Middle East in the Transition. Copernicus Journal

Middle East in the Transition

ISSUE 1 (1) 2013ISSN 2299-4335ISSN 2299-4335 ISSUE 1 (3) 2013

Edited byAgnieszka Bryc, Bartosz Bojarczyk

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Contents

ARTICLES

A New Middle eAst?

dave Jerv isMuch Pain, Little Gain: The Consequences of the iraq War for iraqisand Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Bogdan szajkowskiThe Shia Crescent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Bar tosz Bojarczykiran on the Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Feride Asl i ergül JorgensenTurkey’s “new” Middle East or More of the Same . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Manuel Férez Gi lEverything Will Be Decided in Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Artur Malantowicz“Crisis, Chaos, violence – is that really what We Want?”A Stalled Democratization in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

whAt’s with isrAel?

Agnieszka Brycisrael in a new Middle East: How to respond? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Marcin szydziszThe Palestinian international identity after the Un resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Manuel Férez Gi lPeace Movements in the Palestinian-israeli Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

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REVIEWS

Alfred lutrzykowski

Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Pozycja ustrojowa i funkcje Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiejpo akcesji do Unii Europejskiej [Constitutional Status and Functions of the Sejmof the republic of Poland Following the Accession to the European Union],Dom ELiPSA Publishing House, Warszawa 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Jarosław Jarząbek

Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutionsof the New Middle East, Public Affairs, new york 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Artur Malantowicz

raphaël Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,Hurst & Company, London 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Natalia daśko

nonie Darwish, Okrucieństwo w majestacie prawa. Prześladowanie kobietw świecie islamu [Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implicationsof Islamic Law, nashville 2008], KEFAS Publishing House, Warszawa 2011 . . . . . . . 148

Agata Muszyńska

Adam Daniel rotfeld, Marcin Wojciechowski, W cieniu. 12 rozmów z Marcinem Wojciechowskim [in the Shadow. 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski],Agora SA, Warszawa 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

rober t Mańk

Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, Basic Books, new york 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

A New Middle eAst?

dave JervisMaria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland

PAiN, little GAiN: the CONseQUeNCesOF the irAQ wAr FOr irAQisANd AMeriCANs

ABstrACt

The aim of this study is to provide details about contemporary reality in iraq and the impact of the American invasion on iraq and American interests in the ten years since 2003. The analysis of the various source material, including survey results, policy statements, and statistical data reveals that, while the invasion brought gains to both the iraqis and the Americans, it did so at a great cost. The assessment of the outcome of that invasion is complicated by the fact that contemporary iraq was influenced by two decades of the rule of Saddam Hussein, who dominated the government and repressed his real and imagined foes. in March 2003 the US hoped for a quick win; however, its troops were to remain in iraq until December 2011, giving it significant influence throughout this period. While ten years have passed since the invasion, only ten years have passed and that may not be an adequate time frame in which to identify and evaluate gains and losses.

Key words

iraq, America, democracy, islam, Middle East

The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2013, No. 1 (3) ISSN 2299-4335

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Ten years have passed since the American invasion of iraq and one year has passed since the withdrawal of the last American troops from that country, so early 2013 provides a timely opportunity to assess the consequences of that invasion for the iraqis, the Americans, and the American strategic interests. This study examines those questions, the answers to which are much debated. on the question of whether the invasion advanced America’s interests, for instance, former President George W. Bush has no doubt, writing in his memoirs that, “For all the difficulties that followed, America is safer without a homicidal dictator pursuing WMD and supporting terror at the heart of the Middle East.’ retired General William odom, former head of the national Security Agency, has a very different view, describing the invasion as ‘the greatest strategic disaster in American history.” 1 As to the question about what the Americans left in iraq when they departed, ned Parker, who reported from that country prior to the American withdrawal, writes that it “has become something close to a failed state… The dream of an iraq governed by elected leaders answerable to the people is rapidly fading away.” in contrast, Anthony J. Blinken, a Deputy Assistant to President obama, argues that iraq has made “clear, measurable progress in the few short years since it lurched to the brink of sectarian war.” While the country has much to do, its progress in the last three years has been “remarkable”; it is “less violent, more democratic, and more prosperous than at any time in recent history.” 2

To assess these issues, this study provides details about contemporary reality in iraq and what has changed there since 2003 as well as considers the impact of the war on America’s strategic interests. it will conclude that, while the invasion brought gains to both iraqis and Americans, it did so at great cost, probably too great a cost, for both. This conclusion must be preliminary and tentative, however. While ten years have passed since the invasion, only ten years have passed and that may not be an adequate time frame in which to identify and evaluate gains and losses. Moreover, contemporary iraq was influenced by two decades of Saddam Hussein’s rule prior to the American invasion, so assignment of praise and blame for the contemporary reality is not completely straightforward.

1 T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, new york 2011, pp. 190, 234.2 n. Parker, The iraq We Left Behind, “Foreign Affairs” March/April 2012; A. Blinken,

Morning in Mesopotamia, “Foreign Affairs” July/August 2012.

Much Pain, Little Gain: The Consequences of the Iraq War for Iraqis… 7

1. Context

Any understanding of contemporary iraq must take account of two earlier periods in the country’s history. it had had a “tumultuous quarter-century under the leadership of Saddam Hussein,” the dominant figure from 1979 to 2003. 3 Then, Saddam’s regime was overthrown by the American invasion of March 2003, something that “exacted an enormous toll on iraq’s citizens.” 4 Saddam’s armies invaded two of the country’s neighbours, iran and Kuwait, fighting the first war to an inconclusive outcome and losing the second to an American-led international coalition. As many as 200,000 iraqis may have died in the war with iran, and perhaps 25,000 more in the occupation and war with Kuwait. When, following iraq’s defeat in Kuwait, the country’s Shiite and Kurdish populations rose up in rebellion, Saddam’s retaliation led to the death of as many as 50,000 Shiites, while perhaps as many as two million Kurds fled the country to Turkey and iran.

At home, Saddam dominated the government and repressed his real and imagined foes. Freedom House’s 2003 report on the human rights situation in the country noted that iraq might be “the most oppressive state in the world.” it had long judged iraq to be “not free” and consistently assigned the lowest possible scores on both civil liberties and political rights. There was virtually no freedom of expression or assembly, the majority Shia population faced severe persecution, there were arbitrary arrests and torture was common. Socioeconomic conditions deteriorated, especially in the 1990s. iraq’s ranking on the Human Development index declined from 55 to 126 (of 174) in the 1990s, a result of wars and Un sanctions imposed after the 1991 war. UniCEF reported that 500,000 iraqi children under five died between 1991–1998. 5 it will take years to overcome these conditions and to overcome the political legacy of the Saddam Hussein years, “a culture of deep suspicion coupled with a winner-take-all and loser lose-all form of politics.” 6

3 The Failed States Index: Country Profiles, Iraq, Fund for Peace, p. 3, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=states-iraq.

4 At A Crossroads: Human Rights in Iraq Eight Years after the U.S.-Led Invasion, Human rights Watch, p. 1, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/02/21/crossroads.

5 Freedom in the World 2003, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/iraq.

6 Déjà vu All Over Again? Iraq’s Escalating Political Crisis, international Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/126-deja-vu-all-over-again-iraqs-escalating-political-crisis.aspx>.

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The March 2003 US invasion and occupation of iraq also had a great impact. While the US hoped for a quick win, its troops were to remain in iraq until December 2011, giving it significant influence throughout this period. While total blame for the problems in iraq in recent years cannot be assigned solely to the United States, it certainly contributed to them. The US had invaded, after all, and occupied the country for eight years, and as Secretary of State Colin Powell noted prior to the invasion, “when you take out a regime and you bring down a government, you become the government.” 7

The US occupation lasted as long as it did due to significant and continuing political and military problems in iraq, an indication of its inability to establish a secure and stable iraq, with all the attendant consequences for the iraqis. Thus, the initial plan to turn power over to the iraqis, primarily to the iraqi exiles, and to leave the country in six months was abandoned within six weeks. Widespread violence and widespread iraqi disapproval of the leaders chosen by the Americans led the Americans to reverse course completely in May 2003 and to rule the country directly through the Coalition Provisional Authority, a role planned to last as long as five years. That plan also met iraqi resistance and increased the political and economic costs for the American occupying forces. Consequently, it was decided in november 2003, merely six months later, to turn power over to an iraqi government. The transfer of political authority occurred in June 2004, but thousands of US troops remained in the country, giving it significant influence, but not enough to halt the continuing and escalating violence, leading to another change in US military policy in late 2006, to counterinsurgency, i.e., an effort to protect iraq citizens rather than fixed points and to engage in political-military efforts to win their loyalties. This policy worked in the sense that there was a dramatic decline in violence; however, the iraqi government remained indecisive and sectarian tensions remained. 8 Americans’ influence declined as the date for their final departure approached. Failure to get the iraqis to agree to a power-sharing agreement after the 2010 election or to a continued American troop presence resulted in “an iraq that is less stable domestically and less reliable internationally than the United States had envisioned.” 9

7 D. Samuels, A Conversation with Colin Powell, “Atlantic Magazine” April 2007.8 T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, op.cit.; A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the

War, Losing the Peace, new Haven 2007; C. Tripp, A History of Iraq, new york 2007.9 M. Gordon, In US Exit from Iraq, Failed Efforts and Challenges, “new york Times”

September 22, 2012.


2. Gains and Pains for iraqis

How have the lives of the iraqis changed in the decade since the American invasion? Are they better off than they were in 2003? individual iraqis will have different answers to these questions. What follows is evidence they might use to reach those individual assessments.

The greatest single gain for the iraqis has been the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Few lament his passing. There is a new, American-influenced constitution that was (barely) endorsed in a national referendum in october 2005. Two parliamentary elections, generally regarded as free and fair, were held in December 2005 and March 2010, and turnout was high, especially in the first election, when 75% of the public voted. Still, Freedom House argues in its most recent report that “iraq is not an electoral democracy”: while it had conducted “meaningful elections” in March 2010, “political participation and decision-making in the country remain seriously impaired by sectarian and insurgent violence, widespread corruption, and the influence of foreign powers.” 10

That same Freedom House report demonstrates that there has been some improvement in human rights conditions. Most political rights and civil liberties are guaranteed by the constitution, although their exercise is hindered by violence and fear. For instance, while freedom of expression is protected by the constitution, “in practice it has been seriously impeded by sectarian tensions and fear of violent reprisals.” iraq’s score on the Press Freedom index, to cite one example, decreased from 124 (of 166) in 2003 to 152 (of 178) in 2012, due to “an increase in intimidation and violence against journalists.” There are no restrictions on the operation of non-governmental organizations, although these, too, have seen their operations restricted by safety concerns. This is a change since 2002, when the exercise of civil liberties was restricted by the government and not by societal conditions. The iraqis have far more sources of information in 2012 than they did in 2002. More than a dozen independent television stations and hundreds of print publications have been established, and the number of internet subscribers increased from a pre-war level of 4,500 to more than 1.5 million by January 2010. Criminal justice practices have not changed as dramatically. Security services still engage in arbitrary arrests and the use of torture continues, especially in security-related cases, and the judiciary is not independent. Given these changes, Freedom House still characterized iraq

10 Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/iraq.

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as “not free” in 2012 and assigned scores of 6 (of 7) for civil liberties and 5 (of 7) for political rights, better than the consistent ratings of 7 in the Saddam Hussein years. This is an improvement, but only a modest improvement, especially compared with the changes elsewhere resulting from the Arab Spring. Tunisia’s Freedom House rating, for instance, went from “not free” in 2011 to “partly free” in 2012, with its political rights score improving from 7 to 3 and its civil liberties score improving from 5 to 4. 11

Whatever the character of its institutional structure, the iraqi government does not operate efficiently. A July 2012 report by the international Crisis Group described it as “weak,” “dysfunctional,” “divided,” and “drifting.” 12 it took nine months following the 2010 elections to form a government, and since that time Prime Minister nouri al-Maliki has increased the power of his office, e.g. by gaining control over nominally independent bodies and appointing allies to temporary positions rather than seeking parliamentary approval for permanent occupants. The divided opposition has protested and threatened a vote of confidence but has been unable to do so due to internal divisions and the self-interest of some of its members. Given these internal divisions and resulting weakness, no iraqi government has been able to pass laws on oil exploration or the distribution of oil revenues, the environment, consumer protection, intellectual property, investment, or permanent rules for de-Baathification. 13

The government has failed in other ways, too, and the quality of life for ordinary iraqis remains poor. Broad measures of conditions in the country can be found in the State Fragility Index published by the Center for Systemic Peace and the Failed States Index published by the Fund for Peace. iraq ranked 16th (of 164 countries, with 1 being the most fragile) on the State Fragility index in 2011, a ranking that placed it into the “high fragility” category. Security and economic effectiveness were identified as particular problems. The 2012 Failed States index ranked iraq 9th (of 177 countries, with 1 being the most failed state). iraq ranked among the world’s worst ten countries on five of the index’s twelve components: “group grievance” (ethnic violence, discrimination, powerlessness), “security

11 Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House; At a Crossroads, Human rights Watch; Iraq Index (January 31, 2012): Tracking the Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Centers/saban/iraq%20in-dex/index20120131.PDF.

12 Deja Vu All Over Again?, international Crisis Group, pp. 10,16.13 ibidem; K. Katzman, Iraq: Governance, Politics, and Human Rights, “Congressional

reference Service” December 13, 2012, pp. 13–14, 25, http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/rS21968.pdf.


apparatus” (internal conflict, small arms proliferation, political prisoners), “human flight” (migration per capita, emigration of educated population), “fractionalized elites” (deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain), and “uneven development” (large gaps between rich and poor and/or urban and rural areas). The Failed States index is also useful because it tracks changes over time. This longer-term perspective provides evidence that conditions in iraq have improved in recent years, although modestly: while still very low, its 2012 scores on eight of the twelve components of the index had improved from 2011 and, over a five-year period, had improved on seven of the 12 components. 14

Terms such as “failed state” or “fragile state” suggest a government that is unable or unwilling to complete the tasks expected of all governments. The most fundamental failure of the iraqi government and the Americans before it has been the failure to protect the lives of the iraqis. iraq Body Count documented 116,497 civilian deaths from the time of the American invasion in 2003 until its withdrawal in 2011. Using WikiLeaks revelations, iraq Body Count estimates that as many as 15,000 more iraqi civilians may have been killed. The situation has improved in recent years in the sense that fewer civilians are being killed: the number of civilian deaths was slightly more than 4,000 in both 2010 and 2011, declines from the height of the violence in 2006–2008. in fact, 90% of all civilian deaths occurred by 2009. not only did the number of deaths decrease, but the number of the iraqis killed by the Americans also declined. Approximately 13% of those killed were killed by American soldiers, especially in the first several weeks after the invasion; here, too, there has been improvement, with the number killed by American soldiers declining greatly after 2009, with only 32 iraqi civilians killed in 2010 and 19 in 2011. Following the American withdrawal, however, the level of violence increased. Two attacks by terrorist groups in January 2012 killed 131 people, and overall, 2012 was the most violent year since 2009. 15

Another government failure is the inability to provide public services to all citizens and regions. The iraq Knowledge network, part of the government’s Planning Ministry, conducted a survey on the availability of public services in first quarter of 2011. it found that, with respect to electricity, households receive

14 M. Marshall, B. Cole, Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility, “Center for Systematic Peace”, p. 30, http://www.systemicpeace.org/Globalreport2011.pdf; The Failed States Index 2012, Fund for Peace, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi; Country Profile: Iraqi, Fund for Peace.

15 Civilian Deaths from Violence in 2012, iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2012/; K. Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, op.cit., pp. 19–20.

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an average of 14.6 hours of electricity per day from public and private sources. The public water network provides 25% of its users with less than two hours of water per day. only thirty percent of households, mostly in urban areas, have access to the public sanitation system, and only 52% of households have access to solid waste collection services. 16

Examination of macroeconomic factors provides further evidence that, despite recent improvements, the situation remains poor. The country’s nominal GDP increased from $13.6 billion in 2003 to $128.1 billion in 2011 and per capita GDP increased from $802 to $3808 in the same period. These are dramatic improvements, although some of the gains have been eaten up by inflation – which has been kept in check in recent years – and by corruption, which has gotten worse: iraq’s ranking on Transparency international’s Corruption index declined from 113 (of 133 countries) in 2003 to 175 (of 183 countries) in 2011. The oil industry remains the economic lifeblood of the country, responsible for 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings. Unfortunately for the iraqis, production has barely increased since before the American invasion, although revenues have increased as a result of increased oil process. Production has only increased from a pre-war estimate of 2.5 million barrels per day to 2.89 million barrels per day in April 2012 and exports have increased, maybe, from pre-war estimates of 1.75–2.5 million barrels per day to 2.4 million in June 2012. Unemployment remains high, about 20% nationwide, but is as high as 55% in some rural areas. 17

There are continuing social problems. The Un Development Program’s Human Development index, based on life expectancy at birth, access to knowledge, and standard of living, ranked iraq 132nd of 187 countries in 2011 and placed it in the “medium development” category. The country made progress between 2000–2011 on education measures and on standard of living measures, but life expectancy at birth was lower in 2011 than in 2000 or 1995. Average life expectancy in 2011 was 69 years and mean years of schooling for those over 25 was 5.6 years. 18 The large number of refugees and internally displaced persons

16 Essential Services Factsheet, iraq Knowledge network, http://www.iauiraq.org/doc-uments/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf.

17 World Factbook, Central intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.gov/library/publica-tions/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html; Iraq Index (July 2012), Brookings; Freedom in the World 2012, Freedom House.

18 Human Development Report 2011: Sustainable and Equity: A Better Future for All, United nations Development Program, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/download/>.


create additional social problems. Approximately one million people were displaced or had fled the country prior to the American invasion and another 2.7 million were displaced by April 2010. More than 400,000 of those who fled have returned to their homes since 2009. While that is good news, a 2010 survey of returnees indicated that 87% could not make enough to care for their families and 61% regretted returning. 19

one gain for the iraqis since 2003 is that they feel freer to express opinions about their conditions. only 7% believed they were “thriving” according to a September 2011 Gallup poll, while 25% believed they were “suffering.” Conditions appear to be getting worse: in response to the same question eighteen months earlier, 16% reported they were thriving and 14% that they were suffering. Seventy percent of respondents in September 2011 reported feelings of stress the previous day and 60% reported experiencing anger. one likely source of anger and stress is the standard of living. in February 2010, 46% were satisfied with their standard of living and 49% dissatisfied. Here, too, conditions appear to be worsening: eighteen months later, in August 2011, there was more dissatisfaction: 32% reported being satisfied and 64% dissatisfied. 20

Many iraqis held the US responsible for their condition, especially in the years immediately following the invasion. A September 2003 Gallup poll indicated that only 5% of iraqis believed the United States had invaded to “assist the iraqi people” and only 1% believed it had done so to bring democracy to the country. on the other hand, 94% believed Baghdad was “a more dangerous place than before the invasion.” opinion improved little over the course of America’s direct rule: a Coalition Provisional Authority-sponsored poll conducted near the end of the occupation revealed that 85% of iraqis lacked confidence in the CPA. opinions about the United States did not improve much over the next several years. Asked “Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of the United States?” fewer than 40% of iraqis approved in any year after 2008: 35% in 2008, 24% in 2009, 36% in 2010, and 29% in 2011. 21

19 Iraq Index (January 31, 2012), Brookings.20 ‘Suffering’ in Iraq Highest Since 2008, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/151940/

suffering-iraq-highest-2008.aspx; Opinion Briefing: Discontent and Division in Iraq, Gal-lup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153128/opinion-briefing-discontent-division-iraq.aspx.

21 D. Jervis, Mugged By Reality: The American Experience in Iraq, “South African Journal of international Affairs” 2009, no. 16; The U.S. Global Leadership Project, Meridian international Center and Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153959/Global-Leadership-Project.aspx.

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3. Gains and Pains for Americans

For Americans, too, the iraq war brought some gains but much pain as well. The biggest gain was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. yet this gain must be qualified in two ways. Some argue that Saddam was not all that threatening. iraq’s military had been degraded since the first Gulf War, it did not possess weapons of mass destruction as Americans had believed, and few of its neighbours, the ones presumably most threatened by it, supported the invasion. Also, any threat posed by iraq might have been contained through a combination of Un sanctions and British and American air power. That is, the threat that was eliminated by the American invasion might have been dealt with, or was already being dealt with, by less painful policies.

To achieve Saddam’s removal, America and Americans experienced a lot of pain. The most obvious are the costs in lives and dollars. The Defense Department reported that 4,487 American soldiers were killed in iraq between March 19, 2003 and December 31, 2011 and another 32,223 were wounded. 22 in terms of expenditures, the Congressional research Service reported in March 2011 that Congress had appropriated $806 billion for the war in iraq. Expenditures have undoubtedly increased since then, although probably not too dramatically as US troop numbers have declined. That spending has had an adverse impact on the American economy, and the United States will be paying an economic price for years. Joseph E. Stiglitz, a nobel Prize-winning economist, and Linda J. Bilmes, a lecturer in public finance at Harvard’s Kennedy School, estimate that the war’s ultimate cost (including government spending and the adverse impact on the American economy) will be more than $3 trillion. Why? Because the war added at least $25 to the cost of a barrel of oil coming to the US, was responsible for at least 25% of the increase in America’s growing debt burden, and, because low interest rates and lax regulations – necessary to keep the domestic economy growing while the war continued – contributed to a worsening of the financial crisis. 23

one human and economic cost that will last long after the last American soldier leaves iraq is the treatment of those who were physically and emotionally

22 Iraq Index (December 31, 2011), Brookings.23 A. velasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations

Since 9/11, “Congressional research Service” March 29, 2011, p. 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/rL33110.pdf; J. Stiglitz, L. Bilmes, The True Cost of the Iraq War: $3 Trillion and Beyond, “Washington Post” September 10, 2010.


wounded there. These costs follow all wars, but will likely be higher in the case of the iraq (and Afghanistan) war for several reasons. one is that more soldiers wounded in the current wars are surviving their injuries (90%) than did so in vietnam (86%) or earlier wars. in addition, more veterans are reporting injuries: forty-five percent of returnees from iraq and Afghanistan are filing claims, a far higher rate than in the World War ii or vietnam eras, and as many 20% are reporting symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Finally, more veterans are seeking help from the veterans Administration because they do not have private health insurance. if previous wars, in which the highest costs for treating veterans occurred thirty to forty years after the conflict ended, are any guide, disability and treatment expenses for veterans will become a huge item in the federal budget. The Congressional Budget office has predicted an increase in costs from $1.9 billion in 2010 to as much as $8.4 billion in 2020. Looking to the more distant future, some private groups estimate that treatment and disability costs will amount to as much as $1 trillion over the next forty years. 24

A further problem is that not all of the money spent in iraq was spent wisely or for the purpose it was intended, reducing its impact on iraq while increasing costs to Americans. Writing in February 2009, Stuart Bowen Jr., the inspector General for iraq reconstruction, concluded that expenditures on iraqi infrastructure projects between the summer of 2002 and late 2008 generally did not meet their goals, although expenditures to increase the capabilities of the iraqi military did. There was a “significant waste of taxpayer dollars,” however, contrary to public perceptions, relatively few examples of outright fraud. 25 it was not just American money that was misspent or spent poorly. The US has been unable to account for more than $7 billion in iraqi assets from the Un’s Development Fund for iraq. This fund includes assets left over from the Un’s oil-for-Food program that were to be distributed by the US to help reconstruct the country. Poor bookkeeping rather than fraud is perhaps the reason for this failure, but the iraqis are likely to insist that some of their money be returned. 26

All wars cost money and lives. The more relevant question is whether the outcome of a war justified its costs. World War ii, for example, was far more

24 J. Dao, Cost of Treating Veterans Will Rise Long Past Wars, “new york Times” July 27, 2011; The Paperwork Mountain at Veterans Affairs, “new york Times” 23 november 2012.

25 Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (2009), Special inspector General for iraq reconstruction, http://www.sigir.mil/files/HardLessons/Hard_Lessons_report.pdf#view=fit.

26 J. rogin, U.S. Can’t Produce $1 Billion of Fuel Receipts in Iraq, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.

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costly in terms of both lives and dollars than the war in iraq, but few would argue that those sacrifices were not worth making. What distinguishes the war in iraq from many previous ones America has fought is the large number of strategic costs in addition to lives and dollars. The most significant such cost is that “it dramatically shifted the regional balance of power in iran’s favour,” according to Safa al-Sheik, iraq’s deputy national security adviser. 27 iraq’s military arsenal was bigger than iran’s in 2002, with more tanks, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and surface-to-air missile launchers, but by 2010 it was iran that possessed more of each. The iranian military manpower advantage increased from a ratio of 5:4 to 5:2 in those years. 28 Details such as these do not account for the quality of military equipment or the morale of troops, but they do demonstrate a significant erosion of any regional counterbalance to iran.

The US invasion may also have limited America’s ability to confront iran. While American strategists might have hoped that the presence of US troops in Afghanistan as well as iraq would place great pressure on iran, the opposite turned out to be true, i.e., because Americans were tied down in both countries, America’s ability to pressure iran was reduced and iran’s ability to retaliate to any American strike on iran’s nuclear facilities was increased. Furthermore, questions about America’s intelligence capabilities and the erosion of its position in the world, to be discussed below, contributed to less international attention and pressure on iran and its nuclear program than would otherwise have been the case.

The Shia iran also benefitted because of its increased influence in the Shia iraq. The two governments are increasing cooperation, especially on security matters, and have greatly enhanced trade and tourism ties. iran played an important role in mediating iraq’s political crisis following the 2010 elections and has ties with important iraqi political and security forces. 29 This can be illustrated in the current struggle in Syria, iran’s most important Arab ally. A September 2012 intelligence report claimed that iraq has been allowing iran to funnel “personnel and tens of tons of weapons” through iraqi airspace and into Syria “on almost a daily basis.” There have been reports that buses carrying iranian pilgrims to

27 S. al-Sheik, E. Sky, Is Iraq an Iranian Proxy?, Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com.

28 A. Cordesman, S. Khazi, Iraq After US Withdrawal: US Policy and the Iraqi Search for Security and Stability, “Center for Strategic and international Studies”, p. 4, http://csis.org/publication/iraq-after-us-withdrawal.

29 Déjà vu All Over Again?, international Crisis Group, pp. 10–12; A. Cordesman, S. Khazi, Iraq After U.S. Withdrawal, p. vii.


a Shiite shrine in Syria have also carried weapons, supplies and fighters to aid the embattled Syrian regime. The US has urged the iraqi government to slow or halt the supplies going to Syria, e.g. by inspecting planes on their way to Syria, but it has rarely done so: only two flights to Syria have been inspected since September 2012, the last on october 27. There is also evidence that iranians were alerted to the inspections by iraqi officials. 30

How about terrorism, the reduction of which was one of the purposes of the war? The invasion might be deemed a strategic success if looking merely at the terrorist threat to the US According to the Global Terrorism index, its ranking on the list of countries experiencing the “highest impact of terrorism” dropped from 1 to 41 between 2002–11. The terrorist threat to iraq, in contrast, has increased dramatically. Fully one-third of victims of terrorism in the decade after 2002 were iraqi and it had the highest score on the “impact of terrorism” measure. overall the global number of terrorist incidents increased 460% between 2002– –2011, although most of that increase occurred between 2002–2007. Examination of the number of fatalities and injuries yields similar results. Fatalities increased 195% between 2002–2011 and the number of injuries increased 224%, although there has been a decline in both since 2009. 31

one strategic consequence of the war in iraq (and Afghanistan) is likely to be a reduced public willingness to be active on the world scene. After the wars in Korea and vietnam, the US public “developed a strong aversion to embarking on such ventures again,” according to John Mueller, an expert on public opinion during conflicts, and he predicts similar consequences following the wars in iraq and Afghanistan. 32 There is already evidence of such views emerging. The 2012 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that just 61% of the American public believed it would be best for America to take an active role in the world, down ten points since 2002, while 38% believed it would be best for the country to stay out of foreign affairs, up from 25% in 2002 and the highest level recorded since the question was first asked in 1947. Perhaps most worrisome for the future is that it is young people, those aged 18–29, who are most likely to support a reduced American role. Americans want the US to reduce its global presence,

30 n. younis, Time to Get Tough on Iraq, “new york Times” october 30, 2012; M. Gordon, E. Schmitt, T. Arango, Flow of Arms to Syria Through Iraq Persists, to U.S. Dismay, “new york Times” December 1, 2012.

31 2012 Global Terrorism index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism in the Last Decade, institute of Economics and Peace, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads /2012/12/2012-Global-Terrorism-index-report1.pdf.

32 J. Mueller, The Iraq Syndrome, “Foreign Affairs” november/December 2005.

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too: 52% believe the US should have the same number of overseas military bases as it does today, the lowest percentage since 2002, and 38% believe it should have fewer, up from just 14% in 2002.

none of this should be taken to mean that the American public is isolationist or does not want any involvement in the world. rather, it is calling for a change in foreign policy methods, emphasizing non-military solutions to problems and a very selective use of military force. 33 President obama’s use of military power reflects these views. He has been willing to use US military power in response to direct threats, but to do so “in a targeted, get-in-and-get-out fashion that avoids, at all costs, the kind of messy ground wars and lengthy occupations that have drained America’s treasury and spirit for the past decades.” Examples of the obama approach include the use of drones against al-Qaeda operatives and the use of computer viruses against iranian nuclear program computers. 34

Another adverse consequence of the invasion is the deterioration of America’s global reputation in both the short-term and long-term. This can be illustrated in Pew Global opinion polls. There was a consistent and often dramatic decline in America’s “favourability rating” in Europe between 2002 and 2003, i.e., at the time the US was deciding to invade iraq: from 62% to 42% in France, 60% to 45% in Germany, and 71% to 45% in the Czech republic. European support for the US remained low for the remainder of the Bush presidency and, although it has increased in the obama years, it has generally not returned to pre-war levels. The erosion of support for the US declined even more dramatically in the Middle East in the short term and remains low. in Turkey, for example, the 30% favourability rating in 2003 declined to 15% in 2003 and was still at that level in 2012. in Jordan, support deteriorated from 25% in 2002 to just 1% in 2003 and was just 12% in 2012. While Pakistani support for the US actually increased between 2002 and 2012, it did so from a very low base, 10% in 2002 to 12% in 2012. 35

33 Foreign Policy in the New Millennium: Results of the 2012 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Task%20Force%20reports/2012_CCS_report.pdf.

34 D. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and the Surprising Use of American Power, new york 2012, pp. Xiv–Xv.

35 Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted, Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-policy-4/.


The decline in America’s favourability rating probably resulted as much from the flawed rationale for the invasion of iraq as the invasion, itself. The Center for Public integrity published a report in January 2008 identifying “at least” 935 false statements about the threat posed by iraq in the two years following September 11, 2001. The President made 232 false statements about weapons of mass destruction and 28 false statements about iraqi links to al-Qaeda. Secretary of State Colin Powell made 254 false claims, Secretary of Defense Donald rumsfeld – 109 false claims, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz – 85, national Security Adviser Condoleeza rice – 56, and vice President Dick Cheney – 48. This was part of an “orchestrated campaign that effectively galvanized public opinion and, in the process, led the nation to war under decidedly false pretences,” that the officials knew or had reason to know were false. 36 To cite but one piece of evidence that the administration overreached in its depiction of an iraq with nuclear weapons, George Tenet, who, himself, later exaggerated the iraqi threat, acknowledged in his memoirs that claims of iraqi weapons of mass destruction “went far beyond what our analysis could support. The intelligence community’s belief was that, left unchecked, iraq would probably not acquire nuclear weapons until near the end of the decade.” 37

Americans recognize the pain caused by the war and have become very critical of it. Two-thirds of respondents in a 2012 survey said the war in iraq had not been worth it, the highest percentage since the war started, while just 32% said the war was worth it, the lowest percentage since 2003. Americans recognize the adverse strategic consequences of invading iraq: 71% of respondents in the same poll said the iraq war demonstrated that caution should be used when contemplating military force, 70% believed the war had worsened America’s relations with the Muslim world, while 69% doubted that the war had reduced the threat of terrorism. Given these conclusions, it is not surprising that 51% of respondents in a poll taken at the time of the final troop departure from iraq believed that the decision to send troops there had been a “dumb” one. nor is there much faith that the situation in iraq will improve: 63% believed it was unlikely that the iraqi government would be able to prevent terrorists from using its territory to plan attacks against the United States, 60% doubted the

36 C. Lewis, M. reading-Smith, False Pretenses: Following 9/11, President Bush and seven top officials of his administration waged a carefully orchestrated campaign of misinformation about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, “Center for Public integrity” January 23, 2008, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/01/23/5641/false-pretenses.

37 Quoted in T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, p. 113.

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country would be able to preserve its own safety without American help, and 54% doubted the country would be able to preserve a democratic government. 38

4. Conclusions

one clear conclusion of this study is that the Americans and the iraqis have both experienced significant pain since the American invasion and occupation of iraq. Almost all of the pain for Americans – deaths, adverse economic consequences, and others – can be attributed directly to the decision to go to war and poor planning for the post-war period. For the iraqis, the causal relationship between the invasion and subsequent hardship is not so clear. nonetheless, one can argue that the number of deaths, political instability, and socioeconomic hardships after 2003 were greater than they would have been had the US not invaded.

Were those pains worth it? Americans will likely answer “no,” if only because there were so few gains from the invasion. yes, Saddam Hussein was removed from power, but the costs were great. Consider the standard used by Dick Cheney, then the Secretary of Defense, at the end of the first Gulf War when the US did not invade iraq: noting that only 146 Americans had died in the war, he asked “how many additional dead Americans is Saddam worth? our judgment was, not very many…” 39 More than thirty times as many Americans died in the second Gulf War, and the results were more ambiguous. These, along with all the other costs make it hard to conclude that the invasion was worth it.

Unlike the Americans, the iraqis had more gains from the invasion. Saddam Hussein was removed from power; the human rights situation improved somewhat; iraq is unlikely to threaten its neighbours, although it may face greater threats from them; the socioeconomic situation has improved; and elections have been held. Are these gains worth the costs? While individual iraqis will have different answers, an outsider might generalize that the Shiites would be more likely to answer affirmatively and the Sunnis negatively. For the Shiites, not only did the invasion remove Saddam, whose regime had persecuted them severely, but was followed by a Shia-dominated government. reduced tension with iran not only reduces the danger of foreign invasion but create

38 Gallup/ORC Opinion Poll (December 16–18, 2011), Polling report, http://pollingre-port.com/iraq.htm); Foreign Policy in the New Millennium, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

39 Cheney quoted in T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, op.cit., p. 39.


opportunities for the iraqi Shiites to visit religious centres in iran. For these reasons, the iraq Sunnis, who lost their long-dominant position in society, are more likely to conclude that the post-invasion gains are not worth the pain they have experienced. The political position of the iraqi Kurds is largely unchanged; they have had de facto autonomy since the first Gulf War, although that status has now been inserted into the iraqi constitution. They may have special reason to be thankful for Saddam’s demise, however, given that he launched a genocide against the Kurdish population in the late 1980s.

This study has concentrated on the impact of the American invasion on iraq and American interests in the ten years since 2003. Are its conclusions premature? Should Americans and iraqis take a longer term perspective with regard to changes in that country? ryan Crocker, a former American ambassador, has argued that they should because the “iraq story post-2003, is still chapter one. This is a very long book.” 40 Are its conclusions too harsh? is consideration of the extent to which the situation in iraq has improved since 2003 the correct standard? Should the Americans and the iraqis focus on what has been prevented rather than what has been achieved? Bowen, the Special inspector General for iraq reconstruction, thinks so, writing in october 2012 that “The encouraging thing is that iraq has not fallen apart.” 41 These questions and different alternative perspectives suggest that scholars will be debating the decision to invade iraq and the impact of the invasion for a long time.

40 Crocker quoted in T. Anderson, Bush’s Wars, op.cit., p. 220.41 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (October 30, 2012), Special inspector

General for iraq reconstruction, http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/october2012.html.

Bogdan szajkowskiUniversity of Exeter, United Kingdom

the shiA CresCeNt

ABstrACt

The study focuses on the recent rise in importance of the Shia branch of islam. Ever since the success of the iranian revolution, the Teheran regime has persistently claimed to be protector and promoter of the Shia interests outside its borders. Many Sunni rulers in the Middle East fear that the rising position of the Shia and iran, in particular through its nuclear programme, will alter the traditional balance of power not only in the Gulf region but throughout the Arab world. The study introduces the term “the Shia crescent,” which has become a commonly used expression in popular, intellectual and political debates. As a geo-political term, it is used to describe a region of the Middle East where the majority population is Shia, or where there is a strong Shia minority in the population. The aim of this article is to examine critically the notion of the Shia crescent and suggest possible explanations on what is behind the rise of Shia power, how to account for it, and what are its consequences for the current system of international relations.

Key words

Shia Crescent, Shiite, Sunni, iran, the Gulf region

in December 2004 King Abdullah ii of Jordan warned publically of the emergence of a “Shia crescent” in the Gulf and the Middle East regions. He sounded an alarm that a vast swath of the region, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the indian ocean – from Lebanon through the oil rich Caspian Sea to the even richer Persian Gulf, was coming under the sway of the Shia branch of islam. More importantly, he sent a warning that the hegemonic iran is attempting to dominate the region through an array of Shiite proxies. He was referring to the growing influence of iran in iraq, iran’s support of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the strong alliance between Tehran and Syria.

if pro-iran parties or politicians dominate the new iraqi government – the King said – a new ‘crescent’ of dominant Shia movements or governments stretching

The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2013, No. 1 (3) ISSN 2299–4335

The Shia Crescent 23

from iran into iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge, alter the traditional balance of power between the two main islamic sects and pose new challenges to US interests and allies. 1

The King’s statements reflected the fear of many Sunni rulers in the Middle East that the rising position of the Shia and iran, in particular through its nuclear programme, will alter the traditional balance of power not only in the Gulf region but throughout the Arab world. indeed, in April 2006 in an interview with Al-Arabiya Tv, the then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak deliberately conflated Arab Shias with iranians and questioned their fidelity: “There are Shias in all these countries [of the region], in significant percentages, and Shias are mostly always loyal to iran and not the countries where they live… naturally iran has an influence over Shia who make up 65 per cent of iraq’s population” 2. President Mubarak reflected a wider views of the royal families from the Gulf countries to Morocco. in January 2007 an editorial in al-Ahram, a newspaper widely seen as the voice of the Egyptian state, declared: „iran is working actively towards spreading Shia doctrine even in countries which do not have a Shia minority… paving the way for reviving the dreams of the Safavids.” 3

Subsequently the term “the Shia crescent” became a commonly used expression in popular, intellectual and political debates. As a geo-political term, it is used to describe a region of the Middle East where the majority population is Shia, or where there is a strong Shia minority in the population. The aim of this article is to examine critically the notion of the Shia crescent and suggest possible explanations on what is behind the rise of Shia power, how to account for it, and what its consequences for the current system of international relations are.

