1

Money That Matters: the Role of Money in Campaigns and Elections*

Brian Roberts brian.roberts@austin.utexas.edu

Daron Shaw dshaw@austin.utexas.edu

Taofang Huang

joyfultao@yahoo.com

Mijeong Baek mbaek@mail.utexas.edu

University of Texas at Austin

Government Department 1 University Station A1800

Austin, TX 78712

Abstract

Using the results from a unique experiment imbedded in a national survey on attitudes towards

money and politics, this paper tests voters‟ reaction to the disclosure of campaign contribution

information. In particular, we explore reactions to differences in the source and amount of

campaign contributions. In general, we find that voters react far more to the source than to the

amount of campaign contributions.

Keywords: campaign contributions, elections, corruption, special interests, public percept ion.

Paper prepared for the 2010 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, Washington, D.C.

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Introduction

The US Supreme Court‟s 2010 Citizens United v. FEC (558 U.S. 50) decision ignited a

firestorm of criticism, including an unusually pointed reaction by President Obama in his State of

the Union address. Immediate calls arose for congressional action to undo the Court‟s finding

that limits on corporate (and, by extension, union) independent expenditures in support or

opposition of federal candidates were unconstitutional. It soon became clear, however, that the

Supreme Court justices, by grounding their decision in unusually clear First Amendment

language, had given members of the campaign finance reform community and their

congressional supporters very limited maneuvering room to put the independent expenditure

genie back in the bottle.

One of the few options left open by the Court to even indirectly dampen enthusiasm for

what some thought would be an unfettered flood of corporate political expenditures was to

broaden and deepen federal campaign finance disclosure requirements. Congressional reformers

soon introduced the Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending (DISCLOSE)

Act1, which called for significant strengthening of expenditure disclosure rules. 2 Although the

bill ultimately failed to clear Congress – on 7/27/2010 the Senate failed to vote cloture on S.

3628, effectively ending further congressional action – this episode raises important questions

about the foundations of campaign finance reform. Of particular interest in this case is whether

the failure of the DISCLOSE Act is rooted in a disconnect between the campaign reform

community and public opinion (which, for the sake of argument, will proxy for congressional

preferences) over either the relevance or direction of campaign finance regulation. In other

1 The Senate went through a couple of versions – S. 3295 and, ultimately, S. 3628 – while the House version was

H.R. 5175. 2 The DISCLOSE Act also prohibited firms with significant government contracts, foreign ownership or those that

received bailout funding (e.g., GM) from making any independent expenditures.

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words, was the DISCLOSE Act, with its emphasis on disclosure, doomed from the outset due to

a generic distaste for robust disclosure regulations or were there more idiosyncratic problems

with the bill?

To address this question, this paper uses data from a unique set of questions on a recent

national survey to assess public sentiment toward campaign finance disclosure. Our findings

suggest that the public readily incorporates campaign contribution information in their vote

preference. It is information about the source of money, however, not the amount, that drives

public perceptions of political corruption and voting behavior. This echoes the Court‟s

sentiments in the Citizens United decision; sentiments upon which, ironically, the sponsors of the

DISCLOSE Act failed to capitalize.

Corruption, Disclosure and the Courts

The disclosure of campaign finance activity was one of the earliest targets of federal

campaign finance laws, closely following the banning of corporate campaign contributions under

the 1907 Tillman Act as part of concerted Progressive Era efforts to address growing concerns

about the corrupting influence of money in politics. In fact, the first disclosure bill was

introduced in 1906 under pressure and guidance from the National Publicity Bill Organization, a

private group organized by Perry Belmont, a leading reformer, to galvanize grassroots support

for disclosure of the flow of money in politics. Although this first bill, introduced by Samuel

McCall (R-MA), failed, subsequent efforts in 1910 (c.392, 36 Stat. 822) and again in 1911 (§ 2,

37 Stat. 26) brought to life the first meaningful federal campaign finance disclosure laws (Mutch

1988, pp. 8-16).

