Wireless Pers Commun (2011) 59:17–26DOI 10.1007/s11277-010-0186-2

Security Problems in an RFID System

Jing Huey Khor · Widad Ismail ·Mohammed I. Younis · M. K. Sulaiman ·Mohammad Ghulam Rahman

Published online: 26 November 2010© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010

Abstract This paper focuses on the security and privacy threats being faced by the low-cost RFID communication system, the most challenging of which relate to eavesdropping,impersonation, and tag cloning problems. The security issues can be improved and solvedby utilizing both prevention and detection strategies. Prevention technique is needed sinceit offers resistance capabilities toward eavesdroppers and impersonators. Detection tech-nique is vital to minimize the negative effects of tag cloning threats. This paper proposesthe use of both prevention and detection techniques to make RFID communication moresecure. Lightweight cryptographic algorithm, which conforms to the EPC Class-1 Genera-tion-2 standard, is used in the proposed mutual authentication protocol for RFID system toraise security levels. In addition, electronic fingerprinting system is deployed in the proposedsolution as a detection method to distinguish counterfeit and legitimate tags.

Keywords RFID · EPC Class-1 Generation-2 · Authentication protocols ·Electronic fingerprinting system

1 Introduction

Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology has increasingly becoming popular, espe-cially in supply chain management, transportation, payment, passport system and digitalsmart communities, such as universities, hospitals, and libraries. However, RFID system isvulnerable to suffer from variable attacks including Denial of Service (DoS) attack, attackingand modifying tag threat, traffic analysis threat and spoofing attack. Privacy threat when atag number combines with personal information becomes serious where users are exposed

J. H. Khor · W. Ismail (B) · M. I. Younis · M. K. Sulaiman · M. G. RahmanAuto-ID Laboratory, School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,University Science Malaysia (USM), Nibong Tebal, 14300 Penang, Malaysiae-mail: eewidad@eng.usm.my

M. G. Rahmane-mail: eeghulam@eng.usm.my

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to location threat, constellation threat, transaction threat, preference threat, and breadcrumbthreat [1].

Electronic product code (EPC) tags, which are known to be inexpensive, are broadly usedin many identification and tracking methods. However, the use of EPC tags is inherentlyinsecure. The most challenging security threats in an RFID EPC tags are privacy threats interms of eavesdropping and impersonation, as well as threats on tag cloning. The potentialinvasion of privacy and security due to lack of encrypted message between an RFID readerand a tag has raised various concerns from the public [2]. The privacy of the public mustbe protected by ensuring the meaning of private information transmitted between the RFIDreader and the tag is secure from attackers.

EPC tags offer minimal resistance against eavesdropping, which is one of the most seriousthreats in RFID communication. Communication between a legitimate tag and a reader isoften unprotected and can be easily intercepted by adversaries. In addition, an EPC tag isvulnerable to impersonation threat because of its characteristic of releasing data informationto any compatible reader. Impersonation occurs when an entity attempts to gain access toresources and information by pretending and adopting the identity of an authorized user [3].EPC tags are vulnerable to cloning threats because they do not have explicit anti-cloningfeatures [4]. These tags have low functionality and cannot perform cryptographic algorithmto prevent tag cloning. EPC tags are exposed to skimming attacks, in which tags disclose vitaldata and information to any query reader. This indicates that EPC tags lack authenticationand encryption, which can enable readers to collect information of the tags they scan. Hence,any adversary can gather required information and can manipulate the collected informationto clone counterfeit tags.

Many studies have been conducted over the years to find the best solution in improvingthe security level of EPC Class-1 Generaton-2 (EPC Class-1 Gen-2) UHF passive RFID tag.Because an EPC tag has no explicit authentication and security functionalities [5], protect-ing it from eavesdropping, impersonation, and cloning threats is difficult. An EPC tag onlyhas two basic security features—kill command to permanently silence a tag and the accesscommand to control the access of a tag memory [6]. An EPC tag does neither support theexpensive asymmetric nor the symmetric algorithm, not even the hash function [2]. Hence,a complex cryptographic encryption cannot be deployed in an EPC tag for security purpose.Most of the previous studies on this topic proposed to increase the security performance bymanipulating the features inside them, such as on-chip 16-bit cyclic redundancy code (CRC)checksum and 16-bit pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). This is important becauseit would keep the cost of EPC tag production low, thereby making it affordable in terms ofcosting for use in a variety of fields.

