Public service broadcasting, public interest and individual rights in China

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2012 34: 898Media Culture SocietyYik Chan Chin

Public service broadcasting, public interest and individual rights in China

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Public service broadcasting, public interest and individual rights in China

Yik Chan ChinHong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

AbstractThis article argues that China’s public service broadcasting (PSB) policy has been motivated more by the pragmatic ends of securing social stability and cohesion than by moral or humane concerns for the development of citizens. Actual PSB policy focused predominantly on a narrowly defined ‘basic cultural right’ of access to broadcast media and on social equalization between urban and rural access to broadcast networks. Other values of PSB, including high-quality programming, independence and impartiality, are still marginalized. The continuation of consensus on the authoritarian political model and the prioritization of social order and collective rights over individual political and civil rights has restricted the scope of the policy. The lack of consensus on the substance of the public interest undermines any meaningful political construction of PSB. The long-term implications of PSB policy depend on the legitimation of the discourse of individual rights and equality, and on recognition of the broadcast media’s role in independently serving the public and common good and of the state’s obligation to respect individuals as citizens having equal and unalienable rights.

KeywordsChinese media, Chinese media policy, Chinese politics, citizenship, human rights, media freedom, public interest, public service broadcasting

Introduction

The ‘cultural public service’ policy recently introduced by the Chinese government has prompted renewed discussions on the public service functions of broadcasters in China. The contentiousness and ambiguity of the public service concept and the lack of coherent

Corresponding author:Yik Chan Chin, School of Communication, Hong Kong Baptist University, 5 Hereford Road, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong. Email: [email protected]

34710.1177/0163443712452700Media, Culture & SocietyChin2012

Commentary



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models of public service broadcasting (PSB) poses hard questions regarding the aims and principles of PSB policy in the Chinese social and political context. Answering them is essential to framing a meaningful critique that may help us understand the role of PSB in China and its implications for the lives of Chinese citizens and for the limitation of state power.

This article approaches these questions from the normative and historical perspec-tives. It will first compare the Chinese normative concept of PSB with one typical of liberal democracy, unpacking both their differences and commonalities. It will ask which values and functions of PSB are privileged or neglected in the Chinese discussion by those who hold power. Normative conceptualization is essential, as the destiny of social organizations is determined by the character of the dominant discourse, which has its own preferences in terms of norms and values (Hall, 1993). The comparison with liberal democracy as the benchmark is justified by the broad agreement in political theory on the basic principles of liberalism (see Buckler, 2010).

Next, a historical perspective will be taken up to inquire into the origins and actual evolution of Chinese PSB policy, posing the fundamental questions: why did PSB in China evolve into its current form and how well does this form match the normative justifications for it proffered to the public? The historical approach is particularly perti-nent given the self-reinforcing and evolutionary features of public policy-making in China (Chin, 2011).

The call for public service

In China, the mandate to develop nationwide PSB originated with the state. In September 2006, China’s national government, the State Council, published its Outline of Cultural Development for the Eleventh Five-year Plan (State Council and CCP, 2006). This important policy document championed ‘cultural public service’ (CPS) as the key objec-tive of culture building in the subsequent five years – the first time the government had explicitly referred to this concept. PSB is a part of the CPS project.

Although the Chinese academic literature on PSB goes back to 1980 (see Guo, 1998; Hu, 1980; Hu et al., 2008; Zhang, 1992; Zhao, 1998), the surge of publications on the sub-ject did not happen until 2007, after the official announcement of the CPS policy (Hu et al., 2008). This literature falls into two primary categories: (1) reviews of the evolution of PSB in foreign countries, and (2) articles purporting to define ‘public interest’ and ‘public ser-vice’, and to construct a PSB concept compatible with the Chinese social and political context. This latter aspect is extremely important given that PSB in China is in its infancy.

Since PSB was first created in Britain in the 1920s, no single universal definition of it has emerged, and relatively few coherent models are available (Humphreys, 1994; Tunstall, 2010). Three main normative functions are generally assigned to PSB in Western Europe’s liberal democratic social context: Politically it serves the needs of democracy through the independent and impartial coverage of news and current affairs. Culturally it sets and maintains high programming standards and contributes to national cultural resources, eschewing profitable fare of the ‘lowest common denominator’. Socially it promotes inclusion, binding together diverse groups in society (Curran and Seaton, 2003: 402; Debrett, 2009).



