Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014

1

Парадигма Милгрэма сегодня

Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014

К 40-летию публикации монографии«Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View»

For the 40th Anniversary since the Publication ofObedience to Authority: An Experimental View

2014Коломна

УДК – 316.47 Рекомендовано к изданию редакционно-издательским советом ГАОУ ВПО МГОСГИ

ББК 88.5П 42

Редакционная коллегия: кандидат биологических наук Воронов А.Я., доктор психологических наук Ершова Р.В.

Перевод: кандидат филологических наук С.В. Савельев

П 42 Парадигма Милгрэма сегодня: сборник научных статей / под общ. ред. А.Я. Воронова, Р.В. Ершовой. – Коломна: Московский государственный социально-гуманитарный институт, 2014. – 284 с.

ISBN 978-5-904345-40-2 Данное издание является уникальным собранием статей американских,

английских, французских и российских исследователей, посвящённых разработке различных аспектов одной из ведущих парадигм современной социальной психологии – экспериментальной obedience-парадигмы выдающегося американского психолога Милгрэма (1933 –1984). Наряду с теоретическими работами (Т. Блэсс, С. Ливин, Г. Перлштадт, А.Н. Поддьяков, К. Стотт, Ю. Тарнов, К. Уорси, П. Холландер, А. Чалефф, Э. Эрдос) представлены также эмпирические исследования (Л. Бег, Ж.-Л. Бовуа, А.Е. Войскунский, Р.В. Ершова, В. Зейглер-Хилл, Д. Курбе, Д. Мантелл, О.В.Митина, Д. Оберле, Р. Панзарелла, Е.И. Рассказова, Э.Саузард, В.В. Сорокина, Э. Фэй). Книга вышла в свет в день открытия в России (Коломна, МГОСГИ) Международной конференции «Повинуемость легитимным авторитетам (30 лет социальной психологии без Милгрэма, 40 лет его противоречивой монографии: экспериментальная obedience-парадигма вчера, сегодня, завтра)». Книга представляет интерес для специалистов в области социальной психологии, социологии, политологии, студентов и аспирантов и всех, интересующихся проблемами деструктивной повинуемости легитимным авторитетам – лицам, наделённым официальной законной властью.

УДК 316.47ББК 88.5

©Московский государственный областной социально-гуманитарный институт, 2014

ISBN 978-5-904345-40-2 ©Коллектив авторов. Текст, 2014

2

Оглавление Предисловие редакторов книги 7

Т. БлэссПолвека спустя: Продолжающееся воздействие оbedience-экспериментов Милгрэма (вместо предисловия)

11

. А Чалефф Милгрэм и разумная неповинуемость

15

. , .- . , . , . Д Курбе Ж Л Бовуа Л Бэг Д Оберле Перенос оbedience-парадигмы Милгрэма в контекст телевизионной

игры: влияние легитимного авторитета телевидения и исследование межличностных различий у повиновавшихся и неповиновавшихся участников телешоу

23

. Э Эрдос ( )ЛовушкаМилгрэма пересмотренная версия статьи

50

. Р Ершова : Повинуемость в образовании опыт экспериментального

исследования

61

. П Холландер : Новый взгляд на банальность зла политически

мотивированное насилие и экспериментыМилгрэма

82

. С Ливин Оработе постоянно действующего в Бард колледже

« – » семинара Милгрэм повинуемость авторитету и , некоторых проблемах рассматриваемых на семинаре в

рамках оbedience-парадигмы

108

. , . , . Д Мантелл Э Фэй Р ПанзареллаОbedience-парадигма Милгрэма как методика измерения просоциального поведения: решение причинять или не причинять боль

120

. , . , . О Митина Е Рассказова В Сорокина Конформизм в структуре личностных ценностей и

сопоставительный анализ его выраженности у представителей различных социальных и культурных групп

132

. Г Перлштадт , Обзор литературы и гипотез отсутствовавших в

экспериментальных оbedience-исследованиях Милгрэма

157

. А Поддьяков 178

3

Сравнение экспериментовМилгрэма и Зимбардо

. , . -Э Саузард В Зайглер Хилл : Модифицированная парадигмаМилгрэма повторить

эксперимент станет проще

189

. К Стотт Преодолениешока от оbedience-экспериментов Милгрэма: понять

сущность деструктивной повинуемости означает пойти дальше простых повторений экспериментов

208

. Ю Тарноу, Ослабление инверсия и противодействие власти : , легитимных авторитетов этические принципы

, « »регуляторный захват правила Алинского и противоречия оbedience-экспериментов

230

. А Войскунский : Применение систем виртуальной реальности в психологии виртуальное повторение экспериментовМилгрэма

242

. К Уорси, Милгрэм пространственная близость и экологический

кризис

259

4

Table of ContentsForeword from Editors of the book 9

Т. BlassAfter half a century: The continuing impact of Milgram’s Obedience experi-ments (instead of Foreword)

11

I. ChaleffStanley Milgram and Intelligent Disobedience

15

D.Courbet, J.-L. Beauvois, L. Bègue, D. OberléA transposition of Milgram’s obedience paradigm to the context of TV game show: Effect of the power of television and Study of the personality of the obedient and disobedient participants

23

E. ErdosThe Milgram Trap Revisited

50

R. Ershova«Obedience» in Education: an experimental research

61

P. Hollander1Revisiting the banality of Evil: Contemporary political violence and the Milgram experiments

82

S. S. LevineThe (continuing) development of the seminar “Milgram – Obedience to Authority” at Bard College and a partial array of topics considered in the Obedience domain

108

D. Mantell, A. Faye, R. PanzarellaThe Milgram paradigm as a measure of pro-social behavior: Deciding to and not to inflict pain

120

O. Mitina, E. Rasskazova, V. SorokinaConformity in the structure of personal values and a comparative analysis of its intensity in different social and cultural groups

132

H. PerlstadtThe Missing Literature Review and Hypotheses for Milgram’s Obedience Experiments

157

A.N. PoddiakovComparison of the Milgram and Zimbardo experiments

178

5

A. C. Southard, V. Zeigler-HillA modified Milgram paradigm: replication made simple

189

C. StottGetting Over the shock of Milgram: To understand ‘Obedience’ is to move beyond mere replication

208

E. TarnowDecreasing, reversing and confronting the power of authority: ethical guidelines, regulatory capture, Alinsky’s rules and the obedience experiment “controversy”

231

A. VoiskounskiThe use of virtual reality systems in psychology: virtual reconstruction of Stanley Milgram’s experiments

242

K. WorthyMilgram, proximity, and environmental crisis

259

6

Foreword from editors of the book. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Mil-gram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ РЕДАКТОРОВКНИГИ( посвящено открытиюМеждународной конференции

« », 9-11 2014,Повинуемость легитимным авторитетам декабря , Коломна Россия)

Книга, которую Вы держите в руках, вышла в свет 9 декабря 2014 – в день открытия в России Международной конференции «Повинуемость легитимным авторитетам (30 лет социальной психологии без Милгрэма, 40 лет его спорной монографии): экспериментальная obedience -парадигма: вчера, сегодня, завтра».

Эта конференция, проходящая в Московском государственном областном социально-гуманитарном институте (МГОСГИ, Коломна) стала IV-ой Международная obedience-конференцией в России.

2014 год – год четырёх памятных дат, связанных с жизнью и научным творчеством Милгрэма и его obedience-парадигмой (примечательно, что 2 даты связаны с российскими конференциями):

1. 40 лет первой публикации книги С. Милгрэма «Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View» (1974).

2. 30 лет со дня кончины Милгрэма (20 декабря 1984 года). 3. 20 лет с момента проведения студенческой научной конференции «

Милгрэм и его вклад в социальную психологию и психологию управления (к 10-летию со дня смерти выдающегося американского психолога)», 20-21 декабря 1994 года, Российский государственный гуманитарный университет (РГГУ), Москва.

4. 10 лет II-ой в России, Международной obedience-конференции1 «Конформизм и его психологические механизмы», прошедшей 20-23

1 В конце апреля 1993 года состоялась премьерная российская демонстрация документального фильма Милгрэма «Obedience» в Москве на Международной конференции РГГУ, посвященной этому событию. Синхронный перевод классического фильма на русский язык был сделан под руководством профессора И.В. Петровой (специалиста в области методики преподавания английского языка) несколькими студентами РГГУ, слушавшими курс социальной психологии старшего преподавателя А.Я. Воронова на факультете управления этого университета. Эта Международная конференция была 1-й obedience-конференцией в России.

7


декабря 2004 года в Московском государственном педагогическом университете (МГПУ, Москва) и приуроченной к 20-летию со дня смерти Милгрэма и 30-летию публикации его книги «Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View». С основным докладом «The continuing legacy of Stanley Milgram’s experiments on obedience to authority» на конференции выступил ведущий эксперт по творческому наследию Милгрэма профессор Томас Блэсс (Thomas Blass, The University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA), а с пленарным – «Изучение и развитие экспериментальной obedience-парадигмы Милгрэма в СССР и России» – А.Я. Воронов (Россия).

15-19 ноября 2010 года в России прошёл Международный семинар «К 50-летию первых obedience-экспериментов Милгрэма». Семинар фактически стал III-ей obedience-конференцией в России и работал в течение 5 дней: 2 дня из них – в Москве в Институте Психологии РАН (ИП РАН) и Российском Университете Дружбы Народов (РУДН), а 3 дня – в Коломне (МГОСГИ).

Нынешняя IV-ая Международная obedience-конференция, вновь проходящая в Московском государственном областной социально-гуманитарном институте (Коломна, Россия) продолжает скромный вклад Института в дальнейшее развитие одной из ведущих парадигм современной экспериментальной социальной психологии.

Редакторы этой книги и Организаторы

IV-ой Международной obedience-конференции в России

А.Я. ВороновР.В. Ершова

8


FOREWORD FROM EDITORS OF THE BOOK (devoted to the Opening of International 2014 Obedience Conference,

Kolomna City, Russia)

The book you are holding in your hands has been released on 9th

of December, 2014 – on the day of opening International 2014 OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY CONFERENCE (30 years of Social Psychology without Stanley Milgram, 40 years of his controversial monograph; experimental obedience paradigm: yesterday, today, tomorrow) in Russia.

This conference is the 4th International obedience conference in Russia. It held in the beautiful ancient city of Kolomna at Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies (MGOSGI).

2014 has outlined four important anniversaries of Stanley Milgram and his obedience paradigm (some of the events listed below are connected with Russian conferences):

1. The 40th anniversary of the first publication of Milgram’s book Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View (1974).

2. The 30th anniversary of Milgram’s passing (December 20, 1984). 3. The 20th anniversary of students’ conference Stanley Milgram and his

contribution to Social and Management Psychology (to the 10th anniversary from the date of death of the eminent American psychologist) at Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow (RSUH), December 20-21, 1994.

4. The 10th anniversary of the 2nd International obedience conference in Russia1 at Moscow City Pedagogical University (International Conference Conformity and Its Mechanisms, December 20-23, 2004, Moscow). The conference was devoted to the 20th anniversary of Milgram’s passing and the 30th anniversary of the publication of his book Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View. The

1 At the end of April, 1993, Russian debut of Milgram's Obedience film took place in Moscow at the International conference of RSUH devoted to this event. This time, the classic film was dubbed in Russian language by several students from the department of management (course of Social Psychology, Professor Alexander Y. Voronov). The students were coordinated by Professor Irina V. Petrova (the expert in the field of teaching methodology of English).

This International conference was the 1st obedience conference in Russia.

9


world’s leading expert on Milgram’s heritage, Professor Thomas Blass from The University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA gave the keynote lecture titled The continuing legacy of Stanley Milgram’s experiments on obedience to authority. The plenary lecture under the name of The study and the development of Stanley Milgram’s experimental obedience paradigm in the USSR and in Russia, was given by Alexander Y. Voronov (Russia).

On November 15-19, 2010, an International Seminar To the 50th anniversary of the first obedience experiments of Stanley Milgram was conducted in Russia. This Seminar was de facto the 3rd obedience conference in Russia and took place during 5 days: 2 days in Moscow (at Institute of Psychology of Russian Academy of Sciences and at Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia) and 3 days in the city of Kolomna at MGOSGI.

By organizing the next 4th International Obedience Conference in Russia again at the same Institute in the city of Kolomna in December 2014, we suppose to continue this Institute’s humble contribution to promote one of the leading paradigms of modern experimental Social Psychology.

Editors of this book and Conveners of

the 4th International Obedience conference in Russia

Alexander Y. VoronovRegina V. Ershova

10

T. Blass. After half a century: the continuing impact of Milgram’s Obedience Experiments. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

AFTER HALF A CENTURY: THE CONTINUING IMPACT

OF MILGRAM’S OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS(instead of Foreword)

: ПОЛВЕКАСПУСТЯ ПРОДОЛЖАЮЩЕЕСЯВОЗДЕЙСТВИЕ

OBEDIENCE- ЭКСПЕРИМЕНТОВМИЛГРЭМА(вместо предисловия)

Thomas BlassUniversity of Maryland Baltimore County, USA

[email protected]

Thomas Blass, a professor of psychology at the University of Maryland Baltimore County, is the author of Milgram’s biography, The man who shocked the world: The life and legacy of Stanley Milgram (Basic Books, 2004, 2009). He also edited the third, ex-panded edition of Milgram’s anthology, The individual in a social world: Essays and Experiments (Pinter and Martin, 2010), the most complete collection of Milgram’s writings. Since the 1980s he has taught a seminar on the Social Psychology of Stanley Mil-gram, which he created. In addition, Blass maintains an informa-tional website about Milgram, www.stanleymilgram.com. Томас Блэсс - профессор психологии в Университете штата Мэриленд, графство Балтимор. Он является автором

биографии Милгрэма, "Человек, который потряс мир: жизнь и наследие Стенли Милгрэма" (Basic Books, 2004, 2009). Он также был редактором третьего, дополненного издания антологии работ Стенли Милгрэма «Человек в социальном мире: эссе и эксперименты» (Pinter and Martin, 2010). Эта книга - самое полное собрание работ Милгрэма. С 1980 года Томас Блэсс ведет созданный им семинар «Социальная психология Стенли Милгрэма», кроме того, он регулярно обновляет свой информационный сайт о Милгрэме www.stanleymilgram.com.

Key words: obedience, authority, defiance, legitimate.Ключевые слова: повинуемость легитимному авторитету; легитимный авторитет; неповиновение лицу, наделённому официальной законной властью; законный.

11

http://www.stanleymilgram.com/

http://www.stanleymilgram.com/

mailto:[email protected]


AbstractThis article presents the key elements of Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments.

As most readers probably know, Milgram made the startling discovery that average com-munity residents from New Haven, Connecticut, and surrounding areas were willing to give increasing, and possibly harmful, electric shocks to a vehemently protesting victim who did nothing to merit such punishment. (No actual shocks were given. The victim only faked his distress.) Further, based on my research, which I present, the Milgram findings can be considered universals of social behavior, transcending time and place. Over the years, the experiments have generated considerable controversy, largely because of the ethical issues it brought to the surface.

Аннотация

В данной статье описываются ключевые элементы obedience-экспериментов Милгрэма. Как уже, наверное, известно большинству читателей, Милгрэм сделал сенсационное открытие: совершенно обычные жители из Нью-Хейвена (штат Коннектикут) и его окрестностей были готовы, по указанию экспериментатора, наносить увеличивающиеся по силе и, по-видимому, опасные удары электрического тока молящему о пощаде человеку, который фактически не сделал ничего такого, чтобы заслужить такое наказание. (На деле удары током не наносили. «Жертва» всего лишь симулировала страдания.) Результаты моего исследования, представленного в этой статье, позволяют считать эти результаты Милгрэма универсалиями социального поведения, не зависящими от места и времени. Вот уже полвека вокруг этих экспериментов идёт острая полемика, в значительной степени из-за этических проблем научных исследований, оказавшихся в центре внимания после открытия Милгрэма.

Recently, we marked the 50th anniversary of the start of Stanley Milgram’s groundbreaking experiments on obedience to destructive orders — the most fa-mous, controversial and, arguably, most important psychological research of our times. To commemorate this milestone, in this article I present the key elements comprising the legacy of those experiments. Although Milgram conducted over 20 variations of his basic procedure, his central finding obtained in several standard, or baseline, conditions was that about two-thirds of the subjects fully obeyed the ex-perimenter, progressing step-by-step up to the maximum shock of 450 volts.

First and foremost, the obedience experiments taught us that we have a power-ful propensity to obey authority. Did we need Milgram to tell us this? Of course, not. What he did teach us is just how strong this tendency is — so strong, in fact, that it can make us act in ways contrary to our moral principles.

12


Milgram’s findings provided a powerful affirmation of one of the main guid-ing principles of contemporary social psychology: That often it is not the kind of person we are that determines how we act, but rather the kind of situation we find ourselves in. To perceive behavior as flowing from within — from our character or personality — is to paint an incomplete picture of the determinants of our behavior. Milgram showed that external pressures coming from a legitimate authority can make us behave in ways we would not even consider when acting on our own.

Foreshadowing the widespread attention the obedience experiments were to receive was an early article appearing in the New York Times, titled “Sixty-five Per-cent in Test Blindly Obey to Inflict Pain,” right after the publication of Milgram’s first journal report. Although Milgram had just begun his academic career and he would go on to do other innovative research studies — such as “The small-world problem” and “The lost letter technique” — they would always be overshadowed by the obedience work. Of the 140 or so talks he gave during his lifetime, more than a third dealt with obedience. His book Obedience to authority: An experimen-tal view has been translated into 11 languages.

I believe that one of the most important aspects of Milgram’s legacy is that, in demonstrating our extreme readiness to obey authorities, he has identified one of the universals, or constants, of human behavior, straddling time and place. I have done two analyses to support this contention. In one, I correlated the results of Mil-gram’s standard obedience experiments and the replications conducted by others with their date of publication. The results: There was absolutely no relationship be-tween when a study was conducted and the amount of obedience it yielded. In a second analysis, I compared the outcomes of obedience experiments conducted in the United States with those conducted in other countries. Remarkably, the average obedience rates were very similar: In the U.S. studies, some 61 percent of the sub-jects were fully obedient, while elsewhere the obedience rate was 66 percent.

A more recent, modified replication of one of Milgram’s conditions (Exp. #5, “A new base-line condition”) conducted by Jerry Burger, a social psychologist at the Santa Clara University supports the universality argument. Burger’s replication added safeguards not contained in Milgram’s original experiment. Although carried out 45 years after Milgram conducted the original Exp. #5, Burger’s findings did not differ significantly from Milgram’s.

From the beginning, the obedience studies have been embroiled in controversy about its ethics. They were vilified by some and praised by others. A well-known ethicist commented rhetorically: “Is this perhaps going too far in what one asks a subject to do and how one deceives him?” A Welsh playwright expressed his dis-dain by arguing that many people “may feel that in order to demonstrate that sub-jects may behave like so many Eichmanns, the experimenter had to act the part, to

13


some extent, of a Himmler.” On the other hand, Milgram received supportive letters from fellow social psychologists such as Elliot Aronson and Philip Zimbardo. And in 1964, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) awarded him its annual social psychology award for his most complete report on the experiments up to that time, “Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority.”

The furor stirred up by the obedience experiments, together with a few other ethically problematic studies, has resulted in a greater sensitivity to the well-being of the human research participant today. More concretely, the obedience experi-ments are generally considered one of the handful of controversial studies that led Congress to enact the National Research Act in 1974, which mandated the creation of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). Harold Takooshian, one of Milgram’s out-standing students at CUNY, recalls him saying that “IRBs are an impressive solu-tion to a non-problem.”

A distinctive aspect of the legacy of the obedience experiments is that they are applicable to real life in a number of ways. For example, Milgram’s findings can help us fathom how it was possible for managers of fast-food restaurants through-out the United States to fall for a bizarre hoax over a nine-year period. In a typical case, the manager of an eatery received a phone call from a man who claimed to be a police officer and ordered the manager to strip-search a female employee who supposedly stole a pocketbook. In over 70 instances, the manager obeyed the un-known caller.

The use of the obedience experiments to shed some new light on the Holo-caust is widespread. Less well known is their use in legal scholarship and practice, as well as the US’s military officer training. While Milgram’s work invariably fo-cused on the darker side of human nature, he also recognized the possibility of “constructive obedience,” but was unable to conduct an experiment that would demonstrate its existence.1

1 An earlier version of this article first appeared in the Observer, a publication of the Association for Psychological Science, in 2011.

14

I. Chaleff. Stanley Milgram and Intelligent Disobedience. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Re-gional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

STANLEY MILGRAM AND INTELLIGENT DISOBEDIENCE МИЛГРЭМИРАЗУМНАЯНЕПОВИНУЕМОСТЬ

Ira ChaleffAdjunct faculty at Georgetown University,

Washington, DC, [email protected]

Ira Chaleff - author of groundbreaking books on leader-follower relationships and the forthcoming book on Intelligent Disobedience. Board Member of the International Leadership Association and Chairman Emeritus of the Congressional Management Foundation. He is adjunct faculty at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.Айра Чалефф – автор новаторских книг по психологии

Лидерства-следования, готовящейся к выходу книги, посвященной разумной неповинуемости, член Правления Международной ассоциации лидерства, почетный Председатель The Congressional Management Foundation, приглашенный преподаватель Джорджтаунского университета.

Key words: Milgram, leadership, followership, obedience, intelligent disobedience, authority, courage, moral developmentКлючевые слова: Милгрэм, лидерство, подчиняемость, повинуемость легитимным авторитетам, разумная неповинуемость, авторитет, принципиальность, развитие нравственности

Abstract Intelligent Disobedience is the skill citizens of all countries and members of all

organizations need in order to avoid following orders that will intentionally or unintentionally result in harm.

All human societies must socialize their young to respect authority. They often do this too well. This results in implementation of programs and orders that should be questioned and sometimes resisted. The outcome is a range of personal, corporate and government failures or abuses that could have been prevented.

Intelligent Disobedience examines when obedience is appropriate and when it is not. It establishes a balance between creating respect for authority and recognizing and questioning its misuses. We need to develop this balance in the very young to protect them from predatory abuse and in mature professionals who are responsible for decisions that affect many lives.

We have a model for doing this in animal-human relationships when training guide dogs for the blind and other service dogs. For the first year and a half of the dog’s life it is

15


socialized and taught to faithfully obey every command it needs to know. When it is consistently obedient, the dog is given to a higher level trainer who must teach it not to obey if obedience would cause harm to the human and dog. This is known as Intelligent Disobedience training. The dog must learn when it should not obey an order and how to successively resist the order. If it cannot learn this it cannot be a guide dog, as its purpose is to keep the human safe. There are lessons to learn from this model that can be applied to human-human authority relations.

Unthinking obedience contributes to tragedies. Intelligent Disobedience prevents them. Organizations need to incorporate Intelligent Disobedience into risk management initiatives. Parents and institutions need to weave an understanding of Intelligent Disobedience into childhood development.

This talk by the author will preview the book Intelligent Disobedience that will be published in Spring of 2015. It includes his observations at the oldest guide dog training school in the United States and applications of the relevant principles to human and professional development. It examines how training in a variety of fields such as airline safety and hospital errors-reduction can counteract the behavioral patterns observed in the Milgram obedience experiments. Dr. Milgram was ultimately seeking to discover how to reduce inappropriate obedience through the important variations of his basic experiment and his analysis of the autonomous versus the agentic states. This book and this talk is an applied extension of that work.

АннотацияПод "осознанной неповинуемостью" мы пониманием навык, который

необходим гражданам любого государства и сотрудникам любой организации, чтобы избегать выполнения как заведомо вредных распоряжений, так и таких, об опасном и вредном характере которых источнику таких распоряжений не известно.

Все общества обязаны воспитывать у подрастающего поколения уважение к легитимным авторитетам и иногда слишком в этом преуспевают. Подобная практика приводит к установлению политических режимов и социальных практик не только сомнительных, но и требующих активного противодействия. В результате обществу приходится иметь дело с целым спектром ошибок и злоупотреблений в сфере государственного и корпоративного управления, которые можно было бы предотвратить.

В рамках концепции осознанной неповинуемости мы пытаемся понять, когда повинуемость допустима, а когда нет. Данная концепция позволяет создать баланс между выражением уважения авторитету и пониманием возможности злоупотребления властными полномочиями. Необходимо формировать это умение как у молодёжи, чтобы защитить подрастающее поколение от манипулятивного воздействия, так и у сформировавшихся представителей профессионального сообщества, которые отвечают за принятие решений, влияющих на жизнь многих людей.

16


Моделью такого поведения являются взаимоотношения человека с животными (например, с собаками-поводырями слепых и с другими служебными собаками). В течение первых полутора лет жизни собака проходит социализацию и учится добросовестно выполнять все команды, которые ей необходимо знать. По достижении собакой полной и безоговорочной повинуемости, животное передают тренеру более высокого уровня, который должен научить собаку не повиноваться если повиновение может причинить человеку или собаке вред. Данный тип подготовки получил название "Обучение разумной неповинуемости" (Intelligent Disobedience training). Собака должна усвоить, когда она не должна подчиняться приказу и как успешно ему противостоять. Если животное не сможет выработать этот навык, то оно, например, не может быть собакой-поводырём, так как в задачу такого животного входит сохранение жизни человека. Мы можем применить отдельные элементы этой модели для описания отношений между людьми, один из которых наделён легитимным авторитетом.

Бездумная повинуемость приводит к трагедиям. Разумная неповинуемость предотвращает их. Организациям следует включить разумную неповинуемость в программу мероприятий по управлению рисками. Родители и учебные заведения должны приложить все усилия к тому, чтобы разумная неповинуемость стала неотъемлемой частью развития ребёнка.

Данный доклад является, в некотором смысле, предварительным обзором книги "Разумная неповинуемость", которая выйдет в свет весной 2015 года. В книге представлены наблюдения, сделанные в старейшей в США школе собак-поводырей. В ней также рассмотрены принципы формирования разумной неповинуемости, применимые для профессионального и личностного развития. В книге рассматривается, как такая специальная подготовка людей в различных профессиональных сферах, например, в авиационной безопасности или предотвращении врачебных ошибок, может исключить стиль поведения, наблюдавшийся у испытуемых в экспериментах Милгрэма по исследованию деструктивной повинуемости. Конечной целью Милгрэма было узнать, как, внося значимые изменения в базовый эксперимент снизить неприемлемую повинуемость, учитывая различия между автономностью и слепым повиновением. Настоящий доклад, как и книга, являются продолжением этого исследования в прикладном аспекте.

Let me begin with some background. I was raised in a home with my parents and grandparents. My maternal grandmother lost her entire family in the Nazi holocaust, except for one niece she helped to emigrate before the borders closed. As a child I grew up asking why did people follow such destructive, murderous authority?

In my thirties I read a book by M. Scott Peck on the question of evil. One of the cases he used in the book was the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. Why did

17


several hundred American soldiers participate in a massacre of civilians and the cover up that followed? He observed that something occurs when individuals see themselves in the role of the Follower. They displace moral responsibility onto the Leader. At that moment, I wrote in the margin of the page, “It sounds like a book is needed about different ways of following.”

This began the journey that resulted in the publication of the 1st edition of my book, “The Courageous Follower: Standing Up To and For Our Leaders.” The book posited that followers do not serve leaders. Rather, followers and leaders serve the common purpose and both are doing so while upholding basic human values. In other words, the essence of the relationship is not hierarchical but collaborative. Of course, in the real world, hierarchy always exerts an influence on the relationship.

The model I developed had “courage” at its center. Aristotle viewed courage as the primary virtue because without courage it is difficult to exhibit many other virtues. I posited five classes of behavior that constitute courageous followership. Briefly, they are:

The courage to assume responsibility – to take action to forward the mission regardless if one receives orders or not

The courage to support the leader – to give priority to the leader’s direction if it is forwarding the mission and consistent with basic human values

The courage to challenge the leader – to candidly question the leader’s assumptions, plans or behaviors if these are inconsistent with the mission and the values

The courage to participate in transformation – to support the leader’s efforts to improve their leadership and to work at improving your own performance and behavior in relation to the leader

The courage to take a moral stand – to refuse to participate in an activity viewed as immoral and to take corrective action where possible

My model was based on my observations as a consultant working in both private and public sector organizations and in political offices. Because my book was an early contribution to the emerging field of “Followership” (the other half of the field of “Leadership”) it attracted the attention of scholars. At least half dozen doctoral dissertations have been completed based on my model, validating it through statistical observations in a variety of workplace settings.

My work in this field, of course led me to the work of Stanley Milgram. In essence, the experiments on obedience examine how people behave when they perceive there is a hierarchical relationship, whether the fact of hierarchy is real or only apparent. In 2006 I co-sponsored a conference on Followership at Claremont University, in California. One of our invited speakers was Dr. Thomas Blass who related his renowned work on Milgram to the conference focus on followership.

18


The proceedings of that conference were published in a book I co-edited including Blass’ important essay.

In the editing process I asked Tom if he could speak more about the one third of subjects that did not obey the researcher. In a sense they conformed to my model of “The Courageous Follower” who takes an ethical stand. It seemed to me that understanding what contributes to resistance to harmful orders was at least as important, and arguably more important, than understanding the mechanics of obedience. If I am remembering correctly, he said that Milgram had not found strong patterns about the profiles of those who disobeyed from which we could extrapolate lessons. I found this disappointing but the data is the data.

My work led me to give talks and conduct workshops on Followership to all levels of the federal government in the United States and some lectures and workshops abroad. I found in these that many, or even most people had heard of Milgram’s Obedience experiments. What dismayed me, however, were two things:

1) They only knew of the results of the baseline experiment in which two thirds of the subjects complied with the experimenter’s orders to administer what they thought were painful or lethal shocks. There was virtually no knowledge of the variations of that experiment to determine what lowered the incidence of obedience. To me, once again, this is the most important part of the experiments if they are to have impact on improving human behavior.

2) While many of the professionals knew of these experiments, they were not given adequate attention in the training they were given, even when they were in sensitive fields such as law enforcement, the military or intelligence bureaus. It is precisely in these fields, especially when combined with knowledge of the Asch experiments on conformity and the Zimbardo Stanford prison experiments, that we should be using this research to inoculate against inappropriate use of power and inappropriate obedience.

Depending on the audience and how much time I had with them, I would weave in some discussion around this research. In any case, I always examined the question of obedience to authority. My claim was that in most cases it is reasonable to comply with legitimate authority, but sometimes it was not appropriate or it was even dangerous to do so. In one class of mid-level government managers, after I made this statement a woman raised her hand and said “I have an example of this under the table.”

That got my attention! What did she mean by “under the table”? She explained. She had a dog under the table that was so obedient it had lay quietly for over an hour, unnoticed. The dog was being raised to be a guide dog for a blind person. She received the dog from the agency when it was about 12 weeks old. Her job was to teach the dog all the commands it needed to obey, and to socialize it so it

19


could accompany the blind person in any situation, such as this classroom. The next thing she said was electrifying. When the dog was about 16 months old it would need to go to a higher level trainer to teach if “Intelligent Disobedience.” The phrase immediately caught my attention. I asked her to explain what she meant.

Intelligent Disobedience requires the dog to be able to differentiate between the commands it should obey and those it should not. If obeying the command would place the team of human and dog in harm’s way, it must resist obeying even if the human repeats the command. Here, in the classroom, was a metaphor for the challenge we have in all societies. How do we teach our young to obey the norms and legitimate authorities found in all societies while also teaching them to differentiate when not to obey those norms and authorities?

Milgram, of course, did not focus on this question. He was interested in how we can alter social constructs to reduce the pressure the individual feels to obey when obeying is harmful. His work in this regard is critical to understand and needs to find its place in training all those responsible for seeing that formal authority is used legitimately and not abused. But Milgram also has an important contribution to make to the question of how to train for this distinction in his analysis of the agentic state when one is acting on another’s authority without a sense or personal responsibility, and the autonomous state when one acts freely and thus feels accountable for those actions. This critical distinction needs to be converted into pedagogical and androgogical curriculae containing case examples, role plays, and practice sessions that will develop the skills of Intelligent Disobedience we find in guide dog development. It is my thesis that this will help the seminal work Milgram conducted fifty years ago to at last make its way into societies and improve the character of their citizenship.

This is no small task. We can learn some lessons from guide dog training, and should, but the metaphor and techniques cannot be stretched too far. The human psyche, social arrangements, breadth of activities, incentives to instill obedience and methods of enforcing obedience are far more complex. Even with training in ideal conditions and with dogs bred for the best temperament, not all dogs succeed in mastering the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate obedience. Those that fail are given different roles in life where an error is not likely to prove fatal to the human in its care. Nevertheless, after fifty years of knowing what Milgram experimentally documented, it is time for each of our societies to develop serious movements to incorporate those lessons, as well as the complementary lessons learned from the field of Intelligent Disobedience, into socializing their young and maturing their professionals. In the absence of this we will continue to see the long series of errors and abuses perpetrated by those in authority and carried out by obedient followers.

20


It is my contention that the experimental field of Obedience must focus its attention on the improvement of the ability to differentiate between the legitimate and illegitimate instructions of perceived authority. In other words, to focus on the application of the skills of Intelligent Disobedience to determine the most effective ways of instilling this capacity in the variety of social contexts that Milgram examined. We know that in all human endeavors, skills are developed incrementally and cumulatively. Indeed, this is the same in guide dog training – the guide dog is at first given simple situations in which it must disobey. When it has developed confidence and consistency at that level, it is placed in increasingly difficult situations until it can both disobey the dangerous command and find alternatives for guiding the blind person safely to the intended destination. There is an existing body of work on moral development at different stages of human development. But knowing the morally correct course and taking it in the face of authority figures exerting pressure to the contrary are two different things. Milgram showed us this clearly as subjects squirmed with discomfort and yet continued administering shocks. If experimental work on developing intelligent disobedience under this or another name is being done, it needs to be showcased. If it is not being sufficiently done, I submit that making it a research priority will ensure that fifty years from now we are not just talking about what Milgram observed and his interpretations of the data, but we will be talking about how they changed the character of human civilization.

Milgram, of course showed us the inclination to obey authority even when the authority figure has no power to harm us. In the opening of this essay I described the deadly effects of state based authority with a monopoly on violence that it is all too willing to use. As you well know, human history is strewn with endless examples of this from earliest recorded time right up to today and, unfortunately, tomorrow. How can applied research on effective methods for teaching intelligent disobedience and structuring societal arrangements to reduce culpable obedience help in these situations?

I am afraid that the answer is that it cannot solve this problem in the short term. But in the long term it can make all the difference. How? We are familiar these days with the concept of the “meme” – a unit of cultural material similar to a gene in biology. If a meme is introduced, finds fertile ground and is widely reproduced, it eventually becomes part of the societal mindset, of the identity of the group and the individuals in the group. We are aware of group characters where, for example, “honor” is central to the group identity. An individual in that group would rather risk dying than risk the social discredit of having shown himself lacking in honor. This is the goal I posit for our work on appropriate obedience and intelligent disobedience. It is to instill the values and skills of intelligent obedience

21


and disobedience at all levels of moral development so that in a generation or two they become an integral part of the societal identity. If that were to occur, then the rise of murderous leaders would be nipped in the bud. Those who would rather die than be shamed by having obeyed a destructive order would resist the first instances of such orders, before the would-be authority figure could amass power. If the lessons from Milgram’s variations on the obedience experiments were inculcated, the first follower who resisted the destructive order would immediately be supported by a second and a third. As Milgram demonstrated, at that point inappropriate obedience drops to its lowest level. There will always be the few who are compliant but they will be outnumbered, out-voiced and out-acted by the majority whose identity rests on autonomous responsibility for all their actions.

There is one more point to be made in this regard. Neither Milgram nor I are entering the realm most commonly associated with principled disobedience – that of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is the act of refusing to comply with laws or rules considered morally objectionable, and proactively violating those laws or rules for the sake of publicly calling attention to their injustice. The history of all free societies is punctuated with acts of civil disobedience by individuals or small groups that at times became movements that transformed the social landscape.

There is a heroism required of these acts. By definition few of us are heroes in our day to day lives. Those who are, often pay a very steep price for their commitment. It is my contention that if we develop a citizenry with the awareness and skills of appropriate obedience and disobedience in mundane activities, there will be less need for reliance on the heroic. When people stand up for and with each other in smaller acts of appropriate disobedience, we will need fewer heroes to stand against the might of institutions that perpetrate injustice.

Milgram gave humanity a gift - the code to understanding inappropriate obedience. It is our responsibility to take that gift and turn that code into active programs for transforming the human condition. If we do so, I believe we will be following the underlying intent of Milgram’s experiments, which was to reduce the scourge of inappropriate obedience that has contributed to so much unnecessary suffering in the human experience.

22

D.Courbet, J.-L. Beauvois, L. Bègue, D. Oberlé (2014). A transposition of Milgram’s obedience paradigm to the context of TV game show: Effect of the power of television and Study of the per-sonality of the obedient and disobedient participants. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Re-gional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

A TRANSPOSITION OF MILGRAM’S OBEDIENCE PARADIGM

TO THE CONTEXT OF TV GAME SHOW:

EFFECT OF THE POWER OF TELEVISION AND STUDY OF THE PERSONALITY OF THE OBE-DIENT AND DISOBEDIENT PARTICIPANTS

OBEDIENCE- ПЕРЕНОС ПАРАДИГМЫМИЛГРЭМА : ВКОНТЕКСТ ТЕЛЕВИЗИОННОЙИГРЫ

ВЛИЯНИЕ ЛЕГИТИМНОГО АВТОРИТЕТА ТЕЛЕВИДЕНИЯ И ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ МЕЖЛИЧНОСТНЫХ РАЗЛИЧИЙ У ПОВИНОВАВШИХСЯ И НЕПОВИНОВАВШИХСЯ

УЧАСТНИКОВ ТЕЛЕШОУ

Didier CourbetAix-Marseille University, France

[email protected]éon Beauvois

University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, FranceLaurent Bègue

University of Grenoble-Alpes, FranceDominique Oberlé

University of Paris X - Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France

Didier Courbet (PhD) - full Professor of Communication Science at Aix-Marseille University (France), deputy director of the Research Institute in Information and Communication Sciences (IRSIC, Aix-en-Provence, Marseille), author of several books on media psychology and media influence.His recent articles have been published in Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Journal of Personality,

Journal of Advertising Research, Celebrity Studies, Social Behavior and Personality, European Review of Applied Psychology.Дидье Курбе - профессор в области наук о коммуникации в университете Aix-Marseille, University, заместитель директора в исследовательском институте Institute in Information and Communication Sciences, автор книг по медиа-психологии и медиа-влиянию. Его статьи опубликованы в: Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Journal of Personality, Journal of Advertising Research, Celebrity Studies, Social Behavior and Personality, European Review of Applied Psychology.

23



Jean-Léon Beauvois - full Professor of Social Psychology at Nice-Sophia Antipolis University (France). He taught experimental social psychology in several French universities (particularly Nancy, Grenoble and Nice). He has published several books and

numerous articles in French and English, in French and international journals. He built, with some colleagues, a theory that articulates socio-cognitive processes (rationalization, commitment, internalization) and acts of obedience obtained in the context of social power. See in particular: Deux ou trois choses que je sais de la liberté, Paris, Bourin, 2013. Жан-Леон Бувуа - профессор социальной психологии в университете Nice-Sophia Antipolis University. Преподавал социальную психологию во многих французских

университетах (Nancy, Grenoble and Nice), автор многочисленных публикаций на французском и английском языках во французских и зарубежных журналах. В соавторстве с коллегами создал теорию, описывающую социально-когнитивные процессы (рационализацию, обязательство, интернализацию) и повинуемость в контексте социальной власти.

Laurent Bègue (PhD) is full Professor at Grenoble University (France) and the head of the House of Human Science. He has authored more that 80 chapters, books and papers in various journals such as Psychological Bulletin, Journal of Personality, and Journal of Experimental Social psychology, Cognition. He is interested in the role of belief systems in destructive behavior.Лоран Бэг - профессор университета в Гренобле, руководитель «The House of Human Science». Автор более 80 глав в книгах, книг, а также статей в журналах: Psychological Bulletin, Journal

of Personality, and Journal of Experimental Social psychology, Cognition. Область научных интересов: роль системы ценностей в деструктивном поведении.

Dominique Oberlé (PhD) is full Professor of Social Psychology at Paris West-Nanterre-La Défense University (France). His research interests include: group work (information sharing, problem solving reasoning, decision making, knowledge validation group). She has recently published in British Journal of Social Psychology, Social Behavior And Personality.Доминик Оберле - профессор социальной психологии в университете Paris West-Nanterre-La Défense. Область научных интересов: групповая работа (информационный

обмен, принятие решений, обоснование процесса принятия решения). Последние 24


публикации в журналах: British Journal of Social Psychology, Social Behavior And Personality

Key words: Media effects, TV game show, individual differences, personality, Big Five, political orientation, obedience, Milgram paradigm, disobedienceКлючевые слова: Влияние СМИ, телевизионное игровое шоу, индивидуальные различия, личность, «Большая пятёрка» (пятифакторный личностный опросник), политическая ориентация, повинуемость, obedience-парадигма Милгрэма, неповиновение.

AbstractToday’s fascination with television makes us wonder whether it might not represent

an authority capable of leading people in a television studio to inflict cruel acts on others, even though they condemn those acts.

The experiment reported here allows us to answer this question in the affirmative. Therefore, we transposed Milgram’s famous experimental obedience paradigm to the context of a “real” TV game show, in the studio of a large television production company, with a live audience and no prizes. We set up several experimental conditions designed to tell us if, in such contexts, obedience was the dominant response, as it is in the often-replicated classic situation. We also wished to know if the introduction of variations would reduce obedience. The results show that obedience to the host is the dominant response, as it is in Milgram’s classic situation. However, variations that are assumed to reduce this obedience do not in fact demonstrate the expected effects.

An additional experimental condition appears to demonstrate that a determining factor of obedience is the physical proximity of the host incarnating the televisual power. Note that this scientific research was the subject of several television programs that have been highly publicized in several countries1 (France, Switzerland)

After this experiment, we conducted a second study. We investigate how obedience in this Milgram-like experiment is predicted by interindividual differences. Participants were 35 males and 31 females aged 26–54 from the general population who were contacted by phone 8 months after their participation in the television game show. Interviews were presented as opinion polls with no stated ties to the earlier experiment. Personality was assessed by the Big Five Mini-Markers questionnaire (Saucier, 1994). Political orientation and social activism were also measured. Results confirmed hypotheses that Conscientiousness and Agreeableness would be associated with willingness to administer higher-intensity electric shocks to a victim. Political orientation

1 See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DPXcoYxfgs; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5nQeKqSdJQ ; with translation in English language: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QylfCBXIbW0

25

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QylfCBXIbW0

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5nQeKqSdJQ


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DPXcoYxfgs


and social activism were also related to obedience. We showed that disobedience was influenced by political orientation, with left-wing political ideology being associated with decreased obedience. Results show that women who were willing to participate in rebellious political activities such as going on strike or occupying a factory administered lower shocks. Our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that individual differences in personality and political variables matter in the explanation of obedience to authority.

АннотацияПризнавая, насколько огромна роль телевидения в современном обществе,

нельзя не предположить, что оно может быть носителем легитимного авторитета, способного заставить зрителей в телестудии принимать участие в актах насилия по отношению к другим участникам программы даже в том случае, если сами проявляющие насилие зрители осуждают подобные действия.

Описываемый в настоящей статье эксперимент позволяет ответить на данный вопрос утвердительно.

Мы перенесли знаменитую экспериментальную obedience-парадигму Милгрэма в контекст «реальной» телепередачи – телевикторины, которая была проведена в студии крупной телекомпании в присутствии настоящих зрителей. Призы участникам викторины не вручали. Мы смоделировали несколько экспериментальных условий с тем, чтобы установить, будет ли деструктивная повинуемость, как в случае с часто моделируемой в рамках повторного эксперимента ситуацией, доминирующей ответной реакцией. Также нам было интересно проследить, приведёт ли введение некоторых экспериментальных вариаций к снижению повинуемости. Результаты нашего исследования позволяют утверждать, что, как и в классическом эксперименте Милгрэма, повинуемость ведущему телешоу является доминирующей ответной реакцией. В то же время изменения, которые, как предполагалось, могут снизить уровень повинуемости, на деле не дали ожидаемого эффекта.

Определяющим фактором деструктивной повинуемости является, по нашим наблюдениям, телеведущий, который, находясь в физической близости к аудитории, воплощает власть телевидения. Необходимо учесть, что данное исследование было предметом обсуждения в рамках нескольких телевизионных программ в разных странах1 (Франция, Швейцария).

1

Ссылки: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DPXcoYxfgs ; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5nQeKqSdJQ ; с переводом на английский язык: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QylfCBXIbW0

26






После этого эксперимента мы исследовали роль межличностных различий в поинуемости, проявленной участниками описанной выше телевикторины. Для этого 35 мужчинам и 31 женщине (в возрасте от 26 до 54 лет) через 8 месяцев после их участия в телешоу (без всякого увязывания с предшествовавшим экспериментом на телевидении) мы звонили по телефону и, под видом «опроса общественного мнения», задавали вопросы из мини-версии «Большой пятёрки» (Saucier, 1994), а также измеряли их политическую ориентацию и общественную активность.

Наши результаты подтвердили гипотезу о том, что добросовестность и конформность коррелируют с желанием наносить жертве более сильные удары электрическим током. Левофланговая политическая ориентация оказалась связанной с меньшей повинуемостью. Женщины, готовые принять участие в активных политических акциях (таких, как забастовка или захват предприятия), наносили более слабые удары током.

Полученные эмпирические данные свидетельствуют о роли личностных характеристик и политической позиции в феномене повинуемости легитимным авторитетам.

Today’s fascination with television makes us wonder whether it might not represent an authority capable of leading people in a television studio to inflict cruel acts on others, even though they condemn those acts.

The experiment (study 1) reported here allows us to answer this question in the affirmative. Therefore, we transposed Milgram’s famous experimental obedience paradigm to the context of a “real” TV game show, in the studio of a large television production company, with a live audience and no prizes. Yet, is not televisual authority at work and particularly striking in game shows during which, based on a single order given by the game host, contestants perform violent acts against others or against themselves? We wanted to find out whether, at the present time, television is able to endow certain agents — such as TV show hosts — with a degree of authority that gives them the power to make game-show contestants commit dangerous acts or acts they condemn. To demonstrate this, we transposed Milgram’s obedience-to-authority paradigm (Milgram, 1963, 1974) to a TV game show setting where a female host (an accomplice of the experimenters) asked people to deliver (fake) electric shocks to other persons1.

1 We’d like to thank France Télévision, Christophe Nick and the Yami 2 team for allowing us to perform this experiment. We would like to thank Olivier Codou, Julien Intartaglia, Amandine Tonelli and David Vaidis for their participation in the experiment’s execution and particularly for creating the debriefings. Note that this scientific research was the subject of several television programs that have been highly publicized in several countries (France, Switzerland ...) see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DPXcoYxfgs http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5nQeKqSdJQ ; with translation in English

27





After this experiment, we conducted a second study. We investigate how obedience in this experiment is predicted by interindividual differences.

Study 1: A transposition of Milgram’s obedience paradigm to the context of TV game show

1. IntroductionOur study, then, is not just another replication of Milgram’s laboratory

experiments to be added to the list, the difference being that in the Milgram replications, it was the status of scientific researcher that granted legitimacy to the agent of authority (Blass, 2009). In the transposed version reported here, although we stayed as close as possible to Milgram’s obedience paradigm and electric-shock procedure, our experiment takes place in a totally different social context, one where the authority derives its legitimacy from another entity, the television show.

From the subjects’ standpoint, the experiment was not a scientific study but a game show taking place in front of a live audience. Our goal was to see whether and when people would comply with, or resist, the televisual authority incarnated by the host of the game.

Moreover, for credibility reasons, transposing the experiment into a televised game setting requires the use of violence equivalent to that frequently implemented in some of these games. We thus wondered what would happen if the agent of authority drew her legitimacy solely from her association with the world of television. Given the importance of television in our society, it seems both legitimate and necessary to raise this question.

Our assumption is that the authority is incarnated by the game host. While the persuasive influence of hosts is now widely recognized (Nabi and Hendriks, 2003), it is the host’s prescriptive power which we would like to make apparent and whose potential limits we would like to test. This power is related to the statutory position occupied in an organizational structure and results from a delegation of power (Coenen-Huther, 2005). It thus does not depend on the delegated person’s level of prestige. In fact, the prestige of the hosts, which depends on their relative popularity, primarily relates to their leadership capacities. Moreover, in Milgram’s case, when the notion of prestige is mentioned, it relates to science as a whole, and not to the scientist giving orders. Similarly, we can consider the host to be the recipient of a power delegation from the televisual authority.

Thus, based on our assumption that authority is incarnated by the game host, we set up three experimental conditions designed to tell us when people would

language: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QylfCBXIbW028



obey the televisual authority and when they would resist it. We wanted to know whether, in this context, obedience would remain the dominant response, as in the classic situation; and whether introducing a variation which reduces obedience in the classic situation (social support for disobedience) would have the same effect in a televisual context. Finally, a specific condition was introduced for the televisual context (see section 2.3 “Experimental subjects and experimental conditions”).

2. Method2.1. Experimental setting

The experiment took place in a television studio. An original game show was set up on stage with the help of technical devices (cameras, lighting, giant screen, control room, etc.) and human resources (81 persons) from several companies specializing in the production of game shows on French TV. As such shows, there was a live audience in the seating areas around the stage. The audience consisted of about 100 persons of all ages who had answered a short ad on the Internet posted by a company specializing in the recruitment of game-show audiences. In order to account for any obedience observed, we had to eliminate all causes other than pure obedience to authority, such as the desire to win money. So that no rewards would be at stake, we set up a pilot show in which the participants were filmed in “real conditions” but told that the purpose was to test the game and improve it if necessary.

2.2. Experimental requirementsOur transposition to the television setting had to satisfy two requirements. The

first consisted of staying as close as possible to Milgram’s experimental situation while putting the subjects in a credible televisual context. Following a discussion with television producers and filmmakers, we decided that a game show reproducing Milgram’s situation (a naive questioner is asked by a TV show host to deliver electric shocks) would meet these requirements if we could eliminate the motivation to participate in order to win money. Our next step was to test the credibility of the game show on the producers and TV channel (France 2) that had agreed to fund the experiment and incorporate it into a documentary on the risks of certain reality TV games. To be credible, the experiment had to be conducted in a real television studio, and real television staff had to be trained to work in their usual way, while nevertheless meeting the rigorous requirements of a scientific experiment. This meant not changing the scenario once it was adopted, replying to questions using the exact material found in the scenario, and so on. The scenario

29


was pre-tested on a few technicians from the filming staff and then on the first questioner in each experimental condition. It worked perfectly.

The second requirement was to make sure that the rapport between the agent of authority and the agent subjected to that authority was very close to the one created by Milgram. To verify this, we established a list of 15 criteria for analyzing situations of power involving an asymmetrical relationship between two persons, one who makes behavioral prescriptions and the other who is supposed to obey. The two situations (our game show and Milgram’s scientific laboratory) turned out to be very close for all 15 criteria1 (see Beauvois, Courbet & Oberlé 2012, Table 1).

Photo 1. Experimental setting: a real television studio with the audience (1)

Photo 2. Experimental setting: a real television studio with the audience (2)

Photo 3. The TV host, the questioner and the contestant (on the electric chair in the chamber on the right and on the video)1 The great similarity between the two situations is not a triviality due to an eventual bias driven by our analysis

grid (e.g. lack of sensitivity). To demonstrate this, we mentioned two other power relationships in Beauvois, Courbet & Oberlé (2012, Table 1): the Foreman/Worker relationship and the Social Worker/Socially Disadvantaged Person relationship. It appears that the researcher/teacher relationship and the host/questioner relationship share only six traits (out of 15) with the Foreman/Worker relationship and seven traits (out of 15) with the Social Worker/Socially Disadvantaged Person relationship. It is indeed because they are very similar in the area of possible power relationships that the relationships implemented in Milgram’s and our experiments share the same traits.

30


Photo 4. The contestant on the electric chair in the chamber

31


Photo 5. The questioner who gave electric shocks, the TV host and the audience

These precautions allowed us to conclude that the televisual framing of Milgram’s paradigm in no way modified the basics, the type of relationship between the person giving the instructions and the person receiving them, and thus that in power-based and situation-based terms, the host-questioner rapport in the present study was very close to the researcher-professor situation in Milgram’s study.

2.3. Experimental subjects and experimental conditionsSeventy-six ordinary people were selected from a consumer database by an

independent company that conducts opinion polls and market studies. They each received 40 euros. Subjects who had already participated in a game show were not eligible, nor were persons who had health problems or were taking any kind of medication. The experimental population was from the Parisian area. The characteristics of the sample are given in Tables 2 and 3. The televisual context of the experiment (renting a studio, hiring technicians, the host’s schedule, etc.) restricted us to a predetermined number of days for the experiment, and thus a predetermined number of subjects were asked to participate (80). Four subjects had to be eliminated because they were already familiar with Milgram’s research. The experimental subjects were assigned to one of the following conditions1.

1 Informed consent was obtained from the subjects after they were told that the game involved delivering electric shocks (for an discussion on ethical principles, see Oberlé, Beauvois & Courbet, 2011).

32


2.3.1. Standard condition (n = 32) This condition was similar to Milgram’s “voice-feedback” condition

(Milgram, 1974, Experiment 2). A “questioner” (the experimental subject) asked 27 questions to a “contestant” (an accomplice of the experimenter) who could be heard but not seen.

Every time the contestant gave an incorrect answer (according to a predetermined schedule of 24 incorrect answers out of 27), the questioner was to penalize him by delivering an (alleged) electric shock. The shocks ranged between 20 and 460 volts, and were to be increased by 20 volts with each new mistake. The game host had five prods at her disposal for encouraging reluctant subjects to continue: four were similar to the ones used by Milgram, and the fifth was specific to the TV-show setting (asking the audience to intervene).

2.3.2. Social-support condition (n = 19)This condition was the same as the standard condition, except that when the

voltage reached 120, the production assistant (an accomplice) rushed out on stage and asked that the game be stopped because it was too immoral. The assistant was brushed aside by the host, who went on with the game.

2.3.3. TV-broadcast condition (n = 18)This condition was the same as the standard condition, except that upon

arrival, the questioner and alleged contestant were told that the TV station would broadcast the pilot show. The players would be on TV but would still not win any money.

Immediate observation of the set, even before statistical data analysis, showed that the social support condition, which was supposed to produce disobedience, was not producing the expected effect. This observation led us to introduce a new condition, not included in the original design, which we tested on the remaining subjects.

2.3.4. Host-withdrawal condition (n = 7)This condition was similar to Milgram’s condition in which the researcher

leaves the experiment (“experimenter absence”, Milgram, 1974, Experiment 7). Upon reaching 80 volts, the host explained that from now on, the players would continue on their own. Then the host went off stage and did not come back until the game was over.

33


All four conditions will be taken into account in the discussions which follow, though the small number of subjects in the fourth condition warrants some caution.

2.4. ProcedureAn alleged producer received each participant along with another person who

was in fact a male accomplice of the experimenter. The producer told them that they would be filmed as they participated together as players in a TV game show. Because the filming was said to be for a pilot show aimed at testing the game “under real conditions” and improving it if need be, they were informed that they would not win any money, unlike the future game contestants who would try together to win a million euros.

In three conditions out of four, the players were also told that the film would not be broadcasted on TV. For one of the players (“the questioner”), the task consisted of asking questions; for the other (“the contestant”), the task was to answer correctly. They were told that the penalty for each incorrect answer would be an electric shock delivered by the “questioner” to the “contestant”. The alleged producer then had the subjects draw straws to determine which person would play which role. The drawing was rigged so that the experimental subject was always the questioner and the accomplice was always the contestant. Once this information was given, the producer asked the players if they still wanted to participate in the pilot. No one refused.

After a make-up session, the two players were led on stage where they were awaited by the game host (a female weather forecaster for a French national TV station), the audience, and a warm-up comedian whose job was to organize the applause and encouragements to continue the game. Then, in front of the camera, the host explained the game as follows. The contestant would be given a limited amount of time to learn a list of 27 pairs of related words (e.g., cloudy-sky, tame-animal, etc.). Then the questioner would say the first word in each pair and the contestant would have to find the related word among the four words proposed. If the contestant made a mistake, the questioner was to deliver an electric shock, increasing the shock’s intensity each time. The team of players would win if they were able get through all 27 questions (whether or not the answers were correct or incorrect and penalized by an electric shock). Once these rules were stated, the contestant was taken into a chamber where he would not be seen by the questioner or the audience. In front of everyone, before the door of the chamber was closed, the contestant was strapped to the chair in which he would receive the shocks, and shown the buttons to press to choose the right answer. The questioner was seated at

34


a desk in the center of the stage, under the projectors and cameras, with his/her back to the audience and facing a giant screen where the questions would be displayed in succession. The questioner was shown the handles to be used to deliver the (fake) electric shocks to the contestant, with an increase of 20 volts for each new wrong answer. The shocks ranged from 20 volts to 460 volts and were grouped together in sets labeled:− Slight Shocks (20, 40, 60 volts);− Moderate Shocks (80, 100, 120);− Strong Shocks (140, 160, 180);− Very Strong Shocks (200, 220, 240);− Intense Shocks (260, 280, 300);− Extremely Intense Shocks (320, 340, 360);− Danger: Severe Shocks (380, 400, 420);− XXX (440, 460).

Table 1. Characteristics of the sample: gender, age, and reality-TV watching.

GenderMale(n)

Female(n)

Total(n)

Experimental Population

40 36 7618 of whom (23.7%) were avid watchers of reality TV*

Age GroupAge 25-29 8 6 14

3 of whom (21.4%) were avid watchers of reality TV*Age 30-34 7 5 12

3 of whom (25%) were avid watchers of reality TV*Age 35-39 7 7 14

3 of whom (21.4%) were avid watchers of reality TV*Age 40-44 6 7 13



3 of whom (27%) were avid watchers of reality TV*Mean Age (in years) 39.6 39.8 39.7

Legend. * at least four French reality-TV shows watched on a regular basis

35


Table 2. Socio-occupational characteristics of sample.Social Category: Social class (occupation) n (%)A: Upper middle class (higher managerial, administrative, or professional) 1 (1.3%)B: Middle class (intermediate managerial, administrative, or professional) 12 (15.6%)C1: Lower middle class (supervisory or clerical, junior managerial, administrative, or professional)

31 (40.2%)

C2: Skilled working class (skilled manual workers) 24 (31.2%)D: Working class (semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers) 5 (6.5%)E: Persons at the lowest level of subsistence, state pensioners or widows (no other wage earner), casual or lowest grade workers

3 (3.9%)

The music and spotlights were turned on, and the host announced that the game could begin. According to a predetermined schedule, the contestant responded incorrectly 24 times out of 27. If the questioner began to hesitate or refused to go on, the host intervened by giving at most five prods to urge the players to continue. The first four prods were worded in a Milgram-like fashion (“Go on with the questions”, “Go on, don’t let yourself get upset”, “The rules say you must go on”, “Go on, we are taking all responsibility for this”). Only the fifth prod “You can’t make him lose; what does the audience think?” was specific to the television situation; the audience insisted that the game be continued. As in Milgram, starting from when the shock reached 80 volts, the contestant’s pre-recorded reactions were heard: grunts at first, then loud cries of pain accompanied by refusal to continue, then screams and pleas to stop the game. After 380 volts, the contestant said he refused to go on. After 420 volts, nothing more could be heard.

The game ended either when the questioner had asked all 27 questions (which involved two shocks of 460 volts) or when, in spite of the host’s five prods, the questioner decided to stop. The questioners were informed of the rigging upon leaving the stage. Then, in a calm place, they were debriefed at length.

2.5. Post-experimental debriefingThe debriefings were done by a two-person team that was always made up of

a psychologist and a specialist in the communication sciences. Five areas were covered:

• demystification, which included the two accomplices (contestant and producer). After the questioners had met the contestant and noticed that he was fine, they were asked to rate their degree of psychological stress as they played the game;

• attributions of responsibility. They rated the extent to which the game producer, the host, the contestant, the audience, and the questioner him/herself were

36


responsible for what happened. The questioner had to divide up 100 points of responsibility among these five persons;

• verbalization of the questioner’s feelings, which consisted of letting him/her speak freely without contesting any potential rationalizations;

• statistics-based demonstration that obedience was the most frequent behavior and that the causal weight carried by the situation accounted for this behavior;

• information indicating that the experiment would be incorporated into a TV documentary aimed at opposing certain forms of reality TV. The debriefings lasted between 1 and 2 hours.

2.6. Measures of obedience Like Milgram (1974), we used two obedience measures.

One was a binary measure: obedience vs. disobedience. Obedience occurred when the questioner went all the way up to the strongest shock (here, 460 volts); disobedience occurred when the questioner refused to go that high. The second measure was a continuous measure with several degrees of obedience ranging from “absolute refusal” to “absolute obedience”. In this case, the criterion was the number of shocks delivered. The theoretical range was 0 to 24 (at most 24 shocks, one per incorrect answer). In our data, the observed values ranged from 5 to 24.

3. Results3.1. Results relating to obedience (Table 3)

First, we compared our results on the binary obedience criterion (Table 4) to Milgram’s results in the similar conditions. Our standard condition (81% obedience) did not differ statistically from Milgram’s voice-feedback condition (62.5%) (Chi2 (1) = 3.02, p = .08; Cramer’s V = 0.20). Likewise, the host-withdrawal condition (28% obedience) did not differ from Milgram’s condition “experimenter absence” (20.5%) (Chi2 (1) = 0.12, p = .73; Cramer’s V = 0.05).

Then we compared our four experimental conditions to each other, again, on the binary obedience criterion. Only the standard condition and the host-withdrawal condition differed significantly (Yates Chi2 = 5.48, p < .02; Cramer’s V = 0.45). The standard, social support, and TV-broadcast conditions did not differ, given that the last two conditions did not differ from the host-withdrawal condition (all Chi2 were non-significant). Lastly, the standard, social-support, and TV-broadcast conditions pooled did not differ from the host-withdrawal condition.

37


Table 3. Number of obedient questioners and mean number of shocks delivered in the four conditions.

ConditionStandard(n = 32)

Social-Support(n = 19)

TV-Broadcast(n = 18)

Host-Withdrawal(n = 7)

Number of questioners who went all the way to the end (obedient)

N = 26(81%)

N = 14(74%)

N = 13(72%)

N = 2(28%)

Mean number of shocks delivered(degree of obedience)

M = 21.91s = 4.00

M = 20.63s = 6.00

M = 20. 67s = 5.97

M = 16.43s = 5.80

Legend. M = mean. s = standard deviation. ( ) = percentage of obedient subjects in each condition.

Table 4. Attribution of responsibility by obedient and disobedient questioners to the producer, questioner him/herself, host, audience, and contestant.

Producer Questioner Host Audience ContestantObedient subjectsn=51

M=43.14s =34.45

M=25.20s =29.74

M=19.20s =22.12

M=7.52s =15.11

M=5.13s =10.82

Disobedient subjectsn=20

M=30.53s =31.31

M=40.05s =34.83

M=18.26s =16.38

M=7.37s =13.06

M=3.79s =8.06

All subjectsn=71

M=39.76s = 33.15

M=29.17s = 31.63

M=18.95s = 20.63

M=7.48s =14.98

M=4.77s = 10.14

Legend. M = mean. s = standard deviation. The questioner had to assign responsibility by dividing up 100 points across 5 targets.

On the degree-of-obedience measure (number of shocks delivered), one-way Anova and paired-contrast showed again that only the standard condition differed significantly from the hostwithdrawal condition (F(1.72) = 5.62, p = .02, d = 0.56). But this time, the standard, social-support, and TV-broadcast conditions taken together differed (M = 21.2) from the host-withdrawal condition (M = 16.4, [F(1.72) = 4.75, p = .03, d = 0.51]). Thus, we can oppose the condition that produced the most disobedience (host-withdrawal) to the other three conditions, which mainly produced obedience.

The results indicated that the men and women were equally obedient, which is consistent with many earlier observations (Blass, 1999, 2000) including a recent reproduction of Milgram’s experiment (Burger, 2009). There was also no difference between persons from different socio-occupational categories, between the older and younger subjects, or between the avid reality-TV watchers and the others. This absence of differences was found no matter what measure was used: the binary

38


obedience/disobedience criterion or the degree of obedience (number of shocks delivered).

3.2. Questioners’ attributions of responsibilityAt the beginning of the debriefing, the questioner had to divide up 100 points

of responsibility among the game producer, the host, him/herself, the audience, and the contestant. As a whole, pairwise comparisons showed that only two pairs did not differ significantly. The first was the questioner (M = 29.17) and the producer (who was assigned the greatest amount of responsibility: M = 39.76). The second was the audience (M = 7.487) and the contestant (who was assigned the smallest amount of responsibility: 4.77) (Table 4). All other pairs differenced significantly at p < .05 (Table 5).

For the partial results concerning the obedient vs. disobedient subjects’ attributions of responsibility to the producer vs. the questioner, the means indicated a statistically significant interaction: obedient subjects attributed more responsibility to the producer than to themselves, whereas disobedient subjects did just the opposite (Table 6).

This interaction was significant for the standard, TV-broadcast, and social-support conditions taken together (F(1.63) = 5.08, p < .03), three homogeneous conditions in the sense that they were mostly obedience-generating

39

Table 5. Comparison of Means (F) of Questioners’ Attributions of Responsibility (Obedient and Disobedient Subjects Pooled, n=71, df =70)

ProducerM=39.76

QuestionerM=29.17

HostM=18.95

AudienceM=7.48

Questioner M=29.17 F = 2,34(d = .37 )

Host M=18.95 F = 15,13***(d = .93 )

F = 4,16*(d = .49)

Audience M=7.48 F = 48,16***(d = 1.66)

F = 23,43***(d = 1.16)

F = 14,51***(d = .91)

Contestant M=4.77 F = 64,64***(d = 1.92)

F = 34,69***(d =1.41)

F = 28,52***(d = 1.28)

F = 1,82(d = .32)

Legend. M = mean ; * p<.05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 ; (d = Cohen’s d)

Table 6. Attribution of Responsibility to the Producer and Questioner by Obedient and Disobedient Subjects in the Standard, TV-Broadcast, and Social-Support Conditions Pooled

Producer Questioner Simple effects (df)Obedient M = 43.67

s = 33.78M =24.61s = 29.91

F (1,51) = 5, 38p = .02 (d =.65)

Disobedient M = 25.33s = 29.18

M = 44.07s = 35.65 NS

Simple effects (df) F(1,63) = 3,61P = .06 (d=.48)

F(1,63) = 4,45p =.04 (d = .53)


Legend. M = mean. s = standard deviation ; p = significance level ; d = Cohen’s d

3.3. Additional results about questioner behaviorFirst, to our great surprise, the fifth prod, which was specific to the TV setting

(appeal to the audience by the host followed by encouragement to continue from the public), did not have the expected effect. Of the 16 questioners who heard the fifth prod, in the three standard, social-support and TV-broadcast conditions, only one yielded to pressure from the audience. He went all the way up to the highest voltage. The fifth prod turned out to be especially necessary for the disobedient questioners. Most of the obedient ones went to the very end after only two or three prods.

Second, recall that for Milgram, if certain subjects disobey, it is less for moral reasons than to release tension. He noted a number of other tension-reducing phenomena. Even though our experiment was conducted 45 years after Milgram’s, and in a very different context, we observed the same phenomena. To begin, the questioners laughed in the moderate-shock range (70% of questioners laughed openly at 80 volts, when the contestant first makes a complaint).

Then at 180 volts, another phenomenon appeared: cheating (17% of the subjects), which consisted of using a tone of voice that made the right answer obvious to the contestant (mode at 220 volts). Lastly, when the contestant screamed at 320 volts (70% of questioners still in the game), they did what Milgram called “psychological elimination of the contestant” consisting of ignoring the contestant by talking to cover up his screams (mode at 340 volts).

4. DiscussionIn the present study, we advance that, in addition to the impact that TV images

have on viewers (Courbet and Fourquet, 2003; Marchand, 2004), the hold that television has on people is such that, for persons on the stage of a TV game show, it represents an authority strong enough to make them commit clearly immoral or dangerous acts. To demonstrate this, we transposed Milgram’s famous experimental obedience paradigm to the context of a TV game show with a live audience and no prizes. As far as we know, this is the first time Milgram’s electric-shock procedure

40


has ever been carefully replicated in a social field where science was not the source of legitimacy for the agent of authority1.

Here, it was the authority of the television that was at stake. Note that the credibility of the television environment we created was validated by the statistical equivalence of the results obtained in the standard condition (no broadcasting) and the TV-broadcast condition.

In this game-show setting, where a host incarnating the televisual authority was present, most people were obedient, i.e., they delivered electric shocks that were as strong and as frequent as the ones used by Milgram, whether they had been told that the show would or would not be broadcasted. This is the first notable result of this research.

It seems, then, that even in highly different contexts, the determining factor is the physical proximity of a person invested with the right to give orders (even if only temporarily). The second notable result of this research arises from the fact that the only experimental condition that triggered significantly more disobedience (to extents like those found by Milgram) was the condition where the agent of authority went off stage. Despite the small sample size for this experimental condition, its confirmation of one of Milgram’s results adds to its merit. We thus attributed obedience behaviors to the prescriptive power delegated to the host position.

If the behavioral data obtained in this study was very similar to Milgram’s, so was the attribution data collected during the debriefing. Our questioners attributed a large part of the responsibility to themselves. Like Milgram, we can suggest that these attributions were rooted in a retrospective interpretation of what happened. When answering the responsibility question, the questioners were no longer in the experimental situation, so they could rationalize their behavior. To do so, they may have looked for explanations in the Zeitgeist and in today’s prevailing norms, which prompt us to be held accountable for our acts (Beauvois and Dubois, 1988; Dubois, 2009; Dubois and Beauvois, 2008).

Note, however, that unlike the disobedient subjects, the obedient ones attributed less responsibility to themselves — in line with the pattern of the agent state — than to the producer. This is consistent with Milgram’s (1974) idea that the very fact of being an agent means accepting oneself as an executing agent for some

1 A few researchers objected that obedience to the authority figure in Milgram’s situation was not due solely to his legitimacy. They argued that the authority was also rooted in the attribution of technical skillfulness for operating the device (Blass and Schmitt, 2001; Morelli, 1983). Here, one cannot ascribe any observed obedience to some assumed skillfulness the host might have had for operating the electric shock device, since she was known as a TV weather forecaster.

41


other agent of power, the latter of whom is the one held responsible for what happens.

Study 2: Obedience could be predicted by interindividual differences1. The personality of the obedient and disobedient participantsIn the second study, we shed a new light on how personality factors predicted

obedience and rebellion. We hypothesized those personality traits that are consensually desirable in interpersonal relationships, such as Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, could contribute to destructive obedience given the right context. These are two traits that some observers, including Arendt (1977) herself, attributed to Adolf Eichmann. Because these fundamental traits pertaining to the Five-Factor Model of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1987) express behavioral receptivity to normative expectations (Johnson & Ostendorf, 1993; McCrae, Costa, & Piedmont, 1993), we expected that they would facilitate submissive behavior toward authority. The second aim of the present study was to investigate how sociopolitical position is related to obedience to authority in an experimental setting.

There are a small number of studies indicating that personality factors predict disobedient patterns even in very constraining settings. In a seminal study, Elms and Milgram (1966) pooled a subsample of participants from the first four Milgram experiments and found that the fully obedient participants scored higher on the California F-scale (Hathaway & Mckinley, 1940) and on a nonstandard Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) scale (Adorno, Frenkel- Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) measuring social responsibility. Other scattered studies based on Milgram paradigms found links between obedience and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), trustfulness (Miller, 1975), hostility (Haas, 1966), involuntary subordination (Sturman, 2011), social intelligence (Burley & McGuiness, 1977), empathic concern, and desire for control (Burger, 2009). These studies provide possible explanations for behavioral differences in Milgram’s experiment. However, some of these studies did not reach minimal methodological and psychometric standards. In many other studies, personality factors did not appear to be significant predictors of disobedient behavior.

More fundamentally, the study of interindividual factors involved in obedience still needs a comprehensive and integrated conceptualization based on a general model of personality and on the function of obedience in our society. Regarding the first issue, we believe that the use of current models of personality such as the Five-

42


Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1989) may represent a significant step forward in understanding the individual contribution of obedience to authority.

