Representation of Interests, not Groups: Reclaiming Pitkin’s Second Way

Abstract:

For years, representation has been perceived as being about groups. However, in an era when the concept

of groups is being challenged, we need new ways of thinking about representation that do not depend on

groups as the central units. This article takes a fresh look at Pitkin’s conceptualization of representation,

and shows that although this is seldom acknowledged, her classical concept of substantive representation

opens the way for understanding representation in terms which do not involve groups. Accordingly, the

article sets out to test this “second way” by applying it to the academic field concerned with “women

substantive representation” and it shows that by moving from studying “substantive representation of

women” (the group perspective) toward studying “substantive representation of gender equality” (the non-

group perspective) the field can rid itself of problems it has struggled with for years. The universal character

of these problems suggests that the "second way” is a viable option for research on representation in

general.

1. INTRODUCTION

Within the scholarly literature, representation often seems to be about the representation of groups that

share characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, sexuality, class, ideology, or who live in the same area.

Accordingly, the conventional way of measuring representation is to define or assume a group a priori and

then set out to investigate whether this group is represented in parliament. This is usually done with

reference to Hanna Pitkin’s different concepts of representation (Pitkin 1967).

Lately, however, this means of investigating representation has become more problematic in the light of

empirical as well as theoretical developments. First of all, as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim convincingly point

out, “individualization [Individualisierung] is becoming the social structure of second modern society itself”

thus “it is becoming questionable to assume that collective units of meaning and actions exist” (Beck and

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Beck-Gernsheim 2002, xxii ,14). Within classical political science, increasing individualization is among

others evident in greater voter volatility and falling numbers of party members. Second, conceptualizing

representation as being about groups, which are simply ‘out there’ waiting to be found, has been shown to

be questionable from a constructivist (or contextual) standpoint (Disch 2011, 102). For example drawing on

Foucault’s notion that “juridical power inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent”, Butler has

pointed out that the group of women is in fact constructed by the political representation of this group

(Butler 1999, 1–5 on ; Foucault 1980). Moreover, as Brubaker reminds us, scholars participate in this

activity of constructing groups as well. Hence, groups have what Bourdieu called a performative character,

and by naming groups as such, scholars may actually be producing what they seek to describe (Brubaker

2002, 165). Furthermore, Brubaker’s research on ethnicity demonstrates that focusing too much on groups

– engaging in ‘groupism’ as he calls it – may cause researchers to overemphasize differences between

groups. Furthermore, it may lead them to place too much weight on intra-group solidarity while

overlooking intra-group power struggles and conflicts. Therefore, Brubaker warns, groups are phenomena

that social theory should try to explain – not a construct it should use to explain things with (Brubaker

2002).

Within representation theory some of these developments have been intensively addressed. For example

scholars of political parties have argued that greater voter volatility and falling numbers of party members

have made the assumption that political parties can act as indicators of individuals with certain

characteristics less reliable (Andeweg 2003, 150–151; See Bille 1997; Saward 2010 for similar assessments).

Moreover, the so-called “constructivist turn” within representation theory has paved the way for

outstanding research that conceive of representation as a constitutive process of claim-making (Celis et al.

2014; Saward 2006, 2010; Squires 2008). Unfortunately, Brubaker’s critique concerning the tendency of

‘groupism’ has not yet received the same scholarly attention within representation theory. However, this

critique too, I argue, ought to merit attention within the field of representation theory. Especially, within

the sub-fields in which the notion of groups holds considerable sway, such as that concerned with “women

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substantive representation”. This particular field is so prone to view representation as being about

representation of the group of women that even scholars who dismiss the existence of a universal female

interest and are inspired by constructivist takes on representation continue to stick to the concept of

women as such when setting out to study substantive representation. As I will show, this tendency to treat

women as a group gives rise to specific difficulties in representation theory. Hence, though the field has

successfully opened up what used to be “a black box “of women, we still today witness a tendency to

overemphasize differences between women and men, and to ignore the structures of power at play among

female representatives. These tendencies, I will argue, may fruitfully be viewed as mechanisms of

‘groupism’. Fortunately, it is possible to find a way around the notion of groups, although this is seldom

acknowledged. This involves moving from “women substantive representation” to the “substantive

representation of gender equality”. To do this, we must re-read Pitkin’s classical work, “The Concepts of

Representation”(Pitkin 1967).

When setting out to study substantive representation today, most research takes a point of departure in

Pitkin’s notion of substantive representation. Thus, for instance, writing on gender and representation,

Childs and Lovenduski (2013) summarize Pitkin’s notion of substantive representation as representation;

”where the representative seeks to advance a group’s policy preferences and interests” (Childs and

Lovenduski 2013, 490). This, however, is only half the story1, since Pitkin’s concept of substantive

representation (of “acting for interests”) is, in fact, a dual concept in which representing the interests of

groups only constitutes one aspect. The other aspect pertains to the representation of interests that are

not linked to a specific group (i.e. to someone). I term this “Pitkin’s second way”, and in this article I show

how applying this notion to the field of substantive representation and gender helps solve two major

problems which have been troubling this field in particular – and feminist theory in general – for years.

