To the memory of my father, whose abrupt death in February 2007 particularly aroused my interest in personal identity and life after death.

Personal Identity and Resurrection

How Do We Survive Our Death?

Edited by GEORG GASSER

University of Innsbruck, Austria

ASHGATE

© Georg Gasser and the contributors 2010

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Georg Gasser has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor ofthis work.

Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Wey Court East Union Road Famham Surrey, GU9 7PT England

www.ashgate.com

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington VT 05401-4405 USA

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Personal identity and resurrection : how do we survive our death?.

1. Future life. 2. Immortality. 3. Identity (Psychology) -Religious aspects - Christianity. I. Gasser, Georg. 129-dc22

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Personal identity and resurrection : how do we survive our death? / [edited by] Georg Gasser.

p. cm. Papers originally presented at a conference. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4094-0493-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Resurrection. 2. Identity (Psychology)-Religious aspects-Christianity. I. Gasser, Georg. BT873.P47 2010 236'.8-dc22

ISBN 9781409404934 (hbk) ISBN 9781409404941 (ebk)

© Mixed Sources Product group from well-managed forests and other controlled sources

F SC �·!5F��:s� s�=���:�h�:c��n�i11565 Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Group, UK

2010014642

Contents

List of Figures Abbreviations

vii ix xi

xiii XV

List of Contributors Foreword by Ted Peters Acknowledgments

Introduction

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Resurrection, Personal Identity, and the Will of God Stephen T. Davis

19

Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited 33 Dean Zimmerman

Immanent Causation and Life after Death 51 Eric T. Olson

3.5-Dimensionalism and Survival: A Process Ontological Approach 67 Godehard Brüntrup S.J

Multiple Location and Single Location Resurrection 87 HudHudson

Bodily Resurrection: When Metaphysics Needs Phenomenology 103 Thomas Schärt/

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection: A Kantian Approach 127 Johannes Haag

The Same Body Again? Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity ofthe Resurrected Body 145 Bruno Niederbacher S.J.

Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection 161 Lynne Rudder Baker

vi

10

11

12

13

14

Personal Jdentity and Resurrection

Hylomorphism and the Constitution View Josef Quitterer

Constitution, Resurrection, and Relationality Kevin Corcoran

Joseph Ratzinger on Resurrection Identity Christian Tapp

The Rationale behind Purgatory Nikolaus Wandinger

Scientific Insights into the Problem of Personal Identity in the Context of a Christian Theology ofResurrection and Eschatology Robert John Russe//

Bibliography Index

177

191

207

225

241

259 273

List of Figures

6.1 Hershenov's Model 1 09 6.2 Identity Conditions of Artifacts 1 11 6.3 Fission 1 14 6.4 Fission and "gappy existence" 115 6.5 Products ofFission 116 6.6 Track-Switch Model I 1 19 6.7 Track-Switch Model II 1 20

14. l a Resurrection-based transformation ofthe universe 255 14. l b Continuity and discontinuity in the characteristics ofthe universe 255 14.2a Resurrection as Prolepsis and the Continuity of Personal ldentity 257 14.2b Multi-Prolepses and the Continuity of Personal Identity 257

Chapter 7

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection: A Kantian Approach

Johannes Haag

Introduction

In what follows I will be concerned with the concept of person or, to be more exact, with what I take to be one of the most important aspects of this many-layered concept. As Peter Strawson in bis Individuals famously pointed out, persons are, among other things, subjects which ascribe to themselves mental and physical predicates: we are not only feeling pain, we often conceive of ourselves at the same time as having, for instance, an injury, which is what causes our pain. And we not only perceive a tree in front of us, but conceive of ourselves as standing in front ofthis tree.

The question I will pursue in what follows is this: is it merely a matter of coincidence that we ascribe to ourselves mental and physical predicates? That is, is it a purely contingent fact about our constitution as human beings which enables us to find our way around a largely hostile world? Or is there a reason for this that is accessible to a priori philosophical reflection?

In the third chapter of Individuals, Strawson both asks this question and relates it to another one which is in his view closely connected to it1 • These questions are:

(I) Why are one 's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? (2) Why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to the very same thing as

certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, and so on?

I will call (l) the question of the subject, and (2) the question of psycho-physical predication.

As already indicated, the problem of psycho-physical predication will take centre stage in what follows. However, as will become apparent, the problems are inseparable. Strawson was absolutely right when he wrote: "lt is not to be supposed that the answers to these questions will be independent of one another. "2

See Peter F. Strawson, Jndividuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Oxford: Routledge Strawson, 1959), p. 90.

2 Ibid., p. 90.

128 Personal Jdentity and Resurrection

We must therefore concern ourselves at least briefly with the question of the subject before we can hope to find a suitable solution for the problem of psycho­physical predication.

The thesis I will defend in this paper is this:

(T) We can only be conscious of ourselves if we conceive of ourselves as part of an objectively existing physical and corporeal world.

The same thesis in a semantically ascended version would be:

(T.) We can only ascribe mental predicates to ourselves if we can also ascribe to ourselves physical or bodily predicates.

If this thesis proves defensible, it could serve as an answer to Strawson's question of psycho-physical predication: we have to ascribe bodily predicates to ourselves because otherwise we would not be able to ascribe states of consciousness to ourselves. We would not be conscious of ourselves unless we were conscious of our body as weil. � further question related to this thesis, which deserves special attention agamst t�e b�ckground provided by the essays in this collection, is that of bodily resurrect10n: 1f a version ofT should prove not too far from the truth, this in itself would seem, at least at first glance, to offer comfort for defenders of the doctrine that resurrection-if there is any such thing-has to be bodily resurrection after all F th . . · . · or o erw1se, 1t could be argued, how could we ascnbe to ourselves phys1cal or corporeal-and hence mental predicates? We will see however that things are more complicated. ' '