The Five-Factor Model is a structural model of personality factors accounting for phenotypic personality variation between people (Costa & McCrae, 1989). It encompasses most of the variance in personality description through five dimensions: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness. Based on previous conceptual developments and empirical studies, we expected that the traits of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness would be related to obedience.

The other factor that we hypothesized as related to obedience is Conscientiousness, defined as a tendency to show self-discipline, sense of duty, and aim for achievement and organization. Referring to conformity and socially prescribed impulse control (Hogan & Ones, 1997), Conscientiousness predicts obedience to others’ demands (Mashiko, 2008). It is also related to order preference (Piedmont, McCrae, & Costa, 1992) and achievement via conformance and norm favoring, in addition to being negatively correlated with flexibility (McCrae et al., 1993).

2. Political Positioning, Rebellion and DisobedienceSeveral studies have shown that right-wing authoritarianism predicts

obedience (Elms & Milgram, 1966; Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1995), although there are some exceptions as well (see Doris, 2002, for a review). Because left-wing political attitudes are negatively related to conformity values (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010), we expected an inverse relationship between a left-right ideological dimension and obedience. We also investigated a predictor never previously studied in the obedience literature: behavioral commitment to, or preference for, disobedient actions (e.g., participation in strikes and political activism). We expected that people reporting past rebellious and unruly behavior, or a readiness to perform such behaviors, would be more disobedient to authority in a Milgram paradigm.

43


Method and measuresAfter ensuring that there was no significant difference between the results of

different conditions, we pooled subjects from three conditions and contacted them after the experiment. The only condition that was not pooled was the host-withdrawal condition (“experimenter absence”), considered to be less relevant because no authority was present. The 69 remaining participants were contacted about 8 months after their participation and asked if they would participate in a survey in exchange for 20 euros. Participants were unaware of the link between the survey and the obedience experiment. The response rate was 89%, leaving a total sample of 35 males and 31 females aged 26–54 years (M = 39.66, SD = 8.51). Participants did not differ on obedience when compared to the whole sample.

Due to time constraints, the Five-Factor Model of personality was measured using the Big Five Mini-Markers questionnaire (Saucier, 1994). This 40-item adjective checklist provides an abbreviated version of 100 trait descriptive adjectives of the Big Five personality domains (Goldberg, 1992) and is considered a reliable and valid description of the Five-Factor Model (Mullins-Sweatt, Jamerson, Samuel, Olson, &Widiger, 2006). The internal reliability of the scales in our sample was as follows: Openness (Cronbach’s α = .76), Neuroticism (Cronbach’s α = .75), Conscientiousness (Cronbach’s α = .70), Agreeableness (Cronbach’s α = .68), and Extraversion (Cronbach’s α = .58).

Political ideology was measured with standard items from the World Value Survey Questionnaire (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Political orientation was based on the following singleitem measure: “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (1 = extreme left, 10= extreme right).”

The Political Activism Scale (PAS) was composed of four behaviors, and for each behavior, participants had to select between “have done” (coded 3), “might do” (coded 2), or “would never do” (coded 1). The PAS included the following behaviors: signing a petition, attending lawful demonstration, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories (Cronbach’s α = .73). The measure of obedience was the intensity of shocks delivered by individuals. Intensity of shocks ranged from 100 to 460 volts and exhibited a significant negative skew similar to Milgram’s original studies.

3. Results Regarding the Five-Factor Model and obedience, as expected, results (see

table I below) showed that the highest intensity of shocks participants administered 44


was related to Agreeableness, rs = .26, 95% CI [.03, .47], p = .039, and to Conscientiousness, rs = .34, 95% CI [.11, .54], p = .006. Nonsignificant relationships were found between obedience and the remaining Big Five factors, including Extraversion (rs = .03, 95% CI [–.22, .29], p = .80), Openness (rs = −.03, 95% CI [–.26, .21], p = .84), and Neuroticism, (rs = .08, 95% CI [–.15, .30], p = .55). When all five personality domains were included in a single multiple negative binomial regression, the same pattern of significance emerged with both Agreeableness (b = −0.99, 95% CI [–1.87, −0.11], p = .030) and Conscientiousness (b = −0.93, 95% CI [–1.66, −0.19], p = .016), significantly predicting decreased disobedience (i.e., increased obedience), whereas Extraversion (b = 0.09, 95% CI [–0.47, 0.65], p = .149), Neuroticism (b = .02, 95% CI [–0.71, 0.76], p = .956), and Openness (b = .57, 95% CI [–0.18, 1.32], p = .142) were not significantly related to obedience.

Regarding political orientation, we observed that the more the participants defined themselves as on the “left” of the political spectrum, the lower the intensity of shocks they agreed to give to the contestant, rs(64) = .32, 95% CI [.11, .51], p = .02. The relationship between rebellious political activism and obedience was marginally significant, rs(64) = .20, 95% CI [–.06, .46], p = .10. Analysis by gender showed that the relationship was significant for females, rs(31) = .38, 95% CI [0.01, 0.69], p = .03, but not for males, rs(33) = .01, 95% CI [–.34, .39], p = .95.

The second research makes at least three significant contributions to the literature. This is the first study showing that individual obedience in a Milgram-like paradigm can be predicted using the Five-Factor Model of personality. As

45


expected, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness predicted the intensity of electric shocks administered to the victim. Second, we showed that disobedience was influenced by political orientation, with left-wing political ideology being associated with decreased obedience. Third, we showed that women who were willing to participate in rebellious political activities such as going on strike or occupying a factory administered lower shocks.

All these results suggest that situational context, even though a powerful determinate of behavior, does not necessarily overwhelm individual-level behavioral determinants.

This second research’s primary limitation was that results were based on correlations between participants’ behavior in a Milgram-like obedience study and their answers on a phone survey that took place 8 months after their participation in the experiment. We cannot rule out the possibility that their participation in the initial experiment produced variations in individual dispositions. However, given the relative stability of the personality variables we measured (particularly the Big Five; see Bergeman et al., 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1997), it is reasonable to assume that personality traits were not strongly affected by the experiment.

ReferencesArendt, H. (1977). Eichmann in Jerusalem. A report on the banality of evil.

Harmondsworth: Penguin.Beauvois, J.-L., Dubois, N., (1988). The norm of internality in the explanation of

psychological events. European Journal of Social Psychology 8, 299–316.Beauvois, J. L., Courbet, D., & Oberlé, D. (2012). The prescriptive power of the television

host: A transposition of Milgram’s obedience paradigm to the context of TV game show. European Review of Applied Psychology, 62(4), 111–119.

Bègue, L., Beauvois, J.L., Courbet, D., Oberlé, D., Lepage, J., & Duke, A. (2014). Personality Predicts Obedience in a Milgram Paradigm. Journal of Personality, Article first published online: 24 JUN 2014, DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12104.

Bergeman, C. S., Chipuer, H. M., Plomin, R., Pedersen, N. L., McClern, G. E., Nesselroade, J. R., et al. (1993). Genetic and environmental effects on openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness: An adoption/twin study. Journal of Personality, 61, 159–179.

Berkowitz, L. (1999). Evil is more than banal: Situationism and the concept of evil. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 246–253.

Blass, T. (1991). Understanding behavior in the Milgram obedience experiment: The role of personality, situations, and their interactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 398–413.

46


Blass, T. (2000). The Milgram paradigm after 35 years: Some things we now know about obedience to authority. In T. Blass (Ed.), Obedience to authority: Current perspectives on the Milgram paradigm. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Blass, T. (Ed.), (2000). Obedience to authority: current perspectives on the Milgram paradigm. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ.

Blass, T., (1999). The Milgram paradigm after 35 years: Some things we now know about obedience to authority. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 29, 955–978.

Blass, T., (2009). From New Haven to Santa Clara: a historical perspective on the Milgram obedience experiments. American Psychologist 64, 37–45.

Blass, T., Schmitt, C., (2001). The nature of perceived authority in the Milgram paradigm: two replications. Current Psychology 20, 115–121.

Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American Psychologist, 64, 1–11.

Burger, J.M., (2009). Replicating Milgram: would people still obey today? American Psychologist 64, 1–11.

Burley, P. M., & McGuiness, J. (1977). Effects of social intelligence on the Milgram paradigm. Psychological Reports, 40, 767–770.

Coenen-Huther, J., (2005). Pouvoir, autorité, légitimité. En marge d’un livre récent d’Alain Renaut [Power, authority, legitimacy. On the sidelines of a recent book by Alain Renaut]. Revue Européenne de Sciences Sociales 43, 135–145.

Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1989). The NEO-PII/NEO-FFl manual supplement. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.

Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Normal personality assessment in clinical practice: The NEO Personality Inventory. Psychological Assessment, 4, 5–13.

Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1997). Longitudinal stability of adult personality. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology (pp. 269–290). New York: Academic Press.

Courbet, D., Fourquet, M.-P. (Eds.), (2003). La télévision et ses influences [The television and its influences]. De Boeck, Bruxelles.

Dambrun, M., & Vatiné, E. (2010). Reopening the study of extreme social behaviors: Obedience to authority within an immersive video environment. European Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 760–773.

Doris, J. M. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dubois, N., (2009. La norme d’internalité et le libéralisme. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, Grenoble.

Dubois, N., Beauvois, J.-L., (2008). The social value of internal explanations and the norm of internality theory. Personality and Social Psychology Compass 2, 1737–1752.

Elms, A., & Milgram, S. (1966). Personality characteristics associated with obedience and defiance toward authoritative commands. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 2, 289–292.

Goldberg, L. (1992). The development of markers for the Big Five factor structure. Psychological Assessment, 4, 26–42.

47


Haas, K. (1966). Obedience: Submission to destructive orders as related to hostility. Psychological Reports, 19, 32–34.

Hathaway, S. R., & McKinley, J. C. (1940). A multiphasic personality schedule (Minnesota): I. Construction of the schedule. Journal of Psychology, 10, 249–254.

Hogan, R., & Ones, D. S. (1997). Conscientiousness and integrity at work. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology (pp. 849–870). New York: Academic Press.

Hogan, R., Curphy, G., & Hogan, J. (1994). What we know about leadership effectiveness and personality. American Psychologist, 49, 493–504.

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human development sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, J. A., & Ostendorf, F. (1993). Clarification of the five factor model with abridged Big Five-dimensional circumplex. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 824–835.

Marchand, P. (Ed.), (2004). Psychologie sociale des médias [Social psychology of media]. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes.

Mashiko, H. (2008). The relationship between the tendency of overadaptation and personality traits, fears of abandonment, and approval motivation in adolescence. Japanese Journal of Counseling Science, 41, 151–160.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across instruments and observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 81–90.

McCrae, R. R., Costa, P. T., & Piedmont, R. L. (1993). Folk concepts, natural language, and psychological constructs: The California Psychological Inventory and the five-factor model. Journal of Personality, 61, 1–26.

Meeus, W. H. J., & Raaijmakers, Q. A. W. (1995). Obedience in modern society: The Utrecht studies. Journal of Social Issues, 51, 155–175.

Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York: Harper & Row.

Milgram, S., (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, 371–378.

Miller, F. D. (1975). An experimental study of obedience to authority of varying legitimacy (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Miranda, F. S., Caballero, R. B., Gomez, M. N., & Zamorano, M. A. (1981). Obediencia a la auroridad [Obedience to authority]. Psiquis, 2, 212–221.

Morelli, M., (1983). Milgram’s dilemma of obedience. Metaphilosophy 14, 183–189.Mullins-Sweatt, S. N., Jamerson, J. E., Samuel, D. B., Olson, D. R., & Widiger, T. A.

(2006). Psychometric properties of an abbreviated instrument of the five-factor model. Assessment, 13, 119–137.

Nabi, R.L., Hendriks, A., (2003. The persuasive effect of host and audience reaction shots in television talk shows. Journal of Communication 53 (3), 527–543.

Oberlé, D., Beauvois, J., Courbet, D., (2011). Une transposition du paradigme d’obéissance de Milgram à la télévision : enjeux, résultats et perspectives [Applying Milgram’s obedience paradigm to television: issues, results and prospects]. Connexions 95 (1), 71.

48


Piedmont, R. L., McCrae, R. R., & Costa P. T. (1992). An assessment of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule from the perspective of the five-factor model. Journal of Personality Assessment, 58, 67–78.

Russell, N. J. C. (2011). Milgram’s obedience to authority experiments: Origins and early evolution. British Journal of Social Psychology, 50, 140–162.

Saucier, G. (1994). Mini-Markers: A brief version of Goldberg’s unipolar Big-Five markers. Journal of Personality Assessment, 63, 506–516.

Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2010). Basic personal values, core political values, and voting: A longitudinal study. Political Psychology, 31, 421–452.

49

E. Erdos. The Milgram Trap Revisited. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humani-ties and Social Studies.

THE MILGRAM TRAP REVISITEDЛОВУШКА МИЛГРЭМА

(ПЕРЕСМОТРЕННАЯ ВЕРСИЯ СТАТЬИ)

Edward ErdosAdjunct Professor at New York Institute of Technology,

New York, [email protected]

Edward Erdos received his Ph.D. in philosophy from NYU and his Master’s in psychology from the New School in 1975. He taught as adjunct professor for a number of years at the New York Institute of Technology before financial opportunities in In-formation Systems prompted a career change. Nonetheless he has maintained an enduring commitment to Milgram obedience studies since 1973 when he first developed his ideas. The Mil-gram studies have overtones that resonate more deeply with him than many. He was born in Budapest, Hungary in November 1939 to Jewish parents who were fortunate to immigrate to the US in 1940 just as the Nazi juggernaut clamped shut. His aunt

stayed behind and survived the Nazi occupation through heroic struggle and suffering and many relatives and friends were lost during the Holocaust. In addition he was drafted and served almost 5 years in the U.S. Navy with one year as a Lieutenant in Vietnam. He had firsthand experience at both ends of the power spectrum, witnessing the effects of author-ity – obedience and disobedience - at close range. It was there, the connections to his past, and his ongoing research that his ideas concerning Milgram were crystallized. With the special 2009 issue of American Psychologist featuring Jerry Burger’s replication of Mil-gram’s obedience studies, he has been inspired to resume the work that he started in 1973. He published a first draft of The Milgram Trap (Die Milgram-Falle) in the German jour-nal Psychosozial in 2010 and an updated English version in the 2012 issue of Theoretical and Applied Ethics. He has done extensive research with the assistance of emeritus pro-fessor Stuart Levine of Bard College with ongoing appearances at his Milgram seminar there. He is a participant and contributor to conferences and lectures and is actively con-tinuing his research and writing."

Эдвард Эрдос - Эдвард Эрдос получил докторскую степень по философии в Нью-Йоркском университете и степень магистра по психологии в «Новой Школе» (New School) в 1975 году. В течение ряда лет он работал в должности адъюнкт-профессора в Нью-Йоркском технологическом институте, а затем вынужден был перейти на работу в сфере информационных технологий из-за благоприятных финансовых возможностей. Тем не менее, он сохранил его интерес к obedience-исследованиям Милгрэма, который возник у него с 1973 года, когда Профессор

50


Эрдос начал развивать свои идеи, связанные с этой парадигмой. Для него исследования Милгрэма значат больше, чем для многих других. Он родился в Будапеште, в Венгрии в ноябре 1939 года в еврейской семье, которой повезло иммигрировать в США в 1940 году и тем самым избежать неминуемой гибели. Его тетя осталась в Европе и пережила ужасы нацистской оккупации, стойко перенося выпавшие на её долю тяготы. В то же время многие из его родственников и друзей погибли во время Холокоста. Ещё одна причина глубокого отклика на эти исследования Милгрэма: Эдвард Эрдос был призван на военную службу почти на 5 лет в ВМС США и один год служил во Вьетнаме в звании лейтенанта. Он имел непосредственный опыт нахождения на обоих концах спектра власти, наблюдая с близкого расстояния повинуемость и неповиновение легитимным авторитетам. Именно там, под влиянием мыслей о собственном прошлом и настоящем, его идеи, связанные с парадигмой Милгрэма, окончательно сформировались. Публикация журналом «American Psychologist» в 2009 г. повторения Д. Берджером obedience-эксперимента Милгрэма вдохновила Э. Эрдоса возобновить работу, начатую в 1973 г. Он опубликовал первую версию статьи «Ловушка Милгрэма» («Die Milgram-Falle») в немецком журнале «Psychosozial» в 2010 году, а её доработанную и обновлённую английскую версию в одном из номеров журнала «Theoretical and Applied Ethics» за 2012 год. Совместно со Стюартом Ливином, Почётным профессором Бард колледжа, он провёл обширные исследования в рамках obedience-парадигмы и был и остаётся постоянным участником его Милгрэмовского семинара в Бард колледже. Участвует в конференциях, читает лекции и активно продолжает и публикует свои исследования.

Key words: Milgram, obedience, persuasion, capitulation, trap, Milgram trap, Milgram paradigm, responsibility, moral sense, sanctions, inhibiting factors, malevolence, selfish malevolence, foot in the door, foot-in-the-door, disobedience, binding force, shock levels, point of no return.Ключевые слова: Милгрэм, повинуемость легитимному авторитету, убеждение, капитуляции, ловушка, ловушка Милгрэма, парадигма Милгрэма, ответственность, нравственное чувство, санкции, сдерживающие факторы, злоба, эгоистичная злоба, феномен "нога-в-дверях", неповиновение, сила обязательств, вольтаж ударов током, точка невозврата.

AbstractI argue: 1) contrary to the long held conviction that Milgram’s obedience studies

represent a unitary whole consisting of a sequence of steps beginning at 15 volts and ending at 450 volts, all of Milgram’s experiments are actually comprised of two independent phases; 2) the failure to realize this has been, and still is, responsible for much of the confusions and controversy surrounding his experiments; and 3) The only explanation for otherwise moral individuals to possibly shocking their innocent co-participant to death is that Milgram’s paradigm constituted a trap that made escape ever more difficult with each higher shock

51


subjects inflicted.АннотацияЯ утверждаю: 1) вопреки сложившейся точке зрения, согласно которой obedience-исследование Милгрэма представляют собой единый эксперимент, состоящий из последовательности шагов, начинающейся с 15 вольт и заканчивающейся 450 вольтами, все эксперименты Милгрэма, на самом деле, состоят из двух независимых этапов; 2) неспособность понять данный факт во многом объясняет неоднозначную реакцию на эти эксперименты и споры вокруг них; 3) единственным объяснением жестокого поведения испытуемых, которых в иных ситуациях отличают высокие моральные качества, является ловушка парадигмы Милгрэма, выбраться из которой с каждым новым более сильным ударом током становится всё сложнее.

The dual nature of Milgram’s paradigm

As Erdos described, the phases are: The Persuasion (P) phase that consists of all the events up to the first objection by the learner at 150 volts; and the After Capitulation (AC) phase consisting of all the events surrounding those subjects who succumb. The most prevalent misconception has been that while social forces such as the setting of the experiment and the authority of the experimenter can indeed persuade subjects to ignore the learner’s first demands to be released, these same influences have been cited erroneously by legions of experts as being responsible for subjects continuing to shock the learner possibly to death. Milgram’s results seemed so incredible even to him that he concluded that the only way that social forces could be so overwhelming must be due to the “fatal flaw nature has designed into us” (p. 188). Yet once the subjects capitulate, different forces kick in, and those are the ones propelling them onward in the AC phase. In fact once into the transgressions, a legitimate authority is not even needed, as Mantell demonstrated in his experiments in Germany in 1971, or even an impressive laboratory or a laboratory at all, as seen in the 2005 McDonald hoaxes (there a caller claiming to be a police officer forced managers to commit ever-increasing abuses upon an innocent worker claiming she stole from a customer (Wolfson).

As Erdos (p.130-131) shows, Milgram’s data reveals quite a different picture when separated into two phases. Employing the traditional method that measures the percentage of subjects obeying from the beginning, obedience is found to decline by distance. For the first four experiments: #1: the learner’s protests consisted of knocks on the wall; #2: the complaints of the learner could be heard through the walls; #3: the learner was a few feet from the subject; #4: the experimenter orders the subject to force the learner’s hand onto the shock plate.

As the learner’s distress was brought closer to the subject, obedience declined 52


dramatically: 65, 62.5, 40, and 30 percent. Here we are already faced with an enigma: the disproportionate nature of the reduction. As Blass observes, “Why variations in amount and intensity of feedback or absence versus presence of physical contact did not also have effects still remains a puzzle” (2009, pp. 41– 42). Let us now reexamine this same data separating the P phase from the AC phase. For the variations 1– 4 the number of subjects refusing to shock the learner beyond his first protest we get 0, 15, 27.5, and 42.5 percent. The puzzle disappears: not only is the decline of obedience even more dramatically manifested, its graph is virtually a straight line of descent. The expected effects due to visual feedback and physical contact are now clearly exhibited. By all the rules of evidence, the dual view should be the preferred approach. The unitary view, which can only see behavior from entry to 450 volts, blinds it to an independent P phase and introduces paradoxes like the one above. This decline speaks to the experimenter’s drastically weakening powers to persuade subjects to initiate the punishments over the learner’s protests as he is moved closer. … It is revealing now in the AC phase to calculate the percentage of subjects continuing to the end after succumbing to the experimenter’s urging. We see a quite different effect of distance: 65, 73.5, 55.2, and 52.2 percent, respectively, obey. There is no noteworthy decline here.”

Surprisingly, even when forcing the learner’s hand onto the shock plate, once subjects’ capitulate, 52.2 percent obey to the end. This alone should raise ones suspicions about what is truly happening. In the AC phase obedience is seen to be 50 percent or more for almost all Milgram’s variations - whether it is closeness of the victim, the experiment held at Yale or at Bridgeport, or orders given over the phone or with the experimenter absent, or learner’s heart problem or prior condition.

I believe that Jerry Burger’s 2009 replication of Milgram’s New Baseline variation #5 lends experimental support, however unintentional, to the two-phase division. Seventy percent of his subjects were persuaded by the experimenter to shock the learner over his first objection at 150 volts when, because of ethical guidelines, Burger called a halt to the trial. He provided an impressive amount of data showing that obedience did not differ across ethnicity, gender, education, or personality variables - demonstrating that the P phase can stand alone as an independent experiment. Many commentators have praised his bisecting of Milgram’s paradigm as opening the door for future experiments like this while still meeting IRB approval.

Actually, Hoffling, et al, conducted a model ecological example of a stand-alone P phase experiment in 1966 in their by now well-known hospital experiment. They found that 21 out of 22 nurses were induced by a physician calling over the phone (a violation of hospital regulations) to administer a dose of medication that they knew was well above the limit. Prior to the nurse’s entrance into the patient’s room, a staff psychiatrist terminated the experiment. And in a control condition each nurse

53


interviewed indicated that they would not have given the drug under those same circumstances. The danger is to conclude that these experiments have implications for obedience to authority to the destructive extremes Milgram obtained.

Such is the case with many ecological extensions, a consequence of the failure to recognize the dual nature of Milgram’s paradigm and the distinctive forces influencing obedience in each. Several cases in point: Poskocil conducted experiments with his classes where students felt persuaded to take absurd quizzes (in order some claimed to get an easy 100.) But this has nothing to do with succumbing, as Poskocil claimed, to the “absurd demands” of a Hitler. This same error is being continually made even today by such as Reicher, Haslam, and Smith (p. 319) who write, “the destructive behavior within the Milgram paradigm is a reflection not of simple obedience, but of active identification with the experimenter and his (scientific) mission;” which is “would the shocks improve the learner’s performance or not?” – true for the P phase. However, it is nonsensical to believe or claim that the shocks can serve to improve a presumed “learner’s” answers when there are none forthcoming. What further scientific value is there then in continuing to shock him when he is unconscious and even twice more with the maximum 450 volts?

Burger (p. 9) goes on to argue that most of those who capitulated at 150 volts in his replication would have continued to the end saying “Consistency needs and self-perception processes make it unlikely that many participants would have suddenly changed their behavior when progressing through each small step.” This foot-in-the-door argument has been cited almost universally as a factor for subjects’ continued obedience in the AC phase.

Subjects’ moral sense makes them vulnerable

There are many other influences to which analysts appeal. Russell identifies binding factors namely the experimenter’s verbal prods, e.g., “the experiment requires that you continue,” etc., and strain reducing mechanisms such as the experimenter declaring “Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage,” and “I’m responsible for anything that happens to him,” etc. Russell (p. 411) concludes:

“When contemplating the moral dilemma to continue or stop, some participants ended the experiment. Most, however, accepted what was, for themselves, the easier option to continue inflicting further shocks safe in the suspicion that they could evade blame because they were “just following orders.” Russell and Gregory (2011) concluded that Milgram’s experiments say less about so-called obedience to authority per se, and much more about how most ordinary people can be tempted into unethically resolving a moral dilemma when they are both led to suspect they will

54


personally benefit and can probably act unethically with impunity.”Although Russell as well as most social psychologists recognizes that evading

blame is an important component for obedience in Milgram’s paradigm, they stumble by imputing to obedient subjects the motive of blame avoidance. Then with Russell they can conclude that subjects “can be tempted into unethically resolving a moral dilemma.” But I argue that theirs is an error of misplaced emphasis. It is not subject’s motives for continuing that should be stressed but the almost impossibility of their stopping the further up the line they delay. The different conclusion one arrives at is quite radical, somewhat like reversing figure for ground in an optical illusion. It is counterintuitive to believe that otherwise moral individuals, who have learned from childhood that harming another against his will is wrong, could lose their moral compass so drastically in the short time span of the experiment. In fact THEY REMAINED INTACT: For it is subjects’ moral sensibility which renders disobedience a sanction, for that is what alerts them to the devastating impact to their self-image as decent and upstanding individuals should they admit to themselves by quitting up the line that they had the power to disobey all along.

One can also see a similar inversion in how one interprets the experimenter’s claim that he is responsible for any harm that should come to the learner. For instead of acting as a strain reducing mechanism his “assurances” can just as easily be perceived as a thinly veiled threat, to wit: “I am responsible for any harm to the learner as long as you obey, but not if you should be foolish enough to quit.” Implying, by the way, that harm might indeed come to the victim, contradicting his no tissue damage claim. I do not believe subjects were ever “safe in the suspicion that they could evade blame.” Subjects were trapped into obeying to the end by the mounting sanctions they would incur at every step should they quit. They then had to persuade themselves that they were not responsible since they were following orders and had little control over the process. That tactic however in most cases rang hollow, absolving them of nothing. The obvious need for a debriefing spoke to that very real possibility. And as Perry revealed, many subjects were not “de-hoaxed.” One of those who weren’t, disclosed: “The experiment left such an effect on me that I spent the night in a cold sweat and nightmares because of the fear that I might have killed that man in the chair.”

Indeed one can also see an extraordinary reversal with respect to the foot-in-the-door argument. Before Milgram conducted his experiments, it was assumed by every expert and layman alike, that the step by step increase of shocks administered to the learner would be a formidable deterrent to a subject’s continued obedience -- the greater the learner’s risk and suffering the more powerful the incentive to quit and to disobey. The outrage at senseless cruelty that one would normally expect was behind psychiatrist’s predictions that only a “pathological fringe” would proceed to shock the learner to the very end. True, the gradated shock procedure is a critical strategy for

55


success in Milgram’s paradigm: for no one would have agreed to shock the learner with the highest voltage from the outset. But many agree with Gilbert (p. 692) that Milgram’s incremental shock procedure may have engaged subjects in “committing precedent-setting acts of obedience before they realize … the ‘ugly direction’ in which that momentum is driving them” erecting and reinforcing “the impression that quitting at any particular level of shock is unjustified (since consecutive shock levels differ only slightly and quantitatively).” These consequences “may conspire to deprive subjects of the credible rationale they need to quit at any given point before completing the experiment.” In other words Milgram’s obedience studies demonstrated, in effect, that the step-by-step escalation in torture is not a deterring but on the contrary - a binding force! But by what stretch of the imagination does gradually increasing torture deprive individuals of a “credible rationale” to quit? If one seriously thinks about it, the mounting stress that subjects’ experience as they increase the shocks is not far removed from obeying commands to move one’s hand closer and closer to an open flame where “credible rationale” for discontinuing would also be absent. On the face of it, an incredibly unbelievable if not an absurd claim. But it is now accepted unquestioningly by so many. If analysts had advanced this theory prior to Milgram’s experiments they would have been laughed out of court.

Again, we can re-examine the foot-in-the-door argument and see in it a very different implication. The gradated shock procedure was a critical element in Milgram’s paradigm not because it propelled subjects to the end but because it drove them to a point of no return. In other words, the shocks subjects were spurred on by the experimenter to incrementally administer, were at a swift pace, leaving them hardly any time to think, driving them, before they had a chance to realize “the ugly direction it was leading them”, to a level of inflicted torture for which they felt they could not bear to take the responsibility and blame should they decide to stop.

Examining Milgram’s data we can see that subjects reach their point of no return at different shock levels. Most who quit do so between 150 and 195 volts. Beyond that it becomes ever more difficult: That is why early objectors are more likely to be defiant. Not because, as Modigliani and Rochat (p. 122) point out, that they are the ones who “divest the experimenter of his cloak of scientific altruism--exposing, instead, his selfish malevolence.” For the experimenter’s “selfish malevolence” and the experiments lack of scientific value becomes more apparent the higher the shocks. As Mantell (p. 111) points out: “A person is strapped into a chair and is immobilized and is explicitly told that he is going to be exposed to extremely painful electric shocks. ... This experiment becomes more incredulous and senseless the further it is carried. It disqualifies and delegitimizes itself.” With this realization it should be easier to disobey as subjects go up the line. And yet they carry on. Why? Is it because as Mantell concludes that “It proves that the most banal and superficial of rationales is

56


perhaps not even necessary, but surely is enough to produce destructive behavior in human beings”?

No. I submit that it is the failure to recognize the extraordinary reversals taking place on either side of subjects’ capitulation that confounds analysts understanding of what is really happening. It backs social psychologists into making fantastic declarations of the power of social forces, or of the ridiculous extremes that “the most banal and superficial of rationales” can provoke subjects into committing. When in truth: Recognizing the experimenter’s “selfish malevolence” prior to a subjects’ point of no return can serve as an incentive to quit, whereas the same realization afterward is the very obstacle preventing defiance. For the more gratuitous and reprehensible the shocks, such as delivering them to someone who is suffering with a heart problem, screaming in pain, possibly unconscious or even dead, the more unjustifiable they become and the greater the potential blame subjects would incur should they disobey: A blame that by all rights the “selfishly malevolent” experimenter alone deserves. As a result, the same reasons that served as valid explanations for subjects capitulating, such as furthering the progress of science, etc., become rationalizations as the shocks grow ever more indefensible and serve as convenient justifications ex post facto for the damnable deed already done.

The long held conviction that Milgram’s experiments, as Blass (p. xviii) observed, has reshaped “our conceptions of individual morality” and “taught us dramatically … that our moral sense can readily be trampled underfoot” is what has prevented so many analysts from recognizing the ever-increasing sanctions for disobedience that would otherwise obtain. As Milgram points out, the “inhibiting factor” preventing subjects from “escaping” “must be of greater magnitude than the stress experienced or else the terminating act would occur” (p. 43). In my conceptualization, while as Packer (p. 302) notes that “there is no linear relationship between shock level and disobedience as would be expected if increasingly intense expressions of pain were reliably motivating noncompliance” there is most assuredly a linear relationship between shock level and sanctions for disobedience. The subjects are not deaf to the victim’s cries, or immune to his possible injury. On the contrary it is those very cries and the possible harm to the learner that plays a vital role in securing obedience in Milgram’s paradigm. They continually alert subjects to the serious nature of the acts in which they are complicit. It should be clear that these “inhibiting factors” grow ever more powerful and are amplified in lock step with the subjects’ stress associated with the victim’s apparent injury as opposed to all other proposed inhibiting factors such as the destruction of the experiment or not following orders, which would hold just as true and no more severe at shock level 450 as at 15.

57


ConclusionsIt follows that: 1) only the ever mounting responsibility and blame otherwise

moral subjects would incur by disobeying can coerce them step-by-agonizing-step to the very end; 2) all other reasons for subjects’ continuing which served as explanations for their obedience in the P phase such as "the experimenter must be right;" "I cannot renege on my agreement;" "I am furthering the progress of a scientific experiment;" "I am just following orders;" etc., become nothing more than self serving rationalizations in the AC phase; 3) Not recognizing the dual nature of Milgram’s paradigm and the distinctive forces influencing obedience in each has misled scores of analysts into employing them as explanations for ordinary citizens destructive obedience.

As Erdos (p.139-140) concludes:Yet arguably, one can assert that once beyond their “point of no return” in the AC

phase, Milgram’s experiments are the most diabolical examples of an escalation game ever conducted, in which the stakes for disobedience rise with furious rapidity to a barbarous and draconian extreme. Such emotional abuse could even be more coercive and long lasting than corporal punishment. …

If what I maintain is accurate, the obedient subjects in Milgram’s experiments must be considered the true victims. They were trapped in a unique, indeed artificial situation, one in which most ordinary moral individuals are rendered virtually helpless to cope: confronting their own culpability in the unexpected role they were called on to play in the presumed torture and possible murder of a fellow participant. The paradoxical conclusion is that far from abandoning their humanity, (as Milgram famously declared), by obeying to the end, these participants were trying desperately to preserve it. Whether or not they succeeded is a subject for debate, yet many were haunted by their compliance for a long time afterward.

That is not to imply Milgram’s experiments have no ecological validity. However it is important to distinguish to which phase they apply. Most are applicable, as I have tried to show, only to the P phase. More rarely do we find situations that specifically reflect the AC phase where wrongdoing is coerced incrementally over a relatively short time. A notable instance is the McDonald hoaxes. Yet another can be found in the interrogation techniques employed by law enforcement often extracting false confessions from innocent individuals.

As Kassin explains it is the very fact that those under interrogation are innocent that factors significantly into their confessing to serious crimes including murder. Knowing their innocence they easily fall into the trap of waiving their rights and refusing counsel. The escalating harsh interrogations can then begin. It gets so unbearable at the end that with deceptive assurances from the police that all will go well if they confess, they do so in desperation just to escape from their confinement and release them from their torture. With this evidence most courts have found them

58


guilty. Similarly, with Milgram: It is subjects’ moral values that put them at risk. Before they realize it they have been trapped into going too far in their inflicting of pain and, recognizing the extent of the wrong, are unable to quit. Many behave like caged animals trying franticly to get free, lured on with deceptive assurances from the experimenter that all will go well. They continue to the end in desperation just to escape from their confinement. As Modigliani and Rochat (p. 110) observe: “Given the escalating tension and concomitant stress experienced by subjects, their overarching objective is to alter or escape the unpleasant situation that faces them.” Many subjects noticeably speed up the shocks near the end just to get past their ordeal. But doing so has unfortunately convicted ordinary citizens in the eyes of many social psychologists: As a consequence we along with them have been falsely judged guilty of allowing “our moral sense to be readily trampled underfoot” and “abandoning our humanity.”

Once the increasing sanctions in the AC phase of Milgram’s paradigm that I outline are recognized as coercing obedience and trapping subjects, all other explanations such as foot-in-the-door, cognitive dissonance, the ability for individuals to develop self justifying rationalizations, etc. true as they may be in influencing various forms of destructive behavior in the outside world, are not the ones compelling obedience to the end there. The upshot of citing those influences time and again by scores of experts in ecological extensions results in another inversion. It reinforces the erroneous conviction that they were valid explanations for Milgram’s shocking results in the first place.

ReferencesBlass, T. (2004). The man who shocked the world: The life and legacy of Stanley Milgram.

Cambridge ma: Basic Books.Blass, T. (2009). From New Haven to Santa Clara: A historical perspective on the Milgram

obedience experiments. American Psychologist, 64(1), 37– 45.Burger, J. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American

Psychologist, 64, 1– 11.Erdos, E. The Milgram Trap, Theoretical & Applied Ethics, Vol. 2, #2, 2013, pp.123-142.Gilbert, S. J. Another Look at the Milgram Obedience Studies: The Role of the Gradated

Series of Shocks, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 7 No. 4, December 1981, 690-695.

Hofling, C.K., Brotzman, E., Dalrymple, S., Graves, N., and Pierce, C. 1966. An experimental study of nurse-physician relations. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 143: 171-180.

Kassin, S. M., On the Psychology of Confessions, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk, American Psychologist, April 2005, 215-228

Mantell, D. (1971). The Potential for Violence in Germany. Journal of Social Issues, 27(4), 101– 112.

Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row.59


Modigliani, A., Rochat F. The Role of Interaction Sequences and the Timing of Resistance in Shaping Obedience and Defiance of Authority, Journal of Social Issues, 51. No. 3, 1995, 107-123.

Perry, G. (2012). Behind the shock machine: The untold story of the notorious Milgram obedience experiments. New York: The New Press.

Packer, D.J., Identifying Systematic Disobedience in Milgram’s Obedience Experiments, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 301-304.

Poskocil, A. (1977). The college classroom as a learning environment. Teaching Sociology, 4(4), 283– 296.

Reicher, S. D., Haslam, S. A., & Smith, J. R. (2012). Working toward the experimenter. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(4), 315- 324.

Russell, N. (2014) The Emergence of Milgram’s Bureaucratic Machine, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2014, pp. 409--423

Russell, N. J. C., & Gregory, R. J. (2011). Spinning an organizational “web of obligation”? Moral choice in Stanley Milgram’s “Obedience to Authority experiments. The American Review of Public Administration, 41(5), 495–518. doi: 10.1177/0275074010384129

Wolfson, A. (2005, October 9). A hoax most cruel: Caller coaxed McDonald’s managers into strip- searching a worker. Louisville Courier - Journal. Retrieved from http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20051009/news01/510090392?nclick_check=1.

60

R.V. Ershova «Obedience» in education: an experimental research. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Rus-sia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies

«OBEDIENCE» IN EDUCATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH« » : ПОВИНУЕМОСТЬ ВОБРАЗОВАНИИ ОПЫТЭКСПЕРИМЕНТАЛЬНОГОИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ

Regina Ershova Moscow Regional State Institute

of Humanities and Social Studies, Kolomna, Russia [email protected]

Ершова Регина Вячеславовна - доктор психологических наук, профессор, заведующая кафедрой психологии Московского Государственного областного социально-гуманитарного института, автор более 90 научных и учебно-методических публикаций. Область научных интересов: психология личности, социальная психология личности, психология индивидуальных различий.Regina Ershova - PhD in Psychology, Professor, Head of the Chair of Psychology of Moscow State Regional Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, author of more than 90 scientific and educational

publications. Sphere of scientific interests is psychology of personality, social psychology, differential psychology.

Keywords: obedience to authority, social role, normative influence, informational influence, the agentive state, the personality traits.Ключевые слова: повинуемость легитимному авторитету, социальная роль, нормативное влияние, информационное влияние, состояние агента, личностные характеристики.

Abstract The article presents an attempt to explain the causes and consequences of

unrestricted obedience of students to teacher`s authority. The experimental studies carried out in 2009-2010 and 2014, which was partially a replication of Arthur Poskocil`s. These studies proved the following:

1. The obedience behavior is developed in two successive phases: doubt and protest phase and acceptance and obedience phase.

2. The behavior of the learner who moved into acceptance and obedience phase is characterized by lowered self-esteem, intellectual inertness and meekness.

3. The most significant effect on the obedient behavior in the class-room environment has the situation that requires a learner to remain in his role, even if it

61



involves the performance of absurd actions. The main characteristics of the situation that determine obedient behavior of the learners are:− The perception of the situation as displeasing, but necessary for the purposes of

education;− The perception of the teacher, as the legitimate authority, with all the attributes of

their genuineness;− The normative and informative influence of the teacher and the group members

upon the student.4. The gradual involvement of "learner» to the "agentive state" (during the process

of socialization, learning how to behave in a prescribed role) can be considered as a factor contributing to the formation of the obedience in the educational environment.

5. The presence of opposition or denying figure or figures in the group can act as factor that might provoke disobedience in a minority and reinforce the compulsive or pro-group behavior of the group’s majority.

6. The degree of influence of personality characteristics upon obedience are rather insignificant, only such personality traits as emotional instability, caution and distrust, anxiety and sensitivity to the others estimates, distrust to authority, criticism, liberalism can be considered as features that reduce obedience of a learner to legitimate authority of the teacher. Personal traits can act as the critical factor in the situation when the participants might feel reluctant to undergo the testing, due to the presence of disobedient members in the group.

7. Excessive obedience in the learning environment can be seen as a factor which reduces the quality of education, through the transformation of educational motivation, decreased research activity, skills of logical thinking, analysis, dialogue and discussion, personal responsibility for learning outcomes, the development of intellectual inertness and convergent thinking, narrowing of intellectual horizons that leads to instability, fragmentation of knowledge.

Аннотация В статье представлена попытка объяснения причин и последствий

безграничной повинуемости учащихся воле преподавателя. На основе экспериментального исследования, проводимого в 2009-2010 и 2014 г., в основу которого был положен эксперимент Артура Поскоцила, доказано, следующее:

1. Процесс формирования повинующегося поведения включает две последовательные фазы: фазу сомнения и протеста и сменяющую ее фазу принятия и повиновения.

2. Поведение перешедшего в фазу принятия и повиновения «ученика» характеризуется снижением самооценки, интеллектуальной пассивностью и смирением.

3. Решающее влияние на феномен повинуемости оказывает фактор ситуации, который требует от индивида неуклонного выполнения возложенной на него роли,

62


даже если эта роль связана с абсурдными действиями. Ведущими характеристиками ситуации, определяющими подчиненное поведение студентов, являются: − Восприятие ситуации как проблемной, но необходимой в процессе обучения;− восприятие фигуры преподавателя, как легитимного авторитета, со всеми

атрибутами его неподдельности;− наличие нормативного и информативного влияния со стороны преподавателя и

членов группы. 4. Фактором, способствующим формированию модели повинуемости в

образовательной среде, является постепенное (в процессе социализации, научения правилам поведения в предписанной роли) вовлечение «ученика» в ситуацию, приводящее к закреплению «состояния агента».

5. Наличие в группе отказавшихся (оппозиционных) участников может выступать стресс-фактором, провоцирующим неповиновение у меньшинства и усиливающим про-групповое, конформное поведение большинства членов группы.

6. Степень влияния личностных особенностей на подчиненное поведение весьма невелика, только такие характеристики личности как эмоциональная нестабильность; осмотрительность и недоверчивость; тревожность и чувствительность к одобрению окружающих; недоверчивость по отношению к авторитетам, критичность, либеральность могут рассматриваться как черты, снижающие повинуемость ученика легитимному авторитету учителя. Именно личностные особенности могут стать решающим фактором отказа от тестирования в ситуации наличия в группе неповинующихся участников.

7. Чрезмерная повинуемость в учебной среде выступает фактором, снижающим качество образования, через трансформацию учебной мотивации, снижение исследовательской активности, навыков логического рассуждения, анализа, ведения диалога и дискуссии, личной ответственности учащегося за результаты обучения, развитие интеллектуальной пассивности и конвергентного мышления, сужение кругозора, что приводит к неустойчивости, бессистемности знаний.

Большинство современных исследователей (социологов, философов, экономистов, психологов, культурологов) сходятся во мнении о том, что сейчас человеческое общество живет в принципиально другом мире. Иными, чем даже 20-30 лет назад стали не только условия жизни, но само социальное пространство существования человека, система его отношений, он сам.

В новой реальности утратила свою эффективность продуктивно работавшая ранее система образования. Она практически исчерпала себя как активно действующая. И не потому, что плохая, а потому, что не соответствует реалиям современного общества, которое исторически переросло ее. В связи с этим активизировался психолого-педагогический

63


поиск, направленный на построение научно обоснованной стратегии развития образования на новых теоретически осмысленных основаниях. Известно, что в существующей системе образования формируется и развивается личность ребенка, причем содержание и качество этого процесса во многом определяется качеством отношений «Учитель-ученик», личностью самого педагога. Здесь на первый план выдвигается «наиболее острая сейчас проблема замены авторитарности учителя авторитетом» (Д.И. Фельдштейн, 2010, с. 16). Однако достаточно ли учителю обладать авторитетом? Если рассматривать авторитет как понятие социально-психологическое, становится ясно, что само по себе наличие у учителя авторитета не определяет качества образовательного и воспитательного процесса. Более того, сам по себе авторитет (легитимный авторитет) учителя может стать причиной непродуктивного поведения учеников, что было показано в исследованиях деструктивной повинуемости (М. Шериф; С. Аш; С.Милгрэм; Ф. Зимбардо; А. Поскоцил).

Актуальность исследования определялась необходимостью детального изучения и анализа ситуации обучения, в частности ее характеристик, способствующих и препятствующих проявлению активности личности, развитию ее потенциала к саморазвитию, самообучению через взаимодействие с авторитетным педагогом. Знание этих условий позволило бы выстраивать процесс педагогического взаимодействия в соответствии с декларированными базовыми принципами «Новой школы».

В социально-психологических исследованиях «авторитет» рассматривается с одной стороны, как свойство, принадлежность статуса, «нетестированное принятие чьего-то решения» (Л.Стейн)» (Цит. по: Wrong, 1988, с. 35), как форма проявления власти, институализированная, осуществляемая в соответствии с соглашением власть (М. Вебер, 1993; Б.Рассел, 1926; Д.Истон, 1958; Р. Берштедт, 1950), с другой – как свойство самого субъекта (его знаний, умений и др.), то есть как отличное, лишь эмпирически связанное с властью явление (Х.Арендт, 1986; М. Крозье, 1973; Р. Фридман, 1990; П. Уинч, 1967; С. Льюкс, 1977).

При этом, при определении понятия «авторитет», несмотря на разницу в понимании его источников, представители обоих подходов выделяют его следующие общие свойства:

- отношения, построенные на авторитете предполагают отказ от суждений со стороны того, над кем авторитет осуществляется;

- объект рассматривает притязания субъекта на авторитет как обоснованные (возрастом, статусом, полом, профессией, персональными характеристиками, официальными документами);

64


- в обоих случаях принимается, что авторитет зависит от ценностей и убеждений тех, кто участвует в авторитетных отношениях.

Первые исследования феномена повинуемости легитимным авторитетам связаны, в первую очередь, с obedience-экспериментами С. Милгрэма (Milgram, 1965).

Термин подчинение (повинуемость) в различных толковых словарях трактуется как зависимость, выполнение приказов, беспрекословное послушание. Негативная интерпретация термина связана с предположением о потере индивидуальности, самоуважения, проявления слабости характера, так как современное общество ценит индивидуализм, самоуважение, силу (Росс, Нисбетт, 1999).

Природа повинуемости по-разному понимается различными авторами. С позиций первого подхода повинуемость рассматривается как социально детерминированный феномен, результат научения. Так, по мнению Ф. Зимбардо, подчинение авторитету является следствием инструментального и викарного научения предписывающим правилам поведения (Ф.Зимбардо, 2000). Роберт Чалдини (Cialdini, 1988) считает, что социальные правила, подобные «подчиняйся властям», могут подчинять себе автоматически, если социальное окружение предоставляет для этого специальные сигналы — дискриминативные стимулы, свидетельствующие о том, что в данной ситуации необходима быстрая реакция, бездумно запускающая в действие готовый сценарий. С.Милграм указывал, что «подчинение может быть глубоко укоренившейся наклонностью, побуждением, превосходящим по силе этическое воспитание, сострадание и нормы социального поведения» (Milgram, 1963, р. 371). С точки зрения Р. Брауна «для того чтобы разбить сухую корку привычки к подчинению, необходимо специальное обучение, подобно урокам по технике противопожарной безопасности» (Brown, 1986, с. 35). Некоторые исследователи склонны видеть истоки повинуемости в условиях раннего воспитания. Т. Адорно отмечал, что родительский авторитет устраняется для того, чтобы его место занял другой авторитет (Адорно, 2001). По А. Адлеру, склонность взрослых к подчинению основывается на их послушании в детстве (Адлер, 1997). К. Хорни рассматривает покорность как стремление переложить ответственность на других, получить от них защиту и заботу (Хорни, 1993). Г. Олпорт считает авторитарное подчинение одним из видов конформизма, в основе которого - потребность равняться на сильную, авторитетную фигуру и искать опору внутри группы (Олпорт, 1998). Представители этого направления как фактор добровольного подчинения рассматривают принятие индивидом идеологии,

65


совокупности убеждений и установок, легализующих власть полномочного человека и оправдывающих исполнение его приказов.

Представители второго подхода считают повинуемость врожденной или приобретенной личностной характеристикой (например, потребностью). С.Московичи считает, что потребность иметь над собой авторитет обусловлена стихийным стремлением масс к деспотизму. Внешнее подчинение уступает место внутреннему. Видимое господство подменяется духовным, незримым, от которого невозможно защититься (Московичи, 1996). Повинуемость как врожденная потребность признается и Х. Ортегой-и-Гассетом? По его словам поиск авторитета становится не только психологической потребностью, но и признаком определенного статуса в социальной иерархии, а человек самой природой своей призван искать высший авторитет (Ортега-и-Гассет, 1997). Интересным кажется взгляд на повинуемость, как неспособность управлять собой и влиять на других. Ницше указывал, что должен подчиняться тот, кто не может себе приказывать (Ницше, 1993), Олпорт усматривал в конформизме проекцию собственных враждебных побуждений личности (Олпорт, 1998).

Рассматривая роль повинуемости в жизни человека и общества, исследователи подчеркивают ее приспособительную (адаптивную), компенсаторную функции. Так по Ф. Ницше, есть люди, которые вне подчинения не представляют собой никакой ценности (Ницше, 1993). К. Хорни отмечает, что подчиненная позиция становится средством получения любви (Хорни, 1993). Г. Лебон говорит о возможности найти счастье в обожания и подчинении идолу, в готовности жертвовать своей жизнью ради него (Лебон, 1995). Т. Адорно подчеркивает значение послушания и подчинения для процесса социального приспособления (Адорно, 2001). По А. Адлеру, подчинение помогает удовлетворить свои желания (Адлер, 1997). Э. Фромм рассматривает подчинение как источник скрытого удовольствия и иллюзии самостоятельности (Фромм, 1989). С. Московичи считает, что, следуя за лидером, толпа укрепляет уважение к себе, свое социальное "Я" (Московичи, 1996). В следовании за пророком К. Юнг усматривает такую выгоду, как переложение на него своей ответственности (Юнг, 1994). Привлекательность мазохизма, по Э. Фромму, заключается в освобождении от принятия решения, от ответственности за свою судьбу (Фромм, 1992). А. Кепински отмечает, что тот, кто подвластен, принимает схему, навязанную ему сверху, и становится ее слепым исполнителем, благодаря этому он приобретает чувство порядка, которого сам произвести не смог. Ценой потери свободы повинующийся избегает усилия, связанного с внутренним упорядочением (Kępiński, 1972). По мнению Б. Беттельхейма, для

66


большинства людей, когда они вынуждены выбирать между понижением человеческого уровня и невыносимым внутренним напряжением, неизбежным будет выбор в пользу первого для сохранения внутреннего покоя (Беттельхейм, 1998).

Однако, несмотря на то, что подчинение имеет свои положительные стороны, позволяя удерживать порядок в обществе, избегать наказаний, подчинение авторитету может быть избыточным, что и продемонстрировала серия социально-психологических исследований, проведенных в разное время зарубежными психологами (Cohen & Davis; Hofling et al.; М. Шериф; С. Аш; С.Милгрэм; D.Mantell; Ф. Зимбардо; А. Поскоцил; J. Burger; Wolfson; L. Bègue, J.Beauvois, D.Courbet, D. Oberlé, J. Lepage, A. Duke). Как было показано в исследовании А. Поскоцила, ситуация обучения построена таким образом, что преподаватель влияет или должен влиять на поведение ученика, тот, в свою очередь, занимает подчиненную позицию, предписываемую ему его ролью. Изучая повинуемость студентов американских колледжей и университетов, А. Поскоцил (Poskocil, 1977) доказал, что, в традиционной модели обучения нарушение ролевого поведения участников взаимодействия может привести к снижению качества восприятия и понимания информации. Исследователь получил данные, подтверждающие выводы С. Милграма о том, что люди являются намного более послушными, чем полагают, ему также удалось доказать, что образовательное учреждение - это уникальное место, тесно связанное с повиновением, где в значительной степени формируется послушный гражданин.

Проведенный нами теоретический анализ, посвященный изучению феномена повинуемости, показал, что:

- обнаруживается ряд противоречий в понимании и трактовке феномена повинуемости легитимным авторитетам, объяснении его природы и функций;

- существует дефицит эмпирической информации о роли личностных особенностей в формировании повинуемого поведения;

- чаще всего авторы научных публикаций оперируют результатами, полученными американскими исследователями (Милграм; Зимбардо; Аш; Шериф и др.). При этом известно, что этно и социо-культурные особенности могут существенно влиять на степень подчинения авторитету. До настоящего времени в литературе практически отсутствуют сведения об особенностях повинуемости российских респондентов.

Таким образом, актуальность проблемы исследования была обусловлена несколькими факторами:

67


- важностью социально-психологических исследований системы взаимоотношений, складывающихся между учителем и учениками и обуславливающими качество процессов обучения и воспитания;

- необходимостью расширения научных представлений о феномене повинуемости авторитету учителя и определения ее границ;

- отсутствием отечественных исследований, посвященных изучению повинуемости в контексте образовательной среды.

Для решения этих задач нами была проведена серия экспериментальных исследований (2009-2010, 2014 г.), частично повторяющих эксперимент А. Поскоцила (Поскоцил, 1977).

Целью исследования было расширение представлений о специфике и границах подчинения легитимным авторитетам в ситуации вузовского обучения, выявление степени влияния личностных характеристик и ситуативных переменных на проявления повинуемости студентами. Мы хотели проверить, в какой степени студенты готовы подчиниться авторитету преподавателя, предлагающего им выполнить абсурдный экзаменационный тест, и является ли сам факт принятие предписанной роли «ученика» необходимым и достаточным условием для подчинения.

В основу исследования лег эксперимент А. Поскоцила (1977). В качестве методов исследования использовались: общенаучный метод теоретического анализа литературы, эмпирические методы: наблюдение, тестирование (16-факторный опросник Кэттелла, метод субъективного шкалирования (самооценочный тест Дембо-Рубинштейн), анкетирование, позволяющее выявить уровень притязаний в учебной деятельности, естественный эксперимент, постэкспериментальное интервью. Для анализа полученных данных были использованы методы математико-статистической обработки данных (t-критерий Стьюдента, корреляционный анализ Спирмена).

Эксперимент был спланирован следующим образом. В начале учебного семестра студенты (участники исследования) были предупреждены о том, что в конце курса «Психология» им предстоит написать контрольный тест, который повлияет на итоговую оценку по дисциплине, они получили и примерный перечень тестовых заданий, которые, по заверению педагога, должны были войти в тестовый контроль знаний. За неделю до экспериментальной процедуры студентам еще раз было сделано напоминание о предстоящем тестировании с указанием на необходимость проработки тестовых заданий. В день контрольного испытания студенты получали абсолютно не соответствующий содержанию тестовых заданий «абсурдный» тест, все вопросы теста не имели правильного ответа и не были связаны с содержанием изучаемой дисциплины (например, «Одной из тем лекций было:

68


счастливая лягушка; судебное расследование результатов футбольного матча; точное измерение в молях; правильные русские»), заключительный вопрос теста был на иностранном (английском) языке. Во всех сериях студенты находились под постоянным присмотром преподавателя, задачей которого было регулировать процесс тестирования, отвечать на появляющиеся вопросы. При нежелании отвечать на вопросы теста студентам предлагалось сдать контрольный материал в форме традиционной беседы с преподавателем.

В экспериментальных сериях 2009-2010 года для проверки гипотезы о роли фигуры самого преподавателя и степени нормативного влияния группы на поведение студентов мы оперировали переменными «знакомый преподаватель/ неизвестное лицо, представляющее преподавателя», «тестирование в группе/ индивидуальное тестирование», кроме того, мы изучили роль личностных факторов в починенном поведении студентов.1

В 2014 году исследованием было охвачено 214 студентов (133 девушки, 61 юноша, возраст 18-20 лет, студенты 1 и 2 курсов) и 39 учителей (5 мужчин, 34 женщины, возраст- 30-70 лет).

В этих экспериментальных сериях мы исследовали, каким образом степень принятия роли ученика влияет на подчинение авторитету педагога, и проявляется ли «либеративный (освобождающий) эффект» в ситуации абсурдного тестирования.

Анализ и обсуждение результатовВ первой экспериментальной серии мы сравнили результаты выполнения

теста студентами и учителями, проходящими переобучение на курсах повышения квалификации. Мы предположили, что процент учителей, выполнивших тест до конца будет ниже, чем у студентов. Что можно объяснить «глубиной» принятия роли «ученика». Из 219 человек (180 студентов и 39 учителей), принявших участие в первой серии исследования, только 1 студент отказался выполнять тест. Интересно, что сам по себе отказ был скрытым, студент сдал незаполненный вариант теста, внешне никак не декларируя свое нежелание выполнять работу. 10 % студентов не ответили на 1-2 вопроса (это вопрос на английском языке, и вопрос, в котором требовалось написать 5 слов-терминов, состоящих из 5 букв, которые отвечающий может написать без ошибок), 89 % студентов сделали тест полностью. Отметим, что эти результаты отражают устойчивую

1 См. результаты эксперимента 2009-2010 г. в работе: Ершова Р.В. «Повинуемость» как социально-психологический феномен образовательной среды// Человеческий капитал. 2013 - №9, с.44-50

69


поведенческую закономерность. В нашем эксперименте 2009-2010 года 99% студентов выполнили абсурдный тест до конца, А. Поскоцил (1977) получил 95%, а Д. Ёзинс (2009) - около 93,5% полного выполнения теста. Результаты выполнения теста учителями существенно отличаются от студенческих: пятая часть учителей (20%) поставили под сомнение содержание теста (т.е. авторитет преподавателя), оставив без ответа 3-6 вопросов, причем многие из них вариантов ответов написали: «правильного ответа нет» (протестный ответ), 51% педагогов не выполнили 2 задания и лишь 28% учителей сделали весь тест до конца.

Полученные результаты ставят перед исследователем сразу несколько вопросов, требующих разрешения:

1. Каковы причины столь высокой степени повинуемости студентов алогичной власти педагога?

2. Каковы практические следствия обнаруженного как неотъемлемая часть процесса обучения феномена повинуемости?

Милграм, объясняя феномен повинуемости авторитету, в центр процесса ставил особое состояние субъекта, которое он называл «состоянием агента». «Состояние агента» предполагает полный отказ от собственной оценки ситуации и некритичное принятие мнения авторитетного лица, что позволяет неукоснительно выполнять его указания. Э. Эрдос (Erdos, 2013), рассматривая процесс формирования «состояния агента» (подчинения) в эксперименте Милгрэма выделяет две его фазы: фазу убеждения (которая длится до удара в 150-195 вольт, после чего испытуемый принимает решение: продолжать участие в эксперименте или отказаться от него) и послекаптуляционную фазу. Несмотря на тот факт, что обнаруженная повинуемость студентов, выполняющих абсурдный тест преподавателя, с точки зрения Поскоцила, не имеет ничего общего с повинуемостью абсурдным требованиям Гитлера, мы, вслед за Э.Эрдосом, считаем возможным выделить две фазы формирования повинующегося поведения «учеников»: фазу сомнения и протеста (ФСП), фазу принятия и повиновения (ФПП). Первая фаза сопровождается вопросами к преподавателю, которые в нашем эксперименте рассматриваются как проявления неповиновения. Все вопросы, задаваемые преподавателю в процессе тестирования, носили уточняющий или протестный характер. Причем, как показало наше наблюдение за поведением участников эксперимента, первоначально задаются уточняющие вопросы, направленные на прояснение ситуации, поиск ответа на вопрос (абсурдный по своей сути). Наиболее распространенные вопросы на этом этапе: «Что делать, если правильного ответа нет?», «Может ли быть несколько вариантов ответа?», «Что делать, если в школе изучали не английский язык?» Вслед за

70


уточняющими, появляются вопросы выраженного протестного характера (их, как правило, задают 1-3 человека из группы): «Что будет в случае отказа от выполнения теста?», «Действительно ли этот тест проверяет знания по предмету?», «Что будет, если тест будет сделан неверно?» Кроме вопросов, некоторые участники эксперимента на этом этапе пробовали поставить под сомнение авторитет преподавателя, опираясь на записи в тетрадях. В соответствии с условиями эксперимента, отвечая на вопросы и реплики студентов, преподаватель указывал на возможность сдать зачет/экзамен в традиционной форме устного ответа. Как правило, подобный ответ действовал на аудиторию отрезвляюще, количество вопросов сокращалось до минимума, группа не поддерживала «смельчаков-бунтарей», стремление «сдать» оказывалось сильнее стремления отстоять свой статус, самооценку. Вопросы практически прекращались, наступала вторая фаза процесса – фаза полного принятия роли и повиновения. 50% студентов и 53% учителей, принявших участие в исследовании, указали, что задавали вопросы в процессе тестирования (отметим,что большая часть вопросов испытуемых была обращена друг к другу, а не к преподавателю, озвучить вопрос решилось всего 36 студентов (17%) и 8 (20,5%) учителей.

Сам С. Милгрэм, объясняя невероятные для него самого результаты своего эксперимента, предполагал, что настолько огромное влияние социальных факторов должно быть связано с "роковой ошибкой природы в нас" (Milgram, 1974, р. 188). Reicher, Haslam, and Smith (2012) считают высокую степень повинуемости не проявлением простой покорности, а высокой степенью идентификации с экспериментатором и его научной миссией. Burger (2009) видит причину в согласованности потребностей и процессов самовосприятия личности и постепенностью процесса вовлечения в ситуацию подчинения. По мнению Модильяни и Роша, переход участника в фазу повиновения объясняется желанием избежать неприятной ситуации, снять испытываемую напряженность (Modigliani, Rochat, 1995). Russell and Gregory (2011) в качестве главной причины повинуемости называют безнаказанность неэтичного поведения. Э. Эрдос (2013) говорит о том, что представление об ударе, который может быть нанесен в случае неповиновения по ответственности и чувству вины участника в сочетании с быстрым и постепенным вовлечением являются главными факторами повиновения в «сильных» ситуациях.

На наш взгляд, полученные результаты подтверждают базовые положения когнитивистской теории (Осгуд, Келли, Фестингер и др.) о том, что принятие решения происходит в соответствии с некоторыми социальными категориальными стереотипами — генерализованными схемами,

71


обобщенными «сценариями» — как хорошо заученные роли. Безусловно, сама ситуация обучения несет в себе характеристики, заставляющие ее участников принимать определенные роли: преподавателей - демонстрировать безграничную власть, студентов - не менее безграничное подчинение (это так называемые субъект-объектные отношения, которые реализуются при традиционном обучении).

О высокой степени идентификации с ролью, предписанной участнику ситуацией, в постэкспериментальном интервью признались 65% учителей и 71% студентов (75% американских студентов в исследовании Ёзинс, 2010), они отметили, что им было сложно отказаться от теста. Причем студенты объяснили свое согласие желанием получить побольше баллов (58% респондентов), боязнью навлечь на себя гнев преподавателя (27%), нежеланием стать «белой вороной» (12%). Показательными на этом фоне являются ответы принимавших участие в эксперименте учителей: не захотели навлечь на себя гнев преподавателя 15%, 24 % рассчитывали на получение дополнительных баллов и 61% респондентов признались, что боялись оказаться «белыми воронами», то есть проявили высокую конформность. 90% студентов и 87,1% учителей заявили, что тест они выполнили бы в любом случае. При этом отметим, что ситуация абсурдного тестирования фактически ввергла учителей, участвовавших в исследовании, в ролевой конфликт: «Учитель» vs «Ученик». С нашей точки зрения, именно неполное принятие несвойственной педагогам роли «Ученика» объясняет такое количество «протестно» сделанных тестов.

Обнаруженное различие одновременно иллюстрируют и следующий вывод: тезис о постепенности вовлечения личности, постепенном усвоении модели повинуемого поведения, он может рассматриваться как объяснительный в контексте социализации личности. В своих работах С. Милграм (2001) и Р. Браун (1986) говорят о той роли, которую играет научение предписывающим правилам поведения в современном обществе. Одно из правил, которое люди узнают очень рано – «начальник всегда прав», законная власть требует беспрекословного подчинения. Антропологу Жюлю Анри (Henry, 1963), изучавшему американские школы, наблюдая за всем, что в них происходит, удалось обнаружить практически безграничный контроль учителей за поведением учеников, охватывающий даже такие мелочи, как посещение туалета и заточку карандашей. Аспирантка Анри рассказала, что когда она однажды пришла в пятый класс, где должна была вести наблюдение, учитель сказал: «Кто из вас хороший, вежливый ребенок, который хочет помочь нашей гостье снять и повесить пальто?» В ответ появилось море поднятых рук, как будто все желали этой чести. Ж. Анри

72


утверждает, что дети не имеют иного выбора, поскольку отказ на просьбу учителя может быть истолкован им только как предательство. Его выводы поддерживают практически все известные критики образования (Friedenberg, 1963; Holt, 1964; Postman and Weingartner, 1969; Silberman, 1970). При неформальном обсуждении результатов нашего эксперимента учителя говорили: «Разве мы могли отказаться от теста!?» А два варианта ответа на вопрос: «Почему вы выполнили тест?» («По привычке» (его дал учитель), «Чтобы уважить учителя» (ответ студента)), на наш взгляд, максимально точно иллюстрируют второй тезис. Аналогичные высказывания были получены и Артом Поскоцилом: «…в ряде случаев студенты говорили мне, что они должны были бы быть сумасшедшими, чтобы не выполнить моего абсурдного задания, поскольку уже сдавали много итоговых тестов, которые были не менее абсурдны, но при этом оценивали их уровень знаний» (Поскоцил, 1977).

Частично, объяснить экстремальный процент повиновения, вслед за Модильяни и Роша (1995), можно тем, что в действительности участники воспринимали ситуацию тестирования как проблемную, но необходимую и стремились поскорее ее преодолеть, сняв чрезмерное напряжение («абсурдные вопросы вгоняли меня в тупик», «то, что было в заданиях, мы никогда не проходили», «я чувствовал абсурдность, нелогичность, неловкость», «вопрос на английском языке был непонятен»: 46% студентов и 46% учителей признались, что чувствовали растерянность, 31% и 41% учителей указали но то, что почувствовали себя глупцами (описанный Ф.Зимбардо эффект снижения самооценки при столкновении с авторитетом), дискомфорт ощущали 29% студентов и 17% учителей.

Ф. Зимбардо (2000) связывал причину подобного поведения с тем, что в стрессовой ситуации (а абсурдное тестирование, отчасти, относится к таковой) человек испытывает беспокойство и теряет способность мыслить рационально. В то же время растет стремление как можно скорее покончить с неприятной ситуацией, а это можно сделать, лишь завершив тестирование. Большую роль в этом процессе играют два вида социального влияния: нормативное и информационное. Нормативность подразумевает внешнее принятие превалирующего в группе стандарта. Информационное влияние предполагает, что, оказавшись в трудной ситуации, не будучи уверенными, в том, что именно следует сейчас делать, субъект предпочитает следовать примеру окружающих и положиться на то, что человек, знающий больше (например, преподаватель), подскажет верный путь.

Именно нормативное и информационное влияние во многом определяет две фазы, обнаруженные нами в процессе тестирования (принятия модели

73


повинующегося поведения). Первая фаза сомнения и протеста во всех группах протекала достаточно оживленно и сопровождалась большим количеством вопросов, содержание которых свидетельствует о попытках участников уточнить «границы» нормативности ситуации, прояснить, какие последствия вызовет отказ от выполнения задания. Переход ко второй фазе – принятия и повиновения был связан с ответом преподавателя, объясняющего, что в случае отказа от написания теста, контрольный материал придется сдать в другой форме (утверждающего неизменность нормы: учитель дает задание, ученик его выполняет и получает за него оценку). В постэкспериментальном интервью 6,7% студентов и 2,6% учителей отметили, что не стали бы делать тест, если бы задание было не обязательным. Решающим фактором перехода ко второй фазе поведения, с нашей точки зрения, являлось информационное влияние группы: участниками принималась характерная для большинства модель поведения. 11% студентов и 10,3% учителей (35% в американском исследовании Ёзинс) признались, что отказались бы от выполнения теста, если бы это сделали и другие. Содержание ответов участников навело нас на мысль о проведении второй экспериментальной серии с «фальшивыми» учениками, выступившими в роли помощников экспериментатора, их задачей было публично аргументированно отказаться от абсурдного тестирования. Проявится ли в данной ситуации либеративный эффект (освобождающее влияние группы)?

В первой группе (общее число «наивных» испытуемых 18 человек, в роли помощников экспериментатора выступило 2 студента, которые с интервалом в 1 минуту отказались отвечать на вопросы теста) ни один из остальных членов группы не последовал за протестующими, оставшиеся 18 человек сделали тест до конца.

Во второй группе в качестве «фальшивых учеников» было задействовано 5 человек, количество «наивных» испытуемых составило 15 человек. На этот раз 2 «наивных» участника присоединились к «фальшивым протестующим» и отказались выполнить тест, согласившись сдать задание в традиционной форме.

Сравнение результатов постэкспериментального интервью участников двух исследовательских серий (табл.1) показало, что отсутствие единой групповой нормы поведения, наличие протестующей группы, скорее усложняет, чем упрощает процесс принятия решения. Участники второй экспериментальной серии ощущали большую растерянность и дискомфорт, отчетливее понимали абсурдность теста. Во второй экспериментальной серии студенты, выполнившие тест чаще объясняли свое поведение желанием получить больше баллов (как если бы наличие группы «несогласных»

74


заставило остальных участников активнее искать благовидное, соответствующее традиционным нормам оправдание своей повинуемости). Самым интересным результатом является то, что именно студенты в группе, где были отказавшиеся участники, чаще утверждали, что не стали бы выполнять тест, если бы то же самое сделали и другие. Очевидно, что наличие оппозиции, составляющей третью часть от численности группы, с одной стороны, не смогло поднять массовую протестную волну, с другой, выступило своеобразной лакмусовой бумажкой, позволяющей отчетливее осознать возможные последствия неповиновения, найти четкие (и что очень важно более гомогенные на уровне группы) оправдания собственному выбору в пользу повинуемости.

Таблица 1. Сравнение результатов постэкспериментального интервью участников 1-ой и 2-ой экспериментальных серий

Серия 2 Серия 1 t-value pЧувствовал растерянность 0,68 0,46 2,29 0,02Чувствовал себя дураком 0,23 0,31 -0,93 0,34Чувствовал дискомфорт 0,70 0,19 6,67 0,00Тест был легкий 0,11 0,05 1,49 0,13Тест был абсурдный 0,82 0,31 6,04 0,00Тест был забавный 0,38 0,26 1,40 0,16В вопросах был подвох 0,66 0,52 1,46 0,14Выполнил тест спокойно 0,35 0,45 -1,09 0,27задавал вопросы 0,58 0,50 0,88 0,37Было сложно отказаться 0,55 0,44 1,25 0,20Было несложно отказаться 0,44 0,51 -0,74 0,45Отказался бы, если бы другие отказались 0,76 0,11 10,12 0,00

Сделал бы тест до конца 0,17 0,41 -2,61 0,00 Хотел получить баллы 0,76 0,58 1,98 0,04Не хотел быть белой вороной 0,17 0,12 0,83 0,40Не хотел навлечь гнев преподавателя 0,11 0,26 -1,89 0,05

В эксперименте 2009-2010 г. мы обнаружили, что личностные факторы играют минимальную роль в подчинении легитимному авторитету преподавателя. Было найдено ограниченное число устойчивых связей повинуемости с характеристиками личности. Лишь 4 черты 16- факторного опросника Кэттелла прокоррелировали с повинуемостью: L (доверчивость-

75


подозрительность) (r=0,27); C (эмоциональная нестабильность-эмоциональная стабильность) (r=-0,21); O (спокойствие - тревожность) (r=0,29); Q1 (консерватизм - радикализм) (r=0,25). Мы предположили, что более низкую степень повинуемости скорее всего будут демонстрировать эмоционально нестабильные, слабо толерантные по отношению к фрустрации (C), недоверчивые, сомневающиеся, осмотрительные в своих действиях (L), беспокойные, тревожные, чувствительные к одобрению окружающих (О), недоверчивые по отношению к авторитетам, критичные, либеральные (Q1) студенты. Результаты нашего исследования 2014 года (когда вслед за 5 «фальшивыми» участниками писать тест отказалось 2 «наивных» испытуемых) позволяют предполагать, что эти личностные характеристики скорее всего могут выступать базовым фактором неповиновения при наличии группы протестующих.

