Overview of the Vulnerabilities of the Policy Making Process in Poland. A Policy Cycle Perspective

GoodGov Project, WP I Theory and Practice of Energy, Security, and Migration Governance Case Study: T1.2 “Mapping Polish and Norwegian Governance and Governance Vulnerabilities in Security, Energy, and Migration Policies”

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Krzysztof Kasianiuk PhD, Grzegorz Gałczyński MA

Overview of the Vulnerabilities of the Policy Making Process in Poland. A Policy Cycle Perspective1

Working Paper

Introduction

In the paper we aim at presenting an overview of the vulnerabilities of the decision making process in Poland, as one of the key elements of the national governance system.

‘Governance’ in its simplest definition means the process of decision‐making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)2. In formal organizations such as states, ‘governance’ refers to the actions of governing bodies and their interactions with other actors engaged directly or indirectly in the decision‐making process. Therefore effectiveness of the state strongly depends on ‘good governance’. Not only the quality of state governance seems to be one of the strongest factors influencing the chances of a particular society for its well‐being. The quality of actions of state institutions and actors operating within their boundaries is one of the key determinants of the success of states in their bilateral and multi‐lateral relations as well.

The World Bank has identified three distinct aspects of governance: the form of political regime; the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions3. The World Bank has been studying different countries in a longitudinal World Governance Indicators project. Throughout the study, Poland was evaluated relatively low in all six indicators covered4. We focus on the three aspects of governance: Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality5.

We approach the issue of the vulnerabilities of governance by referring to two research problems: theoretical and methodological. Firstly, we follow some of international and domestic scholars who assume that regardless of the scope of state activities or goals set by social and political actors, the state as an institution needs certain capacities or capabilities which makes these goals, demands or ideas realistic for implementation6. The ability to implement the established policy, particularly in situation of potential or real opposition of large social groups, powerful interest groups or unfavorable socio‐economic conditions, constitutes the essence of infrastructural power of the state7. The quality of the decision making process is crucial in this regard.

Secondly, we apply a general model of a policy cycle to analyze policy making process within Polish democratic regime. We also utilize the experimentalist governance approach to support some of the conclusions in regard to the role of Poland in a broader international context. In short we assume that obtaining a broad perspective requires a conceptual tool of a general nature. We are quite confident that the basic model of a policy cycle may help us


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unfold some of the clue aspects of Polish governance and governance vulnerabilities. On the other hand we believe that experimentalist governance model may help display some of the problems with the applicability of Polish experience to alternative contexts of other states8.

It should be noted here, why the perspective of a policy cycle in combination with the experimentalist governance is of value here. We assume that the high capacity to accomplish public goals is determined by its coherent institutional framework of state institutions. Thus, the coherent institutional framework is a prerequisite of good governance of the country. In other words, the states should be first of all well‐organized internally, to act at an international level – they should possess a coherent structure, so to enable a controlled flow of information for necessary policy making and policy modification within its boundaries. This is also the indispensable condition for transfer of appropriate knowledge between the states, and the experimentalist model of governance focuses on this particular aspect of state international operation9. It seems that since Poland is the member state of European Union and NATO, such an integrated perspective could help understand some of Polish activities on the international scene.

We argue that the policy making process in Poland is burdened with serious defects, which undermine the effectiveness of state institutions.

Our general presumption is that although there are many sources of the governance defects and there are multiple results of governance vulnerabilities, they are petrified to a large degree by two interdependent factors: 1) the lack of constructive dialogue between the political elites and public administration about the basis for mutually legitimized modus operandi, 2) the malfunction of the institutional learning system stemming from the inability to properly manage the role of policy actors within the policy making processes.

In our view, Polish system does not empower sufficiently the actors operating in the public domain. The information exchange mechanisms are not functioning well, as the procedures of inclusion of actors into certain policy making processes is not clear nor the communication practices are not well designed. This makes the system unable to gain knowledge from the very first step of the learning process.

Policy Making Process, Policy Cycle and Experimentalist Governance Model

The term ‘public policy’ is widely used in contemporary European societies. In a broader sense it can be used to describe any plan or course of action which intends to change a certain situation of a society10. A policy is a principle or protocol to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes11. It is also a statement of intent, and is implemented as a procedure12. In short, policies are created in the policy making process.

In its elementary form, the process of public policy making is a decision‐centric and goal‐driven process13. ‘Decision‐centric’ means that the process is focused on the decisions that must be taken. ‘Goal‐driven’ means that the process must have desired outcomes and that iterations are performed until the outcome is produced. The final outcomes can be a compromise between the targeted result and the imposed constraints14.

The whole process engages a variety of decision‐makers who usually have a great deal of autonomy in the way they organize their work, but remain under constant control of the


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policy stakeholders. Therefore, public policy making can be also characterized as a stakeholder‐driven, complex, dynamic, constantly evolving interactive and adaptive system15. As such it should comply with the requirements of self‐learning and self‐correcting from the beginning of the process to the end. Both people and institutions engaged in the policy making process constitute the basic structure of public decision making. Their interaction results in certain constraints on the decision making process. This in turn makes sometimes the whole system vulnerable and inefficient.

Before a policy is passed, several steps must be taken. These steps are collectively called the ‘policy making cycle’. There are many methods of presenting the process. Some scholars focus on showing the simplest general construction16, whilst others tend to show extended schematics that stem from their theoretical approach depending on the aspects of the process they want to analyze17. In a large number of analyses the basic model consists of at least four steps: ‘agenda setting’, ‘policy formulation’, ‘policy implementation’ and ‘policy evaluation’18. Since the policy cycle is an ongoing process it can be illustrated in form of a cycle diagram (see the figure below).

Fig. 1. The Policy Making Cycle

Based on: Werner Jann and Kai Wegrich, Theories of the Policy Process, Handbook of Public Policy Analysis, 2006, p.43‐62.

In a model, each of the elements shown on a diagram represents a complete stage of the process which must be finished before proceeding to the next one19. All stages should also be institutionally driven. We include this into the analysis of Polish governance even though this approach is an idealistic one and has been criticized from various standpoints since its very introduction. For instance, it was noted that the very nature of governance is very complex20. The emergent properties of systems make it far from easy to advance a comprehensive policy21, since in many cases the decisions are highly interdependent with other ones. It was also argued that the decision making process seems to be too complex for decision makers’ cognitive capabilities22. Being aware of the high complexity of the contemporary policy problems, as well as complexity of the real policymaking processes, we apply the simplest conceptual framework to be able to highlight the major vulnerabilities of

1. Agenda setting

2. Policy formulation

3. Policy implementation

4. Policy evaluation


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Polish governance. We assume, that at this level of analysis, such an approach will be not only sufficient, but necessary as well.

We focus on each of the four steps of the policy making cycle, with special attention paid to the very first two, as the quality of governance in these stages determine the following ones. We start our analysis of the Polish policy making process with the ‘agenda setting’ phase.

At the end of the paper we will combine the policy cycle model with the experimentalist governance framework to present some of Polish governance vulnerabilities in regard to its international context. In the experimentalist model it is suggested that only due to existence of relatively autonomous local units (here: states) may support the learning process of larger units23. When the local units are granted with a relatively large discretion of action, the entities of higher structural level (here: European Union) may cope with cope with global challenges. On the other hand when information and resources are managed inefficiently, the knowledge gained by the state locally has limited applicability to other contexts and may pose only moderate value to other local units, and for those at a higher level in the hierarchy of coordination. Thus, at best the learning process may be deemed to fail. At worst, other local units may learn wrong lessons, and the whole system may work in an unstable fashion.

The combination is possible only due to the fact that both share similar assumptions. First, both models are grounded in the conviction that policy making is ‘a recursive process’ which could be divided into phases. Second, in both models it is assumed that the recurrent process funds the basis for learning of the unit under consideration. The experimentalist model incorporates however a more flexible structure of the decision making process than the basic policy cycle. In the policy making cycle model there seems to be no space for the experimentalist ‘provisional goal‐setting’ or ‘revision’ processes. The policy making process starts with the problems that appear as important (remain high on the ‘agenda’) and are supposed to be solved definitively (never again appear on the agenda in the same shape). This means that the problems should be processed by rationally designed and adequately working public institutions. This in turn precludes the need of the integrity (a step‐by‐step structure) of the public decision making system.

Agenda Setting

Agenda‐setting constitutes the first and perhaps the most critical stage of the policy cycle. It refers to actually getting the ‘problem’ on the formal policy agenda of issues to be addressed by decision makers i.e. relevant ministers or parliament. M.E Kraft and S.R. Furlong consider agenda as the process of definition of the public problem, its perception, hierarchization among other public issues, specification of issue stakeholders and their influence on the possibility to solve it24.

