One and many: The early naiy?yikas and the problem of universals

H E E R A M A N T I W A R I

O N E A N D M A N Y : T H E E A R L Y N A I Y A Y I K A S A N D

T H E P R O B L E M OF U N I V E R S A L S *

Our journey into the past can never be complete and final. This is not because we can never exhaustively discover the contours of the past, the land that we have left behind, from the control of the materials that we now have at our disposal. Rather it is that we take new trips to the old land and to see new landscapes from a new angle of vision. It is not that we cannot get always the cartography right, but that we try each time to get a new cartography. - - Bimal Matilal (1990: 121)

Universals were discussed at a great length within the systems of Nyfiya and Vaigesika, beginning with Kanfida (c. t50 BCE). However, the seeds of that discussion were sown by Sanskrit grammarians as early as c. 400 BCE. The first relevant extant work is the Ast.ddhydyi of PS_nini (P). Later Patafijali, the commentator on P, elaborated the issue further in his Mahdbhdsya (Pat) or 'the Great Commentary', interpreting the views of two ancient grammarians, Vyfi.di and V~japy- ayana, who advocated two different theories of the meaning of a word. The views of these two grammarians are contained in Kfityfiyana's Vdrttikas (K), which are quoted and commented upon in Pat. In the present essay, I am going to give a brief account of how the early Naiyfiyikas (especially Gotama and Vfitsyfiyana) handled the problem. The essay is divided into two parts: one deals in brief with a general introduction to the problem; the other contains a fresh translation of the Nydya-sfttras 2.2.58--70 and Vfitsyayana's commentary on them The translation is also supplied with discussions and analysis.

Journal of lndian Philosophy 22: 137--170, 1994. �9 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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P A R T I

1.1. The Problem

What justification do we have for grouping many different things under the same general term? Can we invent an independent term for any perceptible group of things? Should there be a universal rule that everything must belong to a particular group, to which a perceiver can relate it? Is there any entity which is, in some sense, present in all things? Questions like these have given rise at various times in the history of philosophy to what is generally known as the problem of universals. In the West the problem "goes back to Plato at least, perhaps to Socrates, perhaps to even earlier times" (Armstrong 1989: 1). Time and again the problem has been discussed in the West.

Can every property which is shared by more than one object or by a group of objects, be treated as a universal? Does a property qualify for being a universal just because it is a basis for some similarity between certain objects? Not so, according to Indian philosophy. Indian philosophers discussed properties which could easily be mis- understood as universals, and made a clear distinction between a property that is a "real" tmiversal and a property that "appears to be" a universal. Thus only those properties that are in line with what is accepted in the system as "natural" classification are treated as real universals. The properties which do not correspond to "natural" categories are treated as imposed properties (upddhi). A universal, on the other hand, has to be unitary, simple and unanalysable (akhanda). The discussion to highlight the distinction resulted in a corpus of literature which spans all the major schools of Indian philosophy. One such example of a property that "appears to be" a universal might suffice to make the point clear here. It is argued that beasthood (pagutva) as a l~roperty common to many individuals is not a real universal. For the term "beast" (----- padu) is used in Sanskrit to refer to many kind of animals like cows, lions, deer and so on excluding such things as birds, insects and human beings. Such a usage of the term "beast" (pagu) is based upon certain observable features common to most beasts such as a tail, four legs, etc. Unlike the term "beast", "lion" refers to the universal, lion_hood, that is present in all lions. Terms like "beast",

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"animal", etc. would be treated as "imposed properties" (upddhi) (see also Matilal 1986: 382--86).

Many twentieth-century philosophers have engaged in polemics against and in favour of universals, but the issue still remains unsettled. In the first quarter of this century, Bertrand Russell wrote in favour of universals by arguing thus: "If we ask ourselves what justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, arid the other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common. They must all, in some sense, partake of a common nature, which will be found in whatever is just and nothing else." This of course is the view of a Western philosopher, who was influenced by a chain of philosophical thinking that stretches back to the Platonic period of the Greeks. Such thoughts existed in India from the very ancient period, perhaps as early as Plato's in the West. But the aim of the current essay is not to compare Indian thought with Western. It is an essay based entirely upon the classical Indian literature concerning the issue of entities or features which are shared commonly by many individuals. In the West such things are called universals.

The term 'kmiversal" first came into philosophy as a translation of a term used by Aristotle, although the roots of Aristotle's term go back to Plato, who uses the term "form" (eidos). The Indian thinkers used the terms sdmdnya or jdti and upddhi, which, except for a few reservations, carry the same meaning as "universal". In ordinary Sanskrit, however, the terms sdmdnya and jdti have different connota- tions, though not entirely different from the meaning of universals. The term sdmdnya in ordinary Sanskrit means commonality, generality, equality etc. The term jdti means "genus", a term to which it is historically related. It is used to refer to what Europeans have called "caste", but that has nothing to do with the present context, even if one might argue that philosophers in India borrowed the term from the social system in order to mal~e its meaning easily accessible to a layperson. "From one point of view," remarks Matilal (1971: 76), "the Nydya doctrine of generic properties can be said to be due to the instinctive inclination toward the NATURAL classification of objects of our experience. 'Overlapping' destroys, in come sense, the natural order of classification, and hence if there is any 'overlapping' between classes, Nyfiya rules that those class-properties cannot be set up as

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REAL generic properties. They are at best 'imposed' class-concepts. From another point of view, one might discover in the Nyfiya doctrine of generic property a remote influence of the socio-religious ideas of the Brahmins. Translated into biological terms, the above principle of 'non-overlapping' becomes a principle which opposes cross-breeding. There is thus some evidence that the Ny~ya bias for real generic properties was partly influenced by the Brahminical concept of an ideal social structure where intermixture of classes is not to be per- mitted."

The evidence of such views can be found in the Nyfiya-Vaigesika literature. For example, the commentators on the Nydya-sgttras (NS) as well as on the Vaigesika-sgttras (VS) have explained that brahmin-hood is a generic property residing in all brahmins, because their race is indicative of their generic property brahmin-hood. Recently, Halbfass (1991: 29) too has pointed out that "the theory of real universals (sdrndnya, ]dti) serves to explain and support the system of four main castes (yarn. a)", and that the above point has not explicitly been mentioned by the exegetes of the Nyfiya school is due to "an increas- ing apologetic function" to maintain their neutral attitude to Vedic traditions. The above view of Matilal and Halbfass, that the Nyfiya- Vaigesika theory of universals may be explained in terms of its relevance to the organisation of Hindu society into castes, was recently echoed by Daniel (1984: 1--2) in his study of South Indian anthro- pology by saying that

several principles have been identified as underlying or generating the caste system, the most popular being that of purity versus pollution. Unfortunately these present but half the truth . . . . The inability to go beyond or beneath caste arose from the failure to see that jdti meaning "genus" (the sourse concept of the ill-translated "caste") is not applied to human beings only, but to animals, plants and even inorganic material, such as metal and minerals as well . . . . There is no better term than substance to describe the general nature of these variously ranked cultural units. In other words, differen- tially valued and ranked substances underlie the system known as the caste system, which is but one of many surface manifestations of this system of ranked substances.

However, Ingalls (1957: 235) believes that the Nyfiya system falls "between two extremes. It is neither theistic nor atheist ic. . , the [Nygtya] sfitras already represent a compromise with orthodoxy." (Cf. Laine 1989: 228: "The importance of the jdti/upddhi distinction in

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relation to the organization of society into castes goes beyond, I believe, the stricture against marriage between difference castes. Nyfiya philosophers were concerned to uphold the basis of the caste system as founded in the real divisions of the world." There is another application of the term jdti in the Indian system of Ny~ya or Logic. It refers to a kind of trick or a dialectical device in a philosophical debate. When one of the two sides in a debate deliberately uses the unsound reasoning of a fallacious argument to deceive the other, it is called jdti or sophistry [used in the sense of "sophistic rejoinder"], as Matilal [1985:13--14 & 56--57] translates it.)

1.2. Realism vs. Nominalism

The western medieval debate between "realism" and "nominalism" finds its parallel in India. Let us see briefly what the terms "realism" and "nominalism" stand for in the history of philosophy. "Realism", like "real", has always to be understood by contrast. Any view that "emphasises the existence of some kind of thing or object (e.g. material objects, propositions and UNIVERSALS) in contrast to a view which dispenses with the things in question in favour of words (nominalism), ideas (idealism, conceptualism)" can be called realist (Lacey 1986: 200--201). For example, the universalist, i.e. one who believes universals are real and exist in time and space irrespective of their instantia- tions, will argue that a universal already existed before its instantiation came to exist and that it exists even after its instantiation has perished. That is to say that the universal, e.g. cowhood, is real and existed before a cow was produced and indeed its existence is not dependent upon that of any cow, nor is it dependent upon mind. That the universals are independent of mind has been the basic argument of Western medieval philosophy based on Platonic doctrine in favour of universals. The same argument has been used by the ancient Nyfiya-Vaigesika philosophers in India as well. Such an argument is called realism in the West. Interpreting this Western concept of realism, Quine (1980, originally 1953: 14) writes: "Realism, as the word is used in cormec- tion with the mediaeval controversy over universals, is the Platonic doctrine that the universals or abstract entities have been independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them."


