Nation-State Building in Kyrgyzstan and Transition to the Parliamentary System

Nation-State Building in Kyrgyzstanand Transition to the Parliamentary System

Ismail Aydıngun1,* and Aysegul Aydıngun2,*

1Department of Political Science and International Relations, Baskent University, Baglica Yerleskesi, Eskisehir Yolu,

20 km, 06810 Etimesgut, Ankara, Turkey;2Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Inonu Bulvari, Balgat 06531, Ankara, Turkey

*Correspondence: [email protected]

This article explores the post-Soviet political transformations experienced in

Kyrgyzstan and argues that there are structural reasons for the political in-

stability, which places obstacles to nation and state building. The fragility of

the political situation is explained with reference to the 1990 and 2010

Osh riots as well as to the popular revolts of 2005 and 2010. In addition,

the political and legal reforms of the post-Soviet period are evaluated.

Structural reasons for the political instability, the recent transition to parlia-

mentary system and the future of parliamentary democracy are discussed in

the light of domestic and global dynamics and the socio-political history of

the country.

1. Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to major political, economic and social

transformations and problems in the newly independent ex-Soviet republics,

one of which is the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which declared her independence

in August 1991. One of the most important problems of many post-Soviet coun-

tries is to establish unitary states in multiethnic societies. The incongruence of

ethnic borders with political borders, which were established as a result of the

Soviet ethnic engineering policies, and some other historical factors constitute

sources for conflict as well as obstacles for nation and state building. In addition,

the dominance of authoritarian regimes, and the growing involvement of political

leaders in corruption and clientalism aggravated the political instability.

Although the transition in Kyrgyzstan was not realised by the authoritarian

former Communist Party members in contrast to many other post-Soviet Repub-

lics, in time they became authoritarian and strengthened the presidential system

# The Author [2012]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society; all rights reserved.

For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]

Parliamentary Affairs (2014) 67, 391–414 doi:10.1093/pa/gss046Advance Access Publication 6 August 2012

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by enlarging the powers of the president. However, they still could not establish

stability.

The political situation in Kyrgyzstan has been tense since her independence,

although the country is ironically addressed as an island of democracy of

Central Asia by Western countries. However, the literature on transition and

democratisation is mostly far from explaining the complicated and different

nature of the domestic dynamics in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan is

relatively the most liberal country of Central Asia. Still, politicians are far from

responding to the needs and demands of people, and they are ineffective in

dealing with the economic crisis.

Askar Akaev was the president of the Republic from 1990 to 2005. He was pro-

moted by Chinghiz Aitmatov, the famous figure of Kyrgyzstan literature and the

former ambassador. In March 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiev came to power following

the Tulip Revolution, one of the coloured revolutions experienced in the post-

Soviet space that dethroned Askar Akaev, who was accused of corruption and cli-

entalism. Recently, history has repeated itself in this strategic country of Central

Asia; Bakiev, who was expected to give an end to corruption and nepotism in the

country, was accused of the same improprieties as Akaev. Indeed, Bakiev was

much more involved in corruption, and it is under his presidency that corruption

and criminal activities became centralised and controlled by himself (Marat,

2010). Bakiev was overthrown in April 2010 as a result of clashes and protests

in the streets of Bishkek, during which dozens of people died. He was obliged

to flee first to Kazakhstan and then to Belarus. The dynamics of 2005 and 2010

revolutions were different in that the former was more of a result of external

factors relating to the mobilisation of non-governmental organisations, while

the latter was more of a result of internal dynamics very much shaped by the

tradition of Kurultay.

A provisional government led by Roza Otunbaeva, who held the presidency of

the Kyrgyz Republic until 1 December 2011, was formed to govern the country

until 10 October 2010 parliamentary elections. Otunbaeva’s interim government

dissolved the parliament, a fact which is considered by many as a mistake that

none of the former Kyrgyz executives had made since this decision disbanded

the parliament, in which different groups were bargaining, cooperating and

forming alliances (McGlinchey, 2011, p. 82). As a result of this act, the Southern

elite took a stance against Otunbaeva. Ethnic clashes and tensions between

Uzbeks and Kyrgyzs once more reigned in the country soon especially in the

South. They first took place in May, in Jalalabad, the home town of Bakiev,

and later in June in Osh few days before the constitutional referendum.

Despite these, the constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections were

held on time, raising hopes again for the establishment of the parliamentary

regime and a democratic Kyrgyzstan with the new constitution in June 2010.

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The results of the parliamentary elections of 10 October 2010 were thought

provoking because Ata-Jurt, which demanded the return of Bakiev and which

opposed the parliamentary system, became the first party. The election results

required the coalition of at least three political parties to form a government.

It took more than two months for the government to be formed and approved.

In 15 December, Respublika, Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan and Ata-Jurt

were joined. Paradoxically, for the first time in Central Asia, a parliamentary

democracy was established with a majority coalition, including political parties

openly opposing such a regime. One of the leading figures of Ata-Jurt, Akhatbek

Keldibekov, was chosen as the Head of Parliament and the leader of Social Demo-

cratic Party, and Almazbek Atambaev as the Prime Minister. The leader of Respu-

blika, Omurbek Babanov, became the First Deputy Prime Minister. However, the

hopes for a democratic Kyrgyzstan were to face many challenges. A year later,

prior to the October 2011 presidential election, the debate about the consistency

of the parliamentary regime was still on the agenda, and although the challenges

to the parliamentary system were still strong following the election of Atambaev

as the president, the support given to Atambaev was indicative of support given to

the parliamentary regime by the people of Kyrgyzstan to put an end to the

concerns about returning to the presidential system.

Kyrgyzstan has been in an extremely fragile political situation since her inde-

pendence. Therefore, the governments need to apply a balanced internal policy,

aiming at controlling the potential internal conflicts which have erupted since

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as a balanced foreign policy. There

are two main reasons why Kyrgyzstan has a critical importance in the rivalries

among global and regional actors. The first is undoubtedly the geo-strategic sig-

nificance of Kyrgyzstan, which is situated between China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan

and Tajikistan, and which includes in its borderland a part of the Ferghana Valley.

The second reason is her natural resources such as gold, uranium, oil, coal,

antimony and hydroelectric power.

Despite the richness of some resources, Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest coun-

tries of the region. The independence led to economic impoverishment in many

segments of the society. Because of the incompetence of the presidents in man-

agement of the global and local dynamics, and a largely corrupt system hinging

on strong links between most politicians and the mafia, governments lost their

legitimacy in the eyes of the people of Kyrgyzstan, who suffer from poverty,

corruption and human rights violations. The Kyrgyz had a growing distrust of

politics, political parties and the state both because of the experience of the

Soviet regime, during which everything was controlled by one political party,

the Communist Party, and the corruption that dominated politics in the post-

Soviet period (Rose and Mishler, 1998). The Soviet experience of political

party and the parliament considerably influenced the perception of people and

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also the present nature of these institutions, which did not have any significant

power under the Soviet rule, during which laws were created in Moscow and

approved at the republic level.

