Self-serving Responses Arising From Discrepancies

Between Explicit and Implicit Self-esteem

MICHAEL H. KERNISTERESA A. ABENDBRIAN M. GOLDMANILAN SHRIRAANDREW N. PARADISECHRISTIAN HAMPTON

University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, USA

Recent evidence highlights the importance of distinguishing between secure andfragile high self-esteem when examining self-protective and self-enhancementstrategies. The research reported here examines one way to make this distinction,namely discrepancies between individuals’ explicit and implicit self-esteem. Study 1focused on self-promotion and Study 2 focused on out-group derogation. Ourfindings indicated that compared to participants whose measured explicit self-esteemwas congruent with situationally activated implicit self-esteem, participants whoseexplicit and implicit self-esteem were discrepant were more self-promoting (Study 1)or more negative in their ratings of an out-group member (Study 2). These findingsconverge with findings from other research that link heightened self-servingresponses to discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem. We discussthe implications of our findings for the secure – fragile high self-esteem distinction.

Ask people what it means to have high self-esteem and you are likely to hearsomething like ‘‘Having high self-esteem means that you like yourself, you are happywith the way you are, and that you are not easily threatened.’’ From this vantagepoint, high self-esteem individuals are people who like, value, and accept themselves,‘‘warts and all.’’ Their positive feelings of self-worth are well-anchored and secure,and they have little need to feel superior to others or to engage in various self-promoting or defensive strategies. Instead, as Rosenberg (1965) put it, high self-esteem individuals are satisfied with being on an ‘‘equal plane with others.’’ In short,this perspective suggests that high self-esteem reflects positive feelings of self-worththat are well-anchored and secure, and that are positively associated with a widerange of psychological health and well-being indices (Kernis & Paradise, 2002;Rogers, 1959).

Received 20 November 2003; accepted 15 December 2004

This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9618882 to Michael

Kernis.

Address correspondence to Michael Kernis, Department of Psychology, University of Georgia,

Athens, GA 30602, USA. E-mail: mkernis@uga.edu

Self and Identity, 4: 311 – 330, 2005

Copyright ª 2005 Psychology Press

ISSN: 1529-8868 print/1529-8876 online

DOI: 10.1080/15298860500146028

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In contrast, a variety of research findings paint a different portrait of high self-esteem, one in which high self-esteem must be vigilantly defended and enhanced inorder to survive. First, high self-esteem individuals are likely to explain theirsuccesses in ways that glorify themselves (e.g., I am brilliant!) while explaining awaytheir failures by denying responsibility for them (e.g., That test was stupid!) (Fitch,1970; Tennen & Herzberger, 1987; Zuckerman, 1979). Second, after performingpoorly or being insulted, high self-esteem individuals show heightened tendencies toderogate and criticize others (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987).Third, high self-esteem individuals create performance obstacles that allow theircompetencies to seem especially noteworthy should they subsequently succeed (Tice,1991). These and other findings suggest that high self-esteem reflects positive feelingsof self-worth that are fragile and vulnerable to threats, and that are associated withmany different types of self-protective or self-enhancement strategies. In otherwords, high self-esteem individuals are highly caught up in how they feel aboutthemselves and they will do what it takes to bolster, maintain, and enhance these self-feelings.

Which view of high self-esteem is the correct one? Our view is that both arecorrect, in that each characterizes some individuals with high self-esteem.Specifically, some individuals possess secure high self-esteem, whereas otherindividuals possess fragile high self-esteem (see also Baumeister, Smart, & Boden,1996; Kernis, 2003a, 2003b; Kernis, in press; Kernis & Goldman, 1999; Kernis &Paradise, 2002). Secure high self-esteem involves having positive feelings towardoneself that are built on solid foundations that do not require continual validation orpromotion, and that are not easily threatened. In contrast, fragile high self-esteeminvolves positive self-feelings that are vulnerable to challenge and that requirecontinual promotion and protection.

To acknowledge the existence of these two forms of high self-esteem, however,raises the thorny issue of how to determine which is operative. Recent theory andevidence suggest at least four different ways to distinguish between secure and fragilehigh self-esteem (for extended discussions, see Kernis, 2003a; Kernis & Paradise,2002). We designed the research reported in this article to test the viability of onestrategy to distinguish between secure and fragile high self-esteem, namely activatingdiscrepancies between individuals’ explicit and implicit self-esteem. Before discussingthis strategy in detail, we briefly review the literature pertaining to other ways ofdistinguishing secure from fragile high self-esteem.

Distinguishing Secure from Fragile High Self-esteem

Defensive Versus Genuine High Self-esteem

People with defensive (i.e., fragile) high self-esteem are thought to harbor negativeself-feelings, but, due to immense pressures to be socially accepted, they report onlypositive self-feelings. When threatened, these individuals engage in heightened effortsto undermine self-threatening information and to highlight personal strengthsunrelated to the content of the threat. In contrast, people with genuine (i.e., secure)high self-esteem report and hold positive self-feelings that are not easily threatened.Defensive versus genuine high self-esteem individuals are distinguished based ontheir responses to a measure of socially desirable responding, such as the Crowne –Marlowe social desirability scale (Crowne &Marlowe, 1960), which assesses people’s

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willingness to report common, but unflattering behaviors or characteristics. Thoughthe distinction between defensive and genuine high self-esteem has not received muchempirical attention, what exists is supportive (e.g., Schneider & Turkat, 1975).1

Contingent Versus True High Self-esteem

‘‘Contingent self-esteem refers to feelings about oneself that result from—indeed, aredependent on—matching some standard of excellence or living up to someinterpersonal or intrapsychic expectations’’ (Deci & Ryan, 1995, p. 32). People withcontingent self-esteem are preoccupied with their standings on specific evaluativedimensions (e.g., How smart am I?) and how they are viewed by others (e.g., Dopeople think I am attractive?), and they are thought to engage in a continual processof setting and meeting evaluative standards to validate themselves.

