44FERNANDO REINOSO BARBEROCOORDINADOR

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PRINCIPIOS GENERALES DEL DERECHO. ANTECEDENTES HISTÓRICOS Y HORIZONTE ACTUALPR

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Este libro es el resultado del esfuerzo colectivo de investigadores de treinta y seis universidades, las de Ankara, Atenas, Bari, Bolonia, Colonia, Ferrara, Génova, Helsinki, Iasi, Jerusalén, La Laguna, Madrid (Complutense, Uned, Autónoma y Cunef), Mesina, Milán (UNIMI, Bicocca y Commerciale L. Bocconi), Nápoles (Federico II, UNINA2 y Parthenope), Navarra, Nueva York, Padua, Palermo, Parma, Santiago de Chile, São Paulo, Sevilla, Teramo, Turín, Trieste, Valencia, Valladolid, Valparaíso y Varsovia. El propósito de la obra es generalista y pretende abarcar un campo amplio de conocimientos y puntos de vista sobre los principios generales del derecho. Por eso, junto a una mayoría de romanistas, intervienen también catedráticos de filosofía del derecho, de derecho tributario, de derecho comparado, de derecho civil, de derecho internacional y ex magistrados del Tribunal General de la Unión Europea.Esta multitud de autorías polícromas, unida a la extensión casi inagotable de la propia problemática de los principios generales del derecho, ha exigido una distribución de materias provista de la tensión estructural presente en obras de esta naturaleza. Así, un buen número de los artículos aquí recogidos tratan de forma monográfica sobre principios jurídicos concretos –reunidos por orden alfabético en la parte tercera del libro–, pero incluso en ese grupo aparentemente más compacto se abordan las investigaciones con criterios y perspectivas tan diversas y distantes entre sí como lo pueden ser, por un lado, el método historiográfico del «higher criticism» sobre las fuentes primarias del derecho romano o, por otro, el examen epistémico –a forma de escalpelo– de la jurisprudencia actual. Con todo, el coordinador ha estado atento a la pretensión de componer un discurso general no tanto sistemático como lógico en la presentación de los asuntos tratados por los autores.

C. M.: 10347

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Primera edición, 2014

El presente libro ha sido fi nanciado por el Proyecto de Investigación Fundamental no orientada del Plan Nacional I+D+i, con referencia DER2010-19341, titulado Fuentes históricas de los principios generales del derecho español y de la Unión Europea, dirigido por el prof. Fernando Reinoso Barbero.

El editor no se hace responsable de las opiniones recogidas, comentarios y manifestaciones vertidas por los autores. La presente obra recoge exclusivamente la opinión de su autor como manifestación de su derecho de libertad de expresión.

Cualquier forma de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública o transformación de esta obra sólo puede ser realizada con la autorización de sus titulares, salvo excepción prevista por la ley. Diríjase a CEDRO (Centro Español de Derechos Reprográfi cos) si necesita fotocopiar o escanear algún fragmento de esta obra (www.conlicencia.com; 91 702 19 70/93 272 04 45).

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INDICE

ABREVIATURAS Y SIGLAS ESPECIALES ........................................................................................... V PRESENTACIÓN ..................................................................................................................... IX

PARTE I INTRODUCCIÓN

ALEJANDRO GUZMÁN-BRITO

La idea de «principio» mentada en la expresión «principios generales del Derecho» ....................................................................................................................................... 1

GERGELY DELI How did Good Morals become a General Clause? ................................................................ 11

FULVIO TESSITORE Diritto, storia e scienza secondo Rudolf von Jhering: princìpi generali ............................. 31

FERNANDO REINOSO-BARBERO Los principios generales del derecho en la modernización del lenguaje jurídico ............. 69

PARTE II

ORÍGENES MANUEL JESÚS GARCÍA GARRIDO

Los principios contractuales visigóticos en la tradición romanística medieval ................. 91 LUIGI GAROFALO

Principi e ordinamento romano: una riflessione sulle orme di Fritz Schulz ...................... 99 ANTONIO FERNÁNDEZ DE BUJÁN

Ius fiscale: principios informadores del sistema tributario romano .................................. 109 SALVATORE PULIATTI

Giudizio di fatto e nuovi principi nel processo romano tardoantico. La regola unus testis nullus testis ............................................................................................................ 131

ELIO DOVERE Sistema delle fonti e legge-Codice: il Codex Theodosianus .............................................. 149

EMILIO VALIÑO Fiducia cum precario .............................................................................................................. 163

II

ANDREA LOVATO La giurisprudenza romana come fattore di sviluppo degli ordinamenti giuridici tardo-antichi .............................................................................................................................. 169

FERNANDO BETANCOURT-SERNA De regulis iuris en el ius commune y en el ius patrium español y colombiano ............... 185

OSVALDO SACCHI L’interpretazione del giurista romano come fonte creativa del diritto: problemi della contemporaneità e certezze del passato ....................................................................... 209

ALEKSANDR KOPTEV Principles of the Nexum and Debt Law in the Twelve Tables ........................................... 227

ANA MOHINO MANRIQUE Los nova negotia y el principio de libertad contractual ...................................................... 247

PAOLA BIAVASCHI Vetiti furoris audacia. Il principio della tutela delle acque pubbliche nel Tardo Antico e il problema delle derivazioni abusive dagli acquedotti pubblici ........................ 269