Even after 20 years of independence, problems continue, and the fragility of

the nation and state building makes its presence felt. And even 20 years after

the Osh riots, nothing much has changed. Kyrgyzstan is still dealing with

ethnic, socio-economic and regional cleavages. How well the new government

and the new regime will solve these cleavages is yet to be seen. The case of

Kyrgyzstan sets an important example not only for other Central Asian countries

but also for other post-Soviet republics, where parliamentary democracy is

unknown except for the Baltic Republics.

In the light of the view that ethnic and political instability in Kyrgyzstan have

structural reasons (i.e. economic, regional, ethnic and clan), it is argued that the

existing interrelated regional, economic and ethnic cleavages constitute import-

ant obstacles to the nation and state-building process. The strong presidential

system could not overcome these structural problems in the last two decades.

The process of nation and state formation and the changing nature of ethnic rela-

tions among ethnic communities living in Kyrgyzstan are analysed considering

not only the Soviet legacy but also certain historical facts and current dynamics.

In the light of this analysis, the impact of the recent transition to the parliamen-

tary system on the nation- and state-building process, and the future of

parliamentary democracy are evaluated considering the link among security,

nation-state formation and international dynamics.

2. Historical background

Studying the context with a historical perspective is necessary to better under-

stand today’s Kyrgyzstan. In other words, knowing the social history of Kyrgyz-

stan will shed light onto today’s social and political cleavages. Because it is

difficult to depict a national history from the history of Central Asia and

because the Chinese sources are largely neglected, the history of Kyrgyzstan

aiming at understanding today’s situation needs to be overviewed briefly.

There are different views about the origin of the Kyrgyz. While Tsarist ethno-

graphers regarded them as almost identical with the Kazakhs in terms of race and

language, Soviet ethnographers made a clear distinction between the two com-

munities (Wheeler, 1964). Similarly, Golden mentions that there is considerable

debate regarding the origins and ethno-linguistic classification of the Kyrgyz. He

refers to some scholars like K. Petrov, who claims that Kyrgyz (Qırqız) was

originally a territorial name (Upper Yenisei region) and became an ethnonym

only later. This ethnonym later spread as a political designation (Golden,

1992). Although there are different approaches to the formation of Kyrgyz


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tribes and their settlement in today’s Kyrgyzstan, the general consensus is that

they have a heterogeneous ethnic composition with a number of tribes and com-

munities of Central Asia. The ethnonym Kyrgyz had a largely political function

rather than an ethnic function. It is also argued that the first Kyrgyz Khanate

was formed in the 6th century and Kyrgyz tribes had been very influential in

Central Asia and succeeded in great territorial expansions until the Mongol dom-

ination (13th and 14th centuries). The Mongol conquest devastated Central Asia

including the Kyrgyz Khanate, causing the migration of many Kyrgyz to different

parts of Central Asia and China. They first became part of Golden Horde, and

then, part of Mongol Oirat and Jungar Khanates. Later, Kyrgyz formed an inde-

pendent Khanate in the 15th century, during which they started to develop a

sense of nationhood and distinct community. In the 17th century, they were con-

trolled by the Kalmyks. In the mid-18th century, they were under the control of

the Chinese, the Manchus (Akiner, 1983; Olcott, 1997; Kort, 2004).

Rooted in nomadism, the organisation of the community hinged on kinship

groups attached to clans, which formed tribal confederations. These confedera-

tions, especially those of Northern and Southern groups, were struggling with

each other in many cases. Disunity and internal struggle marked most of the

history of the Kyrgyz people (Anderson, 1999). Islam spread relatively late, and

it was only in late 17th and 18th century that it became dominant in the

region despite the survival of many pre-Islamic practices (Golden, 1992,

pp. 405–406). The growing power and influence of the Uzbek Kokand

Khanate in Central Asia at the end of the 18th century and early 19th century

also controlled the Kyrgyz tribes. Disturbed by the control of the Uzbeks and

intra-tribal conflicts, Kyrgyz demanded the protection of Russians by sending

delegations to the Russian Empire. In 1876, Russians defeated the Kokand

Khanate and occupied the region. This entailed the submission of the Kyrgyz

to the Russian Empire, the penetration of Russians into Central Asia, and also

the settlement of many Russians and Ukrainians in the Region. Policies of the

Russian Empire especially regarding distribution and confiscation of land

caused considerable resentment among the Kyrgyz, who suffered from loss of

land and whose traditional lifestyles were threatened (Olcott, 1997, pp. 111–

112; Anderson, 1999, pp. 3–5). The arrival of the Russians caused the migration

of some Kyrgyz tribes to the Pamirs and Afghanistan (Akiner, 1983, p. 329).

It is important to note that the first Kyrgyz-Russian contacts can be traced

back to the 17th century, when the ambassadors of Peter the Great visited the

region. Later, at the end of the 18th century, Russians started to penetrate to

Central Asia by sending ambassadors, travelers and scholars, which eventually

caused the submission of the Kyrgyz to the Russian rule (Anderson, 1999,

p. 4). The Russian rule over Kyrgyz land gradually and inescapably challenged

the traditional way of life and the demographic structure of the region through


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the migration of Russians and Ukrainians to the urban centres. Covert as the

crisis with Russians was, Kyrgyz who were subjected to high taxes, land loss,

forced labor and other discriminatory policies applied by the Russians felt in-

creasingly discontented. The poverty of the Kyrgyz farmers and nomads increased

under the First World War conditions, causing protests against Russian and

Ukrainian settlers backed by the Russian forces. Rebellions did not only take

place on Kyrgyz lands but also in other places of Central Asia, inflicting heavy

casualties and forcing many to migrate to China (Akiner, 1983, p. 329; Olcott,

1997, p. 112; Anderson, 1999, pp. 6–7).

Following the Bolshevik Revolution, despite the rebellions against the revolu-

tion, the revolutionaries were successful in gaining the support of the local people

by giving an end to terror and convincing them to preserve their traditional life-

styles, as well as promising territorial autonomy. In 1918, the Turkestan SSR was

formed, and Kyrgyzstan became part of this SSR until the formation of the

Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Province (part of RSFSR) in 1924. The Kara-Kyrgyz

Autonomous Province was renamed as the Kyrgyz Autonomous Province in

1925, and then it became the Kyrgyz ASSR in 1926. In 1936, Kyrgyzstan

became a Union Republic (Akiner, 1983, p. 329). At the time, the dominance

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the political system was an

unchallenged fact, which continued until the Gorbachev period.

