Reinterpreting South African Housing Policy through Welfare State Theory

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Reinterpreting South African HousingPolicy through Welfare State TheoryAnita Ventera, Lochner Maraisa, Joris Hoekstrab & Jan Cloetea

a Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State,Bloemfontein, South Africab Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment, DelftUniversity of Technology, Delft, The NetherlandsPublished online: 03 Jul 2015.

To cite this article: Anita Venter, Lochner Marais, Joris Hoekstra & Jan Cloete (2015) ReinterpretingSouth African Housing Policy through Welfare State Theory, Housing, Theory and Society, 32:3,346-366, DOI: 10.1080/14036096.2015.1048895

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Reinterpreting South African HousingPolicy through Welfare State Theory

ANITA VENTER*, LOCHNER MARAIS*, JORIS HOEKSTRA**,1 &JAN CLOETE*

*Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa; **Facultyof Architecture and the Built Environment, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT Conventional wisdom holds that South African housing policy is mainly basedon neoliberal principles although some scholars have noted the hybrid nature of welfare pro-grammes. This is because most authors interpret the country’s housing landscape within thedichotomous framework of political economic theory (neoliberalism vs. critical lenses). Theseanalyses do not consider welfare state theories, and most authors end up applying a neolib-eral label to South African housing policy and practice. In contrast, this study takes a welfarestate perspective. It starts off with a description of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state theoryand Hoekstra’s application of this theory to the field of housing, resulting in a housing systemtypology that distinguishes between social democratic, corporatist and liberal housing sys-tems. In the second part of the study, the post-apartheid development of South African hous-ing policy is reinterpreted through the lens of this housing system typology. Our conclusion isthat the South African housing system is of a hybrid nature and that the social democratic,corporatist and liberal welfare state ideologies have all helped to shape the country’sapproach to housing.

KEY WORDS: Housing policy, South Africa, Neoliberalism, Welfare state theory

Introduction

Although there has been considerable growth in South African housing research overthe past two decades, theoretical reflections on housing policy and practice nonethe-less remain limited (Huchzermeyer 2001a). Though a number of contributions haveassessed policy intent and policy changes (Tomlinson 1998, 2006), only a fewauthors have reflected on the theoretical foundations (see Bond 1997, 2000;Huchzermeyer 2001a). Even fewer have assessed housing and welfare provisionwithin the city context (see Parnell and Pieterse 2010; Pieterse 2009 as exceptions).Critical theory was decidedly instrumental in challenging the race-based planning

Correspondence Address: Lochner Marais, Centre for Development Support, PO Box 339, University ofthe Free State, IB 100, Bloemfontein, South Africa. Email: [email protected] for Development Support, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

© 2015 IBF, The Institute for Housing and Urban Research

Housing, Theory and Society, 2015Vol. 32, No. 3, 346–366, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2015.1048895

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2015.1048895

ideology of the apartheid state. Within the framework of critical theory, a number ofscholars have noted an increasing tendency in policy, practice and research to followneoliberal principles (Bond 2000, 2003; Goebel 2007; Huchzermeyer 2001a, 2001b).Because most scholarly responses are based on political economic frameworks, bothSouth Africa’s housing policy and practice are commonly viewed in binary terms:assessments either support or criticize neoliberal principles. Consequently, scholarshave seldom considered aspects outside of neoliberalism or heeded criticism thereof(Parnell and Robinson 2013). Some reflections have however been made about thehybrid nature of welfare systems in South Africa (Pieterse 2009). In line with thesethoughts on the hybrid nature of welfare systems, we argue that a more complexanalysis is required – one that is not confined solely to (criticism of) neoliberalism.In so doing, we agree with Parnell and Robinson (2013, 600) that a need exists for amore relevant (post-neoliberal) urban (in our case, housing) theory, because of the“… growing concern that there may have been a misapplication, or at least anoverextension, of critiques of urban neoliberalism”. We believe that welfare state the-ory offers both a systematic framework and a more complex understanding of hous-ing policy. Against this background, we therefore primarily ask how South Africanhousing policy can be interpreted from a welfare state perspective.This study therefore aims to demonstrate the value of welfare state theory in

attempting to understand South African low-income housing policy. In the first partof the study, we discuss welfare state theories and the implications of these in respectof understanding housing policy. In the second part of the study, the frameworks ofEsping-Andersen and Hoekstra are applied to South African housing policy. In ouropinion, an approach such as this broadens the current understanding and it more-over emphasizes the complexities of the South African housing policy landscape.Finally, on the basis of our analyses, we conclude that South African housing policyhas a hybrid nature and has social democratic, corporatist, liberal and neoliberalcharacteristics.

Welfare State Theories: Implications for Understanding Housing Policy

Introduction

A considerable amount of research has been carried out on welfare state theory, buthousing has received very little attention in these investigations (Hoekstra 2013).Kemeny (2001) traces the origins of welfare state ideology back to the 1600s and1700s. According to the enlightenment-era political philosophers Hobbes and Hume,society is not possible without the state, and the state is what makes civilized societypossible (Kemeny 2001, 188). Ever since these early writings were penned, the roleof the state has been a contested topic in social policy publications (see Kemeny2001).Before discussing the role of the state in housing, it is important first to provide a

definition of welfare state in general. Welfare policy is defined as the interdependentset of public policies through which welfare (social security, pensions, education,health care and sometimes also housing) is produced and allocated between the state,the market and society (Doherty 2004; Gough 2000; Malpass 2004; Ronald 2006),and nearly every country has at least some welfare policies in place. Welfare policiesare intended to provide collective protection from the irregularities of the privatemarket, especially for low-income households (Malpass 2005, 11).