High self-esteem that is contingent is fragile, because it remains high only as longas one is successful at satisfying relevant criteria. In contrast, true high self-esteemreflects feelings of self-worth that are well anchored and secure, that do not dependupon the attainment of specific outcomes, and that do not require continualvalidation. According to Deci and Ryan (1995), true high self-esteem develops whenone’s actions are self-determined and congruent with one’s inner, core self, ratherthan a reflection of externally imposed or internally controlling demands. High self-esteem that is true is secure, because it is not ‘‘earned,’’ nor can it be ‘‘taken away’’(Kernis, 2003a).

Stable Versus Unstable High Self-esteem

Another way to distinguish between secure and fragile high self-esteem involves theextent to which a person’s current feelings of self-worth fluctuate across time andsituations. These short-term fluctuations in one’s immediate, contextually based,feelings of self-worth reflect the degree to which one’s self-esteem is unstable; thegreater the magnitude of fluctuations, the more unstable or fragile one’s self-esteem.Stability of self-esteem is conceptualized as distinct from self-esteem level in that thelatter reflects the positivity of one’s typical or general feelings of self-worth. Researchhas shown that people with unstable (i.e., fragile) high self-esteem are moredefensive and self-aggrandizing than are their stable (i.e., secure) high self-esteemcounterparts (for reviews, see Greenier, Kernis, & Waschull, 1995; Kernis, 1993;Kernis, in press; Kernis & Goldman, 2002; Kernis & Paradise, 2002; Kernis &Waschull, 1995).

Implicit and Explicit Self-esteem

Another way to distinguish secure from fragile high self-esteem involves aconsideration of both explicit and implicit feelings of self-worth. Researchersgenerally characterize implicit self-esteem as ‘‘automatic affective or evaluativeassociations with the self’’ (e.g., Bosson, personal communication; Farnham,Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999; Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999; Koole, Dijksterhuis,& van Knippenberg, 2001; Skarpinski, personal communication; Spalding &Hardin, 1999). A similar definition is that implicit self-esteem involves ‘‘highlyefficient evaluations of self that occur unintentionally and outside of awareness;’’that is, it is ‘‘. . . activated automatically, with little effort or conscious guidance’’(Skarpinski, personal communication). Explicit self-esteem involves more deliberate,

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consciously held self-evaluations. Epstein and Morling (1995) suggest, and re-search has shown, that when people possess high explicit but low implicit self-esteem, they often will react very defensively to negative evaluative information(Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2002). Thus, whereas high explicit self-esteemcoupled with low implicit self-esteem is fragile, high explicit self-esteem coupledwith high implicit self-esteem is secure.

Epstein and Morling (1995) discuss these dual self-esteem components withinthe framework of Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST), which holds thatpeople possess two separate, but interacting, psychological systems. One system,referred to as the cognitive or rational system, operates at the conscious levelaccording to linguistic and logical principles. Explicit self-esteem resides in thecognitive/rational system, reflecting the feelings of self-worth that people areconscious of possessing. Standard self-esteem scales (such as that of Rosenberg,1965) can measure it. The second system, called the experiential system, operatesat the nonconscious level, guided in large part by significant affective experiencesand heuristic principles. Implicit self-esteem resides in the experiential system, butit nonetheless can ‘‘seep through’’ to affect peoples’ thoughts, emotions, andbehaviors.

In line with Epstein’s CEST framework, we assume that people possess two,partially independent, but interacting self-esteem systems, one of which is explicitand the other implicit. It follows, then, that fragile high self-esteem may takemultiple forms. In one, people’s explicit self-esteem is high, but their implicit self-esteem is negative. In another, people’s implicit self-esteem is positive, but theirexplicit self-esteem is low. From this perspective, fragile self-esteem reflectsdiscrepancies between individuals’ explicit and implicit feelings of self-worth. Suchdiscrepancies presumably undermine the certainty and security of individuals’feelings of self-worth, thereby heightening their tendencies to engage in self-protection and self-promotion. Importantly, we anticipate that these two forms ofdiscrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem will yield identical patterns ofself-serving responses. In fact, Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann (2003) recentlyreported such equivalence. Specifically, heightened compensatory self-enhancement(i.e., unrealistic optimism, claiming that a highly flattering personality profile is self-descriptive) was observed among high explicit self-esteem individuals with lowimplicit self-esteem and among low explicit self-esteem individuals with high implicitself-esteem. Findings such as these suggest that, regardless of the particular formthey take, discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem are associated withgreater self-serving responses than are congruent implicit and explicit self-esteem.We believe that this occurs because the coexistence of self-esteem positivity andnegativity fosters self-doubts and insecurity that prompt defensiveness and otherself-serving responses. We sought to replicate the pattern obtained by Bosson et al. inthe present series of studies, except that we situationally manipulated, rather thenmeasured, individuals’ implicit self-esteem.

Examining the implications of individual differences in implicit self-esteem isextremely important. In addition, a complementary strategy that we employ in theresearch reported in this article is to situationally activate implicit self-esteem andexamine its implications. If converging findings emerge from studies that examineindividual differences and those that utilize corresponding experimental manipula-tions, we can have more confidence that they reflect the operation of similarprocesses. Scheier and Carver (1983) made this point brilliantly when theyilluminated the convergence of individual differences in public and private self-

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consciousness with situationally heightened public and private self-awareness. Thesame ambitious goal can be adopted for research on implicit self-esteem, that is, todetermine whether convergent findings emerge from ‘‘dispositional’’ and ‘‘situationalactivation’’ approaches to implicit self-esteem.

