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Social Movement Rhetoric and the Social
Psychology of Collective Action : A Case Study ofAnti-Abortion Mobilization
Nick Hopkins1,3 an d Steve Reicher2
This paper se eks to contribute toward an integrate d approach to social
mo ve m e n t m obili za tion . It do e s so through conside ring how a soc ial
psycho logical accou nt of the de te rmination of collective behavior ( se lf-
cate gorization theory) may be applied to the mobilization rhetoric of social
movements. More specifically it argues that as people may define themselves
and act in te rms of social cate gorie s, we may usefully conce ive of social
move ment rhetoric as be ing organized so as to construct social cate gory
definitions which allow the activists’ preferred course of action to be taken on
by others as their own. O ur theoretical argument is illustrated through the
detailed analysis of cate gory construction in contemporary U.K. anti-abortion
argumentation.
KEY WORDS: social moveme nts; self-categorization theory; social identities;
rhetoric; abortion; fetus.
INTRODUCTION
If one considers the que stion of how people are mobilize d to pursue
particular political proje cts one is drawn to two lite ratures. The first con-
cerns social movements. The second, the social psychology of influe nce .
However, the dominant themes within these literatures are rathe r contra-
dictory.
On the one hand, the social movement literature demands a social
psychological analysis of colle ctive behavior and the role of rhetoric in
changing people ’s conceptions of themselves, social issues, and their rela-
Hum an Relations, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1997
261
0018¯7267/97/0300 ¯0261$12.50/1 Ó 1997 The Tavistock Institute
1Departme nt of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland.2St. Andrews University, Scotland.3Requests for reprints should be addresseed to Nick Hopkins, De partment of Psychology,
University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland.
tionship with such issues. Thus, there has been a growing awareness that
it is not enough to study the obje ctive conditions that give rise to grievances
or the ir psychological manife stations (e .g., feelings of ‘‘relative depriva-
tion ’’) without addre ssing the proce sse s whe re by issue s come to be
‘‘framed’’ or ‘‘named’’ as ‘‘social proble ms’’ (Schneider, 1985; Best, 1987;
Snow, Rochford, Worde n, & Be nford, 1986; Elder & Cobb, 1983) or
‘‘moral’’ issues (Lee & Ungar, 1989) . Further, there has been a recognition
of the relationship between such ‘‘framings’’ and the psychology of self-
definition: among othe r things, such framings organize experience, motivate
action, provide ‘‘vocabularie s of motive ,’’ ‘‘create’’ group members (Wil-
liams, 1995; Snow et al., 1986) . Indeed there is a general recognition that
the transformation of people ’s understanding of who they are and the situ-
ation that they are in is a key moment in mobilization and that activists
may be expe cted to construct what is at stake so as narrow or broade n the
conflict and ‘‘speak’’ to public constitue ncie s in ways that are supportive
of their project (Elder & Cobb, 1983) .
Yet, when one turns to the social psychological literature on collective
behavior and mass social influe nce, one finds a body of work striking for
its neglect of the way in which issues are named and framed. Indeed, far
from concerning itse lf with the content of political argument and the way
in which this constructs people ’s understandings of themselve s and their re-
lations with particular course s of action, we have a social psychology which
typically neglects the content of argumentation (Billig, 1987) and seeks to
explain mass social influe nce in terms of the effects of a source’s attractive -
ness and status (Mills & Aronson, 1965; Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Hovland
& Weiss, 1951) , the role of emotion (Leventhal, 1970) , distraction from mes-
sage content (Osterhouse & Brock, 1970) , message structure (Hovland,
Lumsdaine , & Sheffie ld, 1949; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) etc. The gen-
eral tenor of social psychology’s approach is well capture d in Pratkanis and
Aronson’s (1992) Age of Propaganda which emphasizes the limite d capacity
of human beings’ cognitive resources and the ways in which these may be
exploite d in order to circumvent thoughtful deliberation.
Thus, where students of social movements highlight the need for a so-
cial psychology capable of addressing the ways in which people ’s unde r-
standings of themselve s and the ir re lationship with the world may be
transformed through the ideas containe d in political rhetoric, we have a so-
cial psychology which seems to imply that the content of such rhetoric is of
little theoretical interest. Our purpose in this pape r is to contribute toward
the social psychological analysis needed for an integrate d analysis of social
movement communication. More specifically, we take a recently developed
theory of colle ctive behavior that has its roots in experimental social psy-
chology and consider how it may be applie d outside the laboratory to make
262 Hopkins an d Reicher
sense of several features of mobilization rhetoric. Below, we describe this
mode l, discuss how it may be extende d, and illustrate its utility through ap-
plying it to a specific example of social movement communication.
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR
Self-Cate gorization Theory or SCT (Turne r, 1991; Turne r, Oake s,
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987) argue s that people are able to define themselves at different leve ls
of abstraction. Thus, people may define themselves in terms of their indi-
viduality (and contrast themselves from othe r individuals) . Or they may
define themselve s in terms of particular social categories (e.g., as Scottish
vs. English). At a still higher leve l of abstraction, they may define them-
selve s as members of the human race and differentiate themselves from
nonhumans. As a corollary, the theory holds that the way in which one
defines one self is not fixe d but variable and that one ’s sense of ‘‘psycho-
logical distance ’’ from othe rs will change according to the le ve l of
abstraction at which the self is defined. According to the theory, it is this
ability to define the self in terms of social categorie s that makes colle ctive
behavior possible . Put simply, the adoption of a particular se lf-cate goriza-
tion results in one seeing one self as equivale nt to, and inte rchange able with,
other exemplars of the category, with the corollary that one forms a cog-
nitive representation of the attribute s associated with this category which
is then used to guide one’s own behavior.
The argume nt that collective behavior is mediated by identification
with social categorie s carrie s several implications. First, conformity to the
cate gory’s norms is de pe nde nt upon ide ntification with the cate gory
(Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Reicher, 1984a). Second, the direction of behavior
(i.e ., what is done) is controlle d and determined by the category’s ‘‘con-
tents’’ (the norms and value s he ld to define the category) (Hogg & Turne r,
1987; Reicher, 1984b) . As a corollary, colle ctive behavior posse sses a co-
herence with message s which advocate actions that are incongrue nt with
the category definition being rejected (Reicher, 1987) . Third, as members
conform to the ir unde rstanding of what represents their cate gory in contrast
to othe rs, the theory implie s that a person’s ability to define a category’scontents will be de termined by the ir relationship to the category as a whole .
More specifically, as members view themselve s as inte rchange able exem-
plars of a category (rathe r than as unique individuals) , the views of those
defined as common category members will be perceived as more self-rele-
vant (and so be more influe ntial) than those defined as out-group members
(Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane , Hogg, & Turne r, 1990; Wetherell, 1987).
Psych ology of Collective Action 263
Applying this logic to the issue of mass social influence and political
mobilization has the following implication. If what is done is determined
by the category’s contents and who is involve d in this activity is determined
by the breadth of the category’s boundarie s, political mobilization may be
viewed as depending upon people adopting a se lf-cate gorization, the con-
tents of which support the actions that activists wish to promote .