Reinterpreting South African Housing Policy 347

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Esping-Andersen’s Typologies of Welfare Capitalism

In the decades after the Second World War, many scholars started analysing welfarestates. Later, authors began focusing on the differences between various types ofwelfare states. Chief amongst these theorists was Esping-Andersen (1990), whosetypologies, described in his seminal book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,have become highly influential in social policy research. Although Esping-Andersendid not elaborate specifically on housing, several housing researchers have adaptedhis theories (for a few examples see Barlow and Duncan 1994; Hoekstra 2003,2005, 2010; Kemeny 1995; Matznetter 2002). Esping-Andersen (1990) identifiesthree crucial dimensions that set modern welfare states apart from each other: (1) thedegree of de-commodification of the welfare system, (2) the stratification of welfareprovision and (3) the relation of state activities to the market and the households inthe provision of welfare.In terms of the first dimension, Esping-Andersen (1990) writes that modern social

(welfare) policies are a reaction to the commodification of labour power. In precapi-talist and preindustrialist times, societies were mostly de-commodified. The mainsources of welfare were families, the church and feudal systems. But as a result ofindustrialization, labour aspects, market aspects and commodification became increas-ingly important in society and in welfare provision. More and more, the marketbecame the primary mechanism driving all aspects of society, including socialwelfare. In reaction to this, social policies were developed by the state as a safety netfor those households unable to access welfare through the market, focusing especiallyon elderly, sick and unemployed people. In simplistic terms, de-commodificationrefers to the degree to which individuals or households can uphold a socially accept-able standard of living independently of market participation. As far as the seconddimension is concerned, Esping-Andersen (1990, 55–78) writes that the state influ-ences social stratification through its welfare policies, which either sustain existingclass inequality or enhance the level of class equality. Finally, in terms of the thirddimension, Esping-Andersen (1990, 79) states that both the public (state) and theprivate (market) sectors play a role in welfare provision in most societies. The rela-tionship between the state, the market and the households (family) in the provision ofhousehold welfare is an important variable that helps to define the structural nature ofdifferent welfare states.Esping-Andersen (1990) uses these three dimensions to divide welfare states into

three different typologies, namely social democratic, corporatist and liberal welfarestates. He then attempts to provide a theoretical explanation of the power structuresthat form the basis of welfare systems by analysing the power relationships betweenthe state, the market and society in the delivery of welfare services (Kemeny 1995).Table 1 provides a short summary of Esping-Andersen’s three-way typology ofwelfare regimes.The liberal welfare state is characterized by minimal state interference and a high

dependence on the market for welfare solutions. In the typical liberal state, thewelfare delivery system is residual and is focused exclusively on a selective groupunable to provide for themselves through the market. The power ideology embeddedin this residual system of welfare reflects the liberal principle of minimal state inter-vention. The state only intervenes as a last resort, and when it does, the main objec-tive was to encourage a rapid return to the market. Liberal theories also discouragestate involvement in private household affairs; thus, there are few family policy

348 A. Venter et al.

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measures in these regimes. There are large disparities between income groups and arelatively high poverty rate. In addition, the provision of welfare solely to low-income households reinforces class distinctions and may cause stigmatization. Theliberal regime is exemplified by countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland andSwitzerland (Esping-Andersen 1990).Closely related to the liberal welfare regime, neoliberal policies propose freehold

and market-driven development. Whereas liberalism emphasizes individual choice,neoliberalism advocates the deregulation of economic transactions both within andacross national borders in order to provide the market with free reign (Jessop 2002).From a neoliberal perspective, welfare governance is seen as costly, inefficient andineffective in poverty alleviation. As an alternative, neoliberalism argues for the dis-mantlement of the welfare state in favour of policies that emphasize moving peoplefrom welfare into the economy, thus linking social and market policy (Brenner andTheodore 2002; Harvey 2006; Jones and Ward 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002;Theodore, Peck, and Brenner 2011). In practice, however, neoliberalism does notmean that the welfare state is in demise. Rather, it suggests specific residual forms ofwelfare. The notion of welfare obligation as opposed to entitlement became a domi-nant feature of welfare under neoliberalism. According to Hartman (2005, 64), therelationship between neoliberalism and the welfare states can be articulated as follows:

Table 1. Esping-Andersen’s three-way typology of welfare regimes

Regime type Liberal regime Corporatist regime Social democratic regime

Role in welfareprovision ofstate, marketand family

Market hascentral role inwelfareprovision

Family/conservativegroups have central rolein welfare provision

State has central role in welfareprovision

State and familyare marginal inwelfareprovision

State is subsidiary; thefamily is important;considerable influence iswielded by privatenon-profit organizations

Market and family are marginalin welfare provision

Welfare system Residual systemof targetedwelfare

Conservative system ofsegmented welfareprovision

De-commodified/comprehensivesystem of welfare provision

Commodification High Medium LowStratification Reinforces class

distinctionsReproduces existingclass stratification

Enhances equality; universalaccess to welfare irrespective ofclass

Incomedistribution

Large incomedifferences andrelatively highpoverty rates

Moderate incomedifferences and variableincidences of poverty

Small income differences andrelatively low levels of poverty

Examples ofcountries

UnitedKingdom,Ireland,Switzerland

France, Germany,Belgium, Austria

Sweden, Denmark, Finland

Source: Adapted from Esping-Andersen (1990) and Hoekstra (2010).