CARLOS FELIPE AMUNÁTEGUI PERELLÓ La prehistoria de los principios de Derecho natural. La racionalización del concepto de Derecho en el mundo griego desde Hesíodo a Aristóteles ........................... 287

ROBERTO SCEVOLA Archeologia e genealogia della donatio ex sola cogitatione mortalitatis ......................... 299

ROSANNA ROPERTO Analisi del rischio da inquinamento ambientale. Principi generali dal diritto romano ....................................................................................................................................... 329

MARIA CASOLA Principi e regole in tema di gravidanza ................................................................................. 343

PARTE III

PRINCIPIOS CONCRETOS EN SU GÉNESIS HISTÓRICA: DESDE EL DERECHO ROMANO HASTA LA ACTUALIDAD

MARIAGRAZIA RIZZI

Accessio cedit principali: Die Fälle der scriptura und pictura ........................................... 361 FRANCESCA PULITANÒ

Actio aquae pluviae arcendae non in rem, sed personalis est ........................................... 373 ISRAEL HERNANDO AGUAYO

Actio nondum nata non praescribitur: el dies a quo en la prescripción extintiva ........... 389 JULIO HERNANDO LERA

Ad impossibilia nemo tenetur ................................................................................................. 419 FRANCISCO J. ANDRÉS SANTOS

Audiatur et altera pars: el principio de audiencia en el derecho romano y en el derecho común europeo .......................................................................................................... 439

ALFREDO MORDECHAI RABELLO Il principio della buona fede precontrattuale: la base romanistica della teoria di Rudolf von Jhering sulla culpa in contrahendo .................................................................... 471

ANDREA AMATUCCI Le fondamenta del vigente principio di capacità contributiva nel pensiero di San Tommaso d’Aquino ................................................................................................................. 495

LAURA OSTOS-PALACIOS Causa causae, causa causati .................................................................................................. 507

III

FABIANA TUCCILLO Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur ........................................................................................ 517

PATRICIO LAZO La regla commodum eius esse debet cuius periculum est: para la historia dogmática del artículo 1.820 del Código civil chileno ........................................................ 529

STEFANIA RONCATI Il principio consensualistico nella vicenda del mutuo: da contratto reale a contratto consensuale ............................................................................................................... 541

ALEJANDRO VALIÑO Probatio incumbit qui dicit, non qui negat: el onus probandi en el Derecho romano ....................................................................................................................................... 571

M. FLORIANA CURSI Il divieto degli atti di emulazione: le contestate origini romane di un principio moderno ..................................................................................................................................... 603

MARTA NATALIA LÓPEZ GÁLVEZ El principio impossibilium nulla est obligatio: litigio sobre el cumplimiento de la normativa de aguas de baño en la UE ............................................................................... 635

FRANCISCO BARTOL HERNÁNDEZ In homine libero nulla corporis aestimatio fieri potest ...................................................... 649

ADELAIDE CARAVAGLIOS … male nostro iure uti non debemus: abuso di diritto o eccesso di potere nell’esercizio di un diritto? ..................................................................................................... 663

PAOLO FERRETTI Nasciturus pro iam nato habetur si de eius commodo agitur: storia di un principio ..................................................................................................................................... 685

ANNA TARWACKA Nihil consensui tam contrarium est quam vis atque metus. The Origins of Provisions against Duress in Roman Law ............................................................................ 707

LUCETTA DESANTI Poena maior absorbet minorem ............................................................................................. 717

ANDREAS WACKE Potior est qui certat de damno evitando quam qui de lucro captando. Den Vorzug verdient im Rechtsstreit, wer Schaden vermeiden, gegenüber dem, der Gewinn erzielen will –insbesondere: Im Zweifel keine Schenkung und Durch Schenkung vom Nichtberechtigten kein gutgläubiger Erwerb .......................................... 737

PAOLO GALLO Il principio della prescrizione: dal diritto romano ai testi di Soft Law ............................. 753

SIMONA TAROZZI Il principio qui habet commoda ferre debet onera e la responsabilità del titolare di un'impresa commerciale gestita da un institore ............................................................... 761

ANA MARTÍN MINGUIJÓN Qui suo iure utitur neminem laedit ........................................................................................ 769

FEDERICO PERGAMI Il principio Quod initio vitiosum est non potest tractu temporis convalescere nell’esperienza giuridica romana ........................................................................................... 807

ANTONINO METRO Rebus sic stantibus ................................................................................................................... 817

ALESSIA SPINA Unum testamentum duarum hereditatum: su alcune applicazioni giurisprudenziali dei principi generali del diritto ereditario romano ................................ 827

IV

PIETRO CERAMI D. 1.7.25 pr. (Ulp. 5 opin.) e il brocardo venire contra factum proprium ........................ 855

SELDAĞ GÜNEŞ PESCHKE The reflection of volenti non fit ıniurıa in personality rights in modern laws ................. 869

PARTE IV

PRINCIPIOS JURÍDICOS Y LEY MARIO SERIO

Nuovi assetti del diritto inglese: alcune considerazioni ...................................................... 879 ANTONIO PALMA

La clausola generale di buona fede in senso oggettivo: tipicità e fluidità di una regola. Profili di comparazione .............................................................................................. 889

YURI GONZÁLEZ ROLDÁN El principio bonae fidei possessor fructus suos facit y su incorporación en los códigos civiles actuales. .......................................................................................................... 907

ELIANE MARIA AGATI MADEIRA & HÉLCIO MACIEL FRANÇA MADEIRA Precedente histórico do princípio da defesa do meio ambiente no sistema jurídico romanístico luso-brasileiro ....................................................................................... 925