ARGUMENTS ABOUT SOCIAL CATEGORIES
As individuals may define themselves in a multitude of different ways,
it is obvious that an adequate account of mass social influe nce and mobi-
lization must addre ss the issue of how particular categorie s come to be
used rathe r than others. Turne r et al. (1994) seek to addre ss this question
through the concepts of ‘‘accessibility’’ and ‘‘fit.’’ ‘‘Accessibility’’ refers to
the individual ’s readine ss to use a particular category according to their
goals, motive s and past experiences. ‘‘Fit’’ refers to the match between a
category and the nature of the situation and take s two forms. The first, or
‘‘comparative fit,’’ refers to the relationship between categorie s and the dis-
tribution of the stimuli that are to be categorized. Thus, stimuli are more
like ly to be categorize d as an entity to the degree that the average differ-
ences between them are less than the average diffe rences between them
and the other stimuli that comprise the frame of reference . The second,
or ‘‘normative fit,’’ implie s that if a particular categorization is to be ac-
cepted as appropriate , there must be a congruency between the category’ssocial meaning and the nature of the stimuli. Thus, according to the theory,
gende r categorie s are more like ly to be used to represent a discussion be-
tween men and women if all the males said one thing and all the females
anothe r (comparative fit) , and if the content of these different positions
were consonant with gende r stereotype s (normative fit) .
While recognizing the merits of this formulation and its experimental
support (Oakes, Turne r, & Haslam, 1991), it is ope n to readings which
imply that the relevance of social categories may be mechanically ‘‘read
off’’ the social context by an isolate d individual engage d in an inte rnal cog-
nitive act of computation (Reicher, 1993; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b).
At first sight, this might be take n as signaling the limitation of SCT’s utility
in a domain in which the contested nature of social reality is a key theme.
Inde ed, if the analysis of social movements shows anything it is that the
issue of how people make sense of themselves and their situation is com-
plex. As Elder and Cobb put it, the issue of who has what at stake is never
simply a matter of the “ ‘facts of the situation’ but of what facts are con-
side red relevant and of the meanings people assign to them” (Elder &
Cobb, 1983, p. 129) . In a similar vein, Reicher (1993) obse rves that in order
264 Hopkins an d Reicher
to make sense of something like the Gulf war, one must identify the nature
of the conflict and the identitie s of those involve d, and that this inevitably
require s argument about who is to be viewed as part of the social context
and how their actions are to be construe d. Thus, when deciding on how
to make sense of the conflict we could be faced with arguments about
whether to include U.S. activitie s in Vietnam, Grenada, and Nicaragua in
the picture or not, and if so, how to represent these activitie s. Similarly,
when conside ring the Arab states’ position in the war, our judgments are
continge nt on argumentation about which pieces of information should be
take n as best representing their position (e.g., we may argue over whether
to pay attention to state presidents’ or spiritual leaders’ pronounce ments,
the number and size of the pro- and anti-war demonstrations, etc.). In other
words, whether the conflict is defined as involving two adjace nt dictator-
ships, a dictator and the rest of the world, the West against the Islamic
world, and so on, is crucially dependent upon argume ntation about which
pieces of information are relevant and how they are to be characte rized
(c.f. Elder & Cobb, 1983) .
These observations about the essentially conte stable nature of social
reality are not intende d to dispute the core theoretical thrust of SCT.
Rather, they are to make the point that if categorie s are to be viewed as
intimate ly relate d to context, then our ability to argue about the nature of
that context entails an ability to argue over the relevance , inclusive ness,
and content of social categories. Thus, while accepting SCT’s analysis of
colle ctive behavior as action in accordance with the norms, values, and
‘‘knowle dge’’ associate d with categories, we wish to emphasize that the na-
ture of these categorie s is a site of argument and is constructed in and
through language (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b). Indeed, we would ob-
serve that it is precise ly because of the consequences of social category
definitions for the scope and direction of collective action that argume nts
about such issues are felt important and therefore exist.
THE PLACE OF CATEGORY ARGUMENTS IN POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION
If both the scope and the content of colle ctive action is determined
by category definitions then we could expe ct this to have implications for
mobilization rhetoric. First, we could expect activist speake rs to define the
category boundarie s so as to include as many of the audience as possible .
Second, if the speake r’s views are to be perceived as relevant for others,
we may expe ct the category boundarie s to be constructed so that the
speaker and audience are defined in terms of a common categorization
and opposition activists re prese nte d as standing outside this category.
Psych ology of Collective Action 265
Third, as attitude s and behaviors are adopte d according to their perceived
congruence with the relevant self-de finition, we could expe ct the relation-
ship between the speaker’s propose d attitude s/behaviors and the category
used to define the audience to be constructe d so as to be congruent (and
those of the opposition as incongrue nt). While the term ‘‘argume nt’’ con-
veys the notion that category definitions are constructe d and disseminated
through language , it is also important to recognize that this occurs in a
conte xt where there are alte rnative category constructions in circulation
(Billig, 1987) . Thus, at the same time as exploring the ways in which a
particular definition is constructed, it is also important to consider how
these opposition alternative s are represented and the ways in which the
preferred construction unde rmines them.
In order to demonstrate the utility of this formulation, we now con-
side r the debate about abortion and the role of category arguments in
defining the debate ’s protagonists and the nature of their positions.
ARGUING ABOUT ABORTION
The relevance of the Protagorian maxims that ‘‘there are two sides to
every issue ’’ and ‘‘humans are the measure of all things’’ is graphically il-
lustrated if one considers the status of the human fetus. This entity may
be conside red to be both similar to and different from childre n or adult
persons and its categorization is therefore inevitably dependent upon the
argume ntative construction of particular attribute s as relevant for our judg-
ment. Furthe r, as the weighing of these argume nts about the existence ,
relevance , and value of these dimensions is inextricably linke d with a com-
munity’s beliefs and values, the categorization of the fetus is inevitably a
social choice (Condit, 1990) in which as Knutson puts it ‘‘people are defined
by people ’’ (Knutson, 1967, p. 7). The socially chosen nature of the dimen-
sions according to which the fetus may be categorized is well illustrate d in
social anthropologic al (Williamson, 1978; Minturn, 1989; Morgan, 1989)
and ethnographic (Kovit, 1978) studies.
However, the controve rsy around abortion is not restricted to the
status of the fetus: people also argue over the meaning of abortion, the
nature of the abortion debate’s protagonists, and their re lationship with
wider publics. Inde ed, in keeping with our general position, there is evi-
dence that activists in the debate seek to name or frame the issue so as
to broade n the constituency to which their position appe als (Mall, 1981) .