The two philosophers taking centre stage in what follows will be Immanuel Kant. and .Gareth Evans.3 Just a few words on the structure of the following consideratJons: I will start by (1) giving an analysis ofthe methodological status ofStrawson's two questions. I will then (2) try to make transparent the connection betw�en those two �uestions. This will rather naturally Iead to (3) an answer to the question ofthe subject-an answer that will be needed later to solve the problem of psycho -physical predication. An answer to the second question was given by Gar�th Evans. Although I do not believe that his solution succeeds I will (4) take a q�ick glance at it in the fourth part of my paper. My reason for d�ing that is that I thmk we can learn from Evans which class of bodily predicates is the important

. 3 Str�wson himself proposes an answer to this question in Jndividuals eh. 3.4. I do not thmk that h1s argument which 1· h ·1 ·

' · . ' re 1es eav1 Y on the necess1ty of ascribing mental pred1cate

to other persons, 18 successful. The reason is that I do not believe the central premise to be �orrect, that o�e has to .share th

.e class of predicates by which one identifies persons different

rom one�elf (1.e„ bodily pred1cates) with the persons to whom one ascribes the predicates that one mdeed shares with them (' tal d' · · · . 1 .e„ men pre 1cates). If one reJects th1s prem1se, my own account 1s compatible with the necessary ascribability demanded by Strawson.

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 129

one for a successful solution. I will then turn to (5) my own answer in which I try to utilize certain central features of Kant's critical and post -critical work. In closing I will ( 6) touch upon the question of the relation between T and the doctrine of bodily resurrection.

Methodological lssues

Before turning to the defence of T I will begin with some remar�s on the methodological status of the subject under discussion. The reader m1ght �ave noticed that I have given a particular modal interpretation to Strawson 's questio�s: I did not interpret them as questions about why it is in fact the case that we ascr�be

physical as well as mental predicates or why it is in fact the case that we as�n�e

our mental states to a subject at all. What I took Strawson to be c�nce�ed with is

the question why that has to be the case. (Strawson's own phrasmg 1s neutral to

this distinction.) . . This interpretation is not trivial and I would therefore hke to go mto some

detail concerning its motivation. Let us make the difference in question transparent

in the context of the question of psycho -physical pr�dication. One answer to. the

question, "Why is it the case that we do in fact ascnbe to ?urselves as consci.ou� subjects bodily as well as mental predicates?" could be for mstance the follo�mg. " J b · h t survive in a world that 1s füll We do so because as corporea emgs we ave o

of extended things." . . · These questions concerning the factual state of things often adm1t of mter�stmg

. h t rt · 1 can shed light on the 1ssues philosophical answers as weil, answers t a ce am Y . . . ·11 b t · ted to the-albeit h1ghly m question Those answers however, w1 e res nc . abstract-d�scription of the f�cts in question or rather the description of th�Ir fac�al

causes. But this kind of description is not what Strawson is aim�ng at m. askmg . . " · · t hysics" notw1thstandmg.4 To

h1s two questions the rhetonc of descnptive me ap h' ' · ·11 fi 1 to rephrase 1s

make clear what I take Strawson's aim to be, 1t w1 prove use u questions:

(1 *) Why must one's states of consciousness be ascribed to anything at

(2*) ��y must one's states of consciousness be ascri?ed to t�e ve� s�me h t · t' a certam phys1cal s1tuation,

thing as certain corporeal c arac ens ics, and so on?

Th' f tt' r two questions indicates a lack of alternatives that is IS way o pu mg ou . t h. h th questions

characteristic of the philosophical level of abstraction a w ic . esef h t k' d' . d A 1· fying answer to quest10ns o t a m

m my view are properly locate · sa IS · Th ' · b th se and cannot be otherw1se. e

has to explain, why somethmg has to e e ca -

4 See Strawson, Jndividuals, Introduction.

130 Personal Identity and Resurrection

proper methodological framework for questions of this kind must therefore be the framework of Transcendental Philosophy. Let me explain: 1 must first specify what 1 mean by claiming that there are no alternatives to the answer. lt certainly cannot mean that the answer is somehow logically necessary. That this is not the case is shown by the fact that we can ordinarily think of alternative answers without committing ourselves to any inconsistencies. However, those merely logical alternatives are no alternatives for us, that is, they aren't alternatives to which we can give a determinate content. This determination of content must always be a determination of thought with respect to its object: as soon as the possibility of this kind of determination is missing, the theory in question only gives us a purely formal analysis ofthought. But this is not the kind of answer we expect where we are concemed with the properties of our self-reference about which Strawson is asking. For these questions are concerned with an essential aspect ofthe overarching question: How is the intentional reference to a world ofwhich we conceive ourselves to be a part possible, that is, the intentional reference to a certain reality and ourselves as a part of this very reality?5 The analysis of this reference necessarily has to be neglected by a purely formal analysis ofthe sort envisaged. Wh ich alternatives can be thought about with a determinate content is dependent on the constraints and the scope of our intentional reference to the world. This in turn implies that, although it is not and cannot be the ultimate purpose ofthis kind of theorizing to describe what those actual constraints and scope are, we cannot neglect to clarify what we actually believe those limits and possibilities to be. However, unlike the analysis of our actual employment of concepts, analysis of the enabling conditions implies the impossibility ofaltematives to those conditions under presuppositions specified by our description. The starting point of the thinking about intentional reference therefore has to be the reflexive reference to our own intentionality: There simply is no alternative starting point for the investigation ofthe enabling conditions ofintentional reference. In this sense our actual presuppositions with respect to this reference are a necessary element ofthe analysis of its enabling conditions. This perspective can be broadened systematically to provide a generally valid analysis of intentionality by gradually abstracting from the results ofthis reflexive investigation of our intentionality as weil as from the traits that are specific to our particular way of intentionally referring. In this way the scope of description is systematically broadened so as to become more and more general. Every single step of abstraction in this process will inevitably be connected with a loss of determinate content-a loss which in the limiting case will make the result so general as to make it coextensive with the merely logical possible. In that way we would have transgressed the limits of possible abstraction in the analysis of

5 See Wilfrid Seilars, "Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience", Journal of Philosophy, 64 ( 1967): pp. 633--47, p. 635.