The Progressive Era emphasis on corruption in politics, particularly related to the flow of

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money, remains a hallmark of campaign finance reform to this day. The Supreme Court has

consistently reinforced the corruption framework (as opposed to, for instance, the goal of

equalizing influence) as the basis for the constitutionality of campaign finance laws, which

otherwise might run afoul of the 1st Amendment.

The foundation of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in this arena was its 1976 decision in

Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1), in which the Court first wrestled with 1st Amendment challenges

to campaign finance law. The key to this was an acceptance by the Court of the notion that, in

the context of election campaigns, money was, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to speech;

there would be very little political speech absent the money needed to pay for it. Having made

this linkage of money and politics explicit, the Court obligated itself to address the infringement

of speech rights inherent to any limits on campaign contributions and expenditures. If any

campaign finance restrictions were to survive it was incumbent upon the Court to find a

sufficiently compelling state interest to tolerate infringement of speech rights.

The Court found this compelling state interest in, and only in, the potential of large sums

of money to corrupt, or appear to corrupt, the political process. With the threat of corruption as

its guide the Court delivered a controversial decision in Buckley that found campaign

contribution, but not expenditure limits to pass constitutional muster. This distinction, which

satisfied few on either side of campaign finance policy debates,3 has largely held fast to this day

over a significant number of campaign finance cases addressed by the Supreme Court, including

Citizens United.

Often lost in the controversy of the Buckley decision over contribution versus expenditure

limits is the fact that the Court also addressed constitutional challenges to disclosure provisions

3 The Supreme Court‟s decision to split the constitutional difference between contribution and expenditure limits

irked both those who hoped limits on both would be upheld and those who hoped the court would rule limits on

either to be unconstitutional.

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in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The appellants did not seek the elimination of

disclosure laws but, rather, claimed that those in FECA were overbroad, posing particular

burdens to small parties and independent candidates. In fact, the appellants went so far as to

argue that well-crafted disclosure rules alone were sufficient to address almost all concerns about

the role of money in politics.4

Although the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the FECA disclosure rules were

entirely constitutional, it was careful to apply strict scrutiny to the question because of

acknowledged threats that even disclosure rules had to 1st Amendment freedoms. As the Court

noted,

It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political

parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some instances,

disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not

insignificant burdens on individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the

interests that Congress has sought to promote by this legislation. (Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1)

In the end the Court found a compelling state interest in the ability of the FECA

disclosure rules to deter corruption and that the rules as written were sufficiently narrowly

constructed to pass constitutional muster.5 The Court did not find, as the appellants sought, that

disclosure rules alone met all the legitimate goals of campaign finance regulation. This reasoning

has largely remained intact ever since.

4 The DISCLOSE Act is coming under similar attack, including an open letter of opposition from the ACLU

(http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Ltr_to_Senate_re_ACLU_opposes_DISCLOSE_Act.pdf). 5 In addition to deterring corrupt practices the Court also found an interest in the ability of disclosure rules to combat

the “evils of campaign ignorance” by allowing voters to “…place each candidate in the political spectrum more

precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.” (Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1).

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Public Opinion and Campaign Finance Reform

The Buckley decision was not only controversial for its hair-splitting over contribution

and expenditure limits. As Persily and Lammie (2004) most clearly articulate, the Court‟s

construction of its corruption interest, by including the “appearance” of corruption as a legitimate

concern, is both unique and problematic. In some sense the Court turned the constitutionality of

campaign finance law over to the court of public opinion, or, more accurately, some unspecified

arbiter of the appearance of corruption; the Supreme Court provided no guidance as to whom one

should turn for such an assessment.