By way of example , consider the symbolic significance of the names used
by campaign groups oppose d to the U.S. Equal Rights Amendment and
abortion: names such as ‘‘Women Concerned for America’’ and ‘‘FLAG’’(Family, Life , America, God) framed these as threats to the ‘‘American
266 Hopkins an d Reicher
way’’ and so construed the oppone nts of these measures as representing
(and defending) the national community against a subversive opposition
(cited in Cobb & Elder, 1983; Marshall, 1985) . Reciprocally, pro-abortion
activists have sought to disseminate alte rnative definitions of the debate
and alternative categories for action. Inde ed, as the identification of po-
litical inte rests is bound up with the ways in which people represent (or
categorize ) themselves, it is no surprise to find that pro-abortion activists
have been active ly involve d in constructing and disseminating new ‘‘politi-
cized’’ collective identitie s for women which make talk of abortion as a
‘‘right’’ possible and meaningful (Brodie , Gavigan, & Jenson, 1992; Condit,
1990) .
However, while analyse s of the abortion debate provide materials
which illustrate the general point that the argumentative construction of
an issue and people ’s relationship with it is a key moment in political mo-
bilization, there is little detaile d analysis of how eithe r pro- or anti-abortion
rhetoric is organize d to allow collective mobilization. Instead, analyse s have
concentrate d on the development of campaigning networks and alliance s
(e.g., Stagge nborg, 1991) or aspe cts of within-move ment rhetoric (Vander-
ford, 1989; Soloman, 1980) . Further, where more public rhetoric has been
conside red it has come from parliame ntary debates, news media, submis-
sions to judicial inquirie s, etc. While particularly appropriate for analyse s
of official decision-making, such materials are not always ideal for analyse s
of rhetoric designe d to mobilize public action. For example , parliame ntary
debate s, by their very nature can only involve MPs (rathe r than activists)
and are unusual in that it is not at all clear who the audie nce actually is
(othe r MPs in the chamber? members of the judiciary? news headline writ-
ers? ). Similarly, the structure of parliame ntary debate is distinctive with
regard to the length of contributions, the ritualize d language , the number
and place of interruptions, and so on. Conse que ntly, while demonstrating
something of the range of constructions, they are unsuitable for analyse s
of the sustaine d argumentation of mass mobilization.
Elsewhere, we have applie d our analysis of the role of category con-
struction in mass mobilization to a specific piece of public abortion-re lated
rhetoric: a speech delive red by a leading U.K. anti-abortion speaker to an
audie nce of me dical stude nts/staff at a te aching hospital (Hopkins &
Reiche r, 1992; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a) . In this speech, members of
the audie nce were addressed as members of the medical profession with
the speake r constructing a contradiction between this identity and abortion.
For example , abortion was construe d as contradicting the core values of
the category and those practitione rs willingly involve d in its (legal) provi-
sion, characterized as a nonprofe ssional ‘‘out-group.’’ Other example s of
category-re lated argume ntation were to be found when the speaker con-
Psych ology of Collective Action 267
structed a broade r more inclusive category which include d himse lf, his audi-
ence , and othe rs (e .g., enviornme ntalists, activists concerned about animal
welfare , etc.) and defined it in contradistinction from anothe r broad cate-
gory of people (whose value s lead them to tole rate the exploitation of
nature for personal gain) . Thus, although not himself able to claim mem-
bership of the medical profession, the speake r and audience were, at this
higher order of abstraction, defined as common category members and our
analysis explore d the ways in which this construction of an in-group rela-
tionship allowe d him to represent himself and his anti-abortion views as
not only relevant for this audience but as arising from their identity.
While we cannot know whether audie nce members accepted these
category constructions, we feel that our analysis provide s prima facie evi-
de nce for the im portance of cate gory argum e ntation in polit ical
mobilization. However, the general applicability of our framework may be
que stione d for it could be argued that the promine nce of category-re lated
argume ntation in this speech was due to the distinctive nature of the audi-
ence (members of a profe ssional occupational category at their workplace )
and that our framework would be of less use in making sense of the conte nt
of speeches addre ssing more he teroge neous audie nces. In orde r to examine
the wider applicability of our analysis of the place of category argumenta-
tion in organizing collective action, this pape r analyze s a speech give n to
just such an audie nce . Before proceeding, we conside r several aspects of
anti-abortion rhetoric designed for mass public consumption.
ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENTATION AND GENERAL AUDIENCES
The historical depende nce of the anti-abortion position on religious
argume ntation has meant that anti-abortion communication with general
public audiences has often been difficult (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992) . While
meaningful within the relevant (e.g., re ligious) communitie s, this discourse
has had little widespread resonance and has isolate d anti-abortionists from
large sections of an increasingly secular society. An important response to
the mismatch between this rhetoric and wider public audie nces has been
the attempt to establish the fully human status of the fetus through other
means. Of particular inte rest has been the use of photographic image ry
(Condit, 1990; Petchesky, 1987; Mall, 1981; Danie ls, 1993) . Three features
of this material stand out. First, these images are highly selected and cut
so as to maximize the perceived similarity between fetus and neonate . For
example , one particularly powerful image is of the feet of a 10-we ek-old
fetus he ld between an adult’s finge rs. Although a 10-week-old fetus looks
very diffe rent from a newborn, their fetal feet are visually similar. When
photographe d in such a way that the adult’s finge rs holding the fetus quite
268 Hopkins an d Reicher
literally obscure the visual diffe rences between it and the newborn, we are
led to see the feet as standing in for the whole and hence perceive a ‘‘small
human being’’ (Condit, 1990, p. 88) . Second, these picture s are ‘‘read’’through a lens of cultural meanings. For example , Condit argue s that in
Western socie ties, the code for what is visually human is very broad and
that in a culture where “even the bright look in a dog’s eye can be inter-
preted as ‘personality’’’ (Condit, 1990, p. 85) it was not surprising that fetal
picture s could be read as human be ings and ‘‘the richly embedded cultural
meanings of human be ing’’ ascribed to them (Condit, 1990, p. 211) . Third,
although highly selected and cut so as to be read through these cultural
lenses, the appare nt objectivity of photographic materials (their appe arance
of be ing a “mechanical analogue of reality” and “a message without a
code”; Barthe s, 1982, cited in Petchesky, 1987, p. 269) obscures the argu-
mentative nature of these images. Indeed, their association with medical
science has allowed an inevitably highly constructe d image of the fetus to
be represented as a ‘‘fact’’ thereby laying the basis for the generalization
of an anti-abortion position to a much wider audie nce than that within
reach of more traditional argume ntation.
Given the central role of visual image ry in anti-abortion materials de-
signed for general audiences (e .g., leafle ts, posters, adve rts), it was little
surprise to find that it playe d a promine nt role in the speech de livered to
the general audie nce that we analyze here. Of course , the fact that it was
so prominent makes the speech particularly inte resting. While there has
been some attention to the content and organization of such photography
(see Condit, 1990; Petchesky, 1987) there has been little exploration of the
ways in which our readings of such images are directed by verbal argumen-
tation. However, Condit obse rves that this analysis is particularly important:
on the ir own visual image s are rathe r inexplicit and a picture is ‘‘pote ntially
a thousand different words’’ (Condit, 1990, p. 81, original emphasis) . Thus,
the analysis of this speech provide s an opportunity to consider the argu-
mentation surrounding such image ry and indeed this imagery’s place in
category definition.