Early public discussions on problematic questions and possible solutions are taking place in a important pre‐stage of agenda setting called ‘issue framing’25. The publicity gained at this stage greatly determines if the issue will draw the attention of political society and actors operating in decision‐making circles. Stakeholders outside of government can suggest issues to be addressed by policymakers, but government policymakers must become engaged in


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the process for a problem to be formally addressed through policy. Government policy‐making bodies

can only do so much in its available time period, such as the calendar day, the term of office, or the legislative session. The items which make it to the agenda pass through a competitive selection process, and not all problems will be addressed. Inevitably, some will be neglected, which means that some constituency will be denied. Among the potential agenda items are holdovers from the last time period or a reexamination of policies already implemented which may be failing26.

‘Issue framing’ reflects the way a problem is stated or defined before formal policy making process starts. When a problem or a need arises, citizens expect the government and its representatives to enact policies that address their issues. Through various linkage institutions such as media, special interest groups and political parties, formulated problems become (or not) widely aware to the broader public and become a subject of pre‐debates. Therefore linkage institutions create a bridge between the public and the government bodies that decide what becomes policy and what does not. As Porter writes

The eventual fate of a policy proposal is also a function of how it is formulated in the first place—how it defines the problems to be attacked and what it offers in the way of policy solutions27.

The media play a significant role in this process28. It is easy to agree with Bard and Södeqvist29 that nowadays information, its creation and transformation becomes a central value. The consequence of this phenomenon is the growing importance of groups performing these processes (journalists, PR specialists etc.). On the other hand other, so far dominant groups (like political parties) are trying to maintain the status quo and take control over the creators of information. Simultaneously, some problems can be created or revealed by special interest groups which use media for their particular benefit. The media create an impression that certain issues are crucially important and requires the priority treatment while in reality there are lot of issues of greater importance30. The influence of mentioned groups on media oftentimes results in its instrumental use in Polish public space. They become a useful tool in political competition. Ipso facto, it leads to distortion of the issues perception by the society and affects agenda setting stage of the policy making cycle.

All of the remarks on the media seem applicable and especially significant in Polish phase of issue framing, due to the medialisation of many public problems. Large number of issues in Poland are discussed not because they are first recognized by public institutions, but because they are sensitive from the point of view of public opinion. Sometimes events are purposefully created by politicians or PR managers to achieve certain effects or political goals. Furthermore, media market in Poland lacks transparency and is a subject of informal lobbying. Therefore we perceive this phenomenon as a serious vulnerability of the Polish policy making process.

The latest examples of the short‐term decision orientation within the agenda setting stage is the activity visible during the disabled persons guardians strike which took place in March 2014. The group of guardians, led into the building by a member of opposition party, has launched a sit‐down strike on the corridors of Polish Sejm. Immediate attention from media has forced Prime Minister Donald Tusk to start direct negotiations with the protesters. In


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front of cameras, angered guardians have publicly accused the government of not keeping the promises and called the Prime Minister a liar. In effect, the long neglected though relatively short public debate over the extent of state support for the guardians of disabled persons has finally took place. It also extorted the faster legislative procedure over the law concerning the strikers’ issues. Accelerated legislative proceeding in this case has risen concerns about the quality of the proposed regulatory solutions. The negotiations were widely perceived as a serious PR blow to the leading PO party, especially in the perspective of upcoming local elections and European Parliament election campaign. On the other hand, opposition parties were accused of using the problems of disabled people as a weapon in a political struggle.

Another example of using the media in Poland was visible at the turn of 2011 and 2012, when the Polish Ministry of Health has published its new draft of reimbursement notice, updating the list of medicines reimbursed by the National Health Fund (NFZ) via pharmacies. The released document has caused a massive uproar in Polish society due to two major facts. First, the new reimbursed drug list lacked over 800 drugs that were previously refunded. For some drugs, such as important products used in oncology, despite subsequent changes in the reimbursement list, patients would have to pay more than in 2011. In effect, the Ministry of Health has shifted reimbursement costs onto patients. Moreover, a rapid change in the rules of drug payments caused the doctors’ protest against individual responsibility for writing prescriptions for reimbursed drug.

The second reason for the reimbursement update turmoil was the fact that the act was not implemented in a proper way. The Reimbursement Act was published just before Christmas, on 23rd December – on regulations concerning contracts between pharmacists and National Health Fund that were to be concluded by 1st January 2012. Hasty changes were dictated by the fact that without the list the pharmacists would not be allowed to sell reimbursed drugs. Moreover, the reimbursement act that was to change fundamental rules of drug funding was enacted with disregard for the public and professional opinion. There were only three days for public consultations despite governmental promises of at least two weeks. Despite protests of patients and medical professional societies, when the bill ended up in parliamentary commission, the only amendments that were taken into consideration where the ones the governmental representatives approved of.

The effects of the Reimbursement Act were described in a report prepared by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and international law firm Baker & McKenzie31. The case was widely publicized by media and has provoked the national debate about the flaws of Polish healthcare system. The growing discontent of the society resulted in a drop in support for the ruling PO‐PSL parties coalition.

The situation of the government has changed entirely when the media were informed that at the January 26, 2012 the controversial Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) would be signed. Among many objections against this multinational treaty, public and NGOs organizations argued that ACTA could infringe fundamental rights including freedom of expression and privacy. The spontaneous reaction of the society, including hackers attacks on governmental sites and massive protests all over the country has shifted media attention to a new, more popular topic. Consequently, the issue of Reimbursement Act was


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overshadowed by ACTA signature in Tokyo despite the fact that mentioned multinational treaty has been negotiated since 2006 and most of its amendments were irrevocable by that time. As a result, public attention was effectively reversed from controversies surrounding Reimbursement Act which was finally left for discussion to the narrow groups of specialists.

The third example of the burdens of the agenda setting phase refers to the measures taken by currently dominant groups to exclude inconvenient broadcasting company from widely available media space. It seems true that the process of granting television concessions in Poland is not transparent, not equal to all, and of inappropriate level of control. Furthermore, the activities of national authorities responsible for regulating audiovisual markets were strictly dependent from politicians, parties, private views of the specified people in the opinion elites.

Such was the loud case of refusing by the National Television and Radio Council (KRRiT) a place in the digital multiplex (MUX) for the Catholic television TV Trwam. The digitization of television that is the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting, is obligatory and binding for all European Union Member States under directive of the European Union. Terrestrial digital broadcasting significantly expands the range of viewers' access to television programs and use of other technologically advanced services. Exclusion from digital platform would result in broadcasters’ limited ability to develop. Left out on the peripheries of the media world it would gradually ceased to be reckoned. Since 2011, for over two years the struggle has risen a lot of controversies regarding digitalization process in Poland. The political background of the conflict was clear as TV Trwam has been exposing views criticizing current PO‐PSL (PO – Civic Platform, PSL – Polish Peasant’s Party) Sejm majority policies quite often in the past, supporting the opposing party at the same time (predominantly PiS – Law and Justice). Poles were alarmed by the arbitrary procedures and quite clear division of TV stations into two categories – these who seem to be privileged and those which seem to be excluded from the mainstream media sphere. The issue provoked a spontaneous reaction from the Polish society. National Council of Radio and Television (Krajowa Rada Radia i Telewizji) was accused of not performing the basic tasks of ensuring pluralism in the media. Nearly 2.5 million of Poles has signed the antidiscrimination letter in favor of TV Trwam about the competition for the MUX‐1 – the first of three digital broadcasting platforms. Also over 200 marches and demonstrations were organized all over Poland to ensure the population support for the case. Although the TV Trwam was finally granted a place in a digital multiplex the whole issue has revealed the practice of the process of granting television concessions in Poland.

On the other hand, some issues seem to be too complex for the media public debate. The media have difficulties in presenting all the aspects of the complicated problems, such as energy, and security. In effect, energy and security issues are used in Poland in the political struggle32. Energy and security policies have been especially present in the public media debate. For instance, the case of constructing and subsequent operation of the natural gas pipelines through the Baltic Sea built by Nordtream consortium has been frequently discussed by politicians, experts and journalists not only from an economic standpoint33. The transition of gas between Germany and Russia has been presented as an issue of national security. Throughout the discussion, Polish government has been frequently accused of


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inefficient diplomatic operation34. But the influence of the society on the directions of energy or security was close to none.