The Court‟s reasoning was (and remains) that the mere appearance of corruption, whether

or not any factual basis for a corruption claim exists, could be sufficient grounds for a citizen to

question the legitimacy of the federal government and, consequently, disengage from the

political process. In other words, the appearance of corruption was a clear and present danger to

democracy. The fact that scholars have been unable to establish any empirical foundation for

this chain of reasoning has failed to alter the Court‟s views (Persily and Lammie, 2004; Primo

and Milyo, 2006; Rosenson, 2009; Blass, Roberts and Shaw, 2010)

Public opinion, to the extent it is admissible evidence for or against the appearance of

corruption, thus plays a unique role in defining the nature and direction of campaign finance

regulation. The use and analysis of survey data in this paper is thus not simply a matter of

gaining insight to public opinion – an entirely worthy enterprise in and of itself – but of essential

interest to the Supreme Court‟s reasoning. What follows is an exploration of the relationship

between disclosure rules, contribution limits, perceptions of corruption and voting behavior, as

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expressed in the court of public opinion.

Campaign Contributions in the Public's Eyes: The Experiment

Included within an October 2009 national survey on attitudes towards money and politics

was an experiment designed to gauge respondents‟ support for a hypothetical candidate based on

three treatment variables: The sources and amounts of money raised by the candidate, along with

the candidate‟s party affiliation.6 Survey respondents were randomly assigned across eighteen

(18) combinations of variable values (see Appendix for the average support across the 18

groups).

Source

Disclosure of the source of campaign contributions is, in principle, one of the least

controversial campaign finance laws. The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, identified three

clear benefits of well-crafted disclosure rules: 1) disclosure is a source of information, providing

voters with a valuable means of placing candidates on an ideological spectrum, 2) disclosure is a

deterrent, keeping potentially corrupting contributions at bay, and 3) disclosure is a source of

good records, providing law enforcement and others the means to better detect violations of

contribution limits (Section 2.A., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1). Among the empirical questions

begged by these claims is whether voters do, in fact, take the source of campa ign contributions,

independent of contribution size, into consideration either directly in their vote choice or

indirectly through inferences about corruption.

6 The survey was constructed by two of the authors, Daron Shaw and Brian Roberts. Funding for the survey came

from the Center for Polit ics and Governance and the Texas Polit ics Project of the University of Texas at Austin . The

survey was conducted online by YouGov/Polimetrix and was in the field from October 13-22, 2009. All told, 2,100

people completed the survey, yielding a margin of error of +/- 2.1 percentage points. The response rate, using

AAPOR III standards for calculation, was 86%. Both the instrument and the data set are available from the authors

upon request.

8

To test voters‟ reaction to contribution source information our survey respondents were

presented with one of three primary sources of contributions to our fictitious candidate: Friends

& acquaintances, tobacco companies, or trial lawyers. Our expectations track closely with

campaign finance reform rhetoric, which places corporate money in a class of its own (most

likely to elicit the greatest negative voter response). Trial lawyer money would follow, although

possibly arousing an even greater response than tobacco money among Republicans (who regard

“frivolous law-suits” as a particularly egregious burden on the economy). Finally, contributions

from friends are expected to have the most benign impact.

Amount

Under federal law, campaign contributions are subject to disclosure requirements and

amount limits. A hallmark of federal campaign finance regulation since the 1970s has been the

presence of strong contribution limits.7 In fact, for the Supreme Court it was the campaign

contribution – a direct transfer of money from a contributor to a candidate – that provided the

most likely source of corruption through a real or apparent quid pro quo agreement. While the

Court upheld limits on the contributions to federal candidates by individuals, political

committees and parties, however, it placed no limits on the aggregate amount of contributions a

candidate could raise.8

In our experiment we disclose the aggregate amount – either $50,000 or $20,000,000 –

raised by our candidate from one of three sources. Theory suggests that voter reactions could go

7 State campaign finance laws vary considerably with respect to contribution limits, some having none at all for

individuals (e.g., Texas). 8 In McConnell v. FEC 540 U.S. 93 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the higher and inflation indexed individual

contributions put in place by Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (McCain/Feingold). The Court, in assessing state

campaign finance laws, has also signaled that there are limits below which there might be unacceptable 1st

Amendment infringement (Nixon v. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Randall v. Sorrell , 548 U.S. ___ (2006))