Although changed over time, the political borders drawn by the Soviet regime

never overlapped with the ethnic borders. Also, the Soviet regime built a hetero-

geneous ethnic structure in all Soviet republics not only with the new political

borders but also through deportations and other settlement policies. In addition

to the mismatch of political borders with ethnic borders, the social changes that

rapidly took place as a result of the early policies of the Soviet regime were also

significant. They entailed the destruction of nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyles

contradicting with the promises made in the early years of the revolution. This

had a significant impact on the relations between different communities of the

region and caused competition over certain resources. For instance, the Ferghana

Valley, which had always been at the crossroads of many cultures and communi-

ties, was splintered over three Central Asian republics, namely Kyrgyzstan,

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as a result of the policies of the Soviet regime. More

importantly, however, the collectivisation period (1930s) and the forced

settlement policies drastically changed the traditional lifestyles of many

nomadic tribes. The Kyrgyz, who used to live in the mountains, were forced to

give up their traditional lifestyles and settle in the valley, where the Uzbeks had

been living for a long time in history. This is the main cause behind the conflicts

over land, which raged during the process of privatisation after the collapse of the

Soviet Union.


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As mentioned above, in the past, those two communities were living in their

own natural settings: Kyrgyz in the mountains and Uzbeks in the plain. The trad-

itional Kyrgyz lifestyle was increasingly destroyed in the Soviet period, which

began with the control of the region by Russians in the 19th century and their

settlement in the lowlands, coincided with the development of the idea of a

national state and the institutionalisation of ethnicity by the Soviet regime.

It is of critical importance to understand that, historically, political loyalty has

always been much more important than cultural similarity. In other words,

people living on those lands were socially loyal to their families and neighbours

and politically to their ruler, regardless of culture (Roy, 2000, p. 3; Savin, 2010).

The modern Kyrgyz too are highly conscious of family and clan membership,

which still plays an important role in social life to compete for social and eco-

nomic advantages (Olcott, 1997, pp. 132–133). In other words, the significance

of tribe (or clan, or family) did not disappear. Especially in rural areas, it is still

playing a key role in the functioning of the society and political life (Roy, 2000,

pp. 23–24). The survival of tribal structures which were integrated in the socio-

political and economic system during the Soviet period now seems to constitute a

barrier to the formation of a nation and a democratic nation-state as well as to the

development of equal citizenship notion. Paradoxically, the political (subjective)

nature of loyalty, as an important characteristic of the Kyrgyz people has the

potential to contribute to the development of a modern understanding of citizen-

ship and nation-state. The election of Almazbek Atambaev, who underlined the

significance of Kyrgyzstan citizenship during the recent presidential election

campaign, and who, consequently, received the support of the Uzbeks from the

South, is indicative of the support given by the North as well as the South to

the parliamentary regime.

3. Problems of nation and state building in Kyrgyzstan

Since the political boundaries are relatively recent historical creations, different

ethnic communities living in different regions of Kyrgyzstan have very different

views about political and social issues and more importantly about the attitude

of the state towards the citizens. In some cases, non-titular communities,

mainly Uzbeks and Russians, do not politically identify themselves with the

state of Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, Kyrgyz from different regions and the poor

from rural areas feel excluded and politically alienated because of varying political

alliances. These cleavages cause important problems in building a national iden-

tity and a nation-state in the Western sense of the term. Also, it is important to

note that the fragmentation of the political elite in Kyrgyzstan, which was the

result of the political developments during Osh riots in 1990, can be considered

as one of the main factors that destabilised politics in the post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.


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The legitimacy of Absamat Masaliev, the last First Secretary of the Kyrgyz

Communist Party was challenged by these riots, and Gorbachev remained indif-

ferent to this loss of legitimacy because at the time Masaliev abandoned his

support for the Gorbachev reforms. As a result of the weak support given by

the Kyrgyz Communist Party to the Gorbachev reforms, not only Masaliev,

who lost the presidential elections of 1990, was eliminated but also the elite

unity in Kyrgyz politics was lost. Akaev claimed victory in the presidential elec-

tion. This has been the main source for political instability and a major obstacle

to the nation- and state-building process (McGlinchey, 2011, pp. 83–84).

Two different models of nation-states are known to have emerged in Europe:

the model based on territory and citizenship, and the one based on common

descent, ethnic affiliation or race. These two models are associated with two dif-

ferent forms of nationalism known as civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.

Recently, however, there has been a growing consensus among scholars who

argue that every nationalism contains in itself varying degrees and forms of

ethnic and civic elements (Smith, 1991, pp. 14–15; Aydıngun and Aydıngun,

2004). This approach will help understand and explain the case of Kyrgyzstan.

In addition to the approach mentioned above, it is also important to discuss

whether the Western categories are relevant beyond the Western world. The lim-

itations of our existing categories should be taken into consideration and over-

come. In that perspective, an in-depth analysis of Kyrgyzstan requires a specific

attention to Kyrgyz political history including the nomadic period, the period

of Russian control, the Soviet period and the post-Soviet period. To this end,

the pre-Soviet period was briefly analysed in the previous section, and as men-

tioned above, following the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), the administrative

status of Kyrgyzstan has changed several times and finally become a Union

Republic in 1936. It is during this process that the form of social organisation

has changed.

According to Brubaker, the fact that the Soviet regime repressed nationalism

does not mean that it repressed nationhood and nationality. On the contrary,

it institutionalised territorial nationhood and ethno-cultural nationality as

basic social categories. The administrative divisions created by the Soviet

regime on the one hand, and the ethnic nationalities defined as a statistical cat-

egory and as an obligatory ascribed legal status on the other hand, entailed the

institutionalisation of ethnicity conducive to the development of nationalism

(Brubaker, 1996, pp. 7–8, pp. 17–18). Also, clan networks were integrated into

the Soviet system, and the rural–urban divide was strengthened by the settlement

policies of the Soviet regime.

The Soviet regime contained in itself paradoxical characteristics. While it

encouraged the idea of a common political identity and understanding of citizen-

ship independent of nationality, it also encouraged the strengthening of ethnic


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identification through institutionalising nationality, i.e. ethnicity (Shanin, 1986),

which in fact made the establishment of independent states following the collapse

of the Soviet Union possible. In other words, the transformation of ethnic

identification into a national consciousness at the end of 1980s became stronger

following the dissolution of the Soviet Union facilitating the formation of inde-

pendent nation-states (Roy, 2000, pp. 23–24). The formation of nation-states

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was characterised by a growing nation-

alist ideology, which has strengthened in the last 20 years. This ideology created

new political and social boundaries that constituted the main source for ethnic

discontent, which led to conflict when combined with economic crisis and

regional cleavages. Many nationalities started to experience this time a process

of transition from a nationality to a nation with a growing nationalist sentiment.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, many social scientists were trying to predict

whether these newly independent republics would adopt a strategy toward ethnic

homogenisation or preserve their multiethnic nature. It was first possible to argue

that this would depend on the demographic structure of these societies. Then, it

was realised that, almost in every post-Soviet republic, nationalist policies were

growing aiming at creating a nation for the new nation-state. These policies of

course inflicted a feeling of exclusion among non-titular communities which

felt obliged to migrate to their home countries, either within the former Soviet

Union or outside of it. These waves of ethnic migrations changed the ethnic

structure of all post-Soviet countries leading to new identity problems, which

indicated that relative ethnic homogeneity did not necessarily mean peaceful

coexistence due to different social experiences.

