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Opportunities for changing EU actorness in the G8

Judith Huigens – University of Amsterdam

Paper to be presented at the workshop ‘The European Union in International Relations and the International Political Economy’, Politicologenetmaal 2013, Ghent University, 30 and 31 May. Draft version: Please do not distribute or quote without permission

Abstract

This paper makes a theoretical as well as an empirical contribution to the debate on the changing role of the European Union in International Relations, by offering a case study of EU actorness within the G8 summit. I argue that the continuing relevance of the concept of actorness resides in the fact that it recognizes the EU as an attempt to fill the governance void that has developed in a time of great strain to the traditional nation state. Through this conclusion, it strikes the right balance between the (changing) features of the international system, and the unique and still developing identity of the EU. This suggests that actorness is not necessarily the pursuit of certain indicators, but something that is continuously shaped through three closely related interactions: 1) structure and agency, 2) internal developments and capacities, and external events and expectations, and 3) material and ideational forces. Another reason for studying actorness is that it acknowledges the importance of purposive participation, in informal as well as formal processes of international negotiations, apart from one’s ability to change outcomes. In order to study actorness as a process, two recent moments of change in the position of the EU at the G8 summit are discussed. The first case demonstrates how internal attempts to improve EU agency through the Treaty of Lisbon were conditioned by structural and external conditions. The second case shows how the EU can also exploit such changing external conditions to maintain and/or increase its actorness.

1. Introduction

As the foreign policy capabilities of the European Union (EU) keep developing, so does the debate on

EU actorness. From relative anonymity in the 1980s and 1990s, after first coined by Sjöstedt in 1977,

the concept of actorness, or the ability to act deliberately and actively in relation to others,

experienced a significant upsurge at the turn of the millennium, coinciding with the development of

European foreign policy capabilities as seen in the Saint-Malo and Amsterdam agreements of 1999.

Possibly motivated by the disappointing results on other perhaps more provocative concepts such as

normative power and the extensive challenges concerning operationalization of conceptualizations

such as these (Forsberg 2011; Sjursen 2006), actorness is coming more and more to the forefront of

academic analysis.

This renewed attention to actorness merits a closer look at the concept and its added value

in comparison to other commonly used conceptualizations. Actorness, more than other concepts,

‘tend[s] to stress the differences, as well as the commonalities that the EU shares with the nation

state as an actor in international relations’ (Manners and Whitman 1998: 233), as it recognizes the

structural circumstances in which the EU acts, as well as the EU’s ability to shape its own

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international identity and conceptions of international actors in general. To fully grasp how actorness

is defined, I propose three interactions must be connected: 1) the interaction between structure and

agency; 2) the interaction between the development of internal capacities on the one hand and

external circumstances and expectations on the other; 3) the interaction between material and

ideational forces. An assessment of these interactions offers a more useful image of actorness as a

the process of obtaining a status of participant than the study of formal actorness-criteria (see for

instance Jupille and Caporaso 1998).

Another reason for studying actorness is that it acknowledges the importance of purposive

participation, in informal as well as formal processes of international negotiations, apart from one’s

ability to change outcomes (and thus to be a power). This focus on what the EU does as opposed

what the EU is suggests both less and more than the ability to change outcomes. After all, the EU can

be influential without being an actor, but also be an actor without being influential. The relevance of

studying such purposive participation, or doing, is further underlined by the fact that, through

participation, the EU is able to change the rules of international interaction, for example by no longer

tying these exclusively to the state (cf. Wunderlich 2011: 51). Also, actorness can enable influence,

when participation is translated into the ability to change outcomes according to its own

preferences.

This paper illustrates the relevance of these defining characteristics of actorness by assessing

changing EU actorness in the Group of Eight (G8). The G8 summit is an informal yet high profile

group, in which the EU has taken part (albeit not quite as a full member) since its early days in the

1970s. No formal decision-making takes place at the summit, as it primarily functions as an exchange

of ideas, within which not outcomes, but participation and the social processes of the summit itself

matter. What matters here is what the EU does; whether or not it is present, and participates as a

fully-fledged actor within the summit context. The G8 is about being there, talking, interacting and

exchanging views. Even though the EU is not exactly like the other summit members, an analysis of

EU actorness still enables us to grasp the degree to which the Union is able to function alongside

state actors. The informal yet high-powered setting of the case moreover illustrates the three

interactions of actorness. First, the G8 offers a state-centric social structure, in which limited formal

rules leave ample room for agency. This same informality results in unlimited interaction between

internal elements, such as competences, institutional turf battles and member state interests, and

external events and expectations. Finally, in such an informal setting, material capabilities may have

contributed to EU presence in the first place, but the development of the EU’s position has as much

to do with perceptions and social processes of acceptance, as with the growing physical capabilities

of the Union.

Actorness therefore allows us to understand the way the EU was and is able to change the

rules of this ‘game of states’ so as to be able to participate despite its lack of state characteristics.

The question should therefore not be whether the EU is an actor or not, but how EU actorness is

changing or being changed under changing conditions. To illustrate how this happens, this analysis

focuses on two recent alterations to EU actorness in the G8. The first subcase is one of internal

reform and explains how the intended improvements to EU agency, namely the Treaty of Lisbon,

were conditioned by structural and external conditions. The second subcase constitutes an external

reform, namely the establishment of the G20 and the structural implications of this development for

the G8 summit. It shows how the EU was able to maintain and/or increase its actorness through

strategic (non-)action in response to changing expectations and conditions.