9

either way. On the one hand the size of the amount ra ised from any one particular class of

contributors could evoke concerns about political indebtedness – the quid pro quo that so

concernes the Court – and cause voters to take their support elsewhere; this would be especially

plausible with respect to corporate or interest group contributions.9 On the other hand, the ability

to raise a substantial amount of money may signal candidate strength and appeal to voters

seeking affiliation with a winner. Though many factors play a role in campaigns, the consensus

among candidates and parties is that if money is not sufficient to achieve electoral victory, it is

certainly necessary (Jacobson 1990, Amorós and Puy 2008). It is also possible that a positive

partisan effect could come into play if voters feel aligned with the broader policy agendas of

different contributors. This is to say that the amount of campaign contributions the hypothetical

candidate raised may encourage the public to make malicious as well as benign connection

between the candidate and his contribution donors.

Party

In addition to source and amount, we believe that the candidate‟s party affiliation may

also color the public‟s view on campaign contributions he received. Political scientists have

established a consensus that party matters (see Campbell et al. 1960, Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). A

candidate‟s party affiliation may directly or indirectly shape observers‟ expectations about the

candidate because of broader party images (Jarvis 2005, Philpot 2007).10 The public may reach

such impressions by inferring from policy agendas on parties‟ platforms (Petrocik 1996, Rahn

and Wessel 1998) or the demographic and political contours of party supporters (Phillips 2003,

Philpot 2007, Gelman 2008). In manipulating the party cue, we are also able to examine the

9 Corporate contributions have, of course, been illegal since the1907 Tillman Act, so for the purp ose of this paper the

use of the term should be thought of as contributions from corporate polit ical action committees. 10

One example is the roles that the public expects from the Democrat ic Party to act as “mommy” and the

Republican Party to be “daddy” (Jarvis 2005).

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impact of potential crosscutting pressures; for instance, to what degree will a low-income,

liberal, female Democratic voter support a male Democratic senatorial candidate who receives an

extremely large campaign contribution from the tobacco industry?

The Experimental Frame

The actual experiment imbedded in the larger survey entailed having respondents read a

slightly doctored news story in which the electoral prospects of a hypothetical Senate candidate –

Chris Jones – are discussed (items in brackets are randomly assigned to respondents):

“WASHINGTON, D.C. — When it comes to next year's primaries for U.S. senators, a few challengers may get lucky as their opponent incumbents are feeling a lot like Rodney Dangerfield: They can't get any respect.

As veteran lawmakers, Sens. Arlen Specter, D-Pa., and Jim Bunning, R-Ky.,

should be coasting, under normal circumstances, to the general election. Hard economic times, however, are stirring discontent about politics as usual, which opens the door for challengers, said Clay Richards, who recently retired as a

pollster at Quinnipiac University. "The economy is just catching up with these people who so far have been able to survive," Richards said.

As a(n) [Independent / Republican / Democrat], Chris Jones hopes to take advantage of the current political to win a Senate seat in November 2010. If his

fundraising is any indication, his chances seem pretty good so far. Since last December, Jones has raised [$20 million / $50,000], with the majority of this

money coming from [the tobacco industry / trial lawyers / friends and acquaintances]. Jones may get lucky, if the transcending trend of his popularity and fundraising keeps up. Over the next year, Jones will rely more and more on

his chief staff and growing army of staff and volunteers to launch his campaign with an eye toward an eventual victory in November 2010.”11

Following the news story respondents were asked,

“From what you know about Chris Jones, how likely do you think it is that you would

11

The news was modified based on an actual Associated Press report, “Some Incumbent Senators Seem to Get No

Respect” by Kimberly Hefling released on July 26, 2009 Available at

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-07-25-senators-primarychallenge_N.htm (Last Accessed on July

26, 2010).

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vote for him? Using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you would definitely NOT vote

for Chris Jones, 10 means you would definitely vote for Chris Jones, and 5 is exactly in

the middle, how likely do you think it is that you would vote for Chris Jones?”

All told, respondents could be sorted into any one of eighteen different treatment groups (see

Appendix for attendant summary statistics for each treatment cell).

