another area - usually providing only a temporary inconvenience to criminal activities (Bagely, 2012, p.5). In fact, it can even be argued that Mexican drug cartels strongly benefi tted from the breakup of Colombian DTOs and have proven to be highly entrepreneurial and creative – such as sub-contracting the traffi cking of cocaine to displaced Colombian gangs.

At the same time, the capturing or killing of drug leaders in Mexico itself has only served to create violent succession battles within the cartels themselves (Beittel, 2015). Overall, the protracted confl ict between these many players has resulted in over 250,000 people internally displaced in Mexico since 2006 while estimates of deaths resulting from the spiked violence of the war range between 60,000 and 120,000 with a further 25,000 people considered to be desaparecidos (disappeared) (Beittel, 2015). Some argue that the use and threat of such extreme violence is not only used by Mexican cartels to settle disputes and replace leaders but seen as desirable to encourage employee loyalty as well as a ‘semblance of order’ with suppliers, creditors,


24

and buyers through a culture of fear (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Regardless, in the last few years, the key players to emerge from this setting that have displaced other Latin American DTOs include the renowned Sinaloa cartel (the most dominant group and increasingly tied to the drug trade in Australia) and its affi liates (also known as the Pacifi c Federation) and Los Zetas and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación.

Additionally, Mexican cartels are now largely poly-drug organisations, who traffi c items like cocaine, heroin, crystal methamphetamine and marijuana, and have begun to systematically expand their operations to other areas such as human smuggling and kidnapping. They have emerged the key players in the control the main drug transport routes into the US market as well as other foreign markets in Asia and Western and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, some critics have argued that a shift in American intelligence priorities since 9/11 has left signifi cant gaps in multisource intelligence related to the evolution of these major TOC networks (Burton and West, 2009). For others, this poly-drug traffi cking has been a “deliberate modus operandi” to make these networks more evasive, multilayered and profi table (Hughes et. al., 2016). And while Mexican cartels have a growing international presence, groups like Sinaloa continue to represent decentralized horizontal groupings characterised by independent cell-like cross border networks albeit with some sense of allegiance to a king-pin ‘entrepreneur’. As Beittel (2015, p.6) observed, ‘the larger organisations (Sinaloa, for example) that have adopted a cellular structure may still try to protect their leadership as in the recent orchestrated escape of the world’s most wanted drug kingpin, El Chapo Guzmán.’

Mexican Cartels in AustraliaThe rising appearance of Mexican cartels in Australia — and their transformation into illicit multinational conglomerates that aim to control transportation hubs — is the result of a combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. A key push factor incentivising cartels to seek out new markets has been the relative decline in demand for cocaine from the US. In the ruthless pursuit of profi t, this decline — possibly coupled with the legalization of marijuana in several states -— has meant that the US market alone can no longer sustain the rate of supply fl owing from the ‘south’ into the ‘north’ (UNODC, 2015). Further, the weakening price of illicit drugs in the US market in comparison to European and Asia Pacifi c regions has acted as a further ‘push’ factor for cartels in seeking to franchise their profi t-maximising operations further afi eld.

On the other hand, there are several ‘pull’ factors that have made Australia an attractive option in TOC expansion. According to the UNDOC (2015a. p.2), East Asia, South-East Asia and Oceania have the largest number of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) users in the world, totalling 9.5 million and a further 3.9 million ecstasy users.


25

Mexican cartels have drastically expanded their production and distribution of ATS in recent years, making the Asia Pacifi c a lucrative as well as logical region in which to extend their operations. Further, the appearance of Mexican DTOs in Australia coincided with a period in which the strength of the Australian dollar reached parity with the US dollar and at some points exceeded parity. The strength of the dollar and its ability to be easily converted into US currency has proved to be a strong “pull” factor for the cartels.

Moreover, Australia commands some of the highest prices (wholesale and retail) for illicit drugs in the world. So, while there are greater transportation costs and other miscellaneous expenses associated with distribution to Asia Pacifi c markets, the revenue gained from accessing these markets far outweighs the initial outlays and costs on the part of the cartels. For example, according to UNODC (2015b), the wholesale price per kilo of cocaine salts in the United States is approximately US$54,000 and in the UK the average price is US$87,000, however, in Australia, the price ranges between US$228,000 to US$259,000. In 2016, a spokesperson for the Australian Federal Police (AFP) even estimated the value to be as high as AU$350,000 (Banks, 2016). In this context, it is clear to see that in comparison to other major markets, the extremely high prices that can be obtained in Australia for wholesale products will continue to be a strong ‘pull’ factor for Mexican DTOs and other organised crime groups.

Mexican cartels generally deal in the wholesale distribution of illegal narcotics, especially in relation to cost-effective activities in foreign markets. Their preference for primarily engaging the in wholesale rather than retail aspects of the illicit drug trade places these groups in a semi-dependent position when breaking into new markets. While the cartels have been able to takeover established smuggling routes into the Pacifi c (often previously set-up by Colombian cartels several decades earlier), there is a need on the part of the cartels to create and foster strong linkages with local criminal groups who resell the product through their own networks (ACC, 2015). The preference for the cartels to adopt this type of business practice is because they produce and traffi c such vast quantities of marijuana, heroin, cocaine and methamphetamines that there is enough profi t to be made from distributing wholesale without needing to branch into local distribution — which is riskier and prone to violent friction with competing criminal groups.

Certainly, it does remain diffi cult to determine the total amount of illicit narcotics that are produced and traffi cked by Mexican cartels each year. However, recent reports do suggest that multiplying connections among criminal enterprises such as alliances between members of the Sinaloa cartel and groups such as Ofi cina de Evigado (criminal organisation in Medellin) and the Colombian FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of


26

Colombia) are a key to the Mexican cartels accessing up to 450 tons of Colombian cocaine from these two groups alone each year (El Universal, December 2015).

As stated, these multi-nodal structures and the adaptive use of criminal facilitators with different working arrangements pose a number of challenges to Australia’s approach to combat TOC. For instance, in order for the cartels to ensure the continued receipt of wholesale shipments by local criminal groups, they often add ‘sweeteners’ to each business transaction. Some reports have suggested Mexican cartels provide local criminal groups with incentives such as illegal handguns and other arms in order to ‘sweeten’ their business dealings (Courier Mail, 2015). Such incentives create further potential domestic security problems for Australian law enforcement as local criminal groups are increasingly able to access new sources for the supply of illegal fi rearms. Complicating this issue is the fact that cartels such as the Sinaloa group do not favour a particular local criminal network in Australia. Instead, they appear to deal with any local criminal organisation that is in the position to regularly receive their large consignments. These include but are not limited to ‘Lebanese, Chinese and Albanian diaspora groups, and Australian outlaw biker gangs’ (NPR, 2012). This is of particular concern because of the potential escalation of violence and ‘turf wars’ between local criminal groups vying for control of domestic distribution networks.

Disrupting Dark Networks: Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Policy OptionsFor policy-makers and Australia’s law enforcement agencies, attempting to stem what seems to be a never-ending tide of illicit drugs into Australia can appear to be an exercise in frustration. However, there are a number of things that can be done to better address the problem of Mexican DTOs, their growing deception and this emerging threat to Australia’s national security. The one aspect that should be recognised fi rst and foremost is that this threat to Australia’s national security is not posed by one particular group or foreign organisation such as the Sinaloa cartel, rather, it is a threat posed by a dispersed and adaptive dark-network structure that spans the Asia-Pacifi c and includes multiple foreign and domestic actors.

