RAISING DIPLOMATS AS FIT IN THE IBERO-AMERICANREALM

Armando Marques Guedes1

In what follows, I have a double point of departure.Using as pretexts the book I published in mid-2008 at theVienna Diplomatic Academy, a work I entitled Raising Diplomats.Political, Genealogical and Administrative Constraints on Patterns of Training forDiplomacy, and a Key-Note Address I delivered last year at theCollége d’Europe, and which I called “Raising Diplomats as Fit”2,it is a pleasure to take things on step further with thepresent paper. As will have been noticed, I named mycommunication to you here the same ‘subtitle’, although withan extension which indicates a geographical and politicallimitation. It is a title which suggests that I shall be1 Professor, Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Presidentof the Portuguese Instituto Diplomático, Ministério dos NegóciosEstrangeiros, between mid-2005 and mid-2008.2 A Keynote Address I gave in Bruges, Belgium, at the Collège d’Europe, on theafternoon of the 26th September 2008, at the 36th Meeting of Deans andDirectors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of InternationalRelations, the 2008 Reunion of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training,which focused on "New Challenges to Diplomatic Training". The Meeting wasconvened by the Vienna Diplomatic Academy and by the School of ForeignService, Georgetown University, and it was co-organized by the ViennaAcademy and the Collège d’Europe. I would like to use the opportunity toagain express my gratitude to Ambassador Jiří Gruša, then Director of theDiplomatic Academy of Vienna for everything, from the publication of mybook to the invitation to be in Brussels and Bruges. I am also gratefulto Professor Casimir Yost, Director of the Institute for the Study ofDiplomacy, at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, GeorgetownUniversity and, last but not least, to Professor Paul Demaret, Rector ofthe Collège d’Europe, Bruges, like the other two mentioned a constantpresence in the proceedings, for their wonderful hospitality. I wouldhave been hard put to find a better place to edit my book, given itstopic – and it would be even tougher to find a better venue for itslaunch and for the talk I then gave.

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scrutinizing what, really, amounts to little more thanvariations on my Vienna book’s and my Bruges paper’s themes,but now with a new focus, one on ‘Ibero-America’3. What Iwish to attempt is a two-pronged elaboration on my muchlarger earlier ‘Austrian’ study and a specification of thesecond ‘Belgian’ one: on the one hand, to try to give themsome further theoretical substance; and, on the other hand,to pose a question which is somehow prior to both – whiletrying to offer an answer for this question. What are wereally doing when we are training diplomats, and how is thislikely to change?

Closely following what I said and did last year at theCollége d’Europe, I want to divide what I am going to talk aboutinto three thickly interconnected parts. As it did in Bruges,this tripartite division, I believe, flows naturally from themanner in which I approach my theme, training for diplomacy.The first of my three parts is brief: it concerns whateducation is – or, rather, what education aims at. My secondleg focuses on internal contrasts and on some of the lines offorce along which I try to deconstruct my analysis ofdiplomatic training. I shall give a few Ibero-Americanexamples, and delineate a sort of model, so this section willactually constitute the longer parcel of my presentation, itspièce de résistance as it were. Finally, as a third and last stepI attempt a wide-angle view of my efforts; after trying tounderstand the curious puzzle represented by the gap openedwith the absence of in-depth studies about training fordiplomacy (a matter I shall go into in some detail) I try topull strings together, and look briefly at the future fit ofthe diplomatic training strategies in which both States andmultilateral entities are increasingly engaging. I thusforego talking about many other ongoing changes in moderncontemporary diplomacy, namely the increase weight ofsecurity and defence and the rise and rise of non-State3 These are the notes I used for my Bruges paper, now with an Ibero-American focus. In many cases, in the first halfs of parts 1 and 3, Irepeat ipsis verbis long parcels of my Bruges manuscript. Part 2, however, islargely founded on my Vienna book. A word as for style: I deliberatelyretained the spoken tone I ab initio gave to my text in Bruges, since thiswas an original format I would be loath to forego.

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actors or new communication technologies. This does in nosense means, of course, I do not deem these often radicalchanges important. They are crucial and I have both writtenand lectured extensively about them. But they simply do notfit the economy of the themes I here want to bring up.

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So let me start with education and a few generalitiesabout that. Education remains a rather vague – in the senseof a largely subjectively defined – area, or domain; there is no“traditional wisdom”, that is, there is no commonly agreedconsensus on either what education is, or as to how it shouldbe pursued. Allow me to give you two different, albeitcomplementary takes on this, one ‘legalistic’, the other moresociological. I shall start with the metaphorically juralone. Education does not appear to be easily broken upaccording to the same sort of positive ‘laws’ as those whichare purportedly found in economics, or physics, for example –and this, understandably, makes it difficult for us toascertain, much less define, the ‘success’ or the ‘failure’of a pedagogical strategy relative to an educational theorythat would have been agreed upon and consequently put to use.

Now the second take – the complementary sociological oneon the same issue. For education, be it the education ofdiplomats or of anyone else, there is no commonly acceptedparadigm. So a wide discrepancy prevails. It is naïve toexpect definitive agreements in the face of competing claimsabout what may count as relevant evidence and competing viewsabout the conclusiveness, or even the credibility, ofpreferred approaches. Ultimately, more than simple questionsof method these are epistemological matters. They are bound upin the different packages of biases and a priori preconceptionswhich analysts build into their research programs andenterprises. Given a lack of ‘stable’ evidence that can beaccepted as decisive by all, different epistemologies resultin conclusions which are, therefore, always largelyconditional on the unstated assumptions that underlie a

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particular research program, as they are fully warranted onlywithin the boundaries of a particular conceptual framework.

It only takes a quick look at educational reforms prettymuch anywhere to get the impression of just how much it oftenfeels as if we are flying blindly. But is it really so?Should we just throw down our hands and give up? Thevagueness we sense, I would like to argue, is perhaps not toosurprising, as education (the teaching-learning processesthat is, for my purposes here) has a quite complex connectionto time – and evolutionary or adaptive time-indexed processesare not easy cookies. We all know the severe difficulties thesocial sciences confront when trying to cope with time.

Well, education is right in the vortex there. I want toquote a Japanese pedagogue, K. Koyama, à propos of this, as Ithink he formulates things rather nicely: “[n]o humanactivity is more closely tied to the future than education.As the most basic formative force of tomorrow’s society,education reaches into the future through its role in moldingthe next generation. Moreover, without insight into thepossibilities and pitfalls that await people in the years tocome, education cannot perform that role properly…Yeteducation is also more closely tied to the past—to historyand tradition, and to the propagation of humankind’s culturalheritage—than any other human activity”4. A wonderfulequation, I feel.

It is nevertheless surely important to at least try tounderstand what the purpose of education is, and here it iseasier for us to agree. For convenience sake, focus only oneducation’s role for the future. At the simplest level, thepurpose of education is for us always the skills and facttransmission that are deemed necessary for the future;education also plays a pivotal role in ‘character formation’,that is a role in shaping the way in which future generationswill experience life, reason and behave. This, or a variantof this, is precisely what the underside, as it were, of thefour centuries old Puritan claim that “education is a meansfor bettering oneself”.

4 K. Kōyama (1985) “An End to Uniformity in Education”, Japan Echo, vol.XII, no. 2: 43.

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So, keeping our eyes on the future, and on making a differencethere, how do we go about operationally circumscribing(defining would surely be too strong a word) education? Asgood a definition as any, I think, is a pragmatic one:“learning is the link between what [an entity] wants to doand its ability to gather the needed information andresources to actually do it” 5. This is a usefully crispfuture-oriented ‘teleological’ reading, I think. To recast itin other words, learning amounts to a general mechanism usedfor the acquisition of conceptual as well as material means whichallow us to better achieve whatever objectives we may have.Learning, furthermore, beyond the simple accumulation ofinformation and resources, implies too – if it is to beefficacious – a reorganization, a change which responds tothat process of accumulation. Otherwise, of course, it justbecome an up-in-the-air set of ideas which, interesting asthey may be, will have little connection to reality. For,clearly to be sure, not all change is indicative of learning.Again, let me make a call to realism here. For change toincorporate the results of information and resourceaccumulation processes, such results must give body toeffective alterations in our way of doing things. Whichamounts to merely asserting, of course, that, at one level,at least, we can really only properly talk about learning when it has definitivepractical consequences6.

5 Brian A. Jackson et al. (2005), Aptitude for Destruction. Organizational Learning inTerrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, vol. 1, p. 3, RAND. Amonumental two volume work on organizational learning in contemporaryterrorist groups.6 Ibid.. Let me quote RAND’s Brian A. Jackson once more: “[w]hile change inthe way a group carries out its activities is frequently indicative oflearning, the occurrence of change is not sufficient to indicate thatorganizational learning has occurred. Changes are not necessarilyintentional; they can be made unintentionally or for exogenous reasonsincidental to the behavior that is changed (e.g., a change may occur inone area simply as a result of a change made in another). […] we definelearning as sustained changes that involve intentional action by orwithin a group at some point – such as one or more of the following:intentional seeking of new knowledge or new ways of doing things;intentional evaluation of behaviors, new or old, that leads to efforts toretain valuable behaviors and discard others; and/or intentional

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Now allow me to widen the resolution and thus look atthe smaller picture in the much more granular detail thesecomplex lenses permit us. Let me touch upon social learning.There can be no doubt that education can play a role insocial reform. This is not a new approach by any means, andit has been the focus of attention of numerous authors.However, an important point to be aware of is that itseffects can potentially be longer lasting than other attempts atsocial reform owing to its ability to alter the foundationsof people’s outlooks and organizational changes.