Для сравнения схожести идеальных представлений о степени повинуемости в образовательной среде с реальным поведением «учеников», нами был проведен опрос студентов и преподавателей, которые, ознакомившись с содержанием абсурдного теста, должны были предположить, какой процент студентов выполнит тест до конца, а какой – откажется от выполнения. Мы сравнили полученные результаты с аналогичными данными А. Поскоцила (Табл. 2).

Таблица 2. Прогноз поведения студентов

преподаватели студенты

выполнят до конца

откажутся выполнят до конца

откажутся

данные А.Поскоцила 69% 31% 77% 23%

наши результаты 71% 29% 83% 16%

Использованный для сравнения ответов респондентов t-критерий Стьюдента выявил статистически значимые на уровне p= 0,05 различия в представлениях студентов и преподавателей. Это свидетельствует о том, что преподаватели склонны идеализировать студентов, приближая их образ к модели так называемого «сократического» ученика, активно овладевающего знаниями и задающего множество вопросов, тогда как представление студентов о специфике ситуации обучения более соответствует реальному

76


положению вещей. Этот тезис подтверждается данными Е. С. Новгородовой (2011), согласно им в представлении преподавателей, современные студенты оцениваются как уверенные, коммуникативно компетентные, целеустремленные, готовые к сотрудничеству, порядочные, обладающие гибким умом; по оценкам студентов, преподавателям более всего не хватает коммуникативной компетентности, тактичности, готовности к сотрудничеству, организаторских способностей и самообладания.

По мнению А. Поскоцила, отсутствие у субъектов образовательного процесса единого представления о ситуации обучения и специфике ролей «учителя» и «ученика» может стать причиной коммуникативного барьера и существенно сказаться на результатах обучения. В этой связи студенты в большей мере заинтересованы в четком определении ситуации, поскольку их оценки зависят в некоторой степени от их понимания того, как преподаватель представляет свою собственную и их роль в обучении. Активно интегрируемая в образовательную среду в нашей стране западная стратегия «технологизации образования», реализующаяся в частности через распространение систем «объективного» тестирования уровня знаний ученика (ЕГЭ, ГИА и др.), четко определяет роль современного учителя в нашей стране. Его главная задача заключается в качественной подготовке учеников к разнообразным тестовым срезам. В качестве психологического следствия «современного и смелого прочтения» роли в данном контексте выступает закрепление модели повинуемого поведения. Увлечение тестированием как методом формирования и проверки уровня достижений на разных ступенях образования (а спецификой многих тестов является наличие вариантов ответов, возможность угадать ответ, отсутствие необходимости общаться с преподавателем, отвечать на его спонтанные вопросы) в конечном итоге формирует у ученика устойчивый страх и неуверенность перед непосредственным контактом с учителем, ограничивает личную ответственность за результат обучения развитием навыка работы с разнотипными тестовыми заданиями, трансформирует учебную мотивацию, заменяя стремление к успеху мотивом избегания неудач. «Тест сдать проще, чем ответить устно» - признались все опрошенные студенты. Как следствие мы имеем: снижение исследовательской активности (реактивность) учащихся, интеллектуальную пассивность, конвергентное мышление, сужение кругозора, неустойчивость, бессистемность знаний, снижение навыков логического рассуждения, анализа, ведения диалога и дискуссии.

Выводы

77


Проведенное исследование, посвященное выявлению роли ситуационных и личностных детерминант повинуемого поведения в ситуации обучения позволило сделать следующие выводы:

1. Процесс формирования повинующегося поведения включает две последовательные фазы: фазу сомнения и протеста и сменяющую ее фазу принятия и повиновения.

2. Поведение перешедшего в фазу принятия и повиновения «ученика» характеризуется снижением самооценки, интеллектуальной пассивностью и смирением.

3. Решающее влияние на феномен повинуемости оказывает фактор ситуации, который требует от индивида неуклонного выполнения возложенной на него роли, даже если эта роль связана с абсурдными действиями. Ведущими характеристиками ситуации, определяющими подчиненное поведение студентов, являются:

− Восприятие ситуации как проблемной, но необходимой в процессе обучения;− восприятие фигуры преподавателя, как легитимного авторитета, со всеми атрибутами его неподдельности;− наличие нормативного и информативного влияния со стороны преподавателя и членов группы. 4. Фактором, способствующим формированию модели повинуемости в

образовательной среде, является постепенное (в процессе социализации, научения правилам поведения в предписанной роли) вовлечение «ученика» в ситуацию, приводящее к закреплению «состояния агента».

5. Наличие в группе отказавшихся (оппозиционных) участников может выступать стресс-фактором, провоцирующим неповиновение у меньшинства и усиливающим про-групповое, конформное поведение большинства членов группы.

6. Степень влияния личностных особенностей на подчиненное поведение весьма невелика, только такие характеристики личности как эмоциональная нестабильность; осмотрительность и недоверчивость; тревожность и чувствительность к одобрению окружающих; недоверчивость по отношению к авторитетам, критичность, либеральность могут рассматриваться как черты, снижающие повинуемость ученика легитимному авторитету учителя. Именно личностные особенности могут стать решающим фактором отказа от тестирования в ситуации наличия в группе неповинующихся участников.

7. Чрезмерная повинуемость в учебной среде выступает фактором, снижающим качество образования, через трансформацию учебной

78


мотивации, снижение исследовательской активности, навыков логического рассуждения, анализа, ведения диалога и дискуссии, личной ответственности учащегося за результаты обучения, развитие интеллектуальной пассивности и конвергентного мышления, сужение кругозора, что приводит к неустойчивости, бессистемности знаний.

Успешно сформированная, прошедшая через огонь, воду и медные трубы социализационных процессов, модель повинуемого поведения некритично используется и проявляется во многих контекстах современной жизни не только российского, но и американского, и европейского общества: от образования до производства и политики.

Социальная пассивность и повинуемость общества с одной стороны является выгодной для политиков, выступая мощной гарантией защищенности от революционных взрывов и потрясений, с другой - может стать опасной для человечества: безграничная власть – грозное оружие в руках безнравственного, амбициозного лидера.

Литература/ References

Адлер А. Понять природу человека. СПб.: Академический проект, 1997.Адлер А. Практика и теория индивидуальной психологии. М.: Фонд «За

экономическую грамотность», 1995.Адорно Т. Исследование авторитарной личности. М.: Серебряная нить, 2001.Беттельхейм Б. Люди в концлагере // Психология господства и подчинения. Мн.:

Харвест, 1998. С. 157 - 281.Воронов А.Я. Повинуемость: эксперимент и жизнь // Учительская газета, 1995. 14

февр. С. 13.Д. Д. Ёзинс (Duygu Deniz Özince) Повторение исследования Артура Поскоцила

«аудитория колледжа как среда обучения» //http:// psyjournals.ru/ files/34648/ exp_collection_Ozince.pdf

Зимбардо Ф., Ляйппе М. Социальное влияние. СПб.: Питер, 2000.Лебон Г. Психология народов и масс. СПб.: Питер, 1995.Милграм С. Эксперимент в социальной психологии. СПб.: Питер, 2001.Московичи С. Век толп. Исторический трактат по психологии масс. М., 1996.Ницше Ф. Так говорил Заратустра. Киев: Основы, 1993. Новгородова Е.С. Особенности взаимного восприятия преподавателей и студентов

(на примере вуза): Выпускная квалификационная работа. – Коломна: МГОСГИ, 2014Олпорт Г. В. Личность в психологии. М.: КСП +; СПб.: Ювента, 1998.Ортега-и-Гассет Х. Восстание масс // Избр. труды. М.: Весь Мир, 1997. Росс Л., Нисбетт Р. Человек и ситуация. Перспективы социальной психологии. М.:

Аспект Пресс, 1999. Фельдштейн Д.И. Взаимосвязь теории и практики в формировании психолого-

педагогических оснований организации современного образования //Вестник практической психологии образования. 2010. №4(25). С.9-16.

79


Фромм Э. Бегство от свободы. М.: Прогресс, 1989.Фромм Э. Душа человека. М.: Республика, 1992. Хорни К. Невротическая личность нашего времени. М.: Прогресс, 1993.Юнг К. Г. Отношения между Я и бессознательным // Собр. соч. Психология

бессознательного. М.: Канон, 1994. Arendt H. Communicative Power // Power / ed. by Steven Lukes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

P. 59–74.Asch S.E. Opinions and social pressure// Scientific American. 1955, Vol.193., Р.31-35. Bierstedt R. An Analysis of Social Power // American Sociological Review. 1950. Vol. 15.

№ 6. P. 730–738.Brown R. Social Psychology: The Second Edition. New York: Free Press,1986, P.35.Burger, J. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American

Psychologist, 64, 1– 11.Cialdini, R. B. Influence: Science and practice. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 1988, Р.198Connolly W.E. The Terms of Political Discourse. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.Crozier M. The Problem of Power // Social Research. 1973. Vol. 40. № 2. P. 211–228.Easton D. The Perception of Authority and Political Change // Authority. Nomos 1. / ed. by

Carl J. Friedrich. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1958. P. 170–196.Erdos, E. The Milgram Trap, Theoretical & Applied Ethics, Vol 2, #2, 2013, pp.123-142.Freire P. Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Herder & Herder, 1971.Friedenberg E. Z. Coming of age in America. New York: Random House, 1963.Friedman R. On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy // Authority / ed. by

Joseph Raz. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. P. 56–91.Henry J. Culture against man. New York: Random House, 1963.Hofling C.K. et al. An Experimental Study of Nurse-Physician Relationships// Journal of

Nervous and Mental Disease. 1966. № 141. Р. 171-180.Holt J. How children fail. New York: Pitman, 1964.Kępiński A. Rytm życia. Kraków: Wyd-wo Literackie, 1972.Lukes S. Essays in Social Theory. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977.Milgram S. Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority// Human Relations

, 1965. № 18. Р. 57-76, Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row.Milgram, Stanley Behavioral Study of Obedience // Journal of Abnormal and Social

Psychology. 1963. № 67. P. 376.Modigliani, A., Rochat F., The Role of Interaction Sequences and the Timing of Resistance

in Shaping Obedience and Defiance of Authority, Journal of Social Issues, 51. No. 3, 1995, 107-123.

Poskocil, A. (1977). The college classroom as a learning environment. Teaching Sociology, 4(4), 283– 296.

Postman N., Weingartner C. Teaching as a subversive activity. New York: Delacorte, 1969Reicher, S. D., Haslam, S. A., & Smith, J. R. (2012). Working toward the experimenter.Russell B. Education and the good life. New York: Liveright, 1926Russell, N. J. C., & Gregory, R. J. (2011). Spinning an organizational “web of obligation”?

Moral choice in Stanley Milgram’s “Obedience to Authority experiments. The American Review of Public Administration, 41(5), 495–518. doi: 10.1177/0275074010384129

80


Sherif M. The Psychology of social norms. NY: Harper and Brothers, 1936. Silberman C. Crisis in the classroom. New York: Random House, 1970Weber M. Power, Domination, and Legitimacy // Power in Modern Societies. Oxford:

Westivew Press, 1993. P. 37–47.Winch P. Authority // Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. P. 97–

111.Wrong D.H. Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses. With a New Preface. Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1988.Р.35

81

P. Hollander. Revisiting the Banality of Evil: Contemporary Political Violence and the Milgram Experi -ments. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

1REVISITING THE BANALITY OF EVIL: CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE MILGRAM EXPERIMENTS

: НОВЫЙВЗГЛЯДНАБАНАЛЬНОСТЬ ЗЛА ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИМОТИВИРОВАННОЕНАСИЛИЕИЭКСПЕРИМЕНТЫ

МИЛГРЭМА

Paul HollanderThe University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, [email protected]

Paul Hollander was born in Budapest, Hungary. He left Hungary after the 1956 Revolution. Received B.A. in Sociology at the London School of Economics (1959) and Ph.D. at Princeton University (1963). Taught at Harvard (1963 – 1968); at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (1968 – 2000).He is the author or editor of 15 books. His major areas of interest: communist political systems, totalitarianism, political violence, the political attitude of Western intellectuals and the

sociology of literature.Пол Холландер родился в Будапеште (Венгрия). Покинул Венгрию после Революции 1956 года. Получил степень бакалавра по социологии в лондонской школе экономики (1959) и доктора философии в Принстонском университете (1963). Преподавал в Гарварде (1963-1968) и Массачусетском университете в Амхерсте (1968-2000). Он - автор или редактор 15 книг. Научные интересы: коммунистические политические системы, тоталитаризм, политическое насилие, политические позиции Западных интеллектуалов и социология литературы.

Key words: political violence, ideology, mass murder, Nazism, Communism, Soviet Union, utopianism, collectivism, ends and means.Ключевые слова: политическое насилие, идеология, массовое убийство, нацизм, коммунизм, Советский Союз, утопизм, коллективизм, цели и средства.

AbstractStanley Milgram’s obedience experiments have been among the most influential and

controversial studies in social psychology in recent times. They were also highly original, theoretically significant and relevant to some of the major political and social-historical experiences and preoccupations of the 20th century. His findings were often linked to the influential (and similarly controversial) ideas of Hannah Arendt, notably to her concept of the "banality of evil." Milgram’s experiments seemed to provide empirical support for her highly speculative propositions inspired by the case of Adolf Eichmann and especially his trial. These experiments were sometimes called "the Eichmann experiment." Milgram

82


himself wrote that "after witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the authority in our experiments, I must conclude that Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine." (Obedience to Authority, New York, 1974, p. 6).

Milgram’s findings were both unexpected and startling: the experiments showed that ordinary human beings were capable and willing to inflict a great deal of pain on other human beings for no other reason than being ordered to do so by an authority figure. The implication of these findings seemed obvious and far reaching: virtually anybody could become a mass murderer, or his accomplice, without any ideological or political motive or belief, and without being a sadist. Belonging to a bureaucratic organization and readiness to obey one’s superiors appeared to be sufficient conditions for performing inhumane actions, including participation in mass murder.

My presentation will focus on the affinity between the obedience experiments and the broader conclusions drawn from them, with special reference to the concept of the "banality of evil." I will also discuss why Milgram’s findings resonated with the educated public, why they were also subject to criticism, and why they have remained of great public and social scientific interest.

The major thrust of the paper will be the attempt to assess the contribution these experiments have made to a better understanding of political violence, and especially mass murder, and the light they shed on such violence when carried out by different types of political systems and movements.

Special attention will be given to communist systems, and the role of the ideals these systems sought to realize through the use of political violence.

The presentation will also include the problematic aspects of these experiments, and the questionable conclusions drawn from them.

In the first place, the experiments do not help to differentiate between a) various types of political violence, and b) between individuals who devise, design and legitimate them on the one hand, and

those who execute them, on the other.Secondly, the experiments lend themselves to a morally relativistic interpretation of

political violence by endorsing the idea of the "banality of evil." Arguably, the latter discourages moral judgment and attempts to assign responsibility for devising, committing or legitimating moral outrages and atrocities inspired by political agendas and objectives.

Third, the experiments de-emphasize a) the importance of ideology, of strongly held beliefs and the often associated

political passions which played a crucial part in the major campaigns of political violence of the 20th century;

b) by implication they also divert attention from social and personal pathologies which play a part in political violence, and

c) they do not address the possibility that several different motives are likely to combine, or converge in the genesis of political violence.

83


That is to say, obedience to authority is compatible with enthusiastic support for the objectives of the power-holders, of the authorities; it may also be with compatible with the pleasure derived from the infliction of pain.

Fourth, the experiments and their prevalent interpretations have focused on the Holocaust and overlooked political violence of other types, especially those associated with communist systems and movements. While there are many references in Milgram’s study to Nazi political violence, and a few to atrocities committed by the U.S. military forces in Vietnam, not a single reference is made to the vast amount of political violence perpetrated by various communist systems. Also noteworthy, that, far as I know, no attempts have been made to apply Milgram’s ideas to the analysis of political violence committed by communist systems. Only theories of totalitarianism addressed this issue but without the psychological approaches and considerations pioneered by Milgram.

In light of the points made above there is much room for a reconsideration of the obedience experiments and their relevance to different types of political violence.

АннотацияЭксперименты Стенли Милгрэма, направленные на исследование

деструктивной повинуемости легитимным авторитетам, считаются в современной социальной психологии одними из наиболее резонансных и противоречивых. Помимо очевидной оригинальности и теоретической значимости, исследования Милгрэма позволили обратить внимание научного сообщества на ряд ключевых политических и социально-исторических процессов XX века. Исследователи часто проводят параллели между шокирующими выводами Милрэма и, в значительной степени, столь же неоднозначными идеями влиятельного немецко-американского философа Ханны Ардент, особенно в части, касающейся концепции "Банальности зла". Представляется, что эксперименты Милгрэма являются эпирическим подтверждением теоретических концепций, предложенных Х. Ардент под впечатлением дела Адольфа Эйхмана и в значительной степени самого судебного процесса. Этот эксперимент поэтому иногда называют "экспериментом Эйхмана." Сам Милгрэм позднее писал, что "наблюдая, как сотни обычных людей, участвовавших в нашем эксперименте, повинуются авторитету, я вынужден заключить, что Банальность зла гораздо ближе к истине, чем мы могли себе представить." (Повинуемость авторитету, Нью-Йорк, 1974, стр. 6).

Полученные Милгрэмом результаты в равной степени неожиданны и поразительны: его исследования показали, что обычные люди не только способны, по приказу человека, наделённого авторитетом, причинить сильную боль другому человеку, но и охотно это делают. Смысл этих открытий казался очевидным и имеющим далеко идущие последствия: практически любой человек может стать массовым убийцей или его пособником, не будучи при этом садистом и не руководствуясь какими-либо политическими или идеологическими мотивами. Принадлежность к бюрократической организации и готовность повиноваться

84


руководителю являются, как оказалось, достаточным основанием для выполнения бесчеловечных приказов, включая участие в массовых убийствах.

В статье я сконцентрирован на сходстве результатов obedience-экспериментов и более широких выводов из них, уделяя при этом повышенное внимание концепции "Банальность зла". Я также пытаюсь рассуждать о том, почему открытия Милгрэма наши отклик в среде образованных людей, и почему, несмотря на значительный интерес со стороны общества и социальных наук, его исследования стали объектом серьёзной критики.

Основной акцент сделан на оценке вклада экспериментов Милгрэма в исследование природы политического насилия, и, в частности, фактов массовых убийств. Эксперименты Милгрэма позволяют пролить свет на суть такого насилия, применяемого различными политическими режимами и движениями.

Особое внимание будет уделено коммунистическим режимам и роли тех идей, которые данные режимы пытались воплотить в жизнь насильственным путём.

Мы также рассмотрим трудности, с которыми исследователям пришлось столкнуться в результате этих экспериментов, и спорные выводы, сделанные из их результатов.

Во-первых, при проведении эксперимента невозможно провести различие между:

а) различными типами политического насилия, а также: б) теми, кто разрабатывает формы политического насилия и обеспечивает их

легитимность, и теми, кто фактически осуществляет насилие.Во-вторых, опора на концепцию "Банальности зла" при проведении

экспериментов допускает релятивистскую интерпретацию моральных аспектов политического насилия. Мы предполагаем, что концепция "Банальности зла" не позволяет дать моральную оценку действиям участников, равно как и определить меру ответственности каждого за разработку, воплощение и оправдание зверств и бесчинств, совершаемых по политическим мотивам.

В-третьих, эти эксперименты: а) смещают фокус внимания с проблемы значимости идеологии и иных

сильных политических убеждений, которые играли решающую роль в масштабных кампаниях политического насилия XX века;

б) косвенно отвлекают внимание от социальных и индивидуальных патологий, которые играют определенную роль в политическом насилии и

в) не учитывают высокая вероятность соединения или сближения различных мотивов при исследовании истоков политического насилия

То есть, подчинение авторитету вполне может сочетаться с фанатичной поддержкой целей лиц, наделённых властью или государственных органов; Повинуемость авторитету не исключает возможность получения удовольствия, получаемого от причинения боли.

В-четвертых, эксперименты и их наиболее известные интерпретации были сосредоточены на Холокосте, оставляя без внимания другие виды политического

85


насилия, в частности, ассоциируемые с политическими режимами и системами коммунистического толка. В исследовании Милгрэма часто присутствуют отсылки к фактам политического насилия в нацистской Германии, а также в незначительном количестве упоминаются военные преступления военнослужащих армии США во Вьетнаме. При этом, в них нет ни единой отсылки к фактам политического насилия, имевшим место в коммунистических режимах. Также следует отметить, что, насколько нам известно, не было сделано никаких попыток применения идей Милгрэма для анализа фактов политического насилия в странах с коммунистическими режимами. Данная проблема рассматривалась исключительно в рамках теории тоталитаризма, без учёта данных, полученных Милгрэмом в рамках экспериментальной психологии.

В свете данных замечаний, можно смело утверждать, что на сегодняшний день существует много возможностей для переосмысления результатов obedience экспериментов и их значимости для понимания феномена политического насилия.

IStanley Milgram’s remarkable obedience experiments have been one of the

most influential and controversial studies in social psychology. 1/ They are highly original, theoretically significant and relevant to major political and social-historical experiences and preoccupations of the 20th century. The latter include the ideologically inspired mass murders, the limited moral choices available to individuals in repressive and regimented societies, as well as the venerable issues of free will vs. social and situational determination.

Despite their importance and impact, there is room for a reconsideration of these experiments and their relevance to understanding the varieties of political violence in the 20th and 21st centuries. I believe that Milgram would agree that his experiments could not, and were not designed to explain all manifestations of political violence and the varieties of motives leading to them.

Milgram’s findings were often linked to the influential and similarly controversial ideas of Hannah Arendt, notably her concept of the “banality of evil.” 2/ The obedience experiments seemed to provide empirical support for her highly speculative propositions inspired by the case of Adolf Eichmann and especially his trial. 3/ The famous psychologist, Gordon Allport called these experiments “the

11. According to his biographer “His obedience research has become a classic of modern psychology...a ‘must’ topic for introductory psychology and social psychology courses, and any textbook for those courses that failed to mention those studies would be considered incomplete.” [Thomas Blass: The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram, New York: Basic, 2004, p. 259.]22. Unveiled in Hannah Arendt: Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, New York: Viking Press 1963.

86


Eichmann experiment.” 4/ Milgram himself wrote that “after witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the authority in our experiments, I must conclude that Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine.” 5/

It is most unlikely that Milgram would have undertaken his experiments if there had been no Holocaust. There is little doubt that the Holocaust - a unique historical case of mass murder and incomplete genocide - inspired his study of obedience. He wrote: “The Nazi extermination of Jews is the most extreme instance of abhorrent immoral acts carried out by thousands of people in the name of obedience.” 6/ While communist systems (Soviet, Chinese and other) killed a much greater number of people than the Nazis, the Holocaust is the only instance of an ideologically motivated, premeditated, dispassionate, highly organized and technologically innovative effort to eliminate rapidly an entire ethnic group of several million people - the Jews. 7/

Milgram was determined to find an explanation of this historically unprecedented undertaking and located it in the processes of obedience to authority that appeared to be a cardinal precondition of mass murders requiring an elaborate division of labor and the participation of large numbers of ordinary people. Most puzzling for him and all those seeking to comprehend the Holocaust, was the question of “how apparently normal people could so readily turn into brutal killers?” 8/

Milgram’s findings were both unexpected and startling: the experiments showed that ordinary human beings were capable and willing to inflict a great deal of pain on other human beings (on total strangers) for no other reason than being ordered to do so by an authority figure. As Milgram put it “the most fundamental lesson of our study: ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process... The behavior revealed in the experiments...is normal human behavior...”9/

33. Milgram’s biographer observed that “Milgram’s work provided the scientific underpinnings for Hannah Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’ perspective...” [Blass cited, p. 268.]44. Quoted in Stanley Milgram: Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View, New York: Harper & Row, 1974, p.178.55. Ibid., p.6.66. Ibid., p.2.77. Peter Kenez wrote: “No other mass murder was so ideologically driven, so well organized, and carried out with such mad efficiency.” [The Coming of the Holocaust: From Anti-Semitism to Genocide, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 1.88. Blass cited, p. X.99. Milgram cited, pp.6, 188.

87


The implication of these findings seemed far reaching and startling: virtually anybody could become a mass murderer (or his accomplice), without an ideological or political motive, or belief, and without being a sadist. Belonging to a bureaucratic organization and readiness to obey one’s superiors appeared to be sufficient conditions for performing inhumane act, including participation in mass murder. There was an obvious affinity between the obedience experiments and the broader conclusions drawn from them, including the phenomenon of the “banality of evil” and its suggested omnipresence.

Milgram’s findings resonated with the educated public, but they were also subject to criticism since they involved deception of the experimental subjects and subjecting them to stress. His findings have remained in the forefront of public and social scientific interest. 10/ Milgram’s biographer concluded that “Milgram taught us something profoundly revelatory about human nature - about ourselves - that we did not know before: just how powerful our propensity is to obey the commands of an authority, even when those commands might conflict with our moral principles.” 11/

The experiments were carried out, and received huge amounts of public and social scientific attention, at a time - the 1960s and early 1970s - when the American public and opinion-makers were preoccupied with the Vietnam War and domestic social problems and conflicts. It was a period of intensifying social criticism, collective soul-searching, and growing concern with domestic social injustices. The Vietnam War in particular led large portions of academic intellectuals, students and journalists to regard the United States and its political system unjust and deeply flawed. Radical social critics and war-protestors routinely compared the U.S. to Nazi Germany, stimulated in part by frequent televised reports of the civilian victims of American military actions in Vietnam. Milgram himself argued “that if the same institutions arose in the United States - concentration camps, the gas chambers - there would be no problem finding Americans to operate them...a potential for blind obedience exists in all people.” 12/ He further proposed in the conclusion of his study that “the kind of character produced in American democratic society cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality and inhuman treatment at the direction of malevolent authority. A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, 010.”The wide public exposure he received via television appearances and books reviews made him something of a minor celebrity... Milgram was till giving invited talks on the obedience experiments in 1984 - twenty two years after he had completed them.” [Blass cited, pp. 222, 232.] On the 50th anniversary of his experiments the Journal of Social issues devoted a whole issue (Vol.70, No.3.) to his work. 111. Blass cited, p.278.212. He made this point in the preface to the German edition of Obedience to Authority. Quoted in Blass cited pp. 269-270.

88


irrespective of the content of the act...so long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority.” 13/ Milgram made numerous references to the most notorious of the atrocities committed by American military forces in Vietnam, the My Lai killing of civilians 14/ as a contemporary example of the horrific results of blind obedience to authority. There was pronounced receptivity to the central message of his study, namely, that outrages such as perpetrated by the Nazis could happen anywhere, including the United States, that political democracy does not prevent their occurrence and it is legitimate to compare and equate American misdeeds in Vietnam with those of Nazi Germany. Jerome Brunner wrote in his Foreword to Obedience to Authority: “Stanley Milgram taught us that in any society, anywhere, obedience to authority comes all too easily...” Brunner exemplified such misguided obedience by the more recent mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 15/

The obedience experiments clearly and ingenuously demonstrated a widespread readiness to obey what was perceived as legitimate authority even when such readiness results in human suffering, or, as Philip Zimbardo put it, they demonstrated “the power of social situations to influence human behavior... [and] the failure of most people to resist unjust authority.” 16/ The same experiments also encouraged questionable generalizations and conclusions and overlooked variables highly relevant to politically inspired mass murders.

While Milgram’s findings and conclusions were widely embraced for indirectly supporting broader critiques of American society and the political system, his experiments were also criticized, as noted above, for their allegedly unethical aspects: the use of deception (they were disguised as a learning experiment) and for the stress they imposed on the experimental subjects when they obeyed the experimenter in the belief of inflicting pain (electric shocks) on the “learner.” Less frequently the experiments were also criticized for providing a point of departure for dubious generalizations about human behavior on the basis of behavior observed in a laboratory setting. Milgram was aware of the problem of such over-generalizations 17/ but his study as a whole nonetheless encouraged them.

313. Milgram 1974 cited p. 189.414. See Ibid. pp. 176, 183, 186, 211.515. Brunner: “Foreword” Obedience to Authority, New York: Perennial Classics, 2004, p. XIV.616. Philip Zimbardo: “Foreword” to Obedience to Authority, Harper paperback edition, 1975 p. XV.717. Milgram cautioned that “it is...important to recognize some of the differences between the situation of our subjects and that of the Germans under Hitler.” He also pointed out that the experiments were ostensibly devoted to increase knowledge and about learning, while the Nazis pursued morally reprehensible objectives. Furthermore, “the mechanisms binding the German into his obedience were not the mere momentary embarrassment and shame of disobeying but more internalized punitive mechanisms that can only evolve through extended relationships with authority.” [Milgram, 1974 cited, p.176.

89


He argued that while there were great differences between obedience in the laboratory and in Nazi Germany, “there was “a common psychological process...involved in both events.” 18/ He also wrote that “To focus only on the Nazis...is to miss the point entirely. For the studies are principally concerned with the ordinary and routine destruction carried out by everyday people following orders.” 19/ These warnings notwithstanding, his experiments and their conclusions have remained associated predominantly with the Holocaust and to some extent with American atrocities in Vietnam.

There has been no attempt, as far as I know, to apply his findings and insights to the mass murders carried out by communist states. The obedience experiments and their prevalent interpretations insistently focused on the Holocaust and overlooked political violence of other types, especially those which were produced by communist systems. There are numerous references in Milgram’s study to the Holocaust, and a few to the American misdeeds in Vietnam, but not a single one the vast amount of political violence communist systems engaged in.

It is also noteworthy, that, to the best of my knowledge, no attempts have been made by other social scientists or historians to apply Milgram’s ideas to the analysis of the political violence perpetrated by communist states and movements. 20/ Only theories of totalitarianism addressed the latter but without the psychological approaches and considerations pioneered by Milgram.

Given Milgram’s focus on the Holocaust it remains of great interest how his experiments might also apply and contribute to a more informed, broader 818. Obedience to Authority, 1974 p. 175.919. Ibid., 178.020. Not one of the fourteen contributors to 1995 symposium onMilgram’s obedience experiments raised the question of their applicability to the political violence of communist states. [See “Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: The Legacy of the Milgram Experiments”, Journal of Social Issues, Fall, 1995]. Remarkably enough this has remained the case up to the present as reflected in the 2014 symposium: “Milgram at 50: Exploring the Enduring Relevance of Psychology’s Most Famous Studies’, [Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 70., Number 3, 2014] in which there is still no reference to communist systems. Apparently it did not occur to a single contributor to these fourteen articles, (the exception was one brief, passing reference to Stalin) that there have been (besides the Holocaust) other momentous campaigns of mass murders in the 20th and 21st century undertaken by communist states, which also invite reflection and research about the part played by obedience to authority.

I can suggest two possible explanations of this spectacular and persisting indifference toward, or ignorance of, communist political violence among these authors. One is that American psychologists are not interested in history and know little about it, including that of 20th century communist states and their mass murders. Another possibility is that residual leftist sympathies among American academic intellectuals, including psychologists, predispose them to a more sympathetic view of communist systems that precludes comparing their record of political violence with that of Nazi Germany, it may even preclude entertaining the idea that communists systems engaged in systematic mass murders over long periods of time.

90


understanding of political violence, and especially ideologically inspired mass murders, not limited to the Holocaust. For this reason I will consider below what light his work might shed on the patterns of political violence in communist states. The significance of such an inquiry is further increased by the large number of their victims 21/ and because this type of political violence has never been subject to the sustained social scientific and public attention the Holocaust has received. 22/ Henry Dicks suggested that this might have been the case because “Hitler’s more patent inhumanity provided an almost ideal diversion, drawing the limelight, which allowed the Soviet mass purges and MVD [ministry of internal affairs, in charge of the political police - P.H.] concentration camps to go on almost unnoticed by the world at large.” 23/

The mass murders of communist states are all the more noteworthy because communist systems were far more idealistic than the Nazi one, and greatly concerned, at least in theory and in their rhetoric, with the unity of theory and practice. They explicitly subordinated means, including as mass murder, to ends, to the pursuit of the ideals they sought to realize.

The varied social scientific responses to the obedience experiments fell into two broad categories. Psychologists (like Milgram) focused on situational determinants, while historians probed the dispositional ones. 24/ In turn, Erving Staub, a social psychologist argued that personality and socialization (variables more dispositional than situational) also need attention, as does the scapegoating propensity. He cited a study that found that “former SS members grew up in authoritarian families and developed authoritarian personalities.” 25/

Thomas Blass, Milgram’s biographer, has been among those who contested “the idea that a cold, emotionless, and dutiful approach, such as Eichmann’s, was characteristic of the Nazis’ behavior.” Eichmann himself “pursued his goal of 121. Estimates of the combined total of the victims of communist systems approach one hundred million. See R.J. Rummel: Death by Government, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction, 1997; Stephanie Courtois et al.: The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror Repression, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999; Tony Judt: “The Longest Road to Hell,” New York Times, December 22, 1997. For estimates of the number of Soviet victims (ranging between 15-20 million) see Robert Conquest: The Great Terror: a Reassessment, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 and Anne Applebaum: Gulag: a History, New York: Doubleday, 2003. 222. I made this point at some length in “The Attention Gap and Selectivity in Moral Concerns,” Introduction to Paul Hollander Ed. From the Gulag to the Killing Fields: Personal Accounts of Political Violence and Repression in Communist States, Wilmington DE: ISI Books, 2006, pp. XXIV-XXXIX.323. Hery V. Dicks: Licensed Mass Murder: A Social-Psychological Study of Some SS Killers, New York: Basic Books. 1972, p. 268.424. See Richard Overy: “‘Ordinary Men’ Extraordinary Circumstances: Historians, Social Psychology, and the Holocaust”, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 70, Number 3, 2014, p. 519. 525. Ervin Staub: “Obeying, Joining, Following, Resisting and Other Processes in the Milgram Studies...” Journal of Social Issues cited pp.502, 503, 509.

91


shipping as many Jews as possible to the extermination camps with a degree of drive, perseverance and enthusiasm that was clearly beyond the call of duty.” 26/ Blass further suggested that.

The historical evidence for the spontaneity, inventiveness, and enthusiasm with which the Nazis degraded, hurt and killed their victims also argues against explaining their behavior as mere obedience to an authority’s commands... Milgram’s approach...does not provide a wholly adequate account of the Holocaust. Clearly, there was more to the genocidal Nazi program than the dispassionate obedience of the average citizen who participated in the murder of his fellow citizens out of a sense of duty and not malice. At the same time, it could not have succeeded...without the passive or active complicity of Everyman. While Milgram’s approach may well account for the dutiful destructiveness of the dispassionate bureaucrat...it falls short when it comes to explaining the more zealous, hate-driven cruelties that also defined the Holocaust. 27/

It has also been argued by Henry Dicks, that “though this gigantic operation [the Holocaust, that is - P.H.] was carried out in a cold, matter-of-fact, bureaucratic spirit...we must assume that the majority of SS and Nazi activists shared violent racist beliefs with their Fuhrer as their central justification and instilled them into their simpler followers.” 28/ What Arendt and her followers did not seem to grasp is that such an impersonal, bureaucratic disposition can be compatible with strongly held convictions about the rectitude of the tasks undertaken, including meticulously planned mass murder. Eichmann was both a competent administrator and fervent hater of Jews, intent on exterminating them efficiently. 29/ More generally speaking, “bureaucratic obedience and anti-Semitic ideology” can be integrated. 30/

Not surprisingly, German authors raised the question: What kind of men were these who accepted murder as their daily work? They were perfectly ordinary people, with one difference: they could act as members of the ‘master race’. They decided whether a person lived or died...Hitherto undreamt-of chances of promotion revealed themselves. There were pay bonuses, extra leave and privileges

626. Blass cited p. 272. It has also been shown by other authors that Arendt made a serious error asserting that Eichmann was not an anti-Semite and lacked ideological motivation. See Deborah E. Lipstadt: The Eichmann Trial, New York: Schoken, 2011 and Richard J. Bernstein: Radical Evil: a Philosophical Interrogation, Cambridge, UK Polity Press, 2002, see esp. p. 270, note 42.727. Blass cited p. 276.828. Dicks, p. 57.929. Arendt insisted for no discernible reason other than being beholden to her own theories, that Eichmann was not an anti-Semite. [See Arendt 1963, especially pp. 22-23.] 030. Arthur G. Miller: “The Explanatory Value of Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: A Contemporary Appraisal,” Journal of Social Issues cited, p. 567.

92


such as alcohol and cigarettes. And at all times a sense of power, for the state was happy to remove all sense of personal responsibility from them. 31/

“Perfectly ordinary” they were not, nor were they, for the most part, sadistic monsters, but in neither case were their beliefs irrelevant. As Richard Overy wrote: “Once the reserve policemen were engaged in killing they had few reservations because of the disposition instilled... mass murder became part of a daily service routine informed by a shared ideology in which individual motivation cannot easily be determined.” 32/

IIIn the following I will further examine the limitations of the obedience

experiments to provide generalizable explanations of large-scale contemporary political violence.

Since the experiments suggested that situational pressures were the prime source of obedience to authority, and that such pressures outside the laboratory could result in seriously harming, or killing innocent people, we must take a closer look at the nature of the situational pressures the perpetrators of mass murders, such as the Holocaust, encountered.

A major question arises from the fact that German authorities did not punish those who refused to participate in the execution of Jews, and it was not difficult to evade such duties. 33/ If this was the case, then the situational pressures were bound to be far less compelling, and ”obedience to authority” carried much less weight (in motivating obedience) than the experiments suggested, and as has been widely believed.

In light of the above, other reasons for complying with morally problematic orders have to be considered. They should include a) perpetrators agreement with the official policy of killing the Jews, (or other groups) - an agreement that could combine with personal aversion towards them; 34/ b) taking pleasure in the activity - sadism and sense of power; c) sense of duty blended with conformity and 131. Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess eds.: ‘The Good Old Days’: The Holocaust as Seen by Its perpetrators and Bystanders, New York: Free Press, 1988, p. XIX.232. Overy in Journal of Social Issues cited p. 520. 333. See for example “Forced to obey orders - the myth,” in “Good Old Days”, cited, pp. 75-86. Christopher R. Browning also pointed out that “in the past forty-five years no defense attorney or defendant in any of the hundreds of postwar trials has been able to document a single case in which refusal to obey an order to kill unarmed civilians resulted in the allegedly inevitable dire punishment.” [Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York: Harper Perennial, 1993 p. 170] 434. To say the least, (as Browning put it) “The Jew stood outside their circle of human obligations and responsibility...they [the executioners] had at least accepted the assimilation of the Jews into the image of the enemy.” [Ibid., 73]

93


comradeship - sharing an unpleasant duty with one’s comrades: “refusing to shoot constituted refusing one’s share of an unpleasant collective obligation.” 35/ d) the material rewards noted above by the German authors and e) a combination of all of the motives enumerated and some others, peculiar to given historical conditions. 36/ Under these conditions, “following orders” was a hollow excuse on the part of the perpetrators as well as an inadequate explanation of their behavior.

It remains a critical problem of these experiments that they did not address (even indirectly) the essential question: why various authorities, political systems, movements or particular individuals embark on campaigns of violence, even extermination, which require the obedient assistance, or willing cooperation of many people who do not necessarily share the motivation and outlook of their superiors.

There is a huge difference between those who were deeply committed to the belief that violently purifying the world of Jews (or kulaks, Trotskyites, Tutsis, “Infidels,” etc., etc) is a lofty and noble goal - and those who were ordered to implement this goal without sharing such beliefs. There is also a fundamental and morally significant difference between those who volunteer for, and relish participation in, the mistreatment and killing of various groups of people, and those who take part in such activities reluctantly, under strongly felt situational pressures. It remains difficult to determine what proportion of those engaged in the great mass murders of the past century belonged to either group of wrongdoers but there is evidence that a substantial portion of the perpetrators, Nazi and communist alike, endorsed the objectives of their actions, and some of them enjoyed participation in the mass murders.

The experiments did not, and could not, touch on the deeply felt convictions of those who initiated and organized the major campaigns of political violence in our times, and why they believed that such violence was necessary and fully justified. It has not been widely or explicitly recognized that the findings of the obedience experiments only applied to understanding the attitude and behavior of low-level perpetrators. The part played by the experimental subjects corresponded (in theory) to the roles of those who, when ordered, pulled the trigger in the mass executions, or shoved Jews into the gas chambers. For this reason associating the

535. Ibid., pp. 184-185. Browning emphasized “the pressure for conformity - the basic identification of men in uniform with their comrades and the strong urge not to separate themselves from the group...” [Ibid., p.71]636. Browning listed the following: “wartime brutalization, racism, segmentation and routinization of the task, special selection of the perpetrators, careerism, obedience to orders, deference to authority, ideological indoctrination and conformity. These are factors applicable in varying degrees, but none without qualification.” [Ibid., p. 159] Needless to say all this applied only to the Holocaust; Browning was not trying to generalize to other mass murders.

94


message of these experiments with Eichmann has been totally misplaced, since he was a high ranking planner and organizer of the Holocaust, belonged to the Nazi political elite and zealously endorsed the “Final Solution.”

The experiments did not attempt to illuminate the motivation of those directly responsible for the mass murders of the past century, Nazi or communist - such as Eichmann, Himmler, Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria - nor could they shed light on the outlook of figures such as Hitler and Stalin, the highest authorities inspiring and legitimating the mass murders. Obviously, individuals of this kind did not devise or organize mass murder in response to the commands of higher authorities - they themselves were the higher authorities who strongly believed that the mass murders were fully justified, both as a matter of collective self-defense and as a means to purify their society, or the whole world, of undesirable groups and individuals. 37/

The experiments did not and could not differentiate between a) the individuals who devise, design and legitimate political violence on the one hand, and those who execute such designs, on the other. 38/ Nor could they address the differences among types of political violence, ranging from industrial style mass executions (gas chambers) and mass shootings, to pogroms, ethnic cleansing, acts of terror and assassinations. 39/

Experimental studies of obedience could not shed light either on the motives of those who incited and carried out “ethnic cleansing” in places like Rwanda (in 1994), or on the motives of present day Jihadist terrorists who give every indication of obeying only their own fervent and fanatical religious beliefs - which include the promise of other-worldly rewards for their murderous deeds - rather than the commands of authorities.

The conclusions drawn from the experiments overlooked, or explicitly disputed, that personal pleasure and satisfaction was often generated by such activities - either sadistic, 40/ or derived from the sense of power, or from the satisfaction of scapegoating impulses which encourage and readily legitimate violence by blaming groups or individuals designated as “the enemy.” 737. For a further discussion of the connection between acts and legitimations of political violence see Paul Hollander ”Introduction” to Paul Hollander ed.: Contemporary Political Violence and Its Legitimation, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008., pp. 1-20. 838. Browning emphasized the difference between the executioners and designers of the Holocaust: “’grass-roots’ perpetrators of the Final Solution...were not desk murderers who could take refuge in distance, routine and bureaucratic euphemisms that veiled the reality of mass murder. These men saw their victims face to face.” [Ibid., p. 36.]939. To be sure at the time these experiments were first conducted ethnic cleansing was an unknown concept (though not an unknown practice) and Jihadist terror did not exist. 040. In his conclusions Milgram wrote that there was no “...aggression, anger, vindictiveness or hatred in those who shocked the victim” [Milgram, 1974, p. 188.] Arendt made the same claim about Eichmann’s attitudes toward his victims.

95


Another set of motives laboratory experiments cannot shed light on are the material incentives, benefits, rewards or elite status political systems can provide to the specialists in organized violence. The interests of diverse social or ethnic groups can also be served by eradicating competitors for material benefits or status.

Most difficult is to separate motives which are often intertwined. Individuals engaged in political violence (or its legitimating) can simultaneously seek to gratify a hunger for power, or glory, pursue in good conscience the dictates of an uplifting ideology and concurrently improve their social-economic position. That is to say, obedience to authority is compatible with enthusiastic support for the objectives and ideals of the power-holders, of the authorities 41/; it may also be compatible with the pleasure derived from the infliction of pain as well as the pursuit mundane material and group interests. Despite the presumed intentions of Mailgram, 42/ the experiments lent themselves to a non-judgmental, morally relativistic interpretation by endorsing the idea of the “banality of evil.” Arguably, the latter discourages moral judgment and attempts to assign responsibility for devising, committing or legitimating moral outrages inspired by political agendas and objectives, or any other reason. The “banality of evil” also implies moral equivalence among different social and political systems, movements and groups of people, all of them supposedly capable in equal measure, to obey the commands of amoral authorities.

Christopher Browning’s conclusions of his study of certain German perpetrators of the killings of Jews are relevant here: “The reserve policemen faced choices and most of them committed terrible deeds. But those who killed cannot be absolved by the notion that anyone in the same situation would have done as they did. [My emphasis] For even among them, some refused to kill and others stopped killing. Human responsibility is ultimately an individual matter.” 43/ Daniel Goldhagen made the same point more forcefully, and it has been the animating idea of his lengthy book on the perpetrators of the Holocaust. He wrote: “The conventional explanations [of the Holocaust - P.H.] do not acknowledge, indeed they deny, the humanity of the perpetrators, namely that they were agents, moral beings capable of making moral choices.” He further argued that

141. The remarks of a German police officer illustrate this mentality: “We police went by the phrase, ‘Whatever serves the state is right, whatever harms the state is wrong.’ ...it never entered my head that these orders could be wrong...I was...at the time convinced that the Jewish people were...guilty... The thought that one should oppose or evade the order to take part in the extermination of the Jews never entered my head.” [“Good Old Days” pp. 220-221] 242. Since I knew Milgram quite well as a close friend for over twenty years I believe that he was not inclined to moral relativism and did not refrain from taking strong judgmental positions on various occasions.343. Browning, p. 188.

96


The notion that the perpetrators contributed to genocide because they were coerced, because they were unthinking, obedient executors of state orders, because of social psychological pressure, because of prospects of personal advancement, or because they did not comprehend or feel responsible for what they were doing, owing to the putative fragmentation of tasks, each can be demonstrated ...to be untenable... The initiative that the perpetrators routinely showed in their cruel and lethal actions toward the Jews, the zeal that characterized the Germans carrying out the retributive and exterminatory policy against European Jewry, cannot be accounted for by conventional explanations.

Goldhagen proposed that a specifically German, murderous (“eliminationist”) anti-Semitism was the fundamental explanation of the Holocaust, i.e. “the perpetrators’ belief in the unalterably demonic character of the Jews...” or “a set of beliefs that defined the Jews in a way that demanded Jewish suffering as retribution...[a] profound hatred... Such an undertaking derives generally from enthusiasm for the project.” What he called “voluntaristic cruelty... [that] had no instrumental purpose...” further supported his argument that a profound, strongly felt, and widely shared hatred and fear of Jews among Germans was “the main motivational pillar” and key explanation of the Holocaust. 44/ He also drew attention to the “celebratory atmosphere that sometimes prevailed in institutions of killing...celebrations to mark significant massacres, killings...” and the perpetrators’ “willingness to have their wives live among them as they slaughtered Jews...their eagerness to preserve memories of their genocidal deeds by means of photographs which they took and posed for with evident pride...” 45/

The focus on obedience also diverts attention from social and personal pathologies which at times fueled (and are likely to do so in the future) the kind of political violence, or evil, that came to be designated, and diminished by Arendt, as “banal.” Nor did the experiments address the likelihood that in reality (outside the laboratory setting) different motives combine, or converge in the genesis of political violence, and there is no obvious way to separate them, or to assign

444. Goldhagen was criticized for singling out murderous anti-Semitism, he believed was peculiar to Germany, as the only explanation of the Holocaust. While it is true that only Nazi Germany introduced industrial style mass murders of Jews, many other European nationalities displayed comparable levels of murderous hatred of them and engaged in their killing, sometimes assisting the Nazis, sometimes independent of them, when the opportunity presented itself.Present day Islamic radicals are another group whose murderous hatred of Jews rivals, and possibly exceeds similar sentiments of the Nazis. 545. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen: Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1997, pp. 392, 385, 404, 389, 391, 377, 383.Visual evidence of these attitudes may also be found in the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC (among other places) in the photographs of cheerful, smiling Nazi executioners standing by their victims, or next to their mass graves, before or after performing their grisly task.

97


primacy to one over another. It is of interest that German judicial authorities who endorsed the Holocaust disapproved of taking personal pleasure in the eradication of the Jews, and those who indulged their sadistic disposition were occasionally disciplined. The appropriate court made clear that the accused [in a particular case - P.H.] shall not be punished because of actions against the Jews as such. The Jews have to be exterminated...It must be assumed from the outset that the accused did not act out of sadism but out of a true hatred for the Jews. He nevertheless let himself be drawn into committing acts of cruelty which are to be attributed t severe character deficiencies and a high degree of mental brutalization... ...Execution for purely political motives shall result in no punishment... [But] Men acting out of self-seeking, sadistic or sexual motives should be punished by a court of law... 46/

It is noteworthy that the same authorities considered “the true hatred of the Jews” the proper and legitimate motive for their extermination.

IIIGoldhagen’s explanation of the Holocaust inadvertently and indirectly leads to

the proposition that obedience to authority probably played a greater part in the Soviet practices of repression than in the Nazi mass murders. This assertion only applies to those who performed or assisted in the murderous acts, not to their superiors who designed and legitimated the killings.

There was nothing in Russian, or pre-Soviet culture, or in even Soviet ideology, comparable to the German “eliminationist anti-Semitism,” that is to say, the intense, obsessive preoccupation with, and hatred of, a single, identifiable, allegedly evil and powerful group (like the Jews) designated as the arch-enemy, and blamed for all the ills and injustices of society or even personal misfortunes. Peter Kenez, an American historian wrote: “Hitler and his followers managed to connect everything that they disliked and feared in the modern world to Jews.” 47/ There was no comparable obsessive preoccupation among Soviet (or other communist) leaders and ideologues with any particular group of enemies. The alleged enemies of the Soviet system were a diverse and changeable group, their definitions and identities varied and depended on the tactical political goals and needs of the system. Virtually anybody could be designated as the enemy of the state and Party on short notice, and accused of both specific and unspecific crimes and wrongdoing.

Those entrusted with repressing and killing the alleged enemies of the Soviet state did not necessarily harbor grievances against them (analogous to the culturally conditioned, longstanding and pervasive anti-Semitic aversion to Jews that existed 646. “Good Old Days” pp. 201, 203, 205.747. Kenez 2012, p. 289.

98


in Germany), often they did not even know their identity, or the official reasons for liquidating them. Therefore, a mindless, unthinking obedience to authority was bound to play a greater part in carrying out the mass murders in the Soviet Union than in Nazi Germany.

At the same time there was a pronounced resemblance between German and Russian authoritarian traditions supportive of obedience to authority. Pre-Soviet Russia had a venerable authoritarian tradition that rivaled, or exceeded that of pre-Nazi Germany. Respect for authority was deeply ingrained in Russians, and obedience to authority was an integral part of the authoritarian mindset and tradition. In all probability, replicating Milgram’s experiments in the Soviet Union would have yielded higher rates of obedience than it did elsewhere, and it would probably also reach high levels in present day Russia that has revived and reinvigorated authoritarian traditions.

As did the extermination of the Jews by Nazi Germany, the liquidation of millions of politically undesirable elements in the Soviet Union required the cooperation and division of labor of large numbers of police and military personnel, of specialized forces (GPU, NKVD, MVD, KGB), as well as civilian administrators and transportation workers. While there are numerous studies of those involved in the “Final Solution,” (like Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men) seeking to understand the motivation of the German executioners of Jews, there are no comparable studies of those who performed the Soviet-communist liquidations.

We know of one commonality in the attitudes of the executioners, Nazi and Soviet: for an undetermined number of them these activities were not free of conflict and unease, as indicated by the generous supply of alcohol that was provided to alleviate their apprehensions at the time they were to engage in their grisly activities.48/

Another similarity between the organization of Nazi and Soviet mass murders that both often relied on deceiving those to be killed. Jews were repeatedly assured that they will be transported to places of work, or given a bath (before led into the gas chambers). Less well known that some of the Polish officers before being shot were given a farewell reception and sendoff by military bands, prior to their supposed removal to another location to be set free. 49/ Another deception common to both systems was the claim that forced labor will liberate or rehabilitate those to be destroyed - a more obvious falsehood in the Nazi than in the Soviet case. Signs at the gates Nazi concentration camps promised that “work will set you free” while

848. See Browning p.68 and David Satter: It Was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012, pp. 59-60.949. Satter, p. 233.

99


posted at the entrance of numerous Soviet labor camps was the slogan “Honest labor: the road to home.” 50/

It is a safe assumption that members of the Soviet political police, or state security organs obeyed their commands without hesitation, or protest when ordered to shoot various “enemies of the state” (and Polish prisoners of war). What we do not know is, with what degree, or mixture of enthusiasm, indifference, or reluctance they complied. In the Soviet as in the German case there is insufficient data to generalize about, or quantify the attitudes of the executioners and their accomplices. There is little information about the political beliefs and attitudes of the Soviet rank-and-file executioners. According to one source many were “party members with little education. Several were described as taciturn, but they gave the impression of being dedicated to their work. Nonetheless there is evidence that their role in thousands of murders had an effect on them.” 51/ Several committed suicide and others became alcoholics.

There is evidence of numerous instances (in both the Nazi and Soviet setting) when the politically determined executions (or tortures) were not merely matters of obedience to authority, sense of duty, or belief in the necessity of such actions but also a source of pleasure, or entertainment, and opportunity for freely expressing aggression.

Whether out of a sense of duty or for enjoyment, several leaders of the Hungarian communist party and high ranking political police officers attended the hanging of Laszlo Rajk, principal defendant, and his associates in the post World War II Hungarian show trials. They watched the execution taking place in the prison yard from upstairs windows while refreshments were served. Following the executions a celebratory boat trip on the Danube was arranged to honor the Soviet advisers who helped in the preparation of the trials and in the extraction of false confessions. It was also attended by major figures of the Hungarian political and state security elite. 52/

A notorious instance of enjoyment derived not merely from witnessing or celebrating politically legitimated killing, but from participating in it, was exemplified by some Soviet NKVD officers and a particular general:

In addition to normal executioners, high-ranking NKVD officers also took part in shooting prisoners although in keeping with their rank, they were not obliged to

050. Avraham Shifrin: The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union, Uhidingen, Switzerland: Stephanus, 1980, p. 10. 151. Satter, p. 59.252.Vladimir Farkas: Nincs Mentseg: Az AVH alezredese voltam (No Excuse: I was a lieutenant colonel of the AVH) Budapest: Interart Studio, 1990, pp. 239-240, 241. AVH is the abbreviation (in Hungarian) of State Security Authority.

100


do so. This was called ‘having a shoot’ and was apparently done for relaxation. One of those who relaxed in this manner was General Vasily Blokhin...

The case of Blokhin is particularly illustrative of the way NKVD officers viewed their victims as enemies who were completely without humanity. In addition to shooting prisoners for sport, he was a central figure in many liquidations, including the murder of thousands of Polish prisoners of war in Kalinin. He also executed Tukhachevsky ...Isaac Babel and...Vsevolod Meyerhold. When he participated in large-scale liquidations, he donned his own uniform - rubber apron, leggings, and boots...despite his participation in hundreds, if not thousands of murders, he was extremely popular in the NKVD for his simplicity, cheerfulness and readiness to help anyone in a difficult situation.’ 53/

In all probability Blokhin was convinced that a higher purpose fully justified shooting the Polish officers, while evidently he also enjoyed doing it. Another high ranking Soviet NKVD officer, Dmitri Tokaryev, commander of an execution squad in Katyn pointed out that the Poles executed were class enemies and added “‘I am proud of the work I did in defense of our revolution.’” 54/

A former Hungarian political prisoner reported that his interrogators who tortured him appeared to be “filled with a consciousness of their mission and professional pride...The detectives...all fell upon me...kicked me all over my body. They...acted like a party of drunks intoxicated with rage. Not for a moment did their fury appear simulated...These primitive men...were not shamming...they were firmly convinced that they were dealing with...a determined enemy of the state who refused to confess.” 55/ A Czech political prisoner had a similar experience with his interrogator: “he was trying so hard to hurt me... Never before or since have I seen someone so passionately involved in his work.” 56/

Further light is shed on the disposition of individuals working for the Soviet political police by a former Soviet agent, Nikolai Kholkov. He recalled criteria suggested for their recruitment by his superior, Pavel Sudoplatov (who distinguished himself by organizing the assassination of Trotsky): “’Go search for people who are hurt by fate or nature...those suffering from an inferiority complex, craving power and influence but defeated by unfavorable circumstances ...The sense of belonging to an influential and powerful organization will give them a

353. Satter, p.60.454. Quoted in David Pryce-Jones: The Strange Death of the Soviet Empire, New York: Holt, 1995, p.13. According to another account Tokaryev denied direct participation in the executions but “agreed to provide all organizational assistance.” [Satter pp. 242-243]555. Bela Szasz: Volunteers for the Gallows: Anatomy of a Show Trial, New York: Norton, 1971, pp. 70, 15, 21.656. Alan Levy: Good Men Still Live! The Odyssey of a Professional Prisoner, Chicago: O’Hara 1974, pp. 84-85.

101


feeling of superiority...they will experience a sense of importance, close connection with power.’” 57/ In a similar vein Peter Hruby, a Czech author wrote: “Every nation has a small percentage of potential criminals in is population ...In totalitarian dictatorships these people...get their best chance and can really enjoy themselves, at the same time feeling proud that they are serving a great cause.” 58/

Victor Serge, the idealistic Russian revolutionary, noted a long time ago that in the early years of the Soviet Union the organs of coercion attracted two contrasting types:

The Party endeavored to head it [the Cheka, first embodiment of the political police - P.H.] with incorruptible men like Dzerzhinsky, a sincere idealist, ruthless but chivalrous, with the emaciated profile of an Inquisitor...But the Party had few men of this stamp and many Chekas: these gradually came to select their personnel by virtue of their psychological inclinations. The only temperaments that devoted themselves willingly and tenaciously to...’internal defense’ were those characterized by suspicion, embitterment, harshness and sadism... perverted men seeing conspiracy everywhere. 59/

Dzerzhinsky himself reportedly remarked that “only saints or scoundrels can serve in the GPU, but now the saints are running away from me and I am left with the scoundrels.’” 60/

Lavrentiy Beria, head of the NKVD between 1941-46 was quite unlike Dzerzhinsky, personifying boundless power-hunger and an exceptional amorality and corruptibility. According to one of his biographers he was characterized by “the seeming absence of a human dimension in his personality” and according to another he impressed Stalin favorably by his “predatory character and lust for power.” 61/ Presumably his behavior was also guided, to some degree, by a belief in the nobility of the Soviet system and its long term objectives.

Individuals such as Beria (and other heads of the Soviet political police such as Yagoda and Yezhov) were in all probability attracted to their position because of an overdeveloped thirst for power and a similarly excessive pleasure in its unconstrained exercise legitimated by ideologically inspired certainties and rationalizations. They also took advantage of the opportunities such a position

757. Nikolai Khoklov: In the Name of Conscience, New York: McKay 1959, pp. 165-166.858. Peter Hruby: Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980 pp. 223-224.959. Victor Serge: Memoirs of Revolutionary, 1901-1941, London: Oxford University Press 1963, p. 80. 060. Quoted in Robert Conquest: The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties, New York: Macmillan, 1968, p. 544.161. Amy Knight: Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 10; Dmitri Volkogonov: Gyozelem es Tragedia: Stalin Politikai Arckepe, (Victory and tragedy: the political portrait of Stalin) Budapest: Zrinyi, 1990, p. 236.

102


provided for personal enrichment, and in Beria’s case, sexual predation on underage girls.

Another set of motives emerges from a former Chinese Red Guard’s recollections and reflections illustrating the irrelevance of obedience to authority in political mob violence that erupted in communist China during the so-called Cultural Revolution:

Beating is addictive. The dark side of human nature, whenever it is given a chance to surface, will explode...I remember one day when the students at our school couldn’t find anybody to beat... [they] went to a nearby commune. The commune leadership pointed out to them a landlord who was also labeled as a bad element... He was beaten to death... Beating was the only way to show one’s hatred [toward the enemy, that is - P.H.] as well as one’s love to the great leader...Beating someone to death involved...a whole group. No one dared to show weakness. Non-participation was a sign of a weak revolutionary...62/

Similar attitudes were apparent among crowds of people in various parts of the former Soviet Union who enthusiastically volunteered their services to the German occupiers engaged in purifying these areas of Jews. Hugh Trevor-Roper wrote “In Kaunas, Lithuania...the Jews were clubbed to death with crowbars, [by the civilians - P.H.] before cheering crowds, mothers holding up their children to see the fun, and German soldiers clustered round like spectators at a football match.” 63/

A German observer wrote of another such a scene of pubic violence in Lithuania:

After the entire group been beaten to death, the young man [who did most of the beatings - P.H.] put the crowbar to one side, fetched an accordion... stood on the mountain of corpses and played the Lithuanian national anthem...The behavior of the civilians present (women and children) was unbelievable. After each man had been killed they began to clap and when the national anthem started up they joined in singing and clapping. In the front row were women with small children in their arms who stayed there until the end of the whole proceedings. 64/262. Quoted in Gong Xiaoxia: Repressive Movements and the Politics of Victimization, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1995 p.157.363. “Foreword” by Hugh Trevor-Roper to Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess eds.: “The Good Old Days” - The Holocaust as Seen by Its Perpetrators and Bystanders, New York: Free Press, 1988, p. XII. The attitudes described in the quote, and especially the singing of the nation anthem are reminiscent, of Islamic terrorists shouting “God is Great” while murdering people. Both are grotesque and pathetic attempts to associate repugnant acts with nationalistic or religious symbols and thereby justify them. 464. Ibid., pp. 31-32. The invocation of the Lithuanian national anthem by the mass murderer here described is reminiscent of present day Islamic terrorists who are in the habit of shouting ”God is Great” when committing morally repugnant acts of violence. It is hard to decide what is more absurd and delusional: the attempt to associate the murder of innocent people with a national anthem, or with God, but in both cases the perpetrators obviously felt that their inexcusable atrocities required some lofty

103


In the occupied areas of the former Soviet Union public executions were sometimes organized and publicized by the German authorities and were well attended by both German military personnel and the civilian population. 65/

In many instances the private correspondence and diaries of German military personnel further reflected their hearty approval of the genocidal activities they witnessed or participated in. 66/ A German police official in occupied Poland noted that “members of the Grenzpolizei-kommissariat [border police commission] were, with few exceptions, quite happy to take part in shooting of Jews. They had a ball...Nobody failed to turn up...people today give a false impression when they say that the actions against the Jews were carried out unwillingly. There was great hatred against the Jews; it was revenge...” 67/

Collective self-defense was the most widely used and morally most satisfying justification of different types of political violence ranging from the mass murder of Jews and that of the miscellaneous enemies of the communist states, to the assassination of particular individuals deemed to be a threat to the authorities. Pavel Sudoplatov, lieutenant-general in the OGPU, wrote:

It is strange to look back...and re-create the mentality that led us to take vengeance on our enemies with cold self-assurance. We did not believe that there was any moral question involved in killing Trotsky or any other former comrades who had turned against us. We believed that we were in a life-and-death struggle for the salvation of our grand experiment, the creation of a new social system that would protect and provide dignity for all workers an eliminate greed and oppression of capitalist profit...Active operations [were] logical actions taken to prevent damage to our agent networks or to our interests. 68/

Markus Wolf, former head of the foreign espionage department of the East German political police (Stasi) quoted Berthold Brecht in his memoirs: ”’what baseness would you not commit,/To stamp out baseness?’” adding that “we had all internalized such rationalizations in pursuit of a better, socialist world. Almost everything was permitted, we felt, as long as it served the Cause.” 69/ Molotov felt the same way as he rationalized, in retrospect, the Purges: “Of course there were excesses but all that was permissible, to my mind, for the sake of the main objective - keeping state power!...The terror cost us dearly but without it things

symbolic justification, or excuse. 565. See “Execution as popular entertainment - The murder of Jews as public entertainment” in Ibid., 107-135. 666. Trevor-Roper cited, p. XI.767.”Good Old Days”, cited p. 76.868. Pavel Sudoplatov: Special Tasks, Boston: Little Brown, 1994, pp. XII, 3.969. Markus Wolf: Man Without a Face, New York: Random House 1997, p.233.

104


would have been worse.” 70/ Two high level NKVD officers, Dmitri Tokarev and Pyotr Soprunenko, both closely associated with the Katyn killings, who “during the years of Stalinist terror...held the power of life and death... depict[ed] themselves as civil servants who were merely doing their job” 71/as did Molotov signing orders for executions during the Purges.

Shortly before his death Pol Pot of Cambodia displayed similar equanimity about the unnatural death of over a million and half Cambodians under his exceptionally bloody dictatorship: “I do not reject responsibility - our movement made mistakes, like every other movement in the world. But...we had no other choice...we had to defend ourselves...my conscience is clear. Everything I have done...is first for the nation and the people of Cambodia.” 72/

These explanations and pleadings illustrate the remarkable human capacity - no less puzzling, and reprehensible than mindless obedience to amoral authorities - to dehumanize and demonize other human beings and justify the infliction of suffering and death, here and now, by uncertain future benefits and gratifications.

It was the taken for granted subordination of means to ends that remains the key to understanding much of the large-scale, goal-oriented political violence in both Nazi Germany and the communist states and remains preeminent in present day political violence. This mentality, and especially the untroubled moral separation of means from ends, is further illuminated by Nathan Leites, an American political scientist in his discussion of the attitude of the Soviet elite:

The use of means at sharp variance with the state of affairs under communism itself will not interfere with its ultimate realization. The Party must accept as a matter of course, any expedient degree of discrepancy between means and ends...The Party must be prepared to inflict any amount of deprivation on any number of human beings if this appears as ‘necessary’... The refusal to use necessary bad means appears to the Bolshevik as an expression of stupidity...or imperfect dedication to the great goal; or as self-centeredness which keeps one more concerned with not touching dirt and not feeling guilt than with transforming the world. 73/

György Lukács, the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, and life-long supporter of the Soviet Union, shared these sentiments in slightly different language: “The highest duty of communist ethics is the accept the necessity of acting immorally. This is the greatest sacrifice that the revolution demands of us. The conviction of

070. Quoted in Albert Resis ed.: Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics, Chicago: Ivan Dee 1993, pp. 265, 78. 171. Satter, p. 242.272. Nate Thayer: “Day of Reckoning,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 30, 1997, pp. 14, 15, 16.373. Nathan Élites: A Study of Bolshevism, Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1953, pp. 141, 114-115.

105


the true communist is that evil transforms itself into bliss through the dialectics of historical evolution.” 74/ Similar sentiments pervaded members of the SS: “They were all the Fuhrer’s soldiers fighting a ubiquitous enemy; their historic task must be done in the SS spirit of self-surrender without the selfishness of private emotion.” 75/ Heinrich Himmler expressed identical convictions in his famous speech to SS Group leaders, assuring them that beholding piles of Jewish corpses need not undermine their sense of decency and that the program of extermination they conducted will be a “glorious page in our history.” 76/ Again, it has to be emphasized that these attitudes and commitments guided the behavior mainly those who devised, organized and legitimated programs of lethal political violence, and to a much lesser (undetermined) extent the attitudes of those who implemented their blueprints when ordered to do so.

Communist leaders, ideologues and specialists in the liquidation of undesirable groups had at their disposal another legitimating device in addition to their ideals and philosophical beliefs that also helped to silence doubt about any morally dubious policies; it was the myth of the infallibility of the Party. Georgiy Pyatakov, one of the early revolutionaries and an important Party functionary reportedly said “If the Party demands it...I will see black where I thought I saw white...because for me there is no life outside the Party.” 77/ George Kennan’s observations about Andrei Gromyko captured this mindset: “The Party became...his mother, his father, his teacher, his conscience, and his master...And if it turned out that what the Party required to be done...involved apparent injustice or cruelty - well, one might regret that it was found necessary...But it was not one’s own responsibility.” 78/ More generally, Kennan concluded that “For anything undertaken in response to the will of the collectivity (in this instance, the Party), no matter how distasteful, no matter how unattractive from the standpoint of individual morality, there could be no guilt, no questioning, no remorse.” 79/

Obedience to authority has been an important contributor to certain types of political violence but not its singular precondition. Moreover, the widespread disposition of human beings to inflict suffering and death on other humans in pursuit of various political objectives does not make such a disposition banal.

474. Quoted in Daniel Bell: “First Love and Early Sorrows,” Partisan Review, November 4 1981 p. 547575. Dicks cited, p. 55.676. Himmder Quoted in Joachim C. Fest: The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership, New York: Pantheon Books, 1970, p.118. 777. Quoted in Martin Malia: The Soviet Tragedy, New York: Free Press 1994, p.268. Such devotion to the Party did not save him from being executed in 1937. 878. George F. Kennan: “The Buried Past,” New York Review of Books, October 1988.979. George F. Kennan: At a Century’s Ending: Reflections, 1982-1995, New York: Norton, 1996, p. 236.

106


The demand for the type of obedience Milgram was interested in could not have arisen without an ideological agenda that included the attribution of infallibility to either a leader or an institution (the Communist Party), some type of collectivism, and an unshakeable commitment to far reaching, future oriented goals and social-political transformations which involved purifying the world of undesirable groups variously defined.

107

S. S. Levine. The (continuing) Development of the seminar “Milgram – Obedience to Authority” at Bard College and a partial array of topics considered in the Obedience domain. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Mos-cow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

THE (CONTINUING) DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEMINAR“MILGRAM – OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY” AT BARD COLLEGE AND

A PARTIAL ARRAY OF TOPICS CONSIDERED IN THE OBEDIENCE DOMAIN

ОРАБОТЕПОСТОЯННОДЕЙСТВУЮЩЕГОВБАРДКОЛЛЕДЖЕ « - »СЕМИНАРА МИЛГРЭМ ПОВИНУЕМОСТЬАВТОРИТЕТУ

, ИНЕКОТОРЫХПРОБЛЕМАХ РАССМАТРИВАЕМЫХНАСЕМИНАРЕВ РАМКАХ OBEDIENCE-ПАРАДИГМЫ

Stuart S. LevineBard College, Annandale-on-Hudson,

New York, [email protected]

Stuart S. Levine - PhD, Professor of Social Psychology, Emeritus Dean, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, USA. Teaching and scholarly interests reside in the domain of social influence and obedience to authority.M.A. from the New School for Social Research; study with Solomon Asch. PhD from the State University of New York at Albany (thesis advisers were Abraham Luchins and Josef Seph Steger). At Bard College since 1964 and served as the dean of the college from 1980 to 2001. Developed since 1977 and taught till today the obedience to authority seminar for undergraduate

psychology majors and also in the human rights program at the college.Стюарт Ливин - доктор философии (PhD), профессор социальной

психологии. Почётный декан Бард Колледжа (Эннандейл-на-Гудзоне, штат Нью-Йорк, США). Преподавательские и научные интересы: социальное влияние и повинуемость легитимным авторитетам. Степень магистра получена в Новой школе социальных наук, где он учился у Соломона Эша. Степень доктора философии защищена в Нью-Йоркском государственном университете в Олбани (консультанты диссертации – Абрахам Лачинс и Джозеф Сеф Стеджер). Профессор С. Ливин преподаёт с 1964-го года в Бард Колледже и занимал должность декана этого колледжа (1980 – 2001). В Бард Колледже он основал в конце 70-х гг. семинар повинуемости легитимным авторитетам для студентов-психологов старших курсов, ведёт его до сих пор, а также преподаёт его в программе прав человека.

Key words: seminar, Bard College, Thomas Blass, Milgram, obedience, disobedience, methodology, personal and situational factors, common decency, Francois Rochat, resistance to authority, Milgram’s obedience paradigm.

108


Ключевые слова: семинар, Бард Колледж, Томас Блэсс, Милгрэм, повинуемость легитимным авторитетам, неповиновение, методология, личностные и ситуативные факторы, простая порядочность, Франсуа Роша, сопротивление легитимным авторитетам, obedience-парадигма Милгрэма.