The medialisation of Polish public debate has many side‐effects. For instance, many special interest groups that are already present in the system – such as trade unions and the organizations of the employers – manage to monopolize the public involvement of the decision making process. The limited power of the representatives of other parts of civil society shows the problem of the access to the decision making process. This makes particular interests predominantly present in the further stages of the decision making process.

Policy Formulation

In the model, policy makers at the legislature and the bureaucracy take up the issue by creating legislative, regulatory or programmatic means. The scholars sometimes differentiate this stage between ‘formulation of alternatives of action’ and the final ‘adoption of a policy’ (or the ‘formal decision to take on the policy’)35. This differentiation is especially important in the experimentalist perspective, as in the model the local units are supposed to work autonomously in order to present and evaluate alternative ways of overcoming similar problems. Knowledge of distinct paths provided by local units result in making the experience applicable and adoptable to distinct contexts. Only then the common or ‘agreed’ mode of collective action may take place.

It seems that one of the key vulnerabilities of Polish policy making process at the ‘formulation’ stage has been and remains to a large extent the quality of the coordination activity by the centre of government, especially on the strategic programming part. In 2006, the first since 1989 review of strategic documents revealed that the Council of Ministers adopted 406 documents of strategic character. The reviewers noted that 140 documents were no longer useful, 146 were concluded no longer applicable due to the end of the programming period, and 120 were considered useful, though in a different scope, rank and detail36.

The review also suggests that since the beginning of the transformation process, Poland has been implementing strategies in order to properly react to the international situation (e.g. NATO and EU accession and membership)37. The review showed that four waves of strategic programming have taken place in Poland.

1. 2nd half of 1989‐April 1994 – after the Sejm and Senate contract elections (4th June 1989), the strategies were defining the reforms facing the country during the systemic transformation. At the end of this period, Poland felt the effects of growing economy after the reforms, which helped to negotiate the reduction and restructurization of the external debt. Poland applies for membership in EU. The number of strategic documents: 34.

2. May 1994‐February 1998 – the strategies were strengthening the market economy reforms. However they were also focusing on the adaptation of Polish law to the legal framework of the European Communities e.g. in 1997 the government adopted National


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Strategy of Integration, and Polish Structural Policy in perspective of the European Union Integration. The number of strategic documents: 71.

3. March 1998‐April 2004 – in March 1998 Poland started negotiations with EU, in March 1999 Poland accessed NATO38. In this period the strategies were answering the economic and social issues, mostly in regard to entrepreneurship and unemployment. The problems with sustaining balanced public finance resulted in the introduction of the Strategy of Public Finance Debt Management. The EU negotiations gave impulse to formulate the strategy for agriculture and industry. Additionally, some of the strategies were adopted in the field of energy (e.g. Governmental Program – Reform of Coal Mining Industry in Poland 1998-2002) and security (Strategy of Security for the Republic of Poland – 2000 and 2003). The number of strategic documents: 195.

4. May 2004‐ end 2006 – in May 2004 Poland accessed European Union, so this period has been marked by the need of adaptation to the EU environment. Poland has been acquainting with EU political structures and economic markets, and tried to build its position within EU. Government introduced e.g. Policy of Competition 2004-2005, Foundations of the Scientific, Scientific-Technological and Innovation Policy until 2020. For Energy it introduced Policy of Energy until 2025 and National Plan of Development 2004-2006. For the first time the Program of Regulation Reform was adopted (2006). Further strategies have also been introduced in reaction of Polish EU membership. The number of strategic documents: 106.

Furthermore, the strategic review showed, that the strategies were constructed in an ad-hoc manner, and were internally and horizontally incoherent. Some of them have been dealing with similar problems and issues. The strategies have been developed with limited attention paid to their horizontal relevance. Most of the strategies were focused on the short term and middle term problems. Up to the time on the review, there existed no hierarchy of documents, which made it difficult to understand the true significance of particular policy documents. Many of the documents posed unrealistic goals and did not include any substantial information in regard to financing, indicators nor mechanisms of monitoring and control of the public institutions’ activities.

It seems that the European Union has been playing and is still playing a crucial role in Polish strategic programming. In the past it might have been more the effect of the need of rejection of the central planning system. However contemporarily it is more closely related to the financial support provided by EU within the cohesion programs. The EU budget financial perspective 2014‐2020 is at the moment presented as more important for Polish development plans than the quality of governance system. The latter is almost inexistent in the wider public debate.

In reaction to the fragmentation and incoherence of policies, at the end of 2006 the law regarding the rules of the development policy has been introduced39. And since 2009 some effort has been put order to clear the process of strategic programming in Poland40. At the moment, so after 7 years, 9 integrated are formulated and prepared for implementation. The list below shows the names of the integrated strategies aiming at 2020, along with the names of the coordinating ministries.

Strategy of innovation and economic effectiveness (Strategia innowacyjności i efektywności gospodarki), coordinated by the Ministry of Economy41;


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Strategy of human capital development (Strategia rozwoju kapitału ludzkiego), coordinated by the Ministry of Work and Social Policy42;

Strategy of transportation development (Strategia rozwoju transportu), coordinated by the Ministry of Transportation43;

Strategy Energy Security and Environment (Strategia Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne i środowisko), coordinated by the Ministry of Economy44;

Efficient State Strategy (Strategia Sprawne państwo), coordintated by the Ministry of Administration and Digitalization45;

Strategy of Development of Social Capital (Strategia rozwoju kapitału społecznego), coordinated by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage46;

National Stategy of Regional Development – Regions Cities Rural Areas (Krajowa strategia rozwoju regionalnego – Regiony Miasta Obszary wiejskie), coordinated by Ministry of Regional Development47;

Strategy of Sustainable Development of Villages, Agriculture and Fishery (Strategia zrównoważonego rozwoju wsi, rolnictwa i rybactwa), coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development48;

Strategy of Development of National Security System (Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP), coordinated by the Ministry of National Defense49.

The proceedings over the formulation of strategies is generally assessed positively by the internal control agency – Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli – NIK), however a number of reservations have been made50. Firstly, the coordination of work between different ministries did not proceed in a preplanned manner. Secondly, the process has been started without essential acceptance on the basic “developmental challenges”, the recommendations of the Coordination Committee for Policy of Development has been presented to the Council of Ministers. Thirdly, the institutional enforcement of the in strategic programming subsystem has not been achieved as the Coordinating Ministry has not been given enough of institutional power to execute the methodological and substantial standards along with the organizational procedures in regard the strategic programming.

Policy Implementation

‘Implementation’ represents the conversion of new laws and programs into practice. Government agencies begin the job of making the policy work by establishing procedures, writing guidance documents or issuing grants‐in‐aid to other governments. Policy success depends on how well bureaucratic structures implement government decisions. Legislative activities undertaken by authorized organs of government result in creating new legal frameworks or changing the existing ones. This phase of the policy making process is particularly important because quality of created regulations directly affects the life of the citizens. In some sectors (i.e. energy sector, business) it crucially determines the chances of success or failure of various economic activities.


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In Polish case, implementation is most often conducted through the state law legislation process. It is still a widespread belief among decision makers that the state law, along with the top‐down command and control mode of operation in public affairs is best for regulation of social, economic and political affairs. It seems that there are two consequences of such a rationale. On one hand this results with the lack of trust between state authorities and society. On the other, the state authorities do not search for the more adequate set of tools that could help in the accurate conduct of public affairs and implementation of public policies. In Poland regulation equals mostly legislation, and two most important regulatory institutions in Poland – government and parliament – proceed in accordance.

One of the oldest ways the Council of Ministers assures the quality of implementation process in its legal sense is the involvement of Legislative Council in the legislative process. This body consists of prominent lawyers who are presenting opinions about some of the more important legal projects to be sent to parliament51. Unfortunately, the parliament has no comparable body. Periodically, members of the Legislative Council also prepare the report about state of the Polish law. In one of them, dated in 200552, important theoretical aspects and technical problems of law‐making in Poland were analyzed. The conclusions of the Legislative Council seem still of the moment.

Organization of legislative work was criticized both on the government and parliament side. The authors have enumerated the most severe defects in Polish law which were: a) excessive regulation, b) the instability of the law, c) the inconsistency of regulations, d) lack of transparency of the legal system, e) low technical level on the legislative part of the regulatory process.