True, the full effects of learning may not be seen formany years given, for instance, the resistance to change fromthe rest of the community in which it takes place. But theywill eventually be felt, and then change may occur.

Well, then, against this backdrop, what about training fordiplomacy? Here as elsewhere, note that although there arevarious actors involved in modern policy making processes indiplomatic education, the two most important have surelybeen, in each country that may concern us, the bureaucracyand the Government – in other words, administration and politics.Bringing together what I have been meandering through for thelast few minutes should be straightforward now. Trainingdiplomats means raising some of our people for the future,changing them in what we take as being a more fittingdirection, sculpting them for tomorrow. This is undertaken for thegood of our community, in order to guarantee it a betterplace in the international system which we believe isemerging. But in doing so, we always inevitably challengeestablished political and administrative interests, and sothese operate as limiting constraints which endeavour to slowus down.

As we know only too well, slowing us down they mostcertainly do. This, of course, is what Italian diplomatturned international UN fonctionaire Domenico Polloni7 called,dissemination of knowledge within a group or among groups when suchknowledge is deemed useful or beneficial”.

7 In Domenico Polloni (1996), Birth of a Diplomat: Procedures for Recruiting and TrainingDiplomatic Staff – A Comparative Study, an internal document circulated in theEuropean Council.

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with such graphic gusto, a “viscosity”8: the localized, butoften brutal, tension we all have to confront between theextant bureaucratic-administrative requirements of “theservices” – a pressure to keep diplomats “at work”, in otherwords – and the pressing need to temporarily and periodicallyfree them from this, so they can acquire the in-depthtechnical know-how indispensable to the better organizationand fulfillment of their modern and often technically verydemanding professional roles. Time and again, heads ofdiplomatic training in Ministries of Foreign Affairsthroughout the world have to stand up against this tensionand try to unravel it – which often arguably makes them comeclose to ‘public enemies number one’ in their respectiveMinistries.

The subtext of the animosity, in many cases the textitself, is that training pressures are worsening what is aperceived endemic labour shortage. So the implicit (sometimesit is explicit) claim is that training efforts make MFAs lessviable. Note the kinship of the argument used with the oneagitated to justify child labour where, unfortunately, suchabuse still exists – “we need our sons and daughters righthere, working the fields, not in ‘schools’ somewhere outthere”9. This, I want to argue (and it is a point I will onlybriefly touch upon here, but one I dwell on at some length inmy book), is one negative facet of what I mean by‘administrative constraints’ acting on the education of ourdiplomats – which leads me to a further structural point I wantto make about the distinctive specificities of diplomatictraining.8 Idem, op. cit.: p. 39.9 As I have pointed out in Bruges, this is a silly argument, of course,powerful as it may be. It is also beyond the pale. In most contemporarymodern States formal training of civil servants, diplomats or others, islegally obligatory, in many cases even constitutionally imperative. Inmany cases too, the progression of fonctionaires on their careers is atleast partly indexed of such formal training. The obvious solution to the‘administrative viscosity’ I brought up is to increase the number ofdiplomats, not to boycott their training. The ‘public enemy’ to confrontis the Ministry of Finance or its lateral equivalent, not the head oftraining. Unfortunately, scape-goating is much easier than facing up tothe machinery of the Leviathan.

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I am going to allude to what I call ‘genealogicalconstraints’. I want to simplify a little so as to be veryclear on this point. My argument is that the genealogy of theforms of training diplomats, its archeology, the way itstarted, its DNA-style imprinting if you will, has played acentral role in the case of this particular kind of training,via what I called an “emergent foundational tension”10.

Historically, if you will, there are two historicalmodels for the training of diplomats: that of Paris and thatof Vienna. What were their distinctive traits? The ParisAcadémie Politique’s strategy was mimetic, connected to hearsay,and it operated through a sort of osmosis11. When, in 1712,the then acting French Sécretaire d’Etat, the Marquis de Torcy,founded an Académie Politique, in Paris, he did so with theavowed intention of better preparing the diplomatic staffseen as necessary to a France that was coming onto aninternational stage which was clearly becoming increasinglymore complex and demanding12.10 See my Armando Marques Guedes (2008), Raising Diplomats. Political, Genealogicaland Administraative Constraints on Patterns of Training for Diplomacy, DiplomatischeAkademie, Wien, my Collége d’Europe “Raising Diplomats as Fit”, and, perhapsfirst and foremost, the text of the Opening Lecture for the school yearof 2009-2009 I was invited to give at the 5éme section of the École Pratiquedes Hautes Études, in Paris, which I duly entitled “Répétition et Innovation:Généalogie et Architecture dans les Processus de Formation de Diplomates depuis le XVIIIièmesiècle”.11 Which has two possible kinds of reading, a weak and a strong one. Inthe strong readings, diplomatic skills are either not learnable or areonly so by imitation. Weak versions tend to focus instead on this copyingand learning from one’s elders and experience: as if senior diplomatstoday had the time, pedagogical know-how, or even will to aptly teachtheir junior colleagues. Moreover, for all the advantages experience andinformal ‘osmotic’ learning by mimesis surely has (and there is a placefor it), this really is a pre-modern idea, as it presumes an unchangingworld in which birth, style and courtesy were major rules of thediplomatic agents’ game. ‘Hearsay' was, of course, as “the first confusedform of knowledge”, d’aprés Baruch Spinoza.12 For a more focused piece of work on the general background to thecreation of the Académie, see Joseph Klaits (1971), “Men of Letters andPolitical Reform in France at the End of the Reign of Louis XIV: TheFounding of the Academie Politique”, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, no.4, pp. 577-597. Although further discussion on these themes would surelyfall outside of my scope here, it is surely worth our effort to read

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The training course that he sketched out and startedbore a rather direct connection to the earlier foundation –its establishment had happened two years before, in 1710 – ofthe historical diplomatic archive of the Kingdom: its avowedpurpose was to allow study of an increasingly voluminous andrich diplomatic correspondence, so that political anddiplomatic agents could, via that very exertion, search forinspiration in the actions and activities of the FoundingFathers of a diplomatic practice which was beingstrengthened. In the framework of what we would today call an“analogue method”, what they struggled to do, in fact, was toabsorb the possible teachings of “History”. On the basis ofsuch a model of learning they would one day become able – atleast this is what they thought – to prepare detailedmemoranda of the same sort as those which had, in the heyday,proven to be useful for the design of French foreign policy,and that, in the future, would again guarantee the same sortof victories. Peace of Westphalia old-timers like CardinalsRichelieu and Mazzarin were favourites, of course.

The second pole of my “emergent foundational tension” isoccupied by the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, andgenealogically (or archeologically) by the Orientalische Akademieof old, founded in 1754 by Empress Maria Theresia.Paradoxically, this fervently Catholic Empress, married tothe Holy Roman Emperor Francis I, the duc de Lorraine – whosucceeded her Father in the Imperial throne and was a ‘far-right’ absolutist – became after his death a franticinstitutional creator13. As I have written elsewhere, “[thefinality of] Maria Theresia’s Austrian Orientalische Akademie(later renamed Diplomatische Akademie) was the preparation ofyoung diplomats and imperial consuls for the Near East; the

three exquisite articles published on topics somehow connected to this,the first one about the education Torcy0s uncle, le Grand Colbert, receivedfrom his father, the last two on the education the latter offered to hisown son, Colbert de Torcy’s cousin, the Marquis de Seignelay: John C.Rule (1996), “A Career in the Making: The Education of Jean-BaptisteColbert, Marquis de Torcy”, French Historical Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, SpecialIssue: Biography, pp. 967-996.13 For this, see the marvelous two-volume work by G.M. Dickinson (1987),Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 1740-1780, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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justifications adduced took particularly into account theformal relations with the Ottoman Empire which Austria held,along a lengthy border, close relations with whom it oftenentertained prolonged tensions. The Akademie actually dealtwith an utterly new initiative, on this front: that ofproviding a systematic training – and doing so at a fully-fledged academic level – to its representatives, so theImperial House would be able to better pursue its relationswith the non-European world, or at least an importantlyadjacent part of it. Something for which, shared forms, orthe reduplication of former experiences, was not of muchuse”14. Alterity, or the difficulties encountered when facingit, thus underscored the innovation.

Such institutional duality, Vienna- and Paris-centered,gave rise to what I call “an emergent foundational tension”that I argue still permeates diplomatic training as weconceive of today. It gave rise to a ‘coordinated dance’ ofsorts, a kind of ‘synchronized swimming’ between learning byexperience and osmosis, on the one hand and, on the other,academic-style training – mostly in the disciplinary areas ofLaw, Politics, Economics and History, as things worked out.