AbstractThe paper examines the beginning of and continuing development of the obedience

to authority seminar at Bard College in New York State. The seminar proudly took as its name the title of the Thomas Blass biography of

Stanley Milgram – “The Man and the Experiment that Shocked the World.” The Milgram Yale study and the subsequent fifty years of intensive interest and

critique and even replication concerning obedience to authority has been the central focus of the author and his students since the 1970s.

The conduct of the seminar has led to a close consideration of an array of dimensions and this paper examines such. Among the topics covered are: what is believed to be substantive and valid critiques of the original and many successive studies; the continuing search for instances of and substantial presence of disobedience and the conditions, both personal and situational, which produce such behavior; and, a suggested methodology for the demonstration of disobedience in both the psychology laboratory and an array of natural settings.

The author also recalls and discusses the human trait and potential of “common decency”. This offered by Francois Rochat in his studies of the rescue of Jews by individuals in World War II. Speculation is attempted about how such can be assessed and when combined with advanced moral perspective may be found to provide for resistance and disobedience to authority.

АннотацияДанная статья знакомит читателей с возникновением и продолжающимся

развитием постоянно действующего в Бард-Колледже, штат Нью-Йорк, семинара по проблеме повинуемости легитимным авторитетам.

Семинар с гордостью носит название, взятое из заголовка биографии Милгрэма, написанной Томасом Блэссом «Человек и эксперимент, которые потрясли мир» ("The Man and the Experiment that Shocked the World").

С 70-х годов исследования Милгрэма в Йельском университете привлекают пристальное внимание автора и его студентов: более пятидесяти лет во всём мире наследие Милгрэма активно изучают, критикуют и даже пытаются повторять его эксперименты.

На семинаре с самых различных позиций тщательно рассматриваются многие проблемы наследия Милгрэма. Вот лишь некоторые темы семинара: аспекты оригинальных и последующих исследований, вызывающие существенную и

109


обоснованную критику; постоянный поиск случаев реального неповиновения и личностных и ситуативных факторов, вызывающих такое поведение; предлагаемые методики демонстрации неповиновения, как в условиях лаборатории, так и в широком спектре реальных ситуаций. Автор также напоминает о такой человеческой черте как «простая порядочность» («common decency») и обсуждает её потенциал.

Этот термин был предложен в исследованиях Франсуа Роша, посвящённых спасению евреев отдельными людьми во время Второй мировой войны. Мы рассматриваем способы оценки таких поступков и как такие поступки в сочетании с прогрессивными моральными установками могут запускать механизмы сопротивления и неповиновения власти.

Somewhere in the late winter of 1977 we at Bard College were embarking on an innovative approach to college admissions called The Immediate Decision Program. The details of the plan are not actually germane to either my original motivation or the herein described ongoing study of Milgram’s obedience to authority research and its ever evolving vast amount of subsequent study. The paths however do cross. I was a professor of social psychology at Bard at the time – and I still serve in that capacity. I was asked by President Botstein to prepare a syllabus for an interdisciplinary seminar and also to conduct such for applicants to the college. This seminar would mostly occur during an applicant’s campus visit. My charge was to prepare a set of readings, which we would send in advance of the visit, and would serve as the content of the seminar. A seminar that would reflect our liberal arts tradition and which would extend across the fields of study at the college. My own academic field was and is social psychology and the 1974 Harper Row publication by Milgram of his work at Yale University was active in my mind and central in my teaching agenda at Bard. The readings we sent converged on the theme of obedience to authority, moral development, and the ethical responsibility of those who practice modern medical and social science. Knowing the Milgram work, I anticipated that the Bard class for those applying to the college would interest. It would benefit greatly from the dynamic nature of the work in the Milgram laboratory at Yale University. Not long after this admissions venture, I became the dean at Bard College and while continuing to teach social psychology, the agenda for the Milgram Seminar itself gathered well much material which followed the original work. The mass of this has never escaped my mind and my active interest and now fifty years or so after the “shock machine” was constructed still leaves me in awe.

110


Some years later and following retirement from the dean’s office and a return to full time teaching my attachment to “Milgram Studies” took center stage in my academic life. I prepared a full and up-dated semester long seminar for advanced social studies students in the realm of obedience to authority. I gave my seminar the title of the published biography of Milgram by Thomas Blass – “The Man and the Experiment that Shocked the World”. Professor Blass has become an endeared colleague who has visited me and my seminar and me him on our respective campuses.

Without doubt the seminar has grown to surely unimagined and even unmanageable size and complexity as publication after publication have filled the obedience archive. All this in addition to correspondence from and even controversy among those studying in this domain, some of who trace their work back to time spent as graduate students of Milgram at Yale and in New York City. This including Alan Elms who was one of his assistants for the experiments at Yale. And as anniversary times came and went the expansion of study has been enhanced by conferences such as that one held in Bracebridge, Canada in the summer of 2013 and several organized over the last few years by Professor Alexander Voronov and Regina Ershova and colleagues in Russia. In addition, there have been recent special publications in both 2013 and 2014 by the Journal of Theoretical and Applied Ethics and the Journal of Social Issues. These also to mark anniversary occasions of the original work. And of course one must not overlook the startling partial replication of the Milgram experiment conducted by Jerry Burger in Santa Clara, California (2009) and the multiple responses to his work. My attempt at Bard has been to integrate this considerable array of study of the obedience phenomena into a fifteen-week semester. Such semesters have been enriched by visits from time to time by notable scholars who present particular perspectives on the matter. There is much that can be spoken of and described about the content and organization of the current seminar and to that end I will append the course statement and week-by-week course content to this paper. But for this presentation I offer a number and variety of ideas that have persistently taken center stage within discussion with my students and Milgram colleagues over the past dozen years or thereabouts. They are topics that are constantly prominent in my mind and thus come naturally to the minds of my students. These are: First, the huge domain of critique of the Milgram investigation and the research and scholarship that has followed his study paradigm. I speak of critique beyond the ethical dimension, which by itself occupies much attention but has been considered greatly over the years and even very recently. Thus need not be my major focus. Second, is the notion of brisk “pacing” of the obedience laboratory study design and the singular

111


and, in my judgment, prominent absence of time for reflection. Such is never made available to subjects. This has recently been discussed by Burger (2014) who conjectures that the outcome of the study might be vastly different had a time to “ponder” been made part of the procedure. Over the years my students and I have thought about the place of thinking in all that has been found and a method to include such seems among us to surely be at one’s disposal. Third, is the long sought after traits or factors accompanying the occurrence of disobedience to authority? Finding such has been the goal of social psychologists and others and has been notably wondered about by Philip Zimbardo since 1974 and Lawrence Kohlberg and others even before that. This has recently been restated by Sharon Presley (2013) in a personal communication. (She by the way was one of Milgram’s graduate students at the City University of New York.) This is perhaps best indicated by those subjects who do not even begin to give the initial 15-volt shock when the first word-pair error is revealed. Admittedly this does not happen often. Milgram in 1974 reports two such instances among the hundreds of subjects he ran and Burger (2011) in a private communication reports five instances of “absolute disobedience” in his study. Also there is an interesting conjecture offered by President Botstein of Bard College, who is a distinguished musicologist. He wonders if somehow the use of a tape recording of victim vocalization and complaint, employed for control purposes in many studies, somehow removes, lessens or changes the human particularity of the experimental situation in a substantial manner. This compared with live performance. Finally, there is the human variable of “common decency” discussed by Francois Rochat (2001) that intrigues me greatly. These are the matters discussed in the main body of this paper. This in addition to speculating if there might be a personal variable that can be identified and measured and which can be shown to bring about significant resistance to authority – and thus even observed to bring about resistance in social domains – this where it is to my mind vastly needed. I mention once again in this regard the concept of common decency.

Any Obedience/Milgram seminar must very early in a semester deal with the critiques of the Yale venture. Those among us who teach this material know that this is not a trivial issue, nor is it confined to just an ethical perspective on the study. My students almost immediately are introduced to Diana Baumrind both past and present (1965, 2013). They also come to know some of the content from the Yale Milgram archive that contains not a trivial amount of complaint, and even invective, that came the way of the inventive man. Thomas Blass is one source of the archival trail of much of the heated debate. More recently Gina Perry (2012)

112


serves this particular function rather energetically. But ethics is but one edge of the critique. Let me cite one other.

Some years ago I found a piece written by an English professor and dean at Dennison University in Ohio. William Nichols (1975) made to my mind a stunning argument that the standard complaint of the victim/learner within the Milgram studies was nothing short of vacuous. That is, merely crying out in pain and asking over and over to be released falls far short of providing the necessary human incentive to desist in destructive activity. In Nichols’ view such is devoid of what an actual conversation and appeal for release might and would contain. In his article he envisioned an alternative scenario containing appeals by the learner that were, in his judgment, much more pertinent and which were addressed directly to the “teacher” appealing to basic humanity and not just following commands. It was his conviction that such would go a long way toward lessening, and to his (and my own) mind the stopping of the vast amount of observed destructive obedience. Nichols suggested that an appeal to family and children would be vastly effective in reducing obedience. For example, Nichols’ script contains such choice victim responses as “Good god man, how long can keep this up? You don’t look like an executioner. You look too warm and alive. Do you have any children?” Etc. Now I have listened to any number of recordings and viewed tapes of a Milgram studies and even recently have observed the response scenario of the Paris TV show and I would agree that the begging to be released sounds very urgent and real and is reported as such by subjects. This despite the fact that it is mostly presented in a tape-recorded version about which I will comment later in this paper. However, I know of no study that investigated a change in the victim’s script of the sort suggested by Nichols and noted here. I firmly believe more resistance would be observed. I do not criticize Milgram for the use of the narrowly phrased call to stop the sessions but only suggest that the result may have been vastly different with the introduction of some additional human quality in the complaint of the victim. Surely, a script similar to that one spoken of could be introduced in a controlled manner and a comparative result obtained to that one observed so often in obedience studies.

I turn to another persistent aspect of the Milgram/Obedience study domain that has occupied me and my students for many years. This has to do with the so-called “pacing” of the study and to my mind the centrality of the presence or absence of, and the quality of thinking, which may or may not be at ready disposal of the subjects involved. As recently as this year Jerry Burger (2014) has brought this matter to somewhat center focus within the current discussion of laboratory research of obedience to authority. This in his article about situational factors in

113


the special Journal of Social Issues publication. It has even re-occupied the minds of a number of my current seminar students. Let me explain. Burger argues that there are four prominent situational factors that keep subjects engaged in obedient behavior. One of those he cites is the limited opportunity to “ponder” the decision to obey or resist. I argue, as does Burger, that such is due to the pacing of the experiment. That is the situational factor in question. Burger points to the fact that Milgram’s subjects have very little time to consider their own thoughts or arguments for or against going along with the experimenter’s prods to continue. Moreover, they were instructed to work briskly. In short, Burger stresses that participants are denied an opportunity to fully consider – and thoughtfully so (my contention) - the option open to them. Burger then convincingly makes the case that such circumstances enhance the power of situational factors of the Milgram paradigm. True enough, but I would seek to further articulate and attempt to understand the person-factor which is given less chance of coming to the surface as a result of pacing – that is, advanced moral judgment that could, if allowed to surface, bring about a cessation or even the absolute failure to participate from the very outset when called upon to shock the learner following the first error. I further argue that this is not primarily the operation of a situational factor but that thinking and the quality of such represents a dimension embedded into the psychology of a subject and as such might represent a personal variable of much importance in the subjects’ decision making in the domain we are considering. That the quality of thinking is crucial. Burger notes of course that personal pondering may bring one to act with more prudent respect to situational factors in the experiment. It is my further contention that it is the quality of thinking which needs close examination if one is to unravel the observation of destructive obedience.

A long time ago, I saw a film that connected the Milgram study to Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development and the levels therein described. This was an acted version and not an actual study although an actual study has been reported (1976). In the film a level six person, one with an advanced and sophisticated moral perspective centered on universal principles of justice, when encountering the first error in a word pair stops and turns to the experimenter and says, “Let me think about this”. He then upon reflection declares “that one cannot give an electric shock to a learner in response to a missed word pair” and then promptly leaves the study. Leaves to go and find out if such an experiment was indeed sanctioned by the university. This at the 15-volt level.

If I were to do a Milgram study, – and Jerry Burger offers to lend his authentic “shock machine” to those so interested and could pass the matter through

114


a local IRB – it would be based on the variable that I just articulated. I believe given the time and perhaps even the prompting to think, more subjects would join the disobedient minority. Suppose we were to “fake” a breakdown of the shock apparatus – “Oh there goes my machine again, it will take a few minutes to repair and then we can continue.” A “time out” occurs and when the experimenter returns he is greeted by “you know I have been thinking about all of this and I want to quit.”

A week or two ago in this current semester my students and I were discussing this very idea and one intelligent member of our group reminded me that a couple of weeks prior to this we were reading how an obvious incompetent experimenter was capable of producing significantly less obedience and was not the breakdown of the machine an definite sign of incompetence. This benefit of having smart students attends one’s classes – but surely there are alternative ways to introduce time outs or delays without displays of incompetence.

At this juncture in my lengthy presentation of ideas, and prior to drawing all this to an appropriate conclusion, I come to the issue of the tape recording of the victim, which almost all researchers use when it does not obviate the investigation of particular variables where a taped victim is not possible. I understand very well the need for experimental control and not to have the cries of the learner vary from session to session and variation to variation and subject to subject. Let me offer the following conjecture about the contrast between “live” performance and its tape-recorded version.

I am fortunate enough to have as the President of my college a distinguished musicologist who has thought about and studied the matter of the distinction between recorded music and live performance. Leon Botstein’s sense of recorded music, and often even as a result of its advanced technology, differs remarkably from live performance. Transposing this argued point of view into the context of the experimental effort by Milgram and many others, Botstein goes so on to suggest that the cries of the victim, almost always where appropriate to the research variable tested, are recorded and as such lacks the character and force of a “live event.” A recorded victim is somehow removed from the “real thing.” Now I know that every responsible researcher asks his subjects in a post experimental interview - “Did you believe the shocks were real and did you believe the pleas of the victim were real?” They find the evidence never ambiguous. It is believed and the plea to be released is judged real. And as I pointed out earlier my own sense of such vocalization is that it is real. But perhaps Botstein is on to something and no recording is ever or can ever be the same as a “live” response and this fact interferes with the matter at hand. I know of very few instances where a live victim

115


complaint was studied with the exception of where the victim was brought closer to the subject or in the unpublished last study of the Milgram venture – “the bring a friend study” where the cries of pain are not recorded. In both of these instances there was truly a minimal amount of obedience. I understand we are describing instances of studying two variables at one time. Nevertheless the non-recording feature of the experiment is prominent. I think we could do a controlled “live victim” study with perhaps even a well-trained actor playing the victim’s part.

Finally, I turn to a most often discussed aspect of obedience study in my Milgram seminar and the one that intrigues me most. I should like to study not obedience but its immediate and absolute absence. Perhaps that is what determines for me the importance of all of this. Let me explain. As I pointed out earlier, among the hundreds of subjects Milgram ran he reports in a footnote (1974, p.61) to one study in a table of results that two subjects in the Bridgeport condition refuse to even deliver the first 15-volt shock. I should like to know what human capacity brings about such an outcome. A year or so ago, I asked Jerry Burger about such a finding in his partial replication of the Milgram study. Did he observe any of this in his investigation? He reports five such instances. It did come to me when I observed a film of the Burger replication that I thought I saw some very quizzical early response among his subjects. In other domains (Le Chambon, France in WW II Rochat and Modigliani (1995) and in their thorough analysis within the Milgram archive at Yale (1995) they report that early resistance among subjects to be crucial in the disobedient response. What about not even beginning? Very parenthetically I note that in his video remarks to the current conference professor Zimbardo wears a Tee shirt noting that evil begins at 15 volts. He comments that to begin seems very important. I would like to study people who do not begin. I am reminded of Zimbardo’s (1974) wondering a long time ago about why people did not jump out of their chairs and object to that which was happening, and in my mind even at the very outset of the any Milgram experiment.

How much I would enjoy studying this immediate absence of obedience. What is the human condition that produces such? To my mind the closest I have ever heard is that one articulated by Francois Rochat of Switzerland who pointed out any number of times over the past years the variable of “common decency” as the source of resistance or disobedience. How I wish I knew how to measure such and to show how it is exactly that human capacity that enables one to leave the shock table and hand back the money. This when the first word pair in the list is not recalled correctly and when advanced thinking intervenes.

116


Thank you for the moments at your conference. I surely would have very much wished to attend in person to meet once again those I was will greatly miss - those I was acquainted with a few years ago.

COURSE DESCRIPTION – OBED SEMINAR BARD, Fall 2014

SOCIAL STUDIES/HUMAN RIGHTS 346STUDIES IN OBEDIENCE: THE MAN AND THE EXPERIMENT THAT SHOCKED THE

WORLD: STANLEY MILGRAM AT YALE"*BARD COLLEGEMcCARTHY HOUSETHE HANNAH ARENDT CENTER

FALL 2014MONDAY 3:00 – 6:00

PROFESSOR STUART LEVINE

COURSE STATEMENT

It has now been more than fifty years since the original work of Stanley Milgram demonstrated the remarkable and widely unpredicted finding that large numbers of individuals in multiple samples of American men and women studied were willing to "punish" another person when ordered to do so by an experimenter; this in the context of a psychology experiment on learning and memory. The prominence of the initial work and the continued salience of such study and associated findings in the domain of social psychology cannot be over-stated. It very much has not reached the stage of dormancy and the publication of studies, reviews and conferences continue to appear in unabated fashion. Observed in a review by Thomas Blass (1991) there were listed as many as 200 references. Since the Blass review it could well be that literally dozens more have appeared since then and in a variety of institutional settings. It is even the case that as recently as five years ago a replication of the original study with only slight modifications was published (J. Burger, January 2009). In addition, a diligent search of current psychology or cross disciplinary archives can uncover still further studies and demonstrations that provide evidence that “obedience” and destructive obedience is very much prevalent in our society and in many others as well.

Beyond and aside from the volume of investigations conducted and the attempts at review and theorizing, the domain of the "Milgram study” is especially worthy of continuing interest. This not only because of the vastness of both criticism and praise to which the original work was subjected but also because of historical events in the intervening years between 1960 and stretching to our current time. It is suggested here that the continuing study of obedience

117


phenomena is vital for the betterment of institutions, even in a democratic society and that social scientists should and must find a way to safely and ethically investigate the conditions that promote destructive obedience and thereby learn the rudiments of how it can be minimized.

This is an upper college seminar. It is not limited to psychology or social studies majors. The two criteria for membership are a willingness to read with care and then with conviction share with others the results of such reading and study. Over the course of the semester a sizable portion of the work contained in the body of the obedience literature is reviewed from the perspective of trying to assess the continuing status of the phenomenon and to understand the explanations that have been brought to light.

*The title for this seminar is taken from the biography of Stanley Milgram authored by Thomas Blass, a professor of social psychology at the University of Maryland Baltimore County campus.

WHERE TO REACH ME

BARD COLLEGELIBRARY OFFICE 405845 [email protected]

ANNANDALE HOME845 758-2839

ON OCCASION:NEW YORK CITYBARD HALL410 WEST 58TH STREETNY 10019212 582-9075

TUESDAY – SIMON’S [email protected] FLOOR – HALL CENTER

COURSE OUTLINE – OBED SEMINAR BARD, Fall 2014

SS/HR 346BARD COLLEGE, FALL 2014

MONDAY 3:00 – 6:00McCARTHY HOUSE/ THE HANNAH ARENDT CENTER

SEP 1 – SESSION 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE LABORATORY STUDY OF OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY. ORGANIZATION OF THE SEMESTER. METHOD FOR OUR STUDYREADING ASSIGNMENT (DISTRIBUTED IN SEMINAR). MILGRAM'S INITIAL REPORT – J. OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1963. CHAPTER 1 – 1974 HARPER & ROW, NEW YORK.

SEP 8 – SESSION 2 READING STANLEY MILGRAM: The Full 1974 Report of the

118




Experimental Studies at YaleSEP 15 – SESSION 3 THE ETHICAL DEBATE THROUGH TIME. DIANA BAUMRIND

AND OTHERS. MILGRAM’S RESPONSE. GINA PERRY – “BEHIND THE SHOCK MACHINE”

SEP 22 – SESSION 4 OTHER CRITIQUES OF MILGRAM AND LABORATORY OBEDIENCE STUDIES – PAST AND PRESENT.

SEP 29 – SESSION 5 THE STUDY OF OBEDIENCE IN DIVERSE CONTEXTS I: THE HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL PRACTICE; THE CLASSROOM; THE COCKPIT; THE MILITARY; THE WORKPLACE

OCT 6 – SESSION 6 THE STUDY OF OBEDIENCE IN DIVERSE CONTEXTS AND PLACES II: GERMANY; THE BRIDGEPORT STUDIES; THE VIRTUAL WORLD; BUSINESS AND THE LAW.

OCT 13 FALL BREAK – NO SEMINAR MEETINGOCT 20 – SESSION 7 A VARIETY OF STUDIES I: SITUATIONAL FACTORSOCT 27 – SESSION 8 A VARIETY OF STUDIES II: SITUATIONAL FACTORS (CONT.)NOV 3 – SESSION 9 A VARIETY OF STUDIES III: PERSONAL FACTORS AND

PERSONALITY CORRELATES.NOV 10 – SESSION 10 THE BURGER REPLICATION AND CRITIQUES. CURRENT

ANALYSES OF THE OBEDIENCE FINDINGS.NOV 17 – SESSION 11 INTERNAL VALIDITY ALLOWS FOR THE CONTENTION OF

ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY: EXTENDING LABORATORY OBEDIENCE STUDY TO HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOCIETAL CONTEXTS – COMMENTARY, INTERPRETATIONS AND THE WORK OF FRANCOIS ROCHAT.

NOV 24 – SESSION 12 BACK TO MILGRAM: THE 1974 ANALYSIS AND THE WORK AND INTERACTIONIST CLARITY OF THOMAS BLASS.

DEC 1 – SESSION 13 TO BE DECIDED FINAL ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTEDDEC 8 – SESSION 14 OUT OF SEMINAR WORK – ARCHIVAL AND ESSAY EXERCISE

NO FORMAL SEMINAR – INDIVIDUAL CONFERENCESDEC 15 – SESSION 15 FINAL PRESENTATIONS

119

Mantell, David M.*, Faye, Allison L., & Panzarella, Robert. The Milgram paradigm as a measure of pro-social behavior: Deciding to and not to inflict pain. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Re-gional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

THE MILGRAM PARADIGM AS A MEASURE OF PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:

DECIDING TO AND NOT TO INFLICT PAINOBEDIENCE- ПАРАДИГМАСТЭНЛИМИЛГРЭМА

: КАКМЕТОДИКАИЗМЕРЕНИЯПРОСОЦИАЛЬНОГОПОВЕДЕНИЯ РЕШЕНИЕПРИЧИНЯТЬИЛИНЕПРИЧИНЯТЬ БОЛЬ

David M. Mantell, Allison L. Faye, Robert Panzarella Teachers College Columbia University andJohn Jay College of Criminal Justice, USA

[email protected]

David Mantell is a forensic clinical psychologist who consults to the courts in New England primarily on child protection and criminal prosecution matters in physical and sexual abuse cases. He received his master’s degree at Teachers College Columbia University in Counseling Psychology in 1965 and his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology at the Ludwig Maximillian University, Munich in 1972. During 9 years as a research psychologist at the Max-Planck Institute of Psychi-atry in Munich, Dr. Mantell conducted research and published on the late effects of concentration camp incarceration, PTSD in Vietnam

Veterans, the psychosocial and psychological correlates of decisions to resist induction into the US Armed Forces versus volunteer for combat in the Vietnam war, and the social psychology of compliance and refusal behavior in the Milgram experiment. Dr. Mantell continues to pursue forensic consultation to the courts and lectures as an adjunct professor in the Clinical Psychology MA Program at Teachers College Columbia University.

Дэвид Мантелл - Дэвид Мантелл – специалист по судебной клинической психологии, консультирующий суды Новой Англии по вопросам защиты детей и уголовного преследования в случаях сексуального и физического насилия. В 1965 году Педагогическим колледжем Колумбийского университета ему была присвоена учёная степень магистра по консультативной психологии. В 1972 году мюнхенский Университет Людвига Максимилиана присвоил ему степень доктора философии по клинической психологии. В течение 9 лет д-р Мантелл работал в Мюнхенском институте психиатрии им. Макса Планка в качестве научного сотрудника-

A special thanks is expressed to Professor Stuart Levine and his students in the Milgram Seminar at Bard College for stimulating renewed attention to meaning of the Self-Decision Condition.

Мы выражаем особую благодарность профессору Стюарту Ливину и его студентам, участникам Милгрэмовского семинара в Бард колледже, за то, что они стимулировали нас по-новому взглянуть на значение варианта «Самостоятельное принятие решения».

120



психолога. В этот период им были опубликованы результаты следующих исследований: отсроченные эффекты пребывания в концентрационном лагере, посттравматическое стрессовое расстройство у ветеранов войны во Вьетнаме, психосоциальные и психологические корреляты сопротивления поступлению на военную службу в армию США в сравнении с добровольным согласием на участие в боевых действиях во времена войны во Вьетнаме, а также социально-психологические аспекты повинуемости и неповиновения в эксперименте Милгрэма. Д-р Мантелл продолжает работать в качестве судебного эксперта; кроме того, в качестве адъюнкт-профессора он читает лекционные курсы по магистерской программе "Клиническая психология" в Педагогическом колледже Колумбийского университета.

Allison Faye is a Ph.D. candidate in Cognitive Psychology at Teachers College Columbia University. Элисон Фэй – аспирантка (область исследований когнитивная психология) университета Педагогического колледжа Колумбийского университета.

Robert Panzarella is Professor of Criminal Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Роберт Панзарелла – профессор криминальной юстиции Колледжа криминальной юстиции Джона Джея.

Key words: choice, obedience, Milgram, prosocial, self decision condition, social psychology.Ключевые слова: выбор, повинуемость легитимному авторитету, Милгрэм, просоциальное поведение самостоятельное принятие решений, социальная психология.

AbstractIn 1970, 3 variations of the Milgram experiment were performed in Munich with

markedly different compliance and refusal rates. In the Base-line Condition, an 85% compliance rate occurred. In the Modeling De-legitimization Condition the compliance rate dropped to 50%. In the Self-Decision Condition, the compliance rate dropped to 7%, with 93% of subjects (teachers) discontinuing after different levels of expressed pain from the student. Much of the literature about Milgram experiment and related social psycho-logical experiments concentrates on the compliance /obedience rates and attempts to ex-plain this behavior. This paper focuses on the subjective experience of the 93% of sub-jects who decided to stop administering shocks to an ostensibly restrained student. Stop-ping the experiment was not merely an option for subjects in the Self-Decision Condition. Subjects were expressly instructed that in the role of teacher it was their assigned task to decide if and how many shocks they administered. Subjects in all conditions in the Mu-nich experiments were debriefed. The debriefings were audio recorded and transcribed at that time in the native language of the subjects, German. For this paper, the transcripts

121


made 44 years ago have been analyzed by raters who are fluent German readers and speakers. This paper provides a first look at the content of the explanations provided in 1970 by German subjects in the Munich experiments. Аннотация

В 1970 году в Мюнхене были проведены 3 варианта эксперимента Милгрэма с заметно различавшимися повинуемостью и неповиновением. В базовом

(“base-line”) классическом варианте эксперимента 85% испытуемых подчинились легитимному авторитету. В варианте «Моделирование де-легитимизации» повинуемость снизилась до 50%. В варианте «Самостоятельное принятие решения» повинуемость снизилась до 7%, то есть 93% испытуемых ("учителей"), прекращали наносить удары током после того как "ученик" заявлял, что он в той или иной степени испытывает боль. Большая часть работ об obedience-эксперименте Милгрэма и подобных социально-психологических экспериментах сконцентрирована на количественных показателях повинуемости и попытках объяснить это поведение. Данная статья фокусируется на субъективном опыте 93% испытуемых, которые решили прекратить наносить удары током "ученику", якобы привязанному к креслу. В варианте «Самостоятельное принятие решения» прекращение эксперимента было не просто одним из выборов для испытуемого; испытуемые получили специальную инструкцию: в роли учителя перед ними поставлена задача – решить, сколько ударов они назначат и назначат ли их вообще. Дебрифинг испытуемых проводили в каждом из трёх вариантов мюнхенских экспериментов. Аудиозапись дебрифингов и её транскрибирование были сделаны в то время на немецком языке – родном для испытуемых. Записи, сделанные 44 года назад, проанализировали для этой публикации эксперты, свободно читающие и говорящие по-немецки. Эта статья – первая попытка анализа содержания объяснений, представленных в 1970 году немецкими испытуемыми мюнхенских экспериментов.

MethodAt the close of each trial of the Self-Decision Condition, subjects received

debriefing in a multi-purpose interview. The interview included open-ended questions about spontaneous reactions to the experiment and focused questions to clarify assessment issues. The debriefing prompted subjective data on the following issues with the following questions:

1. Tell me what the experiment was like and what you thought of it.2. Did you think it was a good experiment or not a good experiment? Please ex-

plain your answer. 3. Were you nervous at any time during the experiment, and if so, when was

that?4. In your opinion, did the subject suffer?

122


5. In your opinion (for those who said yes to question 3), did he suffer strongly, moderately, lightly?

6. Did you get more or less nervous as the experiment went on?7. When did you first (measured by shock level number or voltage) want to stop?

8. What was the reason you wanted to stop?9. You went to____ (the last shock level recorded for that subject). Why did

you continue past the level you wanted to stop?10. Which of these alternatives do you think was the purpose of the experi-

ment?a. We wanted to investigate how much a person can learn? b. Or, how much pain a person can endure?c. Or, how far you punish him?11. From 100% responsibility for the experiment, how much of the responsibil-

ity do you assign to us and how much responsibility do you take for your-self? Please explain your answer.

12. Do you feel guilty about any part of your role in this experiment? What do you feel guilty about?

13. In regard to the student’s current condition of health, how do you think he is doing? Please explain your opinion.

14. Would you be willing to change roles and be the student in a follow-up ex-periment?

The debriefing included a face-to-face meeting between the subject and the student. The student presented in a friendly and cordial manner, explained that he in fact had not been hurt and felt fine, that all the screams were pre-recorded, and he sat inside pressing the answer buttons according to a pre-determined list of responses. The subject and student were given as much time as they wanted to talk and many of they hugged each other. The psychosocial information gathered from subjects is not reported here. The reader is referred to the original publications of Mantell (1971) and Mantell and Panzarella (1976) for full descriptions of the research design, obedience data, perceptions of the realism of the experiment, and the study of the relationship between obedience and responsibility. Below is a phenomenological description of the debriefing data from the Self-Decision Condition only. In subsequent reports, debriefing data from the Base-Line and Modeling Defiance conditions will be revisited and compared to the self-decision condition. Theoretically, our interest focuses at this time on the perceptions and reports of subjects in the Self-Decision Condition because we believe this condition most closely approximates the daily life situations faced by people and decisions they are called upon to make.

123


Psychosocial information gathered from subjects, i.e. level of education, income, child-rearing practices experienced, etc. will be presented in a subsequent paper.

The Ground Conflict Posed by The Milgram Paradigm in The Self-Decision Condition: Originally, the Milgram paradigm was thought to mimic circumstances in which individuals were ordered to impose progressively greater harm to a helpless victim for purposes understand best by the authority making this demand (Milgram, 1963 & 1974). Many thought compliance in this case required complicity in destructive behavior. However, in the past 50 years the Milgram paradigm and results have been more broadly applied to decisions in a variety of social and occupational conditions in which harm to others can occur and in which the morality of the individual is pitted against the requirements of a job, the directives of a superior, or the choices in life in which the welfare of self and others may be involved and which may be in conflict ( See Milgram Conference Proceedings On-line, Bracebridge, Ontario Canada, 2013).

We propose that the Self-Decision Condition may be a closer ecological approximation of the conflicts people face in everyday life than the Base-line Experiment in the original Milgram series. In the Munich experiments, from the outset, subjects were placed under pressure to participate and perhaps to comply with the “demands” of authority (Orne, M.T. 1962). All subjects were recruited from governmental agencies and large corporations. The directorship of these organizations were contacted by the chief of the Max-Planck Institute sponsoring the experiment and asked to provide employees on a voluntary basis to participate in a learning experiment. Each subject received a personal letter explaining the origin of the request, that participation is voluntary, and assuming agreement with this request, a day, time and address for participation was provided. Each subject was also informed that he could decline to participate and that the method of doing so was to inform his supervisor so that another person could be substituted. A payment of 25 Marks was offered for participating and a 2 hour time for travel and the experiment was estimated. It is our opinion, that this method of obtaining subjects put them under pressure to comply with the request as the request came from the top down within their work organization and non-participation required a phone call to a supervisor. Prospective participants were advised that no reason for non-participation was required.

We observe that the decision to participate in an experiment sponsored by the Max Planck Institute began a process of commitment which led to the experience within the Milgram paradigm. The Munich Milgram experiments therefore involved a series of decisions which both precede and accompany the actual

124


experiment [See also Sherif (1935) and Asch (1955)] and which involves a number of people. We observe further that arriving at the laboratory, filling out the paperwork, receiving the DM25 “merely for coming” reflect multiple steps on site in which decisions and social experiences occur. We propose that feelings of involvement and perhaps of obligation are intensified by participating in the early stages of the experiment, going through the determination of roles ( a straw drawing ), finding out about the nature of one’s assigned role, and then further through the restraint of the student, taking a sample shock to experience that the machine works, receiving instruction about the rules of the experiment, thereby becoming a participant in a research event involving several people at a prestigious research center. The subject entered the physical grounds of the research center and for a short time became a member of a research team. It was evident that considerable preparation preceded this event. Research personnel appeared in white coats, spoke clearly and authoritatively, and moved events along confidently and seemingly in a predetermined order.

We also assume that the instruction in the Self-Decision Condition that “it is entirely up to you to decide if and how much you punish the student for mistakes” diluted and perhaps cured the sense of concern subjects began to develop as the potentially painful and perhaps very painful aspects of the experiment became clear. We assume that there was a balancing impact of this instruction to offset any idea that ‘blind obedience’ or ‘mindless compliance’ was required. This instruction that “it is up to you” was repeated and emphasized. Subjects were told twice by the Experimenter that it was “completely up to you to decide if and how much punishment you administer. I am only here to answer technical questions.” This instruction was given for the purpose of notifying each subject that stopping is a legitimate option, that when to stop was a decision each subject is called upon to make, and that there was no penalty for stopping. It was assumed that this would bring home to the subjects that it was their decision-making as much as anything else that was being studied, thus inviting subjects to experience the onus of decision making personally. We did not think, however, that this instruction cured the ‘demand ‘characteristics of the situation (Orne, 1962). The Experimenter had made it clear that the Max Planck Institute for Learning Behavior is a serious organization and it had gone to a lot of trouble to set up this experiment. The goal of this effort was to study a subject of self-evident importance which would likely be within the ken of every person – as society at all levels offers inducements to learn and penalties for not learning.

Germany was seen as a traditional society emphasizing tried and true ways of behaving and solving problems, a society in which rewards and punishments might be clearly delineated for compliance and non-compliance with authority - in school,

125


at home, and in the workplace. Thus we assumed that The Self-Decision Condition would present subjects with an easily recognized choice situation. On the one hand we engendered feelings of obligation through the manner in which subjects were solicited, by paying them even if only for coming, by inviting them to a prestigious institution with a brass sign on the door identifying “Max-Planck Institut Fur Lernverhalten”, and by introducing them to several employees and a number of procedures to which they had opportunity to become accustomed and with whom they could develop identification and a working relationship. We theorized that cooperation and compliance could be shown by subjects both by decisions to administer all of the shocks and by administering none or some of the shocks. We hypothesized that the objectionable features of the experiment were so obvious that subjects would immediately understand why we were leaving this decision to them. We hypothesized that there was a built-in expectation that people might be hesitant to administer shocks and this option would become increasingly attractive once shocks were administered since the shocking of the student produced cries and protests of pain. We assumed that people would react adversely to the unpleasantness of the shock chair, the restraining of the student, and putting ointment on his forearm under the electrode so that “electric impulses could freely flow through your tissue”. It became clear that the talk about punishment looked real and the designations on the shock machine indicated that it could become very, very strong. We assumed that the cries of pain would trigger a desire to stop.

The subject was put in control of the dependent variable, and was alone with this decision. Subjects were told - you decide if and how much punishment is administered. You can stop administering punishments whenever you want. The decision is yours. They were also told, we ask you not to be too soft in making your decision about whether or not to proceed with punishments. Participants were advised that if they decided to proceed to higher shock levels there would be no permanent physical damage to the student. This instruction implied it was safe to move on with punishments even if it became difficult. We assumed that life decisions occur in complex ways with alternative considerations which need to be weighed. We attempted to define conditions which were nuanced on each side of the limited options, to shock or not to shock, to inflict pain, or not to inflict pain, or if you had inflicted some pain, to stop and do no more.

The results of the Self-Decision Condition received little attention at the time of their first publication. The major concern of colleagues in Germany as Milgram reports for the United States was to find out how many people would go along with all 30 shocks in the Base-Line Condition. In the United States the percent was in the 60’s. In Germany, the percent was in the 80’s. Colleagues and the public were shocked in both countries by these results. It has increasing become our conviction

126


that the Base-Line Condition does not possess the ecological analogue validity once assumed, and that it does not represent the wide variety of choices that people have in everyday life and perhaps also not in some extreme circumstances. It is our view that the Self-Decision Condition more closely approximates real life situations and has the greater ecological validity as an analogue study, and did so also in Germany during the Nazi years for some of the more horrific decisions people made.

Results

How Far Did the Self-Decision Subjects Go? Our data show that 18 subjects stopped before the midway point at 225 volts ( 15 levers) and 12 continued above the midway point ( 16 or more levers) , 2 going to the 30th shock at 450 volts and the others, 10, stopping between 225 and 435.

What Do Subjects Say is The Level at Which They First Thought of Stopping? (n = 28, missing data = 2) The lowest level reported is 0 (zero) and the highest is 405 volts (27th shock). Twenty Ss wanted to stop between zero and 200 volts (an approximate number as the closest designation is 195 volts).

The other 9 subjects report wanting to stop between 200 and 405 volts.

The Reasons Subjects Report Wanting To Stop Are:− The cries of pain from the student (screaming)− The student had stopped reacting− Anxiety about administering extreme punishment− It was senseless to continue punishing because nothing could be achieved

under those circumstances. The student could not learn.− Concern for the welfare of the student− Did not believe in the premise of the experiment− Did not see any point in continuing after the student refused to answer− Moral reservations about punishment.− Did not want to hurt the student− The punishment had become too severe− Did not want to go beyond the 45 volt shock that the subject himself had

received

The Reasons Given For Continuing Are:− Agreement with the experimental premise ( the experiment is good, value of

psychological research)

127


− Commitment to completing the task ( did not want to compromise the experiment)

− Perceived pressure from the experimenter and not wanting to be soft− Trust in the Max-Planck Institute /trust in the experimenter− Signed a document agreeing to participate voluntarilly− The student might be faking− Confusion about instructions− Thought the student might get better at answering questions− Wanted to see what happens and was interested in the results− Remuneration − Impressive lab set-up − The student was a willing participant− Got used to the screams

What Did We Find Out About the 18 Ss Who Stopped Before the Midway Point (225 Volts or 15 Shocks)? Overwhelmingly, these subjects gave moral reasons for their behavior. They did not believe in the premise of the experiment to apply punishment and pain to study its effects on learning. They were concerned for the welfare of the student, were upset by the cries of pain and the protests of the student, observed that the student continued to make mistakes, or had no way of defending himself.

They say that the punishments were too severe, did not desire to inflict pain on another, and did not want to hurt the student. The majority did not think this was a learning experiment. They came to the conclusion that the experiment was measuring their willingness to inflict pain on the student and they did not wish to demonstrate that they had this willingness or that ability. This result may correspond to the “Competence Hypothesis” of Heath and Tversky (1991) who found that people prefer betting on their own judgment when they consider themselves knowledgeable and are more likely to abdicate judgment and decision-making when they are unsure or consider themselves not knowledgeable. The subjects in this experiment advance moral reasons (moral knowledge) as the basis for their decision to stop the experiment early. They also knew they possessed the decision making authority to do so. Subjects who continued the experiment do not reflect possession of that moral knowledge and tended to abdicate the decision to the institution and the information the institute provided.

What Did We Find Out About the 12 Ss Who Continued on after the Midway point (225 Volts to 450 Volts)? Overwhelmingly, these subjects report commitment to completing a task, trust in the institution, belief in the importance

128


in the task, trust in the examiner, the importance of following instructions, and not wanting to compromise the experiment. It is interesting to note that 10 of these Ss (83%) attributed most of the responsibility for the administration of shocks ( 50%) or more to The Max Planck Institute, while only 2(16%) attributed more responsibility to themselves. Of the 18 Ss who stopped before the midway point, 13 attributed most of the responsibility for the shocks administered to themselves (72%), while 5 administered most of the responsibility to The Max Planck Institute (27%).

Summary of Findings and Discussion In 1970 strong indications of pro-social decision making were found in a

sample of adult male subjects in a self-decision variation of the Milgram experiment. This indicates that even within a social situation with multiple compliance pressures, some immediate and others more remote,

a majority of subjects understood that they had the option of making a decision to hurt or not to hurt a person. This decision opportunity was brought to them by perhaps the most prestigious research institution in their country, The Max Planck Institute. Their decisions indicate that they carried with them a set of moral values which are opposed to the request of the testing agency. It shows that they recognized a duty not to inflict pain which derived from an internal set of values and they experienced their ability to make a decision consistent with their values. In short, they felt morally competent to make a decision and to take primary responsibility for the decision they made.

A smaller group of persons, 12 of 30, continued shocking beyond the midway point even after being told that the decision is theirs. Ten of these 12 Ss administered shocks at and above 400 volts. This is approximately one third of the sample whose behavior matches that of 85% of the Baseline Ss and 50% of the Modeling Defiance Ss. These subjects attribute most of the responsibility for the shocks administered to the Max Planck Institute. Telling them that the decision was theirs did not resonate to a high level of personal responsibility but did result in reasons for compliance that reflect traditional authority relationships and trust in the wisdom and integrity of the sponsoring institution. There is no indication that these more traditional cooperative persons are without moral values. Eleven of 12 of them experienced guilt. Some felt that the punishment was too strong. One thought that if he had taken a more positive approach and not used punishment, he might have been more successful in teaching the lesson. Still another said he did not want to cause pain to the student and so felt guilt. Another reported no guilt or remorse but said he did not enjoy the task. One realized that he could have stopped at any time but said he didn’t because he was assigned the task of punishment. For

129


this subject, most explicitly, the dual demands of the situation stood before him in full view. He could administer punishments for errors in a learning task, or he could decide to stop. The former course was indicated as the purpose of the experiment and he identified with that alternative. The later would have been his individual decision for which he would stand alone.

For some subjects the realization about the nature of their choice set in after the debriefing when they were told that the actual purpose of the experiment was to find out how far they would go. A subject reported strong reservations because he was clearly told he could stop at any time and he recognized it had been his choice to continue. He took 30% of the responsibility because of the realization that he “lacked the civil courage to say no.” He gave 70% of the responsibility to the Max Planck Institute because it originated the experiment, set it up, supervised it, and therefore is accountable if harm comes to anyone. Some of these subjects present as if they are less confident of their own values in making decisions and prefer to be guided by others. But some are convinced that the responsibility lies with the Max Planck Institute. They reason that the Max Planck Institute must exercise the care needed to preserve the health and welfare of its personnel and persons who volunteer for its research. We think that a large measure of credibility can be assigned to this view as well and that it is not readily dismissed as an excuse. These persons largely felt they had acted properly, and also thought they were being pro-social by aiding a research institute to complete a project. In their cases, this happened to require that they apply increasingly painful punishments to a student and in some cases to the point they thought he was likely unconscious or more. The felt they had undertaken a commitment to serve an institutional goal which appeared credible to them and left it to the institution to take care of the outcome. Some attributed all of the responsibility for this action to themselves while the majority attributed more of the responsibility to The Max Planck Institute. Few held themselves as carrying no responsibility for the punishments to the student.

Conclusion It is our understanding that many citizens of Nazi Germany who participated

in mass killings in WWII may have done so voluntarily and could have chosen not to participate. [Please see Hitler’s Furies by Wendy Lower (2013), for example, who describes the voluntary participation of women in various killing roles of the developmentally disabled]. It is our view that the Self-Decision Condition results, by contrast, show that when given a choice in 1970, the majority of male, German subjects recruited from governmental offices and corporations, and placed under

130


continuing conformity pressure, chose pro-socially – eventually - not to inflict pain.

The Self-Decision Condition results of the Milgram experiment teach us that people are inclined to make pro-social decisions and that they will do so when given the opportunity. The Milgram experiment also shows that many people who are pro-socially inclined can benefit from training to increase their sensitivity to their personal values (conscience) and their confidence in their own decision making capacity.

References Asch, S. E. (1955). “Opinions and social pressure.” Scientific American, 193(5), 31–35.Heath, C. and Tversky, A. (1991) Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in

Choice under Uncertainty. Journal or Risk and Uncertainty, 4:5-28Lower, W. (2013) Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields. Mariner

Books, Houghton Miflin Harcourt, Boston New YorkMantell, D. (1971) Das Potential zur Gewalt in Deutschland: Eine Replikation und

Erweiterung des Migramschen Experiments. Der Nervenarzt, 42/5, 252-257 Mantell, D. (1971) The Potential for Violence in Germany. Journal of Social Issues, 27:4,

101-112Mantell, D. and Panzarella, R. (1978) Obedience and Responsibility. Br. J. Soc. Clin.

Psychol., 15, pp. 239-245Milgram, S. (1963) Behavioral Study of Obedience. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. 67, 371-378Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper and RowOrne, M.T. On The Social Psychology Of The Psychological Experiment: With Particular

Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their Implications (1962). American Psychologist, 17, 776-783

Muzafer Sherif, "A study of some social factors in perception: Chapter 2." Archives of Psychology, 1935, 27, No. 187, 17-22.

131

O. Mitina, E. Rasskazova, V. Sorokina. Conformity in the structure of personal values and a comparative analysis of its intensity in different social and cultural groups. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

CONFORMITY IN THE STRUCTURE OF PERSONAL VALUES AND A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ITS INTENSITY

IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND CULTURAL GROUPS КОНФОРМИЗМВСТРУКТУРЕЛИЧНОСТНЫХЦЕННОСТЕЙИ

СОПОСТАВИТЕЛЬНЫЙАНАЛИЗ ЕГОВЫРАЖЕННОСТИ УПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ РАЗЛИЧНЫХСОЦИАЛЬНЫХИКУЛЬТУРНЫХ

ГРУПП

Olga Mitina Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow,

Belgorod State University, Belgorod, [email protected] Rasskazova

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Higher School of Economics

Moscow, RussiaVeronika Sorokina

Moscow City University of Psychology and EducationMoscow, Russia

Ольга Валентиновна Митина - кандидат психологических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник Московского государственного университета имени М.В. Ломоносова. Область научных интересов: количественная психология, психосемантика, приложение теории хаоса и нелинейной теории систем, политическая психология, сравнительные исследования, психология личности, психодиганостика. О.В. Митина – один из признанных специалистов в области

математической психологии в России. Является автором и соавтором 7 монографий и более 200 публикаций.Olga V. Mitina - Ph.D., Leading scientific fellow of Lomonosov Moscow State University. Field of scientific interests: quantitative psychology, psychosemantics, applications of chaos theory and nonlinear systems theory, political psychology, comparative studies, personality, psycho diagnostics. Olga Mitina is one of the well-recognized leaders of mathematical psychology in Russia. The author and co-author of 7 books, and more than 200 publications

Елена Игоревна Рассказова - кандидат психологических наук, доцент Московского государственного университета имени М.В. Ломоносова, старший научный сотрудник Высшей школы экономики. Область научных интересов: психологическая

132



саморегуляция, позитивная психология, психология здоровья, математические методы обработки данных. Является автором и соавтором 4 монографий и более 130 научных публикаций.Elena I. Rasskazova - Ph.D. Associate professor of Lomonosov Moscow State University,Moscow, Russia Senior Researcher Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. Sphere of scientific interests: psychological self-regulation, positive psychology, health psychology, mathematical methods in psychology. The author and co-author of 4 books, and more than 130 publications.

Вероника Васильевна Сорокина - кандидат психологических наук, старший научный сотрудник Московского городского психолого-педагогического университета. Область научных интересов: детская и педагогическая психология, психодиагностика, психометрика, негативные переживания детей. 1982 по 1995 преподавала курс психодиагностики в Московском педагогическом университете. С 2001 по настоящее время занимается разработкой и адаптацией психологических тестов в

Московском городском психолого-педагогическом университете. Veronika V. Sorokina - Ph.D. Senior Researcher of Moscow City University of Psychology and Education. Sphere of scientific interests: developmental and pedagogic psychology, psychodiagnostics, psychometrics, negative emotions in children. 1982-1995 V. Sorokina teached psychodyagnostics in Moscow Pedagogic University. Since 2001 she developed and validated a series of psychological tests in Moscow City University of Psychology and Education.

Key words: values, conformism, comparative study.Ключевые слова: ценности, конформизм, сравнительные исследования

AbstractIn this study, we rely on the structure and content of the values as a basis of circular motivational continuum proposed by Israeli researcher S. Schwartz. We used the latest Russian version of the Schwartz Value Survey that includes 57 items and allows revealing the personal relationship to 19 different values (Schwartz et al. 2012).Conformity as a major explanatory principle for readiness to obey, comply - is one of the values in the structure of Schwartz’s spectrum of values. He differs interpersonal conformity (avoiding upsetting others) and social conformity (complying with expectations, conformity to the rules, laws and formal social norms).In our empirical study residents from four cities in three countries – Russia (Moscow, Kirov), Uzbekistan (Tashkent), Azerbaijan (Baku) of both sexes and various ages and nationalities total number of 989 people took part. We used the latest Russian version of the Schwartz Value Survey that includes 57 items and allows revealing the personal

133


relationship to 19 different values (Schwartz et al. 2012). Results support S. Schwartz’s model circular motivational continuum of values in that (1) all the value scales are mostly reliably reproduced in different age-, gender- and cultural groups, (2) both types of conformity are positively related in most sub-samples, (3) there are consistent secondary-order value groups. We revealed important age-, gender- and cultural differences both in terms of mean scores for different values and in terms of value structure. In particular, in the eastern traditional patriarchal cultures scores on Conformity-interpersonal subscale were typically higher for men than for women while in Russia differences were opposite. Power value is higher not only in men than women (that is expectable) but also is higher in success-oriented megapolis Moscow comparing to other cities.

АннотацияВ данном исследовании мы опираемся на структуру и содержание ценностного спектра, предложенную израильским исследователем Ш. Шварцем, который определяет базовые ценности как внеситуативные цели, организованные в согласованную основополагающую систему, отличающиеся по своей субъективной значимости для одного человека или какой-то группы и в силу этой значимости в той или иной степени служащие руководящими принципами. Конформизм как один из основных объяснительных принципов готовности подчиняться – является одним из ценностных конструктов в структуре ценностного спектра Ш. Шварца. Шварц различает межличностный конформизм как нежелание расстраивать и разочаровывать других людей и социальный конформизм – стремление соответствовать правилам, законам и формальным социальным нормам. В нашем эмпирическом исследовании приняли участие русскоговорящие жители четырех городов трех стран: России (Москва, Киров), Узбекистана (Ташкент), Азербайджана (Баку) обоего пола различных возрастов и национальностей общей численностью 989 человек. Использовалась последняя русифицированная версия опросника Шварца, состоящая из 57 пунктов и позволяющая определять отношение к 19 различным ценностям (Schwarz et al., 2012). Полученные результаты поддерживают круговую модель мотивационного континуума Ш. Шварца в том, что (1) большинство шкал, характеризующих ценности, надежно воспроизводятся в различных возрастных, культурных и гендерных группах, (2) оба типа конформности положительно коррелируют в большинстве групп сравнения, (3) можно выделить согласованные ценностные блоки второго уровня. Выявлены важные возрастные, гендерные и культурные различия, как в отношении выраженности разных ценностей, так и в отношении общей структуры ценностей. В частности, в традиционно патриархальных культурах показатели по шкале межличностного конформизма в целом выше у мужчин, чем у женщин, тогда как в двух российских городах закономерность обратная. Ценность власти не только более характерна для мужчин, чем для женщин (что ожидаемо), но и более выражена в таком ориентированном на успех мегаполисе как Москва, по сравнению с другими городами.

134


Life of any person involves interaction with the society, so the assimilation of social norms, habits, values is an important aspect of personality socialization and the necessary condition of normal functioning of any social system. Socialization presupposes the formation in persons of ability to obey. This ability is included into the structure of the personality from the very deepest level - the level of needs, motives and personal meanings. Motivational structure is closely related to a structure of values. To be “valuable” for a person in this context means to meet his or her needs.

Hierarchy of values is inextricably linked with the how person perceives and relates to the world. The variety of aspects of values revealed in empirical studies reflects multiple aspects of human life: personal and social values, short-term and long-term, universal and national, bodily, material and spiritual, imaginary and true values, age-, subculture-, gender- specific values, traditional and modern, declared and real values.

Studies of the value structure (significance of individual values and their correlations with each other and other variables) at both the individual and group levels can help to explain decisions, attitudes and behavior.

Ability to comply is related to acceptance of dominant role of the society (social values), and the orientation to preservation of the existing order (conservatism). Typically this idea is described in terms of value of conformity and the corresponding personal trait of conformity. (Kryvtsov, 2007). Relationship to conformity in researchers is ambiguous. Some level of conformity not only helps a person, but also is necessary to adapt to the society. However, the larger this value is represented in the human mind (the more important it is) the more personal interests, self-expression, freedom are infringed. Difference between the conscious (legal, active) and subordinate (passive, subservient) conformity is difficult to describe unambiguously. On the one hand, conformity could be understood a continuum scale where each person has a specific score. On the other hand, difference between constructive and destructive conformism is also determined by other personal and social indicators (Aronson, 2007).

For example, the same score on conformity scale in people with different scores on the super-ego scale (adherence to moral principles) according to 16-PF Kettell’s questionnaire could be constructive in the case of high moral principles and destructive in the case of low moral principles. The higher level of self-esteem is, the greater level of conformity person can have without danger for his or her personal development.

One of the leading researchers of value orientations in social and personality psychology is an Israeli scientist S. Schwartz. Summing up long history of research

135


on this topic he developed (Schwartz, 1992) and later refined (Schwartz et al., 2012) the theory of basic individual values a theory of basic values that typical for all societies. Basic values are defined as general goals that vary in their importance and serve as guidelines in life a person or group.

Basic values are organized into a coherent underlying system that can help to explain individual decisions, attitudes and behavior. Each value is determined by one or more of the three universal needs of human existence.

1) biological needs of individuals as biological organisms2) needs of coordination of social interaction3) needs related to survival and well-being of social groups.All these universal needs are met in one way or another in process of

implementation of various values in life. Each value is related to specific motivational complex (type) (see Table 1).

Table 1. Basic values and their description (S. Schwartz)Values Conceptual definitions in terms of motivational goals

1. Self-direction Autonomy and independence in thoughts and actions1.1. Self-direction–thought

Автономия мыслей: Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities

1.2. Self-direction–ac-tion Автономия поступков: Freedom to determine one’s own actions

2. Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and change3. Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification

4. Achievement Success according to social standards; demonstration these compe-tencies

5. Power Social status, prestige, opportunity to control and dominate people and resources

5.1. Power–dominance Power through exercising control over people5.2. Power–resources Power through control of material and social resources6. Security Security, harmony and stability of society, relationships and self

6.1. Face Security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation

6.2. Security–personal Safety in one’s immediate environment6.3. Security–societal Safety and stability in the wider society7. Tradition Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions

8. Conformity Restriction of activity and desires that could be harmful for others and / or don’t follow social expectations

8.1. Conformity–rules Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations8.2. Conformity–inter-personal Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people

8.3. Humility Recognizing one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of things9. Benevolence Care for in-group members: preservation and development of well-

136


being of close others9.1. Benevolence–de-pendability Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the in-group

9.2. Benevolence–car-ing Devotion to the welfare of in-group members

10. Universalism Understanding, tolerance and protection of well-being of all people and nature

10.1. Universalism–concern Commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people

10.2. Universalism–nature Preservation of the natural environment

10.3. Universalism–tolerance

Acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself

Over the past decade, since 1992, the theory of Schwarz and his colleagues developed and the questionnaire was modified several times. Studies of value preferences were conducted in many countries, the methodology was improved in terms of conceptual basis and validity. Significant similarities in the basic values in different countries were found (Bardi, Schwartz, 2003).

Figure 1. Circular motivational continuum of values

Schwartz developed the theory of dynamic relationships between value types, which describes the conceptual organization of the system of values. Values form a circular motivational continuum spectrum (Fig. 1). This model establishes a topology of values: there are values that are closer to each other and values that have a large distance between them. Geometrically closer values are closer also in terms of the theory of basic individual values – they are complementary. Distant values lie on opposite sides of the circle

and “compete” so that desire to achieve both of them at the same moment can result in personal conflict.

137


Conformity - is one of the values in the Schwartz’s motivational continuum. As was described earlier Schwartz differs between interpersonal conformity as an unwillingness to upset and disappoint others and social conformity - the desire to comply with the rules, laws and formal social norms. Importance of both types of conformity is a sign of conservative social orientation and relates to the anxiety avoidance. The list of values that are close to conformity includes tradition, humility and public security and stability. Apparent opposition to these values is constituted by the value oriented on the individual self: self-direction in cognitions and behavior, stimulation (as an importance of novelty and hedonism). We could also hypothesize that conformity has some opposition to power value (domination and control) and achievement value. In the case of apparent opposition blocks differ by any “meta-values” while there is one common basis between conformity and achievement/power values – social orientation.

MethodsRespondents are inhabitants of the two cities of Russia: Moscow and Kirov, as

well as inhabitants of Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and Baku (Azerbajdjan).

Table 2. Socio-demographics of study sample

City Age group Gender Totalfemale male unspecified

Mos

cow

Age

under 18 years old 35 29 1 6518-22 years old 36 46 2 8423-44 years old 13 16 29

unspecified 1 9 10Total 84 92 12 188

Kiro

v

Age 18-22 years old 70 25 0 95

23-44 years old 3 2 0 5Total 73 27 0 100

Tash

kent

Age

18-22 years old 79 30 0 10923-44 years old 99 20 0 119

44 years and older 28 4 0 32Total 206 54 0 260

Bak

u

Age

under 18 years old 11 5 0 1618-22 years old 149 102 0 25123-44 years old 54 69 0 123

44 years and older 21 17 0 38unspecified 7 5 1 13

Total 242 193 1 436

138


In the latter two cases we included only Russian-speaking respondents; however, there are quite a lot Russian-speaking respondents in these cities. Participants were of both sexes, of different ages (we devided 4 age groups) and nationality, in total 989 people. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for age and gender in each subsample. 55 protokols (3.2% of the total sample) were disqualified because of lots of similar answers to the items or lots of missed data. We used the latest Russian version of the Schwartz Value Survey that includes 57 items and allows revealing the personal relationship to 19 different values (Schwartz, et al., 2012).

We were interested how patterns of correlations that are proposed by circular model are reproduced in the different samples in the study. In other words, we wondered whether topologically close values are positively correlated with each other while the opposite values – negatively correlated.

ResultsPrimary examination of the psychometric properties of the scales of SVS

showed that most of scales demonstrated their appropriate for further use consistency.

Table 3 shows the results of three-way analysis of variance. The independent factors were age group, gender and city. As dependent variables we used all the value scales separately. For completeness purposes, the table presents results for all scales, although as we have said earlier we will be particularly interested in the values that promote or prevent readiness to obey.

Table 3 presents all the levels of significance that are lower than 0, 10 (p<0, 05 are in bold italics) and could be discussed as significant or marginally significant differences. It could be hypothesized that self-direction values are least susceptible to cultural and demographic factors. Their corresponding p-values greater than 0.05.

139


Table 3. Levels of significance for main and interaction effects of gender, age group and city on the values scores

Scales Age

Gen

der

City

Age

*

Gen

der

Age

* C

ity

Gen

der

* G

roup

Age

*

Gen

der

* C

ity

1 AC = Achievement 0.000

2 BEC = Benevolence–caring 0.000 0.052 0.014

3 BED = Benevolence–dependability 0.000

4 COI = Conformity–interpersonal 0.007 0.003 0.007

5 COR = Conformity–rules 0.009 0.028 0.006 0.001

6 FAC = Face 0.0377 HE = Hedonism 0.0018 HU = Humility 0.039 0.000 0.001 0.039 0.064

9 POD = Power–dominance 0.004 0.099

10 POR = Power–resources 0.015 0.039 0.091

11 SDA = Self-direction–action 0.057

12 SDT = Self-direction–thought 0.090

13 SEP = Security–personal 0.024 0.004

14 SES = Security–societal 0.000 0.01615 ST = Stimulation 0.04116 TR = Tradition 0.012 0.041

17 UNC = Universalism–concern 0.007 0.000 0.021 0.000

18 UNN = Universalism–nature 0.012 0.002 0.078

19 UNT = Universalism–tolerance 0.000 0.001 0.004

Table 4 describes differences that are significant according to the table 3 in details. Limits of publications volumes and size of the proceedings’ book does not allow putting the table here, but we put it in the conference site http://www.milgram.ru for more interesting readers. The means of each value importance for each subsample are put there also.

140

http://www.milgram.ru/


Sign “>” or “<” in the table indicates the direction of the differences for each pair of sub-samples being compared.

There are following general trends revealed.Scores on a scale of Conformity-rules and Traditions in all cities except

Moscow increases with elder age. In Moscow there is no age-related change in Tradition subscale and decrease in Conformity-rules subscale. Summarizing the differences in Conformity-interpersonal subscale, we can see a tendency that in Russia this value is more important for women, while in Tashkent and Baku - for men. Perhaps this is an echo of the eastern traditional patriarchal culture.

On the contrary power value is more pronounced in Moscow than in other cities and higher for men than for women. Values having social orientation and related to self-determination are more typical of women in all cities.

The most interest in comparisons of values is not only in an expression of value preferences in a particular subsample defined by demographic and cultural characteristics but also in identifying differences in the structure of values. At the operational level the easiest method for that purpose is correlation analysis.

First, we analyzed how close are two conformity subscales (following the rules and interpersonal) to each other in different subsamples. Table 5 presents these correlations.

These correlations were calculated for the sub-samples of more than 10 people (number of participants is presented in Table 1). When comparing men and women in each age group in each city differences between significant correlation coefficients were significant as well (according to Fisher’s test). Significant difference is revealed between correlation coefficients in the second age group for girls in Moscow and Kirov (in the latter case, the relation between these parameters is significantly lower). Thus, we can say that these two values in most cases, in the minds of people are related to each other. There could be speculated that there is a common value of conformity exist. Further studies should concentrate on the cases (specific sub-samples) when correlations are absent.

141


Table 5. Correlations between Conformity-rules and Conformity-interpersonal subscales in different subsamples

City Age group Females Males

Moscowtill 17 n.s. .4118 - 22 .73 .6723 - 44 .73 n.s.

Kirov 18 - 22 .30 .42

Tashkent18 - 22 .54 .5923 - 44 .50 .65from 45 n.s. n/a

Baku

till 17 n.s. n/a18 - 22 .44 .5623 - 44 .56 .43from 45 .80 .60

n.s. – not significant, all the other correlations are significant p<.05, n/a – not applicable (was not calculated due to sample size).

In the next step we have identified more general categories (secondary-order values groups) proposed by S. Schwartz, combining conformity with other values in the group "Conservation – anxiety avoidance”. Similarly, we created groups of "Self-transcendence", "Openness to change" and “Self-enhancement”. In all cases, the correctness of such an association was confirmed by Cronbach's alpha - as a measure of joint coordination of primary scales (see Table 6).

Table 6 supports that secondary value constructs are universal: we can see them as consistent in different age, gender and cultural groups. In addition, it we can hypothesize that there are latent factors behind preference values of conformity: basic conservative orientation, social orientation and anxiety avoidance.

Table 7 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the group of values “Conservation – anxiety avoidance” with “Self-transcendence”, “Openness to change” and “Self-enhancement” groups of values.

142


Table 6. Cronbach’s alphas for secondary-order groups of values in different subsamples

City Age group

Conservation – anxiety avoidance

Self-transcendence

Openness to change

Self-enhancement

Fem

ales

Mal

es

Fem

ales

Mal

es

Fem

ales

Mal

es

Fem

ales

Mal

es

Moscowtill 17 .81 .85 .78 .80 .85 .56 .87 .7718 - 22 .84 .78 .80 .81 .79 .75 .88 .8723 - 44 .85 .54 .54 .79 .85 .76 .74 .94

Kirov 18 - 22 .77 .77 .72 .72 .85 .80 .77 .86

Tashkent18 - 22 .78 .72 .62 .69 .62 .58 .78 .6123 - 44 .85 .88 .73 .80 .64 .57 .72 .71from 45 .67 n/a .76 n/a .46 n/a .72 n/a

Baku

till 17 .75 n/a .77 n/a .80 n/a .82 n/a18 - 22 .79 .86 .74 .78 .76 .76 .70 .7623 - 44 .84 .84 .80 .77 .64 .84 .72 .76from 45 .90 .88 .92 .81 .92 .53 .84 .80

n/a – not applicable (was not calculated).

Table 7. Pearson’s correlations of the group of values “Conservation – anxiety avoidance” with other three groups of values in different sub-samples

City Age group

Females Males

Self-

tran

scen

denc

e

Ope

nnes

s to

chan

ge

Self-

enha

ncem

ent

Self-

tran

scen

denc

e

Ope

nnes

s to

chan

ge

Self-

enha

ncem

ent

Moscowtill 17 .54 .51 .57 .69 .4018 - 22 .62 .37 .7523 - 44 .64

Kirov 18 - 22 .83 .42 .61 .81 .49 .53

Tashkent18 - 22 .44 .25 .31 .5723 - 44 .70 .31 .80from 45 .73 .46 n/a n/a n/a

Baku

till 17 .66 .62 n/a n/a n/a18 - 22 .56 .29 .40 .80 .46 .6423 - 44 .74 .62 .42 .54from 45 .90 .88 .92 .81 .92 .53

143


It is worth noting the absence of a negative correlation between the value blocks. All correlations (including non-significant that are omitted from the table) are positive ones. Thus we can say that the internal contradictions even those lying on the surface are not perceived by people. This consistency in values is reproduced in all our sub-samples.

However, it should be noted also that there are more significant correlations in men than in women for Moscow, Kirov and Tashkent while there are more significant correlations in women than in men for Baku.

ConclusionsIn general, our results support S. Schwartz’s model circular motivational

continuum of values in that (1) all the value scales are mostly reliably reproduced in different age-, gender- and cultural groups, (2) both types of conformity are positively related in most sub-samples, (3) there are consistent secondary-order value groups. Interesting result in the perspective of the theoretical model is the absence of negative correlations between secondary-order groups of values. We suggest that it is due to tendency of the person to perceive his\her value system as consistent suppressing any contradictions.

We revealed important age-, gender- and cultural differences both in terms of mean scores for different values and in terms of value structure. In particular, in the eastern traditional patriarchal cultures scores on Conformity-interpersonal subscale were typically higher for men than for women while in Russia differences were opposite. Power value is higher not only in men than women (that is expectable) but also is higher in success-oriented megapolis Moscow comparing to other cities.

Жизнь любого человека, так или иначе, предполагает его взаимодействие с обществом, поэтому усвоение общественно необходимых норм, привычек, ценностей является важным аспектом социализации личности и предпосылкой нормального функционирования любой общественной системы. Таким образом, социализация необходимо предполагает формирование у человека умения подчиняться. Умение это органично встраивается в структуру личности, начиная с самого глубинного уровня – уровня потребностей, мотивов и личностных смыслов. Мотивационно-смысловая структура порождает структуру ценностей. Для человека ценным является то, что отвечает его потребностям личности.

Ценностная иерархия неразрывно связана с картиной мира человека. Многообразие аспектов изучения ценностей отражает множественность аспектов человеческого бытия: ценности личные и социальные, сиюминутные

144


и вечные, общечеловеческие и национальные, телесные, материальные и духовные, мнимые и действительные, возрастные, субкультурные, традиционные и новомодные, гендерные, декларируемые и реальные.

Детальное изучение ценностной структуры (значимости отдельных ценностей, и корреляционных связей друг с другом и другими переменными) как на индивидуальном, так и на групповом уровне может помочь объяснить принятие решений, установки и поведение.

Умение подчиняться связано с соглашением о доминирующей роли социума (социальных ценностей) и ориентации на сохранение существующих порядков (консерватизм). Наиболее часто в этой ситуации говорят о ценности конформизма и соответствующей личностной характеристике конформности (Кривцов, 2007). Отношение к конформизму у исследователей неоднозначное. Определенная его доля не только помогает человеку, но и просто необходима для адаптации в социуме. Однако чем больше эта ценность представлена в сознании, чем она важнее, тем в большей степени ущемляются непосредственные интересы личности, связанные с самовыражением, свободой. Грань между сознательным (правовым, активным) и подчинительным (пассивным, «угодническим») конформизмом трудно провести однозначно. С одной стороны, это континуальная шкала, и каждый человек характеризуется определенным баллом по ней. Но граница между конструктивным и деструктивным конформизмом определяется также и другими личностными и социальными показателями (Аронсон, 1998).

Например, один и тот же показатель конформности для людей с различными показателями по шкале супер-эго (следование моральным принципам) из 16-факторного опросника Р. Кэттелла может быть конструктивным в случае высоких моральных принципов и деструктивным в случае низких моральных принципов. Чем выше самооценка человека, тем большую степень конформизма без опасности для личностного развития может иметь человек.

Одним из ведущих современных исследователей ценностных ориентаций личности является израильский ученый Ш. Шварц. Подытоживая длительные многосторонние исследования, Ш. Шварц построил теорию базовых ценностей, которые обнаруживаются во всех обществах (Schwarz, 1992). Базовые ценности определяются как внеситуативные цели, отличающиеся по своей значимости и служащие руководящими принципами в жизни человека или группы.

Базовые ценности организованы в согласованную основополагающую систему, которая может помочь объяснить индивидуальное принятие

145


решений, установки и поведение. Каждая ценность обусловлена одной или более из трех универсальных потребностей человеческого существования.

1) биологических потребностей индивидов как биологических организмов;

2) потребностей координации социального взаимодействия; 3) потребностей, связанных с выживанием и благосостоянием

социальных групп. Все эти универсальные потребности удовлетворяются в той или иной

мере при реализации различных ценностей, каждая из которых связана с определенным мотивационным комплексом (типов) (см. Табл. 1).

За последние десятилетия с 1992 г. концепция Шварца и его коллег развивалась, а опросник модифицировался неоднократно. Исследования ценностных предпочтений проводились во многих странах мира, методика совершенствовалась и приобрела концептуальную обоснованность и валидность. Она позволила выявить также значительное сходство в проявлениях базовых ценностей в разных странах (Bardi, Schwarz, 2003).

Таблица 1. Основные ценности и их содержание (по Ш. Шварцу).Ценности Описание

1. Самостоятельность Самостоятельность и независимость на уровне мыслей и поступков в познании, создании, совершении выбора;

1.1. Самостоятельность мыслей

Автономия мыслей: свобода развивать свои собственные идеи и способности

1.2. Самостоятельность поступков

Автономия поступков: свобода определять свои действия и совершать их

2. Внешняя стимуляция Получение эмоционального возбуждения, ощущения новизны, преодоление трудностей и испытаний;

3. Гедонизм Получение наслаждений и удовольствий разного уровня;4. Достижение Личный успех, достигаемый с помощью компетенций в

соответствии с социальными стандартами; демонстрация владения этими компетенциями

5. Власть Обладание социальным статусом, престижем, возможность контролировать и доминировать над людьми и ресурсами;

5.1. Власть над людьми Доминирование и контроль над людьми5.2. Власть над материальными ресурсами

Контроль над материальными ресурсами

6. Безопасность Безопасность, гармония и стабильность общества, отношений и самого себя.