Results

The initial top-line results displayed in Table 1 are interesting. Among all respondents, the

average likelihood of voting for candidate Jones is 3.95 (out of 10). Looking at support numbers

across the distinct contribution sources, significant differences exist: if Jones received

contributions from friends and acquaintances, his average support was 4.58, but if he received

contributions from the tobacco industry or trial lawyers, his average support was 3.64 and 3.69,

respectively. These differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Perhaps surprisingly, support for candidate Jones is utterly unaffected by how much he is

getting: his average support is 3.95 if he raised $20 million and 3.95 if he raised $50,000.

Finally, regardless of contribution source or amount, candidate Jones does worse if he is

identified as a Democrat. His average is 4.27 as a Republican, 3.99 as an independent, and 3.58

as a Democrat. This difference almost certainly reflects the mood of the nation at the time of the

survey. In the fall of 2009, Republicans were energized (and angry) while Democrats were

divided and defensive over issues such as the auto industry bailouts and health care reform. That

Republicans rallied to a Republican candidate more readily than Democrats to a Democratic

candidate is expected. We hasten to point out that the differential effect is not due to the partisan

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make-up of the sample. In fact, 32% of those surveyed identified themselves as Democrats

compared to only 24% as Republicans.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 2 gauges the statistical significance of differences between specific treatments;

especially between contribution source and amount, while controlling for the candidate‟s party.

Indeed, we find that Jones‟s party may well affect how the public sees the connection between

the contribution source and the candidate. A simple comparison of the average support level by

the source of money while controlling for the candidate‟s party affiliation demonstrates that

voters seem to be harder on Democrats and independents. If Jones was identified as a Democrat

or independent, receiving contributions from the tobacco industry or trial lawyers costs him

support compared to receiving money from his friends and acquaintances. But if Jones was

identified as a Republican, only receiving money from trial lawyers (and not the tobacco

industry) costs him support when compared to receiving money from his personal network.

Once again, we see that the amount of money candidate Jones received does not have a

significant impact on his support. This suggests that the public sees little difference between

$50,000 and $20 million in contributions. It is possible that both $20 million and $50,000 are

seen by the public as “too much,” and thus do not produce different responses. It is also possible

that people view influence (and perhaps corruption) as either present or absent. Once you are

“bought,” you are “bought,” irrespective of the underlying price.12

[Table 2 about here]

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When asked “At what point would the amount of money a candidate has raised cause you NOT to support him?”

84% of respondents offered an answer, with 26% saying “less than $50,000.”

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Model and Measurements

Although simple difference of means tests are highly instructive, we need to insure that

the effects noted above are not influenced by systematic differences in assignment to treatment

groups. As Imai (2002) notes, random assignment does not necessarily eliminate the possibility

that estimated effects are really driven by demographic or attitudinal variance between and

amongst cell populations. To control for this possibility and to specify conditional effects, we

offer multivariate models of support for candidate Jones. The dependent variable is the 0-10 level

of support for Jones, our hypothetical candidate. Given our continuous measure and the

plausibility of I.I.A. assumptions, we use an ordinary least squares estimator to analyze the

effects of our identified factors on support probability. Our key independent variables include the

source and amount of contributions to Jones, along with Jones‟s party.

Given our theoretical discussion (and a quick peek at the simple differences of means),

our main expectations are three-fold. First, we expect contributions from corporate or

professional associations to decrease the likelihood of support for candidate Jones. Second, we

expect that the amount of contributions could influence voters positively or negatively. Voters

may make inferences about a candidate‟s capacity to get things done or manage finances based

on the amount of money raised in the campaign, which suggests a positive relationship. On the

other hand, the amount may also signal to voters a worrisome closeness between donors and the

candidate, which suggests a negative relationship. Third, we expect the candidate‟s party to have

both a direct and a conditional effect. Partisans should support their candidate, though support

for the Republican candidate should be relatively high given prevailing political conditions. It is

also possible that the party of the candidate will condition the effects of contribution source and

amount. In particular, since Republican candidates are often identified with corporate interests,

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information to this effect may be less powerful than for a Democratic or (especially) an

independent candidate. Similarly, Democratic and Republican candidates are assumed to be

heavily involved in the money game, while independent candidates often emphasize their

outsider status and relative “purity.” We might therefore expect information about greater

amounts of money raised by an independent candidate to negatively affect his support.