CARLOS CUADRADO PÉREZ Perspectiva histórica sobre el relativismo de los derechos subjetivos .............................. 947

MARYCRUZ OLIVER Los “Principios Generales del Derecho Navarro” en la ley 2 del Fuero Nuevo .............. 969

ATHINA DIMOPOULOU-PILIOUNI Il diritto privato romano nella giurisprudenza dei tribunali ellenici ................................ 1025

SALVADOR IGLESIAS MACHADO Principios apodícticos del recurso de apelación civil ........................................................ 1031

PARTE V

PRINCIPIOS GENERALES DEL DERECHO EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA COMUNITARIA EUROPEA CLARIBEL DE CASTRO SÁNCHEZ

Los principios generales en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea: especial referencia a los derechos humanos ........................................... 1065

VALERIUS M. CIUCĂ Euronomosofia sous le parapluie du jus actionum. Les principes qui donnent la substance de l’extraordinaria cognitio, comme héritage ontologique du procès européen modern .................................................................................................................... 1079

MARÍA JOSÉ TORRES PARRA Patere legem quam ipse fecisti en la jurisprudencia comunitaria .................................... 1087

GIOVANNA COPPOLA BISAZZA Il diritto di proprietà nella prospettiva europea: un ritorno al modello romanistico? ............................................................................................................................ 1101

TERESA MARCOS MARTÍN El principio de la buena fe en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea sobre derecho de la competencia .............................................................. 1129

FEDERICO FERNÁNDEZ DE BUJÁN Damnum y reparatio. Daño resarcible y principio de reparación ................................... 1139

ANNA TARWACKA University Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in Warsaw

NIHIL CONSENSUI TAM CONTRARIUM EST QUAM VIS ATQUE METUS. THE ORIGINS OF PROVISIONS AGAINST DURESS IN ROMAN LAW

The aim of this paper is to discuss some issues concerning the origins of protection of individuals, who performed a legal act under duress in Roman law. This theme has been already explored by many authors1. However maybe it is worthwhile to review it once more, putting emphasis on its relation to Cicero’s speech in defence of Roscius from Ameria as well as some controversies by Seneca the Elder.

In the age of archaic law in Rome, when performing legal act, its form was more important than the motives, driving the party2. Therefore duress was not a basis for invalidating a legal act. Paulus concisely summed up this situation in his commentary to the edict: quamvis si liberum esset noluissem, tamen coactus volui3 – “although I would have refused if I had a free choice, nevertheless, when compelled, I wanted”. The jurist moved the issue of acquiring the inheritance under duress, stating that the person acquiring it became an heir under ius civile. However, he added that the praetor should recover the previous status in order to grant right to refrain from acquiring the inheritance. Thus this text shows a fundamental difference between ius civile, under which duress did not affect effectiveness of the legal act, and ius honorarium, which enabled negating such an action.

D. 50.17.116 pr. (Ulp. 11 ad ed.): Nihil consensui tam contrarium est, qui ac bonae fidei iudicia sustinet, quam vis atque metus: quem comprobare contra bonos mores est.

«Nothing is so contrary to consent, which sustains cases of good faith, as force or duress; it is contrary to good behaviour to approve to either of them.» (transl. A. Watson)

Ulpian’s commentary to the edict leads to the conclusion that force and duress were perceived as incompatible with bona fides and legal acts based on it. It is, in some respects, an intermediary stage between a rigid regulation of ius civile and protection of the party provided under ius honorarium. In case of iudicia bonae fidei, where the judge was not strictly bound by the wording of the legal formula, one could indicate duress as a factor invalidating the agreement between the parties4. Thus the sentence given took into consideration such circumstances, despite of rigid rules of ius civile.

However the situation was different with the actiones stricti iuris. Here the judge had to stick to the formula and could not take into consideration any additional circumstances. Therefore there was a need to introduce new legal solutions iuris civilis corrigendi gratia.

1 Most recently CALORE, ‘Actio quod metus causa’. Tutela della vittima e azione ‘in rem scripta’,

Milano, 2011, with abundant literature. 2 Tab. 6.1: UTI LINGUA NUNCUPASSIT, ITA IUS ESTO (FIRA I). Cf. VON LÜBTOW, Der

Ediktstitel ‘Quod metus causa gestum erit’, Greifswald, 1932, 9 ss. 3 D. 4.2.21.5 (Paul. 11 ad ed. ): Si metu coactus adii hereditatem, puto me heredem effici, quia

quamvis si liberum esset noluissem, tamen coactus volui: sed per praetorem restituendus sum, ut abstinendi mihi potestas tribuatur. Cf. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, Oxford, 1996, 652-653.

4 Cf. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, cit., 652.

ANNA TARWACKA

708

The scholars generally agree5, that the praetorian protection against duress was introduced by Octavius by an edict and it took its name of formula Octaviana from his family name. But it is unknown, when it took place, because it is uncertain, which praetor Octavius is concerned.

Terminus ante quem may be determined based on a fragment of Cicero’s Verrine orations.

Cic. In Verr. 2.3.152: [scil. Gallus] postulavit ab L. Metello ut ex edicto suo iudicium daret in Apronium, Quod per vim aut metum abstulisset, quam formulam Octavianam et Romae Metellus habuerat et habebat in provincia.