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“… it is possible to claim that the connections between them are so cosy as to suggestthat neo-liberalism has indeed got into bed with its putative enemy”.In corporatist welfare states, institutions such as the family and the church, in

partnership with the state, play a primary role in welfare provision. These institu-tions, often organized according to religion, class, ethnicity and gender, maintain orpreserve pre-existing class stratifications. The corporatist power structure appliesconservative systems of welfare in which a strong central state supports the vestedinterests of selected institutions such as the nuclear family. The welfare state systemdistributes benefits unevenly amongst groups in a way that reflects the relative powerof the selected institutions. This results in a segmented welfare system. Germany,France, Belgium and Austria are countries classified as corporatist welfare states(Esping-Andersen 1990). The state is more prominent in welfare provision than inthe case of the liberal regime type, and considerable influence is wielded by the fam-ily and private non-profit organizations. Income and poverty differences betweenclass groups vary, but are not as large as in liberal welfare states.At the other end of the spectrum, the state is the main provider of welfare services in

social democratic welfare states. Welfare services are predominantly de-commodifiedand not dependent on a household’s income. A relatively large proportion of thepopulation has access to welfare services. The power structures underlying the socialdemocratic regime are characterized by support for an extensive welfare state amongstboth the lower- and the middle-income groups. Income differences are not as pro-nounced in social democratic welfare states as in corporatist or liberal welfare stateregimes, and there are relatively low levels of poverty. Sweden, Denmark and Finlandare examples of social democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990).Although Esping-Andersen’s typology has been used by some researchers in the

South African context (Seekings 2002), it is probably fair to argue that the applica-tion thereof is limited for the most part, while to all intents and purposes, theapplication of this typology to the housing field has been non-existent. This studyattempts to fill this gap.

Housing and the Welfare State

Ulf Torgersen (1987) used the phrase “wobbly pillar under the welfare state” todescribe housing in relation to other welfare services. In terms of the “wobbly pillar”metaphor, Torgersen argues that welfare sectors such as social security, educationand health have a number of characteristics in common that are not shared with thehousing sector. Instead, housing has more in common with capitalist development,which is why he regards it as the “wobbly pillar” under the welfare state. Proposingan explanation for this phenomenon, Harloe (1995, 536) theorizes that housing isregarded as real estate, and private property rights are a defining characteristic ofcapitalist societies. Thus, propositions that may imperil property rights (such ashousing welfare policies) encounter much more resistance than suggestions tode-commodify welfare provision in the sectors of social security, education andhealth. Unlike the other welfare sectors, housing is also not always regarded as auniversal right, nor is it provided as a free or subsidized welfare service in all coun-tries. Instead, housing delivery is characterized by various combinations of public,subsidized and private provision (Harloe 1995; Kemeny 2001).Even though housing is not an integral part of the welfare state, the relationships

between the field of housing and the other pillars of the welfare state are definitely


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strong. Stephens et al. (2010) state that the relationship between welfare stateregimes and housing systems is bilateral rather than unilateral. On the one hand, thewelfare state regime clearly exerts an influence on the housing system; it defines theparameters within which housing systems and housing policies operate. On the otherhand, the housing system is certainly not a passive victim of the welfare state regimebut itself exerts an independent influence on this regime. According to Stephenset al. (2010), the functions that are carried out by the housing system partly overlapwith those of the other sectors of the welfare state regime. Hence, the housing sys-tem may either accentuate or soften the outcomes of these other sectors (Hoekstra2010).The concept of (housing) asset-based welfare offers a good illustration of the rela-

tionship between housing and the rest of the welfare state. This concept has recentlygained considerable currency in the United Kingdom, and it is also an important fea-ture of the East Asian welfare and housing systems (Ronald 2006). The pivotalnotion in housing asset-based welfare is that home owners can employ the assetsaccumulated in their dwelling as a safety net. They can use these assets as a supple-ment to, or even a substitute for, welfare state provisions. Consequently, govern-ments may perceive these housing assets as a justification to cut back spending inkey areas of the welfare state, specifically social security and social assistance,pensions, healthcare and education (Hoekstra 2010). Housing may thus act as a leverfor welfare state restructuring, which is why Malpass (2008, 1) depicts it as anincreasingly important cornerstone of the new welfare state.

Hoekstra’s Housing System Typology

On the basis of Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states, Hoekstra (2010) cre-ated a typology of housing systems. Hoekstra divided housing systems into threetypes: social democratic, corporatist and liberal (see Table 2).It is important to note that Hoekstra (2003) made provision for the fact that a sin-

gle housing system might have attributes of different types, referring to such systemsas “hybrid”. We shall argue later that an analysis of South African housing policy onthe basis of this idea of a hybrid system provides a more nuanced understanding thanan interpretation that is based solely on political economic frameworks.

South African Housing Policy: Setting the Scene

This section starts off by contextualizing the South African housing policy. Thefocus then shifts to identifying the key neoliberal elements of this policy.

Introduction

The history of black housing is closely associated with exclusion, dispossession andforced removals in many urban areas of South Africa (Mabin 1992). Ironically, theapartheid government was also in the forefront of a large-scale, state-driven housingproject that provided well over 500,000 houses between 1950 and 1970 (Morris1981). The initial drive to provide state-driven housing in core urban areas was, fromthe early 1970s, replaced by a drive to provide housing units in homeland areas(Mabin 1992). Increasing resistance from the mid-1970s and onwards meant thatgovernment was forced to rethink its policy approaches. The apartheid government


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Table 2. Hoekstra’s housing system typologies

Criteria Social democratic Corporatist Liberal

De-commodification • High • Medium • Low

Stratification • Low • Relativelyhigh, mainlybased on socialstatus

• High, mainlybased onincome

Role of state, marketand family

• The state isdominant

• The state issubsidiary

• The family isimportant

• Privatenon-profitorganizationshaveconsiderableinfluence

• The market isdominant

State regulation • Strongcentralgovernmentinfluence

• Functionaldecentralization

• Incremental,problem-solving policies

• Little stateregulation (atboth centraland locallevels)

Housing policyobjectives

• Guaranteehigh-qualityhousing forall citizens

• Preserve socialstratification

• Preferentialtreatment ofthe nuclearfamily

• Encouragehouseholds andother privateactors to takeinitiative in thehousing market