The main concerns at the government side were: a) the departmental model for the creation of law, which made coordination of legislative actions ineffective, b) frequent initiation of legislative work on unprofessionally prepared projects which led to great numbers of amendments, c) lack of competence of the Government Legislation Centre to co‐decide on the course of the government's legislative process, d) dysfunctional and formal treatment of public consultation in the legislative process, e) exceptionally rare and improper use of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA – Ocena Skutków Regulacji or OSR in Polish), f) rare use of the Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny – TK), the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny – NSA) and the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy – SN) jurisprudence in the legislative process, g) underestimation of the Legislative Council role and its achievements.

The main concerns at the parliament side were: a) Little involvement of the governmental legislative departments in the phase of the parliamentary debates on the bills which led to compilation of many legislation proposals (in the same area) into one project or thorough reediting of the proposal in parliamentary commissions; b) little involvement of the Marshal of the Sejm in the process of initial control of the bill proposals, c) lack of planning of the legislative work in the Sejm, d) lack of requirements obliging bill proposal designers to systematically assess the effectiveness of the law, e) the lack of clear rules of cooperation between the government and the ruling coalition in enacting laws.

Most of these concerns are either very general or technical. We believe that we have to focus on two major vulnerabilities of the implementation phase of the policy making cycle


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which are: 1) improper use of the RIA mechanism, 2) little predictability of the legislative process as a whole. First is important because it is used to predict or assess the quality of the legislative proposals and their direct impact on the society. Second, because it affects the previous as well as the decision making process in Poland.

Since 2001 Polish decision makers have been supposed to provide a Regulatory Impact Assessment to each legal act to be implemented. RIAs are similar to other European mechanisms (e.g. French, German, British)53. It is a mean, by which all consequences of the new regulation – positive as well as negative ‐ are predicted and described. This document is supposed to provide decision makers with information required for rational decision making.

Unfortunately in Poland bill proposals are not attached with properly made RIA documents, despite that most of the formal requirements in terms of legislative practice are usually met. According to the report prepared by Zubek54 in 2007, RIA methodology refers to the way legal acts proposals should be developed, which consists of five steps: problem analysis, baseline scenario analysis, analysis of the purpose of regulation and cost – benefits analysis55. The author concluded, after the analysis of 220 legal acts from years 2001 ‐ 2005, that Polish legislative process is characterized by a low level of integration with RIA methodology. His conclusions included:

‐ Lack of data on the analysis of the problem indicates that the legislative actions were taken without the appropriate discern whether legislative intervention is indeed necessary;

‐ Lack of data on the analysis of the baseline scenario indicates that the legislative interventions were undertaken without a fair count of all costs and benefits. It is not possible to compute the effects of it without a reference point for such an analysis;

‐ Although information on the purpose of the regulation can be found in almost all the proposals, simultaneous lack of information on the scale of the problem and the baseline scenario indicates that the purpose of the regulation is referred to in a general way, which does not guarantee the ability to measure the effects of legislative proposals;

‐ Lack of data on regulatory variants indicates that during regulatory intervention not all possible solutions were examined in order to identify solutions that brings maximum benefits at the lowest cost;

‐ Lack of information on costs and benefits for beneficieries of regulation and high prevalence of qualitative data on the benefits for public policy objectives indicates that the information was made ex post to justify pre‐legislative decisions. This means that the process of development of proposals was accompanied by a limited cost‐benefit analysis, or that such an analysis has not been undertaken.

Among many reasons responsible for the inadequate use of RIA methodology in Polish legislative Zubek indicates two which seem to be interesting from the standpoint of decision making process:

1) Law quality seems to have low rank in the preferences of political leaders. Elections are not won by substantive solutions, but legislative initiatives are bent on maximizing short‐term political gain. This state of affairs results mainly from a small


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number of non‐governmental programs to monitor the quality of legislation. The consequence is a relative lack of interest of the political leaders in the law quality.

2) The dominance of parliament in the legislative process. The Polish Sejm has a decisive influence on the shape of laws in Poland. Government bills are subjected to far‐reaching transformations in the parliament, including the change of the purpose and solutions concepts. Zubek’ research reveals that more than 80 percent of governmental projects were substantially changed. This situation weakens seriously the government motivation for proper preparation of legislative projects.

A significant drawback of the RIA indicated in evaluations of legislation and the quality of laws, by other domestic experts56 is perfunctory formal approach to RIA. RIA are prepared without identification of risks and possible effects of the proposed regulations in the economic, trade and public finances spheres. Another important fact is that evaluation is performed only at the design stage of a normative act, whereas in fact the act is created to a significant extent in the later stages of the legislation. Another essential weakness is lack of or limited analysis and expertise of the scientific (i.e universities, R&D institutes) and specialized public sector units both at the initial and final stage of the legislation.

In 2008 the Prime Minister introduced the group, which is supposed to coordinate the legislative activity of the Council of Ministers and the evaluation of the activity already undertaken57. This is in line with some of the expert recommendations stated before, in particular that the centralization of coordination should enhance the cohesion of the legislative work of the government58. There are also some new tools implemented that are supposed to help with the implementation of high quality law – regulatory test, OSR ex‐post. The latest version of it was approved by the government in October 2013. Along with OSR, all three constitute the more general ‘Regulatory impact assessment’ tool (Ocena wpływu regulacji)59. It is a direct answer to OECD and EU recommendations and is supposed to be an integral, prioritized part of the governmental decision making process60. The RIAs are supposed to be standardized and should be compiled in the very beginning of the work on the legal act project assumptions and enable the assessment of all important effects of the regulation and the choice of optimal decision. It is too early however to declare, whether these tools will have any influence to the actual quality of the legislative process.

Another vulnerability of the decision making process in the implementation phase has been also criticized from the standpoint of the predictability of the process. As Zubek, Stecker and Goets writes61:

The predictability of the regulatory environment is widely considered to be crucial for economic development62. A comparative study showed a negative relationship between policy volatility and economic growth and direct foreign investments63. Therefore, improvement of predictability of regulation is potentially beneficial to the national economy. Research conducted by The World Bank has shown that raising predictability may increase the likelihood of new investment by more than 30 percent64. Reduction of uncertainty associated with the Policy formation proved to be also significant for stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship.


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The predictability of the policy making process is also an essential importance from the standpoint of proper legislation. The more pre‐planned legislative acts are included in the agenda, the more chances to avoid an ad hoc legislation manner. The most basic benefit of proceeding according to schedule is the better chance to adapt planned legal provisions to the complex law system. It gives more time to procure proper RIA procedures and help to eliminate ‘gaps’ which may be used to the detriment of the state. The unpredictability of the legislation in context of the schedule of legislative work seems as well a major vulnerability of policy – making process in Poland65. Between 2008‐2011 out of 541 governmental projects of legal acts, only 35 per cent have been implemented according to the schedule66. It shows the scale of this phenomena which cannot be neglected in the debate on improving the policy – making process in Poland.

One of the most visible examples of exploiting the competences of Polish officials to cripple the legislative schedule is the ‘the Marshal Freezer’ or ‘the legislative freezer’67. ‘Marshal Freezer’ is a colloquial term describing phenomenon of blocking work on legislative proposals in Parliament. For the Parliament could begin work on a project (the Act or resolution), Marshal of the Sejm must first direct it to the first reading. However, the project must be free from legal defects. Marshal may call author of the project to remove legal defects for any length of time on the basis of its arbitrary assessment. In practice, it allows to block any kind of proposal for a long time with almost no consequences. Exploiting this flaw leaves a wide field for manipulation, shaping the policy making in a way suitable for government (as the Marshal always comes from the governing coalition), but not necessarily in accordance with the expectations of the society expressed by opposition parties.

Policy Evaluation

According to the theory, policy analysts inside and outside government should determine whether policy is addressing the problem and whether implementation is proceeding well. They may recommend revisions in the agenda, in the formulation of policy (ex ante evaluation), in its implementation (ongoing evaluation). Finally they may recommend changes in any of the aspects of public intervention after the termination of the first policy (ex post evaluation). This evidence based policy model is supposed to enable learning process of the state as a whole. It is also one of the clue aspects of the experimentalist governance model. From this point of view, Polish evaluation system lacks in many respects.

In addition to RIA (OSR), which is in fact a form of an ex ante evaluation, a major effort in Poland was put to policies and programs co‐financed by European Union68. This refers especially to cohesion policy programs, e.g. National Development Plan 2007-2013 (Narodowy Plan Rozwoju 2007-2013) and subsequent ones69. In 2008 some experts have noted

the generation and application of operational knowledge in these on-going evaluations suggests that Poland’s performance in terms of the technical absorption of Structural Funds (i.e. ability to spent funds on time and in line with procedures) is progressing. However, analysis of the case studies suggests that evaluation in Poland still faces a significant challenge in generating strategic or conceptual knowledge that can inform policy choices and influence other interventions70.