THE SPEECH
The speech, involving a slide presentation, was given by a senior male
official from the U.K. ‘‘Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child’’(SPUC) to stude nts at a public meeting organize d by a stude nt anti-abor-
tion society.4 Transcribed, it runs to 15 and a half pages of single -spaced
Psych ology of Collective Action 269
4The speech was given in a lecture theatre at Dundee University, Scotland, in 1993. Of course
it is possible to conce ive of a student audience as differing from an ‘‘ideal’’ general audience
text. After some introductory comments referring to a contemporary legal
judgment concerning euthanasia, the speaker turne d to abortion and the
slide presentation began. A total of ten slides were shown. First, five slides
depicted the fetus at various stage s of development. In seque nce they were:
a fetus at 6 and half weeks (shown inside an amniotic sac hanging between
the finge rs of a doctor) ; a 10-we ek-old fetus’s feet (the rest of the body
was masked by an adult’s finge rs); fetuses at 11 or 12 weeks; 16 weeks; 23
weeks. Second, four slide s of dismembered aborted fetuses were presented
as he described common abortion procedure s. Finally, and as a conclusion,
a slide of an intact 10-week-old fetus was presented.
ANALYSIS
The Issue: Abortion as Killin g
The general framing of the issue at hand (offered in his introduction)
drew a paralle l between abortion and the war in Northern Ireland. Indeed,
he note d that recently there had been:
1. ‘‘The three thousandth death, the three thousan dth victim of the trou-
bles in Northern Ireland, which coincidentally began in 1967, the year the
Abortion Act was passed, the three thousandth victim ’s life was claim ed on,
you know, all sides of the tragic circumstances surrounding Northern Ireland.
Every single week in hospitals, in Britain, three thousand five hundred unborn
children are killed. Now, what one has to make up one’s mind abou t on this
issue, is, is the unborn child a fellow human or not? To my mind, that is the
crunch issue and everything else, if you like is dependen t upon that answer.
If the answer you arrive at, let’s say after this evening, is ‘no,’ the unborn child
is not a fellow hum an being, then that’s fine, let’s forget abou t it. But if the
answer is ‘yes,’ the unborn child is a fellow human being, then how do we
face up to the fact that three thousan d five hundred are killed? ’’One hour late r, the presentation conclude d with the final slide and
these words:
2. ‘‘Here we have an embryo, a fetus of 10 weeks growing in the womb
and the womb has becom e the most dangerous place on earth to be: one baby
is killed for every four babies that are born .’’
270 Hopkins an d Reicher
and imagine argumentative constructions which are specifically designed to appeal to students
in terms of value s associated with age or education (e .g., ‘‘academic rationality’’). However,we believe that a student audience may be seen as exemplifying many of the features of a
more ge neral public audience: while a speaker faced with a medical audience working in a
hospital has an audience for whom a specific occupational identity is particularly meaningful
and which presents itself as a fairly obvious focus for attention, a general student audience
offers no such distinctive identity to work with.
Overall, these paralle ls imply a direct comparability between the fetus
and the adult person and between abortion and killing. Before turning to
how this definition of the heart of the debate was deve lope d through his
construction of the fetus le t us consider his construction of the debate’sprotagonists and their relationship with the audie nce.
The Protagon ists an d Their Style of Argumentation
A major problem facing U.K. anti-abortion propagandists is the wide-
spread public support for access to legal abortions (Francombe , 1989)
which means that they are particularly vulnerable to argume nts which de-
fine them and the ir ide as as unre presentative and marginal to public
opinion. At the start of the speech, the speake r’s construction of SPUC
took steps to counter such a construction:
3. ‘‘We have tradition ally over the past 25 years gathered most of our
support from young people which is why we are a growing society. We have
six and a half thousand new m embers last year and given that we are, as
well as being an education al organ isation , an organ isation dedicated to pro-
moting research, dedicated to prom oting knowledge on the unborn child, we
are also a non-party political organ isation and I think for any group to be
developing that fast, if it was any political party that had six and a half thou-
sand new paid up members in the course of the year, I think they would be
pretty happy.’’This construe s his own position as one which has a growing base. Fur-
the r, it is represented as base d upon rese arch with his own mode of
communication involving education and the dissemination of knowledge .
This theme was also manife sted in his use of research scientists’ findings
to back up his claims as well as in his invitation for the audie nce to conduct
its own research:
4. ‘‘So, incidentally, I don ’t expect you to swallow what I say, I don’texpect you to just believe what I say hook, line and sinker. But I do expect
people to check on what I say and I also expect people to check on what the
pro-abortion lobby says on these issues, go back and check. I think it’s terribly
important when so many claim s on so many issues are constantly made, we
should always go back and check.’’With his own style of argumentation defined as educational and open
to rational appraisal, he defined the opposition ’s as devious. For example ,
he argued that the media collaborate d with the pro-abortion ‘‘lobby’’ and
silenced debate with this be ing illustrate d by a story of how a radio phone -
in presenter switched off a SPUC member mid-sentence and ‘‘proceeded
in the rest of the program me to refer to her as ‘‘that clown who was talking
out of her backside.’’’ This contrast between the protagonists’ style of ar-
Psych ology of Collective Action 271
gumentation implied that pro-abortion sentiments only circulate because
proper debate is silenced with the corollary that public support for abortion
is based on misinformation. This theme was developed through the con-
struction of a series of commonalitie s between anti-abortionists and public
opinion. One step was to emphasize the receptive ness of the public to
SPUC argumentation:
5. ‘‘I am sure that many if not all of you here this evening will be en-
couraged to know that education, persistence and giving people access to the
truth, giving people access to facts from objective sources, does actually work.