We report the results of two studies in which we situationally activated implicitself-esteem by exposing people to positive or negative self-esteem relevant stimuli(e.g., words such as worthless, capable, likeable, insecure) at speeds too fast to beconsciously recognized. An important assumption underlying this manipulation isthat it is possible to shift temporarily people’s implicit self-esteem and therefore theextent to which their high self-esteem is fragile or secure. That is, we anticipated thatapart from the individual difference characteristics described earlier (e.g., contingentself-esteem, stability of self-esteem), the subliminally presented primes would bepotent enough to affect reactions reflective of self-esteem fragility or security.Importantly, a series of studies recently reported by Dijksterhuis (2004) offerssupport for the validity of our manipulation. In these studies, participants weresubliminally exposed to repeated pairings of the word ‘‘I’’ with positive-trait terms.Relative to control conditions, this procedure increased implicit self-esteemmeasured three different ways. A second assumption underlying this approach isthat participants are not aware that they have been exposed to either positive ornegative self-relevant words. Consistent with this assumption, our pilot workindicated that people were unable to name the correct words at a level evenapproaching chance. Specifically, only one participant out of 18 correctly called outthe word cruel during the presentation of the 50 primes. When he was questioned atthe end of the session, he was uncertain if he had actually seen the primed word. Outof 900 prime presentations, only this one was correctly identified, and even that wasnot with great certainty.

We adopted this situational approach in the present research to test thehypothesis that discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-esteem would beassociated with heightened self-enhancing responding (Study 1) and out-groupderogation (Study 2). Individuals with fragile high self-esteem frequently engage inself-enhancing responses to bolster their positive, yet vulnerable feelings of self-worth (Kernis, 2003a, 2003b). Likewise, Fein and Spencer (1997) demonstrated in anelegant series of studies that prejudice can serve a self-image maintenance function.They argued that many instances of prejudice are motivated in part by desires tomaintain positive feelings of self-worth. Specifically, prejudiced evaluations allowindividuals to ‘‘. . . reclaim for themselves a feeling of mastery and self-worth, oftensaving themselves from having to confront the real sources of self-image threat’’ (p.31). In other words, to the extent that individuals feel threatened or insecure, theycan bolster their self-feelings by derogating out-group members (see also Greenberg,Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Wills, 1981). Our framework suggests that thetendency to defensively derogate out-group members will especially characterizeindividuals who possess fragile as opposed to secure high self-esteem.

Study 1: Self-enhancing Responses

Participants first completed Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale (to assess explicitself-esteem) and a ‘‘background survey’’ in which they indicated whether or not awide range of characteristics were self-descriptive (e.g., I have a close relationshipwith my mother; I have good social skills; I am a leader; I regularly read books forpleasure). Approximately one week later, participants returned to the lab to perform

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several different ‘‘tasks.’’ The first task was described as a ‘‘visual perception task,’’but, in actuality, it was designed to situationally activate either positive or negativeimplicit self-esteem. Following this task, participants read a description of a fictitiouscollege student and then rated the extent to which various attributes contributed toher successful graduation from college. These were the same attributes thatparticipants previously indicated were or were not self-descriptive. We created ameasure of self-serving responses by subtracting the average importance rating givento non-self-descriptive attributes from the average importance rating given to self-descriptive attributes. Finally, we examined the impact of success versus failureperformance feedback on the magnitude of self-serving responses. Given the resultsof previous research (Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995), we expected thatcompared to success feedback, failure feedback would magnify any differences inself-serving responses that we observed as a function of discrepancies betweenimplicit and explicit self-esteem.

Method

Participants

Eighty undergraduate students (15 men, 65 women) from a large southeastern stateuniversity participated in the experiment. They received partial credit towardfulfillment of a course research involvement requirement (non-participationalternatives were provided). An additional 19 participants did not complete theexperiment due to computer program malfunctions.2

Measures

Attributes questionnaire. In the first session, participants completed a backgroundsurvey that solicited demographic information and judgments about whether or notthey possessed various attributes. These attributes were the same ones that, in asecond session, participants rated the importance of to the success of a hypotheticalcollege student. The full list of attributes is presented in Appendix A. Only attributesthat yielded reasonable yes/no distribution rates were included in analyses.

Explicit self-esteem. Also in the first session, participants completed the Rosenberg(1965) self-esteem scale, a well-validated measure of global self-esteem (Blascovich &Tomaka, 1991). Responses were made on five-point scales (1= strongly disagree;5= strongly agree; alpha= .86), and after reversals, were summed to reflectparticipants’ level of explicit self-esteem. Scores were split at the median (40) to formlow and high explicit self-esteem groups.

Implicit self-esteem primes. Participants completed five trials (consisting of tenprimes each) of parafoveal presentation of positive or negative self-relevant primeson a Pentium 133 MHz computer. The primes were presented for 90 ms andimmediately followed by a mask of random letters for 90 ms. Primes and masks werepresented within a range of 1.08 to 3.25 inches from the fixation point to ensure thatthey appeared within the parafoveal visual field. The computer program used topresent the primes was written using Microcomputer Experimental Laboratory v2.0

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(Schneider, 1990) computer program generation software. Computer programsgenerated by MEL allow for the control of screen refresh rates. This control featureis important to ensure that the primes are completely printed to the computer screenand that no primes are partially printed.

Participants in the positive implicit self-esteem activation condition werepresented with the following primes: capable, talented, competent, intelligent,valuable, likable, benevolent, secure, considerate, and worthwhile. Participants in thenegative implicit self-esteem activation condition were presented with the followingprimes: a failure, incompetent, unintelligent, inadequate, incapable, insecure,unlikable, worthless, inconsiderate, and cruel.

Description of college student. Participants read a short description of anothercollege student (actually hypothetical) who was in her last quarter of college. Variousattributes of this ‘‘student’’ were presented along with information that she willgraduate with an excellent Grade Point Average (GPA) at the end of the quarter.The complete description is presented in Appendix B.