King Abdullah’s idea of the Shia crescent met with a great deal of support among the Sunni Muslim political elite on the one hand and with substantial

1 Quoted by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri in their book, A. Ehteshami, M. Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution, London 2007, p. 133.

2 ibidem, p. 134.3 r. Hardy, Sunni and Shia: Spectre of Sectarianism, BBC report, 20 February 2007.

The Safavids were the 16th century Persian dynasty that unified much of Persia under a single political control and, initially, also subjugated large parts of iraq. They introduced Shia islam to that part of the world. The theocratic Safavid Empire lasted from 1501 to 1722 and it covered all of contemporary iran, parts of Turkey and Georgia. Under Safavid rule, eastern Persia became a great cultural centre, best represented by isfahan, the capital of the Empire for over 120 years.

24 Bogdan Szajkowsk i

criticisms from iran and the leaders of Shia communities throughout the Arab world on the other.

Speaking to the Cnn in 2010 king Abdullah was asked whether he regrets making the comment about the Shia crescent. He replied:

no, well, that’s not what i said. What i said is i was worried about members – certain members of the iranian government using an agenda to create the perception of a Shia crescent, because the last thing that we need in this part of the world is a conflict between Sunnis and Shias. And so when i raise the alarm bell, i saw a political strategy that would as an endgame have the Sunnis and Shias at each other’s throats. if you look back at the iraq-iran war, the war first started as a war of territory. it then became an issue of race – Persians against Arabs – which i think was wrong. never did they ever come close to touching the religious aspect, because the fault line between Shias and Sunnis goes from Beirut all the way to Bombay and it’s a catastrophic subject to play with. in my view, i felt that there was an agenda out there that was going to try and push it in that respect, and also raising the alarm bell that that cannot happen. 4

interestingly, in this re-visit to his controversial opinion, the king placed the responsibility for the idea of the Shia crescent on “certain members of the iranian government,” ignoring the background to the tensions between the two sects and the role of the Sunni political elites in curbing the Shia minority aspirations. remarkably, this time king Abdullah extended the fault-line between the Shia and the Sunnis all the way to india.

The Sunni-Shia conflict is centuries old and deeply imbedded into the ideology and theology of the two main sections of islam, as well as into various aspects of relations between them. The claims of the two groups as to who holds the proper succession from Prophet Mohammad and, therefore, which group represents the properly constituted assemblage of adherence and should be recognised as such, presents an insurmountable problem. Throughout the centuries, the claims of the Sunnis and the Shia to the origins and property of the Prophet’s succession have been a source of open conflicts and skirmishes, as well as intense communal animosities. recently, the Sunni-Shia hostilities reached new dimensions – each of the two main traditions of islam is now associated with a powerful state – Saudi Arabia on the one hand and iran on the other – which also represent groupings of countries linked through their version of islam with two important clusters in the system of international relations.

4 Cnn interview with King Abdullah at Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, January 29, 2010.


Shiism arose as a distinct movement within islam primarily as a political movement and as a political identity, irrespectfully of the issue of the succession to the Prophet Mohammed. The difference between the Shia and the majority Sunni community can be summarised in three different categories: political, religious and ethnical.

The Shiat Ali (the partisans of Ali), were the partisans of a particular movement that believed that the succession to the Prophet Mohammed should rest within the prophet’s immediate family. “So when we talk about that original split between Shiism and what will eventually become known as Sunni islam, we need to recognize that at first there was very little religiously that separated these two groups. This was surely political separation. However, once the Shia political aspirations were more or less denied and the Muslim community transformed into an empire, a distinctly Arab empire, the Shia slowly began to withdraw from the larger political implications of their movement.” 5 This was particularly apparent after an epic battle in Karbala in 680 when the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, Hussain, and a small group of the Shia, fought against the tyrannical reign of the Umayyad caliph yazid ibn Muawiya. outnumbered by the tens of thousands, Hussain and his small band of followers fought bravely but were brutally massacred. The “tragedy of Karbala” as it is known continues to serve as inspiration to the Shia; endowing them with the belief that standing up to oppression and injustice, no matter how great or at what odds, is an act of faith. 6 resistance against despotic rule and rulers is a deeply-seated notion among the Shia. The withdrawal of Shia from the society after 680, particularly in political terms, inescapably led them to become a distinctly religious sect.

it is interesting from the point of view of religious studies that Shiism is one of very few religions in the world whose origins are in many respects defined by ritual, and not so much by mythology. it was the lamentation rituals, the mourning rituals that arose out of the massacre at Karbala that began to give Shiism its distinct religious definition, and only later on the theological implications emerged. The theological definition of Shiism was formed as a result of rituals that had already very organically been going on for quite some time. From about 680 onwards, Shiism comes to represent essentially the protest movement within the islamic world.

5 The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Understanding the Shia, Council on Foreign relations, http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescent-symposium-understanding-shia-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10864.

6 r. Amiri, The Shia Crescent Revisited, rSD reports, February 10, 2011.


Shiism is something that is not so much defined just by doctrine, but by a convergence of a certain type of institutional identity, a very strong, practical sense of ties with whom one follows his religious leader to talk about personal issues, family issues, household and community issues and just about everything else. And then, on the other hand, there is the identity shaped sometimes by rituals, which allowed many different interpretations. 7

Within Shiism there is a great deal of emphasis on the charismatic leader, the imam, the true successor to the Prophet Mohammed. The Shia clerics have much more organization and much more influence over ordinary Shia believers than most Sunni clerics have over Sunni believers.

The Shia tradition is far from uniformed – there are varieties of schools and sects within Shiism, including the ismaili, Zaydi, 8 nizari, Musta lis, Druze, and Muqanna ah.

There is little difference between the Sunnis and the Shiites when it comes to basic rituals like prayer and fasting. But fundamentalist Sunnis label Shiite practices, such as treating dead religious figures like saints, as blasphemous.

The idea of Sunni islam is very much tied to the development of islamic law, which, while it has its primarily foundations within the Koran, the bulk of islamic law, particularly in the Sunni world, involves the Sunnah, the traditions of the Prophet.

The contemporary rise of Shiism and the ascendancy of the Shia can be associated with three pivotal events. First was the 1979 islamic revolution in iran and the return of Ayatollah ruhollah Khomeini to Tehran. The revolution toppled the secular, well-established and particularly well-endowed, Western-backed administration. The demise of the Shah Mohammad reza Pahlavi regime spread panic among the Western-allied governments in the Arab world. But even more telling and worrisome was the technique deployed by Khomeini to secure and further galvanise the revolution. He took the Shia clerics out of the seminaries and told them to teach what was relevant to actual political action. The clerics became political actors and the Shia political force. By many, if not the majority in the Arab world, the Shia in their own countries were now seen as an extension of iran – a non-Arab Shia country. However, in retrospect, it can be argued that the local Shia communities in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, yemen, iraq,

7 The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Understanding the Shia, Council on Foreign relations, op.cit.

8 Zaydis (also: Zaidi, Zaiddiyah, or in the West Fivers) are the most moderate of the Shi’a groups and the nearest to the Sunnis in their theology.


Kuwait, Lebanon and elsewhere, by supporting iran and indirectly the iranian threat, have primarily tried to renegotiate their position in their individual countries. Thus, it can be contended that they have been using the spectre of iran in order to establish a different relationship with the Sunni regimes they were ruled by.

The second important event that brought the emergence of the Shia, as a new major political force, under intense scrutiny was the result of the first post-Saddam Hussein elections in iraq. in the poll held on January 30, 2005, the United iraqi Alliance, tacitly backed by Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, won about 48% of the votes. The Sunnis, which for decades dominated the ruling Ba’ath Party and the administration of the iraqi regime, lost control of the state. The persecuted and brutally suppressed Shia majority population seized the helm of iraq’s politics. 9 The subsequent emergence of a Shia-dominated government in iraq 10 and the perceived growth of iranian influence in the region inevitably generated Sunni backlash.

The third set of events that focused the attention of analysts and politicians on the upsurge of the Shia was the integration of Hezbollah, the Shia political party and militia, into Lebanon’s political structure. in 2000 Hezbollah succeeded in forcing the israelis to withdraw from the south of Lebanon, which they occupied for 18 years. in the 2005 parliamentary election it won 14 seats 11 and two government posts and its leader, Sayyid Hassan nasrallah, clearly enjoyed widespread popularity not only in Lebanon but also on the Arab streets outside the country. During the years 2000–2006 Hezbollah managed to construct dynamic and well organized system of Shia community associations and institutions, including hospitals, orphanages, schools and social centres, which formed an essential part of the construction of a modern confident notion

9 For the history of political and socio-economic marginalization of the Shia see for example: G. Fuller, r. Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims, London 2000.

10 in the 37-member post-election cabinet, 19 members were Shiites, nine were Sunnis, eight were Kurds and one was Christian.

11 With political endorsement from iran, Hezbollah first participated in national elections in 1992. its decision to present parliamentary candidates marked the beginning of the group’s active involvement in Lebanese participatory politics. in 1992 Hezbollah won eight seats in the Lebanese parliament. Subsequently, the group continues to field candidates in national and municipal elections, achieving a modest, variable, yet generally steady degree of electoral success. in the 2009 national election, Hezbollah won 10 seats in parliament and was awarded two cabinet posts for the Ministries of Agriculture and Administrative reform.


of identity. 12 The Hezbollah-israeli war in the summer of 2006, which lasted thirty four days and ended without an unequivocal winner, further increased the reputation and popular standing of the group. The war made nasrallah one of the most admired leaders in the Middle East.

The group’s political strength had grown further after May 2008, when in an armed conflict with the Western-backed Lebanese government, it took over western areas of Beirut, in response to a government-ordered shutdown of Hezbollah’s communications network. Subsequently Hezbollah worked out a deal that paved the way for peaceful elections in 2009. These elections gave the militia 13 seats in the 128-member parliament 13 and two government posts. in fact, however, together with its allies Hezbollah controlled 11 out of the 30 seats in the Cabinet – enabling them to have veto power over major decisions, keep their weapons and prevent the government from moving too close to the United States. 14

in August 2010, the obama Administration reported that Hezbollah is “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world” and stated that the group has “thousands of supporters, several thousand members, and a few hundred terrorist operatives.” 15 According to the Director of national intelligence, Dennis C. Blair, Hezbollah receives financial support from Lebanese Shiite expatriates around the world and “profits from legal and illegal businesses,” including some illegal drug activity. 16 The US Administration also reported that Hezbollah receives “training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from iran, and diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria.” 17

Since its birth in 1982 as an islamic militia fighting israel’s invasion of the country, Hezbollah has transformed itself into a powerful military, political and social organization. it controls a large swath of southern Lebanon, much of the Bekaa valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut. 18

12 A. norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, Princeton 2007, p. 108.13 Hezbollah has maintained its electoral standing routinely winning 10 per cent of

all parliamentary seats.14 Associated Press, August 13, 2009.15 Country Reports on Terrorism – 2009, U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010.16 D. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010.17 Country Reports on Terrorism – 2009, U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010.18 D. Duncan, Jihadi Tourism Hits Lebanon, “The Wall Street Journal”, June 17, 2010.


it is important to remember that Hussein’s desperate struggle in 680 in Karbala serves as a point of reference for the pivotal events mentioned earlier. They were recalled by Khomeini in the 1979 revolution deposing the Shah. Although it would be incorrect to conclude that the Shias are in a continuous state of revolt against the established order of the state, their 1991 uprising against Saddam in aftermath of the first Gulf War, Hezbollah’s battles against the militarily superior israeli Army in the 1990s and in 2006, and the continuing clashes between the Zaidi Shia rebels and the governments of yemen and Saudi Arabia, are all viewed with a great deal of mistrust and misgivings by the Sunni political class in the Middle East. 19

The Arab world is run by a set of Sunni elites for whom Shia power is an unwelcome novelty. The Sunni Arab governments are understandably apprehensive about the rising profile of the Shia power in iran, the emergence of the Shia dominated government in iraq and the influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon. 20 The fear has been that all these forces might well inspire domestic opposition forces in their own countries, especially as Hezbollah gained enthusiastic support even among the vast Sunni population of the Arab world.

The idea of the Shia crescent reflects a geopolitical struggle between iran and the Sunni Arab regimes over who is the regional superpower – iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt or the United Arab Emirates? However, there is also another factor which is particularly important in the context of the Arab revolts of 2011. The discontented and, thus far, ignored mass of downtrodden population of the Middle East has turned to iranian-style Shia radicalism to express their discontent with the status quo.

The notion of an iranian-dominated “Shia crescent” stretching from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia may be exaggerated, but it is proving hard to shake off.

Although it is difficult to find accurate data on the Sunni and the Shia populations throughout the world, it is estimated that in the years 2009–2010, among the 1.6 billion Muslims (23.4 per cent of the population of the world), the Sunnis comprise 87–90 per cent and the Shia 10–13 per cent. 21

Between 12–15 per cent of the Muslim population in the Asia Pacific region is Shia, as is 11–14 per cent of the Muslim population in the Middle East and

19 r. Amiri, The Shia Crescent Revisited, rSD reports, February 10, 2011.20 A. norton, op.cit., p. 137.21 Mapping the Global Muslim Population. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the

World’s Muslim Population, The Pew Forum on religious and Public Life, Washington DC 2009.


north Africa. Most Shiites (from 68 to 80 per cent) live in four countries: iran, Pakistan, india and iraq. iran has 66–70 million Shiites, or 37–40 per cent of the global population of this faction. iraq, india and Pakistan are home to at least 16 million of the faithful of the sect. The following table gives the appropriate number of Shiites in the countries where they count more than one hundred thousand.

Estimated populationof the Shia – 2009

Estimated percentageof the Shia Muslim population

iran 66–70 million 90–95%Pakistan 17–26 million 10–15india 16–24 million 1–15iraq 19–22 million 65–70Turkey 7–11 million 10–15yemen 8–10 million 35–40Azerbaijan 5–7 million 65–75Afghanistan 3–4 million 10–15Syria 3–4 million 15–20Saudi Arabia 2–4 million 10–15nigeria <4 million <5Lebanon 1–2 million 45–55Tanzania <2 million <10Kuwait 500,000–700,00 20–25Germany 400,000–600,000 10–15Bahrain 400,000–500,000 65–75Tajikistan ~400,000 ~7United Arab Emirates 300,000–400,000 ~10United States 200,000–400,000 10–15oman 100,000–300,000 5–10United Kingdom 100,000–300,000 10–15Bulgaria ~100,000 10–15Qatar ~100,000 ~10Total in the world 154–200 million 10–13

Source: Mapping the Global Muslim Population. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population, The Pew Forum on religious and Public Life, Washington DC 2009, p. 8.


The arrival on March 14, 2011 in Bahrain of about 1,500 soldiers from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, led by Saudi Arabia, under the umbrella of the Peninsula Shield Force, 22, 23 is the latest manifestation of the on-going Sunni-Shiite conflict that has endured at many levels in the islamic world. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia iran appear to be engaged in a struggle for supremacy among the Muslim faithful.

The expanse of the conflict between two major sections of islam, represented by the two powerful states, Saudi Arabia and iran, extends through Africa, the

22 The Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), officially created in 1982 at the third summit of the GCC’s Supreme Council, comprised of the rulers of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, oman, Kuwait and Qatar. it took part in the liberation of Kuwait during the First Gulf War in the early 1990s, and was again sent to Kuwait in 2003 ahead of the US-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein. initially the PSF was based in north-eastern Saudi Arabia, in the city of Hafr al Batin, close to both the Kuwaiti and iraqi borders. The size of the force was estimated at a modest 5,000 soldiers at its inception, but according The National (March 16, 2011) it has since grown six-fold. At the 21st GCC summit in Manama on December 31, 2000 the member states signed a mutual defence pact, which also created a joint GCC defence council, and a high military committee – codified what is now the pillar of the GCC’s military doctrine: that the security of all the members of the council is an “indivisible whole”. According to the communiqué issued at that time “…any aggression on a member state is aggression against the other states, and facing aggression is considered a joint responsibility whose burden is on all the member states… interference from any entity in the internal affairs of one of the member states is interference in the internal affairs of all the nations of the council.” The communiqué thus made attacks by a foreign force, foreign interference and destabilisation of a GCC state all contingencies that demand unified action by the council. A proposal by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, adopted in 2006 by the Gulf Supreme Council, transformed the PSF. it was agreed that soldiers would be stationed in their home countries but come under joint command.

23 in addition to Saudi forces the UAE sent about 500 police officers to Bahrain. Qatari troops were also deployed to Bahrain as part of the PSF. According to the Qatar news Agency: “The duty of the Qatari force participating in the Peninsula Shield Force is to contribute in restoring order and security in Bahrain” (QnA, March 18, 2011). Subsequently, on March 21, 2011 Kuwait navy vessel with a number of ground forces on board docked off the Bahraini coasts, as part of the Peninsula Shield Force troops deployed by the GCC in the kingdom. in February 2013, the Commander of the GCC peninsula Shield Forces, Joint Staff Major General Motlq Alozima was reported as saying that they will stay in Bahrain “to perform tasks for which they have been provided”. (Shafaqna, February 13, 2013). on April 14, 2013 Gulf News reported that “An additional permanent headquarters for the Peninsula Shield… is set to be inaugurated in Bahrain soon… The headquarters will be named The Advanced Command of the Peninsula Shield Forces…” The report did not specify the size of the Gulf force to be stationed in Bahrain.


Middle and Far East to Asia – from nigeria to Malaysia. Although, generally the relationship between these two major factions of islam, in most islamic countries are fairly satisfactory, Saudi Arabia’s Wahabi doctrine contains “virulent hatred” for the Shiites, which is semi-publicly and privately often expressed with great intensity. 24 Conservative Sunni clerics in Saudi Arabia routinely denounced the Shia as heretics. For great many, the Shia are simply an inferior community and have been regarded as such for a very long time.

This confrontation is founded on the belief that each of these two factions sees itself as the true representative of islam, and the other is contemptuously considered as heresy. The confrontations often turn violent, even during the pilgrimage in Mecca and Medina, where riots caused by Shiite pilgrims, whom the Saudi suspect of acting with iranian encouragement, have caused hundreds of casualties. 25

Saudi Arabia has decided to intervene in Bahrain after a month of social unrest that has left the tiny Gulf nation sharply divided between the minority

24 This antagonism towards the Shi’a is much less pronounced in north Africa, for example. in iraq, Jordan Egypt and Maghreb countries the Shia and the Sunni inter-marry.

25 There is a long history of clashes between the iranian pilgrims and the Saudi police in Mecca and Medina. The most notorious one took place during the pilgrimage in July 1987, when the iranian pilgrims’ demonstrations against the “enemies of islam” (including the U.S. and israel), turned into a battle between the protesters and the Saudi security forces. The police opened fire on demonstrators, which led to panic among the pilgrims. in this skirmish 402 people died (275 iranians, 85 Saudis, including many police officers, and 42 pilgrims from other countries), and 649 people were wounded (303 iranians, 145 Saudis, and 201 citizens of other countries). Much smaller riots took place in subsequent years. in early 2009, the Shiite pilgrims were attacked in Medina after performing rituals that are prohibited by Wahhabi islam. As a result, the Minister of interior of Saudi Arabia, Prince nayef ibn Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, said that the Shiites should not show publicly their faith with respect to the majority Sunni. According to the Human rights Watch, a pilgrimage of the Saudi Shia to Medina in February 2009 to observe the anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad’s death led to clashes between the pilgrims and the Saudi security forces, who objected to what they consider the idolatrous innovations of Shia rituals of commemorating special holidays and making visits to graves. The immediate cause of the Medina clashes was the filming on February 20 of female Shia pilgrims by a man believed to belong to the Saudi religious police. The clashes continued over a period of five days in the area of the Baqi’ cemetery in Medina, which is believed to contain the graves of several of the Prophet’s wives, many of his companions, and four of his successors whom the Shia recognize as rightful leaders of the Muslim community. They resulted in the arrest of 49 Shias.


Sunni Muslims backing the ruling system and the Shiite majority demanding sweeping changes. The ruler of the kingdom, King Hamad bin isa al-Khalifa, is a Sunni Muslim like the entire ruling elite of Bahrain. Although, technically, Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy, the country’s parliament’s prerogatives are limited in favour of the king, who is the real power broker.

By the middle of March Bahrain’s Sunni ruling elite had discovered that the country’s security forces are unable to cope with the on-going protests of the majority Shiites, who constitute around 70 per cent of the population of 1,214,705. 26 ostensibly a parliamentary group asked King Hamad bin isa al-Khalifa for a three-month declaration of martial law and claimed that “extremist movements” were trying to disrupt the country and push it toward sectarian conflict. 27 The king declared a state of emergency and invited the GCC to help to establish “security and domestic stability”. The deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force has been explained as a show of solidarity among the Gulf Council states – “safeguarding security and stability in one country is a collective responsibility”. 28

Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, the Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, stated: “There are common responsibilities and obligations within the GCC countries… The arrival of Saudi and UAE troops in Bahrain is in line with a GCC defence agreement that calls for all members to oblige when needed and to fully co-operate.” 29

Quite clearly Bahrain’s leadership found itself under intense pressure from its Gulf neighbours, particularly from the powerful Saudi Arabia, not to give ground to the demands of the protesting majority of the country’s population.

iran has been accused of being behind the demonstrations in Bahrain. King Hamad bin isa al-Khalifa went as far as to blame a foreign plot for the nation’s unrest, using veiled language to accuse iran of fomenting an uprising of the Shia majority. 30 His view was not shared by the US administration which declared that

26 The figure includes 235,108 non-nationals (July 2011 est.) CIA World Factbook: Bahrain, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.

27 The 40-seat chamber was left with only pro-government politicians after 18 opposition members resigned to protest violence against demonstrators.

28 GCC secretary general, Abdulrahman al Attiya, quoted by Frank Kane and Jonathan Lessware, UAE and Saudi Arabia Send Forces to Bahrain, “The national”, March 15, 2011.

29 Saudi Soldiers Sent into Bahrain, “Al Jazeera”, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011314124928850647.html.

30 Associated Press, March 21, 2011.


it “have not seen any indications that iran is playing an ‘active role’ in helping the mainly-Shiite Bahrain protest movement”. 31 US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show that the Americans were rather dismissive of Bahraini allegation, or at least that the accusation made by the Manama government was not backed by hard evidence.

Bahraini government officials sometimes privately tell U.S. official visitors that some Shia oppositionists are backed by iran. Each time this claim is raised, we ask the GoB [government of Bahrain] to share its evidence. To date, we have seen no convincing evidence of iranian weapons or government money here since at least the mid-1990s, when followers of Ayatollah Shirazi were rounded up and convicted of sedition. 32

The British Ambassador to Manama, Jamie Bowden, spoke of evidence of iran seeking to exploit the situation once demonstrations were underway, but he did not think Tehran was involved in starting the protests. “in the case of Bahrain, we did not see any suggestion that the iranians were responsible for triggering what happened here, but what we do have concerns about is having started, we saw in a number of ways evidence the iranians were seeking to exploit the situation.” 33

There can be little doubt that iran had certainly tried to gain leverage from the Bahraini unrest, insofar as any kind of instability there is to its own advantage. Bahrain hosts the US navy Fifth Fleet and a major British naval force in the Gulf, and is thus of crucial strategic importance to Washington and London, for instance in monitoring iran over its nuclear programme.

Bahraini and Saudi anxieties over the role of iran in the region are shared by the United Arab Emirates. The recent uncovering of an Emirati ‘spy ring’ in oman, allegedly there to investigate oman’s iranian links, further propagates the notion of the Emirates as highly concerned with iran’s activities. 34

A secret diplomatic cable from the US Ambassador in Bahrain, Adam Ereli, dated April 17, 2008, published by WikiLeaks illustrates the US diplomat’s awareness of the simmering unrest between the Shia majority underclass and the Sunni minority rulers in Bahrain.

31 Voice of America, April 14, 2011.32 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/164906.33 r. Smith, UK Raps Iran Role in Bahrain, “The Gulf Daily news”, July 7, 2011.34 D. roberts, The Endgame in Bahrain: Saudi and UAE Troops Enter Manama, http://

www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4D80925B1234B/.


Small but violent bands of Shia underclass youth, frustrated with persistent discrimination and what they perceive as too gradual a pace of reform, clash with police nearly every week. The Sunni minority, which rules the country and controls all security forces, has generally acted with restraint, but it takes only one mistake to provoke a potentially disastrous escalation. 35

Another cable from the US Charge d’Affaires, Christopher Henzel, dated July 25, 2008, published by WikiLeaks, again warned of the impending disturbances.

regional tensions may be adding to long-standing domestic tensions as well, contributing to the stridency of sectarian voices in Bahrain. The majority of Bahraini citizens are part of the Shia underclass, and their grievances, expressed both in legal political activity and in street skirmishes between youths and police, are at the center of all domestic politics here. 36

There is every evidence that the demonstrations in Bahrain, which began on February 14, 2011 and turned into a revolt had largely an economic base which gave rise to direct political demands for democracy, rule of law and human rights. Primarily, the demonstrators sought the end to what they called the “apartheid-like policies” of the ruling Sunni minority over the Shia majority. in particular, they called for constitutional monarchy and full democratic citizen rights to choose their representatives, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

The Shiites in Bahrain make the poorest and least educated section of the society. According to a secret US Embassy in Manama dispatch published by WikiLeaks: “With the exception of a few merchant families, Shia Bahrainis are poorer than Sunni Bahrainis. Most Bahraini Shia are Arabs, but about 10–15 per cent of Bahrainis are ethnically Persian, and speak Persian at home. Many of these descend from families who came here to work in the British administration or, starting in the 1930s, in the oil industry. Persian-speakers (mostly Shia, a few Sunni) now tend to belong to the professional classes”. 37

The Shia complain about discrimination on religious grounds in search for jobs and public services and that they are regularly pushed to lower levels, even in comparison with the naturalized Sunni immigrants from other countries, including those from Asia. The majority of Shiite feel shut out of the best jobs and other employment opportunities. Their position is becoming increasingly difficult in a situation when the government of Bahrain naturalizes tens of

35 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/150213.36 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/163668.37 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/164906.


thousands of the Sunnis, whose presence in the security forces, is one of the main factors for harsh police responses to protests. The allocation of housing, health care and other benefits for the Sunnis from outside Bahrain also causes resentment among the Shiites who increasingly feel like second-class citizens in their own country. Despite the wealth of the country, they believe that they never received a fair share in economic benefits. As a result, Bahrain Shiites rallied during the Spring of 2011 in expectation of true democracy, pointing to the example of the Shiites in iraq, where the Shia took over the control of the government after the first post-Saddam elections in January 2005.

This, however, is a nightmare scenario for Saudi Arabia and other Sunni oil principalities in the Persian Gulf – the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait – whose troops are involved in the Peninsula Shield Force. Each of these countries struggle with their own restless Shia minority. Moreover, each of these states is also an object of iranian ambitions. Their concern is that Shia control of Bahrain will be the final result in the implementation of age-old iranian desire to take over this strategically located island.

Bahrain is just off the east coast of Saudi Arabia and the two countries are connected by 25 km long causeway. 38 The world’s longest causeway links Bahrain with Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province – the largest province of the country, comprising 31.28 per cent of the kingdom’s total size. This province is not only inhabited by large number of the Shiite population, but it is an area that contains most of the country’s 14 oil fields, all the most important sources of natural gas, crude oil and refineries on which, not only the United States but also the majority of western countries rely. Saudi Arabia in 90% is dependent on oil exports. Also, 75% of the state budget comes from the export. Crude oil accounts for 45% of GDP. The Eastern Province is of paramount strategic importance not only to the Saudi government but also to the global energy supply chain.

There are no accurate figures on the number of the Shia in the Eastern Province. The 1992 Library of Congress study estimates that “in the Eastern Province… they constituted perhaps 33 per cent of the population, being concentrated in the

38 The King Fahd Causeway was opened in 1986. The idea of building the causeway is based on the notion of improving relations and ties between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The project cost a total of $ 1.2 billion. one of the main contractor of the Ballast nedam project was based in the netherlands. This four-lane road is 25 km long and about 23 m wide and was built with 350,000 m² of concrete and 47,000 tons of reinforced steel. it is estimated that the number of vehicles using this road is around 45.000 on weekdays and 60,000 during weekends.


oases of Qatif and Al Ahsa”. 39 The 2005 international Crisis Group report states that “Saudi Arabia’s roughly two million Shiites represent between 10 and 15 per cent of the total population. Most live and work in the Eastern Province, which they dominate demographically… While a small number reside in Dammam, the Eastern Province’s capital and largest city, the overwhelming majority live in the towns and villages of the two large oases, Qatif and Al Ahsa. Small Shiite communities also exist in Mecca and Medina…” 40

Their demands for greater freedom of worship to take account of their religious traditions and freedom from Sunni practices based on the dominant in Saudi Arabia Wahhabi school of islam, are interpreted as an affront to Sunni Wahhabism which is the basis of the kingdom’s legal system. The Shiites are prohibited to gather in community centres, they do not receive funding from the state budget for the construction of their mosques, and do not have access to certain jobs, such as the teaching of history. Deep tensions exist since 1913, when King Abdul-Aziz, who later created the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, secured control of this region. in recent decades, inner-religious, sectarian issues have become even more accentuated as a result of momentous developments in the region, such as the iranian revolution, unrest in the neighbouring Bahrain, and the Shiite-Sunni tensions in iraq following the American invasion in 2003, which has completely changed the power dynamics of the area. The latter in particular “strengthened Shiite aspirations and Sunni suspicions and generally deepened confessional divisions throughout the region.” 41 For the Saudi Shia the failure of their engagement with the Saudi ruling circles dating back to the early 1990s and the successes of their co-religionists in iraq suggested that they must demand political reforms in the kingdom.

The report published in September 2009 by the new york-based Human rights Watch gives examples of discrimination against the Shiites 42 that include other aspects than just religious freedom. The Human rights Watch cites discrimination in the education system, where the Shiites cannot teach religion in

39 Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, H. Metz (ed.), Washington 1992. The same study suggests that in the whole of the kingdom “Shia… probably constitute about 5 percent of the total population, their number being estimated from a low of 200,000 to as many as 400,000”, in a population of 12.3 million in 1992.

40 international Crisis Group, The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia, “Middle East report” 2005, no. 45.

41 ibidem.42 Denied Dignity: Systematic Discrimination and Hostility toward Saudi Shia Citizens,

Human rights Watch, new york, September 3, 2009.


schools and Shia students learn from Sunni teachers that the Shiites are infidels. 43 The Shiites are not well represented in school faculties and administration in the Eastern Province. This report also cites discrimination in the judiciary, ranging from denial of access to justice to arbitrary arrests and discriminatory verdicts. 44 Sunni judges sometimes disqualify Shiite witnesses because of their religion and only apply the assumptions of the Sunni religious law. The Shia cannot be judges in ordinary courts. There are no Shia judges except for seven judges serving three Shia courts – two first instance courts in Qatif and Al Ahsa’, and an appeals court, also in Qatif. However, their jurisdiction is limited to personal status, inheritance, and endowments cases. in August 2005 a new royal decree significantly curtailed the already limited jurisdiction of the two Shia first instance courts, giving Sunni courts the authority to supervise the Shia courts and take up cases pending there. 45 Discrimination also includes employment. There were no Shia ministers in the successive Saudi governments, high-ranking diplomats, 46 or high-ranking officers. Shiite candidates generally cannot get access to military school. AShia woman from Ahsa’ was detained as she was returning from Syria for having a Shia prayer book in her possession. A court later sentenced her to six months for witchcraft and sorcery. 47 The report also lists instances of closure of Shia mosques and private communal prayer buildings. Damman, the largest city in the area, has no Shia cemetery. According to the 2012 Human rights Watch report, Saudi “Authorities continue to suppress or fail to protect the rights… of some 2 million Shia citizens.” 48 The same body in its 2013 report said that Saudi Arabia “…systematically discriminates against its Muslim religious minorities, in particular Shia and ismailis… official discrimination against Shia encompasses religious practices, education, and the justice system… Security forces have killed at least 11 Shia in protests since 2011.” 49

The most serious problems occurred in late november 1979 and were associated with the revolution in iran. The Shiites in Qatif region organized

43 in its 2005 report international Crisis Groups quotes an example of a middle school history class exam paper it obtained, which asked students to discuss why “the ahl al-Sunna [Sunnis] prefer to characterise Shiites as al-rafida” [rejectionists].

44 Human rights Watch, op.cit., p. 11.45 Human rights Watch, op.cit., p. 12.46 The exception of Shiite ambassador was Jamil al-Jishi, envoy to iran from 1999 to

2003.47 Human rights Watch, op.cit., p. 1148 World Report 2012, Human rights Watch, new york 2012, p. 621.49 World Report 2013, Human rights Watch, new york 2013, p. 607.


an Ashura procession without the permission of local authorities. This led to bloody street violence between state security forces and thousands of frustrated Shiites that lasted seven days, and rocked the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 50 Women, as well as men, marched in anger. Several building were destroyed, including the offices of the Saudia national Airline and the British bank in the town. Protesters seized weapons from soldiers, destroyed state-owned vehicles and even occupied the old city in downtown Qatif, from which they held off the Saudi military for days. The security forces, which included 20,000 officers of the Saudi national Guard, cordoned off the major roadways, particularly those in Qatif, Sayhat, and Safwa to localize the protest. The national Guard relied on the heavy firepower of helicopter gun ships for crowd control, turning the area into a deadly conflict zone characterized by terror, hostility, and fear. The protest were eventually crushed by the national Guard. About 20 people were killed and an unknown number wounded. 51

Similar clashes took place in Qatif in February 1980. Such events only emphasize the long-held concerns of the Saudi government about iran’s machinations and attempts to interfere. in 1993 riyadh announced a general amnesty, and many Shiites living in exile returned to the Eastern Province. in exchange for the release of political prisoners and easing travel bans, Shiite activists agreed to stop publishing books and magazines criticizing government policies. However, the gains arising from the arrangements and the attempts at reconciliation proved to be uncertain, when the government began to arrest the Shiites in 1995 after the unrest in Bahrain, and again in June 1996 after the Khobar Towers bombing in the Eastern Province, which killed 19 American

50 The protests coincided with the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a group of about 200 Sunni extremists on november 20, 1979. The heavily armed group of fundamentalists, men and women, consisting of peninsular Arabs and Egyptians enrolled in islamic studies at the islamic University of Medina took over and besieged the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The seizure was led by Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaibi who belonged to a powerful Sunni family of najd. He justified the action claiming that the ruling Al Saud dynasty had lost its legitimacy, because it was corrupt, ostentatious and had destroyed the Saudi culture by an aggressive policy of Westernization. The events in the Eastern Province added to an already worrying and insecure situation faced by the Saudi authorities.

51 T. Jones, Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization and the Shia Uprising of 1979, “international Journal of Middle East Studies” 2006, no. 38, pp. 213–233.


soldiers. Hezbollah al-Hijaz, a radical Shiite group operating in Arabia and linked to iran was suspected of involvement in this attack. 52

During the spring of 2011, several demonstrations in the Eastern Province took place with the protesters demanding the release of prisoners. 53 The most recent unrest in the province took place in october 2011, when, according to the BBC, quoting Saudi state media, fourteen people were injured in clashes.

it should be stressed that the Shiites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and their coreligionist neighbours in Bahrain are among the oldest Muslim communities and are linked by blood ties. The mutual relationship between these two communities is extremely important for the constantly changing links and relationships between the various actors in the Persian Gulf and for the future stability of the region.

The threat to the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and also indirectly to the interests of the United States and other Western countries, is also the most likely reason that the administration of President obama refused to condemn the Saudi military ventures in Bahrain. “The new york Times” quoted White House spokesman Jay

52 it should be pointed out that the involvement of Shia in this attack has been questioned. See G. Porter, Investigating Khobar Towers: How a Saudi Deception Protected bin Laden, inter Press Service, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47312.

53 on February 16, 2011 the Shiites staged a small protest in the town of al-Awamiyah. on February 25, 2011 residents of al-’Awamiyah held a silent vigil the same day calling for the release of the so-called “Forgotten Prisoners,” nine Shia Saudis detained without charge or trial for over 12 years. on March 3, 2011 about 100 people, mostly men and one group of women, staged small protests in two towns of the Eastern Province. on March 4, 2011 more than 100 protesters march through the city of al-Hofuf to demanding the release of Shiite cleric Tawfiq al-Amir. on March 9, 2011 at least three people are injured after police fired in the air to disperse protesters in Qatif. Around 600–800 protesters, all Shia and including women, took to the streets of the city to demand the release of nine Shia prisoners. on March 11, 2011 around 500 protesters demonstrated in the cities of al- Hofuf, al-Ahsa and al-Awamiyah. Hundreds of protesters rallied on March 17, 2011 to show solidarity with their fellow Shiites in Bahrain. on April 8, 2011 hundreds of Saudi Shiites protested in the city of Qatif demanding the withdrawal of the Saudi troops from neighbouring Bahrain and political rights and freedoms at home. Sporadic protests by Saudi Shiite took place throughout 2011 and 2012 – see for example reports by Amnesty international and from the United nations Human rights Council. According to Arab Times, hundreds of Saudi Shiites staged peaceful protests on April 1, 2013 in support of Shiites in Bahrain and political freedoms at home. When protests began, demonstrators called for reforms. But now, younger militants demand elimination of the monarchy and an end to the US policy of supporting the Saudi ruling family.