900 Media, Culture & Society 34(7)

The normative reasoning justifying the functions of PSB relies on its relation to the ‘public interest’ (PI), a presupposed ‘common good’ over and above the interests of par-ticular individuals (Feintuch and Varney, 2006; van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003). The substance of the PI remains highly contested and subject to capture and reinterpretation, inasmuch as the values in question are inseparable from those involved in democracy and the good society (Dahlgren, 2000; McQuail 1992). The contested nature of the PI has been vividly exposed recently in the Chinese context.

Defining the PI: principle, substance and procedure

The Chinese academic debate on PI has achieved little consensus either in principle or in spirit, regardless of the approach taken. Xiao (2009) identified 10 different viewpoints in theorizing the concept, concluding that none of them are ‘better’ or ‘more persuasive’ than the others. Instead, a procedural legitimacy involving all stakeholders in deciding collectively the substance of PI – procedures such as public hearings – rather than a comprehensive definition a priori is suggested (Xiao, 2009). The latter would contribute little to resolving practical problems. This reliance on deliberation and dialogue is sup-ported by academics in both China and Europe (see Morgan and Yeung, 2007).

Citizenship, which is advocated as the fundamental basis for discovering the norma-tive principle of the PI in the European legal and media studies scholarship (Born and Prosser, 2001; Dahlgren, 2000), is not deployed in China to serve the same role, because of its contested nature in the Chinese political context. First, both Chinese officials and academics tend to prefer words like ‘the People’ or ‘individual’ instead of ‘citizen’. ‘The People’ is a politically restrictive and exclusive category in China; its membership is not fixed but changeable according to the interpretations of politicians (see Kean, 2001), unlike ‘citizen’, a legal concept which establishes the equality of all Chinese nationals before the law (Chinese Constitution, 1982: Article 33). The Constitution provides that ‘all power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the People’ (Article 2). Peng Zhen, the Vice-Chairman of the 1982 Constitutional Revision Commission, in his report to the National People’s Congress (NPC), the national legislature, stressed that:

freedoms and rights in an absolute sense subject to no restrictions whatsoever have never existed in the world.… Only when the democratic rights and fundamental interests of the majority of people are ensured and extended will it be possible for the freedoms and rights of individual citizens to be effectively ensured and fully realized (Peng, 1982).

Even liberalism accepts that individual freedoms and rights are not absolute, and may be limited to prevent harm to others and to protect the general welfare; however, its princi-ple is respect for the equality and autonomy of all citizens, and the ‘general welfare’ is a universal value shared by all, not just some individuals (Swift, 2004). By conceptualiz-ing persons in competing guises – ‘the People’ and ‘citizens’ – Chinese law actually mili-tates against the protection of equal individual rights from violation by the ‘majority’, even in the spirit of socialism.

Historically, the individualizing concept of citizenship has been spurned in China as ‘antithetical to the socialist goal of mass mobilization, class struggle, and collectivism’



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(Kean, 2001: 3). Following Confucian and socialist tenets, China has historically placed the state first, the collective second and the individual last (Huang, 1998: 186). The idea of embracing individual rights challenges the core cultural and political values and prac-tices in China. Article 51 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution provides that ‘the exercise by citizens of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens’. This provision justifies subordinating the indi-vidual citizen’s liberty, autonomy and rights to the tyranny of the majority at best, and at worst, to Party-state dictatorship when the latter monopolizes the interpretation of major-itarian interests. In recent years, the concept of citizenship has attracted growing atten-tion in Chinese academic and public debates alongside the renewed call for political reform at the top and public participation in politics at the bottom (see Yang G, 2008).

The Constitution of the PRC indeed speaks the language of the PI, and the term regu-larly appears in legal provisions without definition (Han, 2005). There have been no juridical interpretations of ‘PI’, either. This ambiguity gives discretionary power to the authorities to interpret ‘PI’ in ways that invade and deprive individuals of their rights (Ren and Ji, 2005).