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Many of my findings draw from interviews with various officials from the EU G8 delegations,

as well as the other G8 member delegations, which were conducted between 2008 and 2013. These

interviews were pivotal in my attempt to do justice to the constructivist character of the

development of EU actorness in the G8.

2. The three interactions of actorness

David Allen once said that the European Union ‘seems to exist in conceptual no man’s land’ (1998:

43). Neither a state, nor an entity comparable to other non-state actors, the EU offers serious

challenges to IR scholars. Possibly the biggest of those is the lack of analytical leverage that EU

analysis tends to portray due to its unique n=1 status (Hix 1998: 44; Jorgensen 2004; Rosamond

2005: 469; Jachtenfuchs 2006: 157; Wunderlich 2012: 654). For a case that is often considered to be

one of a kind, or sui generis, generalization, the much acclaimed goal of the social scientist, proves to

be difficult. ‘[The EU is] an instance of what?’ Rosamond wonders (2005: 469). In order for scholars

to prevent a method that is too descriptive in nature, we are therefore obliged to ‘ask the right

questions’ (Ginsberg 2001: 5). This entails moving beyond classic state conceptions of international

actors, while at the same time aiming to understand the changing conditions of the global order. In

this section, I argue that actorness presents us with the tools to do exactly that, through its

recognition of EU agency within state-centric structures, through its ability to make external what is

internal and finally, through its acknowledgement that material and ideational forces are mutually

constitutive.

Most sui generis concepts share the same starting point, which brings them to conclude that

the EU is not a state, nor on its way to become one (Zielonka 2008: 473). In fact, the EU is the result

of a combination of pressures on the nation state, some strengthening it and others threatening it

(Mann 2003: 145; Gilpin 2003: 349). The most significant of these pressures is globalization, which

has a paradoxical relation with the modern conception of the state, in that it needs it, but at the

same time corrodes it (Maull 2005: 795). The state has by no means become obsolete (Scholte 1997;

2005; Maulll 2005; Strange 2003; R. Cooper 2000), but ‘the institution of sovereign statehood, which

was well adapted for the Westphalian system, is being modified, although not superseded, in

response to the interests of participants in a rapidly internationalizing political economy’ (Keohane

2003: 156). This inability of states to deal with certain global challenges has created a governance

void, a power vacuum which states are unable to fill and attracts new global actors with

characteristics that distinguish them from the traditional state.

In it in this light of changing capacities of the state, that we must understand the

international role of the European Union. The advantage of such a perspective is that it enables us to

understand the international role of the EU without touching upon the classic integration debate,

which focuses upon the dichotomy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. This

debate stemmed from the traditional IR focus on relations between states, making the EU either a

cooperation between states or on its way towards a superstate (Rosamond 2000). Such a narrow

range of options to choose from would prevent us from properly understanding the phenomenon

that the EU is, which starts with recognizing the international influence of the EU despite overlapping

authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements and multiple identities

(Zielonka in K. Smith 2008: 19). This post modern governance (R. Cooper 2000; Caporaso 1996) does

not necessarily herald the end of the nation state in the short or even the long term, but it does

change the outlook of the world order, in the sense that the actors and their characteristics, as well

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as the rules of engagement change. The EU is therefore both a result of the changing global order, as

contributor to it (see also Wessels 1997; Miles 2011). Such a conclusion on the question of what the

EU is exactly, calls for a conceptualization that recognizes that agents function within the restrictions

of a structure. A structure which, in turn, may also be altered by their actions (Rosamond 2000: 180-

183).

Over the past few decades, several scholars have tried to find a concept that strikes the right

balance between the (changing) features of the international system, and the unique and still

developing identity of the EU. The EU has been considered a presence (Allen and Smith 1990), an

actor (Sjöstedt 1977), a leader (e.g. Elgström 2007), an identity (Manners and Whitman 1998), a

polity (e.g. Jachtenfuchs 2006), a modern empire (Zielonka 2008) and several varieties on the

concept of power.1 One way to categorize these different conceptualizations is to divide them into

‘substantive’ and ‘process-oriented approaches’2, which focus respectively on either what ends the

EU pursues or how it pursues these. Substantive approaches thus focus on outcomes and the kind of

power or influence that the EU is able to exert, or what the EU is. Examples of substantive

approaches are presence, leadership and most of the variations on normative power. Process-

oriented approaches, such as identity or actorness, on the other hand concentrate on the way the EU

tries to act internationally, or what the EU does. Of course, in reality, what the EU does influences

what the EU is and vice versa, making the two approaches undeniably interlinked (Zielonka 2008;

Wendt 1992: 422). However, for analytical purposes, I propose to separate the two categories.

While most conceptualizations have tried to understand the EU as some sort of new and

unique influence in the international system, actorness instead is more basic and challenging at the

same time, taking a real shot at striking the previously mentioned balance. Actorness merely looks at

whether or not the EU is a fully-fledged participant in international negotiations that is, and this is

the crucial part, able to act purposefully. Thus, the status of actorness suggests both less and more

than the ability to change outcomes, a point which will be revisited later on in this section.