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 131

1 · ld be empty in that it affords no intentionality: the purely formal ana ys1s wou determinate content anymore. . h ·t· that · th. · th c re are concerned w1t necess1 ies Strawson's queshons on is v1ew ereio

h t se if we can use concepts at result from the analysis of concepts we ave o u , . . all-that is ifwe can intentionally refer to anything at all. Accor�mgfly

h, answe

brl�ng

' ·d· lys1s o t e ena mg these questions should be conceived of as provi mg an ana . h" . . t . . . . h t endental-ph1losop ic sense.' is conditions of our means of ascnpt10n m t e ransc . . . world concerned with the most general conditions of the mtent10nal relat10n to ad t 1 b rt The results of such a transcen en a of which we conceive ourselves to e a pa · . . "fi d-they lack an analysis are only justified if-under the precond1t10ns thus spec1 e

· d · t ontent 6 alternative that can be thought ofwith a etei:uma e c d d) thesis should make The following re -phrasing of our (seman�1call� ascen. e_

located· clear at which level of philosophical abstract10n th1s thes1s is properly .

. b d'l dicates to ourselves is an (T *) That we can ascribe phys1cal or 0 1 Y pre . 1 s enabling condition of ascribing mental pred1cates to ourse ves.

How the Two Questions Connect

. f ri tion of bodily predicates is an What is the reason for holdmg that the sel -asc P . . . lf · t" on of mental states? enabhng cond1tion ofthe se -ascnp 1 . F long time it seemed . . . t at all obv1ous. or a very Prima facie th1s connection 1s no . 1 nly of our own mental h immediate y aware o clear to many philosophers t at we are . .fi d · self ascribing mental states and therefore are only unproblematically JUStl e . m d�

1 f lf ascription notwithstan mg. predicates-the phenomeno ogy o se -. d h h"l sophical development it . h" eption an t e p I o f Let us glance bnefly at t 1s conc

t" between the problem o . . . . h" d 1 ment the connec 10n m1tiated. For by recallmg t 1s eve op . f h b" et will become apparent . . . d th uestion o t e su �e psycho-phys1cal pred1cat10n an e q . 1 t we will find an answer . . . h d of th1s deve opmen m an mterestmg way. At t e very en c d tion for my own answer to b . h t ·n serve as a 1oun a to the question ofthe su �ect t a w1 . . the question of psycho -physical predicatwn. .11 be Cartesian philosophy. . . f h" d 1 pment however, w1 . . The startmg pomt o t 1s eve o ' fD rtes 's aim in bis Medztatzons F . . . . c: th success o esca

1 or lt 1s of essential 1mportance 1or e . ·bes to itself only menta in First Philosophy that the subject of the Cogzto a.stcn

s a thinking subject, and . . . 11 . nly a res cogz an , d

pred1cates. This subJect essentia Y is 0 . d" t s to ourselves as well an , nothing eise. That we in fact ascribe bodily pre ica: with a certain sort of as Descartes's argument goes on to show, that we 0 so

· . . h" c: damental fact. Justificahon, does not change t is 1un

h methodology sketched here see Johannes 6 For a more detailed assessment oft e . s· 1. hkeit und Verstand (Frankfurt "' h ··1tms von mn ic Haag, Erfahrung und Gegenstand. Das rer a a.M.: Klostermann, 2007), eh.!.

132 Personal Jdentity and Resurrection

This aspect of the Cartesian image greatly infl.uenced the early modern discussion about conscious states and their subjects: subjects of experience have been treated as being essentially subjects of mental predication and as only accidentally subjects ofbodily predication. Yet even in Descartes's writings this move generates skeptical problems concerning the existence of an external world that is supposed to exist objectively, that is, independently of an agent's perceiving it: the existence of one's own body, on this view, is as much a matter of inference as is the existence of an extemal world in general. But how can this inference be justified? Descartes's own solution in the Sixth Meditation is closely tied to his ontology of substances and is hardly convincing, as the reaction even ofhis contemporaries shows.7 L_ate� on this skeptical move would be applied to our knowledge ofthe subject ofthmkmg as weil, famously so by David Hume: just as we have to infer from the content of our mental states the existence of something existing objectively outside our thoughts, we have to infer, from the occurrence of mental states the existence of something that has those mental states-a subject modified b; those mental stat��-8 (Note th�t this move was justified in Descartes. But with the rejection of a positive �onc�phon of substance it appears unwarranted.) The s1tuat10n, so the argument goes, is symmetrical and the required inference equally problematic in both cases: Just as we can doubt the existence of an extemal worl�, we therefore can, or so the skeptic argues, cast doubt upon the existence of a subject ofthose mental states. lt may already be apparent that what is discussed here is exactly the first of Stra_wson 's questions, the question of the subject. The skeptic, however, does not try �o give an an�wer to this question; he is instead arguing against its presupposition: ifwe can (with good reason) cast doubt upon the existence of a subject ofmental states, we apparently do not have to ascribe those mental states to a subject in the first P!ace. But this was exactly what the question ofthe subject presupposes. With _th� Cartesian denial of a necessary connection between mental and bodily s�l� -ascnp�ion, there a development began which ultimately led to an ostensible d1smtegrat10n ofthe subject ofthis ascription.

The Question of the Subject

Thhis, as we know, was not the end ofthe story. lt did not prove that easy to eliminate t e concept of a think" b. mg su �ect-not even for Hume.9 And shortly afterwards

. ; See; .g. Thomas Hobbes's critique in the Objections & Replies to the "Meditationes", ;�1�:�:t. / �e;�:;�es, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (12 vols, Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-8 See David Hume, A 7J reatise of Human Nature, ed. P.H . Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), I, iv, 6. 9 See Hume, Treatise, Appendix.