According to the realist view, individual objects such as cow, etc. are what they are only in virtue of their relation to universals, but the universals on the other hand would be what they are even if no individuals existed at all. Plato too held the view that the "existence of the Forms is independent of the existence of particulars" (Staniland 1972: 3). Hence, a general word, e.g. "cow", corresponds to the universal, cowhood. It is only that we cannot perceive cowhood unless we perceive a cow. The realist's argument here is that the word "cow" is applied only to those individuals which share a common property called cowhood (Cf. NS 2.2.64). Both Platonic Form and Nyfiya's real universals are separate from and independent of concrete particular things or individuals in space and time. The difference between Platonic "form" and Nygtya's "real universals" is that the former is "copied" by the concrete particulars while the latter is "instantiated" in individuals. Thus Plato's "forms" and Nyftya's "real universals" are independent, eternal, changeless, whereas particulars and individuals are dependent, transient, and in a state of continual change. It is not difficult to see why the Indian philosophers held universals to be eternal and changeless. Even if there were no individual cows, that would not prevent the universal, cowhood, from existing -- and what else could prevent it from existing? So universals must exist.

There are indeed many problems with the above argument for there may be properties other than the universal cowhood that can be the basis of applying the word "cow" to a number of animals, for example, the particular form (dkrti) or configuration of an individual. On the other hand "nominalists" oppose realists by arguing that only individuals exist and not universals; there are only general words like "cow" and no such real things as cowhood. While the realist believes that "classes are discovered," the nominalists "object to admitting abstract entities at all" (Quine 1980, originally 1953: 14--15). In the West there had sprung a third theory called conceptualism which holds that "there are universals but they are mind-made" -- as opposed to the realists -- and that "they are invented" (Ibid. 14). Such positions have been argued for and against by philosophers in both India and West for long time, but they have reached no commonly agreed solution.

In the West there have been many varieties of "nominalism", or what I prefer to call "antirealism", but it would not be relevant to

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discuss them here. In India the main opponent of the realists, i.e. the Naiyfiyikas, has been the Buddhists. The most important of them was Diflnfiga (c. 550 C.E.). In his Pramdn. asamuccaya (PS), Diflnfiga argues that universals are non-existent, or at least unknowable. Difinfiga questions the very ground on which the Naiyfiyikas establish their theory of universals: that a universal is "indivisible" (avibhdjya) and "resides in a plurality of individuals" (anekavrttitva). He argues that such an entity is logically impossible. For, if a universal is resident in an individual, it must reside either completely or partially, that is, either the entire universal resides in an individual or a part of it does (see Pramdn. asamuccaya 5:17--18 & 2: 16). If a universal U resides in its entirety in a given individual xl, then it does not reside at all in individuals x 2, x3. x4, �9 . . xn and thus fails to be resident in a plurality of individuals. If on the other hand the universal resides only partially in each of several individual instances, then it loses its indivisibility, for it then has as many internal divisions as there are individuals in which it supposedly resides.

Similarly, Diflnfiga questions the knowability of an indivisible entity which resides in a plurality of individuals. The theory of universals is conceived to be based on a resemblance, by virtue of which a number of individuals are collected together in a class. So even if there is such a class, it is impossible to know what all the members of a class have in common that qualifies them for membership of that class until we know each member of the class. "But to know each past, present and future individual in a class is clearly impossible for anyone who is spatially and temporarily finite" (Hayes 1988: 183--184). The Naiyfiyikas who succeeded Diflnfiga answered these questions (e.g. Uddyotakara). Diflnfiga did not stop at questioning the reality of universals. He provided a substitute for universals called anydpoha or apoha, which means "exclusion of others", and held that it would be easier to establish the knowability of an individual, say, a cow, if we say that it is a cow by virtue of '~being a locus of the deniability of the absence of a cow", rather than saying that "a cow is a cow by virtue of being a locus of the universal, cowhood".

Perhaps Difln~ga was the first Buddhist philosopher to put the authority of scripture to the test. Reducing the authority of scriptures to the authority of reason, Diflnfiga stated in his PS that scriptures


could be recognised as authoritative only to the extent that they could meet the criteria of logical soundness. Modern Buddhist philosophers like Van der Kuijp (1979: 6--28) and Vetter (1964) have paid con- siderable attention to the role of logic and epistemology in Buddhism. Steinkellner (1982:1--15) has summarised Vetter's account as follows:

Valid cognitions (pramdna, samyag[hdna) are a necessary presupposition of meaningful human action. The Buddhist's actions are oriented towards the goal of emancipation. This goal and the path towards it have been shown by the Buddha. The Buddha thus offers a goal and guidance for human activity that cannot be derived from ordinary means of cognition, i.e. perception and inference. However, that he is an authority for this has to be proven, for faith alone is an insufficient motive to be a Buddhist. The words of the Buddha can be accepted as an authority only when it has been demon- strated that they are words of somebody who shows through his conduct that he does not lie, and who because of his development of his experience has something to tell us that cannot be mediated to us in another way. For the last goal of human actions, which also is the only point of orientation for everyday human practice, has to be indicated by such an authority, since it is never immediately present -- or it would not be a "last goal".

Such a doctrine that the authority of scripture is reducible, however, did not always exist in the Brfihmanical tradition. Nor was it wel- comed by the exegetes of this tradition, the Mimfirn. sakas, who believed the Vedas to be unquestionable, inerrant and eternal. The great grammarian-philosopher, Bhart.rhari, a contemporary of Difinfiga in opposition to whom Difinfiga formed many of his ideas, defended the inerrancy and irreducible authority of scripture by contending that scriptures have a unique subject matter and that inference or logic and epistemology, unlike scriptures, are fallible. In the first chapter of the Vdkyapadfya (VP), Bhartrhari (1: 30--31) states: "Not without the sacred tradition (dgama) is religious duty fixed by means of reason. Even the knowledge of seers was preceded by sacred tradition. And no one can refute by means of reason the uninterruptedly fixed modes (avyavacchinndh panthdnah.) of religious duty, for they are well known to people". Bhartrhari states further that it is only scriptures that give a person knowledge of moral matters: "Men, including outcastes (cdn. d. dlam), have little use for academic treatises in the two matters of what is right and what is wrong" (Ibid. 1: 40). The expression "academic treatises" (gdstra), in the verse here refers to texts com-

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posed by humans (mdnavaracita) as opposed to the eternal Vedas, which were revealed to humans through the agency of Seers (.rsi). Thus, according to Bhartrhari, religious, moral and metaphysical truths fall outside the realm of reasoning.

The Nyfiya-Vaigesika system is an example for such an exception. Chemparathy (1983, quoted in Halbfass 1991) and Halbfass (1991: 23--24) have argued that Nyfiya and Vaigesika "were not originally and genuinely affiliated with the Vedas. They recognized the Vedas as a 'source of knowledge' (pramdn. a), and committed themselves to its defense, in a retroactive manner, after they had established themselves as philosophical systems." So the affiliation of the Nyfiya and Vaigesika to the Vedas is more "apologetic", as Hatbfass has called it, than "genuinely exegetic". These two schools engage in the "defense and maintenance of the Vedic tradition" justifying its validity through reasoning. Nyfiya is not only an dtmavidyd 'science of the self' but also an dnviksd 'investigative science'. (See also Halbfass 1988: 263--86.) But its commitment to the authority of the Veda, and its assumption of "apologetic responsibilities" keep the Nyfiya system detached from all traditions "of merely 'worldly' thought and argumentation (yukti, tarka, dnvfksd)" (Halbfass 1991: 24).

The above view of Brfihmanical tradition can be loosely compared with what is called "strict realism" or the Platonic form of realism in the West. Ny~ya realism is something in between the Buddhist "nominalism" of Difmfiga and the "strict realism" of the Mim~tmsfi tradition.

P A R T II

ILl. Prelude

As mentioned in Part I, we are now going to discuss some textual material from the Nyfiya school of Indian systematic philosophy. We know that both the Nyfiya and the Vaigesika schools are based on sets of aphorisms (stYttra) and that Aksapfida Gotama, commonly known as Gotama (or Gautama), is believed to be the author of the Nydya- sCttras. I have explained elsewhere how the Vaigesikas tried to hang the whole world between the two poles, sattd (being) and vigesa (particularity), and asserted that every conceivable reality that exists


must be within these two ends. That is to say that different individuals, viz. cow, horse, human being, birds, trees and so on share at least two properties: (1) that they all exist and therefore share the property of 'existence' or 'being', and (2) that each individual above is different from the other and therefore they all share the property of particularity. The common factor which combines a group of individuals in one class is called universal (sdmdnya). (I have discussed in detail how the Vai~esikas and the Grammarians have approached the problem of universals in my D.Phil. thesis 1993, Oxford University.)