This tension, as I named the ever-present ambivalence,plays events out in an interesting way, diachronically. Sinceits very inception, diplomatic training, because of the DNA-style emergent tension it incorporates (perhaps ‘congenital’would actually be a better term, as it was only grafted on atbirth, so to speak), has been going through long periods ofstasis punctuated by fast spurts of often informally synchronizedchanges. If that is Hegelianism, it is of the non-organicistsort. This is not very different, I believe, frompaleontologists models of “punctuated equilibrium” to explainspeciation. So, to return to my general line of argument, wehave change and resistance to it. Change thus comes inspurts.

What do I want to get to here? Overall, notice, theVienna model contrasted rather starkly with the Parisian one.

14 Armando Marques Guedes (2008), Raising Diplomats. Political, Genealogical andAdministraative Constraints on Patterns of Training for Diplomacy: p. 31, DiplomatischeAkademie, Wien.

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It was also to prove a more flexible and adaptive solution,in a fast changing world – albeit, in the template set by thefoundational imprint, the two matricial ‘lodes’ always joinedhands. If there is one patent regularity that emerges out ofmy study of empirical diplomatic training cases, it is theperennial character (or, at least, the longue durée exhibited)of this pairing of structural traits.

Two points are worth making here: one concerns a macrodimension of the changes that occur, the other micro ones.Let me start with the macro dimension, as I called it, asthis is an easier thing to do, since changes are crisper there,at that higher Gestalt level. Bear with me as I again quote myVienna book on that: “the greatest, the most significant andpermanent transformations of diplomatic training – the spurtsbetween phases [phases which are marked by a relative stasis,with a few adjustments here and there] – have tended to comenot just from the more or less fictional intellectualtâtonnement of a few Illuminist philosophes or from thegenerosity of well-meaning and benevolent diplomats, but frommomentous changes in global political and economic patternsof international relationships, the barrels of Gatling orMaxim guns, the calculations of grey accountants in theirlairs, the points of spears and the edge of scimitars, thecourage of rebellious irredentism, the ludic dimensions ofacademic back-stabbing, or the ferocity of terrorist suicidebombers. A slightly different way of putting this is tostress the obvious: diplomatic training is not just part ofdomestic politics, it is also part of internationalpolitics”15.

My point here is, I trust, a rather simple one. Macro,or global, alterations, in the sense of system-wide changesin diplomatic training, have characteristically taken placein response to tectonic shifts in the international Statesystem. Training substance and formats16 (and these two planes15 Armando Marques Guedes (2008), Raising Diplomats, Wien, op. cit.: 11.16 I here follow, overall, A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (1994), The Sons and Daughters ofMaria Theresia, An Anniversary History of the Annual Meeting of Directors and Deans of DiplomaticAcademies and Institutes of International Relations, [s.l.]: Edmund A. Walsh School ofForeign Service, Georgetown University, , p. 1. As may be seen, I findKirk-Greene’s periodization of diplomatic training compelling, although I

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are, of course interdependent) saw major alterations as aresult of the Vienna Congress of 1815 (when Conferences and abudding form of multilateralism arose, with its own demands,of course); they saw more change coming upon them with thedecisions taken in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 (whichbrought in new Consular and private international legalmatters and litigation, as well as novel economic arenasdiplomats had to understand); they again moved mightily in1919 with Versailles (which meant newly reinforcedmultilateralisms and pushed for new breeds of diplomats tohave to try and cope with hardened political-military issues,and a profusion of new consular and legal realities whichlargely outshone the earlier Berlin demands); both did soonce more after Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco in 1945(with full-fledged multilateralism arising, cooperation, andregional integration processes, compounded with an unexpectedvehemence of Great Power politics revisited in a MutuallyAssured Destruction – MAD – format): they got robustlyreadjusted, in post-communist countries at least althoughsometimes in slow motion, as it were, after the marvel thatwas 1989-1991; and both substance and formats are stillshape-shifting after 9/11 2001, and this last batch ofchanges only God knows how they will play and to where theyshall lead us.

The bottom line seems to be: macro changes in diplomatictraining follow wars and peace-making ‘after victory’-typegeometries of power, and thus they flow out of majorupheavals. Not a great surprise, surely – we are allprofessional grown-ups, after all, we have all been aroundfor a while now, and we do know that is, unfortunately, theway things go in the international State system.

Before giving concrete Ibero-American instantiations ofwhat I am talking about, I shall turn briefly to a moremicro-level, now. Locally, and in the short-term, changescome lightly (even though this is often less visible, giventhat it constitutes the only reality we actually doexperience directly and we often tend to reify that as if it

try to add to it a few new ‘phases’.

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were all – which of course it is not). They are merereadjustments, balancing and re-balancing acts, clustersformed out of mutual influences between co-operativepartnerships – and this while still more often than notreacting to the turmoil that is international politics.

2.

I will give a couple of Ibero-American examples ofthis17. My focus shall be placed on the manners in whichdiplomatic training changes with foreign policyreorientations, and then mainly only major ones. I begin withPortugal’s Iberian neighbour, Spain, whose State – at leastinsofar as its juridical-political plane is concerned – showsa few similarities with the Portuguese one. I will then touchbriefly the Portuguese case, lightly indeed, as this issomething I have written about profusely elsewhere18. In asecond moment I will turn to Brazil and a couple of LatinAmerican cases, Chile, Venezuela and Costa Rica, mostly –Peru and Argentina too, but really only touching the surfacehere, as I believe deeper studies are needed on this front,one which is very rich, indeed, in the kinds of politicalturmoil normally associated with substantive changes indiplomatic training patterns.

In the Spanish case there is much to be said, even if myapproach is the merely indicative one preferred in thisstudy. A moment of attention shows us that not only doesSpain have a notable ‘global’ past, but that – as we shallsee in detail in the following section of this monograph – itis trying hard to regain that sort of role after a couple ofcenturies of what Spaniards often perceive as a relativedecline19. In other words, in terms of the modelling I earlier

17 In the examples which follow, I stick closely – sometimes ipsis verbis,although in a much summarized form – to what I wrote in my Viennese RaisingDiplomats.18 I.e., in my Raising Diplomats, a work largely framed around what I called“the Portuguese counter-example”..19 Indeed, there is no lack of assertions as to these points. In a volumeedited in 1980, entitled (ed.) James W. Cortada (1980), Spain in the Twentieth-

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suggested, Spain is attempting to regain a lost internationalstatus. This is coupled to a generalised conviction, widelyheld in the country and outside it, about the quasi-inevitability of such near-future regaining of a lostprominence by the larger of the two Iberian States – a claimfor which, with or without a heavy dose of a quiteunderstandable messianic wishful thinking, there is no locallack of expression.

A higher level of international protagonism is surelywithin Spain’s reach. Spain’s inevitable return to the worldstage, was, characteristically, justified by James W.Cortada, who explained in what may perhaps best be heard as areinvindicative geopolitical tone: “because other Europeancountries eclipsed Spain's political and military importanceduring the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most studentsof European events have assumed that Spain's day in the sunis but history. However, the historical fact remains thatsince the days of the Roman Empire, the Iberian Peninsulaplayed an interesting and usually significant role in theevolution of North African and European societies and, later,Century World: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 1898-1978, Greenwood Press – acollection of articles by specialists which emerged during the shortinterval between Spain’s democratic transition and the country’saccession into the European Union, the editor, James W. Cortada, was ableto write that “[t]here is very little good literature devoted to Spain'srole in international affairs for most centuries (p. xiii), a pointechoed in greater detail, over a decade later, by Javier Rubio, a SpanishAmbassador, when he wrote that “[s]obre la falta de estudios de lapolítica exterior de España se ha llamado la atención con ciertafrecuencia. Y ciertamente no sin razón, pues si es justo reconocer que enlos dos últimos siglos – nos referimos especialmente a la épocacontemporánea – la proyección exterior de España ha tenido un tono menor,de escasa relevancia en el concierto internacional de naciones aconsecuencia de una serie de circunstancias que no son ahora el caso deexaminar, también lo es que la referida proyección es un componente delque no se puede prescindir a la hora de abordar el examen de la historiade nuestro país”[in La Escuela Diplomática: cincuenta años al servicio del Estado (1942-1992), a book review by a Spanish Ambassador, Javier Rubio, published inCuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, 17, Servicio de Publicaciones, UniversidadComplutense, Madrid, 1995 (the quote is from its p. 205). The volumereviewed was published two years earlier, and is Luis Togores y Jose LuísNieto (1993), La Escuela Diplomática: cincuenta años al servicio det Estado (1942-1992),Escuela Diplomática, Madrid].

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of cultures in the New World and parts of the Pacific. Closerto home, Spain's influence was tied to its geographicalposition--being the point at which the southern end of Europemeets the western entrance to the Mediterranean; the distanceto North Africa is so short that on a clear day one can seeit from Gibraltar. Thus, early in the affairs of European andAtlantic communities, Spain served as a cultural conduit upand down the western half of Europe. Early it pushed itselfinto the role of an important maritime power in theMediterranean, and later it became a jumping-off point forexploration and use of the Atlantic. Its geopoliticalposition clearly suggested that one could expect Spain tocontinue its traditional role as a bridge between Europe,Africa, and the Americas. Inevitably, Spain's geographicalposition would be translated into political constants, whichwere evident in its activities over many centuries.Historians acknowledge that Spanish participation in thediplomatic and political activities of Western Europe hasbeen significant; both when Spain was a great power and whenit played the perceptive observer, Spaniards have identifiedthemselves with the fundamental activities of European, NorthAfrican, and American societies”20.