6.1. Репутация Статус и престиж, обеспечение безопасности и власти за счет защиты своего имиджа и избегания дискредитации

6.2. Безопасность личная Безопасность своя собственная и непосредственного

146


окружения6.3. Безопасность общественная

Безопасность и стабильность общества в целом

7. Традиция Уважение, принятие, ответственность за сохранение и следование культурным и религиозным обычаям, идеям и традициям;

8. Конформность Ограничение действий и побуждений, которые могут навредить другим и (или) не соответствуют социальным ожиданиям;

8.1. Социальный конформизм

Соответствие правилам, законам и формальным социальным нормам

8.2. Межличностный конформизм

Нежелание расстраивать и разочаровывать других людей

8.3. Скромность Признание себя менее значимым в более широком контексте событий, происходящих в своей группе и в обществе в целом

9. Доброта Забота о ближайшем окружении: сохранение и повышение благополучия близких людей;

9.1. Надежность Надежное и доверительное исполнение функций члена группы

9.2. Забота о близких Забота о благополучии членов группы10. Универсализм Понимание, терпимость и защита благополучия всех людей

и природы;10.1. Социальная забота обо всех людях

Стремление обеспечить равенство, справедливость и защиту всех людей

10.2. Забота о природе Сохранение окружающей природы10.3. Толерантность Принятие и понимание «других», тех, кто является членом

«чужой» группы

Шварц разработал теорию динамических отношений между ценностными типами, в которой описывается концептуальная организация системы ценностей. Ценности образуют круговой непрерывный спектр (рис. 1). Такая модель устанавливает определенную топологию: есть ценности, расстояния между которыми малы, а есть расположенные друг от друга на большом расстоянии.Геометрически близкие ценности близки и, с точки зрения ценностно-мотивационной теории, комплементарны. Далекие лежат на противоположных сторонах круга, конкурируют, желание их одновременного достижения может приводить к внутри личностному конфликту.

Конформизм – один из ценностных конструктов в структуре ценностного спектра Шварца. Различается межличностный конформизм как нежелание расстраивать и разочаровывать других людей и социальный

147


конформизм – стремление соответствовать правилам, законам и формальным социальным нормам. Так, согласно Шварцу, значимость обоих типов конформизма имеет консервативно окрашенную социальную направленность и связана со стремлением избавиться от тревоги.

Рис. 1. Ценностный круговой спектр Шварца

К сходным ценностям относится следование (уважение, принятие, ответственность за сохранение и следование) традициям, культурным и религиозным обычаям, идеям, отчасти скромность (признание себя менее значимым в более широком контексте событий, происходящих в своей группе и в обществе в целом) и стремление к общественной безопасности и стабильности. Очевидную оппозицию этим ценностям составляют ценности индивидуальной

направленности: самостоятельности в когнитивном и поведенческом аспектах, стремление к новизне и гедонизм (потребность открытости изменениям). Однако можно предположить определенную антонимию конформности с ценностями доминирования и контроля над людьми, достижения (связанными с потребностью в самоутверждении и также имеющими индивидуальную направленность), с одной стороны, а также с ценностями самоопределения – с другой. В первом случае оппозиционные блоки отличаются по всем «мета-ценностям», в то время как во втором случае у этих блоков есть одно общее основание – избегание тревоги, а в третьем общим является социальная направленность.

МетодыРеспонденты – жители четырех городов в трех странах: России (Москва

и Киров), Узбекистана (Ташкент) и Азербайджана (Баку). В двух последних

148


случаях участвовали только русскоговорящие респонденты, которых, впрочем, в этих городах достаточно много. В исследовании участвовали респонденты обоего пола различных возрастов (были выделены 4 возрастные группы) и национальностей общей численностью 989 человек. В таблице 2 представлен численный и процентный состав каждой подвыборки с учетом пола и возраста. 55 протоколов (3,2% от общей выборки) были дисквалифицированы по причинам очевидного недобросовестного выполнения методики (определялось по числу повторяющихся ответов – если все или почти все ответы респондент давал одинаковые, то его протокол не учитывался при анализе), наличия большого количества пропусков.

Таблица 2. Демографический состав выборок исследования

Город Возрастная группаПол

Всегоженский мужской не указан

Мос

ква

Воз

раст

ре

спон

дент

ов до 17 вкл. 35 29 1 65от 18 до 22 вкл. 36 46 2 84от 23 до 44 вкл. 13 16 29

не указан 1 9 10

Всего 84 92 12 188

Кир

ов

Воз

раст

ре

спон

ден

тов

от 18 до 22 вкл. 70 25 95

от 23 до 44 вкл. 3 2 5

Всего 73 27 100

Таш

кент

Воз

раст

ре

спон

ден

тов

от 18 до 22 вкл. 79 30 109от 23 до 44 вкл. 99 20 119

от 45 и старше. 28 4 32

Всего 206 54 260

Баку

Воз

раст

ре

спон

дент

ов до 17 вкл. 11 5 16от 18 до 22 вкл. 149 102 251от 23 до 44 вкл. 54 69 123от 45 и старше. 21 17 38

не указан 7 5 1 13Всего 242 193 1 436

149


Мы использовали последнюю версию ценностного опросника, состоящую из 57 пунктов – по 3 пункта на каждую ценность. (Шварц и соавт., 2012).

Нас интересовало насколько паттерны корреляций, задаваемые круговой моделью, воспроизводятся на разных выборках, охваченных исследованием. Иными словами, насколько топологически близкие ценности положительно коррелируют между собой, а противоположные – отрицательно.

РезультатыПервичная проверка психометрических свойств шкал опросника Шварца

в большинстве случаев показало их достаточную для дальнейшего использования согласованность. В таблице 3 представлены результаты трехфакторного дисперсионного анализа. В качестве независимых переменных выступали возрастная группа, пол и город, в качестве зависимых – шкалы опросника, характеризующие различные ценности.

В таблице 3 представлены представляющие для нас интерес уровни значимости частных нулевых гипотез об отсутствии влияния того или иного фактора и/или межфакторного взаимодействия какой-либо пары факторов или всех трех (указаны только значения p<0,10, жирным курсивом отмечены значимости меньше 0,05, на основании которых нулевые гипотезы могут быть отклонены).

Можно считать, что в наименьшей степени подвержены влиянию культурно-демографических факторов ценности самостоятельности. Соответствующие р-значения больше 0,05.

Таблица 3. Значимости влияния факторов (пол, возрастная группа, город) и результатов их взаимодействий на выраженность зависимых переменных

(выраженность ценностей)

Шкалы

Воз

раст

Пол

Груп

па

Воз

раст

* П

ол

Воз

раст

* Г

рупп

а

Пол

* Г

рупп

а

Воз

раст

* П

ол *

Гр

уппа

1 AC = достижение 0,0002 BEC = благожелательность: забота 0,000 0,052 0,014

3 BED = благожелательность: чувство долга 0,000

4 COI = конформизм: межличностный 0,007 0,003 0,007

150


5 COR = конформизм: правила 0,009 0,028 0,006 0,0016 FAC = репутация 0,0377 HE = гедонизм 0,0018 HU = скромность 0,039 0,000 0,001 0,039 0,0649 POD = власть: доминирование 0,004 0,09910 POR = власть: ресурсы 0,015 0,039 0,091

11 SDA = самостоятельность: поступки 0,057

12 SDT = самостоятельность: мысли 0,09013 SEP = безопасность: личная 0,024 0,00414 SES = безопасность: общественная 0,000 0,01615 ST = стимуляция 0,04116 TR = традиция 0,012 0,041

17 UNC = универсализм: забота о других 0,007 0,000 0,021 0,000

18 UNN = универсализм: забота о природе 0,012 0,002 0,078

19 UNT = универсализм: толерантность 0,000 0,001 0,004

Для полноты картины в таблице приведены результаты по всем шкалам, хотя, как мы говорили, нас будут особенно интересовать ценности, способствующие и препятствующие готовности подчиняться.

В таблице 4 представлены все установленные в соответствии с результатами таблицы 3 различия. Ограничения объема статьи и формата сборника не позволяют привести таблицу 4 в данном тексте, однако для заинтересованного читателя таблица размещена на сайте http://www.milgram.ru.

Знак «>» или «<» указывает направление различий для каждой сравниваемой парой подвыборок. Там же приводятся усредненные значения выраженности показателей для каждой из подвыборок.

Среди общих тенденций можно указать следующие. По шкалам Конформность – правила и Традиции во всех городах, кроме

Москвы, с возрастом показатель увеличивается. В Москве по шкале Традиции значимых различий нет, а показатели по шкале Конформность – правила значимо снижаются с возрастом. Если обобщить различия по показателю межличностной конформности, то можно увидеть тенденцию, проявляющуюся в том, что в России, в основном, эта ценность более важна для женщин, а в Ташкенте и Баку – для мужчин. Возможно, это отголосок восточной традиционной патриархальной культуры.

151

http://www.milgram.ru/


Наоборот, показатели по шкале Власти больше выражены в Москве, по сравнению с другими городами, и выше у мужчин, по сравнению с женщинами. Ценности социальной направленности, но связанные с самоопределением, более свойственны женщинам. Последняя закономерность проявляется во всех городах. Интерес представляет не только выраженность ценностных предпочтений в той или иной подвыборке, определяемой демографическими и культурными показателями. Другой аспект анализа – это выявление различий в структуре ценностей. На операциональном уровне простейший метод, позволяющий это сделать – это корреляционный анализ.

На первом этапе мы проанализировали, насколько близки показатели обоих видов конформности (следования правилам и межличностной) между собой. Соответствующие корреляции представлены в таблице 5.

При сравнении мужчин и женщин в каждой возрастной группе по каждому городу во всех случаях, когда оба коэффициента корреляции были значимы, разница между ними не достигала статистической значимости по критерию Фишера. Значимо различаются коэффициенты корреляции во второй возрастной группе девушек в Москве и Кирове (в последнем случае связь между этими показателями существенно ниже). Таким образом, можно говорить о том, что эти две составляющих конформности в большинстве случаев в сознании людей связаны между собой и можно говорить о единой ценности конформизма. Случаи отсутствия корреляций нуждаются в дальнейших дополнительных исследованиях.

Таблица 5. Корреляции между шкалами следования правилам и межличностной конформности в различных подвыборках

Примечания. Коэффициенты корреляции были подсчитаны для подвыборок объемом более 10 человек (объем подвыборок указан в таблице 1). N.s. – корреляции не достигали уровня значимости, n/a – корреляции не рассчитывались.

152

Город Возрастная группа Женщины Мужчины

Москвадо 17 n.s. 0,41

18 - 22 0,73 0,6723 - 44 0,73 n.s.

Киров 18 - 22 0,30 0,42

Ташкент18 - 22 0,54 0,5923 - 44 0,50 0,65от 45 n.s. n/a

Баку

до 17 n.s. n/a18 - 22 0,44 0,5623 - 44 0,56 0,43от 45 0,80 0,60


На следующем этапе мы определили более емкие категории, согласно предлагаемой Ш. Шварцем (Schwartz et al., 2012) схеме, объединив конформизм с другими ценностями, входящими в группу «консерватизм – избегание тревоги». Аналогично были выделены группы: «самопреодоление», «открытость изменениям», «самоутверждение». Во всех случаях корректность такого объединения подтверждалась величиной альфа Кронбаха – как меры совместной согласованности первичных шкал (табл. 6).

Таблица 6. Значения альфы Кронбаха для вторичных категорий теории Ш. Шварца

ГородВозраст

ная группа

Консерватизм-избегание

Самопре-одоление

Открытость к изменениям

Самоутверждение

жен

щин

ы

муж

чины

жен

щин

ы

муж

чины

жен

щин

ы

муж

чины

жен

щин

ы

муж

чины

Москвадо 17 0,81 0,85 0,78 0,80 0,85 0,56 0,87 0,77

18 - 22 0,84 0,78 0,80 0,81 0,79 0,75 0,88 0,8723 - 44 0,85 0,54 0,54 0,79 0,85 0,76 0,74 0,94

Киров 18 - 22 0,77 0,77 0,72 0,72 0,85 0,80 0,77 0,86

Ташкент18 - 22 0,78 0,72 0,62 0,69 0,62 0,58 0,78 0,6123 - 44 0,85 0,88 0,73 0,80 0,64 0,57 0,72 0,71от 45 0,67 n/a 0,76 n/a 0,46 n/a 0,72 n/a

Баку

до 17 0,75 n/a 0,77 n/a 0,80 n/a 0,82 n/a18 - 22 0,79 0,86 0,74 0,78 0,76 0,76 0,70 0,7623 - 44 0,84 0,84 0,80 0,77 0,64 0,84 0,72 0,76от 45 0,90 0,88 0,92 0,81 0,92 0,53 0,84 0,80

Значения, приведенные в таблице 6, подтверждают универсальность вторичных ценностных конструктов: они воспроизводятся в разных возрастных, гендерных и культурных группах. Кроме того, можно предполагать существование латентных причин предпочтения ценностей конформизма: базисная консервативная ориентация, социальная направленность и стремление к избеганию тревоги. Таблица 7. Корреляции ценностного блока «консерватизм – избегание тревоги» с другими ценностными блоками

153


Город Возрастная группа

Женщины Мужчины

Сам

опре

одол

ение

Отк

рыто

сть

изм

енен

иям

Сам

оутв

ерж

дени

е

Сам

опре

одол

ение

Отк

рыто

сть

изм

енен

иям

Сам

оутв

ерж

дени

е

Москвадо 17 0,54 0,51 0,57 0,69 0,40

18 - 22 0,62 0,37 0,7523 - 44 0,64

Киров 18 - 22 0,83 0,42 0,61 0,81 0,49 0,53

Ташкент18 - 22 0,44 0,25 0,31 0,5723 - 44 0,70 0,31 0,80от 45 0,73 0,46 n/a n/a n/a

Баку

до 17 0,66 0,62 n/a n/a n/a18 - 22 0,56 0,29 0,40 0,80 0,46 0,6423 - 44 0,74 0,62 0,42 0,54от 45 0,90 0,88 0,92 0,81 0,92 0,53

Примечания. n/a – показатели не рассчитывались ввиду малого объема подвыборки. Незначимые корреляции в таблице опущены для удобства восприятия.

В таблице 7 представлены коэффициенты корреляции Пирсона ценностного блока «консерватизм – избегание тревоги» с остальными ценностными блоками.

Стоит отметить отсутствие отрицательных корреляций между ценностными блоками. Все корреляции (в том числе, незначимые) положительны. Можно предполагать, что даже лежащие на поверхности противоречия в системе ценностей таковыми не воспринимаются. И такая непротиворечивость воспроизводится во всех выборках. Интересно, что в Москве, Ташкенте и Кирове больше значимых связей у женщин, а в Баку – у мужчин, причем эта тенденция сохраняется для всех возрастных групп.

ВыводыВ целом, полученные результаты поддерживают круговую модель

мотивационного континуума Ш. Шварца в том, что (1) большинство шкал, характеризующих ценности, надежно воспроизводятся в различных возрастных, культурных и гендерных группах, (2) оба типа конформности положительно коррелируют в большинстве групп сравнения, (3) можно

154


выделить согласованные ценностные блоки второго уровня. Интересный результат с точки зрения теоретической модели – отсутствие негативных корреляций между ценностными блоками второго уровня. Можно предполагать, что человек склонен воспринимать свою систему ценностей как согласованную, подавляя любые возникающие противоречия.

Были выявлены важны возрастные, гендерные и культурные различия, как в отношении выраженности разных ценностей, так и в отношении общей структуры ценностей. В частности, в традиционно патриархальных культурах показатели по шкале межличностного конформизма в целом выше у мужчин, чем у женщин, тогда как в двух российских городах закономерность обратная. Ценность власти не только более характерна для мужчин, чем для женщин (что ожидаемо), но и более выражена в таком ориентированном на успех мегаполисе как Москва, по сравнению с другими городами.

ЛитератураАронсон Э. Общественное животное. М.: Аспект-Пресс, 1998.Кривцов С.Н. О конформности правосознания // Вестник Томского государственного

университета. 2007. 303. С. 157 – 159.Шварц Ш., Бутенко Т.П., Седова Д.С., Липатова А.С. Уточненная теория базовых

индивидуальных ценностей: применение в России // Психология. Журнал Высшей школы экономики. 2012. 9(2). С. 43-70.

Bardi, A., Schwartz, S. H. Values and behavior. Strength and structure of relations. // Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2003. 29(10). P. 1207-1220.Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., Ramos, A., Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J.-E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., Konty, M. Refining the theory of basic individual values. // Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2012. 103(4). P. 663-688.Schwartz, S. H Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries. / In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1992. Vol. 25. P. 1-65.

ReferencesAronson E. (Ed.) The Social Animal. Basingstoke / New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 10th

revised edition, 2007.Bardi, A., Schwartz, S. H. Values and behavior. Strength and structure of relations. //

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2003. 29(10). P. 1207-1220.Kryvtsov, S.N. Conformal LEGAL // Bulletin of Tomsk State University. 2007. No. 303. P.

157 – 159 (in Russian).Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., Ramos, A., Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J.-E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., Konty, M. Refining the theory of basic individual values. // Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2012. 103(4). P. 663-688.

155


Schwartz, S. H Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries. / In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1992. Vol. 25. P. 1-65.Schwartz, S., Butenko, T.P., Sedov, D.S., Lipatov, A.S. Refined theory of basic individual values: application in Russia // Psychology. Journal of the Graduate School of Economics. 2012. 9(2). P. 43-70.

156

H. Perlstadt. The Missing Literature Review and Hypotheses for Milgram’s Obedience Experi-ments. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Para-digm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

THE MISSING LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES FOR MILGRAM’S OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS1

ОБЗОР ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ И ГИПОТЕЗ, ОТСУТСТВОВАВШИХ OBEDIENCE- ВЭКСПЕРИМЕНТАЛЬНЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯХМИЛГРЭМА

Harry PerlstadtMichigan State University,

East Lansing MI [email protected]

Harry Perlstadt - Ph.D. (University of Chicago). M.P.H. (University of Michigan) is professor emeritus of Sociology at Michigan State University. He taught medical sociology and served as director of the MSU Program in Bioethics, Humanities and Society. He has evaluated health programs and initiatives for the Kellogg Foundation (community health access), Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (school based substance abuse prevention), Health Resource Services Administration (HIV-AIDS), and World Health Organization (national environmental health action plans in Europe). In 2010 he was a Fulbright lecturer on US health care policy and politics at Semmelweis University, Budapest Hungary. He is the recipient of the American Sociological

Association’s 2014 award for distinguished career in sociological practice. Two recent publications are: Milgram's Obedience to Authority: Its Origins, Controversies, and Replications, Theoretical & Applied Ethics 2013, 2(2), 53-77 and The Healthy Cities/Communities Movement: The Global Diffusion of Local Initiatives, in Jan Fritz and Jacques Rheaume (Eds) Clinical Sociology Perspectives New York: Springer, 2014.Гарри Перлштадт – доктор психологии (University of Chicago), почетный профессор социологии в Университете штата Мичиган. Преподавал медицинскую социологию и был директором Программы MSU в области Этики биологических исследований, Гуманитарных наук и Общества, выступал в качестве эксперта медицинских программ и инициатив Фонда Келлога, Центра предотвращения злоупотребления наркотиками (школа занималась профилактикой употребления наркотиков), Health Resource Services Administration (СПИД- ВИЧ) и Всемирной организации здравоохранения. В 2010 он был лектором Fulbright в университете Semmelweis, Будапешт, Венгрия. Лауреат премии американской Социологической Ассоциации 2014 года за выдающуюся карьеру в социологической практике. Его последние публикации: Milgram's Obedience to Authority: Its Origins, Controversies,

1 This paper was originally presented at Obedience to Authority Conference: Milgram’s Experiments 50 Years on Nipissing University, Bracebridge, Ontario, Canada, Aug 8, 2013

157


and Replications, Theoretical & Applied Ethics 2013, 2(2), 53-77 and The Healthy Cities/Communities Movement: The Global Diffusion of Local Initiatives, in Jan Fritz and Jacques Rheaume (Eds) Clinical Sociology Perspectives New York: Springer, 2014.

Keywords: authority, obedience, experimental design, exploratory research, suggestibility.Ключевые слова: легитимный авторитет, повинуемость легитимным авторитетам, планирование эксперимента, поисковое исследование, суггестивность.

AbstractIn contrast to the expected development of experiments based on theoretical

perspectives and earlier studies, Milgram’s approach to studying obedience to authority can be termed exploratory experimentation. His 1963 article does not contain a literature review or set of hypotheses, but rather a short paragraph entitled “Related Studies” covering the topics of obedience and authority (Hannah Arendt, Carl Freidrich, and Max Weber), studies in obedience (Jerome Frank), authoritarianism (Theodor Adorno, et al, Milton Rokeach, studies in social power, Dorwin Cartwright) and suggestion (Alfred Binet and John-Martin Charcot. Each referenced work will be reviewed in terms of its possible contribution to Milgram’s thinking and design of his experiments on obedience to authority. For example, Frank’s soda cracker eating experiment included varying the distance and physical contact between the authority figure and the subject, a forerunner of Milgram’s proximity series. This culminates in a set of six plausible hypotheses that Milgram could have derived from the literature review. Although he did not explicitly state them, they were tested and supported by his findings. For example the Bridgeport experiment supports Weber’s theory that that obedience will decrease as the legitimacy of the setting decreases.

АннотацияВ отличие от привычной разработки экспериментов, базирующейся на

теоретических перспективах и более ранних исследованиях, подход Милгрэма к изучению деструктивной повинуемости легитимным авторитетам можно в буквальном смысле назвать исследовательским (“exploratory”). В знаменитой его статье 1963 года нет обзора литературы или набора гипотез, а вместо них вниманию читателя предлагается краткий раздел "Сходные исследования", в котором говорится о повинуемости авторитету (Ханна Арендт, Карл Фридрих, Макс Вебер), исследовании повинуемости (Джером Франк), авторитаризме (Теодор Адорно и др., Милтон Рокич, исследовании социального авторитета, Дорвин Картрайт) и внушении (Альфред Бине и Джон-Мартен Шарко). Мы пытаемся рассмотреть, какое влияние оказала каждая из упомянутых Милгрэмом работ на его obedience-исследование. Например, эксперимент Франка с горькими крекерами,

158


предполагавший варьирование расстояния и степени физического контакта между авторитетом и испытуемым, был предтечей экспериментов Милгрэма по исследованию пространственной близости. Результатом этих экспериментов стали шесть правдоподобных гипотез, которые Милгрэм мог почерпнуть из приведённого обзора работ. И хотя он и не приводит их в явном виде, его исследования проверили и подтвердили эти теории. Например, Бриджпортский эксперимент подтвердил гипотезу Вебера о том, что, повинуемость будет уменьшаться по мере уменьшения легитимности окружения.

A scientific paper is expected to include a literature review which generates hypotheses, and hypotheses should be developed before data is collected. But sometimes a researcher becomes aware of a situation and intuitively proceeds to investigate it before explicitly stating hypotheses. This seems to be the case for Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments which were published piecemeal over ten years, culminating in his book Obedience to Authority (Milgram, 1974).

In his first article Behavioral Study of Obedience, Milgram (1963) explained that his study had its antecedents in the obedience of the German Officer Corps and concentration camp guards in World War II. Later, in Obedience to Authority (Milgram, 1974:5-6) he would support Hannah Arendt’s (1963) contention that Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi lieutenant colonel in charge of the deportation of Jews to the extermination camps, was not a sadistic monster but rather an uninspired bureaucrat. Milgram wondered: Were Americans also capable of carrying out orders that could harm other people such as launching atomic weapons? (Fermaglich, 2006:92).

To explore this general research question, Milgram devised and ran a series of experiments in the early 1960s. A naïve subject plays the role of teacher and the learner is given a list of word pairs which he is to memorize. The teacher/subject then reads the first word of each pair and four possible answers. The learner presses a button to indicate his response. The researcher/experimenter instructs the teacher/subject to administer ever increasing electrical shocks to the learner whenever an incorrect answer is given.

Unknown to the subject/teacher, the learner is a confederate who does not receive any actual shocks, but who systematically provides physical and verbal feedback as if receiving the shocks. In these experiments, Milgram’s primary manipulations involved both the proximity of the teacher/subject to the learner/confederate and proximity of the teacher/subject to researcher/experimenter.

In his January 1962 report to the National Science Foundation, Milgram indicated that he could correlate obedience with demographic and personality

159


variables and that different experimental situations had produced different rates of obedience (Fermaglich, (2006:90-93). But in his publications, he failed to include a reasonable literature review and explicitly derived hypotheses. In this paper I will develop a literature review and hypotheses for Milgram’s experiments based on his initial 1963 publication and indicate where they would support several of his findings in Obedience to Authority.

Milgram was practicing what philosophers of science call exploratory experimentation where researchers are not guided by theories or hypotheses, but seek interesting patterns that can later generate hypotheses (Franklin, 2005). In the absence of an established theory or scientific paradigm, the researcher manipulates experimental parameters and identifies those that contain only the indispensable conditions that characterize a “pure” case (Steinle, 1997, 2002). Migram sought to identify conditions that would maximize obedience to authority in a social psychology laboratory setting.

The closest that Milgram came to a literature review in his 1963 article is the following paragraph headed Related Studies:

The inquiry bears an important relation to philosophic analyses of obedience and authority (Arendt 1958; Friedrich 1958; Weber, 1947), an early experimental study of obedience by Frank (1944), studies in authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Stanford, 1950, Rokeach, 1961), and a recent series of analytic and empirical studies of social power (Cartwright, 1959). It owes much to the long concern with suggestion in social psychology, both in its normal forms (e.g. Binet, 1900) and in its clinical manifestations (Charcot, 1881). But it derives in the first instance from direct observation of a social fact; the individual who is commanded by a legitimate authority ordinarily obeys. It is a ubiquitous and indispensable feature of social life. (Milgram, 1963:372)

In creating a literature review and set of hypotheses for Milgram’s first article, I will limit myself to what was available in early 1963. I will examine each of the authors mentioned by Milgram beginning with the philosophical analyses of obedience and ending with the power of suggestion. After summarizing the work of each author, I will attempt to show how that work may have influenced Milgram’s thinking and research design. I will then formally state a set of hypotheses that Milgram actually tested. Philosophical Analyses of Obedience and Authority

160


Milgram was motivated by the abuse of authority in Nazi Germany, and wanted to discover under what conditions ordinary people would follow extraordinary and harmful orders. His first related study was Hannah Arendt’s (1958) essay “What was Authority,” Arendt, a Jewish political theorist who escaped from Nazi Germany to the US in 1941, traced the rise of authority in classical Greek and Roman society from the household to the public-political sphere. She noted that ancient Greek did not have a specific word for a person possessing formal legal authority. For the Greeks, the relationship between parents and children and teachers and pupils was a hierarchy in which both recognized the rightness and legitimacy of issuing and following commands. The relationship precedes the commands. Arendt (1958:88-89) gave the example of the patient who visits a physician when ill and has confidence in the physician’s expert knowledge. Arendt, (1958:100-101) then quotes historian Theodor Mommsen (1888:1034, 1038-39) who considered authority to be “more than advise and less than command, an advice which one may not safely ignore.”

Milgram expanded the primary dyadic interaction between teacher and pupil into a three level hierarchy of researcher/experimenter, teacher/subject, and learner/confederate. Recognizing that authority is somewhere between a command and advice, he created a series of four prods that the subject/teacher could not safely ignore when he was unwilling to continue to administer the shocks: “Please continue;” “The experiment requires that you continue;” “It is absolutely necessary that you continue;” and “You have no other choice, you must go on” (Milgram, 1963:374).

Milgram then lists Carl J. Friedrich, a professor of government at Harvard, political theorist and expert on totalitarianism. Friedrich’s (1958) argued that communication is a key component of authority and that a person possesses the capacity to issue authoritative communications which may be elaborated (or augmented) by reasoning. Such persons are “worthy of acceptance,” (that is, are seen as legitimate authorities). Friedrich also mentioned Mommsen on advice and command, but then noted that, according to political philosopher T. D. Weldon (1953:50-56), the simple question of “Why should I obey?” is the first step in undermining authority. Weldon suggested that the authority figure could reply “because he is your father,” “because God commands you,” “because she loves you,” and “because section ‘x’ of the civil code requires you to do so.” This last could be the model for Milgram’s second prod “the experiment requires that you continue.” In addition, Friedrich noted that symbols also communicate authority, and Milgram had the researcher/experimenter wear a laboratory coat.

161


Interestingly, Friedrich (1958:37, 45) thought that respect, esteem, admiration or other psychological traits that co-exist with authority should not be used to identify persons possessing authority since they also co-exist with wealth or holiness. This is an indirect challenge to the theory of the authoritarian personality and may have dissuaded Milgram from initially administering the Fascist or F scale developed for The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al, 1950) to his subjects.

The third theorist on Milgram’s list is sociologist Max Weber. Weber (1947:152-153) defined Herrschaft (translated as imperative control or domination) as the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons. Herrschaft depends only on the actual presence of one person successfully issuing orders to others. However, it commonly exists in a corporate group with an administrative staff (bureaucracy), whose members are subjected to the legitimate exercise of Herrschaft, that is, rule by a person possessing formal legitimate authority. At this point sociologist Talcott Parsons, who translated Weber, inserted the following footnote:

In this case imperative control is confined to the legitimate type, but it is not possible in English to speak here of an ‘authoritarian’ group. The citizens of any state, no matter how ‘democratic,’ are ‘imperatively controlled’ because they are subject to law.

(Weber, 1947:153)

Milgram studied authority in an ad-hoc three person hierarchy of experimenter/researcher, teacher/subject and learner/confederate rather than in a corporate group. Weber (1947:327) noted that what is important is that under certain conditions, a particular claim to legitimacy will be treated as valid and confirm the ability of the person to issue commands. Most of the experiments were conducted in a research laboratory at Yale University which offered a reasonable claim to legitimate authority. To test the issue of background authority, Milgram (1974:66-70) moved the experiment to a commercial building in downtown Bridgeport CT operated by Research Associates of Bridgeport, a private research firm with no visible link to Yale (Experiment #10 Institutional Context).

Weber’s definitions and Parson’s footnote may have helped Milgram frame his experiments. The key is the probabilistic nature of Herrschaft. From a social psychological perspective, this means that the content of the command and characteristics of the group increases the likelihood of obedience by group members. Milgram designed a set of variations in which the probability of obedience depended on the proximity of the teacher/subject to the

162


learner/confederate as well as the proximity of the teacher/subject to the researcher/experimenter.

When the teacher/subject is only able to hear the learner/confederate thump on the wall from an adjacent room at 300 volts followed by no further responses (Experiment #1 Remote Feedback), 65 percent of the subjects administered all 30 shocks including the “lethal” 450 volts (Milgram, 1974). When the teacher/subject and learner/confederate were in the same room and the teacher/subject able to observe the learner‘s physical and verbal reactions to the shocks (Experiment #3 Proximity Condition), compliance dropped to 40 percent (Milgram, 1965). If the researcher/experimenter left the room and telephoned in the orders (Experiment #7 Closeness of Authority), compliance dropped to 21 percent.

Milgram never published his last experiment (Rochat and Modigliani, 1997; Russell, & Gregory, 2011; Perry, 2013:310). He asked potential subjects to Bring-a-Friend (Experiment #24) to an office building in downtown Bridgeport, CT in which he had already conducted Experiment #10 (Institutional Context). The 20 subjects who brought a friend—three brought a relative—became the teacher and the friend or relative became the learner. After being strapped in an adjacent room for the Voice Feedback Condition, the learner/friend was coached on how to respond at various shock levels. Only 15 percent of the teacher/subjects in the socially close pairs administered the full series of 30 shocks compared with the 47.5 percent of Bridgeport participants where the subject/teacher did not know the learner/confederate. This suggests, not, as Milgram claimed, a consistently high level of obedience, but that the propensity to obey questionable orders decreases as physical and social distance decreases.

Like Friedrich, Weber downplayed the role of an authoritarian personality as essential for obedience. Obedience (Gehorsam) means that a person carries out the order for its own sake, that is, the order itself motivates the person regardless of his own attitude to the values of the content of the command (Weber, 1947:327). In a follow-up study, Milgram’s research assistant Alan Elms (Elms and Milgram, 1966) administered the F-scale (Adorno et al, 1950) to twenty defiant teacher/subjects who, in a previous trial, refused to continue when the only feedback from the learner/confederate was a bump on the wall or a voice feedback (Experiments #1 and #2), and twenty obedient teacher/subjects who previously administered all 30 shocks including the “lethal” 450 volts when the learner/subject was sitting next to them or when they had to press his arm to the shock plate (Experiments #3 and #4). Elms found that obedients are significantly more authoritarian than defiants.

163


An Early Experimental Study of ObedienceA key study on Milgram’s list is Jerome D. Frank’s “Experimental Study of

Personal Pressures and Resistance.” Frank would become a well known professor of psychiatry at Johns-Hopkins University. After completing his bachelor’s degree at Harvard, Frank studied with Kurt Lewin in Berlin in 1930-31, earned a Ph.D. in psychology from Harvard in 1934 and then worked as Lewin’s research assistant at Cornell in 1934-35. In 1978 Frank doubted that Milgram knew of Lewin’s experiments on social influence in which Lewin demonstrated that “an experimental subject will do whatever he believes the researcher/experimenter required of him, no matter how uncomfortable or absurd” (Frank,1978:224).

Lewin was studying children’s eating habits, and Frank devised an experiment to explore resistance to what could be thought of as a range of parental attempts to pressure a child to try a new food. The subjects, however, were 49 volunteer college students (29 male and 20 female) at Cornell University and the NY State College of Agriculture. They were brought into a room with a table with a tray containing three rows of 12 plain unsalted soda crackers.

Frank (1944a:25-26) designed three variations involving the instructions given to the subjects. In condition A the subject was told at the start that the experiment involved persuasion and that the researcher/experimenter was going to try to make him/her eat the twelve crackers in the first row on the tray but if the subject resisted, the experimenter would try to make the subject eat them anyway. In the other two conditions, the subject was not immediately told that the experiment involved persuasion. In condition B, the researcher/experimenter (perhaps mimicking a parent encouraging a child to eat a new food) said “Let’s both eat a cracker.” When both had eaten a cracker, the researcher/experimenter asked the subject to eat another cracker which they all did. At that point the subject was informed that the experiment involved persuasion and what the subject might expect during the remainder of the experiment. In variation C, the control condition, the subject was only told that the experiment involved eating the twelve crackers in the first row and was asked to begin eating. It was only after the subject had eaten half of the twelve crackers that the researcher/experimenter informed the subject that he had not been quite honest and that it was really an experiment in persuasion.

If the subject stopped eating, the researcher/experimenter systematically applied increasingly strong measures to get the subject to continue to eat. These ranged from just staring at the subject, to asking the subject to put a cracker between his/her lips, to walking around the table and, like a frustrated parent, trying to force a cracker into the subject’s mouth. If at any point the subject was adamant

164


and refused to continue, the researcher/experimenter said either “the experiment requires you to go on eating,” or “if you eat one more cracker that will be enough.” If the subject still refused to eat, the researcher/experimenter then said “the experiment requires you to eat one more cracker and that will be enough.” (Frank, 1944b: 52-53). The experiment ended when the subject took the first bite of the twelfth cracker or if the subject ate the “just one more cracker” or still refused to eat another cracker after the last set of requests.

The request to eat one more cracker was successful about half the time as was the combined request to eat one more because the experiment required it. However, the instruction “the experiment requires you to go on eating” failed all seven times it was used. According to Frank (1944b: 54), the subjects refused to continue because they realized they were being tricked or deceived. Milgram may have reasoned that to keep his experiment realistic, he could not afford to have the subjects realize they were being tricked (Perry, 2013:49, 100).

Overall Frank (1944a:37-38) concluded that subjects were very likely to carry out an activity required by a researcher/experimenter. Subjects reported that since they had agreed to do whatever was required before starting the experiment, they did not want to break their promise. This can be explained on both a psychological and sociological level. On a psychological level, Frank thought that failing to comply reflected on the subject’s trustworthiness and implied a loss of self respect. On a sociological level, Frank noted that successful requests to comply were framed as impersonal rules rather than as a personal demand, e.g. “I insist that you eat another cracker.” Impersonal rules would apply to everyone and rest on a sentiment of conformity. By following the experimenter’s requests the subject identified himself as an obedient, cooperative member of a group. Following Frank’s lead, Milgram relied on impersonal orders that played upon the subject’s propensity to conform and cooperate with authority.

Securing compliance rests on both the psychological characteristics of the subjects and the social structure and interactions of the experiment. Like Friedrich and Weber, Frank suggested that successful compliance was more closely linked with the wording of the request and the experimental situation than with the personality characteristics of the subjects.

In all three conditions Frank changed the distance between the researcher/experimenter and the subject each time the subject resisted eating a cracker, from first sitting across the table from the subject, to coming around the table, to finally trying to force a cracker into the subject’s mouth. Milgram’s four proximity experiments (#1 through #4) similarly varied the distance between the teacher/subject and learner/confederate (Milgram, 1974). It is possible that

165


Milgram transformed the researcher/experimenter’s attempt to force a cracker into the subject’s mouth to requiring the teacher/subject to force the learner/confederate’s arm onto the shock plate (Experiment #4 Touch Proximity). In Experiment #7 (Closeness of Authority), Milgram altered the distance between the researcher/experimenter and the teacher/subject.

The Authoritarian Personality StudiesThe Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Sanford, and

Levinson, 1950) was commissioned by the American Jewish Committee to study authoritarianism and anti-Semitism in the United States after World War II. Part of the data collection consisted of questionnaires with items that were being considered for the construction of the opinion-attitude scales. Over time these items changed as Levinson and the research team developed the Anti-Semitism (A-S), Ethnocentric (E), Political-Economic Conservatism (PEC) and Fascism (F) scales. The F-scale had nine subscales of which only three—authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and sex—had discriminative power (DP) higher than two. One key item was “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn,” (Madge, 1962:392-95).

The issue of children respecting and obeying authority was the focus of Milgram’s earliest critic, Diana Baumrind (1964), who developed a typology of authoritarian, authoritative and permissive parenting styles (Baurmind, 1966). But unlike Baumrind who studied authority in the private-domestic sphere Milgram was interested in authority in the public-political sphere.

Milgram constantly compared his experiments to the situation in Nazi death camps and emphasized the large proportion of American subjects who obeyed in his laboratory setting (Fermaglich, 2006:87-88; 96-97). In this respect, he may have adopted Adorno’s (1950:10) statement that: “…any attempt to appraise the chances of a fascist triumph in America must reckon with the potential existing in the character of the people.” In his first publication Milgram (1963) accentuated this by reporting only the findings from the remote feedback condition (Experiment #1) in which 65 percent of teacher/subjects were fully compliant and administered all 40 shocks including those labeled “lethal.”

What Milgram might also have gleaned from The Authoritarian Personality was the exploratory nature of the research. The development of the various scales was an evolving process that may have foreshadowed his experimental variations (Milgram (1974: viii-ix). Although he had proposed to correlate obedience with demographic and personality variables, he never did that (Fermaglich, 2006:90-93). Furthermore, Milgram may have been aware of the methodological shortcomings in

166


The Authoritarian Personality. In his chapters, Levinson, who would later be at the Harvard Psychological Clinic where he worked with Milgram’s mentor Gordon Allport, discussed problems with some of the demographic measures, and Milgram may have read the methodological criticisms by Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) and Christie (1954).

The third researcher on authoritarianism is Milton Rokeach, who wrote his dissertation on mental rigidity as a factor in ethnocentrism at UC-Berkeley in 1947. He is thanked and his work cited in The Authoritarian Personality, He later developed the Dogmatism D-Scale designed to measure whether a person held open or closed (dogmatic) belief systems. Rokeach became a psychology professor at Michigan State University.

Like Friedrich, Rokeach (1961) defined authority as any source that provides information which serves our cognitive need to know and guides action designed to serve others. According to Rokeach, conformity is a state of mind and he considered compliance to be a behavior that is a function of coercion. For individuals who were closed minded as indicated by a high score on the D-Scale, the power of authority does not rest on cognitive correctness but solely on the ability of the authority to reward and punish. Milgram would study compliance and obedience to authority rather than conformity. Although offering the subject/teacher the apparent choice of administering a punishing shock or not, Milgram’s researcher/experimenter increasingly pressured the subject/teacher to punish the learner/confederate. .

Empirical Studies of Social PowerStudies in Social Power (Cartwright, 1959) is a collection of papers reporting

on work conducted at the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan over an eight year period. The best known chapter is “The Bases of Social Power” by French and Raven (1959) in which they define and explain their five bases of power. Reward Power exists when a social agent is able to influence a person by the ability to provide rewards to him while Coercive Power is the ability to inflict punishments. Legitimate Power means that a person perceives that a social agent is in a position within a hierarchy to prescribe behavior for him; Referent Power that a person identifies with a social agent and will emulate his beliefs and behaviors, and Expert Power when a person perceives that a social agent has some special knowledge or expertise whose advice should therefore be followed.

In Milgram’s experiments, the most likely bases of power between the researcher/experimenter and the teacher/subject are the legitimate power resulting

167


from conducting the research at Yale University, and the expert power of the researcher/experimenter symbolized by the laboratory coat.

Milgram ran two relevant trials. In post-experiment interviews, Milgram learned that the locale and sponsorship of the study at Yale gave some subject/teachers confidence in the integrity, competence and benign purposes of the research. But they claimed they would not have shocked the learner if the experiments were conducted elsewhere. Without referencing French and Raven or Weber, Milgram (1974:62-70) acknowledged that background authority was highly relevant to any theory of human obedience. He therefore moved the experiment to an office building in downtown Bridgeport (Experiment #10 Institutional Context) where 47.5 percent were fully compliant and only two subjects refused to administer even the lowest shock.

In Experiment #13 (An Ordinary Man Gives Orders) he decreased expert power. A teacher/ confederate was assigned to recording times while the naïve teacher/subject is to read the first word of the word pairs and administered the shocks. Before the researcher/experimenter can finish his instructions on which shock levels should be administered and when, he is suddenly called from the room. The teacher/confederate then sits at the researcher/experimenter’s desk and tells the naïve teacher/subject that he thinks the shocks should be increased each time a wrong answer is given. If the naïve teacher/subject objected, the teacher/confederate insisted that the experiment continue and tried to persuade the naïve teacher/subject to administer the next shock. Only 20 percent (4 of the 20) subjects were fully compliant when an “ordinary man” replaced the researcher/experimenter and issued orders. Despite the laboratory setting and having the teacher/confederate sit at the researcher/experimenter’s desk, the authority of the teacher/confederate was much less than that of the researcher/experimenter when present.

Milgram’s interest may have been drawn to another chapter based on a doctoral dissertation by Ezra Stotland, later a psychology professor at the University of Washington. In “Peer Groups and Reactions to Power Figures,” Stotland (1959) compared the reactions of subjects towards a power figure when working alone or periodically able to meet with another subject working on the same problem. Pairs of subjects were told that they would be working on a common task to layout a city by placing wooden models of various buildings on a table containing a representation of a landscape. Subjects were told that one of them would make the placements and the other would exercise veto power over the placements. The subjects drew cards to see which role they would play, but the cards were stacked so that the subject/confederate would always become the

168


supervisor (power figure) with the veto. The supervisor disapproved of a fixed proportion of the placements and in a preset order. The supervisor’s standardized response to any query or action on the subject’s part was to refer back to the instructions. Milgram would adopt the fixed draw and a pattern of preset responses when the subject/teacher challenged the experimenter/researcher.

In the alone condition, the researcher/experimenter stopped the experiment after seven minutes for a work break. Both the supervisor/confederate and the naïve subject were told to read a magazine in separate cubicles. They then worked for another four minutes, were given a second break, and worked for another four minutes. In the membership condition, two identical trials were run simultaneously. All subjects could see the setup of the parallel trial through one way mirrors before they each began their task. After seven minutes, the naïve subjects from the two trials were given a break in the same room and could freely talk with each other. At the end of the break, the naïve subjects were told they would meet again during a second break. After the second break they returned to work for a final four minutes.

Stotland found that naïve subjects in the membership condition, which permitted peer interaction, expressed more direct, overt hostility toward the supervisor/confederate after the last working session than did naïve subjects in the alone condition. In turn, the alones were more likely to view the supervisor/confederate as cooperative and reasonable than those in the membership condition. Milgram may have concluded that subjects would be more likely to comply with orders in an alone one-on-one situation. Milgram (1977:12; 2010: xxvii, Travis, 1974:80) would later explain that in contrast to Solomon Asch’s experiment on group conformity, he wanted to know how an individual subject would perform without any group pressure. Interestingly Stotland did not reference Asch, and Milgram did not include Asch in his list of relevant studies in his 1963 publication but did in Obedience to Authority (1974: xv; 114).

Milgram (1974:116) may have taken Stotland’s finding on alone vs. membership attitudes toward authority and created experiment #17 (Two Peers Rebel). Two additional confederates are added as teacher/subjects and the tasks previously carried out by the naïve subject/teacher are distributed so that teacher/confederate A reads the first word of the word pairs, teacher/confederate B announces whether the answer is correct or not and the naïve teacher/subject is expected to administer the shock and increase it one level each time. At shock level 10 (150 volts), teacher/confederate A refuses to continue and moves to a chair way from the desk. The teacher/subject is asked to both read the first word and administer the shocks. Then at shock level 14 (210 volts) teacher/confederate B

169


likewise refuses and in addition confronts the researcher/experimenter. The naïve teacher/subject is then asked to continue with the experiment. In this situation, only ten percent of the 40 naïve subject/teachers were fully compliant.

The Doctrine of SuggestionMilgram was very familiar with Asch’s work for he served as Asch’s teaching

assistant at Harvard for the 1955-56 academic year. Chapter 14 of Asch’s (1952) text Social Psychology is entitled “The Doctrine of Suggestion.” The doctrine emerged from the use of hypnosis in medical research and treatment in the late 1800s. Jean-Martin Charcot, Director of Medicine at the Saltpêtrière Women’s Asylum in Paris, worked with hysterical women. Among his students were Sigmund Freud, Pierre Janet, William James, and Alfred Binet. Charcot attempted to link the symptoms of hysteria with the three stages of hypnosis—Lethargy where the subjects would not respond to any suggestions offered by the hypnotist; Catalepsy where the subject would only respond to physical suggestions, and Somnambulism where the subject could communicate and respond to suggestions.

Charcot was challenged by two physicians at the medical school in Nancy, Ambroise-Auguste Liébault and Hippyolte Bernheim, who argued that hypnotic conditions could be induced in most people through the power of suggestion and that it is continually manifest in the waking state. Asch wrote that the doctrine of suggestion demonstrated “the possibility of inducing actions, beliefs and feelings in obedience to the command of one in authority,” and quoted social psychologist Gabriel Tarde’s quip “Social man is a somnambulist.” (Asch 1952:398-99). Suggestion as a means of social control was applied to a wide range of phenomena including a part of “learning under the guidance of reward and punishment,” (Asch, 1952:402). Perhaps this last statement led Milgram to set the experimental task as learning in relation to punishment.

Although not referenced in Obedience to Authority, Somnambulism may have informed Milgram’s theory of the “agentic state:”

The critical shift in functioning is reflected in an alteration of attitude. Specifically, the person entering an authority system no longer views himself as acting out of his own purposes but rather comes to see himself as an agent for executing the wishes of another person. …this altered attitude places the individual in a different state from the one he was in prior to integration into the hierarchy. …he sees himself as an agent for carrying out another person’s wishes.

(Milgram, 1974:133)170


Combining the theories of Arendt, Friedrich, Weber, and French and Raven,

one could argue that upon entering a hierarchical relationship a person perceives the power base of the influencing agent (supervisor, expert, researcher) makes his/her orders worthy of acceptance and obliges the person to follow rather than ignore the order. Somnambulism adds the idea that in such a social situation a person may consciously or unconsciously suspend his or her critical judgment and carry out orders that they would not ordinarily consider obeying. But Milgram did not explicate the relationship between his “agentic state,” theories of hierarchical authority and hypnotic Somnambulism.

Alfred Binet, who would later develop the first intelligence (IQ) test, worked with Charcot at Saltpêtrière during the 1880s. In the early 1890s, Binet moved to the Sorbonne, where he and his student Victor Henri conducted research on memory in Parisian school children (Binet and Henri, 1894; Nicolas, Collins, Gounden, Y. & Roediger III, 2011; Nicolas and Levine, 2012). In the process of studying visual memory, Binet and Henri wondered what would happen if the children were given a suggestion so slight that they did not notice its existence?

Children were shown a model line on one board which was then turned around. They then had to identify the model line on a second board which contained a set of lines including the model line. When a child pointed to a line on the second board, the researcher/experimenter would quietly ask “Are you really sure? Is it not the next line?” (Binet, 1900:20; Nicolas, Collins, et al., 2011:396).

School children ages 7 through 13 were shown a model line on one board which was then turned around. They then had to identify the model line on a second board which contained a set of lines including the model line. When a child pointed to a line on the second board, the researcher/experimenter would quietly ask “Are you really sure? Is it not the next line?” (Binet, 1900:20; Nicolas, Collins, et al., 2011:396).

Overall, almost all (88%) of children who initially chose the wrong line changed their minds compared with half (54%) who correctly identified the model line. Binet and Henri observed that the children who made a wrong choice did not become disturbed or aggravated and concluded that the suggestion helped the children correct their answer. Although not translated into English during Milgram’s lifetime (Howard, 2009) both Asch (1961:146) and Milgram (1963) cite Binet (1900) La Suggestibilite, in which he reported on the memory experiments (Binet, 1900:20-31) as well as experiments on imitation (Binet, 1900:330-359).

At one point Binet revealed that he used what Steinle (1997) and Franklin (2005) would later term exploratory experimentation:

171


I did not draw my inspiration from theoretical ideas… on the mechanisms of imitation, its laws and its philosophy; it is quite rare for theoretical ideas to provide a practical outlet into experimentation, and those who seek to perfect their experimental results stand to gain little from leafing through the writings of those who work beyond the sphere of experimentation and observation.

(Binet, 1900: 330, Nicolas, Gounden and Sanitioso, 2011:64)

Binet’s experiment and approach may have provided Milgram with some missing pieces that enabled him to design obedience to authority. Milgram appears to have adopted Binet and Henri’s memory learning task and combined their use of suggestibility with Frank’s wording of requests to continue the experiment in creating his four prods.

Miller (1986:18) pointed out that one of Milgram’s problems was to generate sufficient social pressure on an individual in a one-on-one situation. The memory learning experiment was precisely what Milgram could have been looking for—a one-on-one situation in which the researcher/experimenter subtly questions a child’s perception and choice of matching lines. It may have dawned on Milgram that he might be able to transform Asch’s experiment on correctly identifying a matching line under indirect group pressure to conform to a situation in which the researcher/experimenter would strongly influence the naïve subject to obey. As Milgram put it:

…to study the group effect you would also need an experimental control, you’d have to know how the subject performed without any group pressure. At that instant, my thought shifted, zeroing in on this experimental control. Just how far would a person go under the experimenter’s orders? It was an incandescent moment, the fusion of a general idea on obedience with a specific technical procedure.

(Tavris, 1974:80)

Plausible HypothesesHaving created a literature review based on of the relevant studies listed in

Milgram’s (1963) first publication, I now present a set of plausible hypotheses that Milgram could have derived from the literature review and, in fact, tested. These are drawn from all of Milgram’s trials including the one he never published.

1. The amount of obedience will decrease as the physical proximity between 172


a. the teacher/subject and learner/confederate increases.b. the researcher/experimenter and the teacher/subject decreases.

Milgram’s (1974) first four experiments—remote feedback, voice feedback, proximity and touch proximity—revealed that the amount of obedience decreased as proximity between the authority figure, here the teacher/subject, and the learner/confederate increased. Similarly obedience dropped sharply in Milgram’s Experiment #7 (Closeness of Authority) where the authority figure, here the researcher/experimenter, left the laboratory and gave his orders by telephone. These would support Weber’s contention that obedience is probabilistic and depends on certain conditions.

2. The amount of obedience will decrease as the social distance between the teacher/subject and the learner/confederate increases.

In the unpublished Bring-a-Friend condition (Experiment #24) only 15 percent of the socially close 20 pairs of friends or relatives administered the full series of shocks, and 80 percent stopped obeying less than half way through at the 195 volt switch labeled “very strong shock” (Russell & Gregory, 2011). According to Milgram’s tapes, friend/teachers often responded to the last prod “You have no other choice, you must go on” by asking “Why?” (Rochat & Modigliani, 1997:239). This recalls Weldon’s (1953) point that asking “Why?” is the first step in undermining authority. The reluctance to inflict harm on an immediate family member or close friend when ordered to by a stranger supports Weber’s view that the probability of obedience depends on characteristics of the group.

3. In the voice back condition, women will exhibit the same amount of obedience as men.

Milgram (1974) reasoned that although women are more compliant than men, they are less aggressive and more empathetic; these two factors would balance each other out. Experiment #8 (Women as Subjects) found no differences between women and men in amount of obedience but women experience more conflict and stress than men.

4. The amount of obedience will decrease when a. a less legitimate authority issues the orders.b. a non-expert issues the orders.

When the researcher/experimenter is called away in Experiment #13 (An Ordinary Man Gives Orders), a teacher/ confederate tells the naïve teacher/subject that he thinks the shocks should be increased each time a wrong answer is given. Only 20 percent of the teacher/subjects (4 of 20) were fully compliant suggesting that an ‘ordinary man’ held less authority than the researcher/experimenter when present. This supports the French and Raven (1959) theory that legitimacy and

173


expertise are bases of social power. The authority of an ‘ordinary man’ to obtain obedience was much less than that of the researcher/experimenter when present. Weber wrote that Herrschaft (imperative control or domination) depends only on the actual presence of one person successfully issuing orders to others. Finally, the teacher/confederate apparently did not follow the impersonal script—“the experiment requires that you…” The results are in line with Frank’s contention that impersonal rules are more likely to be obeyed compared with personal appeals and Friedrich’s idea that it matters how the order is communicated.

5. The amount of obedience will decrease as the legitimacy of the setting decreases.

Milgram tested the issue of background authority of Yale University by running the experiment in downtown Bridgeport CT under the auspices of Research Associates of Bridgeport (Experiment #10). He only ran the verbal feedback condition, and found a lower although not significant decrease in the rate of obedience. This supports Weber’s views on the underpinnings of legitimate authority.

6. Obedient subjects will have a higher Fascist F-scale score than defiant subjects controlling for education

Elms and Milgram (1966) identified subjects who were unambiguously authoritarian or anti-authoritarian and then gave them the California F-scale. This hypothesis was upheld and remained when comparing high school vs. college educated subjects.

ConclusionBy constructing in the missing literature review for Milgram’s 1963 original

article I have provided some insights into his possible thinking and decisions concerning his experimental design. Rumbling around in the back of his mind were things he learned from the soda cracker experiments (Frank, 1944a, 1944b), the studies carried out at the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan (Cartwright, 1959) and Binet (1900). This included techniques for ensuring that the naïve subject was assigned to the teacher/subject role, keeping the experiment realistic, scripting the responses of both the researcher/experimenter and the learner/confederate and not wanting the subjects to realize they were being tricked or deceived.

Milgram may have taken into account the critiques of The Authoritarian Personality study, Friedrich’s view that psychological traits that co-exist with the person possessing formal legitimate authority should not be used to identify persons possessing authority, and Weber’s contention that an order is obeyed

174


regardless of a person’s own attitude to the values of the content of the command. Given these caveats concerning personality variables and his interest in behavior rather than opinion-attitude, Milgram apparently decided to leave the incorporation of the F-scale to a supplementary study conducted by his research assistant, Alan Elms (Elms and Milgram, 1966).

In his first published work, Behavioral Study of Obedience, Milgram (1963) did not include a standard literature review and did not propose formal hypotheses which would have informed the reader of previous work on the topic and identified research gaps that his hypotheses would attempt to address. In the abstract he noted that “the possibility of parametric variation within the framework of the procedure point to the fruitfulness of further study” (Milgram, 1963:371). At the time of this first publication, Milgram had already utilized exploratory experimentation to devise new conditions in response to feedback from the participants and his close colleagues.

His initial 1963 article was first and foremost a discussion of his methods for studying destructive obedience and only described his most extreme finding in which approximately two-thirds of his subjects were fully obedient and willing to lower a switch labeled “450 volts XXX” that was beyond switches labeled “danger severe shock.” By developing a literature review and set of hypotheses that Milgram tested, I have presented Milgram’s experiments in a more standard research paper format; one that gives us a different perspective on his work on obedience to authority.

ReferencesAdorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Sanford, R. N. & Levinson, D. J. (1950). The

authoritarian personality. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers. Arendt, H. (1958) What was authority? In C. J. Friedrich (Ed.). Authority (pp. 81-112).

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Arendt, Hannah (1963). A Reporter at Large: Eichmann in Jerusalem 1-5. The New Yorker.

Feb 16, Feb 23, Mar 2, Mar 9 and Mar 16. Published as Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking Press (May 1963).

Asch, S. E. (1952). Social psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Asch, S. E. (1961). Issues in the study of social influences on judgment. In I. A. Berg, &

B. M. Bass, (Eds.), Conformity and deviation (pp. 143-158). New York, NY: Harper, Baumrind. D. (1964). Some thoughts on ethics of research: After reading Milgram’s

"Behavioral study of obedience." American Psychologist, 19,421-423.Baumrind, D. (1966). Effects of authoritative parental control on child behavior. Child

Development 37,887-907.Binet, A. (1900). La suggestibilité [On suggestibility]. Paris: Schleicher frères

175


Binet, A., & Henri, V. (1894). De la suggestibilité naturelle chez les enfants [On natural suggestibility in children]. Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger, 38, 337-347, English translation available in S. Nicolas, T. Collins, Y. Gounden, & H.L.Y. Roediger III, (2011) Natural suggestibility in children. Consciousness and Cognition 20, 394–398.

Cartwright, D. (Ed.) (1959). Studies in social power. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Christie, R. (1954). Authoritarianism re-examined. In R. Christie & M. Jahoda, (Eds.) Continuities in social research: Studies in the scope and method of “the authoritarian personality” (pp.123-196). New York, NY: The Free Press.

Elms, A. C., & Milgram, S. (1966). Personality characteristics associated with obedience and defiance toward authoritative command. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 1, 282–289.

Fermaglich, K. (2006). American dreams and Nazi nightmares: Early holocaust consciousness and liberal America, 1957-1965. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press.

Frank, J. D. (1944). Experimental study of personal pressures and resistance. Journal of General Psychology, 30, 23-64.

Frank, J. D. (1944a). Experimental Study of Personal Pressures and Resistance: I. Experimental Production of Resistance Journal of General Psychology, 30, 23-41.

Frank, J. D. (1944b) Experimental studies of personal pressure and resistance: II. Methods of overcoming resistance. Journal of General Psychology, 30, 43-56.

Frank, J. D. (1978). Kurt Lewin in retrospective—A psychiatrist’s view. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 14, 223-227.

Franklin, R.L. (2005). Exploratory experiments. Philosophy of Science 72,888-899.French, Jr., J. R.P. & Raven, B. (1959) The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.)

Studies in social power (pp. 150-167). Ann Arbor. MI: University of Michigan Press.Friedrich, C. J. (1958). Authority, reason, and discretion In C. J. Friedrich (Ed.). Authority.

(pp. 28-48). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Howard, R. (2009). Alfred Binet: A truly applied psychologist. The Psychologist, 22, 278–

279.Hyman, H. H. & Sheatsley, P. B. (1954) The authoritarian personality — a methodological

critique. In R. Christie & M. Jahoda (Eds.) Continuities in social research: Studies in the scope and method of “the authoritarian personality” (pp. 50-122). New York, NY: The Free Press

Madge, J. (1962). The Origins of Scientific Sociology. New York, NY: The Free Press.Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social

Psychology 67, 371-8.Milgram, S. (1965). Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority. Human

Relations 18, 7-76.Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York, NY: Harper

and Row.Milgram, S. (1977), The individual in a social world: Essays and experiments. Reading,

MA: Addison-Wesley Milgram S. (2010) The individual in a social world: Essays and experiments 3rd Edition

London: Pinter & Martin Limited,

176


Miller, A. G. (1986). The obedience experiments: A case study of controversy in social science. New York, NY: Praeger.

Mommsen, T. (1888) Römisches Staatrecht 3rd ed. Vol. III, Chapter 2.Nicolas, S., Collins, T., Gounden, Y. & Roediger III, H L. (2011). Natural suggestibility in

children. Consciousness and Cognition 20, 394–398. (First English translation of Binet, A., & Henri, V. (1894)).

Nicolas, S., Gounden, Y. & Sanitioso, R. B. (2011). Alfred Binet, the first investigator of the group conformity effect. Psychologie et Histoire, 11, 51-82.

Nicolas, S., & Levine, Z. (2012). Beyond intelligence testing: Remembering Alfred Binet after a century. European Psychologist 17, 320-325.

Perry, G. (2013) Behind the shock machine: The untold story of the notorious Milgram psychology experiments. New York, NY: The New Press.

Rochat, F. & Modigliani, A. (1997). Authority: Obedience, defiance, and identification in experimental and historical contexts. In Gold, M. & Douvan, E. A New Outline of Social Psychology. , (pp. 235-246). Washington, DC, American Psychological Association,

Rokeach, M. (1961) Authority, authoritarianism, and conformity. In I. A. Berg, & B. M. Bass, (Eds.), Conformity and Deviation. (pp. 230-257). New York, NY: Harper,

Russell, N. J. C. & Gregory, R. J. (2011). Spinning an organizational “web of obligation”? Moral choice in Stanley Milgram‘s “obedience” experiments. American Review of Public Administration. 41(5), 495-518.

Steinle, F. (1997). Entering new fields: Exploratory uses of experimentation. Philosophy of Science 64 (Proceedings) S65-S74.

Steinle, F. (2002). Experiments in history and philosophy of science. Perspectives on Science 10, 408-432.

Stotland, E. (1959). Peer Groups and Reactions to Power Figures. In D. Cartwright (Ed.) Studies in social power (pp. 53-68). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Tavris, C. (1974). The frozen world of the familiar stranger: A conversation with Stanley Milgram. Psychology Today 8, 74–80. Available at: www.psychologicalscience.org/pdf/psychtoday/Milgram_Stanley_R.pdf

Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (Parsons, Talcott, Ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press.

Weldon, T.D. (1953). The vocabulary of politics. Gretna, LA: Pelican Books.

177

A. N. Poddiakov. Comparison of the Milgram and Zimbardo experiments. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Mos-cow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

COMPARISON OF THE MILGRAM AND ZIMBARDO EXPERIMENTS СРАВНЕНИЕЭКСПЕРИМЕНТОВМИЛГРЭМАИЗИМБАРДО

Alexander N. PoddiakovNational Research University Higher School of Economics,

Moscow, [email protected]

Александр Николаевич Поддьяков – профессор Национального исследовательского университета Высшей школы экономики. Научные интересы: компликология (создание трудностей и проблем), помощь и противодействие в социальных взаимодействиях, мышление, психология решения комплексных проблем. Web: http:// www.hse.ru/ staff/apoddiakov Alexander N. Poddiakov – Professor of National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.

Scientific interests: complicology (creating constructive, destructive and diagnosing difficulties and problems by humans for each other), help and counteraction in social interactions, thinking, complex problem solving. Web: http://www.hse.ru/en/staff/apoddiakov

Keywords: Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo, Milgram, obedience experiment, situational paradigm, comparative analysis Ключевые слова: Стэнфордский тюремный эксперимент, Зимбардо, Милгрэм, obedience-эксперимент, ситуационная парадигма, сравнительный анализ

AbstractThe experimenter bias was present in Stanford Prison Experiment by Zimbardo (“I

was thinking like a prison superintendent rather than a research psychologist” (http://www.prisonexp.org/psychology/27). “It is hard to ignore the role of Zimbardo’s leadership in establishing and policing those norms”, whose emergence he then proclaimed to be the result of the distribution of roles between the participants [Haslam, Reicher, 2012, p. 156]. From the experimental psychological point of view, the experimenter, whose psychological traits were unknown, was actively involved in the experiment and commanded the participants. If one assumes for the sake of argument that the experimenter was a psychopath with a talent for leadership who could influence people, the experiment shows what ordinary people are capable of if they fall under such a person’s influence, rather than what a simple assignment of roles does to them. But that makes Zimbardo’s experiment a carbon copy of Milgram’s experiment.

178

http://www.hse.ru/en/staff/apoddiakov



In Milgram’s experiment the experimenter’s confederate was not in fact tortured. In Zimbardo’s experiment the “prisoners” were treated in such a way that some of them had seizures. Can it be justified by the value of the results obtained through the experiment? Let us ask an existential question: would it be right, in order to extract detailed and scientifically invaluable data on people’s behavior in a concentration camp, to reproduce live everything that was happening there? The answer is obviously no. But Zimbardo made a step in that direction. It is often argued that in Milgram’s experiment the participants who thought they were administering electrical shocks to another person were suffering themselves. But this was suffering over the decisions they had taken themselves. In Zimbardo’s experiment the “prisoners” were third parties with regard to whom decisions were made in spite of their will by the “guards” and Zimbardo himself.

Behaviorist commitment to the situational paradigm exonerates Zimbardo in his own eyes and in the eyes of the researchers who espouse that paradigm. If man is the function of a situation, Zimbardo’s own behavior is the result of a faithful performance of the role of a scientist who assumed the role of a ruthless prison warden.

The analysis of this and other studies shows that experimental diagnosing the ability to do damage is always loaded with the researcher’s value-related and ethical ideas of what is proper, allowable or not allowable, and of the price that can be paid for the result.

АннотацияВ исследовании Зимбардо имел место экспериментатора («Я мыслил как

комендант тюрьмы, а не как психолог-исследователь»; http://www.prisonexp.org/slide-27.htm). «Трудно игнорировать роль лидерства Зимбардо в установлении и управлении теми нормами конформизма», возникновение которых он затем объявил результатом распределения ролей между испытуемыми [Haslam, Reicher, 2012, p. 156].

С экспериментально-психологической точки зрения, дело обстоит так: активно участвовал в эксперименте и командовал участниками экспериментатор – человек с неизвестными психологическими особенностями. Если формально допустить, что экспериментатор – садист и психопат с талантом влияния, то эксперимент говорит о том, на что способны обычные люди, подпавшие под это влияние, а не о том, что с ними делает простое распределение ролей. Но это влияние исследовалось в работах Милгрэма.

В эксперименте Милгрэма якобы пытаемого участника (актера) реально не пытали. В эксперименте Зимбардо обращение с «заключенными» было таково, что дело доходило до судорожных припадков. Могут ли судороги и рыдания испытуемого оправдать ценность полученных в эксперименте результатов? Вообще, поставим следующий экзистенциальный вопрос: в пределе, можно ли для более детального и сверхценного, с научной точки зрения, эксперимента по изучению поведения людей в концлагере полностью воспроизвести всё, там происходившее? Ответ очевиден – нет. Но Зимбардо двинулся в этом направлении. В его эксперименте люди испытывали реальные длительные и сильные страдания.

179


Нередко говорят, что в эксперименте Милгрэма испытуемые, считавшие, что наносят всё более сильные удары током другому человеку, тоже страдали. Но, заметим, это были страдания по поводу решений, которые они сами и принимали. А в эксперименте Зимбардо страдали третьи лица – «заключенные», относительно которых и помимо воли которых принимали решения испытуемые-«надзиратели» и сам Зимбардо.

Бихевиористская установка на парадигму ситуационизма делает невиновным Зимбардо в глазах исследователей, разделяющих эту парадигму, и в его собственных. Ведь если человек - функция ситуации, то поведение самого Зимбардо – это результат добросовестного принятия роли ученого, принявшего в одном из экспериментов роль жестокого начальника тюрьмы. В целом, анализ этого и других исследований показывает, что диагностика способностей наносить ущерб другим всегда нагружена ценностно-этическими представлениями исследователя о должном, допустимом и недопустимом, а также о цене, которую можно заплатить за результат.

In 1961 S. Milgram conducted one of his most famous experiments studying obedience of adult participants – readiness to punish other participants (“learners”) with more and more strong electric shocks because of an experimenter’s orders. After 10 years P. Zimbardo conducted his no less well-known Stanford Prison Experiment when one group of participants playing the role of guards abused the other group who acted as prisoners. Often these experiments are considered as being in one row of experimental studies of humans’ cruelty (though caused by different reasons). Really these experiments have a pattern of non-evident but crucially important similarities and differences not taken into account usually. For example, Haslam and Reicher [2012a] compare Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments and analyze conduct of people involved in situations of cruel orders from a representative of authority or of appointment of definite roles by a representative of authority. Haslam and Reicher prove that seeming passive conformity of these people is not the only possible way of behavior. In such situations many people are active–either in their resistance to cruel orders and resistance to playing roles appointed by the authority or, vice versa, in sharing values of the cruel authority and doing “their dirty work … energetically and creatively to ensure its success” [Haslam, Reicher, 2012a, p. 3].

Yet here we will consider mainly not the participants’ party but the experimenters’ party: we will compare designs of Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s researches as aimed to study experimentally humans’ ability to do damage and evil.

Let us consider Stanford Prison Experiment in more details. The hypothesis in this study (critically described by Erich Fromm as behaviorist) was as follows: “No

180


specific hypotheses were advanced other that the general one that assignment to the treatment of ‘guard’ or ‘prisoner’ would result in significantly different reactions on behavioral measures of interaction, emotional measures of mood state and pathology, attitudes toward self, as well as other indices of coping and adaptation to this novel situation” [Haney, Banks, Zimbardo, 1973, p. 72]. Zimbardo selected 21 young men who were physically and mentally fit and had no antisocial record that would put them outside the norm. They were taken to a mock prison in the university basement where the experiment unfolded. The participants were randomly divided into “guards” and “prisoners” and had been told that the selection was randomly made. During a briefing the “guards” were told that they were part of the study of the behavior of prisoners and their task was “to maintain the reasonable degree of order within the prison necessary for its effective functioning” [Ibid. p. 74]. No further instructions were given in order not to influence the participants’ behavior and a ban was imposed on physical abuse and aggression. The experiment had to be terminated prematurely, six days after it started, because what was taking place was ethically unacceptable. The “guards” had settled in their roles so thoroughly that “prisoners” began to react pathologically, with one of the “prisoners” even having convulsions. Zimbardo’s modern internet site devoted to the experiment (http://zimbardo.socialpsychology.org) contains candid ethical assessments by the author and an analysis of the errors in the study. Under modern ethical norms of conducting psychological research the experiment would not have been allowed. (Indeed, the analysis of the Zimbardo experiment contributed to the formulation of these norms.) The experiment, carried out more than 40 years ago, is still the subject of heated debate, with some claiming that the high scientific value of the experiment justified the price considering the importance of the results it yielded, while others challenge that view.

To begin with, the “experimenter’s bias” was definitely present in the study, as Zimbardo himself admits: “I was thinking like a prison superintendent rather than a research psychologist” (http://www.prisonexp.org/slide-27.htm). This is highlighted by the episode when on his orders (!) the “guards” blindfolded and shackled the “prisoners” to move them to another room.

One has to go along with S. Haslam and S. Reicher, who analyze several episodes in the experiment (Zimbardo told the “prisoners” that they could not leave the place and successfully brought pressure on them in order to break up the signs of an emerging coalition of resistance, etc.) to conclude that “it is hard to ignore the role of Zimbardo’s leadership in establishing and policing those norms”, whose emergence he then proclaimed to be the result of the distribution of roles between the participants [Haslam, Reicher, 2012b, p. 156].

181


Thus, the “guards” were influenced not only by being assigned to that role, but by Zimbardo’s instructions, the “prison expert” he had invited, a man who had served a prison term or someone else (a real prison chaplain had been also invited). But that makes Zimbardo’s experiment a carbon copy of Milgram’s ideas and experiment, only a more dramatic and ruthless copy that has a ready appeal to a broad audience. If that is the case, the sufferings of the prisoners were in vain from the scientific point of view (though the experiment brought the problem to the public eye and highlighted its importance in the perception of the broad masses).