As a result of certain social, political, economic and international dynamics,

certain pragmatic nationalising policies aiming at creating a new nation, a na-

tional identity and a national consciousness, the Kyrgyz governments and

leaders have adopted certain ethnic policies. Among the two aforementioned

models, Kyrgyzstan can be said to have followed to a certain extent the ethnic

model of nationalism in the early years of independence. This exclusive under-

standing of nation and form of nationalism caused growing discontent among

the minorities, mostly among Russians and Uzbeks, leading to the development

of counter nationalist movements. This fact caused problems related to political

identification because many Kyrgyz citizens did not feel loyal to the Kyrgyz state

anymore. Thus, many Russians migrated from Kyrgyzstan, making the Uzbeks

the largest minority of the country. Furthermore, relations between the Kyrgyz

and Uzbeks deteriorated especially in the Southern region, where Uzbeks are con-

centrated. Consequently, as in many other post-Soviet Republics, national inte-

gration became, and still is, one of the most important problems of Kyrgyzstan.

The issue of territorial integrity and sovereignty are essential for the establish-

ment of security in Kyrgyzstan, as well as in Central Asia. In other words, security


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cannot be established without the existence of fully sovereign states, and sover-

eignty can only be realised with legitimate governments. The integrity of the

state and the legitimacy of the governments can only be achieved with more dem-

ocracy, and effective management of multiple identities. Also noteworthy is that

ethnic conflicts that took place in Kyrgyzstan were not solely directed to the

Uzbeks of the South but also to other minorities such as the Dungans and the

Meskhetian Turks during different protests and crisis periods. Furthermore,

political instability did not only arise from ethnic cleavages but also from other

structural reasons such as regional (intra-ethnic) and economic problems,

which weakened the loyalty of the disadvantaged groups to the state. This

also renders difficult the construction of a nation, which is an indispensable

element of the nation-state.

The flexible nature of the Central Asian social and political organisation in the

pre-Soviet period and the Soviet experience, which enhanced a political identity

besides the institutionalisation of ethnicity, has the potential to allow the creation

of a civic national identity. This is crystallised in the election of Atambaev as the

president of the republic. Atambaev supported an inclusive civic national identity

during his electoral campaign, which was very much in line with Akaev’s attitude.

Undoubtedly, any nation-state which tried to construct ethnic and cultural

homogeneity also made the development of democracy possible. One needs to

be reminded that nationalism contributed a lot to this process. However, social

changes caused by globalisation and the social context created by further devel-

opment of human rights and democracy challenged and transformed the classical

homogenising understanding of nation-state (Aydıngun, 2008, p. 12). In that

perspective, Kyrgyzstan can hardly build a nation-state with a homogenising

understanding accompanied by ethnic policies. Kyrgyzstan and other post-Soviet

republics are experiencing this process of nation and state building under the new

global conditions, which for sure renders the process much more difficult, endan-

gering territorial integrity. The preservation of territorial integrity requires the

development of a subjective understanding of the nation underlying the import-

ance of common culture rather than blood ties. This inclusive understanding of

nation, which is very much in line with that of Renan (1882), did not take root in

Kyrgyzstan after the independence despite the Soviet legacy, which encouraged

that inclusive understanding, due to a strong anti-Soviet attitude and enthusiasm

about building an independent Kyrgyz state.

As many social scientists argue, every nationalism contains varying degrees

and forms of ethnic and civic elements, and Kyrgyzstan is no exception.

However, until quite recently, ethnic elements have been more powerful com-

pared with civic elements. Considering the political history of Kyrgyzstan,

other factors should also be taken into consideration with the purpose of over-

coming the limitations of Western categories such as clientalism and corruption


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that further complicate the process of nation building. In addition, as briefly

mentioned above, the fragmentation and poor estimations of the Kyrgyz political

elite, and the rush of the elite to create the institutions of liberal democracy can be

regarded as the fallacies of Kyrgyzstan in analysing the process of nation building.

Renan has highlighted the significance of the willingness (la volonte) for the

formation of a nation; if people in Kyrgyzstan lose their willingness to be the

members of the Kyrgyz nation and to share a common future, this will be a

threat to the territorial integrity of Kyrgyzstan.

The territorial integrity is threatened both as a result of the discriminatory

policies of the government towards minorities and the loss of their willingness

to maintain the sense of belongingness to Kyrgyzstan, which are a consequence

of the mismanagement of identities and alliances by the political elite in the

first place. Moreover, minority communities are active actors that are open to

some national, regional and global influences. Thus, a new understanding of

nationalism should be developed favouring civic elements. Last but not least,

interethnic tensions, cleavages among Kyrgyz due to regional and clan differences,

clientalism and economic differences constitute obstacles to the building of a

nation. The willingness to share a common future should also be established

among Kyrgyz. This requires different types of elite alliances.

State building is already a painful and complicated process even when it occurs

independently; nevertheless, it is much more painful under the influence and

manipulations of some regional and global actors. International influences

are critical because they further complicate the nation-state building process

besides internal difficulties. These interventions, based mostly on a narrow

understanding of security and short-term interests, unquestionably render state

building difficult in the region, facilitate the development of semi-authoritarian

regimes and thus, undermine the development of democracy. Regional and global

actors still seem to perceive national security and global security as independent

from each other, and they still believe that manipulations will yield the expected

results and that conflicts can be controlled. Nevertheless, if global actors deter-

mine their strategies by means of short-term strategic and economic estimations

ignoring sociological and historical facts, this can produce results completely con-

trary to expectations.

It is not possible to establish stability and security in Kyrgyzstan without

making progress in nation and state building, and without the existence of

fully sovereign states. This requires the strengthening of state institutions, the

development of trust for politicians and the political system, the union of each

state’s citizens around a common goal, achievement of consensus of different

ethnic groups on the method of cohabitation and establishment of different

types of elite alliances. This also requires the sovereignty of each state over the

land and its people, and a consensus among the countries of the region on


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certain issues relatively independent of the global actors. As the former President

Otunbaeva argued during her address in the first session of the new parliament

on 10 November 2010, the parliamentary system is suitable for attaining all

these in Kyrgyzstan. The representation of the different segments of the society,

including elite groups, ethnic groups and clans is expected to allow the realisation

of different alliances within the parliament, which became far more powerful with

the adoption of a more democratic constitution. However, clearly the success of

the regime is highly dependent on the effective application of the constitution.