While the Vai~esika philosophers use the term sdmdnya, Gotama uses jdti for universal. His commentators, Vfitsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vficaspati, et aL, and other exponents of Ny~ya have frequently used both sdmdnya and jdti to refer to universal. The Nyaya approach of dealing with universals is slightly different from that of the Vai~esikas: it is like that of the grammarians, as I have discussed elsewhere. It is interesting to see how the movement of samanya is being shaped in the Nyfiya school. In fact the discussion of universals began in NS with the controversy about the meaning of words. There are in the Indian philosophical tradition three different views concerning the meaning of a word. The issue was raised by Pfinini in his Ast.ddhydyi and the later grammarians, Kfttyfiyana and Patafijali, discussed in great detail the two different views of Vyftdi and V~japy~tyana about the meanings of words. In NS too fdti is discussed under the section where Gotama explains the meaning of a word in the process of establishing word (dabda) as a means of correct knowledge (pramdna), because it is through ~abda that one acquires knowledge.

II.2. How Does One Derive Knowledge from Words?

A brief look at the theory of acquiring knowledge will be in order. A human language is always used to communicate with people, and it is the process of learning a language that is called in Indian philosophy ~dbdabodha (acquiring knowledge through a linguistic utterance), where gdbda stands for human speech or linguistic utterance and bodha for knowledge. This process of learning language involves two people, the speaker and the hearer, who belong to the same linguistic community. '~ hearer's knowledge," comments Matilal (1990: 52),


"of the word-meaning from the utterance of the words is generated according to the following psychological rule of association. The hearer is a competent language-user, and he is acquainted with the connection between word and meaning. This acquaintance or cognition may be called ~akti-jlidna or vrtti-jfidna, the said connection is called vrtti, and an awareness of it is therefore called vrtti-ffidna. The general nomological rule is that whenever such cognition of the connection between the two items is present, the cognition of one will generate remembrance of the other. Hence, if words are cognized, meanings are presented to the hearer." There are certain considerations to be followed in acquiring such a knowledge which can be summarized as follows: (a) that the sound emitted by the speaker to communicate some information to a hearer must be linguistically identifiable and consist of a word or words ending with affixes, (lo) that the hearer must have linguistic competence to identify such a sound and be reminded of meaning/things connected with each word. Then there are certain auxiliary episodes which are vital to a successful communication of information or knowledge. These are:

(1) dkdfiksd (syntactic expectancy), there should be a mutual syntactic connection among words that form a linguistic sentence -- because in order to produce a meaningful sentence (be it a one word sentence or a many word sentence) one word creates expectation of another grammatically connected to it. For example, listing many words without any syntactic connection with each other, viz. "river tree monkey bird" does not yield any linguistic information.

(2) Yogyatd (mutual fitness), that the meaning of each word in the sentence must fit with each other. For example, there is no compati- bility or fitness between the words forming the sentence, "mountains fly", because the verb "fly" involves wings which are operational through natural vitality or a machine; hence the mountains cannot fly. Furthermore, the hearer must not be aware of any mutual unfitness among the word/words in such an utterance.

(3) dsatti (spatio-temporal proximity), that the words spoken in such an utterance must spatially and temporally be close to each other. For example, nobody can discern the meaning of three words, viz. 'cows', 'are' and 'grazing', spoken quite separately at three different hours and/or in three different speeches.


And finally, (4) the hearer should be intelligent enough to connect certain ambiguous words spoken in such an utterance to the intention of the speaker, through the context. For example, a homonym saindhava means in Sanskrit 'salt' as well as 'horse'. Thus if asked, "bring me the salt please", by the speaker at the dining table, the hearer must look for the salt, not for a horse.

Therefore, only after meeting the above considerations can a linguistic utterance yield a meaningful information. The process of knowledge thus acquired is called in classical Indian philosophy ~dbdabodha. This gdbdabodha also requires

another intermediate factor called vydpdra, 'function' or 'operation', which is in this case the resulting remembrance of the meanings of the individual words. The theory is that an efficient causal factor (an 'instrument' = karana) needs an intermediate factor (called vydpglra) to produce the end-product (phala, in this case a pramd) (Matilal 1990: 50).

Here we shall not go into the details of what role do the 'intention of the speaker', the 'context of a speech act' and the 'competence of the hearer' play in a gdbdabodha. (For a detailed analysis of the above theory see, Kunjunni Raja 1969: 157--187; Matilal 1967, 1985: 372-- 387 & 416--430; 1988: 107--122, 1990: 49--83; G. Bhattacharya: 1977: 73--84; Kant: 1979.)

So, why did NS not discuss universals as VS did? Why did he prefer to follow the grammarians' approach of dealing with the problem to that of the Vaigesikas? There could be two different reasons for this. This first may be that Gotama was not aware of the Vaigesika-s(ttras (VS) and he picked up the issue from the grammarians to discuss the validity of word. One could conjecture that NS antedates VS, and it seems that Gotama did not know about VS, at least about the VS's theory of universals, whereas he knew not only the debate between grammarians (viz. Vyfi.di vs. Vfijapyfiyana) about word and meaning, but also that among the Mimfimsakas. (See Matilal 1971: 52--83.) But it is believed that NS contains a few sfitras which belong to VS (cf. Tucci 1929; Oberhammer 1963: 70; and Bronkhorst 1985: 122-- 124). M-tmfimsakas in general believed, however, that the meaning of the word is universal, for "the Mimfi .msakas," writes Ingalls et al. (1990: 713) "as a result of believing the words of the Veda to be eternal, held that the meaning with which the word is connected, is


likewise eternal. It is therefore a universal (sdmdnya), not a transient particular." Gotama argued that a word, say 'cow', designates all the three items, e.g. individual cow, its form or configuration, and the universal cow-hood. (Cf. Kunjulmi Raja & Coward 1990: 63--82.) Gotama began with an examination of each of the three items and argued that if a word, say 'cow', is believed to refer only to one of these three, it would lead to certain unavoidable problems. Gotama first concentrates on the view that a word refers only to an individual. This view was earlier held by Vyfidi. But, neither Gotama nor Vfitsyfiyana has mentioned that the view is that of Vyfidi. It may have been held by other Proto-Nyfiya philosophers.

The other reason why Gotama did not mention the VS may be that he was writing primarily in response to Buddhist criticism of Br5_h- manical views. There is textual evidence that Gotama had Buddhist opponents in mind when he wrote down the sfitras. In fact the commentators on NS (viz. Vfitsyfiyana, Uddyotakara and Vficaspatimiira) have cited and openly criticized the Buddhist and grammarians' views on epistemology. Whatever the case may be, the proper exchange of thoughts between the Nyfiya and Vaigesika schools took place after Pragastapfida. For the present purpose, however, we wish to continue our discussion of universals by explaining the textual materials from Gotama and his commentator, Vfitsyfiyana Paksilasvfimin (NBH).

As will be clear in what follows the Sanskrit terms, vyakti and drayva have been used synonymously by the commentators of NS in the present context, while these two terms may be translated, in a particular context, as individual and substance respectively. Etymologi- cally, however, vyakti means manifestation, visibility, clarity, etc., and dravya object, matter, substance, thing and so on. To avoid confusion here I will use 'thing' and 'individual' interchangeably to refer to wakti and dravya.

II.3. What Does Gotama Have to Say About Universals (Jfiti)?