Carney saying “this is not the invasion of the country.” 54 This official position of the U.S. administration, however, is open to charges of hypocrisy, because the United States supported the demands of unarmed demonstrators in Egypt and Tunisia, and supported the rebels in Libya.

The Saudis believe the iranians plan a long-planned game to use Bahrain as a springboard to destabilize this very sensitive area. Already at the beginning of the riots in March 2011, following the revolutions in Egypt, Saudi activists proclaimed the Day of rage in the Eastern Province during which, hundreds of Shiites demonstrated against the Saudi authorities. Just as in Bahrain, there is deep dissatisfaction among more than two million Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are on the margins of economic and socio-political life. Their demands and expectations are of course open to exploitation. Saudi Arabia is deeply afraid of possible “fragmentation” – the parcelling of its territory and also its oil and gas wealth without which the kingdom loses its significance.

iranian politicians are far from shy and openly expressed their desire to conquer Bahrain. Several times in recent years they have called Bahrain the 14th province of iran. in July 2007, the semi-official “Kayhan” newspaper ran an editorial that asserted the iranian claim to Bahrain. it called Bahrain, “a province of iran”, ready for reunification with the “native land”. 55

in February 2009, this claim was repeated by Ali Akbar nateq-nouri, a close advisor to iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei Hosseini. iran bases its claim on the period in the nineteenth century when in 1830, Sheikh Abdul Al Khalifeh declared his submission to the Shah Fath Ali Shah. over the next 30 years iran has controlled the island. And although the government of Mohammad reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of iran, renounced these claims in 1970, it would appear that today the mullah in iran are clearly nostalgic for the demands of the nineteenth century.

For the Sunni rulers of Bahrain and its neighbours, it is difficult to forget that with the onsets of the iranian revolution in 1979, Bahrain witnessed mass demonstrations in support of the islamic revolution, and that the leaders of the

54 D. Sanger, E. Schmitt, U.S.-Saudi Tensions Intensify With Mideast Turmoil, “The new york Times”, March 14, 2011.

55 K. Sanati, US Presence Fuels Iran-Bahrain Tension, “Asia Times”, July 19, 2007. The claim was made in an editorial written by Hossein Shariatmadari, who is close to iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Shariatmadari has reiterated that Bahrain is an integral part of iran that was taken from it in a Western plot on September 4, 2007.


Shiites in Bahrain, demanded that their state, like iran, be proclaimed an islamic republic.

iran supports its claims to Bahrain through actions. in the 1970s Tehran bolstered the establishment of a radical Shiite islamist organization – the islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (iFLB). it is alleged that the iFLB was involved in a coup attempt in December 1981. According to Bahraini sources, “An iranian-trained team of Shiite Bahrainis were to simultaneously attack telecommunications services and Bahrain’s airport and assassinate key members of the Al Khalifa regime. in the ensuing chaos, iran would send in its military and establish a new theocratic regime similar to its own.” 56 indeed, in 1981 the government of Bahrain announced the discovery of a conspiracy led by the iFLB, which aimed at the overthrow of the government in Manama and the establishment of the “islamic republic”. A group of the Shia from Bahrain and other parts of the Gulf, reportedly trained in iran, was supported during the overthrow attempt by an iranian hovercraft. 57 A number of persons were arrested in 1987 in another plot linked to iran. in June 1996, fifty one Bahrainis were arrested and charged with plotting against the government. They were accused of being members of “Hizballah” trained and armed in an iranian-backed plot. 58 The importance of the “Hizballah plot” as an attempt to overthrow the Bahraini regime has been largely dismissed by the Shiite observers and the Sunni liberals. Apparently, the number and type of weapons found by the security forces was “hopelessly inadequate to start a revolution or even to stand up to Bahrain security forces.” 59 in December 2008, fourteen people were arrested on suspicion of planning a series of terror attacks against commercial centres, diplomatic missions and nightclubs in Bahrain.

Again in 2010 Bahraini authorities arrested hundreds of Shiites, some local and some foreign, and accused them of taking part in a conspiracy of preparing attacks in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The purpose of this conspiracy

56 http://manamapress.net/?p=4148.57 iFLB infrastructure was badly damaged during the government’s crackdown in

1981 and 1982. Several of its members were imprisoned. The groups influence on political developments in Bahrain has diminished substantially over time. At present the iFLB has little support among the senior Bahraini clergy and only some measure of street support. its leadership remains based in iran.

58 The Bahraini Hizballah were established in 1985 with the help of iranian cleric Hojjat ol-Eslam Hadi al-Madrasi and are reputed to have operated in coordination with the islamic revolutionary Guard Corps’ (irGC) Quds Force.

59 G. Fuller, r. Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims, new york 1999, p. 135.


was the “planning and execution of a campaign of violence, intimidation and subversion”. in February 2011, Bahrain put on trial 23 people accused of belonging to a “terror network” aimed at overthrowing the government. iran was accused of participating in preparing the actions of this network.

Conclusions

iran has for a very long time cultivated a covert strategy in the Persian Gulf states, particularly in Bahrain, but also elsewhere in the Arab world, that has helped to advance the Shia unrest, including the revolt in the Spring of 2011. The iranian strategy is primarily based on the special relationship between the most powerful Shia country and the Shia co-religionists in the Middle East, the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula. iran has sought to harness the support of large sections of the Shia community in certain Gulf Arab states, as a means to back iranian political and strategic objectives. 60 “iran’s role as a source of weapons, training and ideological support had thus become central to the most radical Shiite groups in a struggle in which it was difficult for the Shia to avoid being dragged into the vortex of broader… struggle whether they liked it or not”. 61

The action of the GCC states led by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Al Khalifa ruling family in Bahrain has substantially limited the options available to iran in terms of being able to sustain the momentum of Shia unrest in eastern Arabia.

While it appears that Saudi Arabia, at least for now, won the battle for Bahrain, its success in other areas of the proxy conflict with iran are much smaller. iranian-backed Hezbollah in the past three years, has become a political force in Lebanon intended role of power broker in the country. Lebanese government, backed by Saudi Arabia, was paralyzed for many months. Long Saudi Arabia mediation attempt failed and in January 2011, Hezbollah has withdrawn participation in the government forcing him to resign. resignation of the government in Beirut, not only emphasized the importance of Hezbollah and its iranian sponsors, but also undermined the importance of efforts and the efforts of Saudi Arabia in the region.

As a result of sectarian violence in iraq, thousands of the Sunnis were killed and tens of thousands of refugees were forced to emigrate to neighbouring countries, Europe and Canada. President obama’s intention to withdraw U.S.

60 M. Alani, GCC-Iran Relations: The Encounter in Bahrain and Beyond, GrC Analysis, october 24, 2011.

61 G. Fuller, r. rahim Francke, op.cit., p. 126.


troops from iraq before the end of 2011 also lies the danger of invasion of iran, which is likely to lead to direct conflict between the two countries.

The basis of King Abdullah ii assumption of the “Shia crescent” are divided loyalties of the Arab Shia and the utility of these to iran. There is little evidence of the these divided loyalties. The great majority of the Shia communities in the Arab states have not deviated from loyalty to their own country and to their Arab identity. “indeed, they have never suffered from a conflict of loyalties because, in short, they have no other loyalty superseding that to their country and to their Arab national belonging.” 62

The case of the Shia in the so called Shia crescent is primarily one of a group of people claiming the civil and human rights that are available to their co-citizens. Ever since the success of the iranian revolution, the Teheran regime has persistently claimed to be protector and promoter of the Shia interests outside its borders. Unfortunately, the Sunni majority states allowed these claims to go unchallenged. As long as the Shia are marginalised, treated as second class citizens and vilified as infidels in their own countries, the Tehran regime would have call on its claims of protection of their co-religionists.

“over time and particularly today, this self-proclaimed status of iran as the leader and protector of the Arab Shia has turned into the main instrument of iranian interventionist policy in internal Arab affairs.” 63 To eradicate this claim and to undermine the international threat of iran it is best to change the dynamics of internal Sunni politics.

The rise of the Shia power in Bahrain where the US Fifth Fleet is based, in the strategically important south Lebanon, and the oil producing power house of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is primarily reflection of domestic policies of those countries. These policies that contained the potential for the Shia to think as a community and allowed them to see themselves as a community not only for historical but most importantly for political reasons. it is safe to assume that in the future within each country the Shia will ultimately demand larger access to power and the Sunnis will ultimately resist it.

62 M. Alani, op.cit.63 ibidem.

Bartosz BojarczykUniversity of Maria Curie-Sklodowska in Lublin, Poland

irAN ON the CrOssrOAds

ABstrACt

in recent years, the islamic republic of iran has been facing several important challenges to its security. Advanced nuclear programme, which is a source of conflict with Western powers, and rapid regional developments (iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan and mainly Syria) have put that state into a very fragile or even dangerous position. international economic isolation (US, European and the United nations’ sanctions lately) brought iran to the edge of economic surveillance. Deep, structural economic crisis that was worsened by international sanctions is devastating the daily life of the iranians and may serve as a good pretext for social unrests. Tehran has limited its room for manoeuvre with regard to the sanctions and it urgently needs to implement radical changes into its economy. on the political level, the election of new president – Hassan rouhani ended the conflict between the main political figures and groups in iran, but the status quo is still very fragile and in the near future we may expect new developments inside the iranian decision-making centre.

Key words

iran, crisis, security, Middle East, conflict

1. introduction

The islamic republic of iran is on the crossroads, both internally and externally. in domestic arena, iran faces few very serious challenges that may undermine the security of the fragile socio-political and economic systems, or even may result in deep and fundamental changes of its primary outlook. The most crucial issues are related to the economic situation of iran. The oil sanctions that were imposed by the Western countries (mainly the USA, the EU, and their allies) have already took effect and caused considerable problems for iran. its economy was already in difficult position and the latest sanctions have hit it quite badly. The combination of oil, financial, and banking sanctions drove iran into terrible


46 Bar tos z Bojarc z yk

condition and there is no noticeable hope for the economic resurrection. However, the economic challenge is now directly related to the international position of iran, but there is an urgent need for fundamental and long term, as well as very costly and painful (for the society) reforms. Economic situation, or rather the further economic decline, may result in social unrests that would easily turn into state-wide turbulence. Breaking out of economic isolation or the economic containment imposed by the Western powers may be only achieved through political dialogue, mainly on the nuclear programme.

on the international level, iran is under direct threat of military intervention aimed at stopping or slowing down its nuclear programme. it looks like the near future may bring final developments in the ongoing conflict with the Western powers, mainly the USA and their regional ally – israel. Washington has to deal with the iranian issue quickly and military action is promoted not only by israel, but also by influential parts of the American establishment. Therefore, the top figures of the iranian regime need to decide how they want to resolve that conflict and what conditions need to be fulfilled in order to bring it to the negotiation table. The Western powers are quite tired of the iranian ducking game and will push into final solution whatever it may be. regional developments, like the two regime changes in Egypt, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the very fragile iraqi securitization processes, revolts in Arab states, and, most importantly, the civil war in Syria, make iran more powerful in the short-time perspective, but each of them may easily become very dangerous for iran’s security. The conflict with the USA and their allies plays an important role in shaping and cementing iranian domestic system, it but can not be used forever to that purpose. Moreover, it looks like the limit has been already reached, and new developments will follow with all the consequences. The main question for today is what will be the future of iran if Syria fell apart under foreign intervention combined with internal struggle (the Libya scenario).

2. internal dimensions

The iranian political system, described by its founding fathers as an islamic republic, is very awkward and complicated in its unique nature. iran is the only state where the clergymen (in this case the Shia ones) has so much impact, or rather play a crucial role within it. Political Shiism, the doctrine of which was shaped by Ayatollah ruhollah Khomeini, became a base for iranian socio-political system and until now that state is the only theocratic republic in the world. in

Iran on the Crossroads 47

practice, the constitution adopted in 1980 legitimised centralisation of most religious, political, and economical powers in the hands of the Supreme Leader 1. However, the newly established republican system divided the powers among three fundamental branches and found political bodies like the parliament, the government, the president, the guardian council, and others, but, in practice, it was Khomeini, who, with his inner circle, was responsible for the structure and policies of the state. The situation changed in late 1989, when the constitution was revised and later developments resulting from Khomeini’s death. His close associates had to reorganize the system and divide the powers among themselves to keep the achievements of revolution and sustain the stability and security of the system. Thus, this very fragile and interdependent system (among key regime figures) came into being in late 1980-s and continues to exist. According to K. M. Polack, the iranian regime is one of the most fragmented governments in the world 2. The existence of overlapping institutions and the informal system, parallel to the constitutional one and based on key personalities, bring a lot of misunderstandings and uncommonness to the analysis of the iranian decision-making processes. “The system is a composite of key personalities, their informal networks and relationship with other individuals and power centers, and the institutions with which these personalities are associated.” 3 iran’s political system is a mixture of republicanism and theocracy, where institutions, personalities, and family connections alternate on political and economical levels.

During the 1980s, under the supervision of Ayatollah Khomeini two factions were shaping iranian system – the traditional conservatives and the islamic leftists. After his death, the revolutionary figures like Khamanei, rafsanjani, Mahdavi-Kani, Karrubi, yazdi, Jannati, and many others constructed the system where none of the factions was able to obtain a dominant position. Such an informal system of checks and balances worked pretty well, where formal and informal relations were aimed to secure the system and conduct day-to-day politics. The end of a longstanding war with iraq brought an urgent need for economical reconstruction and stabilization of its international position. The revolutionary approach to the external environment has mostly failed and iran

1 L. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs 1982, p. 99.2 K.M. Polack, Iran: Three Alternative Futures, “Middle East review of international

Affairs” 2006, no. 2, p. 75.3 Mullahs, Guards, and Bonayads. An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics,

D.E. Thaler, A. nader, S. Chubin, J.D. Green, Ch. Lynch, F. Wehrey (eds.), rAnD-national Defense research institute 2010, p. Xiii.


needed to reorient its strategy and put emphasis on more moderate policies. in 1989, Khamanei became the Supreme Leader and rafsanjani took the president’s office. That brought balance to the system and was advantageous for the stability of the state. During the period of normalisation (of external relations) and reconstruction (of economy) in the years 1989–1997, the old revolutionary guards served as a main faction and shared the responsibility to maintain the system in an acceptable shape. Pragmatism and national interests have overwhelmed the revolutionary rhetoric and the current fragmented system has been established at that time 4.

The election of President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 was widely perceived as a signal of opening and democratization of iran. new strategy of détente in international relations and more moderate domestic policies have raised a lot of hopes for the possible evolution of the system. new parties like the islamic Participation Party of iran, the Servants of reconstruction, and the 2nd Khordad Movement were the main bases for ongoing reforms. Leftist orientation aimed for gradual evolution of closed system was slowly changing the iranian realities. A limited liberalism was applied at the social, political, and economic levels and full reconciliation with the regional and international players was taking place. During the first term of office of President Khatami, iran shifted to a very moderate stance and it looked like the final rapprochement would be possible. Unfortunately, regional and global developments, especially related to the war on terror (after 9/11), active penetration of the Middle East system by the USA, collapse of peace process, war in Afghanistan, and occupation of iraq have resulted in a dramatic shift in the iranian internal affairs. new challenges to the security of iran caused radicalisation on the domestic level. The ongoing changes have been aborted and the so called hardliners once again came to power.

External developments, once again, have brought the conservative (radical) faction into power. They were able to win the parliamentary election in 2004 and their candidate Mahmood Ahmadinejad has won the presidential election in 2005. That radicalisation of the iranian political scene was a direct answer for the growing external insecurity, mainly connected with the US military offensive in the surrounding regions. The US confrontational attitude towards iran under the administration of President G. Bush completely ruined the possibility of normalization in the bilateral relations. iran has stiffened its position and moved into very harsh regional activities. of course, both states resolved some issues

4 H. Hassan-yari, Iranian Foreign Policy in the Postwar Era [in:] Iranian Perspectives on the Iran – Iraq War, F. rajaee (ed.), Gainesville 1997.


thanks to informal cooperation (Afghanistan and iraq), but the conflict raised even more, and the case of iran’s nuclear programme as well as its support for the radical islamic organizations (Hezbollah and Hamas) became primary sources of conflict. Between 2004 and 2009, the co called opposition movement was cracked down in iran and the final battle took place after the controversial presidential election in 2009. The “Green movement” led by Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mahdi Karroubi, and the Khatami brothers was not able to extort fair results from the regime, which led to street violence and civil unrest. The hopes for peaceful evolution were lost and the regime emphasised its own surveillance rather than acceptance of the people’s will.

There were no dramatic changes within the system and the surveillance of it was not shaken. We have to understand that “opposition” leaders are the long time servants of revolution and they were not proposing serious changes in the iran’s socio-political system. The developments of 2009 resulted from the regime’s internal struggle between the opposing factions. it was the struggle between the leftists and conservatives; the latter were directly supported by the Supreme Leader, which was crucial for their victory. it seems that the opposition movement, connected with liberalization of internal and foreign policies, was decisively crushed down and their leaders were put into house arrest. The shift on the domestic scene, from rivalry between the leftist and conservatives into internal struggle on the right side of iranian political scene, drove into very dangerous situation. During the 1980s and 1990s the factional balance system was composed of the organization of Mojahedin of the islamic revolution and the Militant Clergy Association (and the earlier mentioned supporters of Khatami) on the one hand, and the Militant Clergy Association and the Coalition of islamic Associations on the other 5. in the 21st century, the leftists lost their power and the system was overwhelmed by the conservative or radical right factions. it has shaken the equilibrium of the iranian “republican” system and new conflicts grew up in connection to the domination of the conservatives.

The main shift in the top political circle began between 2004 and 2005, when conservatives took Majlis (2004) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became President. neoconservatives, or principalists, as they were later called, came to the top structures as a result of the declining position of reformists. They are a new generation politicians, fairly religious, supported by the Supreme Leader,

5 W. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, Washington 2000, Chapter 1 and 2.


and often with background in the islamic revolutionary Guards Corps 6. They were perceived by the Khamanei as the answer to the international challenges and they served as great supporters of iran’s confrontational position. They were able to unite and organise themselves in the begging of the century and for ten years they have played a dominant role in the formal/constitutional institutions. That faction, with the praise from the Supreme Leader, practically disabled the reformist movement and only the former president Hashami rafsanjani defended some of his power. Lately, his three children were arrested, which may be understood as a harsh attack not only on him, but also on his supporters 7. other leaders of the leftist/reformist factions are under house arrest, like Karrubi and Mousavi, or kept away from governmental or influential positions. However, the principalists did not remain cohesive, and soon after monopolisation of the power, there was a split between them. Ahmadinejad, with the support of top military and intelligence commanders, started to implement a modified vision of the state. The fact that he sought independency and his international activity were seen as very dangerous and brought Khamanai’s disappointment. The great economic crisis that hit iran (sanctions) complicated his position even more. Since early 2010 (when his close associates were accused of corruption), Ahmadinejad’s powers were declining up to the election in 2013, which he lost in a rather humiliating manner. Different approach to iranian polity, seeking an independent role, and economic difficulties broke his power and he was left out.

The other group of neoconservatives are the circle of the chosen “youngsters” close to the Supreme Leader. The most prominent is the Larijani family, of which one of two brothers is the Chief Justice and the second is the Speaker of Parliament. But, also Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel (Khamanei’s son in law), Saeed Jalili, and many others form that “power keeping” party are directly chosen and secured by the Supreme Leader. Together with the old revolutionary guards they keep the islamic republic in traditional ways, shaping state’s policies, and managing the economy. Khamanei controls the Parliament, the judiciary, the Guardian Council, and most of the military and paramilitary forces (existing independently to the irGC) what makes his associates very strong, not only politically. Huge wealth located in religious foundations (bonayads) and family connected businesses gives them power over the existing and possible opposition.

6 Mullahs…, op.cit., pp. 40–46.7 n. Bozorgmehr, Rafsanjani’s Son Released on Bail in Iran, “Financial Times”

December 17, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a44a440-484e-11e2-8aae-00144feab49a.html.


The presidential election of 2013, won by Hassan rouhani might be seen by the international community as a sign of iran’s moderation, but not much has happened in the internal affairs as yet. new president is a longstanding associate of Ayatollah Khamanei, he even served as chief negotiator with the Western powers. in his inauguration speech, he called for moderation and wisdom, he promised economic reparation program and called for transparency in nuclear negotiations 8. it looks like the Supreme Leader has chosen rouhani to manage economic crisis and to negotiate with international community because of his clean history of public service. The need for internal changes, mainly on the economic level, and promises of political reconciliation gave rouhani victory. He was also supported by the old reformists and his cabinet is fairly multi-factional. He appointed Eshaq Jahangiri as First vice-President, and Bijan Zanganeh as the Minister if Petroleum (both were close allies of Mohammad Khatami), but mainly invited conservatives and technocrats to form the government 9. The new president meets difficult challenges at the beginning of his term, with the Syrian civil war, the upcoming US-led military conflict, the economic crisis, and the international nuclear conflict on top of them.

The political situation in iran is in gridlock, and the conservative faction mostly related to the Supreme Leader is the most powerful one. on the political level, it looks like the need of counterbalancing the leftist/reformist faction was again realized by Khamanei and his supporters; perhaps a new wave of moderate politicians will approach top institutions in the near future. The other power is the islamic revolutionary Guard Corps which grew in military and economic importance in the last decade. They would like to enter the decision-making process, not only in advisory and limited character, and they have been securing their growing interests through legal institutions not related to military issues 10. So, for today we may recognise at least four main factions within the iranian politics, but the whole system is controlled by the office of the Supreme Leader. We may see some fundamental changes only when Khamanei leaves politics,

8 Rouhani Calls for Moderation in First Speech as President-Elect, BBC, August 4, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23565996.

9 S.K. Dehghan, Iran’s Parliament Approves 15 of Hassan Rouhani’s 18 Cabinet Ministers, “The Guardian” August 15, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/15/iran-middleeast; Iran’s Rouhani Appoints Reformist as Top Deputy, “The Big Story” August 5, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/irans-rouhani-appoints-reformist-top-deputy.

10 B. Hourcade, The Rise to Power of Iran’s ‘Guardians of the Revolution’, “Middle East Policy” 2009, no. 3, pp. 61–63.


but it would mean his death. on the other hand, the internal situation of iran is influenced by external developments, mainly arising from conflicts with the Western powers over its nuclear programme (up to the level of open military confrontation) and from insecurity or conflicts of regional neighbours. Further isolation or active containment of iran may only worsen its internal situation, which most probably will lead to radicalization of the iranian politics.

3. external Variables

Like it was already stated, right now iran is in a very difficult international position. The long term (political, ideological, religious, and strategic in its essence) conflict with the United States reached the level of a possible military intervention in iran. Washington accuses Tehran of supporting terrorist organizations and, what is the most important, of working on nuclear weapons development. There are also other concerns, like violation of human and citizen rights, spreading the radical Shia ideology and the anti-American propaganda, and more, but the first two are the most prominent accusations. External iranian difficulties became even more complicated when the Arab Spring shaken the Middle East. The regime changes in Egypt, the evolution of israeli position, the revolt in Bahrain, the civil conflict in Syria, the permanent iraqi insecurity, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and the yemeni conflict are just a few major concerns that the iranian regime must react to. The regional position of iran is contained and actively opposed by the US (and its allies), which hold a dominant position in regional security system. As A. Ehteshami said, the 9/11 attacks gave the USA a perfect pretext to extend its influence over the Middle East to a dominant or even hegemonic position 11. Such an active US involvement naturally hurts iranian interests and serves as a source of constant conflict for the Ayatollahs.

The main reason of iran’s international problems is its nuclear programme. Because of advanced uranium enrichment capabilities and accusation of building a nuclear bomb, iran became the target of the US, its allies’ and international sanctions. They are not only political, but lately a set of economic sanctions hurt iran a lot. The embargo on oil and shipment, isolating its financial, insurance, and energy sectors, as well as basically banning transfer of new technologies were the main ones imposed on iran in the 21st century. The most serious sanctions

11 A. Ehteshami, Globalization and Geopolitics In the Middle East. Old Games, New Rules, London–new york 2009, pp. 69–70.


were adopted together with the US allies after 2010, when the Western powers finally decided to support US policy of active containment toward iran 12. Tehran probably works on building a nuclear bomb, which is quite rational for many analysts, considering the dominant and aggressive US attitude towards iran over the last three decades. obtaining a nuclear weapon fits into the resistance doctrine adopted in the 21st century, shaped under the rule of neoconservatives as an answer to a growing isolation and insecurity of iran, mainly related to the US regional activity 13. Moreover, Despite the fact that iran denies these accusations and the Supreme Leader stated many times that iran would not build and use nuclear weapons, the international community is quite aware of iran’s growing nuclear capabilities. it is the reason why the USA and its coalitionist try to stop iran from breaking the nPT regime, which would jeopardize Western interests in the region and naturally increase Tehran’s power and security. The set of the latest economic sanctions deeply damages iranian economy and jeopardize its daily life. As it was stated in August 2013 by the iranian Expediency Council Chairman (and former president) Hashemi rafsanjani: “We are besieged, under sanctions and boycott. We cannot use our resources, we cannot sell our oil, and if we do sell it, we cannot get the money transferred to us. if we buy anything, we must pay extra. We must pay extra in order to have the money transferred to us” 14. There is still a chance that iran’s new president would reach the USA

12 New Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Department of State, november 21, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177609.htm; United States Welcomes European Union Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Department of State, January 23, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/182350.htm; Increasing Sanctions Against Iran, U.S. Department of State, July 12, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194924.htm; Deal Struck to Tighten Sanctions against Iran, “The new york Times” July 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com, [access: 31.07.2012]. For deep analysis of sanctions that were imposed on iran see: K. Katzman, Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress July 16, 2012, Congressional research Service, http://www.crs.gov.

13 M. Eisenstadt, Religious Ideologies, Political Doctrines, and Iran’s Nuclear Decisionmaking [in:] Nuclear Fatwa. Religion and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy, M. Eisenstadt, M. Khalaji (eds.), “Policy Focus” 2011, no. 115, pp. 5–8, The Washington institute for near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus115.pdf [access: 14.05.2013].

14 y. Mansharof, E. Kharrazi, The Struggle Between Khamanei and Rafsanjani Over the Iraniab Leadership – Part III, “inquiry & Analysis Series report” 2013, no. 1014, p. 1, The Middle East Media research institute, http://www.memri.org/report/en/print7389.htm [access: 03.09.2013].


and open new chapter in negotiations, but the situation would be clearer after Washington decides on actions against Syria.

iran’s international stance is greatly affected by unstable situation in neighbour and regional states and is mainly shaped in opposition to the US dominance in the Middle East. Tehran is surrounded by a circle of instability just outside its borders. Close attention is paid to the situation in iraq, where, after the withdrawal of US forces, situation is still very tense and a full-scale civil conflict may occur anytime. right now, iran is probably the most influential external power in iraq 15. During long stabilisation process in iraq, Tehran was able to build its influences not only on the political level, but also on the social and economic ones. Security, territorial integrity, and material development of iraq are supported by the iranian leaders, but they would like to maintain their significant influence over the iraqi polity and daily life. With the ongoing nation-building process in iraq, the position of iran is somewhat declining, but it still has the power to destabilise it by activating the Shia militias 16. The best example of iranian power and influence was shown lately, when Tehran sent arms to Syria using iraqi airspace and no one could do anything about it 17. To maintain a stable, but a pro-iran oriented iraq is in the interest of Ayatollahs, but if under attack or under harmful international pressure, they may use their influence to jeopardize the security of that state.

The longstanding conflict in Afghanistan, additionally decreased the level of iranian external security. on one hand, iran supports nATo military struggle because the Taliban are the bitter enemy of Tehran, but on the other hand, it would like to see the USA to be humiliated in that conflict, like it was the case with the USSr. The position of iran in Afghanistan is growing, especially in the central and western provinces, where iran trough huge money transfers is

15 E. Sky, Iran Has Strong Influence in Iraq, “The new york Times” March 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/19/the-iraq-war-was-it-worth-it/ten-years-after-the-iraq-war-irans-influence-is-strong [access: 17.07.2013].

16 M.r. Gordon, A.W. Lehren, Leaked Reports Detail Iran’s Aid for Iraqi Militias, “The new york Times” october 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23iran.html [access: 23.10.2012]; K. Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress June 4, 2009, Congressional research Service, http://www.crs.gov, pp. 6–8.

17 M.r. Gordon, Iran Supplying Syria Military via Iraqi Airspace, The new york Times September 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/world/middleeast/iran-supplying-syrian-military-via-iraq-airspace.html [access: 05.09.2012].


trying to buy influence over the Afghani polity and decrease the position of the USA and its allies 18. However, if nATo would withdraw from Afghanistan, most probably that state will fell down once again to the Taliban and that would end the current iranian influences.

The most important factor for the international position of iran, right now, is the evolution of the Syrian civil conflict. The possible military intervention, which has been lately promoted by the USA after chemical weapons were used on August 21, 2013 in the Syrian war, will directly endanger iran’s position and destroy its only ally state in the Middle East. The close cooperation between iran and Syria has been gradually built since 1979, but after the fall of Saddam Hussein regime the cooperation speed up to the level of a strategic alliance 19. The main common interests of those two states are: cooperation in Lebanon (support for Hezbollah), containment of israel and constant support for Palestinians, restraining American and Western influences within the Middle East (e.g. in iraq), and developing close economic and financial relations 20. Syrian civil conflict has surprised the iranian leaders, but they decided to fully back Assad’s regime, by providing military, economic, and political support. But the long term and very bloody war in Syria creates real dilemmas for Tehran. it is rather unlikely that iran will be able to take a decisive and military action if Syria becomes a victim to the Western (US) military intervention. iran has no military means to support Syria, and deep economic crisis does not allow Tehran to send sufficient help to the Syrian government. only the option of activating Hezbollah and Shia militants across the region remain, but Tehran needs to be very careful about inflaming the Middle East territories, because, in the strategic sense, it may decrease its regional position and bring actions from regional powers, as well as from the Western ones. Therefore, iranian leaders are pushing for a diplomatic solution, opposing any military intervention in Syria,

18 D. Filkins, Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful, “The new york Times” october 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/asia/24afghan.html [access: 24.10.2010].

19 J.M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment, “ortadoğu Etütleri” 2013, no. 2, pp. 46–49, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/201331_makale2.pdf.

20 Syria i Iran zacieśniają stosunki [Syria and iran Strengthen relations], onet, october 2, 2010, http://biznes.onet.pl/syria-i-iran-zaciesniaja-stosunki,0,3709760,onet-wiadomosci-detal [access: 02.10.2010].


and calling for international negotiations. iran supports Assad’s regime and is backing russian activities aimed at preventing any attack on Syria 21.

The iranian Supreme Leader, as well other politicians and top military commanders, predict that the possible Western intervention in Syria would damage the USA forces, destabilize israel’s security, and may spill over into other hotspots of the Middle East region 22.

if the USA and some European states decide to strike Syria, iran’s position would be jeopardized even more. Attack on Syria may be understood as a prelude to a bigger action directed to break iranian policy and end nuclear conflict. iranian leaders are in difficult position, because is Syria falls, iran would be a new possible target of military intervention aimed at democratising iran, or rather at breaking its confrontational posture.

4. Conclusions

iran is not cohesive politically and we may observe a gradual decline of the Ayatollah’s power over the state. new factions are competing with the old ones for power within the systemic boundaries, but soon those centralised fluctuations may slip out of the old guards’ hands. it looks like the political stability of iran is mainly related to the position of Ali Khamanei as the Supreme Leader and his unilateral decisions of the divine rulership. Taking under consideration the age and rumours about Khamanei’s bad health, we may expect harsh and unpredictable struggle for total power after his death. iran’s stability and security is also questioned by the developments on international level. Long term conflict over the nuclear programme, together with rapid changes in the regional security system (Syria, iraq, and Afghanistan) may result in international intervention. it looks like the USA is eager to reorganize the Middle East according to its own vision and iran is one of the main obstacles on the way. There are just two options for iran. Either it will find a way to negotiate a “big deal” with international community and moderate its policies, or it will become the place

21 E. Benari, Putin and Rouhani: Intervention in Syria is Unacceptable, “israel national news” August 29, 2013, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/news.aspx/171388 [access: 03.09.2013].

22 Iran: If Syria Is Attacked, It Will Strike U.S., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, As Well As E.U. Interests, Israel Will Be Destroyed. Special Dispatch No. 5429, The Middle East Media research institute, August 30, 2013, http://www.memri.org/report/en/7386.htm [access: 05.09.2013].


of a next military intervention. The longstanding status quo of iran is reaching its limits and Tehran is already badly damaged by international sanctions what makes it already rather worn out. it looks like the confrontational posture has brought great dangers for iran, but the iranian leaders may still opt for a peaceful solution by changing their policies and aggressive orientation. The ball is on their side, but the tension is growing and it may result in a great disaster for the islamic republic of iran.

Feride Asli ergül JorgensenEge University, Turkey

tUrKeY’s “New” Middle eAstOr MOre OF the sAMe

ABstrACt

Turkey’s Middle East policy has been changed a lot in time but the most dramatic one has happened during the reign of the AKP government. As the political islam tendency in Turkey has evolved, the economic, political and cultural relations with the Middle East have developed in parallel. Besides, the Turkish democracy, which seems to solve its problems with islam, is shown by some people as a “model” for the Middle Eastern countries. it is a fact that the recent Gezi protests in Turkey constitute some doubts about the success of this model but the impact of AKP’s new foreign policy on the Middle Eastern politics is clear. With the “zero problems policy” and the “new activism” era in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has focused on the Middle East more than ever. However, to evaluate this change as a complete turn from Turkey’s century-old westernization and a shift in its identity would be a misreading of the developments. in fact, this change could be interpreted as another phase in its strategic foreign policy enriched with an opening to the East. in this context, this article tries to discuss the new orientation of Turkey upon old grounds in the Middle East according to its new focus between the regional dynamics and global actors.

Key words

Turkey, Middle East, regional actor, role model, AKP’s foreign policy, the USA

1. introduction

The Middle East constitutes a vital region in world politics. not only the enormous resources of oil and gas, but also the social, political and religious composition of the region has been of great importance. The balance in the Middle East is so fragile that any local or national tension between the Shiite and the Sunni people, between israel and Palestine, or between the Kurds and the Turks has a tendency


Turkey’s “New” Middle East or More of the Same 59

to turn into a regional problem. As a matter of fact, the Arab uprisings, which had started as a local protest in a small village in Tunisia, spread into Egypt, Libya and the rest of the region in just a few days. yet, the events were not limited to the region and the protests spread into many European and American metropolises, i.e. London, Madrid, and new york. it is noteworthy to mention that the direction of influence was not from the West to the East, as usual, but from the East to the West. The events that cascaded through many countries all around the world had originally started in the Middle East and then became worldwide. Apparently, the role of the Middle East has slowly shifted from being just a receiver into being the inspiration for change. in fact, the fire that had been ignited is still burning in many parts of the world. Moreover, the recent mass movements in Turkey, Brazil or Bulgaria, which are still going on as this article is being written, look like extended outcomes of this fire kindled in the Middle East.

Within this context of change, the relations of Turkey with the Middle East can be best understood according to its transformation from the ottoman times to the republican era, from dismemberment to cooperation, or from being the role model to something that we do not know yet how to describe. The debate on the role of Turkey in global affairs has always been deeply connected with its role in the Middle East. its relations with individual states in the region and with the USA, in terms of the American policy towards that region have been shaping the Turkish foreign policy. The new active strategy of the Turkish foreign affairs, which had been started by the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) government, has opened a new path of advanced relations with the Muslim countries in the Middle East. As Turkey’s social, economic and political relations with the Arab countries and iran have developed, new horizons of activity have opened for the Turkish foreign policy.

The aim of this paper is to analyze this change in Turkey’s Middle East politics that brings a “new” dimension to enhance a strategic turn into a regional actor. The new foreign policy of the AKP cannot be solely explained by some identity issues or a shift of axis; due consideration must be paid to its aim to becoming a regional actor in the Middle East. The rank of the region has immensely risen in Turkey’s scope, but it is still far from a break from its western-oriented foreign policy strategy that focuses on cooperation with the USA in the Middle East region. yet, instead of a total change, a more widened and sophisticated regional foreign policy within the same caliber would be more logical to define this new circumstances of Turkey.

instead of reactionary, the new policy of Turkey has locked on being active and present everywhere in the region. The decades-long dismemberment form

60 Fer ide A sl i Ergül Jorgensen

the Arab world seems to be abandoned, but it is still early to declare the success of Turkey as a role model for democratization and liberalization of the Middle Eastern states, especially after the Gezi Park protests which brought a bitter test for the democratic sensitivity of the Turkish government. These events can be evaluated as the end of dreams about being the “role model” and would be interpreted as the “Middle Easternization” of Turkey instead, but it can also be seen as a step required for developing the Turkish political system. if truth be told, the rhetoric of the AKP about being the apostle of democracy needs to be backed by active politics in order to be an appreciated example of stability of a state that is Muslim-oriented, secular and democratic. The way that the AKP deals with these protests is a new challenge to the Turkish democracy that can elevate it to the western standards of democracy and unlock the gate towards being a regional actor which “deserves” to be the “role model” for the Middle East.

To this extent, Turkey’s new foreign policy in the Middle East will be evaluated and the reasons for this change will be discussed in this article. The intriguing balance between its approach towards the East and West will be analysed within the context of Turkey’s new strategic target to become a regional actor. in order to grasp the picture as a whole, it would be better to start with identifying the Middle East as a region and then to have look at the history of the relations between the Middle East and Turkey.

2. the Middle east as a region: where to Begin?

in order to analyze these transformations, we first need to place the Middle East as a region in world politics. As many experts on the Middle East underline, the region is not easy to define and generalise. neither its boundaries nor its actors are clear. The Middle East, although it sounds like that, is much more than a geographical term. it can also be political, social, religious, or mythical. Being the Middle, and East of the West, itself is problematic in the first place. The identity of the region has been carved according to its role in relation to the West.