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 133 Immanuel Kant argued that the self-ascription of mental states is an �nabling condition ofhaving conscious mental states: he tried to show that self-consc1ousness and consciousness of objects are mutually dependent. Let me give you a very short outline of this central argument of the Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. w

. F or Kant the paradigmatic conscious mental states are conscious repre�en�ahons of some object broadly conceived. The phenomenon he is conc�rn�d with m first instance therefore is the conscious reference to objects that ex1st mdependently

· ·fi bl 1 · that our of our representing them. How, . Kant asks, can .w� JUStl. a ;11c aim

representations do in fact refer to mdependently ex1stmg obJects ·

We can do so because we can show that the presupposition of a ge.n.erally successful reference to independently existing objects is an enabling conditI�n of conscious thinking in general: we would not even have conscious representatlons, Kant argues, ifwe would not presuppose the principal success ofthe reference of our representations-their objectivity, as he puts it. . . . . . . . l' 1 ful cess1"ty Yet th1s necessity cannot Objechv1ty on h1s account 1mp 1es aw ne · . 1 I th. espect Kant was a perfect be found in our representat10ns themse ves. n 1s r . . . . · ly give us associat10ns wh1ch Humean: a mere regulanty ofrepresentahons can on . . . f 1 b. ctive success1on we search are subjectively necessary; m th1s sort o mere Y su �e in vain for objectively necessary connections.12 • .

But Kant decisively sets himself apart from Hume in claiming that 1��s �?t �p to us to accept a skeptical solution and satisfy ourselves with a merely su �ec ':e. Y

· nr t on his view choose to re1ram necessary association ofrepresentat10ns. vve canno ' ' h . . . th b. ts ofour thoughts Ot erw1se, from thinking a lawful, objective necess1ty m e o �ec . ·

. ld b esentations of objects anymore, so he argues our representat10ns wou not e repr . f b · t because re�resentations of objects imply lawfulness: we conceive 0 � ��c : as that which by being the objects of their reference, gives our repr�s

den a

l ion

f . ' th would only be a "bhn P ay 0 the1r objectivity! If this were not the case, ere h t ld be "less representations"13 instead of consciousness of objects-a play t a wou

. " 15 than a dream"14-and therefore would be "nothmg to us · . . . 1 ful d therefore object1ve connection

. Since we cannot find this necessary, aw an infer that we ourselves are m our representations themselves, we have t�

h . that we put it into responsible for the obiectivity of our representations, t at is, J

b" 16 them by referring our representations to an o �ect.

[C R] An elaborate defense of the 10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason P ·

following sketchy remarks may be found in Haag, eh. 6· H fi m February 11 . • . . • the letter to Marcus erz ro

Kant ongmally asked th1s question m f the central topics discussed 1772. See Kant, Briefe, AA. 10: 130. lt later on became one 0

in the CpR. 12 CpR, A 112/3. 13 CpR, A 112. 14 lbid. 15 CpR, A 120. 16 CpR, A 124.125.

134 Personal Jdentity and Resurrection

In doing this, we always apply to those representations the same most general structuring principles. These structuring principles are nothing other than the Kantian categories ofthe understanding. 1 7 This application ofthe categories in the structuring of a sensually given manifold, the empirically Given, thus guarantees the objectivity that makes our representations of objects in the first place.

The categories, in turn, are applied by a thinking, that is, representing, subject­a subject that consciously refers to objects by means of this application. lt is th�refore the subject itself which, by means of this structuring of the empirically G1ven, makes the reference to objects lawful and thereby gives it its objectivity.

On the other hand, this structuring of representations is possible only if our representations can be treated as representations of one and the same consciousness. We can unite the unconnected mental states into representations of objects by means of the categories only if we can conceive of them as mental states of a unitary subject, that is, ifwe are able to ascribe them to one and the same subject. 1 8

In that way the conscious subject as a point of reference for the self-ascription of repres�ntations furnishes the empirically Given with the unity necessary for the �ons�10usness of objects: the conscious reference to a unitary subject that is �ossible m every moment of our conscious life is as it were the constant element m the steady flow of the empirically Given. And that is the sense in which consciousness of objects is not possible without self-consciousness.

On the other hand-and this is very important-we can become conscious of ourselves only in th1"s spont · · f · · b · · h . . . aneous activ1ty o structurmg: m rmgmg t e empIT�cally GIVen to a unity that we can consciously experience, we simultaneously exper�ence ourselves as subjects of those conscious experiences of unity.19 We expenence ourselves as that which applies the same structuring principles over and over again in connect· ·t · . . . mg 1 s representations. W1thout consc10usness of obJects, theref�r�, there could not be self-consciousness. . If it IS possible to fill in the details of this outline of an argument-a very

d1fficult though not hop l t k h · · lf . ' e ess, as -t en consc10usness of obJects and se -consc10usness are mutually dependent.

But at the same time th · ld · . · f h . Is wou prov1de us w1th an answer to the question

o t e subject of our mental t t . . . . s a es. we must ascnbe states of consc10usness to a

subject because we would t b . . . no e consc1ous of obJects 1fwe could not ! However the self-consc· fK , · h

b ' 10usness o ant s transcendental deduction one m1g t e tempted to say is n t t 11 h . '

. . ' . 0 a a t e consc10usness of a subject to which we could poss1bly ascnbe bodily p d. t Th" . . re ica es. 1s transcendental apperception as Kant calls It, is a very formal and by d fi ·t · . ' h . e m ion empty consc10usness: it is nothing more than t e consc1ousness that we a l d . .

. . 1 . PP Y over an over agam to the very same structunng pnnc1p es-m Kant's w d h · · o or s, t e consc10usness of the identity of a function.2

17 CpR, B 143. 18 CpR,A 123.124 and similar: B 137 1 9

• CpR, A l 08 and similar: B 135;6.

2° CpR, A l 08.