Attribute importance list. Participants rated on seven-point scales (1=contributedlittle or nothing; 7=contributed a great deal) the importance of eighteen target‘‘student’’ attributes to her successful graduation from college. Refer to Appendix Afor the list of attributes.

Bogus intelligence test. Participants completed the remote associates test (Mednick,1962), which has been used in past research to administer success and failureperformance feedback (e.g., Brown & Rogers, 1991). The test consists of ten sets ofthree stimulus words that are related to an unreported fourth word. Participants’task was to generate this fourth ‘‘related’’ word. Established norms (Mednick, 1962)were used to create ten easy sets and ten hard sets for participants in the success andfailure feedback conditions, respectively.

Manipulation check questionnaire. Participants were asked a series of questionspertaining to their experience on the remote associates test. Specifically they wereasked: ‘‘How difficult was the test?’’ ‘‘How much did you enjoy the test?’’ ‘‘Howimportant was it for you to do well on the test?’’ ‘‘How well did you do on the test?’’and ‘‘To what extent do you think the test accurately measures general intelligence?’’All questions were answered on seven-point scales (1=not at all; 7=very much).

Procedure

Participants were run in two separate sessions separated by approximately six days.Both sessions were conducted by either one male experimenter or one of three femaleexperimenters. In the first session, participants completed the background surveyand Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale and then were scheduled for the secondsession. Participants completed the first session in groups of ten to fifteen. Self-esteem scores were not computed until after data collection was completed to ensurethat experimenters for the second session were blind to explicit self-esteem groups.

The second session consisted of the experimental manipulations and participantscompleted the session individually. Upon entering the lab, they were told that thesession consisted of three brief, unrelated studies that were combined because of theirbrevity.

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Implicit self-esteem manipulation. For the first ‘‘study,’’ participants were seated infront of a computer screen to complete a visual perception task. Participants satapproximately 60 cm from the computer screen to ensure parafoveal presentation ofthe stimuli that, through random assignment, served to activate either the positive ornegative implicit self-esteem system.

Participants were informed that they would see ‘‘I AM’’ at the center of thescreen and that they would see flashes (distractors) in different areas of the screen.The use of ‘‘I AM’’ as a fixation point also served to focus participants onthemselves and activated the self-system, thereby increasing self-relevant processing(Hull & Levy, 1979). The flashes or distractors were the stimuli used to activate theimplicit self-esteem system. Participants were told that the object of the task was tosee how fast people can judge where distractors occur in their visual fields. Theywere instructed to focus on the ‘‘I AM’’ at the center of the screen and that asquickly as possible after seeing each flash, they were to indicate whether the flashoccurred to the right or left of ‘‘I AM’’ by pressing the ‘‘z’’ key if left and ‘‘/’’ keyif right. Participants completed five trials each consisting of ten stimuluspresentations for a total of 50 primes presented in random sequence within eachof the four visual quadrants. A 90 ms mask of random letters immediatelyfollowed each stimulus presentation.

Performance feedback manipulation. Next, participants completed the remoteassociates test on which they received success or failure feedback. Theexperimenter stated that she/he was collecting normative data for a well-validatedtest of general intelligence that supposedly was an important component of lifeskills predictive of future achievement. The experimenter briefly described the testand told the participant that the computer would score the test and provide him/her with performance feedback. At this point, the experimenter started thecomputer program that explained the test in detail and guided participantsthrough it.

Through random assignment, participants were given either an easy or difficult setof items on which they received either success or failure feedback, respectively.Performance feedback appeared on the computer screen immediately following thesupposed scoring of participants’ responses. Participants in the positive feedbackcondition were informed that they had performed very well on the test, scoring in thetop 15% of all students tested at the University of Georgia. Participants in thenegative feedback condition were informed that they had performed very poorly onthe test, scoring in the bottom 30% of all students tested at the University ofGeorgia.

Self-promoting response measure. Immediately following the performance feedbackmanipulation, participants were given a short description of another college studentin her last quarter of college. Various attributes of this ‘‘student’’ were described andparticipants were asked to rate the importance of each attribute to her success incollege (see Appendixes A & B).

Manipulation check questionnaire. Finally, participants completed a questionnairethat assessed their experiences on the remote associates test. We delayedadministration of this questionnaire until after assessment of the dependentmeasure to avoid sensitizing participants to the potential role of performancefeedback.

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Upon completion of this questionnaire, the experimenter probed participants forsuspicion and debriefed them fully using process-debriefing principles.

Results and Discussion

The major dependent variable involved participants’ eighteen target characteristicimportance ratings. First, participants’ importance ratings were standardized.Then, for each participant, the average standardized importance rating given toattributes previously deemed self-descriptive, and the average standardizedimportance rating given to attributes considered non-self-descriptive, werecalculated separately. We created a measure of self-serving responding bysubtracting the mean importance rating of non-self-descriptive attributes from themean importance rating of self-descriptive attributes. Computed this way, higherpositive scores reflect the self-serving judgment that successful college performancedepends relatively more on those attributes that one possesses than on thoseattributes that one does not possess. As noted previously, this procedure has beenused by Dunning and his colleagues to assess self-serving responses in a number ofstudies (e.g., Dunning et al., 1995).