In the process of giving the definition of "word" (pada) in the second section of the second book, NS (2.2.58--70) explains jdti in the following nine sfitras:

te vibhaktyantdh padam (2.2.58): "that (cluster of letters) ending with a case affix is called 'word' (pada)."


vyaktydkrtijdtisannidh~iv upacdrdt sam~ayah. (2.2.59): "There arises a doubt (with regards to the meaning of a word), for a word is used in the presence of individual, form and universal."

ydgabda-sarntiha-tydga-parigraha-samkhy~-vrddhy-apacaya-varna-sam~isdnubandhdn~m. vyakt~v upacdr~d vyaktih. (2.2.60): "It is the individual (that is referred to by the word), because (in connection with the following situations) the word is applied to (refer to) the individual (vyaktdv upac&dt), viz. (1) the pronominal term 'which', (2) a cluster, (3) abandonment, (4) possession, (5) number, (6) growth, (7) decline, (8) colour, (9) a compound and (10) propagation."

na tadanavasthdm~t (2.2.61): "(This is) not true because of infinite regress."

sahacarana-sthdna-tddarthya-vrtta-mdna-dhdrana-sdmipya-yoga-sddhanddhipatyebhyo brdhmana-mahca-kata-rdja-saktu-candana-gahggt-~dt.akdnna-purusesv atadbhdve 'pi tadupac&ah. (2.2.62): "(It is often seen that) due to (the following, viz.) (1) association, (2) location, (3) goal, (4) conduct, (5) measurement, (6) containing, (7) immediate vicinity, (8) connection, (9) means, and (10) sovereignty, the word is applied to the secondary instead of the primary meaning (atadbhdve tadupacdrah.). For example, (1) brahmin, (2) platform, (3) mat, (4) king, (5) flour, (6) sandal, (7) Ganges, (8) cloth, (9) food and (10) man."

d&rtis tadapeks.atvdt sattvavyavasthdnasiddheh (2.2.63): "(A word denotes) 'form' because the determination of a precise arrangements (of parts) of a entity depends upon it (tadapeks..atvdtt)."

vyaktyg&rtiyukte 'py aprasahgdt proks.anddindm mrdgavake jdtih. (2.2.64): "(It is) the universal (i.e. cow-hood, that is denoted by the word cow) for otherwise, although a clay cow is an individual and has the form (of a cow), its 'washing' etc. (other ritualistic activities) would be impossible."

ndkrtivyaktyapek4atvd j ]dtyabhivyakteh. (2.2.65): "No(t) the universal alone is denoted by a general term). For the manifestation of a universal depends upon both individual and form."

vyaktydkrtijdtayas tu paddtrthah (2.2.66): "In fact, individual, form and universal, all three are denoted by a word."

vyaktir gunavi~esd~rayo mdtrtih. (2.2.67): "An individual is a concrete substance (mdtrti), the locus of particular qualities."

dtkrtirjdtili~igd, khyd~ (2.2.68): "Form expresses a universal and its indicator (lihga, i.e. individual)."

samdnaprasav6tmikd ]dtih. (2.2.69): "Universal generates (the awareness of) commonality."

It is c lear f r o m the a b o v e text that NS is a t t empt ing to reso lve the

c o n t r o v e r s y a b o u t w o r d and meaning . It is in teres t ing to n o t e that in

2 .2 .58 N S fol lows def in i t ion of a ' w o r d ' (pada) given by P 1.4.14: supt ihantam padam m e a n i n g "(a c lus ter of let ters) end ing with a


nominal (sup) or verbal (tiff) suffix is called a word (pada)". Sfitra 2.2.59 refers to the two theories propounded by the grammarians and the three theories (including jdti) propounded by the Mimfimsakas. NS raises the question whether a word is taken to refer to the above three items simultaneously or refers to only one of them or to more than one of the three. (Cf. Jha's 1939: 242, tr.: "There arises a doubt; because the Word is used in reference to the individual, the Con- figuration, and the Universal, as inseparable from one another.") The famous example for a word used often in this context is go, "cow". When a word, e.g. 'cow' is used it refers to a thing where at least three items are present: (a) an individual (vyakti) or a concrete substance, (b) form/configuration or the descriptive features of the cow animal (viz. catus.pada-sdsnd-puccha-vis.dnddiyutd'k.rtih. -- a particular form with four legs, dewlap, tail, two horns, etc. and the universal, cow- hood (gotva). In other words, the above three, e.g. the individual, the form and the universal, "cow-hood" are all inseparably present in the thing for which the word "cow" is used.

II.4. How Does NBH, the Commentator, Explain the Problem ?

Before embarking on the interpretation of NBH, it might be helpful to note here that commentators in general are prone to read into their subjects. Perhaps they end up interpreting their texts more than the original authors intended in the first place. It does not mean, however, that the commentators imagine things at their will -- though it is sometimes the case -- and by doing that subvert the intention of the subject: on the contrary, in an academic world like ancient India, where teaching and academic debate and research was basically carried out in oral form for well into the first few centuries of modern era, the sEttra style of educating pupils was a most helpful means to initiate the student into the subject followed by interpretative discourses on the satras by the teacher(s) (dcdryas). In the process the commentators interpreted the text(s) instilling their own ideas into the subject, which might have not been thought by the composers of the texts commented upon. As Mohanty (1992: 5) remarks, each "interpreter intends to give the meaning of a text, but so also does every other. It is only a sign of philosophical naivety to claim that there is just one privileged sense of

152 H E E R A M A N TIWARI

a text or of a tradition, and that the author of the text or the ancients

had it. One forgets that the author is also an interpreter of his own

text, and that t empora l proximity has nothing to do with authentic

interpretation. There is no privileged access." Therefore we often do

come across an entirely new theory springing f rom a part icular theory.

Such new theories, as byproduc t s of a part icular theory, are often not,

however , un in tended consequences in a part icular tradition; they are

always directly relevant to the main theme of the subject. E a c h theory

is "part and parcel of its so-called 'verbal ' cloak. They are not separ-

able. Like the mythical suit of a rmour which was ' in-born ' with Karna

in the Mahdbhdrata, thought and language are bo rn together" (Matilal

1990: 123). Translat ing any ancient Sanskrit text into a Wes te rn lan-

guage is a mos t a rduous task for a student; every piece of a translation

fails to convey precisely what the text or the author intends in its orig-

inal language. M a n y Sanskrit terms convey different meanings in dif-

ferent contexts; take, for example, the term ~abda. We find different

English equvalents of this te rm in different context, viz. 'word ' ,

' speech' , ' language' , ' supreme reality' and so on. It does not mean to

say that we can never get a satisfactory meaning through a translation;

in fact with a little caut ion and preference to the context, the transla-

tor may get close to what the original writer in tended to convey

th rough a different tongue. As Matilal (1990: 1 2 1 - - 123) remarks,

translation is

an activity to which philosophers, social anthropologists and historians of ideas can hardly afford to be indifferent. As far as modern philosophical activity is concerned, this seems to be relevant not simply due to the obvious and trivial fact that philosophers over the ages have written in various languages which are worlds apart. More importantly, some translational activity in a deeper sense is part of the accepted style of philosophizing. To put it blandly, 'translation' in a non-trivial sense is involved even when a philosopher tries, with whatever motivation, to read the writings of another philosopher, ancient or modem. The same material can have different readings, and thereby inevitably different meanings, different interpretations . . . . It is a matter of common knowledge that a translator may deliberately or unconsciously choose the translational forms or expressions in order to create the intended result, and within certain limits this choice may become tolerable. If it is intolerable the transaltion is bad. We can decide that the translation is bad or distorted to the extent it becomes intolerable.

So we can look at Vfitsyfiyana's comments on NS 2 .2 .58- -70 with

hope that they are not going to take us away f rom what G o t a m a

O N E A N D M A N Y : T H E E A R L Y N A I Y A . Y I K A S 1 5 3

intended to convey through his aphorisms on the issue in question. In support of the view that individuals (vyakti) are designated by a word, NS 2.2.60 enumerated ten cases where the word should refer only to particular things or substances and not to universals. The first of the above ten terms is yd, "that" which is a "defining relative" or a "demonstrative pronoun". This is like using a definite article in English. Sanskrit, however, has no such facility. Matilal (1971: 65) remarks on how the English articles are substituted in Sanskrit:

A general name or a common noun like cow (gau) in Sanskrit is normally used unaccompanied by an article or determiner . . . . The Sanskrit (e.g., proto-Nytiya) 'denotat ion ' theory holds that any name including a general name like cow has various modes of 'supposit ion' or reference, but its primary function is to EXPRESS, or refer to, an individual. Which mode of reference a general term has in a given sentence is generally gathered from the 'context ' or from the total sense of the sentence.

NBH introduces the problem by saying that it is rather confusing to decide whether a word refers to one of the three things (individual, form and universal) or to all of them. He says:

avindbhdvavrttih sannidhih, avindbhdvena vartamdndsu vyaktydkrtifdtisu gaur iti prayujyate, tatra na jt~dyate kim anyatamah, paddrthah, utaitat sarvam iti (NBH 2.2.59): "The term sannidhih (in the sfitra) refers to "essential co-existence" (avin6bhdvavrtti). W h e n the term "cow" is used to refer to the three essentially coexisting items, individual, form and universal, it is hard to know whether only one of the (above) three is denoted (by the term 'cow') or all of them." - - [Cf. Jha's (1939: 242) translation: "The term 'sannidhih ' signifies ' inseparable existence', i.e. invariable concomitance. As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' is used in connect ion with the Individual, the Configu- ration and the Universal, as inseparable from one another; and it is not definitely known whether what is denoted by the Word is any one of these three or all of them.'].