Some genealogical background is appropriate here. In1911, the Kingdom of Spain a seminal training institution wascreated specifically to form diplomats and consular officers.This timely innovation was but a first move; as it isstressed in the Spanish Ministry’s official internet site,during the last World War Spain quickly stepped ahead of itsinternational potential rivals: “España fue uno de losprimeros Estados en crear una Escuela Diplomática (1942).20 James W. Cortada (op. cit.: pp. ix-x). In what understandably became amantra for academics and politicians in democratic EU Spain, JamesCortada claimed in 1980 that “authors […] acknowledge again whathistorians, political scientists, diplomats, and economists believe andcontinually prove: Spain still influences the world in many ways” (ibid:p. xii). Although it could be argued this is by no means a new ambitionin Spain, Cortada was hardly enouncing a triviality. While it is truethat Franco also wished for this sort of influence and often activelysought it, the fact is his regime options tended to inhibit Spain fromgoing very far along those lines, something only overcome with democracyand the country’s accession into the European Union.

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Podría afirmarse que un Centro de formación para los miembrosde las Carreras diplomáticas y consular ya había sido creadoen 1911, bajo patrocinio de la Real Academia deJurisprudencia y Legislación y con la ayuda del Ministerio deEstado se creó el Instituto Libre de Enseñanza de lasCarreras Diplomática y Consular y Centro de EstudiosMarroquíes. Se trata del primer precedente de la EscuelaDiplomática”21.

21http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Ministerio/Escuela%20Diplomatica/Paginas/escuela_diplomatica.aspx, retrieved on 19.07.2008. The same sitecontains some interesting legal and historical background to Spaindiplomatic past: “Fernando el Católico tenía Embajadores permanentescerca de la Santa Sede desde 1475 y en otras capitales como Londres,Borgoña, el Imperio, Lisboa, Venecia, Nápoles y París, todas a finalesdel S. XV. Estas Embajadas permanentes exigían la existencia de oficinaso Cuerpos que centralicen la política internacional, y se inicia con elRey Fernando la especialización de los secretarios del rey en losasuntos, bien por razón de la materia o de territorio. Durante el s. XVIla red diplomática más extensa es la de España y es Carlos V quieninstitucionaliza los órganos del servicio exterior creando el Consejo deEstado (1526). La Secretaria del Consejo se convierte en Secretaría deEstado cuando se nombra a Fco. de los Cobos”.

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In the Spanish case, this tonic on coordination22 was tobe intensified with time. In 1942, under General FranciscoFranco’s military dictatorship, a larger offspring was born,a much more sophisticated and extensive institution, with aneven clearer universitary facies. In the Ministério de AsuntosExteriores y de Cooperación an enormous and very well equippedEscuela Diplomatica emerged, with its own corps and withestablished umbilical links to numerous entities in the

22 Of particular relevance in this ‘genealogical declination’ in whatconcerns comparisons are the coincidence of facts and timings of‘constitutive moments’ like the creation of a ‘French-style’ accessiongrand concours, the introduction of salaries so as to widen the social basesof recruitment, and the establishment of training courses. If only forthe sake of organic comparison, it is surely worth our while to quoteextensively from this very same document as concerns theinstitutionalization of ‘a diplomatic career’ in Spain, specifically itsconnection to the evolution of training: “[e]n España la primera normaque regula el acceso al servicio diplomático es el R.D. 17.07.1816.ElR.D. de 4 de marzo de 1844, siendo Ministro de Estado González-Bravo,establece la primera norma que organiza de forma estable y unitaria laCarrera Diplomática española, fijando el sistema de acceso, ascensos,categorías y nombramientos. El R.D.  exigía un examen previo paraingresar en la Carrera Diplomática. Ahora bien, como la primera categoríaera la de agregado sin sueldo, esto convertía la Carrera en un cotocerrado. Esta situación era parecida a la establecida en el Reino Unido oen Francia. No se suprimió esta categoría hasta el R.D. Ley de 29 dediciembre de 1928. El R.D. de Bravo Murillo de 18 de julio de 1852constituye el primer cuerpo normativo que merece el calificativo deEstatuto general de la Función Publica en España. El verdadero comienzode una organización moderna de la Carrera Diplomática data de la LeyOrgánica del Ministro Vega de Armijo de 14 de marzo de 1883 que estableceel sistema de ingreso por oposición a la manera del grand concours francés.En 1911  se crea el primer precedente de la actual Escuela Diplomática.El Decreto-Ley de 29 de septiembre de 1928 estableció la fusión de lasantiguas Carrera Diplomática y Consular. Con la República en 1932 seestablecieron como obligatorias las lenguas francesa e inglesa”. LaEscuela Diplomática se crea por el R.D. de 7 de julio de 1942 para laformación de diplomáticos a través de un curso selectivo. El Reglamentode 31 de diciembre de 1944 establece las normas de ingreso en la Carreraque fueron modificándose a través de sucesivos decretos hasta laaprobación del Reglamento Orgánico de la Carrera Diplomática de 15 dejulio de 1955, y posteriormente del R.D. 1475/1987, de 27 de noviembre,por el que se reorganiza la Escuela Diplomática, y de la Orden de 5 deoctubre de 1988, por la que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Escuela

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Spanish university world, namely (although not exclusively)the justly famous Universidad Complutense de Madrid23.

The Escuela Diplomatica is a public organism which has asits primary objectives of action the training of youngcandidates to the Ministry and the improvement of diplomaticstaff24. In effect, in the pursuit of its legally definedends, the Spanish Ministerio de Assuntos Exteriores considers study,academic reflection, and critical discussion, as beingabsolutely fundamental aspects of the preparation of itsdiplomats25. The number of seminars, subjects and thematicround tables which the Escuela organises for diplomats atvarious moments of their career is extraordinary. They arefrequented by as many Spanish nationals as staff and citizensfrom Latin American States, and many others from elsewhere —by way of illustriousness and edification, the Spanish Escuelastands out in the fact that, since the East Timor rise toIndependence, it has organised special courses dedicated tothe training of diplomatic staff of this small Portuguesespeaking country. Although in this as in other cases I shallmainly limit my focus to the training provided to youngdiplomats right at the start of their career, it isworthwhile underlining the fact that in the Madrid Escuelaemphasis is placed on an increasing specialization of the

Diplomática”.23 More than simple connections to a University system of which it is apart, even in its adhesion to the Bologna Declaration, the Escuela also,for instance, houses the Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho Internacional yRelaciones Internacionales, as well as the Spanish National Commission for UNESCO.24 The site indicated above contains a detailed mission statement for theEscuela. On this very subject and with objectives identical to those I havehere, the Escuela Diplomatica published in 2005 a magnificent volume co-authored by Nicolás Cimarra Etchenique, Helena María Cosano Nuño,Magdalena Cruz Yábar, María Luisa Marteles Gutiérrez del Álamo e JorgeMijangos Blanco, entitled Los procesos de selección y formación de funcionariosdiplomáticos en los principales países del mundo. It covers the cases of France, UK,USA, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland.25 Domenico Polloni explains its mission well: “The Escuela Diplomática istending to develop into something between a diplomatic training centre, apublic administration college and an academy for diplomatic studies”,Domenico Polloni (1996), Birth of a Diplomat..., p. 14. Its curriculum covers,in any case, a fairly novel propensity-tendency for mid-carrierdevelopment training which the Escuela recognises explicitly.

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audience – this is something which is both assumed andsought, with an ever increasing percentage of specialsessions dedicated to themes such as foreign cultural action,economic diplomacy, the defence of Human Rights, orprevention of terrorism26.

Attendance to the basic course which the Escuela Diplomaticaholds (with a mainly theoretical curricular content, albeitwith smatterings of practical work, very clearly a coursespecifically geared towards a deeper knowledge of thepriorities of Spanish foreign policy) is a sine qua non of fullaccess to the national diplomatic career. This is easy tounderstand if we take into account the main aims of theEscuela: after the relative worldwide marginalisation which itsuffered during the Francoist period, it is one instrumentused to try to guarantee a full reinsertion of moderndemocratic Spain into the international system of States, andto do so assuming its new status of ascending medium-sizedglobal power27.

Let us stick to the paradigmatic case of the “basicinduction course” of Spanish young diplomatic staff. Thiscourse has a markedly academic nature — patent in the link itkeeps with the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. We should note,first, that it is intensive, obligatory, and designed tocover all the aspects of life of a future diplomat, includinga period which involves practical experience in the SpanishMinistry. It has a variable duration, oscillating between alength of 6 and of 8 months. This longish core course is,later, complemented by various shorter ones, of varieddimensions and contents, but normally with a nature heavilyweighted towards an academic style “post-graduation”28. The26 There is no mistaking the importance Spain attributes to the Escuela:the formal closing ceremony of the School year is always attended by theSpanish King and Queen, as well as by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.27 For a general overview of modern Spanish foreign policy, see the attimes somewhat formalistic but always serene Ignacio M. A. de Cienfuegosy Fernando R. Rodriguez (2002), “Las Transformaciones Organizativas de laPolitica Exterior Española”, Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), n. 117:173-220.28 Since the 2004-05 academic year, in any case, the Escuela, inconjunction with six Spanish Universities, offered two Magisters degrees(now Second Cycles). These degrees came to complement the basic training,

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pedagogic format followed and, equally, the curricularcomposition chosen in defence of what it considers to beSpain’s national interest – and, thus the curriculum isannually made available by the Escuela in book format. This isevidence of the importance attributed by the Spanish State toamplifying the capacity of creative adaptation and inter-articulation of its large and nowadays very active diplomaticstaff abroad.