As a countermeasure to the privacy and security issues being faced by EPC tags, pre-vention and detection are two strategies that could be used to solve these problems [7]. Interm of prevention, the security of EPC tags could be strengthened by using lightweightcryptographic algorithm [8] (i.e., CRC, PRNG, and XOR functions). On the other hand,detection techniques are deployed to minimize the negative effects of tag cloning threatsand increase the chances of catching adversaries [9]. Counterfeit tags can be detected byemploying the electronic fingerprinting system in an RFID system since each RFID tag isunique, based on their radio frequencies and manufacturing differences [10]. The uniquephysical characteristics of RFID tags, such as the power response of tags toward differentradio frequencies, enable the creation of electronic fingerprint for the detection of counterfeittags. Cloning tags could be detected by comparing the extracted specific fingerprints of tagsand the stored fingerprints of legitimate one. When the extracted fingerprints match the ones

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stored in the system, this indicates the tag is legitimate; otherwise, the tag could be consideredas counterfeited.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Related works on protocol and RFID tag’sphysical layer identification, which is used to increase security in an RFID tag, are presentedin Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, a fingerprint-based mutual authentication protocol is proposed for thelow-cost EPC RFID tag. Section 4 analyzes the security and efficiency of proposed protocol.Finally, Sect. 5 provides the conclusion of this paper.

2 Related Work

Various schemes that conform to EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standards [2,5,8,12,13] are proposedto solve security problems in computational constraint low-cost tags. In Chien and Chen [2],PRNG, CRC and XOR are used as the fundamentals in the protocol. Two sets of authenti-cation and access keys are designed to defend DoS attack that causes the disruption of thesynchronization between tag and backend server. However, the scheme is vulnerable to replayattack and information leakage. Chien et al. [8] presented a lightweight mutual authenticationprotocol to solve replay attack and secret disclosure problem of Li et al. [11] scheme. But,cloning attack problem is not resolved in this scheme. Burmester and Munilla [12] proposeda lightweight mutual authentication protocol that supports session unlinkability, forward andbackward secrecy. The protocol is optimistic with constant key-lookup, and can easily beimplemented on an EPC Class-1 Gen-2 platform. However, the scheme is susceptible toreplay and cloning attacks. Chen and Deng [13] proposed mutual authentication protocolthat able to reduce database loading and ensure user privacy. But, the authentication protocoldid not take consideration on cloning attack issues.

In recent years, many anti-counterfeiting schemes [4,5,9,14] are proposed as cloningattacks issues are prevalent among low-cost RFID tags. In Choi et al. [4], a unique serialnumber for all tags is used to prevent cloning attacks. However, the scheme is not conform-ing to EPC Class-1 Gen-2 due to 32-bit PRNG is used instead of 16-bit PRNG. In addition,the unique serial number that stored in TID memory is not secure because it is just pro-tected by access password that is easy to reveal. A. Juels [5] proposed simple authenticationtechniques that combat skimming attacks against basic EPC tags and thereby enhanced EPCtags. The authentication techniques can also strengthen EPC tags against cloning in environ-ments with compatible reading devices. However, the authentication protocols that focus onskimming attacks did not take consideration on eavesdropping and privacy invasion threats.Daney et al. [9] performed a comprehensive study on the physical layer identification ofRFID transponders to detect cloning tags. Several techniques have been proposed to extractRFID physical layer fingerprints. Their research indicates that RFID transponders could beidentified accurately in a controlled environment based on stable fingerprints correspondingto their physical layer properties. Koscher et al. [14] performed a case study on United StatesPassport Card and Washington State “enhanced” drivers license (WA EDL), both of whichincorporate Gen-2 EPC tags. Tag identifier (TID) is proved not to confer anti-counterfeitingprotection. From the experiment, access PIN and kill PIN are claimed to be unable to clonefor the passport card.