II.5. Individual or Thing (vyakti) as Meaning of a Word

When a general term, e.g. cow (go) is accompanied by the defining relative "that" (yd), i.e. "that cow" or "the cow" (yd gauh), the meaning of the phrase will be limited to the particular cow, that is to say that, in this context, the term "cow" then refers to the 'individual cow'. NBH elaborates the points as follows:

vyaktih paddrthah., kasmdt? yddabdaprabhrtindm, vyaktdv upacdrdt, upacdrah prayog@. y6 gaus tis.thati yd gaur nisanneti, nedam vdkyan.~ jdter abhidhdyakarn abhedht, bheddt


tu dravydbhidhdyakam, gavdm samgthah iti bheddd dravydbhidhdnam na jdter abheddt. vaidydya gdm. daddtiti dravyasya tydgo na jdter amtirttatvdt pratikrarndnukrarndnupa- patted ca. parigrahah, svatvendbhisambandhah, kaundinyasya gauh. brdhrnan, asya gaur iti; dravydbhidhdne dravyabheddt sambandhabheda ity upapannam, abhinnd tu jdtir iti: "It is a thing that is referred to by a word. How?

(1) Because such (relative pronominal) words as "which" etc. are applied (upacdra) to an individual. The word upacdra, here, stands for "application". The expressions, "that cow which stands (over there)", "that cow which is sitting (over there)", do not refer to a universal (cow-hood), because a universal is only one. Because it (the pronoun) refers to different things (bheddt), it (the above sentence) refers to individual (cows) (dravydbhidhdyakam).

(2) Because (a cluster is made) of different things, the statement, "a cluster of cows" (gavdm. samtihah.), refers to a thing (dravya = cow), not to a universal (cow- hood). For the universal is only one.

(3) With the sentence "he gives away a cow to the doctor", a thing (cow) is given away, not a universal because (a) a universal is an abstract or incorporeal item (amtirta), (b) it is not possible to grasp and abandon (pratikramgmukrama) (an abstract item).

(4) parigraha means connection through ownership (svatvendbhisambandhah.). In the expression "the cow of Kaundinya', "the cow of a Brahmin", it is explained that only when a thing is referred to (by a word) can different things be connected to different owners. A universal, however, is undifferentiated or one."

Artha means 'referent of word' (paddrtha) here. I am using the terms, viz. "means", "denotates", "designates" and "refers to", interchangeably to translate the Sanskrit term abhidhdna (abhi + ~dhd). For, although the above terms have a different sense in Western philosophical writing in English, in Sanskrit such a distinction is not found regarding the use of the term abhidhdna. The term abhidhdna means "speaking of" or "meaning". For example, jdter abhidhdyakam "(the word) speaks of a (referent, i.e.) universal", and dravydbhidhdnarn "(the word) speaks of a (referent, i.e.) individual". (See below, NBH 2.2.61.)

NBH goes on to enumerate further cases where a word refers to individuals and not to universals. He states:

sahkhyd -- dada gdvo vi.~atir gdva iti bhinnam dravyam satikhyg~yate, na ]dtir abheddd iti. Vrddhih kdranavato dravyasydvayavopacayah., avardhata gaur iti; niravayavd tu jdtir iti. etena apacayo" vydkhydtah., varnah. -- gukld gauh kapild gaur iti; dravyasya gunayogo na sdmdnyasya, samdsah. -- gohitam gosukham iti dravyasya sukhddiyogo na jdter iti. anubandhah -- sar@aprajananasantdno gaur grim. janayatiti, tad utpattidharmatvdd dravye yuktam na f&au viparyaydd iti. dravyam vyaktir iti hi ndrthdntaram:

(5) With regard to number, in such phrases as "ten cows", "twenty cows", etc., it is


individuals not universals, that are numbered, because the universal (cow-hood) is one (abheda).

(6) With regard to such verbs as "growing", (we find) that a thing which has a cause (kdran. avatah.) increases in its parts (avayavopacaya); for example, "the cow has grown". Universal (cow-hood), on the other hand, has no parts (hence, it cannot be the subject of growth).

(7) Declining (apacaya) is explained likewise. (8) With regard to colour, in the examples, i.e. "the white cow", "the red cow", it is

a thing to which a quality (gun a) belongs, not a universal. (9) With regard to compounds, such as gohitam (welfare-of-the-cow), gosukham

(comfort-of-the-cow), (the second member of the compound) sukha etc. belongs to an individual, viz. cow, not to a universal (cow-hood).

(10) Propagation (anubandha) means "continuity in procreating what looks alike", for example, "a cow procreates another cow". This is appropriate for an individual (cow) because it has the quality of being produced (utpattidharma), not for a universal (cow-hood) because of the contrary (viparyaya) (i.e. the universal cannot be produced). (In this context the word) dravya (thing) is synonymous with vyakti (individual)."

N B H has explained above that in the associat ion with such verbs as "grow" the word "cow" refers to an individual, not to a universal , for

(a) in o rde r to grow the entity has to have a body , i.e. the entity

should be m a d e of parts , and (b) that the entity mus t be caused by

ano the r entity, i.e. the entity mus t have causes, i.e. inherent cause

( samavdyi kdrana ), non- inheren t cause ( asamavdyi kdrana ) and

ins t rumenta l cause (nimitta kdrana). This example indicates the

Nyfiya-Vaige.sikas' theory that act ion inheres in and cannot exist

independent ly of a thing (= substance). A universal, e.g. cow-hood , on

the contrary , has no parts , and also is not a p roduc t (akdrya), but a

causeless (akdranavat) and changeless single entity: it can exist

independent ly of individual things as well. The next example given by

NS above is of a eolour, a quality (guna) of an individual; as we have

seen above, a quality too inheres in a thing ( = substance) and cannot

exist independent ly of a thing. H e n c e the example , "the cow is white",

indicates that an individual cow is different ia ted f r o m the cows of

o ther colours. If a word, e.g. cow, were to refer to a universal , one

would not be able to distinguish one thing f r o m another , e.g. a white

cow f r o m a b r o w n cow, because a universal , e.g. cowhood , does not differentiate an individual on the basis of colours , e.g. white, etc. Similarly, such express ions as c o m p o u n d words , e.g. gohitam (= the benefi t of the cow) etc., would not be appl icable if the word, cow,


were to denote a universal. For, being a quality, benefit ( h i m ) must be

connec ted to a thing or individual. A n d also in terms of cont inuous

propagat ion, a thing, no t a universal, can be denoted by the word

"cow" in statements like "a cow procreates a cow", because a universal

is never created: it is deemed eternal by the Nyfiya-Vaigesikas because

something which is eternal is no t created.

II.6. D o e s a W o r d D e n o t e a Universal?

That a word, e.g. cow, refers only to an individual, and not to a

universal, as explained by N B H above, is no t indeed Gotama ' s view

on this issue. For G o t a m a believes that a word refers not only to an

individual, but also to a configurat ion (dkr t i ) and a universal (jdti).

The sfitra 2.2.61 in t roduces his objection. N B H explains the sfitra in

detail as follows:

na vyaktih, paddrthah, kasmdt? anavasthdn6t, yddabdaprabhrtibhir yo vigesyate sa go~abd(trtho yd gaus tisthati yd gaur nis.anne 'ti, na dravyamdtram avigis..t.am jdtyd rind 'bhidhfyate. kim. tarhi ? jdtividist.am, tasmdn na vyaktih, paddrthah., evam samfthddisu drastavyam. -- "The referent of a word is not an individual. Why? Because of infinite regress. (In fact) the meaning of a word (e.g. cow) is that which is distinguished by words like relative pronouns, viz. "which (y~) etc., in expressions like "the cow which is standing", and "the cow which is sitting". A word (e.g. "cow") does not denote a mere object undifferentiated by any category (jdti). What then? It is qualified by a category. Therefore a mere individual is not the referent of a word. (The other examples above, viz.) 'cluster' etc. too should be understood likewise."

N B H amplifies NS 2.2.61 by explaining that a word refers not only

to an individual, but also to a universal. Fo r it would be impossible,

states N B H , to have an awareness of an individual without its being

qualified by a universal (fdtivi~ista). Qualification here does not refer

to the Ny~tya-Vai~esika quality (guna). A general te rm primarily refers

to a universal, secondari ly to individuals. In the commen ta ry in t roduc-

ing 2.2.62, N B H says:

yadi na vyaktih, paddrthah, katham tarhi vyaktdv upacdra iti? nimittdd atadbhdve 'pi tadupacdrah., drdyate khalu: -- "(Objection:) If an individual is not denoted (by a word), how then is it (the word) applied to an individual? (Answer: It is seen that) for some reason (nimitta) it (a word) is used even if its primary referent is not there."