That is something, as I have argued for a long time now,which the Portuguese MFA should do and does not really carryout enough at all – although we did dig into it for a coupleof years; there will, of course, be a price to pay for that29.

Without further ado, allow me to move to Latin Americaand Brazil, now. Let me start with the Pacific Coast. Chilehas an Academia Diplomatica called “Andres Bello”30, an integralpart of The Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores31. It was founded in1954 with the purpose of selecting, training and specialisingChilean diplomats. According to Ambassador Rolando Stein, theformer Director of the Chilean Institute (this was confirmedto me by his successor, Pedro Barros) , the initial trainingof young diplomats of his country includes “un curso deformación que dura 18 meses – distribuidos en cuatrimestres –y contempla aproximadamente 60 materias, muy vinculadas a laagenda internacional. [This course includes] nocioneselementales de Derecho Internacional Publico, Relaciones

offered at the level of an “undergraduate degree”, which the Escuela hadoffered, for quite some time, to the students starting their Spanishdiplomatic career. Run by a non-diplomat and university professor, thesecourses had entirely academic characteristics. Note that these coursesoccurred before the “induction” course, that took place after the publicentrance exam, and which was destined only to those who completed itsuccessfully.29 For a lengthy discussion of this, see my Raising Diplomats, particularlywithin its framing chapters, 2 and 5. 30 As is surely well known within the fold of Latin American elites,Andres Bello was an eighteen hundreds academic. One of his contributionstowards education was the creation of the Universidad de Chile(University of Chile) in 1842, where he was the chancellor for over 20years, until 1865. Bello was a regular diplomatic envoy of Simon Bolivar.He was posted in London, Paris and Brussels.31 See, for further details, www.minrel.cl, the official Chilean MFA site.

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Internacionales y Economia para nivelar los conocimientos dealumnos que provienen de diversas carreras universitarias(últimamente han sido seleccionado periodistas, unarquitecto, un ingeniero electronico e historiadores, ademasde abogados y economistas. [...] Cuando se graduan después de18 meses reciben su Maestria en Diplomacia y luegodesarrollan una practica de dos anos antes de salir alexterior en su primera destinacion” 32.

The Academy has organized international courses since1977, including the training of young diplomats from“friendly countries”, its students originating especiallyfrom Spanish-speaking America. The Chilean Curso Internacional enDiplomacia – without the shadow of a doubt the most importantof all – gives special emphasis to Latin American affairs,having received students from 48 countries. The objectives itdefined privilege a multidisciplinary focus, a specialisationin regional affairs (in this case, above all, Latin Americanones), knowledge of specifics of international policy fromthe Latin American point of view, the deepening of contactwith other diplomats, and a wider and deeper knowledge ofChilean reality.

In both cases, the teaching of classes is assured by“diplomats and university professors”. The first of these twocourses is that which interests us most. The initial trainingprogram for young Attachés runs, as we saw, for twoquadrimestres, in the first of which the Academy givesgreater emphasis to general topics, while in the second itconcentrates more on regional questions. Simultaneously, avariable number (but always a great number) of seminars orshort courses on different subject matters take place in theChilean Academy whose emphases tend to be, in essence,academic33.

If only as mere allusions, let me add a couple of casesfrom Latin America. In Venezuela the Instituto de Altos EstudiosDiplomaticos “Pedro Gual” was founded in 1991 (in homage to thefirst Chancellor of Great Colombia, the Head of State of32 Rolando Stein, a former Director of the Chilean Academia Diplomatica“Andres Bello”, personal communication.33 Embajada de Chile, Lisboa, Nota Verbal n.º 49/2005, de 19.07.2005, inresponse to a set of queries I formulated.

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Venezuela and a historical symbol of Latin American unity),with a mandate to work as an organism of the Ministerio deRelaciones Exteriores defining it as “a forum for study,analysis and understanding of the affairs of main concern inVenezuelan foreign policy”; although it suffered a fewchanges with the rise of Hugo Chaves and modernBolivarianism, these priorities remain unaltered – albeit thesubstance surely changed quite a bit, in the just measure, ofcourse, and as could be expected, that the foreign policy ofVenezuela went through a series three hundred and sixtydegree turns. To do so, the almost thirty year old Institutooffers training courses updating and professional extensionfor diplomats – but also simultaneously, in having universitystatus, it develops postgraduate studies.

As I pointed out earlier, many more cases could beexamined here, but we really do not have as yet much precisedata on these – albeit it such information would indeed berather easy to obtain. Cuba is a good case in point here,which I shall not go into34. A few sprinkles: in Costa Rica,there is an Instituto Diplomatico (called Manuel Maria dePeralta), partly integrated in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs (and the Catholic Church, rather surprisingly!),which started its diplomatic training activity in 1998, inthe training, updating and preparation of diplomats. It madea partnership with Costa Rica University at the level of theorganization of postgraduate studies and it sought to attractteachers from Central America and the Caribbean. Peru has anAcademia Diplomatica, created in 1955, in the heart of theMinisterio de Relaciones Exteriores, whose attendance,through a course of 2 years, is a sine qua non condition ofentry into the diplomatic career. Argentina has a modelidentical to that of Brazil, with an Instituto del Servicio Exterior dela Nación, a department of the Ministry, which organises a 2-year course for access and another for Attachés, also of 2

34 I had fascinating talks on this, in both Madrid and Montevideo, withthe notable Isabel Allende, a personal Friend and the long-time head ofthe vigorous and very special Cuban diplomatic training efforts. Cubawill become a particularly interesting case when and if deep politicalchange occurs there.

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years, the first of which is theory and the secondpractical35.

I want to now turn to the Brazilian example and thenotable courses organized in the Instituto do Rio Branco, aspecialised training entity created in 1946 with an aim toselect and raise diplomats “in a continuous process oftraining”. The celebrated Institute does so by means of threecourses: the Program of Training and Improvement (PROFI-A)attended by young diplomats starting their career; the Courseof Improvement of Diplomats (CAD), destined for Secondcategory Secretaries; and the Curso de Altos Estudos (CAE)designed for Counsellors.

The Instituto do Rio Branco also offers technical courses innegotiation and diplomacy, diplomatic practice protocol andlanguages. It organizes too, in parallel, courses forjournalist and civil servants working with foreign commerce36.The so called PROFI-A is destined for diplomats who havepassed the admission contest and it is a training cycle, aswell as evaluation of aptitudes and capacities for the periodof internship in which they are Embassy Attachés (lasting for 2years).

Its aims — and surely the transcription I here includeseems to corroborate the idea that, in Brazil, a path towardsa harmonious meshing of theory and practice is being triedout in earnest — are immediately and clearly equated by theInstituto itself: “i) to stimulate the interest in theprofession; ii) to harmonize the knowledge acquired onuniversity courses with the needs of diplomatic training;iii) to transmit and practise the teachings particular to thediplomatic functions; iv) to develop critical capacity inorder to better understand gestation of decisions andattitudes of Brazilian foreign policy and v) to introduce tothe rules of conduct and to the management techniques ofItamaraty”37. The instruments of training and improvement usedthroughout the course take the form of various practicalprojects, lectures, exams, debates held in seminars. In the

35 For these cases, see D. Polloni (1996), op. cit., p. 34.36 http://www2.mre.gov.br/irbr/irbr/institu.htm, consulted 19.08.05.37 Idem, Portaria dated from the 10th November 1995.

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superb Instituto do Rio Branco analytical monographs on variousforeign policy topics are regularly written, and training inposts abroad and in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs itselfare made available to the young Attachés; moreover, they areoffered visits to various states and enterprises of theBrazilian Federation, so as to acquire a wider knowledge ofthe country they will represent.

But there is more, in a Brazil which is betting ratherheavily on a global role for itself38. CAD — the internship ofimprovement destined for Second category Secretaries in theBrazilian diplomatic career— has as its main objective thedeepening and updating of the knowledge necessary forcarrying out the functions of the Second and First categorySecretaries; its successful completion is a prerequisite ofprogression in the career of national diplomats. The coursehas two phases, a first composed of conferences aboutBrazilian foreign policy and current political affairs and asecond consisting of exams. There is also at the Instituto do RioBranco a CAE — literally, the course “of Higher Studies”;essentially a second deeper CAD, a specialization of sorts.It is aimed at Ministers of 2nd and 1st Category.