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 135

This consciousness is the self-consciousness of a merely transcendental subject, a

rather formal concept, far removed from the empirical self-consciousness we are

after in the question of psycho-physical predication. Even a quick glance at my thesis T will confirm some of those considerations

and make it clear that my defense of this thesis may not stop at this formal concept

of subject. T necessitates much more robust concepts of self and consciousness .. But at the same time those considerations tend to make us overlook that th1s

argument itself already provides a key to a successful defense of T -and thereby

to a convincing answer to the question of psycho-physi�al pr�di�ation: 1 ho�e to

show in due course and with some more help from KantJan prmc1ples, that, 1fwe

indeed must ascrib� our mental states to a subject, we must necessarily ascribe

bodily predicates to the very same subject.

Evans on Bodily Self-Ascription

Before I can continue with the Kantian thread, however, 1 have to explain why 1 think it is needed in the first place. After all, one might object, solutions of that

kind are laden with transcendental-philosophic ballast. Is this really necessary?

My answer is: Yes because it provides us with a systematically embedded and

comprehensive ans�er to Strawson's questions that is not given by contempora?' treatments ofthis topic. Let me illustrate this with the example ofGareth Evans s

proposed answer to them. . . What makes Evans especially interesting in this context 1s that I take him

to subscribe to my thesis T. Evans's analysis furthermore makes clear wh�t a

successful answer to the question of psycho -physical predication must be hke. . . fi d t d. why a successful argument

Fmally, Evans's answer 1s helpful or un ers an mg for T is best provided by going back to Kant. 1 h · k r;: · t · ifRe'erence Evans ana yzes t e

In the relevant passage of h1s boo rane 1es o J' . . . . . d b t rporeal properties.21 Th1s 1s

ways m which we can gam knowle ge a ou our eo crucial to his own agenda since it is part of his project to make clea.r how even

d ' 1·ty nstraint22 that 1s suppose thoughts about ourselves are subject to a genera I eo . .

. h ht t one and the same obJect, in to guarantee that we can apply different t oug s 0 . .

. b eal propert1es on h1s account, th1s case to ourselves. Knowledge a out our corpor ' . is one form of immediate identification and can thus ensure that the generahty

constraint is fulfilled in the case of self-ascription. Embedded in this investigation we find, as it were en passant, Evan�'s �wn

. 0 th ne hand we have on h1s view, attempt to answer Strawson's questJons. n e 0 . '

fi · b dies" 23 In th1s way we can, or the "general capacity to perce1ve our own o ·

21 Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (New York: Oxford University Press,

1982), pp. 220-4. 22 lbid„ pp. 100-5. 23 Ibid„ p. 220.

136 Personal Jdentity and Resurrection

instance, perceive that we are hot or cold, that our legs are crossed, that we are leaning against a tree, and so on. This knowledge, in other words, encompasses our proprio-ceptive abilities and our sensitivity to touch.

The interesting and, 1 believe, exceptionally important point that Evans makes is the following: This kind ofknowledge is not, on Evans's view, the kind that is relevant for answering Strawson's question ofpsycho -physical predication. What comes into play in the context of such an answer is another way to gain knowledge about our corporeal properties: "I have in mind the way in which we are able to know our position, orientation, and relation to other objects in the world upon the basis of our perceptions of the world."24

This ability, Evans explains, consists in the ability to perform a certain kind of material inference. As an example one can think of the following inference:

1 see a tree to my right. Therefore 1 stand to the left ofthat tree.

Or alternatively:

1 see a tree to my right. 1 am currently at place X. Therefore there is a tree at X.

. Characteristic of these-and of all of Evans 's other examples of inferences-18 the interaction of an ascription of conscious perception on the one hand-in the e�a?1ples �f th� perception of a tree-and the positioning or orienting of the perceivmg subJect m space-I am standing to the left of the tree, am currently at place X, and so forth.

The importance of this ability for our thought about ourselves, Evans points �ut'. ca� hardly

_ be overrated: we would not have a conscious representation of an

object1ve spatial world" u l bl · · f n ess we were a e to relate our consc1ous perception o ��e w�rld to a state of the world and to our position in the world at the very same time. The 1dea that there is an ob· t" ld · · · h �ec 1ve wor and the 1dea that the subject 1s somew ere

cannot_ be separated, and where he is is given by what he can perceive. "25 . This_ conc�ptual dependence gives the self-ascription of a positioning or

onentat10n an 1mportan th t . . . . ce a surpasses every other ab1hty of the self-ascnptwn of corporeal properties.

Unfortunately it remains unclear why those observations, true and important as the� may be, should provide us with an answer to Strawson 's two questions. Evans claims, however, that this is precisely what they do, when in this very context he

24 Ibid., p. 222. 25 Ibid., pp. 222.

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 137

asks the rhetorical question: "Do we really have to go any further than this in order

S , . ?"26 to answer trawson s quest10ns. . , . ? So, does Evans really provide us w1th an answer to Straws?n � quest10ns ·

What Evans claims is that we have to position ourselves in an obJective wo�ld t?

have a representation of an objective world at all. This claim in itself, assummg lt

can be supported, is an interesting and important point. . Yet even ifit can be argued for-which Evans does not do---1t should be clear

that this would not entail an answer to the two questions: Strawson wan�� to _kno� · · · · · d c · tance in our pos1t10mng m

how bodily self-ascnpt10n, as 1t 1s expresse ior ms . space, is an enabling condition ofthe self-ascription ofmental states. lt _wi�l h�rdly

. . · h th" rt fbodily self-ascnpt10n 1s an do to answer th1s quest10n by showmg t at 1s so o

. . . . l ld even ifthis argument should enablmg condit10n of representmg an externa wor , . . .

. ful -as it will Th1s claim would prove to be an essential part of a success answer · . . f

. . · th b"l"t ofthe self-ascnpt10n o still have to be connected m a systemabc way to e a 1 1 Y mental states-and Evans does not indicate how this is supposed to be done.

. · h th ore is to be done by way To Evans's merely rhetoncal quest1on w e er m . .

· h c hould react wJth an emphatJc of answering Strawson's questions we t ere1ore s "Yes"; more than this must indeed be done.

A Kantian Answer to the Question of Psycho-Physical Predication

ful argument on my view, for 1 will now turn to an exposition of how a s�ccess . . .