N B H then goes on to explains the examples given in NS 2.2.62, as

follows:


atadbhdve 'pi tadupacdra iti -- atacchabdasya tena ~abdendbhidhdnam iti. sahacarandd -- yastikdm bhojayeti, yastikd sahacarito brdhmano 'bhidhiyata iti. sthdndt -- ma~cdh kro~antiti rnahcasthdh purusd abhidhiyante, tddarthydt -- katdrthesu vfran, e~'u vys katam karotiti bhavati, v.rttdt -- yamo rdj5 kubero rdjeti tadvad vartate iti. mdndt - - ddhakena mitdh saktavah ddhakasaktava iti. dhdrandt -- tul@dm dhrtam candanam tuldcandanam iti. sdmfpydt - - gan.g@Sm, gdva~ carantiti de~o 'bhidhiyate sannikrst.ah., yogdt -- krsnena [email protected] yuktah, gdt.akah, krsn. a i t y abhidhfyate, sddhandt -- annam prdn. d iti. 5dhipalydt -- ayam. purusah kulam ayam gotrarn iti. tatrdyam. sahacaran~id yogdd vd ]5tidabdo vyaktau prayujyata iti: -- "(The statement) 'it is used even when its referent is not there' , here means to denote something by the word which it does not mean (primarily). (For example) (a) due to accompanying: 'Feed the staff please' refers to the b rahmin walking with the staff. (b) Due to the location: "The platforms are yelling", means the men standing on the platforms. (c) Due to a goal: "S/he is working on a mat when the grass is being woven to make a mat." (d) Due to conduct: "The king is Yama", "The king is Kubera" refer to the king who behaves like Yama (i.e. a ruthless king) and to the king who behaves like Kubera (i.e. a benevolent king). (e) Due to the (means of) measurement: "The flour weighing an ddhaka" means flour measured by an ddhaka (an ancient Indian measuring ins t rument equal to about five pounds). (f) Due to a container: "The balance sandal" refers to the sandal contained in the balance. (g) Due to proximity: "The cows are grazing on the Ganges", refers to the lands in the vicinity (of the Ganges). (h) Due to connection: "The black" refers to the cloth which is coloured black. (i) Due to being a means: "Food is life". An d (j) due to dominance: "This man is the lineage", "This man is the clan". Thus a general term is used to denote an individual, due either to accompanying or to connect ion with the individual."

NBH's language is rather misleading here in 2.2.61. Previously (2.2.60), he explained upacdra as prayoga (application), however, upacSra is generally used in the sense of transference of meaning. When a word is not used in its primary sense but denotes a secondary meaning it is called upacdra. This is, perhaps, what both NS and NBH had in mind when they wrote the above text. Hence, upaciira can be explained as "application to a secondary meaning". So the argument here is this: although the word primarily means universal, in a secondary sense it can be applied to refer to an individual.

II.7. A Note on NS 2.2.62: Can the Stitra be Reconstructed?

There is some uneasiness about the arrangement of the present form of NS 2.2.62. A careful reading of the examples cited by NBH reveals that the sfitra in question contains a list of words which, in the pur- ported examples, would appear as having secondary (or metaphorical) meanings. In the first part of the sfitra the compound word with an ablative ending gives a list of the nirnittas (reasons), e.g. sahacarana

158 HEERAMAN TIWARI

(association) etc., on the basis of which a word would be used to denote secondary meaning. In the second part of the sfitra, the long compound with a locative ending should contain a list of such secondary meanings, e.g. brdhmana etc. the usual example is yastikdm, bhojaya ("feed the staff please"), where the word staff should refer to the brahmin by a metaphorical transfer of meaning. But, curiously enough, the next word in that list is mahca (platform), which is not the secondary meaning, but the word itself which is used in the example to bear a secondary meaning. The example is mat~cdO kro~anti ("the platforms are yelling"). Here the word "platform" has been used metaphorically and, therefore, it refers to the person on the platform. Hence, this list is undoubtedly anomalous. Of the ten members of the list, five, such as brdhmana, rdja (king), saktu (flour), candana (sandal) and ddtaka (cloth), are those that are metaphorically referred to by such words as yasti (staff), Yama (the god of death), ddhaka (the thing measured equal to c. five pounds), tuld (balance), and kr.sn.a (dark colour). But the other five, such as mahca (platform), kata (grass), gahgd (Ganges), anna (food), and purus.a (man), are words which are used in the example where a secondary meaning is intended. This anomaly has been noted by a modern commentator, Sudarganfi- cfirya (Nydyabhds.ya, ed. Shastri 1986: 210). Following NBH's interpretation, he suggests the following amendment:

yast.i-ma~ca-kata-yamdd, haka-tuld-gahgd-krsn, dnna- purusdn, dm. brdhman, a-ma~castha-viran, a-rdja-saktu- candana-ffra-ddtaka-prdn, akulesv atadbhdve tadupacdrah..

If the compound word of the sfitra gives the list of meaning metaphorically referred to such as brdhmana, then it should have a locative ending. But if it is a list of the words actually used in the examples that would have metaphorical meaning, then it should have a genitive ending.

An important point in NS examples above is that in each case there is some kind of relation (sambandha) between the primary and the secondary meaning on the basis of which the meaning of the word used is transferred from the primary to the secondary. At the end of his bhdsya on 2.2.62, NBH makes it clear that the "universal" (jdti~abda)

ONE AND MANY: THE E A R L Y N A IY A Y IK A S 159

is applied to an individual due to either "accompanying" (sahacarandt) or "association" (yogdt). In the first example, i.e. 'feed the staff please' (yastikdm bhojaya), there is a relation of "accompanying" between the "brahmin" and the "staff". In the example, e.g. the platforms are yelling (maficdh. krodanti), there exists a relation of "locus and located" (ddhdrddheya) for the people yelling are standing on the platform (mahcasthdh. puru4.dh ). In the third example, e.g. "s/he is working on the mat" (katam karoti), "there is a cause and effect relation" (kdryakdrana), for the grass is the material cause (updddna or samavdyi kdrana). The rest of the examples can be explained likewise.

II.8. A Brief Note on laksoa?.fi (the Secondary Meaning of the Word)

The process of referring to the secondary meaning is called lak4and (metaphor). I prefer to translate the Sanskrit term laksan5 as "metaphor", for its meaning is very close to that of metaphor. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (3rd rev. ed. 1983: 1315) gives the meanings of metaphor as follows: "The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object to which it is not properly connected." NS 2.2.63 above explicates one of the predominant Indian theories of word and meaning. There has been in Indian literary criticism a very strong tradition of such a theory, dubbed laksan, d (secondary import or the metaphorical meaning of words). Rhetoricians, beginning from Bharata, the father of Indian poetics, to Pa.n.ditarfija Jagannfitha (c. 1600 CE) have discussed the issue in detail. The idea behind the theory is that if the primary meaning of the word, e.g. the river Tyne in the statement, "Newcastle upon Tyne", does not match with the context, for no town can be built on a river, i.e. on the current of water, the hearer or the reader will have to resort to a secondary possible meaning of the river Tyne. The immediate secondary meaning of the river Tyne, connected with the town Newcastle, will be the banks of the fiver Tyne. Thus the fiver Tyne refers, in the above context, to the banks, and not to the fiver itself. The oft-quoted example of Indian rhetoricians is gatigdydm. ghosah. (the hamlet of cowboys on the river Ganges). The example NBH cites in his commentary to explain the "immediate vicinity"


(sdmipya) is "the cows are grazing on the Ganges" where the term Ganges is applied to the grazing land by the river Ganges, Explaining laksand Ingalls, et al. (1990: 93, Note 6) writes: "Note that the Sanskrit sentence gahgdydm ghosah., unlike the English translation, 'a village is on the Ganges,' is literally impossible. The locative case does not have as wide a span of meaning as the English preposition 'on,' which may mean 'by the side of' as well as physically 'on top of.' The Sanskrit phrase means literally 'a village situated in the Ganges,' so if we take the phrase literally, we will suppose that the inhabitants are drowning."

I have pointed out above that NS 2.2.62 does not refute the view that the general terms refers to the individuals, but it proposes to de- monstrate that the general term refers also to universal. What NS has repudiated above is the view that the general term does not refer to the universal alone. All the ten examples given above indicate, one way or another, an existing connection between the generic notion or the property of the object referred to and the secondary meaning of the term. At the end of his explanation of NS 2.2.62 NBH has indicated that the term, e.g. "cow", refers either both "to the individual cow and the universal cow-hood or to the cow-hood alone, but does not refer to the individual cow only. What NS and NBH have so far done is to combine the views of both the individualist (vyaktivddin) and the universalist (jdtivddin).

11.9. Is Form (fikrti) then the Meaning of a Word?

Having explained two different views over the meaning of a general term NS proposes a third option. There are some philosophers who believed that a general term denotes a "form" or "configuration" (dkrti). This view is held by some Mimgt .msakas, e.g. Kum~rila Bhatta. NS argues in 2.2.63 that each individual has a particular form or dkrti and all individuals with that form are recognised as belonging to one class. Thus having learnt that cow means "an individual bearing four legs, two horns, a tail, a dewlap, etc.", a person conjures up the image of a cow on hearing the general term, "cow". fi~krti and ]dti in Sanskrit are always used in the feminine gender.