1 Their interpretation, however, is not surprising as this “second way” notion of substantive representation is not very widely recognized. Accordingly, a search on “Pitkin” and “unattached interests” in Web of Science and Scopus conducted on February 26th 2015 revealed no research focusing on this term in relation to the concepts of “gender” or “women”. The concept of “unattached interests” does appear, however, now and then, notably within research on representation in environmental politics (see Tanasescu 2014; Wellstead, Stedman, and Parkins 2003).

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First, I explain how these problems are caused by ‘groupism’; and second, I outline a means to conceive of

political action, characterized by greater gender parity, that does not involve the concept of groups.

I start out by explaining Pitkin’s concept of substantive representation in greater detail, and discussing why

her notion of representing interests that are not linked to anyone in particular does not play a bigger role in

contemporary research. Following that, in section three, I illustrate how the notion of groups is deployed in

the field of substantive representation and gender, and I highlight the problems that this can give rise to. In

section four, I show how “Pitkin’s second way” allows the field to move beyond these problems, and I

construct two Weberian ideal types for how to study substantive representation and gender. One involves

conceiving of representation in the usual manner. This ideal type is inspired by current literature in the field

which conceptualizes representation in terms of the representation of groups, and explores the substantive

representation of “women’s interests”. The other applies Pitkin’s second way and does not hold any

assumptions about groups. Rather, it is concerned with the substantive representation of “the interest of

gender equality” and is inspired by Beck and Beck-Gernsheims’ notion of individualism as well as the

perspectives of so-called “third wave feminism” as it is currently unfolding in the United Kingdom. This ideal

type has the potential to circumvent the difficulties caused by applying the notion of groups. Finally, in

section five I summarize my argument and discuss how the case of substantive representation and gender

may be applied to the field of representation theory as a whole.

2. PITKIN’S SECOND WAY

In “The Concept of Representation”, Hanna Pitkin explores how people in general, and political scientists in

particular, have thought about political representation. In order to establish the circumstances under which

one can correctly speak of representation,2 she develops three overall frames for how to conceive of this

idea: 1) A formalistic frame (conceiving of representation as a question of authorization or accountability);

2) A frame that conceptualizes representation as standing for (in which representation is seen as either

2 To Pitkin, representation means “Making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact” (Pitkin 1967, 8–9).

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descriptive or symbolic); and 3) a frame that views representation as acting for (focusing on representation

as acting in favor of attached or unattached interests). To Pitkin, the frame of acting for is especially

important, since this part of the concept concerns the substance of the act itself (Pitkin 1967, 12, 213).3

Substantively acting for

In order to leave room for the notion of ‘substantively acting for’ Pitkin defines this very broadly as acting

in the interests of the represented, in a manner at least potentially responsive to them (e.g. see Pitkin 1967,

155, 209, 213, 222)4. An important aspect of Pitkin’s analysis of writings on substantive representation

concerns the so-called mandate-interdependence dispute.5 The position of a writer in this debate, Pitkin

tells us, depends on his “metapolitics”, i.e. his views on 1) what is being represented (the nature of

interests); 2) the nature of the issues with which the representative must deal; and 3) the capacities of the

rulers and the ruled (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 146, 210, 166-167)6. Of these three, the first, which concerns the

nature of the interests being represented, is of special interest to scholars of representation since, as I will

show, it holds the key to bypassing the concept of groups and moving beyond ‘groupism’.

To Pitkin, interests are the essence of representative democracy, since they are the objects being

represented by a representative within parliament. Interests are always the interests of people (the

constituency to which the representative is potentially responsive), but interests may be more or less tied

to specific people. Pitkin uses the term “being attached”. The question of whether a writer conceives of

interests as being attached or unattached to certain people is so fundamental to Pitkin’s notion of

substantive representation that she devotes no less than two chapters of her book to discussing this

question in detail.

3 It should be noted that Pitkin never used the term substantive representation as such (see also Dahlerup 2014, 62). However, as this word is often used and it does seem to describe the phenomenon very well (at least in the British usage) I will use “substantive representation” (the popular usage) and “acting for” (Pitkin’s own term) synonymously. 4 Not all scholars, who interpret Pitkin stress the aspect that the representative is (only) potentially responsive to the represented. Runciman and Disch however do also conceive of Pitkin’s notion of responsiveness this way(See Disch 2011, 106 on Runciman 2007; Runciman 2007).5 This concerns the philosophical debate about whether a representative ought to act as his constituency would prefer him to do (the mandate perspective) or as he himself believes is the best way to act on their behalf (interdependent perspective).6 My interpretation of Pitkin’s summary of the important points in a writer’s metapolitics, which she herself sums up in a slightly different way (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 146, 210, 166-167).

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Acting for attached interests

For Pitkin, the notion of interests as attached to a single individual or to a group of people constitutes the

mainstream way of conceiving of interests amongst modern political writers today (Pitkin 1967, 159). In

order to describe how interests appear in this ‘attached’ form, she refers to Madison and the English

utilitarians.