The Western understanding of nation and state building should be further dis-

cussed by considering domestic factors, which are not encountered by Western

countries.

4. Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan since 1990

4.1 1990 Osh riots

The economic problems that arose during the Gorbachev period and the incap-

ability of reforms to solve the problems in Kyrgyzstan as well as in other republics

exacerbated with the breakdown of the Soviet regime causing dramatic levels of

unemployment, especially in rural areas and triggerring migration to cities with

the hope of a better life. Protests, call for land, pursuit of jobs and tensions among

different communities fuelled by the economic crisis and certain policies like the

language law, which made the Kyrgyz language the state language of the republic,

marked the Kyrgyz society in that period. The growing anti-Russian attitude

forced many Russians to emigrate from Kyrgyzstan. It is in that atmosphere

that violence broke out in the summer of 1990 in Osh, where the large majority

of the Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan were living. One of the main reasons for this riot was

dispute over land (Anderson, 1999, pp. 18–19). However, it is not possible to

explain these riots, during which hundreds died, only with land claims. Other

reasons certainly did exist, but what needs to be considered first of all is that

the Uzbek minority felt discriminated against both in economic and political

spheres, whereas the Kyrgyz were disturbed by the autonomy demands of the

Uzbeks. Furthermore, the Kyrgyz were under the conception that the Uzbek

minority was enjoying a more prosperous life in Kyrgyz lands. The riots were

taken under control with the intervention of the Soviet troops. The troops

stayed in the region for six months until the normalisation of the situation

(International Crisis Group Report, 2010, pp. 2–4).

The relative success of Askar Akaev, the first president of independent Kyrgyz-

stan, in stabilising ethnic relations should not go unnoticed. Concerned about the

emigration of Russians and Germans, who constituted an important percentage

of professionals in Kyrgyzstan, Akaev continuously underlined his commitment


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for the creation of a multi-ethnic republic composed of equal citizens regardless

of nationality (nationalnost) and worked for that purpose. With the hope of mini-

mising the emigration of minorities, Akaev praised in every occasion the contri-

bution of non-titular communities to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. However,

despite this attitude of Akaev, the anti-Russian attitude and Kyrgyz nationalism

grew slowly but steadily among certain segments of the society, and this increased

within years the discontent and discomfort of non-titular communities

(Anderson, 1999, pp. 44–45). Still, it can be concluded that, despite growing

Kyrgyz nationalism and anti-Russian attitude, Akaev’s period was relatively

peaceful compared with post-2005 period.

4.2 2010 Osh riots

The increase of taxes on small and medium enterprises, taxes on telecommunica-

tions, the rise of electricity prices caused by the privatisation of the biggest electricity

providing company of the country, the rise of gas prices in a country where winter is

usually quite severe and where the alleged corruption was believed to be organised by

Maxim Bakiev, the son of Bakiev, fueled the discontent in Kyrgyz society (Engdahl,

2010; Marat, 2010). This economic deterioration played a significant role in the civil

uprising and overthrow of Bakiev in April 2010. The fact that the economic deteri-

oration was the source for common frustration became obvious with the first deci-

sions taken by the Interim Government of Otunbaeva such as the cancellation of the

late privatisations and reduction in certain prices and taxes (Karaagaclı, 2010). It is

under these circumstances that the June riots took place, and Maxim Bakiev was

accused of organising provocations leading to pogroms to create instability in the

country and preventing the realisation of the constitutional referendum aiming at

securing the return of Bakiev into the political scene. On 11–14 June, 2010, 20

years after the 1990 riots, new riots took place between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 2

weeks before the constitutional referendum as a result of rumours of an attack to

a university dormitory and the killing of a Kyrgyz girl. Many people were again

killed in Southern Kyrgyzstan, mainly in Osh, known as the capital of Southern Kyr-

gyzstan. Although Osh was the centre of most violence, violent events also took place

in other Southern cities like Jalalabad. This violence forced many Uzbeks to migrate

from their hometowns to the Uzbek border, where they were not really welcomed

and obliged to live under unfavourable conditions (International Crisis Group

Report, 2010, pp. 11–12).

These riots showed that the Kyrgyz state was still not entirely capable of pro-

tecting her citizens. It also became clear that the old problem related to the land

issue still constituted one of the main causes of ethnic competition, conflict and

discontent, which is evident in the impact of the project of the mayor of Osh,

Melisbek Myrzakmatov’s reconstruction plan for Osh that was expected to start


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in 2010. Besides the land problem and rumours, the growing belief among the

Uzbek population that they are excluded from the state sector should also be con-

sidered as a major factor of discontent. At this point, it is important to note that

this perception is based on objective data because the members of the titular na-

tionality, namely Kyrgyz have greater access to official positions and resources

(International Crisis Group Report, 2010, pp. 17–18).

The continuing deterioration of Kyrgyz economy further increases the poten-

tial for ethnic tensions. In other words, we need to make an emphasis on the link

between poverty and ethnic tensions or nationalism that is seen in many other

countries of the world in different periods of history. It is not possible to

account for these riots simply as spontaneous events based on rumors and dis-

putes among different communities over land and other resources of the

country. Certainly, these factors did play a role in fueling such events, but it is

vital to understand that these riots are based on structural problems, which

have deep roots in history and the potential to mobilise thousands of people im-

mediately. The social climate in Kyrgyzstan made people ready to believe in any

rumor perceived as a threat to their ethnic community and to define themselves

first with their ethnicity. This fact underlines the importance of the identity issue,

the link between security and identity and also, the importance of identity man-

agement to establish stability and security.

In other words, the case of Kyrgyzstan is a good example showing the signifi-

cance of identity management and reconsideration of the concept of security for

social and political stability. The debate over these issues began in the related

scientific literature in 1980s and increased with the collapse of the bipolar

system of Cold War. A narrow, state-centred and military focused classical under-

standing of security is challenged by new approaches because this classical under-

standing is not capable anymore of solving the problems that we are facing and of

responding to the needs of human beings. Such new approaches should be

adopted if we have faith in and want to promote and disseminate values like

respect to human rights and democracy. Thus, all countries should try to grasp

the significance of a new approach which prioritises societal security. As for iden-

tity management, the first steps to be taken are of course legal arrangements and

political reforms aiming at encouraging the internalisation and strengthening of a

sentiment of citizenship among people of Kyrgyzstan, which is hoped to weaken

other attachments including ethnic, clan and other forms of identifications.