«[Gallus] applied to Metellus for permission to prosecute Apronius, in accordance with the governor’s own edict, on the charge of ‘Robbery with Violence or Intimidation’, a form of action, instituted by Octavius, which Metelus had accepted as valid when in Rome and was accepting as valid now in Sicily.» (transl. L.H.G. Greenwood)

Senator Gallus asked L. Caecilius Metellus, who became a governor of Sicily in 70 B.C., for recognising an action against Apronius, a Verres’ sycophant. Cicero called the complaint formula Octaviana and quoted its wording: Quod per vim aut metum abstulisset. Metellus included this formula into his edict in 71 B.C. as a praetor and, next year, as the governor of Sicily.

Among the politicians, who might be the authors of this first measure against duress, are Cn. Octavius – praetor in 79 B.C.6, L. Octavius – praetor in 78 B.C.7 and C. Octavius – praetor in 61 B.C., the father of Octavianus Augustus8. The last one, even if he included formula Octaviana into his edict, certainly could not be its first author, because his praetorship fell to the later period, after the trial of Verres had taken place.

The beginnings of this legal institution are often associated with a requirement to provide legal protection to the victims of the extortions committed in the provinces, so it is associated with development of tribunals judging crimen repetundarum9. There is also an opinion that we should see its genesis in the proscriptions during the dictatorship of Sulla. It is no doubt that both the former and the latter situation generated cases of using duress.

But there are some reasons to associate the inclusion of formula Octaviana into the edict with the last period of Sulla’s dictatorship.

Plutarch in the Life of Sulla wrote10, that «proscriptions were made not only in Rome, but also in every city of Italy, and neither temple of God, nor hearth of hospitality, nor paternal home was free from the stain of bloodshed, but husbands were butchered in the embraces of their wedded wives, and sons in the arms of their mothers. Those who fell victims to political resentment and private hatred were as nothing compared with those

5 Cf. LABRUNA, ‘Vim fieri veto’. Alle radici di una ideologia, Napoli, 1971, 14 ss.; FRIER, Urban

Praetors and Rural Violence: The Legal Background of Cicero's ‘Pro Caecina’, in TAPA, 1983, 232; CALORE, Considerazioni sulla clausola edittale “Quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum non habebo”, in Diritto@Storia, 2012, http://www.dirittoestoria.it/9/Tradizione-Romana/E-Calore-Quod-metus-causa-gestum-erit.htm; CALORE, ‘Actio quod metus causa’, cit., 11 ss .

6 Cf. BROUGHTON, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, II, New York, 1952, 83; COREY BRENNAN, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, II, Oxford, 2000, 444.

7 Cf. BROUGHTON, The Magistrates, cit., II, 86. 8 Cf. BROUGHTON, The Magistrates, cit., II, 179. 9 Cf. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, cit., 651-652; GONZÁLEZ ROMANILLOS, El

procedimiento civil como medio de control de la corrupción política. ‘Formula Octaviana’ y ‘crimen repetundarum’, in Foro. Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Nueva Época 2004, 391-400. An interesting thesis was developed by CALORE, Considerazioni, cit.; CALORE, ‘Actio quod metus causa’, cit., 13 ss., who associated auferre appearing in the formula Octaviana with pecunia ablata in lex repetundarum.

10 Plut. Sull. 31; transl. B. Perrin.

NIHIL CONSENSUI TAM CONTRARIUM EST QUAM VIS ATQUE METUS

709

who were butchered for the sake of their property, nay, even the executioners were prompted to say that his great house killed this man, his garden that man, his warm baths another».

From the historian’s description we can clearly see that the proscriptions, which were, generally, brought against the dictator’s political opponents, affected also the wealthy citizens, whose property was an object of desire of people in the entourage of Sulla.

A specific example of such a situation is the case of Roscius from Ameria, who had been accused of patricide11 and was defended in 80 B.C.12 by young Cicero, a novice advocate. In his speech the Arpinate exposed a plot, which was meant to lead to take over the property of Roscius the father. The relatives of the murdered and Chrysogonos, a Sulla’s freedman and right hand managed to enter him into the proscription list, despite of the fact that it had been already closed13, and then, because this plot did not bring satisfiable effects14, they accused the son of parricidium15, wanting to eliminate the claimant to the inheritance.

Cic. Pro Rosc. Amer. 91: Verum, ut fit, multa saepe imprudentibus imperatoribus vis belli ac turba molitur. Dum is in aliis rebus erat occupatus qui summam rerum administrabat, erant interea qui suis volneribus mederentur; qui, tamquam si offusa rei publicae sempiterna nox esset, ita ruebant in tenebris omniaque miscebant.

«But, as generally happens, the violence and turmoil of war bring many acts in their train unknown to the generals. While he who wielded the supreme power was occupied with other matters, there were some who in the meantime were attending to their own wounds; these people’ as if eternal night had enveloped the republic, rushed about in the darkness and threw everything into confusion.» (transl. J.H. Freese)

By taking this case, Cicero found himself in a very awkward position, because he had to overtly accuse a man from the vicinity of the dictator, what imposed a direct risk not only to his career, but also to his life. However he fought for glory and ability to stand out as a homo novus. In these circumstances he adopted the only possible tactics: at all the possible cost he underlined lack of any connection between Sulla and the Roscius case. The dictator, busy with matters of utmost importance, was not able to guard everything and many ignoble acts were committed behind his back.