The term actorness or ‘the ability to act deliberately and actively in relation to others’ was

first coined by Sjöstedt (1977), to offer guidance as to how one might recognize an non-state entity

with the capacity to act, or function, on the international political level (Vogler 1999: 27). Actorness is

a process-oriented approach, since it focuses on the EU’s capacity to act and interact on an equal

level with other international bodies of governance, including states. Sjöstedt’s interpretation of

actorness was meant to describe and explain the patchy and uneven nature of the international

capabilities of the EC, while considering that the Community possessed some of the characteristics of

the typical actors in the international system, but lacked others. As Wunderlich argues ‘the spectre of

the sovereign state continues to loom large in any descriptions of international actorness’ (2011: 51),

given the fact that many international settings, some more than others, continue to be dominantly

state-centric and require state-like characteristics to enable real participation. Such characteristics

include authority, autonomy and certain policy-making capabilities, but exclude the most significant

trait of the modern nation state, namely sovereignty (Ibid: 52).

Since Sjöstedt, the most significant contributions on actorness were made by Jupille and

Caporaso (1998) and Bretherton and Vogler (20061999), who added a more external component to

Sjöstedt’s rather one-dimensional focus on internal characteristics, including recognition and

1 These interpretations of power range from civilian (Duchêne 1972) and normative power (Manners 2002), to the latest

contributions on smart power (Cross 2011) and pragmatic power (Wood 2011). 2 This categorization is inspired by the one used by Ferreira Nunes (2011: 2). However, she fails to clearly demarcate the

two categories, resulting in a slightly altered interpretation of the dichotomy here.

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opportunity. As Hill and Smith suggest: ‘the very conception of international actorness depends on

bringing ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ into a relationship with each other, just as agents and structures are

mutually dependent’ (2011: 5). A complete definition of actorness therefore recognizes three

interactions that make the concept distinctively constructivist in nature. Although inherently difficult

to isolate from one another, I will separate these interactions to explain the concept of actorness

more thoroughly. First is the interaction between structure and agency, since an actor is an

autonomous identity, which is capable of agency, within the (social) structures in which it functions

(cf. Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 21). This agency is manifested in the institutionalized articulation of

policy objectives, but also in the instruments to pursue these objectives (K. Smith 2008: 25). This

ability to act is conditioned by the social context and norms of behaviour that determine what

constitutes participation, and purposive behaviour. Wendt phrased this as follows: ‘Thus, the analysis

of action invokes an at least implicit understanding of particular social relationships (or "rules of the

game") in which the action is set - just as the analysis of social structures invokes some

understanding of the actors whose relationships make up the structural context. It is then a plausible

step to believe that the properties of agents and those of social structures are both relevant to

explanations of social behavior’ (1987: 338).

Second is the interaction between internal and external, which is most clearly seen in the

development of internal capacities on the one hand and external events and expectations on the

other. But the interaction is also a specific characteristic that distinguishes a post modern actor from

a state, in the way that the traditional separation between external (international) and internal

(domestic) politics is challenged (Linklater 2011: 438; Hettne 2011: 29). In this case, that means that

the way the EU deals with policy matters internally, influences its ability to engage in external

relations and the other way around.

Figure 1: Dialectic process of actorness

The final interaction is the one between material and ideational forces, since the ability to act

depends as much on physical capabilities, such as its power in trade or its institutions, as intangible

elements, such as norms, identities, expectations and perceptions. Also, the two interact in the sense

that material capabilities can for instance change expectations, or even existing general notions of

actorness. In turn such expectations and notions of international actorness may offer opportunities

than enable material capabilities to increase.

To summarize, the dialectic process of agency and structure, internal and external, and

material and ideational forces runs as follows (see figure 1): starting at a random point in this cyclical

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interaction, first, internal capacities are determined by an interplay between psychical capacity,

national actors, European actors and Europeanized institutional norms and practices (Ginsberg 1999:

435). Second, this results in institutions and norms that more or less enable the EU to participate

purposefully in the international arena. This (in)ability to act, or agency, results in expectations,

either high or low (see also Hill 1993; 1998), or material or ideational. These external expectations

and demands, either caused by (limited) capacities shown in the past, or arising from current

developments such as international conflict, feed back to the internal interplay mentioned

previously. This is where perceptions of actorness influence actual actorness (Ginsberg 1999: 435).

Possibly, this may result in a change in internal actor capabilities, for example more competences or

coordination initiatives, or external actor opportunities, such as membership possibilities. Through

these processes, the EU can change the international conceptions of actorness, no longer tying these

exclusively to the state (Wunderlich 2011: 51). ‘(I)t is possible to recognize that the EU is not an actor

in the conventional sense, but to find interesting the process through which it seeks to wrestle for a

form of agency, bound by prevailing ideational structures that dictate what an actor should be’

(Rosamond 2005: 472). Relating back to Wendt’s ‘rules of the game’, it seems that that is what the

EU has done: it has changed the traditional characteristics of international units, but is at the same

time still constrained by these rules. These interactions thus show how the concept of actorness

offers a solution to the n=1 puzzle faced by the sui generis approaches, by recognizing the EU’s

unique (post-modern) characteristics, within the constraints of the modern global order. This makes

actorness more of process than an end-goal, which is why I propose studying actorness in this way,

as opposed to an assessment of predetermined general indicators.