Unsurprisingly, then, few studies have been done on the relation between media and the PI in China. Three approaches are currently identified in public forums. The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with its one-Party authoritarian mode of governance, assert ‘as a Socialist country, the interests of the State and society are in basic accord with the citizens’ personal interests’ (Peng, 1982), whence Party and governmental poli-cies necessarily reflect the PI. This statement subsumes individual, public and state inter-ests under one comprehensive doctrine. However, both international and China’s own recent histories prove that such a claim is untenable (see He, 2007; Kumar, 2010; Xiao, 2009; Xiong and Zhu, 2005). In 2004, the CCP’s role as representative of the fundamen-tal interests of the broad majority of citizens was inscribed in the Chinese Constitution as the result of an amendment to its Preamble. The PI, as defined by the Party-state, assigns to the Chinese cultural sector the duty to ‘protect, realize and develop the basic cultural rights of ordinary people’; to ‘develop the nation’s moral, intellectual, scientific and cultural standards’; and to ‘build up a wealthy and strong, democratic and harmonious modern Socialist country’ (CCP, 2007).

Some Chinese intellectuals concede the key role of the state in protecting the public from harm caused by private interest groups. In their view, both the Western European public broadcasting and US commercial broadcasting are seen as pervaded by the rheto-ric of ‘liberal’ values, yet increasingly dominated by profit- and rent-seeking motives at odds with their claims to serve the PI (Li, 2008; Wang, 2008). The Chinese people require instead a fair government protecting all members of society equally (Pan, 2008). Indeed, all Chinese constitutions since 1954 have stressed the role of the state as the safeguard and realization of the PI (Han, 2005). This proposition differs little from the general expectation in democratic societies for the state to pursue the PI on behalf of its citizens by providing necessary regulatory frameworks and material resources to enable its mem-bers to pursue a better life and to safeguard the common good (Buckler, 2010; Gearty, 2007; Swift, 2004). However, the Party has historically considered its socialist ideology above and beyond the Constitution, and has intervened in every area of social life.




Others are concerned with the pragmatic questions of the PI: how to apply it, in what context and for what purpose. Substantive definition is less important than devel-oping procedures for its articulation, and representation in public policy. These schol-ars concede the legitimacy of governmental coordination of social activities and public order, but have misgivings with regard to governmental discretion and lack of account-ability in interpreting PI. The public may confer on government or media rights of implementation of PI, but its substantive values can be constructed only through rational public discussion, under public scrutiny (Luo and Liu, 2006; Xia, 2005). The formation of the PI depends on the formation of modern public: citizens who can actively and collectively discuss and act upon issues and events affecting their interests (Xia, 2005). These strictures resonate, given that the CCP’s politically superior to the state authority, and given its intolerance of dissenting voices and its ideological control of the government’s media policy-making (Chin, 2011; Esarey, 2006); thus, it is diffi-cult to see how the government could be able or willing to defend the PI from the Party’s political interference. Even the legitimacy of the judiciary to vindicate the PI is questionable because of concerns over its lack of independence. Thus, the public hear-ing procedure, involving the administration, the judiciary and the public, is suggested as the most feasible possibility (Xiao, 2009). However, broadcasting histories in tran-sitional societies like Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea suggest that the participation of civil organizations, academics and ordinary citizens are crucial to the establishment of PSB (Hung, 2010; Lin, 2005; Lu, 2008). In China, the development of civil society is seriously constrained by the Party-state. It encourages a greater role for non-govern-mental organizations (NGOs) in economic and social areas, but is very reluctant to give them more space in the political realm (Zheng and Fewsmith, 2008). The fragility of political civil organizations in China challenges the effectiveness of public delibera-tion regarding the PI and public service functions of PSB. Besides, China’s authoritar-ian political system has not provided an open and institutionalized channel for citizens and civil organizations to participate in governing public affairs (Chin, 2011). Whether the online sphere, the only public space ordinary citizens could possibly utilize, can facilitate a rational public deliberation and civil rights movement is, however, an unsettled question in the Chinese context (see Li, 2010).