E. Fromm wrote (and S. Haslam and S. Reicher confirmed by their experiment) that Zimbardo had ignored the facts that contradicted his hypothesis, the fact that the prisoners were not submissive, but resentful (there are real examples of it in prison life). The same is true of the guards: in real life they are different in spite of the formal identity of their roles, and by no means all of them have a sadistic streak to them. In fact there were some benevolent guards in Zimbardo’s experiment, but he dismisses that fact. On the whole, as Erich Fromm writes, “descriptions indicate a certain lack of precision in the formulation of the data, which is all the more regrettable when it occurs in connection with the crucial thesis of the experiment. The authors believe it proves that the situation alone can within a few days transform normal people into abject, submissive individuals or into ruthless sadists. It seems to me that the experiment proves, if anything, rather the contrary” [Fromm, 1973, http:/ /www.angelfire.com/or/ sociologyshop/ frozim.html].

Let us draw a tentative conclusion. In Zimbardo’s experiment the participants were not assigned their roles and left “on a dessert island”, instead the process was covertly and overtly controlled. So, the experiment does not prove the hypothesis that the behavior of the people who had assumed the roles of guards and prisoners was independent of their psychological traits. From the experimental psychological point of view, the picture was as follows: the experimenter, whose psychological traits were unknown, was actively involved in the experiment, organized and commanded the participants. That variable was not controlled: unlike the participants, the experimenter had not been subjected to a psychological test. If one assumes for the sake of argument that the experimenter was a psychopath with a talent for leadership who could influence people the experiment, if anything, shows what ordinary people are capable of if they fall under such a person’s influence, rather than what a simple assignment of roles does to them. Milgram studied such influence in his work.

Let us compare the Zimbardo and Milgram experiments on one more important count. In Milgram’s experiment a participant allegedly subjected to torture (an actor who was helping in the experiment) was not in fact tortured (he

182


merely simulated convulsions from non-existent electrical shock). In Zimbardo’s experiment the “prisoners” were treated in such a way that some of them had seizures, in fact they were subjected not only to moral abuse. Can the convulsions or sobbing of the participant be justified by the value of the results obtained through the experiment? Broadening it out, let us ask an existential question: would it be right, in order to extract detailed and scientifically invaluable data on people’s behavior in a concentration camp, to reproduce live everything that was happening there? The answer is obviously no. But Zimbardo made a step in that direction. In his experiment people were subjected to real prolonged and intense suffering. It is often argued that in Milgram’s experiment the participants who thought they were administering electrical shocks to another person were suffering themselves. But this was suffering over the decisions they had taken themselves. In Zimbardo’s experiment the victims were third parties, the “prisoners” with regard to whom decisions were made in spite of their will by the “guards” and Zimbardo himself.

Let it be added that the behaviorist commitment to the situational paradigm (humans’ behavior depends exclusively on external circumstances) exonerates Zimbardo in his own eyes and in the eyes of the researchers who espouse that paradigm. If a person’s behavior is the function of a situation Zimbardo’s own behavior is the result of a faithful performance of the role of a scientist who, in one of his experiments, assumed the role of a ruthless prison warden, and nothing more. Absolute situationism means that the individual is amorphous, abdicating his self, his identity. As Benson writes in a different context, “He is other-shaped rather than self-created” [Benson, 2001, с. 134]. But everything shows that Zimbardo was very much “self-created.” He creates such situations rather than being their function.

In general, the analysis of this and other studies shows that diagnosing the ability to cause damage and do evil is always loaded with the researcher’s value-related and ethical ideas of what is proper, allowable or not allowable, and of the price that can be paid for the result.

ReferencesBenson C. (2001.) The cultural psychology of self: place, morality and art in human

worlds. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.Fromm, E. (1973.) The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. Fawcett Books.Haney, C., Banks, W.C., & Zimbardo, P.G. (1973.) Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated

prison. International Journal of Criminology and Penology, 1, 69–97.Haslam, S.A., & Reicher, S.D. (2012a.) Contesting the ‘‘Nature’’ of conformity: What

Milgram and Zimbardo’s studies really show. PLoS Biol 10(11): e1001426. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001426

Haslam, S.A., & Reicher, S.D. (2012b.) When prisoners take over the prison: a social psychology of resistance. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16, 154–179.

183


В 1961 г. Милгрэм провел свое знаменитое исследование, различные версии которого продолжают активно проводить до сих пор. Испытуемым сообщалось, что они участвуют в эксперименте по обучению. Но на самом деле изучалась их подчиняемость – готовность наказывать ученика, допускающего ошибки при заучивании, всё более сильными ударами тока, следуя указаниям экспериментатора. В не менее знаменитом Стэнфордском тюремном эксперименте Ф. Зимбардо, проведенном 10 лет спустя, одна группа участников, исполняющих роль надзирателей, мучила другую группу участников, выступавших в роли заключенных. Эти два эксперимента нередко ставят в один ряд, но на самом деле у них есть, помимо обсуждаемых, и не очевидные, но очень существенные различия и сходства. Например, Хаслам и Рейчер сравнивают эти два эксперимента, чтобы проанализировать поведение людей в ситуации, когда им прямо отдают жестокие приказы или же назначают на определенные роли, требующие, в соответствии со стереотипами, определенной жестокости. Эти авторы доказывают, что конформизм и подчиняемость испытуемых в таких условиях – вовсе не единственный способ поведения. Многие люди проявляют здесь собственную активность: они либо сопротивляются жестоким приказам, навязыванию ролей, либо, наоборот, разделяют ценности того, кто отдает приказы, и «делают свою грязную работу … энергично и творчески, чтобы гарантировать ее успех» [Haslam, Reicher, 2012a, p. 3].

Однако мы здесь будем рассматривать в основном не сторону участников, а сторону экспериментаторов, и сравним исследования Милгрэма и Зимбардо с точки зрения экспериментального дизайна – как исследования, направленные на экспериментальное изучение способности людей наносить ущерб и совершать зло.

Остановимся подробнее на эксперименте Зимбардо.Гипотеза исследования была следующей (бихевиористской, как ее

критически оценивает Э. Фромм): «назначение ролей “надзирателей” и “заключенных” приведет к значимо различающимся поведенческим реакциям участников и их взаимодействиям, разным эмоциональным состояниям, отношению к себе, а также другим показателям совладания и адаптации к этой новой ситуации, вплоть до патологии» [Haney, Banks, Zimbardo, 1973, p. 72]. Для эксперимента Зимбардо отобрал 21 молодого человека. Все участники, по результатам предварительно тестирования, были физически и психически здоровы и не имели сколько-нибудь существенного асоциального опыта, выводящего их за рамки нормы. Их отвезли в подвал Стэнфордского университета, имитирующего тюрьму, где и развернулся эксперимент.

184


Участников случайным образом поделили на «надзирателей» и «заключенных», причем они знали, что распределение случайно. При инструктаже «надзирателям» сообщили, что они участвуют в изучении поведения заключенных и их задача – «достигнуть разумной степени порядка, необходимой для нормального функционирования тюрьмы» [Ibid., p. 74]. Более подробных инструкций не давалось, чтобы не влиять на поведение участников, при этом был введен запрет на физические наказания и физическую агрессию. Эксперимент пришлось остановить преждевременно, через 6 дней после начала, из-за этической неприемлемости происходившего – «надзиратели» настолько хорошо вжились в свою роль, что у «заключенных» начались патологические реакции, вплоть до припадка у одного из них. Современный интернет-сайт Зимбардо, посвященный этому эксперименту (http://www.prisonexp.org), содержит собственные нелицеприятные этические оценки автора и анализ ошибок этого исследования. По современным этическим нормам проведения психологических исследований, этот эксперимент не был бы разрешен. (Собственно, вклад в формулировку этих норм внес и анализ эксперимента Зимбардо.)

При этом полемика по поводу данного исследования, проведенного более 40-лет назад, идет до сих пор. Ряд авторов настаивает на высокой научной ценности проведенного эксперимента и считают, что это была допустимая цена за получение столь важных данных. Другие авторы с этим не согласны. Развернем подробнее критику данного эксперимента, поскольку во многих учебниках о ней ничего не говорится.

Прежде всего, в этом исследовании имел место так называемый эффект экспериментатора, о чем пишет сам Зимбардо: «Я мыслил как комендант тюрьмы, а не как психолог-исследователь» (“I was thinking like a prison superintendent rather than a research psychologist”; http://www.prisonexp.org/psychology/27). Эпизод, когда по его (!) приказу «надзиратели» завязывают глаза «заключенным» и сковывают их цепью, чтобы перевести в другое помещение, ясно это показывает.

Следует полностью согласиться с С. Хасламом и С. Рейчером, которые, анализируя целый ряд эпизодов эксперимента (Зимбардо заявил «заключенным», что они не могут отсюда выйти, осуществлял успешное давление на них, чтобы расколоть наметившуюся было коалицию сопротивления и т.д.), пишут, что «трудно игнорировать роль лидерства Зимбардо в установлении и управлении теми нормами конформизма», возникновение которых он затем объявил результатом распределения ролей между испытуемыми [Haslam, Reicher, 2012b, p. 156].

185


Итак, на «надзирателей» влияло не просто назначение на эту роль, а установки самого Зимбардо, приглашенного им «тюремного эксперта» – человека, отсидевшего в реальной тюрьме, и, может быть, кого-то еще (был приглашен и реальный тюремный капеллан). Но тогда эксперимент Зимбардо – принципиальный повтор идей и эксперимента Милгрэма. Хотя, может быть, более яркий, жестокий, приближенный к пониманию широкой аудитории. При таком положении дел реальные страдания испытуемых, с научной точки зрения (а не с точки зрения популяризации проблемы и показа ее важности среди широких масс), – впустую.

Э. Фромм писал о том (а С. Хаслам и С. Рейчер подтвердили своим экспериментом), что Зимбардо при анализе игнорировал факты, противоречащие его гипотезе, - факты вовсе не подчинения заключенных, а их борьбы и сопротивления (чему имеются реальные примеры из реальной лагерной и тюремной жизни). То же следует сказать о надзирателях – в реальной жизни между ними бывают существенные различия, несмотря на формальную идентичность ролей, и к садизму склонны далеко не все. Собственно, доброжелательные «надзиратели» были и в эксперименте Зимбардо, но он не анализирует значение этого факта. В целом, как пишет Э. Фромм, «расхождения и недостаток точности данных и формулировок тем досаднее, что с ними авторы связывают главный и решающий тезис эксперимента. Они надеялись доказать, что сама ситуация всего за несколько дней может превратить нормального человека либо в жалкое и ничтожное существо, либо в безжалостного садиста. Мне кажется, что эксперимент как раз доказывает обратное, если он вообще что-нибудь доказывает» [Фромм, 2012, с. 88].

Подведем промежуточный итог. В эксперименте Зимбардо не было чистого назначения ролей участникам и последующего их «оставления на необитаемом острове», а было постоянное скрытое и явное руководство процессом. Соответственно, в данном эксперименте вовсе не была подтверждена гипотеза о независимости поведения людей, взявших на себя роли тюремщиков и заключенных, от их психологических особенностей. С экспериментально-психологической точки зрения дело обстоит так: активно участвовал в эксперименте, все организовал и командовал участниками экспериментатор – человек с неизвестными психологическими особенностями. Эта переменная не контролировалась: экспериментатор-то, в отличие от испытуемых, психологического тестирования не проходил. Если формально допустить, что экспериментатор – садист и психопат с талантом лидера, с талантом влияния, то эксперимент, скорее, говорит о том, на что способны обычные люди, подпавшие под это влияние, а не о том, что с ними

186


делает простое распределение ролей. Но это влияние исследовалось в работах Милгрэма.

Сравним эксперимент Зимбардо и Милгрэма по еще одному принципиально важному параметру. В эксперименте Милгрэма якобы пытаемого участника (актера) реально не пытали (он лишь изображал муки при ударах тока, которых на самом деле не было). А в эксперименте Зимбардо обращение с «заключенными» было таково, что дело доходило до судорожных припадков, фактически это были уже не только моральные пытки. Могут ли судороги и рыдания испытуемого оправдать ценность полученных в эксперименте результатов? Вообще, поставим следующий экзистенциальный вопрос: в пределе, можно ли для более детального и сверхценного с научной точки зрения эксперимента по изучению поведения людей в концлагере полностью, живьем воспроизвести всё, там происходившее? Ответ очевиден – нет. Но Зимбардо двинулся именно в этом направлении. В его эксперименте люди испытывали реальные длительные и сильные страдания. Нередко говорят, что в эксперименте Милгрэма испытуемые, считавшие, что наносят всё более сильные удары током другому человеку, тоже страдали. Но, заметим, это были страдания по поводу решений, которые они сами и принимали. А в эксперименте Зимбардо страдали третьи лица – «заключенные», относительно которых и помимо воли которых принимали решения испытуемые-«надзиратели» и сам Зимбардо.

К сказанному добавим, что бихевиористская установка на парадигму ситуационизма (зависимости поведения человека исключительно от внешних обстоятельств) делает невиновным Зимбардо в его собственных глазах и в глазах исследователей, разделяющих эту парадигму. Ведь если человек - функция ситуации, то поведение самого Зимбардо – это результат добросовестного принятия роли ученого, принявшего в одном из экспериментов роль жестокого начальника тюрьмы, и ничего более. Абсолютный ситуационизм означает аморфность личности, отказ от своего "Я", от своей идентичности. “He is other-shaped rather than self-created” («Он формируется другими в большей степени, чем создает себя сам»), как пишет о людях такого типа К.Бенсон – хотя и не в контексте исследования Зимбардо. Но Зимбардо, судя по всему, как раз вполне self-created. Он создает, творит такого рода ситуации, а не является их функцией.

В целом, анализ этого и других исследований показывает: экспериментальная проверка способностей одних людей создавать трудности и наносить ущерб другим всегда нагружена ценностно-этическими представлениями самого исследователя о должном, допустимом и недопустимом, а также о цене, которую можно заплатить за результат.

187


ЛитератураФромм Э. Психология человеческой деструктивности. М.: АСТ: Астрель: 2012.Benson C. The cultural psychology of self: place, morality and art in human worlds.

London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2001.Haney C., Banks W.C., Zimbardo P.G. Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison //

International Journal of Criminology and Penology. 1973. Vol. 1. P. 69–97.Haslam S.A, Reicher S.D. Contesting the ‘‘Nature’’ of conformity: What Milgram and

Zimbardo’s studies really show // PLoS Biol. 2012a. 10(11): e1001426. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001426

Haslam S.A., Reicher S.D. When prisoners take over the prison: a social psychology of resistance // Personality and Social Psychology Review. 2012b. Vol. 16(2). P. 154–179.

188

A. C. Southard, V. Zeigler-Hill A modified Milgram paradigm: replication made simple. In Regina V. Er-shova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Rus-sia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

A MODIFIED MILGRAM PARADIGM: REPLICATION MADE SIMPLE

МОДИФИЦИРОВАННАЯ ПАРАДИГМА МИЛГРЭМА: ПОВТОРИТЬЭКСПЕРИМЕНТСТАНЕТПРОЩЕ

Ashton C. SouthardOakland University

[email protected] Zeigler-HillOakland University

Ashton C. Southard earned her Ph.D. in social and personality psychology from the University of Southern Mississippi in May of 2014. Her dissertation focused on attempting to create an ethical, inexpensive, and easily replicable paradigm for the study of destructive obedience. Her current research focuses on dark personality features such as narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism, spitefulness, as well as fragile self-esteem. Эштон Саузард – доктор наук в области социальной психологии и психологии личности (University of Southern Mississippi, май 2014). Ее диссертация посвящена попытке

создания согласующейся с требованиями этики, недорогой и легко воспроизводимой методики повторения исследований в области деструктивной повинуемости. Область научных интересов: психология личности (нарциссизм, психопатия, маккевиализм, злость, уязвимость самооценки).

Virgil Zeigler-Hill is an Associate Professor at Oakland University. He conducts research concerning self-esteem, dark personality features (e.g., narcissism, spite), and interpersonal relationships. He has authored or co-authored articles on these topics for outlets such as the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Personality, and Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Dr. Zeigler-Hill earned his PhD in Social-Personality Psychology from the University of Oklahoma. Вёрджил Зайглер-Хилл – профессор университета Oakland University. Докторскую степень в области социальной психологии личности получил в University of Oklahoma.

Проводит исследования в области самооценки, нарциссизма, злости, межличностных отношений. Его работы опубликованы в: the Journal of Personality

189



and Social Psychology, Journal of Personality, and Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.Keywords: obedience, methodology, 150-volt solution, MilgramКлючевые слова: повинуемость легитимным авторитетам, методология, решение «150 вольт», Милгрэм

AbstractObedience to authority is an important construct interwoven into many aspects of

various cultures around the world (Milgram, 1974). Following the events of World War II, Stanley Milgram conducted a series of studies that examined the conditions under which individuals would follow the orders of an authority figure to ostensibly administer severe electric shocks to an individual who claimed to suffer from a heart condition (Milgram 1963, 1974). In reality, the individual participants believed to be receiving the shocks was a paid actor and no shocks were actually administered. Milgram’s unsettling findings revealed that the majority of individuals in his studies continued to administer increasingly severe electric shocks despite the protest of the confederate. Milgram’s research contributed to many changes in the field of psychology, including advancements in the area of research ethics (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009), and today regulations place exact replications of these classic studies well outside of ethical boundaries. As a result no direct replications of Milgram’s procedure were attempted for more than three decades (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009; Blass, 2009; Burger, 2009; Werhane et al., 2011). In this chapter, we will review alternative methodologies that have been used to study destructive obedience and then describe a modified version of the paradigm that is relatively inexpensive and could be easily replicated in typical psychology laboratories.

АннотацияПовинуемость легитимным авторитетам является важной концепцией

различных аспектов многих культур (Мильгрэм 1974). После Второй мировой войны Милгрэм провел ряд исследований, направленных на изучение условий, при которых люди, подчиняясь приказам легитимных авторитетов, наносят удары электрическим током людям, страдающим, по их собственному заявлению, сердечными заболеваниями (Милгрэм 1963, 1974). На самом деле, "жертвами" экспериментов были специально нанятые для этого актёры, а удары током не наносили. Открытия Милгрэма оказались весьма тревожными: большинство участников продолжали наносить удары током, даже несмотря на протест "жертвы". Исследования Милгрэма оказали значительное влияние на психологическую науку, включая вопросы научной этики (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009). Современные требования научной этики не позволяют повторять классические obedience- эксперименты. Более тридцати лет не предпринимались попытки проведения классического повторного эксперимента (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009; Blass, 2009; Burger, 2009; Werhane et al., 2011). В данной статье мы рассматриваем альтернативные методики изучения деструктивной повинуемости и предлагаем

190


модифицированную версию парадигмы, которая, при очевидной дешевизне, может быть легко воспроизведена в большинстве исследовательских лабораторий.

Obedience to authority is an important construct interwoven into many aspects of various cultures around the world (Milgram, 1974). The field of social psychology became interested in the study of obedience following the events of World War II. Stanley Milgram conducted a series of studies during the 1960s and 1970s that examined the conditions under which individuals – who were playing the role of “Teacher” in a paired-associate learning task – would follow the orders of an authority figure to ostensibly administer severe electric shocks to an individual who was playing the role of “Learner” and claiming to suffer from a heart condition (Milgram, 1974). In reality, the individual who participants believed to be receiving the shocks was a paid actor serving as a confederate in the study and no shocks were actually administered. Milgram’s unsettling findings revealed that the majority of individuals in his studies continued to administer increasingly severe electric shocks despite the protests of the confederate. Although a considerable amount of time has passed since Milgram’s research was conducted, his work continues to be referenced in a wide array of disciplines as well as in the popular media (Blass, 2004). Milgram conducted multiple investigations of obedience that employed various methods and manipulations but the most widely known and most relevant version of the study is Experiment 5 which involved the confederate claiming to suffer from a heart condition and complaining about his heart bothering him when he ostensibly received the electric shocks (Milgram, 1963, 1974).

Milgram’s obedience research contributed to many changes in the field of psychology including advancements in the area of research ethics (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009). Soon after Milgram’s original studies, many ethical issues were raised regarding the well-being of participants, the use of deception, and informed consent (Miller, 1986). Due to regulations that were put into place after Milgram’s work, most scientists agree that exact replications of his classic studies are well out of bounds given current ethical guidelines and, as a result, no direct replications of Milgram’s procedure were attempted for more than three decades (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009; Blass, 2009; Burger, 2009; Werhane et al., 2011). In this chapter, we will review alternative methodologies that have been used to study destructive obedience and then describe a modified version of the paradigm that is relatively inexpensive and could be easily replicated in typical psychology laboratories.

191


Alternative Methodologies for Studying ObedienceAlthough true behavioral replications of Milgram’s studies are not permitted

due to ethical concerns, multiple authors have attempted to study obedience to authority using other methodologies. An example is the virtual simulation methodology that was employed by Slater and his colleagues (2006) in which participants were asked to administer increasing levels of shock to a virtual female Learner. Participants were seated in a dimly lit room with a projection device placed on their head and an electric shock machine with 20 voltage levels was placed on a table in front of them. The image of a woman seated with her arms restrained to the arms of her chair was projected onto a blank wall via the device attached to the participants’ heads. Participants were instructed to conduct a paired associate word test with the virtual woman and to administer electric shocks to her that increased in voltage after each incorrect response she gave by selecting the appropriate shock level on the electric shock machine. If a participant asked the Experimenter what to do or if they could stop, the Experimenter would say “Although you can stop whenever you want, it is best for the experiment that you continue, but you can stop whenever you want.” This response from the Experimenter is quite different from the responses given by the Experimenter in Milgram’s original research. In Milgram’s comparable condition, the Experimenter would respond with four increasingly demanding prods aimed at convincing the participant to continue the learning task whenever a participant expressed a desire to stop the procedure. Each time a participant indicated reluctance to continue with the experiment, the Experimenter would begin with the first prod and would give each successive prod until the participant obeyed and continued the learning task or still refused to continue following the fourth prod, at which point the experiment was terminated. The order of the successive prods was as follows: “please continue” or “please go on,” “the experiment requires that you continue,” “it is absolutely essential that you continue,” and lastly, “you have no other choice, you must go on” (Milgram, 1974, p. 21).

The results of Slater et al. (2006) indicated that the participants experienced heightened levels of stress during the study – as evidenced by elevated heart rate and skin conductance – even though they were aware that the virtual female was not a real person. However, despite heightened levels of stress, 17 of 23 participants obeyed the Experimenter and administered all 20 shocks to the virtual Learner resulting in an obedience rate of approximately 74%. Participants who refused to obey the Experimenter disobeyed on the trials that came later in the procedure.

The research of Slater et al. (2006) is indeed provocative and supports the utility of virtual environments in psychological research but the authors

192


acknowledge that their study “did not address Milgram’s hypothesis about destructive obedience” (p. 39). Specifically, the type of obedience involved in Milgram’s (1963, 1974) research is of a destructive nature and entails obeying a legitimate authority figure when obedience to that authority means harming another person. Given that the participants in the study conducted by Slater and his colleagues were acutely aware that both the shocks as well as the virtual female were not real, this research does not truly address Milgram’s conception of destructive obedience. Another drawback to this type of methodology is financial because virtual environments similar to the one employed by Slater et al. tend to be rather expensive to construct. Although we are unaware of the actual cost of the equipment used by Slater et al., we found that the estimated costs to build similar virtual environments may exceed one million U.S. dollars in some cases. This is an expense that most social psychologists are unable to afford.

Another study involving an immersive video environment was conducted by Dambrun and Vatiné (2010) using a sample of French college students. Similar to Slater et al. (2006), participants in this study were made explicitly aware that the procedure was only a simulation. However, in contrast to Slater et al.’s use of a virtually simulated Learner, Dambrun and Vatiné employed prerecorded video of an actual student actor. Videos of the actor were programed to give the impression of a real time interaction. The procedure for each study session was divided into three phases. During the first phase, participants were seated at a computer and shown a series of slides. First, the slides informed the participants that everything they were about to see was completely artificial (i.e., the Learner’s reactions were all prerecorded and no shocks were actually delivered). Second, the slides explained that participants were about to take part in a study investigating the effects of punishment on learning, which would involve a paired associate learning task. Next, participants were told that each time the Learner gave an incorrect response on the learning task they were to administer an electric shock that would increase in intensity with each successive incorrect response by clicking the appropriate voltage button on a shock generator displayed on the bottom of the computer screen. In the second phase, participants were shown a recording of an Experimenter strapping a male actor into a chair and placing an electrode on each of his arms. The Experimenter then read a list of 30 word pairs to the Learner.

In the final phase of the procedure, participants watched as an Experimenter read a word (e.g., blue) and four answer choices to the Learner. The word would then appear on the participant’s computer screen along with the correct answer choice (e.g., sky). Then participants heard the Learner give his response, which was also presented on the computer screen in a box labeled “result.” Participants were asked to indicate whether the Learner’s response was correct or incorrect by

193


selecting the corresponding button on the computer screen. When participants selected the incorrect button on the screen they heard an “electric buzzing sound” and an “electric discharge sound” (Dambrun & Vatiné, 2010, p. 765). This study also included two conditions. In the “visible” condition, participants saw and heard the Learner respond to the shocks simultaneously with the “electric discharge sound,” and in the “hidden” condition participants only heard the reaction of the Learner. The intensity of the Learner’s reaction rose with the intensity of the shock administered. If a participant expressed at any point that they did not wish to continue the procedure, an Experimenter would respond with the first two prods originally used by Milgram. First, the Experimenter would respond “please go on;” if the participant still refused to continue, the Experimenter would respond “the experiment requires that you continue” (Dambrun & Vatiné, 2010, p. 765). If a participant refused to continue after the second prod the experiment was discontinued.

Results indicated that in the visible condition 62.5% of participants obeyed the Experimenter and administered all the electrics shocks to the Learner. Additionally, the authors found that greater levels of state-anger and right-wing authoritarianism reported by the participants were associated with higher levels of electric shock being administered to the Learner. This means that participants who reported higher levels of state-anger and right-wing authoritarianism displayed the highest levels of obedience. Although these results are provocative, the procedure used by Dambrun and Vatiné differs from that of Milgram’s original studies in several ways. First, participants were made explicitly aware that they were taking part in a prerecorded simulation. Participants were aware throughout the study that neither the shocks nor the Learner’s reactions were real. As a result, this study is similar to the research conducted by Slater et al. (2006) such that it did not exactly match Milgram’s earlier conceptualization of destructive obedience. Second, the Experimenter in this study only gave two prods in response to participants’ reluctance to continue which means that participants only needed to indicate three consecutive times that they no longer wished to continue to be considered disobedient. In contrast, the Experimenter in Milgram’s original studies issued four prods, which meant that participants had to indicate five consecutive times that they no longer wished to continue in order to be deemed disobedient. Thus, in the research of Dambrun and Vatiné (2010) the threshold for disobedience was somewhat lower than in Milgram’s original studies. However, this particular method does have the advantage of being relatively inexpensive because the software package used is open access (i.e., Psyscope X [B37]).

Other studies have assessed obedience to an authority figure who requests that participants give increasingly harsh verbal feedback and rude remarks to an

194


individual who is obviously upset (Bocchiaro & Zimbardo, 2010; Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1995). Bocchiaro and Zimbardo (2010) conducted a study in which participants worked with a confederate – a 25-year-old male – on solving a series of logic problems. Participants were assigned the role of “Coach,” which entailed assisting the confederate “Performer” in solving the problems by giving personal feedback. Personal feedback was given by the participants to the confederate in the form of harsh negative comments regarding his performance on the logic problems as well as rude remarks regarding his general ability. The severity of the harsh remarks increased with each successive incorrect response the Performer gave. For example, a relatively mild comment was “You are going bad…” whereas a very harsh comment was “You are really the most stupid person I have ever seen!” The Performer’s reactions to the comment also escalated in severity. Early in the experiment the Performer reacted to the comments in an anxious manner by shaking his head and nervously tapping his leg. By the end of the session, he was sobbing with his body slumped over his desk. The Experimenter was not physically present during the study and the participants were only able to communicate with him during the experiment via a microphone. The authors state that this situation is one that is likely to produce higher rates of disobedience because participants are in direct contact with the confederate throughout the trials, which requires them to make the harsh statements directly, and the Experimenter (i.e., authority figure) is not physically present during the trials. The results confirmed the authors’ expectations with only 30% of participants fully obeying the Experimenter by giving all 15 harsh remarks to the confederate. Further, immediately following the conclusion of the syllogism task, disobedient participants were asked questions regarding their first feelings after disobeying, whether their decision to disobey was carefully considered, and the reason they decided to disobey. Responses indicated that the majority participants believed that stopping the experiment was the “right” thing to do and that they believed the majority of people would have made the same decision. Additionally, participants reported that the decision to disobey was made rather impulsively, as opposed to being carefully thought out, and their reasons for disobeying included concern for the Performer’s health, moral objections to the situation, empathy for the Performer, and the futility of continuing the experiment while the Performer was so upset.

Although this research was novel and provided valuable insights into the mechanisms underlying decisions to obey or disobey, there are drawbacks to this methodology. Specifically, finding a confederate who can convincingly carry out this role is likely to be challenging and, to that end, standardizing the behaviors of the confederate Performer across study sessions is likely difficult to achieve and would undoubtedly require many practice sessions in order to ensure that the

195


actor’s reactions are as similar as possible in each study session. Indeed, Bocchiaro and Zimbardo report that they conducted extensive practice sessions and multiple pilot tests aimed at increasing the believability of the confederate’s general attitude and emotional reactions, as well as standardizing his reactions across study sessions.

Further, the research of Bocchiaro and Zimbardo (2010) differs somewhat from Milgram’s conception of destructive obedience. Specifically, the “harm” that participants believed they were inflicting on the Learner was of an emotional and psychological nature, as opposed to physical harm. Milgram’s (1974) participants were led to believe they were inflicting physical harm via the administration of electric shocks to the Learner. Additionally, participants were also aware that the Learner suffered from a heart condition, which implies that the electric shocks could possibly result in long-term physical harm.

Burger (2009) conducted a partial replication of Milgram’s procedures employing what has been called “the 150-volt solution” (e.g., Miller, 2009, p. 22). The 150-volt solution was proposed by Packer (2008) in a meta-analysis of Milgram’s original studies. Packer analyzed the relationship between level of shock and the likelihood of terminating participation across eight of Milgram’s original studies. The results indicated that the largest proportion of participants who disobeyed the Experimenter and ended their participation (39%) did so at the 150-volt point. More specifically, Burger (2009) points out that only 14 of the 40 participants in the version of Milgram’s study involving a heart condition stopped before reaching the end of the shock generator’s range of 450 volts. Of those 14 participants, six stopped at the 150-volt point. Only seven participants who continued after the 150-volt shock stopped at all. In other words, 79% of participants who continued past the 150-volt shock went all the way to 450-volts (Burger, 2009). The 150-volt level of shock is a significant point in the study because this is the first time that the Learner explicitly expresses that he does not wish to continue the session. Thus, it appears that the 150-volt point can be considered as somewhat of a “point of no return” (Burger, 2009, p. 2).

Burger (2009) suggested that the 150-volt point could be used as an ethical solution in conducting research in the Milgram paradigm. He reasoned that “knowing how people respond up to and including the 150-volt point in the procedure allows one to make a reasonable estimate of what they would do if allowed to continue to the end” (Burger, 2009, p. 2). Further, preventing participants from delivering punishments after the 150-volt point avoids the later trials during which Milgram’s participants experienced especially high levels of distress. Thus, ending the session quickly after a participant chooses to proceed to the next trial following the 150-volt shock avoids the more intense stress

196


experienced by Milgram’s participants while allowing reasonable estimates to be made about participants’ further obedience (Burger, 2009).

Burger also adopted several additional safeguards meant to further protect participants from any negative effects as a result of their participation. First, participants underwent a two-part screening process which excluded anyone who may have a higher likelihood of being negatively affected by participating in the study. Second, participants were informed – once verbally and twice in writing – that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Third, the Experimenter administered a sample shock of only 15 volts to participants to ensure they believed the shock generator was real, as opposed to the sample 45-volt shock administered to Milgram’s participants. Fourth, participants were debriefed immediately following the conclusion of the study session. Lastly, the Experimenter for every session was a clinical psychologist who was instructed to terminate the study if any participant showed signs of excessive distress.

The procedure and script for each session was very similar to the original script and procedure employed by Milgram in his original research. Burger also built a shock generator designed to be virtually identical to the one used in Milgram’s research. The key difference – aside from the adoption of numerous safeguards as described above – between Burger’s paradigm and the original Milgram obedience studies was Burger’s implementation of the 150-volt solution. Participants heard the confederate’s protest after pressing the 150-volt switch on the shock generator which conveyed that he no longer wished to continue the experiment and that his heart was bothering him. At this point, if the participant read the next item on the paired associate learning task they were considered obedient, the experiment ended, and the participant was immediately debriefed. If the participant refused to continue the procedure after hearing all four prods from the Experimenter, then that participant was considered disobedient. Burger’s results indicated that 70% of participants continued on to read the next item on the learning task after pressing the 150-volt switch. This obedience rate is slightly lower than the 82.5% of participants who continued on after this point in Milgram’s comparable condition but this difference is not statistically significant.

Burger’s paradigm offers a promising avenue for the investigation of destructive obedience to authority. However, there are some aspects of this procedure that may make it difficult for other researchers to replicate. First, Burger fabricated a shock generator designed to look virtually identical to the one used in Milgram’s original obedience studies. Fabricating this type of equipment is likely to cost thousands of dollars and many researchers do not have the budgetary means necessary to afford this kind of expense. Second, Burger’s recruitment of a

197


community sample that was paid $50 is also an expense that many researchers may not be able to afford.

Finally, Zeigler-Hill, Southard, Archer, and Donohoe (2013) conducted a study that employed a modified version of the 150-volt solution used by Burger (2009). First, rather than administering electric shocks as punishment to a Learner who was believed to suffer from a heart condition, Zeigler-Hill et al. used white-noise sound-blasts – that increased in decibels – to punish a Learner who was believed to suffer from severe migraine headaches. Similar to earlier studies conducted by Milgram (1974) and Burger (2009), participants watched as the Experimenter strapped the Learner into a chair in a room separate from the laboratory where participants conducted the learning task. The Experimenter also placed headphones on the Learner’s head and secured them using a strap that was tightened around the forehead to ostensibly prevent them from falling off during the session. The second modification involved how the learning task was conducted. Specifically, the learning task was conducted on a computer using the software package Inquisit 3 and participants used a microphone to communicate with the Learner and the Learner’s responses could be heard over the computer’s speakers. Additionally, following each white-noise sound-blast administered as punishment, the Learner’s reaction could be heard. The Learner’s reactions to the sound-blasts began as mild discomfort and escalated in intensity until the administration of the 150-decibel noise-blast at which point he expressed explicitly that he did not want to continue the procedure for the first time. All of the Learner’s responses were prerecorded so that responses were standardized across study sessions. The Learner’s responses were computer-programmed such that the participant’s clicks on the screen activated the Learner’s responses so that participants could move through the learning task at their own pace.

The results of Zeigler-Hill et al. (2013) revealed that only two of 33 participants disobeyed, which resulted in an obedience rate of 94%. This rate of obedience is higher than those observed by Milgram (1974) and Burger (2009). While some of the procedural modifications made by Zeigler-Hill et al. make this paradigm more practical (i.e., conducting the learning task using a computer software program and prerecorded Learner responses), the use of white-noise sound-blasts instead of electric shock may have reduced the severity or power of the situation so much that participants were not distressed enough to disobey the commands of the Experimenter.

Although current ethical standards prevent true replications of Milgram’s research, several researchers have constructed innovative methodologies for the ethical study of obedience. However, each of these paradigms has particular drawbacks. The current study was conducted in an attempt to establish a relatively

198


inexpensive and easily replicable paradigm for the study of destructive obedience to authority that was based closely on the 150-volt solution employed by Burger (2009).

MethodParticipants. Participants in the present study were 54 undergraduates (5 men,

49 women) from a university in the Midwestern region of the United States who participated in exchange for partial completion of course-required research participation. Of the 54 individuals who completed Phase 1 (online measures of personality), 15 females were excluded from participation in Phase 2 (in person lab session). Of these 15, six were excluded because they endorsed at least one of the exclusion criteria (part of a health form described below), five were excluded because of prior knowledge of the true purpose of the study (i.e., were familiar with Milgram’s original studies), and four were excluded because of technical issues (i.e., computer program malfunction). The final sample consisted of 39 participants (5 men, 34 women).

MeasuresDemographic/Health Form. A brief demographic/health form containing items

regarding participants’ age, sex, racial-ethnic background, academic status, marital status, annual income of family of origin, and sexual orientation was administered to participants directly after completion of the informed consent. Additionally, the health portion of the form included items designed to probe for mental health issues such as anxiety (e.g., “Has a doctor ever diagnosed you as ‘anxious’?”), depression (e.g., “Has a doctor ever diagnosed you as ‘depressed’?”), and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (e.g., “Has a doctor ever diagnosed you as having Posttraumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD]?”). In addition, items addressing physical health issues such as heart disease (e.g., “Have you ever been told by a doctor that you have heart disease [e.g., heart attack, angina, abnormal heart rhythm]?”), stroke (e.g., “Have you ever been told by a doctor that you had a stroke?”), and pregnancy (e.g., “Are you currently pregnant?”) were also included. Participants responded to each item by circling “Yes” or “No.” This form was administered as a precautionary measure aimed at identifying individuals who may potentially be at a higher risk for being negatively impacted–physically or mentally–by participation in the study. If a participant responded “yes” to any of these items, they were told they had been randomly assigned to a “control” condition, thanked for their time, and the session ended.

Affect. Affect during the procedure was measured via the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The

199


negative affect subscale of the PANAS consists of 10 items (e.g., distressed, scared, hostile) and the positive affect subscale consists of 10 items (e.g., strong, proud, excited). Responses were made on scales ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Gross and John (2003) reported adequate alpha reliabilities of .87 for the positive affect subscale and .85 for the negative affect subscale. The alpha reliabilities for the positive and negative affect subscales of the PANAS in the present study were .83 and .91, respectively.

ProcedureParticipants first arrived and took a seat in a waiting area where either a male

or female confederate posing as another participant was already waiting. After approximately two to three minutes, a female Experimenter greeted both the participant and the confederate and escorted them to the laboratory where a second female Experimenter was seated. In the laboratory, Experimenter 1 read the informed consent aloud after which both the participant and confederate signed the informed consent form and completed the demographic/health form. After participants completed the demographic/health form, Experimenter 1 examined the health portion of the survey. If any participant responded with a “Yes” to any of the mental and physical health questions, then the study was terminated at this point. Experimenter 1 informed the participant and confederate that they were randomly assigned to a control condition and nothing further was required for their participation. The participant was thanked for his or her time, granted credit for participation, and dismissed from the session. If participants did not indicate any possible mental or physical health problems, then the session proceeded.

Experimenter 1 explained that the study was designed to examine the effects of punishment on learning and would require one individual to assume the role of “Teacher” and the other to assume the role of “Learner.” Experimenter 1 explained that the roles would be assigned via a drawing in order to ensure the roles were assigned in a fair manner. She then presented two folded slips of paper and allowed the participant and the confederate to each take one (the word “Teacher” was written on both slips of paper to make certain that the participant was always assigned the role of Teacher). After the rigged drawing, Experimenter 1 briefly described the roles of the Teacher and the Learner. Participants were informed that as the Teacher they would conduct a paired-associate learning test via computer with the Learner and would administer a punishment to the Learner, in the form of a mild electric shock, each time the Learner made a mistake. Experimenter 1 then informed the Learner that his or her job in the session would be to learn the word pairs read to them by the Teacher. Next, Experimenter 1 asked if either the Teacher or Learner had any questions before continuing with the session. At this point, the

200


Learner stated that they had been diagnosed with a mild heart arrhythmia and asked how severe the shocks would be. Experimenter 1 responded in a dismissive manner by saying “while the shocks may be painful, they are not dangerous. There is no risk of any long-term damage.”

Participants then watched as Experimenter 1 and Experimenter 2 seated the Learner behind a table with a microphone and placed standard medical restraints around his or her wrists, ankles, and waist. Experimenter 1 also attached two electrodes to the right forearm of the Learner and switched on the ostensible shock generator. At this point, Experimenter 1 instructed Experimenter 2 to finish setting up the shock generator and provide more specific instructions to the Learner. Experimenter 1 then escorted the participant out of the laboratory to another room. Participants were seated in front of a computer with a microphone and speakers attached to it. Experimenter 1 explained that the Teacher’s role was to read a list of word pairs to the Learner via the microphone after which they would test the Learner’s memory for the word pairs. Each test word would appear on the computer screen with four possible answer choices, one of which was the correct answer. The correct answer for each trial was presented in blue so that participants could easily determine whether the Learner’s response was correct or incorrect. Participants were told that there had been problems with Learners asking questions or trying to speak at the same time as the Teacher in prior versions of the study and that the Learner would only be able to communicate with the Teacher at two specific times during each trial in order to correct this problem. Participants were told that the Learner would only be able to respond after each test item and the answer choices were read to indicate the answer they believed to be correct and after each electric shock was administered in order to indicate the pain associated with the shock using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all painful) to 10 (extremely painful).

Participants were told that each time they communicated with the Learner they must click on a “Transmit On” icon to initiate the communication and they must click on a “Transmit Off” icon to end each communication in order to activate the Learner’s microphone. In reality, however, all of the Learner’s responses to test items and pain indications were prerecorded and clicking the “Transmit Off” icon on the computer screen simply activated the Learner’s response for that trial. The schedule of the Learner’s responses is provided in Table 1. It is important to note that, as our confederates were college students of approximately 20 years of age, the reactions to each electric shock needed to sound typical of a college student around this age. As a result, the Learner’s prerecorded reactions to the shocks contain some profane language.

201


After Experimenter 1 made sure that the Teacher understood the procedure, Experimenter 2 entered the laboratory and informed Experimenter 1 that the Learner understood his or her instructions and was ready to proceed with the session. At this point, both Experimenter 1 and Experimenter 2 took a seat behind the Teacher and Experimenter 1 stated that Experimenter 2 would be monitoring and recording the Learner’s responses while Experimenter 1 made sure that the procedure “ran smoothly.” Experimenter 1 then instructed the Teacher to begin the learning task.

Table 1. Script for the SessionProbe Options Answer Voltage Response to Shock1. Blue Boy-Girl-Grass-Hat “Umm…Girl.” — —2. Nice Day-Sky-Job-Chair “Umm…Day.” — —3. Fat Man-Lady-Tub-Neck “Umm…Lady?” 15v “Eh…that’s not so bad. I give that a

1.”4. Green Grass-Hat-Ink-Apple “Um…Grass?” 30v “Ah, Um, That was, that was OK.

Um I’ll give it a 3.”5. Rich Boy-Cake-Man-Girl “Um…Man.” 45v “Yeah, alright. That one definitely

stung. I’ll give that one a 5.”6. Fast Bird-Car-Train-Plane “Alright, I got this one.

Bird.” — —

7. Blunt Knife-Stick-Word-Arrow

“Ahh…Word.” 60v “This is really starting to hurt! Umm…7.”

8. Soft Rug-Pillow-Hair-Grass “Uhh…Rug?” 75v “Crap! Uh… This really hurts! Ah… that’s an 8.”

9. Cool Day-Shade-Water-Cave “Ah um…Water.” 90v “Jesus Christ that hurt! 9!”10. Gold Dollar-Necklace-

Moon-Paint“Uh. Moon.” — —

11. Hard Stone-Head-Bread-Work

“Umm…S-Stone.” 105v “Holy shit! My arm’s like burning. 10!”

12. Wet Night-Grass-Duck-Cloth

“Uh. Cloth!” 120v “God! I don’t know how much more I can take! 10 again!”

13. Brave Woman-Soldier-Dog-Horse

“Damn it! Soldier.” 135v “Goddamn fucking 11!”

14. White Cloud-Horse-Rock-House

“God, I don’t know! Cloud!?”

150v “God! This is bullshit! I, this, this is not what I signed up for! My heart’s skipping beats! I, I don’t want to go on!”

15. Sad Face-Music-Clown-Girl

“Really!? You really want me to answer this? I don’t know! Face!”

— —

202


Note. The underlined options are the correct responses. Trials with a “—” indicate the Learner provided a correct response.

For each test trial, participants indicated whether the Learner’s response was correct or incorrect by clicking either a “Correct” or “Incorrect” icon on the computer screen. For trials on which the Learner’s response was correct, clicking the “Correct” icon allowed the Teacher to move to the next trial. For trials on which the Learner’s response was incorrect, clicking the “Incorrect” icon prompted a screen stating that the Learner’s response to the previous item was incorrect, what the correct answer was, and the voltage level of the shock that would be administered as punishment. The Teacher would read this information aloud to the Learner (e.g., on trial three, Teachers read “Incorrect, the correct answer was ‘neck,’ you will now receive an electric shock of 15 volts”). Participants then selected the appropriate voltage by clicking its icon on the computer screen. As displayed in Figure 1, voltage icons were displayed in a grid-like fashion on the computer screen.

Figure 1. Voltage Selection Screen–Trial 4.

After the appropriate voltage icon was selected, participants heard the Learner’s prerecorded pain indication. The Learner’s pain indications escalated in severity along with the increasing shock voltage administered. After a voltage icon had been selected, a red “X” appeared over it for the remainder of the session so that participants had to select the next highest voltage icon on subsequent trials.

203


Each time the participant indicated reluctance to continue the session, Experimenter 1 responded with four increasingly authoritarian prods which were the same as those used by Milgram in his original obedience studies. In order, the prods were “please continue,” “the experiment requires that you continue,” “it is absolutely essential that you continue,” and “you have no other choice, you must go on.” Each time the participant indicated reluctance to continue, Experimenter 1 began with the first prod. If the participant still refused to continue, then the second prod was given and so on. The session was terminated if the participant still refused to continue after the fourth prod or if the participant continued to the 15th trial of the learning test. It is important to note that occasionally the prods issued to participants during the session had to be slightly modified to be appropriate for the context. For example, a participant might respond to the Experimenter’s second prod by saying “I thought you said I could stop at any time?” In these instances, the Experimenter would acknowledge that the participant was correct but that they should still continue with the session (e.g., the third prod was altered to “Yes, but it is absolutely essential that you continue”).

After the session was terminated, either because the participant had protested after Experimenter 1 had given the fourth prod or the participant had continued to the 15th trial of the learning task, Experimenter 1 assessed participants’ affect using the PANAS and conducted a manipulation check. The manipulation check consisted of four items meant to assess participants’ suspicion regarding the purpose of the study (e.g., item two asks participants to state the purpose of the study in their own words). If any participant expressed suspicion or responded to one of the four items in a way that indicated they were aware that the Learner had not been receiving shocks, that participant’s data were excluded from the final sample. After completion of these measures, participants were fully debriefed and told the true nature of the study. The participant was then reunited with the Learner who reassured the participant that they were unharmed and had received no electric shocks. Participants were finally thanked for their time and granted partial course credit for their participation.

ResultsOverall, six out of 39 participants – all of whom were women – disobeyed the

Experimenter and refused to continue the learning task. This resulted in an obedience rate of 84.62%. As displayed in Figure 2, this rate of obedience is very similar to the percentage of participants who continued beyond this point in Milgram’s comparable condition (i.e., 82.5%). Of the 6 disobedient participants, 1 refused to begin the learning task after following the Experimenter’s description of the procedure, 1 disobeyed on trial 3 (15-volt shock), 1 disobeyed on trial 8 (75-

204


volt shock), 1 disobeyed on trial 11 (105-volt shock), and 2 disobeyed on trial 12 (120-volt shock). The total number of prods received by participants ranged from 0 to 6 (4 participants required more than 4 prods during the session but did not require more than 3 on any single trial), and the average number of prods required during the session was 1.69. The trial on which participants required their first prod ranged from trial 3 (15-volt shock) to trial 15 (final trial), with 12 participants requiring a prod prior to trial 15, 19 participants requiring their first prod on trial 15, and 8 participants completing the session without requiring any prods.

15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 15050

60

70

80

90

100

MilgramCurrent Study

Voltage Level

Obe

dien

ce R

ate

Figure 2. Percentage of Obedient Participants per Trial

DiscussionThe current study was conducted in an attempt to develop a relatively

inexpensive and easily replicable paradigm for the ethical study of Milgram’s (1963, 1974) conceptualization of destructive obedience to authority. Following the procedures of Burger (2009) and Zeigler-Hill et al. (2013), the present research employed the 150-volt solution based on the meta-analysis of Packer (2008). Results revealed an obedience rate of approximately 85%, which is comparable to the 82.5% obedience rate found in Milgram’s original study at the 150-volt point. The only participants who were excluded due to suspicion were already familiar with the Milgram studies prior to their study session. This suggests that we were successful in creating a convincing scenario in which participants truly believed our confederate Learners were receiving electric shocks.

205


The procedure presented in the current study has several advantages over other previous methodologies. First, all the Learners’ responses used in the current study were prerecorded. The use of prerecorded responses allows researchers to avoid the multiple lengthy practice sessions that were necessary in the research conducted by Bocchiaro and Zimbardo (2010). The use of prerecorded responses also ensures that Learner responses will be standardized across study sessions. A second advantage is that our modified paradigm is relatively inexpensive to replicate. Our paradigm does not require researchers to fabricate a shock generator as in the research of Burger (2009) because participants ostensibly administer shocks to the Learner by simply clicking on an icon on the computer screen. Further, as this procedure employed undergraduate research assistants as experimenters and confederates, and utilized an undergraduate sample, researchers are able to avoid hiring actors. Our procedure also does not require costly audiovisual simulation equipment as in the research of Slater et al. (2006). Overall, our equipment costs were quite low. The most expensive elements of our study were a desktop computer – which most social psychologists already have in their laboratories – and the Inquisit software package that we used to program the trials. Researchers could further reduce their costs by using open access programs that have similar capabilities such as Psyscope which was used by Dambrun and Vatiné (2010) in their study of obedience.

Similar to the research of Burger (2009) and Zeigler-Hill et al. (2013), a third advantage of the current procedure is the use of the 150-volt solution. Preventing participants from delivering punishments after the 150-volt point avoids the later trials during which Milgram’s participants experienced especially high levels of distress. Thus, ending the session quickly after a participant chooses to proceed to the next trial following the 150-volt shock – which is the first time the participant is taking action that contradicts the expressed wishes of the confederate – avoids the more intense stress experienced by Milgram’s participants while allowing reasonable estimates to be made about participants’ further obedience (Burger, 2009). Additionally, the fact that participants believed they were administering shocks to a real person allows for a more direct examination of Milgram’s original conception of destructive obedience. This approach is quite different than the research of Slater et al. (2006) and Dambrun and Vatiné (2010) who made participants aware of the fact that the events of the study were completely simulated.

In summary, the present research attempted to present a relatively inexpensive and easily replicable paradigm for the study of destructive obedience to authority. Our results revealed obedience rates similar to those of Milgram’s (1963, 1974) comparable condition at the 150-volt point. Further, this paradigm appears to create

206


a seemingly authentic situation as evidenced by the fact that no participants were excluded from data analysis due to suspicion other than those who were aware of the original Milgram studies. It is our hope that researchers interested in destructive obedience will find the methodology presented in the current study to be useful in their future studies.

ReferencesBenjamin, L. T., & Simpson, J. A. (2009). The power of the situation: The impact of

Milgram’s obedience studies on personality and social psychology. American Psychologist, 64, 12-19.

Blass, T. (2004). The man who shocked the world: The life and legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Blass, T. (2009). From New Haven to Santa Clara: A historical perspective on the Milgram obedience experiments. American Psychologist, 64, 37-45.

Bocchiaro, P., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2010). Defying unjust authority: An exploratory study. Current Psychology, 29, 155-170.

Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American Psychologist, 64, 1-11.

Dambrun, M., & Vatiné, E. (2010). Reopening the study of extreme social behaviors: Obedience to authority within an immersive video environment. European Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 760-773.

Meeus, W. J., & Raaijmakers, Q. W. (1995). Obedience in modern society: The Utrecht studies. Journal of Social Issues, 51, 155-175.

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 371-378.

Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. NewYork, NY: Harper & Row.

Miller, A. G. (1986). The obedience experiments: A case study of controversy in social science. New York, NY: Praeger.

Packer, D. J. (2008). Identifying systematic disobedience in Milgram’s obedience experiments: A meta-analytic review. Perspective on Psychological Science, 3, 301-304.

Slater, M., Antler, A., Davidson, A., Swap, D., Gouger, C., Barker, C.,…, Sanchez-Vies, M. V. (2006). A virtual reprise of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments. PLoS ONE, 1, e39.

Werhane, P. H., Hartman, L. P., Moberg, D., Englehardt, E., Pritchard, M., & Parmar, B. (2011). Social constructivism, mental models, and problems of obedience. Journal of Business Ethics, 100, 103-118.

207

C. Stott. Getting Over the shock of Milgram: To understand ‘Obedience’ is to move beyond mere replica-tion. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

GETTING OVER THE SHOCK OF MILGRAM: TO UNDERSTAND ‘OBEDIENCE’ IS TO MOVE BEYOND MERE REPLICATION

ПРЕОДОЛЕНИЕШОКАОТ OBEDIENCE- : ЭКСПЕРИМЕНТОВМИЛГРЭМА ПОНЯТЬ СУЩНОСТЬДЕСТРУКТИВНОЙПОВИНУЕМОСТИ

ОЗНАЧАЕТПОЙТИДАЛЬШЕПРОСТЫХПОВТОРЕНИЙ ЭКСПЕРИМЕНТОВ

Clifford StottSchool of Law

University of Leeds, United [email protected]

Clifford Stott is Principal Research Fellow in Security & Justice at the University of Leeds. He is based in the School of Law but is also a Visiting Professor of the Socio-Technical Centre in the School of Business. His research interests revolve around crowd psychology, collective conflict, social identity, intergroup dynamics, human rights and public order policing, particularly as this relates to understanding

‘riots’, protests and 'football hooliganism'. He has published over fifty articles in leading journals and co-authored and edited three books the last of which was on the 2011 ‘English riots’.Клиффорд Стотт – ведущий научный сотрудник в области безопасности и правосудия в университете Лидса. Преподает в Школе права, является приглашенным лектором в Социо-техническом центре в Школе бизнеса. Область исследовательских интересов: психология толпы, массовых конфликтов, социальной идентичности, межгрупповой динамики, прав человека и охраны общественного порядка, что частично позволяет объяснить причины массовых беспорядков, протестов и хулиганских действий футбольных болельщиков. Имеет более 50 публикаций в ведущих журналах, является соавтором трех книг, в том числе «English riots», 2011.

Key words: social identity, obedience, resistance, ethics, MilgramКлючевые слова: социальная идентичность, повинуемость легитимным авторитетам, сопротивление, неповиновение, этика, Милгрэм

AbstractIt is widely recognized that Milgram’s ‘obedience’ paradigm developed from a

tradition of research driven to engage psychology with important social and political issues. Yet, while many find the phenomena Milgram documented compelling, others find his theoretical account of the agentic state unpersuasive. On the one hand, it fails to account for widespread resistance to ‘authority’ evident within Milgram’s own studies. On

208



the other, the model provides a weak account of the historical evidence regarding mass violence and genocide. In this paper it is argued that we are therefore left with a body of theory that not only lacks explanatory power but also which is increasingly marginalized from meaningful and progressive impact upon contemporary social and political issues. Unpacking this state of affairs, this paper reports upon a ‘journalistic demonstration’ of Milgram’s ‘baseline’ experiment for the BBC’s flagship science programme Horizon and discusses its meaning and relevance to a recent body of work that theoretically reframes ‘obedience’ as identity based ‘engaged followership’.

АннотацияУтверждение о том, что исследования Стенли Милгрэма в рамках obedience-

парадигмы принадлежат научной традиции, ориентированной на выявление роли достижений психологической науки в решении широкого круга социальных и политических проблем, является признанной истиной для научного сообщества. Несмотря на то, что многие считают полученные Милгрэмом результаты убедительными, некоторые исследователи не склонны соглашаться с предложенной им концепцией слепого повиновения. С одной стороны, эта концепция не может объяснить широко распространенное явление сопротивления авторитету, наблюдаемое в собственных исследованиях Милгрэма. С другой стороны, эта концепция обладает недостаточной объяснительной силой при рассмотрении фактов массовых убийств и геноцида. В настоящей статье мы пытаемся показать, что научному сообществу приходится оперировать научной теорией, которая не только не обладает достаточной объяснительной силой, но и при этом находится на периферии психологической науки и, следовательно, не может ощутимо повлиять на выработку конструктивных решений современных социальных и политических проблем. Мы описываем здесь так называемую "журналистскую" демонстрацию основного варианта эксперимента Милгрэма в эфире ведущей научно-популярной передачи Horizon компании BBC и обсуждаем, как этот эксперимент связан с недавними работами, рассматривающими "повинуемость легитимным авторитетам" как “вовлечённое соучастие адепта", основанное на социальной идентичности

Introduction: The Zeitgeist of ObedienceThe importance of obedience as a social, political and conceptual issue was

crystalized in the Military Tribunals held at Nüremberg between 1945 and 1949. But in 1960, in a context of Cold War tensions, partly being played out through the politics of the Middle East, the Israeli secret service captured and illegally extradited from Argentina, Adolf Eichmann, a leading Nazi architect of the Holocaust. His subsequent trial in 1961 in Jerusalem, televised internationally, made salient the question of how it was that Germany, a technologically advanced

209


and highly educated society, could send millions of innocent people, predominantly Jews, to their deaths in the concentration camps.

As is already well known, in the public gallery observing the Eichmann trial was one of the most influential political theorist of the twentieth century, Hannah Arendt. Arendt had already published significant books on the ‘Origins of Totalitarianism’ (1951) and the ‘Human Condition’ (1958). During her observations she wrote a series of articles about the trial for the popular ‘New Yorker’ magazine, articles which were then subsequently developed into her highly influential book ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil’ (1963). Far from the personification of evil that she had expected, Eichmann instead came across as a passionless bureaucrat, obsessed with the technical detail of the genocide, that had no conception of the bigger picture of the immorality of his work (Haslam & Reicher, 2007). Whilst Arendt’s arguments were complex and nuanced, her portrayal of Eichmann as an ordinary man merely following orders was important because it transformed the primary theoretical problematic of genocide, in a way that directed psychologists away from notions of dysfunctional personality (Adorno et al, 1950) toward more normal processes of obedience.

The Legacy: Popularizing Obedience and Occluding ResistanceIt was in this climate where conformity was seen as an important intellectual

issue (see also Nicholson, 2011) that the National Science Foundation funded Milgram in 1961 to conduct his two-year programme of experimental research on the dynamics of obedience. It is unnecessary to go into detail here about the precise nature of Milgram’s experiments, as these are widely known and comprehensive descriptions of the basic procedure are available elsewhere (e.g. Blass, 2004; Gibson, 2011; Milgram, 1974; Perry, 2013). Suffice to say that subsequent representations of those experiments focus primarily upon a single ‘voice-feedback condition’ (Experiment 5; Milgram, 1974) whereas in fact he ran multiple variations across roughly two years of data collection (Perry, 2013; Reicher, Haslam & Miller, 2014). This ubiquitous focus on a single variant is important because it is in the baseline condition that 62.5% of the ‘Teachers’ proceed all the way to 450 volts – ostensibly delivering what they believed to be potentially fatal shocks to the ‘Learner’ in the adjacent room.

The prominence of this baseline condition in interpretations of Milgram is hardly surprising. It was this variation that was the focus of the first peer-reviewed article published from the research, just a year after Eichmann had been sentenced to hang for his crimes (Milgram, 1963). What is also apparent from Blass’s (2004) detailed and powerful biographical analysis is that in the wake of publication of this first article extensive popular dissemination of the research took place through the

210


mass media; tapping as it did into the broader ‘big questions’ that had excited public curiosity following the Eichmann trial.

As a precursor to the 50th anniversary of this publication there has been something of a renaissance of interest in Milgram (as this special issue attests; see also Jetten & Mols, 2014; Reicher, Haslam & Miller, 2014). An important dimension of this has been recognition that he was not merely a influential scientist but also a skilled filmmaker (Millard, 2011; Russell, 2011; see Perry for a contrarian review of the film as propaganda in this issue). In particular, Millard (2011, 2014) provides an analysis of ‘Obedience’, Milgram’s powerful and influential film about the experiments, released in 1965. Millard acknowledges Milgram’s skill in using the film to translate a salient social issue into the dry format of the positivist laboratory, whilst also capturing the powerful and engaging emotional dilemmas that his participants endured. However, she also contends that this creative piece of work conveys a particular and restricted narrative. She reminds us that Milgram produced this film only after the bulk of his data had already been collected. Thus, she acknowledges that Milgram purposefully repeated and filmed a single variation, the highly dramatic ‘voice feedback condition’; presumably because it captured in such an engaging fashion the specific narrative Milgram wanted to convey about the power of situations to invoke what he believed was a universal human propensity toward obedience (Milgram, 1974).

Such was the capacity of Milgram to excite public imagination and controversy that nearly a decade later a television movie was created about the research, in which William Shatner of ‘Star Trek’ fame played the dynamic social psychologist. The film was released just one year after Milgram published his seminal book (Milgram, 1974). In this respect Milgram was an erudite master of multi-format dissemination and self promotion. But it was arguably this mass media exposure, combined with Milgram’s focus on the baseline condition in his first publication and film, which has fuelled what has become the hegemonic interdisciplinary narrative of Milgram’s research. As the New York Times headline in 1963 put it “Sixty-five Percent in Test Blindly Obey Order to Inflict Pain” (cited in Blass, 2004, p.121).

More recently Reicher and Haslam (2011) have argued, Milgram has come to be seen as somewhat a victim of his own success; for this ubiquitous focus on the voice-feedback condition and its associated story of conformity has functioned to mask the underlying complexity of Milgram’s data. In fact, across the different variations of the paradigm there were widely different levels of both ‘obedience’ and ‘disobedience’, all occurring as a function of relatively minor variations in context. It simply was not the case that the paradigm as a whole demonstrated that obedience to authority was the norm. Indeed, there were several variants that

211


resulted in almost complete disobedience — including the “Bring-a-friend” study that has only recently come to light in the Yale archive (Russell, 2014; Rochat & Blass, 2014; Perry, 2013). Thus, the ubiquitous focus on obedience is essentially ideological, as it has functioned to occlude important questions about, and analysis of, equally important questions of the dynamics of resistance (see Haslam & Reicher, 2012).

Limitations of theoryOne important feature of Milgram’s experimental paradigm is that it was

largely inductive. In other words, what Milgram achieved was a powerful and widely acknowledged demonstration of conformity but little or no systematic support for a theoretical analysis of why such behaviour was taking place. Moreover, the subsequent ethical sanction upon further research of this kind has meant that for decades following the initial studies no substantive replication of the paradigm took place. Arguably, over 50 years since the studies were first conducted the social sciences have therefore not moved much beyond Milgram’s post hoc ‘agentic state’ analysis (Milgram, 1974) and, some assert, we are no closer to explaining at a theoretical level what actually went on in those powerful and influential experiments (Ross, 1998; Miller, 2004, 2009; Russell, 2011, Brannigan 2004, pp. 52-60).

The concept of the agentic state is summarised by Haslam, Reicher, Millard and McDonald (2014a) who state that the “key idea here is that, in the presence of a powerful authority, individuals come to focus their attention on the challenge of enacting authority’s wishes rather than the question of whether those actions are right or wrong. Thus, just as Eichmann was seen by Arendt to never realize what he was doing, so Milgram’s participants were seen to have failed to grasp the lethal significance of the punishments they were required to mete out in furtherance of the experimenter’s goals. They abstained from active and reflective thought. They succumbed to the power of the situation. They became the passive and uncritical agents of authority” (p.5). In short, the agentic state analysis, reinforced through the ubiquitous reference to the baseline condition, suggests that humans suffer from a natural tendency toward obedience. Moreover, that this psychological mechanism, or “dispositional cement”, is the basis from which we can understand the emergence of the political structures underpinning totalitarian regimes and phenomena such as genocide (Milgram, 1974, p.3)

Milgram’s ideas were quite radical at the time that they were made, suggesting as they did that the propensity to harm others was not confined to individuals with defective personalities. For textbook writers in particular, this was certainly an argument that resonated well with the interpretation of Arendt’s evaluation of

212


Eichmann as a mechanical, unimaginative and unquestioning bureaucrat. Haslam and Reicher (2012) suggest that this resonance then played centre stage in an emerging, but soon to become hegemonic, broader cultural narrative - that tyranny thrives because individual perpetrators cede the responsibility for their actions to authorities. However, while the ‘agentic sate’ is compelling to some (e.g. Meeus, 2013) it remains problematic to others (e.g. Blass, 2004; Brannigan, 2004, 2013; Reicher & Haslam, 2011; Reicher, Haslam & Millar, 2014; Ross, 1998; Miller, 2004, 2009; Russell, 2011, 2014) primarily because it is a theory that cannot account for the empirical evidence, both within the obedience paradigm itself and more generally.

First, the agentic state denies the complexity of Milgram’s own data. In this sense, the theory does not explain the patterns of systematic variability in obedience that is evident across the multiple variations of the experiment. For example, in one variant, (Experiment 15) there were two experimenters who gave contradictory commands to the subject. In this context all participants were disobedient (Milgram, 1974, p.108). If there is a natural universal tendency toward obedience, engendered through an agentic state, how and why does this simple variation in context create the systemic increase in disobedience witnessed in this subtle variation of the paradigm? Moreover, even in those variants where obedience was more prevalent there was often vociferous resistance among participants, who were at times extremely anxious about what they were doing (Perry, 2013). This pattern of behaviour does not sit well with the idea of participants becoming emotionally and intellectually remote from the pain and suffering of the learner (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2011).

The agentic state also struggles to articulate with the historical evidence about the Holocaust. In this regard, one of the things that characterized the Nazi state was the lack of evidence of explicit orders relating to the murder and persecution of Jews (Kershaw, 1993; Rees, 2005). On the contrary, the historical evidence shows that perpetrators acted on their own initiative, with greater brutality than the orders of their superiors actually called for (e.g., Browning, 1992). Moreover, in his seminal analysis of Hitler’s hubristic war in the east, Kershaw (2000) argues that the “more ideologically committed pro-Nazis would entirely swallow the interpretation of the war as a preventative one to avoid the destruction of western culture by the Bolshevik hoards. They fervently believed that Europe would never be liberated before ‘Jewish Bolshevism’ was utterly and completely rooted out. The path to the Holocaust, intertwined with the showdown with Bolshevism, was prefigured in such notions” (p.389). Thus, far from acting under orders or in ignorance, the Nazis positively embraced brutality against the Jews as an extension and enactment of their ideology. Moreover, to committed Nazis the extermination

213


of the Jews was moral because they believed it was necessary to ensure the survival of humanity. As such, Brannigan (2013) points out Eichmann was significant not because he followed orders under duress but because he did not, that he acted with individual agency out of a sense of vociferous duty to Nazi identity and ideology (also see Haslam & Reicher, 2007).

Given these issues, one of the key features of more contemporary critiques of Milgram’s analysis is that they have questioned the very notion of the ‘banality of evil’ (Haslam & Reicher, 2007, 2012). When this notion of banality is combined with Milgram’s theses on the predilection for obedience, underpinned by a distorted focus on the baseline condition, we are left with a powerful conceptual consensus that some argue has functioned to undermine theoretical development in a range of disciplines (Cesarani, 2006; Millar, 2014; Lipstadt, 2011). In other words, despite the ubiquitous allusion to Milgram’s research as somehow having advanced theoretical understanding of the psychological processes underpinning genocide, actually, the opposite is the case. In short, the inductive nature of the original studies, the subsequent inability to fully replicate the paradigm, the post hoc theorising, have essentially left the social sciences with an inadequate psychological model not just of the behaviour witnessed in Milgram’s experiments but of genocide itself (Karstedt, 2013).

Replicating Milgram for the BBCShortly after the publication of his first article from the studies (Milgram,

1963) Bruno Bettelheim, a survivor of Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps and influential psychoanalyst, publicly attacked Milgram’s studies as “so vile that nothing these experiments show has any value… They are in line with the human experiments of the Nazis” (cited in Blass, 2004, p.123). One can only imagine how devastating such a high-profile verbal assault would have been for the early career researcher, himself Jewish. However, it is widely acknowledged to be Baumrind’s (1964) article in the American Psychologist that established the now widely shared belief that Milgram’s research had gone too far.

Put simply, Baumrind’s argument was that participation within the paradigm would have undermined participant’s self-image and damaged their ability to trust adult authorities and therefore led to long-standing psychological damage. Despite Milgram’s defence of his approach (which was supported by post-experimental survey data; Milgram, 1964) this critique occurred within a wider debate concerning the ethical framework for psychological research that culminated in the American Psychological Association’s publication of the “Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants” in 1973; a document that effectively ended any possibility that Milgram’s obedience paradigm could be

214


recreated for research purposes. At the same time, the NSF wrote to Milgram in 1961 expressing concerns over treatment of subjects (Perry, this issue), although this can itself be interpreted as an attempt by the scientific bureaucracy’s to minimize its own culpability (Russell, 2014).

In 2008 the BBC’s flagship science programme ‘Horizon’ was producing a factual documentary on why people kill other human beings. Whilst individual pathology was a central narrative of the programme, the producer also wanted to convey the idea that mass violence could not be adequately understood without some acknowledgement of situational determinism. After serious consideration, and perhaps like Milgram himself (Millard, 2014), the producer decided that the most dramatic way to engage a television audience with these narratives was to directly replicate and film the voice feedback condition, with the intention of allowing the ‘experiment’ to progress all the way to 450 volts.

This ‘replication’ was not merely haphazard ‘reality television’ but a facsimile that followed strict protocols on a par with the original studies. As such it provided an opportunity for the social psychologists involved to ‘pilot’ some emerging theoretical concepts about the psychological processes underpinning ‘obedience’ (Haslam & Reicher, 2007), concepts that were subsequently developed into a more systematic programme of research around the concept of ‘engaged followership’ (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2012; see below). This theoretical reinterpretation of the Milgram data was derived from self-categorisation theory (SCT; Turner et al, 1987, 1994) applied as an analysis of leadership and social influence to the concept of obedience. A central feature of this argument is that it challenges the way in which obedience is typically treated as a phenomenon distinct from general social influence processes (see Turner, 1991). In contrast, SCT asserts that a person’s willingness to accede to the influence of others is always dependent upon social identification. Moreover, common identification is itself associated with the perception of the source of influence as a legitimate representative of the goals, value and ideology that defines the relevant social category within the specific comparative and normative context (Turner, 1991).

Thus, the BBC replication provided a powerful opportunity to provide an early and informal ‘test’ of the ‘engaged followership’ model and qualitatively explore its potential to account for participant behaviour within the paradigm. Accordingly, participants were recruited by the BBC via a newspaper advert designed to convince potential volunteers that they would be involved in important and groundbreaking research conducted in partnership between the BBC and leading University scientists. The advert was deliberately worded to attract participants who would be strongly identified with the ‘scientific project’; in other words to entice those who would see that science was important because it was an institution

215


that was the basis for progressive developments in society and who would therefore see their participation in the ‘research’ as an active and engaged contribution to this project. Volunteers were then pre-tested by the BBC to select those who showed high levels of identification1 (Van de Pool, 2010).

In order to conduct their version of the Milgram paradigm the BBC then commissioned an impressive facsimile of the shock generator and took over a suite of unused offices in the BBC’s prestigious science studios in London. A series of hidden cameras were installed and two professional actors were recruited, one to play the ‘Experimenter’, a ‘Professor Lawrence’, and one the supposed ‘Learner’. The recruits and arrived one at a time at the studio where they were shown into a waiting room. Shortly afterwards the learner arrived— introducing himself as another naïve participant. Professor Lawrence then walked into the room wearing a white lab coat and introduced himself to both. He loosely followed Milgram’s original script explaining to both ‘participants’ that they were going to take part in a study of the effects of punishment on learning. He then asked the participants to draw straws to determine who was going to play the ‘Teacher’ and who the ‘Learner’. As in Milgram’s original study, the draw was fixed and the genuine participant was allocated to the role of Teacher. Both were then shown into an adjacent room where the Learner was strapped into a sturdy steel framed chair with an electrode around his forearm.

The Teacher was then taken to an adjacent room. He or she was shown the impressive shiny metal shock generator with its array of switches, instructed about their role and, to add realism, each was given a small electric shock as an example of the type of sensation the learner would initially receive. The Teacher then set about the task in earnest with Professor Lawrence seated slightly behind them at a desk writing notes. As the task progressed the Learner began to make mistakes and very quickly the recorded verbal responses were delivered to the Learner’s protestations, in line with the protocol established by Milgram.