Mutual authentication between legitimate tag and server has been widely proposed byresearchers [2,7,8,15,16]. Lehtonen et al. [7] proposed a synchronized secrets method, whichuses tag’s rewritable memory. The random number in a tag is changed every time the tagis used. A centralized back-end server issues these numbers and keeps track of which num-ber is written on which tag to detect synchronization errors. Every time a tag is read, the

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back-end server verifies the tag’s static identifiers first. After the verification, the back-endserver generates a new synchronized secret, and the reader device writes on the tag a newpassword for future authentication process. But this scheme is appears to be susceptible toeavesdropping and impersonation attack. Song and Mitchell [15] proposed an authenticationprotocol that uses challenge-response approach and simple functions such as right and leftshifts and bit-wise exclusive-or operation in the scheme. The scheme is designed for tagsthat can generate random strings and perform a hash function and a keyed hash function.The weakness of the scheme is, it is vulnerable to tag impersonation attack and server imper-sonation attack. Song [16] presented an authentication protocol for tag ownership transferthat meets new owner privacy, old owner privacy, and authorization recovery requirements.However, the ownership transfer protocol is vulnerable to a de-synchronization attack thatprevents a legitimate reader from authenticating a legitimate tag, and vice versa.

3 Proposed Fingerprint-based Mutual Authentication Protocol

In this section, a protocol which conforming to EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 and secure againsteavesdropping threat, replay attack, DoS attack and cloning attack is proposed. The channelbetween a back-end server and a reader is assumed secure. On the other hand, the chan-nel between a reader and a tag is assumed insecure. The specifications of the EPC Class-1Generation-2 standards that are applied in the proposed scheme are listed below:

i. RFID system operating in the 860–960 MHz frequency range.ii. Tag shall generate a CRC-16 and verify the integrity of a received message that uses a

CRC-16.iii. Tag shall implement a pseudo-random number generator and has ability to store at least

two RN16s while powered.iv. Tag modulates a backscatter signal only after receiving the requisite command from a

reader.v. Tag memory shall be logically separated into four distinct banks, each of which may

comprise zero or more memory words. The memory banks are reserved memory, EPCmemory, TID memory, and user memory.

The main idea of the proposed protocol is to use the XOR function, which is the simplestencryption and decryption method in protecting the transmitted data from an eavesdropperand impersonator. The encryption key is updated for each new session by utilizing the PRNGfunction. A tag’s unique electronic fingerprint information is stored inside the tag’s memoryand the database. Thus, a counterfeit tag can be detected when the fingerprint informationstored is compared with the fingerprint extracted from the tag. The fingerprint informa-tion stored in the tag memory is prevented from an attacker’s modification with the use oflightweight cryptographic algorithm, which ensures that the tag’s electronic product code,the fingerprint information, as well as the data, are protected when transmitted in an insecurechannel.

The definitions of notation used in the description of proposed protocol are shown inTable 1.

The proposed fingerprint-based mutual authentication protocol consists of initializationphase and authentication phase. In the initialization phase, a back-end server and tag storeinformation required to perform authentication. The back-end server initially stores five val-ues of each tag in its database. There are index denotes as CRC(EPCT‖FP) ⊕ Ki, sessionkey denoted as Ki, tag’s electronic product code denoted as EPCT, tag’s unique electronic

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Table 1 Notations used in theprotocol

Notation Interpretation

EPCT Tag’s electronic product codeFP Fingerprint

CRC Cyclic redundancy code

PRNG Pseudo-random number generator

Ki Current session key

Ki+1 New session key

Kt Tag’s temporary key

Ks Server’s temporary key

⊕ XOR function

‖ Concatenation

Ck Cipher

Dk Decipher

fingerprint denoted as FP and all information of tag denoted as DATA. On the other hand,three values that are stored in the tag are Ki, EPCT, and FP. Session key of current session isdenoted as Ki. The session key after a successful session is denoted as Ki+1.