Defining PSB’s normative functions: striking a balance between freedom of speech, development and social stability

Chinese academics support PSB for its symbolic importance in a diverse society pursu-ing democracy, transparency, fairness and minority rights (Yuan and Xian, 2006); for contributing to a balanced media ecology amid intensified media commercialization (Guo, 2006; Zhang, 2008); for its facilitation of exchange and dialogue between govern-ment and society, reducing social tensions; and for its role in developing democracy and the rule of law (Yuan and Xian, 2006). Public ownership, independence, universality and impartiality of PSB are also advocated (Shi and Zhou, 2007; Shi and Zhang, 2007). Academic discussions converge on PSB’s non-profit and PI-serving purposes, and on its



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social and cultural functions of education, enlightenment, moral critique, quality infor-mation, defence of minorities and national cohesion (Shi and Zhang 2007; Shi and Zhou, 2006; Yang C, 2008; Yuan and Xian, 2006).

Qi Yongfeng, a policy-maker at the State Council’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), agrees regarding the educational and social functions of PSB, but disputes its institutional independence and role in upholding citizens’ civil and political rights. Qi prioritizes the values of social solidarity over impartiality and inde-pendence, and supports the idea that the degree of the media’s freedom, and priorities regarding rights and responsibilities should depend on the developmental stage of soci-ety. Stricter supervision and prioritization of social responsibility of media are required in a transitional society to avoid social upheaval, to improve cultural, scientific and moral standards, to create channels for citizens to publicly and in an orderly way partici-pate in governance, to reconcile competing interests, and to facilitate social consensus supporting reform and institutional innovation (Qi, 2006:21).

Coming from a high official, Qi’s reasoning exposes the profound differences between Chinese and western assumptions about the relationship between state power and indi-vidual rights, and about the values that might justify political freedom for PSB.

Liberal democracy recognizes media freedom as an ‘instrumental freedom’ that pro-motes the values and ends of freedom of speech (FoS) on behalf of everyone (Barendt, 2007: 422–4; Gibbons, 1998). FoS is paramount for securing individual liberty, discov-ering truth, participating in a democratic political process, holding authority accountable, and promoting individual development and fulfilment (Emerson, 1977; Gibbons, 1998; Greenawalt, 1980; Perry, 1984). The liberal conception of truth-seeking stresses a refusal of the infallibility of authority; exposing facts and opinions to criticism; and rational discussion to reach better judgments (Emerson, 1977: 740–1). Chinese philosophy, by contrast, has traditionally been elitist and paternalistic, holding that rulers and elites are best situated to discern the common good, and are entitled to rule by their superior moral wisdom or technical knowledge. The Chinese government has traditionally pursued a substantive moral agenda defined by the normative vision of the ruling class (Nathan, 2008; Peerenboom, 2006: 61; Shue, 2004: 31).

Liberalism preconceives the state as neutral arbiter and presupposes a social contract whereby individuals precede the state and are entitled to choose society’s normative agenda, which the state enforces, or to pursue individual normative agendas without state interference (Greenawalt, 1980: 674; Peerenboom, 2006). Because people reasonably disagree about the common good, a procedural mechanism (viz. elections) for resolution is set up. The legitimacy of the Chinese government is rooted not in procedures and con-tracts, but in its capacity to preserve the peace and impose order (Shue, 2004). The domi-nant academic discourse since 1989, which might be styled ‘neo-conservatism’, champions a powerful central authority guaranteeing stability during a socioeconomic transition, directed by the CCP’s wise politicians, ‘to achieve effective modernization, fair distribution, political order, and national security’ (Chen, 1997; Nathan, 2008: 33). Grave doubts as to the feasibility of liberal democracy in China heavily influence official policy still.

Liberalism regards FoS as a deontological value intrinsic to the autonomous subject which develops more reflective and mature individuals even if the exercise of free




thoughts and FoS may be inimical to the welfare of society (Barendt, 2007; Greenawalt, 1980; Perry, 1984). In contrast, the Chinese Constitution conceives of rights as granted by the state. FoS is not protected as a fundamental human right. Historically, democracy and press freedom in China have not been valued as ends in themselves, but as means to national modernization, even at the expense of individual autonomy or democratic citi-zenship (Lee, 2005). Public opinion and the flow of information must be managed to ensure that criticism of the Party does not impair its capacity to govern effectively. Authoritarianism implies a preference for hierarchical relations characterized by domi-nance and submission. But the rise of the autonomous self and the decline of conformity serve to develop a capacity to transcend the ‘law and order’ mentality that the powerful exploit to justify their rule; the autonomous self, standing outside, generates and applies an independent morality, which is essential for a countervailing control of power (Lane, 1979:72–3).