In broad terms, in combating DTOs and the operation of illicit markets, much recent work on disrupting illicit networks has focussed on two key approaches: kinetic and non-kinetic (Roberts and Everton, 2011). The kinetic approach entails ‘…offensive measures to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters and employs such things as bombs and bullets to pursue the campaign’ (Roberts & Everton, 2011, p.3). Yet such military-led approaches by Mexico (sometimes in conjunction with support from impacted nations) — that have largely been fi xated on removing the leadership of the major DTOs — have had only a limited impact on the actual


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fl ow of drugs. The Mexican government’s force-on-force strategies have also had a consistent track-record of being heavily criticized for misallocating resources and sharply increasing human rights violations by the military, which is largely untrained in domestic policing (see Beitel, 2015).

Alternately, Robert and Everton (2011, p.3) outline a variety of ways in which the non-kinetic approach ‘…employs neither bombs nor bullets but instead uses non-coercive means to counter networks and impair a combatant’s will to fi ght.’ Non-kinetic approaches to the problem of criminality will encompass a variety of qualitative elements and related strategies that focus areas like supporting institutional judicial reform and community-based rehabilitation programs in Mexico itself. It can also entail increased intelligence gathering activities and the improved sharing of intelligence to support investigations and operational activities by impacted actors, including the enforcement of criminal fi nancial deterrence.

In particular, intelligence collection and analysis capabilities can assist to ensure a measured, targeted response to prioritized issues while helping to ensure consequences of particular policy frameworks are fully recognised. For Australia, this will demand adopting a framework that utilizes a long-term ‘staged approach’ that prioritises intelligence gathering activities, including addressing defi cits in HUMINT operations, that aim to map out the reliance on sophisticated dark networks that operate across the Asia-Pacifi c region. Moreover, utilizing network analysis can allow openings to better identify critical regional nodes, the organisation and resources relied upon by these networks to function effectively and, critically, support decision-makers to develop longer term planning prescriptions rather than simply fi xate on immediate enforcement activities.

Many illicit drugs are not directly smuggled from Mexico to Australia. For example, the majority of cocaine entering Australia is channelled through third countries in the Pacifi c, passing through hubs such as in New Caledonia, Tonga, Vanuatu and Fiji. ‘In 2010-11, the majority of cocaine intercepted coming into Australia entered via small craft by way of the Pacifi c Islands…. or stowed away in commercial shipping containers (say, hidden in a shipment of ride-on lawn mowers or stone pavers)’ (Pottenger, 2013). Similarly, in 2013, this was evidenced by several large seizures including a capture via a luxury yacht that netted 750kg of cocaine bound for the Australian market (Raggat, 2013). Indeed, with increased US surveillance on the Mexican order alongside airports worldwide having tightened security settings, the US coast guard noted ‘that the rise in cocaine traffi cking in the Pacifi c corresponded with a 66 percent drop in cocaine traffi cking on land’ (Martel, 2015). So with the growth of the Pacifi c maritime corridor, it will remain crucial that policy-makers begin to focus on strategies that concentrate on the ‘borderless’ nature of crime, how


28

law enforcement agencies cooperate in an international context and best practice in areas like maritime interdiction and deterring the fi nancing of such cartel activates.

According to UNODC 2015 World Drug Report, maritime seizures account for the largest quantities, averaging 365kg per seizure between 2009 and 2014 (UNODC, 2015, p.39). In 2013, parcel post was the most commonly detected method of drug importation in Australia. However, in the same year, just three maritime seizure cases accounted for 74% of the total weight of heroin intercepted by Australian law enforcement agencies (The Guardian, 2013). UNODC (2015a, p.39–40) has correctly argued that maritime interdiction has potentially the greatest impact on total quantities of drug smuggled, traffi cking fl ows and availability of illicit drugs on a global level and therefore provides a clear opportunity for law enforcement agencies to produce positive outcomes in confronting the threat before it reaches Australian shores.

In addition to cocaine, the synthetic drugs market has become more complex and interconnected with other regions. A 2015 UNODC report entitled ‘The Challenge of Synthetic Drugs in East and South-East Asia and Oceania’ (2015, p.4) identifi ed that the synthetic drugs market in East, South-East Asia and Oceania ‘is not a separate and self-contained entity, but part of a larger complex global network with interconnect channels for supply and demand’. The growing appetite for synthetic drugs has further encouraged Mexican cartels to increase their production, connection and distribution platforms across the Asia-Pacifi c. For instance, in 2012, Philippine law enforcement reported dismantling a sophisticated meth lab operated by a Chinese drug traffi cking group which was found to have clear connections to Mexican criminal networks (UNODC, 2015a, p.13). In 2013, Korean offi cials seized 15kgs of crystalline methamphetamine and identifi ed Mexico as the most likely point of origin of the drugs. In the same year, Japanese offi cers uncovered the traffi cking of crystalline methamphetamine from Mexico directly into Japan (UNODC, 2015b, p.70). Similarly, in 2015 the Australian Crime Commission concluded that Mexican cartels are involved in methamphetamine in Australia and have been actively seeking out partnerships with local criminal networks in the region (ACC, 2015a).

More recently, reports have identifi ed the forging of close links between Chinese organised crime groups and Mexican cartels (Harris, 2014). These connections relate to the importation (by Mexican cartels from Chinese organised crimes groups) of precursors for the production of methamphetamines. The fi nished product is then shipped from Mexico (primarily Jalisco state) back to the Chinese mainland. Such structures illustrate the evolving organisational forms and symbiotic relationships within dark networks. And in another example, the announcement in early 2016 of a ‘super seizure’ of ice that originated from Hong Kong with connections in mainland


29

China demonstrated the degree to which diverse organised crime groups have been able to develop and co-ordinate production and distribution methods (ABC, 2016).

Other studies have pointed to these networks reverting to ‘low’ technical modes of communication that include targeting older people as unsuspecting couriers (Nixon, 2016). Again, while these types of dispersed and agile organisational structures — from specialists to amateurs to opportunists — make it increasingly diffi cult for law enforcement agencies to easily identify high-value assets and targets in the network, they do reinforce the importance of strengthening transnational law enforcement cooperation, such as police-to-police information sharing and cooperation in investigations.

Overall, it is apparent that, fi rst, in regard to skill and resource sharing, criminal groups have converged to form overarching networks that have removed previous reliance on unfettered access to a specifi c geographical location in which to conduct activities. In short, current practices are characterised by a wide variety of openings to adopt and exploit effective cell-type structures. Second, while many geographical limitations are removed, the nature of these networks mean that continued operations are contingent on ‘collective cooperation’ and some degree of fi xed assets and transfer to achieve goals. Third, this places individuals, groups and the network as a whole in a perpetual state of semi-dependence. So even if parts of the network may not be entirely monitored, it is this perpetual state of semi-dependence that can be potentially used as leverage by law enforcement agencies when formulating policies (and transnational solutions) aimed at attacking ‘weakest-links’ within network settings — stemming from actors like cartel members to corrupt offi cials to fi nancial intermediaries.