Cic. Pro Rosc. Amer. 94: Permulta sunt quae dici possunt qua re intellegatur summam tibi facultatem fuisse malefici suscipiendi; quae non modo idcirco praetereo quod te ipsum non libenter accuso verum eo magis etiam quod, si de illis caedibus velim commemorare quae tum factae sunt ista eadem ratione qua Sex. Roscius occisus est, vereor ne ad pluris oratio mea pertinere videatur.

«There is very much else that might be said, which could make it clear that you had the greatest facilities for commiting this crime; but I pass them over, not only because I have no pleasure in accusing you, but more so because, if I wished to speak of all the murders like that of Sextus Roscius which were commited at that time, I am afraid that my speech would seem to be aimed at a number of others.» (transl. J.H. Freese)

11 Cf. ALEXANDER, Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 BC to 50 BC, Toronto-Buffalo-London,

1990, 66-67. 12 Cf. Quint. Inst. or. 12.6.4; Gell. 15.28.3; KINSEY, The Dates of the “Pro Roscio Amerino” and

“Pro Quinctio”, in Mnemosyne, 1967, 61-67. 13 Cic. Pro Rosc. Amer. 21: Cum nulla iam proscriptionis mentio fieret, cum etiam, qui antea

metuerant, redirent ac iam defunctos sese periculis arbitrarentur, nomen refertur in tabulas Sex. Rosci, hominis studiosissimi nobilitatis.

14 Cf. Cic. Pro Rosc. Amer. 130. 15 Cf. JOŃCA, ‘Parricidium’ w prawie rzymskim, Lublin, 2008, 82 ss.

ANNA TARWACKA

710

Cicero also added that the case of his client was not an exception and he did not mention other similar cases only because he did not want to accuse Sulla and in order that his speech did not concern more crimes.

Regardless of the actual intent of Cicero16, the dictator became involved in the case in some way and had to give some response. Saving face required a radical cut-off from the practice of Chrysogonos and others of his conduct, even if Sulla not only purposefully turned a blind eye to them, but also was engaged into them.

The case of Roscius shows that duress was one of the methods used by property hunters. In fact Cicero said that his client took a refuge in Caecilia’s home, when escaping from weapons and threats of the bandits17.

What could be the consequences of a so overt attitude of the young advocate? First of all, Sulla could not pretend that he knew nothing about the abuses, and if he had been able to do an effective reform of penal procedure, then, it was, for certain, expected, that he would take steps against those, who illegally took over civil property, including the cases where duress was used.

Sulla resigned voluntarily from the dictator’s office in 79 B.C. However first he himself appointed the consuls, Servilius Isauricus and Claudius Pulcher18, for that year, waited for the next year’s consular elections, and, in addition, expressed his readiness to take responsibility for his decisions.

It is very probable that the dictator had influence also on elections for praetors held in 79 B.C. It is hard to imagine that any novelty not approved by Sulla could be included into praetor’s edict. Nonetheless it seems that, in regard to the implications of the case of Roscius mentioned above, even a hypothesis may be built that introduction of protection of individuals, who had performed a legal act under duress, was in the interest of the dictator, who could demonstrate this way that he had nothing in common with depredation of property. An action, which could not have been included into the edict before, because it would have stricken people strictly linked with Sulla, now could appear in the edict without problems.

Therefore we can formulate a hypothesis that it was Cn. Octavius who on request, or, at least, with approval, of Sulla, introduced formula Octaviana into the edict, opening the way to bring the property hunters, who threatened their victims that they would enter their names into the proscription list in case of lack of cooperation, to justice.

The arguments presented here do not have a definitive nature. However it seems that due to its subject, the Pro Roscio Amerino speech should be taken into account in the discussion on origins of protection of individuals, who performed legal acts under duress.

Cic. Ad Q. fr. 1.7.21: Adiungenda etiam est facilitas in audiendo, lenitas in decernendo, in satisfaciendo ac disputando diligentia. Iis rebus nuper Cn. Octavius iucundissimus fuit, apud quem proximus lictor quievit, tacuit accensus, quoties quisque voluit dixit et quam voluit diu; quibus ille rebus fortasse nimis lenis videretur, nisi haec lenitas illam severitatem tueretur: cogebantur Sullani homines, quae per vim et metum abstulerant, reddere; qui in magistratibus iniuriose decreverant, eodem ipsis privatis erat iure parendum. Haec illius severitas acerba videretur, nisi multis condimentis humanitatis mitigaretur.

16 Cf. APPEL, ‘Calamitas rei publicae’. Cyceron o nadużyciu prawa w mowie wygłoszonej w obronie

Roscjusza z Amerii, in ‘Salus rei publicae suprema lex’. Ochrona interesów państwa w prawie karnym starożytnej Grecji i Rzymu, eds. DĘBIŃSKI, KOWALSKI, KURYŁOWICZ , Lublin, 2007, 25-36.

17 Cic. Pro Rosc. Amer. 27: Ea Sex. Roscium inopem, eiectum domo atque expulsum ex suis bonis, fugientem latronum tela et minas recepit domum.