No further comments are really needed — they wouldcertainly be unnecessary — as to the level of professionalism38 For a well argued and wide-ranging study of past, present and futureBrazilian foreign ties and policies, see (eds.) Foreign Policy atBrookings and Wilson International Centre for Scholars (2007), NewDirections in Brazilian Foreign Relations, Washington. An interesting analysis ofinternal stresses within the very structure of Brazilian foreign policymay be found in C. Santiso (2003), “The Gordian Knot of Brazilian ForeignPolicy: promoting democracy while respecting sovereignty”, Cambridge Reviewof International Affairs, vol. 16 (2): 343-358. According to Santiso, ”thereexist [sic] inherent tensions between the dual principles guidingBrazilian foreign policy, the promotion and protection of democracyabroad and the attachment to national sovereignty and non-interference ininternal affairs”. Santiso’s study assesses Brazil's response to threatsto democracy during the last decade in 10 case studies. It argues thatPresidential diplomacy has played a key role in furthering the democraticcommitment of Brazilian foreign policy. For a tightly argued, crisp, anduseful recent theoretical discussion of Brazil’s bid for post-bipolarregional hegemonic status, see Sean W. Burges (2008), “ConsensualHegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War”,International Relations, vol. 22, no. 1: 65-84.

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and the level of quality of training given by the State todiplomats who represent Brazil’s interests abroad39.

I could go on and on with examples, but I would be doingso with diminishing returns. The fact of the matter is,although the narrative changes from case to case (andcircumstances do alter cases), the ropes do not. So allow meto attempt a sort of take off, so as to fly higher and take abird’s eye view. 39 Once again, some relevant and useful context. It is perhaps in theofficial Itamaraty internet site(http://www.country-studies.com/brazil/foreign-policy-decision-making.html, retrieved on 18.07.08) that we may find a clearerdescription of the complex processes of foreign policy decision-making inBrazil: “[m]ost foreign policy strategies and decisions originate withinItamaraty. A senior diplomat always occupies the position of foreignaffairs adviser within the president's office, and diplomats occupysimilar liaison positions in key ministries. Since the 1980s, Itamaraty,in response to the growing complexity of foreign policy issues, hasestablished new divisions dealing with export promotion, environmentalaffairs, science and technology, and human rights. Itamaraty alsoestablished the International Relations Research Institute (Instituto dasPesquisas das Relações Internacionais--IPRI) as part of the AlexandreGusmão Foundation, which functions as a think tank and conference centreand publishes foreign policy studies. The Senate and Chamber of Deputieseach have foreign affairs standing committees. Under the 1988constitution, the Senate expanded its treaty approval prerogative toinclude all international financial agreements, such as negotiations withthe International Monetary Fund […] and international banks, which in thepast had been the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch (see TheMilitary in the Amazon, ch. 5). The Congress also has involved itself inmajor government contracts with foreign companies, such as the contractwith Raytheon for an Amazon surveillance system. The BrazilianCooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperacão--ABC), a foreign aidagency formally established in the late 1980s, coordinates allinternational technical cooperation and assistance received by Brazilfrom foreign donors (often, but not always, within the context ofbilateral agreements). For example, in the absence of a United States-Brazil bilateral agreement, United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) programs in Brazil are not coordinated through theABC. The ABC also coordinates Brazilian international technicalcooperation and assistance directed to other countries, mostly throughSouth-South relationships conducted by Brazilian government agencies,universities, and NGOs. At times other agencies may take the lead inforeign policy decision making. For example, in June 1995 the economic

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Keeping in mind my initial ‘roadmap’, let me try to dojust that. Looking with wide-open eyes at teaching-learningfor diplomacy leads us to take note of an interestingworldwide distribution of training strategies: training is almostinvariably only carried out when and where good Universities,or other institutions of higher learning, are in place.Indeed, this appears to be more of a sine qua non than aneffective cause. Or, in other words, it really adds up tolittle more than a necessary but by no means a sufficient set ofconditions – as some States with such good academicinstitutions seem actually not to care a whiff about trainingsome of their people in diplomacy, the net outcome being thata few States with great academic institutions do not havegood effective diplomatic training. But what are the emergentpatterns of ‘serious’ training among those States that doengage in it?

A careful scrutiny leads us to a curious asymmetricaldistribution, throughout the international State system [or,if you prefer, in what the English School of InternationalRelations (IR) calls “the international society”], of,intensive, systematic, and professionalized (and, therefore, effective)diplomatic training efforts. Interestingly, that asymmetricaldistribution too is far from random, or arbitrary. A simpleoverview of the data-set bring out clearly two majorclusterings, which one sees ‘coagulating’ in a kind of self-sector, led by the Ministry of Planning, made the initial decision toimpose quotas on imported automobiles. This decision provoked a crisiswithin the Common Market of the South (Mercado Comum do Sul—Mercosul[…])--because Argentine automobile exports to Brazil would have beenaffected. Itamaraty intervened, and a solution was negotiated exceptingMercosul from the rigors of the measure. The military had the final sayon foreign policy during the 1964-85 period, when foreign policy wasdecided frequently within the National Security Council (Conselho deSegurança Nacional--CSN). Since then the military occasionally hasexercised some influence. When the United Nations (UN) requestedBrazilian troops for a peacekeeping force in Namibia during the delicate,pre-election phase of transition in 1991, Itamaraty was favourable, butthe army vetoed the initiative. The reverse occurred in 1995. After asuccessful peacekeeping mission in Mozambique in 1993-94, the army, insearch of new missions, approved sending a battalion to the peacekeepingoperation in Angola. However, for reasons of economic austerity theministries of Planning and Finance delayed the appropriation until 1996”.

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organized fashion. Effective systematic intensive trainingfor professional diplomats tends to emerge in two verydifferent (albeit akin, in this as in many other fields)groups of States. Here are the two groups I mean:

(i) States who are (or were and want to regain thatstatus) major global players, or players in diverse regionalsettings – an interesting cluster which includes, of course,States such as the US, the Russian Federation, Japan, China,India, Brazil, Germany, or the UK, France, and Spain, to listjust the most obvious ones.

So far so good, that is intuitive enough, one couldsurely say this is a clustering one would expect in advance,or intuitively. But then comes a surprise [for me it was asurprise, at least], as we see a second, unexpected, groupforming:

(ii) Robust teaching-learning is also patent in smallish-medium-sized powers who are ambitious enough to want to punchabove their weight; a somewhat symmetrical and inversegrouping, notice – another clustering, this time gatheringtogether a rag-tag grouping composed of such disparateentities as the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Chile, SouthAfrica, and Israel, to again name just a few clear-cut cases.

Overall, then, this amounts to a rather uneven spread, ordistribution, of ‘serious’ training efforts, but quiteobviously too not an arbitrary one. Why this should be so isactually quite easy to understand – or so I believe – if wehaul ourselves back to education and its reach. So allow meto go into that for a few moments40.

Note that, in the first case, we have large powerful States,typically entities who have to deal with, and to deal in,many different scenarios. They must, as a result, contendwith a tough functional specialization (or at the very least with apartial internal division of labour) such that facing up to theirmultiple and very varied challenges becomes a feasibleendeavour. And, in the second one, we are up to small ambitiousStates which want to use ‘soft’ [I am alluding to Joseph Nyehere, of course] or structural power [now Susan Strange] in

40 For a fairly detailed discussing, see the already quoted ArmandoMarques Guedes (2008), particularly Chapter 3.

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order to make it possible for their foreign services to batabove the little that they would otherwise be ‘mechanically’limited to.

None of this, indeed, is very surprising at all – onceyou think of it, that is. But notice that, in this last case(the case of the small ambitious States), more than in thefirst set of examples, which concerned great powers, domesticmechanisms do indeed come into play – something which, ofcourse, most neorealists would be rather loath to admit. Whatthis empirical distribution shows, it seems to me, is thatdomestic matters (in this case training built upon a State’sdesire to have a heavier impact in its external politicalenvironment, if I may call it that, thus sticking to myspecific mass metaphor) do make a difference in thefunctioning of the international system – in other words, inagreement with institutionalists such as Liberal theoristRobert Keohane, and also, suggesting, somewhat tongue incheek, that ‘some of the international Hobbesian anarchy isindeed what States make of it’, to paraphrase AlexanderWendt, another well-known IR scholar, this time one withforceful Constructivist leanings41. I will return to thispoint.

What I tried to do in the book I published on theraising of diplomats – and it would be both silly andimpossible to either re-do or even repeat that here – was tolook in detail at all this: namely, at how small ambitiousStates and well established Great Powers conduct the trainingof personnel for their diplomacy. I looked at some threedozen cases. It was hard work; it was also great fun.

Having stated this, I shall now turn to the third andlast leg of my presentation.

3.

41 Idem. Most of Chapter 3 of my 2008 book may surely be read in this non-neorealist sense, namely my concern with contextualizing diplomatictraining within the wider framework of foreign policy decisions andreorientations, and within that of different administrative structures.

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As indicated at the outset, in my last step I shallattempt a wide-angle view, one in which I try to somehowdevelop the argument beyond what I did in my Vienna book andin my Bruges address. A first pitch-setting note: as hasperhaps been noticed by the more attentive among you, thetitle I chose for my talk embodies a rather Byzantine doubleentendre; or actually, two of them, as the title I pickedplays on a word couched, if not in a joke (I used the termraising somewhat – but only somewhat – tongue in cheek again),at the very least on the insinuation that when preparing ourpeople for diplomacy we are in some sense domesticating them ina rather industrial manner. The term ‘raising’ here resonateswith the ‘raising of chicken’, of course.