In authentication phase, the overall protocol scheme is shown in Fig. 1. Firstly, the readerwill request information from the tag. The tag computes M1 = CRC(EPCT‖FP). After-wards, M1is encrypted (i.e., XOR-ing M1 and the session key) to protect the secrecy of thetag information. The encrypted message is sent via the reader to the back-end server, whereback-end server searches for an index, CRC (EPCT‖FP)⊕Ki in its database that is matchingwith the encrypted message. If matching index is found, the encrypted message is decryptedusing the session key, Ki that is in the same row as indicated by index. Otherwise, the serverwill ignore the session. The authentication of the message is then verified. If the decryptedmessage does not match the message recorded in the database, an error message will be sentto the reader. On the other hand, if the server successfully authenticates the tag, a server’stemporary key, Ks, is generated. At the same time, the tag will update a tag’s temporary key,Kt, and the back-end server computes M2 = CRC(EPCT‖FP) ⊕ Ks, while the tag computesMt = CRC(EPCT‖FP)⊕Kt. Afterwards, the back-end server forwards M2 to the tag throughthe reader. A new session key, Ki+1 is generated and CRC (EPCT‖FP) ⊕ Ki+1 is computedand updated as a new index in the database. The new session key is stored in the row thatindicated by the new index. On the other hand, the authentication of the reader is verified bythe tag where a comparison of M2 and Mt is made. If both messages are matched, then thetag will update a new session key, Ki+1, where Ki+1 = PRNG(Kt). Otherwise, the key willbe maintained as current session key, Ki.

The fingerprint stored in a tag memory is important in detecting counterfeiting tags. Inthis paper, the power response of tags toward different radio frequencies is measured. Eachtag has a unique power response which is utilized as a unique electronic fingerprint for eachtag. The unique power response of each tag is measured in Watt and is converted into 16 bitstring. The 16 bit string is stored in database for further reference. The cloning tags couldbe detected by comparing the extracted specific fingerprints of the tags and the stored fin-gerprints of the legitimate ones. When the extracted fingerprints match with those that arestored, this indicates that the tag used is legitimate; otherwise, the tag could be considered ascounterfeited. Figure 2 shows the overall process for detecting counterfeiting tags by usingthe electronic fingerprinting technique.

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Database Reader Tag

1. Request

4. Ck (M1)

13. M2

9. Kt= PRNG (Ki)

14. Mt = CRC (EPCT FP) Kt

15. Verify

M2 = Mt?

If not match, send error message

16. Ki+1 = PRNG (Kt)

5. Search index in database

CRC (EPCT FP) Ki

6. If exist,

Dk [Ck (M1)] = [CRC (EPCT Ki] Ki

If not exist,

send error message to reader

7. Verify

Dk [Ck (M1)] = CRC (EPCT

If not match,

send error message to reader

8. Ks = PRNG (Ki)

10. M2 = [CRC (EPCT Ks

11. Ki+1 = PRNG (Ks)

12. Store new index in database

[CRC (EPCT Ki+1

2. M1 = CRC (EPCT

3. Ck (M1) = [CRC (EPCT Ki

CRC(EPCT Ki Ki EPCT FP DATA

DATAFPEPCKeyIndex Key

Ki

EPC

EPCT

FP

FP

FP)

FP)?

FP)]

FP)]

FP)

FP)]

FP)

Fig. 1 Fingerprint-based mutual authentication protocol

4 Security Analysis

The security of proposed protocol is analyzed based on four criteria. They are replay attack,DoS attack, eavesdropping attack and cloning attack.

The secrecy of the tag’s information is safe from eavesdropping attack. The EPCT is enci-phered with session key where the session key will be updated after each complete session.In addition, tag is hard to compromise due to M1 and M2 are enciphered by using differ-ent key. If M1 and M2 are eavesdropped between legitimate tag and reader, the attacker is

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Fig. 2 The overall process ofdetecting counterfeit tags

Detect fingerprints from tag

Read fingerprint from tag memory

Start

Fingerprints detected

match with record?

Release data stored in the tag

End

Reject clone tag

Yes No

Identify fingerprints of tag

Store fingerprints in tag memory

Initi

al P

hase

D

etec

tion

Phas

e

unable to obtain any secret information. For example, M1 ⊕M2 = [CRC(EPCT‖FP)⊕Ki]⊕[CRC(EPCT‖FP) ⊕ Ks] = [CRC(EPCT ⊕ EPCT‖FP ⊕ FP) ⊕ Ki ⊕ Ks] = CRC(0‖0) ⊕Ki ⊕ Ks = CRC(0) ⊕ Ki ⊕ Ks. Hence, attacker is only able to get enciphered key and isimpossible to guess its original key value.

Replay attack can be prevented in this proposed protocol due to the value transmitted foreach session is different. Different value of session key is utilized in individual session andPRNG plays a vital role in providing different value of session key to encrypt with tag’s EPCT

and fingerprint information. For each session, M1 and M2are enciphered by using differentsession keys, Ki and Ks. Attacker is unable to use the same session key, Ki and Ks to decipherencrypted message for the following session. Hence forward secrecy is achieved and make itis impossible for adversaries to apply replay attack on the RFID system because of the smallprobability for same value of session key generated over twice.