In order for Mexican cartels to effectively penetrate markets in the Asia Pacifi c, they are forced to establish relationships with intermediaries and local actors in foreign markets to help guarantee the supply chain and distribution of their product. Such semi-dependence is amplifi ed due to the preference of Mexican cartels to primarily deal in the wholesale aspects of the illicit drug trade in foreign markets. For instance, in order for cartels to supply wholesale quantities of cocaine salts to the Australia market, they are forced to draw on the resources of a network that originates in rural Mexico, which then expands to include actors in the United States, East and Southeast Asia, the Pacifi c islands and ends with ties with local actors in Australia. This simple description reveals how this network performance is dependent on a vast array of linkages in multiple countries. These linkages are critical juncture points across the network because they are the key to keeping profi ts and the wider operational success of the network’s goals.


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As a result of their operational importance, these critical junctures are potential weak points in the network that can be pro-actively exploited by law enforcement agencies. Further, unlike most countries, Australia is in a unique position to target these critical junctures and exploit the weaknesses of these facilitating networks due to its geographical location and systematic ties with many Asia-Pacifi c nations. This must include not only areas like maritime interdiction or enforcing criminal fi nancial deterrence but assembling closer relationships with partners such as America's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as well as developing the customs and law enforcement capabilities of Pacifi c states that do not have the current capacity to patrol their territory and borders. Australia’s infl uence in the Asia-Pacifi c means that a focus on capacity-building with international partners and related areas like intelligence analysis and gathering can provide increased opportunities to map dark network structures and derive optimal planning and sustainable disruption strategies.

ConclusionMexican drug cartels are well-organised global businesses. This TOC threat and allied supply chains has grown signifi cantly in density, diversity and complexity. Mexican-driven networks continue to operate in a multidimensional manner worldwide, including utilising dark networks and emerging traffi cking routes throughout the Asia-Pacifi c. This internal dynamic through the use of forward and backward linkages, dispersed criminal facilitators in many countries and assorted smuggling routes and tactics means that DTOs are not a stand-alone or static movement. The fundamental point is that ‘…governments and law enforcement agencies have to think and act much more in network terms; they need to develop the same kind of fl exibility to operate both nationally and transnationally through the creation of informal transnational law enforcement networks based on trust that is exhibited by drug-traffi cking networks. Greater care also needs to be given to devising strategies for more effective attacks on networks’ (Williams, 1998, p.154).

As such, the enhancing capacity to map and track transportation hubs, specialised cells and money laundering techniques will all be necessary fi rst steps that must be accompanied with improved sharing and collaboration with foreign counterparts about emerging Mexican drug cartels, their structure and the rise of illicit exchanges in the region. This will enable, in part, a better understanding of how these dark networks operate, the convergence of criminal activities at critical nodes and their unique transportation and distribution characteristics. It will also involve rethinking how intelligence collection and analysis capabilities can be best prioritized and implemented in order to support international efforts to identify such threat convergence and disrupt high-leverage intervention points within transnational organised crime chains.


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References

BooksGrint, K. (2005). Leadership: Limits and possibilities. Palgrave Macmillan.

MacCoun, R. J., & Reuter, P. (2001). Drug war heresies: Learning from other vices, times, and places. Cambridge University Press.

Wood, J. (2006). Dark Networks, Bright Networks and the Place of the Police. Fighting Crime Together. UNSW Press, Sydney. 252.

ArticlesBagley, B. (2012) Drug traffi cking and organised crime in the Americas: Major trends in the twenty-fi rst century. Woodrow Wilson Centre for International Scholars. Washington, D.C.

Bright, D. A., Hughes, C. E., & Chalmers, J. (2012). Illuminating dark networks: a social network analysis of an Australian drug traffi cking syndicate. Crime, Law and Social Change, 57(2), 151–176.

Hughes, C. E., Chalmers, J., Bright, D. A., & McFadden, M. (2016). Poly-drug traffi cking: Estimating the scale, trends and harms at the Australian border. International Journal of Drug Policy, 31, 80–89.

Jackson, B. A. (2006). Groups, networks, or movements: a command-and-control-driven approach to classifying terrorist organizations and its application to Al Qaeda. Studies in Confl ict & Terrorism, 29(3), 241–262.

O’Toole, L., Jr. (1997), Treating networks seriously: practical and research based agendas in public administration. Public Administration Review, 57(1), 45–52.

Raab, J., and Milward, H. B. (2003). Dark networks as problems. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13(4), 413–439.

Roberts, N., and Everton, S. F. (2011). Strategies for combating dark networks. Journal of Social Structure. 12, 1–32.

Williams, P. (1998). The Nature of Drug-Traffi cking Networks. Current History, April

Government DocumentsBeittel, J. S. (2015). Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Traffi cking Organizations. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). (2015). United States: Areas of Infl uence of Major Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations. Retrieved from www.dea.gov/docs/dir06515.pdf

United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC). (2015a) ‘The Challenge of Synthetic Drugs in East and South-East Asia and Oceania’ May 2015.

United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2015b). World Drug Report.


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Newspaper ArticlesBanks, L. (2016, May 9). Mexican drug cartels target Sydney. The Daily Telegraph. Np.

Courier Mail. (2015, January 20). Violent Mexican cartels reach Australia. Retrieved from: www.couriermail.com.au/news/breaking-news/mexican-cartels-reach-australia/news-story/763326b07cbf2a8656e1a226e3b7ec49

El Universal. (2015, December 19) ‘Interview with Ex-President Pastrana of Colombia.’ Retrieved from: www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/mundo/2015/12/19/las-farc-deben-aclarar-sus-relaciones-con-el-chapo-andres-pastrana

Harris, B. (2014, January, 12). Hong Kong Triads supple meth ingredients to Mexican drug cartels. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from: www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1403433/hong-kong-triads-supply-meth-ingredients-mexican-drug-cartels

Miami Herald. (2004, June 24). Key cocaine routes closed, Feds say. Retrieved from: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/key-cocaine-routes-closed-feds-say

Nixon, R. (2016, February 10). ‘Drug Traffi cker Turn to New Type of Courier: Senior’, The New York Times. Retrieved from: www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/drug-traffi ckers-turn-to-new-type-of-courier-seniors.html?_r=0

NPR. (2012, March 3). ‘Mexican Drug Cartel Targets Australia’, NPR. Retrieved from: www.npr.org/2012/03/02/147821195/mexican-drug-cartel-targets-australia

Raggat, M. (2013, August 23). International drug bust nets 750kg of cocaine. The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved from: www.smh.com.au/national/international-drug-bust-nets-750kg-of-cocaine-20130823-2sfsq.html

The Guardian, (2013, August 23.) ‘Cocaine worth $370m Seized from Luxury Yacht in Vanuatu’, 23 August. Retrieved from: www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/cocaine-seized-from-vanuatu-yacht

Web Documents / SitesAustralian Broadcasting Corporation (2016). ‘Ice 'worth $1.26 billion' hidden in gel bras, art supplies seized by police, Justice Minister says’. 15 February. Retrieved from: www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-15/more-than-1-billion-of-ice-seized/7168050

Australian Crime Commission (ACC) (2015). Organised crime in Australia. Canberra. Retrieved from: https://crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/fi les/FINAL-ACC-OCA2015-180515.pdf

Australia Crime Commission (ACC) (2015). The Australian methylamphetamine market: A national picture. Canberra. March. Retrieved from: www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/fi les/AUS-METH-%20MARKET-%20200315%20FINAL.pdf