18 Cf. App. Bell. civ. 1.103; BROUGHTON, The Magistrates, cit., II, 82.

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«Other requisites are readiness to listen, mildness of manner in delivering judgment, conscientiousness in arguing with suitors and answering their complaints. C. Octavius recently gained much public regard by these means. The First Lictor in his court had nothing to do, the orderly held his tongue, every man spoke as often as he pleased and as long. Perhaps he might have seemed too indulgent, were it not that his indulgence supported his rigour. Sulla’s men were obliged to restore what they had stolen by violence and terror. Magistrates who had given wrongful rulings were obliged as private persons to yield obedience in conformance with the same rules they had made themselves. His rigour would have seemed harsh, had it not been qualified by a generous seasoning of kindliness.» (transl. D.R. Shakelton Bailey)

Cicero mentioned Octavius in his letter to his brother Quintus in the context of duress. He stated that the Sulla’s people19 were enforced to return what they had seized by force and terror. Octavius was mentioned here as an example for Quintus, who performed the governor’s office: available and open towards the brought cases, but severe towards those, who took profits, by using force and duress, and also towards those, who turned out to be dishonest, when making official decisions.

Detailed recovery of the content and effects of formula Octaviana is problematic due to small number of available sources. The action contained a phrase quod per vim aut metum auferat, purpose of which was probably a restitution20 (reddere) of what had been seized. The proceedings took place before a college of recuperatores21.

We have got much more information about protective measures, use of which had been announced in edictum perpetuum compiled by Salvius Iulianus, although also these issues raise doubts among the scholars. It seems that an action22 and exceptio23 as well as restitutio in integrum24 were provided. Finally developed actio quod metus causa25 was a praetorian action with intentio in factum concepta. It had the nature of actio in rem scripta26 and was arbitrary27. In Justinian’s law it was classified into actiones mixtae, although it was originally rather a penal action28. The condemnation was in quadruplum29. However it did not result in infamy.

19 Cf. VENTURINI, ‘Metus’, in Derecho romano de obligaciones: homenaje al profesor José Luis

Murga Gener, Madrid, 1994, 927 ss. 20 Cf. CALORE, Considerazioni, cit.; CALORE, ‘Actio quod metus causa’, cit., 133 ss . 21 Cf. Cic. In Verr. 2.3.153. 22 Cf. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, cit., 654-656. 23 Cf. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, cit., 657-658. 24 Cf. KASER, Zur ‘in integrum restitutio’, besonders wegen ‘metus’ und ‘dolus’, in ZSS, 1977, 101-

183; BOJARSKI, ‘In integrum restitutio’ w prawie rzymskim, in Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne,1963, 15-21; ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, cit., 656-657.

25 According to LENEL, Das Edictum perpetuum, Lipsiae, 1907, 112, the formula was worded as follows: Si paret metus causa AmAm fundum q.d.a. NoNo mancipio dedisse q.d.r.a. neque plus quam annus est cum experiundi potestas fuit neque ea res arbitrio iudicis restituetur, q.e.r. erit, tantae pecuniae quadruplum iudex NmNm AoAo c.s.n.p.a.

26 D. 4.2.9.8 (Ulp. 11 ad ed.): Cum autem haec actio in rem sit scripta nec personam vim facientis coërcerat, sed adversus omnes restitui velit quod metus causa factum est.

27 D. 4.2.14.4 (Ulp. 11 ad ed.): Haec autem actio cum arbitraria sit, habet reus licentiam usque ad sententiam ab arbitro datam restitutionem, secundum quod supra diximus, rei facere: quod si non fecerit, iure meritoque quadrupli condemnationem patietur.

28 See however KUPISCH, Considerazioni in materia di ‘metus’: l’‘actio quod metus causa’, in Diritto romano, tradizione romanistica e formazione del diritto europeo. Giornate di studio in ricordo di Giovanni Pugliese, ed. VACCA, Padova, 2008, 134 ss.

29 After a year a citizen was entitled to an action in simplum, which, however, was of a subsidiary nature. Cf. D. 4.2.14.1 (Ulp. 11 ad ed.): Si quis non restituat, in quadruplum in eum iudicium pollicetur: quadruplabitur autem omne quodcumque restitui oportuit. satis clementer cum reo praetor egit, ut daret

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We do not know too much about the intermediary stages between formula Octaviana and edictum perpetuum. Some hints are given by an antiquarian fragment of the Ulpian’s commentary to the edict30, as well as by controversies by Seneca the Elder31.

D. 4.2.1 (Ulp. 11 ad ed.): Ait praetor: „quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum non habebo”. olim ita edicebatur „quod vi metusve causa”: vis enim fiebat mentio propter necessitatem impositam contrariam voluntati: metus instantis vel futuri periculi causa mentis trepidatio. sed postea detracta est vis mentio ideo, quia quodcumque vi atroci fit, id metu quoque fieri videtur.

«The praetor says: ‘I will not hold valid what has been done under duress.’ At one time the words of the edict were: ‘what has been done through force or under duress.’ For mention was made of force because the compultion brought to oppress the will, whereas duress expressed the alarm of a mind brought about through present or future danger. But the mention of force was later ommited, because whatever is done through extreme force is also held to be done under duress.» (transl. A. Watson)

Ulpian pointed out the difference between the new and the old wording of the edict, where instead of quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum non habebo there was quod vi metusve causa32. In the jurist’s opinion the mention of force was added to the edict in connection with imposing a necessity to act against one’s own intent. Whereas metus is an anxiety of mind in view of current or future danger. Over time the mention of force was deleted, because what was done under a brutal force seemed also to be done in fear.

Introduction of protection against duress preceded many regulations intended to counteract the use of force: the interdict de vi armata33, actio bonorum raptorum, penal laws de vi34. Thus we may suppose that originally the edict was intended to fight the psychological and physical violence, but then the latter aspect became redundant in respect of other protective measures available to the injured.

The term vis was initially interpreted broadly. An example of such understanding can be found in one of controversies by Seneca the Elder35.