DoS attack can be defended by using updated session key. The legitimate tag can beidentified by verifying the encrypted message with message recorded in the database. On theother hand, the authentication of the reader is verified by the tag by comparing the decryptedmessage with message recorded in the tag.

The proposed protocol can prevent the issue of cloning tags by using fingerprint infor-mation stored in the tag memory to detect counterfeit tags. Each tag has it own uniquefingerprint properties. Even though adversaries are able to copy all the data from a tag, butthey are unable to create a counterfeit tag that has the exact same physical feature as originaltag. Thus, any counterfeit tag can be found when the fingerprint of tag detected is not matchwith the fingerprint information stored in the tag.

Table 2 indicates a comparison of results among our scheme and related securityschemes in terms of replay attack, DoS attack, cloning threat, eavesdropping attack andEPC Class-1 Gen-2 standards compliance. From the comparison it is clear that the proposedfingerprint-based mutual authentication protocol has more complete security protection com-pared to existing security schemes.

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Table 2 Comparison between schemes

Protocol Replay attack DoS attack Cloningattack

Forwardsecurity

EPC Class-1Gen-2standardscompliance

Chien and Chen [2] X O X X O

Choi et al. [4] O O X O X

Chien et al. [8] O O X O O

Burmester [12] X O X O O

Chen and Deng [13] O O X O O

Song and Mitchell[15] X O X X X

Song [16] O X X O X

Our scheme O O O O O

O satisfied, X not satisfied

5 Conclusion

The most challenging security threat in an RFID system is privacy threat in term of eaves-dropping, impersonation, and tag cloning. This paper proposed the use of both preventionand detection techniques in order to raise the security level in an RFID system. To detectcounterfeiting tags, unique fingerprint information can be stored in a tag memory. By usinglightweight cryptographic algorithm, including XOR, CRC, and PRNG function, the datasecrecy of a tag is protected from eavesdropping and impersonation. The proposed protocolconforms to the EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 standards and is suitable for deploymentin a low-cost RFID tag.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,USM, and the USM RU (Research University) grant secretariat, for sponsoring this work.

References

1. Kim, J., Yang, C., & Jeon, J. (2007). A research on issues related to RFID security and privacy. In W. Wang(Ed.), IFIP international federation for information processing, Volume 252, integration and innovationorient to E-society Volume 2. Boston: Springer.

2. Chein, H. Y., Chen, C. H. (2007). Mutual Authentication Protocol for RFID Conforming to EPCClass 1 Generation 2 Standards. In Computer Standards and Interfaces, vol. 29. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

3. Mitrokotsa, A., Rieback, M. R., Tanenbaum, A. S. (2008). Classification of RFID attacks. In Pro-ceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on RFID Technology: Concepts, Applications, Challenges(IWRT’08), 10th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Barcelona, Spain.

4. Choi, E. Y., Lee, D. H, Lim, J. I. (2009). Anti-cloning Protocol Suitable to EPCglobal Class-1Generation-2 RFID system. In Computer Standards & Interfaces, Volume 31, Issue 6.

5. Juels, A. (2005). Strengthening EPC tags against cloning. In ACM-Workshop on Wireless Security,WiSE.

6. Bailey, D. V., Juels, A. (2006). Shoehorning Security into the EPC Tag Standards. In ComputerScience. Berlin: Springer Press.

7. Lehtonen, M., Ostojic, D., Illic, A., Michachelles, F. (2009). Securing RFID Systems by DetectingTag Cloning. In Seventh International Conference on Pervasive Computing, Pervasive’09.

8. Chien, H. Y., Chen, C. W. (2006). A lightweight authentication protocol for low-cost RFID. InProceedings of the 2nd Workshop on RFID Security.

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9. Danev, B., Hedyt-Benjamin, T. S., Capkun, S. (2009). Physical-layer Identification of RFID Devices.In The Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium. Montreal, Canada.

10. Fingerprinting RFID Tags: Researchers Develop Anti-Counterfeiting Technology. Available from:http://www.physorg.com/news177842859.html.