Furthermore, the ability to act deliberately and purposefully differs per setting. While certain

characteristics may suffice for actorness in one setting, this may not be the case for another, which

explains for the variety of results on EU actorness studies thus far (see for example case studies by

Heidener 2011; Kissack 2008; Greiçevci 2011; Groen and Niemann 2012). Most previous assessments

of EU actorness have focused on actorness in more formalized settings, because in this case formal

indicators of actorness suffice, which are easier to observe. However, the multidimensional nature of

actorness is most clearly visible in cases of informal governance. Moreover, actorness and informality

work well together, because informality closely aligns with doing (interaction), not being. The fact

that informality and its relation with actorness has often been overlooked in the past, is unfortunate,

because informality may actually present the EU with unique challenges and opportunities that come

with a lack of (formal) rules and the importance of social structures instead.

One more clarification on actorness is necessary, namely its relation to other commonly

used conceptualizations, most significantly substantive approaches. First, an important distinction

that needs to be made is that between effectiveness and actorness. Some scholars, such as Thomas

(2010) have questioned the relevance of actorness without effectiveness being present. However,

such a refute seems rather premature in light of Wunderlich’s remark that states are considered

actors, even when they are not effective (2012: 656). To be able to act does not necessarily mean to

act effectively. Similarly, many scholars in the past have tied actorness indissolubly to Allen and

Smith’s presence, often considering presence a necessary condition for the more complex state of

actorness to occur (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Wunderlich 2011; Hettne 2011: 31). However, the

relation between presence and actorness is not direct, perhaps even to an extent that denoting

presence as a condition to actorness may not be fitting. While presence indeed sets the parameters

for actorness, these are not necessarily stimulating ones. Presence can influence actorness both

positively, by creating a demand for actorness for example, and negatively. Patchy influence here and

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there and through different means and institutions may for instance restrict the development of

consistent and coherent actorness. The euro is an example of such a formidable and established

presence, which lacks the capabilities and effective tools for actorness and policy-making more

specifically (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 219). Similarly, in light of recent EU enlargements, one may

conclude that while EU presence has increased, purposive behavior, or actorness, has become even

more challenging than before (Hettne 2011: 31).

This also connects to the relation between power and actorness, which is equally indirect.

Influence seems to be the missing link here. Actorness and influence are not equals. Instead,

actorness enables influence, and in turn, influence can (but does not necessarily have to) stimulate

actorness. But this does not suggest that influence will necessarily take place. The other way around,

states or non-state actors can be influential, both in material and in normative sense, without having

the status of international actor (Diez 2005: 615). In fact, one could even argue that, in line with an

argument made by for example Kagan (2002), the EU is a normative power by default. Exactly

because the EU lacks actorness it can only be a normative power or intellectual leader (Laatikainen

2010). This is why I posed earlier that actorness is both less and more than the ability to change

outcomes. Power relates much closer to influence than actorness, as it entails the ability to change

the behavior of others, either directly by deploying means or indirectly by setting an example.

To conclude, if we are to understand the EU as a means to fill the governance void that

challenges the supremacy of the nation state, we are to take into account the state centric structure

in which the EU functions, as well as its ability to alter this structure. For this purpose, actorness is

highly suitable. The G8 serves as an example of such a state-centric forum, in which both material

and ideational elements play a part. The next section turns to this case and how changing features of

the three interactions alter the EU’s ability to act.

3. Changing EU actorness

To illustrate the three interactions of actorness, the case of the EU in the G8 is well suitable. The

unscripted and informal setting of the summit allows for a dynamic process of ‘participation shaping’

by the EU itself as much as by the context and other actors it interacts with. Contrary to many

previous studies of actorness, it is this process through which the EU tries to obtain some form of

actorness that I focus upon, and not the actual end result.3 Because of this reason, I discuss two

recent situations of change that possibly offered opportunities for altering and/or enhancing EU

actorness in the G8. In light of the premises that EU actorness depends on external as well as internal

developments, and on structural as well as agency dynamics, the two situations of change represent

an internal attempt at altering the EU’s ability to act, and an external change of circumstances. First, I

discuss the reform of the EU delegation in the G8 due to the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Next, I turn to the recent challenges that the G8 has been faced with and how these have affected

the EU’s ability to participate purposefully in the summit process.

The Lisbon Treaty

Up until 2009, the European Union was represented at the G8 summit by the European Commission

and the rotating President of the European Council. Under these circumstances, only the Commission

3 For a recent study of the status of EU actorness in the G8, see Huigens and Niemann (2011).

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managed to approximate the status of regular G8 members, although it still held a ‘shadow

membership’ (an established participant, but not a formal member) and lacked the independence to

act proactively (Huigens and Niemann 2011). The position of the Council Presidency, on the other

hand, has always been marginal. The single most important reason for this fact was limited

consistency. In a personalized intimate forum such as the G8, social relations need time to develop.

Under such circumstances, the changing face of the Council President was a distinct disadvantage.

Because of the challenge of constituting a new delegation each year, the practice developed for a

Council President that was not a G8 member, to tag along with the Commission delegation.