, ve interesting

this sort of thesis should look. 1 will do this ?Y highhghtm� :hie� often goes development in Kant's thought, the systemat1c relevance 0

unnoticed. · . h d e , t th question ofthe subject. w y o w 1 have already sketched Kant s answer 0 e nstruction was

b. t t alJ? His answer on my reco , ascribe our mental states to a su �ec a · . ' h ht there would be h. . . h" th t ives umty to our t oug

t 1s: w1thout a subJect as somet mg a g . f b. ect . l b" t nor consc1ousness o a su � . ne1ther consciousness of externa o �ec s

b" · 1 think it is safe to h stion of the su �ect is,

That Kant tried to answer t e que . . . . d 1 debated whether bis say, more or less unanimously accepted, even if it IS WI e Y attempt succeeded. h d elopment ofhis critical

What 1 would like to show now is that in the �rt er ev ent for the necessity of

philosophy Kant gave an interesting and challen_gihn� arg

t uthm

same time intimately h . . . gument wh1c 1s a e

psyc o -phys1cal pred1cat1on-an ar . In that way I suggest related to his answer to the first of Strawson's questJons.

t" ns are b; no mean� we can substantiate Strawson's claim that the two ques 10

independent of each other. .1 myself with the general 1 .11 . t . First I w1 l concern

w1 proceed m two s eps. . rt " to anything at all; second, necessity of ascribing corporeal and spatial prope ies

26 Ibid., p. 223.

138 Personal Jdentity and Resurrection

1 will provide an argument in Kantian spirit for the necessity of applying this sort of predicate to ourselves.

The Necessity ofSpatial Predication: No Consciousness of Objects without Determination of Space

In t?e first edition ofhis Critique of Pure Reason from 1781, the corporeal predication wh1c� Evans (rightly) considers so important does not play a significant role. The quest10n of po_sitioning ourselves in space is not a transcendental -philosophically relev�nt �uest�on for _Kant at that time. The reason is probably that Kant, at this stage m h1s philosoph1cal development, is still very much confined to the Cartesian constraints of the dominance of the self-ascription of mental states. These states, however, are ordered only in time, not in space. Although time and space for Kant are forms of intuition that is basic �ha�acteristics of intuitive representation, time, in the first edition 'of the C;itique, Is giv�n a somewhat more fundamental function. Kant's reason is the following: all consc10us representations, that is, the representations of something different from us and the representation of our own mental states are subjected to the structuring through time as fl f · ru· · ' . a orm o m 1hon. But only the representations of something different from us are in addition subjected in this way to space. The spatial form of intuition thus becomes relevant only if the temporally structu�ed st�tes of consciousness are referred to something different from us. For somethmg different from us must, so Kant argues, be thought of as something external to us. And what we must think of as extemal to us must be positioned in space.27

. And yet this spatial determination or positioning cannot be carried out w1thout the temporal determ· t. f h h" · . ma 1on o t e t mgs extemal to us as success1vely or szmultaneously in space Wh t · t 1 . . i . . . ·

. a 1s ex ema to us, for that reason, 1s m space and t me. determmatJon of space 1s not possible without determination of time. In_ 1781 Kant still believes that the other direction does not hold: our stream of consc10usness appears to hi 1 1 . . . m pure Y temporal y determmed, a steady success10n of representat10ns What is · t 1 · . . . . . · m ema to us 1s only m time. Determmation of time therefore seemed possible without determination of space That this dominance of mental states and of temporality could not be the last word on these matters bec 1 . . . . ame c ear to Kant when, shortly after the pubhcat10n of the first Crztzque he was eo f] t d . h . . .

wo ' . n ron e w1t the allegatlon that h1s ph1losophy . uld come to the same thmg as Berkeley's idealism.28 Kant rightly feit himself m1sunderstood as a result of wh · h h . . ' 1c e attended to a defic1t m his own theory: lt

27 This r t · f · � , S

1 . econs ruction ° the Kantian argument is originally due to D.P. Dryer,

pp�n: ;

3[0 ution for Verification in Metaphysics (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1966),

28 1 �s forsinsta

h nce in the review by Christian Garve 1782 in the Göttingische Anzeigen von ge e rten ac en (shortened by the editor).

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 139

became clear to him that determination of time is not possible without determination of space as well-and therefore that there can be no reference to our own mental

b. . rtfi 29 states without reference to o �ects m space apa rom us. Without determination of space we would only have our representations

as temporally structured states of consciousness: "They arise successiv�ly, in continuous flux one after the other. "3° Could this temporal structure prov1de us with the tempo�al determination needed, as mentioned above, for determining something in space? .

To this end we would already have to be capable of representing somethmg persistent in time. For this continuity in time is an essential characteristic of an object that is supposed to exist independently of our perceiving _it a� b�ing extemal to ourselves. What is continuous is defined by Kant as "that wh1ch 1s s1multa�eous with succession" (mit dem Nacheinander zugleich).

31 Being simultaneous 1s not

a determination of space, but of time: "Two things are 'simultaneous', as Kant explains in the third analogy, when the perception ofthe one (A) can bot� follow and be followed by the perception ofthe other (B), that is, when apprehens10n (and

"' B b k to A "32 not only thought) can proceed both from A to B as weil as irom ac _ ·

So far, the reasoning seems exactly in line with the above claim that the determination of time is necessary for the determination of sp�ce: w_e have good reason again, to think that no determination of space is poss1ble w1tho�t _a correspondi�g determination of time. At this stage in the_ arg�ment, however, it 18 clear that this kind of determination of time is not poss1ble m a purely temporal

· · · ryth"n 1·s successive and therefore consc1ousness: m temporal consc10usness eve 1 g . · · · d r and thus not s1multaneous. In a every new percept10n 1s later than 1ts pre ecesso

· 1 ed either from A to B or from purely temporal consc10usness one on y can proce B to A. .