Pitkin claims that to Madison, interests are always the interests of somebody. Since interest owners are

rational and egoistic, the Republic is necessary because its representation procedures stalemate action,

thereby preventing severe conflicts and the creation of factions (Pitkin 1967, 195). Moreover, since

interests always have owners, to Madison and the utilitarians these owners are best positioned to know

their own interest(Pitkin 1967, 192). That an interest is best known by the interest’s owner means that a

representative is elected to Congress merely to put forward the interests already articulated by his

constituency. Hence, Pitkin concludes, Madison and the utilitarians hold rather extreme positions within

the mandate-interdependence controversy, and they come rather close to falling outside her frame of

substantive representation as such since they practically suggest that representatives are merely delegates

that should stand for the constituency (which is Pitkin’s definition of descriptive – not substantive -

representation).

Acting for unattached interests

Regarding the lesser known definition of interests as unattached to specific individuals, Pitkin refers to

Edmund Burke as the foremost exponent of this way of thinking (Pitkin 1967, 168). To Burke, an interest is

never ‘of’ somebody, Pitkin tell us. Rather, it exists as an objective abstraction, and citizens (most often

people working in the same trade) may engage in an interest. E.g. farmers will participate in the agricultural

interest (Pitkin 1967, 174–176). Since citizens do not own interests, Burke does not believe that they are

the best people to formulate and understand these. Instead, interests are best understood in parliament,

where competent, knowledgeable representatives come together and deliberate in order to discover the

true interest of the nation. Thus, as Pitkin tells us, to Burke deliberation has to do with how interests are

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made known, and accordingly “the people are at a disadvantage in discovering their true interest because

they cannot participate in parliamentary deliberation” (Pitkin 1967, 181). However, in order for Parliament

to recognize these interests, it is a prerequisite that representatives are apprised of all the feelings of all

people (Pitkin 1967, 183). Accordingly, in Pitkin’s interpretation this prerequisite (which is in fact a

requirement in terms of parliament’s descriptive representation) is so important to Burke that he makes it

the criterion for knowing whether or not suffrage should be extended (Pitkin 1967, 177–180). Whereas

Pitkin categorized the writings of Madison as an extreme example of the mandate perspective, Burke’s

speeches may be seen as the opposite extreme, i.e. an example of the interdependence perspective, since

only the representatives know the true interests in which citizens engage. That being the case, one suspects

that like Madison, Burke too comes close to falling outside Pitkin’s frame for substantive representation

(albeit for the opposite reason), when she suggests that he does not believe that representatives ought to

be responsive to citizens as a general, procedural criterion (Pitkin 1967, 129). To Pitkin, however, this does

not seem to be an issue since she writes that Burke took responsiveness to be a key criterion of a

representative government. Hence, concerning Burke’s thoughts on the importance of responsiveness,

Pitkin writes that at the end of the day,“…when the people as a body…expressed their wishes “strongly,

decidedly, and upon long deliberation”, then their “general sense” was to be taken for wisdom” (Pitkin,

1967, 181-182).

Applying Burke´s notion of unattached interests in present day political science

The thoughts of Madison and Burke, as put forward by Pitkin, are presented in the matrix in Table 2 (in the

appendix).7 Having established that Pitkin’s concept of ‘substantively acting for’ is in fact a dual concept

which exists in two opposite versions, we are able to see that the representation of interests belonging to

groups (such as women’s interests) only counts for half of this concept. In Pitkin’s conceptualization,

substantive representation is not about groups, it is about interests. These interests may be thought of as

either linked to a group, as Madison proposed; or they may be thought of as something people may engage

7 Pitkin’s interpretation of Madison and Burke may, of course, be questioned. Here, as I am not interested in these writers’ texts as such, but in the way Pitkin uses them, I do not discuss the correctness of Pitkin’s interpretation, which has been questioned elsewhere in the literature (see for example Conniff 1977 on Pitkin's interpretation of Burke).

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in, as suggested by Burke. Although Burke may have believed that some groups of citizens would naturally

participate in the interest of the major trade in their geographical locality, this is not a necessary

precondition. In other words, we do not need to establish a group in order to conceive of an interest. This is

because Burke’s interests, as interpreted by Pitkin, exist independently of a specific agent. They are

“unattached”. Groups of certain people do not define or presuppose an interest. Accordingly, people who

share certain similarities – e.g. gender, religion, political view or class - may participate in an interest. Or

they may not. The interest as such is not defined by the characteristics or internal similarity of the group

which engages in it, nor is it defined by the group.

One may ask why the concept of acting for unattached interests has dropped beneath most scholars’ radar.