Sen. Rhet. Contr. 9.3.8: (an) in re vis aut necessitas sit: nulla, inquit, vis est: arma lex et vincula et ultimum periculum complectitur, quorum nihil fuit in tua persona. ille ait: vis est et necessitas, ubi velim nolim succumbendum est mihi.

«Is this a case of force or necessity? ‘There is no force here; the law relates to force of arms, imprisonment and extreme danger: none of these was present in your case. He says:

ei restituendi facultatem, si vult poenam evitare. post annum vero in simplum actionem pollicetur, sed non semper, sed causa cognita.

30 Cf. D’ORS, El Comentario de Ulpiano a los Edictos del “Metus”, in AHDE, 1981, 223-290. 31 Cf. CALORE, Considerazioni, cit.; CALORE, ‘Actio quod metus causa’, cit., 4 ss. In the author’s

opinion also fragments of Cic. De off. 3.29.103 and 3.30.110 refer to this edict. Cicero wrote there explicitly about force majeure, and specifically about vis hostium, that is about violence used by enemies. It seems that the texts may, in fact, reflect the edict norms, if force majeure was also referred in this context by Seneca the Elder, when he wrote about ultimum periculum (Contr. 9.3.8). Cf. below. See also D. 4.2.9.1 (Ulp. 11 ad ed.); HARTKAMP, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, Amsterdam, 1971, 48-49.

32 Cf. VON LÜBTOW, Der Ediktstitel, cit., 99 ss.; CERVENCA, Per la storia dell’editto ‘quod metus causa’, in SDHI, 1965, 312-318; EBERT, ‘Vi metusve causa’, in ZSS, 1969, 403-415.

33 Cf. BIENIEK, Geneza interdyktu ‘de vi armata’, in Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Prawo 1967, 9-25.

34 Cf. LINTOTT, Violence in Republican Rome, Oxford, 1968, 107 ss.; LABRUNA, Alle radici dell’ideologia repressiva della violenza nella storia del diritto romano, in Adminicula2, Napoli, 1991, 167 ss.

35 See more about this controversy below.

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‘Force and necessity are present where willy-nilly I have to give in.» (transl. W. Winterbottom)

Now one party persuaded that there was no force, because the law defines force as using weapons, bonds and existence of the highest danger, whereas the other party argued that the force is also necessity, that is a circumstance, when someone had to do something whether he wanted to or not. The last opinion demonstrates that there was a conviction that using psychological duress, that is, a threat, could also be considered use of force.

We do not know, who was originally passively legitimate in the discussed suit, whether only an individual, who used duress, or also a third party, which could take benefit from this act. Therefore it is not certain, if initially the action was in personam or in rem scripta.

The intermediary stage between formula Octaviana and edictum perpetuum described by Ulpian may be analysed also based on the already mentioned controversies by Seneca the Elder, who included the principle per vim metumque gesta irrita sint/ ne sint rata into subjects of two rhetorical exercises as a legal basis36.

Controversy 4.8 concerns a patron, who – defeated and proscribed during the civil war – took a refuge in his freedman’s home. He was accepted and asked by the freedman to release him from his obligations (operae liberti), what was done by conducting consignatio, that is, signing a document, which was then sealed. When the patron recovered his rights, he demanded that his freedman fulfilled the obligations, what the freedman objected. The text suggests that the patron demanded restitutio in integrum37. The exercise was embedded in reality of the age of the first triumvirate, which was in terms of terror quite similar to the Sullan times.

Sen. Rhet. Contr. 4.8: ‘Non mea’ inquit ‘sed aliena vis fuit’; aeque dignus est poena qui ipse vim adhibet ut qui ab alio admota ad lucrum suum utitur.

«‘I did not use force – someone else did.’ The man who applies force himself and the man who makes use to his own profit of force applied by another are equally deserving of punishment.» (transl. W. Winterbottom)

The proposition of argumentation to the benefit of the patron contains a very interesting phrase. That is, when the freedman explained that he was not the one, who used duress, the former owner should respond that not only someone, who uses force himself, but also someone, who takes benefit from using force by others, deserves to be punished38. It seems that the term vis used in this fragment means duress in general sense, not only a physical one, but also a psychological one.

This fragment is a clear proof of discussion on possibility to bring accusation against someone, who did not use force or threat, but who took material profit in connection with using duress by someone else. It does not prove that in the beginning of the Principate protection against duress was in rem, but – if this solution was postulated – it may confirm a relatively early admission to use it in such a way.

Controversy 9.3, in which the principle per vim metumque gesta ne sint rata was also invoked, concerns a dispute on children abandoned in their infancy, who had been found and brought up by a stranger, who later swore to their natural father seeking them, that he would tell him, where they were, if he agreed to send one of them back to himself. The parties concluded an appropriate pactum, the fosterer returned two sons to their father and demanded to send one of them back to himself. A fragment of divisio, where Seneca quoted a pronouncement of Latro, is very interesting.

36 Even though the subjects of the controversies were fictitious, it may be supposed that the opinions

quoted mirrored some actual discussions among the educated citizens, also jurists. 37 Sen. Rhet. Contr. 4.8: Patronus a liberto restitutionem peto. 38 Cf. MARTENS, Durch Dritte verursachte Willensmängel, Tübingen, 2007, 21.