People are fundam entally open to the truth and you know, the one thing we
have to guard again st, and I think it goes wider, than , in in than , just on the
defence of the sanctity of human life. What we have to guard again st are those
in our community who seek to stop a particu lar poin t of view being expressed
by variou s intim idatory measures.’’Overall, this defines anti-abortionist argumentation as having a natural
resonance with public opinion and construe s pro-abortion activists as be ing
a small and deviant group who fail to prope rly represent both the contents
of wider opinion and the appropriate style of argument. The implication
that people would adopt an anti-abortion position if only free and open
debate were allowe d is made quite explicit when he argued that ‘‘99.99%
of students’’ would be anti-abortion if ‘‘given the facts.’’A second step in building a consonance between anti-abortionist ar-
gumentation and the wider constitue ncy of public opinion involve d the
representation of the content of anti-abortion argume ntation as ‘‘common-
se nse .’’ For example when discussing the argument that without legal
abortion there would be dange rous ‘‘back street abortions’’ he argued that:
6. ‘‘There’s an awful lot of good pro-life people who find this a difficu lt
argument. When I say, good pro-life people, I mean people who are naturally
pro-life, but just don’t, you know, they have been convinced by the constant
media repetition of this argum ent. And again, we have to do two things, there’sthe common-sense of the mum and dad, who have seen their baby on the
ultra sound machin e at the hospital; there is the common sense way of looking
at this argum ent. And there is also the hard evidence.’’ This constructs a body of people who, though appare ntly supporting
the availability of legal abortions, are in essence ‘‘naturally pro-life’’ and
against abortion. Further, his invocation of ‘‘common-sense’’ in his discus-
sion of how to communicate with such people implie s a fundame ntal
congruency between what people naturally think or feel and the anti-abor-
tion message. This militate s against constructions of anti-abortionists as
outside mainstre am opinion and inde ed implie s that they are simply ar-
ticulating what people already know but may have lost sight of because of
the ‘‘constan t media repetition .’’ A particularly interesting feature of this
272 Hopkins an d Reicher
construction concerns the way in which this ‘‘pro-life ’’ ‘‘common-sense’’ is
constructed through reference to the vie ws and experiences of quite specific
people (i.e ., ‘‘the mum and dad, who have seen their baby on the ultra sound
machine at the hospital’’). The selection of these people to stand in for the
whole (i.e ., public opinion) is important because such people stand in a
particular relationship to the fetus. Such people have willingly accepted the
pregnancy, deve lope d a sense of responsibility for it, and, through their
actual and anticipate d reorganization of the ir lives, welcomed the fetus as
a separate entity into their live s (Lumley, 1980; Stainton, 1985) . As such,
social and relational factors are so important in the ascription of fetal per-
sonhood (Minturn, 1989; Morgan, 1989) , and the willingly pregnant like ly
to see the fetus in qualitative ly diffe rent ways from the unwillingly pregnant
(Maquire , 1989) , the construction of such figure s as representative s of eve-
ryday common-sense is important for the audie nce is encourage d to see
what such willing parents may see: a baby person. Furthe r, generalizing a
construction of the fetus which is actually continge nt upon particular social
relations to all is important because it has the effect of representing a highly
constructed perception of the fetus as natural and inevitable . Inde ed, the
definition of such a construction of the fetus as common-sense implie s that
it is not his construction (and hence one that is constructe d and interested)
but a neutral description of what ‘‘everyone ’’ knows. Again this not only
naturalize s a particular construction of the fetus (see below) but give s sub-
stance to his claim that there are broad congrue ncie s between himse lf and
the ‘‘common-sense’’ of the community. Inde ed, these two issues are intri-
cate ly related: the anti-abortion position is represented as base d upon the
common-se nse ‘‘knowledge ’’ that every ordinary person has.
Having outline d his representation of the protagonists in terms of their
style of argume ntation and his representation of the commonalitie s be tween
himself and his audie nce in terms of the form and content of their argu-
mentation, we can now more prope rly turn to his construction of the fetus.
The Fetus
Constructing the Fetus as a Human Person
7. ‘‘Now, you were you and I was me at the moment of conception . When
sperm and ovum unite in fertilisation , the complete genetic information is pre-
sent, that spells out the characteristics, that you are goin g to have ginger hair,
6 foot tall, be good at maths or music, maybe a great athlete, maybe you will
develop some sort of heart condition . All these characteristics are there in the
single cell with which we all began .’’
Psych ology of Collective Action 273
Here there is a se lection of a series of dimensions of similarity/diffe r-
ence (and a definition of their significance ) which creates a powerful sense
of continuity in personal identity. Furthe r, it is one which is of personal
significance for every living adult; each of us is invite d to see a range of
attribute s of enormous significance for our current sense of personhood as
being similarly present in the fertilized ovum. This sense of continuity is
developed in his commentary upon the first slide (which features a vague ly
discernible embryo in its amniotic sac which was removed as it was an ec-
topic pregnancy):
8. ‘‘This slide demonstrates how viable the embryo is, what a tremendous
determination to live the embryo has, because even though it’s in the wrong
place, it’s not being very clever, it’s not showin g much foresight, which is a
very human characteristic, the embryo carries on growin g in the tube because
it has the right nutrients surroundin g it: thus test-tube babies, which grow first
of all in the petrie-dish .’’‘‘Viability,’’ often used to diffe rentiate between stages of fetal deve l-
opment (and hence legitimate abortion at particular developmental stages),
is construed to dissolve such distinctions and advance instead a sense of
continuity. Further, the embryo is ascribed an agency (a ‘‘tremendous de-
termination to live’’) which, through its construction as error-prone , appe ars
distinctive ly ‘‘human.’’ In his commentary upon the second slide (showing
two fetal feet and introduce d as ‘‘one of the most upsetting pictures we show,
because these two perfectly formed feet were attached to a perfectly formed
tiny body’’) he again ascribes the fetus an age ncy:
9. ‘‘Mothers to be and fathers to be, routinely see these days, their chil-
dren developing in the womb, moving around in the womb as early as 7
weeks when spontaneous movements begin and one lawyer m ember of ours
said he saw his unborn child doin g the breast-stroke in the wom b. And we
move with much m ore agility and co-ordin ation and ease and grace of move-
ment in the womb where we are surrounded by amniotic fluid, where you
know, in those early weeks in the womb we have tremendous space in which
the tiny hum an can move aroun d, it’s only a couple of inches long, but every-
thing is there and the baby leaps around like a ballet dancer, like an acrobat.
(Excluded material) It can also make complex facial expressions and even
sm ile.’’ The naming of movements (as ‘‘swimming,’’ ‘‘smiling,’’ etc.) construes
them as controlle d or purpose ful, and further, because it ascribes them a
social significance allows us to perceive a sense of continuity between our-
selve s as we are now and as ‘‘we’’ were then. This is developed when he
argue s that ‘‘we’’ moved with more ‘‘ease and grace’’ in the womb thereby
implying that the only difference between these stage s of our personal ex-
istence is that ‘‘we’’ have lost something. Once again it is note worthy that
274 Hopkins an d Reicher
our perspective on the fetus is constructed through the eyes and experi-
ences of quite specific people ; willing pare nts watching the ultrasound
video-screen. Again, this invite s us to view the fetus through the eyes of
particular social actors and so not only encourage s us to ascribe the fetus
the status ascribed by those positione d in this re lationship (Maquire , 1989)
but grounds this highly constructed image in the direct experience of eve-
ryday othe rs.
Elsewhere, these same constructions were grounde d in the direct ex-
perience and ‘‘hard evidence’’ (c.f. extract 6) of scientists. For example he
cited one ‘‘leadin g geneticist’’ as obse rving that those involve d in the first
test-tube baby:
10. ‘‘ . . . knew with absolu te certainty, that the being that was created
in a petrie-dish would develop into nothing other than a mature human if it
just developed in the normal way and didn ’t die on route, that they could be
absolu tely certain it wasn’t a mole, it was a member of the human family and
I say, they put it very simply themselves: ‘She looked beautifu l in the test tube,
she looks beautiful now.’ ’’ ‘‘Her’’ beauty in the petrie dish and her beauty as a newborn, create
a powerful sense of continuity such that our cultural response to the latter
is applie d to the former. Of particular interest is the way in which the
ascription of attribute s associate d with personhood is made easier through
the argument that ‘‘they could be absolutely certain it wasn ’t a mole, it was
a member of the human family.’’ Simply put, the ambiguity concerning what
being a ‘‘member of the human family’’ entails, means that our agre ement
with the statement that this be ing is human (and not a mole ) may encour-
age us to ascribe to it all of those things that we associate with hum an
beings.