Maybe we just think of interests as attached to certain persons due to mere habit? Or perhaps it is because

we equate the concept of unattached interests with Burke, who is today regarded as “the last and greatest

champion of Parliamentary oligarchy” (Pitkin 1967, 168).8 Pitkin, however, stresses that Burke’s writings are

inconsistent and that they also contain a number of democratic doctrines (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 172–174, 188–

189). Moreover, if her use of Burke is what stops us from using the concept of unattached interests, it is all

the more surprising that we so readily accept and refer to her notion of attached interest, which she

developed by drawing on the work of writers, who - as Pitkin reminds us -“were far from being democrats”,

favored the representation of property owners and did not even discuss “anything like virtual

representation”(Pitkin 1967, 190–191). Consequently, instead of excluding Burke as irrelevant, I suggest

that we reflect upon why Pitkin - who discusses more modern writers in the rest of her book - does not do

so in her analysis of the representation of attached and unattached interests.9 Here, Schwartz’s comment

on how and why representation theorists use ancient words like “autonomy” and “sovereignty” may inspire

our reading of Pitkin: “The older terms give people a distance from their present situation; one which at the

same time names the present but urges them to go beyond this. This, it should be said, was always the

function of such words”(Schwartz 1988, 18).

8 Narud for example emphasize the aristocratic perspectives in Pitkin’s interpretation of Burke and further notes that “today’s more normative views of political representation seldom believe in unattached and impersonal interests” (Narud 2006, 6- 8).9 She makes one exception when mentioning Cole in chapter 9 (Cole 1920) (Pitkin 1967, 207).

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Similarly, it is possible that Pitkin chose the classic texts of Madison and Burke to inspire her readers to look

beyond the particularities of their thought and focus on her important point relating to the distinction

between attached and unattached interests? I find this plausible. Therefore, I suggest we move beyond the

particularities of Burke’s theory on objective interests that can only be acknowledged by morally righteous

men and focus instead on how the general idea of unattached interests may be used to inspire political

science today. Accordingly, I now set out to illustrate how this concept possesses qualities that may help us

steer clear of the theoretical problems facing the field of substantive representation and gender today.

3. THE CONCEPT OF WOMEN AND THE PROBLEMS THEY CAUSE

The concept of women

Overall, the literature on gender and substantive representation tends to explore when, how and why

politicians represent women’s interests (Celis et al. 2008). Due to this subject matter, the category of

“women” forms the group that is the focus of this literature (see also Squires 2008, 189 for a similar

appraisal of this literature). With Pitkin’s notions of representation as a point of departure, the dominant

tendency within the field is to investigate how the independent variable of women’s descriptive

representation (WDR, the number of women in parliament) influences women’s substantive representation

(WSR, the degree to which the interests of women are represented within parliament). This agreement

about the character of the dependent and independent variables has paved the way for a well-integrated

and methodologically well founded body of research on the representation of women’s interests, notably

in Anglophone parliaments but also in North European and South American ones (see for example Childs &

Krook, 2009; Dahlerup, 1988; Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008; Mackay, 2004; M. Sawer, 2012; Skjeie, 1992;

Tremblay, 1998; Wängnerud, 1998). While some studies find that WSR does indeed increase when WDR

does, others fail to detect such a relationship (see Childs and Krook 2009; Franceschet 2011; Wängnerud

2009 for exellent reviews of this litterature). Accordingly, there has been a tendency to investigate the

possible intervening variables.10

10 Today, a very rich literature on these variables exists: from studies looking at the concepts of critical mass, critical acts and critical actors (Childs and Krook 2009; Dahlerup 1988) to studies measuring the effect of a right- or left-wing

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Early on, the content of ‘women’s interest’ was contested (Grant 1993; Jónasdóttier and Jones 2009; Jones

and Jonasdottir 1985) and Saprio, Diamond and Hartsock were among the political scientists who early on

tried to define this. Saprio, as well as Diamond and Hartsock, for instance, pointed out that women have

common interests (or needs (Diamond and Hartsock 1981)) due to their position within the division of labor

of reproduction (Diamond and Hartsock 1981; Sapiro 1981). Similarly, Dahlerup has pointed out that

“women as well as other disenfranchised groups have an objective interest in achieving the right to vote”

(Jónasdóttier 1988, 52 on Dahlerup 1984).

Such points however have been criticized during the past decades. For example, by Vickers, who argues

that we need to “retire the universal woman permanently “but may still need to construct such interests

when it is political favorable (Vickers 2006)11. In fact however, already in the 1980s, black and lesbian

feminists emphasized the heterogeneity of the group of women, pointing out that although all women face

oppression due to their gender, this does not mean that their experiences are identical since other identity

markers such as race and sexuality intervene in the structures of gender (see Bryson 2003, 2007; Crosby

1992 for exellent reviews of this critique). Consequently, in the field on substantive representation and

gender a way of capturing this heterogeneity has been to focus on smaller, dispossessed (Dovi 2002)

groups, which are believed to face even more similar oppressive structures than the group of women as a

whole (i.e. Behr 2000; Minta 2009; Orey et al. 2006; Takhar 2014). Recently, inspired by theory on

intersectionality, studies have stressed the fluid character of identity markers such as race, sexuality and

gender, and have sought to determine the relative importance of these dynamics for the representation of

groups (i.g. Minta and Brown 2014; Severs, Celis, and Erzeel 2016).