NBH explains NS 2.2.63 as follows:


(tkrtih pad(~rthah, kasmdt ? tadapeksatvdt sattvavyavasthdnasiddheh., sattvdvayav(mdm. tadavayavdng~m ca niyato vyftha dkrtih. , tasydm, grhyamdn, dydm sattvavyavasthdnam sidhyati ayam gaur ayam adva iti, nd~hyamdn, dy6m. yasya grahandt sattvavyavasthdnam. sidhyati tam gabdo 'bhidhdturn arhati so 'sydrtha iti: -- "The meaning of a word is a form. Why? Because on it (form) depends the determination of the classification of an entity. Form is a set arrangement of the parts of an entity and their (further) parts. Only when that is recognised can the classification be established, e.g. 'this is a cow', 'this is a horse', not without its being recognised. A word should denote only that due to which the classification of an entity is established. Therefore that (form) is its meaning."

11.10. Refutation of Form as the Meaning of a Word

NS (2.2.64) rejected the above view too for, according to him, form

alone is not denoted by a word. Such a view would let one confuse a real thing with a token or picture of that thing; there would then be no distinction between a real cow and a clay cow, for a clay cow does

have the form of a real cow. Thus NBH explains:

tad upapadyate yasya fdtyd yogas tad atra jdtivi@tam abhidhiyate gaur iti. na cdva- yavavy~hasya fdtyd yogah., kasya tarhi ? niyatdvayavavytihasya dravyasya, tasmdn ndk.rtih. paddrthah.: -- "So it is established that what is denoted here is that which is connected with a universal (fdtyd yogah), cow qualified with the universal (jdtivi~ista). And an arrangement of the component parts (avayavavyftha) alone is indeed not (directly) connected with a universal. What does then? The object whose component parts have a set arrangement. Therefore, a word does not denote a form."

NBH explains above that it is the individual cow along with the

universal cow-hood that is denoted by the word "cow". The individual, on the other hand, is not just a lump of the component parts, but it is a set arrangement (niyatavyf&a) of those parts. It is also accompanied

by the universal, cow-hood. For we cannot classify an object as having a cow's form (i.e. beating a tail, horns, dewlap etc.) without the univer-

sal, cow-hood, which is connected with individual cows possessing that form.

11.11. Does a General Term then Denote a Universal?

NS says in 2.2.64 that if we call a clay cow a cow, one may argue that the word "cow" refers to a form. But a clay cow has only the form of a cow; there is no universal, cowhood, in it. NS cites an example to


show how both individual and form are insufficient in the absence of a universal. In a Vedic ritual a cow is brought to perform certain rites,

w h e r e it is bathed, tied to the ritual post, and made to move about etc. Suppose the vyaktivddin (individualist) and the dkrtivddin (formist) insist upon their views, how can they explain that a clay cow, which is an individual and has the form of a cow, cannot be used for the ritual purposes. For a clay cow cannot be bathed, tied and moved about like a real cow (see also, Sudar~anfichrya's comm. on NBH 2.2.65, ed. Shastri 1986: 212). NBH explains it as follows:

f6tih, paddrthah, kasmdt ? vyaktydkrtiyukte 'pi mrdgavake pro~anddindm aprasahgdd iti. g(tm. proks.aya gdm dnaya gam dehfti naitdni mrdgavake prayujyante, kasmdt? jdter abhdvdt, asti hi tatra vyaktir astydkrtih yad abhdvdt tatrdsampratyayah, sa pad6rtha iti: -- "Universal is denoted by a word. Why? For such things as washing are inapplicable to a clay cow, even though it is individual and has a form. For example (in a Vedic ritual) we cannot use a clay cow to follow such injunctions as 'bathe the cow', 'bring the cow', 'give the cow', etc. Why? Because of the absence of the universal (cow- hood), although it is an individual and has a form. Hence, a word denotes that in the absence of which the application (of such expressions as above) is not possible."

Children and ignorant people may on the basis of its form treat a clay cow as a real cow, and thus relate it to the class of cows. (Cf. E. Gombrich 1963: 2, see below.) But, what about the contribution of both individual and form to allow the universal to be manifest in a thing? As we have seen above, NS does not believe in one single aspect of word meaning, i.e. the universal aspect of meaning. He showed in sfitra 2.2.65 that not only do individual and form depend upon a tmiversal; the universal, in turn, depends for its manifestation upon both individual and form.

11.12. NS's Triangular Theory of the Word-meaning

NS then puts forward his own view that a word refers to not only one of the above three, viz. vyakti, dkrti and j(~ti, but to all of them. NS first stated in 2.2.65 that a universal alone is not denoted by a word. NBH explains 2.2.65 as:

j~ter abhivyaktir dkrtivyakti apeks.ate, nd~..hyam~ndydm dkrtau vyaktau ca jdtimdtram. guddham. ~..hyate, tasrndn na jKtih paddrtha iti: -- "The manifestation of the universal is dependent upon both individual and form: where individual and form are not


grasped, a universal alone is never grasped in isolation. Therefore, a word does not denote (only) a universal."

Thus none of the three items, as explained above, can be held in siolation, to be the meaning of the word. For, the three are co-existent and form a triangle. Does a word then remain meaningless, or is there a mystery behind it? NBH suggests in his prelude to NS 2.2.66 -- which suggests that all three, viz. individual, form and universal, are denoted by a word -- that it is inconceivable that a word denotes nothing: na vai paddrthena na bhavitum ~akyam. kah khalv iddnim paddrtha iti?: -- "It is not conceivable that a word has no meaning. Now, what then does it denote?" NBH goes on to explain 2.2.66 as:

tu dabdo videsan, drthah, kim vigis.yate ? pradhdndhgabhfvasydniyamena paddrthatvam iti. yadd hi bhedavivaksd videsagatid ca, tadd vyaktih, pradhdnarn atigam tu jdtydkrts yadd tu bhedo 'vivaksitah sdrndnyagati~ ca, tadd jdtih, pradhdnam ahgam tu vyaktydkrti, tad etad "bat;ulam prayogesu, dkrtes tu pradhdnabhdva utpreky.itavyah: -- "(The Sanskrit defining relative) tu (= in fact) is used (in NS 2.2.66) to express a qualification. What is being qualified? (Primarily) a word is meaningful without any regularity in what is the principal and what the subordinate referent. But when the (speaker's) intention is to express difference (bhedavivaks.d) (of one thing from others) and a particular thing is grasped (videsagatih) (by the hearer), then the individual becomes the principal meaning (vyaktih. pradhdnam) and the universal and the form are subordinate. And when there is no intention to express difference (bhedo 'vivaks.itah.) and commonality is grasped (sdmdnyagatih.), then the universal becomes the principal meaning and the individual and the form subordinate. This occurs variously in usage. Similarly, one should look for cases where form is the principal referent."

What NBH is explaining above is how a spoken word is understood by the hearer. NBH has explained that human beings engage in re- spectable language behaviour, that is to say that nobody uses words to mean nothing. NBH says that the three meanings are inter-dependent; there are two people who communicate in the same language and understand (gati) the meanings of the word according to the proper linguistic rules and following the intention of the speakers (vivaksd) who use the language. This is what is known in Indian classical epistemology as knowledge through a linguistic utterance.


II.13. How Does One Know Individual, Form and Universal as Different from Each Other?

Having established the view that a word denotes all three, individual, form and universal, NS explained how one knows them as distinct from each other, although denoted by the same word. As a prelude to NS 2.2.67--69, NBH writes, katham punar jhdyate ndnd vyaktydkrtijd- taya iti ? laksanabheddt, tatra tdvat. .. : "(Question:) But how does one know individual, form and thing as differnt from each other? (Reply:) Because they have different definitions. So, regarding these (definitions the following sfitras, 2.2.67--69).

II.14. Vyakti (Individual) Defined by NS!

We have seen above that NS defined each of the three, vyakti (individual), dkrti (configuration), and jdti (universal) separately. First he explained "individual" on which NBH comments as follows:

vyajyata iti vyaktir indriyagrdhyeti na sarvam vyaktih, yo gunavi~esdndm, spargdntdndm gurutva-ghanatva-dravatva-samskdrdndm avydpinah parimdnasyd'~rayo yathdsambha- yam tad dravyam, mftrtih, m~rchitdvayavatvdd iti: -- "Individual is that which is manifested, i.e. perceivable by the sense-organs (indriyagrdhya): therefore not each substance is an individual. That substance which is the locus (d~raya), as applicable, of the particular qualities (beginning from colour, taste etc.) ending with touch, as well as of gravity, solidity, fluidity and impressions (samskdra), and of finite measure, is a corporeal thing (mgtrti) because it is composed of material parts (mtirchitdvayava)."