The boundaries of the region are highly open to discussion and various definitions are visible in the literature. While Carl Brown 1 (1984) includes the states which were once under the rule of the ottoman Empire within the limits of the Middle East, thus including israel and Turkey, but excluding iran and

1 C. Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game, Princeton 1984.


Morocco, Stephen Walt’s 2 (1987) Middle East excludes iran, Turkey and the north African states. Albert Hourani 3 (1991), on the other hand, suggests the term “Arab world” instead of the Middle East. Michael Barnett 4 (1998) also believes in the defining feature of Arabism and takes the founding members of the Arab League: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, plus Palestine as the Middle East countries.

it is possible to give many more definitions of the Middle East. yet, for the discipline of international relations to define what really constitutes a region is a difficult task on its own. To split global affairs into regional zones is severely complex for the scholars. The difficulty is not limited by the borders, but by the criteria of being a region. in some regions, historical commonalities can give that area a regional identity, such as it is in the case of the Balkans. Some regions can be highly uni-polar and everything in that region can be directly or indirectly connected to a dominant power. America can be given as an example of this type of regionalism. in Europe, on the other hand, the balance of power is highly calibrated to the multi-polarity in many ways, which puts many different countries forward.

The Middle East is highly contradictory to define as a region, and the same could be said about the commonalities of the members of that region. instead of commonalities, literature on the Middle East mostly highlights antagonism as the canon. The endless conflicts within the region have been commonly referred to as a feature of the Middle East. Moreover, unlike many other regions, the Middle East is open to penetration. The USA, russia, the EU, and China have more impact on this region than the countries of the Middle East themselves. To this extent, regional developments are outcomes of the influences of both the regional and the global powers.

3. transformation of turkey’s relations with the Middle east

Turkey is a country that is located both in the Middle East and in Europe in terms of its geography, history, politics and culture. This Eastern-Western duality has been one of Turkey’s sui generis characteristic. Westernization has been the main

2 S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, new york 1987.3 A. Hourani, How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?, “international

Journal of Middle East Studies” 1991, no. 2, pp. 125–136.4 M. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, new york

1998.


drive for the country since the last decades of the ottoman Empire, whereas the islamic and the Middle Eastern dimensions have had a deep impact on its social and cultural background. While the Western type of modernization of the country has been introduced as the ultimate goal, social, religious and psychological landmarks have shown great attachment to the Eastern civilization and societies. Turkish history is full of this contradiction between becoming a Western-style nation-state and following its Muslim social instincts. yet, until the 1990s the official state policy had insisted upon a total Westernization which had been the continuation of the modernization project of the last decades in the Middle East. This trend goes back to the 18th century when the ottoman Empire started to lose the battle against the Europeans on the battlefields, but also in the fields of technology, economy and science. As military defeats, economic problems and social restlessness were taking the place of the old glorious days of the ottoman Empire, the necessity for a change and modernization was widely accepted among the statesmen and the intellectuals of the ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, modernization and Westernization were used interchangeable, both of which were referring to catching up with the European powers. However, the technological and the intellectual gap between the ottomans and the modern world was huge. Besides, the already tried and wasted ottoman identity was not appealing to the non-Muslim citizens when they compared it with the independent state promises of the nationalist movement. Hence, the dissolution of the Empire could not be stopped with these late reform attempts. on the contrary, the limited freedom of speech and press indirectly accelerated the collapse 5.

The disengagement between the Turks and the Arabs goes back to the years of modernization during the ottoman Empire. As the multi-nationality of the Empire as a political system did not manage to satisfy the nationalist movements of the international system, some alternative strategies were introduced by the state elites to keep the Empire together. Pan-islamist strategy of Sultan Abdul Hamid ii and the ottoman nationalism of the young Turks could not stall the collapse of the ottoman Empire. yet, the ottoman Turks also failed to introduce an “exit strategy” from the Middle East. The centralization policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) government dramatically augmented nationalist uprisings in the Empire and also in the Arabic region.

5 M. Belge, Türkiyede Zenofobi ve Milliyetçilik [in:] Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik, T. Bora (ed.), istanbul 2003, p. 183.


Under the leadership of Sharif Hussein, the Great Arab revolt had launched the disintegration process between the Arabs and the Turks. This process continued during the rule of Mustafa Kemal, who began pushing modernization towards the establishment of a nation-state. Meanwhile, the ottoman dynasty, the Caliphate, and other institutions were all stripped of power to enforce a secular nation state regime. Generally speaking, the abolishment of these institutions, especially the Caliphate, not only did cut ties but also breached the “social contract” between the Turks and the Muslim territories 6.

During the first years of the republic (1923–38) under the rule of Mustafa Kemal, Turkey focused on modernization and Westernization even stronger than the last epoch of the ottoman Empire. However, the interest in the Arab region was highly limited, as the relations with the Middle East began to be more than just border settlements. Hence, Turkey managed to achieve border settlement with iraq over the oil-rich Mosul area in 1926, with iran in 1932 and with Syria in 1939. There were also some cooperation attempts with iran, iraq and Afghanistan in 1937 (the Sadabat Pact), and with iran, iraq, Pakistan and the United Kingdom in 1955. The relations and agreements, however, were parts of the Western security system and did not offer Turkey a viable security assurance. The Cold War years pushed Turkey entirely into the arms of the West and the security priorities concentrated on the two internal threats: the Kurdish nationalism and the political islam 7. The governments generally had been controlled by the military; secularism and Westernization were the two important pillars of the state, which should be protected against the threat of the political islam and the Kurdish nationalism.

These early years of the republican Turkey passed mostly under the impact of the Western type “orientalism” toward the Middle East that perceived this region with by a stereotype of inefficiency, superstition, and dubious morals. it was seen as a backward, conflicted region and considered it as an area to be cautious of. The imperial memories of betrayal were combined with cautious, non-interventionist, low-profile approach towards the Arabs. it was only dealt with in cases when Turkey’s national security was threatened by some forces connected to this region. Therefore, the early republican Turkey has kept its distance and limited its involvement in the Middle East. The mistrust towards

6 A. Ehteshami, S. Elik, Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East, “Turkish Studies” 2011, no. 4, pp. 643–644.

7 ibidem, p. 644.


the Arabs was also a part of the state ideology within this security perception 8. The Cold War strategy of Turkey would bring little change to the Middle East strategy. its limited involvement in the region had lacked substance, a consistent regional scope, and, most importantly, a well-defined discourse. nevertheless, the strict Western-oriented foreign policy prevented Turkish foreign policy makers from adopting an independent neighbourhood policy toward the Middle East.

yet, the image of Turkey among the Arabs was far from positive. There were psychological and political barriers in the Middle Eastern peoples’ views regarding Turkey which had long been considered the Trojan Horse of American imperialism in the region. The end of Cold War was far from changing the Arab public’s “terrible Turk” perception. Let alone diminishing, the negative perception was strengthened for several reasons: the rise of pan-Turkism in the Turkish foreign policy and, therefore, activism in Central Asia, military operations in the northern iraq against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), water problems with the Syrian state, and the growing strategic cooperation with israel 9.

The loose connections of the Turkish state with the Middle East have been largely shaken by the 1995 election. The national view has achieved a remarkable victory together with the Welfare Party (refah Partisi) under the leadership of nemettin Erbakan. The earlier mentality of loose connections with the Middle Eastern states was largely turned upside down by Erbakan’s new government. As an expected step, Erbakan’s government turned its face mostly to the Middle Eastern countries and started a new era for the Turkish foreign policy. The cold relations with the Muslim states were improved and cultivated through mutual agreements, cultural connections and trade. What is striking, as a Prime Minister, Erbakan in 1996 made his first official visits to iran and then to Egypt, Libya, and nigeria. instead of the EU countries or the USA, his priority was set on the Middle Eastern counties.

When Erbakan’s government remained in power, the discourse of the state became a critical stand on the Westernization of Turkey. The actors, institutions, process and objective of westernization were questioned in the name of authenticity. The impact of Westernization on the character of the state and society, which were traditionally and culturally under the influence of islam, was

8 E. Dal, The Transformation of Turkey‘s Relations with the Middle East: Illusion or Awakening?, “Turkish Studies” 2012, no. 2, p. 247.

9 ibidem, p. 248.


regarded as a serious problem of Turkey rather than of the West. The national view Movement believed that historically, culturally and geographically Turkey did not belong to the West but to the islamic world 10. Erbakan argued that “Turkey should cooperate with the Muslim countries through which it can realize the goal of being a leader, instead of being a servant in the European Union (EU)” 11.

This change in the attitude has altered the image of Turkey in the eyes of the Middle Eastern societies. yet, Erbakan’s harsh criticism of the West and accusing them as the “mother of all evils” 12 was accepted as a sign for many Arabs that Turkey had abandoned its distanced foreign policy towards the islamic countries. The transformation of Turkey’s Middle East policy has reached its peak with the government of AKP (Justice and Development Party) after the 2002 elections. AKP was formed as a more moderate and neo-liberal form of national view Movement, and inherited its islamic tendency. The change in the rhetoric was reinforced by the new government and evolved into a new form of policy, which is a combination of islamic tendency, neo-liberal economy and Westernization.

4. New Activism of turkey and New Presence in the Middle east

The new approach to foreign policy of the AKP government is not a total turnabout for Turkey. There is continuity between the previous governments and the AKP in the policy towards the Middle East, however, Erdoğan’s government foreign policy changes in response to changes in the internal and external dynamics. The Cold War parameters are no longer defining the geopolitics of Turkey in the Middle East. instead of a cautious approach to this region, as during the interwar or the Cold War years, Turkey developed a new strategy to be a central country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia. The Middle East is seen as a key strategic region in world politics, in addition to concerns about access to the region’s wide resources of gas and oil 13. Domestic politics, security and social systems were redefined, as the new foreign policy discourse of Turkey evolved into a new state policy.

10 i. Dağı, Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization, “Turkish Studies” 2005, no. 6, pp. 24–25.

11 E. Dal, op.cit., p. 249.12 i. Dağı, op.cit., p. 24.13 A. Ehteshami, S. Elik, Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East,

“Turkish Studies” 2011, no. 4, p. 646.


AKP has developed an islamic language in its dialogue with the Middle Eastern countries, while it keeps good relations with the USA and israel in the region. This pragmatic foreign policy was mostly grounded on the idea of being a great regional power which has more space in its political, economic and social environments. in this regard, in addition to being a cultural or a regional partner, the Middle East has become a new ground for new markets and opportunities for the AKP government.

The real breakthrough came with the arrival of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current minister of foreign affairs, who introduced the “zero problems policy”. This policy aims to improve and expand Turkey’s relations with its neighbours by a growing interest to seek solutions to the problems of the country from the Balkans to the Middle East. it has engendered considerable Turkish involvement in regional issues, ranging from efforts to mediate between the clashing peoples and countries in the neighbouring territories. Even if these mediation efforts have not always ended with success, there is no doubt that it has helped to change Turkey’s image in the eyes of the Arab world. Turkey has come to be known as a country that uses a much more soft, multilateral, and cooperative language than ever 14.

Davutoğlu mentions Turkey as a “central country”, and that its geographic location cannot permit it to pursue merely reactive policies. Since its security is closely interconnected with the regional developments that Turkey is a part of, a proactive policy has to be implemented in order to advance the national interests and to ensure the state’s survival 15. in his recent article, Davutoğlu highlights similar points and says “in rejecting a reactionary foreign policy approach, Turkey develops its positions on regional and international issues with careful consideration of its own conditions” 16. in fact, when Prime Minister recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave his famous balcony speech after his electoral victory on June 12, 2011, he declared the continuation of Turkey’s increased engagement in the Middle East, when he said: “All friendly and brotherly nations from Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku and nicosia… the hopes of the victims and the oppressed have won”, and “Beirut has won as much as İzmir.

14 K. Kirişçi, Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East, “insight Turkey” 2011, no. 2, p. 43.

15 Ş. Kardaş, Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles, “Middle East Policy” 2010, no. 1, p. 124.

16 A. Davutoğlu, Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring, Ankara 2012, p. 1.


West Bank, Gaza, ramallah, Jerusalem have won as much as Diyarbakır. The Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans have won, just as Turkey has won” 17.

5. “role Model” for the Middle east?

According to Larry Diamond, a well-known American scholar on democracy and democratization, a “model” would be an inspiration for reform and transformation among the Arab countries. in fact, he thinks that there is an absence of such a model in the Middle East, which complicates the prospects of democratization in the region 18. Samuel Huntington also mentions the importance of the demonstrative effect as a model for the democratic change. He describes this process as a snowballing effect of earlier transitions that allow “stimulating and providing models of subsequent efforts of democratization” 19. in other words, earlier experiences of democratic transitions can constitute examples for the latecomers.

yet, recently, Turkey has been referred to by some prominent personalities as a model or an example for the transformation of the Arab world, which has shaken with the uprisings in 2011. The Tunisian opposition leader rashid al-Ganouchi and Tariq ramadan, the grandson of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, have underlined Turkey’s importance as a model. As a matter of fact, it is not a new development for Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the journal “Economist” announced Turkey as the “star of islam” and a model for the Central Asian republics when the issue of reform and democratization emerged in the former Soviet republics. About a decade later, American President George Bush pointed to Turkey as a model once again when he launched the BMEnA initiative. in general terms, both of these cases are taking Turkey as an appropriate “model” because of its credentials as a secular Muslim country and a democracy with a liberal market economy.

As Turkey has risen as a successful example of a combination of islamic tendency and democratic system, it won over some liberal Arabs as well. Hence, when Turkey was accepted as a candidate to open accession negotiations with the EU in December 2004, some Arab journalists presented it as a model of reform

17 B. yinanç, PM poses as a Middle Eastern rather than a European leader, “Hürriyet Daily news” June 13, 2011.

18 K. Kirişçi, op.cit., p. 34.19 ibidem.


for the Arab world 20. Being a candidate for the EU as an islamic country was something that was attractive for the people who are looking for the expected compromise between islam and democracy. This highlighted aspect of Turkey, to a large extent, seemed to be appealing to the Arabs, because according to a survey conducted by Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEv) in 2010 in seven Arab countries, 61% of the respondents considered Turkey as a model for the Arab world. 63% agreed that Turkey constitutes a successful example of coexistence of islam and democracy 21.

Unquestionably, economic development is important for this positive image of Turkey. The growth of the economic capacity of Turkey, the rise of income per capita, the animated trading relations, and the increasing number of internal and external investments of Turkish enterprises contribute to this positive perception. in fact, the AKP government is very sensitive about the growing economy of Turkey up to a point of largely implementing a liberal visa policy to open the doors of Turkey to any foreign trader or investors. Kemal Kirişçi, a respected scholar on Turkey’s foreign policy, explains this attitude of Turkey with the term “trading state”, that is to say a state whose “foreign policy is increasingly shaped by economic consideration and a country whose foreign trade acquires an important place in the GnP” 22. The middle class and liberal capitalism have also grown during this economic prosperity, which makes Turkey one of those centres of attraction for a new opening for the economies of the Middle East trapped between oil revenues and the rentier state model.

in addition to the economic statistics, Turkish media, and especially the Turkish Tv series, are also influential on the societies of the Middle East. The way of living depicted on Tv looks like a Western style grounded in Muslim culture, which is attractive for the Arabs, especially for women, youngsters or marginalised groups, who are look for more liberalism in their countries. Hence, beyond the economic or the political instruments, Turkey’s image has been constructed sociologically by the media and filming industry. Turkish series and popular artists seem to be representing the image of Turkey on the “Arab street”.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s popularity had mounted among the Arab people especially after his rise against the israeli president Simon Peres in 2009 at the Davos World Economy Forum. His emotional reaction supporting the

20 ibidem.21 M. Akgün et al., The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, istanbul 2009, pp. 21–

–22.22 K. Kirişçi, op.cit., p. 37.


Palestinians against the “cruelty” of the israeli military operations has been known as “one minute”. This reaction was seen as a change in the Turkish foreign policy, which used to be a supporter of American interests in the region and a collaborator of israel. However, it should be mentioned that Turkey’s popularity as a model was not always welcomed by the elite groups, who were toppled by the recent protests. There are some doubts about the sincerity of Turkey in its Middle East policies. The state might look like more American than islamic in many dimensions to these people. in this sense, the new activism of the Turkish foreign policy has been interpreted as an extension of new imperialism. yet, the discourse on Turkey’s role as a model for the Middle Eastern states can be considered in a broader scope of analysis. To evaluate the new activism of the Turkish foreign policy within its global and regional politics would not be a conspiracy theory. in fact, to be a model for the Middle Eastern states would be in favour of Turkey in its quest towards being a regional power than of the Arabs who are “seeking” for a model. To be followed by others would perhaps serve Turkish political interests more than the needs of Arab populations. For some people, “The use of the Turkish Model is perhaps largely a Turkish or a Western tool used to enhance Turkey’s discursive power or to contribute to the western hope that the Arab Spring states could become as amenable to Western interests as Turkey has been in the past” 23.

Thus, to discuss further the subject of being a “model”, it is necessary to indentify the reasons behind this “demand”. To bring stability and a more Western-type modernity to the region would also bring easy access to the region not only for Turkey but also for the Western countries. Stable political systems and liberal economies are more open to dialogue and to develop connection with these powers, especially with the USA, which probably has held the position of the “most unfavoured nation” in the minds of the Middle Eastern people. To have an ally like Turkey in the Middle East would be very welcome by the USA as it also brings a more peaceful and controllable access to the people of the region. For Turkey, being a model country for the region would provide the expected position of being a regional power and also a candidate to a global actor. yet, the card of the Middle East is the strongest one that Turkey has in its hands in world politics and it would not want to lose it as it did before.

The AKP government has come a long way in its Middle Eastern policy and strengthened its position as a regional power. The rhetoric of “zero problems”

23 A. Stevens, The ‘Turkish Model’ in the Arab Spring: Discourse and Foreign Policy Metaphors, “The Journal of Turkish Weekly” July 2, 2012.


would be reasonable and attractive, but it has required more than just good intentions. in fact, the tense reaction of Turkey towards the civil war in Syria constitutes a challenge for the peaceful philosophy of “zero problems” neighbourhood policy. The profile of “always with the peace” has been distorted by the “anytime can get into war” image of Turkish foreign policy during the recent crisis between Syria and Turkey. The financial and military support for the “aggressive” opposition group in Syria, the Syrian Liberation Army, has been questioned by many groups in Turkey because of its risks and irrationality. Despite the visibility of risks, the AKP government has been probably calibrating its foreign policy according to the vision of Turkey as a regional power in the Middle East. As the global dynamics have been changing in the region, Turkey seems to use its initiative as a “reactionary state” more than being an “apostle of peace”.

Moreover, the success of Turkey’s role as a regional actor and a soft power depends largely on the stability of its domestic politics, the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question and the place of political islam in the secular state. 24 As the hope for the Kurdish rapprochement has been diminished by mutual reluctance of the PKK and the Turkish government, domestic politics have also been shaken by the recent turmoil. The Gezi Park protest in Turkey, which had started as a small protest, has been challenging for the AKP government both from the inside, as a source of instability, and from the outside, as a stain on the state’s image. The outcome of these events is still away from certainty, since they are still going on during as article is being written. However, it is a fact that they would be an important experience for the improvement of democracy in Turkey. The rhetoric of democracy, which has been used as a “model” for the developing democracies of the Middle East, have finally found an opportunity to be practiced. There would be ups and downs in every democracy, but what matters is the way how that government deals with these problems. The emergence of pluralism and a comprehensive form of democracy in Turkey would bring hope not solely to Turkey, but also to the Middle East.

6. Conclusion

Turkey and the Middle East have had a history of a very changing relationship. The close cultural and religious relations have been damaged during the last decades of the ottoman Empire and did not improve with the establishment

24 A. Ehteshami, op.cit., p. 658.


of the republican Turkey. The late ottoman and early republican Western-oriented and secularist policy orientation drove Turkey even further away from the Middle East. With the rise of the political islam in Turkey, the tendency of the governments to move closer to the Middle East started to be more evident in the foreign policy. The Arabs’ perception of Turkey has also been transformed during these developments, especially during the AKP government. With the new policy of the AKP government, relations between Turkey and the Middle East have been closer than ever. The cold relations had warmed up within this new environment. numerous publications were released on Turkey’s new foreign policy in the Middle East. The change in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East has been named the “Shift of Axis” by some scholars, pointing out its new identity orientation towards the East instead of the West. However, instead of evaluating this process as an identity transformation, evaluating the developments from the perspective of strategic reformation in its foreign affairs would be a better way to understand the new AKP policy in the region.

in this regard, “Turkey’s new activism has aimed at keeping its old alliances in balance while establishing relations with a new power centre in the Middle East” 25. Within this context, the new strategy of Turkey is mainly to maintain the status quo in the region and to avoid regional conflict. Creating relations of interdependence by using political, social and economic channels is a useful way of realising this new strategy. in contrast to the interwar or the Cold War politics, Turkey’s new strategy and entrance into the Middle East has not been perceived by the Arab Middle East as a hegemonic threat or a Western influence, but rather as a balancing power 26.

in fact, what makes Turkey closer to becoming a regional actor within the Middle East is the AKP’s new foreign policy strategy of focusing on the Arab states more than any other Turkish government. This new strategy of getting closer to the Middle East is sometimes misinterpreted as a detachment of Turkey from the West. However, the new activism of Turkey on the Muslim lands is a part of its general international relations strategy. To be an active player within the region, which had been neglected for a long time, could certainly give Turkey a broader perspective on the world politics. in this sense, Turkey needs to play its cards on two tables. on the one hand, it needs to consider the regional dynamics and act as a regional actor. on the other hand, it has to keep the balance between

25 A. Ehteshami, S. Elik, Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East, “Turkish Studies” 2011, no. 4, p. 658.

26 A. Ehteshami, op.cit., p. 646.


the global actors. This bilateral task can be confusing in evaluating Turkey’s new policy, but treating the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East as a disconnection from the West would be an oversimplification. This new era is an extended version of its Westernization. An increased effectiveness of Turkey in the region, an improved image among the Arabs and more effective economic relations with the Middle Eastern economies would raise the importance of Turkey for the global actors, as this is the aim of the AKP government. Within this context, the role model talk would do nothing but support the position of Turkey in the Middle East.

Apparently, the Middle East has never been an isolated region as the great powers’ interests have been clashing on it. Any slight shift of balance within the region could mean a change on the global arena. Therefore, Britain, France, Germany, russia and the USA have always given great importance to the Middle East in their foreign affairs. Among these powers, Turkey has had a special political, strategic and military link with the USA. Actually, as the leading global power in the world, the USA has paved the way of Turkey for importance as a both democratic and islamic country in the region. yet, for the USA, Turkey’s significance has always been connected with the Middle East, which was not always welcomed by the Turkish authorities during the Cold War years. in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Middle East became one of the most crucial elements of the Turkish-American alliance, a development that was largely accepted by both sides 27. Turkey’s close relation with the Middle East would be helpful for Turkey to strengthen itself and for the USA to have access to the Arab societies.

The USA may be an important power, but the Middle East has been changing as a region and the balance of power in the region has been changing. it is moving from being a multipolar system to bipolarity between the poles around iran and the USA. Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shiite government in iraq, with support from russia and China forms the group which supports iran. israel, Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with the support from the European allies, stand against that group as the opposing pole in the region 28. Multipolarity in the region used to give Turkey an opportunity to play a balancing role in the region and to increase its influence by using a soft power

27 M. Altunışık, The Middle East in Turkey-USA Relations: Managing the Alliance, “Journal of Balkan and near Eastern Studies” 2013, no. 2, p. 157.

28 L. Martin, Turkey and the USA in a Bipolarizing Middle East, “Journal of Balkan and near East Studies” 2013, no. 2, p. 175.


paradigm grounded on expanding trade networks, diplomatic mediation and enhancing cultural ties with the Arab world and iran 29. However, a bipolarizing region will likely increase threats to Turkey’s national interests in the Middle East. The future threat of iran armed with nuclear weapons, the need for securing energy sources, while reducing reliance on iranian supplies, and expanding the capacity of trade and investment would be among the upcoming challenges for Turkey’s foreign policy 30.

Apart from the tension between iran and he USA, the civil wars in the region have been challenging for Turkey’s stable foreign policy. Turkey needs great dexterity to handle these challenges all alone 31. An active foreign policy, in this sense, necessitates a strategic turn strengthened by the regional and global dynamics. Cultural bonds, religious similarities and growing economic ties would bring more and more substance for Turkey in the Middle East, as it is developing both its regional activism and, at the same time, its stability in the world politics. The Middle East gives the right strategic horizon for Turkey to expand its vision.

29 ibidem, p. 176.30 ibidem, p. 181.31 A. Ehteshami, op.cit., p. 646.

Manuel Férez GilMilddle East Universidad Iberoamericana and Universidad Anahuacin Mexico City, Mexico

eVerYthiNG will Be deCided iN sYriA

ABstrACt

it is difficult to understand the current situation in Syria without making an analysis of the historical reasons that have led to the country on the brink of collapse. This brief article intends to expose the lines of rupture of the Syrian regime as well as the regional and international importance of this conflict.

Key words

Bashar Al Assad, sunni/chii division, civil war

Syria is, at the same time, a symbol and a symptom of a regional war that recast the composition of what will be the Middle East: it is this too much to fight and it is resolved in this nation state.

Hans Kung remembers that the city of Damascus has an ancient history of more than four thousand years. Mentioned first in 1470 BC to be conquered by the Pharaoh Tutmés ii, this beautiful city bears the marks left by King David, the Persians, the Seleucid Empire, the romans, and the Byzantines. However, from the year 634, Damascus, is primarily (though not only) Arabic and for almost a century (661–750) the Umayyad Caliphs ruled from there a huge islamic Empire. That glorious history is behind us, and today we are distant witnesses of a civil war that has led to the country to the verge of a total collapse and human tragedy that is far from being over.

in my classes about the Middle East i put emphasis on the huge tensions experienced by entire countries and other international actors (United States, russia, Britain, China, and France, among others) that converge in Syria

Professor Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow at the international institute for strategic studies, in his book Syria s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant lists five reasons behind the tensions:


Everything Will Be Decided in Syria 75

1. The discrepancy between the Government and their society (delegitimiza-tion);

2. The confrontation for regional leadership between iran, some Arab countries of the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia), and Turkey;

3. The deepening of the Sunni/Chii division; 4. The role of political islam in the identity of the Arab and Muslim and non-

Muslim groups; 5. Breaking the balance of different ethnic groups in traditionally multi-

ethnic societies (in Syria the Kurdish case is most obvious).The regional impact of this conflict is already unquestionable; for example,

the flight of the Kurds to the Kurdish regional Government of iraq will have demographic, political and economic implications. The large number of refugees in Jordan is threatening the precarious stability of a regime that historically barely survives in a ruthless region. Turkey, which for too long has called on the international community to intervene in its neighbour, receives the impact of refugees seeking asylum in the South of the country. Lebanon is absorbed by the violent dynamics. israel distributed gas masks among its population and prepares militarily for conflict on their northern border and finally, iran becomes witness of how its main ally in the Middle East pound an existential battle, while the Gulf countries are committed to which groups Sunni fundamentalists are the final winners.

internationally, the picture is more complex with the Security Council paralyzed by the fundamental disagreement between russia and the United States on the construction of the law (ius ad bellum, and ius in bello) and legitimacy of operations. Similarly, little is debated on the consequences of the post-conflict period in the short and medium timeframe (reconstruction of the state, social cohesion, and the Syrian identity preservation), central questions that have inhibited rapid participation in the conflict by actors such as the US and Britain due to the previous conflicts in Afghanistan (2001) and iraq (2003).

President Putin has made it clear that his country will only validate only the decisions agreed upon in the Security Council and interventions supported by international law, while President obama is in a dilemma whether to act unilaterally or to negotiate a plausible solution with russia on terms of equality.

The use of chemical weapons by the government forces is, at least, difficult to prove clearly and forcefully, which inhibits russia and China from proclaiming their support for an intervention, which, moreover, would cause harm to their area of influence, as well as their military and commercial presence in the Middle East. Likewise, the Kremlin puts on the table the analysis of the Syrian

76 Manuel Férez Gil

case, where it was not only the Government of Assad who has committed crimes of war and against humanity, but also the opposition has not hesitated to use inhuman methods during the fi ght.

Th e viewpoint of President obama is diff erent because the refusal of the British Parliamentąs support to Prime Minister David Cameron in his intervention proposal, joined with the uncertainty of the French, Washington sees itself deprived of two fundamental props that placed it in a dilemma: how to act in the Syria case without compromising the credibility of a President who wanted to mark out the legacy of the Bush doctrine?

Th e columnist of Haaretz, Anshel Pfeff er poses varying degrees of involvement: the fi rst involves an attack limited to strategic objectives (bases, and military stores of chemical weapons) without removing Bashar Al-Assad’s power, which would result in a scenario similar to the iraq post Hussein. Th e alternative would involve ground presence; however, realising it is practically impossible at the moment, because of the great military and economic costs that this would entail added to the unpopularity among the American population of this intervention.

Th e scenario may not seem more diffi cult and daunting: already more than one hundred thousand dead, two million refugees, millions of internally displaced persons, destruction of infrastructure, cultural and historical sites, fracture of the fabric of Syrian society are the result of the civil war. When i was fi nishing writing these words, i heard that the United States Senate Foreign relations Committee approved the use of military force in Syria. Will the decision of the Washington be benefi cial to the future of Syria or will it further exacerbate the war?

Source: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/news/middle-east/2013/09/03/obama-confi dent-of-getting-Congressional-support-for-Syria-strike.html.

Artur MalantowiczUniversity of Warsaw, Poland

“Crisis, ChAOs, ViOleNCe –is thAt reAllY whAt we wANt?”A stAlled deMOCrAtisAtiON iN JOrdAN

ABstrACt

Amidst the regional turmoil in the Middle East, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan prevails its relative stability despite undergoing only limited democratic reforms. The article aims to present and analyze the Jordanian regime’s reaction to the Arab Spring in light of the international historical sociology, which depicts multidimensional and interlinked relations between the state, society and international environment, all immersed in historical context. The analysis finds that Jordan is a case proving that some nations praise stability over rushed political reform and, what is a key to understand the phenomenon, this is the view shared not only among the ruling elite but also by a vast part of the society. The somewhat stalled democratisation works in favour of the autocratic regime of King Abdullah ii who retains power, of the Jordanian society, which does not have to fear internal disorder, and of the international community for whom Jordan is a long-standing and reliable partner.

Key words

Arab Spring, Jordan, democratisation, stability, international Historical Sociology

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was closely observed by the international community since the very onset of the Arab Spring. By many it was doomed as an another Middle Eastern autocratic regime endangered by massive protests and socio-political mobilisation, capable of overthrowing the monarchy. rightly, demonstrations in Jordan started earlier than those in Egypt or Syria, yet they have neither gained critical mass nor did they really seek a change in the regime. Up to this point, Jordan prevails in its relative stability, despite undergoing only limited democratic reforms and facing regional turmoil. The article aims to present and analyze the Jordanian regime’s reaction to the Arab Spring in the light


78 Ar tur Malantowic z

of the international historical sociology, which depicts the multidimensional and interlinked relations between the state, society and international environment, all immersed in historical context. Therefore, the paper aspires to depict how these three elements of the system interconnect in the case of Jordanian monarchy and, concurrently, how do they influence the democratisation process. The thesis of the article is the notion that the stalled reform process in Jordan is working in favour of almost all parties concerned: the autocratic regime of King Abdullah ii, the Jordanian society and the international community.

1. international historical sociology & democratisation

Historical sociology that emerged in the late 1970s and matured in the 1990s can be described as studying the past in order to explain how societies function and encounter changes; studying mutual connections between the past and the present, and between events and processes 1. Despite a variety of works published within the stream of historical sociology, all of them are “perceiving the social reality as a process and underlining the role of historical momentum, pace and rhythm of changes” 2.

initially reserved only for analyzing societies, historical sociology very quickly became ‘internationalized’, particularly by including into analysis the international system and the relations between the state and security. A prominent work by Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions introduced the concept of a state as an open system, arguing that social changes can be stimulated not only by internal factors (eg. class rivalry, economic pressure) but also by political, economic and military pressures coming from the international environment 3.

Fred Halliday explains that the term ‘historical sociology’ implies both historicisation of the state and locating that history within an international context 4. What is important, international historical sociology “refuses to treat

1 D. Smith, The Rise of Historical Sociology, Cambridge 1991, p. 3.2 A. Kolasa-nowak, Socjolog w badaniu przeszłości. Koncepcja socjologii historycznej

Charlesa Tilly’ego [A Sociologist Studying the Past. Charles Tilly’s Concept of Historical Sociology], Lublin 2011, p. 14.

3 T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge 1979, passim; J. Czaputowicz, Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja [Theories of international relations. Critique and Systematisation], Warszawa 2008, pp. 389–390.

4 F. Halliday, For an International Sociology [in:] Historical Sociology of International Relations, S. Hobden, J. Hobson (eds.), Cambridge 2002, p. 245.

“Crisis, Chaos, Violence – Is that Really what We Want?”… 79

the present as an autonomous entity outside of history, but insists on embedding it within a specific socio-temporal place” 5. Hence it is necessary to place the studied reality in a broader context of historical structure, within which it is rooted. “We can never understand the detail if we do not understand the pertinent whole, since we can never otherwise appreciate exactly what is changing, how it is changing, and why it is changing” 6. nonetheless, history, which offers an analytical framework for events, contingencies and local specifics, is only one element of the theory; sociology brings into study the understanding of how relatively constant configurations of social relations influence these processes, whereas international relations underline the central role played by the international dimension in shaping their dynamics 7.

Consequently, historical sociology proposes epistemological changes which are meant to address the reductionism of neorealism and Marxism. As such, an adequate theory of the state, society and international relations should include: 1) A study of history and change, 2) Multicausality (many independent power sources), 3) Multidimensionality (space without clear borders between dimensions), 4) Partial autonomy of power sources and actors, 5) Historicism – complexity of history and change, 6) (nonrealist) theory of state autonomy and power 8.

Full understanding of the contemporary social relations thereby requires knowledge about short-term and long-term events, as well as the processes which preceded them. Such assumption stems from acknowledging the path dependency with all its consequences. importantly, historical sociology is far from claiming that such path is linear or structurally determined. on the

5 J. Hobson, What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations’? Transcending ‘Chronofetishisim’ and ‘Tempocentrism’ in International Relations [in:] Historical Sociology…, S. Hobden, J. Hobson (eds.), op.cit., p. 13.

6 i. Wallerstein, European Universalism. The Rhetoric of Power, new york–London 2006, pp. 82–83.

7 J. Hobson, G. Lawson, J. rosenberg, Historical Sociology, LSE research online, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28016 [access: July 2013], p. 13. originally published in: r. Dene-mark (ed.), ISA Compendium, new york 2010.

8 T. Lapointe, F. Dufour, Assessing the Historical Turn in IR: An Anatomy of Second Wave Historical Sociology, “Cambridge review of international Affairs” 2011, p. 11; J. Hobson, The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations, “review of international Political Economy” 1998, no. 2, pp. 294–295.


contrary, “it has been a story of conflict and struggle as individuals, groups, political communities, religions, firms, nations, and empires have interacted within rapidly shifting contexts in the construction of contemporary world politics” 9. Simultaneously, as Andrzej Gałganek argues, social development is not only a multilinear but also an interactive and interdependent process and, as such, it might be determined or transformed by external pressures 10.

Multidimensionality offered by historical sociology suggests coexistence of different spatial levels – subnational, national, international and global – mutually interlinked and influencing each other. in other words, every single of these levels cannot exist separately: society, state and international community are interdependent 11. Therefore, it is impossible to explain politics of an individual actor (state) without taking into consideration numerous factors, both internal and external, historical and contemporary. it is essential to link sociological explanation focused on the nature of societies with geopolitical explanation based on conditions generated by their coexistence 12. needless to say, the international dimension is not merely a background for the state activities – it rather has a dominant character and decides about state formation. However, it does not remain autonomous as to some extent it is shaped by other elements of the system which in general can be seen as presented in Figure 1.

As Fred Halliday indicates, historical sociology could be of a real value when applied to analyze the themes important for the Middle East studies, such as conflicts and their determinants, the role of ideology and religion in international relations, transnational movements, domestic changes witnessed by the countries of the region and their foreign policy 13. Likewise, historical sociology recognizes the trend of world homogenisation – convergence of

9 G. Lawson, The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations, “interna-tional Studies review” 2006, vol. 8, pp. 403–404.

10 A. Gałganek, Abstrakcja nierównego i połączonego rozwoju w wyjaśnianiu historii stosunków międzynarodowych [The Abstract Theory of the Uneven and Combined Development in Explaining the History of international relations], “Prawo i Polityka” [Law and Politics] 2009, no. 1, p. 80.

11 J. Hobson, State and International Relations, Cambridge 2000, p. 195.12 A. Gałganek, Czy istnieje teoria społeczna »międzynarodowości« i »wewnętrzności«?

[is There a Social Theory of ‘internationality’ and ‘intranationality’?], “Przegląd Politolo-giczny” [Political Science review] 2007, no. 2, pp. 22, 32.

13 F. Halliday, Bliski Wschód w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Władza, polityka i ide-ologia [The Middle East in international relations. Power, Politics and ideology], Kraków 2009, pp. 42–43.


political institutions in eff ect of modernity and the regional context, which aims at strengthening international legitimacy and stability 14. in such form, the theory can also contribute to our understanding of the democratic process, since it acknowledges the shift ing functions of the state and changeable defi nitions of the civil society. it also considers international dimension as a source of the role models, inspiration for the domestic political scene. Consequently, historical sociology claims that in order to make it work, democratisation needs a “democratic coalition” historically consisting of the bourgeoisie, the middle class and the working class. Likewise, democracy requires a balance between the ruler (state) and the independent social groups (society), “in which the state is neither wholly autonomous of dominant classes nor captured by them, allowing a space within which civil society can fl ourish” 15.