Burton, F. and West, B. (2009). When the Mexican drug trade hits the border. Stratfor. Retrieved from: www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090415_when_mexican_drug_trade_hits_border

Dudley, S. and Gagne, D. (2014). Iguala massacre: Mexico’s PR message goes up in fl ames. Insight Crime. Retrieved from: www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/iguala-massacre-guerrero-students-mexico


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Martel, F. (2015). ‘Coast guard seized more cocaine in Pacifi c in 2015 than past three years combined.’ Breitbart. 11 August. Retrieved from: www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/08/11/coast-guard-seized-more-cocaine-in-pacifi c-in-2015-than-past-three-years-combined/

Pottenger, M. (2013). The true cost of cocaine. The Conversation, February 22. Retrieved from: https://theconversation.com/the-true-cost-of-cocaine-11992

Dr Anthea McCarthy-JonesDr Anthea McCarthy-Jones is Assistant Professor in the School of Government & Policy at the University of Canberra. She has extensive fi eldwork experience in Latin America and has published articles on the politics and policies of the region. Her research interests include policy in developing nations, Latin American organised crime and linkages between Latin America, Asia and Australia. Anthea currently teaches courses on international relations, Asia-Pacifi c security and politics in developing nations.

Dr Daniel BaldinoDr Daniel Baldino is a political scientist specialising in Australian foreign, defence and security policy including counter-terrorism, intelligence studies and government and politics of the Indo-Pacifi c at the University of Notre Dame, Fremantle. He has produced numerous books and articles including (with Langlois, A and Carr, A) Controversies in Australian Foreign Policy: the core debates by Oxford University Press. He is currently the Western Australia state representative for Australian Institute for Professional Intelligence Offi cers (AIPIO).

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Practitioner’s perspective

Analysis and Infl uence in Combat IntelligenceJames Ellis-Smith

Intelligence support to combat and war-fi ghting operations — combat intelligence — is a unique challenge for an intelligence offi cer. The provision of intelligence support to combat planners and leaders requires more than just a comprehensive knowledge of the enemy or an effective assessment, which are the products of intelligence collection and analysis. Combat intelligence offi cers must also be able to work to a commander or planner in a demanding, stressful and dynamic operating environment, where the measure of effectiveness of intelligence is whether it enhances the quality of the decision. The critical factor that determines whether intelligence will enhance the plan or decision is the ability of the intelligence offi cer to integrate with and affect the decision-making process — their infl uence. Within many Western armies, there are a range of structural and cultural barriers to developing infl uence skills amongst combat intelligence offi cers, but by acknowledging the importance of infl uence — and in some cases, altering existing approaches to military training and employment — the standard of intelligence support to military commanders can be signifi cantly enhanced.

Intelligence in combatThe defi ning characteristic of combat — and where it is differentiated than any other environment in which intelligence is practiced — is that combat is an inherently contested endeavour. The decision-making process occurs in a deliberate contest between multiple actors seeking to defeat or destroy each other. Combat intelligence offi cers are, for the most part, not responsible for decisions or the execution of operations. Instead, intelligence (and fundamentally, the intelligence offi cers) exists to enhance plans and decisions. Ultimately, they must accept that intelligence is only essential to good plans and decisions. The realities of combat and the actions of an enemy force mean that planners and commanders are compelled to make decisions and conduct operations, regardless of the input of the intelligence offi cer.

In a combat environment, ‘good’ intelligence support is an inherently intangible product and outcome. Commanders must make decisions. Failure to act cedes decision superiority and initiative to an active enemy, and so commanders and planners are committed to action regardless of how well objectively well informed or effective those decisions are. Defi ning what is the objectively ‘right’ decision is largely irrelevant, an exercise for post operational and historical review.


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Acknowledging this, while some factors that contribute to fl awed decisions are inevitable — friction, deception and limited time — other factors are innately preventable — a lack of timely and accurate intelligence, fl awed assumptions, and the unconscious bias of commanders and planners. The combat intelligence offi cer’s fundamental role is to continually enhance plans and decisions by challenging and overcoming these factors — acting as an advocate for the enemy plan — continually seeking to guide the decision and plan as close to objectively ‘right’ as possible.

In practice, this means that the combat intelligence offi cer maintains something of an adversarial relationship with planners and commanders. The combat intelligence offi cer must not only provide accurate intelligence, but they must also be prepared to continually challenge the decision-making process, at much higher stakes. In this relationship, the challenge for the combat intelligence offi cer is in both gaining the information necessary to inform the best decision possible, but also using that information — actively working to ensure that it is incorporated into the decision-making process at all levels — and on occasion, against resistance. Analysis alone cannot achieve this — analysis only enables the combat intelligence offi cer to know. Infl uence — their ability to directly affect the plans and decisions using that information — is critical.

The adversarial nature of the relationship between intelligence and command is galling to some, who fail to understand the obligation held by commanders to make decisions. They may argue that it is a failure of command if plans or decisions are not infl uenced by sound intelligence. They might argue that their analysis is good, but the commanders and planners are incompetent. That direction was poor. The commander is overbearing, obtuse or disinterested, or 'doesn't like intelligence'. Proving ‘worth’ in combat intelligence is diffi cult, because the most signifi cant impact of good combat intelligence comes in the continual improvement of plans and decisions, more often than not through discussion and debate during planning. Infl uence that enhances plans and decisions is intangible — it can be recognised as it is happening —- but it remains diffi cult to quantify. Ironically the intangible nature of what ‘good’ combat intelligence is protects poorly performing intelligence offi cers as well. In the words of Major General Michael Flynn:

Too often, when an S-2 offi cer fails to deliver, he is merely ignored rather than fi red. It is hard to imagine a battalion or regimental commander tolerating an operations offi cer, communications offi cer, logistics offi cer, or adjutant who fails to perform his or her job. But, except in rare cases, ineffective Intel offi cers are allowed to stick around.


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Defi nitionsClearly defi ning what analysis and infl uence are — and how they are distinct — is therefore critically important. Analysis is at the foundation of every intelligence function. Analysis incorporates the ability to source, collate and synthesize information, including the use of core tools, information systems and communications. Analysis incorporates the ability to fi nd information — the ability to read and understand large amounts of occasionally confusing, confl icted reporting — and identify those elements of information that are most reliable and of the highest utility. To support the fi nding of intelligence it also includes an understanding of the capabilities of intelligence collection assets so that they might be employed effectively. Analysis incorporates the ability to synthesize information and produce intelligence — making a predictive assessment, but also being able to communicate that assessment clearly. Analysis is the cognitive component of the intelligence offi cer's role, the 'core' skill that defi nes Intelligence as a function.

Infl uence incorporates some specifi c and acquired skills, such as verbal briefi ng, tactics, knowledge of operational concepts and an understanding of military planning methods - but it is mostly dictated by experiential skills. These include: understanding of and adaptation to organizational culture, rank, relevant experience and, of some signifi cance, the ability to generate rapport. Infl uence can be characterised with three key traits. Credibility is the fi rst — recognised by the military intelligence community and its importance is reinforced to intelligence trainees- incorporating a range of personal traits such as bearing, confi dence, combat effectiveness, fi tness and general military skills. Authority is the second — specifi c skills and knowledge, taught or accumulated — that acts to convince the commander and planner that the intelligence offi cer’s input to the plan is worthwhile. These include an understanding of the planning and decision-making process itself, when planners require specifi c inputs, and what is possible in plans and operations — which requires an understanding of tactics and operational theory. Authority also requires that the intelligence offi cer understands their own core role — intelligence capabilities, how to task them effectively and where information can be gained. Finally, infl uence is strongly affected by rapport. Rapport incorporates personal traits — emotional intelligence, the ability to conform to organisational culture, communication skills and the general ability to build effective relationships with others — particularly planners and commanders.