To underscore the obvious: the word fit, too, was chosenby me with deliberation. One the one hand, it suggests thattraining diplomats is something which has a vivid pragmaticdimension, something which – somehow – responds to (it fits)needs. On the other hand, it hints at the idea that doing soin one way or another implies there is a tight correlation (afit) between our strategies for doing so and something else, itsuggests that there is some sort of correspondence, even ahomology, even a causal link, between the way in which diplomatsare trained and something (or things) external to this effort.I, of course, believe both these senses are indeed there andthis is something I tried to show in my presentation.

I would like to try now to briefly take thispresentation one step further and apply the analyticalframework suggested to the whole of diplomatic training, to thevery structural distinguishing characteristics and traits whichI have been stressing it exhibits. This is something I didnot really do in the book I wrote on Raising Diplomats – but whichI began carrying out in my Bruges address.

So, to cap a rather ‘theoretical’ communication off, letus ask ourselves plainly: although a few rather casual (andoften very good) papers have been written and sometimes evenpublished on this venerable subject42, why have there not

42 Three examples, for me the best ones: apart from D. Polloni (1996), op.cit., see also the already quoted A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (1994), The Sons andDaughters of Maria Theresia, An Anniversary History of the Annual Meeting of Directors and Deans

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been, for such a longtime, any serious in-depth studies ondiplomatic training? The gap is indeed surprising, asdiplomatic training surely forms one of the core businessesof many of us here, and given that so many entities arenowadays involved in it in earnest… I shall break up anattempted answer to this meta-question (it sounds nice tocall it that, when it is actually just a glaring failure)into various layers.

I want to argue that this glaring absence, thisomission, results at least partly from an uneasiness thatflows out of traditional neorealist ‘explanations’ ofdiplomacy. Allow me to be clear about what I mean. Theconnection between diplomacy and Realism (whether neo- ornot) is uneasy, to say the very least. I am definitely not arealist in any meaningful sense of the term – even if I dorecognize a surprising amount of explanatory power in modelswhich take off from the presupposition that a “securitydilemma” does indeed subtend the international arena, andeven as I do actually recognize that that dilemma largelyformats the real-world and real-time operation of this arena.But it is surely well worth our while to ponder for a secondon the realist take on diplomacy, as I believe doing soallows us to partially answer my question: namely, why wereno full-fledged studies of diplomatic training ever writtenwhen training for diplomacy has been going on for so long andits centrality has blatantly been increasing?

I would like to offer a first, and tentative, answer tothis question. From a strictly neorealist perspective,observe first, diplomacy is something of a sham; forneorealists it is certainly not what it claims to be – alittle like multilateral organizations, diplomacy isultimately envisaged by neorealists as being probably more atool of States’ interests than the modern mechanism for pacification anddialogue that its practitioners time and again purport it to

of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations, [s.l.]: Edmund A. WalshSchool of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and also NicolásCimarra Etchenique, Helena María Cosano Nuño, Magdalena Cruz Yábar, MaríaLuisa Marteles Gutiérrez del Álamo and Jorge Mijangos Blanco (2005), Losprocesos de selección y formación de funcionarios diplomáticos en los principales países delmundo, Escuela Diplomatica, Madrid.

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be. An up to date version of this take will make diplomacyout to amount to a soft power tool; but, to be sure, a State tool,nevertheless. And although other attributes will surely berecognized as a part and parcel of the diplomacy package,neorealists will tend to look at these as rhetorical tactics,somewhat akin to legal niceties – but always as an integralpart of State strategies, to be sure.

The impact of this type of perspective on what diplomacyis all about is most certainly not to be taken lightly.Indeed, Realists of all stripes have as a consequence a sortof inherent difficulty in at all distinguishing diplomacy fromforeign policy: take as two examples, Martin Wight, arguably theFounding Father (or, at the very least, the éminence grise) ofthe British School of International Relations, and HenryKissinger, one of the great American thinkers in the samedomain (although with a much different outlook): both haveput “diplomacy” in the titles to splendid monographs thatwere actually focused in foreign policy rather than with what wenormally, in our daily usage, consider as diplomacy43. This isa conflation of notions which most diplomats – steeped in anoften painful division of labour with politicians that issomewhat akin to a separation of powers – would never indulgein.

As a result of this conflation, and because for so longneorealism was so very important in IR theorizations, I wouldargue that diplomacy has in actual fact hardly ever seenitself constituted as an analyzable object. To be sure, forhistorians, diplomacy has for quite a long time now been asubject-matter of great interest, and important insightsresulted from that – from Harold Nicholson44 to M.S.

43 For the first of these, the book I am referring to is (eds.) HerbertButterfield and Martin Wight (1966), Diplomatic Investigations. Essays in the Theory ofInternational Politics, Harvard University Press; the second is Henry Kissinger(1994), Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster. Although, strict sensu, Martin Wight andH. Butterfield were not linear realists, one would be hard put to claimthey did not come close: Butterfield, for instance, in 1952 described the“security dilemma” so dear to Realism in his History and Human Relations,referring to it as an “absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma”.44 Harold Nicolson (1945), Diplomacy, London, Oxford University Press.

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Anderson45, to give two examples only, but two tremendous ones– before things international started to move with the end ofthe Cold War. But they were either too narrative and attached tothe petite histoire of the life of Chancelleries, or too grandiosein scope, focused on the mechanics of great events and/or thepostures and decisions of great men. What they lacked was theinterpretative frameworks to see diplomacy as somethingstudiable, not simply as the “diplomatic histories” of old, orthe “history of international relations” that was meant byPierre Renouvin46 and his team at the Annalles School in Franceto supersede them, but as the “history of diplomacy”. It isonly in the last decade or two that diplomacy, conceived ofin this historical and sociological guise, really re-emergedas a legitimate theme for research. So the hegemony ofneorealism was one of the culprits – or so I am suggesting.

I can, of course, fathom a plethora of other reasons forthis painful comparative lack of bona fide studies ondiplomatic training. Diplomatic training is, itself, ashappens with most State-conducted structured internalorganizational matters, in this midst of a bureaucraticbattlefield, as all of us who have or had responsabilities inthe area know only too well.

So precisely what are the obstacles I am alluding tohere, which would hinder the development of studies ondiplomatic training? Bureaucratic warfare, that wonderful moderninvention, is what I am talking about here. In MFAs as in allorganizations, there is an “us” and a “them”, a “good” and a“bad doctrine”; what George Bush Senior would certainly call“lines in the sand” are drawn. Let me quote you a formidableassertion made in a notable study on the nature and dynamicsof bureaucratic politics: in a wide-ranging study entitledBureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, published in 1974 by the

45 M.S. Anderson (1993), The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1519, London: Longman.46 Two of whose works will stand for all: Pierre Renouvin (1994, original1954), Histoire des relations internationales, Hachette, a study in 4 volumes, andPierre Renouvin et Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1991, original 1964)Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales, Armand Colin. Rather than thetraditional ‘great men’  of ‘classical’ diplomatic history, Renouvinpreferred the study of what he called the ‘forces profondes’, which heclaimed channeled and led the dynamics of international relations.

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Brookings Institution, the authors, Morton H. Halperin andPriscilla A. Clapp, discuss Graham Allison’s and PhilipZelikow’s classical analysis of the Cuban missile crisis47. Asa sort of side comment on the well-known institutionaldissent in US State entities, they bitingly remarked on astriking reversal of priorities induced by in-fighting whenthey note that, in Washington, at the Pentagon, in Langley,Virginia, etc.. Both in relation to Soviet Moscow and asconcerns reactions in good old Washington, the arrival ofrockets with fully armed nuclear warheads and theirdeployment in Cuba, within easy range of major US cities andstrategic sites, the authors underscored the flabbergastingfact that “[t]he development of strategic missiles alsoproduced controversy over roles and missions, although it lackedthe intensity of the other [internal] fights because it did not threaten the essence ofany of the services”48. Is it not an amazing comment? As Allisonand Zelikow so aptly put it, “where one stands does, indeed,depend on where one sits”. One feels like adding that sittingis surely more comfortable than standing.

Writing about matters close to the heart of bureaucrats– particularly in allusion to real-time and battle-awaresettings –is obviously a hazardous endeavour. It ispositively dangerous. So it should be studiously avoided. So,I would claim, no surprise there. To slightly overstatethings, let me claim that writing about diplomatic trainingdoes not really turn riskier if one does it in Kandahar, orin Baghdad; it is like doing research in a mine-field. Afterall, even to the Pope, in Catholic doctrine, has a specialdispensation, entitled “Papal infallibility” [a sort of “redtelephone to God”, a kind of “continuous revelation”, this ishow the Vatican hierarchy actually views and defends it], inwhat concerns his pronunciations relative to organizationalChurch matters – your excommunication is automatic should youdisagree with his decisions at this level.

47 Essence of Decision, was its title. Here is the full reference: Allison,Graham and Zelikow, Phillip (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban MissileCrisis, 2nd ed. Longman.48 Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp (2006, original edition1974), Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution: 48.

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To wrap this up, here goes one more reason – the lastone I shall adduce – for the rarified hard-vacuum patent asconcerns in-depth studies on training for diplomacy. I havetalked about a theoretical limitation induced by neorealistpresuppositions, and also of a more down-to-earth prudencewhich is commendable in an institutional ecosystem permeatedby what I am tempted to call “3rd Generation bureaucraticwarfare”. I now want to turn to a final (not to call it a‘terminal’) limit: again, a socio-professional one.