5. The political system: constitutional changes, political parties

and the electoral system

Independent Kyrgyzstan is neither a fully authoritarian nor a democratic country.

There are various terms used to define the Kyrgyz political system, such as illiberal


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democracy, managed democracy, weak autocracy, hybrid regime or weak state

(cited in Alkan, 2009, p. 356). There is a clear indication that the country’s pol-

itical structure or political life is fragmented. On the one hand, there are admin-

istrative and political authorities, who try to strengthen an authoritarian regime,

but on the other hand, there are local political leaders who try to act independ-

ently from the central authorities. Constitutional changes are taking place under

the shadow of these conflicting internal forces.

Constitutional changes made since the independence are shaped by the ten-

sions between the president and the parliament, especially when the interests

of different regions and their local leaders are not balanced by the president. In

other words, the fundamental crisis that emerged following independence is

caused by the conflicts between the members of parliament aiming at strengthen-

ing their authority based on regional support and the president who tries to

enlarge his power. One important characteristic of the Kyrgyz political system

compared with those of other Central Asian States and Azerbaijan is the lack

of a strong political party controlled by the president. In these societies, the presi-

dent controls the parliament via this strong political party having the majority of

the seats. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, however, the parliament, which is strongly

attached to the executive, is not functioning as a legislative body. This is the

main source of the tension between the president and the parliament.

The constitution of Kyrgyzstan changed nine times between 1993 and 2010.

The first constitution was accepted in 5 May 1993. Although several changes

and modifications were undertaken in 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2002, the 1993 Con-

stitution remained in force until 2 February 2003. The common aim of the four of

these constitutional changes that took place between 1994 and 2003 was to

enlarge the power of the president through bypassing the executive. The 1994

changes granted to the president the right to make constitutional changes

through referendums. The 1996 changes rendered the parliament’s right to

propose constitutional changes difficult and gave the president the right to

appoint the judges and prosecutors directly excluding those in higher judiciary

bodies. With the 1998 changes, the parliament’s authority over the budget was

restricted together with the immunity of the deputies. The 2003 Constitution

further enlarged the power of the president while it restricted the power of the

parliament. It is possible to argue that with the 2003 Constitution, Kyrgyzstan’s

regime became more authoritarian. However, until 2007, the presidential

nature of the constitution was transformed into a semi-presidential one as a

result of the concessions given by both Akaev and Bakiev. The post-2007

period can be defined as a return to a presidential system with the presidency

of Bakiev. The country experienced frequent constitutional changes, which was

one of the factors giving rise to discontent among people (Ozer, 2010).


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The submissive status of the parliament caused by these constitutional changes

shaped the structure of an opposition, which is composed of regionally powerful

leaders and which curbed the tendency to put pressure on the president through

the forces outside the parliament. Civil movements of 2005 and 2010 are good

examples for what is named as unconventional participation, which dethroned

both presidents. In both civil movements, regional leaders played important

roles. For example, the fall of Akaev regime in 2005 was the result of the alliance

between the Southern origin bureaucrats and the opposition leaders from within

the parliament.

The latest constitution adopted on 27 June 2010 referendum includes changes

related to not only the electoral system but also the other issues such as separation

of powers, the judicial system, local governments and human rights. The 2010

Constitution aimed to solve these structural and conjectural problems of the

country with a parliamentary system. One of the main characteristics of the con-

stitution accepted by the 2010 referendum is the emphasis on social justice,

welfare state, state-controlled economy and social policies. Besides, it can be con-

cluded that the basic purpose of this constitution is to restrict the power of the

president. According to the constitution, the president elected by the people

for six years is not to be elected for a second time. The aim here is to limit the

political power of the president. Furthermore, with the new constitution, while

the president’s right to hold a referendum is forfeited, this right is given to the

parliament. In fact, the 2010 Constitution extends the power of the parliament

and includes new arrangements to prevent one-party dominance. According to

the article 70 of the Constitution, independently of the percentage obtained,

the number of deputies of the leading party cannot exceed 65.

The question of how political stability can be achieved in a society where there

is a weak multi-party system and a weak consensus culture following these con-

stitutional changes is still unanswered. Political stability can be ensured only

through a broad consensus in the parliament. The 2010 Constitution practically

means a semi-presidential or semi-parliamentarian political system. The parlia-

ment becomes more powerful, but the existence of the parliamentary majority

which will use this power is actually not desired. Stability in the parliament

can only be realised by coalition governments based on a large consensus.

The current political culture, however, is far from reaching such a consensus.

That is why, the restriction of the power of the president and the extension of

the power of the parliament stipulated by the new constitution have the potential

to cause new tensions and conflicts probably because neither the president nor

the parliament is powerful enough to establish stability.

In addition to the factors mentioned above, it is not possible to argue that

there is an ideal electoral system which fits all the countries and which contributes

to the consolidation of democracy. The ideal electoral system for any country


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depends on its political history and traditions. Similarly, the party system also

depends on the history of the political experience of any given country and on

the perception of political parties by the members of that given society. As a con-

sequence, the Soviet experience led to the development of strong distrust for the

state, of the political system and of political parties. This is the main reason for

the weak identification of people with political parties in the post-Soviet space.

As in modern societies, political parties play an essential role in the development

of democracy. Similarly, the amelioration of democracy in Kyrgyzstan is very

much dependent on the competition between political parties, the development

of trust in political parties and state, and the development of party identification.

To realise this amelioration, political parties in Kyrgyzstan need to fulfill their

social mission adopting a national development ideology followed by concrete

proposals, which will increase people’s trust in their own state.

Electoral systems are also an important element of representative democracy.

Four different electoral systems have been used for national legislature in the last

20 years in Kyrgyzstan. With the latest constitution, the fifth system is applied.

There was a unicameral parliament using a two-round system inherited from

the Soviet times between 1990 and 1995. Between 1995 and 2005, a bicameral par-

liament replaced the former model with a two-round system and a parallel

system. The number of electoral districts was reduced from 350 to 45, and the

number of deputies from 350 to 105. From 2005 to 2007, the number of deputies

was further reduced to 75, and a unicameral parliament was reintroduced. From

2007 to 2010, the unicameral nature of the parliament continued, but 75 deputies

were elected through a closed-list proportional representation (Weise, 2010).

According to the current electoral system, there is a unicameral parliament com-

posed of 120 deputies elected for five years with a proportional representative

system. Proportional representation is a constitutional rule. A threshold of 5%

at the country level is required for political parties to enter the parliament, and

as mentioned earlier, political parties cannot win more than 65 seats in the

parliament (Alkan, 2010).

After the independence, the multi-party system was quickly established.