As mentioned earlier, our models also control for other important demographics including

respondent‟s party identification (Republican, Independent, and Democrat), age, education,

income, union household (yes or no), gender, and general political knowledge. Controlling for

these covariates allows us to ascertain the unique influence of our treatment variables on support

for candidate Jones.

Results and Discussion

Table 3 offers our baseline and full models, including the key treatment variables along

with various controls. Notice also the inclusion of multiplicative interaction terms for

contribution source and the candidate‟s party. Other potential interactive relationships were

estimated (including those between candidate‟s party and contribution amount, and between

contribution source and amount), but none proved significant. Neither model indicates that

candidate support is much influenced by contribution totals. Though we did not predict this,

neither is it totally unexpected. In contrast, the source of campaign contributions exerts a

significant impact. Compared to contributions made by friends and acquaintances, campaign

contributions from the tobacco industry or trial lawyers decrease the likelihood of support for

Jones. For example, campaign donations to Jones from tobacco companies decrease the

likelihood of voting for him by almost one point on a 0-10 scale, holding other factors constant.

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A similar but slightly lesser effect is found in the case of trial lawyers. As for partisanship, as

expected we find that when Jones was presented as a Republican candidate the vote probability

score is significantly greater than when he is an independent or a Democrat, even controlling for

the respondent‟s party identification. The data here clearly foretell subsequent GOP triumphs in

Virginia, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, where Democratic candidates were swamped by an

energized GOP base and disgruntled independent voters in November 2009 and January 2010

(respectively).

What of the interactive relationship between the candidate‟s party and contributions?

Results of the full model show that the candidate‟s partisanship does indeed change the relative

importance of funding sources in the vote decision. When the candidate is Republican, the

negative effects associated with campaign contributions from the tobacco industry and trial

lawyers declined. In particular, the interaction effect is statistically significant in the c ase of the a

GOP candidate and contributions from the tobacco industry. This indicates that voters are in

general more tolerant of the Republican Party regarding the potential influence of corporate or

special interest groups. We should also observe that for both the baseline and full models, the

control variables have no statistically significant effect on support for candidate Jones.

[Table 3 about here]

The regression models in Table 3 suggest that, when it comes to information about a

candidate‟s campaign contributions, voters put more weight on where the money comes from

than how much the candidate raises. As noted in the discussion of the interaction term effects

above, we also find that the candidate‟s partisanship conditions the effect of contribution source

on candidate evaluations. This last effect begs for additional elaboration, however. Towards this

end, we run separate regressions by the candidate‟s party.

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Table 4 shows the results of these estimations, and demonstrates (again) that when

campaign money came from the tobacco industry or trial lawyers, voters were less likely to

support Jones. When Jones was Republican, however, the contribution source effect disappears.

By comparison, when Jones is labeled as Independent, the contribution source effect is largest.

These regression results suggest that financial connections with corporations or special interest

groups may disproportionately hurt independent candidates, while Republicans are relatively

immune to negative blow-back. Again, the public's expectations seem to be that Democratic and

independent candidates are less tied to corporate interests so that information establishing such a

connection has a more dramatic influence on voters‟ appraisals.

The estimated effects associated with contribution amounts in Table 4 reaffirm the

findings in Table 3: how much money a candidate raises does not significantly affect the

likelihood that voters will support him. This lack of effect holds across all candidate/party

categories. Interestingly, if Jones is a Republican candidate, the contribution total of $50,000 (as

compared with $20 million) very slightly decreases his support, while the opposite relationship is

found when Jones is either a Democrat or independent. Note, however, that the estimated effects

associated with these contribution totals are far from significant factor in all three models.