Moreover, non-G8 Presidencies were not involved in the preparations of the summits and thus did

not participate in the extensive network of pre-summit (‘sherpa’4) communications. As a result of this

minor role, a common EU position was not prepared in European Council meetings, but only

discussed briefly by the Commission in informative COREPER meetings before and after the summits.

In the case the Council was chaired by a G8 member, either the UK, France, Germany or Italy, the

position of Council President was in effect non-existent.5 Over the years, it became clear that while

the Commission’s position at the summit was specifically not a ceremonial one, the Council’s

presence in fact was. By the time the Treaty of Lisbon was to be implemented, it was obvious that

the representation of the Council would need a different attire.

The Lisbon Treaty solved these issues by instating a permanent President of the European

Council. One of the main goals of the Treaty was to make the Common Foreign and Security Policy a

more integral part of the EU and to enhance coherence in EU external action generally (Gebhart

2011: 121; Bache et al 2011: 213). The position of the permanent President of the Council was

therefore designed to do just that: manage coherence, in terms of organizational unity, and

consistency, or organizational continuity, by for the first time representing the Council as a self-

contained institutional actor (European Union 2008: Article 13.1). The very goals of the Lisbon

reforms in fact represent an attempt to boost EU agency by increasing its ability to function in the

international structure. Also, the Lisbon Treaty was the result of a difficult compromise between

what could be internally agreed upon, and what was needed in order to be effective in external

relations. Thus, as of 2010, the EU is represented by both the Commission President and the

permanent President of the European Council, Jose Manuel Barosso and Herman van Rompuy

respectively.

The practical implication of this change was that a new division of labour developed between

the Commission and the Council. The two institutions were to be tightly connected and form one

single EU delegation, with in effect ‘two heads’. Since each summit participant is entitled to one

sherpa and three sous-sherpas, these positions are crossways divided for both the G20 and the G8.

Hence the Commission provides the G20 sherpa and the Council the G8 sherpa, while in return both

sherpas act as sous-sherpa in the other forum. Both summit teams are supported by a small but

experienced Commission-team, which connects the summit input and output to the daily affairs of

the Commission DG’s. Apart from the expertise input by the Commission, the G8 representation of

the Council is first and foremost directed by Van Rompuy’s cabinet, and not by specific input from

the European Council or its individual members.6

4 To assist the summit leaders, so-called sherpas (after the Nepalese mountain guide that leads mountaineers to the top of

a summit), personal representatives of the state leaders - usually high profile bureaucrats - gather several times before the actual summit to set out the conditions of the summit and compose the draft of the summit communiqué. Each sherpa is assisted by up to three sous-sherpas, each specializing in a certain topic, for example finance. 5 Interview, Brussels, September 2008.

6 Interview, Brussels, June 2012.

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This infrastructure is complemented by an informal division of tasks between Van Rompuy

and Barroso. In typical G8 fashion, the division of labour is not exactly according to legal

competences, but the result of a practical exchange of subjects that are considered relevant that

particular year by one or the other. Competences play a part here, but only indirectly, as the Council

President has been more involved in foreign policy issues, such as Syria or Afghanistan, while the

Commission focuses on certain other topics that are either an exclusive competence, such as trade,

or a so-called ‘pet’ issue, such as climate change.7 On some issues both Presidents speak, for example

because they speak from different angles.8 Development aid budgets can be a topic on which

individual EU member states represents a different perspective than the Commission, which has its

own aid budget.

What effect did these changes in EU representation at the G8 have on EU actorness? As

consistency and coherence were the targeted means to improve the EU ability to act internationally,

I discuss the extent to which both goals were met and whether and how they altered the three

interactions of actorness.

The most significant improvement has obviously been to consistency, which is an essential

element in the context or structure of the G8. In a setting so intimate, personal relations are of

essential value. Previous studies have shown that leaders with more summit experience tend to

perform better, in terms of interaction as well as effectiveness (Kokotsis 2002). The EU, the Council

more specifically, lacked agency to function in this particular structure, because a new Council

delegate was attending each time, a problem that had even worsened over the years, as the number

of member states increased. Moreover, participation in such a halfhearted fashion was deemed to be

somewhat demoralizing for the Council representative, and the Commission who was to take the

extra delegate on.9 All in all, while the Council had the authority to be present, its autonomy, as well

as political skill and will were too limited to be able to participate purposefully.

Under the Treaty of Lisbon, Herman van Rompuy is now serving his second term and has

already attended the G8 summit three times. This newfound consistency has improved the position

of the Council in terms of experience, motivation and relations. Of course, the problem with social

conventions such as those that exist in the G8 is that they are structures and therefore difficult to

change, especially by an actor that lacks agency. However, this newcomer disadvantage was

neutralized by three aspects. First, political skills and experience were assured by manning the

Council team with highly experienced diplomats, who, in most cases, had previous experience with

the G8 (either on the national or Commission level), and were thus able to integrate into the G8

network smoothly.10 Second, through its close cooperation with the Commission, the Council was

able to benefit from their lead and experience. Finally, as a Council representative notes: ‘as soon as

we became a member of the club, and it was known that we were there to stay, we received the

respect of other members, informally as much as formally’.11 This final element shows how

institutional/material decisions interact with ideas and relations. The other way around, the good

personal relations between Van Rompuy and the other G8 members also benefitted the Council’s

ability to act.12 Thus with regard to the interaction between agency and structure and material and

ideational elements, increased consistency was a success for the ability of the EU to act purposefully.