majority in parliament. Similarly, institutional variables are put forward and scholars have found that variables such as different institutional rules and quota laws (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Franceschet 2010), the general degree of feminist awareness (Wängnerud 2015, 132–134) and the presence of parliamentary women’s committees, caucuses as well as more informal networks (Grace 2013; Green 2013; Holli and Harder 2016; M. Sawer 2012) may in fact influence WSR. Furthermore, specific conditions outside parliament have been found to support WSR within parliament. For example, the presence of an autonomous women’s movement as well as the existence of Women’s Policy Agencies (Dahlerup 1998; McBride and Mazur 2010; Weldon 2002).11 Though she does this, it should however be noticed that she in the same text insists that, “being able to assert what is in “women’s” best interest in a particular context enables contestation when men are making laws and allocations or formulating policies based on their images of what is good for ‘the universal women’”(Vickers 2006, 17). In other words, Vickers (perhaps unintentionally) seems to be implying that it is in the interest of all women not to let their interests be defined by men.

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Very much in line with this latter literature, scholars have expressly refrained from defining groups of

women a priori. Instead, inspired by Saward and Mansbridge (Mansbridge 2003; Saward 2006, 2010), they

focus on how groups and groups interests are constructed in the process of representation itself (Celis et al.

2014; Squires 2008). Still, despite their emphasis on the construction of groups, groups and group interests

remain the main focus of these scholars’ studies of representation, since they continue to study

representation of women.

The problems of women

By bringing in the notions of heterogeneity and multiple and constantly interacting identities, and by

stressing the role played by claim-making when dealing with women as a group, scholars within the field

have opened up what would otherwise have remained a black box. Yet the box persists, since the notion of

women as a group remains central within this literature. I will now turn to the problems that this gives rise

to.

First of all, the concept of women’s interests practically paves the way for essentializing the difference

between women and men, since the very words imply that women’s interests are not shared by men. This

follows from the use of the binary distinction of “women” and its opposite, “men”. This framing implies

that men are not “naturally” likely to try to promote women’s interests – at least not to the same extent as

women are.

Bearing in mind Bourdieu’s point that scholars’ accounts may have a performative character, it is clear that

the tendency to frame issues as being in the interest of women is not beneficial to efforts to encourage

men to embrace these issues, an endeavor that is underway in parliaments all over the world (Baldez 2011;

Palmieri 2013b). Framing issues as being in the interest of women only (as the term “women’s interest”

implies) almost suggests that men do women a favor by supporting such issues – that they need to “possess

some inherent goodness”12 to address these issues! Since my focus here is on the consequences of such

framing for research, I shall not address these important political implications further. Within empirical

12 For example Kaufmann suggests that among other things men need to “possess some inherent goodness, or at least their ability to relate to women as equals…” for gender based violence to end (Kaufmann 2001, 50)).

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research on politics and gender, the assumption that women´s and men´s interests are mutually exclusive

gives rise to research which tends to stress the differences between women and men much more than the

similarities when drawing up conclusions (Baldez 2011). Hence, the assumptions embedded within the

concept of ‘women’s interests’ seem to call for conclusions which reinforce them, making research work

almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. A further aspect of this male-female divide concerning the interests in

question is that although the need to consider males as potential critical actors with regard to women’s

interests has been pointed out (Celis and Erzeel 2015; Celis et al. 2008; Fiona Mackay 2008), after decades

of research within this field there is still very little evidence that men act as such (Celis and Erzeel 2015;

Palmieri 2013b are recent important exeptions). What little research exists does not discuss males as prime

proponents of action to support women’s interests. As noted above, according to Brubaker a tendency to

overemphasize differences between groups arises from applying the perspective of groups too extensively

(Brubaker 2002, 176). One may ask whether this is what is going on within the field of gender and

substantive representation? And if so, could it be about time to stop insisting on pursuing research objects

framed in terms of groups of women or men, and instead to think in terms of alternative objects of study?

The second problem arising from focusing exclusively on an object that assumes the existence of a group is

that the group perspective - when applied too rigidly - involves an excessive focus on intra-group solidarity

on the one hand, and risks overlooking intra-group struggles of power and conflict on the other (Brubaker

2002, 169, 177)13. Asked about the occurrence of female power struggles and conflict, few would probably

claim that these do not exist. Indeed – unsurprisingly - research in other fields suggests that they do.14 The

literature on substantive representation and gender, however, does not contain many thick descriptions of

tensions and struggles among women in parliament. There are, however, numerous descriptions of

supportive behavior by female MPs towards other female MPs within the literature of practitioner

organizations especially15 (see Marian Sawer, Palmieri, and Freidenvall 2013 for an extensive literature

13 See also Butler, who stress the link between the category of women (a unit) and the presumption of internal group solidarity (Butler 1992, 15, 1999, 14–15).14 See Skelton, 2005 for an inspirational analysis of specific women-to-women tensions and struggles within academia.15 See for example Palmieri’s otherwise excellent description of how the establishment of a Women’s Parliamentary Body in Serbia facilitates “an exchange between more and less experiences Serbian women politicians, thus building inter-generational solidarity and understanding”(Palmieri 2013a, 31).