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The evaluation knowledge is still generally limited to the EU co‐funded programs and learning process on the wider scope does not in fact taking place. Moreover, there is a very limited confidence that the standards worked out during the implementation of EU Cohesion policies, may play significant role on a wider scale at the moment. There is not much effort put to make thembecome practiced on a wider scale in public decision making. For the time being, it seems that monitoring of indicators defined for strategic documents on a national level is far enough. “STRATEG – a system of monitoring of development” is supposed to help decision makers in regard of satisfying the goals of integrated strategies, but it seems that it lacks in the number and quality of indices to be taken into consideration71.

The impact of EU standardization impact may be seen as even stronger when considering the present institutional design and structure of decision making within the 9 integrated strategies. The knowledge gained through the implementation of EU programs by the Ministry of Regional Development (MRD) became crucial for the capability of state for evaluation process. The clue position in the institutional learning belongs to the National Evaluation Unit (Krajowa Jednostka Oceny ), based in MRD. In March 2014 the President signed the amendment of the law on the rules of management of development policy72. This document gives more authoritative power to the MRD over the policy coordination and evaluation processes. Additionally, due to the newest law, the evaluation is to be held only for specific type of projects, that yield quantitative criteria, specifically for the projects whose cost exceeds 300000 PLN. However, there are certain activities initiated also by state authorities directed at disseminating the knowledge on evaluation and tools helping in policy making process (e.g. post‐diploma studies, handbooks, seminars and conferences).

Unfortunately, no strategy has been up to date evaluated with the means similar to the EU cohesion policies, although experts believe that such a process should take place in other state financed spheres. Neither of public policies has been put through of in‐depth evaluation at a country level one as well. For instance, all four major policies implemented at the end of 90’s by Jerzy Buzek’s government have not been yet comprehensively evaluated, which would require presentation of the evaluation criteria73.

In 1999 Buzek’s government introduced a pension reform, along with three other reforms (education, administration and healthcare reforms). The most recent criticism of the reforms came with the state plans of changing the pension system. The system was reformed primarily due to demographical and economic problems, as well as inefficiency of the existing system. The reform was an effect of growing financial needs covered by the yearly state budget to cover the gap between the needs of pension beneficiaries. This reform was supposed to change the system from the social pension one (based on the inter‐generation exchange) to a contribution based benefit one. The reformed system consisted of three pillars: obligatory 1) Social Insurance Fund (Fundusz Ubezpieczeń Społecznych), administered by existing Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych); 2) Open Pension Funds (Otwarte Fundusze Emerytalne), which managed individual contributions (privately owned) of the citizens; 3) and voluntary Individual Pension Accounts (Indywidualne Konta Emerytalne). However, the government of D. Tusk passed the law that in practice withdrew the major part of the privately‐owned resources to a state‐based system. The new system has been launched in 2014. Many allegations have been made throughout the policy


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implementation process, including the constitutional discrepancy of new regulations and the economic inefficiency of the new system74. This started a hot public debate. It seems that many of the questions and criticisms regarding the pension reforms would not have existed if the policy making process was monitored and evaluated in an on‐going manner.

The vulnerabilities of the evaluation in Polish decision making process seem to be caused by high level of political conflict and the low level of independency of public administration from political processes. Even though some of the policies put forward by one political coalition may be perceived as acceptable or even suitable from the substantial point of view, many of the policies are changed or not implemented by the following coalition. The parties are not capable of cooperating in this regard.

Nevertheless, in recent years Poland has been witnessing a gradual change of the relationship between society and public administration. Slowly but steadily, the old but still dominant top‐down model of governance is evolving into a more participatory one. Civic involvement in public affairs seems to be an expected and required change in the Polish society. One of the mechanisms which allows citizens to take part in the decision‐making process75 is public consultation.

Public consultation is an organized way of getting opinions and statements by the administration of entities (ie people and institutions), which will be directly or indirectly affected by the solutions (or actions) proposed by administration. The plans for these proposals may be included in the projects of, inter alia, legal acts, different kinds of programs or strategies, but also the budgets of public entities76.

Public consultation is especially important from the policy making cycle perspective. The reason we decided to analyze public consultation in the evaluation part of this document is its versatility and omnipresence. The mechanism itself exists (or should exist) on every step of the policy cycle, as it represents public participation in the decisionmaking process ‐ one of the main ‘virtues’ of civic society. It is a tool useful both to: evaluate the whole policy and revise each step of the cycle. It is also a source of unconventional and innovative ideas that may help to solve discussed issues in more efficient way. Therefore we agree that public consultation sustains one of the systemic self–learning mechanisms. Being the link between public administration and citizens it utilizes the capacity of the society to solve its problems and present new ideas. Public consultation institution stands for civic involvement in each of the policy cycle steps, in other words, it represents the constant presence of citizens in the policy making process.

The conclusions from public consultation should be used to set the starting points both to adapt old policies and formulate new problems or ideas which have to be addressed by public policy. Unfortunately public consultation mechanism in Poland is burdened by serious flaws and misconceptions. There still exist widespread misunderstanding in Poland that public consultation means large public discussion while in administrative practice consultation is usually addressed to the narrow group of institutions called ‘civic partners’77. It would be technically difficult and economically inefficient to conduct nation – wide consultation each time the new legislation was made. Also not every legislation requires such measures, i.e. sectoral, technical or administrative regulations which are more efficiently discussed in the specialists groups.


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Based on report from the research78 on effectiveness of public consultations (2011) we distinct the main barriers and deficits of this process at the governmental level. These seem to show also some more general vulnerabilities of the decision making process as a whole. That is why we present them almost in extensis. The barriers and deficits are

• present at the "both sides" (government bodies and consultation participants) barriers of awareness and lack of faith in the purpose of the consultation. The consequence is relatively low involvement of potential participants (non‐governmental organizations and individual citizens) in the process;

• poor technical preparation to conduct consultation processes, followed by frequent lack of a deeper practical knowledge of the techniques of public consultations;

• lack of standards defining the consultation process (i.e. scope, time, feedback, etc..); • restricted circle of entities to which consultations are addressed; • too little time for the process of consultation and inappropriate moment of their

conduct; • little involvement of the resources necessary to conduct the consultation process

(financial resources, responsibility, competence), • Budgetary constraints, rigid financial rules limiting the ability to conduct non‐routine

measures; • passive forms used in the consultation process; authorities often confuse the

transparency of the process with the intention of getting the real opinion; • dispersion of information, the lack of a "place" where citizen can find all necessary

data subject to consultation; • repetitive negligence of feedback in relation to the people and institutions which

took part in the consultation process; • "unfriendly" form of the documents, no overviews, specifically formulated questions,

limited access to supplementary materials; • no real mechanism to test the accuracy of the consultation process and ‐

consequently ‐ widespread abuse of the term; • limiting and restricting the number of entities involved in the consultation;

anachronistic, restrictive consultation model limited to institutions while ignoring individual citizens;

• limited competence of the consultation participants, both as to the form of participation, and the nature of proposed solutions

• the problem of organizations participating in the consultation that represent only their special interests – they oftentimes bring chaos and represent a demanding attitude;

• frequent misunderstanding of the essence of consultation. The participants often believe that each reported proposal should be taken into account by the office. This makes a widespread confusing the process of consultation with negotiation;

• lack of the available database of information on professionals competent in the areas of consultation;

• frequent formal treatment of the consultation process ‐ due to limited scope and time of consultation and ignoring the substantive feedback comments;

• lack of the platform of communication developed between NGOs and the government;


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• insufficient involvement of government institutions in the coordination of public consultation process.

The main problem from the decision making point of view seems to lie in the lack of trust between both sides of the process. On one hand, there is the public administration which treat public consultation as a ‘necessary evil’ performing it in a formal, minimalistic manner. On the other hand, there is the society, unaware of the importance and limitations of the public consultation institution. The changes in this area are crucial from the standpoint of policy cycle, to comply with the requirements of self‐learning and self‐correcting from the beginning of the process to the end.

Summary

The short presentation of the policy making process in Poland through four policy cycle lenses reveals some of its general and specific vulnerabilities. First of all, it seems that Polish decision making system is still a more a ‘decision‐centric’ than a ‘goal‐driven’ process. Polish elites are at the beginning of understanding the policy making process as a long term, multi‐step, coherent and conjugated process. Although, the 9 new strategies have been set, the public debate shows that it is constantly more important to show the support for solving particular problems by making provisional decisions than to attain the predefined public goals. Some partial solutions are already present in the Polish design of the decision making process, however Polish system as a whole does not seem sufficiently prepared for application of modern tools of public management. In effect, the learning process may not be conducted in a coherent way.