These difference scores were analyzed in a 2 (Feedback: success, failure) 6 2(Explicit Self-esteem: high, low) 6 2 (Implicit Self-esteem: positive, negative)analysis of variance (ANOVA). As previously noted, a median split was performedon self-esteem scores (Median=40) to divide participants into high and low explicitself-esteem groups. The only significant effect to emerge was the Explicit Self-esteem6 Implicit Self-esteem interaction, F(1, 72)=4.68, p5 .04. The means are displayedin Table 1. As anticipated, the tendency for participants to rate self-descriptiveattributes as more important than non-self-descriptive attributes was greater amongindividuals subliminally exposed to trait adjectives whose valence was self-esteemdiscrepant rather than congruent. Stated differently, whereas among high self-esteemindividuals, self-serving responses were greater among those who were subliminallyexposed to negative rather than to positive self-relevant stimuli, among low self-esteem individuals, self-serving responses were greater among those who weresubliminally exposed to positive rather than to negative self-relevant stimuli. Thispattern of cell means indicates that both types of explicit/implicit self-esteemdiscrepancies were associated with enhanced self-serving responses, although tests ofsimple effects were not significant. No main effects or interactions involving feedbackemerged, ps 4 .10.3

TABLE 1 Importance of Self-descriptive Relative to Non-self-descriptive Attri-butes as a Function of Explicit and Implicit Self-esteem

Explicit self-esteem

Implicit self-esteem condition High Low

Positive .144 (18) .335 (24)Negative .366 (22) .192 (16)

Note: Main entries are average standardized importance of self-descriptive attributes minusaverage standardized importance of non-self-descriptive attributes. Entries in parentheses arecell sizes.

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The primary goal of Study 1 was to examine if self-serving responses would begreater when discrepancies existed between individuals’ explicit and implicit self-esteem systems than when the two systems were congruent. The findings support thisconclusion, as the Explicit Self-esteem 6 Implicit Self-esteem interaction wassignificant and cell means reflected the classic crossover interaction. Thus, regardlessof whether explicit self-esteem was high or low, exposing individuals to self-relevantwords opposite in valence was associated with enhanced self-serving responses. Ourinterpretation of these findings is that discrepancies between implicit and explicitself-esteem increased the fragility of individuals’ feelings of self-worth that, in turn,motivated self-serving responses. No additional effects emerged for failure feedback.It is unclear why this was the case, although some evidence existed that participantswere not very invested in doing well on this task. We return to this issue in thegeneral discussion. In the next study that we report we employed a differentmanipulation of performance feedback.

Study 2

In Study 2 we examined whether situationally activating implicit self-esteemdiscrepant from individuals’ explicit self-esteem would heighten out-group deroga-tion (relative to congruent implicit and explicit self-esteem). Level of self-esteem wasmeasured with Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale as part of a large group testing. In alaboratory session, participants were given information about a woman that ledthem to conclude that she was Jewish. Participants were all non-Jewish. Afterviewing excerpts from a staged ‘‘job interview,’’ participants rated the woman on twosets of characteristics, one that pertained to her suitability for the job, and the otherthat pertained to various personality characteristics. We predicted that among highself-esteem individuals, ratings of an out-group member would be lower amongthose who were subliminally exposed to negative rather than to positive self-relevantstimuli, whereas among low self-esteem individuals, ratings of an out-group memberwould be lower among those who were subliminally exposed to positive rather thanto negative self-relevant stimuli. We anticipated that this pattern of responses wouldproduce an Explicit Self-esteem 6 Implicit Self-esteem interaction. In addition, weexpected that failure feedback would magnify any differences in self-servingresponses that we observed as a function of discrepancies between implicit andexplicit self-esteem.

Method

Participants

Sixty-seven female undergraduates participated in the laboratory portion of thestudy in exchange for credit toward a research participation requirement. They wererecruited from a larger sample that was administered the Rosenberg (1965) scale ingroup settings. A median split (Median=40) was used to classify individuals aseither high or low in self-esteem.

Measures

Implicit self-esteem primes. The primes were the same as those used in Study 1.

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Bogus intelligence test. The ‘‘test’’ was the same as that used by Fein & Spencer(1997, Study 2).4 It was called the ‘‘the reasoning and verbal acuity battery’’ and itconsisted of analogies, antonyms, sentence completions, syllogisms, and a ‘‘verbal-nonverbal matching test’’ consisting of matching difficult words to various pictures.Participants were given 10 – 20 seconds to answer each item (or to just read each itemif they were in the neutral condition).

Target religious orientation. Participants were given a sheet to read that containedvarious bits of information about the target. Embedded in this information werestatements indicating that she attended Yeshiva Jewish Academy high school, thatshe was a member of a Jewish sorority and that she did volunteer work for HillelFoundation. In addition, they were shown a picture of the target wearing a necklacewith a Jewish star.

Target videotape ‘‘job interview.’’ Excerpts from a staged job interview were shownto participants. The target’s performance was intended to be relatively neutral inquality, that is, not especially positive or negative. Pilot testing indicated that whenparticipants were led to believe that they were watching an actual job interview, theywere very reluctant to rate the target negatively because they feared that their ratingscould actually harm the target. Therefore, in the main study, we informedparticipants that the target was participating in a staged interview.

Target ratings. Participants rated the target on two sets of characteristics, onepertaining to her job qualifications, the other pertaining to her general personality(obtained from Fein & Spencer, 1997). Job qualification items were the following: ‘‘Ifeel this person would make an excellent candidate for the position in question;’’‘‘I would likely give this person serious consideration for the position in question;’’‘‘I would guess that this person is in the top 20% of people interviewed;’’ ‘‘I feltfavorably toward this person.’’ Ratings were made on seven-point scales rangingfrom (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. Responses to these items weresummed to create an overall job qualification score (alpha= .92). The generalpersonality items were intelligent, insensitive, trustworthy, arrogant, sincere,inconsiderate, friendly, self-centered, down-to-earth, rude, creative, motivated,ambitious, conceited, happy, vain, warm, and superficial. Two additional items,materialistic and cliquish, were dropped because of their relatively low item-totalcorrelations (rs= .21, .28, respectively; the next lowest r=.37). Responses weremade on seven-point scales ranging from (1) extremely uncharacteristic of him/her to(7) extremely characteristic of him/her. After reversals of negative items, responseswere summed to create an overall score (alpha= .89).