When applied to the case of Jordan, international historical sociology aims to underline the interconnectedness between the state, the society and

14 ibidem, p. 45. For a broader account see: F. Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, London 1994, pp. 90, 94–123.

15 r. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Th eory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique, “Democratization” 2006, no. 3, pp. 378–379.

Figure 1. international relations according to historical sociology Source: Artur Malantowicz


the international environment and to show that the democratisation process mirrors the shifting interests of all three elements of the system. While it proves that, very often, the external dimension has a decisive impact on the pace and direction of socio-political reforms in the kingdom, it nonetheless admits the role society plays in voicing its approval or discontent towards the state apparatus. Subsequently, in order to fully understand the links between the state, the society and the international community, and their joint influence over the shape of political system of Jordan, it is essential to explore the historical context.

2. Jordan & democracy prior to the Arab spring

Unlike most of the countries in the Middle East, Jordan has a long tradition as the constitutional monarchy with a parliament that, in theory, limits the king’s executive power. nevertheless, the political history of Jordan experienced only two episodes of democratisation, first of which took place in the mid-1950s.

The 1952 constitution, at the time perceived as liberal, guaranteed various personal freedoms (e.g. freedom of opinion and the right of free association, political parties included), direct elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and a system of checks and balances between the legislative and the royal court. The king’s position was nevertheless relatively strong – he was entitled to appoint the Senate, to appoint and dismiss government officials, to dissolve the lower house of parliament and to call for new elections 16. Soon after the constitution emerged, however, the regime started to restrict the public sphere, fearing the increasing support for Arab nationalism. The ruling elite was also aware that political freedom worked against its interests, such as maintaining the alliance with the United Kingdom or close ties with israel 17. in 1957, martial law was declared in response to the coup attempt and, after it was lifted in late 1958, it was subsequently reintroduced in effect of the June 1967 War and lasted until early 1990s.

The second wave of democratisation reached Jordan in 1989, when its economic situation severely deteriorated due to the structural decrease in oil prices worldwide, and, accordingly, a serious decline in private remittances by

16 r. Brynen, Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan, “Canadian Journal of Political Science” 1992, no. 1, pp. 76–77.

17 M. oren, A Winter of Discontent: Britain’s Crisis in Jordan, December 1955–March 1956, “international Journal of Middle East Studies” 1990, no. 2, p. 173.


expatriate workers and official assistance from the Gulf states. Hence, facing budgetary deficits, weakening terms of trade and falling rates of growth, Jordan turned to international financial institutions to renegotiate its debt. in return for help, Jordan was forced to cut governmental expenditures and subsidies, impose a new sale tax, improve and expand the tax base in addition to public administrative reform, financial deregulation, trade liberalisation and significant privatisation 18. All of the reforms sharply increased prices of fuel and food which, unsurprisingly, triggered anti-government riots across the kingdom. Confronted with the legitimacy crisis, King Hussein used the democracy agenda as a tool to re-establish the monarchy’s authority and bring back its stability.

The first full parliamentary elections in more than twenty years were held in november 1989. Consequently, the national Charter was drafted and endorsed by the king in June 1991, a month later the martial law was lifted and in 1992 political parties were ultimately legalized. The following twenty years brought ups and downs in the democratisation process, depending on the international context of Jordanian politics, with a visible influence of phenomena like the Middle East peace process or the war with terrorism on Jordan’s domestic political scene. The facade aspect of democracy – parliamentary elections – was nevertheless maintained 19.

By the end of 2009, the level of dissatisfaction with the parliament’s work arose so high that King Abdullah decided to dissolve – not for the first time in Jordanian history – the Chamber of Deputies. A day later he instructed the government to amend the electoral law so that the new elections were “a model of transparency, fairness and integrity, and a promising step in our process of reform and modernisation, the aims of which are to achieve the best for our

18 H. El-Said, The Political Economy of Reform in Jordan: Breaking Resistance to Reform? [in:] Jordan in Transition 1990–2000, G. Joffé (ed.), London 2002, pp. 261–262; C. ryan, Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund, “Middle East Policy” 1998, no. 2, p. 56.

19 For a detailed account of the democratisation process in the 1990s and 2000s see, for instance: B. Milton-Edwards, Façade Democracy and Jordan, “British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies” 1993, no. 2, pp. 191–203; K. rath, The Process of Democratization in Jordan, “Middle Eastern Studies” 1994, no. 3, pp. 530–557; L. Brand, The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan, “Journal of Palestine Studies” 1998, no. 2, pp. 52–67; J. Choucair-vizoso, Illusive Reform: Jordan’s Stubborn Stability [in:] Beyond the Façade. Political Reform in the Arab World, M. ottaway, J. Choucair-vizoso (eds.), Washington 2008, pp. 45–70.


nation and to expand the horizon of progress and prosperity for Jordanians” 20. However, the new Elections Law of May 2010 contained only some of the popular demands: total number of the parliamentary seats increased from 110 to 120 with the women quota rising from six (introduced already in 2003) to twelve; extra four seats were granted to underrepresented urban areas of Amman, irbid and Zarqa; the previous multi-seats districts were re-designed into 108 smaller single-seat sub-districts; strict punishments for votes-buying were introduced along the expansion of the role of the political observers to assure fairness and transparency 21.

Even though in the weeks leading up to the election there were several incidents noted, mostly concerning arrests of the young people who were protesting against government and calling for an electoral boycott as well as instances of press censorship, the election day itself – november 9 – was an example of transparent, free and fair voting. it has also set a precedent in Jordanian history – for the first time the king invited international observers who joined national monitoring groups. Some of them indicated a paradox of the voting process being credible even if “the elections unfolded within a broader political system that lacked credibility” 22. Barely two months later the Arab Spring brought a new momentum to the Middle East.

3. Arab spring in Jordan: 2011–2013

Similarly to other countries of the region, Jordan became a scene of the Arab Spring as early as in January 2011, when the Jordanians went out on the streets of major cities to protest against the worsening socio-economic conditions 23.

20 K. Malkawi, King Directs Government to Amend Elections Law, “Jordan Times”, november 25, 2009, jordantimes.com/king-directs-government-to-amend-elections-law [access: July 2013].

21 M. Beck, L. Collet, Jordan’s 2010 Election Law: Democratization or Stagnation, 2010, pp. 1, 3–5.

22 M. Dunne, Jordan’s Elections: An Observer’s View, “Carnegie Commentary”, november 17, 2010, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view &id=41954 [access: July 2013].

23 First protests took place as early as on January 7, 2011 in the city of Theiban in the south of Jordan and soon spread across whole country. See: A. vogt, Jordan’s Eternal Promise of Reform, “internationale Politik und Gesellschaft” [international Politics and Society] 2011, no. 4, p. 65; C. ryan, Identity Politics, Reform, and Protests in Jordan, “Studies in Ethinicity and nationalism” 2011, no. 3, p. 565.


initially, the demonstrations mostly gathered educated and unemployed youth along with leftist activists, although soon later they were joined by many representatives of islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and ex-regime officials. They raised demands for improving living conditions, efficient fight with unemployment and corruption, prime minister rifai’s dismissal and the political system reform 24. Luckily for the Hashemite monarchy, however, the popular protests, even if run on a regular basis, have never assembled more than 8,000–10,000 people.

Contrary to the other regional leaders, king Abdullah ii was prompt to address the popular demands and replaced Samir rifai with Marouf Bakhit as the new prime minister at the end of January 2011. nonetheless, it did not calm the public tension, since merely two weeks later the 36 traditional Bedouin leaders from the south of Jordan, commonly perceived as the monarchy’s backbone, sent to the royal court an open letter, in which they overtly criticized the royal family. They mostly condemned Queen rania’s political involvement which they perceived as going “against what Jordanians and Hashemites have agreed on in governing and [being] a danger to the nation and the structure of the state (…) and the institution of the throne” 25.

The continued protests convinced the regime of a need to undertake several political reforms. For this aim, in mid-March 2011 the king established the national Dialogue Committee consisting of leaders of political parties, lawmakers, journalists, and activists, and assigned it with the task of reviewing the Elections Law and Political Parties Law to make the political system more democratic and more pluralistic. After the heavy clashes occurred in Amman on March 24–25 (with dozens of civilians and policemen injured) and again in mid-April, King Abdullah eventually ordered the formation of the royal Committee on Constitutional review on April 27. The results of its work were published on August 14 26 and instantly became the framework of the discussions about strengthening the rule of law, ensuring balance between powers and wider public participation.

24 A. Jebrin, What Did the Arab Spring Bring to Jordan?, “Middle East Flashpoint” 2012, p. 2.

25 Jordan Tribes Criticize Queen Rania’s ‘Political Role’, BBC news, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12400274 [access: July 2013].

26 Recommendations Made by the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review, “Jordan Times”, August 15, 2011, http://jordantimes.com/recommendations-made-by-the-royal-committee-on-constitutional-review [access: July 2013].


Throughout September 2011 the Committee’s recommendations were consequently discussed and endorsed by the parliament with only minor alterations. By the end of the month, the amendments were signed by King Abdullah, who called them a “turning point in the history of the Kingdom”. indeed, the Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was amended for the first time since 1984 and, what is even more important, for the first time on such a large scale. The new provisions not only made any infringement on the rights and public freedom a crime punishable by law (Art. 7), officially forbade torture (Art. 8), guaranteed freedom of scientific research and artistic activity (Art. 15), introduced independence of the judiciary (Art. 27) and the rule of “innocent until proven guilty” (Art. 101), but, above all, they established an independent commission to oversee the elections (Art. 67) and the Constitutional Court as an independent judicial body (Art. 58–61), a novum in the Jordanian legal system. Even though almost one third of the constitutional provisions were changed, the reform almost entirely omitted royal prerogatives – the king has lost only the right to indefinitely postpone elections to the parliament in case of force majeure (Art. 73), which was severely abused by successive monarchs 27.

Soon after the constitution was amended, Jordan has witnessed yet another government reshuffle, when the Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit was replaced by Awn Khasawneh, a widely respected lawyer and a former judge at the international Court of Justice. His primary assignment was to conduct reform of the electoral law and political parties law 28. As soon as in December 2011, the new government established the independent Elections Commission tasked with administration and supervision over all stages of parliamentary elections. Barely three months later, in February 2012, the Political Parties Law was amended, slightly reducing the requirements for establishing a new political party. The reform of electoral law came only in June 2012, already under the new prime minister – a conservative politician Fayez Tarawneh, since Khasawneh resigned from his post at the end of April 2012. Despite changes, the commonly criticized “one man, one vote” system remained a significant part of the new regulations, thereby constantly discriminating political parties and favouring minorities. To mitigate such effect the national list based on proportional representation

27 For a full list of constitutional amendments see Constitutional Reform in Arab Countries. Jordan, Max Planck institute for Comparative Public Law and international Law, http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/overview_amendments.pdf [access: July 2013].

28 A. Mahafzah, Jordan: The Difficult Path Towards Reform, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2012, p. 6.


system with 27 seats (out of 150) was introduced and, in consequence, voters were granted an additional ballot. Also in June 2013 the Constitutional Court was established to “interpret the Constitution and to examine the constitutionality of laws and regulations” 29.

The path of reform was not entirely progressive as one might have expected – in fact, it arrived nowhere close to a substantive change that would shift the status quo. in some areas it was even retreating from previous advancements, eg. the September 2012 Press and Publications Law was commonly perceived as cracking down on freedom of expression and an effort to shut down websites critical of government. As Asher Susser argues, even though king Abdullah called for the protection of responsible press freedoms, in reality it was “nothing more than code words for state supervision of the media” 30.

Furthermore, in mid-2012 Jordan became a scene of growing problems of both internal and external character. A direct military threat and the refugee exodus caused by the war in Syria, the energy crisis caused by the destabilisation of the Sinai Peninsula, the increasing pressure from the Gulf States, Egypt, the United States and the international Monetary Fund, the deterioration of the economic situation and the increase in development disparities – they all were matters of serious concern for the decision makers.

Since the very beginning of the Syrian crisis, Jordanian authorities remained cautious in framing its response to the challenges coming from its northern neighbourhood. Above all, Jordan was afraid of a spill over of the conflict, and of possible retaliatory actions on behalf of the Assad’s regime and further destabilisation of the region, which would directly hit its relatively weak economy. it constantly called for a political solution of the crisis, maintained good relations with both the Friends of Syria and the supporters of Assad (iran, russia) and tried to manoeuvre between Syrian government and opposition 31. nevertheless, when faced with a massive influx of Syrian refugees, Jordan turned into a more decisive stance and overtly criticized Syrian authorities for its bloody

29 A detailed overview of the reforms see: Key facts on Elections and Jordan’s Political Reform. January 2013, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the European Union, http://winweb10.ovh.net/specicom.net/www/jordan/election_new.asp [access: July 2013].

30 A. Susser, Is the Jordanian Monarchy in Danger?, “Middle East Brief” 2013, no. 72, p. 5.

31 E. Gnehm, Jordan and the Current Unrest in Syria, “USiP Peace Brief 2011”, no. 114, pp. 1–2.


response to popular demonstrations. Such a position was understandable, since dozens of thousands of refugees have already started to be a burden for Jordan’s scarce water and energy resources, its economy and job market.

Further deterioration of the economic situation was caused by the instability in the Sinai Peninsula and the consecutive disruptions of the gas supplies from Egypt. By mid-2012, they fell as low as to 16% of the agreed level and in october 2012 they were completely halted 32. The lack of Egyptian gas forced Jordan to seek alternative and more costly sources of energy, which in effect contributed to an enormous budget deficit, which grew by $2 billion during one year only. For a country whose GDP in 2011 amounted to roughly $30 billion, it was a huge sum, which in fact pushed Jordan into financial crisis. Combined with pressure exerted by the international Monetary Fund, it forced the new government (in power since october 2012) to implement severe cuts in the public expenditure.

Along with other austerity measures, on november 13, 2012 Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour announced his decision to lift state subsidies on fuel which consequently led to a drastic increase in the price of gasoline, diesel and cooking gas by 15%, 33% and 54% respectively 33. Quite predictably, such move triggered popular unrest with many demonstrations all over the country, during which some protesters called for the downfall of the regime 34. initially supported by opposition, soon the manifestations lost their momentum, due to many incidents of vandalism and clashes between the rioters and police that took place. Even while opposing the government’s decision, all political forces criticized violence and called for peaceful protests, expressing opinions in a civilized and democratic manner, and respect for national unity 35. Such stance of the opposition, an intensified public presence of the security apparatus, and the arrest of several

32 Egyptian Gas Supply to Jordan Stabilizes at below Contract Rate, Ahram online, http://english.ahram.org.eg/news/72994.aspx [access: July 2013].

33 o. obeidat, Fuel Prices Up After Subsidies Removed, Decision Triggers Protests, “Jor-dan Times”, november 13, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/fuel-prices-up-after-subsidies-removed [access: July 2013].

34 S. Al-Khalidi, Jordan Protesters Call For ‘Downfall Of The Regime’, reuters, november 16, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/us-jordan-protest-idUSB rE8AF0LK20121116 [access: July 2013].

35 See: T. Luck, Vandalism, Arrests as Fuel Riots Continue, “Jordan Times”, november 14, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/vandalism-arrests-as-fuel-riots-continue [access: July 2013] and T. Luck, Calm Returns to Streets After Fuel Price Riots, “Jordan Times”, novem-ber 15, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/calm-returns-to-streets-after-fuel-price-riots [ac-cess: July 2013].


hundred rioters, ultimately resulted in the termination of the unrest after six days. Soon after the government captured the public attention by launching the electoral campaign.

At the end of 2012, the monarch had already become actively involved in promoting the royal vision of the reform, initially presenting it in an interview with two major newspapers 36 and then in the form of royal discussion papers 37. King Abdullah outlined his roadmap, in which the elections scheduled for January 23, 2013 were meant to become a crucial milestone initiating the majority-based parliamentary governments in Jordan, therefore setting the basis for a real constitutional monarchy. The elections’ aftermath was to introduce stable governance with the four-year terms of office 38, based on a parliamentary majority rather than the monarch’s autonomous decision. in consecutive discussion papers, the king underlined the need to strengthen the political parties system and the civil society.

nonetheless, the pre-elections period proved that both society and the political system are far from maturity. Missing from the campaign was a serious debate on Jordan’s needs and on ways to tackle the problems of its growing economic concerns, energy dependency, young generation’s frustration or poverty. What dominated the posters and fliers all around the cities were simply slogans of fighting corruption and unemployment. Even though for the first time the entire electoral process – voters and candidates’ registration, campaign and the poll itself – was prepared and supervised by the independent Election Commission, during both the campaign and the election day many law violations were observed. They included clashes between voters, campaigning, vote buying and single cases of vote forging. in comparison with previous years, however, the scale of infringements was a minor one, hence the elections were commonly described as free and fair by international and local monitoring groups 39.

36 King Outlines Vision for Reform Roadmap for New Jordan, “Jordan Times”, December 5, 2012, http://jordantimes.com/king-outlines-vision-for-reform-roadmap-for-new-jordan [access: July 2013].

37 See: Discussion Papers, King Abullah ii official Website, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/244.html [access: July 2013].

38 in Jordanian reality it is phenomenon almost like a political fiction since during 14 years of king Abdullah’s term eleven different prime ministers governed the country.

39 K. neimat, Majority Says Elections Were Free and Fair, “Jordan Times”, February 20, 2013, http://jordantimes.com/majority-says-elections-were-free-and-fair----survey [access: July 2013]. An observatory mission was also dispatched by the EU whose report described the elections as transparent and credible with minor shortcomings. See:


Despite the main opposition party – the islamic Action Front – boycotting the elections on the charge of electoral law discriminating political parties, the society has legitimatized the path chosen by the monarchy. Almost 57% of the registered voters casted their ballots by choosing to the 150-seat lower chamber of parliament 37 representatives identified with the opposition (independent islamists, pan-Arabists and leftists) and 18 women (of out which 15 got their seats within the quota system) 40.

Unfortunately, serious fragmentation of the parliament and the lack of political affiliation of the majority of the deputies have caused that the long-awaited political consultations with parliamentary blocs in the process of nominating the prime minister turned into a political show. After six weeks, the king nominated for this position an old-new Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour. Further three weeks were devoted to consultations over the government’s composition which at the end of the day was nominated with disregard for any of the parliament’s demands 41. in other words, it turned out that, in reality, both the new parliament and the new government do not differ significantly from hitherto existing institutions. Both are largely occupied by loyal and conservative monarchists who care more about the status quo and the regime’s stability than any sincere reform.

4. why the democratisation remains stalled?

An analysis of why the democratisation process remains somewhat limited in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should be conducted at this point. To that end, the international historical sociology shall be applied in order to present how state, society and international community are interrelated, all being immersed in historical context which constitutes an explanatory key to the problem. in this light, democratisation should be seen as a reflection of shifting interests of

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Parliamentary Elections, 23 January 2013. European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report, European Union External Action, http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/final-report_en.pdf [access: July 2013].

40 2013 Elections – Final Results, “Jordan Times”, January 28, 2013, http://jordantimes.com/2013-elections----final-results [access: July 2013].

41 o. Al Sharif, Jordan’s New Government: Same Old Politics, “Al Monitor”, March 31, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/jordanian-government-formation.html [access: July 2013].


the three elements of the political system in that particular historical moment (2011–2013), largely overlapping in fact. Even though Jordan experiences similar socio-economic and political situation as most of the countries in the Middle East, the Jordanian Arab Spring was approached significantly different. Factors standing behind it can be divided into two groups: one connected with the events unfolding in Jordan in 2011–2013 and the second stemming from the society’s permanent attitudes and perception of the monarchy and the foreign actors.

First of all, contrary to other countries that witnessed revolutions, demonstrations in Jordan, with a very few exceptions, have never been of a spontaneous character. Generally, they were planned and organized by certain political movements, and even if they gathered participants with a very diversified background and broad agenda – from leftists to islamist groups, both Jordanians of Palestinian and East Bank origins, youth and elders, traditional opponents of the regime and its former officials 42 – they never reached a critical mass capable of seriously influencing the decision makers.

Furthermore, the anti-governmental protests were nothing new for the Jordanian society and Jordanian political culture – organized massive and nation-wide demonstrations have taken place many times in the history of the Hashemite monarchy. it is sufficient to mention the protests of 1989, which initiated the opening of the political system of Jordan, or those of 1996, when people showed their discontent due to drastically increasing prices as a result of cancelling subsidies on food and fuel 43. Jordan has also an endless history of demonstrations targeting the pro-israeli policy of the government in the form of the so-called anti-normalisation movement 44. Consequently, immediately before the Arab Spring, five months prior to the Tunisian spark, Jordanian teachers went on strike and organized several manifestations in Amman and other cities, demanding their long-denied right to establish a professional association. it clearly evidenced an increasing pressure between the state and the society,

42 The most prominent ex-regime official taking part in the demonstrations was Ahmad obeidat, a former intelligence chief (1974–1982) and a former prime minister (1984 –1985) who in 2011 established the national Front for reform, a coalition of islamist, nationalist and leftist parties. See: A. Mahafzah, op.cit., p. 3.

43 About the protests in 1989 and 1996 see, for instance: C. ryan, Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund, “Middle East Policy” 1998, no. 2, pp. 54 –66.

44 See, for instance: P. Scham, r. Lucas, ‘Normalization’ and ‘Anti-Normalization’ in Jordan: The Public Debate, “israel Affairs” 2003, no. 3, pp. 141–164.


nevertheless it has never led to a massive insurgence of the people against the government 45.

Equally important was the regime’s reaction to the demonstrations and the behaviour of the protesters themselves. Despite an increase in the number and scale of the manifestations, they have almost never escalated into violent clashes – an exception to this tendency were the fuel riots of november 2012. The peaceful character of those demonstrations was on one hand related to the moderation of Jordanian political elites, who decided not to use excessive force – even though security forces were present during protests, they were unarmed in order not to provoke the crowds. Moreover, following the king’s orders, they were very often distributing water to the demonstrators. on the other hand, the protesters believed that by avoiding violence they would achieve better negotiating position in their dialogue with the regime 46.

Jordan’s domestic political scene is inseparable from the international and regional affairs. Firstly, the monarchy’s stability lies at the core interest of the United States, probably more than ever before in its history – the fact that Jordan is a reliable partner and a buffer zone between israel and the hostile and full of turmoil Arab world, makes it a strategic and not-to-lose asset for the Americans. The monarchy is also actively engaged in the recent American attempt to revive the israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, Amman is the channel through which Washington reaches into the regional terrorist networks – the Jordanian Mukhabarat (General intelligence Directorate) is commonly seen as one of the CiA’s key collaborators 47. one should not expect the US to let this particular status quo element change. That is why the Americans support the monarchy even in the moments of its biggest crisis, above all by praising its stability: “We call on protestors to do so peacefully. We support King Abdullah ii’s roadmap for reform and the aspirations of the Jordanian people to foster a more inclusive political process that will promote security, stability as well as economic development” 48. Likewise, the EU has its interest in a stable Jordan

45 H. Barari, C. Satkowski, The Arab Spring: The Case of Jordan, “ortadoğu Etütleri” [Middle Eastern Studies] 2012, no. 2, pp. 49–50.

46 ibidem, p. 50.47 A. Malantowicz, Stosunki jordańsko-amerykańskie. Prawdziwy sojusz czy przejaw

neokolonializmu? [The Jordanian-American relations. A True Alliance or a Manifestation of neocolonialism?], Centre for international initiatives Analysis 2012, no. 20, http://centruminicjatyw.org/?q=pl/node/190 [access: July 2013].

48 U.S. State Department Spokesman Mark Toner. Quoted in: Scott Stearns, US Supports Jordan’s King Abdullah Over Fuel Protests, “voice of America”, november 15, 2012,


and that is the reason why it is engaged in supporting the king’s vision of reform and cautioning against any moves which could hinder Amman’s security. As Julien Barnes-Dacey puts it, “Jordan is a key strategic ally and, at a moment of significant regional volatility, the preservation of a calm in the kingdom is clearly an important aim” 49.

Events taking place in Egypt and Syria have also left their trace on Jordanian land – both in the streets and inside the royal palace. Even though the islamic Action Front boycotted the January 2013 election and continually contests the regime, now it would possibly count on much less popular support than even a year ago. The fear that the islamists in Jordan would not be willing to share power, once taking a grip on it, mounted significantly after the December 2012 constitutional struggle under Morsi. recent events in Egypt – massive demonstrations and coup d’état – further increase the concerns about the possible polarization of the Jordanian society, which is quite significant already. The Syrian Civil War, on the other hand, constitutes the biggest security threat for Jordanian regime – a possible spill over of the conflict, the continuing massive influx of the refugees (estimated at more than 600,000 up to date) along with the terrorist activity made Jordanian elites very cautious about further developments in Damascus. Both crises also have a moderating impact on the public opinion in Jordan – you can hardly meet a Jordanian citizen who would like to see the violence escalate in the streets and for that particular reason a lot of them are willing to maintain the status quo. not without importance is the huge financial assistance from the Gulf countries ($5 billion to be provided over a period of five years), which helps Jordan mitigate its serious economic burden – for them Jordan’s stability is also in the centre of attention.

That smoothly brings into consideration the issue of the durable attitudes in the Jordanian society. one should remember that the Jordanians are largely supportive of the monarchy, while the royal family is commonly perceived as a symbol of national unity and an element of national identity. it stems from a social contract agreed between the Hashemites and the Transjordanian tribes, which dates back to the 1920s. Similarly, the majority of Jordanian citizens are satisfied with the direction their country is heading. When asked about

http://www.voanews.com/content/us-support-jordan-abdullah/1547111.html [access: July 2013].

49 J. Barnes-Dacey, Jordanian Tremors: Elusive Consensus, Deepening Discontent, “ECFr Policy Memo” 2012, p. 2, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFr68_JorDAn_MEMo_AW.pdf [access: July 2013].


reasons that lead them to believe so, they indicate above all the security and stability provided by the current regime (46%), the Hashemite leadership (6%) and a situation relatively better than in other countries of the region (7%). Simultaneously, citizens who are discontent about the developments in their country argue that it is mostly caused by increasing socio-economic problems (corruption, poverty, unemployment, high cost of living etc.), rather than, as an outside observer could think, the lack of democratic reforms. Consequently, barely 12% of the Jordanians believe that political reform should be the state’s priority 50.

A proof for the lack of critical mass needed to implement bottom-up changes in Jordan and for the high support for the monarchy is the unwillingness of majority of the citizens to participate in anti-government demonstrations. 70% of the Jordanians see no reason for which they should take part in the protests, whereas only a small percentage has in fact participated or intends to participate in the manifestations in the future 51.

in order to fully understand the society’s stance in the democratisation discourse one has to draw attention to the advancing growth of the middle class in Jordan, particularly within the capital area of Amman. it is a group of educated and cosmopolitan people, who are acquainted with the Western cultural trends. As Sarah Tobin illustratively describes, they are “a population who ‘want peace’ and are relieved not to discuss the Civil War of the 1970s and to retreat to their apartments and villas in sympathetic disdain for israeli raids of the homes of Palestinian family members and friends just 60 miles away. They are consumers of political information put forth on blogs, news and internet sites, but are not otherwise politically engaged. instead, they organize around certain places and times for consumption and around economic points for solidarity” 52. They are the Jordanians who consciously observe the situation in the neighbouring countries and see only “civil wars, death, chaos, poverty, refugees, extremism, and the collapse of governmental systems” 53. it is not a perspective favourable

50 National Priorities, Governance and Political Reform in Jordan. National Public Opinion Poll #9. July 17–20, 2012, The international republican institute, http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-poll-jordanians-split-over-direction-country-economy-and-corruptio [access: July 2013].

51 ibidem.52 S. Tobin, Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution, “Middle East

Policy” 2012, no. 1, p. 100.53 U. Dekel, o. Perlov, The Elecions in Jordan: People Want Evolution, Not Revolution,

“inSS insight” 2013, no. 402, p. 2.


to revolutionary attitudes, hence the Jordanians are more often keen to opt for consumption, to phrase slogans calling for “evolution, not revolution”, to label the Arab Spring more as a threat than an opportunity and to switch the centre of gravity of the public discourse to social and cultural issues, such as an active civil society 54.

Consequently, it strengthens the feeling that Jordan “cannot afford to have the Arab Spring the way the others did (…), cannot afford to have any kind of instability” 55. These words fall in line with Sarah Tobin’s opinion that “unitary construction of social life in Amman as middle class and anti-revolution is further reinforced by an outward-looking disposition” 56. The Jordanians are not willing to replace the current regime with the situation in Syria, Egypt or iraq; they cannot demand overthrowing the monarchy since “part of the socio-economic system [in Jordan] is how monarchy makes stability, not just for Jordan” 57. in that option “people prefer to enjoy this medium level of freedom rather than lose security and stability” 58 and precisely such a standpoint has a predominant impact on what the democratisation of the socio-political system in Jordan looks like. it is hindered, cautious, limited, very often retracing and illusory.

5. Conclusions

The analysis clearly indicates that Jordan is a case proving that some nations praise stability and security over a rushed political reform and the full opening of the political system. What is crucial to understand the phenomenon, this is the view shared not only among the ruling elite, but also by a vast part of the society and foreign actors, since the current democratisation discourse largely reflects their overlapping interests. Additionally, a historical perspective is needed in order to fully explain interlinks and interdependency between the elements of the political system.

The somewhat stalled democratisation works in favour of the autocratic regime of King Abdullah ii, who retains power and broad prerogatives. Likewise,

54 ibidem. it was also the topic of King Abdullah’s last discussion paper. See: Towards Democratic Empowerment and ‘Active Citizenship’, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/253.html [access: July 2013].

55 H. Esmeiran, author’s interview, Amman, February 14, 2013.56 S. Tobin, op.cit., p. 106.57 A. Dahmash, author’s interview, Amman, February 12, 2013.58 T. al-Masri, author’s interview, Amman, March 2, 2013.


maintaining the status quo is a vital interest for the political elites, whose influence over the shape of socio-political scene in Jordan may be extensively limited due to full democratisation. Equally important is the stance of the Jordanian society, which does not have to fear internal disorder and, consequently, may run their ordinary life without any disruption. Finally, stability of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is also profitable for the international community to whom Jordan is a long-standing and reliable partner.

ABstrACt

israeli foreign policy, its mechanisms, conditions, as well as driving forces is a complex phenomenon composed of intersecting elements of security, defense, and foreign interests that are inseparably braided. Generally speaking, there are at least four main interests which determine states’ foreign activity, firstly security of the state and its territory, secondly economy and development, thirdly international position, prestige among other states, and lastly international society common benefits. The only way to understand israel’s international conduct is to look deeper into its national identity, political tradition, and historical burden as well.So the goal of this paper is to study the priorities of the israeli foreign policy, particularly while the so called Arab Spring, crisis over iranian nuclear program, and the changes in the Middle East.

Key words

israel, foreign policy, the Middle East, the Arab-israeli conflict, iran, Syria, russia, U.S., the Arab Spring, Arab revolts, the iranian nuclear program


whAt’s with isrAel?

Agnieszka BrycNicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland

isrAel iN A New Middle eAst:hOw tO resPONd?

1. the main drivers of israeli foreign policy

in the case of israel, security is a predominant and key driver influencing each sphere of its foreign policy. in this way the need to survive in a hostile neighborhood has ever been the essence of israel’s policy, so the idea of an

98 Agnies zka Br yc

existential threat has formed israeli way of thinking and its perception of international politics. Perceiving Arabs as a threat to israel’s very existence has been the core of its international strategy, an instrument of maintaining the image of an endangered state in the Middle East, as well as an explanation for defense itself by preemptive and retaliatory use of force.

The decades of israeli independence have been marked by dramatic changes in regional conditions, and also by a significant alternation in the international environment. The inception, evolution, then end of the Cold War, and later the establishment of an American hegemony have led to changes in israeli approaches and policies. Living under the threat of being wiped out by hostile Muslim neighbors derives from the Jewish identity of israeli state, and to make the story more complex – the state being established on the mostly former Palestine (under the British Mandate). This brings both Jewish history and contemporary Jewish concerns to the forefront of politics and policy. What is more israel’s policy is conditioned by its view of Jewish history as a history of negatives. The great turning points in Jewish history are negative events – the destruction of the Temple, the exile of the Jews from the Holy Land, the creation of the concept of the diaspora, anti-Semitism (the Jewish Question), persecution and discrimination, and the Holocaust. Among the symbolic locations of modern israel are Masada, yad vashem, and the Western (Wailing) Wall – each a symbol of and memorial to a great negative event in Jewish history. The creation of the state was something of an aberration, because it was a positive event, but even that was short-lived, as the Arab states were designed to restore Palestine to the Palestinians and eliminate the newly born Jewish state. israeli thinking is reflected in such phrases as “never again”, in which it is suggested that the horrors of the past (mostly the Holocaust) cannot be allowed to be repeated in the modern world. So israeli history, based on Jewish history, provides the basis for attitudes that condition thinking about foreign and security policy. its way of explaining history and modern politics is recognized as the “ghetto mentality” with its unique interpretation of history, isolation, and victimization. Jewish history, which derives from the Biblical period and perceives the Bible as a recording of history, provides a basis for foreign policy, and strengthens the sense of isolation and insecurity 1.

israel is the creation of political Zionism described and defined by Theodor Herzl. it also resolved the Jewish Question by creating a sovereign Jewish state that would serve as a haven for imperiled and persecuted Jews through widespread

1 Israel’s Strategic Agenda, E. inbar (ed.), London 2007.

Israel in a New Middle East: How to Respond? 99

anti-Semitism, pogroms in Eastern Europe, and finally the Holocaust. israel’s declaration of independence formally declared “the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-israel, to be known as the State of israel”. The Law of return, passed by the Knesset on July 5, 1950, established this principle as a legal requirement of the state. By granting virtually any Jew the right to immigrate to and become a citizen of the Jewish state it formalized a connection between the state and the people, and created a foreign-policy requirement for the state. Thus israel’s history is marked by the immigration waves of European Holocaust survivors, Jews of the Arab world, and, later, the Jews of Ethiopia, and the former Soviet Union. Each affected the nature of the state and its politics in its own way.

isolation in the Middle East and the feeling of a direct threat for the state existence results in the image of a “besieged fortress”. So, the fact is that israel is a small state located in an Arab world much larger in both size and population. israel’s territory is comparable to the area of a small province of France, and the population exceeded seven million in 2012. israeli society is in fact a mosaic of Jews, israeli Arabs (Palestinian), immigrants from post-Soviet republics, and Ethiopia. The acute social and political division is an important feature of israeli political scene and way of thinking, as well. There is the old saying, that if there are two israelis there are three political parties to reflect their viewpoints. That manifests itself in the fact that all israeli governments since the set up of the state have been coalitions, as no single party has ever achieved an absolute majority in the Knesset, so the fractionalization of the political scene is a feature of israeli way of making decisions. in this case, the intersection of domestic and foreign politics has become even more obvious than usual 2.

The image of “besieged fortress” has eroded, and today israel is perceived as a regional power with a vibrant economy, a dynamic high-tech sector, and a powerful military. in the eyes of the world, israel has lost its image of a small state struggling against impossible odds. israel now has “security needs” and “requirements” rather than existential fears. its power obligates it to be more magnanimous and forthcoming on peace issues, and its strength should produce restraint, not excess. indeed much of the erosion of israel’s image is driven by the realities and perceptions of an asymmetry. israel with its GDP per capita of 31,000 USD and 100 companies on the new york Stock Exchange is no more a weak country. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness index ranks israel sixth in innovation capacity, just after the United States. it is

2 B. reich, Israeli Foreign Policy [in:] Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, L. Brown (ed.), London 2006, pp. 121–139.

100 Agnies zka Br yc

only behind the United States and China in the number of companies listed on nasdaq. Militarily, israel is the region’s superpower, with an armed force that could easily defeat any of its neighbors. U.S. aid 3 enhances its military edge. it also has one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, estimated at more than 200 missiles. At home the wall along the West Bank has essentially solved the problem of Palestinian suicide bombing, rendering israel safer than at any point in its history 4.

There is much truth in this image of israeli might, and those who deny that capacity trivialize israel’s most powerful moment in its history. But there is also truth in israel’s vulnerabilities, and the asymmetry of power does not work in israel’s favor here, either 5. israel’s eroding image flows from its own actions and conduct towards the neighbors. Many international actions, mainly by using force but labeled as preemptive attacks are widely criticized in the world such as the 1981 attack on the iraqi reactor; the 2007 preemptive strike on the fledging Syrian one, illegal settlements in the occupied territories, or building the separation wall. But as the israeli founding father David Ben Gurion used to say is: it doesn’t matter what the goyim say; what matters is what the Jews do 6.

israel’s security as well as foreign policy are integrated. Without understanding the idea of deterrence no analysis of israel’s international moves makes sense. The concept was formed in early 1950s by its political and military leadership: Moshe Dayan, David Ben Gurion, Shimon Peres, and yigal Allon. The roots of the idea lay literally in the problems of infiltrating the israeli territory by Egyptians in the 1950s. Moshe Dayan explained the idea based on these problems that israel did not have the capability to defend itself from every possible infiltration and thus could not address the challenges from Egypt. retaliation was used as a strategy of punishment that forced Arab army commanders to evaluate whether penetrating the border was worth the humiliation they suffered at the hands of israelis.

So in israeli deterrence strategy a few factors are of fundamental importance. The first is the immediate, asymmetric retaliation, what is the proof of capability to deter, the second is the reputation of being capable, the third the israel’s enemies’ calculations of the costs of the attack. As a result of israel’s capability

3 Congress recently moved to add 1 billion USD for israel’s missile defense program to the president’s budget.

4 F. Zakaria, U. netanyahu, Israel Is Stronger than Ever, “Washington Post” May 10, 2012.

5 A. Miller, Israel’s Image Revisited. What’s Driving Israel’s Very Bad PR?, “Foreign Policy” May 16, 2012.

6 ibidem.


demonstrated in many retaliatory acts, the Arab governments would be forced to first ask themselves whether their military could compete with israeli military and, in the long run, whether the destruction of the state of israel was a realistic goal. in the long term deterrence stabilizes the political situation around israel. it also explains the need to dominate in every military aspects over Arab states, and determination to keep such a status quo, because this is the only way to keep israelis foes at bay.