When estimating support for candidate Jones by party in Table 4, we see that some of our

control variables exert a significant effect. This is expected; random assignment should mitigate

such effects across the full sample but not within specific (and low N) treatment groups. Perhaps

more to the point, some of the different control variable effects are notable. When Jones is

Republican, the voters' own party identifications have a significant influence, trumping that of

campaign contribution source. When Jones is a Democrat, however, both party and contribution

source matter. When Jones is an independent, party falls to insignificance and contribution

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source dominates.

Two other factors merit mention: all else being equal, (1) senior voters are less likely to

support an independent candidate, and (2) union members are more favorably inclined to support

a Democrat.

[Table 4 about here]

In short, money matters in campaigns and elections, but not as one might have guessed.

The source of campaign contributions, as we expected, does affect the public's support for a

candidate. The amount of money a candidate raises, however, does not. When campaign

contributions come from the candidate's friends and acquaintances, voters tend to be more

favorably predisposed towards the candidate. If contributions come from corporations or special

interest groups, though, Democratic and independent candidates tend to lose support while

Republican candidates are unaffected.

Conclusion

This paper focuses on how the public perception of contribution source and amount

affects vote choice. We find that where the money is coming from greatly matters to the public,

while the amount does not. Moreover, we find that voters apparently expect Republican

candidates to raise money from corporations and special interest groups, and are therefore less

likely to “punish” them for this fact.

But what does this mean for the future of campaign finance in the U.S.? The present

analysis suggests that increasing information about contribution source (disclosure) could

significantly affect voters‟ perceptions of candidates. Furthermore, the apparent irrelevance of

the total sums of money raised and spent in the 2008 U.S. presidential election – few withheld

18

support for Barack Obama in objection to his unprecedented fundraising – is also entirely

consistent with our findings and begs questions of reform efforts centered on reducing the

amount of private money in politics. The Court‟s initial ruling in Buckley, therefore, may have

been off the mark, while the efforts of congressional Democrats to pass DISCLOSE in the 2010

session were more in line with the sort of information voters use to infer influence and/or

corruption.

There is an obvious irony here with respect to these recent efforts by congressional

Democrats, however. Our data show that increased disclosure could disproportionately hurt

Democratic and independent candidates by providing information on corporate and special

interest group linkages.

As always, caveats abound. Most obviously, the experimental set-up here maximizes the

relevance of source effects; most candidates rely on a mix of contributors and are not dominated

by a single, unpopular industry. Still, there is no reason to doubt that the nature (if not the

magnitude) of the pattern observed here is idiosyncratic. Moreover, policy-makers, as well as the

courts, could clearly benefit from additional data on the subject.

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22

Appendix—Assignment of Respondents to Different Treatment Groups

N Mean 0-10

S.D. S. E. 95% Conf. Interval for Mean

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

1 Independent, 20 mil, tobacco

86 3.41 2.433 .262 2.89 3.93

2 Independent, 20 mil, trial 99 3.40 2.792 .280 2.85 3.96 3 Independent, 20 mil, friends 82 5.09 2.361 .261 4.57 5.61 4 Independent, 50 thou, tobacco

90 3.27 2.278 .240 2.79 3.74

5 Independent, 50 thou, trial 74 4.06 2.439 .283 3.50 4.63 6 Independent, 50 thou, friends

75 5.05 2.346 .271 4.51 5.59

7 Republican, 20 mil, tobacco 109 4.31 3.230 .310 3.69 4.92 8 Republican, 20 mil, trial 98 4.21 2.988 .302 3.61 4.81 9 Republican, 20 mil, friends 88 4.46 2.973 .318 3.83 5.09 10 Republican, 50 thou, tobacco

90 4.36 3.203 .338 3.69 5.03

11 Republican, 50 thou, trial 96 3.66 2.515 .256 3.15 4.17 12 Republican, 50 thou, friends

83 4.68 2.989 .328 4.03 5.33

13 Democrat, 20 mil, tobacco 96 3.25 2.609 .266 2.73 3.78 14 Democrat, 20 mil, trial 90 3.43 2.592 .273 2.89 3.97 15 Democrat, 20 mil, friends 92 4.06 2.652 .277 3.51 4.61 16 Democrat, 50 thou, tobacco