The analysis of the agenda setting phase shows that Polish governance vulnerabilities may be closely connected to the quality of political culture. It seems that the relations between politicians, the media and the civil society form and sustain the short‐perspective attitude not only toward specific policy problems but strategic goals as well. On the other hand, the investigation of the policy formulation phase reveals that Poland is at the verge of building its own capacity of strategic programming which in a contemporary world predefines policy formulation in particular issue areas. The modernization within the public domain is limited, and is visible mostly in the policy areas stimulated by external forces (such as European Union and NATO), as a number of policies in Poland have been implemented only in effect of Polish EU accession79. Also the policy implementation mechanisms lack in many respects. Implementation oftentimes equals legislation, the most procedurally demanding mode of operation, which undermines the capability of regulating public affairs adequately and in an appropriate moment. Thus, the social and economic systems are in many respects overregulated and inconsistent. The projects of laws are often criticized due to their low quality and passed without proper control as on the side of the government as on the legislative bodies. The study of the policy evaluation practice shows that some of the clue competences required for modern policy making are already present in the Polish governance system, but the spread of necessary practices and experiences in the decision making process is not taking place at a necessary pace. It seems that main obstacles lie in the attitude of the decision makers, who do not want to take more responsibility for the conduct of public affairs. The evaluation mechanisms have not been widely implemented and it


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seems that decision makers do not use them, because they perceive it as a form of control imposed on them80.

There are also some additional conclusions that could be drawn when applying the experimentalist governance model to Polish phenomena. The nature of Polish governance and policy making process has been predominantly shaped by its international historical experience. At the very beginning of the transformation process (since 1989) Poland shifted from Soviet toward Western political structures. The strategic choice to integrate with NATO and European Communities (and consequently with European Union) was supposed to support or even guarantee the fulfillment of Polish political, social and economic interests. NATO was supposed to help Poland secure its external borders, and EU was supposed to trigger the transformation of the country within social and economic areas. For these reasons, Poland has aligned its strategic goals with the goals of NATO and European Union. Both structures forced internal changes and helped to introduce mechanisms that generated positive processes, such as faster modernization of the economy.

However it seems that neither the contemporary EU nor NATO are confident of their future interests and goals. The 2008 economic crisis revealed the vulnerability of the European financial and economic system. The 2014 Crimea crisis showed that countries could start thinking of the more close cooperation within security issues, but still preserve the right to cooperate bilaterally with external actors, such as Russian Federation. Furthermore, the EU multiannual financial framework beyond 2014‐2020 is the last in which Poland receives more than it contributes to the European budget.

These external factors predominantly shape the decision making process in Poland. More importantly however, Polish strategic programming is in its early stage. It will be the question to be answered to what extent or whether at all Polish development path would still be perfectly aligned with the paths of the EU and NATO. On one hand, the strategic goals are at the time defined very similarly to the ones of the both international structures. This suggests that the goals set ‘provisionally’ have been introduced and assimilated. On the other hand however, Poland has not undergone a full cycle within any of the decision making processes considered in the 9 new strategies. For that reason, the ‘peer review’ of the Polish experience with the ones of other countries could be limited, and it would not give appropriate image suitable for the learning process.

Recommendations

The general level of analysis does not make it possible to give issue specific recommendations, however a number of points could be made that seem favorable for the system of policy making.

1. A more detailed attention should be paid by public institutions to the design of the policy making process. The policy making process should be constantly reviewed and evaluated. The 9 strategies set recently should be further operationalized in order to be able to evaluate their impact toward publicly stated goals. Additionally, the comprehensive review should regard also specific issue areas.


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2. Stronger leadership mechanisms on a central level should be introduced. The Prime Minister and his Chancellery should be primarily responsible for the coordination of strategic planning and evaluation. A specialized coordination body within government should be established that would especially monitor the consistency of the policy making process within and between particular issue areas.

3. A wider range of policy implementation tools should be recognized and reconsidered for application81. Self‐organization and self‐regulation governance mechanisms could be implemented in this regard. It seems that the cooperation with social, civil society actors as well as professional societies may be a good source of ideas and support for such tools of public management.

4. Good practices transfer between domestic actors should be initialized and supported on a daily basis. Specifically, an online service available to public administration staff and civil society could be launched. This would serve as a communication tool and help enhance the capabilities of the state of problem recognition and source of solutions.

5. Functioning of the RIA should be improved by strengthening quality control and institutions of public control. Quantification of administrative burdens should be a permanent part of the RIA. Poland should continue the training of officials in the implementation techniques of the RIA.

6. Public consultation mechanism in Poland still needs perfection. It should be improved and its importance increased throughout the legislative process in such a way that it should become a mandatory part of the RIA. Balance should change in the direction of broader civic participation. We believe it can be attained through technical means (new, more approachable forms of public consultation should be implemented i.e. ‘on‐line’ consultation platforms), broad educational and social awareness campaigns, and deeper technical training of public administration.

7. The efforts must be made to improve the predictability of the legislation process in Poland. The change of proportion between scheduled and ad hoc legislative would be a visible sign of improvement. Cutting the practice of ‘freezing’ the legislation proposals with the ‘Marshal freezer’ mechanism seems also to be the necessary change that would improve effectiveness in this area.

1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the Polish‐Norwegian Research Programme operated by the National Centre for Research and Development under the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009‐2014 in the frame of Project Contract No xxx. 2 See: What is Good Governance, UNESCAP, 2009, http://www.unescap.org/resources/what‐good‐governance, (accessed: 9 April 2014). 3 See: Governance. The World Bank’s Experience, Development in Practice, May 1994. 4 World Bank, Country Data Report for Poland 1996-2012, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c177.pdf (accessed: 30 April 2014). 5 Apart from the three mentioned, another 3 are studied in the WGI project. These are Rule of Law, Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Control of Corruption. See: World Bank, The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (accessed: 30 April 2014). 6 OECD, Poland: Implementing Strategic-State Capability, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264201811‐en (accessed 20 March 2014); Antoni Z. Kamiński, Jan


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Stefanowicz, “Syndrom słabości państwa: Wydolność strategiczna Polski XXI wieku” [“State Weakness Syndrome: Polish Strategic Capacity in the 21st Century”], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Społeczny, 2011, pp. 11‐39. 7 Cf: Artur Wołek, Słabe Państwo, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Kraków – Warszawa 2012, p. 39. 8 Charles F. Sabel, Jonathan Zeitlin, "Experimentalist governance", Oxford Handbook of Governance, 2012, pp. 169‐183;. 9 Sandra Eckert and Tanja A. Börzel, “Experimentalist Governance: An Introduction”, Regulation & Governance, 6(3), 2012, pp. 371–377 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748‐5991.2012.01163.x (accessed: 15 April 2014). 10 Charles E. Lindblom, Edward J. Woodhouse, The Policy-Making Process, Prentice‐Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 1968; David P. Dolowitz, David Marsh, “Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy‐making”, Governance, 13(1), 2000, pp. 5‐23. 11 Michael Howlett, Micheal Ramesh, Arthur Perl, Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems, 1995 12 Chris Anderson, What's the Difference Between Policies and Procedures?, Bizmanualz, April 4, 2005. 13 Charles Lindblom, Edward J. Woodhouse, Policy-Making Process, 3rd Ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993. 14 Thei Geurts, “Public Policy Making ‐ The 21st Century Perspective”, Be Informed, July 13, 2011, p. 6. 15 Ibidem, p. 4. 16 Cf.: http://www.sotsioloogia.ee/vana/esso3/3/tatjana_doroshko.htm#_ftn3 (accessed: 22 April 2014). 17 Cf.: http://ec.europa.eu/digital‐agenda/en/how‐does‐policy‐making‐30‐differ‐current‐practices (accessed: 1 May 2014) 18 Werner Jann, Kai Wegrich, “Theories of the Policy Process”, Handbook of Public Policy Analysis, 2006, pp. 43‐62. 19 With an exception. Authors of this article distinguish policy evaluation as a whole from a revision of policy making stages when the policy is in act. This issue will be explained later in the “Policy evaluation” chapter of this article. 20 Volker Schneider, “Governance and complexity”, Oxford Handbook of Governance, 2012, pp. 129‐142. 21 Andreas Duit, Victor Galaz, “Governance and complexity—emerging issues for governance theory”, Governance, 21(3), 2008, pp. 311‐335. 22 Charles Lidblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through”, Public Administration Review, 19(2), 1959, pp. 79‐88. 23 Ibidem. 24 Cf: Michael E. Kraft, Scott R. Furlong, Public Policy. Politics. Analysis and Alternatives, CQ Press, 2007, p. 72‐75. 25 One may also differentiate three subsequent sub‐processes in the agenda setting phase: ‘issue framing’, ‘problem recognition’ and ‘issue selection’ within this stage. In our analysis we focus on “issue framing” as it is, in our opinion, the most vulnerable sub‐phase in the “agenda‐setting” step of the policy making cycle. 26 Hayes, W. 2001. “The Public Policy Cycle.” www.geocities.com/~profwork/pp/implement/index.html. Accessed March 19, 2004. After: Karen Hardee, Imelda Feranil, Jill Boezwinkle, Benjamin Clark, “THE POLICY CIRCLE: A Framework for analyzing the Components of Family Planning, Reproductive Health, Maternal Health, andHIV/AIDS Policies” POLICY Working Paper Series No. 11, June 2004. 27 Robert W. Porter, “Knowledge Utilization and the Process of Policy Formation: Toward a Framework for Africa”, Washington, DC, Academy for Educational Development, SARA Project, and USAID/HHRAA, p. 15. 28 See: Magdalena Marzec, Media w procesie komunikowania politycznego – władza, wpływ, a może symbioza?, PALIMPSEST Czasopismo Socjologiczne, 1, October 2010. ‐ According to the author media usually shape the direction of thinking rather than particular private opinions. Recipients of the information acquire beliefs about its rank and importance depending on the hierarchy given them by the broadcaster. This mechanism is so powerful that even the recipients unrelated to the discussed issue form their general opinion based on what the media has to say about it. The views of individuals usually greatly depend on the opinions prevailing in their social environment, and these depend on the views presented in the media. It is then quite clear that media are the most accessible means for evaluation of the dominant opinions, and so the views presented in them are easier to reinforce by public opinion than others. According to the principle of conformity people tend to hide their views when they feel they are in the minority, as well as they are more willing to say what the