Around 30 political parties are present now in the country and their number is

increasing. Although their programs, organisational structures and ideologies

are not very much developed, and although they have a small number of

members, political parties became the important actors of public and political

life, especially after the October 2010 elections (Alkan, 2010).

A total of 3480 candidates and 29 political parties participated in the October

2010 elections. The large number of candidates can be explained by the fact that

30% of the candidates were unemployed. Interestingly, 26 parties out of 29 were

against the parliamentary system. These political parties promised to return to

the presidential system during the electoral campaigns. Social Democratic Party


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of Kyrgyzstan (Almazbek Atambayev), Ak Shumkar Party (Temir Sarıyev) and Ata

Meken Socialist Party (Omurbek Tekebayev) supported the parliamentary system

whereas Ata-Jurt (Kamcıbek Tasiyev) and Ar-Namys (Felix Kulov) and other pol-

itical parties demanded the reestablishment of the presidential system. The pol-

itical parties which support the parliamentary system, namely, Social Democratic

Party of Kyrgyzstan, Ak Shumkar Party and Ata Meken Socialist Party were the

parties forming the Interim Government headed by Otunbaeva. Omurbek Teke-

bayev, the leader of Ata Meken Socialist Party, is a Constitutional Jurist, who was

the leading figure and who prepared the constitution securing the transition to a

parliamentary regime. Also, Tekebayev is the only politician who opposes the

most to Russia and supports the presence of the American base in Manas.

Political parties are mostly not powerful at the national level. Social Democratic

Party of Kyrgyzstan, Respublica, Ata Meken Socialist Party and Ak-Shumkar do not

have much support in the south of the country. Ata-Jurt, which is powerful in the

south, where Bakiev supporters form the majority, was also opposing the Interim

Government of Otunbaeva. Similarly, Ar-Namys is also known as a political party

which was in opposition to Otunbaeva government because both oppose the

parliamentary system. Ar-Namys with Felix Kulov receives open support from

Russia and is more powerful in the North than in the South.

6. 10 October 2010 parliamentary elections

Kyrgyzstan elections took place smoothly in October 2010; however, the govern-

ment was formed with great difficulty in more than two months. Five political

parties managed to enter the parliament. However, none of the five winning pol-

itical parties obtained the absolute majority. Ata-Jurt (8.89%) obtained 28 seats;

Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (8.04%) obtained 26 seats; Ar-Namys

(7.74%) obtained 25 seats; Respublika (7.24%) obtained 23 and Ata-Meken

(5.6%) obtained 18 seats.

These election results required the coalition of three political parties to have

enough seats to form a government. The constitution gave President Otunbaeva

the right for two initiatives to form the government. Otunbaeva first gave the

mandate to form the government to the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan,

but this first attempt failed. Although three political parties (Social Democratic

Party, Ata-Meken and Respublika) managed to agree to form a coalition, they

did not receive enough votes from their own members in the parliament on

2 December for the designation of the leader of Ata-Meken, Omurbek Tekebaev

as the head of the parliament. The three political parties had 67 seats, and the

required number was 61. Tekebaev’s failure with 58 votes also meant the failure

of the coalition (Trilling, 2010).


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The second attempt was made by Respublika as Otunbaeva passed the mandate

to form the government to Omurbek Babanov, the leader of Respublika. Babanov

had time until 24 December 2010. If Babanov failed to form the government, the

parliament itself would have to make nominations for government posts within

15 days. The failure in this third possibility would require the renewal of elections

(Trilling, 2010).

Two months after the elections, it was voiced that the only remaining alterna-

tive was the formation of a five party coalition. These developments caused

serious criticism, which is directed, to parliamentary democracy, especially by

the former presidents Bakiev and Akaev. Both former presidents expected Otun-

baeva to dissolve the parliament and renew the elections defending the view that

the best political regime for Kyrgyzstan is the presidential system. Akaev openly

expressed that parliamentary democracy cannot function successfully in Kyrgyz-

stan and that stability in the country can only be ensured with a more powerful

president and a less powerful parliament. He also argued that none of the post-

Soviet countries adopted a parliamentary regime, which is in contradiction with

the political history of these societies and that parliamentary regimes in these

countries are doomed to failure. Akaev mentioned that the five political parties

that entered the parliament took only 39% of the votes of the Kyrgyz people.

Similarly, Bakiev argued that the parliament should only be a legislative organ

and that parliamentary regime was not suitable for Kyrgyzstan. For him, the

best regime was the presidential system.

It was under this political atmosphere that Respublika managed to form the

government with Ata-Jurt and the Social Democratic Party, bringing 77 deputies

together. The leader of Social Democratic Party, Almazbek Atambaev, became the

Prime Minister, while the leader of Respublika, Omurbek Babanov, became the

First Deputy Prime Minister. One of the leading figures of Ata-Jurt, Akhatbek

Keldibekov, became the Head of the Parliament. The fact that one of the coalition

parties, Ata-Jurt, was against the parliamentary system and that Social Democratic

Party promised to begin the trial of those responsible for the 2010 pogroms of the

Bakiev regime can be considered as the factors making the coalition a fragile one

from the very beginning. The reason for Ata-Jurt to participate in the coalition

can be to prove that they will continue to remain within the political system

despite their rejection of the parliamentary system. In addition, being a part of

the government was the only way to protect their own and supporters’ interests

(Ozkan, 2010).

Another factor which increased the fragility of the coalition is the hidden com-

petition between the two important actors, namely the USA and the Russian Fed-

eration. The Russian Federation played an important role both before and after

the elections. Campaigns against Ata-Meken and its leader Omurbek Tekebaev

supported by Russia are said to have decreased the votes received by Ata-Meken.


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It is also worth mentioning that Russia played a role in the failure of the first

attempt to form a coalition by preventing Tekebaev’s headship of the parliament

(Ozkan, 2010). A year later, following the presidential election and the selection of

Almazbek Atambaev as the president, a new coalition government was formed by

Social Democratic Party, Ata-Meken, Ar-Namys and Respublika. The new govern-

ment was a larger coalition composed of 92 deputies, and it received the consent

from the large majority of the parliament with 113 deputies. The adoption of the

parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan seemed to allow for the formation of alli-

ances necessary for the Kyrgyz society to have hopes for a democratic Kyrgyzstan.

7. Conclusion

Since independence, the process of transition from a centralised economy to a

free-market economy has been extremely painful in Kyrgyzstan. Corruption

has been one of the main obstacles to a healthy transition to free-market

economy, and it has dominated the process of the privatisation of the state prop-

erty. Many reforms were carried out varying from the liberalisation of prices and

trade to fiscal, budget, banking reforms; however, the application of these reforms

was not as successful as it was intended to be. The governments failed to realise

structural reforms that could stimulate employment and economic growth. In

other words, despite all the reforms, progress has been limited, and Kyrgyzstan

has been producing less compared with the Soviet period. Besides, despite the

establishment of National Council on Combating Corruption in March 2005,

the combat against corruption has not been successful and Kyrgyzstan has not

been able to meet the Millenium Challenge Account criteria.