Others’ Constructions of the Fetus
At the same time alternative constructions of the fetus were charac-
terised so as to rende r them unte nable . One strategy was to present a se ries
of diffe rent criteria for categorization (‘‘you ’ll get som e who say hum an life
begins then, you ’ll get others who say, no, it begins when the baby starts m oving,
you’ll get others who’ll say no, it begins when the baby’s heart starts beating’’)and conclude on the basis of this range of constructions that:
11. ‘‘So, we see there is a complete incon sistency in the argum ent, as
there must be if you claim as any other starting poin t that which can be shown
to be the case from a scientific poin t of view that human individual develop-
ment begins from conception . Any other point is completely arbitrary.’’
Psych ology of Collective Action 275
Charge s of inconsiste ncy are freque ntly obse rved in argume ntation
(Billig, 1987) and are of special inte rest here for they turn attention to the
opposition ’s argumentation while detracting attention from aspe cts of his
own. Indeed, his ridiculing of others’ argumentation surrounding the selec-
tion of features as a basis for categorizing the fetus is inte resting because
it seemingly denies the possibility of social categorization at all and thereby
obscures the fact that his own categorization is similarly base d upon the
active singling out and construction of dimensions of similarity and conti-
nuity. This tactic of advancing a categorization as ‘‘natural’’ or ‘‘give n’’through appare ntly denying the possibility of categorization was also to be
found in his description of how a pro-abortionist (Profe ssor Wendy Savage )
had responde d to an anti-abortion ist in a TV debate. During the pro-
gramme the latte r held up a plastic mode l of a fetus declaring
12. ‘‘ ‘Look this is what we are talkin g abou t. This is a baby of 18 weeks.’and Professor Wendy Savage shouted across the room , the studio: ‘That’s not
a baby, it’s a fetus.’ Now, all of us have different technical nam es as we go
through life’s journey. We begin as embryos, we go on to be fetuses, when we
are born the doctors call us neonates, we become infants, toddlers, children ,
adolescen ts, adults, geriatrics and so on. I have yet to hear of a proud new
father looking over the cot of his new born baby and saying: ‘What a lovely
neonate I’ve got.’ (some audie nce laughte r) If he did, I think it would say
more abou t him and his state of mind than it would abou t the humanity of
his baby. Well, it’s quite proper for the doctor to call it a neonate, it’s quite
proper for the doctor to call the unborn child a fetus, bu t you start usin g names
like that deliberately and you could question what is Professor Wendy Savage
trying to do? She is trying to foist a particular attitude towards the unborn
child and towards the unborn child’s rights on to the viewers on that particu lar
occasion and you know, using nam es to distance people from the hum an re-
ality of the unborn child, this is a common ploy in all great campaigns for
and against human rights, in particular instan ces.’’ This construes the opposition ’s use of the category ‘‘fetus’’ as a specific
instance of their general deviousne ss. Thus, while both pro- and anti-abor-
tionists se e k to advance particular constructions of the fe tus, his
construction of the opposition ’s motive s detracts from the argumentative
substance behind it, and through the contrast that it implie s, rende rs his
own as disinte rested. That his preferred construction should be seen as a
nonconte stable description of reality is developed by his dismissal of the
relevance of the distinctions implie d by such categorizations as ‘‘neonate ’’or ‘‘adole scent.’’ Defining them as merely ‘‘technical’’ has the effect of de-
tracting attention from the way in which our categorizations are bound up
with complex public de libe ration about the meaning of adulthood and the
degree to which the rights of adulthood can be claimed by othe rs (Aries,
276 Hopkins an d Reicher
1962) . In effect, this constitute s an argument against arguments which do
support a differentiation between human beings according to stage and so
allows him to advance his own categorization in such a way as to give the
impression that it is unconstructe d.
The Fetus in Words and Pictures.
The inte raction between the visual imagery on the screen and his dis-
cursive representation of the fetus was especially appare nt in those sections
of his speech where he sought to contrast his own and the opposition ’scategorization. For example , while the image of two fetal feet lingered on
screen he commented;
13. ‘‘Now, this is when the pro-abortion lobby will talk abou t a safe, early
abortion , an early abortion which is just a blob of jelly, they will argue. I ask
you, a blob of jelly with two feet and can make complex facial expression s
and even smile! So, that when we begin to examine unemotionally, objectively,
the kind of arguments put forward by the pro-abortion lobby, we find that they
just don ’t stand up to scrutiny. That they can be rebuffed by the observation
of an ordinary mum and dad who’ve never read an article in the British Medi-
cal Journal, but they can also be rebuffed by a learned article read by doctors
throughout the world .’’With this characterization of the opposition ’s construction of the fetus
and the sharp contrast between the amorphous shape less form of a ‘‘blob
of jelly’’ and the precisely de fined feet on the screen, the audie nce is invited
to judge and reject the opposition ’s claim (‘‘I ask you, a blob of jelly with
two feet and can make complex facial expression s and even smile!’’). That
this is the appropriate response is deve lope d through the argument that
the opposition ’s construction can be ‘‘rebuffed by the observation of an or-
dinary mum and dad who’ve never read an article in the British Medical
Journal.’’The use of the eyes and voice s of willing pare nts was similarly appare nt
in his observations about the slide showing a 23-week-old fetus:
14. ‘‘Here we have a baby girl who was christened Kelly, who was born
very, very prematurely at 23 weeks. You can see how tiny she is from the nurse’sweddin g ring on her forearm here and when she was born , the doctors and
nurses did everything they possibly could to enable her to survive. Sadly she
died of pneumonia which is a common enough fate for a baby born this pre-
mature because of the immaturity of the lungs, but when she died it was a
little baby girl called Kelly who died. It wasn’t a piece of tissue that had been
got rid of, or a blob of jelly. It was a little baby girl called Kelly who died and
the doctors and nurses and parents mourned her passing. But, the fact is, that
Psych ology of Collective Action 277
possibly at the same hospital at possibly the same day in Britain , a baby pos-
sibly the same age would have been taken and put into an incinerator lawfully,
or put into a kidney dish and left to die, the only difference would be that
this is a so called ‘wanted’ baby and the other is a so called ‘unwanted’ baby.
So, people are given human rights accordin g depen ding on their degree of want-
edness.’’The choice of a slide of a wante d fetus again invite s the audie nce to
see the fetus through the eyes of people who have welcomed the preg-
nancy and are like ly to ascribe the fetus a distinctive social status. Inde ed,
the act of naming is a practice associate d with ‘‘social birth’’ (Minturn,
1989; Morgan, 1989) and powerfully conveys ‘‘her’’ welcome into a social
community. Again the important point here is that a sense of personhood
that is continge nt on a particular social re lationship (and which affects
our reading of the visual image before us) is unive rsalize d so that all fe-
tuses are seen as ‘‘Kellys’’ rathe r than as ‘‘pieces of tissue’’ or ‘‘blobs of
jelly’’ and as a corollary, the pro-abortion construction ridicule d as wholly
inade quate .