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majority does. As a result, the most exposed views are gaining more and more public followers and their alternatives become even less visible. 29 Cf.: Alexander Bard, Jan Soderqvist, Netokracja [Netocracy], przeł. Piotr Cypryański, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2006, p. 13‐18. 30 Cf. Andrzej Zybała, Polityki publiczne. Doświadczenia w tworzeniu i wykonywaniu programów publicznych w Polsce i innych krajach. Jak działa państwo gdy zamierza/chce/musi rozwiązać zbiorowe problemy swoich obywateli?, KSAP, Warszawa 2012, p. 50. 31 See: http://www.pwc.pl/pl_PL/pl/publikacje/raport_ustawa_refundacyjna_po_publikacji_trzech_pierwszych_wykazow.pdf (accessed: 22 April 2014). 32 Immigration is not yet a major public issue, although it is highly possible that it may soon become one ‐ for more information on immigrant integration related problems in Poland, see: Aleksandra Grzymała‐Kazłowska, Sławomir Łodziński (eds), Problemy integracji imigrantów. Koncepcje, badania, polityki [Immigrant Integration Problems. Concepts, research, policies], Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2008. 33 Janusz Kowalski, Polska w objęciach Nordstream, Nowe Państwo, Numer 5 (63)/2011; URL: http://www.panstwo.net/399‐polska‐w‐objeciach‐nord‐stream (accessed: 18.02.2014); MJ/PAP, "Chory związek". Kaczyński kontra Nord Stream, Newsweek Polska, 09‐08‐2011, URL: http://polska.newsweek.pl/‐chory‐zwiazek‐‐‐kaczynski‐kontra‐nord‐stream,72395,1,1.html (accessed: April 2014). 34 Aś, Polska żąda zmiany trasy gazociągu Nord Stream [Poland Demands for the Change of the NordStream Gas Pipeline], 21 September 2010, URL: http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/polska‐zada‐zmiany‐trasy‐gazociagu‐nord‐stream/t0zyv (accessed: April 2014); Mariusz Staniszewski, Nord Stream pokazał słabość Polski [Nord Stream Showed Weakness of Poland], 14 November 2014, URL: http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/366347,rosyjsko‐niemiecki‐gazociag‐na‐dnie‐baltyku‐pokazal‐slabosc‐polski.html (accessed: April 2014). 35 Cf.: Jann, Wegrich, p. 48. 36 The dokument Ocena rządowych dokumentów strategicznych przyjętych w latach 1989–2006 [The Assessment of the Governemental Strategic Documents Approved Between 1989 and 2006] was approved by the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers, but recommended as an information document, and not a guideline. http://www.mir.gov.pl/rozwoj_regionalny/poziom_krajowy/programowanie_strategiczne/Documents/ocena_rzadowych_dokumentow_strategicznychRMostatec.rar (accessed 19 January 2014). 37 It is noticeable that between 1989 and 2006 some attention has been put for energy and security issues. The security policy has been first determined by the NATO negotiations and then the membership. The energy has not been a critical, but an important issue. Migration has never been considered as a major issue, although the demographic and political factors would point to its public relevance (as when Poland has accessed EU, many Poles migrated to other countries of EU zone, more and more migrants are coming to Poland, and Poland is facing a relatively large decrease in birth rate). 38 The NATO accession process is presented today to have started in 1991. 39 http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20062271658 (accessed: 22 February 2014). 40 Two documents are crucial for the strategic planning: Założenia systemu zarządzania rozwojem Polski [The Prerequisites of the System of Management of the Polish Development], approved by the Council of Ministers in April 2019 (available at: https://www.mir.gov.pl/rozwoj_regionalny/Polityka_rozwoju/System_zarzadzania_rozwojem/Documents/Zalozenia_SZR_wersja_przyjeta_przez_RM_270409.pdf ‐ accessed: 23 May 2014), and Plan uporządkowania strategii rozwoju [The Plan of Arrangement of the Development Strategies], presented in 24 November 2009 (http://www.mir.gov.pl/rozwoj_regionalny/polityka_rozwoju/system_zarzadzania_rozwojem/porzadkowanie_dokumentow_strategicznych/documents/plan_uporzadkowania_strategii_rozwoju_reasumpcja_decyzji_rm_10032010.pdf ‐ accessed: 23 May 2014). 41 See: http://www.mg.gov.pl/files/upload/17492/SIEG_PL_wersja%20ksi%C4%85%C5%BCkowa.pdf (accessed: 23 May 2014). 42 See: http://www.mpips.gov.pl/download/gfx/mpips/pl/defaultopisy/7616/1/1/Strategia%20Rozwoju%20Kapitalu%20Ludzkiego%202020.pdf (accessed: 23 May 2014).