7 Ibid.

8 Interview, Brussels, October 2012.

9 Ibid.

10 Interview, Brussels, June 2012.

11 Ibid.

12 Interview, Paris, November 2012.

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A substantial challenge remains with regards to the second interaction, between external

and internal. In a way, the attempt to increase consistency was a concession by member states that

was needed due to the lacking effectiveness of EU external representation. But exactly because the

Council President has been appointed specifically for external purposes (namely external

consistency), its internal power and legitimacy remains restricted (Lord 2011). This lacking power and

legitimacy is a problem if one aims to participate in the G8, which specifically aims to bring together

those with significant domestic power, relevance and legitimacy (cf. Putnam and Bayne 1987: 29).

The example of the G8 thus shows us how a tradeoff between internal and external can be harmful

for EU actorness.

Concerning the second Lisbon goal, namely coherence, results on improving actorness have

been more ambiguous, not in the least because coherence is a hotly debated indicator of actorness

(see for instance Gebhard 2011; Thomas 2012 and Niemann and Bretherton 2013 forthcoming). Two

problems exists with regards to coherence. First, one could suggest that true cohesion is an onerous

requirement for actorness, which most states even lack (Koops 2011: 123).13 Second, the relation

between autonomy, a common indicator of actorness, and coherence is a potential problematic one,

as it is not unlikely that less coherence will lead to more autonomy. Thus, when EU institutions and

member states are unable to agree on a united position, the solution could be for them to act

independently. Still, writing off coherence as an indicator of actorness completely seems premature,

as it holds both the main reason and difficulties that underlie the initiative of the EU in the first place

(European Union 2002). Coherence is thus an agency characteristic that the EU strives for, both

internally and externally, for symbolic reasons as much as for material ones. In fact, its complex

relation with actorness is one of the primary reasons why coherence should be studied as a

determinant of actorness.

A twofold question therefore needs to be addressed: 1) was coherence indeed the problem

for EU actorness in the G8 and 2) how did the Lisbon changes affect EU coherence in the G8? Huigens

and Niemann (2011) already showed that the most significant challenge ánd explanation for EU

representation in the G8 was its lack of coherence, primarily that between EU member states and the

EU institutions (mostly the Commission). Coherence affected actorness in two respects. First, it made

the EU a less proactive and a more formal participant at the summit than most of its G8

counterparts. The Commission, more than other G8 members, took care to uphold the internal

division of competences. Also, it would not act unilaterally, but in most cases with the support of at

least two European G8 members. The structural circumstances of the G8, its informality specifically,

make the EU’s formal actor behavior problematic as it does not fit the summit’s casual atmosphere.

On the other hand, informality also makes formal boundaries of less importance, enabling

participants to speak ‘a little bit despite the legal arrangements’.14 This created a situation in which

the question of who was represented by whom became unclear. Consequently, so became the

question of how much coherence was necessary and also between whom exactly, making coherence

in effect a latent problem and also an explanation for the delicate position of the EU at the summit.

Second, coherence is considered to be of considerable symbolic value, most explicitly for EU member

states and institutions. ‘Disagreement is a common disaster, also for reasons that do not directly

relate to the G8’.15 This symbolic value of coherence as an agent characteristic is amplified by the

13

However, as Maull (2005: 791) notes, lack of coherence within EU is of an entire different order than that of most large states. 14

Interview, Brussels, July 2008. 15

Interview, Rome, November 2012.

11

enormous press coverage that the G8 summit receives. This case therefore shows how internal

attempts at increasing agency interact with the structure of the external setting, in a way that can

ultimately enable actorness, or limit it.

The above analysis already reveals the answer to the second question - how did the Lisbon

changes affect EU coherence in the G8? - to a considerable extent. Quite simply: the permanent

participation of the Council president did not solve the above mentioned issues with coherence, as

coordination between member states and EU institutions did not increase with the involvement of

the Council. In fact, the inclusion of the Council president in effect added a ‘second head to the

beast’, which was doing a fair job dealing with the challenges of participating in a state-centric forum

up until then. ‘Our non-EU partners were a bit surprised. (…) We told them: “with the Lisbon Treaty,

believe us, you will see the EU more united, it will be a big change”. But in the end of the day, it

became two people for just one representation. That was for some a bit funny’.16 Nonetheless,

although this development would seem detrimental for coherence, in practice this was not the case.

This was primarily because the extra head was in fact already attached to the beast pre-Lisbon, in the

shape of the rotating Presidency. In light of that fact, it clearly makes more sense to have a unified

position be represented by a true EU institution, as opposed to an individual member state, which

inevitably represented national as well as communal EU interests.17 Also, cooperation between the

Council and the Commission seems to run smoothly so far, as their interests seem not only to align,

but to be similar, as both bodies represent the EU interest.18 Additionally, the Commission deems

cooperation and coordination with the permanent Council president significantly easier than with a

different rotating president each year. Interviews with officials from non-EU G8 members confirm

the image of one actor. Some of them were not even aware that both institutions were a part of the

G8, since they only dealt with one (double representation only takes place at the very highest level).