What I am talking about is preparation. Although quite afew do most certainly have it in abundance, the truth is thata good deal of the people who do have a hands-on knowledgeand experience of diplomatic training do not, simultaneously,have the basic theoretical distancing [le recul analytique] whichis essential to be able to carry it out adequately, orconvincingly. Moreover, the many persons who do have bothsuch hands-on experience and knowledge and that theoreticalknow-how as a rule work within, or at least in closedependency of, their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs– and that, of course, does not always allow them theacademic and pedagogical freedom which are so essential toreally get into those studies properly. This is unfortunatelytrue in many Ibero-American diplomatic training facilitiesand Ministries. I am sure there are a few Popperians outthere, so let me say that there is indeed a way ofempirically corroborating this last hypothesis – a hypothesiswhich might otherwise seem a bit far-fetched.

I am not going to discuss politics, ideologicalpolitics, here, of course, but rather the ‘softer’corporatist version. I have touched enough on that as it is,so that we may now take a wider-angle view. Corroborationcomes via the simple observational verification of the hardlydisputable fact that entities such as the Vienna DiplomaticAcademy, Dutch Clingendael, American Georgetown, BritishOxford, MGIMO in Moscow, Geneva’s Diplo Foundation, or theBruges Collége d’Europe, are undisputedly amongst the mostcreative we have, and surely the most capable of mobilizingus all to meetings like this one, from all five corners ofthis God-forsaken planet in distress. Note that these are all

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institutions which are comparatively freed from Stateshackles, to again overstep myself a little. Notice, too,that people like John Hemery, Jovan Kurbalija, and PaulMeerts [some of the most important and renowned trainers fordiplomats, used by many MFAs the world over] are, by andlarge, freelance specialists, mostly independent fromofficial public ties and dependencies; they are also amongthe very best we have. Is this all accidental? I think not.

States engender viscosity. So, notwithstanding theexcellence of many State institutions like the EscuelaDiplomatica in Madrid, and the superb Brazilian Instituto do RioBranco, or, to vary a little, the US Foreign ServiceInstitute, overall State-dependency does appear to create problems for notonly robust and sustained research on diplomatic training, but also on itsachievable quality. I do not want to take unwarranted Liberalhigh-flights while comfortably anchoring my discourse down onthis – but I would like to squeeze some last drops of juiceout of it: is this State blocage of a recul analytique ameanableto a part and parcel of administrative “viscosity”, asDomenico Polloni called it, or is it best thought of as anepisode in the battle-scenarios of bureaucratic bellicosityand havoc? Probably both.

I want to finish on a positive note. Allow me to usethis last stretch for a few words in a matter close to myhome: a few words on the urgency of European diplomatictraining – training for EU institutions, namely the up andcoming (we hope) European Foreign Action Service49. The issue

49 Earlier called the European Diplomatic Service, an expression thenegative referenda in Holland and France which sank the ConstitutionalTreaty led us to abandon. As a curiosity, note that from its verybeginning the process was marred by disagreements as to nomenclature,which in a way still continues: there is as yet no precise agreement onterms. The Council referred to a European Diplomatic Academy, the EuropeanParliament to a College of European Diplomacy and, in French-speaking circles,reference was made to an École Diplomatique Communautaire. Interestingly, thesame issue of terminology surfaced in the third pillar with references toboth a European Police Academy and a European Police College. In spite ofthe difference in titles, however, there is little difference in theunderlying substance. At its meeting in Tampere, on the 15th–16th October1999, the European Council agreed to establish a network of nationalpolice training institutes, which could ultimately lead to the creation

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has been turbulent, but by no means has it shown signs ofbeing insoluble50.

Now, I am well aware that what will be involved here isnot in fact training aimed and directed at State-service, butinstead training for service in a largely multilateral institution – and avery sui generis and intricate one at that. And I am keenlyaware that expertise in one domain (or one of these two verydifferent political topographies) does by no means necessarilymean an expertise of any sort in the other; but it does giveyou all (at least the Heads of the European Academies andInstitutes who are here today) a special droit de regard, andeven a partial droit de territoire, in relation to this urgentimperative. My point is rather easy to make, here: we mustquickly and efficiently train EU ‘diplomats’, particularlynow that Europe will finally get a President and a ‘ForeignMinister’ with some clout. International scenarios aregetting more and more complex and tough. The world is notwaiting for us.

When one focuses on training, one realizes this isindeed not merely a problem for Europe. It is far wider-reaching than that. In the absence of specialists on, notreally multilateralism as such, but training for multilateralorganizations, and, in particular, for increasingly supranationalmultilateral entities like the EU (so training personnel forregional, if not global, governance entities is really what Iof a permanent institution. The Council Decision of 22 December 2000establishing the European Police College (CEPOL) followed from thatdecision (see Official Journal L 336, 30 December 2000), after a consensus onthe name was finally reached. Let us hope this parallel is maintained anda consensus emerges in our domain too.50 I discuss this in substantial detail in my 2008 book. For moreinformation and discussion, see also Simon W. Duke (2002), “Preparing forEuropean Diplomacy?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 5: 849–870. For an early prospective study, see G. Woschnagg (2001) ‘The Futureof European Diplomacy’, Favorita Papers 02/2001 (Wien: DiplomatischeAkademie/Europäisches Parlament), pp. 39–40. For a detailed map ofissues, see Nataliya Neznamova (2007), Does the European Union need a CommonDiplomatic Service?, unpublished Master's thesis, Institut des Hautes ÉtudesInternationales. For the pre-Treaty situation, see M. Bruter, (1999)‘Diplomacy without a State: The External Delegations of the EuropeanCommission’. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 183–205.

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getting to) – we are, unfortunately face to face with acomparative institutional void which urgently needs to befilled. There aren’t many institutions which can actually dothat. But let us hope they do emerge I due time.

I suspect Latin America and regional integration therewill not follow paths which differ too much from thispattern. May events guarantee them – and us in Europe, inBrazil and Latin-America – a brighter future.

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Etchenique, Nicolás Cimarra, Helena María Cosano Nuño,Magdalena Cruz Yábar, María Luisa Marteles Gutiérrez delÁlamo and Jorge Mijangos Blanco (2005), Los procesos de selección yformación de funcionarios diplomáticos en los principales países del mundo,Escuela Diplomatica, Madrid.Halperin, Morton H. and Priscilla A. Clapp (2006, originaledition 1974), Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, The BrookingsInstitution.Jackson, Brian A. et al. (2005), Aptitude for Destruction. OrganizationalLearning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, RANDCorporation.Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (1994), The Sons and Daughters of Maria Theresia,An Anniversary History of the Annual Meeting of Directors and Deans of DiplomaticAcademies and Institutes of International Relations, Edmund A. WalshSchool of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.Kissinger, Henry (1994), Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster.Klaits, Joseph (1971), “Men of Letters and Political Reformin France at the End of the Reign of Louis XIV: The Foundingof the Academie Politique”, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 43,no. 4, pp. 577-597.Marques Guedes, Armando (2008), Raising Diplomats. Political,Genealogical and Administraative Constraints on Patterns of Training forDiplomacy, Diplomatische Akademie, Wien.Marques Guedes, Armando (2008), “Raising Diplomats as Fit”,Collége d’Europe, unpublished manuscript. Marques Guedes, Armando (2008), “Répétition et Innovation:Généalogie et Architecture dans les Processus de Formation deDiplomates depuis le XVIIIième siècle”, 5éme section, ÉcolePratique des Hautes Études, Paris, unpublished manuscript.Neznamova, Nataliya (2007), Does the European Union need a CommonDiplomatic Service?, unpublished Master's thesis, Institut desHautes Études Internationales.Nicolson, Harold (1945), Diplomacy, London, Oxford UniversityPress.Polloni, Domenico (1996), Birth of a Diplomat: Procedures for Recruitingand Training Diplomatic Staff – A Comparative Study, an internal documentcirculated in the European Council.Rubio, Javier (1995),”La Escuela Diplomática: cincuenta añosal servicio del Estado (1942-1992)”, in Cuadernos de Historia

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Contemporánea, 17, Servicio de Publicaciones, UniversidadComplutense, Madrid.Rule, John C. (1996), “A Career in the Making: The Educationof Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy”, French HistoricalStudies, Vol. 19, No. 4, Special Issue: Biography, pp. 967-996.Santiso, C. (2003), “The Gordian Knot of Brazilian ForeignPolicy: promoting democracy while respecting sovereignty”,Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 16 (2): 343-358.Togores, Luis y Jose Luís Nieto (1993), La Escuela Diplomática:cincuenta años al servicio det Estado (1942-1992), Escuela Diplomática,Madrid.Woschnagg, G. (2001) ‘The Future of European Diplomacy’,Favorita Papers 02/2001: pp. 39–40, Wien, DiplomatischeAkademie/Europäisches Parlament.

http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Ministerio/Escuela%20Diplomatica/Paginas/escuela_diplomatica.aspxhttp://www.minrel.cl http://www2.mre.gov.br/irbr/irbr/institu.htm

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