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43 See: http://www.mir.gov.pl/Transport/Zrownowazony_transport/SRT/Documents/Strategia_Rozwoju_Transportu_do_2020_roku.pdf (accessed: 23 May 2014). 44 See: http://bip.mg.gov.pl/files/upload/19680/2013‐11‐25_BEi%C5%9A_v.4.1.pdf (accessed: 23 May 2014). 45 See: https://mac.gov.pl/files/wp‐content/uploads/2011/12/SSP‐20‐12‐2012.pdf (accessed: 23 May 2014). 46http://bip.mkidn.gov.pl/pages/polityka‐wewnetrzna‐i‐zagraniczna/strategia‐rozwoju‐kapitalu‐spolecznego.php (accessed: 23 May 2014). 47 http://www.mir.gov.pl/rozwoj_regionalny/polityka_regionalna/ksrr_2010_2020/informacje_podstawowe/strony/ksrr_2010_2020_inf_podstawowe.aspx (accessed: 23 May 2014). 48 http://www.minrol.gov.pl/pol/Aktowka/Ogloszenia/Strategia‐zrownowazonego‐rozwoju‐wsi‐rolnictwa‐i‐rybactwa‐na‐lata‐2012‐2020 (accessed: 23 May 2014). 49 See: http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2013/09/SRSBN_RP_przyjeta090413.pdf (accessed: 23 May 2014). 50 NIK, Informacja o wynikach kontroli „PRZYGOTOWANIE RZĄDOWYCH DOKUMENTÓW STRATEGICZNYCH PERSPEKTYWY 2014–2020” [NIK, Information on the results of the control „PREPARATION OF THE STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS FOR THE 2014‐2020 PERSPECTIVE], Nr ewid. 140/2013/P/12/181/LWA, pp. 15‐17; URL: file:///C:/Users/K/Downloads/lwa~p_12_181_201211271234501354016090~01.pdf (accessed: 22.02.2014). 51 See: http://radalegislacyjna.gov.pl/ (accessed: 23 May 2014). 52 See: Sławomira Wronkowska, “Tworzenie prawa w Polsce – ocena i proponowane kierunki zmian. Raport Rady Legislacyjnej przy Prezesie Rady Ministrów”, Przegląd Legislacyjny, 1(53), 2006, pp. 7‐21. 53 This has been implemented as an effect of a belief in a rationality and predictability of public decision making, although the rationality of predicting the consequences of public decision making has been long ago criticized from various standpoints. 54 See: Zubek Radosław, 2007 – Jak i dlaczego reformować ocenę skutków regulacji w Polsce? Opracowanie dla Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich (www.rpo.gov.pl/pliki/12180262910.pdf) (accessed: 22 May 2014). 55According to Zubek methodology proper RIA analysis, based on OECD recommendations, consists of five steps: 1) Problem analysis ‐ determines whether there is a real social or economic problem that requires a legislative intervention; 2) Baseline scenario analysis ‐ determines expected development of current situation if no legislative intervention would be made; 3) Analysis of the purpose of regulation ‐ determines the extent to which regulatory intervention should solve the problem; 4) Analysis of variants of regulation ‐ identifies regulatory solutions useful to achieve the purpose; 5) Cost‐benefit analysis ‐ determines which regulatory solution brings maximum benefits at minimum cost. 56 Jan A. Stefanowicz, Krzysztof Szamałek, „Analiza skutków regulacji prawnych w obszarze prawa geologicznego i górniczego” (Regulatory impact analysis in the field of geological and mining law), Zeszyty Naukowe Instytutu Gospodarki Surowcami i Energią Polskiej Akademii Nauk, no. 79, 2010, pp. 43 – 54. 57 ZARZĄDZENIE Nr 51, PREZESA RADY MINISTRÓW, z dnia 8 maja 2008 r., w sprawie Zespołu do spraw Programowania Prac Rządu [ORDINANCE NO. 51 OF THE PRIME MINISTER, 8 May 2008, on the Group for the Programming of Government Proceedings (available at: http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/bip‐rady‐ministrow/organy‐pomocnicze/organy‐pomocnicze‐rady/137,Zespol‐do‐spraw‐Programowania‐Prac‐Rzadu.html). 58 Radosław Zubek, Katarína Staroová, Wykonywanie prawa Unii Europejskiej. Wpływ organizacji administracji rządowej na transpozycję dyrektyw UE [Execution of EY Law: The Impact of the government administration on the Transposition of EU Directives), Ernst and Young, Warszawa 2010, http://webapp01.ey.com.pl/EYP/WEB/eycom_download.nsf/resources/Wykonywanie_prawa_UE.pdf/$FILE/Wykonywanie_Prawa_UE.pdf (accessed: 23 May 2014). 59 See: “Ocena wpływu” [“Impact Assessment”], URL: http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/bip‐rady‐ministrow/ocena‐wplywu/1773,Test‐regulacyjny.html (accessed: 23 May 2014). 60 OECD, pp. 123‐154. 61 Radosław Zubek, Christian Stecker, Klaus H. Goetz, “Sprawny Parlament: Wpływ Partii i Reguł na przewidywalność legislacyjną” (Efficient Parliament: The influence of the Party and the Rules the predictability of the legislative), Ernst&Young, Warsaw 2009, p.8.


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62 Dixit, A.K. and Pindyck, R.S. (1994) Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 63 Brunetti, A. (1997) „Political Variables in Cross‐Country Growth Analysis”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 11(2). Brunetti, A. and Weder, B. (1998) Investment and Institutional Uncertainty: A Comparative Study of Different Uncertainty Measures. Weltwitschaftliches Archiv. 134(3). 64 World Bank (2004) World Development Report: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone. 65 Klaus H. Goetz, Radoslaw Zubek, “Law‐making in Poland: Rules and Patterns of Legislation”, Ernst and Young Poland, Warsaw 2005. 66 Radosław Zubek, Heike Klüver, Marcin Matczak, Tomasz Zalasiński, Barometr legislacyjny. Analiza przyczyn braku terminowości w realizacji rządowych planów legislacyjnych w latach 2008–2011 (Legislative Barometer. The Analysis of the Lack of Punctuality in Governmental Legislative Plans in 2008-2011) , Domański‐Zakrzewski‐Palinka, Warszawa 2012 (available at: http://www.dzp.pl/files/Publikacje/BAROMETR_legislacyjny.pdf, accessed on 15 Apil 2014). 67 The ‘Marshal freezer’ problem also refers to the ‘Policy formulation’ stage of the policy – making cycle as it is oftentimes used for blocking the opposition policy initiatives. 68 See: http://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/Strony/glowna.aspx(accessed: 23.05.2014). 69 Piotr Żuber, Stanisław Bienias, „System ewaluacji w Polsce – dotychczasowe doświadczenia i wyzwania na przyszłość”, In: Karol Olejniczak, Marek Kozak, Bartosz Ledzion (eds.), Teoria i praktyka ewaluacji interwencji publicznych. Podręcznik Akademicki, Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego‐Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2008, pp. 84‐98; Martin Ferry, Karol Olejniczak, The use of evaluation in the management of EU programmes in Poland, Ernst and Young Poland, Warsaw 2008. 70 Ibidem, p. 10. 71 See: http://strateg.stat.gov.pl/ (accessed: 23.05.2014). 72 See: USTAWA z dnia 24 stycznia 2014 r. o zmianie ustawy o zasadach prowadzenia polityki rozwoju oraz niektórych innych ustaw, http://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/DU/2014/379/1 (accessed: 23.05.2014). 73 Jerzy Buzek’s government released the report on the state of the country at the end of the cadency: RAPORT O STANIE PAŃSTWA I DZIAŁANIACH RZĄDU W LATACH 1997 – 2001. Raport, na polecenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów prof. Jerzego Buzka, Warszawa, wrzesień 2001, http://kuczyn.com/papers/sluzba/raportbuzka_20050923.pdf (accessed: 23.05.2014). 74 One of the most active leaders of the new system was the former Minister of Finance in Jerzy Buzek’s Government – Leszek Balcerowicz and his organization Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju. See: http://www.for.org.pl/pl/a/2818,Cd‐sprawy‐M‐Barczentewicza‐FOR‐z‐Prezydentem‐RP‐o‐dostep‐do‐informacji‐publicznej‐dotyczacej‐nowelizacji‐tzw‐ustawy‐o‐OFE‐z‐2011‐r 75 There are three basic forms of interaction with interested members of the public. These three forms of interaction are related to each other, complementing and overlapping each other: Notifications –the administration informs about the decisions or procedures that relate to citizens. Consultation - administration proposes solutions and collect opinions on them. Co-deciding – communication is parallel since both parties (administration and civic actors) define problems and looking for good solutions together. The process of designing solutions and consultation occur simultaneously. Co‐deciding is still a new issue in Poland, therefore in our analysis we focus on public consultation since it is a well established tool in Polish decision – making process. 76 Based on: Dagmir Długosz, Jan Jakub Wygnański, „Obywatele współdecydują. Przewodnik po partycypacji społecznej”, Warszawa 2005, p.24. 77 Cf: Ibidem, p. 32. 78 See: “Raport końcowy z badania efektywności mechanizmów konsultacji społecznych” (Final report on the research on efficiency of public consultation mechanisms”, sygn. 43/DPP/PN/2009, Warsaw 2011, http://www.pozytek.gov.pl/files/Biblioteka/raport_efekt_konsult.pdf (accessed: May 2014). 79 ClientEarth, 2013, Implementacja prawa klimatyczno-energetycznego UE w Polsce. Stan prawny 13.09.2013 ( legal state for 13.09.2013), http://www.clientearth.org/reports/implementacja‐prawa‐klimatyczno‐energetycznego‐ue‐w‐polsce.pdf (accessed: 23.05.2014). 80 This is also noted by some representatives of Krajowa Jednostka Oceny; Evaluation Culture(s) in Europe: Differences and Convergence between National Practices, http://www.diw.de/sixcms/detail.php/38672 (accessed: 23.05.2014). 81 OECD (2013), Poland: Implementing Strategic‐State Capability, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264201811‐en (accessed 20 March 2014).