An edited 14-minute summary of the replication can be viewed online (YouTube, 2011). Of the twelve participants placed through the procedure nine (75%) progressed to deliver 450 volts shocks and only three refused to continue to the end of the shock board. Of course there are a number of issues that mean that this journalistic demonstration does not stand scrutiny as a reliable replication of the ‘voice feedback’ condition from which generalizable findings can be drawn. However, such epistemological issues distract from the genuine contribution that the qualitative observational data generated from this journalistic demonstration actually makes.

1 This selection process was conducted by the BBC and no data is available on the number of volunteers that applied and were rejected nor on the exact processes adopted during this screening exercise.

216


At face value, this skilful replication of Milgram’s ‘voice feedback’ condition produced a pattern of ‘obedience’ even greater than that within the original study (Milgram, 1963). Given the absence of any formal empirical assessment there are no guarantees that participants actually believed they were administering shocks. None the less, during debrief only one of the participants expressed any doubt they were delivering shocks. Moreover, during participation their protestations, non-verbal behaviours and obvious sense of relief at the end of the experiment suggested that at least some of the participants genuinely believed they were involved in a scientific experiment and that they were inflicting high intensity and dangerous electric shocks.

In this respect, and as the video montage demonstrates, participants displayed behaviour that does not appear to be the result of being morally unaware; indeed, some explicitly express awareness that their actions may have potentially killed the learner. The qualitative data also begins to expose the complexity of the rhetorical interactions between the Teacher and Learner, similar in form to those highlighted by analysis of the Milgram archival data by Gibson (2011, 2014) and Perry (2013, this issue). During these complex interactions, participants’ protestations elicited the ‘Professor’ to provide the various prompts, but these only extended to urging that it was “essential that you continue”. This prompt, far from being an order to obey, is a statement that highlights the importance of the ‘research’, potentially reorienting the participants toward their task and undermining the influence of the protestations of the Learner. Thus, despite the caution we must necessarily apply to any interpretation, it was at interesting that this prompt is one that potentially invokes some sort of obligation to the scientific project. Indeed, the ‘Professor’ in the paradigm had no coercive power thus the effectiveness of this prompt combined with the other aspects of the observational data were all consistent with the idea that the influence was ideological and suggested some credibility to the idea that participants were actively identified with and acted as ‘engaged followers’ of science a system for good.

Despite its adherence to strict scientific protocols, this ‘journalistic demonstration’ was not able capture any meaningful data beyond the film footage it created. Thus, while it provided some substance and confidence that the engaged followership idea had some traction as with Milgram’s original study, this replication actually raises more questions than it is capable of answering. Most notably why was it that people conformed and perhaps more importantly why was it that some ‘disobeyed’?

217


The ethical paradoxThe BBC developed its replication with the current author playing an advisory

role. His initial reaction to the suggestion that the BBC planned to conduct a full replication of the Milgram obedience study was that it could not be achieved. This was primarily a reflection of the strict ethical frameworks governing research in research institutions, developed in part as a direct reaction to Milgram’s original studies. In contrast, the BBC took the view that:

The purpose of the study was not to elicit new scientific evidence but to vividly demonstrate the social determination of violence to a television audience. Our recreation of Milgram’s study was therefore not research but a journalistic demonstration. Moreover, we are not researchers and the replication of the paradigm did not take place in a research institution. It was therefore our judgement that this activity did not fall within the remit of the ethical guidelines of the American or British Psychological Associations (Van de pool, 2010).

In other words, provided this replication was exclusively for journalistic purposes, the BBC was not professionally constrained by the guidance of another profession and was at liberty to develop and run a recreation of the paradigm with reference to its own professional standards.

That is not to say that the BBC completely ignored their ethical obligations; in fact they took them very seriously indeed. At that time, two prior replications of the paradigm had already taken place for television, the most prominent of which was by the American Broadcaster ABC (Burger, 2009)1. As with Milgram’s early film work, ABC had also replicated the ‘verbal feedback condition’, but in order to allow for the associated research to be ethically approved, the researchers had only allowed participants to progress to the level of 150 volts (in light of the fact that this was the point that most of Milgram’s participants withdrew if they were going to; Packer, 2008). The BBC adopted a number of measures from this earlier replication in order to safeguard the well-being of participants. To run its own replication, the BBC inevitably had to rely upon deception and was therefore obviously unable to inform potential participants fully about the purposes of the procedure. Nonetheless, they provided key aspects of information from the outset. Specifically, during the initial recruitment stage, the BBC advertised for volunteers in a free London newspaper. In that advert it was made clear that participants would be taking part in a ‘scientific study’ where they may experience forms of

1 The second was a ‘Channel 4’ recreation of the paradigm by the popular British illusionist ‘Paul McKenna’.

218


psychological distress and might appear on TV as a consequence of their participation.

A key concern for the BBC was to minimise the possibility that participants would suffer any psychological harm as a result of their participation in the study. Consequently, all respondents to the adverts were initially pre-tested and filtered by BBC staff via telephone1. During these screening interviews applicants’ background knowledge of the Milgram study was also assessed and they were evaluated for any prior history of psychological trauma. The results of these interviews were then discussed with a professional cognitive behavioural psychotherapist who determined whether the applicant was suitable to progress to a second, more intensive, ‘screening’ stage. During this second phase applicants were invited to the BBC studios where they underwent a battery of standard psychiatric measures delivered and assessed by a qualified and practicing clinical psychologist. The psychologist was fully aware of the experimental procedures and was instructed by the BBC to identify anyone who they judged might have a negative reaction to participating in the study.

There were further safeguards adopted during the replication itself. In particular, throughout the procedure two independent clinical psychologists observed participants through CCTV and were empowered to intervene to stop the study if, at any time, they felt an unacceptable amount of stress was being caused to any participant. As soon as the experimenter announced that the study was over, the participant was informed that the shock generator was not real and that the ‘Learner’ in the adjacent room had not been harmed. Shortly afterwards, the participant was interviewed in isolation by a professional counsellor where a judgment was made regarding the impact of the procedure on his or her psychological wellbeing. In all cases participants had the ability to access free subsequent counselling, which remained in place for a full twelve months after the conclusion of the procedure.

As some measure of the effect of the procedure, nine months after completing the filming and one month after transmitting the finished programme none of the participants had reported any adverse reactions. Accordingly, the BBC was satisfied that the safeguards they had undertaken were sufficient in protecting the psychological wellbeing of the participants and that they had therefore provided a robust framework of protection. In other words, as far as the BBC was concerned, its full replication of Milgram’s ‘voice-feedback condition’ was entirely ethical.

1 As previously stated the screening was conducted by the BBC and no data is available on the applicants that were rejected.

219


However, as this was exclusively a journalistic demonstration, his University ethics committee precluded the current author from collecting primary data2.

For this reason it was not possible to formally examine the underlying processes governing behaviour within the replication. This of course raises the question of why it is that this foundational paradigm can be fully replicated in partnership with an academic for the purposes of ‘journalistic demonstration’, but this partnership cannot be utilised ‘ethically’ for the purposes of serious scientific research? Or to put it slightly differently, if the paradigm can be recreated ‘ethically’ for television, then why is the research community so averse to utilising similar approaches? Such questions are particularly important given the significance of understanding the psychological dynamics of genocide, the limited explanatory power of current theory and the problematic interpretations that have perpetuated since Milgram’s original research took place.

Identity-based followershipThus, the ‘journalistic demonstration’ provided an opportunity to pilot the

‘engaged followership’ model and did provide some early indication that the model had some traction. However, given the weaknesses surrounding the demonstration it would be necessary to develop far more powerful research. Yet the ethical restraints raised serious questions about whether it would be possible to develop a programme of systematic research that would enable a fuller test of the engaged followership model.

1. Engaged ParticipationIn order to systematically test their rather radical reinterpretation, Haslam and

Reicher’s interest was at first drawn to the extensive material contained within the Milgram archives — in particular, the large data corpus gathered from Milgram’s post- experimental questionnaires (Haslam, Reicher, Millard & McDonald; 2014a). Their analysis suggests that the majority of participants were glad to have taken part in the study and that involvement had not ‘bothered’ them in any way. Moreover, they note that a majority of respondents understood the study to have scientific value and identified this as a key motivator for their actions. Indeed, whilst not seeking to dismiss the small proportion of participants that reported negative experiences, the researchers conclude that the archive data bears evidence of “a preponderance of positive feelings” about participation (Haslam et al., 2014a, p.10).

2. Identification with Scientific Authority 2 Which at this time was the University of Liverpool.

220


Following on from this analysis, Haslam and colleagues (2014a) conducted a thematic analysis of the participants’ qualitative responses to the ‘additional items’ section of the questionnaire, to which 65% of respondents replied. Here three distinct themes were identified, which they labelled as support for: 1) Milgram’s project, 2) behavioural investigation more generally, and 3) for Yale as a scientific institution. On the basis of their analysis the researchers argue that the dominant theme within the archive data is a sense of fulfilment among participants — satisfaction that reflected their sense of taking part in what they saw as an important piece of research. A sense of scientific authority and legitimacy then appears to have helped resolve any ambivalence and, in particular, dispelled the negative emotions many of the participants experienced when taking part. On this basis, the researchers argue that” participants’ comments were predominantly positive, and… that being positive about the science was associated with coming to feel more positive about having participated in the studies even to the extent of being willing to undergo (and for others to undergo) similarly stressful experiences in the future” (Haslam et al., 2014a, p.21).

3. Attachment versus aversionThis analysis of the archival data is controversial because it starts to open up

some important questions about the hegemonic idea that Milgram’s participants were subject to powerful and long-lasting psychological damage (Baumrind, 1964; Perry, 2013). Indeed, Haslam et al (2014a) go further and suggest that the subsequent focus on the potentially negative experience of participating in the studies may actually have been misplaced. For them the key question that needs addressing is “not whether or not participants were distressed but rather why they were happy” (2014a, p.27). In other words, we should concern ourselves ethically with the question of how it is that participants could go through such a powerful and potentially disturbing scenario yet perceive their participation in largely positive terms because they believed they were inflicting this harm for the ‘greater good’ of the scientific project.

4. Linking Obedience and IdentificationThe empirical focus on the Milgram archive (Gibson, 2011; Perry, 2011;

Russell, 2011, Nicholson 2011) is in part driven by the fact that, as already discussed, under current ethical guidelines it is difficult, if not impossible, to recreate the full paradigm for research purposes. Haslam and Reicher have therefore been particularly creative by addressing these challenges through a programme of imaginative primary research. In one such study (Reicher, Haslam & Smith, 2013) they recruited academic social psychologists in Britain and Australia

221


to whom they presented details of the fifteen variants of the obedience studies described in Obedience to Authority (Milgram, 1974). They then asked participants to judge the extent to which they felt they would identify with the Experimenter as a ‘scientist’ or alternatively with the ‘Learner’ as a member of the public. They found that the level to which the participants identified with either predicted the degree to which participants in Milgram’s studies either respectively conformed or disobeyed (for related evidence, see Haslam, Loughlan & Perry, 2014). In other words, this study supports the contention that where rates of obedience were high this was because a particular version of the study encouraged participants to identify with the Experimenter and the scientific enterprise of which he was representative. Conversely, when rates of obedience were low this was because a particular variant created a social context in which participants were more likely to identify with, and therefore be influenced by, the protestations of the Learner (Reicher et al., 2012).

5. Value of the ScienceTo test these ideas further Birney, Haslam and Reicher (2014) created an

analogue paradigm in which they sought to capture theoretically relevant features of the Milgram paradigm — requiring participants to complete a task of ostensible scientific value (a neuro-scientific study of impression formation) that became increasingly aversive over a series of thirty graded trials. As with Milgram’s original studies, the central dependent variable was the extent to which participants continued to the thirtieth trial (i.e., were fully ‘obedient’) or else withdrew from the experiment at any stage prior to the end (were ‘disobedient’). In order to test the ‘engaged followership’ model the study directly manipulated participants’ identification with the experiment’s scientific purpose across three independent conditions. In support of the ‘engaged followership’ model the study revealed a main effect for condition, with participants in the low identification condition withdrawing earlier from the study than those in the high identification condition. Indeed, participants in the low identification condition were significantly less likely to complete the study than either those in the control or high identification conditions (Birney et al, 2014).

6. ‘Tuning’Having addressed this core theoretical issue, the researchers then set about

dealing with another central issue that emerges from Milgram’s original studies. As Milgram notes, one of the key factors that affects obedience within his paradigm is ‘tuning’ (Milgram, 1974; p 146). As he puts it, during the experiments “a process of tuning occurs in the subject, with maximal receptivity to the emissions of the

222


authority, whereas the Learner’s signals are muted and psychologically remote” (p.146). He goes on to invoke a dependency model of power to explain the dynamics of this influence (Turner 1991, 2005) stating that this “reflects the natural responses to authority” because “the person in authority, by virtue of that position, is in the optimal position to bestow benefits or inflict deprivations” (1974; p 146). However, closer analysis suggests a much more nuanced theoretical position is required in order to account for data.

6b. More on ProximityFirst, from the pattern of variation in Milgram’s original studies it is evident

that obedience depended upon the utterances of the different actors. For instance, in contrast to the baseline condition, in a pilot study, where the learner’s voice was not heard, all participants proved willing to administer the maximum level of shocks (450 volts). Second, while obedience rates vary across the different variations of the experiment, as noted above, the points at which Teachers are most likely to break off are 150 volts and, to a lesser extent, 350 volts — both points at which the Learner demands to be released from the study (Packer, 2008). A key issue therefore is that these different variants and each brings the learner physically and audibly closer to the teacher, and that this ‘closeness’ induces disobedience (N. Haslam et al., 2014). Haslam et al (2014a) argue that this suggests the dissenting voices mediate an emergent psychological group formation and consequent identification between Teacher and Learner. Thus, far from being ‘one way traffic’, in which obedience is determined solely by attention to the voice of the Experimenter (as the agentic state model suggests), Reicher et al (in press) contend that the paradigm hinges upon an identity-based dilemma associated with participants’ identification with two parties that pull them in opposite directions (see also N. Haslam et al., 2014; Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Millard, 2014).

7. Experimental Prods and Social IdentificationFrom a social identity perspective it is argued that participants proved willing

to take part in Milgram’s experiments in part because they wanted to contribute to a legitimate scientific enterprise. In the initial stages participants are therefore likely to identify with the experimenter, given that in this particular context he is representative of the social category ‘science’. Within Milgram’s experiments there are four formal prompts escalating initially from “Please continue” to “The experiment requires that you continue”. If further resistance materialises there is a third, “It is absolutely essential that you continue” and then a final prompt, “You have no other choice, you must go on”. In line with the study’s scientific pretext, the first three prompts appear to be requests that accord with an underpinning

223


scientific rationale (Haslam, Reicher & Birney, 2014b). It is only the fourth prompt that approximates to an order.

Yet as Gibson (2011) concludes from his analysis of the archival data, there is actually very little evidence of this fourth prompt having any effect at all — other than to cement disobedience. Furthermore, it is apparent that in the replication of the paradigm for ABC television, on every occasion where the experimenter issued the fourth prompt, participants actually refused to continue (Burger, 2009a; Burger, Girgis, & Manning, 2011). Thus, rather than showing that people obey orders, the Milgram paradigm in fact seems to provide evidence of the very opposite; that orders induce disobedience (Brannigan, 2013; p.20; Haslam & Reicher, 2012). This leads Reicher & Haslam (2012) to conclude, “There is a powerful irony at play here. For, as we have noted, Milgram’s studies are widely remembered as showing that people obey orders. However, upon closer inspection, it appears that one thing they show unequivocally is that, when requests are framed as orders, people do not obey” (p.168).

Evidence therefore suggests once again that much of the dominant interpretation of Milgram’s studies is open to question; prompts do not generally approximate to orders and, when they do, the generally provoke disobedience. Haslam and colleagues (2014b) suggest that the ineffectiveness of an order in that situation can be understood in terms of their identity-based model, since invoking an order breaks the tie of common identification between ‘Experimenter and ‘Learner’ and therefore undermines the psychological capacity for influence to take place. On this basis they predict that the influence of the Experimenter’s prompts will be mediated by the extent to which (a) the variant of the experiment encourages identification with the scientific community, and (b) the experimenter acts in a manner that is consistent with this shared identity.

In order to test this hypothesis, Haslam et al (2014b) conducted a study in which they used their analogue of the Milgram paradigm to investigate the impact of the prompts more closely. Participants were once again presented with images that became increasingly pleasant while being forced to describe them using negative traits. However, in this variation, after presentation of each image one of the prompts was delivered to create four independent conditions. Here Milgram’s agentic state model (and more general understanding of the lesson of his studies — i.e., that people are naturally inclined to obey orders; see Haslam & Reicher, 2012) would suggest that participants should go further the more the prompt resembles an order. In contrast, the engaged followership model predicts that participants would go further the more that the prompt appealed to the study’s scientific purpose. Additionally, to examine the underlying psychological processes the study

224


measured participant’s task comfort, identification with researchers, identification with experimental goals and identification with psychological science.

The results of the study provided further support for the engaged followership model. Specifically, participants exposed to the second prompt, urging that they continue for scientific reasons, continued further into the study than those exposed to fourth prompt, the closest approximation to an order. Moreover, those exposed to the second prompt were much more likely to complete the study’s post-test measures. Post-test data also indicated that participant’s willingness to complete the task was correlated with high levels of identification both with psychological science and with the experimental goals.

Reflections Looking BackMilgram asserts on the opening page of his 1974 book: “obedience, as a

determinant of behaviour, is of particular relevance to our time. It has been readily established that from 1933 – 1945 millions of innocent people were systematically slaughtered on command... These inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could have only have been carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of people obeyed orders” (Milgram, 1974, p.3). Whilst this analysis of the Holocaust rather simplistic (see Cesarani, 2004), it does establish some key features of Milgram’s intellectual position. First, it illustrates how his powerful studies on the topic took place within a specific historical context, where questions about the relationship between obedience and the Holocaust were salient socially, politically and theoretically. Second, they convey the point that Milgram conceptualised obedience more as a noun than as a verb; as a psychological state rather than as a process, in which human behaviour was driven by an underlying propensity to conform. Third, the analysis implies that the Holocaust was a product of obedience and hence that by empirically studying obedience researchers will necessarily be better positioned to understand how the Holocaust took place.

It is undeniable that Milgram’s work on obedience stands as one of the most influential bodies of research ever created in psychology. This impact was, at least in part, because of his skill as a disseminator but it was also a fact that, as an ambitious early career researcher, he chose to research an issue that was of profound social and political relevance. .But more than this, his impact reflects the fact that he stood as one of an array of social psychologists that clearly wanted to engage the discipline with significant social issues – in this case the Holocaust – and in this endeavour he was incredibly successful. His impact also arises from a theoretical analysis that helped establish and sustain the view that genocide is possible because individuals have a tendency to lose the rational control of their

225


actions and become the relatively mindless vessels of tyrannical authority. This may be partially true, but in light of more recent evidence, it seems equally apparent that this theoretical position denies the individual agency of the perpetrators of genocide and oversimplifies the complex political, social and psychological processes that create it (Reicher et al., 2014).

Moreover, despite the clear attempt to link the proposed psychological mechanism of the agentic state to broader social and political dynamics, the analysis provided by Milgram lacks any formal link to broader social theory. In passing, Milgram alludes implicitly to Durkheimian notions of ‘anomie’ (Milgram, 1974; p.13) and to Marxist ideas about the ways in which various forms of social institution function to create social relations of subordination (Milgram, 1974, p. 138-139). But beyond these passing glances at social theory, his analysis is, like so much of psychology, bereft of any broader theoretical contextualization; such that we are left with a dangerously reductionist account in which a predilection for obedience is seen to subvert individual rationality and where perpetrators of atrocity are understood as mindless automaton all too easily led toward atavistic destruction.

Looking AheadFifty years on from first publication, Milgram’s theoretical legacy leaves

psychology in an uncomfortable position. First, the world and social theory has moved on. Since 2010, the contemporary world has been rocked and in places transformed by resistance. In the Middle East crowds flooding onto the streets to resist authority created an ‘Arab Spring’. In the United Kingdom four consecutive nights in cities across England saw some of the largest and most destructive urban ‘riots’ for over thirty years. In Ukraine crowds toppled President Viktor Yanukovych and set in motion perhaps the most dangerous crisis in international relations since World War 2.

The explanatory challenge of the 21st century is therefore not so much to understand obedience but equally its antithesis, the dynamics of protest and resistance (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Mason, 2012; Reicher & Stott, 2011). Second, since Milgram, the world has also witnessed further genocides, in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; thus whilst genocide has not gone away the ability of psychology to meaningfully engage with understanding it arguably has. Third, psychology continues to inhabit a dangerously isolated and theoretically reductionist space — isolated to a large degree from interdisciplinary perspectives on important social issues such as genocide.

This paper has focused upon the growing calls to re-examine both Milgram’s ideas and his original data. At the forefront of this agenda is a programme of

226


research work driven from a social identity perspective, which has presented a comprehensive rereading of the core assumptions and dominant interpretations of the original studies (Haslam & Reicher, 2007, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2011). We should bear in mind that the social identity approach was itself born as an interactionist critique (Asch, 1952) of the decontextualized individualistic reductionism of mainstream social psychological theory (Tajfel, 1972; Turner et al, 1987). In this sense this meta-theoretical approach was born from an attempt to build a more social social psychology, addressing a wider problem of a conformity bias in the discipline of psychology at the expense of an analysis of social change (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972). In this respect the approach enables a (re)emergence of the broader agenda that Milgram originally aspired to — where the focus was not merely on obedience but equally upon disobedience and resistance (see Einwohner, 2014).

The ‘engaged follower’ critique of the agentic state rejects the idea of ‘blind obedience’. In its place the approach seeks a reinjection of a sense of agency among participants, as meaningfully engaged followers. It is argued that the carefully crafted contexts of the Milgram paradigm (e.g., Russell, 2011) engenders among its participants a sense of identification with the study’s ostensible scientific ideals, goals and ideology, and that these are reinforced by both by the experimenter and by Milgram himself (Haslam et al., 2014a). As such, participants actively work toward these goals, until confronted by the cries of the Learner — protestations that provoke a dilemma of identity. Each subtle variation of the paradigm impacts upon the power and legitimacy dynamics of this dilemma. At times the contextual manipulations and subtle rhetorical techniques of the experimenter entrench identification with the scientific project, undermining the influence of the Learners’ cries of pain and rendering their apparent suffering incidental to the greater good of the scientific project. At other times the variations provoke identification with the Learner, in turn undermining the influence of the Experimenter, engendering and emboldening resistance.

This theoretical conceptualisation not only captures neatly and powerfully the emotional drama of the paradigms (Millard, 2014) but also helps explain patterns of variation in Milgram’s data more parsimoniously than the concept of the agentic state. Participants are seen as agents who perceive science as a social good and as an important driver of human progress. Participants’ identification with this ideological picture of science thus not only gave meaning and legitimacy to their actions but also helped them to deal with the unpleasant implications of that involvement. In this respect, this idea of identification with an ideological project not only advances our understanding of what was happening within Milgram’s experiments, but also makes sense of the positive embrace that characterized the

227


Nazi’s promotion of their own barbarity (Rees, 2008). For it was through processes of identification that committed Nazis were encouraged to embrace an ideological picture of National Socialism as essential to productive human growth, purity and stability. In turn, when enacting this identity, the Nazis were able to undertake and protect themselves psychologically from the negative states that their genocidal brutality might otherwise have been expected to provoke.

ReferencesAdorno, T.W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D.J., Sanford, R. N. (1950) The

Authoritarian Personality. New York: Norton.Arendt, H (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago PressArendt, H. (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York:

PenguinAsch, S (1951) Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of

judgments. In H. Guetzkow (ed.) Groups, leadership and men (p.177-90). Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press.

Asch, S. (1952) Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Baumrind, D. (1964) Some thoughts on the ethics of research: after reading Milgram’s

“Behavioural Study of Obedience”. American Psychologist. 19, 421-423.Birney, M., Haslam, A. and Reicher, S. (2014). In the name of progress: Evidence that

identification with science increases obedience in an experimental analogue of the Milgram paradigm. Paper presented at the General Meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology. Amsterdam, July 9-12.

Blass, T (2004) The man who shocked the world: the life and legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books.

Brannigan, A. (2004) The Rise and Fall of Social Psychology: The Use and Misuse of the Experimental Method. New York: De Gruyter.

Brannigan, A. (2013) Beyond the banality of evil: Criminology and Genocide. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Browning, C. (1992) Ordinary men. New York: Harper Collins.Burger, J. (2009) Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American

Psychologist, 64, 1-11Burger, J., Girgis, Z. & Manning, C. (2011) In their own words: explaining obedience to

authority through an examination of participant’s comments. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2, 460-466.

Cesarani, D. (2004) Eichmann: His life and crimes. London: Heinemann.Eihwohner, R. L. (2014). Authorities and uncertainties: Applying lessons from the study of

Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust to the Milgram Legacy. Journal of Social Issues, 70 (3), 529-541.

Fox, R., Crask, M. & Kim, J. (1988) Mail survey response rates: a meta-analysis of selected techniques for inducing response. Public Opinion Quarterly, 52, 467-491.

Gibson, S. (2011) Milgram’s obedience experiments: a rhetorical analysis. British Journal of Social Psychology, 52 (2) 290-309.

228


Haslam, N., Loughnan, S., & Perry, G. (2014). Meta-Milgram: An empirical synthesis of the obedience experiments. PLoS ONE, 9(4): e93927. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093927

Haslam, S.A. & Reicher, S. (2007) Beyond the banality of evil: three dynamics of an interactionist social psychology of tyranny. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 615-622.

Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (2012a). Contesting the ‘nature’ of conformity: What Milgram and Zimbardo’s studies really show. PLoS Biology, 10(11), e1001426. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001426

Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (2012b). When prisoners take over the prison: A social psychology of resistance. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16, 152-179. doi:10.1177/1088868311419864

Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., & Birney, M. (2014). Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Milgram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science. Journal of Social Issues, 70 (3), 471-486.

Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S., Millard, K., & McDonald, R. (2014) “Happy to have been of service”: The Yale archive as a window into the engaged followership of participants in Mil-gram’s ‘obedience’ experiments. British Journal of Social Psychology. Article first published on-line: 5 SEP 2014 DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12074

Jetten, J. & Mols, F. (2014). 50–50 Hindsight: Appreciating anew of the contributions of Milgram’s obedience experiments. Journal of Social Issues, 70 (3), 585-601.

Karstedt, S (2013) Contextualizing Mass Atrocity Crimes: Moving Toward a Relational Approach. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 9: 383-404.

Kershaw, I. (2000) Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis. London: Penguin. Kershaw, I. (1993) Working towards the Führer: Reflections on the nature of the Hitler

dictatorship. Contemporary European History, 2, 103-108.Lipstadt, D. (2011) The Eichmann Trial. New York: Schocken Books.Mason, P. (2012) Why it’s still kicking off everywhere. The new global revolutions. London:

Verso.Meeus (2013) ‘Administrative Obedience Thirty Years Later: Rethinking the Utrecht

Studies.’ Paper presented at the ‘Obedience to Authority’ conference. Bracebridge, Canada. 6th

August 2013.Milgram, S. (1963) Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social

Psychology, 67, 371-378.Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to authority: an experimental view. New York: Harper &

Row.Millard, K. (2011) The window in the laboratory: Stanley Milgram as filmmaker. The

Psychologist, 24, 658-660.Millard, K. (2014). Revisioning Obedience: Exploring the role of Milgram’s skills as a

filmmaker in bringing his shocking narrative to life. Journal of Social Issues, 70 (3), 439-453. Miller, A. (2004) What can the Milgram obedience studies tell us about the Holocaust?

Generalising from the social psychology laboratory. In A. Miller (Ed.) The social psychology of good and evil (pp. 193-239). New York: Guilford.

Miller, A. (2009) Reflections on ‘Replicating Milgram’. American Psychologist, 64, 20-27. Moscovici, S. and Faucheux, C. (1972) Social influence, conformity bias and the study of

active minorities. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 6, p.149-202.

229


Packer, D. J. (2008). Identifying systematic disobedience in Milgram’s obedience experiments: A meta-analytic review. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 301-304. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00080.x

Perry, G. (2013) Behind the shock machine: The untold story of the notorious Milgram psychology experiments. New York: The New Press. Originally published by Scribe Books in Melbourne in 2012.

Rees, L. (2005) The Nazis: A warning from history. London: Random House.Reicher, S. & Stott, C (2011) Mad mobs and Englishmen: Myths and realities of the 2011

riots. London: Constable & Robinson.Reicher, S. & Haslam, S. A. (2011) After shock: Toward a social identity explanation of the

Milgram ‘obedience’ studies. British Journal of Social Psychology, 50, 163-169.Reicher, S., Haslam, S.A., & Smith, J. (2012) Working toward the experimenter:

reconceptualising obedience within the Milgram paradigm as identity based followership. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(4) 315-324.

Reicher, S. D., Haslam, S. A., &, Miller, A. G. (2014). What makes a person a perpetrator? The intellectual, moral, and methodological arguments for revisiting Milgram’s research on the influence of authority. Journal of Social Issues, 70 (3), 393-408.

Reicher, S., Spears, R., & Haslam, A. (2010). The Social Identity Approach in Social Psychology. In M. S. Wetherell & C. T. Mohanty (Eds.) Sage Identities Handbook. London: Sage.

Rochat, F. & Blass, T. (2014). Milgram’s unpublished obedience variation and its historical relevance. Journal of Social Issues, 70 (3), 454-470.

Ross, L. (1998) Situationist perspectives on the obedience experiments. Contemporary Psychology, 33, 101-104.

Russell, N. (2011) Milgram’s obedience to authority experiments: origins and early evolution. British Journal of Social Psychology, 50, 146-162.

Russell, N. (2014). The emergence of Milgram's bureaucratic machine. Journal of Social Issues, 70 (3), 409-423.

Tajfel, H. (1972) Experiments in vacuum. In J. Israel & H. Tajfel (eds) The context of social psychology (pp. 69-119). London: Academic Press.

Turner, J (2005) Explaining the nature of power: a three process theory. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35 (1) p.1-22.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J. Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: a Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford & New York: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A. & McGarty, C. A. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 454-463.

Turner, J.C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.Van de Pool (2010) Unpublished letter by the series producer in response to the British Psychological Society in connection with concerns raised about the ethical conduct of the

BBC.You Tube (2009) Psychology: Electric Shock Experiment (Milgram Experiment).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b7YFtiE5EA

230

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b7YFtiE5EA

E. Tarnow. Decreasing, reversing and confronting the power of authority: ethical guidelines, reg-ulatory capture, Alinsky’s rules and the obedience experiment “controversy”. In Regina V. Er-shova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

DECREASING, REVERSING AND CONFRONTING THE POWER OF AUTHORITY: ETHICAL GUIDELINES, REGULATORY CAPTURE, ALINSKY’S RULES AND

THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENT “CONTROVERSY”ОСЛАБЛЕНИЕ, ИНВЕРСИЯ И ПРОТИВОДЕЙСТВИЕ

: ВЛАСТИЛЕГИТИМНЫХАВТОРИТЕТОВ , , ЭТИЧЕСКИЕПРИНЦИПЫ РЕГУЛЯТОРНЫЙЗАХВАТ ПРАВИЛА

АЛИНСКОГОИ« » OBEDIENCE-ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЯ ЭКСПЕРИМЕНТОВ

Eugen TarnowIndependent researcher, USA

[email protected]

Eugen Tarnow - PhD in physics from MIT, independent researcher, USA. After a few years in physics, he noticed the encroachment of of-fice politics. He published on the topics of obedience and conformity, surprised about the lack of a societal follow-up on Milgram’s findings. He continued with survey research on scientific co-authorship, finding that a majority of papers in physics and pathology had inappropriate authors added to the byline and that current authorship guidelines were not preferred by the scientific membership. His current research inter-

ests include the short term memory experimental results of Murdock, memory tests for Alzheimer’s disease and optimized piano practice. Юджин Тарноу - доктор философии по физике (степень получена в МТИ, Бостон), независимый исследователь. В течение нескольких лет работы физиком он наблюдал вторжение офисной политики в научную деятельность. Обратив внимание на отсутствие разработок в сфере социальных приложений результатов obedience-экспериментов Милгрэма, он провёл и опубликовал исследования в области повинуемости и конформности. Он также занимался обследованием системы регистрации научного соавторства и показал, что современные рекомендации по этой системе не удовлетворяют членов научных сообществ, а большинство научных публикаций в областях физики и патологии были подписаны авторами с сомнительной значимостью. Сейчас он занят анализом результатов экспериментальных исследований Мёрдока по кратковременной памяти, тестирования памяти при болезни Альцгеймера и оптимизированной практики игры на фортепьяно.

Keywords: Milgram, obedience, authority, regulatory capture, Alinsky

231



Ключевые слова: Милгрэм, повинуемость легитимным авторитетам, легитимный авторитет, регуляторный захват, Алинский

AbstractI argue that the subjects of authority can remove significant power from the author-

ity by minimal compliance, subterfuge and convincing the authority to change. While this did not have much of an effect in the Milgram obedience experiments it occurs in real life situations presumably because the time scales are much larger. The result is sometimes a weakened authority and sometimes even a reversal of authority. I discuss the examples of scientific authorship, regulatory capture in bank regulation, Alinsky’s rules for reversing authority and that the obedience experiments seem to be forever linked to an unrelated ethics controversy.

АннотацияЯ утверждаю: можно лишить представителей власти значительного объёма

официальных, законных полномочий минимальной повинуемостью, увёртками, а также прямым убеждением измениться. В то время как эти методы не были достаточно эффективными в obedience-экспериментах Милгрэма, – в реальных ситуациях мы видим противоположную картину, что, вероятно, вызвано большим масштабом времени. Иногда в результате мы наблюдаем ослабление, а иногда даже и инверсию власти. В связи с этим я обсуждаю проблему авторства в научном исследовании, «регуляторный захват» на примере банковских правил, инверсию авторитета согласно правилам Алинского, а также, по-видимому, обречённую навечно связь obedience-экспериментов с не имеющим к ним никакого отношения этическим противоречием.

IntroductionIn the Milgram obedience experiments the Experimenter is choreographed to

insist on continuing and finishing the experiment, and nothing the Learner does will change his behavior. The Experimenter’s strong will makes the subjects give up theirs capturing a number of them in what Milgram called "the agentic state".

Milgram's approach to his experiment presented his subjects with a digitized choice: obedience or disobedience. He wrote down a mathematical formula in which obedience or disobedience took place depending upon the balance between the strength of the binding factors and the difference between strain and "strain-resolving mechanisms". A strain free obedient subject was fully caught in the agentic state but if he showed some strain, the capture was only partial. Some of the "strain-resolving mechanisms" were Freudian defense mechanisms of

232


avoidance, denial, displacement, and somatization. More interesting for purposes of today were the other strain-resolving mechanisms: minimal compliance and subterfuge: In the former case, the subjects pushed the buttons but only for a tenth of the amount of time others did. Milgram wrote that "there is an element of self delusion ... It does not challenge authority... and is chiefly important as a balm to the subject's conscience." In the case of subterfuge the subject would signal the correct answers to the victim (for example, by emphasizing the correct choice when reading the choice list) or administer lower shocks than reported. Milgram's comment was that "most often, [subterfuge] does not help at all. The subject is unable to act openly on his humane feelings, deflecting them into a trivial subterfuge of no real consequence ... helps preserve his self-image as a benign man."

Milgram wanted people to powerfully stand up for themselves and say no to the Experimenter. After all, people were willing to send human beings to gas chambers over and over and one would like for somebody to have said "Stop!”. One would like to have some faith in the humanity of those around us, and, perhaps most important, in the humanity of oneself.

But I believe that devaluing forms of protest that do not include disobedience is a mistake. Minimal compliance and subterfuge do not, as Milgram wrote "allow the subject's relationship to authority to remain intact", but rather they are extremely important ways to remove power from authority. If the Experimenter has the power P with a person in the agentic state, he has the same power P if the subject shows strain via Freudian defense mechanisms but his power to get the Teacher jolted is much smaller if the subject minimally complies or uses subterfuge. For example, Milgram stated that some subjects gave shocks lasting only 50 milliseconds while others lasted 500 milliseconds. If the Experimenter wants a 500 millisecond shock but only gets the Teacher to give a 50 millisecond shock, the obedience level could be considered 10% instead of 100%. After all, most Teachers would know from getting electrical shocks by mistake that the duration of the shock counts as well as whether the shocks are administered. We then arrive at a hypothetical situation as displayed in Fig. 1.

Unfortunately for us, I don’t think this occurs in the experiment. There are three reasons I can think of: perhaps the invariable Learner feedback removes the incentive for the subjects to shorten the shock duration or, worse, the subjects do not think to do it or do not want to do it. (This raises new possibilities for the design of the experiment: have the Learner reaction be dependent upon the shock duration to see if this reduces the duration of the shocks and have the shock

233


generator work on a fixed duration to see if the removal of the possibility of minimal obedience increases the level of overt disobedience).

By his design, Milgram's experiment did not allow for one other important mechanism to decrease the importance of authority: convincing the Experimenter to cheat via pressure from threats or social bonding.

Figure 1. Level of obedience reported by Milgram (1963) and hypothetical level of obedience if one includes a hypothetical minimal compliance in the duration of the shocks administered.

I have previously written about the importance of optimizing obedience (Tarnow, 2008) and rules in high risk situations such as the airplane cockpit (Tarnow, 2000) or critical health care situations, making sure rules and authority are not too strong but exactly as strong as needed. But I forgot that the subjects can do something as well. By using minimal compliance, subterfuge, and social pressure, the strength of the authority is strongly modified by the subject.

This contribution will address how authority can be weakened and, indeed, reversed, without any direct disobedience. I am going to begin by discussing a situation in which I have done some of the research and which affects us all – the ethics of coauthorship.

A weak authority: scientific authorship rulesIn every science, the byline is really important: who should be an author on

the paper and in which order should the authors be listed. This demonstrates the intellectual ownership of the research presented in the paper. Each paper represents

234


a value of anywhere from hundreds of hours of solitary work, to hundreds of thousands of man hours and the use of expensive machines, animals and human subjects. A low cost article might be something like $20,000 while a high cost article can reach $1 billion if it involves, say, super collider rings. The value of the paper also includes the potential of receiving grant monies and prize monies as well as patent rights.

Typically, theft of something worth between $20,000 and a billion is heavily punished. Not so in the realm of scientific authorship. Up to 90% of papers have inappropriate staff on the byline (Cohen et al, 2004). Imagine if 90% of cars had inappropriately registered owners? We would never know if the car was ours to use and in an accident the other party would now know who to assign responsibility to. This situation is tolerated in academia. One never knows whether a coauthor takes credit for ones work and the readers and editors do not know how to assign responsibility if, say, an experiment was faked.

The stakes are high in authorship. For scientists authorship, inappropriate or not, leads to funding which leads to jobs and more authorship, inappropriate or not. For tax payers, appropriate authorship allows tax monies to be spent on researchers who make contributions, inappropriate authorship leads to monies wasted.

So there are rules set up for authorship. But there is minimal compliance and subterfuge everywhere one looks.

First, the authorship rules, often referred to as "ethical guidelines", were created not by tax payers or authors to protect public investment or intellectual property but by editors. Editors wanted to avoid the situation of a discovered fake experiment with the article authors disclaiming any responsibility. Thus ethical guidelines are heavy on responsibility for content and light on protection of intellectual property.

Second, the rules have no teeth. Editors do not enforce their own ethical guidelines.

Third, the rules provide for wide interpretation of reasons to assign authorship allowing anyone to squeeze in on the byline.

Fourth, social pressure prevents authors from removing undeserving byline entries. Indeed, just like Milgram had a tough time asking for a seat in his subway experiment, I have myself written a paper on the ethics of authorship with two completely undeserving byline entries!

Fifth, pressures to write grant proposals prevents senior scientists from spending their time on research while at the same time pushing them to get themselves byline entries.

235


If one were to dig, how many Nobel prizes are undeserved? And, more importantly, how much public monies are wasted on the wrong researchers? So in this real life situation of authority, the authority is much weaker than the scientific communities represent. Interestingly, training in authorship ethics is correlated with a lower level of compliance suggesting that the more one understands, the more one believes that the authority of the authorship rules is actually negative!

Some academic journals are learning from Milgram: instead of a simple check box asserting the compliance with the ethical guidelines, corresponding to a Milgram experiment with the Learner far away, they add more fields on the submission forms to make subterfuge more explicit, in effect moving the Learner closer to the author filling out the journal submission. Nevertheless, the same journals will insist on keeping the correspondence between editors and authors confidential presumably since the journals are not willing to make their own subterfuge explicit.

Explicit disobedience (“I did not do any of this research but my name should be on the paper anywhere”) may be rare but it is not necessary when the strength of the authority can be undermined by minimal compliance, subterfuge and social bonding. Explicit obedience is also rare: removing an underserving senior coauthor leads to career difficulties.

There is minimal compliance and subterfuge in other areas as well, for example, in traffic rules. Certain traffic rules are frequently violated (on average a driver gets a ticket after having broken more than a thousand rules) and often an effort of social bonding with the police officer at the time of receiving a ticket.

Reversing authority: regulatory captureAt around the time of Milgram's obedience experiments, the concept of

"regulatory capture" was invented (Stigler, 1971). This seemingly odd idea states that government rules governing corporations do not serve to further the public interest but instead the interest of the corporations they are set to govern!The Experimenter thinks he is running the Subject but in reality it is the other way around.

Stigler gave the example of truck regulation in the US in the beginning of last century. Trucks were getting bigger and started to complete with rail roads. Political powers decided to regulate the size of trucks with the reason given that heavy trucks would destroy the roads though the real reason was that the rail road’s wanted to limit competition from trucking. So far the Experimenter is running the trucking subjects. But as the rules evolved they started to server existing trucking companies by limiting the entry of new trucking companies: many decades after the

236


rules were put in place, five thousand new applications for trucking licenses are turned down every year, every single one of them, as Stigler comments “a rigorous proof that hope springs eternal in an aspiring trucker’s breast”.

Just like Milgram set up an equation of when a subject would obey and when he would disobey, economists set up a framework for regulatory capture: the state will impose rules that favor the public if the product price lowering results in a marginal vote increase that is larger than the marginal vote loss from the product price loss born by the producers of that product, otherwise it will do the opposite (for a review, see Dal Bó, 2006). When there is no transparency – who understands truck regulations? – there is no cost from lost votes. Rules that are meant to limit corporations instead work to benefit the corporations.

Regulatory capture was recently in the news. A regulator from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the lawyer Carmen Segarra, was a worthy Experimenter when she was set up to regulate Goldman Sachs (Bernstein, 2014). She insisted on her authority to question transactions made by Goldman Sachs, but since her employer had been regulatory captured by Goldman Sachs, she was soon fired, a move that emphasized that regulators of banks are supposed to be reverse Experimenters.

In this case “regulatory capture” refers to regulators being unable to regulate their subjects. While there are bank regulations that limit competition from new banks, such as the rule that interest rates cannot be set high by a new bank to attract depositors, in this case the regulators become collegial coworkers instead of regulators.

What were the reasons for the reversal of authority? Before Segarra joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the “Fed” or FRBNY), a report by David Beim and Christopher McCurdy and others reviewed the organizational culture of this institution. Importantly, the report was supposed to be confidential allowing the authors to be more open in their criticism. The reason for the review was the wish to prevent another financial collapse of the magnitude of the collapse in 2008. They noted that it is socially difficult to preventing financial bubbles: “while [financial] booms may be characterized as bubbles in retrospect, they are extremely popular while they are occurring.” In other words, social pressure on an Experimenter regulator may prevent the institution from using its authority to “pop” a financial bubble. Social pressures along the same lines occurred because the Fed supervisors strived to be non-confrontational, striving for consensus and to rely on the banks doing the right thing. The regulators had offices inside the banks and would become friends with the bankers.

237


As in the case of the authorship ethical guidelines, the rules for the federal oversight are not transparent. This allows them to contain surprises. Thus when the Experimenter regulator comes into the bank, it is the bank that tells them what risks to worry about! Subterfuge from the bank subjects allows the banks to hide risks from the most profitable business lines – the business lines escape important scrutiny.

The Fed’s authority is thus removed by social niceties and subterfuge. It is also removed by indirect bribes. The financial writer Michael Lewis writes that “Wall Street’s regulators are people who are paid by Wall Street to accept Wall Street’s explanations of itself, and who have little ability to defend themselves from those explanations.” (Lewis, 2014) He also wrote in an email to Bloomberg News “it’s become standard practice for Fed employees to go to work for Wall Street firms, so the last thing they want to do is to alienate those firms” (Thompson, 2014).

As a result, the Experimenter regulator becomes the subject and the banks become the Experimenters.

There are two problems of regulators, Beim et al continue, recognition and action. Recognition “requires insight and creative thinking, a willingness to make inferences based on partial information … communication across organizational lines … people willing to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy, even the Fed’s own orthodoxy.” Recognition was difficult but sometimes it did occur but then there was no action taken. Action “requires support from the highest levels of management in the interest of financial stability, even if this makes banks less profitable. Supervisors must be willing to stand up to banks and demand both information and action, especially when things are apparently going very well. This requires a degree of conviction that can only arise from intense debate and determination across the organization.”That recognition and action did not happen was because Experimenter regulator was trapped in an agentic state instead of trapping the banks it was supposed to regulate. Because the Fed was in an agentic state, it relied on two incorrect assumptions, according to Beim et al, that banks can provide rigorous risk control –they can’t because making money trumps risk control; and the idea that markets will always self-correct allowing the Fed to sit back and do nothing.

Reversing authority by direct confrontation: Saul Alinsky’s rules and labeling the Milgram experiments “controversial”

But one can also confront authority directly, according to the wishes of Milgram. Saul Alinsky is considered a founder of "community organizing", a

238


concept that became widely known after the election of Barack Obama, himself a community organizer. Alinsky wrote the book Rules for Radicals as a counterweight to Machiavelli's The Prince as he stated "The Prince was written by Machiavelli for the Haves on how to hold power. Rules for Radicals are written for the Have-Nots on how to take it away." A search on the internet finds several blogs noticing the relationship between Milgram's findings and Alinsky's work but I don't think it has moved into the research community. I don't think the two men knew each other.

Alinsky's had several sets of rules for confronting authority. Those concerning "power tactics" include several that directly challenge authority. Rule 3: "whenever possible go outside of the experience of the [authority]". Rule 4: make authority "live up to their own book of rules ... they [can not]". Rule 5: "Ridicule is man's most potent weapon. It is almost impossible to counteract ridicule. Rule 9: "the threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself." Rule 13: "pick the [authority], freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it.

We can try to apply Alinsky's rule to the Milgram situation. Rule 3 suggests the subject might check out the back of the shock generator, call the police, tell the Experimenter there is something wrong with it, say there is a strange smell coming from it, ask the Experimenter to prove there is no permanent damage to the Learner, ask about the rules for getting the payment, whether the Experimenter can trade places with the subject or with the Learner, start complaining about a head ache, a finger ache, tell jokes. Rule 4 suggests to ask the Experimenter to see what was signed, ask to see the newspaper ad, ask why the experiment has to go one - really why? Rule 5 suggests to ask the Experimenter why he is wearing a white coat, ask what is underneath it. Rule 9 suggests to tell the Experimenter "make me do it". Rule 13 suggests to tell the Experimenter he is a terrible person and disregard anything he might say about his supervisors and insist it is all his fault!

An example of how Alinsky’s rules were used is how the psychology community itself was made to turn on the authority of the results of the Milgram obedience experiments. Thus rather than willingly accepting the experimental results like good scientists, the psychology community has often insisted on presenting the experiments as unethical, labelling them "controversial" and even suggesting that the experiments not be taught at all to students (as discussed in Tavris, 2014): “Phoebe Ellsworth (University of Michigan) recently told me that she surveyed her upper-level social psych course to find out how students had first heard about Milgram. Roughly half of them were first introduced to him through his work demonstrating obedience to authority and the power of the situation. The other half first heard about him as an example of how unethical social

239


psychologists could be.” The authority of the Milgram experiments has been half reversed by the modern institutional authority of psychology research, the acclaimed University of Michigan!

Alinksy Rules 3, 4 and 5nicely describe the attack on the experiment that I would never have imagined, that insists on the experiment follow its own rule book on doing the right thing, and that amounts to ridicule of the experiments, the idea that there was a flawed informed consent. It was not that the experiment was incorrect, that the subjects were unusual, that real life is not like the experimental situation; rather it was that the experiment itself was unethical. The attack was difficult to start, “as a young and unknown woman it was not easy to get my critique published, and once it was I had to tolerate severe condemnation from many who felt I was wrong to critique Milgram, in view of his worthy objective” (Baumrind, private communication). Indeed, she might feel a certain kinship to Milgram: “I am an advocate of constructive dissent; indeed my critique of Milgram is an example of dissent against the use of unethical means to justify a worthy end”(private communication).

How this attack came to overpower the experimental results is difficult for me to understand. My emotional response would be to ask for the compliant subjects to be jailed (until I realize everybody would then be in jail) and my later rational response would be to limit real-life situations that would put other compliant subjects in similar situations. Instead informed consent took over. Indeed, the industry that arose around informed consent seems to have been the most important, or even the only, action that occurred as a direct result of the Milgram experiments. We certainly live in a topsy-turvy world. Perhaps attacking the lack of informed consent allowed authorities to continue function uninhibited, effectively covering up the experimental results. No doubt many careers were also made in university administration to take care of all the new requirements. Finally, the use of Alinsky Rule 13 can be seen in a comment by a former head of the psychology department at CUNY, Milgram’s old institution: “Milgram did a lot of damage; it is a lot harder to find experimental subjects nowadays”. It may be that research agencies around the world have been subject to regulatory capture in which they uphold complex informed consent rules and institutional review board rules that limits research involving human beings to large institutions and makes it difficult even for the large institutions.

But as far as authority is concerned our society is still pre-Milgram. We are not at the center of the universe (Copernicus), we cannot control our

instincts (Freud) and we cannot control our social behavior (Milgram).

240


241


ReferencesAlinsky, S. (2010). Rules for radicals. Random House LLC.Beim, D, McCurdy, C (2009) Report on Systemic Risk and Bank Supervision. Retrieved

from https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1303305/2009-08-18-frbny-report-on-systemic-risk-and.pdf?_ga=1.225356569.208604166.1416340473

Bernstein, J (2014) Fed Tapes: The Secret Recordings of Carmen Segarra, retrieved from http://www.propublica.org/series/fed-tapes.

Cohen, M. B., Tarnow, E., & De Young, B. R. (2004). Coauthorship in pathology, a comparison with physics and a survey-generated and member-preferred authorship guideline. Medscape General Medicine, 6(3).

Dal Bó, E. (2006). Regulatory capture: a review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2), 203-225.

Lewis, M (2014) The Secret Goldman Sachs Tapes. Retrieved from http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-09-26/the-secret-goldman-sachs-tapes

Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell journal of economics and management science, 3-21.

Tarnow, E. (2000). Towards the Zero Accident Goal: Assisting the First Officer: Monitor and Challenge Captain Errors. The Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 10(1), 8.

Tarnow, E. (2008). The Social Engineering Solution to Preventing the Murder in the Milgram Experiment. Open Ethics Journal, 2, 34-39.

Tavris, C. (2014). Lessons from the lab teaching contentious classics: Sherif, Milgram and Harlow revisited.

Thompson, RC (2014) Maybe this is why Carmen Segarra Drove the Fed Nuts: Opening Line. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-30/here-s-theory-why-segarra-drove-new-york-fed-crazy-opening-line.html.

242

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-09-26/the-secret-goldman-sachs-tapes

http://www.propublica.org/series/fed-tapes

https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1303305/2009-08-18-frbny-report-on-systemic-risk-and.pdf?_ga=1.225356569.208604166.1416340473

https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1303305/2009-08-18-frbny-report-on-systemic-risk-and.pdf?_ga=1.225356569.208604166.1416340473

A. Voiskounski The use of virtual reality systems in psychology: virtual reconstruction of Stanley Milgram’s experiments . In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Regional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

THE USE OF VIRTUAL REALITY SYSTEMS IN PSYCHOLOGY:VIRTUAL RECONSTRUCTION OF STANLEY MILGRAM’S EXPERIMENTS

ПРИМЕНЕНИЕСИСТЕМВИРТУАЛЬНОЙРЕАЛЬНОСТИВ : ПСИХОЛОГИИ ВИРТУАЛЬНОЕПОВТОРЕНИЕЭКСПЕРИМЕНТОВ

МИЛГРЭМА 1

Alexander Voiskounski Moscow Lomonosov State University

[email protected]

Войскунский Александр Евгеньевич - кандидат психологических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник факультетата психологии МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова. Автор более 300 научных публикаций (в том числе более 50 – на иностранных языках). Член редакционных коллегий редколлегию 1-го российского и 4-х иностранных научных журналов. Область научных интересов - психология Интернета (киберпсихология). Alexander E. Voiskounsky is affiliated with the Psychology

Department, Moscow Lomonosov State University, and lectures on psychology of cyberspace. He is the first psychologist in Russia to start pioneer research in this field. He authored several monographs (including “Psychology and Internet” in Russian), compiled and edited several books in Russian and co-edited two books in English: States of Mind (Oxford University Press, 1997, with D. Halpern) and Human Perspectives in the Internet Society (WIT Press, 2004, with three more coeditors). The full list of his academic publications includes over 300 positions. He is in the Board of five scholar journals.

Keywords: history of psychology, obedience, cyberpsychology, Stanley Migram, virtual reality, presence, education in psychology, imitative and repetitive studiesКлючевые слова: история психологии, повинуемость легитимным авторитетам, киберпсихология, Милгрэм, виртуальная реальность, эффект присутствия, психологическое образование, повторение классических экспериментов

AbstractThe paper presents an analysis of current studies dealing with the use of information

and communication technologies (ICT) in the obedience experiments, initiated by Stanley Milgram. The most current ICT related approach to the obedience studies involves the use of virtual reality technologies. Two major types of virtual applications in the obedience studies involve the use of an avatar or a prerecorded video image of a real-life 1 Подготовлено при поддержке РГНФ, проект № 14-06-00740

243

https://e.mail.ru/compose/?mailto=mailto%[email protected]


actor/actress’ behavior patterns. The actor/actress or the avatar imitates verbal and paralinguistic reactions of a “pupil,” whose imitative role was designed by Milgram. The results of the current studies show that for the majority of the participants the virtual images are very close to the real-life persons, although the participants never hesitate to recognize the fact that the “pupils” are virtual: either actors or avatars. The relation to the virtual image identical to the real-life character has been checked by the use of numerous psychological parameters, including both descriptive and instrumental methods. The result of taking virtual persons for real human beings shows new perspectives for planning obedience studies in the near future with the use of rapidly developing virtual technologies. Besides, it opens a perspective of replication of the obedience experiments by psychology students.

АннотацияВ статье рассмотрены современные – опирающиеся на применение

информационных технологий – подходы к организации, реализации и интерпретации obedience- экспериментов, инициированных и введенных в психологическую науку С. Милгрэмом. Опора на информационные технологии в obedience-исследованиях в последнее десятилетие означает применение технологий виртуальной реальности. Рассмотрены актуальные подходы к применению систем виртуальной реальности в психологии, выделены и проанализированы исследования, представляющие собой два представленных в научной литературе варианта виртуального obedience-исследования. Данные варианты связаны с заменой имитирующего болевые реакции «ученика» (ассистента экспериментатора) виртуальным аватаром или заранее записанным видеоизображением с участием реального актера – в обоих случаях и актер, и аватар, согласно составленной программе исследования, «выполняют задания по запоминанию» и демонстрируют соответствующие речевые и паралингвистические (прежде всего, мимические) реакции. В осуществленных с применением систем виртуальной реальности исследованиях продемонстрировано, что испытуемые, нисколько не заблуждаясь в том, что демонстрируемый на экране монитора «обучающийся» являет собой виртуальный персонаж, явным образом демонстрируют отношение к этому персонажу как к реальному человеку. Такой вывод делается на основании ряда изучаемых психологических параметров. Вскрытый факт отношения к виртуальным персонажам как к реальному человеку открывает перед специалистами перспективу планирования и реализации новых проектов obedience-исследований средствами виртуальных реальностей, а также перспективу повторения классических экспериментов С. Милгрэма в студенческих психологических практикумах, причем в условиях запрограммированной полной повторяемости процедурной части экспериментов, тождественной для каждого участника исследования.

244


Obedience эксперимент Cтэнли Милгрэма заслужил широчайшую известность и подробно описан во множестве учебников по социальной и политической психологии, в том числе, в книгах на русском языке. Это освобождает от необходимости представить подробное описание данного исследования. Автор исследования – С. Милгрэм – прожил до обидного короткую жизнь; к этому следует добавить, что он не только слишком рано скончался, но и слишком рано родился: всего через пару десятилетий после его кончины открылась перспектива подготовки и осуществления подобных исследований в виртуальной сфере, так что можно было бы ожидать, что родись Милгрэм попозже, он бы нашел себя в сфере опосредствованной компьютерами и Интернетом эмпирической психологии. Поскольку этого не случилось, в данной статье рассматриваются соответствующие разработки и оцениваются перспективы.

Эксперимент, известный как obedience-эксперимент, получил также переносное наименование «тест Эйхмана», поскольку предлагает объяснение бесчувственного поведения бюрократического чиновничества, с готовностью и тщанием выполняющего бесчеловечные и преступные распоряжения своего начальства, не обрекая себя при этом на мучения совести или раздвоенного сознания. Эсэсовец Адольф Эйхман – немецкий чиновник, реализовывавший на практике нацистскую программу уничтожения евреев и цыган в лагерях смерти; по окончании второй мировой войны ему удалось скрыться и найти убежище в Аргентине, где он под чужим именем, однако вполне легально проживал со своей семьей. В 1960 году его выследили, опознали, похитили и тайно вывезли в Израиль, где состоялся публичный суд, после которого Эйхман был признан виновным в преступлениях против человечества и в принадлежности к преступным организациям; по приговору суда Эйхман был в 1962 г. повешен, труп его был сожжен, а прах развеян над Средиземным морем.

В послевоенные годы Адольф Эйхман осознавал, что совершил тяжелые преступления и должен скрываться; когда он исчез из Буэнос-Айреса, члены его семьи обратились за помощью в розыске не к кому-нибудь, а к знакомым им бывшим членам нацистской организации, также проживавшим в Латинской Америке. Вместе с тем Эйхмана не мучили угрызения совести, поскольку свои действия он полагал не более чем выполнением служебных обязанностей, ответственность за моральную сторону которых должны нести отдававшие ему приказы руководители. Протоколы суда над Эйхманом, его дневники, а также основанный на личных впечатлениях во время судебного процесса и на глубоком изучении его материалов труд выдающегося

245


политического философа и мыслителя Ханны Арендт (Арендт, 2008) показывают, что организаторами и участниками массовых злодеяний являются обыкновенные вполне заурядные люди, без раздумий и колебаний подчиняющиеся своему начальству – своего рода «винтики» тоталитарной системы. Ханна Арендт говорит в этой связи о «банальности зла».

Именно в такой общественной атмосфере, когда у психологов не было ясного понимания, каким образом обыкновенный человек превращается в изувера и чудовище, С. Милгрэмом был задуман и реализован знаменитый эксперимент. Напомним, что не менее знаменитый «Стэнфордский эксперимент» был осуществлен Филиппом Зимбардо на 10 лет позже. По-видимому, С. Милгрэм едва ли ожидал получить результат, согласно которому порядка двух третей испытуемых (собирательно: ведь соответствующее исследование осуществлялось неоднократно в разных местностях и в разное время), пусть не без тяжких колебаний, будут готовы выполнять распоряжения экспериментатора и игнорировать при этом требования и мольбы актера-испытуемого, заявлявшего об испытываемых мучениях, требовавшего прекратить эксперимент и, в конце концов, перестававшего выдавать реакцию на опасные для жизни удары электрическим током. Такой результат С. Милгрэм посчитал бы скорее характерным для жителей пост-тоталитарной Германии, а не для Америки (конкретно – Восточной Англии, т.е. там, где находится Йельский университет), пусть даже пережившей незадолго до эксперимента С. Милгрэма (в первой половине и середине 1950-х годов) период маккартизма, т.е. политических чисток, безосновательных обвинений и преследования деятелей культуры и политиков, демонстрировавших или (чаще) якобы демонстрировавших либеральные и коммунистические взгляды (в результате Чарли Чаплин, например, был вынужден покинуть США); тем не менее, период маккартизма был относительно кратким, а преследования практически не затронули обыкновенных, ничем не примечательных жителей Америки. Значительно более характерным для населения США считается «дух фронтира» – отраженный во множестве фильмов-«вестернов» почти столетний (конец XVIII — конец XIX века) период продвижения американских поселенцев-пионеров на Дикий Запад и освоения ими новых территорий, с которых они оттесняли аборигенов-индейцев. С тех пор понятие «фронтир» обозначает не просто гибкую и не маркированную географическую границу, но особое общественное настроение и психологическое состояние «людей фронтира». Согласно выдвинутой историком Ф.Д. Тёрнером в 1893 г. системе взглядов, известной под названием Turner Theory (Тёрнер, 2009), фронтир — и как

246


подвижная граница, и как социокультурный стереотип в американской ментальности — заметно способствовал развитию таких отличительных черт национального характера граждан США, как предприимчивость, индивидуализм, вера в собственные силы, свободолюбие, нацеленность на успех и др.

Итак, obedience-эксперимент принес неожиданные результаты и занял свое место среди классических психологических экспериментов. При обучении научной психологии принято проводить практикумы, в ходе которых студенты самостоятельно проводят исследования и учатся обрабатывать добытые данные, и в первую очередь их обучают на примере ранее проведенных классических исследований. Исследования Ф. Зимбардо или С. Милгрэма не могут повторяться в массовом порядке минимум по трем причинам. Во-первых, они довольно широко известны, что затрудняет подбор истинно «наивных» испытуемых. Во-вторых, процедурная часть методики С. Милгрэма во многом опирается на импровизацию (и со стороны актера, и со стороны экспериментатора), а потому при повторных – и особенно массовых – исследованиях трудно ожидать непременного получения результатов, не отличающихся от ранее опубликованных. В-третьих и в основных, процедура таких исследований едва ли соответствует нормам этических комиссий при современных университетах, а без одобрения таких комиссий студенческая работа не может быть запланирована и выполнена. Поэтому организаторам студенческих практикумов стоило бы обратить свое внимание на перспективы повтора ранее выполненных исследований в плане виртуальной реальности. Последняя во многом готова придти на помощь психологическому (и не только) образованию (Архитектура…, 2009; Войскунский, 2010; Войскунский, Меньшикова, 2008).

Обратимся сначала к краткому рассмотрению вопроса о роли виртуальных реальностей в современном мире. Можно утверждать, что следует различать не менее трех общепринятых систем представлений о природе виртуальной реальности. А именно, имеются следующие трактовки виртуальной реальности:

1. Общекультурное.2. Психолого-философское.3. Компьютерное.Охарактеризуем все три коротко; как представляется, пристального

внимания специалистов и серьезного изучения заслуживают все три. Таким образом, неправильно было бы, на наш взгляд, ограничиваться рассмотрением

247


лишь одного какого бы то ни было представления о природе и значимости виртуальной реальности.

Разрабатываемое в настоящее время представление об «интерреальности» (Riva et al., 2010) призвано описывать весьма специфическое взаимодействие между реальностью и виртуальной реальностью: предпринимаемые в одной из реальностей действия воздействуют на поведение субъекта и в другой реальности, и наоборот; рассматриваются гипотетические и реалистические психологические механизмы, обеспечивающие такие «интерреальностные» взаимодействия. Показано, к примеру, что определенные характеристики аватаров оказывают воздействие на то, как воспринимаются конкретные люди, которых представляют эти аватары (Dodds et al., 2011; Scarborough, Bailenson, 2014; Yee, 2014). Для изучения специфики подобного восприятия делаются попытки прибегнуть, в частности, к методам нейровизуализации (Carter, Pollick, 2014).

Данное представление может с определенной мерой вероятности быть отнесено ко всем трем трактовкам виртуальных реальностей. Охарактеризуем их коротко.

1. Общекультурное понимание виртуальной реальности связано с представлениями о «путешествиях» в иные реальности, об «эффектах присутствия» у кинозрителей и посетителей Диснейленда, компьютерных геймеров и чатеров, об измененных состояниях сознания, соседствующих с мистикой, эзотерикой, психоделикой и др. В массовой культуре виртуальная реальность с некоторых пор понимается как иллюзорная, игрушечная, управляемая извне реальность (как, скажем, в кинофильме «Матрица», его продолжениях и подобных ему).

Так, широко обсуждаемый ныне «феномен присутствия» (Presence) состоит в иллюзии присутствия в одной реальности с предметами или субъектами, не находящимися в непосредственно наблюдаемой реальности (Войскунский, 2010; Войскунский, Селисская, 2005). Тем самым «присутствие» может быть зарегистрировано у унесенного мечтой читателя увлекательной книги, у кинозрителя 2D и – особенно – 3D фильмов, у работающего в чуждой среде водолаза, у ощущающего себя в стране «фэнтези» компьютерного геймера или у посетителя интерактивного виртуального музея, у участниц чат-группы: разъехавшихся на каникулы школьниц; перечень может быть с легкостью продолжен.

В наиболее широком смысле виртуальная реальность в рассматриваемой трактовке близка также к измененным состояниям сознания

248


в предсонном или не вполне проснувшемся состоянии, в результате алкогольного или наркотического опьянения, гипо- или гипервентиляции легких, пищевого или медикаментозного отравления, пребывания в искусственном или естественным образом достигнутом трансе, галлюцинаторных состояниях, под гипнозом, эриксонианским гипнозом или под действием наркоза, истерическом состоянии, сильном испуге и др. (Измененные…, 2009; Руднев, 2000; Тарт, 2003). Даже психологические различия между людьми, как полагает В.Руднев, имеют значение: «У синтонного сангвиника одна реальность, у агрессивного эпилептоида – другая, у дефензивного психастеника - третья, у шизоида-аутиста – четвертая. Таким образом, любая реальность является виртуальной» (Руднев, 2001). Тем самым налицо обобщение понятия «виртуальность» вплоть до отрицания единой для всех и всеми ощущаемой «реальной» реальности.

2. В сочинениях философов постмодернистской ориентации, как и в вызвавших массовый интерес кинофильмах («Матрица», «Искусственный интеллект», «Аватар», «Социальная сеть» и др.), современное общество предстает как нечто вроде виртуальной реальности, наполненной гаджетами, протезами, аватарами, а в особенности симулякрами (Бодрийяр, 1999) — все это предстает в одном ряду с культурой предшествующих эпох и с природной средой. Исходя из философско-религиозных представлений, Н.А.Носов (2000) представил систему научной виртуалистики, опирающуюся на представление о полионтичности реальностей, или одновременном существовании множества онтологически имеющихся, хотя и различающихся реальностей. Психолого-философское понимание (Носов, 2000) виртуальной реальности связано с признанием:

• полионтичности реальностей и интерактивных отношений (взаимодействий) между ними,

• разделения реальностей на константные и виртуальные,• наличия т.н. виртуальных состояний, их особых свойств (среди которых

наиболее существенны спонтанность, фрагментарность, актуальность и др.),• особенностей психического развития как процесса «удвоения

реальностей» и соответствующей смены виртуальных состояний,• виртуалистики как кумулятивного научного направления,• виртуальной психологии как отдельного направления с собственными

теорией, феноменологией, методами, • инкапсуляцией, фактическим отрывом данного научного направления от

компьютерного понимания виртуальных реальностей.

249


Полионтичность, или равноправие и одновременное сосуществование в сознании каждого из нас (и ребенка, и взрослого) «мира обыденной реальности» и «мира необыденной реальности» (фантазии, игры, художественных образов, магических верований, состояний перехода ко сну, сновидений и др.) эмпирически обосновывает Е.В. Субботский (1999; 2010). Данный автор различает два вида предлагаемых им «трансреальностных переходов»:

• полный – «когда новая реальность обретает полный онтологический статус», или

• неполный - когда «Я одновременно присутствует в двух сферах реальности, попеременно переходя из одной в другую».

Не сохранив способность попеременно переходить из одной – вполне осязаемой – реальности в другую реальность – реальность сказки, мечты, игры, или же способность полностью погружаться в «виртуальную» реальность, мы бы не смогли наслаждаться искусством, литературой, рассказами других людей об их жизни и т.п. Таким образом, умение осуществлять «трансреальностные переходы» - безусловно, ценное качество, и оно, насколько можно судить, обеспечивает такую столь высоко ценимую всеми способность, как креативность.

3. Компьютерная трактовка виртуальных реальностей также теснейшим образом связана с психологическими знаниями. Виртуальная реальность, создаваемая за счет визуализации трехмерных объектов методами компьютерной графики и анимации, является продуктом не только информационных, но и психологических технологий. Именно в этом аспекте компьютерные, или технические виртуальные реальности рассматриваются в недавних публикациях (Архитектура…, 2009; Войскунский, Меньшикова, 2008; Зинченко, 2013; Сергеев, 2009). Взаимодействие человека с виртуальной реальностью понимается как иллюзорное взаимодействие с динамическим трехмерным окружением, генерируемым с помощью компьютерной графики и других (напр., для создания сигналов акустического и/или тактильного характера) программных средств предъявления информации, с учетом непрерывно поступающей обратной связи о собственных движениях человека, автоматически отслеживаемых и оперативно обрабатываемых управляющим компьютером.

Родоначальником научного и практического рассмотрения данной проблематики должен быть по праву признан американский специалист в области информационных технологий, а также музыкант и бизнесмен Джарон Ланье. Отечественный биограф отзывается о нем следующим образом: «Он

250


первый начал реализовывать симуляторы реального времени для хирургических операций и телехирургии и стоял у истоков внедрения визуального программирования. Он – пионер в области коммерческого продвижения идей виртуальной реальности» (Частиков, 2002, с. 350). Сообщается также, что Джарон Ланье в 1984 г. создал компанию VPL Research, Inc. (Visual Programming Language). В VPL «он сконструировал первую примитивную систему виртуальной реальности, состоящую из телевизионных дисплеев малого размера (они надевались на голову) и перчаток, от которых шли провода, предназначенные для того, чтобы манипулировать виртуальными объектами в электронном пространстве» (Частиков, 2002, с. 352). Джарон Ланье «рассматривал будущее как винегрет возможностей…» (Частиков, 2002, с. 354). Кроме того, «он профессиональный пианист и специалист в области нетрадиционных музыкальных инструментов Востока. Он пишет камерную и оркестровую музыку. В 1994 г. выпустил диск «Инструменты перемен»…» (Частиков, 2002, с. 355). Написанная Дж. Ланье книга «Вы не гаджет. Манифест» была крайне неудачно переведена на русский язык – даже фамилия автора оказалась иной (Ланир, 2011); в 2012 г. данное издание на русском языке было отмечено «антипремией», названной «Полный абзац»: она присуждается «за полное попрание всех норм книгоиздания», прежде всего – некачественный перевод (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Антипремия «Абзац»).

Вслед за Джароном Ланье созданием все более совершенных систем виртуальной реальности занялись другие специалисты, мощные промышленные и венчурные компании, государственные органы разных государств. Широко используются в настоящее время носимые на голове мониторы в виде специальных «шлемов» либо специальные очки, стереонаушники, виброкостюмы или перчатки, обеспечивающие тактильные компоненты взаимодействия с системами виртуальной реальности, а также датчики для трекеров, отслеживающих движения человека (в шлеме, очках, виброкостюме и др.) и передающих информацию об этих движениях на управляющий компьютер, который ее обрабатывает и соответственно изменяет изображение таким образом, чтобы оно соответствовало тому повороту головы или тела человека, которые он выполнил. Например, подняв или опустив голову либо повернувшись, человек меняет обзор окружающей обстановки: компьютер обрабатывает информацию о поднятии/опускании головы или повороте тела и предъявляет в мониторы, наушники и вибросистему изображение, звук и тактильную информацию, соответствующие измененному положению головы и тела человека. В

251

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%20%D0%90%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%8F


участии в такой работе видится серьезная перспектива для психологов (Архитектура…, 2009; Зинченко, 2013), тем более что системы виртуальной реальности находят все более широкое применение в психологии, как это будет рассматриваться ниже.