• Maintain thedominantposition of themarket

• State supportreserved formarginalgroups

Subsidization • Large-scaleproductionsubsidies

• Subjectsubsidiesfor largetargetgroups

• Segmentedsubsidies:specificarrangementsfor specificgroups

• Subjectsubsidies aremeans-tested

• Fewproductionsubsidies

(Continued)


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consequently started to sell off much of its housing stock (Mabin and Parnell 1983;Marais et al. 2014) and implemented a small-scale site-and-services programme (nohousing units being provided) as from the mid-1980 (Harrison 1992). The selling ofgovernment housing stock was made more attractive by the introduction of a dis-count benefit scheme in the early 1990s, which, in practice, meant that the majorityof state-owned stock was handed over free of charge (Marais et al. 2014). TheIndependent Development Trust was established in 1992 to deliver 100,000 site-and-services stands through a capital subsidy to households earning less than R1500per month in the period of democratic transition (Huchzermeyer 2001a). Yet neitherthe government’s site-and-services projects nor those projects implemented by the

Table 2. (Continued)

Criteria Social democratic Corporatist Liberal

Price setting and priceregulation

• Strong staterole in pricesetting andpriceregulation

• Moderate stateinfluence

• State regulationof prices tocorrectnegative effectsof the market

• Marketdeterminationof house prices

Housing allocation • Allocationon the basisof need

• Stateintervention tocorrectnegative effectsof the market

• Certain groupsmay befavoured in theallocationprocess

• Marketdeterminationof housingallocation formost of thehousing stock

• Regulatedallocation of asmall part ofthe housingstock

Organization ofhousing provision

• Strict spatialplanning

• State takesinitiative fortheproductionof newlybuilt houses

• Moderatelystrict spatialplanning

• Private actors(mainlyhouseholds andsmallcompanies)take initiativefor theproduction ofnewly builthouses

• No strictspatialplanning

• Private actors(mainly bigcompanies)take initiativefor theproduction ofnewly builthouses

Source: Hoekstra (2003), 63.


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Independent Development Trust made a significant dent in the housing backlog. By1992, the National Housing Forum (a think tank formed to establish a post-apartheidhousing policy) was set up, and by May 1994 (a month after the first democraticelection), the first housing White Paper was released (Rust and Rubenstein 1996).Post-apartheid policy continued both the discount benefit scheme and the capital sub-sidy scheme (Marais et al. 2014). The release of Breaking New Ground (BNG): aComprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements in2004 largely continued on the existing housing policy pathway and it emphasizedhousing quality, the housing market and integrated planning (Tomlinson 2006).Post-apartheid housing policy, through the Housing Subsidy Programme (com-

monly known as reconstruction and development (RDP) houses) has focused on pro-viding low-income households with a starter home, a stand (ownership) and services(Rust and Rubenstein 1996). Government assistance has been provided in the formof a capital subsidy for the poor. In 1994, the subsidy amount was R15,000 forhouseholds earning less than R800 per month, R12,500 for households with anincome of between R800 and R1500 per month, R9000 for households with amonthly income of between R1500 and R2500, and R5000 for households with anincome of between R2500 and R3500 per month (Tomlinson 1998). The full subsidyamount was sufficient to ensure ownership of a stand, basic services and a starterhome (Tomlinson 1998). Although the specific amounts and the targeted beneficiarygroups have changed somewhat over the past 20 years, the policy approach hasremained the same (Shisaka Development Management Services 2011). The currentamount of the main subsidy is nearly R110,000 (Department of Human Settlements2014).1

Napier and Landman (2010) have segmented the South African housing landscapeand provide for an effective understanding of post-apartheid housing provision (seeFigure 1).The main state housing delivery tool has been the Housing Subsidy Programme

(also commonly known as RDP housing – as Napier and Landman (2010) refer to itabove). While the state also funds a small Social Housing Programme, there are alsoattempts to link the subsidy programme with private sector funding/mortgages (alsoknown as credit-linked housing) (Rust 2006). The People’s Housing Process is aself-help approach to the housing subsidy (houses not being delivered through a con-tractor and private developer but by people themselves) (Ntema 2011). The incre-mental nature of the policy also requires extensions and consolidations (Napier1998). Most of these activities take place within a regulated environment. Considera-tion should however also be given to the unregulated activities that form part of thehousing processes – such as backyard shacks (Crankshaw, Gilbert, and Morris 2000)and traditional houses (constructed mainly in rural areas). The main focus of thestudy was on state housing but, where relevant, some of the linkages with privatesector and self-help housing will be made.The Department of Human Settlements oversees housing policy and processes at

the national level, while provincial departments and, to a lesser degree, metropolitanmunicipalities are responsible for the implementation of the Housing Subsidy Pro-gramme. Since the programme was introduced in 1994, nearly three million house-holds have received a variant of the housing subsidy system described above(Sexwale 2013). This amounts to an investment of approximately R100 billion2 overa period of 20 years (state funds not adjusted for inflation). It should be mentionedthat although the Housing Subsidy Programme described above is not the only


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housing programme (see Napier and Landman 2010), it certainly is the most domi-nant one and it is therefore the focus of this study. Annually, the South African gov-ernment spends approximately 3% of the national budget specifically on housing andabout 5% of funds earmarked for social services are spent on housing (NationalTreasury 2014). While education receives just more than one-third of social servicesspending, health and social protection each receive approximately 20% of the budget(National Treasury 2014).