Procedure

Participants reported individually to the lab for what were described as threeunrelated studies that were combined because of their brevity. For the ‘‘first’’ study,participants completed the computer administered ‘‘visual perception task’’ thatconstituted the implicit self-esteem manipulation.

Self-esteem threat manipulation. Next, participants moved to a different computer ina different part of the room and completed the bogus intelligence task. Participantswere randomly assigned to either the failure feedback or neutral conditions.

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Individuals in the failure condition were told the tasks constituted a highly validatedmeasure of intelligence. In contrast, individuals in the neutral condition were toldthat they had been assigned to a control condition in which they were asked tosimply read the items on a bogus test of intelligence. At the completion of the task,participants in the failure (but not neutral) condition received scores indicating thatthey had performed very poorly.

All participants then were directed to a different lab room down the hall wherethey were greeted by a different experimenter who informed them that the studyconcerned people’s ability to judge others. The experimenter then informedparticipants that they would rate a person from a different university who wasvideotaped performing a staged job interview. Prior to viewing the video,participants were shown a picture of the target and they read over the sheetcontaining biographical information.

Results and Discussion

Job qualification and personality ratings were analyzed in separate 2 (Feedback:success, failure) 6 2 (Explicit Self-esteem: high, low) 6 2 (Implicit Self-esteem:positive, negative) ANOVAs. A median split was performed on the self-esteem scores(Median=40) to divide participants into high and low explicit self-esteem groups.Explicit Self-esteem 6 Implicit Self-esteem interactions emerged for both sets ofratings [for job qualifications, F(1, 59)=3.81, p5 .056; for personality ratings, F(1,59)=3.63, p5 .062.] The means are displayed in Table 2 where it can be seen thatthe same pattern emerged on both sets of ratings. Among high self-esteemindividuals, those exposed to negative self-relevant words rated the target lowerthan did those exposed to positive self-relevant words, whereas among low self-esteem individuals, those exposed to positive self-relevant words rated the targetlower than did those exposed to negative self-relevant words. None of the simpleeffects were significant, however. No main effects or interactions involving feedbackemerged, ps 4 .26. We also created a total evaluation index by first converting thejob qualification and personality ratings to z-scores and then summing them. The

TABLE 2 Target Job Qualification Ratings as a Function of Explicit and ImplicitSelf-esteem

Explicit self-esteem

Implicit self-esteem condition High Low

Job qualification ratingsPositive 93.9 (15) 84.7 (16)Negative 87.0 (17) 91.1 (19)Personality ratingsPositive 13.9 (15) 10.9 (16)Negative 10.1 (17) 12.3 (19)Total evaluations (in z scores)Positive .72 (15) 7.48 (16)Negative 7.43 (17) .22 (19)

Note: Higher numbers are more positive ratings. Entries in parentheses are cell sizes.

322 M. H. Kernis et al.

Explicit Self-esteem 6 Implicit Self-esteem interaction was significant, F(1,59)=4.63, p5 .04. The means are displayed in Table 2 where it can be seen thatthe pattern is identical to that obtained when the two sets of ratings were analyzedseparately. Once again, none of the simple effects tests proved significant.

The findings from Study 2 conceptually replicate those obtained in Study 1,although here the focus was on defensive rather than self-enhancement processes.Among high self-esteem individuals, ratings of an out-group member were loweramong those who were subliminally exposed to negative rather than to positive self-relevant stimuli, whereas among low self-esteem individuals, ratings of an out-groupmember were lower among those who were subliminally exposed to positive ratherthan to negative self-relevant stimuli. As in Study 1, negative feedback had nodiscernible impact on target ratings.

General Discussion

These findings are among the first (along with Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan, Spencer,& Zanna, 2002) to provide empirical support for Epstein’s (1983, 1991) and Epsteinand Morling’s (1995) assertion that discrepancies between individuals’ explicit andimplicit self-esteem have important implications for psychological functioning. Wedemonstrated that greater self-promoting responses (Study 1) and out-groupderogation (Study 2) were associated with subliminally exposing individuals toself-relevant stimuli discrepant rather than congruent in valence with their explicitself-esteem. Specifically, whereas among individuals with high explicit self-esteem,self-serving responses were greater among those exposed to negative as compared topositive self-relevant words, the opposite was true among individuals with lowexplicit self-esteem.

Our findings for individuals with high explicit self-esteem are consistent withrecent theory and research that distinguishes between secure and fragile forms ofhigh self-esteem (e.g., Kernis, 2003a, 2003b). That is, activating negative implicit self-esteem among individuals with high explicit self-esteem heightens self-protective andself-enhancing strategies that are tied to fragile rather than secure high self-esteem.Our findings for low self-esteem suggest that researchers and theorists may need torevise their thinking on how the two systems relate to one another and to variousaspects of psychological processes. We take up this issue in the context of examiningthe potential roles of self-verification and self-enhancement in our findings.

Self-verification Versus Self-enhancement Processes

Self-verification theory (Swann, 1983) proposes that, just as negative self-relevantinformation threatens individuals with high self-esteem, positive self-relevantinformation threatens individuals with low self-esteem. Thus, a potential alternativeexplanation of our findings is that they reflect the operation of self-verificationprocesses. Specifically, exposure to negative stimuli may have threatened the positivefeelings of self-worth of high explicit self-esteem individuals in the present study. Inorder to restore their threatened feelings of self-worth, these individuals may have‘‘self-verified’’ by promoting their own positive characteristics (Study 1) or byengaging in downward comparison (Study 2) (Wills, 1981). However, self-verification theory cannot account for the reactions of low self-esteem individualswho we subliminally exposed to positive self-relevant words. That is, self-verificationtheory cannot account for why these low self-esteem individuals were more self-

Self-serving Responses 323

promoting (Study 1) and more derogating of an out-group member (Study 2).According to self-verification theory, positive self-relevant stimuli threaten thenegative self-feelings of individuals low in explicit self-esteem. However, to restorethese negative self-feelings, these individuals should have engaged in less self-promotion and out-group derogation, not more.