So far, we have described the speake r’s construction of the protago-
nists’ re lationship with ‘‘ordinary’’ people and explored the way in which
a particular construction of the fetus was made to seem obvious. Let us
now look at the construction of women.
Wom en an d Pro-abor tion ists
As anti-abortionists speak in a conte xt in which they are vulne rable
to constructions which define them as reactionary and anti-wome n, we
could expe ct the speake r to define the relationship between women and
abortion so as to break the opposition ’s construction of abortion as ex-
pressing women’s political inte rests. Inde ed, in a speech dire cted to a
general audie nce which seeks to unive rzalise a particular construction of
the fetus and the act of abortion through presenting it as be ing grounde d
in everyone ’s common-se nse knowle dge of reality, it is vitally important
that the speake r anticipate alte rnative constructions which could splinte r
such a general category and identify categorie s of people that have a
pro-abortion position base d on political analyse s of women’s place in so-
cie ty.
Below we consider how women were represented in relation to the
fetus, the act of abortion and the debate’s protagonists, and how the con-
struction of these relations functioned to se parate women from those
calling for abortion.
278 Hopkins an d Reicher
The Significant Absence of Women as Persons
At the same time as the fetus was establishe d as a separate social actor,
the woman’s presence was obscured. Thus, as a corollary of representing
the fetus as a free-floating autonomous being, the woman was rendered in-
visible (e.g., in extract 9 she was reduced to a backdrop—a ‘‘tremendous
space’’). In similar vein, the woman was represented as an ‘‘environme nt.’’For example , in his discussion of test-tube babie s he argued that:
15. ‘‘If the test tube were to say, ‘this baby is my property,’ nobody would
believe the test tube. And when the pro-abortion lobby argues the baby is part
of the mother’s body, it is exactly, we can make exactly the sam e poin t, we
have a living human growing in the mother’s womb dependent upon the mother
for life, but dependence does not mean you are part of the body of which you
are dependent.’’Construing an equivale nce between the test tube and women invite s
us to view the woman as akin to a non-animate containe r. This not only
supports a clear sense of the separate identity of containe r and containe d,
but also encourage s us to see the woman as simply a passive environme nt
which like the test-tube is not dramatically affected by the containe d. The
construction of woman as containe r was furthe r developed through the fol-
lowing representation of ‘‘depende ncy’’:16. ‘‘All of us were dependen t on som e body when we were born, we were
not part of the people upon whom we were dependent. My baby granddaughter
was born prematurely at thirty weeks, was dependen t upon the incubator in
the first several weeks of her life. She did not stop being part of her mother’sbody when she was born prematurely at thirty weeks and start to be part of
an incubator. We recognised her as Hannah who required a particular envi-
ronment in which to live and we all require a particular environm ent in which
to live.’’Again, the analogy between the woman and the incubator is powerful
because it defines the woman as an inanimate containe r that is unchange d
by the presence of the fetus. With no sense of the woman’s personhood
and no sense of the reciprocal relationship between woman and fetus, we
have little sense of how the woman’s personhood is affected by the change s
of pregnancy and hence no sense of the woman as a person able to ar-
ticulate claims about her body.
Women as Onlookers
That women may articulate demands for abortion was also counte red
by a construction of the debate’s protagonists which defined women as on-
Psych ology of Collective Action 279
lookers while others advocate d abortion on the grounds of cost-cutting. This
construction of the logic behind abortion occurred while the image of the
23-we ek-old ‘‘Kelly’’ lingered on screen (5th slide , extract 14) . Having con-
trasted the care extende d to Kelly with the abortion of similarly age d
others, he argued that most of ‘‘the children who are killed ’’ after 24 weeks
are handicappe d and that the Department of Health and some doctors
‘‘prom ote the killin g of the disabled for explicitly financial reasons.’’ Thus,
while his earlie r construction of women as environme nts meant that there
was an absence of women as persons, the disability example allows him to
represent women as particular sorts of persons: those that desperate ly want
the ir babie s and who are forced into abortion in ‘‘a moment of pan ic’’ be-
cause of the pressures imposed upon them by othe rs.
Women as Victims
In addition to the above , the speake r also constructe d women’s health
as a direct victim of abortion:
17. ‘‘Now, post-abortion syndrom e is a disorder which is in exactly within
the same sort of pattern as other post traum atic stress disorders which is some-
thing first recognised in war veterans, whereby if you like, behaviour patterns
in these veterans might cu lminate in some dram atic inciden t or other and mas-
sive evidence was built up to show that all sorts of behaviou r patterns really
related back to som e unresolved trauma that they had experienced while fight-
ing in Vietnam and unfortunately because, you know, there is a tremendously
growing body of evidence, you’ll see it in popu lar women’s magazines, you ’llsee it in serious medical journals, showin g that women need to go through a
natural grieving process followin g miscarriage; they’re mourning their lost child.
They don’t talk after all, they say, ‘I lost my baby,’ they do not talk about
havin g aborted a fetus which is perhaps a more accurate technical way of
puttin g it. They say they’ve lost their baby. And there is the same sort of rec-
ognition about abortion .’’The expe rience of a woman who is willingly pregnant and desperately
wants a child (and here has a miscarriage ) is once again made to stand in
for all women’s experiences. While before this meant that a construction
of the fetus continge nt upon a particular relationship was generalize d and
naturalize d, a similar effect is obtaine d here for women. In other words,
the experiences of a woman who has defined herself and her fetus in terms
of a mother¯child relationship is made to stand in for the whole . As a
consequence we see all pregnant women as viewing their fetuses as ‘‘unborn
children’’ and as experiencing the same sense of loss after abortion as that
suffered by a woman after miscarriage . Note too how the meaningle ssness
280 Hopkins an d Reicher
of the categorization ‘‘fetus’’ is conve yed and how this again advance s his
own as directly arising from women’s experience. Furthe r, this construction
of women’s experience has conseque nces for others’ attempts to represent
abortion as an important element of women’s political inte rests. Thus, in-
stead of be ing an expre ssion of women’s inte rests, abortion is represented
as inevitably harmful with the implication being that it is the anti-abortion-
ists that best represent women’s interests. This is forcefully conveyed when
the speake r refers to the pro-abortion campaigne rs’ slogan ‘‘a woman’sright to choose ’’ and their opposition to anti-abortion ‘‘education’’: their
opposition shows that they can never prope rly represent women because:
18. ‘‘They want a woman ’s right to choose but they don’t want a woman ’sright to know what she’s choosing.’’
DISCUSSION
Inevitably, the application of our theoretical analysis to specific in-
stance s of communication e ntails a proce ss of active interpre tation.