Neoliberal Elements of the South African Policy

The section makes mention of eleven neoliberal elements related to the SouthAfrican policy. In this respect, Huchzermeyer (2004) and Bond (2000) trace theneoliberal foundation of post-apartheid housing policy back to the influence of theUrban Foundation (UF) – a private-sector think tank established after the Sowetounrest in 1976. Bond (2000) also argues that international organizations such as theWorld Bank have influenced policy directions. The UF’s neoliberal ideas wereprominent at the end of apartheid and during the period of transition, influencing theprivatization of state housing, the informal settlement upgrading of the 1980s, thehousing approach taken by the Independent Development Trust (which providedsites and services to approximately 100,000 households between 1992 and 1994)and the new national housing policy of 1994 (Huchzermeyer 2004). The debates thattook place at the National Housing Forum were also affected by political economictheory: the depth vs. breadth debate (should a small number of households receive alarge housing product or should a large number of households receive a small hous-ing product?), the question of the size of the subsidy and whether the state or privatesector should act as developers (Tomlinson 1998). According to Huchzermeyer(2001a, 2004), the UF’s private-sector background is what resulted in the neoliberalpost-apartheid emphasis on individual ownership, a targeted subsidy, freehold tenure(see also Seekings 2000), private-sector development processes and the exclusion ofcommunity organizations in the housing delivery process. Some scholars go furtherarguing that it was part of a deliberate attempt to ignore the economic consequenceof the political negotiations (Klein 2007). Beneficiaries of the housing subsidyreceived a completed housing product to the amount of the subsidy on completion of

Private Sector State housing Self-help housing

Source: Napier and Landman 2010

Regulated

Unregulated

Financed privately or through bank loan

Social housing

Credit linked

RDP People’s Housing Process

Extensions/consolidations

Urban and rural self-built

Backyard shacks

Traditional houses (natural materials)

Figure 1. Emerging housing landscape with three parallel streams of housing delivery.


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the project/house (varying between 18 and 40 m2 in size) (Charlton and Kihato2006; Marais and Krige 2000). In the majority of cases, the state paid the develo-pers, contractor or conveyancers directly (Tomlinson 1998). During the first eightyears (1994–2002), this process was usually conducted through a developer whotook the development risk and had a land development agreement with a localmunicipality, and who was paid via conveyancer attorneys on behalf of the state(Shisaka Development Management Services 2011).The UF’s neoliberal viewpoint was also instrumental in the following policy

aspects: a predetermined housing outcome (site and services with the later inclu-sion of a housing top structure) and the emphasis on macroeconomic stability(Huchzermeyer 2004). As a result, the housing process in South Africa becametechnical and business-oriented, undermining community development, communityinitiatives and community-based organizations (Huchzermeyer 2004). Housingpolicy proposals in the 1990s were also heavily influenced by the World Bank(see Bond 2000). This notion is well articulated by Goebel (2007, 293): “What isclear, however, is [that] neo-liberal policies limited funds available for public, wel-fare-oriented programs, meaning that the low-cost housing program is under-funded,placing delays on delivery and resulting in housing of poor quality, built on cheapland on urban peripheries”. Subsequently, critics, including Huchzermeyer (2001a),have argued that South Africa’s neoliberal housing policy has led to the commodi-fication of poverty. Tomlinson (2006) summarizes this criticism in the followingwords: “Critics of the National Housing Forum’s policy formulation process havelong been of the view that business interests, as mainly represented by the UrbanFoundation (UF), were much more effective at pushing a ‘neo-liberal’ social policyagenda, which focused on capacity, managerial, resource and technical issues, thanthe much more poorly resourced ‘left’, which was pushing for much broader socialtransformation”. The small size of houses provided through state subsidies (a directresult of macroeconomic requirements) has also been criticized (Goebel 2007; Khan2003; Tomlinson 2001).By the early 2000s, points of criticism regarding the poor quality of subsidy

houses (Khan 2003), their poor location and the lack of integrated planning werecommon (Huchzermeyer 2004; Pieterse 2009). Against this background, the NationalDepartment of Housing released its BNG in 2004 (Department of Housing 2004). Inaddition to addressing the problems relating to quality and the lack of integratedplanning, BNG emphasized the role of housing in the economy, the importance ofthe housing market and the creation of sustainable settlements. The influence of DeSoto (2000) is evident, particularly with regard to the focus on the housing marketand creating assets for the poor (Tomlinson 2006). But this emphasis on assets andhousing markets can also be seen as a continuation of the neoliberal ideology of the1994 White Paper.In addition to the new focus on upgrading informal settlements, there were other

important changes. First, the income bands were removed in 2004; since then, allhouseholds earning less than R3500 have qualified for the full subsidy. There wasalso a substantial increase in the subsidy amount, resulting in an improvement in thequality of the end product. This was a change from the initial focus on “incremen-talism” (Tomlinson 2006). Furthermore, the notion of assets became more pro-nounced, with the goal of linking households with formal housing finance. Therewere even plans to provide a subsidy to households earning between R3500 and


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R7000 per month. Thus, government policy no longer focused only on the poorestof the poor (Tomlinson 2006).

A Reinterpretation of South African Housing Policy on the Basis of WelfareState Theory

We will now turn to a discussion of the implications and lessons that welfare statetheories hold for researchers attempting to understand South African housing policy.For this purpose, the housing system typology of Hoekstra (2003), based on the wel-fare state theory of Esping-Andersen (1990), will be used to reinterpret the housingpolicy developments that were described in the previous section. We will show thatunlike political economic theories, which focus on binary interpretations, welfarestate theory allows for a more complex and nuanced reading of South African hous-ing policy and practice. Our analyses will reveal that, even though (neo)liberal ele-ments are clearly visible in South African housing policy, social democratic andcorporatist welfare state ideologies have also helped to shape the country’s approachto housing.