According to many international organisations, Kyrgyzstan is among the

countries with the highest levels of corruption (Koichumanov, 2010). It is

extremely important to note that the failure to combat corruption has both pol-

itical and social consequences as well as the economic ones, and this has been one

of the basic factors increasing the discontent among the people and fueling con-

flicts. Corruption deepens the lack of trust in the state and also in the political

parties, which has its roots in the Soviet period. It is one of the major factors

that put into question the legitimacy of the governments.

Establishing stability, peace, security and democracy in Kyrgyzstan is not an

easy task when all dimensions of the conflicts discussed in this paper are taken

into consideration. It is clear that the authoritarian model of government,

which is encouraged by some regional and global actors, has not resolved the pro-

blems of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan in the last 20 years (International Crisis Group

Report, 2010). Stability seems to be far from being established, and the road to

stability will surely be long and difficult for the new government with the new

political regime. A connection should be established between the people and


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the politicians who, in most cases, serve their own personal and family interests

rather than those of the people. A connection should also be formed between

people and political parties, between the leading figures of the South and the

leaders of the central government who in most cases long to be perceived legitim-

ate by global and regional forces rather than their own people. All the leaders have

to realise that stability cannot be established without popular consent and that

political reforms are necessary for the development of democracy, which

should be followed by economic development and a fair distribution of wealth

among the citizens. The postponement of political reforms and the control of

wealth by a largely corrupt political elite are the main factors which have

fueled the ethnic clashes so far, and depending on the attitude of the new govern-

ment, they have the potential to aggravate social and ethnic tensions in the future.

If Southern Kyrgyzstan remains out of the control of the central government

and if the tension between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz continues, this may lead to the

widening of social distance between the two communities, which can be consid-

ered as an invitation to more bloody conflicts, and these conflicts may be

manipulated by those who are fighting to strengthen their political power,

those who are engaged in narcotics trade and those who are planning to increase

their personal wealth. Such an environment can also provide an exceptional

ground for those who are willing to support any sort of radical or terrorist move-

ment and activity. Certainly, this will not bring peace to the region. The govern-

ment’s ability in bridging the social distance between the North and the South will

determine the future of the Kyrgyz society. If the parliamentary regime is applied

in such a way as to bring all the voices in and secure the representation of all the

segments of the society in the parliament, this will undoubtledly contribute to the

formation of the necessary elite alliances, stability and territorial integrity, which

are vital for the legitimacy of the government and nation-state building.

Clearly, the current constitution is much more democratic. It secures an equal

distribution of power between the president and the prime minister, balances the

power of political parties in the parliament by limiting the maximum number of

seats that a political party can have and thus, by giving important room to the

opposition. Also, the new system encourages coalition governments, avoiding

the danger of majoritarianism and requiring in a way the bargaining and cooper-

ation of different groups in the parliament. This can be interpreted as an oppor-

tunity to challenge the classical homogenising understanding of nation and to

develop a more inclusive understanding as it is observed in the formation of

the government in December 2011.

It is an undeniable fact that any attempt to settle a conflict will be dependent

on the desires of the people or groups involved in the conflict and their consent.

The most important feature of the Kyrgyz political system is the existence of fault

lines such as competing clans and ethnic divisions. According to many scholars,


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politicians and analysts, these are the main reasons for instability in the country.

Economic differences further intensify these problems causing instability. Thus, it

is extremely important to adopt a sociological perspective aiming at grasping the

perceptions of different groups, understanding the structural and historical

reasons behind tensions and conflicts. This is essential to bridge the gap

between both different ethnic communities and different clans. To secure the

bridging of this gap and to rebuild the trust in the state, important measures

should be taken such as fighting against corruption, securing fair investigation

about riots and a fair trial for every Kyrgyz citizen, respecting human rights

and securing the return of those who were forced to migrate from conflict zones.

More importantly, the new government needs to take a strong position against

any nationalism and ethnic discrimination and discourage any policy having the

potential to strengthen ethnic nationalism and regional differences, which are

also important fault lines in the Kyrgyz society. It is essential to build a Kyrgyz

nation and to overcome the difficulties of building a nation-state. Kyrgyz

politicians have to cease to perceive European Institutions, the USA and

Russian Federation as magic sticks that can bring immediate stability to their

country without their own efforts. Furthermore, the development of a balanced

policy to keep good relations with regional and global actors will probably be the

most difficult task for the new Kyrgyz government. The governments’ ability to

solve the economic, social and security problems of the country will to a large

extent determine the future of the parliamentary regime in Kyrgyzstan.

Although it is still difficult to argue that the parliamentary regime is function-

ing properly in Kyrgyzstan, the continuation of the former coalition until the

presidential election and the formation of a larger coalition following the presi-

dential election give signs of stability in the country. If the current coalition

manages to realise cross-regional elite alliances and cross-ethnic elite alliances

combined with some economic development, societal security, integrity and

identity management can be secured (Ryabkov, 2010).

In addition, although important, the role of international actors should not be

exaggerated. Domestic factors causing political instability should be explored

in-depth by all researchers who should use Western categories critically while

trying to understand the non-Western world. Surely, domestic cleavages

prepare the necessary ground for international manipulations. There are long

debates over military bases of both the USA and the Russian Federation, the

attitude of the Russian Federation regarding the mobilisation of the Collective

Security Treaty Organization and the sponsoring of NGOs. It is clear that

global actors are striving for power in the region. However, despite external

influences, security cannot be established in Kyrgyzstan without solving struc-

tural domestic problems, which require the strengthening of the parliamentary

regime. To this end, the institutionalisation of political parties that are the


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indispensable institutions of parliamentary systems is of vital importance. It is

possible to argue that only political parties may work as efficient instruments

to express the demands of the people who previously had no way other than

street protests. Given the socio-cultural fabric and the political history of the

country, which is flexible enough to allow for political alliances regardless of

ethnic, regional and other cleavages, it is possible to argue that strong political

parties may be formed and contribute to the establishment of a democratic

parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan.

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Alkan, H. (2009) ‘Post-Soviet Politics in Kyrgyzstan: Between Centralism and Localism?’

Contemporary Politics, 15, 355–375.

Alkan, H. (2010) ‘Yeni Kırgızistan Anayasası Uzerine Notlar’, accessed at http://www.

dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=129794 on 28 October 2010.

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Documents

Nation-State Building in Kyrgyzstan and Transition to the Parliamentary System