One could be forgiven for assuming that being an effective combat intelligence offi cer is a near-impossible task, given the scope of skills and traits required for the role. In reality, no combat intelligence role requires the full spectrum of analysis and infl uence at all times — it is a continual compromise between two complementary but distinct elements.


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This compromise is dictated by the demands of the role, and the nature of the intelligence support required. The principal intelligence offi cer of a combat unit, directly shaping a combat commander’s decision-making process in a competitive, aggressive and high-stake environment, must possess signifi cant infl uence if they are to be taken seriously and genuinely effect planning. Through the tempo of battle and the demands of the decision cycle, this offi cer might rarely, if ever, have the capacity to exercise extensive analysis. The demands of the threat and pace of the operation means that they will typically lack the time, and more often than not the information, to enable deliberate analysis. They must instead be comfortable using their creativity, tactical acumen and instinct to predict enemy action — in essence, being able to conduct rapid analysis with minimal support.

Conversely, an intelligence staff offi cer in a strategic agency, or a specialist intelligence collector, might be entirely focused on producing thorough, highly detailed intelligence reports for dissemination by their organization. This offi cer or collector may never infl uence a decision personally, and more than likely does not manage a relationship with a decision maker or planner. Intelligence staff in these positions place a far greater emphasis on analysis, because their product will be subject to ruthless scrutiny and will be used by others to inform decision makers. In this environment, accuracy and detail — the products of detailed analysis — are of much greater value.

For the combat intelligence capability, it then becomes essential to design a force structure and employment plan that aligns the most appropriate combat intelligence offi cers to each role and position, based on an understanding of the distinction between analysis and infl uence. The training and development of combat intelligence offi cers must also allow for the selection and development of infl uence traits — deliberate development of these traits in those who demonstrate the predisposition.

Combat intelligence and military structure — the existing paradigmExisting, western approaches to combat intelligence design can make selection for infl uence diffi cult. Most militaries maintain a hierarchical model of appointment in aligning intelligence staff to commands — with increasing junior intelligence offi cers being appointed to smaller, subordinate force elements. This structure is largely driven by the cultural legacy of the Revolution in Military Affairs. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) arose from the US experience in the Cold War, driven by the practicalities of facing overwhelming conventional force from the Soviets in Europe.


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US intent to exploit their advantages in the technical/industrial base, combined with unwillingness to take casualties, saw a focus shift towards superiority in air and space-based ISR and force projection, combined with increased strategic precision strike capabilities. This focus change was a 'revolution' in the sense that an advantage in sensor capabilities, combined with far reaching surface or air strike assets, meant that the metric of land superiority, the size of forces and their advantageous position on the battlefi eld, was now redundant. From an intelligence perspective, air and space-based sensors, including satellites, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and highly specialised surveillance aircraft become the tool of choice. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in its various forms rapidly become the most valuable contributors to intelligence analysis.

In an RMA operational environment, these sensors are central to shaping the forces’ actions, promoting a ‘top down’ approach to intelligence support. When these sensors are the primary means of gathering intelligence, combat intelligence is typically Brigade and Division centric, the optimal nexus between critical combat decision making and access to top-down intelligence feeds. In the RMA, conventional operations mindset, top down headquarters decision making will drive operations, informed by strategic collectors, and intelligence will be produced at the strategic and operational level to serve subordinate tactical commands. As a result, combat intelligence is often characterised by a reliance on a large staff and access to ICT in operational and senior headquarter nodes, and the provision of intelligence staff to subordinate commands is a secondary effort. As a result, it is culturally ingrained to appoint junior-ranked and relatively inexperienced intelligence offi cers and soldiers to subordinate units. The expectation is that this experience will shape the product that they produce when they are subsequently employed in a senior, operational or strategic headquarters, producing intelligence for tactical units.

While this is a neat theory, it has rarely worked in practice. Just as the RMA war-fi ghting philosophy has faltered in the face of complex environments, human terrain, asymmetric actors and hybrid threats, so too has the ‘top-down’ combat intelligence approach. Senior and operational headquarters often understand less about the operational environment than subordinate units. Additionally, the pace of operations means that centrally driven decision making is often too slow. In many aspects of complex, asymmetric war, strategic sensors and collectors have become subordinate to human intelligence and the battlefi eld awareness of the units themselves. In this operational environment, subordinate units fi nd themselves facing inherently complex decisions against capable actors — and hence the demand placed upon the intelligence offi cer is equally challenging.


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Infl uence remains a critical element of the intelligence offi cer’s function, regardless of the size and focus of the supported unit — and in contrast to accepted convention, it is even more challenging at the tactical level. At this level, an offi cer is unlikely to be supported by a dedicated staff, is more often than not in a high threat, austere environment, and commanders demand a high fi delity of information.

As a result, there is a common dissonance between the demands placed on combat intelligence staff in tactical, subordinate units, and the level of training and experience they have received. Considering infl uence, most intelligence offi cers are not provided enough training to achieve authority by the time they take up their fi rst appointment. As junior ranks they are also at a disadvantage, where rank is a well defi ned metric of experience and training in the hierarchical military system. In the vast majority of cases, Majors are not acclimatised to receiving advice from Corporals. From a career and employment management perspective, there is generally insuffi cient time and metrics of performance on these junior intelligence personnel to assess them for suitability for combat intelligence — and subsequently it is something of a gamble as to whether the intelligence offi cer assigned to a combat position possesses credibility and rapport.

The net result of these factors is that military intelligence personnel managers and employment structures routinely fail to assign personnel able to achieve infl uence in key combat intelligence positions. There are a few successes — those who take up positions as junior offi cers and soldiers, but through experience, previous education, innate qualities, and luck; manage to achieve infl uence. But a false precedent is established by these few individuals, who also received insuffi cient preparation for their role, but whose success serves to validate the existing training and employment models.

As a result, the majority of junior intelligence offi cers and soldiers continue to receive insuffi cient training and experience to serve in combat roles, and there are secondary, damaging effects that occur as a result of this. Firstly, the continual exposure to underperforming combat intelligence officers serves to incrementally degrade the status of combat intelligence as a whole within combat units. Every planner, commander and unit exposed in this way becomes incrementally harder to infl uence, and the threshold of acceptable credibility, authority and rapport becomes higher for every subsequent combat intelligence offi cer. Secondly, the lack of preparation and training to achieve authority and credibility generates an increased reliance on rapport as a means of achieving infl uence.


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Employment structures for combat intelligence offi cers then evolve to enable the development of rapport — practically, this means that intelligence offi cers must be permanently assigned to tactical units in order to develop relationships — and the requirement to build these relationships over time preclude posting intelligence staff to units as they need them on an operational basis. This requirement generates massive ineffi ciencies in a limited workforce. The skills and knowledge of intelligence staff in combat units atrophy in the domestic training and barracks employment. At the same time, units and organizations desperate for intelligence staff to work on real-time problems lack critical manning.