Although that which is intemal to us therefor� is only in tim�, th_e purely intemal determination of time is not possible: for g1ven that so�ethmg 18 purely

· · "bl · e of it as s1multaneous. But temporally structured, 1t 1s not poss1 e to conce1v . . d h h s to be determmat10n of space. extemal determination, as we alrea y ave seen, a . .

Therefore determinahon of time, contrary o an · · t K t's original assumpt10n, 1s not possible without determination of space. . .

lt thus becomes obvious that I can acquire the representatwn of somethmg · · · h t t. n of space can be presupposed different from me m space only 1f t e represen a 10 .

· · h t · nly if both representat10ns are, together with the representation of time, t a 1s, o . . . · · · · · I th r words the d1stmct10n between to speak with Kant, a przorz mtu1t10ns. n o e ,

· h · ·1ar argument in Eckart Förster's 29 The following considerat1on owes muc to a s1m1 . .

h ·z h (C bridge MA Harvard Umvers1ty forthcoming The Twenty-Five Years of P 1 osop Y am , · Press, 20 10).

30 Ibid., eh. 3. 3 1 CpR, B 67. 32 Förster, Twenty-Five Years.

140 Personal Jdentity and Resurrection

rtepre

tsent

dation and e�ternal object cannot be drawn on the basis of temporally s ruc ure representabons alone.

But what does it mean to p Am th h' . resuppose space as an a priori form of intuition?

. ong. o er t mgs tt means that we cannot directly perceive space but onl . �����ts m s�ace. In determining objects as spatial objects, we determine somethin�

mus:���e�st�no��=�:� ::

l�ust therefore refer to corporeal objects in space if we

The Necessity of Bodi/ s lf A . . Positioning ofOursel

y � � scnptzon: No Determination of Space without ves zn ipace as Corporeal Beings lf Kant restricted his own anal sis h determination of space th'

yld

to t e dep�ndence of mental predicates on would Jack a way to ar� � wo� prese�t a d1fficulty for my own project: we of bodies in space h .

uhe o� t e necess1ty of spatial predication as predication

' w tc we Just have shown t b f h' necessity of ascribing eo 1 . 0 e a part o ts theory, to the In this context it is he{��� pre�1cates to ourse!ves as subjects of experience.

systematically important p

d �

·n�t�c� an element m the Kantian system which is

is recognizable only in �n w

l tc ts tmplicit in his published writings yet which

priori form of intuitiona e

h':

hp aces: the fact that Kant conceives of space as an a w Je structures our · from us has the import t

representat10ns of objects different an consequence that 1 . . from a certain perspective Wi . . we a ways perce1ve extemal obJects or behind us, see their fro�t 0� f�;�re�ve objects to o�r right or our left, in front of us

lf these objects were 1 fi ack, from a w1de or narrow angle, and so on.

fb . on Y ront or back-ifth h d h b' · · o emg on our left or 0 . h ey a t e o �ectJve propert1es

independently in the requ� ndg t-then the world would not be objective or exist utre sense lt would . t d b . perspective of the perce · .

b. · ms ea e essentially related to the But th' . .1vmg su �ect-and therefore subjective' is is not poss1ble as Kant's

. already shown The per ' . 1

answer to the question of the subject has . spectiva nature of o 1 . sharp contrast to the essenf 1 . ur perceptua representation stands m that is, objects which we m

ia non-p�rspectiv�l �ature ofthe objects so perceived, To bridge this contrast

ust conce1ve as ex1stmg independently. fi we must reflect on wh t 't . rom a certain perspective lt . a 1 means to regard an object positioning both oneself ·d th

means r�latmg oneself as oneself to this object by f an e perce1ved ob· t · o reference. 33 In relating . . �ec m one and the same framework b. our own pos1tion i h . . . o �ect we conceive the p 1.

n space to t e pos1tion ofthe perce1ved b. ercep ion ofperspecf o �ects that are part of th . ive as a result of a relation between

. . e same spatial world The med1at10n between sub 'ecf '. . ofthis perception therefo . � 1 •ve perception and obJectively existing objects

' re, 18 on Y possible if · · · · · ourselves in the spatial fra k we as perce1vmg subJects pos1tton mewor of the objective world.

33 s· ·1 . 1m1 ar considerations may be fl . . . Ideahsm'', Collections of Phil

hy ound m Wilfrid Seilars, "Kant's Transcendental osop , 6 (1976): pp. 165-81, §§ 44ff.

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 141

lt has probably become clear that this taking into account of the perspectival nature of our perception is essentially connected with what we already have encountered in Gareth Evans's talk about positioning and orientation in space: without positioning a la Evans, there would be no differentiating between subjective perspective and objective being.

From this observation we can therefore return to Evans 's discussion of Strawson's questions. But I hope that we now understand better what Evans did not provide, namely, an explanation for why we must transcend the temporal, purely internal determination of our states of consciousness at all and must orient and thereby position ourselves in space.

In Conclusion: Eternal Life and Bodily Self-Ascription

Let me begin this closing section with a short recollection of my Kantian considerations:

( 1) F or the self-ascription of mental states we need the reference to objectively existing objects. (That was the result ofKant's answer to the question of the subject.)

(2) This reference is not possible as a purely temporal reference. Spatial reference is needed as well.

(3) What we need for spatial reference, however, is a reference to objects in space.

(4) This reference to objectively existing objects in space is possible only if the perceiving subject is able to differentiate between its own perspective on the objects and the objects existing independently from its perspective.

(5) To this end it is necessary for the subject to position itself bodily in space as one object among others.

Without positioning there is no differentiation between subjective perspective and objective being; without this differentiation there is no reference to independently existing objects; and without that reference we cannot ascribe mental states to ourselves. The self-ascription of bodily predicates as predicates of our position in space seems indeed to be an enabling condition of the self­ascription of mental states.

And yet this thesis might still seem rather weak: the bodily self-ascription in question, one might argue, is still not the ascription of a material body interacting with other material bodies in space. And indeed, if we stick to the critical Kant in the manner outlined, we are left with the result that all that is needed is the ascription of a position in space to a thinking subject. The consideration up to this point must remain silent about what predicates, beyond those mostly relational

142 Personal Identity and Resurrection

p;�dicates constituting the perspective, are characteristic of the subject in question a east as far a� transcendental -philosophy is concerned.