While israel has had more or less impact on creating balance of power the Middle East for 40 years, the recent Arab revolts, known as the Arab Spring has generated an earth quake in the Middle Eastern status quo, reshaping it from grass-roots. ongoing political change in the Arab Middle East could have a lasting impact on israeli perceptions of security. Following israel’s peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the priority that israel had placed since its founding in 1948 on defending against a concentration of Arab conventional armies at its borders gave way to concerns about generally asymmetric threats posed by terrorism and rocket arsenals. near-complete success in stopping Palestinian terrorist attacks inside israel after 2006 led to greater israeli focus on perceived threats from iran – including a possibility of existential nuclear threat – and non-state actors allied to it in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. What is more the closest neighborhood of israel has been changing, because of taking power in Egypt by Muslim Brotherhood, civil war in Syria, which might destabilize Lebanon and Jordan, as well as fuel Palestinian resistance. So once again israel is uncertain about what to expect from Egypt and Syria, and is also concerned about the future stability of Jordan’s monarchy.

The newly emerged unstable environment makes up serious security problems for israel. Firstly, Jerusalem authorities are afraid of increasing islamist influence in post-Spring Arab states, which may create not only anti-Jewish regimes of revolutionary zealots, but also repeat the scenario of making the states – failed, like in Libya and yemen. in this perspective israelis look carefully at the developments in iraq and Syria. Secondly, the rising non-Arab powers in the Middle East, iran and Turkey, are unfriendly toward israel. Domestic changes, beyond israel’s control, have led to the foreign policy reorientation of these regional powers that were once israel’s allies. in Turkey, the entrenchment of the islamist AKP 7 moved this pivotal state into the anti-israel camp. Both instances indicate further regional isolation for israel. Thirdly, the Arab Spring underlines the further erosion of the US position in the region, and consequently weakens

7 After successive electoral victories 2002, 2007 and 2011.


israel’s deterrence capability. The strategic alliance, and American guarantees for israel’s security have always been a crucial component of deterrence. Furthermore, israeli use of force as preventive or preemptive move could worsen American-israeli ties – a pillar of its national security. Such considerations are however not new, but nowadays they are more relevant than in the past when israel considered military action against Hamas, Hezbollah and iran.

2. israel strategy in the post-Arab spring neighborhood

Arab hostility forced israel to secure its existence, and to look for opportunities to break the isolation. its first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion developed the concept of “the peripheral states”, known also as “strategic depth” according to which if israel had no relations with its immediate neighbors it should seek the friendship of “the neighbors of the neighbor”. At the early stages israel was looking at regional non-Arab states, much of the focus was Turkey and iran. They gained attention because of their geographical and religious position, as well as historical relations with the Arab states. Tensions over borders, colonial past, and religious-ideological differences between these two Muslim but non-Arab states and the Arab world suggested opportunities for israel to develop ties that would enhance its regional position and, perhaps, contribute to its security and assist in resolving the Arab-israeli conflict. Although both (iran and Turkey) voted against U.n. partition plan that created israel, they soon established diplomatic relations, albeit limited in scope. over time these improved and became increasingly complex.

iran, on its part, was viewed by israel as an especially important country in the region due to its strategic location, its size and economic potential, and it seemed to have no reason for conflict with israel. After the fall of the Shah and creating the islamic republic of iran its role in israeli foreign policy has reversed, and Teheran became a number one enemy, “pushing israel to the sea”, and looking for wiping out “the Zionist state” 8. The loss of iran was very sore for israel, because their enduring community of interest was shaping the Middle Eastern geopolitics for 40 years. What is more, israel was supplied in oil by iran in return for military equipment and intelligence.

After the 1991 Gulf War, israel urged the world to keep the “iran issue” high on its agenda. The Shia iran, which started rebuilding its nuclear program

8 B. Downing, The Israeli Endgame in Iran, “Asia Times”, June 27, 2012.


became a state, which was able to undermine israeli strategic superiority in the region 9. Teheran gained growing influence in Lebanon and Syria along israel’s northern and eastern boundaries. That is how iran became israel’s primary strategic threat. israel was also concerned about iran’s nuclear and long-range missile program, which was perceived as a major strategic challenge. Since that moment by and large, all subsequent israeli prime ministers and ministers of defense never miss an opportunity to stress the “iranian danger”, censuring iran’s “dark regime” blaming iran for acts of terrorism and presenting it as a major threat to the free world.

What makes the iranian nuclear program an issue is not the possibility of acquiring a nuclear warhead to allegedly wipe out the state of israel from the face of earth, but fundamentally the balance of power, and an excessive growth of Teheran’s influence in the region, violating the israeli strategic nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Hence keeping this narrative is in israel’s interest, what the Benjamin netanyahu government and his hawkish allies in the West have been doing. it allows to intensify international pressure on the islamic regime, and to restrain ayatollahs from concentrating their influence in the region 10. A deterring function of nuclear arsenal is worth remembering, because if iran decided to target israel with nuclear missiles using such weapon would bring to self-elimination, which is guaranteed by so called MAD doctrine 11. new waves of hysteria over an imminent israeli attack on iran are used to keep the international attention at iran’s threat, as it provides arguments for tougher iran sanctions 12.

Thus, it is crucial for israel to prevent any iran-West diplomatic compromise, which will give Tehran a free hand to enhance its regional influence and maintain a modern nuclear infrastructure. Simultaneously israel has repeatedly warned of “preemptive strike” if diplomatic efforts of stopping iranian nuclear program fail. A unilateral attack on iran would bring negative consequences also for israel. Firstly, radicalization of the Muslim world, however iran is its Shia branch, secondly, reaction of terrorist groups supported by iran – Hezbollah on the Lebanese border and Hamas inside the Palestinian Autonomy, thirdly, triggering a huge regional war, because iran would respond to any aggression, and lastly, it may at best set back iran’s nuclear ambitions a couple of years.

9 ibidem.10 r. Heydarian, Israel Hampers Diplomacy on Iran, “Asia Times” August 10, 2012.11 B. Downing, The Israeli Endgame in Iran, “Asia Times” June 27, 2012.12 Israel and Iran, “The new york Times” August 13, 2012.


it is rather of low possibility for israel to start a direct military strike on iran without American backing, however toppling iran’s closest regional ally – Syria is believed to bring to undermining the islamic republic’s regional influence by striking a blow to the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Hezbollah axis of power, which Jordan’s King Abdullah nervously identified as the “Shia crescent”. The problem for israel is the politics of Syria after the ouster of Assad’s regime and coming into power Sunni islamists 13. it is stressed that if the Assad regime stays in power it will not attempt to repossess the Golan Heights by military force and will meet with israeli leaders to negotiate for peace, whereas the an open question is how a post-Assad Syria would handle the problem of Golan Heights occupied by israel since 1967.

Another problem for israel would be the rule of radical Muslims instead of the Alavit regime. Even if the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would not take power in post-Assad Syria, or even if it does not change Syrian foreign policy vis-a-vis israel-Palestine, israelis worry about the consequences of the change of rulers in Damascus. Assad’s regime is however for israel an enemy, but a predictable one and ousting the president from the post could lead to a disintegration of the Syrian state, what constitutes a security threat for israel 14. Efraim inbar, director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, believes that “in the event that the Syrian regime collapses, Syria’s advanced arsenal, including chemical weapons, shore-to-ship missiles, air defense systems, and ballistic missiles of all types could end up in the hands of… radical elements”. The growing presence of Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia in Syria has been evident since the turmoil began in 2011, and the potential for AQi, or other militant groups like Hezbollah, to acquire such weapons could create new dilemmas for israel 15. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has become increasingly moderate in the last 30 years, the other radical islamist elements in the region, such as the Salafists or even al-Qaeda, could gain influence in Syria.

on the other hand the collapse of the Syrian regime would isolate iran in the Middle East, however potentially provide it with an additional rationale to develop nuclear weapons. As Syria has provided iran with the capacity to transform Hezbollah into a force that the israeli military cannot defeat, the loss of Syria may likely mean a weaker Hezbollah, thus decreasing iran’s ability to

13 G. Cafiero, Syria: America versus Israel, “Asia times” June 6, 2012.14 ibidem.15 E. inbar, The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security, “Mideast Security

and Policy Studies”, no. 95, p. 16.


deter israel from attacking its nuclear facilities. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, arguably the most important israeli decision-maker on this question, told that the Assad regime’s fall “will be a major blow to the radical axis, major blow to iran… it’s the only kind of outpost of the iranian influence in the Arab world… and it will weaken dramatically both Hezbollah in Lebanon and islamic Jihad in Gaza Strip” 16.

Lebanon, a northern neighbor of israel influences its security for a few reasons, firstly, via connections with Syria. Lebanon is affected by what is happening in Syria due to their long-lasting historical, political, social, and economic ties. Lebanon’s security and stability have been negatively affected by the Syrian violence, not just because of the steady influx of refugees seeking shelter within Lebanese borders, but also the rise in cross-border smuggling of weapons. Secondly, the Syrian crisis has created rifts within the Lebanese government, which consists of the Shia parties, Hizbollah and Amal, standing steadfastly behind President Assad. So in this perspective although there are no diplomatic relations between israel and Lebanon, destabilization of Beirut challenges the security of the Jewish state, surprisingly not due to Hezbollah’s control of the southern part of Lebanon, but the possibility of the final destabilization of Lebanon which may end up with an another domestic war. According to israeli analysts what is happening in Syria negatively affects Hezbollah. A weakening Assad regime may disrupt Hezbollah’s vital long term support from Damascus and Teheran, because the emergence of openly hostile radical Sunni groups on its doorstep in Syria challenges Hezbollah’s previously unrivaled dominance 17.

The region’s revolutionary tremors have shaken the cornerstones of israel’s national security, even raising doubts about the future of its peace agreement with Egypt under Muslim Brotherhood in power. When Egypt’s longtime leader, Hosni Mubarak, was toppled in 2011 israel worried about the loss of a dependable strongman who had helped preserve a reliable if chilly peace. The concerns have grown as Egyptians from across the political spectrum have demanded a review of the treaty, and in particular, its restrictions on Egypt’s military presence in The Sinai Peninsula. it has once become a subject of serious potential problems that could lead to strategic damage to israel-Egypt relations. Even before Mubarak’s ouster it was not fully under Egypt’s control, demonstrated by massive smuggling

16 J. rubin, The Real Reason to Intervene in Syria Cutting Iran’s Link to the Mediterranean Sea Is a Strategic Prize Worth the Risk, “Foreign Policy” June 4, 2012.

17 T. First, E. yogev, Jihad in Syria: The Penetration of Radical Islam in the Syrian Conflict, “inSS insight” 2012, no. 355.


into Gaza, but the situation has deteriorated since the revolution in Egypt. israeli military is worried about the spread of crime in Sinai and smuggling weapon from Libya to Gaza, as well as islamic jihadist terrorist groups like apocalyptic Salafists, and al-Qaeda elements consolidating terror cells in the Sinai area 18. it also has an impact on israeli-Egyptian economic relations, due to the fact that Egypt is one of the gas suppliers for israel. Gas began to flow in February 2008, but repeated attacks by militants or tribal groups in the Sinai have disabled the pipeline carrying gas to israel and Jordan multiple times since Mubarak’s departure. Although the pipeline supplies over 40% of israel’s natural gas, its energy resources dependence is minimal, so supply disruption actually has a greater effect on Jordan’s energy security 19.

Civil war in Syria may also have a destabilizing impact on the domestic situation in Jordan, which is a unique neighbor for israel due to the fact, that as the only one the Hashemite Kingdom has been maintaining good and predictable relations with the Jewish state. While the peace treaty signed by israel and Egypt has already been endangered by new Muslim elites, a israeli-Jordan peace accords of 1994 have still been valid. normalization of ties is however not popular with the Jordanian people, over half of whom are of Palestinian origin either from the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of israel. There are an estimated 1.9 million United nations-registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future settlement.

Thus in such refugee perspective the Hashemite royal family has concerned about another refugee problem, but this time from Syrian direction. According to recent Un figures, more than 142,000 refugees have fled to Jordan since the conflict broke out in Syria, but only 37,000 have registered as asylum seekers. What is more, the problem is not in numbers, but in the possibility that the Syrian fraction of the Muslim Brotherhood will look for its momentum in Jordan, and what is worse such enormous wave of refugees may bring with it the seeds of trouble, planted in the form of terror cells of organizations like al-Qaeda smuggled into Jordan in the guise of refugees 20.

18 U. Dekel, o. Perlov, President Morsi and Israel-Egypt Relations: Egyptian Discourse on the Social Networks, “inSS insight” 2012, no. 357.

19 S. Brom, The Crisis in Israeli-Egyptian Relations, “inSS insight” 2011, no. 278.20 o. Eran, Jordan’s Internal and External Pressure Cooker, “inSS insight” 2012,

no. 358.


Before the Arab Spring started there have been some worrying changes for israeli policy in the region. Apart from iran, which since 1979 seems to have been a challenge for israel, Turkey started deteriorating its relations with israel. Such a change is crucial for israel because since the very beginning close relations with Ankara were pretty beneficial for israel at least due to a few reasons: firstly, a unique chance to break free from regional isolation, secondly, Ankara’s role as a Muslim country, thirdly, Turkey’s anchorage to the West. not to overestimate for israel is the symbolic fact, that Turkey was the first, and for decades, the only islamic country that recognized the Jewish state, setting up diplomatic relations with israel in 1949. During the cold war both countries played a similar role in the Middle East as Western allies to counter the Soviet alliances in the Arab world. With the end of the cold war, their pro-Western orientation, self-perception as bastions of democracy, and free-market values put them again in the same strategic boat. So in the 1990s bilateral relations bloomed economically, diplomatically, and militarily 21. For political support israel was in return the only Western state providing military technology to allow Ankara suppress the Kurdish insurgency. Generally speaking Turkey became second closest after U.S. ally for israeli leaders in Jerusalem.

Their relations started deteriorating after the electoral victory of the islamic rooted AK Party (AKP) in october 2002, however initially cooperation even in the strategic field was continued. Despite this worrying change in Ankara authorities in Jerusalem believed that their strategic cooperation will successfully face the upcoming crises, such as on one hand israeli support for the establishment of a Kurdish state in fractured iraq 22, and on the another hosting of Hamas delegation in Ankara (January 2006). Then israel disappointed Turkey with not informing about its attack on Gaza and with not making enough concessions to Syria in the Turkish mediation effort. Moreover, in September 2009, israel turned down a request from Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to enter

21 Defense trade during that time was worth several million dollars. Major programs included a $700 million deal to modernize Turkey’s aging fleet of F-4 Phantoms and a $688 million deal to upgrade its M-60 tanks and an array of other sophisticated weapons systems. in return the israeli Air Force was allowed to use Turkish air space to practice complex operations and the countries collaborated on issues of counter terrorism and intelligence.

22 Also in 2010 Turkish military and government officials have also accused israel of providing support to militants from Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – PKK), including during a May 31 attack against a naval base in iskandirun that left seven servicemen dead and six more wounded.


Gaza Strip from israel, where he planned to meet Hamas officials before crossing back into the Jewish state 23. in return the Turks cancelled the participation of the israeli Air Force in the international “Anatolian Eagle” exercise in october 2009. in August 2010, israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak expressed apprehensions about the appointment of a pro-iranian candidate to head the MiT (Turkey’s intelligence agency) commenting it as the continuing of the process of leaving the Western block. Turkish-israeli relations reached their lowest point as a result of israel’s May 2010 seizure of a Turkish ship – the Mavi Marmara in international waters that was part of a flotilla intending to break israel’s blockade of Gaza Strip in order to deliver humanitarian aid 24. Turkey accused israel of “state terror”, recalled its ambassador from israel, cancelled joint military exercises, and banned israeli military planes from its airspace. it demanded an apology, compensation for victims, and an international investigation. israel withdrew its military advisers from Turkey, warned israeli tourists against traveling there, and refused to apologize after maintaining that it had acted lawfully in self-defense and alleging that the flotilla’s planners had terrorist links.

Although israel and Turkey take more or less a similar position towards the civil war in Syria, looking at details shows that their interests are not composed. The Kurdish issue makes Ankara vulnerable to the international pressure and may weaken Erdogan politically. Kurdish problem exists also in Syria and iran, what makes israel naturally involved in it at least to deter and weaken Syria, iran, and recently Turkey. To make it more interesting a sovereign Kurdistan would not only be one of the most populous states in the region, but also one of the biggest territory, and naturally bound to the Jewish state. That is why israeli intelligence and businessmen have longstanding contacts with the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern iraq.

Apart from the Kurdish issue another weak point of Turkey is Cyprus. From israel’s perspective, Cyprus is attractive not only as an EU member, and a stable democracy, but also has highly developed infrastructure and untapped natural resources. The crucial factor is however the need to look for new friends in the region, as israel’s relationships with former allies Turkey and Egypt are strained.

23 This decision was part of israel’s policy of not meeting with foreign statesmen who, on the same trip, met with Hamas officials.

24 Turkey expelled israel’s ambassador when Tel Aviv refused to meet its demands, which included an official apology for the incident, compensation for the families of the victims and an end to the Gaza blockade. Ankara also froze all military and security cooperation with israel and filed criminal charges against the chiefs of the israeli armed forces.


What is more discovery of huge natural gas reserves off the coast of the Greek-dominated republic of Cyprus attracts the interest of nearby israel, which itself made two stunning gas discoveries of its own – Tamar and Leviathan – in recent years. The two countries began to discuss how they could help each other take advantage of their new finds, which could make both states energy-independent, if not exporters of natural gas.

The fact is that all cooling incidents of the israeli-Turkish relations have their political reasons, namely the so called “neo-ottoman” orientation in Turkish foreign policy, and new diplomatic priorities “zero problems with the neighbors”. An important factor became the Palestinian issue, which helps Turkey to lead in the Middle East, but to achieve that partnership with the Jewish state had to deteriorate 25.

3. israel and the United states: change or continuation

Political isolation as well as existing in constantly insecure environment made israel look for the support of at least one major power. Special relationship 26 that exists between Washington and authorities in Jerusalem have developed over the years and are now a central focus of israeli foreign policy, however this was not always so to the same extent. At israel’s birth the U.S. seemed to be a dispassionate, almost an uninterested, midwife – its role was essential and unconventional, but also unpredictable and hotly debated in U.S. policy circles. Also today it is believed that israeli-American relations have deteriorated after Barack obama coming to power. Some specialist point that the reasons of mistrust and chilly relations are new, comparing to previous American presidents, attitude towards

25 M. Herzog, S. Cagaptay, How America Can Help Its Friends Make Nice, “The new york Times” June 20, 2012.

26 America’s attitude to israel rests on three major pillars. The first is the idealistic dimension in United States foreign policy: America’s commitment to fight for and defend democracies abroad. Since israel is a democracy, supporting israel is an American interest. The second is the American Jewish community, which serves as a bridge between israel and the American people. The third pillar is shared security and foreign affairs interests. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the common enemy in every way. Since the end of the Cold War, a shared interest has been the war on terrorism, as terrorism is viewed as a common threat and as such is supposed to ally the two nations (although unlike israel, America has made no official declarations linking al-Qaeda terrorism to Palestinian terrorism aimed at israel). in israel’s view, the iranian threat, first and foremost the nuclear challenge, is another threat linking the two nations.


the Middle East, and dislike between the hawkish leaders of israel – netanyahu and Barak on one hand, and dove – the President of U.S. Barack obama on the other.

The first discrepancy in israeli – American agendas is about iranian nuclear program. israel is fairly disappointed by the conduct of President obama’s administration in the talks with iran. Prime Minister netanyahu stated that the threshold of demands presented to iran is far from satisfactory to israel 27. on the other hand American administration is more distanced from israeli conduct in the Middle East, because as they predict the United States will hold responsibility to a greater degree for israel’s actions. in other words the White House does not enthusiastically perceive the israeli traditional prerogative of “defending itself, by itself”. At the same time American analysts assume that in spite of decline of the U.S. activity in the Middle East the recent Arab revolts in the israeli neighborhood make israel much more dependent on U.S. security guarantees, strategic cooperation, and regional influence.

Thus nowadays the discussion is about, whether to launch a “surgeon attack” on iranian nuclear facilities with the American “green light” or without it. Simultaneously statements made by administration officials are clear evidence of the administration’s unwillingness to be viewed as the one giving israel even a tacit “green light” to attack iran. Pentagon analysts estimate that even a sustained israeli air campaign would set back the program by only a few years, drive it further underground and possibly unleash a wider war 28. on the other hand israelis stress that they may take such sole military action without American acceptance, because similar were taken previously, like those of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion on the eve of the Sinai Campaign, when it was clear that a military operation against Egypt would meet with a negative American response, or even more similar to Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s position on the eve of the bombing of the atomic reactor osirak in iraq.

The second israeli-American discrepancy is about civil war in Syria. Washington’s two primary interests in Syria are to strengthen the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) vis-a-vis iran and to undermine russia’s influence in the Middle East. The collapse of the Assad regime would almost inevitably decrease russian power in the Middle East, as Syria has hosted russia’s naval

27 Z. Shalom, Israel and the United States in Disagreement over Iran, “inSS insight” 2012, no. 340.

28 Z. Shalom, The US on an Israeli Military Strike against Iran: A Change in Position?, “inSS insight” 2012, no. 317.


base in Tartus for several decades and, since 1971 has been Moscow’s closest Arab ally. Furthermore Syria is the largest Arab purchaser of russian weapons and is seen by Moscow as russia’s doorstep into the Middle East. So if the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood removed Syria from Moscow’s and Tehran’s spheres of influence, the regional balance of power would be shifted fundamentally. Washington is assuming that the Muslim Brotherhood, the most influential party within the istanbul-based Syrian national Council, would end the iran-Syria alliance if it came to power 29. israel shares American interests in cutting off iran and russia’s growth in the region, however there are some diverse interests. While Washington used in the past the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as a proxy to topple the Ba’athist regime 30, which has governed for almost half a century, israel is primarily concerned about the future security consequences of Assad’s ouster.

To sum up, although recent relations between israel and the United States have been called as pretty chilly, the truth is that such ups and downs have occurred in the past. The United States is an indispensable ally of israel. it provides the Jewish state with economic, technical, military, political, diplomatic, and moral support. it is seen as the ultimate resource against potential enemies, the source of israel sophisticated military hardware, and its interest in lasting peace is central to the Arab-israel peace process. Although there is this positive relationship, there is also israeli reluctance to abdicate security to another party’s judgment and action. israel will continue to consider its perceptions of threat and security as decisive. it has been a vital foundation of israel’s security and foreign policy for years.

29 G. Cafiero, Syria: America versus Israel, “The Asia Time” June 6, 2012.30 Beginning in 1956, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, the Dwight D Eisenhower

administration sought covertly to overthrow Syria’s left-wing nationalist government. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, through Jordan and israel, Washington backed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s armed uprising against the regime of Hafez Assad. Syria is only one country where Washington supported islamists to undermine nationalist and leftist forces. This alliance between the United States and islamist organizations was widespread throughout the Muslim world during the Cold War, as Washington deemed such forces – Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, the Mujahideen of Afghanistan, Abu Qurah in Jordan, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – to be reliable partners in the effort to undermine Communism and Arab nationalism. After the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, the United States continued to foster alliances with islamist groups to undermine governments that did not cooperate with the “new World order”.


4. Conclusions

israel’s foreign policy shaped by historic burden and security concerns has been very dynamic due to the ongoing Arab revolts and the changing regional balance of power in favor of Turkey and iran, who both encourage radical elements in the region. What is more, American decline in the Middle East has been weakening israel’s position in the Middle East, and reducing its deterrence. israel in Arab eyes is no longer an “exceptional” partner of the most influential state in the world. By and large israel feels much more isolated and endangered by the changing neighborhood, rising islamist radicalization of Arab states, and grooving anti-israeli postures of the Middle Eastern societies.

not to exaggerate the international troubles of israel, the fact is that it remains the strongest in every aspect of military affairs in the region. israeli military analysts are however worried about the ongoing “arms race”, because it results in shortening the asymmetrical domination of israel over Muslim states, and consequently may deteriorate israeli deterrence strategy.

it may be predicted, that political and military crisis in the Middle East will change the environment for israel, but the basic pillars seem to persist, such as special, however quite unspontaneous partnership with U.S., cooperation with Jordan, “chilly” friendship with new Muslim governors in Cairo, who cannot deny the financial weight of American support, weakening of the danger of Hezbollah in the southern Lebanon, which suffers from declining support from Syria and iran, what results in making it more vulnerable to the deterrence strategy of iDF.


Marcin szydziszUniversity of Wrocław, Poland

the PAlestiNiAN iNterNAtiONAl ideNtitY AFter the UN resOlUtiON

ABstrACt

Hundreds of press articles on the issue of Palestinian identity have been written in the last two years. it happened due to granting Palestine on november 29, 2012 a non-member observer state status by the General Assembly of the United nations.resolution 67/19 of the Un assembly, contrary to appearances, does not answer explicitly the question concerning the Palestinian identity. in my paper i will try to display the whole spectrum of legal nuances referring to this issue.

Key words

Palestine, United nations, identity, General Assembly of the Un

1. the history of Palestinian identity

After the collapse of the ottoman Empire, the British started to carry out their mandate in the territory of Palestine. Their task was to lead to its formal and real independence. This aim was not attained. After the war, the United nations (Un) tackled the problem of Palestine on november 29, 1947. General Assembly of the United nations decided that two states should come into being in the territory of the Mandatory Palestine: the Jewish and the Palestinian states. indeed, in 1948 the history of the Jewish statehood started, however, the Palestinian state did not come into being. As a result of the Arab-israeli war, some of the terrains which belonged to Palestine were taken over by israel, the West Bank became a part of Transjordan, and Egyptian administration appeared in the Gaza Strip. The conflict also resulted in many Palestinians seeking refuge (ca. 750 000 people).

in 1967, a subsequent war broke out. Consequently, israel took over all of the remaining Palestinian terrain: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

114 Marcin Sz ydz is z

Arab citizens of the Mandatory Palestine had issues with Jewish settlements from the very beginning. During the British mandate, there were many clashes between the feuding sides. An open conflict broke out in 1947. However, we cannot speak about the Palestinian side at the time. Arab people in Palestine were at the stage of shaping their identity, in principle, their interests were represented by the neighbouring Arab states. However, at the time we could speak of the beginnings of the Arab people’s right to terrains they inhabited. in advisory opinion of the international Court of Justice concerning the Western Wall (2004) it was written, that “The Mandate was created. in the interest of the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international object – a sacred trust of civilization” 1. According to Daniel Benoliel and ronen Perry, all the facts “stating that Palestinians are entitled to self determination because self determination has been a central part of aspirations within international law since the demise of the ottoman Empire in the wake of World War i. As the ottoman Empire lost sovereignty, a Palestinian state presumably emerged” 2.

However, the period of intensified endeavours of Palestinians themselves to become an independent power on the international arena did not start until the sixties. in 1964, the Palestine Liberation organization (PLo) 3 was created, which has become notably independent from the Egyptian auspices since 1968.

The next decade brings a change in the attitude towards the Palestinians. it can be seen especially on the Un forum. Before, the Un, when referring to the problems of that region, concentrated on reacting to armed conflicts, promoting peace solutions, or asserted Palestinian refugees’ rights. in the seventies, however, the question of Palestine began to be understood in a broader political context. At the time, we can speak about Palestinian identity being acknowledged internationally. in 1974, on the forum of the General Assembly of the Un, Jaser Arafat, the PLo leader, gave a speech. The result of this speech was a confirmation by the General Assembly of the right to exercise by the Palestinian people their

1 it was a quote from the Advisory opinion on the international Status of the South West Africa (1950). Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in The Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004, p. 165; The international Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf [access: 17.07.2013].

2 D. Benoliel, r. Perry, Israel, Palestine and the ICC, “Journal of international Law” 2010, vol. 32, p. 73.

3 Palestinian national-liberation organizations had come into existence before (e.g. Fatah).

The Palestinian International Identity after the UN Resolution 115

inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference, the right to national independence and sovereignty, and the right to return to their homes and property 4. At the time, the PLo was granted the right “to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer” and “to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly” 5.

one year later, the General Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People, whose main task was to indicate recommendation allowing to accomplish Palestinians’ rights. 6

Establishing the international Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People in December 1977, which is celebrated annually on november 29 7 was the last – important and mostly symbolic – move of the General Assembly.

The PLo conducted diplomatic offensive as well as classical diplomacy on forum of the Un. Jaser Arafat strove to promote Palestinian issue during numerous meetings with representatives of different states. However, it is obvious that due to certain respects, the PLo could count on the support of the states belonging to the Eastern Bloc, of uninvolved states, and of Arab states.

Positive approach of the Un to the Palestinian issue was also connected with the domination of the Soviet Union and its allies in the General Assembly.

Basically, the status of Palestine did not change until the eighties. in 1982, israeli intervention in Lebanon took place. As a result, military and political forces had to flee from Lebanon. During this conflict, a massacre in camps for Palestinians – Sabra and Shatila 8 – took place. All of these events arose global interest in the Palestinian problem. in September 1983 the international Conference on the Question of Palestine convened. As a result, the Geneva Declaration was accepted, which included i.a.: the postulate: “the attainment

4 information Centre of the Un in Warsaw, http://www.unic.un.org.pl/palestyna/tlo.php [access: 16.07.2013].

5 Resolution GA 3237, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/512BAA69B5A32794852560DE0054B9B2 [access: 16.07.2013].

6 Resolution GA 3376, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/B5B4720B8192FDE3852560DE004F3C47 [access: 16.07.2013].

7 Resolution GA 32/40(A+B), UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/2DA3D547118BFD25852560DD006BF4BB [access: 16.07.2013].

8 Christian Phalang were perpetrators. However israeli army was able to stop bloody massacre.


by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent state in Palestine” 9.

At the end of the eighties, Palestinians one more became interesting to the world. in December 1987, the intifada broke out. it was a spontaneous revolt of the Palestinian people against the israeli presence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The authorities of the PLo, residing at the time in Tunis, tried to use natural compassion of the global public opinion to the Palestinian question and took up diplomatic action. in november 1988, the Declaration of independence was proclaimed. it included the following statement: “The Palestine national Council hereby declares, in the name of God and on behalf of the Palestinian Arab people, the establishment of the State of Palestine in the land of Palestine with its capital at Jerusalem” 10.

Some states decided to answer this declaration, thereby recognising the state that was created. in May 1989, there were more than ninety states that had done so 11. The General Assembly of the Un also formed an opinion on these actions. in December 1988, resolution no. 43/177 was adopted. it said that it “acknowledges the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine national Council on 15 november 1988” and “affirms the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967”. A regulation saying that within the scope of the Un system, the name Palestine Liberation

9 Apart from this demand, anther one also appeared: to counter the establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, as well as the actions taken up by israel to alter the character and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem. They also demanded to guarantee “the right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people”. Report of The International Conference on the Question of Palestine, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/6F71BD16D6273ABC052565C9005730E6#sthash.iTXaiw0U.dpuf [access: 16.07.2013].

10 Letter dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/6EB54A389E2DA6C6852560DE0070E392 [access: 17.07. 2013].

11 in the request for acceptance of as its member, addressed to the UnESCo we can find information about 98 states, although in the Appendix there is a list of 92 states. Request For The Admission of the State of Palestine to Unesco as a Member State, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/94D9C3C3DC87698D85257919005223A3#sthash.6amyZr68.dpuf [access: 17.07.2013].


organization is replaced with Palestine 12 was of practical value. At the time, the Palestinians took up decisive action, the goal of which was the membership in the UnESCo and the WHo. Both of those initiatives failed 13.

The next decade again aroused hopes of the Palestinian nation. The collapse of the bipolar world was connected with the loss of a powerful ally – the Soviet Union. on the other hand, however, a chance to peacefully solve the Arab-israeli conflict arose. The peace process, initiated in Madrid in 1991, did not result in expected decisions, but it nevertheless it induced the peacefully-disposed israeli and Palestinian leaders to conduct bilateral talks. it resulted in signing the Declaration of Principles on interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington in September 1993. Due to subsequent agreements, the Palestinian national Authority was created. it played a role of an autonomous body in the areas inhabited by Palestinians. A part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were transferred to the Palestinian administration. in the light of the settlements with israel, in the so called A-Zone (the Gaza Strip and eight big cities in the area of the West Bank) the Palestinians took full civil and security control, and in the B-Zone, the Palestinians held civil control and security was jointly controlled with the israeli services. Palestinian national Authority (most often called the Palestinian Autonomy) was thus established; however, it did not formally change anything in the legal position of the Palestinians. They were still represented on international arena by the PLo.

The next change took place in 1998, when the General Assembly in resolution 52/250 decided to confer “additional rights and privileges of participation in the sessions and work of the General Assembly and the international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly or other organs of the United nations, as well as in United nations conferences” 14.

Privileges given to Palestine were limited to i.a:. “the right to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly or the right of reply, and also the right to raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East

12 Resolution GA 43/177, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/146E6838D505833F852560D600471E25 [access: 17.07.2013].

13 J. Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, “European Journal of internal Law” 1990, no. 1, p. 311, http://ejil.org/pdfs/1/1/1137.pdf [access: 17.07.2013].

14 Resolution of General Assembly 52/250, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://uni-spal.un.org/UniSPAL.nSF/0/162094FCBE8245D30525665E00536281 [access: 17.07.2013].


issues and the right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East issues” 15.

These decisions brought about an increase of importance of Palestine on international arena and, as commentators report, “in 1998, the General Assembly extended Palestine privileges that had previously been exclusive to member states, including the right to participate in the general debate at the beginning of each General Assembly, and the right to cosponsor resolutions. According to the Un, the decision »upgraded Palestine’s representation at the Un to a unique and unprecedented level, somewhere in between the other observers, on the one hand, and Member States on the other«” 16.

in 2000 the final israeli-Palestinian agreement was to take place. However, this did not occur as the talks in Camp David failed 17. Moreover, in this period a subsequent intifada broke out, which additionally complicated the difficult situation in the region.

The 21st century marks an extremely hot period, full of various initiatives and actions taken up by both sides of the conflict. For the needs of our analysis, we will take into consideration only those, which have a direct or indirect impact on the legal situation of Palestine. Parliamentary election in Palestine (January 2006) belongs to such events. Hamas 18, regarded by the majority of the world as a terrorist organization, won the democratic elections. in no time clashes started, and later on – fights between the supporters of Fattah and president Abbas on one side, and Hamas on the other. They resulted in the division of the Palestinian territory. Hamas took control over the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank remained under control of the Fatah and president Abbas, whom the majority of the states regarded as the representative of the Palestinians. Since 2007, there have been two administrations on the Palestinian territory, and both have functioned to some extent also in the international dimension. Although there were some attempts to start talks between them (and even some agreements were signed), a government of national unity was not eventually created.

15 ibidem.16 r. McMahon, Palestinian Statehood at the UN, Council on Foreign relations,

http://www.cfr.org/palestine/palestinian-statehood-un/p25954#p8 [access: 17.07.2013].17 Palestinians emphasized that lack of the possibility of the final agreement with

israel was decided i.a. by the actions in the Un.18 The truth is that the difference between Fatah and Hamas result was equal to

3 percentage points. The elections statue adopted by the PA (half of mandates were filled by a simple majority vote) caused that Hamas gained 74 seats in 132-seat parliament.


The next important event was the elevation of the Palestinian status on the forum of the Un. The initiative was personally endorsed by the President of the Palestinian national Authority Mahmud Abbas. in this way, he tried to bring the global interest back to the Palestinian issue, since the focus of the world had changed due to events related to the so called Arab Spring. A rise of the public opinion interest, caused by the aforementioned initiative, also led to diminishing the importance of the Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip.

Maximalist version of the project assumed acceptance of Palestine as a rightful member of the Un. However, as the Americans had announced their veto in the Security Council, it was clear, that it will not be accepted. This is why the Palestinians decided to demand granting Palestine a non-member observer state status. This procedure assumed the consent of the General Assembly expressed by a simple majority vote. The initiative of the Palestinian Autonomy authorities succeeded. The resolution on the status of Palestine in the Un was adopted by a vote: 138 were in favour and 9 against with 41 abstentions in the 193-member Assembly. The states which voted against the resolution were i.a. the United States, Canada, israel and the Czech republic. The most significant achievement of the Palestinian diplomacy was convincing the democratic European states, which either abstained from voting (Poland, Great Britain, Germany) or which supported their demand (Spain, France).

This resolution “reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967” and “decides to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation organization in the United nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice” 19.

2. is Palestine a state?

At the beginning, we should take into consideration a definition of a state in the light of the international law. in the doctrine there are two categories of essential elements. The first one belongs to objective group, the other one is a part of

19 Resolution GA 67/L.28, UniSPAL Documents Collection, http://unispal.un.org/UniSPAL.nsf/47D4E277B48D9D3685256DDC00612265/181C72112F4D0E0685257AC500515C6C [access: 24.07.2013].


the subjective category. objective criteria, were laid down in article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the rights and Duties of States (1933).

“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states” 20

Subjective category is connected with international recognition (constitutive theory). Some lawyers claim that an entity is a state (in addition to the objective conditions), when it is recognized as such by the international community.

Population is the first element which allows us to talk about a state. of course, in the area recognized by the General Assembly as Palestine, we have a permanent population, but also in this context there are some problems. We have to ask a question, whether all Palestinians should be recognized as population of Palestine. Ca. 5 million of Palestinians are refugees, who inhabit neighbouring states. The PLo have always emphasized that they also represent Palestinian refugees. However, formally today they are by no means subject to the Palestinian administration, and some of them will never come back to the land inhabited by their ancestors.