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review on this topic). Although this perspective is, of course, very important, one cannot help but wonder

what would happen if we stopped looking at representation and gender through the lens of women as a

group. Would we see social mechanisms of conflict and power? Could it be that norms concerning the logic

of appropriateness in parliaments all over the world restrict the variety of possible actions that female MPs

may choose between because they are expected to act in solidarity with other women? Could it be that

powerful female MPs apply a norm of female solidarity to keep other females in their place? Or that

expectations of less powerful female MPs with respect to sisterly solidarity or mothering care (see Morley.

L. 1999) restrict the room for political maneuvering of incumbent females in different ways? In fact, could it

be that struggles among MPs of the same gender are often so serious that if we acknowledged them, we

would find it hard to retain the notion of women as a group when studying representation? The truth is

that we have no idea, and as long as we stick to women’s interests as the object being represented we too

subscribe to the notion of women as a group.

To treat women as a group16 is by no means a special feature of the literature on substantive

representation and gender: as Grant convincingly points out, apart from recent post-modern theory, Anglo-

American feminist theory as such can be characterized by exactly this tendency17, which is in fact a

characteristic of radical feminism (Grant 1993). Accordingly, still today radical feminism is embedded within

the perception of what a feminist theory is supposed to be about and within the language and the concepts

this theory uses (Grant 1993, 27).

Surely, Grants conclusion may be extended to the literature that concerns us here. Hence, the particular

‘groupism’ involving the tendency to characterize women as having interests which are different from

those of men and to assume solidarity among women, which I have shown to be prominent within the core

concepts of this literature, is in fact very central to radical feminism. Consequently, to steer clear of the

legacy of radical feminism and the type of ‘groupism’ we have inherited from it, great changes are called

for. Accordingly, to change the way we operationalize “acting for women” when setting out to do the

16 A group which may be more or less pre-given and more or less homogenous.17 As well as the tendency to stress personal experience and conceptualizing the public as private (Grant 1993).

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empirical studies as Childs and Celis suggest will help us to part from the demands of radical feminism will

not do (Celis and Childs 2014, 4). We need greater change! Such changes, involve changing the perception

of what feminist theory on substantive representation and gender is about and – just as importantly –

parting from the core concepts of “women’s interests” and of “acting for women”, since these are

embedded with radical feminism. If we do not dare to make such changes, we will never move free from

the legacy of radical feminism. In other words, changes within what Pitkin refers to as the level of

“metapolitics” (Pitkin 1967, 146) are called for! I now move to describe how the field on substantive

representation and gender may carry out such changes.

4. SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION OF GENDER EQUALITY

Following Pitkin’s conceptualization of substantive representation, in order to establish a way for the field

of our concern to study representation and gender without the notion of women as a group, we must

reconceptualize the interest in question. Consequently, we need to find an alternative to the concept of

‘the interest of women’. To find such an interest is not a question of “botanizing”. That is, unlike the

botanist searching for new species, the scholar of representation theory need not scan the social world for

something new. Rather, the task is to re-conceptualize an interest that is perceived as belonging to a group

into one that is not, but which has a similar essence. The interest of gender equality works well as a

candidate for such a reconceptualization, I believe since its wording does not suggest anything about the

existence of two genders. Also, since specific no owner or “natural” agent is embedded in its formulation

no one is automatically in- or excluded by the formulation of this interest. In principle, therefore, everyone

may participate in the interest of gender equality. Finally, by pursuing this type of interest, scholars can

study substantive representation without having to predefine an agent (or seeing the way such an agent is

constructed during the process of representation as its main goal). In fact, focusing on the content of the

interest (the message itself), as this type of interest forces the scholar to do, may help solve a puzzle within

feminist theory. This puzzle concerns whether or not it is necessary to conceive of a feminist subject (a

messenger). Since the unattached interest of gender equality focuses on “what is being represented” rather

14

than “who is being represented?, a specific agent (a “who” with certain characteristics or a certain identity)

is not necessary for conceiving of this interest (nor for promoting this interest politically). This may turn out

to make the debate on the importance of a feminist subject less relevant (See Butler 1999; Grant 1993;

Vickers 2006 among others for this debate, which it unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this article to

adress in detail).

In practice, the concept of gender equality (like that of women’s interest) may be taken to mean very

different things depending on how and in what discourses it appears (Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2009).

However, in order for the concept of gender equality to bypass the problematic assumptions embedded in

the notion of “women’s interest”, it must appear in a version consistent with a feminist perspective that

does not hold these assumptions about gender. To illustrate how we may conceive of the substantive

representation of gender equality in the 21st century in a way that sets us free of such assumptions, I

propose an ‘ideal type’ conceptualization, in the Weberian sense.

My proposed ideal type for conceptualizing substantive representation and gender draws on the notion of

gender equality as inspired by Beck and Beck-Gernsheims’ writings on individualism (Beck and Beck-

Gernsheim 2002), as well as on the so-called “third wave feminism” as it is currently unfolding in the United

Kingdom, according to the special issue of Social Movement Studies that explores this (Social Movement

Studies 2015). I term this ideal type “substantive representation of gender equality based on the

perspectives of New Liberal Feminism”.