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Sen. Rhet. Contr. 9.3.9: An, si in re vis et necessitas est, ita tantum rescindantur quae per vim et necessitatem gesta sunt, si vis et necessitas a paciscente adhibita est: nihil, inquit, mea, an tu cogaris, si non a me cogeris. meam culpam esse oportet, ut mea poena sit. non, inquit; neque enim lex adhibenti vim irascitur sed passo succurrit, et iniquum illi videtur id ratum esse, quod aliquis non quia voluit pactus est, sed quia coactus est. nihil autem refert, [quam] per quem illi necesse fu(er)it; iniquum enim quod rescinditur facit fortuna eius, qui passus est, non persona facientis.

«If there is force or necessity present, can actions done as a result of force and necessity only be annuled if the force and necessity were applied by the bargainer? ‘It is nothing to doo with me whether you are forced – if you arent’ forced by me; if I am to be punished, the fault must be mine.’ ‘No. The law is not angry with the applying the force; it merely comes to the aid of one who has suffered by it, and regards it as unfair that something should stand when one party agreed to it not because he wanted to but because he was forced to. It makes no odds, I repeat, who caused him to be forced; for what is annuled is made unfair by the fortunesof the man who suffered, not the person of the agent.» (transl. W. Winterbottom)

A matter of discussion here is, whether a party had to use duress to be responsible to the law, or even the fact of taking advantage of it was enough. The fosterer should use the argument that he did not enforce the father to conclude pactum and there was no fault on his side. Whereas the natural father should respond that the purpose of the legal provision was not to pursue a party, who used force, but to help a party, who experienced duress. Thus a subject of an agreement concluded by the party not voluntarily, but under duress, should not be relevant.

The legal background of this discussion is a norm of the praetorian edict concerning protection of agreements – pacta39.

D. 2.14.7.7 (Ulp. 4 ad ed.): Ait praetor: „pacta conventa, quae neque dolo malo, neque adversus leges plebis scita senatus consulta decreta edicta principum, neque quo fraus cui eorum fiat facta erunt, servabo”.

«The praetor says: ‘I will enforce agreements in the form of a pact which have been made neither maliciously nor in contraversion to a statute, plebiscite, decree of the senate or edict of the emperor, nor as a fraud on any of these.» (transl. A. Watson)

The praetor ensured protection of the agreements, which were concluded in good faith, not contrary to the positive law and without any fraud. So emphasis was put on behaviour of the contracting parties themselves and no external circumstances were mentioned. In the light of this fact we can assume that pactum, which is a subject of the discussed controversy, was concluded in accordance with the edict provisions and should be under praetorian protection. However now an issue of duress not used by any party, certainly vividly discussed in those times, which is an external circumstance and has influence on decision on concluding the pactum, appears. The Latro’s statement contains a suggestion that existence of vis et necessitas during conclusion of an agreement excludes free decision of the party and should be a basis for nullifying it (rescindere).

The discussed fragment contains also another very important nuance. The duress, under which the father was, was considered an internal duress, based on his conviction that there was no other way out of this situation. So there would be no culprit, but only someone, who took benefit from this conviction. However in further section of the text an opinion

39 ARCHI, ‘Ait Praetor: Pacta conventa servabo’. Studio sulla genesi e sulla funzione della clausola

nel ‘Edictum Perpetuum’, in: ‘De iustitia et iure’. Festgabe für Ulrich von Lübtow, Berlin, 1980, 373 ss.

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appeared that conditioning revealing the information about children up on consent to conclude a pactum was also a use of duress40.

The arguments used seem to reflect the juridical deliberations about the edict quod vi metusve causa. The discussion must have been related to possibility of using the protection measures offered by the praetor against third party, who took benefit from the circumstances, but did not use duress. Also the term necessitas appeared here, which was used by Ulpian, meaning need, necessity, when consent to perform a specific legal action seems to be the only way out to the party. It is a borderline case, where a kind of threat is visible, but it is doubtful, if it is enough in order to apply the edict41. The terror (metus) of the party in such a case must have strong grounds42.

It is worth noting that in case of pactum the agreement of both parties, that is, a consensus, to which, as Ulpian wrote, there was no more flagrant contradiction, than force and threat, is required. Therefore granting protection to the party, which had concluded pactum under duress, in circumstances excluding free decision, seems natural. The deliberations conducted in this controversy correspond with the issues disputed within the legal discussion on the edict quod vi metusve causa, also in relation to negotia stricti iuris. A subject of quite vehement debates – as it may be supposed – was providing protection against a party, who did not use violence, but only took benefit from the situation. A justification, used also in this period, was the fact that the discussed legal provisions were aimed to protect the injured, not to punish the culprit, and on these grounds it was suggested that the praetorian measures might be used in rem, and not only in personam.

40 Sen. Rhet. Contr. 9.3.9: tu, inquit, mihi vim admovisti, qui non aliter indicabas, quam si pactus

essem. 41 Cf. Sen. Rhet. Contr. 9.3.8: primum non est vis, ubi aliquid expediendae rei causa patiendum est,

sed ratio; tamquam non possum domum habere, nisi hanc emero; nulla alia venalis est. hanc occasionem vidit venditor et premit. non tamen hanc emptionem rescindes; alioqui in infinitum calumnia excedet.

42 Cf. D. 4.2.5 (Ulp. 11 ad ed.): Metum accipiendum Labeo dicit non quemlibet timorem, sed maioris malitatis; D. 4.2.6 (Gai. 4 ad ed. provinc.): Metum autem non vani hominis, sed qui merito et in homine constantissimo cadat, ad hoc edictum pertinere dicemus.