Understanding Housing in Relation to Other Welfare Services

In this section, we argue that if one contextualizes housing delivery as a welfarefunction and analyses housing policy in relation to other welfare functions, itbecomes clear that the neoliberal label should at least not be regarded as the onlylabel that can be attached to the South African housing policy. Welfare state theorysuggests that state housing programmes have a fundamental welfare function and areclearly related to the other pillars of the welfare state. In South Africa, however, theinitial development of the post-apartheid housing policy occurred outside the contextof other social/welfare services. In fact, the White Paper on Housing, developed dur-ing the transitional period (1992–1994), was the first post-apartheid White Paper tobe accepted, predating the rest of the new government’s welfare response. EvenBNG (2004), with its emphasis on assets and housing markets, considers housingpolicy to be separate from an overall welfare approach, despite the fact that housingfalls within the “social cluster” of the South African government’s cluster manage-ment system. It therefore comes as no surprise that researchers have not been in thehabit of contextualizing and comparing South African housing policy in terms ofother welfare policies such as the grant (social protection), education or health sys-tems. This situation has worsened over time: for example, although the originalWhite Paper makes some reference to housing and health, these other welfaredomains are less prominent in BNG.When the original housing policy was accepted in 1994, the country’s welfare and

subsidy systems were limited. Since then, however, welfare systems have beengreatly expanded (Pieterse 2009). The original old-age pension has been supple-mented by child support grants, foster care grants, disability grants and other caregrants. Furthermore, equity grants are now provided to municipalities and then allo-cated to households which qualify for free basic services and electricity (Pieterse2009). As argued by Parnell and Robinson (2013), the expansive roll-out of welfareservices since 1994 can hardly be labelled neoliberal. The old-age pensions and childsupport grants, which are targeted, and based on income, more closely resemble thewelfare support provided by corporatist welfare state regimes. The equity grants and


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the free water and electricity, on the other hand, suggest a population-wide welfaresystem more closely related to social democratic welfare states.

Welfare State and Housing Policy Typologies

As mentioned earlier, not every housing system will fit exactly within one of thetypologies suggested by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Hoekstra (2013) – some coun-tries have hybrid features. This section assesses South African housing policy as ahybrid system, using Hoekstra’s housing system typology (see Table 2) as a frame ofreference. Before continuing, it is important to note that housing is entrenched as aright in the South African constitution, and this right is made a reality in SouthAfrican housing policy.The initial post-apartheid housing policy included aspects of commodification

(emphasis on freehold that is common in liberal welfare state regimes). These liberalaspects were further reinforced by BNG’s emphasis on housing assets and thesecondary housing market. Yet there are also examples of the housing process beingde-commodified. For instance, the sales restriction on subsidized houses in the firsteight years and the fact that nearly 50% of housing units do not have a title deedsuggest that the initial policy direction on ownership and the BNG focus on the sec-ondary housing market are not necessarily accepted by all, or not regarded as impor-tant enough to enforce in practice. In terms of the latter, it is unclear whether theabsence of title deeds is the result of a deliberate policy imperative, a lack of politi-cal will, or the state’s neglect of its responsibility in this respect. Yet, the inability ofgovernment to act in a decisive way in order to enforce the policy guideline probablysuggests an acceptance of the fact that many of the housing developments effectivelyremain in the state’s asset register. Furthermore, the implementation of the eight-yearsales restriction can also be seen as a way of correcting the negative effects of thefree market and should be associated with the corporatist-type regime (Table 3).In terms of stratification, it is safe to say that income and the market are the

dominant actors in non-subsidized new housing developments. This results instratification of housing and is in line with liberal regimes. Critics of the housingsubsidy system argue that because the subsidy is based on income, it further rein-forces the market-based stratification of housing in urban South Africa (Bond 2000;Huchzermeyer 2004). According to Bond (2000), the subsidy mechanism createsnew township ghettos. Huchzermeyer (2004) argues that, owing to the fixed subsidyamount, subsidy houses are located on the periphery of many cities, and that thissubsequently promotes a market-based stratification of the poor on the edges ofSouth African cities.The role played by the various actors in South Africa’s housing environment

(state, market, institutions and family) also points to a hybrid system. Policy andpractice indicate that the state is becoming increasingly dominant (Ntema 2011).This is in contrast to the initial emphasis on the market and private-sector develo-pers. Although there have been a number of attempts to increase the role of non-profit organizations (either through social housing or the People’s Housing Process),the influence of non-governmental organizations in the domain of housing remainsextremely small. The increasing role of local government through legislation allow-ing for the accreditation of local municipalities in the housing development processis an indication that the initial consensus surrounding private-sector development hasbeen eroded.


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Although, in the main, the original policy guidelines were oriented to self-help(the provision of a small house that had to be upgraded by making use of self-helpprocesses) the emphasis all too soon fell on increasing the size of houses (Charltonand Kihato 2006; Marais and Krige 2000). The central government plays a strongregulatory role in the subsidized housing sector through the eight-year ban on sellingunits, comprehensive building regulations, the National Home Builders RegistrationCouncil (established mainly to ensure and guarantee the quality of the housing unitfor the beneficiary) and the emphasis on norms and standards (providing larger,higher-quality homes) (Charlton and Kihato 2006). There has also been a movetowards decentralization, such as the accreditation of municipalities to drive thehousing process. Thus, as far as state governance is concerned, South African hous-ing policy has both social democratic and corporatist characteristics.The hybrid nature of the housing policy is further evident in the general policy

objectives. Although South Africa cannot yet boast of universal, high-quality hous-ing as can some social democratic welfare states, achieving this is the ultimate goal.BNG and the increased pressure to enforce norms and standards comprise attemptsto reach this objective. BNG articulates this aim in the following words: “TheDepartment will undertake an audit of and develop a programme to address the poorquality of houses built before the introduction of national norms and standards andthe NHBRC Warranty Scheme” (Department of Housing 2004, 12). Yet the avail-ability of housing subsidies mainly to households is more akin to corporatistregimes. The housing subsidy can only be accessed by a core household, and not byindividuals or households consisting of one person. The initial prominence of indi-vidual home ownership (as opposed to communal land tenure arrangements) and ofthe private sector suggests a more liberal typology. The role of housing subsidies asa social safety net for the poor is also probably more related to liberal regimes.However, there are also social democratic welfare subsidy mechanisms such as freewater and electricity, which are provided to the total population and which are notdependent on a means test. On the other hand, the emphasis in BNG on the housing