The explanation of NBH refers to the ontology of the Nyfiya- Vai~esikas in which all constituents have been defined in relation to each other. For example, in the present context, the individual is defined as something which is manifested and which can be perceived by sense organs -- a corporeal thing because it is composed of various parts and their further parts. Those which cannot be perceived are not individual. Thus the individual is understood as a finite thing. Nyfiya- Vai~esika believed that such an individual is the locus of particular qualities, viz. colour, taste, smell and touch, which inhere in fire, water, earth and air respectively. It has been explained in NS 1.1.14 & 3.1.62--67, that smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are objects of the five senses, viz. nose, tongue, eyes, tactile sense and ear. All five


qualities belong to earth, the last four to water, the last three to fire,

the last two to air and, finally, space is left with only one quality. The

reason for saying "ending with touch" is to count the Nyfiya-Vaigesika

categories f rom the beginning of the list of 1.1.14 till touch.

I1.15. Ak.rfi ( F o r m ) as D e f i n e d by G o t a m a

NS 2.2.68 emphasises the importance of form in terms of recognising

the universal and the individual. For no universal can be manifest

without there being a mark (lifiga). And the individuals~ e.g. a cow and

a horse, depend upon a particular order in their structure, which is

called form. Keeping this issue in mind, N B H explains:

yayd jdtir jdtilitigdni ca prakhydyante tdm dkrtim vidydt, sd ca ndny6 sattvdvayavdndm tadavayavdndm, ca niyatdd vy(thdd iti. niyatdvayavavyYth@ khalu sattvdvayavd jdtilirigam, girasd pddena gdm anurninvanti, niyate ca sattvdvayavdndm, vyf~he sati gotvam prakhydyata iti. an~krtivyarigy@dm jdtau tort suvarnam rajatam ity evam ddisv dkrtir nivanate jahdti paddrthatvam iti: -- "Form is known as that by which a universal and its indicators are recognised. And that is none other than the set arrangement (niyat~d vy(thdt) of the component parts of a thing and their parts. The component parts of a thing, which have their parts in set arrangement are indicators of universal. People infer a cow by its head or by its foot. And cowness is, therefore, recognised if the set arrangement of the component parts (of a cow) is present. Where a jdti 'generic property' cannot be made manifest by a form (andkrtivyar~gydydm jdtau), like in clay, gold, silver, etc., form is absent, it gives up being the referent of a word."

N B H explains above the role of form in recognizing both the uni-

versal and individual. That is, an individual, say, a cow, is recognised

on the ground of a particular bodily structure which the viewer is

aware of, i.e. the particular head and foot and so on. Such an individual

form is an indicator of the universal, cow-hood. Or even a part of

cow, viz. foot etc., functions as the indicator to recognize the cow.

Once we have known or experienced something, a cow, for example,

and have associated the term "cow" with it, we immediately conjure up

an image of cow whenever we hear the word "cow" thereafter. By the term "image" here I mean not just the "external form" of a cow, but its representat ion . (I have borrowed the term represen ta t ion here f rom Sir Ernst Gombrich (1963: 1) who has aptly interpreted it further as a subs t i tu te f o r an individual, a cow ink the present case.) The word in

166 HEERAMAN TIWARI

this sense acts like "a history painter" who "paints man in general"

as opposed to a "portrait painter" who paints "a particular man"

(Reynolds, quoted by Sir Ernst Gombr ich 1963: 2). For "the portrait",

explains Sir Ernst, "being an exact copy of a man's 'external form' with

all 'blemishes' and 'accidents', refers to the individual person exactly as

does the p roper name. The painter, however, who wants to 'elevate

the style' disregards the particular and 'generalizes the forms'. Such a

picture will no longer represent a particular man but rather the class

or 'concept ' man" (Sir Ernst Gombr ich 1963: 1). Such a generalized form of a cow is recollected in our memory when we hear the word

"cow". That is to say that when we first learnt about a cow, it may

have been a cow of a particular colour and size. But, our subsequent

experiences of cows, in different colours and sizes at different places

and times, have painted a generalized form of a cow in our memory,

so that at later times, as soon as we hear the word, we recollect the

class of cows, regardless of colour or size.

To make the point clearer I may as well quote a piece f rom the

same paragraph of Sir Ernst 's interesting interpretation of a class

concept. Although Sir Ernst is discussing the class concept for the

theory of art, his observations are illuminating in this context. His

subject here is a hobby horse:

There is a deceptive simplicity in this argument, but it makes at least one unwarranted assumption: that every image of this kind necessarily refers to something outside itself - - be it individual or class. But nothing of the kind need be implied when we point to an image and say "this is a man". Strictly speaking that statement may be interpreted to mean that the image itself is a member of the class "man". Nor is that interpretation as farfetched as it may sound. In fact our hobby horse would submit to no other interpretation. By the logic of Reynolds' reasoning it would have to represent the most generalized idea of horseness (Ibid. 1963: 2).

F rom the above passage, the idea of a class concept can be understood inasmuch as a member , e.g. a picture of a cow, belongs to the class of cows: The generalized form of a hobby horse of Sir Ernst is, of course, a little different from the generalized form of a cow in our context. For a hobby horse may not have any similarity in its external

form to that of a real horse or picture of a horse, yet it belongs to the class of horses or 'horseness'. Plato too has spoken about ' forms' by asking a question: "Shall we proceed as usual and begin by assuming


the existence of a single essential nature or 'form' for every set of things which we call by the same name?" (The Republic: 595). But as far as the ~form' or dkrti of the Sanskrit grammarians or Indian philosophers in general is concerned the 'form' of a cow is not merely an idea, but does have some observable resemblance to a real cow in its external form. However, when it comes to the point of a true copy of an individual, a cow in this context, the meaning of the term dkrti does not stand very far from that of a hobby horse. Akrti then does not refer to a true copy of a particular cow, rather it refers to a class concept. Thus one does infer the cow as well as the universal, cow- hood, from the form. But there are cases where the form does not act as the indicator of a universal. For the form may change but the individual/thing remains the same, or one may mould lumps of clay, gold or silver into any form but the substances will still be the same. Although it does play a major role in recognizing individuals and universals, form fails to be the essential factor in perceiving universals (cf. VS 2.1.8, visdn, f kakudmdn prdntevdladhih, sdsndvdn iti gotve drst.am li~gam: "[In the case of a cow] possessing horns, hump, tail and dewlap are seen as indicators of the universal"),

In the above NBH has made it clear that just as in order to be perceived the individual is dependent on both the form and the universal, form too is dependent upon individuals, because a form can only be of an individual. Similarly, stated NBH, "only after the proper arrangement of the component parts has been recogofized is the universal recognized." That is to say that in order to reveal itself the universal must have its indicators, which are nothing but the proper arrangement of the component parts and their parts. That is why NBH has explained under NS 2.2.67 that the word denotes different things in different contexts, i.e. there is no set rule for the principal meaning of the word.

11.16. Universal as Defined by NS and NBH

We have seen above the NS defines universal as "that which produces the awareness of commonality". Jha (1939: 250), however, translates NS 2.2.69 as "the 'Universal' is the cause (or basis) of comprehensive cognition." This translation of Jha's does not sound correct for the


phrase samdnaprasavdtrnikd does not mean "the cause (or basis) of comprehensive cognition". What is intended by the author here is the phrase, samdnabuddhiprasavdtmikd (that which generates a common awareness), because samdna literally means common, equal or indifferent.

NBH elaborates the sfitra further as follows:

yd samdndm, buddhim prasgtte bhinnesv adhikaran, esu, yayd bahfmitaretarato na vydvarttante yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratyaydnuvrttinimittarn, tat sdmdnyam, yac ca kesdhcid abhedarn kuta~cM bhedam karoti tat sdmdnyavis'eso ]dtir iti: -- "(a) That which produces the common awareness regarding many substrata (adhikaran. esu), that by which many things are not differntiated from each other, that thing which is the instrumental cause of the recurrence of an awareness (pratyaydnuv.rttinirnitta) with regard to many things (anekatra) is commonality (sdmdnya). And (b) that which makes some individuals non-distinct (kesdlicid abhedam) from each other and distinct from others (kuta~cid bhedam) is called a particular commonality (sdmdnyavi~esa), a universal."

We have seen in the pages above that the theory of universal which was discussed by the early Vaigesikas in order to see a proper order in the constituents of the world, the early Naiyfiyikas; while retaining the old Vaigesika approach, extended the purpose of the study of the universals and got into the debate about word and meaning, the debate which was inaugurated by early grammarians (PS_n.ini, Vyfidi, Vfijapyfiyana and Patafijali) as well as with the Buddhist thinkers who raised many questions against the Brahmanic philosophy, especially the validity of the Vedic scriptures. Therefore, the debate on language became more and more important for all the parties concerned.

N O T E

* I am grateful to my teachers, Professor Bimal Matilal (now late), Professor Richard Gombrich and Dr. S. Gupta for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. Professor Gombrich has read through the paper more than once and has made many valuable suggestions regarding the material, style and language. Professor Phyllis Granoff, the editor of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, has very kindly read through the paper before accepting it for publication: I am thankful to her for her insightful comments.


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Balliol College, Oxford, England

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