Liberalism also prioritizes first-generation civil and political rights over second- and third-generation economic, social and cultural rights, and collective or group rights (Freeman, 2002); in China, as elsewhere in the developing world, the discourse of a col-lective right of development predominates. The Party-state upholds subsistence as the primary right from which all others derive (Li and Wei, 2011). Since the 1980s, suppres-sion of individual civil and political rights has been justified by the necessity to facilitate economic growth, efficiency and foreign investment. A human-oriented alternative to the development imperative only appeared on the government’s policy agenda in 2007. Literally, a human-oriented development approach is to enhance individuals’ opportuni-ties for education, health care, employment, and economic and political freedom (Hamm, 2001). Both FoS, as a ‘cornerstone’ and enabling right, and free flow of information, as key for an effective interaction between the state and society, are requisite to human development (Callamard, 2006)

From a liberal perspective, the media provide the most important institutional channels for exchange of information and opinion between individuals and groups; they function as a Fourth Estate, checking government’s actions. In the Chinese con-text, the dominant discourses – an elitist philosophical tradition, the conception of governance as maintenance of harmony and social stability, and the privileging of the right to development – underpin an authoritarian and paternalistic media whose remit is to mould public opinion to perceive the Party-state as performing and legiti-mate; to ‘enlighten’ the public as regards morality and virtue; and to mobilize sup-port for the state’s socioeconomic reform agenda. Coercive information control and asymmetrical information dissemination are routinely deployed to these ends (see Zheng, 2009).

Whose interests are served by privileging social order and economic development over individual rights? And is such a state of affairs just? If unjust, it would be legiti-mate to challenge it (Freeman, 2002: 62). In China, the media’s role is structured according to the Party-state’s priorities: first and foremost, they must serve the CCP’s interests, protecting its legitimacy and capacity to govern; second, they must serve the ‘collective or national interest’ as predominantly defined by the Party-state; third, they are required to serve the marketplace to sustain economic capacity; fourth, they may serve individual cultural and social rights; finally, they are permitted to enable



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individual FoS and facilitate political participation only insofar as this does not inter-fere with the higher priorities.

Nevertheless, channelling the public and orderly expression of opinion through media is necessary to achieve the first two priorities. Coercive information control has become a barrier to national integration (see Zheng, 2009), and ‘long-term structural stability’ depends on the incorporation of different interests into the political system under the control of the Party (Weng Jiemin et al., 1996 in Chen, 1997: 606). FoS could function as ‘a form of social control that strikes a balance in society between stability and move-ment, thereby allowing for necessary change without resort to violence, contributing to social stability’ (Emerson, 1977: 742–3). Second, Officials within the CCP do not dis-count the importance of public opinion for policy change; public opinion does influence policy agendas and affects the success of policy implementation (see Chin, 2011). Given the failure of coercive information control to reconcile ethnic conflicts or palliate social grievances, the media is increasingly seen as an instrument of social modulation. A cer-tain degree of freedom of information and opinion conserves social cohesion and enables a more efficient policy process.

The Chinese government has shown some willingness to relax the suppression of civil liberties (Tsang, 2009; Yang G, 2008). The Constitution was amended in 2004 to provide that the ‘state respects and protects human rights’. Such protection thus becomes an obligation incumbent upon the state (Li and Wei, 2011:18). In 2007 the government revised the country’s development strategy away from economic development alone toward the Harmonious Society, and ‘efficient, human-oriented, comprehensive, coordi-nated and sustainable scientific development’ (CCP, 2008). In 2009, it announced the National Human Rights Action Plan, ‘the coordinated development of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights, and the balanced development of individual and collective rights’ (IOS, 2009). The plan pledges to develop the civil and political rights to: (1) be informed of government affairs; (2) participate in an orderly way in political affairs at all levels and sectors; (3) be heard (through development of the press and publication industries and protection of journalists’ rights); and (4) to oversee (through improving mechanisms of restraint and supervision).

At the international level, China’s ratification in 2001 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, binds the government legally to the obligations enshrined therein. In 2005 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its concluding observations, highlighted its concerns over income inequalities between rich and poor and urban and rural areas, and over adequate standards of living. It urged the Chinese government to allow freedom of information, so that all Chinese may take part in cultural life and enjoy the benefits and applications of scientific progress (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2005).