Connecting back to the three interactions, the Lisbon Treaty offered a ‘one size-fits all’

solution to the challenges that the EU was facing in translating its presence into actorness across the

board. What the Treaty most significantly did, was increase consistency, and increase coherence

between EU institutions. What it did not do, was take care of the most substantial problem, which

was coherence between the member states and the EU. The solution primarily represented an

internal attempt to increase agency, and overlooked how this agency interacts with changing

external factors and structural dynamics of social interaction, which will be the focal point of the next

section.

New possibilities in a G8 under pressure

The changes that occurred in the EU representation at the G8 coincided with a tumultuous period in

the history of the G8. During the 1990s, as global economic circumstances were changing, the

relevance of the G8 was increasingly questioned. Most of this criticism revolved around legitimacy

and effectiveness (cf. A. Cooper 2007: 4; Hajnal and Panova 2012). Minor attempts at G8 reform

were initiated, mostly focusing on questions of ‘outreach’, by on the one hand the extension of

membership to include Russia in 1998 and on the other the permanent participation of the so-called

Outreach Five - Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa – from 2005 onwards. The dimensions

of ‘in-reach’ (institutionalization of the summit system) and ‘down-reach’ (involvement and

16

Interview, Paris, November 2012. 17

Interview, Brussels, September 2008. 18

Interview, Washington, November 2012.

12

participation of civil society) received considerably less attention (Kirton 2008: 1). However, the

attempts to reform were not able to turn the changing of the tide, and as the first decennium of the

new millennium drew to a close, it was obvious that the G8 in its old attire would not be sustainable.

Therefore, 2007 summit set the ‘Heiligendamm Process’ in motion, which was to transform the G8

into the G13 by 2009. However, when the financial crisis of 2008 hit, another idea resurfaced, which

was to use the G20 finance ministers’ format as had been set up for the Asian crisis in the 1990s, in a

leaders’ attire. Shortly after the 2009 G8 summit of l’Aquila, the first G20 leaders’ summit was

assembled in Washington.19

Because the whole thing had happened so quickly and the people involved in the G20 were

not necessarily the same people that were involved in the G8 (the first being more financial in its

focus, also after its elevation to the leaders’ level), it was initially not quite clear how the G20 and the

G8 would relate. The most significant question was whether or not the G20 was to replace the G8,

resulting in intra-G8 discussion on what was to be the added value of the smaller summit. In the end,

it was the G20 more than the G8 itself that solved the matter, because the larger and more diverse

format of the G20 made it considerably less flexible, informal and like-minded, which proved to be

especially problematic for political issues. Thus when the G8 summit cycle continued in the summer

of 2010 in Toronto, it focused on exactly those strengths: small scale, informality, compatibility and

political topics. Although the battle between the ‘Atlanticists’, who prefer a small exclusive G8, and

the ‘Continentals’, who prefer a somewhat more encompassing and inclusive format, continues, the

issue of whether or not the G20 has taken over the position of the G8 is commonly considered to be

resolved, especially when the (perceived to be reluctant) Americans continued to take the summit

seriously as the host of 2012.20 What the G20 also seems to have done, is take some of the pressure

off the G8, both in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness, in effect enabling it to focus once more on

what it does best: catalyze ideas. By now, under the current UK presidency, economic and financial

topics are even back on the agenda, despite initial predictions that those would fall to the G20 from

now on.

In the early discussions on the possible reform of the G8, the EU, more specifically the

Commission at that time, took a low profile role for reasons that had to do with capabilities as much

as willingness. As a participant that lacks the ability to host a summit, the EU was not the one

handing out the invitations, and therefore less able to take a prominent position on the issue. But it

is also plausible that the EU did not engage in the discussion because a possible alteration of the

summit composition would in all likelihood call into question the issue of EU ‘shadow membership’,

as well as the possible overrepresentation of European members.21 As it was, the Commission was

doing a fair job in terms of participation in the summit, working a dynamic that had been developing

since the 1970s. Calling that into question could have not only caused external discussion, but

possibly also internal debate on issues such as authority, autonomy and coherence. The Commission

had managed to avoid such debate for decades, acting rather independently at the summit. As such,

it seems that, at the outset at least, the opportunity of G8 reform offered more of a threat than an

opportunity for EU actorness, both for internal and for external reasons. Consequently, the

19

Interview, Brussels, June 2012; interview, Frankfurt, November 2012. 20

Interview, Rome, November 2012; interview, Brussels, June 2012; interview, Brussels, October 2012; interview, Frankfurt, November 2012; interview, Paris, November 2012. 21

Interview, Brussels, October 2012.

13

Commission was hoping that as long as the issue would not be discussed, it would not become

labelled as a problem.22

However, structural change, the financial crisis and external pressure made the prospect of

summit reform inevitable and at the last minute the Commission seemed to turn the flow of events

into an opportunity by jumping on the G20-inititative. In fact, Commission President Barroso played a

key role in the establishment of the G20 at leader’s level in 2008 (Larionova and Renard 2012;

European Commission 2010). Two weeks after Lehman Brothers announced its bankruptcy, Barroso

and Sarkozy went to Camp David, and are said to have convinced US President Bush (hardly a

multilateralist) to support the broadening of the G20.23 By doing so, Barroso secured EU full (as

opposed to ‘shadow-’) membership in this new forum from the start (Griesse 2010: 31). This

initiative, in combination with the fact that Europe was one of the main scenes of the crisis, resulted

in more actor capability in the G20 than in the G8, most significantly in terms of proactivity.