An alternative explanation, based primarily on the operation of self-enhancementstrivings, may be more tenable. The self-enhancement motive holds that individualsoften direct their behaviors toward enhancing their feelings of self-worth. We suggestthat this is true both for explicit and implicit feelings of self-worth. In other words,we believe that people strive to have high self-esteem at both the explicit and implicitlevels. Failure to have one form of high self-esteem will undermine the security ofthis self-esteem system comprised of conscious and nonconscious elements.Consequently, self-promotion and out-group derogation are engaged in to counter-act this increased fragility of one’s multifaceted self-esteem system. This explanationholds equally well for the reactions of either high or low self-esteem individuals whowe exposed to discrepant stimuli. To accept it, however, means that we cannot grantprimacy to the explicit system. We recognize that some may find this too audacious aclaim to make based on the findings from these two studies. Regardless of one’sstance, the issues raised are important enough that more researchers and theoristswill soon have to grapple with them.

Although it may be easier to recognize individuals with chronic high explicit andnegative implicit self-esteem than individuals with chronic low explicit and positiveimplicit self-esteem, the existence of the latter individuals has been noted (Epstein,1983; Losco & Epstein, 1978; O’Brien & Epstein, 1988). It is important to note thatwe did not identify such individuals in the present study. Rather, we exposedparticipants to a manipulation that we presumed would situationally activateimplicit self-esteem. Given that we situationally activated implicit self-esteem, thepairing of positive implicit self-esteem with low explicit self-esteem is not puzzling. Inthe real world, it may be fairly common for low self-esteem individuals totemporarily experience nonconscious positive self-associations and evaluations, evenif these are not chronic.

We should note that the pattern of findings that emerged could have been due todiscrepancies in implicit and explicit self-esteem, congruencies between the two, orboth. Given that we did not have a no-prime control condition, either or both sets ofprocesses associated may have been operative. To tease apart these possibilities,future research should include a no-prime condition.

Relations Among Various Forms of Fragile High Self-esteem

As noted earlier, high explicit self-esteem that is accompanied by negative implicitself-esteem has been characterized as one form of fragile high self-esteem (Kernis,2003a, 2003b; Kernis & Paradise, 2002). Other forms include high self-esteem thatis contingent or unstable. What is the relation between these various forms of highself-esteem? Are they independent of one another or do they covary substantiallywithin individuals? With respect to the relation between contingent and unstableself-esteem, several studies have shown that they do covary within individuals(Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993, Study 2; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001).However, this relation does not appear to be very strong. Paradise and Kernis(1999) found that the correlation between self-esteem stability and scores on theircontingent self-esteem scale was .25. Kernis and Paradise (2002) suggested that

324 M. H. Kernis et al.

one reason for this modest relationship is that contingent self-esteem is based onpeople’s awareness of the factors that influence their self-esteem, whereas self-esteem instability reflects responsiveness to internally generated and externallyprovided stimuli of which people may be unaware.

Apart from the considerations discussed in the previous paragraph, it is importantto note that both contingent and unstable self-esteem reflect responsiveness ormalleability of self-feelings, not negativity per se. An important agenda for futureresearch is to examine whether negative implicit self-esteem (either alone or incombination with high or low explicit self-esteem) relates to heightened responsive-ness to evaluative events.

Absence of Effects Attributable to Performance Feedback

Contrary to our expectations, failure performance feedback did not heighten self-serving responding. We are unsure why this was the case. On the one hand,manipulation checks administered to participants in Study 1 indicated that,compared to participants who received success feedback, participants who receivedfailure feedback rated themselves as doing substantially more poorly on the test. Onthe other hand, most participants were unconvinced that the test was a validindicator of intelligence. In fact, when participants in Study 1 were asked to whatextent they thought the test accurately measured general intelligence, the responsesof participants in both the success and failure feedback conditions were, on average,below the scale’s midpoint. This suggests that most participants did not believe thetask to be a valid test of intelligence and so they may not have taken the feedbackseriously.

Another factor may be that the tasks in both studies on which feedback wasgiven were academic in nature, focusing on verbal, mathematic, and conceptualskills. It is possible, then, that feedback pertaining to one’s social skills andconfidence may have a stronger effect. In fact, some pilot testing conducted in ourlab is consistent with this possibility. Participants read a passage in front of a videocamera that ostensibly transmitted their image to another participant in a differentroom whose job was to rate the person’s nonverbal presentational skills. They thenwere given positive or negative feedback in paragraph form (this manipulation wasused successfully by Kernis et al., 1993). Next, participants reported to a differentlab, where they were asked to serve as a ‘‘peer counselor’’ and rate the adjustmentof a freshman based upon his or her essay. Among other details, participants eitherread that the freshman firmly believed in God (a theist) or did not believe in God(an atheist). They then rated the essayist’s intelligence, likeableness, overalladjustment, etc. The feedback manipulation proved to be effective. Specifically,ratings of the freshman were more unfavorable following negative as compared topositive feedback, especially if the essayist was portrayed as an atheist (which is anout-group for our participants). Although neither explicit nor implicit self-esteemwas examined in this pilot work, the fact that feedback pertaining to social skillsaffected ratings of an out-group member is more than what we found for feedbackin the present studies. Therefore, examining social skills feedback in future researchmay be more fruitful than continued examination of feedback on more academictasks.