Public service policy: from socialist spiritual civilization to equalization

The emergence of the Chinese PSB policy is embedded in the social, political and legal context of the last decade. The origin of the policy goes back to the 1990s. Since 1979, the shift from state funding of media to commercial advertising led to commercialization




of content and a dramatic decline in its social and educational value, and the neglect of the rural broadcasting system (Zhou, 2006). A government policy circular decried an ‘impoverished’ cultural life, widespread ‘decadent ideas’ and ‘pornography, gambling and drugs’, and illegal religious activities in the countryside. Grassroots cultivation became important for policy dissemination, the connection of the Party-state with the populace, and public virtue (Guofaban [(State Council, 2002)] No. 7). In response, the Party launched a large-scale Spiritual Civilization project during three successive Five-year Plans for Economic and Social Development (1991–2005), which endeavoured to uplift civic virtue (CCP, 1996). The civilizing of rural areas was among several important policy goals (CCP, 1998). Projects on infrastructure construction and improvement of broadcasting coverage for rural regions and sub-national regions with high concentra-tions of national ethnic minorities were launched in 1998 and 2000 (Zhou, 2006: 47).

Since 2006, infrastructure and coverage expansion in the countryside has gradually shifted from the language of Spiritual Civilization, aimed at countervailing commerciali-zation, to ‘public service’ emphasizing urban–rural equalization and protection of ‘basic’ rights. PSB is an integral part of the national CPS policy announced by the State Council in 2006 (State Council and CCP, 2006). CPS is intended to ‘enrich the people’s spiritual [and] cultural life and establish a harmonious society’. Launched to ease the inter-regional and urban–rural socioeconomic development gaps, the lack of the rule of law, the deterioration of morality and trust, and corruption, the Harmonious Society aspires to ‘human-based individual comprehensive development’, ‘social justice’, ‘sharing of the fruits of reform by all people’, ‘the rule of law and democracy’, and ‘social unity’ (CCP, 2006). The national construction of CPS and PSB is thus informed by the policy goals of social equalization – universal coverage and equal access – through public funding pro-vision, and protection of people’s basic cultural rights and needs, that is, rights of access to TV, radio, books and newspapers, in particular for low-income and other vulnerable groups (CCP, 2006; CCP, 2007).

CPS is planned and funded by the government and provided through public cultural institutions such as television and radio stations (State Council and CCP, 2006; CCP, 2007). Its policy shows no indication of setting up a ‘public service’ broadcaster. The news media are still state-owned and politically dependent on the Party. Drama, enter-tainment and sport content production and distribution units, and news media’s advertis-ing, distribution, printing, transmission-network and sales departments are all excluded from the CPS, defined as the ‘cultural industry’, and allowed mixed ownership to strengthen competition and efficiency (CCP and State Council, 2005; State Council and CCP, 2006).

The government’s PSB policy prioritizes cultural resources allocation to minority groups and rural areas, and the production and provision of public cultural products. The former aims to address the urban–rural development gap by focusing on universal and equal access to the basic broadcasting service (terrestrial and satellite program-ming) in rural and remote areas. The latter means that the government may pay or sub-sidize private cultural industry to produce high-quality, and inexpensive public service contents (Yang, 2009a, 2009b; CCP, 2007). Between 1998 and 2009 central and local governments spent a total of 10 billion yuan on rural broadcasting infrastructure con-struction and maintenance, bringing access to approximately 100 million



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rural inhabitants; nevertheless, as of 2009 11.61 percent of the rural population (some 40 million) had no access to any kind of broadcast programming (Yang, 2009a: 127). Despite the successes, problems of infrastructure, funding, corruption and lack of broadcasters’ support for PSB have reduced the project’s effectiveness (Chin and Johnson, 2012).

Conclusion

This article has sought to identify the aims and principles of PSB policy in China, and its implications for the cultural, social and political lives of individual Chinese, and for the limitation and control of the Party-state’s power.

From the normative perspective, the basic principles underpinning PSB in west-ern liberal democracies entail serving the PI, for instance enhancing and developing political, civil, social and cultural citizenship. In the Chinese context the substance of the PI is subject to arbitrary interpretation by the Party-state, and apt to be con-tested by rival camps of academics. The lack of consensus undermines any mean-ingful political construction of PSB in China, and a fair and legitimate procedure of deliberation is urged by Chinese academics as a pressing need in determining what the PI is.