However, this more prominent participation of the Commission and Council at the G20 also came

with more external expectations, and internal coordination in the form of Council meetings. Contrary

to the G8, in the G20, the eurocrisis demanded the habit to let the EU speak first, on behalf other EU

members.24 Moreover, the larger size of the summit, inevitably led to (slightly) more formalization in

comparison to the G8, making issues of autonomy and coherence more of a challenge in the G20

than in the G8.

This development of (different) EU actorness in another forum coincided with little change in

the EU’s ability to participate in the G8. The establishment of the G20 seems to have mainly

reinforced the original dynamics of the G8 summit, in terms of informality as well as exclusiveness.

‘You go back to the old tradition or logic of poles, or nation states. (...) In a way, it is old diplomacy, it

is old school, but you go back to that. It is very different from the G20 in this regard’.25 The EU has

mostly been able to profit from this informality in the past, and it still manages to do so now. Also,

similar to the G8 benefitting from the decreasing pressure with regard to legitimacy and

effectiveness, so has the EU’s position in the G8 since the establishment of its leading role in the G20.

Internal as well as external concerns in light of the position of the EU in the case of possible G8

reform were averted, contributing to a more confident Commission (and Council) delegation. In light

of that conclusion, the EU seems to have done rather well in terms of attempting to maintain and/or

boost its actorness, by using the opportunity of the G20 without losing its established semi-

participant status at the G8 summit.

4. Conclusion

This paper put forward an attempt to reassess the concept of actorness in light of its recent rising

prominence in the academic debate. This reassessment encompassed a more dynamic

conceptualization of actorness as well as a case study of changing EU actorness in the G8 that

underlines this dynamism.

Like other sui generis conceptualizations, actorness attempts to solve the IR-mystery of how

to understand the EU’s international role without on the one hand becoming too descriptive, or too

parsimonious on the other. In light of this purpose, the concept assesses the extent to which the EU

22

Interview, Tokyo, July 2008. 23

Interview, Brussels, September 2012. 24

Interview, Paris, November 2012. 25

Ibid; cf. Interview, Berlin, March 2009.

14

is able to participate purposefully in relation to other actors and within the structure in which it

functions. Actorness is thus both more and less than the ability to change outcomes, because the

ability to participate can (but does not have to) enable influence, while influence can also exist

without the ability to participate purposefully, in which case influence is patchy and not deliberate

(not unlike presence). This focus on what the EU does therefore offers an interesting addition to

discussions on what the EU is, as analyses of Normative Power Europe present (Manners 2002: 252).

A complete interpretation of what the EU does entails the connection of three interactions: 1)

structure and agency, 2) internal developments and capacities, and external events and expectations,

and 3) material and ideational forces. These interactions also attest to the dynamic character of

actorness, suggesting that what is most interesting is not whether or not the EU is an actor, but how

actorness is shaped by various agents and circumstances.

Two cases of changing EU actorness in the G8 summit are to illustrate how actorness can

change and be changed. The G8 offers a suitable platform for changing actorness, because of its

informal nature which allows for dynamic interactions without (minor) formal obstacles affecting

them. Also, because summitry is not so much about outcomes, but more about the processes of

interaction, participation, or what the EU does is especially important.

The first case of changing EU actorness was an internal attempt to increase agency through

the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, increasing consistency and coherence. The most

significant improvement to the EU’s position in the G8 was in terms of consistency since the rotating

presidency was replaced by the permanent president of the European Council. In the informal setting

of the summit, the ability to participate depends to a large extent on the ability to fit in, which was

very difficult for the rotating president. The more consistent presence of Van Rompuy has already

made the Council a much more mature participant at the summit, even though his status remains

slightly more formal and slightly less evident in terms of relevance. This handicapped position of the

Council was however not the main problem to EU actorness in the G8, because the main

representative of the EU has always been the European Commission and it has done rather well too

in terms of actorness. One latent problem that has remained though has been coherence, primarily

between the Commission and the EU G8 member states. The inclusion of the permanent Council

president has hardly solved this matter, as it mainly improved Commission-Council coherence, but

not that between the EU and its member states.

The second case illustrated how changing circumstances of actorness can offer both threats

and opportunities, depending on how the agent responds to it. Initially, the EU kept a low profile in

discussions and attempts to reform the G8 in response to criticism with regard to legitimacy and

effectiveness, because of limited capabilities to influence them, and the fact that change might not

be in their interest. However, when change became inevitable, the Commission jumped on board

and joined the frontline negotiators, hereby securing a prominent status in the G8’s intended

successor, the G20. Despite the establishment of the new forum, the G8 managed to keep afloat and

reinvent itself, returning back to its roots of intimacy and like-mindedness. While the EU managed to

increase its actorness in terms of its position in the G20, it managed to avert a possible threat of G8

reform and maintain its position as a semi-member.

To conclude, these cases demonstrate how EU actorness can be the result of increasing

internal capacities that are to improve agency, that interact with external opportunities and

expectations. This understanding of actorness not only offers academics a tool for understanding the

EU’s changing ability to act, but also a strategy for policy makers. Understanding of what is needed

15

for the EU to act purposefully in a particular setting can enable more effective EU action and

influence even.

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