However, we hope to have provide d the reade r with enough material to
be able to judge the argument that it is useful to pay close attention to
how the content of political rhetoric constructs social categories and cate-
gory contents. More specifically we hope to have demonstrated that this
discourse defines both anti-abortionists and audience as common-cate gory
members, and represents the anti-abortion construction of the fetus as
firmly grounde d in, and indeed as arising from, the common-se nse knowl-
edge and everyday expe riences of a category of people whose boundarie s
are so wide ly set as to include all ‘‘ordinary’’/‘‘everyday’’ people .
Furthe r, we hope to have provide d a fine -graine d analysis of the
rhetoric used to define the ‘‘conte nts’’ of this category. Thus, our analysis
highlights the way in which the expe riences of particular people (e .g.,
‘‘ordin ary m ums and dads,’’ women grie ving ove r miscarrie d babie s, etc.)
were used to stand in for and define the whole . More specifically, it ex-
plore s the way in which these othe rs’ expe riences imply that the speake r’spreferred representation of the fetus (i.e ., as a fully human person) is
ne ithe r his, nor argume ntative ly constructed, but a ‘‘give n,’’ known by all
within the community (and alte rnative constructions of the fetus con-
strued as thoroughly marginal) . Furthe r, we hope to have contribute d to
an unde rstanding of the ways in which our reading of visual image ry is
dire cted by verbal argumentation. ‘‘Seeing’’ the screen fetuses through
the eyes of willing pare nts allows the sense of fetal personhood contin-
gent upon that particular social re lationship (Maquire , 1989) to be gen-
eralize d to all. The real grie f associate d with miscarriage and the real
excitement of prospe ctive pare nts before an ultrasound scanne r, brings
Psych ology of Collective Action 281
these screen image s to ‘‘life ’’ in a way which counte rs opposition argu-
ments that anti-abortionists are preoccupie d with abstract metaphysical
and religious debate rathe r than everyday reality. Inde ed, according to
this construction, if anyone ignore s reality it is the pro-abortionists who
cannot see what everyone else can see—that the fetus is a human person
and that abortion is killing.
We would also emphasize that the power and significance of these
constructions can only be prope rly recognized if they are contextualize d in
relation to the pro-abortion alte rnative s that have some currency. Take for
example , the construction of women. As the identification of political in-
terests (and hence the demands for political ‘‘rights’’) is continge nt upon
the adoption of particular collective identities (c.f. Brodie et al., 1992) much
pro-abortion activity has been associated with the construction and dissemi-
nation of politic ize d analyse s of womanhood. For the se re asons, this
speaker’s construction of women has a special significance : whe re pro-abor-
tion activists have sought to represent women in terms of a distinctive
category with distinctive political demands, they are here either reconsti-
tuted as the prototypical representative s of an everyday knowledge which
holds that a fetus is a person or as victims of abortion.
CONCLUSION
As explaine d in the introduction, one reason for analyzing this par-
ticular speech was to conside r the degree to which our emphasis upon the
prominence of category argument could apply to speeches given to hetero-
geneous public audie nces as well as audiences that may be de fined in terms
of quite specific (e.g., occupational) categories. Comparing this speech with
that give n to medical staff (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992; Reicher & Hopkins,
1996a) illustrate s major differences in the content of argume ntation. The
speaker addre ssing the medical audie nce argue d that there was a funda-
me ntal schism in the public ’s value s and proce ede d to construct an
anti-abortion definition of what it meant to be a profe ssional medical prac-
titione r through locating it on one side of this value divide and in
opposition to the othe r. Thus, a striking feature of that speech was the
explicit construction of contrasting social categorie s defined in terms of
the ir value s.
When we consider the present speech we find such explicit category-
re late d argume ntation to be marke dly abse nt. Howeve r, our analysis
suggests that on closer inspe ction there is much to be gaine d from analyzing
both speeches in terms of their arguments about social category definitions.
More specifically, our analysis implie s that the key diffe rence between the se
speeches is the leve l of abstraction at which the categorie s used to represent
282 Hopkins an d Reicher
the audiences are defined. In the speech directed to the medical audience
the category was more specific/le ss inclusive and defined through contrasts
with other categorie s. In the speech analyze d here, the category was more
general and so inclusive as to be almost universal. Furthe r, and as a cor-
ollary, the cate gory conte nts we re de fine d in such a way that the
anti-abortion construction of the fetus was construed as arising from ‘‘or-
dinary’’ people ’s expe riences and common-se nse knowledge. Thus, although
the two speeches differ in the nature of the categories used and the manner
in which the ir contents were defined, there is an important sense in which
both speeches can be analyze d for the work that they do in representing
the anti-abortion position as arising from their audie nces’ social identitie s.
Of course , the detailed analysis of this anti-abortion speech should not
be taken as indicating that it is exceptional in any respect: we could expect
to find those seeking to mobilize support for abortion to devote consider-
able attention to constructing and disseminating social category definitions
which make mass pro-abortion action possible . Inde ed, in an analysis of
the mobilization rhetoric in anothe r domain (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b)
we describe how speakers with very different proje cts (those attempting to
mobilize support for a strike and those attempting to mobilize opposition
to it) used similar forms of argume ntation. More specifically our analysis
showed that although diffe ring in the content of their argume ntation, both
constructed category boundarie s and category contents which represented
the ir own position as embodying the mass of public opinion and their op-
pone nts as isolate d and pe riphe ral figure s. However, our de cision to
analyze this speech was made on theoretical grounds. While we could have
complemented our earlie r analysis of anti-abortion argume ntation by ana-
lyzing pro-abortion mobilization rhe toric, we be lie ve that the re is a
theoretical case for exploring category-re late d argume ntation in different
contexts. In particular, we hope to have demonstrated that even in contexts
where one may not expe ct category argume ntation (e.g., where the audi-
ence cannot be defined in terms of a distinctive group membership and
contraste d from others) it is he lpful to analyze the content of rhetoric for
the work that it does in constructing social category definitions.
Of course , to have demonstrated the existence of category-argume n-
tation in social movement communication is not to say anything about the
degree to which speake rs are consciously aware of their activity. Nor is it
to say anything about the reception give n to particular constructions. Thus,
the next stage of our research program is to conside r the degree to which
audiences accept particular category constructions as the basis for the ir ac-
tion. In this se nse , our e mphasis upon the importance of cate gory
construction in political mobilization must remain provisional. However, in
the light of the very considerable evidence that social categories have im-
Psych ology of Collective Action 283
portant conseque nces for cognition and action, we hope to have persuaded
the reader that this approach has some promise .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Jannat Saleem and Suzanne Zeedyk for
the ir very he lpful comments upon an earlie r draft of this paper.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
NICK HOPKINS is a Lecturer in Social Psychology at Dundee Unive rsity and has research
interests in issues conce rning social identity, social influence , social conflict, and politicalmobilization.
STEV E REICHER is a lecturer in Social Psychology at St. Andrews Unive rsity and has
rese arch interests in social conflict, social influence , mass/crowd behavior, racism, and thesocial construction of collective identities.
286 Hopkins an d Reicher