Within this “New Liberal Feminism” perspective, gender is seen as a complex spectrum of identities and not

a dichotomous category (Lorber 2005). Being a gendered person is an individual project and it is up to the

individual to invent how this is to be done and how a gendered person may look (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim

2002, xxii in ; Skelton 2005, 321). Therefore, gender is a very diverse category. Finally, an important aspect

of this ideal-typical way of approaching the substantive representation of gender equality is that it is not

defined by a specific gender category. Accordingly, nothing within the interest of gender equality expects

persons with a certain gender to promote this interest, nor to act in solidarity which each other.

15

Consequently, all persons – transgendered, transsexual, queerpersons, women and men etc. may, or may

not, participate in the interest of gender equality (Baily 2015; Dean and Aune 2015; Lorber 2005; Mackay

2015 all stress that men are viewed as potential feminist agents within the current young British feminism

they describe). 18

Contrary to this ideal typical way of approaching substantive representation we may formulate an ideal-

typical way of understanding women’s substantive representation. This ideal type builds on the logic of the

concept of “women’s interests” as outlined in section three. Consequently, the reader familiar with the

field of the substantive representation of women may find similarities to the literature within this field. This

ideal type looks into the representation of women’s interests. Based on this dichotomous definition, it

expects women and men to have different interests and although some men may act in solidarity with

women, this perspective does not expect male MPs to take the lead in this type of representation (unless,

of course, they have been convinced by women to do so). The two ideal-typical ways of approaching

substantive representation may be summed up as follows:

18 The idea that men are included in the fight for gender equality is prominent in the view of “liberal” feminism (Bryson 2003). That is why I refer to this perspective as “liberal”, while using “new” to stress that this version of liberal feminism is different (more postmodern, one may say) from earlier notions. Alternatively, I could have used the much contested “third wave” metaphor.

16

Table 1: Two ideal types for approaching substantive representation within the field

Substantive

Representation of Women

based on the formulation

of “women’s interests”

Substantive Representation of Gender Equality based on the “New Liberal Feminism” perspective

Expected line of political

conflict

Women > < Men People who participate in the interest of gender equality > < people who do not participate in the interest of gender equality

Potential critical actors Women (male MPs may act

to help women)

People who participate in the interest of gender equality

Expected solidarity Between women Between people who participate in the interest of gender equality

It is worth stressing the difference between choosing how to conceptualize or conceive of a given interest

in a study of substantive representation; and deciding how to operationalize and measure that interest. The

first is a matter of the research questions asked. The other is a matter of how to approach the data.

Accordingly, setting out to conduct a study on the extent of substantive representation of gender equality

in parliament does not necessarily mean that we should not count representative acts that are conducted

or framed in terms of “women’s interests” as incidents of this particular interest. Whether the researcher

chooses to do so or not is a question of methodological choice. Hence, it is not pertinent to the actual re-

conceptualization of the notion of ‘interest’ as presented here. As Brubaker puts it, there is an important

difference between the data we look at and the analytical tools we apply – and the notion of groups

pertains to the data, not to our tools (Brubaker 2002, 165). Therefore, political actions framed by a

representative as “doing good for women in third world countries” for example, or actions which are

framed as “being capable of supporting unemployed single mothers” may be counted as being in the

17

interest of gender equality by a researcher of substantive representation.19 Whether they are, in fact,

counted as such depends on the methodological operationalization applied by the individual researcher.

“Now that is all very well”, the empirically-minded reader who is not too concerned with clearing up

theoretical problems might ask. “Groups or no groups, does it really make any difference?”

Of course it does. As for the immediate empirical consequences of reconceptualizing the object of study in

the field, it should be kept in mind that when setting out to conduct a study on substantive representation

and gender, the choice of object (the interest of gender equality or the interest of women, as put forward

here) is only one of several choices which might all influence the study in different ways. Therefore, the

direct influence of this is hard to quantify. An example from my own research may, however, illustrate

some possible empirical consequences.

Setting out to study the substantive representation of gender equality within the XX parliament in the

period 2004 – 2015, I used a method in which the content of the interest of gender equality was defined by

the acts of the actors in question.20 By doing this, I found the extent of this type of substantive

representation to be different – and much bigger – than I would otherwise have done had I set out to study

the substantive representation of women’s interests instead. This occurred because the actors in question

defined actions which were framed to improve the position of women as well as actions which were framed

to improve the position of men as being acts aimed at promoting gender equality.21 Accordingly, had I set

out to study the representation of women’s interests instead using the same method, I would not have

been able to count the many acts of representation in which improving the situation of men was framed as

being in the interest of gender equality.22 Moreover, setting out to study the substantive representation of

gender equality, and conceptualizing it as an interest that belonged to nobody, required a research design

19 So may actions framed as “being capable of supporting unemployed single fathers”, of course.20 This method was inspired by the approach developed by Celis (Celis 2009). An important difference was, of course, that I looked into the representation of gender equality while Celis studied the representation of women.21 Illustrating the importance of distinguishing between the empirical data found (in which interests of one or the other gender were often framed as being in the interest of gender equality) and the analytical concepts and tools applied (at the conceptual level, the interest of gender equality was defined as not belonging to any group and at the methodological level it was defined according to the use of the actors in question). 22 This, in turn, shows the importance of treating the concept of “women’s interests” and “the interests of gender equality” as two different things.