By asserting that the interests of the Party-state, society and the individual are identical, the CCP at present claims entitlement to privilege its own version of the PI, which prioritizes the values of national wealth creation, national strength and social harmony; the propagation of the Party-state’s moral, intellectual and scientific stand-ards; and the promotion of a narrowly defined basic cultural right. Individual politi-cal and civil rights, such as FoS and participation in political affairs, are not regarded as core values of the PI. Such de-politicization of the PI is exacerbated by the de-emphasis of individual equality, and the subordination of individual liberty to collec-tive and state interests in the Chinese Constitution, as well as by the government’s practice of implementing collective rights to subsistence and development ahead of civil and political rights.

Nevertheless, the revision of China’s development strategy from economic growth to human development, and the Party-state’s willingness to concede some civil liberties, partly in response to the pressures of its legal obligations to the international human

Table 1. Income of Chinese broadcasters in 2009 (billions of yuan, %)

Income Percentage of total income

Total income 185.3 100.00Government funds 24.5 13.23Advertising 78.2 42.19Internet service 41.9 22.61Others 40.7 21.97

Source: Development and Research Centre, SARFT, 2010




rights treaties it has committed itself to, may be conducive to improved protection of individual rights, even if economic, social and cultural rights continue to have priority. It is within this fluid context between maintaining an old order and developing a new social relationship between political authority and the individual citizen that the discourse of cultural rights and public service first appeared in official policy documents. In conse-quence, growing academic and public interest is being given to the functions of PSB and its possible future in China.

Actual PSB policy continues to be motivated predominantly by a narrowly defined basic cultural right and an emphasis on social equalization between urban and rural access to broadcasting networks. Other values of PSB, including high-quality program-ming, universal accessibility to content, independence and impartiality, are still margin-alized, if not ignored. Marketization, corruption and local disparities in infrastructure, funding, consumption power and lack of media support for PSB also pose significant challenges to the national government’s capacity to afford even the very limited rights promised to the Chinese public.

History shows remarkable similarities but also differences elsewhere. Unlike the PSB histories in former authoritarian societies such as Taiwan and South Korea that are primarily driven by NGOs and pressure groups for the purpose of establishing a media independent from both commercial interests and the state, the development path of Chinese CPS and its embedded PSB is reminiscent of the early history of the first PSB, the British Broadcasting Corporation, created in the divided British soci-ety of the 1920s. The notion of CPS in Britain was first inspired by a sense of moral purpose in meeting the educational and cultural needs of the working classes, but also by the pragmatic and instrumental political purpose of ‘civilizing the masses’ as ‘a means of alleviating the strain and hostility between classes in a deeply divided society’, and ‘a means of incorporating the working classes within the existing social and political order, and thus preventing the threat of revolt from below’ (see Scannell, 2000: 55–6). The ideals of the BBC as a public service were to serve the PI, social unity and national pride. Its role as a public forum independent of the state devel-oped slowly and in tandem with the long battle for a fully democratic representa-tional system and the introduction of limited competition in the broadcasting sector (Scannell, 2000). In the Chinese context, the broadly similar project is motivated more by the purely pragmatic end of social stability and cohesion than by moral or humane concerns for the development of citizens. Indeed, the marginalization of individual self-development and autonomy, and the continued support among politi-cal and intellectual elites for an authoritarian Party-state, cast serious doubt on the future possibilities of realizing in China a genuine PSB serving the needs of democ-racy, culture and social inclusion.

Certainly the long-term implications of the Chinese public service project and policy depend on the legitimation of the discourse of individual rights and equality, and on recognition of the broadcast media’s role in serving the public and common good, and the state’s obligation to respect individuals as citizens having equal and unalienable rights. As with all Chinese public policy-making, the development of PSB and relevant governmental policy will be a long, incremental process. The



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future of Chinese PSB is uncertain, but at least the wind of individual rights and equality is blowing.

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Erratum

Yik Chan ChinPublic service broadcasting, public interest and individual rights in ChinaMedia, Culture & Society Vol. 34(7): pp. 898– 912 (2012)DOI: 10.1177/0163443712452700

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