Table 3. Neoliberal elements of the South African housing policy

The historic linkages with the Urban Foundation and the impact of the World Bank ensuredbusiness-oriented housing development processes

The initial emphasis on the private sector as housing delivery agentAn emphasis on breadth (small subsidies to a large number of households) over depth (largesubsidies to a smaller number of households)

Housing is key in macroeconomic stability – a belief that the programme is under-funded,leading to small housing products

The once-off nature of the targeted subsidy is transparent and can be accounted forThe small size of the subsidy leads to a concentration of poor households on the peripheryof urban areas

Emphasis on freeholdA predetermined housing outcome (emphasis on what can be delivered in business terms asopposed to the needs of the household)

Very little room for community involvement and community-based developmentArguments that the housing subsidy has led to a commodification of povertyTechnical nature of the housing development process


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market and on “climbing the housing ladder” as essential aspects, is once again remi-niscent of liberal regimes. As for subsidies, the large-scale production subsidies(capital subsidy) in South Africa (a supply side mechanism) are common in socialdemocratic welfare states. Yet, as we have already noted, the targeted nature of thesubsidy suggests a liberal influence. The income-based segmentation related to thesesubsidies is also a (neo)liberal feature. However, one should probably accept that thecollapsing of the income bands could be considered as a social democratic tendencyin policy (reduced segmentation over time). Moreover, the mere fact that the subsidyhas been provided to well over three million poor households, and the fact thatapproximately 50% of the population qualify for the subsidy, led us to the conclu-sion that the subsidy mechanism is more in line with the social democratic approach.Furthermore, the fact that the subsidy was used for a housing structure in addition tothe infrastructure was in direct contrast to World Bank policies (Marais and Krige2000).However, BNG’s focus on demand-driven housing has a more liberal slant. Never-

theless, as already noted, the massive expansion of social welfare grants since 1994is anything but neoliberal. Both the extensive grants system and the settlement-related subsidies (free electricity and water) are in keeping with a social democratictypology and cannot be viewed in isolation from the housing subsidy. Meanwhile,the focus on households (nuclear families) is more closely related to corporatistregimes. In respect of price setting and price regulation, a number of observationsshould be made. In general, house prices are determined by the market, in terms of aliberal ideology. However, there has been some regulation to correct the market, suchas the eight-year ban on selling subsidy houses, which is more corporatist in nature.In addition, there is a substantial informal market (Roux 2013), which exists beyondany government regulations or restrictions, and which we have also categorized ascorporatist.Housing allocation processes are based on need (via a means test). Owing to the

large scale of subsidies allocated, we have categorized this aspect as social demo-cratic. However, state subsidies are also intended to create a secondary housing mar-ket, improve access to that market and facilitate households’ ability to climb thehousing ladder. This focus on the market is more in line with a corporatist or liberalregime. After all, the state intervention aims to “correct” the market deficiencies inorder to create a secondary housing market.The policy emphasis on ownership also came under pressure owing to changing

procedures associated with the housing subsidy. A major change was that of allow-ing final payment to be made to the developers/contractors before final registrationof the stand at the deeds office (Shisaka Development Management Services 2011).The rationale for this was to speed up the process, as the final deeds registration pro-cess took far too long. This perceived delay, combined with the fact that con-veyancers were no longer responsible for paying the subsidies, resulted in a 50%drop in the percentage of newly constructed housing units being registered at thedeeds office. Thus, despite the fact that the policy promoted ownership and a subse-quent growth in the secondary housing market, it became common practice not toregister completed housing units. The end result was that, owing to administrativeincompetency and pressure from developers and contractors for payments that weredue, one of the cornerstones of the housing subsidy programme was left unattended.The question is: Why has the political will to enforce this fundamental neoliberalpolicy requirement not been present?


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Tab

le4.

Plotting

South

African

housingpolicywith

inwelfare

statetheory

Criteria

Socialdemocratic

Corporatist

Liberal/neolib

eral

De-commodificatio

n•

50%

ofsubsidized

housingunits

arewith

outtitle

deeds;units

areeffectivelyconstructedon

stateland

andthereforelegally

belong

tothestate

•Eight-yearsalesrestriction

•Focus

onself-help

•BNG’sem

phasison

clim

bing

thehousingladder

andthesecondaryhousingmarket/h

ousing

assets

•Focus

onow

nership

Stratificatio

n•

Locationof

housingon

theurbanperiphery

reinforces

racial

andeconom

icstratifi

catio

n

•Marketisdominant

•Income-basedsegm

entatio

n

Mix

ofstate,market

andinstitu

tions

such

asthefamily

•The

increasing

role

ofthestate(the

initial

role

ofthe

privatesector

hasbeen

replaced

bytheincreasing

role

oflocalgovernmentin

housingdevelopm

ent)

•Som

einfluence,albeitlim

ited,

on

thepartof

privatenon-profi

t

organizatio

ns

•Since

BNG

–theem

phasisison

the

accreditatio

nof

municipalities

(functionaldecentralization)

•Initial

emphasison

theprivatesector

State

regulatio

n•

Increasedregulatio

nof

build

ingnorm

sandstandards

•Alsoincreaseddecentralization

General

housing

policyobjectives

•Intentionto

providegood

quality

housing;

also

increasing

pressure

toprovidelarger

homes

•Provision

ofhousingsubsidies

•Som

ewelfare

subsidiesavailableto

thetotal

populatio

n(for

exam

ple,forwater

andelectricity

)

•Subsidies

givento

households

–

individualscannot

access

subsidy

•Eight-yearsalesrestriction

•Emphasison

homeownership

•Promotionof

thehousingmarket(housing

seen

as

anasset;clim

bing

thehousingladder)

Subsidizatio

n•

Large-scale

subsidiesroll-out

•Subsidies

forlargetarget

groups

(muchof

the

populatio

nmeetsthemeans

test)

•Collapsingof

incomebandsmeans

less

segm

entatio

n

•Focus

onnuclearfamilies

•The

intentionof

BNG

tomovefrom

productio

n

subsidiesto

demand-driven

housingwith

less

emphasison

subsidiesandmoreem

phasison

markets

(Contin

ued)


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Tab

le4.