18

that treated female and male parliamentarians as potentially equal actors. Consequently, although this was

not my focus, I found a male representative to be one of the most progressive actors on gender equality;

and an organization concerned with fathers’ rights to be among the NGOs which had most frequently

approached the parliament recently about issues concerning gender equality. 23Hence, changing the

interest in question while sticking to the excellent methods developed within the field, this research design

was able to capture actions that would otherwise have been overlooked by the very same field.

5. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER PERSPECTIVES

In this article, I have problematized the tendency to conceive of substantive representation as the

representation of groups in research on representation. Most importantly, I posit that it tends to over-

emphasize differences between groups, as well as intragroup solidarity, while overlooking intragroup

struggles of power as well as the potential of group outsiders to act as critical actors.

To demonstrate the problematic tendency of ‘groupism’ within representation theory, I focused on the

subfield concerned with substantive representation and gender. Although some scholars study subgroups

of women, in general this field is concerned with the representation of women and women’s interests as

such. In analyzing this field, I suggested that the extensive use of the notion of groups has meant that

despite decades of outstanding research, the field still has problems treating male actors as potential

critical actors on an equal footing with women. Moreover, I highlighted the tendency to overemphasize

differences between women and men, as well as intra-group solidarity; and to overlook intra-group

conflicts as problems – difficulties which all arise from applying the concept of groups too extensively.

As a solution to the problems caused by this ‘groupism’ tendency, I suggested that scholars reclaim Pitkin’s

“second way”, which is concerned with the substantive representation of interests that are not linked to

any group of persons with specific characteristics. This, I argued, offers a way for research on substantive

representation to move beyond the concept of groups. Within the field of substantive representation and

23 Moreover, I chose to study arenas and networks within the parliament where actions on gender equality were supposedly taken, instead of women’s arenas and networks.

19

gender, I illustrated how this idea could be deployed with a view to reconceptualizing women’s interests in

terms of the interest of gender equality as the research focus.

Brubaker suggests that although his analysis of the problems created by ‘groupism’ is concerned with the

way sociology uses the notion of ethnic groups, these problems are likely to be universal and to pervade

fields concerned with areas such as gender, sexuality, class, nationality. Here, I have pointed out that they

do, in fact, affect the field of gender and substantive representation. Moreover, although the use of groups

within this field has some particular characteristics (e.g. the assumption that only two dichotomous groups

exist (men and women) we would expect similar problems to exist in other areas of representation theory

which seem to assume that representation is about groups. Consequently, “Pitkin’s second way” may be

equally beneficial if applied to other fields as well. What remains to be seen is how Pitkin’s second way

would play out when applied to other areas of representation theory.

Moreover, a pressing question is whether Pitkin’s second way calls for changes in the way we argue for

certain types of descriptive representation. Do we, for instance, need to rethink the arguments for electing

more women, more ethnic minorities or more people from a certain class, if we think of representation as

being about interests that are not linked to the characteristics of a particular group? Or can these

arguments be allowed to continue undisturbed? The same applies to the way we think about the concepts

of responsiveness and accountability: does thinking of representation as being about interests that are not

linked to a group of people with certain characteristics call for a rethinking of the mechanisms associated

with these democratic ideals? I suspect that it might. For example, it might involve evaluating

representation as a matter of systemic reflexivity, as argued by Disch (Disch 2011)?

Hopefully, this article will inspire a scholarly debate on these questions in particular, as well as on the

general usefulness of Pitkin’s notion of the ‘second way’, thereby helping representation theory to steer

clear of the problems caused by ‘groupism’.

20

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APPENDIX:

Table 2: Pitkin´s notions of interests and the type of substantive representation they each generate in the

thought of Madison and Burke

Acting for attached interests

Acting for unattached interests

Interest characteristics:

Interests are attached to a group or a faction of individuals

Interests are unattached. Individuals can participate in an interest.

Level of conflict: High. Focus on power relations

Low. Focus on deliberation

Input needed for MPs to represent interests:

Knowledge of individuals’ subjective opinions

Knowledge of people’s feelings, as they exist objectively

Political goal of representatives:

To win the power contest, “politics is the realm of pressures and opinion” 24

To reach the best decision, “politics is the realm of knowledge and reason” 25

Classical view of the representative-constituency relationship26:

Mandate perspective

Interdependence perspective

Source: Author

24 See Pitkin for the citation comparing Madison and Burke (Pitkin 1967, 197).25 (Pitkin 1967, 197).26 (Pitkin 1967, 166–167). See also Frank, for this interpretation of mandate-interdependence (Frank 2011) as well as Monroe and Marmor, for the linking of representation of “subjective preferences” and the good representative who follows constituent wishes on the one hand; and the representation of “objective facts” and the good representative who acts as a trustee, on the other (Monroe and Marmor 1981, 438–439).

28