Structural re-design and training developmentThankfully, the resolution of these issues can be relatively simple if infl uence is adequately quantifi ed, and employment structures are built to select and train individuals who can meet these requirements, or show suitable potential. Infl uence is a specifi c trait developed over time, aligned to rank within the military hierarchy as a readily understood and recognised metric of experience and qualifi cations. While infl uence cannot be taught, it can be selected for (through the existing process for course nominations, performance reporting and assessment) and developed over time through deliberate training, assessment and workplace mentoring. The intelligence training continuum should be designed to expose and assess analysts to infl uence fundamentals — in the combat intelligence context, this means training courses that teach and assess tactics, operational concepts, planning, and organisational culture. A combination of courses, assessment and workplace performance evaluation could be used to select individuals with inherent infl uence traits — intuition, confi dence and interpersonal skills, as an example — allowing for these key traits to be captured as a base standard for progression through mid and senior rank levels.

The effect of the analysis/infl uence would be twofold. The fi rst would be a signifi cant enhancement of command, leadership and management skills amongst mid and senior level ranks, as a natural consequence of the fact that infl uence skills and traits are common to effective leaders, managers and communicators. The second effect would be the natural evolution of a clear operational model and hierarchy for the conduct of intelligence and support to combat commanders. A base 'mass' of trained and technically profi cient analysts would produce the majority of analytical product. This base would provide analytical support and in turn be led and managed by an increasingly competent and mature cadre of senior staff. These senior staff — specifi cally selected and developed for the role and empowered by the rank and experience to infl uence — would be responsible for the assessment, refi nement and appropriate delivery of that analytical product to commanders and planners.


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The second order effect of the adoption of an analysis/infl uence-based model is the effi ciencies in manning achieved. Although diffi cult to quantify, the deliberate selection of personnel based on infl uence criteria is certain to enhance — and more importantly, standardise — the capability and expectation of performance at each rank. The intelligence function can then move toward a 'high performance, limited numbers' approach to manning, particularly in high tempo, combat intelligence positions. The analysis/infl uence structure builds an inherent organisational function of a large group of analysts, removed from the subordinate command but in support of command decision making in a 'reach back' capacity. These analysts are free to concentrate on the conduct of analytical tasks, under supervision, free from the requirement to infl uence a supported commander or planner — a task that is often inherently beyond them. The system is no longer required to strain to support a mass of analysts at every command and location — necessary, in many cases, to support underprepared intelligence offi cers — instead centralising the core analytical asset and relying on a smaller cadre of highly trained personnel to deliver the 'effect'.

Further effi ciency could potentially be achieved through this model by rationalising the requirement to permanently assign intelligence staff to all levels of command. The analysis/infl uence model — deliberate selection, training and preparation of staff in key infl uence roles — would mitigate the requirement to develop habitual and personal relationships. An intelligence professional — of the right rank — who has been deliberately trained and selected in core infl uence skills and has experience in intelligence, operations and tactics — doesn’t need an extended period of permanent appointment to build infl uence. They can be attached to a combat unit in accordance with operational need and Army priority — just as any other critical enabler is — and recognised for their ability to enhance command and planning through their skills, experience and inherent traits.

ConclusionAnalysis and infl uence are the twin foundations of success in a combat intelligence offi cer. Infl uence incorporates the skills, traits and qualities that allow an intelligence offi cer the access to a plan, or more importantly the internal decision-making process of a commander — from which point the quality of their analysis becomes important.

In combat operations an intelligence offi cer with superb analytical skills but no infl uence is irrelevant — and one with poor analytical skills but signifi cant infl uence is dangerous. Military employment structures and intelligence training have been historically poor at recognising infl uence as a key component of the combat intelligence function — at times confl ating it with analysis, or reducing it to credibility.


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Intelligence organisations are already under-manned and overcommitted, but all forces must become accustomed to achieving more with less. The intelligence capability will soon no longer be able to afford to throw more personnel at the same problem in the hope of compensating for fundamental structural failures. The combat intelligence function must demonstrate that it is operationally fl exible and results driven. Understanding the importance of infl uence — and the adjustments to the intelligence architecture, culture and training of intelligence offi cers - provides a foundation for intelligence that inherently improves the decision making of combat commanders and planners.

ReferenceFlynn, M.T., Pottinger, M., Batchelor, P.D. Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, Center for a New American Security, 2010.

Major James Ellis-Smith Major James Ellis-Smith is a currently serving member of the Australian Army, with more than ten years of experience in Army Intelligence. He has served in a range of intelligence postings, including deployments in combat intelligence roles, instructional duties and managing specialist intelligence capabilities. Major Ellis-Smith is a passionate student of combat intelligence theory, training and force design.

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Book Review

Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past experience, future outlook, and response strategies

Michael Fredholm (Ed)

Published by Routledge, New York, NY (2016).

Reviewed by Douglas Fry

Keywords: Active shooter, terrorism

Following a jihadi terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, in December 2015, The New York Times ran an editorial on its front page for the fi rst time in almost a century. The attack, in which a married couple opened fi re on a public servant function and infl icted 36 casualties, was condemned by the newspaper as a “national disgrace,” a further malignant symptom of the United States’ ongoing struggle to balance citizen gun rights with broader social wellbeing. “Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are searching for motivations, including the vital question of how the [San Bernardino] murderers might have been connected to international terrorism,” the editorial noted, before listing a string of recent domestic mass-casualty fi rearms attacks: a South Carolina church, a Colorado cinema, a Connecticut elementary school. “Let’s be clear,” the Times declared. “These spree killings are all, in their own ways, acts of terrorism” (“End the Gun Epidemic,” 2015).

Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism thus emerges at a time when the phenomenon of fi rearm-based attacks – active shooter events, in offi cial parlance – is receiving heightened interest from security practitioners and the public alike. The book examines a wide spectrum of contemporary lone actor issues, ranging from eco-terrorism to the “information technology insider threat” of rogue government employees. However, its contribution to the discussion surrounding active shooter events is particularly of note, highlighting intelligence-led interdiction measures and, crucially, the recurring similarities between mass shootings, regardless of declared political affi liation. This aspect of the book will be the primary focus of this review, with a particular emphasis on the US context.


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The increased interest in active shooter events stems in no small part from the emphasis by organisations like al-Qaeda and Islamic State on “Individual jihad using the method of urban or rural guerrilla warfare for sapping the enemy” (Al-Hakaymah, 2008, p.153). In other words, inciting self-directed attacks that employ easily accessible weaponry – knives, cars, and fi rearms – has become a preferred method of striking “the far enemy,” not least because such plots are diffi cult to detect. Indeed, 2015-16 has witnessed multiple fi rearm-based jihadi operations in the United States, Europe, and North Africa. Even in Australia, with its restrictive fi rearm legislation, active shooter events have been fl agged as “a real, persistent and substantial threat to the community” (ANZCTC, 2015, p.4), underscored by a fatal shooting outside a Sydney police station in October 2015.

Despite the threat of jihadi fi rearm attacks, it is important to note that they still account for only for a minority of active shooter events that take place each year. This type of violent act is particularly prevalent in the US, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation notes an increasing annual average of about 16 active shooter events (Blair and Schweit, 2014, p.8). Of these, the vast majority are committed against essentially arbitrary targets by individuals without any clear ideological or organisational ties.