Таким образом, не забывая об общекультурном и психолого-философском понимании виртуальности, можно призвать психологов заниматься в первую очередь теми психологическими задачами, которые являются смежными с компьютерными моделями виртуальной реальности, как наиболее актуальными и перспективными в настоящее время. Это тем более верно, что с психологической точки зрения – с точки зрения сторонника культурно-исторической теории развития психики – применение виртуальных реальностей есть поистине современный этап опосредствования и переопосредствования деятельности (Войскунский, 2010).

В психологических работах (Архитектура…, 2009; Зинченко, 2013; Сергеев, 2009), отмечается, что среди основных областей применения виртуальных реальностей следует назвать такие области знания и практики, как:

• создание тренажеров для обучения опасным профессиям, работе в нештатных ситуациях и т.п.,

• развлечения, игры, шоу-бизнес, туризм, • медицина, обучение медицине, реабилитация пациентов,• конструирование в промышленности, архитектуре, дизайне,

градостроительстве,• организация заочных совещаний, дистантного обучения, электронных

справочников,• психология, дефектология, психотерапия, психологическая

реабилитация.Последний пункт перечня подробно рассматривается в указанных

источниках, как и в других работах последних 10-15 лет. Действительно, уже разработанные системы виртуальной реальности широко применяются в психологических исследованиях, психотерапии и психологической реабилитации (Войскунский, 2010). Обсуждение всех этих направлений работы выходит за рамки настоящей статьи. Поэтому остановимся подробнее на перспективах применения систем виртуальной реальности в психологическом образовании.

В качестве примера рассмотрим возможность применения в рамках психологического практикума конкретного социально-психологического эксперимента, проведенного Милгрэмом – того эксперимента, с упоминания

252


которого началась данная статья. Такой перспективе отвечает работа М. Слэйтера – британского специалиста, который работает одновременно в Великобритании и в Испании – и его сотрудников (Slater et al., 2006), а также работа французских специалистов (Dambrun, Vatine, 2010). Однако во время встречи автора статьи с М. Слэйтером в 2012 г. оказалось, что программное обеспечение, позволившее осуществить данное исследование, утрачено в связи с тем, что оно было рассчитано для реализации на конкретной серии компьютеров (а именно, Silicon Graphics), которая перестала выпускаться и поддерживаться разработчиком; М. Слэйтер и его сотрудники не посчитали необходимым позаботиться о переносе программного комплекса на другие модели компьютеров. Тем самым возможность виртуального повторения предпринятого М. Слэйтером и его сотрудниками исследования утрачена. Виртуальное повторение работы французских специалистов в области применения систем виртуальной реальности в психологии, напротив, может, как представляется, активно применяться в учебных и научных целях.

Остановимся подробнее на разработке М. Слэйтера, поскольку это была первая виртуальная модель в области психологии obedience. Приведем краткое описание повтора эксперимента С. Милгрэма в виртуальной среде, сделанное командой специалистов под руководством М. Слэйтера.

Исследование М. Слэйтера состояло в том, что испытуемым предлагали «обучать» виртуальный персонаж, которого они воспринимали на экране посредством стереоскопических очков. Причем о виртуальности и «ненастоящести» этого персонажа испытуемым с самого начала было доподлинно известно. Несмотря на это знание, они, как было показано исследователями, в подавляющем большинстве отнеслись к виртуальному персонажу как к живому существу, сочувствовали ему и одновременно «наказывали» за недостаточную успешность в выполнении предписываемых действий. Отношение «как к живому существу» было зафиксировано на основании устного опроса, заполнения испытуемыми специальных опросников, наблюдения за ними вместе с фиксацией их действий, а также регистрации психофизиологических параметров (электрическое сопротивление кожи и частота сердечных сокращений).

Исследователи пришли к выводу, что классический эксперимент С. Милгрэма, как, вероятно, и другие эксперименты, которые в силу изменившихся требований к психологическому исследованию более не могут быть проведены, все же могут быть повторены в виртуальной среде и, следовательно, системы виртуальной реальности способны принести существенную пользу психологическому образованию, являясь источником

253


получения сравнительных данных, а также осуществления профессионального тренинга студентов.

Процедура исследования в виртуальной среде – т.е. с применением специальных очков и наушников – состояла в следующем.

Испытуемые приглашались провести серию экспериментов по проверке запоминания виртуальным персонажем женского пола вербальных ассоциаций. При неправильном ответе надо было включать «электрошокер», каждый раз увеличивая вольтаж на 1 деление. Испытуемых тестировали, они проходили курс обучения (10 мин.), после эксперимента их также тестировали и дополнительно опрашивали о наличии или отсутствии неприятных ощущений (что случается при использовании ВР).

Имелось 32 набора из 5 слов. Виртуальный персонаж отвечала ошибочно на 20 из 32 заданий, под конец списка ошибки становились более частыми. Из 34 испытуемых 23 видели и слышали виртуальный персонаж (Режим 1), а 11 взаимодействовали с ней посредством обмена электронными сообщениями и видели только несколько секунд в самом начале (Режим 2). Испытуемые знали, что имеют дело с виртуальным персонажем, который реагировал на действия испытуемых. Испытуемым позволялось в любой момент прекратить свое участие в эксперименте.

В режиме 1 (n = 23) виртуальный персонаж реагировал на включение «электрошокера» высказыванием дискомфорта, протестами, несогласием, призывами прекратить эксперимент, а под конец «впадала в ступор» и не реагировала на призывы продолжить эксперимент. При этом реакции были значительно менее яростными, чем в исходном эксперименте С. Милгрэма. В режиме 2 (n = 11) ответы поступали в электронном виде, протестов со стороны виртуального персонажа не было. Оба режима работы проходили в одном виртуальной среде (система типа CAVE, т.е. комната виртуальной реальности, в которой формируемое компьютерами изображение проецируется на стены, пол и потолок помещения).

Результаты проведенного исследования состоят в следующем. Все участники в Режиме 2 включили электрошокер все 20 раз. В Режиме 1 таких было 17 человек, трое сделали это 19 раз, а по одному человеку - 18, 16 и 9 раз (после отказа «наказывать» виртуального персонажа эксперимент прекращался). На постэкспериментальный вопрос «Возникало ли у вас желание прекратить эксперимент до его формального окончания?» утвердительно ответили 12 (из 23) участников Режима 1 и 1 (из 11) участник Режима 2. Причиной такого желания они назвали негативное отношение к происходящему.

254


Опросные методики, примененные в ходе исследования, включали следующие тесты:

• Испытуемые дважды заполняли опросник The Autonomic Perceptions Questionnaire (24 пункта) для оценки того, насколько они осознают свое физиологическое состояние (дрожь в теле, лицо покраснело, учащенное дыхание и т.п.). В режиме 1 после эксперимента показатели удвоились (по медиане), т.е. увеличилось самоощущение соматических реакций. В режиме 2 увеличение незначимо.

• Испытуемые заполняли также Личностный опросник NEO-FFI (60 вопросов), который направлен на выявление параметров «big five».

Самоощущения испытуемых могут быть описаны следующим образом. В Режиме 1 испытуемые обычно реагировали так, как если бы имели дело с реальным существом. Они раздражались или хихикали при неверных ответах, консультировались с экспериментатором, когда виртуальный персонаж требовала прекратить работу. Когда она просила говорить громче, они всегда делали это. Когда она «впадала в ступор», они окликали ее: “Hello? Hello?…” При опросе испытуемые говорили, что удивлены своими реакциями, при этом отмечали, что в ходе эксперимента они иногда задавали себе вопрос: «А вдруг это вправду?» Им приходилось, по их словам, убеждать себя в том, что на самом деле не происходит ничего такого, что помешало бы провести эксперимент до конца.

Измерявшиеся психофизиологические показатели также о многом говорят. Так, измерение сопротивления кожи показало, что уровень возбуждения испытуемых непосредственно после включения электрошокера и в Режиме 1, и в Режиме 2 выше, чем этого можно было бы ожидать при случайном течении событий. В Режиме 1 уровень возбуждения значимо превышал уровень возбуждения при Режиме 2. Показатель ритма сердечных сокращений значимо увеличился к моменту начала основной серии эксперимента (после 10 мин. обучения) в обоих режимах, причем в Режиме 1 (но не в Режиме 2) это увеличение сохранялось до конца эксперимента. Исследователям удалось показать, что это может быть вызвано протестным поведением виртуального персонажа, но не движениями нажатия на кнопку.

Один из самых существенных вопросов, который задали себе исследователи и на который они постарались дать ответ, состоит в следующем. Действительно, пусть испытуемые испытывали стресс и возбуждение, пусть в Режиме 1 это выражалось сильнее, чем в Режиме 2 – однако о чем конкретно это говорит и отлично ли это, например, от созерцания фильма? Иногда в Режиме 1 испытуемые подчеркивали голосом

255


правильное слово, которое надо выбрать. 8 испытуемых хотя бы по одному разу повторили вопрос, когда на него не последовал ответ. В Режиме 2 такого не случалось. Кроме того, измерение времени, в течение которого испытуемые ожидали ответ виртуального персонажа (перед тем, как нажать на кнопку электрошокера), показало, что в Режиме 1 это время значимо превышало период ожидания в режиме 2 (к примеру: медианы 23 с. и 7 с., соотв.).

Приведенные наблюдения и измерения говорят о том, что для испытуемых виртуальный персонаж отличен от киногероя: ведь, в отличие от просмотра кинофильма, на виртуальный персонаж можно попытаться воздействовать своим поведением, чтобы избежать необходимости «наказывать» ее электрошокером.

Выполненное французскими авторами виртуальное исследование в области obedience (Dambrun, Vatine, 2010) скорее подходит для многократного повторения, чем рассмотренная выше работа под руководством М. Слэйтера, поскольку программное обеспечение последней, как уже отмечалось выше, оказалось утрачено. Работа (Dambrun, Vatine, 2010), как отмечают сами авторы, начиналась как самостоятельное исследование, хотя разработка М. Слэйтера оказалась значительно более продвинутой. В общем и целом исследование французских авторов не очень заметно отличается от рассмотренной выше виртуальной модели М. Слэйтера.

Вместо выполненной методами компьютерной графики фигурки (аватара) «ученика», заучивающего сочетания слов и «наказываемого» в случае ошибочного воспроизведения, французские авторы демонстрируют на мониторе компьютера кинематографический образ реального человека – актера, называющего «заученные» слова, играющего «боль» и «страдание» в случае «наказания» его. Авторы отмечают – и вероятно, справедливо, что при всем совершенстве компьютерной графики киноизображение человека пока что выглядит реалистичнее, нежели формируемое с помощью компьютерных программ изображение, наблюдаемое посредством очков виртуальной реальности.

Разработанный процедурно-методический комплекс получил наименование «иммерсивная (т.е. способствующая психологическому «погружению») технология виртуального окружения» (immersive virtual environment technology). Задача состояла в апробации данной технологии как способной добиться результатов, аналогичных полученным С. Милгрэмом результатам. Предметом познавательного интереса были также характеристики самой технологии, включая психометрические свойства

256


новой методики и перспективы ее дальнейшего применения в социальной психологии. Кроме того, французские исследователи попробовали внести новую для проблематики obedience переменную – а именно, расу «жертвы», которую требуется наказывать за ошибки воспроизведения слов. Для этого были записаны и впоследствии демонстрировались испытуемым вербальные и невербальные реакции двух актеров – один из них француз, а другой – североафриканец. Предполагалось, что повиновение авторитету и соответственно готовность жестоко наказывать «жертву» может оказаться более высокой, если «жертва» принадлежит к «чуждой» расе (аут-группе), в то время как применительно к представителю своей расы (ин-группы) испытуемый скорее проявит сострадание и, значит, неповиновение. Отмечается, что жители Северной Африки и выходцы из этого региона являются весьма распространенным предметом предубеждений и дискриминации во Франции.

Исследование проходило во многом аналогично процедурам, разработанным М. Слэйтером (и, конечно, прежде всего, С. Милгрэмом): испытуемые доподлинно знали, что реальное наказание опасным для жизни разрядом электрического тока не имеет места; они тестировались до и после исследования, проводилось наблюдение за их поведением; кроме того, по прошествии нескольких месяцев после участия в исследовании, испытуемых опрашивали об их отношении к проведенному исследованию.

В итоге получен результат, согласно которому разработанный и использованный вариант «иммерсивной технологии виртуального окружения» дает возможность достичь результатов, аналогичных результатам исходного исследования С. Милгрэма. Тем самым открывается перспектива моделирования разнообразных исследований девиантного, полного предубеждений и дискриминации, хулиганского, порочного, провокативного и террористического поведения – для таких исследований понадобится дополнительная постановочная работа с актерами, в то время как процедуры предъявления тревожащей человека информации уже в достаточной степени отработаны. Внесенный французскими исследователями (Dambrun, Vatine, 2010) параметр расовой принадлежности, как оказалось, не сыграл большой роли в поведении испытуемых: правда, впоследствии (по прошествии нескольких месяцев) испытуемые высказывали меньше сочувствия в адрес представителя «чужой» расы.

Таким образом, классический эксперимент С. Милгрэма, как и другие исследования такого рода, может быть повторен в рамках студенческого практикума, а кроме того, на этой основе могут быть спроектированы и

257


разработаны новые перспективные исследовательские методики. Самый существенный, пожалуй, итог рассмотренных исследований (Dambrun, Vatine, 2010; Slater et al., 2006) состоит в том, что обман испытуемых (в том виде, как это было предпринято С. Милгрэмом) не является необходимым компонентом obedience-исследования: виртуальное изображение «жертвы» в виде аватара вызывает у испытуемых такое же отношение (в разной степени сочувственное или безразличное), как подлинный человек, который ошибается и потому заслуживает (или – в зависимости от конкретного испытуемого – не заслуживает) жестокого наказания.

Итак, поведение испытуемых в ситуации виртуального повтора экспериментов С. Милгрэма соответствует поведению тех, кто считал, что воздействует электрическим током на другого человека. Существенным представляется следующий момент: пользуясь системами виртуальной реальности или иммерсивной технологии виртуального окружения, можно создавать практикумы для учащихся, в том числе такие, которые в силу разных причин нельзя реализовать в реальности; кроме того, могут разрабатываться новые методические средства в парадигме obedience-исследования. Для образовательных целей особенно существенно, что процедурная часть взаимодействия виртуального персонажа с испытуемыми не подвержена изменениям, ибо полностью соответствует разработанному плану и дизайну исследования. Иначе говоря, для каждого занятого повторением obedience-исследования студента процедура всегда будет тождественной.

Литература / References

Арендт Х. Банальность зла. Эйхман в Иерусалиме. - М.: Европа, 2008.Архитектура виртуальных миров / Под ред. М.Б. Игнатьева, А.В. Никитина, А.Е.

Войскунского. – СПб.: Изд-во ГУАП, 2009.Бодрийяр Ж. Система вещей. - M.: Рудомино, 1999.Войскунский А.Е. Психология и Интернет. - М.: Акрополь, 2010.Войскунский А.Е., Меньшикова М.Я. О применении систем виртуальной реальности

в психологии // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 14. Психология, 2008. № 1. С. 22-36.

Войскунский А.Е., Селисская М.А. Система реальностей: психология и технология // Вопросы философии. 2005. № 11. С. 119-130.

Зинченко Ю.П. Технологии виртуальной реальности в системе постнеклассической психологии // Мир психологии. 2013. № 1. С. 31-42.

Измененные состояния сознания и культура: Хрестоматия / Автор-составитель О.В.Гордеева. - СПб: Питер, 2009.

258


Ланир Дж. Вы не гаджет. Манифест. М.: Астрель; М.: Corpus. 2011.Носов Н.А. Виртуальная психология. – М.: Аграф, 2000.Руднев В.П. Прочь от реальности: Исследования по философии текста. – М.:

Аграф, 2000.Руднев В. П. Энциклопедический словарь культуры ХХ века. – М.: Аграф, 2001.Cергеев С.Ф. Обучающие и профессиональные иммерсивные среды. – М.: Народное

образование, 2009.Субботский Е.В. Индивидуальное сознание как система реальностей // Традиции и

перспективы деятельностного подхода в психологии // Под ред. А.Е. Войскунского, А.Н. Ждан, О.К.Тихомирова. – М., 1999. С. 125-160.

Субботский Е.В. Выживание в мире машин: взгляд психолога на причины веры в магию // Национальный психологический журнал, 2010. № 1 (3). С. 42 – 47.Тарт Ч. Измененные состояния сознания. – М.: Эксмо, 2003.Тёрнер Ф.Дж. Фронтир в американской истории. — М.: Весь Мир, 2009.Частиков А. Архитекторы компьютерного мира. – СПб.: БХВ-Петербург, 2002.Carter E.J., Pollick F.E. Not Quite Human: What Virtual Characters Have Taught Us about

Person Perception // The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality / M. Grimshaw (Ed.). – New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. P. 145–161.

Dambrun M., Vatiné E. Reopening the study of extreme social behaviors: Obedience to authority within an immersive video environment // European Journal of Social Psychology. 2010. Vol. 40. Issue 5. P. 760-773.

Dodds T.J., Mohler B.J., Buelthoff H.H. (2011) Talk to the Virtual Hands: Self-Animated Avatars Improve Communication in Head-Mounted Display Virtual Environments // PLoS ONE 6(10): e25759. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025759

Riva G., Raspelli S., Algeri D., Pallavcini F., Gorini A., Wiederhold B.K., Gaggioli A. Interreality in practice: Bridging virtual and real worlds in the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorders // Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 2010. Vol. 13. № 1. Р. 55-65.

Scarborough J.K., Bailenson J.N. Avatar Psychology // The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality / M. Grimshaw (Ed.). – New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. P. 129–144.

Slater M., Antley A., Davison A., Swapp D., Guger C., Barker C., Pistrang N., Sanchez-Vives M.V. A virtual reprise of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments. 2006//http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchArticle.action?articleURI=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0000039

Yee N. The Proteus Paradox: How Online Games and Virtual Worlds Change Us-And How They Don't. – New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.

259

http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchArticle.action?articleURI=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0000039

http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchArticle.action?articleURI=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0000039

http://ru.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%D0%A2%D1%91%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%80,_%D0%A4%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BA_%D0%94%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BD&action=edit&redlink=1

K. Worthy. Milgram, proximity, and environmental crisis. In Regina V. Ershova & Alexander Y. Voronov (Eds.) Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014. Kolomna, Russia: Moscow Re-gional State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies.

MILGRAM, PROXIMITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS1

, МИЛГРЭМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕННАЯБЛИЗОСТЬИЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ КРИЗИС

Kenneth WorthyUniversity of California, Santa Cruz

[email protected]

Kenneth Worthy - Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley is a research associate at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and teaches at UC Berkeley and St. Mary's College of California. He is the author of the book Invisible Nature: Healing the Destructive Divide between People and the Environment published in 2013 by Prometheus Books. He blogs at kennethworthy.net and “The Green Mind” on PsychologyToday.com. Кеннет Уорти - доктор философии, Калифорнийский университет, Беркли является научным сотрудником

Калифорнийского университета в Санта-Крузе и преподает в Калифорнийском университете в Беркли и колледже Св. Марии в Калифорнии. Он является автором книги "Невидимая природа: преодолевая пропасть между человеком и окружающей средой", выпущенной издательством Прометеус Букс в 2013 году. Он ведет блог на kennethworthy.net и рубрику «The Green Mind» на странице PsychologyToday.com

1 Adapted from “From Dissociation to Destruction through the Psyche” in Kenneth Worthy, Invisible Nature: Healing the Destructive Divide between People and the Environment (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2013).Адаптация текста « From Dissociation to Destruction through the Psyche» От диссоциации к уничтожению через личность» из книги Kenneth Worthy Invisible Nature: Healing the Destructive Divide between People and the Environment (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2013). Author’s note: Dr. Kaiping Peng first suggested the Milgram studies for empirical data about the connection between phenomenal dissociations and destructive behavior. Thanks also to Dr. Nestar J. C. Russell and Dr. Brian Dahmen for many ideas and for reviewing various versions of the manuscript.Примечание автора: Первым, кто предложил использовать исследования Милгрэма в качестве источника эмпирических данных о связи между феноменальными разобщениями и деструктивным поведением, был доктор Кайпинг Пэнг. Я бы хотел также поблагодарить Д-ра Нестара Дж. К. Рассела и Д-ра Брайана Дамена за внимательное прочтение различных версий рукописи данной работы и за ценные замечания.

260


Key words: proximity, authority, obedience studies, Milgram, ecopsychology, environmental values and attitudes, environmental consciousness, environmental crisis, organizational structures.Ключевые слова: пространственная близость, легитимный авторитет, исследования повинуемости легитимным авторитетам, Милгрэм, экопсихология, экологические ценности и установки, экологическое сознание, экологический кризис, организационные структуры.

AbstractSeveral of Stanley Milgram’s experiments following his famous obedience

experimental paradigm examined the effect of proximity between subject and victim. He found proximity to be inversely related to obedience—that is, as the victim was made more present to the subject across experimental variations, obedience dropped. This article uses these proximity findings and related empirical results and theory to support the assertions of environmental scholars who claim that human-nature alienations are to blame for the increasingly severe global environmental crisis. It shows that phenomenal dissociation—the lack of immediate, sensual engagement with the consequences of our everyday actions and with the human and non-human others that we affect with our actions—increases destructive tendency; knowledge and awareness are not always sufficient to curb destructiveness. This study begins to reveal some of the psychodynamics by which phenomenal dissociations lead to destructive tendency; discusses how modern institutions, organizational structures, and technologies propagate harms by mediating between actor and consequences; and argues that environmental psychology, which commonly focuses on attitudinal variables like awareness and concern, must expand its reach to account for the pervasive phenomenal dissociations of contemporary life.

Аннотация Милгрэм поставил несколько экспериментов в рамках его знаменитой

экспериментальной obedience-парадигмы, направленных на изучение влияния пространственной близости между испытуемым и «жертвой». Он обнаружил: чем ближе «жертва» находится к испытуемому, тем меньше деструктивная повинуемость. Эти результаты, касающиеся эффектов пространственной близости, а также другие сходные эмпирические данные и теоретические соображения, как показано в данной работе, подтверждают мнение учёных экологов, считающих, что причиной разрастающегося глобального экологического кризиса является отчуждение человека от природы. Феноменологическая диссоциация – отсутствие непосредственного эмоционального и чувственного участия в событиях, составляющих последствия наших повседневных действий, равно как и отсутствие взаимодействия с "другим" (человеком или животным), на которого оказывают влияние наши поступки – усиливает деструктивные процессы. Таким образом, знание и понимание не всегда достаточны для сдерживания деструктивности. В

261


настоящем исследовании мы сначала описываем психодинамические процессы, с помощью которых феноменологическая диссоциация приводит к деструктивной тенденции. Затем мы рассматриваем как современные общественные институты, структуры и организации, а также технологии, выступая в качестве промежуточного звена между деятелем и последствиями, способствуют распространению вреда. Экологическая психология, обычно концентрирующаяся на таких аттитюдных переменных, как осведомлённость и интерес, должна распространить своё внимание на феноменологическую диссоциацию, пронизывающую современную жизнь.

IntroductionThe United Nations-sponsored Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the most

comprehensive survey of the ecological conditions of Earth ever undertaken, reveals widespread, severe human-caused damages to nature. The harms include a substantial, largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on Earth; severe degradation or unsustainable use of sixty percent of “ecosystem services,” such as fisheries and air and water purification; and a significantly increased likelihood of spontaneous and potentially catastrophic non-linear ecosystem changes.1 These developments are taking place under societal conditions that are unprecedented in human history—the stark separation of people from nature and from the consequences of their actions.

In most of the contemporary world, people live and act within contexts that are dramatically different from those experienced by people throughout most of human history, when global-scale, multifaceted environmental crises did not exist. Modern life situates each person at the nexus of a series of elongated material and informational networks that separate individuals to an unprecedented degree from the origins of their sustenance, the destinations of their wastes, and the consequences of their actions. Modern material and social networks disperse and propagate the consequences of one’s actions globally and in turn provide a degree of phenomenal (capable of being known through the senses or immediate experience) insulation from those consequences. Institutions such as corporations and government agencies separate people from nature by mediating between them and the resources, nature, and other humans that they affect with their everyday consumption and other acts. These conditions reduce or distort knowledge and experience of particular consequences of particular actions. Separations from the

1 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Program, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2005), pp. ii, v, 1, 2.

262


spheres of nature and society where consequences are manifest also limit more general knowledge and appreciation of those spheres.

This chapter explores the nexus of these two salient features of modern life—the global proliferation of environmental destruction on one hand, and the marked and increasing separations of people from the human and non-human others that they affect with their actions on the other. It uses Stanley Milgram’s obedience experimental paradigm and other empirical and theoretical psychology as a lens to better understand how such separations result in harmful choices. I introduce the term phenomenal dissociation to mean a lack of immediate, sensual engagement with the consequences of one’s everyday actions and with the human and non-human others that one affects with his or her actions.

The long reach of late-modern transportation, telecommunications, and other technological and institutional networks places people in phenomenally dissociated relationships with many other remote, unknown individuals, societies, and landscapes and other natural entities by dispersing the consequences of actions globally. Modern institutions have become important mediators between individuals and the others with whom we have material relationships; they mediate in virtually all of our important relationships with non-human nature and with the human others producing goods that we rely on; they aggregate and disperse our choices, actions, and relevant consequences with those of many other people, obscuring them. Harmful consequences of one’s actions return in abstracted, aggregated, and diluted form. It is difficult for a beef-eater to associate particular acts of beef eating with the suffering of particular factory-farmed animals and with the contamination of particular soils and waterways by drugs administered to those animals, even when having abstract knowledge of those problems. It is difficult to know who and what are all of the others affected by our choices and actions.

The theory and empirical data presented in this chapter show that knowledge of the harmful consequences of one’s actions is not enough to inhibit destructive actions; immediate, sensual experience of one’s consequences and the spheres where those consequences are expressed are crucial ingredients in limiting destructiveness and fostering caring relationships. One motivation for this research is the perplexing contradiction exhibited profusely in contemporary society between high levels of environmental concern or awareness and continuing high levels of global environmental degradation. One need only note concerns over the severity of global climate change and the proliferation of large, inefficient personal vehicles and homes in the United States. This gulf between environmental

263


awareness and environmental destruction has been an explicit point of engagement for many researchers.1

Proximity and Destructiveness in the Obedience ExperimentsOur spatial relations shift from one situation to the next, and the fact that we are near or remote may have a powerful effect on the psychological processes that mediate our behavior toward others.

Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 1974

In the early 1960s a young Yale University psychologist, Stanley Milgram, wanted to understand the destructive obedience of soldiers in the German death camps from 1933 to 1945 when “millions of innocent people were systematically slaughtered on command.”2 To that end, Milgram performed some of the most surprising, controversial, influential, and famous experiments in the history of psychology: at least twenty-one variations on an experiment designed to measure destructive obedience to authority.3 The studies made a deep and lasting impression 1 Ulrich Beck, Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society (Atlantic Highlands,

N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995); Michael Christopher, "An Exploration of the "Reflex" in Reflexive Modernity: The Rational and Prerational Social Causes of the Affinity for Ecological Consciousness," Organization & Environment 12, no. 4 (1999): 359; Elisabeth Ryland, "Gaia Rising: A Jungian Look at Environmental Consciousness and Sustainable Organizations," Organization & Environment 13, no. 4 (2000).2 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, 1st ed. (New York: Harper &

Row, 1974), p. 1. Together with Hannah Arendt’s writings on the Holocaust, particularly Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Milgram’s findings dispelled the belief that the Holocaust had been the result mainly of a peculiar, perhaps momentary, characteristic of the collective German psy-che. The experiments showed in contrast that situational, social features were more relevant to understand-ing how so many people could have supported and carried out the German Nazi attempt at exterminating European Jews. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem; a Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963).

3 Thomas Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Per-sonality, Situations, and Their Interactions," Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 60, no. 3 (1991): 408. Blass and Arthur G. Miller have written extensively on the influence of Milgram’s obedience experi-ments. For example, see Thomas Blass, "The Milgram Paradigm after 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority," Journal of Applied Social Psychology 29, no. 5 (1999); Blass, "Un-derstanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions."; Thomas Blass, Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Para-digm (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000); Arthur G. Miller, Barry E. Collins, and Diana E. Brief, "Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: The Legacy of the Milgram Experiments," Journal of Social Issues 51, no. 3 (1995); Arthur G. Miller, The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Contro-versy in Social Science (New York: Praeger, 1986); Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 207.

264


on our understandings of human behavior. In 1975, the Turkish social psychologist Muzafer Sherif, a founder of the field, said,

Milgram’s obedience experiment is the single greatest contribu-tion to human knowledge ever made by the field of social psy-chology, perhaps psychology in general.1

More recently, researchers performing a comprehensive review of the studies declared,

Stanley Milgram’s experiments on obedience to authority are surely among the most celebrated in the history of psychol-ogy…. The Milgram experiments…have stimulated thought as has perhaps no other single research program.2

Among other results, some of Milgram’s variations showed that phenomenal dissociations make people more destructive.

In Milgram’s obedience experiments, a naïve subject (a volunteer), playing the role of teacher in a supposed learning experiment, is instructed to administer increasingly severe electrical shocks to a supposed learner in the experiment.3 The shocks are supposed to serve as punishment for incorrect answers and thus improve learning. But the learner is not a volunteer as the subject is told; rather, he is an actor who receives no shocks at all. If the subject protests against moving to the next higher shock level, an authority figure (supposedly the experimenter but actually another accomplice of the experimenter) instructs the subject to continue delivering shocks and thus fulfill his role as teacher. The instructions to continue follow a pre-set script that increases in level of insistence to match increasing levels of resistance from the subject.

The switch array used by the subject to supposedly deliver shocks runs in 15-volt increments from 15 volts to 450 volts. Labels on the switches range from SLIGHT SHOCK at the lower end to DANGER-SEVERE SHOCK at the higher end. Before the experiment proceeds, the subject receives an actual sample shock of 45 volts, applied by pressing the third switch on the shock generator, to convince

1 As quoted in Harold Takooshian, "How Stanley Milgram Taught About Obedience," in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. Thomas Blass (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000), p. 10.2 Miller, Collins, and Brief, "Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: The Legacy of the Milgram

Experiments." Introduction.3 In this chapter, I use both “subject” and “participant” to denote people being studied in psychological

experiments, following the original authors. The term “subject” has gradually been replaced by the term “participant” in psychology.

265


him or her that the generator is real.1 The subject helps the experimenter strap the learner into the chair.

The following describes the baseline version of the experiment, the basic procedure of which many variations were carried out. The subject hears the learner mention that he has a “slight heart condition.” During the supposed learning experiment, the subject and learner remain in adjacent rooms, and the subject can hear but cannot see the learner. The learner’s audible responses to the supposed shocks begin at 75 volts, when he grunts. The responses increase to a verbal complaint at 120 volts and a demand to be released from the experiment at 150 volts, when he also mentions that his heart is starting to bother him. At 270 volts he begins to produce an “agonized scream.” The learner’s screams and demands to be released become increasingly vehement and emotional as the voltage is increased. Forty subjects were tested in this baseline version of the experiment.2

The psychologist Thomas Blass, a foremost scholar on the obedience studies, argues that they have remained not only controversial but also salient for many reasons. First, there is the “unexpected enormity of the basic findings.”3 Sixty-five percent of the subjects (twenty-six out of forty), all American adult men, complied with the experimenter’s instructions fully, shocking the learner all the way to the maximum level of 450 volts. Eighty percent of the subjects (thirty-two out of forty) continued past the point when the learner said his heart was bothering him and demanded to be freed from the experiment.4 These results defied predictions by groups of Yale University seniors and professional psychiatrists, who predicted total obedience rates of 1.2 percent and 1.25 percent respectively—a far cry from 65 percent.5

A second reason for the salience of the obedience studies is that together they make up one of the largest integrated research programs in psychology. Milgram conducted extensive variations on the baseline experiment and developed an integrated analysis of the aggregate findings. A third reason for their relevance is that psychologists have fervently debated the obedience studies in print, both praising and criticizing them.6 A “storm of controversy” grew around the 1 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, pp. 3–4, 20.

2 This describes Experiment 5: A New Base-Line Condition. Ibid., pp. 3–4, 34, 55–57.3 Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality,

Situations, and Their Interactions," 398.4 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, pp. 56, 60–61.5 Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral-Study of Obedience," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67,

no. 4 (1963): 375; Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 30.6 For instance, the obedience experiments have “played a central and enriching role” in a number of

controversies, such as those over research ethics, the social psychology of experimentation, and deception versus role playing. Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions," 398.

266


experiments because they actively deceived naïve volunteer subjects, they seemed to show how easy it is to get people to do harm, and they exposed participants to emotionally grueling conditions.1 Although the subjects were told after each experiment that no shocks had actually been administered, some experienced severe psychological reactions during the experiments, including signs of extreme tension while delivering the most powerful shocks, ranging from sweats and trembling to nervous laughter and uncontrollable seizures (experienced by a remarkable number of the subjects).2 Some volunteers believed they could be seriously injuring the “victim.”

The fourth reason for the unusual salience of Milgram’s obedience research is its relevance to and use in fields outside of psychology, from communications research to philosophy, political science, education, and Holocaust studies. Finally, the research remains significant because it revealed a “fundamental and far-reaching” implication about human nature: that situations can override personal dispositions in determining behavior.3 In other words, even nice, sympathetic people can, under certain circumstances, be influenced to harm others, even when their own wellbeing is not at risk.

Context is crucial, the experiments confirmed. People do not simply act according to their own predispositions, which may help explain why some people who care greatly about the environment consume and create pollution just as much as other people. Without the context created in the obedience experiments—an authoritarian figure continually demanding that the subject deliver shocks—certainly few subjects would have “hurt” the learner unprompted, having been told 1 Miller, Collins, and Brief, "Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: The Legacy of the Milgram

Experiments," in "The Ethical and Methodological Controversies"; Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions," 398; Miller, The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in Social Science, pp. 88–89. 2 Milgram, "Behavioral-Study of Obedience," 375; Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram

Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions," 398–99. Subjects were observed sweating, trembling, stuttering, biting their lips, groaning, digging their fingernails into their flesh, and smiling and laughing nervously. In four of the experimental conditions, fifteen subjects ex-perienced full-blown, uncontrollable seizures. Stanley Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Dis-obedience to Authority," Human Relations 18, no. 1 (1965): 68.

Some might question whether it is proper to use the results of the obedience studies due to the ethical questions surrounding them. There certainly was at least momentary suffering for many of the subjects, though Milgram claimed that follow-up studies showed that subjects did not suffer long-term conse-quences of participation in the experiments, and very few subjects (1.3 percent) stated that they were sorry to have participated. Ibid., p. 58; Stanley Milgram, "Issues in the Study of Obedience: A Reply to Baum-rind," American Psychologist 19, no. 11 (1964). In my view referring to the obedience results (and those of the other experiments cited here) causes no substantial further harm and may lead to important benefits. I do not mean to condone the methods by referring to the results.

3 Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions," 398–99.

267


what to do only at the start. A man dressed in a white lab coat posing as a scientist in a university setting with serious-looking equipment sitting nearby could get people to inflict pain on other people. A variation on the experiment showed that the subjects would not have delivered painful shocks on their own volition, that they were not acting out their latent aggressions: when told that they could choose any shock level to be administered, most of the subjects delivered shocks in the lowest range. Only two ventured into the “danger” zone.1

In the longstanding debate between psychologists who are situationists (seeing behavior as arising from context or situation) and those who are dispositionists (seeing behavior as arising from personality or disposition), the obedience experiments come down firmly on the situationists’ side. Situation prevailed over disposition for most of the volunteers. The experiments provided ample evidence of subjects forcing themselves to act against their own personal dispositions to do no harm. The conflict expressed itself as sweats, trembling, nervous laughter, and seizures for many subjects. Strangely enough, these symptoms are a hopeful sign that people are predisposed not to harm others.

But neither situation alone nor disposition alone determines behavior. Most subjects in the baseline experiment succumbed to the situation, but fourteen out of forty (35 percent) disobeyed.2 Interestingly, the ones who disobeyed, choosing not to hurt the learner, scored higher in “social responsibility” on a well-known personality test, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.3 Nevertheless, from the start, just by demonstrating the power of situations to influence behavior—particularly to do harm—the obedience experiments already begin to support the idea that dissociations can be harmful. Dissociations are about contexts that lead people to make destructive choices seemingly against their personal values.

You can see situations at work all the time. Perhaps you know about global climate change and even about some of the many problems that it causes, and maybe you want to reduce your burden on the planet. Meanwhile, you are bombarded with advertisements to buy a new car (and the manufacture of a car alone makes a large global-warming impact). In the United States car companies for decades have been pushing large, consumptive vehicles because they return the highest profit margins; today, SUVs and muscly trucks dominate many American parking lots and streets. The two main candidates in the 2012 US presidential election sometimes seemed to be competing over who would drill for more oil,

1 This was Experiment 11: Subject Free to Choose Shock Level. Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, pp. 61, 70–72.2 Milgram, "Behavioral-Study of Obedience," 375.

3 Alan C. Elms, Social Psychology and Social Relevance (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), pp. 130–31.

268


implying there is no urgent climate change problem. Advertisements, peer choices, government officials—all seem to condone the choice that conflicts with your values. You buy. Your environmental values take a back seat in your roomy new vehicle.

Starting with the compelling power of situations, the obedience experiments provide a solid foundation to begin to understand the links between dissociation and destruction despite the criticism they have received, particularly around the ethics of experimental deception.1 Milgram studied almost a thousand American adults in the series.2 Psychologists have carried out and published at least twenty experiments modeled on Milgram’s obedience paradigm worldwide, with overall results confirming the original findings.3 The validity of the results has not diminished in time.4 A similar experiment with an authentic victim (a puppy receiving actual shocks to the point of becoming animated and howling, sad to say) yielded similar results for men (curiously, all thirteen female subjects obeyed fully in delivering shocks to the puppy).5 Milgram’s results and those from the puppy experiment closely match results from an experiment conducted in 1924 in which the experimenter instructed subjects to manually cut off the head of a live rat.6 The relevance of the obedience results outside of psychology, their remarkable demonstration of the power of situational, contextual factors, and their central concern with human destructiveness all suggest that they can shed light on our harmful choices.

1 Miller and Blass are among the psychologists who continue to find the Milgram experiments of value and who survey their continued influence in psychology and other fields. Miller, Collins, and Brief, "Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: The Legacy of the Milgram Experiments."; Miller, The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in Social Science; Blass, Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm; Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions," 398.2 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," 74.3 Blass, Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, p. 59; Thomas

Blass, "A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Studies of Obedience Using the Milgram Paradigm: A Review," Social and Personality Psychology Compass 6, no. 2 (2012).

4 Blass, "The Milgram Paradigm after 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority," 969.

5 Charles L. Sheridan and Richard G. King, "Obedience to Authority with an Authentic Victim," Pro-ceedings of the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association 7, no. 1 (1972). The com-plete obedience of the female participants may be related to the youth of the participants, who were in their late teens. One may wonder about the detachment required for the experimenters themselves when they designed an experiment in which a puppy suffered like this.

6 This experiment was conducted by Carney Landis and associates at the University of Minnesota to study physiological expressions of emotion. The job of decapitation was often awkward and prolonged due to the stress and internal conflict experienced by the participants. Peter V. Butler, "Destructive Obedi-ence in 1924: Landis' 'Studies of Emotional Reactions' as a Prototype of the Milgram Paradigm," Irish Journal of Psychology 19, no. 2–3 (1998): 242.

269


Testing ProximityThe strongest confirmation of the link between dissociation and destruction

comes from a set of variations on the obedience experiments: the “proximity series,” which manipulated the proximity of the supposed victim to the subject across four experiments. The first variation, “Remote-Feedback,” differs from the baseline experiment in that the victim (“learner”) makes no vocal complaint and the subject cannot see him. But at 300 volts, the “laboratory walls resound as he pounds in protest.” After 315 volts the victim no longer answers questions, and the pounding ceases. The next experiment in the proximity series, “Voice-Feedback,” adds vocal protests. The victim is in a separate room, but his complaints can be heard clearly through the walls of the room. The “Proximity” variation places the victim in the same room as the subject, a few feet (a meter or so) from him, and thus makes the victim visible as well as audible. In the final proximity variation, “Touch-Proximity,” the victim receives a shock only when his hand rests on a shock plate. At the 150-volt level, the victim demands to be set free and refuses to place his hand on the shock plate. The experimenter then orders the subject to force the victim’s hand onto the plate, requiring the subject to have physical contact with the victim beyond the 150-volt level.1

Forty subjects were studied in each of these four experimental variations. Obedience rates, the percentage of subjects who obeyed the experimenter fully and delivered all shocks up to the highest level, fell as the subject became more proximate to the victim: 65% in the Remote-Feedback condition, 62.5% in the Voice-Feedback condition, 40% in the proximity condition, and 30% in the Touch-Proximity condition.2 In the most dissociated condition, Remote-Feedback, no subject stopped before administering the 300-volt shock, at which point the victim kicks the wall and no longer answers the teacher’s multiple-choice questions.3 Overall, the subjects became less willing to inflict harm as the victim (and his suffering) became more immediate and salient to them.4 Results from earlier pilot studies support this relationship. In the pilot the victim provides no protests, verbal or pounding, but is still dimly visible through a mirror to the next room. In this setup “virtually all subjects, once commanded, went blithely to the end of the board, seemingly indifferent to the verbal designations [on the shock generator before them] (‘Extreme Shock’ and ‘Danger: Severe Shock’).”5 Similarly, if we

1 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, pp. 32–34.2 Ibid., pp. 34–36.3 Ibid., p. 35.4 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," 62.5 Ibid., p. 61.

270


cannot see and hear nature, if we cannot witness our degradations, there may be no limits to our destructiveness. Proximity is the opposite of phenomenal dissociation, so the proximity series shows that people are more likely to make harmful choices when they are more dissociated from the consequences and the others they are affecting, even when they know they are causing harm.1

Milgram’s ViewAlthough the obedience results provide ammunition for the argument that

phenomenal dissociations are inherently destructive, they do not quite tell us why. This question concerned Milgram. Why should it be relevant to actually witness a harm that you are creating if you know about it? Moreover, when you are able to witness it, why should it matter how close you are? With the results in hand he sought to develop a theory to explain the relationship between distance—phenomenal dissociation—and destruction, among the other findings. In a paper titled “Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority,” Milgram presented an elaborate framework to explain this relationship.2 He identified six factors that make people more harmful under conditions of dissociation. Most of them, described below, seem to apply to situations in which the object of harm is not a human.

Empathic Cues: In the more remote conditions, the victim’s suffering possesses an abstract, remote quality for the subject. “He is aware, but only in a conceptual sense, that his actions cause pain to another person; the fact is

1 Thomas Blass analyzed the Milgram data and showed that, although there actually is no statistical significance to the differences in obedience rates between the remote and voice-feedback variations or be-tween the proximity and touch-proximity variations, all of the other differences were significant. So there exists an inverse relation between proximity and obedience. Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Mil-gram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions," 401.

One of the most interesting experiments following the Milgram obedience model is the one per-formed in the late 1960s by Harvey A. Tilker of the City University of New York. Tilker investigated sub-ject responsibility and victim feedback by manipulating them through several experimental conditions. Responsibility was varied between No Responsibility, Ambiguous Responsibility, and Total Responsibil-ity. Feedback was varied between No Feedback, Auditory Feedback, and Auditory-visual Feedback. Tilker found that total accepted responsibility for another person’s well-being and maximum feedback from that person regarding his or her condition were major determinants of socially responsible behavior. Harvey A. Tilker, "Socially Responsible Behavior as a Function of Observer Responsibility and Victim Feedback," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14, no. 2 (1970): 99. These results match previ-ous results showing that feedback from a victim reduces the intensity of aggression directed toward the victim. Arnold H. Buss, "Instrumentality of Aggression Feedback and Frustration as Determinants of Physical Aggression," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, no. 2 (1966). When responsibility was diffused, as it is when there are multiple witnesses to an emergency, speed of assistance or action was declined. John M. Darley and Bibb Latané, "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Respon-sibility," Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 8, no. 4, pt. 1 (1968). 2 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority."

271


apprehended but not felt.” A conceptual engagement does not necessarily lead to an emotional response. Milgram noted that this is a common enough phenomenon and gives the example of a bombardier who knows that his weapons will inflict suffering and death, yet his knowledge is “divested of affect and does not arouse in him an emotional response to the suffering that he causes.” Visual cues of the victim’s suffering may trigger empathic responses in the subject and give him a more complete grasp of the victim’s situation. The empathic responses themselves may be unpleasant and thus curb destructive behavior. You might not enjoy looking up close into the eyes of the pig being slaughtered for your dinner.

Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman studies the conditions that enable killing in war and everyday society and its psychological costs. He writes, “At close range, the resistance to killing a person is tremendous. When one looks an opponent in the eye, and knows that he is young or old, scared or angry, it is not possible to deny that the individual about to be killed is much like oneself.” 1 Grossman quotes a Vietnam Special Forces veteran saying, “When you get up close and personal, where you can hear ‘em scream and see ‘em die, it’s a bitch.” Proximity to a source of authority and distance from a victim facilitates killing, Grossman notes.2 Empathic cues work, of course, with nonhumans as well. It is easy to imagine feeling empathy for a pet or perhaps even a “head” of cattle. I have personally experienced it with inanimate things as well, such as trees, and I know others do, too. Proximity and face-to-face encounters encourage empathy and provide the context for all sorts of genuine emotional connections to arise, including those that lead to caring and nurturing choices.

Denial and narrowing of the cognitive field: Milgram writes, “When the victim is close, it is more difficult to exclude him phenomenologically.”3 In the more remote conditions, it is easier to exclude him and his suffering from thought. In the two most remote conditions, feedback is sporadic and discontinuous, while in the two most proximate conditions, inclusion in the immediate visual field renders the victim continuously salient, and harder to ignore.4 Tellingly, in the conditions in which subjects could see the victim, subjects often averted their eyes to avoid seeing him.5 Clearly, when our victims lie outside our cognitive fields, when we do not even know they exist, it becomes difficult to consider their well-being, regardless of whether they are humans.

1 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2009), p. 118.

2 Ibid., pp. 117, 308.3 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," 63.4 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, pp. 37–38.5 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," 61.

272


Reciprocal fields: In proximity conditions, not only can the subject observe the victim, but the actions of the subject are now under scrutiny by the victim. When the victim witnesses the subject’s actions, it may give rise to shame or guilt in the subject, an emotional response that can curtail harmful action. Blindfolding the victim of a firing squad may result in less stress not only for the victim but also for the executioner. Executioners may wear hoods for the same reason. Being part of the victim’s field of awareness may make subjects more self-conscious, embarrassed, and inhibited in perpetrating destructive violence against the victim. Reciprocal fields are defeated by forms of dissociation that prevent the victim from seeing the actor. Perhaps this factor is most relevant when the recipient of destructive acts is human. But consider also the powerful effect of the gaze of nonhuman animals. I will never forget the frightened, desperate look in the eyes of a very sick dog I had taken to the veterinary hospital in an emergency, as the vets approached her to draw blood.

Experienced unity of act: Under dissociated conditions, it is more difficult for the subject to be aware of the connection between his actions and the consequences for the victim. The act and the consequences are physically separated. The two events of pressing a lever and protests and cries in another room are in correlation, but “lack a compelling unity.” In the proximity conditions, this unity is more fully achieved.1 The experienced unity of an act is disrupted when actors are dissociated from consequences in space or time. There is little experienced unity, for example, between buying a ream of paper and the felling of the trees that went into it.

Incipient group-formation: Placing the victim in another room affects the social relations of the situation. It draws the victim further away from the subject while the subject and experimenter remain closer together. A group begins to form between subject and experimenter, but the victim is excluded. In the remote condition, the victim is truly an outsider who stands alone, physically and psychologically, like nature, which stands alone, away from our daily lives. When the victim is brought closer to the subject in the proximity conditions, it is easier to form an alliance with him against the experimenter. The subject now has an ally against the experimenter. Alliances shift with changing spatial relations. Another of Milgram’s experimental variations, the “closeness of authority” variation, further supports the notion of incipient group-formation. When the experimenter is physically removed from the room where the subject sits and the two communicate via telephone (with all other conditions remaining equal), obedience drops sharply.2 Alliances are of course more relevant to situations involving other humans being harmed, but perhaps they occur when animals are victims, too.

1 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, pp. 38–39.2 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," 65.

273


Another experimental variation confirms the importance group formation: the “bring-a-friend” condition. Milgram never published this condition, possibly because he used an unethical procedure in it.1 Subjects were instructed to bring an acquaintance of at least two years, who became the learner, who was then secretly instructed by Milgram in how to deceive the subject into thinking the shocks were real. In this condition, in which a relationship already existed between the subject and the learner, only 15 percent agreed to administer every shock. For most people, the existing relationship outweighed the one between the subject and the experimenter, though it is strange to think that 15 percent of people would agree to give dangerous shocks to a friend or acquaintance. Nevertheless, we can see that having a pre-existing relationship with someone—or something, perhaps—reduces harm, a result that can be applied to reducing destruction in the real world by establishing more relationships with the others our actions can affect.

Acquired behavior dispositions: People and other social animals learn not to harm others mostly in contexts of the proximal relations in everyday life, dealing with people in face-to-face interactions at home, in the neighborhood, and at the grocery store. In the past aggressive actions against physically close others may have resulted in retaliatory punishment, while aggression against physically more distant others may rarely have led to retaliation. In the obedience experiments “the concrete, visible, and proximal presence of the victim acted in an important way to counteract the experimenter’s power and to generate disobedience” against destructive orders.2 We may in effect be taught to respect and protect others who are physically closer to us. Perhaps that explains why so many indigenous cultures living in close contact with nature exhibit great respect for the natural world.

Milgram’s concepts of agentic state and strain help in understanding the tension we feel between our environmental values and our participation in actions that harm nature.3 Milgram believed that the obedience-experiment subjects were drawn into an agentic state—they became, in part, agents of the experimenter, carrying out his wishes. Several factors drew them into this state: the experimenter’s elevated authority in the institutional setting, the existing agreement between the subject and experimenter, the relative ignorance of the subject compared with the experimenter in the setting, and the subject’s loss of

1 François Rochat and Andre Modigliani, "Authority: Obedience, Defiance, and Identification in Experimental and Historic Contexts," in A New Outline of Social Psychology, ed. Martin Gold and Elizabeth Douvan (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1997), pp. 235, 37, 38; Nestar J. C. Russell and Robert J. Gregory, "Spinning an Organizational 'Web of Obligation'? Moral Choice in Stanley Milgram’s 'Obedience' Experiments," The American Review of Public Administration 41, no. 5 (2011): 500–01.2 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, pp. 39–40.

3 Ibid., pp. 143–48, 54–57.274


responsibility. Strain is the internal force that drives subjects to want to stop their harmful acts.1

Milgram’s concept of agentic state aptly describes our abdication of responsibility to corporations and institutions that decide how our food is grown, what drugs are safe, and how nature will be used. His concept of strain likewise seems to describe the phenomenon in which many people want to stop the environmental damages to which they contribute but end up just feeling disempowered to do so. Most of us do have choices, just as the obedience subjects could stop obeying. But we seem to abdicate much of our responsibility to society to tell us what is right and proper, and it tells us, for instance, that driving personal cars is completely acceptable in almost all cases—it is our right as free individuals—even while driving is well known to create some of our worst environmental problems.

In the obedience experiments several aspects of the situation kept subjects in the agentic state. Milgram called them “binding factors.” The sequential nature of the action makes it hard to give up at any particular point once you have started giving shocks because doing so might imply that your prior actions were immoral.2 The subjects also had situational obligations: they made a promise to help the experimenter and felt obliged to keep that promise.3 Because people are socialized to follow rules set down by authority figures, the subjects experienced anxiety when they considered not following the experimenter’s instructions. Their anxiety over violating the rules appeared in the form of nervous laughter and trembling. These symptoms disappeared as soon as subjects chose to disobey, resolving the tension of the situation.4

It is always easier and less anxiety provoking to go along with the rules and conventions of society, which bind us into maintaining the sequence of harmful acts that we participate in daily. Why not just buy one more plastic bottle of water or one more smartphone? Many aspects of daily life place us in situational obligations to do things we know result in harms. To maintain friendships often means driving long distances and flying. To be a good mother for many Americans means buying plenty of gifts for the children at Christmas, even knowing many will be used only briefly before being discarded.5 Milgram’s analysis of destructive obedience reflects everyday life in other ways as well.1 Ibid., pp. 132–34, 53–64. Blass believes that the theoretical component of Milgram’s book was its

weakest section: Thomas Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2004). Nevertheless, it appears to be the most comprehensive framework currently available for understanding the obedience proximity results.

2 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 149.3 Ibid., pp. 149–52.4 Ibid., p. 152.

275


Cogs in the Machine?When people know they are inflicting harm but continue to do so because

situational factors compel or entice them, they feel strain. Some people might feel slightly guilty about driving instead of taking public transit. But factors that increase dissociations between the subject and action on the one hand and the object and consequence on the other alleviate the strain. The ill consequences of driving are so remote, and there are so many layers of industry and government between us and the consequences, that it is usually easy for most of us to just drive without considering them at all. Milgram summarizes this effect:

Any force or event that is placed between the subject and the consequences of shocking the victim, any factor that will create distance between the subject and the victim, will lead to a re-duction of strain on the participant and thus less disobedience [to the demand to inflict harm]. In modern society others often stand between us and the final destructive act to which we con-tribute…Indeed, it is typical of modern bureaucracy, even when it is designed for destructive purposes, that most people in-volved in its organization do not directly carry out any destruc-tive actions. They shuffle papers or load ammunition or per-form some other act which, though it contributes to the final de-structive effect, is remote from it in the eyes and mind of the functionary.1

Milgram envisions fields of force that diminish in effectiveness with increas-ing psychological distance from their source. They can either inhibit or promote certain types of behavior.2 Fields of force emanating from the experimenter pro-mote compliance with his instructions, whereas those emanating from the “learner” inhibit compliance. The more we are inundated with advertisements to buy new smartphones, for instance, the more we may be under the influence of the field of force of the companies selling them. Conversely, the more we hear about, see, and maybe even feel the toxic effects of their creation, the more we may be influenced by a competing field of force.

In some versions of the obedience experiments, the field of force emanating from the learner was muted. One obedience subject said, “It’s funny how you really

5 George Monbiot, "On the 12th Day of Christmas...Your Gift Will Just Be Junk," The Guardian, London, December 10, 2012, http://gu.com/p/3cdnx (accessed February 4, 2013).1 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 121.2 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," 66.

276


begin to forget that there’s a guy out there, even though you can hear him.”1 His comment echoes modern humanity’s relationship with nature. Most of us know about our society’s abuses of nature. We can hear nature at a distance. But institu-tions of science, government, and industry hold authority in our lives and can put us in an agentic state. We comply, yielding to their authority, carrying out acts we know to be destructive toward nature and other people, like Milgram’s subjects who yielded to the experimenter and delivered (what they believed were) painful, possibly damaging shocks to the victim, even when hearing his screams. Milgram observed, “any competent manager of a destructive bureaucratic system can ar-range his personnel so that only the most callous and obtuse are directly involved in the violence.”2 Relatively few people are needed for the most socially and environ-mentally destructive tasks, and corporations can usually find people sufficiently obedient, tolerant, ignorant, or unconcerned. Most simply lack more benevolent op-portunities.

Our continued abuses of invisible others can have effects on us, not just on them—just as Milgram’s subjects found themselves trembling, laughing, or worse. Ecopsychologists talk about environmentally related despair in ways that recall the emotional effects of strain experienced by obedience experiment subjects.3 The authority of modern industrial and other institutions prescribes behaviors—purchasing inefficient vehicles and other features of the “good life”—that contribute to results that people find distressful, such as global climate change and deforestation. Most meat eaters are appalled when they finally find out about the conditions on factory farms that their purchases support. The dissonance between acting in accord with that authority and the knowledge of undesired consequences of such actions may harm our mental health in ways we are only beginning to appreciate.

The Cycle of DestructionWhat other psychological dynamics may inhibit change? Milgram’s

explanations for continued obedience in the experiments offer some insights. To change a routine, to give up a practice that may be harmful, runs the risk of implicitly condemning our own past behavior. The new behavior would create a self-critical stance toward the old one, and the self-critical stance would conflict with our positive self-image and thus create cognitive dissonance: the discomfort or anxiety of holding two conflicting ideas or beliefs. In the obedience experiments

1 Ibid., p. 63.2 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 122.

3 Terrance O'Connor, "Therapy for a Dying Planet," in Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind, ed. Theodore Roszak, Mary E. Gomes, and Allen D. Kanner (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1995).

277


the step-wise progression and the gradually increasing nature of the harms probably helped launch the sequence and propel it forward. At lower shock levels, it is easier to obey the authority figure and deliver shocks because the effects are much smaller. As the shock level increases, it becomes emotionally more difficult for subjects to continue to obey, yet to break off the pattern recriminates oneself for delivering the previous shocks. Subjects may feel compelled to continue to the end to justify the previous shocks they gave.1 Because the shock levels increase gradually and uniformly, there is no obvious dividing line at which the subject can justify stopping without condemning his own previous behavior. The overall effect is similar to the “foot-in-the-door” technique: a person is more likely to comply with a major request after having complied with a more minor one.2

Similarly, environmental destruction has increased in scale and scope continuously over the five or so centuries of the modern period, with some exceptions. Modern technology and wealth, bolstered by the exploitation of new energy sources, particularly fossil fuels, have increased each person’s individual potential for destruction. Continuing on the same path may be a way of avoiding the cognitive dissonance that might be created by tacitly condemning past behaviors with a change in direction. Put another way, we may have a need to validate past behaviors that degrade the environment by repeating them or changing them only gradually.3 People who seek major social change would do well to account for cognitive dissonance, in addition to comfort, greed, and the like, as inhibitors of change.

Other researchers have come to similar conclusions. In The Roots of Evil the psychologist Ervin Staub, a pioneer in the research and practice in the psychology of peace and violence, sought to understand how destructive practices are perpetuated. The book analyzes destructive human projects such as genocide and other group violence. Staub notes that the further destruction has progressed, the more difficult it is to stop. He builds on the psychologist Kurt Lewin’s (1890–1947) conception of the “goal gradient…the closer you are to a goal, the stronger the motivation to reach it.”4 Interrupting goal-directed behavior creates tension, Staub found, and humans are motivated to reach closure, to resolve psychic tensions. One of Milgram’s subjects said to himself, obviously loud enough for the experimenter

1 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 149.2 Jonathan L. Freedman and Scott C. Fraser, "Compliance without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door

Technique," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4, no. 2 (1966).3 Perhaps corporate executives resist switching to new, more environmentally benign practices out of

fear of implying that past behavior was improper or even illegal, thereby opening their companies to lawsuits or punitive action by government agencies.4 Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge

England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 85–85.278


to hear, “It’s got to go on. It’s got to go on,”1 as if the goal of completing the experiment were paramount. Meeting a goal brings the promise of closure.

What goal might lead to environmental destruction? The modern story of progress drives much of the change that we see. We believe in progress—a linear historical progression in which human welfare continually improves through better science, technology, and social organization. According to this story, humans are becoming less dependent on and vulnerable to nature. We are becoming nature’s masters. Perhaps the thought of getting closer to the goal of true independence of and mastery over nature, as expressed in science fiction, drives us ever onward. As Lewin said, as we get closer to the goal (or so we believe), our motivation becomes stronger to reach it. And this drive may persist in full light of the damages we cause along the way. So far, better technology and management have not delivered us from environmental ruin, in spite of positive developments like wind power and hybrid vehicles.

In his work in Burundi, Rwanda, and elsewhere to foster caring, non-aggressive people and societies, Staub applies “just-world” thinking to understand human destructiveness and the absence of helping behavior. People’s naïve beliefs in a just world lead them to devalue victims of harm, making harm self-perpetuating. At some level most of us believe that people get their just desserts, that victims have earned their suffering by their actions or character. Staub notes that genocidal conflict is fueled by an intense devaluation along class or other group lines.2 Milgram also saw this effect in his subjects, many of whom grimly devalued the victim after hurting him. A typical comment was “He was so stupid and stubborn he deserved to get shocked.” Milgram writes, “Once having acted against the victim, these subjects found it necessary to view him as an unworthy individual, whose punishment was made inevitable by his own deficiencies of intellect and character.”3

Just world thinking may carry over to social institutions, to lead us to believe that our institutions of industry, science, and governance are operated by mostly righteous people performing mostly righteous acts, so others who are harmed may justly be so. We can ask, Does this phenomenon apply at some level not just to other people we may harm with our choices, like the coastal populations in Bangladesh who will be inundated as the seas rise with global climate change, but also to nonhuman nature? Do we begin to think that having suffered our abuses nature, including other animals, somehow deserves such treatment?

1 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 9.2 Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence, pp. 33–34, 79, 86.3 Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, p. 10.

279


Social Division and DestructivenessIs it possible to test the idea that participation in a bureaucracy can perpetrate

harms? Another variation of the obedience experiments showed that it is. The “peer administers shocks” variation removed the subject one additional step from the vic-tim in the experiment’s social hierarchy by placing another person between the sub-ject and the victim. The subject in this variation does not press the shock levers but tells someone else to do so. The person sitting at the shock-machine controls is ac-tually an accomplice of the experimenter, though the subject is told he is another subject. The subsidiary act of ordering another person to administer the shock re-mains vital to the overall progress of the experiment in which the subject believes he is participating.1

In this condition, when the experimental subject does not press shock levers but rather orders someone else to do so, only three subjects out of forty (7.5 percent) refused to continue to the highest shock level.2 Recall that in the baseline experiment, fourteen out of forty subjects (35 percent) defied the experimenter. That means introducing only one level of social intermediation into the situation, and no other changes, dramatically increased the likelihood of subjects to be destructive, from 65 percent to 92.5 percent. Similar experiments verified these results.3 These findings cast a shadow on the bureaucratic structure of modern institutions of industry and governance, in which decisions traverse uncountable layers of intermediaries. Adding only one layer in the experiment, one person, between deciders and their material-world consequences increased the chances that they would make a harmful choice by almost 30 percent. How many intermediaries might there be between a high-tech executive and a high-tech factory worker? Researching bureaucratic destruction, the psychologists Nestar J. C. Russell and Robert J. Gregory concluded that bureaucracies actively seek to broaden the “zones of indifference” enveloping their members so that they can complete the inhuman tasks of the organization as efficiently and smoothly as possible.4 Feeling and

1 Ibid., pp. 121–22.2 Ibid., p. 122.3 Wesley Kilham and Leon Mann in Australia directly tested and compared obedience levels of trans-

mitters (the role of conveying the command) and executants (the role of pressing the levers). In their trans-mitter condition 54 percent of their subjects were fully obedient, as compared with 28 percent of subjects in the executant condition. In other words, subjects were twice as likely to be destructively obedient when they did not have to directly press the lever, but rather instructed another person to do so. Wesley Kilham and Leon Mann, "Level of Destructive Obedience as a Function of Transmitter and Executant Roles in Milgram Obedience Paradigm," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29, no. 5 (1974): 700. Kil-ham and Mann included a study of gender effects. They found that females were much more defiant than males in the executant condition, but in the transmitter condition, they were only slightly more defiant than males. Ibid., p. 699.

280


emoting people only disrupt a well-oiled administrative apparatus. Perhaps bureaucracies are inherently destructive.

Bureaucratic harm motivated the “Utrecht Studies,” a series of nineteen experiments exploring the willingness of intermediaries to carry out harmful acts. Modern bureaucracies are full of intermediaries, noted the experimenters, Wim H. J. Meeus and Quinten A. W. Raaijmakers. Participants were instructed to disturb a job applicant undergoing a test that supposedly would determine qualification for a job (the applicant was actually an accomplice of the experimenters). The participants were told to say fifteen negative “stress remarks” cleverly designed to hurt applicants’ performance (and supposed job prospects) and to affect performance cumulatively. In the basic setup over 90 percent of participants complied. “Obedience is extremely high when the violence to be exerted is a contemporary form of mediated violence,” the experimenters concluded.1 Positive attitudes toward social institutions and distant relationships with fellow citizens lead to the high levels of “psychological-administrative violence” found in the experiments and in modern society more broadly.2 Granted, institutional authorities in contemporary society do not necessarily have “violence” toward people or nature as their goal. Nevertheless, it is certainly one outcome.Conclusion

Milgram’s obedience experimental results and analysis, together with the other empirical studies and theories presented here, suggest that phenomenal engagement with the outcomes of our choices inhibits destructive acts. And when our victims are more remote from us phenomenally or are separated from us by social or administrative structures, we become liberated to make choices that may hurt them. The same probably holds for non-human victims and nature and society as wholes as well.

As he analyzed the obedience experiments, Milgram wrote, “Proximity as a variable in psychological research has received far less attention than it deserves.” 3

Little work in this area has been done since his obedience studies. And we have virtually no empirical psychology that directly tries to understand what happens to

4 Russell and Gregory, "Spinning an Organizational 'Web of Obligation'? Moral Choice in Stanley Milgram’s 'Obedience' Experiments," 512. The authors take the concept of “zone of indifference” from Chester Irving Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1938).1 Wim H. J. Meeus and Quinten A. W. Raaijmakers, "Obedience in Modern Society: The Utrecht

Studies," Journal of Social Issues 51, no. 3 (1995). The original article reporting the experiment was Wim H. J. Meeus and Quinten A. W. Raaijmakers, "Administrative Obedience: Carrying out Orders to Use Psy-chological-Administrative Violence," European Journal of Social Psychology 16, no. 4 (1986).

2 Meeus and Raaijmakers, "Obedience in Modern Society: The Utrecht Studies."3 Milgram, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," 65.

281


our decision making when the consequences of our actions are diffused and distributed across the globe. It would be helpful to know, for instance, how much we can gain by simple knowledge of particular environmental problems versus witnessing them firsthand. It would be fascinating to carry out obedience experiments in which the victim is not a simulated human victim but a potted plant, for instance. In light of the severity of global climate change, species extinction, habitat loss, and a host of other major environmental problems—which some observers believe could, in the aggregate, spell doom for human society within decades—the analysis presented here suggests that the need to learn more about the psychopathology of phenomenal dissociations may be more urgent than Milgram could have imagined.

The experiments that I discuss in this chapter are inspired by the desire to better understand the origins of major human problems. Milgram wanted to know more about the mass violence in the Nazi concentration camps. The “Utrecht Studies” sought better understanding of the mediated, administrative types of violence that happen in everyday bureaucratic life. Staub’s concern lies in inter-group violence, particularly genocide, which has unfortunately risen in modernity. But what about perhaps the most encompassing complex of problems challenging the future of humanity—the global environmental crisis? One problem alone in this category, global climate change, promises to bring on major problems including mass destitution, wars, and political chaos. Psychologists could contribute greatly by giving us a clearer understanding of the psychopathology of dissociation and how we might best address it.

ReferencesArendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem; a Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking

Press, 1963.Barnard, Chester Irving. The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University

Press, 1938.Beck, Ulrich. Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society. Atlantic High-

lands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995.Blass, Thomas. "A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Studies of Obedience Using the Milgram Para-

digm: A Review." Social and Personality Psychology Compass 6, no. 2 (2012): 196-205.Blass, Thomas. The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. 1st

ed. New York: Basic Books, 2004.Blass, Thomas."The Milgram Paradigm after 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedi-

ence to Authority." Journal of Applied Social Psychology 29, no. 5 (1999): 955–78.Blass, Thomas. Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm. Mahwah,

N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000.Blass, Thomas."Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Per-

sonality, Situations, and Their Interactions." Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 60, no. 3 (1991): 398–413.

282


Buss, Arnold H. "Instrumentality of Aggression Feedback and Frustration as Determinants of Phys-ical Aggression." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, no. 2 (1966): 153–62.

Butler, Peter V. "Destructive Obedience in 1924: Landis' 'Studies of Emotional Reactions' as a Pro-totype of the Milgram Paradigm." Irish Journal of Psychology 19, no. 2–3 (1998): 236–47.

Christopher, Michael. "An Exploration of the "Reflex" in Reflexive Modernity: The Rational and Prerational Social Causes of the Affinity for Ecological Consciousness." Organization & Environment 12, no. 4 (1999): 357-400.

Darley, John M., and Bibb Latané. "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsi -bility." Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 8, no. 4, pt. 1 (1968): 377–83.

Elms, Alan C. Social Psychology and Social Relevance. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972.Freedman, Jonathan L., and Scott C. Fraser. "Compliance without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door

Technique." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4, no. 2 (1966): 195-202.Grossman, Dave. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. New

York: Little, Brown and Co., 2009.Kilham, Wesley, and Leon Mann. "Level of Destructive Obedience as a Function of Transmitter

and Executant Roles in Milgram Obedience Paradigm." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29, no. 5 (1974): 696–702.

Meeus, Wim H. J., and Quinten A. W. Raaijmakers. "Administrative Obedience: Carrying out Or-ders to Use Psychological-Administrative Violence." European Journal of Social Psychology 16, no. 4 (1986): 311-24.

Meeus, Wim H. J., and Quinten A. W. Raaijmakers. "Obedience in Modern Society: The Utrecht Studies." Journal of Social Issues 51, no. 3 (1995): 155–75.

Milgram, Stanley. "Behavioral-Study of Obedience." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371–78.

Milgram, Stanley. "Issues in the Study of Obedience: A Reply to Baumrind." American Psycholo-gist 19, no. 11 (1964): 848–52.

Milgram, Stanley. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. 1st ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

Milgram, Stanley. "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority." Human Rela-tions 18, no. 1 (1965): 57–76.

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Program. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2005.

Miller, Arthur G. The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in Social Science. New York: Praeger, 1986.

Miller, Arthur G., Barry E. Collins, and Diana E. Brief. "Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: The Legacy of the Milgram Experiments." Journal of Social Issues 51, no. 3 (1995): 1–19.

Monbiot, George. "On the 12th Day of Christmas...Your Gift Will Just Be Junk." The Guardian, London, December 10, 2012, http://gu.com/p/3cdnx (accessed February 4, 2013).

O'Connor, Terrance. "Therapy for a Dying Planet." In Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind, edited by Theodore Roszak, Mary E. Gomes and Allen D. Kanner, 149–55. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1995.

Rochat, François, and Andre Modigliani. "Authority: Obedience, Defiance, and Identification in Experimental and Historic Contexts." In A New Outline of Social Psychology, edited by Martin Gold and Elizabeth Douvan, 235–46. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1997.

Russell, Nestar J. C., and Robert J. Gregory. "Spinning an Organizational 'Web of Obligation'? Moral Choice in Stanley Milgram’s 'Obedience' Experiments." The American Review of Public Adminis-tration 41, no. 5 (2011): 495–518.

Ryland, Elisabeth. "Gaia Rising: A Jungian Look at Environmental Consciousness and Sustainable Organizations." Organization & Environment 13, no. 4 (2000): 381-402.

283

http://gu.com/p/3cdnx


Sheridan, Charles L., and Richard G. King. "Obedience to Authority with an Authentic Victim." Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association 7, no. 1 (1972): 165–66.

Staub, Ervin. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Takooshian, Harold. "How Stanley Milgram Taught About Obedience." In Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, edited by Thomas Blass, 9–24. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000.

Tilker, Harvey A. "Socially Responsible Behavior as a Function of Observer Responsibility and Victim Feedback." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14, no. 2 (1970): 95–100.

Worthy, Kenneth. Invisible Nature: Healing the Destructive Divide between People and the Envi-ronment. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2013.

284

Научное издание

«ПАРАДИГМА СТЕНЛИ МИЛГРЭМА СЕГОДНЯ»

Под общей редакциейкандидата биологических наук,

Александра Ярославича Воронова,доктора психологических наук

Регины Вячеславовны Ершовой

Переводкандидат филологических наукСергей Владимирович Савельев

Технический редактор Капырина Т.А.Компьютерная верстка Ершова Р.В.

Подписано в печать 01.12.2014. Формат 60х80/16Усл. печ. л. 23,2. Бумага офсетная. Тираж 100 экз. заказ № 8 _______________________Отпечатано в ООО «Позитив» Московская область, г. Воскресенск, ул. Октябрьская, д.14Т./ф. (496) 44-205-44

285

Documents

Stanley Milgram's Obedience Paradigm for 2014