88 3.11 2.440 .260 2.60 3.63

17 Democrat, 50 thou, trial 89 3.42 2.585 .274 2.88 3.97 18 Democrat, 50 thou, friends

81 4.26 2.587 .287 3.69 4.83

Total 1606 3.95 2.749 .069 3.82 4.09

F=4.624, p < .000

23

Table 1—Voting for Jones by Contribution Source, Amount, and Candidate Party

Total Number

of Cases

0-10 Probability

of Voting for

Jones

Standard

Deviation

Contribution Source

Friends and acquaintances 500 4.58 2.69

Trial lawyers 547 3.69 2.68

Tobacco companies 559 3.64 2.78

Contribution Amount

$50,000 766 3.95 2.68

$20,000,000 840 3.95 2.81

Candidate Party

Republican 563 4.27 3.00

Democrat 537 3.58 2.60

Independent 506 3.99 2.56

TOTAL 1,606 3.95 2.75

Table 2—Level of Supporting Jones by Party and Source of Money

Jones is … Difference in Means ANOVA Test

Tobacco vs.

Friends

Tobacco vs.

Lawyers

Lawyers vs.

Friends

Republican -0.24 0.39 -0.63* p > 0.05 (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) Independent -1.73* -0.35 -1.39* p < 0.001

(0.27) (0.26) (0.27) Democrat -0.97* -0.24 -0.73* p < 0.01

(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)

*: p < at lease 0.05

24

Table 3—Predicting support for Candidate Jones by Treatment

Baseline Model Full Model

Variable β s.e. β s.e.

Money Source

Tobacco Industry -0.911*** 0.172 -1.359*** 0.213

Trial Lawyers -0.835*** 0.173 -1.038*** 0.214

Party Affiliation of Jones

Republican 0.440** 0.171 -0.219 0.279

Democrat -0.257 0.173 -0.259 0.172

Interactions

Republican Jones X Tobacco -- -- 1.289*** 0.361

Republican Jones X Lawyers -- -- 0.595 0.364

Money Amount

Amount 0.033 0.140 0.047 0.139

Demographics

Republican 0.285 0.180 0.258 0.180

Democrat -0.231 0.163 -0.254 0.162

Age -0.118 0.076 -0.111 0.076

Education -0.021 0.151 -0.021 0.151

Income -0.010 0.089 -0.005 0.089

Union household 0.344$ 0.195 0.376$ 0.195

Female -0.233 0.144 -0.237$ 0.144

Political Knowledge -0.347 0.254 -0.313 0.253

Constant 5.073*** 0.394 5.241*** 0.397

F p < 0.001 p < 0.001

R2

0.044 0.052

***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.010; * : p < 0.050; $: p < 0.100.

25

Table 4—Predicting support for Candidate Jones by Treatment (by Party)

Chris Jones is … Republican Independent Democrat

β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.

Money Source

Tobacco Industry -0.049 .302 -1.682*** .276 -1.059*** .268

Trial Lawyers -.494 .305 -1.256*** .279 -.790** .271

Money Amount

Amount -0.026 .245 .160 .223 .147 .217

Demographics

Republican 1.073** .307 .243 .294 -.680* .282

Democrat -1.880*** .293 -.281 .254 1.331*** .252

Age -0.079 .136 -.337** .123 -.142 .115

Education -.255 .274 -0.077 .239 -.257 .232

Income .124 .161 -.119 .138 -0.093 .139

Union household -0.010 .347 .340 .298 .906** .318

Female -.253 .255 .129 .227 -.362 .225

Political

Knowledge

-.623 .444 .394 .401 -.682$ .397

Constant 5.062*** .687 5.459*** .593 4.888*** .573

F p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001

R2

0.170 0.107 0.170

***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.010; * : p < 0.050; $: p < 0.100.