The other, more problematic issue, is the territory of Palestine. Crawford lists two criteria, which should be fulfilled simultaneously: “the existence of an organized community on a particular territory, exclusively or substantially exercising self-governing power, and secondly, the absence of the exercise of another state, and of the right of another state to exercise, self-governing powers over the whole of that territory” 21. international society acknowledged Palestine within the borders dated as of 1967, including East Jerusalem. it does not mean, however, that the real power of the Palestinian administration is exerted over the entire area indicated. in the light of agreements with israel, Palestinian Autonomy has administration over a part of the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The israelis rule in ca. 40% of the West Bank. in this area Jewish settlements were established. Some inhabitants of this area claim that these terrains should be joined to the Jewish state. Some people justify this move

20 Convention on Rights and Duties of States (26 December 1933), The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp [access: 24.07.2013].

21 J. Crawfort, op.cit., s. 309.


with religious arguments. They believe that in controlling the whole biblical land occupied by the israelis, they make the coming of the Messiah nearer.

irrespective of the sources that justify the Jewish settlers’ presence in the land of biblical Judea and Samaria (these are the official names of these terrains in israel), this is a group of more than 300,000 people. By no means can the israeli government disregard the opinion of such a considerable group of voters.

The situation connected with Jerusalem is even more complex. The East part of this city was officially joined to israel in 1980. Palestinian authorities did not have any control over this city. What is more, districts inhabited by the Jewish people are being established around the Arab part of the city. Today, a number of the israelis in the East Jerusalem is estimated at more than 190,000 people.

Some commentators also emphasize that there are people, who claim that israel is not a legitimate state, and that the entire territory should belong to Palestine 22.

Summing up, the land which is controlled by the Palestinian authorities, does not coincide with the land in which Palestinian state would come into existence or, as some people claim, in which Palestinian state already exists.

The third criterion connected with authority that really controls the territory, which is going to be acknowledged as a state, is much more controversial in this case. This is because we cannot speak about one Palestinian administration.

When the Palestinian national Authority came into existence, its competences defined by the agreements with israel were limited to administering the governed land. The national Authority could neither conduct foreign policy nor represent the country abroad. Theoretically, such actions could be conducted exclusively by the PLo. However, actual changes did take place. it is a common belief that the President and the government of the Palestinian Autonomy became representatives of the Palestinian nation. This conviction is legitimate, since the President, as well as the Parliament, were democratically elected by the Palestinians themselves 23. Besides, authorities of the Autonomy essentially started to conduct foreign policy. First, as it is set out in the Permanent

22 Stadnik, Palestinian Statehood under International Law, http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law-blog/archive/2013/01/03/palestinian-statehood-under-international-law.aspx [access: 24.07.2013].

23 Palestinian democracy is still faulty. Presidential term of office expired in 2010, and as a result of Hamas election victory, democratically elected parliament basically has never exerted a real impact.


Constitution Draft (a quasi constitution of Palestine), the President “shall appoint the ambassadors of the state and representatives of the state of Palestine to states and international and regional organizations and relieve them of their duties” and “shall accept the credentials of representatives of foreign states and international and regional organizations” 24. Second, in 2003 the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was established in the government of the Autonomy.

The actions taken up by the Palestinian authorities were very practical. They, for example, made negotiating the rules of international aid easier. in addition, they gained international acceptance. The President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs paid international visits, they were received by heads of states and by prime ministers. nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the Presidents of Autonomy (Jasir Arafat and Mahmud Abbas) were (and Abbas still is) at the same time leaders of the PLo. Thereby, President Abbas performs a double role.

if the government of Autonomy residing in the West Bank does not arouse controversy, the same cannot be said about the authorities in the Gaza Strip. Hamas have ruled there since 2007. Election victory of Hamas confused the international society. The organization questions all agreements concluded with israel, it claims that the peace process should not be conducted any longer, and its members deny the israeli state the right to exist and they want to destroy it. The majority of states, in turn, conduct a policy of isolation towards Hamas, which is commonly considered to be a terrorist organization, and do not recognize its authorities. However, in practice Hamas conducts foreign policy. They accept international aid, and Hamas activists meet the representatives of various friendly regimes (e.g: iran or even russia). We can even observe an increase of international recognition of the Hamas authorities. During the israeli operation Pillar of Defense conducted in november 2012, representatives of authorities of various states were in contact with Palestinians inhabiting the Gaza Strip. At the time, a delegation of ministers of foreign affairs of five Arab states (Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and iraq) took place. Prime Minister of Egypt also visited the Gaza Strip, and even Qatar Emir met with the Hamas leaders 25. All

24 Art. 125 of the Permanent Constitution draft (May 4, 2003), Palestitian Center for Policy and Survey research, http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2003/nbrowne.pdf [access: 24.07.2013].

25 Qatar was regarded as one of Fatah’s declared allies, n. Al-Mughrabi, Qatar’s Emir Embraces Hamas Leadership in Gaza Visit, The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/qatars-emir-embraces-hamas-leadership-in-gaza-visit/article4630750/ [access: 25.07.2013].


these events definitely indicate that Hamas isolation policy has not been so consistent.

of course, from the point of view of the majority of entities that create the international society, the only representative of Palestine is the Abbas administration, but it must be emphasized that Hamas is not absolutely isolated any more.

if a government of national unity came into being, it would be just a superficial solution. Furthermore, such attempts have already been made. Egyptian diplomacy was actively involved in these actions. in May 2011, an appropriate agreement was signed in Cairo. it assumed, apart from creating a common government, conducting presidential and parliamentary election.

Such initiatives, however, are criticized by israel, and the rest of the international community may call into question such a new government, as they refuse to acknowledge the Hamas authorities.

in this context, doubts, which result from the Weberian definition of the state adopted by some people, are justified. This definition explains the notion of the state in the following way: this is institution, which has an exclusive right to use force within its territory. Apart from the fact, that authorities of Autonomy do not have such rights in B and C Zones, they cannot do it either in the Gaza Strip.

Some lawyers emphasize, that the state should be characterized by the following features: “protection from the use of force by other states, the right of self-defense and collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack against it, plenary jurisdiction over its territory, the prohibition of intervention in matters essentially within its domestic jurisdiction” 26. According to the aforementioned definition, it is justifiable to question whether Palestine possesses these attributes of a typical state.

The last element, which is mentioned in the Montevideo Convention, refers to the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Some people question even this element. David rivkin jr and Lee Casey wrote “This pivotal requirement involves the ability to enter and keep international accords, which in turn posits that the ‘government’ actually controls – exclusive of other sovereigns – at least some part of its population and territory. The PA does not control any part of the

26 J. Cerone, Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to Accord Palestine the Status of Observer State, “The American Society of international Law insights” 2012, no. 37, http://www.asil.org/insights121208.cfm [acess: 25.07.2013].


West Bank to the exclusion of israeli authority, and it exercises no control at all in the Gaza Strip” 27.

Constitutive theory assumes that an entity is a state when it is recognized as such by the international community. voting in the General Assembly showed that 138 states perceived it in such a way. However, even in this case there are people who dispute with this argument. Thomas Stadnik writes: “the theory is weakened by the problem that may arise when some but not all States recognize an entity as a State. What is to come of the nine nations that voted against Palestinian statehood and the forty one abstentions, constituting a total of twenty seven percent of the General Assembly members that were present during the vote?” 28

The last question which raises lawyers’ doubts refers to the entity that decides whether to acknowledge a state or not. in the light of Charter of the Un, the General Assembly is not entitled to decide about the membership of a state. Such a decision is made by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council 29. in 2011, Palestinians tried to gain full membership in the Un. The USA, who were a decisive opponent, declared readiness to veto such a resolution in the Security Council. it resulted in Palestinian authorities’ withdrawal from this project.

They managed to obtain a status of non-member state one year later; however, it did not significantly change their legal situation in the Un. non-member States are entitled to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and maintain permanent observer missions at Headquarters. Palestine had obtained these rights before.

it can be assumed that this voting was an attempt to confirm the acknowledgment of the Palestinian statehood. it was perceived in this way by President Mahmud Abbas, who just before the voting said: “The General

27 D. rivkin jr, L. Casey, The Legal Case Against Palestinian Statehood, “The Wall Street Journal” September 20, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576578423114178378.html [access: 25.07.2013].

28 T. Stadnik, op.cit.29 Art. 4 sec. 2 of the Charter of United Nations: “The admission of any such state to

membership in the United nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”, United nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf [access: 28.07.2013].


Assembly is called upon today to issue a birth certificate of the reality of the State of Palestine” 30.

However, even in this case some doubts emerge. The following information can be found in the website of the Un: “The recognition of a new State or Government is an act that only other States and Governments may grant or withhold (…). The United nations is neither a State nor a Government, and therefore does not possess any authority to recognize either a State or a Government. As an organization of independent States, it may admit a new State to its membership or accept the credentials of the representatives of a new Government”. This opinion is also confirmed by lawyers. David rivkin Junior and Lee Casey claimed that “The U.n. – General Assembly or Security Council – has no power to create states or to grant all-important formal ‘recognition’ to state aspirants. The right to recognize statehood is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty and the United nations is not a sovereign” 31.

The other aspect of the resolution of the General Assembly raised John Cerone’s doubts: “Weighing against these considerations is the significant number of abstentions, constituting just over 20% of the membership. in addition, several of the states that voted in favor of the resolution underscored that statehood could only be achieved through dialogue between the parties, implying that Palestine had not yet achieved statehood” 32.

Some commentators emphasized the significance of the decision of the General Assembly indicating that exactly 65 years before, the same assembly decided to accept a resolution dividing the area of Mandatory Palestine into two states: the Arab and the Jewish. The Arab state did not come into being. resolution to grant Palestine a non-member observer state status was going to be a symbolic finish of this process.

30 Abbas’ Speech to the UN General Assembly (November 2012), Council on For-eign relations, http://www.cfr.org/palestine/abbas-speech-un-general-assembly-novem-ber-2012/p29579 [access: 28.07.2013].

31 D. rivkin jr, L. Casey, op.cit.32 J. Cerone, op.cit. Such reservations were submitted by e.g. new Zealand. its

representative said: “noting that the resolution just adopted conferred non-Member observer State status, he said that the question of recognition of a Palestinian State was a separate issue”. General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine’ Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations, United nations Meeting Coverage & Press releases, http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [access: 28.07.2013].


However, the conviction that both actions of the General Assembly have the same legal character, is wrong. in the first case, the General Assembly acted as an organ which was tasked with issuing a final decision on the status of mandatory areas; in the second case, it just regulated legal position of an entity within the scope of its own structures.

3. Conclusion

it is hard to escape the impression that the legal consequences of granting Palestine a non-member observer state status are evaluated differently by various parties, which are interested in this issue. This is why the author claims that the resolution adopted on november 29, 2012 was much more a political act than a confirmation of the existing present situation.

it seems that the majority of the international community supported the Palestinian proposal, because it claimed that the Jewish settlements in occupied territories and practical freezing of negotiations is not acceptable, and not because they believe that the Palestinian state really exists.

it seems that gaining a full Palestinian statehood is possible through bilateral (israeli-Palestinian) talks. only the United States (apart from the interested parties) have a real impact on their success. israeli and American diplomats emphasize that declarations of international organizations are not able to change anything.

regardless of what we think about the adopted resolution, we hope that peace in the Middle East and the establishment of Palestinian state is only a matter of time.


Manuel Férez GilMilddle East Universidad Iberoamericana and Universidad Anahuacin Mexico City, Mexico

PeACe MOVeMeNtsiN the PAlestiNiAN-isrAeli CONFliCt

ABstrACt

The peace movements, both Palestinians and israelis, have been little discussed academically, however, its importance in the development of the israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial. This article intends to expose the dynamics that the israeli and Palestinian peace organizations have had over the years.

Key words

israel, Palestine, nGo’s, conflict resolution, peace

“The great figures of the previous generations warned us that the guaranteeing of international peace was a sine qua non. Furthermore, the technical progress achieved in our times has made this a crucial issue for civilized humanity, and each and every one of us, without exception, has a moral duty to play an active role in solving the problem of how to achieve peace.”

Albert Einstein

The sun rises over israel and Palestine, and, at the israeli-army control points that connect israel with – and sometimes disconnect it from – the Left Bank, the women of Machsom Watch, a non-governmental organization that has been monitoring the behaviour of israeli soldiers and policemen since 2001 in response to the press reports about human-rights abuses committed on the Palestinians who enter and leave israel every day, are monitoring the behaviour of the israeli police and soldiers.

At 9:00 a.m., Jeff Halper, the Director of the israeli Committee against the Demolition of Houses, will arrive at his office in Jerusalem. The aforesaid israeli nGo, founded in 1996, is an organization that uses non-violent means


to prevent the israeli armed forces from demolishing Palestinian homes, as well as rebuilding Palestinian houses that have already been demolished, sometimes with the support of rabbis for Human rights, a group founded in 1988 during the Palestinian intifada, which, from its headquarters in Jerusalem, strives to give voice to the Jewish religious tradition regarding human rights. As its Executive Director, rabbi Ascherman, says: “The aim of we rabbis who are members of our organization, and variously belong to orthodox, conservative or reform Judaism, is to take part in non-violent action, show solidarity with the victims of abuse, and carry on an inter-faith dialogue, in addition to keeping alive, in the yeshivas (Jewish religious schools), the Jewish tradition of defending victims and rebuilding demolished houses.”

Sami Awad will soon arrive – albeit 10 minutes late, having lingered over a cup of coffee with his friends as always – at the offices of the Holy Land Foundation in Bethlehem, where he works hand-in-hand with Jeff Halper. Since 1998, the aforementioned Palestinian organization has worked to promote non-violent resistance and put an end to the israeli occupation of the West Bank, while at the same time advocating a democratic Palestine and condemning Palestinian terrorist attacks on israeli civilians.

The Foundation attempts to improve the lives of Palestinian children and youths via programs such as Peace and reconciliation (which operates in association with the israeli nGo, Journey and Encounter, and Palestinian news network, whose aims are to teach Palestinian youths to respect others, to eschew hatred and to assume individual responsibility in the search for peaceful coexistence with israel.

At four p.m. on the same day, in Hayasmin de ramat Efal street in israel, some Palestinian and israeli families from Families Forum, an association that includes hundreds of israeli and Palestinian families that have lost close relatives in the conflict, gather together. The aim of the Forum, officially founded in 1998, is to end the israeli occupation and establishment of settlements in the West Bank, stop the terrorism that kills innocent people like their own relatives and achieve a lasting political settlement, for which purpose, via messages published on the internet and conferences in schools and universities, it strives to have an impact on public opinion and convince politicians to seek reconciliation and understanding.

Though my favourite byword, during my university years, was “let’s be realistic and seek the impossible”, i have learned that this is a selfish, simplistic and irresponsible slogan, since it places us in the very advantageous position of asking the impossible from others while comfortably ensconced in our favourite

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armchair, seated in a university classroom or study cubicle, taking part in some conference, or marching in a demonstration; indeed, there are those who, more cynical, repeat it while lying in bed watching a movie.

This is why these lines set out to be a reflection on – and homage to – those Palestinians and israelis who, in uncommon – and very sad – circumstances, have every reason to hate each other, choose to go out into the streets each day, not to ask the impossible, but to do it.

Since i feel that the words of Julio Cortazar aptly describe what has happened to the words, peace/shalom/salaam – words of consolation and hope; what a pity that they have a certain air of being overused, oft-repeated, worn out by constant repetition – i would like to use a definition formulated by Julien Brenda, who eschews sentimentalism and goes to the heart of the concept of peace: “if it ever comes, peace will be based not on fear of war, but on love of peace. it will not consist in refraining from doing something, but in a new mental attitude.”

Though the word “politics” suffers from the same problem, here i will cite what Manuel Azaña once said: “if politics is the art of governing countries, let us all engage in it, and the more the better, because it is only thus that we will be able to govern ourselves and avoid being badly governed by others.”

Since the State of israel was founded, civil society has played a very active, decisive role in its formation, as witnessed by the many israeli citizens who are members of social movements, non-governmental organizations, cultural and recreational associations, and political parties.

relations between the israelis and the Palestinians have changed across the years, and one might say that most of the Palestinian population lived under Arab leadership (above all Jordanian and Egyptian) from 1948 to 1967, thus rarely coming into direct contact with israeli civilians.

Such interaction between the two societies intensified after the 1967 war, especially along the so-called Green Line, when israel occupied most of the West Bank and all of Gaza.

Alongside this increase in contact between the Palestinians and the israelis, the occupation of the Sinai desert, the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights, stemming from the military victory in the 1967 war, polarized the Jewish population into two factions that can be seen today in israeli society:

− The Eretz israel Hashlema (Greater israel) movement, which resulted from the coming together of nationalist Jewish religious groups and secular organizations that advocated the annexation of the conquered territory – i.e. the right-wing and religious sectors of israeli society.


− The Movement for Peace and Security, which is mainly secular and saw the 1967 war as an opportunity to settle Arab-israeli differences, being made up of groups that identify with the left wing.

As the academics Walid Salem and Edy Kaufman have mentioned, between these two factions there is the silent majority, which is politically indecisive and, in the right circumstances, will support any leadership, which explains the abrupt changes that occur from one election to the next.

Academics such as yakov Talmor and the religious philosopher yeshayahu Leibowitz spoke out against the occupation just after the 1967 war. Leibowitz was deemed to be “the conscience of israel” during the 1970s and 1980s, and his positions regarding the conquering of territory, the role of the Jewish religion in the State of israel, and the position occupied –and role played- by israel in the world, provoked both admiration and repudiation in israel society. in his most widely recognized works, which include Judaism, the Jewish People and the State of Israel and Israel and Judaism, he very polemically asserted that “no people has any right over any land. Land is an objective entity, while “right” and “people” are constructs of the human mind… a land belongs to a given people only in the mind of that people”. 1

Such statements garnered Leibowitz the hatred and contempt of the Zionist religious groups. in an article entitled Right, Justice and Reality, published in the Haaretz newspaper, he wrote: “There is only one way out of the predicament stemming from the complicated past between the Palestinians and the israelis, though neither side considers the said solution to be fair or fully agrees with it; that way out consists in splitting the land between the two peoples.” 2

Groups such as the Siach (Dialogue) aligned themselves with well-known peace advocates such as Shulamit Alón, Uri Avneri, ran Cohen and Matti Peled, to form yaad, the left-wing Zionist party that opposed the colonization and annexation of territory.

While social activism has existed in israel since the early days and has permeated israeli society, it would appear that civilian pacifist activism did not become part and parcel of israeli political life until the late 1970s, when the governing establishment became more sensitive to – and favourable towards –

1 y. Leibowitz, La crisis como esencia de la experiencia religiosa [Crisis as the Essence of religious Experience], Mexico 2000, p. 142.

2 ibidem, p. 1432.


extra-parliamentary political activism than it had been in the preceding years, when the founding and survival of the State of israel were absolute priorities.

After the 1973 war, also known as the yom Kippur war, a wave of protests by israeli soldiers about government actions and policies during the armed conflict began, giving rise to an intense debate among israelis about whether those governing them were competent and helping a lot to legitimize political action outside the Knesset – i.e. the israeli Parliament.

in March of 1978, in response to the decision of the then Prime Minister, Menahem Begin, to defend – and even support – the creation of a host of new settlements inside the occupied territories, around 350 israeli-army reservists sent a letter to him, accusing the government of encouraging the building of settlements in order to create “Greater israel”, and of not seeking peace with the Arab world.

This letter marked the creation of the Shalom Ajshav (Peace now) movement, which, in September of the same year, organized the biggest political demonstration in israel’s history in Tel Aviv.

on September 25, 1982, as a result of the murders of Palestinians in the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps committed by the forces of the Lebanese Christian Phalange with the blessing of the israeli army, 400,000 israelis took to the streets of Tel Aviv in a demonstration convened by Shalom Ajshav, once again showing the government that a large portion of israeli society opposed the measures taken during the occupation of southern Lebanon.

The active role played by women in the israeli pacifist groups and organizations merits special mention. in the words of Salid Salem and Edy Kaufman: “The gender factor should be acknowledged, since a majority of the members of the peace groups in israel are women, who have not only set up groups such as Four Mothers Lebanon and Parents Against Silence, but also participate in human-rights organizations such as Machsom Watch, and in political coalitions such as the one between the israeli Bat Shalom group and the Palestinian Jerusalem Center for Women.” 3

The history of the Palestinian peace movement is very different, since there is no record of any non-violent demonstrations by Palestinian civilians seeking that their national and human rights be respected until the start of the first intifada in 1987, and it should be stressed that, during its short history, the

3 Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, E. Kaufman, W. Salem, J. verhoeven (eds.), London 2006, p. 27.


Palestinian peace movement has been mainly influenced by two parties – the European Union and, paradoxically, israel.

The 1987 intifada exposed not only the israeli government and its policies in the occupied territories and towards the Arab population, but also the corrupt, non-functional leadership of the Palestine Liberation organization. Academic studies of the Palestinian nGos all concur that the two intifadas and the 1993 oslo Accords laid the foundations for the development of these movements within Palestinian society, with the number of such organizations increasing in the mid 1990s.

While there are records of the existence of Palestinian civil organizations in the 1930s and 1940s, most researchers, and academics such as Juliette verhoeven, Manuel Hassassian, and Walid Salem and Edy Kaufman in their book Bridging the Divide agree that the 1987 intifada might be seen as the event that gave rise to civil organizations in Palestine (with differences between Gaza and the West Bank) and also to the Palestinian peace movements.

in broad terms, these were the beginnings of the peace movements in both israel and Palestine, the history of which is marked by a series of successes, but also by dark, difficult periods when citizens’ participation has diminished due to violence, economic instability and radical extremist political leaders.

The activities of the peace movements in israel and Palestine can be divided into three categories, depending on the population at which they are aimed: the israeli peace movement which is active inside israel; the Palestinian peace movement that targets Palestinian civilians; and the overall Palestinian peace movement – i.e. those joint israeli-Palestinian actions that are aimed at promoting peace, good will and understanding between the ordinary Palestinians and israelis.

Since the very beginning of the 1987 intifada, informal contacts began to be established and joint activities were undertaken between Palestinian and israeli associations, with the 1990s being the most fruitful decade, in terms not only of the number of organizations founded, but also of the intensity of the contacts between the said organizations and the amount of pressure that they managed to exert on the political establishment.

At times, the ability of those non-governmental organizations that seek and promote peace to apply upward pressure increases – i.e. they manage to influence the politicians who make the big decisions; at the same time, they also apply downward pressure on public opinion, giving rise to organized mass demonstrations that also influence the politicians and affect parliamentary


decisions, not to mention their horizontal effect – i.e. the influence of israeli organizations and vice versa.

The main areas in which these groups have managed to achieve success are bicultural and interfaith education, legal counselling, academic research in general, human rights and democracy, economic development via cooperatives, and alternative proposals to settle territorial conflicts.

Some examples of the successes achieved by the Field of Peace are: the upward pressure that the latter organization succeeded in applying both in israel and in other countries, leading to the israeli government’s decision to withdraw from southern Lebanon in the year 2000; the aforementioned 1987 intifada; the pressure brought to bear on both Arafat and the nineteenth national Palestinian Congress by the Palestinian peace organizations, leading the former to approve the two-state solution and the proposal to recognize israel; the 1993 oslo Accords, which reaped unprecedented popular support, though they later fell through; and even Ariel Sharon’s plan for the splitting off of the Gaza Strip in 2005, all of which can, to some extent, be attributed to the said civilian organizations.

“you say that working with children is exhausting. you’re right, because you have to get on the same level as them, stoop, bend down, crouch, make yourself small.

you’re wrong on that score: that’s not what tires you out, but rather having to rise to the level of their feelings, stretch, make yourself longer, stand on tiptoe in order not to hurt them.”

Janusz Korczak 1942

Also one should not neglect to mention other initiatives of the so-called “Field of Peace”, such as the neve Shalom-Wahat al Salam (in English: “oasis of Peace”) school community founded in 1970 on the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

By 2006, around 50 families had settled in the aforesaid community, which is self- governing and not affiliated to any political party. in the words of one of its founders, “neve Shalom is not something inside a bubble, removed from reality. This community confronts the conflict between Palestine and israel, which is reflected inside it.”

With very little initial support from the israeli Ministry of Education, the community in question opened a school that mainly covers the pre-school and primary levels, as well as the lower senior-high-school grades, and currently has between 250 and 300 children enrolled, both Palestinian and Jewish.


The said school, which is bilingual and bi-national, takes in children from both the neve Shalom community and also the environs of the village where it is located, who presently make up 90% of all the pupils, as well as day-pupils from the more distant communities of nachshon, Harel and Gezer.

its alternative curriculum is based on several basic tenets, the most outstanding of which are:

− Jews and Palestinians participate equally in both management and teaching.

− The establishment of a natural framework that allows Jewish and Palestinian children to come together every day in a safe environment.

− Teaching in both Hebrew and Arabic for all pupils. − Strengthening of the children’s individual identity, via teaching about

their own culture and traditions, along with the inculcation of respect for the other culture based on teaching about its values and traditions.

it should be stressed that, both in the classroom and during recesses and extracurricular activities, the issue of identity is constantly brought up at neve Shalom, where the classes are given in Hebrew and Arabic, the children learn about each other’s traditions, and both the Jewish and the Moslem children celebrate each other’s feast days together.

outstanding among the programs that the school offers is the one called “Home Hospitality”, which consists in pupils visiting their classmates’ homes in other villages. in this way, the children develop strong inter-community links, with stress being placed on mutual understanding of the different family environments that exist side by side in the same area. To quote one of the members of neve Shalom: “Since the school operates based on a democratic, egalitarian model, the children learn that it’s possible for Arabs and Jews to work together.”

This ongoing cultural exchange leads the children of neve Shalom to develop alternative viewpoints and hence to understand, accept and respect each other.

in recent years, other schools have been set up based on the neve Shalom model. While these schools adhere to the state curriculum, they make their own educational and administrative decisions, as exemplified by their opting to use israeli books that include texts aimed at Arabs (one should not forget that both Hebrew and Arabic are israel’s official languages).

At present, the primary school is state-recognized, but operates independently, and there are plans to extend the neve Shalom model to communities in other parts of israel, as well as to set up cooperative projects with Palestinian schools,


though it must be acknowledged that the said educational model has still not been put into practice within the Palestinian educational system.

outstanding in the neve Shalom model is the approach proposed by the israeli teacher, Dan Bar-on, and his Palestinian colleague, Sami Adwan, who both published a text book for israeli and Palestinian secondary schools that presents two versions of history, since, in the words of Bar-on, “A common history was not possible. Given the existence of two states, one must accept two narratives. We have to learn to live with each other.” 4

Bar-on’s and Adwan’s book was published in Catalan and Spanish by the intermón publishing company and caused a great deal of controversy among israeli educators, since various teachers, including the israeli Minister of Education himself, have consistently refused to implement the book’s methodology, which involves the analysis of three historic events – the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the 1948 War, and the First intifada in 1987 – based on “an asymmetrical narrative”, since, in the words of Adwan, “it is not a matter of denying one own version in order to accept that of the other. one must accept the other’s version without denying one’s own.” 5

The very title of the book, Histories of the Other. Israel and Palestine, One Conflict, Two Viewpoints, reveals its aims. in it, the authors enter what they describe as a “minefield” full of dangers, though they assert that, if one accepts that history is interpretation – the formation of perceptions and interpretations that make it possible to bring about a change that has been awaited for years – then “in the XXi century, there are no excuses for continuing to deny the other.” 6

in this regard, one must acknowledge that violence and terrorism have damaged the legitimacy and credibility of the arguments about reconciliation and dignity that these groups put forward.

The lack of effective dialogue among institutional leaders, which, in recent years, has led to unilateral policies, should not polarize those people who are committed to building peace, but it cannot be denied that, in such a violent political climate, initiatives for peaceful coexistence do not receive much support from the bulk of the civilian populations of either israel or Palestine.

non-violent strategies are needed in both the Palestinian and the israeli societies. in this respect, the joint development by the various peace movements

4 “El Periódico”, February 15, 2006.5 ibidem.6 ibidem.


of an interdependent economic and social program could lead to contact at the most immediate level – that of everyday life. indeed, improved living conditions enable the peace movements themselves to grow.

Also, it must be admitted that the participation of both Palestinian and israeli intellectuals in the aforesaid civilian demonstrations and organizations has decreased over the last few years, due to the polarization that one sees at all levels of both societies.

The terror that the people of Palestine and israel have been subjected to has had an enormous impact on civilian participation in the peace process, and, indeed, the extremist forces and the violent factions in both communities have indirectly cooperated in continuing the violence, the hate and the demonization of the other.

Therefore, it is necessary to create minimum levels of stability, economic development and security, so that most israelis and Palestinians will not only support efforts to bring about peace, but also believe that such efforts can succeed, and it is here that the international community – if such a thing really exists – could be of help.

However, i am bound to remark that the difficult situation that has prevailed for so many years in Gaza, the West Bank and israel has revealed the profound ignorance about the conflict that prevails in the media, politicians, academics and most specialists.

The war in Gaza and israel has led to the polarization and radicalization of the supporters of both israel and Palestine, leaving very little leeway for those of us who like to define ourselves as both pro-Palestinian and pro-israeli, with the result that dialogue between those holding different positions has become equally impossible not only in the universities and the media, but also in daily life. And without serious dialogue and analysis, no sincere agreement can be reached.

in my opinion, this situation is due to various factors, among which i would like to highlight: the simplistic and superficial sensationalist communications media, which prefer quick sound bites over rigorous analysis; the lack of an academic community with social clout that explains and analyzes the causes of the conflict; the scant objectivity and professionalism of most opinion columns and specialists speaking on the radio or appearing on television; a civil society that is keen to support either israel or Palestine, but from a distance, without running any risks, and without the curiosity and humility that stem from an awareness that the aforesaid superficial and tendentious communications media


have misled people into erroneously believing that they are well informed about the topic in question.

Thus, based on superficial news reports or sensationalist photos or scenes shown on Tv, everywhere there emerge specialists who demand that their voices be heard and respected by the rest of us. However, in reality nobody listens to, or reads, the words of those who think differently, nobody doubts his own opinions and convictions, clashing discourses are created, and everybody, from his own entrenched position, condemns those with views that differ from his own.

And these people who are incapable of listening to, or reading, a different opinion are the same ones who demand peace in Palestine and israel. What cynics!

in the words of Amos oz, we become fanatical adherents of the cause that we defend, and unfortunately fanaticism is very contagious.

it is essential and urgent that we create spaces for analysis, study, research and discussion in those universities that have enough impact on society to generate the minimum amount of factual knowledge required in order for people to take the most objective position – and reach the most informed opinion – that is possible about this, or any other, conflict in which people are dying.

Continuous proximity with these real, encouraging expressions of solidarity between israelis and Palestinians will enable people to become more productively involved and, in the words of Hannah Arendt, to eschew lazy ways of thinking that shun complexity and depth, splitting the world into good and bad, black and white – mental routines that are blind to the complexity and depth of social problems and turn us into implacable judges of distant conflicts that are alien to us. As ray Loriga has written, “nobody wants to pay the price of struggle, and so, day after day, words such as ‘repudiation’, ‘condemnation’ or ‘solidarity’ gain ground over effective action”.

And it is precisely effective action that the nGos we have mentioned propose, encourage and take action that will enable us to develop the mental attitude that constitutes the true peace that Julián Brenda speaks about and the self-governing environment that Azaña seeks.

These civilian demonstrations and organizations may be the key to a future which, while not perfect, is the best one possible in the Middle East. However, like all good things, this will take time, patience, respect for those who refuse to accept their cruel fate, humility, and a lot of hard work.

i can think of no better way to end this paper than by transcribing the following extract from the book, The Same Sea, by Amos oz:


“And you?Shattered, desperate, one hears from a distance the cries, in yiddish, of a woman whose stomach has been slashed open before her very eyes.And one hears, moaning in Arabic, yet another woman whose house or child…Her voice is piercing, terrifying.And you sharpen a pencil or glue together the ripped cover of a book.At the very least, shudder!”

note:Some of the quotations ate taken from interviews carried out in israel and Palestine by the author of this article in the period 2007–2008. The author wishes to thank all who so kindly and warmly gave their time and shared their thoughts and feelings.


Alfred lutrzykowski (rev.)

Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Pozycja ustrojowa i funkcje Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej po akcesji do Unii Europejskiej [Constitutional Status and Functions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland Following the Accession to the European Union], Dom ELIPSA Publishing House, Warsaw 2012, pp. 713

Mrs. Dr. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, the author of numerous multidisciplinary publications balances mainly between legal and political science. Undoubtedly, her latest book is a real masterpiece of writing not only because of its volume. The problems she describes cover fundamental topics of the constitution of contemporary Poland. By leading her reader through a huge number of events to the end of the first decade of the XXi century, the author assumed the accession of our state to the European Union (1st May 2004) as a caesura defining the time horizon of her considerations. The book is also abundant in time references to the period before 2004 and in issues that appeared, literally, in the last months before the book was published. This proves that the Author manages to conduct the most current analysis, which obviously enhances its attractiveness and the relevance of the book.

All the considerations included both in this part of the writing which is a constitutional analysis of normative considerations shaping the position and functions of the Sejm of the rP and in the European “plot” are subject to a few introductory assumptions. Their purpose is to present the constitutional transformations of the Polish Sejm and its functions in the context of the ongoing processes in the European Union. Already in the Introduction the Author states that the transformation of the Union and its entities by “building a thick network of trans-national dependencies must (…) lead to serious changes concerning the position of national authorities”; she also adds that “Their full exclusivity of decisions/competences (…) in the advanced integration/unity would be non-functional in the need of transnational unity” (p. 8).

As it is generally known, not only did these changes concern national parliaments but also brought crucial transformations of other public authorities mainly of governments of EU Member States as well. These processes led to the shaping of new relations between parliaments and governments on the national forum, new forms and methods to perform their functions within the EU and new connections and

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references between authority bodies on the European scene. According to the Author, a significant and more visible phenomenon is a “specific remodeling of relations between legislative and executive powers” (ibidem). As a result, the supremacy of governments and ministers in building and integrating the European structure appeared. The parliaments of EU Member States became authorities that had to accept the information to set representatives of national executives constituted in accordance with original Treaties of Communities (later the European Union) as bodies with the highest decision-making power.

one must agree with further assumptions that the Author made by conducting a detailed multi-layered analysis of current processes in our country. in fact, Polish practice and experience in this field are a textbook illustration of the phenomenon in which the existing paradigm of functions, tasks and decision-making order are skipped within the frames of the public authorities system. it was directly connected with an active presence of Poland in Union bodies and institutions. Becoming a Member State of the European Union and following ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon (10th october 2009) obliged Poland not only to a new theoretical outlook on the question of its role in the constitutional rank of the Sejm, government and other bodies. The need to build a coherent set of relations between them both from the point of view of the Constitution of the rP and the EU model appeared as well. This also raised the question about the necessity of constitutional revision and a range of constitutional laws.

The hypothesis of the writing is very interesting although a bit questionable. The author assumes in it that as a result of the accession of Poland to the European Union, serious changes in a constitutional position and function of the Sejm occurred. Part of the competences of the Sejm was shifted towards the government, which resulted in dominance over the legislative. And that is the sentence that exactly describes the situation and is an introductory assessment verified during the analysis of the process! However, does the partial acquiring of European Union competences of the Sejm by the Council of Ministers mean that “the prerogatives of the Sejm were significantly reduced in favour of the government” and that “The fall of the legislative sovereignty took place (…)” (p. 11). This statement, bearing the phrase which alleviates the categoricalness of the assessment (“as the changes were becoming more and more often assessed”, ibidem), may raise concerns due to its “radicalism” and categoricalness. The processes described and analysed by the Author derive from a wish to participate in European integration, which implies the need to recourse to new tools and methods in decision-making bodies of the European Union. in the post-accession reality, one needs to once again read and redefine the traditional functions of particular national authorities system as well. This system resembles an institutional construction “written” in the constitution, so it must be functional for the interests of the state and for challenges resulting from the current internal and international situation. Being part of the European Union, which is a result of adhesive accession, inevitably involves the necessity of a series of changes in the mechanisms and functioning rules of authorities in Member States, and the necessity of modification of “competency fields” and their interrelationships.

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The first two chapters of the book convince us that the dramatising statements about reducing the prerogatives of the Sejm and the fall of its legislative sovereignty should be treated as a hypothesis verified only as a whole. While discussing the change of the position and the function of the Sejm after 2004 the Author states: “We face (…) a completely new situation which resulted mainly from shifting the traditional role of parliament to EU institutions” (p. 231). So these are not only the prerogatives of the Sejm that were reduced. These were the European Union bodies that acquired part of the legislative competences of national parliaments. That is where the source of the so called “fall of the legislative sovereignty” of the Sejm is to be found, because “also in the EU, an organisation of inter-governmental character, there is a necessity to shift some of the roles concerning legislative function of the Council of Ministers” (p. 238). it also has to be pointed out that this part of the book contains comparative fragments which show transformations and solutions applied in other Member States as well. This significantly enhances the cognitive qualities of the writing.

Did the described phenomena mean degradation of the constitutional status of the Sejm of the rP, which would be equal to undermining constitutional regulations? Was the range of supervision over government carried out by the Sejm limited to a national level only, while in front of the EU the Council of Ministers could be an autonomous participant of the decision-making process and Union legislative? The range of the real power of the Polish parliament would be diminished in this way. The Author is critical of the fact that the Polish parliament did not make any effort in order to establish a new model of Sejm and Senat relations on EU matters with the Council of Ministers (ibidem). Later events and decisions made by the Polish parliament and EU bodies, especially the Treaty of Lisbon, had new contributions while defining the roles of national parliaments and their constitutional status in the country both in front of the European Union and its authorities. The importance of advisory, supervisory and control competences of parliament was increased. The Sejm obtained new entitlements in the decisive mechanism of the EU. These are mostly: participating of the procedure of modifying EU treaties, acceptance of international agreements, the right to participate in EU legislative activity, giving opinions on EU laws or co-deciding on the EU budget (p. 585 and 629). The role of parliament to implement the norms of Union law into the Polish system is of vital importance. The Author sees this role as a way to compensate a prejudice of the legislative bodies which parliaments of EU Member States had to face (p. 629).