'

tr��:

n�;�:��;�:io�a���:�i if not properly critic�l, attempt to argue that it is

bod· ld p y necessary to conce1ve of ourselves as material

unfi�

i�h��e

w���

thap�eal to the development of Kant's thought in his last and

the critical philo�op� �s �ostumum. In this bold attempt to account for gaps in

self-as�ription ofma�ria�o����r���:;e��an ever to a full -blown defence ofthe

Th1s task, however is not onl t . 1 and will thus have to be left

fi y sys ematica �y but also exegetically complicated,

the weaker result of the b or anot�er oc

_cas1on. 34 Instead I will close by linking

question of (bodily) res a o�

te c0

Wns

h1derations to the topic of this collection: the

urrec ion. en all we d fi

b . . . is a perspective it at least h . nee or emg consc10us subjects

a spatial enviro�ment wit:ee�� t at subjects �ould account for this perspective in

Kant himself . d" t ou emselves havmg a material body.

m 1ca es as much i d" ·

boundaries of mere reas 1 n iscussmg whether a religion within the

on eaves room for th f . . says that what he calls the" h 1 . e concept o bodily resurrect10n. He

psyc o og1cal materi l" " h ·d .

of a material body-is n t 1 a ism -t e 1 ea ofthe resurrectJon

even detrimental to the Po on y u

dnnecess�ry for the belief in an etemal life but is

W roper un erstandmg of these matters 35

e seem to be left with the idea of . .

material subject which could erha s a �hm�ed -out, somehow spatial yet not

leave it at that and his "" rth p P survive its own death. But Kant does not

iu er remarks seem t ·

above defence of a think" b. . 0 pose a senous problem for the

existing spatial obiects Fmg su �ect n_ecessanly relating itself to independently

J • or not only 1s psych l · 1 . . .

transcendental philosoph b k" 0 og1ca matenahsm untenable m

. . Y ac mg· the same go fi h K .

matenahsm, the doctrine that the thin . . es or w at ant calls cosmolog1cal

at all. 36 How is this possibl . kmg subject has to be part of a spatial world

Th 1 . e, g1ven the above argument? e exp anat1on for this is both . :

doctrine: space and time a h simple and cons1stent with Kant 's critical

specific to human cogniti.'ons we a:� seen, are only the fonns of intuition that are

· ' a cogmhon chara t · d b h mmd and body in the way 0 tl. d

c enze Y t e mutual dependence of

not--or at least not necessaril -b . · survivors o our own death we would u me above As · f

would survive, so to speak y

t e tted to those ve� same fonns ofintuitions. We

' as ranscendental subJects.37 True, we would still be

34 F .

or a very helpful outline of this line f Synthes1s. An Essay an Kant s 0 p

0 thought see Eckart Förster, Kant s Final

2000), pp. 24-8. pus ostumum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

35 K ant, Religion innerhalb der G 36 Ibid.

renzen der b loßen Vernunft, 6, 1 2 8 fn.

37 Th" is p:obably distinguishes a Kantia . .

model as outlmed in Eric Ols , . n

. model of resurrect10n from the Cartes1an

1mmment causation, however, would b ful ec 1on apter 3 ). The criterion of . . on s essay m th1s coll f (Ch

of cause would be different fro .t

e filled-though the schematization ofthe category

furth 1 m 1 s current spatio te 1 .

er a temative to the ones dis d b - mpora one. Th1s would therefore be a

cusse y Olson (Chapter 3).

Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection 143

finite rational beings (as opposed to the infinite rational being that is god), but this

only means that we are in need ofsome intuition-sensible intuition in general38-

that need not be specified by the very same forms as our current intuition. But we

cannot say what this intuition would be like, since we are tied to our spatial and

temporal framework of reference. We certainly cannot determinately imagine such

an alternative, non -spatial system of reference, but Kant took himself, as early as

the first Critique, to have proven that we must postulate the possibility of such

alternative systems of intuitive reference.39 What we can know right now is that

there has to be an alternative system ofreference. For, as the above discussion has

shown, without a system ofreference that allows for the difference ofperspectival

and non -perspectival properties of objects conceived of as existing independently

ofus, we could not ascribe mental predicates to ourselves.

In conclusion, we can say that in a Kantian framework we need some form

of intuition that allows for a conception of an objective reality of which we

can conceive ourselves to be a part.40 This conception presupposes a difference

between perspectival and non -perspectival properties of the objects constituting

this objective reality. And an enabling condition of making that difference is the

(not necessarily spatial! ) "location" of those objects in a system of reference of

which we conceive ourselves likewise to be a part-a location which, given the

system of reference we as human beings are endowed with, can only be location

in space. Resurrection, therefore, against the Kantian background advocated in this

discussion, can be neither the resurrection of a material body nor that of a body

thinned out from all but its purely spatial properties: Eternal life in no way

presupposes bodily resurrection, even if we could not conceive of ourselves as

thinking subjects without ascribing to ourselves spatial predicates in this world.41

38 E .g. CpR, B, p. 148. 1 50.

39 E.g. CpR, A 42. A further interesting example is B 155.

40 This may sound rather like the final version of"bodily" (yet �on�materia� and non-

extended! ) resurrection proposed by Nikolaus Wandinger in his c�ntnbut10n t? th1s volume.

There is, however, at least one significant difference: the underlymg con.cepu

.o� of cosmos

is deeply realistic, whereas Kant's conception is, at least in this respect, 1deahst1c.

4 1 I would like to thank Georg Gasser, Stefanie Grüne, Hud Hud�on, Matthias Stef�n,

and Markus Wild for helpful comments on previous versions of th1s pape�. �y spe�ml

thanks go to Eckart Förster for inspiring discussions ofthese and related top1cs m KantJan

philosophy.