Yet in this volume, Malkki (Chapter 8) suggests there may be more of a political dimension to supposedly non-aligned active shooter events than is commonly accepted. In some instances, this case is much easier to make – the racial motivations of a white shooter at a largely African-American church in South Carolina last year being one such example. But even among more nihilistically-driven shootings – those committed by disaffected school students in particular – Malkki notes the “sense of community among the shooters and their admirers” (p.171). A recurring touchstone is the 1999 Columbine High School attack, which has been referenced both directly (e.g. in manifestos) and indirectly (e.g. manner of dress) in numerous subsequent shootings in the United States and Europe, even when not committed by students. Columbine has been referenced as recently as August 2015, when a man killed former colleagues during a live TV broadcast in Roanoke (“Virginia shooting,” 2015). Coupled with the performative dimension of such violent acts, Malkki says, “the line between school shootings and terrorism is no longer that clear-cut” – furthermore, the “cultural scripts” surrounding school shootings may also inform more ideologically-motivated acts of mass violence (pp.182–4).


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Given the frequently recurring behavioural traits of active shooters – ideologically-driven or otherwise – Sinai (Chapter 9) makes the case that they should be treated as “worrisome signs of potential risk of violence” by associates and authorities (p.192). Sinai proposes a four-phase detection/intervention model, covering emotional changes in a would-be shooter, directly observable planning and preparation, and the fi nal approach to a target. Fredholm (Chapter 12) also suggests that rather than examining a person’s apparent radicalisation, it is “more worthwhile to focus on the concrete and linked actions taken by an individual” (p.233, emphasis in original). Such actions may be legal in isolation, but could point to violent intent when viewed in collective context. And while Sturidsson (Chapter 11) emphasises the importance of a lone actor’s psychological motives, he acknowledges that threatening intent can only be measured in tangible behaviour, such as an obsession with fi rearms, or online browsing preferences (p.224).

To that end, Kaati and Johansson (Chapter 13) point to the “automated sifting” of digital material as a useful aid to intelligence agencies in lone actor detection. Online activity like social media posts can serve as “weak signals” to aid detection and intervention in the right context – that is to say, when a person has the intent, capability and/or opportunity to carry out an attack (p.245). While the authors acknowledge the legal and ethical delicacies surrounding the automated capture of online activity, they point to the many instances where “people who have carried out lone actor attacks or school shootings have posted revealing content online lone before their attack” (p.243). It must be noted here, however, that the timeframe between online warning signals and the attack itself can be very short. For example, the night before a mass shooting at an Oregon college in October 2015, the shooter posted on the website 4chan, warning that an attack was imminent (Vanderhart, Johnson and Turkewitz, 2015).

The Oregon example underscores the importance of the networked security approach outlined by Van Buuren (Chapter 7). In his review of Dutch authorities’ efforts to address “fi xated individuals,” Van Buuren highlights the successes – and challenges – of incorporating non-traditional actors into security efforts, including social workers, psychiatrists, and family doctors (p.162). The detection of warning signals by these stakeholders, who may have extensive experience with an at-risk person, can assist early intervention (e.g. Mental health care, detention) before a person escalates to violence. Fredholm (p.236) also emphasises the need to incorporate the wider community in “fused intelligence” efforts to interdict lone actors, pointing to the If You See Something, Say Something public awareness campaign introduced by the US Department of Homeland Security after 9/11.


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Returning to the Oregon active shooter example, however, it must be asked whether the general public is suffi ciently prepared to Say Something about non-aligned lone actor threats, as it is with “traditional” acts of terrorism. Granted, the Oregon shooter posted vague information that provided little advance warning, and 4chan is a notoriously cynical and irreverent online forum, making it diffi cult to distinguish between “bark” and “bite”. Nevertheless, a different outcome may have resulted if a 4chan user had been primed to contact authorities regarding this threat. Similar circumstances surround a Canadian high school student who, in the weeks (and hours) prior to a February 2016 knife attack that wounded seven classmates, repeatedly foreshadowed her plans in a Tumblr blog (Ross, 2016). If this attacker had framed her violent intent in jihadist terms, for example, it may well have resulted in greater public alarm – and actionable intelligence.

In his concluding remarks, Fredholm (Chapter 15) stresses the importance of “proactive, not reactive” measures in effi ciently counteracting lone actor terrorism. In a US context, security offi cials have undertaken extensive measures to proactively (and successfully) intercept post-9/11 terrorism threats. Yet in the same period, mass casualty fi rearm attacks by apparently non-aligned individuals have increased in frequency and lethality. Accordingly, US offi cials have taken strong measures to address this problem. The US Department of Justice provides law enforcement offi cers nationwide with standardised tactical training for active shooter situations, while a public awareness campaign, “Don’t Name Them,” seeks to undermine the “contagion” effect of mass shootings by dissuading news outlets from identifying perpetrators (ALERRT Center, 2016).

Such measures, while undoubtedly necessary, are also reactive. If they are being put to use, it means another active shooter event has taken place. What is perhaps needed is heightened recognition that the pre-attack stages – and indeed, the violent outcome – of non-aligned active shooter events function much in the same way as terrorism. To that end, Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism serves as an important text. By presenting non-aligned and politically-motivated lone actors as two sides of the same coin, it breaks down some of the categorical barriers that may be inhibiting proactive steps to address the active shooter problem in the US. It is only when the US citizens and policymakers come to terms with the serious nature of the active shooter threat that meaningful headway will be made in reducing its prevalence.


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ReferencesAdvanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Center. (2016) Don’t Name Them. Retrieved from www.dontnamethem.org/

Al-Hakaymah, M.K. (2008). Toward a New Strategy in Resisting the Occupier. In J. Lacey (Ed.), The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America (pp.147–161). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press

Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee. (2015). Active Shooter Guidelines for Places of Mass Gathering. Retrieved from https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-shooter-guidelines-places-mass-gathering.pdf

Blair, J.P. and Schweit, K. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/offi ce-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-incidents/a-study-of-active-shooter-incidents-in-the-u.s.-2000-2013

End the Gun Epidemic in America. (2015, December 4). The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/opinion/end-the-gun-epidemic-in-america.html

Ross, S. (2016, February 24). Grade 9 girl’s virtual life gives perspective to school stabbing attack. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/teen-faces-15-charges-after-stabbings-at-pickering-ont-school/article28866572/

Vanderhart, D., Johnson, K. and Turkewitz, J. (2015, October 1) Oregon shooting at Umpqua College Kills 10, Sheriff Says. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/oregon-shooting-umpqua-community-college.html

Virginia shooting: Suspected WDBJ gunman Vester Flanagan said Charleston massacre ‘was the tipping point.’ (2015, August 27). ABC News. Retrieved from www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-27/charleston-shooting-was-'tipping-point',-said-suspected-gunman/6728132

Douglas FryDouglas Fry completed a Masters degree with Macquarie University’s Department of Security Studies and Criminology in December 2015. He is currently enrolled as a Doctoral candidate with the Australian Graduate School of Policing Studies, Charles Sturt University. He writes as a freelance journalist in his spare time.