This comprehensive and richly documented study of constitutional, legislative, supervisory and creative functions of the Sejm of the rP (Chapters iii-vi) after the accession of Poland to the European Union is a “masterpiece itself”. A reader will find here an expertly analysed, complex compendium of knowledge on the contemporary Polish Sejm: its organisation, principles for action, achievements and issues requiring deeper attention, so that this authority could fully perform its functions assigned by the Constitution of 2nd April 1997. in accordance with the title of the book, the Author reports on further issues presenting changes that follow our accession to the European

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Union. The book also presents solutions included in the Treaty of Lisbon which significantly modify the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process so that their roles could be valued.

Chapter vii (“new roles of the Sejm of rP after the accession to the European Union”) and Ending Chapter (which synthesises different aspects of assessments, conclusions and requests) create a homogenous sequence of analysis with numerous, sometimes brilliant, aspects that are a punch line of all the discussed matters. Special attention should be given to: the catalogue to the “new roles of the Sejm after the accession to the European Union” (pp. 594–602, 622) and remarks and recommendations about the methods and means to fulfil the new tasks (pp. 602–622).

The Annexe and list of data sources and literature increase the value of the whole book showing the abundance of sources that the Author used while preparing her work. The way those sources are discounted in the text proves the Author’s excellent writing skills. Certainly the book will be read by political scientists, lawyers, historians and everyone interested in the way the system of public authority was remodelled in connection with Polish membership in the European Union. A communicative title precisely describes the content of the book.

This work certainly deserves to be recommended to students of various faculties and specialities. Accessible language, clarity, consistency of conclusions and the Author’s easy narration to formulate even the most difficult issues – are also important advantages of the reviewed book. Such advantages are quite uncommon with scientific research. The Aesthetical way of editing fully corresponds with the serious content of this work, which encourages to careful study.

Jarosław Jarząbek (rev.)

Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, Public Affairs, New York 2012, pp. 304

The latest book by Marc Lynch is one of the many works published after the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 that aspire to describe this phenomenon and to explain its roots and origins. What distinguishes The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East are a few facts. First, Marc Lynch writes the book not only from the position of a scholar, a professor at George Washington University, but also as an active blogger. He utilized his blog on foreignpolicy.com and his Twitter channel to observe and cover up to date the subsequent stages of the Arab uprisings. Frequent travels to the Middle East on the other hand, gave him an invaluable insider view on the course of events. Second, being an advisor to the members of the administration of the President Barak obama during the time of the Arab revolts, he is able to approach the events from the point of view of a policy maker and a security advisor.

The Arab Uprising… is a well written book, with a lot of information about both the historical background as well as the most present events of the Arab Spring. in the first

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chapter the author considers the nature and the main features of the Arab uprisings, correctly concluding that they do not meet the conditions of any specific definition of a “revolution”. However, his explanations showing the uniqueness of this phenomenon and the role of a “new Arab public sphere” are not very convincing 1. Also the use of the term „counterrevolution” to describe the reactions of the Arab governments to the waves of protests and their attempts to crush the uprising is questionable 2.

The author analyses the previous waves of mass protests, revolts and regime changes of the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1980s in chapters two and three, concluding that popular uprisings were quite common for the Arab societies in the past 3. The results of those revolts and revolutions of the past were radical and lasting changes of the political systems and structures in many Arab states. This usually meant a collapse of conservative monarchies and the rise of a new type of Arab authoritarianism, strongly influenced by elements of nationalist and socialist ideology. over the next decades the authoritarian regimes were able to strengthen their position and solidify the political systems with the use of various tricks and sham operations. Despite of this political shift, the social structures remained mostly untouched or underwent only superficial changes 4. This experience of the past should make the reader cautious about the author’s assumption that “what we have seen in the first year of the uprisings (…) are only the very earliest manifestations of a deeper transformation” 5.

What has surely changed over the years is that, thanks to the development of new types of social media, the Arab societies are now more closely connected with one another and to the world than before. As a matter of fact, the role of media and new technologies in the Arab Spring are very well described and analyzed in Marc Lynch’s

1 The term “revolution” in political and social sciences refers to “a major, sudden, and hence typically violent alteration in government and in related associations and structures”. See entry “revolution”, Encyclopedia Britanica Online, www.britanica.com. This definition clearly links revolution with an alteration of power and its structures. Thus we will be able to use this term only to those of the events which will result in an essential, long term change of the political systems and political structures. So far, except the still uncertain case of Tunisia, the Arab uprisings did not change the political systems and structures of the states; thus, the use of the term “revolution” is unfounded.

2 in fact, many of the so called “revolutions” were in fact counterrevolution themselves, of course in a more common then a scientific sense, as they meant the return to power of the traditional and conservative groups and return the of the old, conservative social order.

3 M. Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, new york 2012, p. 65.

4 instead of creating new political, social and economic elites of the countries, the Arab authoritarian regimes preferred to rely on the old ones, traditionally including members of some specific clans and tribes, major landowners, local notables, members of religious groups and minorities, the army officers or just friends, comrades and members of family of the political leaders. r. owen, State, Power and Politics In the Making of the Modern Middle East, London 2008, pp. 34–35.

5 M. Lynch, op.cit., p. 5.

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book. it is easy to see that all the issues related to the social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, as well as to satellite television and news programs (Al-Jazeera) are the author’s particular object of interest. The deeply analyzed role of the media, together with a well depicted atmosphere of the events of the Arab Spring of 2011, are the biggest advantages of Marc Lynch’s newest book. The author describes the cases of Tunisia and Egypt in chapter 4, while in chapter 5 he focuses on what he calls “hashtag protests” in other Middle Eastern states 6. Though not all the protests and uprisings were so successful in toppling the governments as those in Tunisia and Egypt, all of them had numerous common features and the later ones repeated the patterns designated by the previous ones.

Concentrating on the influences of the new Arab public sphere, the hashtag protest and the role of mass media in spreading the patterns of the uprising all over the region, author almost completely ignores the core and most important factors lying behind the desperate protests and furious antigovernment demonstrations. People in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, yemen and other Arab countries, went out to the streets not because they heard about the meeting on al-Jazeera or read about it on Facebook, but because of poverty, unemployment, critical economic situation and lack of hope for a better future. other factors, like authoritarian political system, religious disputes, lack of civil liberties, ubiquitous corruption, or ethnic conflicts also stayed behind many antigovernment actions, but usually they either were rather short or could mobilize only relatively small parts of the society. Additionally, the governments had quite a few tools to deal with the problems of political, ethnic, or religious nature. Much more dangerous were the economic difficulties, as most of the authoritarian regimes did not have any ideas or solutions for them. They were also operating in a much longer period of time and the gap between the rich and the poor parts of society was widening constantly. The economic factor did mobilize the Arab societies and did force people to stand against the authoritarian regimes more effectively than any other 7, but reading Marc Lynch’s book one could have an impression that revolts and uprisings are just in the Arabs’ nature and they were waiting ready for a tweet or an announcement in al-Jazeera to start one in 2011.

6 The name related to the hashtag dates of the mass protests which occurred in a different states and are a result of the development of the new Arab public sphere. As noted by the author “The hashtags that began as a casual coordination device quickly became a symbol of the unification of diverse national struggles into a single campaign. The hashtags very explicitly defined each uprising as one chapter in a single unfolding story”. M. Lynch, op.cit., p. 104.

7 The role of the collapsing economy as a major threat for the stability of the authoritarian Arab regimes has been widely analyzed for example in C.M. Henry, r. Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, new york 2011; S.J. King, The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa, Bloomington 2009; D. Long, B. reich, M. Gasiorowski, The Government and the Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder 2011; B. Milton-Edwards, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, Cambridge 2008.

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in chapters 6 and 7 the author describes the responses of the Arab regimes of the respective states to the protests. Lynch starts with Bahrain, where the demonstrations of the Shia opposition were brutally crushed by the local police supported by the Saudi Arabian forces 8. The other Arab monarchs, King Abdullah ii of Jordan or King Muhammad vi of Morocco, whose budgets lack billions due to some moves on the political scene (like the dismissals of the most unpopular officials), promises of reforms, and some concessions to the opposition; however, they were able to appease the critics and retain power. Some revolts (or revolutions, as Marc Lynch calls them) lasted so long that they finally stalled. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt stalled after overthrowing the old regime, when the transition to the political reality already started. in yemen the protestors split into many different groups and the revolt lost its initial dynamic, leaving the country with a new president, Abd rabu Mansur Hadi, who substituted Ali Abdullah Salih, but with the same old regime.

The bloody civil wars that broke out in Libya and Syria are the subject of the author’s considerations in chapter 7, where he tries to explain the reasons of the Western states’ intervention in Libya and a lack of such thus far in the case of Syria. The explanation of the complexity of geopolitics in the Middle East and the interrelations between the Arab Spring and the politics of the region’s states are strong points of this chapter of the Arab Uprising… The reasons provided by the author for the restraint of the US and the European states in sending their warplanes and soldiers to Syria, as they did to Libya, are convincing, but lack at least a few points. First of all, the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt and the civil war in Libya brought to power and significantly strengthened different groups of Muslim radicals and fundamentalists. Potential fall of the Assad regime in Syria would most probably result in the same, but instead of the moderate islamists of the Muslim Brothers or Ennahda Movement, one could expect far more radical groups to play the major role. The other point missed by Lynch is that, paradoxically, the change of the Syrian regime does not lie in the interest of the most powerful player in the region – israel. For the israelis, Syria controlled by the Assad regime, their well-known enemy, but far too weak to pose any serious threat for their security, and aware of its weakness, is much better solution than Syria plunged into chaos, destabilized or controlled by various groups of Sunni radicals and fanatics.

in the final chapter Marc Lynch recapitulates the changes the Arab Spring brought to the Middle East and tries to present his own view of the American policy towards the region in these new circumstances. once again addressing the policy of president obama and his administration, Lynch strives to present their efforts as genuine, honest and selfless. The approach, he argues, which tried to combine liberal ideals

8 in his chapter Lynch tries hard to defend the position taken president obama during the events in Bahrain, suggesting that the lack of any reaction by the US government was a result of Saudis pressure and obama “had little choice but to defer to the Saudis and accept the fait accompli”. it would be really naive to believe it. US government was rather fully informed and fully supportive of the Bahraini brutal crackdown and Saudi Arabian intervention.

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with pragmatic interest became an object of unfair criticism from all the sides, from American neocons to the Arab activists. Unfortunately, his close ties with obama’s administration visibly influence Lynch’s attitude towards the current US government policies and deprive him of the capability of critical appraisal. Subsequently, the author concludes that the old status quo in the Middle East has been shattered for good and that the new realities will demand new methods.

i cannot restrain myself from taking advantage of my privileged position and using the most recent events in Egypt, to show how groundless were Lynch’s hopes for the definitive change of the old status quo and his belief in the radical change of the US policy toward the Middle East. The removal of president Mohamed Morsi from power by the army in a regular coup d’état and the establishment of an interim government, met with applause from a large part of Egyptian society and rage of the Muslim Brotherhood, which proves that neither the society nor its political culture changed after the Arab uprisings. And clearly they did not become more democratic. instead, President obama’s restrained reaction to this coup shows that the principles of the US policy towards the Middle East are still subordinated to their interests in that region.

The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East by Marc Lynch has two different faces. The good and very interesting descriptive part contrasts with a rather shallow analysis and sometimes with simply naive conclusions. At certain points the book also seems to be an uncritical attempt to defend the dull policy of president obama and his administration towards the Middle East.

Artur Malantowicz (rev.)

Raphaël Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,Hurst & Company, London 2013, pp. 288

“Hafiz died and Hama didn’t. Bashar will die and Hama won’t”. This quote from a Syrian rebel chanting anti-Assad slogans could as well sum up the masterpiece written by a young scholar raphaël Lefèvre, thanks to whom the significance of Hama is yet once again brought to light. inquisitively researched, thoroughly analyzed and timely published, Ashes of Hama is not only a critical guidebook to the history of the Syrian Muslim Brothers – long missing from the academic literature – but also a great explanatory key to events currently unfolding in Syria. Lefèvre provides readers with a unique account of the development of the islamist movement in Syria with the landmark of the Hama massacre still present in the public consciousness. All of this is backed by endless hours of interviews with the Muslim Brotherhood activists, independent islamists, members of the Ba’ath regime, experts, and analysts.

Throughout his book Lefèvre methodically explores the history and legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, starting from its intellectual roots in the ottoman and colonial times and finishing with the recent events of the civil war. As such, it is a valuable

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contribution to the debate on the Syrian political scene, both for the Academia and the general public, since many commentators agree that very little is known about the contemporary Syrian Ikhwan and its internal politics.

Ashes of Hama proves wrong all those claiming that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is merely a branch of its bigger and better known sister from Cairo. Early leaders of the Syrian Ikhwan, such as Mustapha al-Sibai and Mohammed al-Hamid, were in fact influenced intellectually by Hassan al-Banna as a result of their studies in Al-Azhar University in Cairo, but, as Lefèvre puts it, “the birth of Syria’s ikhwan in 1946 was very much the product of the country’s particular socio-religious and political landscape”. Based on the network of islamic societies created throughout 1930s and 1940s and inspired by the moderate Salafiyya movement, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was from the very onset an administratively and financially independent organisation.

Lefèvre presents the record of the Ikhwan’s early moderation and attempt to combine political islam with democracy, which was the first experiment of this kind in the Middle East. He also presents the process of radicalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in effect of its socioeconomic, political and ideological opposition to the Ba’ath party which took over and eventually monopolized Syrian political scene after 1963. Mutual distrust and rivalry between the two main political forces have also become the background for a rising wave of sectarianism which altered the social fabric of Syria in the 1970s and 1980s, and maintains its significance up to this day.

The progressing radicalisation of the Ikhwan, the leadership crisis and the struggle between different wings of the organisation (Damascus, Aleppo, Hama) eventually gave way to the rise of violent and radical jihadist movement within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in the form of its offshoot – the Fighting vanguard. As Lefèvre further explains, it ultimately led to a military confrontation between the islamists and the Ba’ath party, which came at the end of the 1970s. its culmination in February 1982, when pro-regime forces killed 25,000 to 40,000 civilians in the city of Hama, has thereafter become a symbol of the regime’s bloody crackdown on opposition and a factor successfully limiting any discontent among Syrian society. it also forced into exile the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, which, after years of internal crisis, has eventually restructured and recovered its coherence and now is about to return to the political scene in Syria.

Several notions raised by Lefèvre deserve special attention. one of them is the birth of jihadist movement in Syria, formed in opposition to the Ba’athist regime. Created by Marwan Hadid in the early 1970s, the Fighting vanguard soon turned into a well functioning terrorist organisation targeting Ba’ath state officials. When faced with severe regime oppression, militant islamists would eventually leave abroad, principally to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet presence, but also to iraq. in consequence, jihad became globalized and many members of the Fighting vanguard rose to prominence in other terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda, eg. Abu Musa’ab al-Suri, who was the main ideologist of al-Qaeda in the early 2000s. in the midst of the current civil war, some of them are now coming back to Syria to fight the Assad regime once again.

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Consequently, by exploring the relatively unknown history of the Ikhwan and its uneasy relations with the Ba’ath party, full of rivalry and mutual animosities, Ashes of Hama contributes to our understanding of the contemporary Syria. After reading it, the Ba’athist claims of the current war being the “final act of Syria’s long struggle between islamism and secular pan-Arabism” receive essential context and are more comprehensible. Likewise, the book’s narrative helps to recognize the internal complexity and diversity of the Ikhwan with its radical and moderate factions.

Simultaneously, the author shows in a clear manner that the Muslim Brotherhood is in fact only a part of a broader islamist movement among the Syrian opposition, yet it attracts most of the Western attention. Furthermore, Lefèvre raises important questions which should be of concern for the leadership of the contemporary Ikhwan in Syria, particularly how can they re-establish their support networks after a long time in exile, especially in the rural areas, and what role could they possibly play in post-Assad Syria?

one might wish to see a few aspects of the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood more deeply explored in raphaël Lefèvre’s work, principally its socio-economic and political agenda, which remains vague, as well as its relations and attitude towards the jihadist groups currently fighting in Syria. it would surely help in building a coherent and complex image of the Syrian Ikhwan among the Western audience. Despite these few minor oversights, Ashes of Hama is a valuable, well researched and very timely volume which enhances our knowledge about the issues essential for understanding the past, the present and the future of Syria.

Natalia daśko (rev.)

Nonie Darwish, Okrucieństwo w majestacie prawa. Prześladowanie kobiet w świecie islamu [Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law, Nashville 2008], KEFAS Publishing House, Warszawa 2011, pp. 352

in the democratic countries of the West, one of the fundamental principles of the state political model is the separation of the activity of religious organizations from the state bodies. However, the principle of the separation of the church and the state is alien to the states from the circle of islamic culture, where all law derives from the teachings of the prophet Muhammad.

Sharia, that is the essence of the Muslim law, encompasses all the aspects of human life, such as politics, economy, banking, trade, concluding contracts, marriages, divorces, children upbringing and taking care of them, sexuality, sin, crimes and various social issues 1.

1 n. Darwish, Okrucieństwo w majestacie prawa. Prześladowanie kobiet w świecie islamu [Cruel and Usual Punishment: the Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law, nashville 2008], Warszawa 2011, p. 36.

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Darwish tries to show Western communities how big a threat is the spreading of the law of islam to the Western civilizations. At the same time, she emphasizes that she is not against emigration of people from the Muslim countries to the Western states – after all, she is such an emigrant herself, but she warns the West against excessive tolerance to attempts (partly successful already) to use sharia by immigrants instead of the laws of the place of their permanent residence.

nonie Darwish was born in Egypt. in 1978, when she was 30, she moved to the United States – as she mentions “leaving to America set me free from life under the burden of the most cruel law system in the world. This was the best gift i received, when deciding to leave Egypt”. Darwish is an activist for the human rights, she gives lectures throughout America and she also appears in radio and television broadcasting stations, such as Cnn, Fox, Al-Arabiya, israeli Tv etc. She also visits many American universities, such as Harvard, Brown, Stanford etc. She has established the organization Arabs for Israel, and performs the function of the director at the Former Muslims United. Both organizations oppose jihad and opt for reforms in the world of islam.

in her first book: Now They Call me Infidel: Why I renounced Jihad for America, Israel and the War on Terror, Darwish shares her private experiences that made her give up islam and then convert to Christianity. The author’s latest book, The Devil We Don’t Know: The Dark Side of Revolutions in the Middle East, published in 2012, has not appeared in Poland yet.

Cruel and Usual Punishment is divided into two parts: Sharia: the Family and Sharia: the State, and within these parts, into eight chapters. Darwish shows how sharia regulates all the aspects of private and public life. With the help of sharia, the dominating culture of islam regulates the personal life (on a micro-scale) and state life (on a macro-scale). Giving examples, the author shows that absolutely every aspect of life is determined by sharia – marriage, inheritance, sexual intercourses, family relationships, trade, economy, law etc. Additionally, the most severe punishments are provided for the conduct against the rules – the death penalty included.

The first part, entitled Sharia: the Family concerns two issues – the history, or the roots of sharia, as well as the situation of women in the world of islam.

Firstly, Darwish explains the historical and environmental determinants of the tribal culture of Bedouins inhabiting the Arabian Peninsula, describes their culture and the way of life, and shows in what way Mahomet used all those specific features to create a new religion that would allow him to unite the tribes and enable their expansion. Darwish shows how the customs of the Arabian Peninsula, dating from the 7 th century AD, were codified as the law which applies to all Muslims to this day.

next, Darwish presents the situation of women in the world of islam. Her descriptions and observations are the more precious, because Darwish was born and brought up as a Muslim – therefore it may be stated that this is a “first hand” account so to speak, but given from the perspective of a “woman of the West”, whom she became in the United States.

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The situation of women is accurately rendered by the first sentence of the book by Darwish, who writes: “for the first thirty years of my life i was a real slave”. Darwish reveals the cruel rules women are subject to in the world of islam. She supports it both with theoretical examples – by quoting particular verses of the Quran or sunnah and their interpretations, and describing the events from everyday life, which ended up in the international media many times (e.g. the case of the raped Saudi girl 2).

The women of islam have no chance to shape their lives, they are controlled by men all the time – by their fathers and, later, by their husbands. Every aspect of their lives is limited to a minimum – they have no right to take free decisions about marriage, sexual intercourse, work, travelling, or even to have their own views. Darwish as an ex-Muslim testifies that women subject to sharia are second class citizens, for whom death is the penalty for committing a “sin”, both from the authorities and the society.

in the second part of the book Sharia: the State, the author shows what does the life of non-Muslims look like under sharia law. She describes in particular the position of Christians and Jews, who are discriminated and persecuted, as well as deprived of the fundamental rights.

The author dedicated much attention to jihad and acts of terrorism performed by Muslims. She warns that Muslims use lie and deception in relations with infidels, which is a great threat not only in personal, but also political relations, which the Western leaders seem not to notice.

According to Darwish, “the idea of the human rights is alien to nations in which sharia law is in effect, thus they have developed only the idea of oppression, shame, as well as alienation and sex segregation, which is propagated by sharia”. The author points out that the lack of awareness and respect for the fundamental human rights and a consistent ban and suppression of freedom of thinking breeds terrible social consequences. The draconian law of sharia is an ideal tool in the hands of rulers, because it allows the absolute subordination of the society to the state.

After the thorough analysis of Quran and the rules resulting from it, as well as quoting other studies, Darwish presents the position that islam should not be called religion but a political and legal system. Many times the author compares islam to communism, as a system that also in principle aspired to a total enslavement of the society, or to fascism, indicating that racism and class discrimination are an inherent part of the Muslim society.

The main objective of the author is to make the Western societies aware of the global threat connected with the expansion of islam, and together with it – of sharia. The book reflects Darwish’s personal involvement in struggle for discovering the truth about sharia and keeping freedom and democracy in the Western countries, which, in her opinion, are unaware of the threat connected with islam and consequently, they are too tolerant towards the Muslim immigrants.

2 ibidem, p. 106.

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Darwish persuades the readers that the West must finally realize what the true nature of sharia is, which is nothing more than the law of tyranny, “a fatal disease which destroys well functioning societies”. Darwish emphasizes that the aim of islamic fundamentalists is introducing sharia in all countries of the world. in her opinion, such a scenario may materialize if the West does not change its current policy towards islam, based on tolerance and openness.

Darwish does not make do with showing that threat in her book, but she goes one step further and she formulates a nine-point plan for the Western states that should be followed in order to oppose the expansion of islam. The original plan by Darwish assumes the redefinition of the concept of religion, regarding sharia as an illegal law, increasing the control of immigrants from Muslim countries, stopping granting visas to islamic imams coming from the Muslim countries, closing mosques and seats of Muslim organizations that use religion to encourage Muslims to murder and hurt people of other faiths or atheists, elaborating of immigration forms, demanding mutuality, stopping the inflow of petrodollars to the Arab countries, and strengthening the Jewish and the Christian fundaments of the Western civilization.

Darwish’s remark, which seems to be worthy of interest, is that the secularization of Western communities makes in a way “free room” for islam, which takes advantage of it and spreads with lightning speed. Moreover, the aim of islamists – the total control – is totally counter to the objectives of advocates of freedom and democracy. Darwish sheds light on the consequences of life under sharia and leaves it to the readers to decide how to react to this.

Presenting robust views and actively opposing the expansion of islam, Darwish comes in for harsh criticism from the representatives of this religion. nevertheless, typical charges against people criticising islam, that is the ignorance of the Arabian language and consequently, the impossibility of understanding the Quran, sunnah and other sources of law, as well as unfamiliarity with Muslim communities, cannot be directed at the ex-Muslim Darwish, born and brought up in Egypt. it is curious that the author, who is an advocate for reforms concerning particularly the women’s rights, many times experiences criticism also from Muslim women, who accuse her of distorting the picture of women’s life under sharia. The author repeatedly stresses that she meets with the indifference of young Muslim women to death and corporal punishments used towards islamic women for even minor departures from the rules of sharia. Darwish is often criticizes for her support for israel. Paradoxically, her father Colonel Mustafa Hafez, an officer of the Egyptian army, stayed in Gaza in the years 1951–1956 and was responsible for air raids on the south border of israel, where many civilians were killed. When Darwish was 8, her father died as a result of a bomb attack, which was the israeli response to attacks launched by him. The author remembers the impression made on her by the visit of President nasser, who asked her and her siblings: “which of you is going to avenge your father’s death by killing Jews?”

in spite of subjectivity – which is, however, difficult to avoid in her case – the book by Darwish makes a good study of islam and sharia and fills the gap in the information

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about the everyday functioning of this system from the inside. Some shortcomings are of editorial nature – the same thoughts, and even expressions, are repeated in almost identical form in different parts of the book. Sometimes one may have reservations about the language the author uses, as colloquial phrases appear in many places. However, one cannot resist the impression that such a form of message is determined by deep emotions Darwish feels, after all describing also her own experiences. What’s more, the book reflects Darwish’s great involvement in protection of democratic values and her genuine fear of the expansion of islam. The active attitude of the author certainly has an effect on the language of the book, which renders a great deal of emotions.

The great value of the book is Darwish’s personal experiences from the period when she lived in Egypt as a Muslim, as well as an extensive knowledge of the Arabian law sources in their original versions, thanks to which the book has both practical and theoretical value.

one of the drawbacks of this book are the incomplete footnotes (numbers of pages are missing) and a lack of index. incidentally, one may notice the inaccurate Polish translation of the title, which suggests that the book applies solely the prosecutions of women in the world of islam. Such a title detracts the value of complexity from the book which after all describes islam and sharia both in the private and state aspects.

Darwish emphasizes that her aim is not to propagate hatred towards the particular group of people but “show the truth about the baseness of the Muslim sharia law”.

in 2008 Darwish was honoured with the Clare Boothe Luce Award “Woman of Exceptional Courage” for her attitude. There is no doubt that is a justified choice, and nonie Darwish is indeed a woman of incredible courage.

Agata Muszyńska (rev.)

Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Marcin Wojciechowski, W cieniu. 12 rozmów z Marcinem Wojciechowskim [In the Shadow. 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski], Agora SA, Warszawa 2012, pp. 288

Adam Daniel rotfeld, b. March 4, 1938 in Przemyślany near Lviv. Polish Foreign Minister in 2005, a distinguished scholar, one of the best in the history of polish diplomats. Man for difficult issues, an expert on international security, indisputable authority in the international arena.

The most important moments in his academic career include: completing studies at the Diplomatic-Consular School of Foreign Service in Warsaw, where he defended his master’s degree in public international law, obtaining the title of Doctor of Law at the Law Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, receiving the title of Professor of the Humanities in 2001 1.

1 Adam Daniel Rotfeld, The internet Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/20080612182359/http://msz.gov.pl/auths/91/files/min_cv_de.html [access: 30.07.2013].

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For many years, he has been working with the Polish institute of international Affairs, was a member of the polish delegation during the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was the head of a research project at the international Peace research institute (SiPri) in Stockholm from 1989 to 2002, since January 2008 the Polish-russian co-chair Group for Difficult Matters. in August 2009, a member of the “Group of Wise Men” of nATo 2, author of numerous scientific papers dealing with international security, disarmament issues, public international law and international relations, including Poland in an Uncertain World (2006), Whither the World (2008), Thinking about Russia… and beyond (2012) and In the Shadow, 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski (2012).

The structure of the reviewed book, enriched with the introduction written by Teresa Torańska, contains 12 chapters – 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski, each presenting the memories of the people who rendered outstanding services to the history of international relations, with whom Adam Daniel rotfeld met, befriended, argued, worked and talked. The professor says that he remains “in the shadow” of the following personalities: ryszard Kapusciński, Czesław Miłosz, Zygmunt Bauman, Leszek Kołakowski, Henry Kissinger, Helmut Kohl, Charles de Gaulle, Mikhail Gorbachev, Pope John Paul ii and Jerzy Giedroyc.

The first chapter (Organizing Chaos) and the last (The Art of Diplomacy) tie up the recent history of international relations, organize reality – the mentioned chaos, and illustrate the role of diplomacy in the current world.

Adam Daniel rotfeld offers a collection of reflections as a witness of the age, he shows the connection between events of the last century and the current reality, shows their influence on today’s international order, examines contemporary issues that diplomats, politicians and leaders of all countries must face today. Everything is described from the perspective of the leading representatives of the intellectual and political life, “in the shadow” of ideas and concepts that accompanied the years of their lives.

The professor answers many important questions posed at the beginning of each chapter. He is of the opinion that we cannot predict the direction in which the world is changing and we cannot clearly define what is best for it. Moreover, author states that the further changes do not necessarily have to be connected with development and progress 3.

in the matter of the Polish culture, he believes that Polish literature lacks what is most important in the lives of Poles. There are no lofty, epic books which would allow the reader to move to the old days and to experience former realities. Writers create shallow, mass and chaotic books – it is highly probable that the former level of literature will never return 4.

2 Archives of the Polish institute of international Affairs [access: 30.07.2013].3 A. rotfeld, M. Wojciechowski, W cieniu. 12 rozmów z Marcinem Wojciechowskim [in the

Shadow. 12 conversations with Marcin Wojciechowski], Warszawa 2012, p. 37.4 ibidem, p. 61.

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The author says that there is no nation predestined to crime, or ethnic communities completely impregnated and incapable of crime. The source of evil which prevails in different countries is an ideologized political system based on terror and manipulation of human masses on a large scale 5.

rotfeld also describes the evolution of Marxism from Marx’s philosophical thought with the task of healing the economy, to transformation into a “new religion”, an instrument to eliminate political opponents. Marxism as an ideology remains an important point of reference for other ideologies of the XiX century, however, being implemented it leads to distortions, contradicts the very idea of the original concept, breeds the formation of sects and propagandists 6.

He also gives attention to the radicalism with which the world has changed. Democracy has become the norm, the population of the countries are not subject, but political society. Therefore, the actions that were taken in the XiX century would not yield the same results today. in an increasingly demanding world, we need to use more complex methods. Decisions are made by continuously growing groups of decision-makers, while the number of matters hidden from the wide population is decreasing due to the level of technological development. According to the professor, current politicians lack the courage to make significant reforms in the country, to actually change the situation for the better. What matters is the support of voters to maximise the chance for re-election. it leads to a kind of populism, where the government will promise anything, as long as the society is happy. According to the author, there was no lack of moral courage in Mazowiecki, Balcerowicz, or Kuroń. They paid a heavy price for it – have been hated by the society and thus lost a chance to be re-elected. However, for the good of the state and its citizens they did what was necessary. in today’s world politicians lack the courage to tell the truth 7.

rotfeld believes that empty statements are not enough in order to strengthen the spirit of Europe. They have to be followed by specific actions that will reinforce the presented position. Decisions must be made rationally, there is no place for favouring the members, belittling the problems, and creating inequality. in the EU, everyone should play by the same book 8.

The professor points out that the contemporary world is a great challenge caused by the existence of countries that are not able to control the situation within their own borders. These are weak, failing and failed states. in the interest of all, russia, Europe, and our neighbours should show no acceptance to an increase in number of those states.

5 ibidem, p. 80.6 ibidem, pp. 101–102.7 ibidem, pp. 176–177.8 ibidem, pp. 190–191.

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We should take such measures that would facilitate the process of their development and growth 9.

Author notes that the secularization of society does not lead to the collapse of ethical and moral principles. He concludes that they are respected there even more than in countries where religion is demonstrated in a very ostentatious way 10.

in today’s world these are valuable ideas for policy makers. According to rotfeld, no old idea can meet new challenges and threats. There is a need for the EU and other countries to learn new ways of overcoming the global crisis. They should create new ideas that will inspire leaders to take action and strive to achieve a consensus 11.

in my opinion, this book is one of the best positions regarding foreign affairs released in 2012. The original intention of the author – to create a volume of reflection – is fully achieved. The book touches, intrigues, forces to confront our own perceptions with the memories of a witness of the age. it describes the main problems of the modern world and shows possible solutions. The chapters contain similar number of pages, together form a coherent, logical and harmonious whole.

Author brilliantly analyzes and interprets the facts, as well as explains their connections to the events of the last century. Dialogue is not conducted in a haughty or arrogant manner. rotfeld allows readers to get to know his history and become familiar with the presented ideas, regardless of level of their knowledge.

reading this book not only allows to learn about Adam rotfeld, but also to learn about people in whose shadows he claims to remain. However, delving deeper and deeper into the reading, we come to the conclusion that rotfeld does not deserve the title of being in someone’s shadow. His contribution to the development of international relations is so immense that the reason the world has the highest respect for him is highly understandable.

From my perspective, the reviewed book should be on the shelf of anyone who is looking for reliable information, wants to understand the complexities of the modern world, and wishes to consciously participate in the political life, to know the history of his own country, but also its relationship with the rest of the international community over the last century.

9 ibidem, pp. 208–209. 10 ibidem, p. 215. 11 ibidem, p. 240.

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rober t Mańk (rev.)

Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, Basic Books, New York 2012, pp. 224

Zbigniew Brzezinski – born in Warsaw (March 28, 1928), an eminent geostrategist and political scientist. Since 1958, a US citizen, formerly President Jimmy Carter’s national Security Advisor between 1977 and 1981 1. Politically engaged not only in supporting the anti-Soviet guerrilla in Afghanistan but also in taking advantage of human rights as an instrument of ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, and in helping Polish “Solidarity”.

Laureate of numerous decorations – order of the White Eagle, the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the First Class Ukrainian order of Merit, to name just a few. Author of countless works, monographs, essays and reports in the field of international relations, of which the following are considered as the most popular and acclaimed: Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1990), The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), or Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower (2007). Long-term American universities lecturer – in the years 1953–1960 he worked at Harvard University, then from 1960 to 1989 – at University of Columbia. Currently a counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and international Studies and a professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced international Studies at John Hopkins University.

Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power is the latest book by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The work is written from a perspective of a geostrategist concerned about the fate of his homeland. Author sees the forthcoming changes in the foreign affairs and outlines an ambitious, long-term plan of action for the United States by 2025. The strategy is not looking further ahead because of the large number of variables occurring in the interstate relations, thus the accurate predictions made on a scale greater than two decades are, to a large extent, doomed to failure.

in the book composed of an introduction, four chapters (The Receding West, The Waning of the American Dream, The World After America: By 2025, not Chinese but Chaotic and Beyond 2025: A new Geopolitical Balance) and a conclusion titled America’s Dual Role, Zbigniew Brzezinski touches on numerous vital issues in the field of international relations. His primary goal is to predict the most likely scenario of progress of the foreign affairs and to determine the role of the United States in such setting. Hence, author shows the reasons of decline of the United States on the world stage, both domestic (such as causing the economic crisis in 2007 and unilateral policy of the George W. Bush administration) and external (shift in the center of gravity of foreign affairs from the West to the East resulting from rapid economic development of

1 http://csis.org/expert/zbigniew-brzezinski.

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Asia or dispersion of global power). What is more, Brzezinski thoroughly explains the origin and effects of the phenomenon known as the mass political awakening.

The next part of the book is focused on the constructive criticism of the United States. Brzezinski bluntly lists the largest and most serious weaknesses of the former global hegemon. He says that if the US do not take decisive steps – do not “rebirth” by at least achieving a political consensus on the matter of national debt or developing their infrastructure – they will deny themselves the chance to play a key role at the global level in the coming years. At the same time Brzezinski argues that American leadership will not be followed by the emergence of Chinese primacy, because the world is now in a situation in which no single state will be able to seize the role of a global leader 2. Author claims that the potential failure of the US in restoring its position will make the world more chaotic – whether in the case of neighborhood with Mexico 3, environmental problems, or states whose national security is largely guaranteed by the United States (South Korea and Japan to name just a few).

To prevent such an outcome, a former Jimmy Carter’s Advisor defines a dual role which, if performed correctly, will allow the United States not only to remain a key worldwide power, but also to act with their allies as a guarantor of the world’s stability and be a counterbalance to the growing Asia. According to Brzezinski, the role of the US would involve acting towards the enlargement and revitalization of the West – seen not only as the EU, but also as a Turkey, Ukraine and russia – as well as mediating and conciliation among the Asian countries 4.

While assessing the merit of the presented work, one has to keep in mind that it belongs to the branch of futurology. Author interprets current events and trends, and on such basis attempts to predict the most likely course of action. Therefore it is impossible to fully evaluate the accuracy of the forecasts themselves (since they will be reviewed in the future). They are not however totally improbable. Even more, many of them have a strong legitimacy in the contemporary geopolitical environment and with the occurrence of certain circumstances, these projections would likely become reality. in addition, Brzezinski demonstrates a comprehensive acquaintance with history, while the usage of historical references (such as noticing the similarities between the fate of the Europe of the twentieth century and the emerging competition in contemporary Asia 5) often reinforces the author’s thesis and allows the reader to better understand the complexity of described issues.

Furthermore, an experienced political analyst formulates his thoughts in a transparent way (four questions implemented in the introduction are an example, as they precisely define the subject of the whole work 6), and the utilization of additional

2 Z. Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, new york 2012, p. 75.

3 ibidem, p. 103.4 ibidem, p. 192.5 ibidem, p. 155.6 ibidem, p. 2.

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graphs, maps and tables helps to justify them in a thorough and consistent manner. What is noteworthy is that individual chapters are logically interrelated – for example, the question ending one chapter is simultaneously an opening to the reflections picked up in the next section 7. The only inadvertence which can be pointed out in the structure of the Strategic Vision is the irregular fullness of chapter four (over 60 pages) compared to the previous sections (about 30 pages each).

Finally, Brzezinski not only foresees the future global order, but, even more importantly, provides ready solutions that could and should be implemented under these circumstances. Hence, author is not a doomsayer, but an active creator of a potential strategy – be it rebuilding the international status of America described in the second chapter, or proper functioning on the East, which would avoid major clashes in that part of the world in the chapter four.

in conclusion, the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski is a book that broadens horizons, provokes and gives plausible vision of what might happen in the global balance of power in the forthcoming decades. At the same time i want to point out that the complexity of used vocabulary, as well as complex historical metaphors, could cause less knowledgeable receivers to find this book too difficult. However, it is a must-read for all concerned – in an amateur or professional way – with the contemporary foreign affairs. Students of politically-related courses, scientists and politicians will therefore be excellent recipients of this work.

7 ibidem, p. 74.