Despite the fact that threatening feedback did not affect the interaction betweenexplicit and implicit self-esteem, the overall implications of these two studies shouldnot be ignored. In both studies, interactions emerged between the implicit and

Self-serving Responses 325

explicit systems that reflected conceptually identical patterns. The findings reportedin this article are encouraging in light of recent work by Bosson and colleagues(2003), Spalding and Hardin (1999) and by Hetts et al. (1999). Bosson et al. (2003)reported that self-enhancing responses were greater among individuals whosemeasured explicit and implicit self-esteem were discrepant rather than congruent.Spalding and Hardin (1999) examined whether individual differences in explicit andimplicit self-esteem differentially predicted performance-based anxiety. Theyreported that whereas implicit self-esteem predicted participants’ nonverballyexpressed anxiety, explicit self-esteem predicted participants’ self-reported anxiety.Hetts et al. (1999) examined the influence of cultural identity on individuals’ explicitand implicit self-esteem. They found that implicit self-esteem was influenced byparticipants’ previous cultural socialization whereas explicit self-esteem wasinfluenced by participants’ current cultural context. Each of these studies foundimportant effects for implicit self-esteem that sometimes were independent of effectsfor explicit self-esteem. In future research, it will be important to examine theconvergence in findings across situationally activated and measured implicit self-esteem. The study of nonconscious self-processes is a fertile area for investigationthat is only beginning to be tapped.

Notes

1 Some scholars believe that defensive high self-esteem is not a form of high self-esteem,

but is instead a form of low self-esteem that involves people’s unwillingness to divulgeits existence. Historically, however, defensive high self-esteem has been treated as aform of false high self-esteem. Although we acknowledge the importance of this issue,

we do not focus on defensive and genuine high self-esteem in this paper. Therefore, wewill not pursue it any further.

2 During the second session of the experiment which consisted of the experimental

manipulations, the computer program that administered the remote associates testmalfunctioned 19 times. There was a ‘‘bug’’ in the program that occurred at randomthroughout the experimental sessions. The researchers attempted to find and correct the

bug to no avail then sent the program to the technical support team of the companythat distributes MEL v2.0. The technical support team was also unable to find andcorrect the bug. Since the program malfunctions occurred at random, the researchersdecided to continue the experiment and replace the participants for whom the program

malfunctioned.3 Consistent with the intent of the feedback manipulation, participants in the successfeedback condition felt that they performed better (M=5.6), and that the task was

easier (M=3.4), relative to participants in the failure feedback condition (Ms=1.5,6.0, respectively), Fs(1, 72)=488.63, 57.66, respectively, ps 5 .0001. In addition,participants who received failure feedback (M=2.1) reported enjoying the task less

than did participants who received success feedback (M=4.4), F(1, 72)=55. 49,p5 .0001, and they indicated that it was less important for them to do well (Ms=3.5,4.5, respectively), F(1, 72)=7.11, p5 .01, and that the test less accurately measuredgeneral intelligence (Ms=1.9, 3.4, respectively), F(1, 72)=33.35, p5 .0001.

In addition to these feedback main effects, a main effect for explicit self-esteem, F(1,72)=4.77, p5 .04, and an Explicit Self-esteem 6 Feedback interaction, F(1,72)=4.44, p5 .04, emerged on responses to the item ‘‘How well did you do on the

test?’’ High and low self-esteem individuals rated their performance equally poorlyafter receiving failure feedback (Ms=1.5), whereas following success feedback, highself-esteem individuals rated their performance more favorably (M=5.9) than did low

self-esteem individuals (M=5.3). On the test difficulty item, a Feedback 6 Explicit

326 M. H. Kernis et al.

Self-esteem 6 Implicit Self-esteem interaction emerged, F(1, 72)=4.27, p5 .05.Although all self-esteem groups rated the task as more difficult following failure than

following success, this difference was greatest among individuals in the low explicit,positive implicit condition. Finally, on the question asking participants to rate howaccurately the test measured general intelligence, a Feedback 6 Implicit Self-esteem

interaction, F(1, 72)=5.05, p5 .03, and a Feedback6 Implicit Self-esteem6 ExplicitSelf-esteem emerged, F(1, 72)=9.61, p5 .003. Although all self-esteem groups ratedthe test as less accurate following failure than following success, this difference was

greatest among individuals in the high explicit, positive implicit condition.4 We thank Steve Fein and Steve Spencer for graciously providing us with the testmaterials, target picture, and job-interview videotape.

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Appendix AList of Attributes

Appendix B

Description of College StudentInstructions. The following is a description of a college student. Please read thedescription carefully. After reading the description, you will be asked to makevarious judgments of this student.

Susan is finishing her last quarter at the University of Georgia. She will graduatewith an excellent grade point average and is facing a bright future. She is very closewith her father and her parents have been married for 27 years. She is the oldest childwith one brother and one sister. Susan had a part-time job most of her high schoolyears. She is considered by many of her friends to be intelligent and extremelycreative. She spends a lot of time studying. Susan is leader—she leads study groupsand tutors students when she can. She is very motivated to do well in all of herclasses. As an extracurricular activity, Susan volunteers at a youth shelter two hourseach week. She regularly engages in physical activities, such as, running, aerobicsand working out at the gym. She also enjoys going out with her friends on theweekend.

Items used in analyses: Filler items:

1. Close relationship with father 19. Close relationship with mother2. Had a job in high school 20. Excellent overall grade point average3. Extremely creative 21. Good social skills4. Religious person 22. Easy going5. Leader 23. Well-developed moral code6. Regularly eat a healthy diet 24. Regularly spend time with friends7. Outgoing 25. Good sense of right and wrong8. Well-organized 26. Have a role model9. Regularly engage in physical activity 27. Sociable

10. Regularly read books for pleasure11. Regularly read newspapers and

magazines12. Patriotic13. Regularly spend time alone14. Belong to one or more clubs and

organizations15. Good speaking skills16. Support school athletic teams17. Regularly attend school athletic

activities18. Have a college role model

330 M. H. Kernis et al.