Twitter: @d_fry | Email: [email protected]

ooOoo


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Aims and Scope The AIPIO Journal is a refereed publication dedicated to the advancement of the discipline of intelligence studies. The Journal aims to be a medium for professionals and scholars to exchange views on contemporary issues in Australian and international intelligence practice. The Editorial Committee welcomes contributions related to all aspects of intelligence theory and practice and/ or studies in the application of intelligence in related disciplines (eg intelligence and terrorism or intelligence and peacekeeping).The Journal seeks to encourage a broad cross fertilisation of ideas from all AIPIO members and non-members working in the fi eld of intelligence. Research and thematic articles relating to different practice contexts such as national security, law enforcement and business intelligence are welcome. Synopses of professional/workplace projects backed by appropriate references, conference papers and research contributions from University students and postgraduates in the fi eld of intelligence are also welcome. The Journal is an independent, non-partisan forum. It seeks to disseminate the diverse fi ndings of its contributing authors and does not advocate positions of its own.

Submission and Editorial Procedures High quality submissions are welcome and should be submitted to the Managing Editor, Rebecca Vogel, email: [email protected] Manuscripts should be emailed as Word attachments. Submissions should include the article with the identity of the author removed, together with a separate cover sheet that includes an abstract of the submitted paper of no longer than 200 words, three keywords, and the author’s name and full contact details. A short biographical statement (up to 70 words) must also be included for each author. The Editorial Board assumes in submitting an article for publication, that the author has received any necessary clearances from his/her employer for their work to be published in the Journal. Manuscripts submitted for publication must not contain any classifi ed material.Evaluation of submissions involves blind peer review by the AIPIO Editorial Board. The Managing Editor or members of the Editorial Board reviews these comments and, where appropriate, communicate them directly to the author. Where necessary, the Managing Editor will also confer with other members of the Editorial Board. The Managing Editor will inform the author of whether or not the original or revised paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal.The criteria for evaluating the suitability of the submissions for publication are:

• Rigorous and insightful analysis• Relevance and interest of the article to AIPIO Journal readers.• Accessibility to the general readership and not only to specialists in the area addressed.• Topicality and use of up-to-date sources.• Adequacy and thoroughness of coverage of the topic (eg coverage of theoretical concepts and/or

practical applications).• Adequacy and clarity of tables, diagrams and fi gures included.• Treatment of topic in a way that makes a contribution to the theory and practice of intelligence. • Avoidance of plagiarism• Clarity of expression• Conformity to APA style specifi cations.

AIPIO Journal — Instructions to Authors


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Length and format of submissionsScholarly Articles Submitted articles should be approximately 5,000 words, double spaced, and should be accompanied by an abstract of 200 words. Three keywords should be included beneath the abstract. Copies should be submitted with names removed and with contact details attached separately. All article submissions are sent out for blind peer review. Before publication, proofs will be sent to authors for amendment and must be returned to the Managing Editor by the deadline given.

Practitioner Perspectives The Journal welcomes submissions providing analysis, commentary and debate on specifi c topics related to current Intelligence practices and concepts in the areas covered by the Journal. Responses to published articles or book reviews are also welcome. Contributions should be between 2,000 and 5,000 words. Submissions should include an abstract of up to 200 words, and three keywords listed beneath.

Book ReviewsThe Journal encourages succinct, evaluative reviews of books relevant to the interests of the Journal. Reviews should provide a descriptive and evaluative summary and a brief overview of the work’s signifi cance in the context of current theory and practice. Reviews should also clarify any conceptual trends and developments arising from the reviewed work. Reviewers are encouraged to contact the Managing Editor concerning their book of interest before writing the review. Submissions should be between 800 and 1,500 words.

Layout and StyleAll submissions to the Journal must conform to the following guidelines. Times New Roman font should be used, with a font size of 12. Spelling and grammar should conform to English (Australian) standards. Numbers up to and including ten should be spelled out. All acronyms should be expanded at the time of their fi rst use. Submissions should be double-spaced with pages numbered consecutively.

Title pageIn the following order, include the title, abstract of 200 words and three keywords. Do not use underlining. The author’s name should be omitted.

HeadingsHeadings should be left justifi ed, in sentence case, with only the fi rst letter of headings and proper nouns capitalised. Do not use underlining. Major headings are in bold; middle headings are bold and italicised and minor headings are italicised. Indicate new paragraphs by using one extra line space and indenting the fi rst line.

QuotationsShort quotations should be included in the body of the text in double quotation marks with the author and source cited. Quotations of more than 50 words should be set off from the text and indented without quotation marks.

Tables and fi guresNumber tables and fi gures consecutively. Table headings should be placed at the top of a table, and fi gure headings below the fi gure.



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ReferencingAPA (author-date, 6th edition) system is followed. In general, author’s surname and year of publication is given in brackets after the cited text (Johnson & Adams, 1988).

• For direct quotes, also add the page number (Johnson & Adams, 1988, pp. 27–8).• Where there are three or more authors, list all authors the fi rst time you cite the source (Kernis,

Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993); subsequently list only the fi rst author’s name and et al. (Kernis et al., 1993).

• If there is no author, use a short title (‘New drug’, 1993).• For websites, use paragraph number if no pages given (Johnson, 1988, para.7).• For websites, if author is unknown, cite website URL ( http://www.mq.edu.au , 1988, para.7).

The reference list should be structured as follows, and ordered alphabetically by author at the end of the manuscript:

• Books Johnson, G.H., & Adams, F.I. (1998). Harper’s connection (3rd Ed.). Boston: Penguin Books. (For no author) Harper’s connection (1990). Canberra: Australian Government Publishing

Service. (For edited books) Forgas, J. P. (Ed.). (2000). Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social

cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press.

• Chapters in books Macklin, R. (1983). Confl icts of interest. In T. L. Beauchamp & N. E. Bowie, Ethical theory

and business (240–46). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

• Journal articles Johnson, G.H. (1988). Harper’s connection: Exploring the alternatives. Journal of Arctic

Exploration, 33(4), 78–99.

• Government documents Department of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. (1999). Police integrity, England, Wales

and Northern Ireland: Securing and maintaining public confi dence. London: Home Offi ce Communication Directorate/HMIC.

• Newspaper articles Johnson, G.H. (1988, August 2). Harper’s connection. The Australian, 78–9.

• Web documents/sites Johnson, G.H. (1988). Harper’s connection. Retrieved from http://www.mq.edu.au/



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Copyright It is a condition of publication that authors assign copyright or license the publication rights in their articles, including abstracts, to the AIPIO Journal. This enables us to ensure full copyright protection and to disseminate the article, and of course the Journal, to the widest possible readership in print and electronic formats as appropriate. If you are an employee of a government agency, you should check if copyright can be released to the AIPIO Journal to publish and disseminate your work. As an author, you are required to secure permission if you want to reproduce any fi gure, table, or extract from the text of another source. This applies to direct reproduction as well as ‘derivative reproduction’ (where you have created a new fi gure or table which derives substantially from a copyrighted source).When submitting an article to the AIPIO Journal, authors should also include with their article an additional page with the following sentence:

I (name of author) transfer copyright of my article (insert title) to the publishers of the AIPIO Journal the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Offi cers (AIPIO).Signature, name of author and date.

Authors may retain moral rights and use the article elsewhere after publication without prior permission from AIPIO Journal provided that acknowledgement is given to the Journal as the original source of publication and that the AIPIO Journal Managing Editor is notifi ed so that the AIPIO Journal records show that its use is properly authorised. For any further information related to submissions to the Journal, please contact the Managing Editor, Rebecca Vogel, [email protected]


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