(Contin

ued)

Criteria

Socialdemocratic

Corporatist

Liberal/neolib

eral

Price

setting

and

priceregulatio

n

•Sales

restrictioncanbe

seen

asa

form

ofpricesetting

•A

substantialinform

almarketexists

•General

marketprinciples

prevail

Housing

allocatio

n•

Allo

catio

non

thebasisof

need

–large-scaled

approach;focusedon

thepoor

Organizationof

housingprovision

•State

takesinitiativefortheproductio

nof

newly

built

houses

throughits

provisionof

subsidies

•Moderatelystrict

spatialplanning

•Householdsandsm

allcompanies

take

theinitiativefortheproductio

n

ofmanynewly

built

unsubsidized

houses

•Som

eem

phasison

self-builtand

self-helpthroughnon-governmental

organizatio

ns

•Initial

focuson

largecompanies


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Already present in the earlier phase, the tendency to shift the housing delivery pro-cess from the private sector to the public sector continued (Shisaka DevelopmentManagement Services 2011). The original legislation made provision for accreditingmunicipalities to deliver houses, and this approach became more common afterBNG. Non-profit organizations have increased their role over time, but the role ofsocial housing and of the People’s Housing Process (a community-based self-helpprogramme) remains relatively limited because of the intense pressure to (1) deliverhousing and (2) run these institutions in a viable manner. It should be noted here thatthere have been some attempts (although not very successful) to bring back private-sector role-players by increasing the subsidy amounts (Tomlinson 2006).One of the key problems that arose during this period was the lack of adequate

bulk infrastructure. This was a direct result of two factors: mediocre planning at themunicipal level and the division between the top structure (house) and infrastructure– housing size was prioritized while basic infrastructure was neglected. The othermain problem has been mentioned above: nearly 50% of houses constructed duringthis phase were not registered at the deeds office.Finally, as regards the organization of housing provision, South Africa has a

moderately strict approach to spatial planning and regulation. Private actors (house-holds and small companies) take the initiative for the production of many of thecountry’s newly built unsubsidized houses (Napier and Landman 2010). The empha-sis on self-build and some delivery through the People’s Housing Process might alsosuggest a corporatist tendency. On the other hand, the fact that the state has such alarge role to play in the provision of housing subsidies happens to be more in keep-ing with a social democratic framework, while the initial focus on large companiescould suggest a pronounced liberal slant. Table 4 provides an overview of how vari-ous aspects of South African housing policy fit within the different welfare statetypologies.

Conclusion

Scholars commonly assess South African low-income housing policy on the basis ofpolitical economic frameworks (either accepting neoliberal trends or being extremelycritical of them). In line with international trends in urban studies, this study hasargued that housing policy should be understood in the context of a range of factorsthat influence such policy. Rather than assessing South African housing policy on acontinuum related to political economic positions, consideration should be given tothe complexity and hybrid nature of policy. Although South African housing policyhas certainly been influenced by neoliberalism, there are other important ideologiesthat should be taken into account.A consideration of welfare state theory and related housing regime typologies

reveals the hybrid nature of South African housing policy, which contains aspects ofsocial democratic, corporatist and liberal typologies. Therefore, rather than attempt-ing to understand South African housing policy only within the framework ofneoliberalism, it is useful to also consider the important influence of welfare statetheories.On the basis of the foregoing motivation of the value of welfare state theory in

understanding the complexities of housing policy in South Africa, the question thatarises is what a possible future research agenda would entail from this perspective.Three aspects can be mentioned, inter alia. In the first place, the role and importance


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of housing in relation to other welfare services in South Africa requires more specificattention. This should entail a consideration of the relative importance of housing asa welfare service, as well as more empirical work on the relationship between hous-ing and other welfare services (for e.g. health, retirement and social welfare). TheEsping-Andersen typology could play an important role in such research. It wouldfor example be interesting to examine whether the mix of social democratic, corpo-ratist and liberal elements that is visible in the South African housing system canalso be found in the other pillars of the South African welfare state. Secondly, inview of the hybrid nature of policy and practice, as emphasized in this study, it isour contention that the theoretical logic of different paradigms in different geographi-cal locations should also receive some attention. The fact that the Cape TownMetropolitan government is in the hands of an opposition party that is more inclinedto further the basic neoliberal approach holds interesting research opportunities forthe future. Finally, the empirical work related to the secondary housing market andthe housing finance system remains limited, and still tends to be left in the hands ofnon-governmental organizations, to a large extent (the work by Tomlinson andShisaka Development and Management services quoted in this study originated to alarge degree from non-governmental organizations, and certainly not from any uni-versities). Considering the fair amount of research that has been carried out on thistopic in the north, this aspect could well be considered as a priority.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The current subsidy is an amount of approximately R110,000 provided to households earning lessthan R3500 per month. It is important to note that though the income segmentation of the initialpolicy was dropped, the limit of R3500 was retained over a period of 20 years.

2. The rand dollar exchange rate in November 2014 was around R11 for 1 USD.

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Reinterpreting South African Housing Policy through Welfare State Theory