11. Li, Y. Z., Cho, Y. B., Um, N. K., & Lee, S. H. (2006). Security and privacy on authentication protocolfor low-cost RFID. In IEEE International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security.

12. Burmester, M., & Munilla, J. (2009). A Flyweight RFID Authentication Protocol, in RFIDSec09, the5th Workshop on RFID Security. Belgium: Leuven.

13. Chen, C.L., & Deng, Y.Y. (2009). Conformation of EPC Class 1 Generation 2 Standards RFIDSystem with Mutual Authentication and Privacy Protection, in Engineering Applications of ArtificialIntelligence. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

14. Koscher, K., Juels, A., Kohno, T., Brajkovic, V. (2008). EPC RFID Tags in Security Applications:Passport Cards, Enhanced Drivers Licenses, and Beyond.

15. Song, B., & Mitchell, C. J. (2008). RFID Authentication Protocol for Low-cost Tags. In WiSec’08.Alexandria, Virginia, USA.

16. Song, B. (2008). RFID Tag Ownership Transfer. In 4th Workshop on RFID Security (RFIDsec 08),Budaperst, Hungary.

Author Biographies

Jing Huey Khor received her bachelor degree in electrical and elec-tronic engineering with First Class Honours from University MalaysiaPahang in 2009. Currently, she is pursuing her Ph.D. degree in RFIDsecurity at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) and is a member of Auto-ID Laboratory research group, USM. Her research interests are in RFIDsecurity and authentication protocol.

Widad Ismail graduated from University of Huddersfield, UK in 1999and earned First Class Honors in Electronics and CommunicationsEngineering and she received her Ph.D. in Electronics Engineeringfrom University of Birmingham, UK in 2004. She is currently a SeniorLecturer at the School of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, USMin Nibong Tebal, Penang, Malaysia. She has contributed extensively inresearch and in the areas of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID),Active Integrated Antennas (AIA), RF systems and Wireless Sys-tems Design. She has initiated Auto-ID Laboratory (AIDL), Malay-sia in 2008 as a research and commercialize oriented centre where themain objective is to become a hub for research and commercializa-tion activities. These research works have produced 8 filed patents, 4international awards, 3 commercial products and more than 50 publi-cations including international journal papers, conference/seminars andother publications. She is also a member of IEEE and Wireless WorldResearch Forum (WWRF). Email: eewidad@eng.usm.my

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Mohammed I. Younis obtained his B.Sc. in computer engineeringfrom the University of Baghdadin1997and his M.Sc. degree from thesame university in 2001. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate attachedto the Software Engineering Research Group of the School of Elec-trical and Electronic Engineering, USM. He is a Senior Lecturer anda Cisco instructor at Computer Engineering Department, College ofEngineering, University of Baghdad. He is also a software-testingexpert in Malaysian Software Engineering Interest Group (MySEIG).His research interests include software engineering, parallel and dis-tributed computing, algorithm design, RFID, networking, and security.He is also a member of Iraqi Union of Engineers, IEEE, IET, IAENG,IACSIT, IJCTE, CEIA, and ICCIS.

M. K. Sulaiman received his B.S. degree in electrical and elec-tronic engineering from University Malaysia Pahang in 2008. Hebecame a member of Auto-ID Laboratory, USM, since 2009. Currently,he is pursuing his M.S. degree in RFID field at University ScienceMalaysia. His research interests are in development of Mobile UHFPassive RFID Reader.

Mohammad Ghulam Rahman is currently serving Universiti SainsMalaysia (USM) as Senior Lecturer. He obtained his bachelor’s degreein Electrical & Electronic Engineering from Bangladesh Universityof Engineering and Technology (BUET), Dhaka in 1994. He receivedMaster of Engineering in Telecommunications Engineering from AsianInstitute of Technology (AIT), Thailand in 1998 and Ph.D. in Informa-tion and Communications Engineering from the University of Tokyo,Japan in 2003. He was a Post Doctoral Fellow of the University ofTokyo, Japan and also University of Calgary, Canada. He also served asAssistant Professor at East West University (EWU), Bangladesh and asExpert Researcher at National Institute of Information and Communi-cations Technology (NiCT), Japan. He is a Member of IEEE and LifeFellow of Institute of Engineers, Bangladesh (IEB).

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