Structural Injustice and Moral Demands1

Draft Paper – Please do not cite without permission.

Comments appreciated by email (Elizabeth.kahn@durham.ac.uk).

The aim of this paper is to propose and defend an account of the moral requirements that apply to

individuals with regards to structural injustice. The paper adopts Iris Young’s account of structural

injustice but seeks to improve upon her account of the moral demands agents have with regards to

it.2 The paper improves upon Young’s social connection model by exploring one way of defining

social connection and offering a possible explanation as to why such a connection can ground a

moral demands to act. The paper drops Young’s account of essentially shared and primarily

forward looking responsibility in favour of an account that identifies those who are likely to causally

contribute to future structural injustice as having precautionary duties that require responsive ex-

ante action aimed at preventing future structural injustice. Stephanie Collins concept of a

‘collectivization duty’ is used to propose that individuals likely to be causally connected to structural

injustice in the future must act responsively with a view to forming a collective willing and able to

prevent the continuance of the structural injustice.3

It is argued that the duties outlined honour Iris Young’s commitment to recommending a collective

action solution to structural injustice and ensuring that each socially connected agent is obliged to

act. Furthermore, it is argued that these duties are appropriate in their attribution of blame, the

action they recommend and their explanation as to why social connection to injustice grounds a

duty to work towards overcoming it. How such negative collectivization duties can address the

Martha Nussbaum criticism of Young’s account is also discussed.4 

The structure of the paper is as follows. First, it is argued that Young’s account does not make

clear what precisely counts as social connection and why it is that such a connection constitutes

sufficient grounds for assigning shared remedial responsibility with regards to overcoming injustice.

Evidence that Young is vague concerning what defines connection and why such a connection

should ground remedial responsibilities is thus offered. Next, it is proposed that an agent is social

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connected to injustice when they causally contribute to that injustice. It is then argued that

substantial risk of such a connection to future injustice is sufficient to ground obligations to take

action aimed at preventing that injustice. It is suggested that such action is a reasonable

precaution that agents can be required to take if they are likely to be causally connected to future

injustice.

It is then suggested that responsibility sharing is not the clearest way of expressing the idea that

each member of the aggregate of agents causally connected to structural injustice is morally

required to work towards addressing injustice through collective action. It is argued that the key

points of Young’s account can be better articulated using Collins’ concept of a ‘collectivization duty’

and an account that draws on Collins’ account is then outlined.

In response to Martha Nussbaum’s observation that over time those who fail to take up political

responsibility must be blamed an approach that explicitly does so is adopted. It is explained that

the approach proposed avoids blaming agents for causally contributing to structural injustice when

they could not avoid doing so. It is explained that the account judges socially connected agents on

the basis of whether or not they take the sort of responsive action aimed at establishing a collective

committed to preventing the injustice that is required of them.

The paper concludes by stressing the key differences between the proposed account and the

liability account Young criticises. Why it is important to acknowledge negative collectivization duties

in addition to positive duties to prevent injustice is also briefly discussed.

Structural Injustice and Responsibility

Sociologists use the concept of structure to explain how a society works. They use it to map the

elements of a society that are socially reproduced and thus persist over time. Typically the

different social positions within a society and the on-going relationships between them make up the

social structure of a society. Both Iris Young and A J Julius have identified this sociological

understanding of structure as the primary subject matter of an account of justice.5

Young’s analysis suggests that agents experience much of social structure as an objective reality

that constrains and enables them (in particular ways) and attaches rewards or costs to different 2

choices. 6 Thus the social structure can be said to treat people in a particular way.7 Young

describes social structure as placing people in positions of relative privilege or disadvantage.8 It is

inequality between different positions in the social structure (that do not result from un-coerced and

un-constrained choice) that constitute structural injustice.

In explaining the concept of structural injustice Young describes cases in which inequality result

from institutional organisation, rules, decisions, patterns of behaviour and trends in choices. What

matters for identifying structural injustice is that some individuals systematically experience worse

opportunities as the cumulative result of social practices and broad patterns in the actions of

others. Thus according to Young’s account in order for individuals to be identified as occupying an

inferior social position they must be systematically disadvantaged. This rules out claiming that

freak incidents of disadvantage constitute structural injustice. To be in a disadvantaged social

position an individual must systematically experience fewer opportunities than others as a result of

social practices and the aggregation of the actions of others.9

Young suggests that when a particular social group systematically does worse in some significant

aspect of life this is likely to be the result of a social structural disadvantage that is a persistent

feature of the society’s social structure. She suggests that recognising such statistical

disadvantage should lead us to examine whether social processes come together to cause the

systematic disadvantage. 10 If such processes can be identified we can diagnose structural

injustice. Young utilises an understanding of social processes which includes formal and informal

institutions as well as trends and patterns in actions and choices.

Young identifies relative disadvantage as constituting structural injustice only when it results from

social institutions and the decisions made by others within those social institutions.11 According to

Young, inequalities that result from ‘uncoerced and considered decisions’ are probably not unjust.

On Young’s account structural injustice occurs when social institutions (both formal and informal)

and the decisions of others within those institutions come together to reduce the opportunities of an

individual relative to others.

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Building on Young’s approach I would like to propose that when a persisting inequality in prosperity

(broadly construed) between social groups is: morally significant, the result of social processes and

cannot be justified, then this constitutes structural injustice. This is because in such a scenario the

social structure systematically and unjustifiably disadvantages some by giving them less

opportunity to prosper.12

The concept of social structure is a way of describing the background conditions within which

agents act and are held responsible for their actions. Young’s book Responsibility for Justice asks

what responsibilities agents have with regard to this background. She proposes that when

identifying responsibility with regards to these conditions we should not use a liability approach that

seeks to hold agents liable for blame or compensation on the basis of their causal responsibility for

an outcome. Instead she suggests that what we need to do is identify who has forward-looking

responsibilities to try to lessen ongoing structural injustices in background conditions.13

A liability model of responsibility asks which consequences can legitimately be attributed to an

individual. This approach can be used to find an agent guilty of a crime, liable for costs, or

deserving praise or reward. Usually the liability model assigns responsibility to an individual or a

collective agent. Young suggests that an account of responsibility for structural injustice should not

be based on a liability conception that assigns agents as responsible or blameworthy for causing

the social structure in question. Instead she proposes that responsibility with regards to structural

injustice is more akin to responsibilities that come with a particular social role like magistrate,

mother or linesman.14 Her ‘social connection model’ suggests that those who are ‘social connected’

to on-going structural injustices share a primarily forward-looking responsibility for lessening that

injustice. Thus she argues that those socially connected to structural injustice share a remedial

responsibility to overcome structural injustice: that is a responsibility to fulfil a certain role going

forward rather than moral responsibility for a particular outcome.15

Defining Social Connection

Structural injustice is a persistent disadvantage that results from the amalgamation of social

practices, the decisions of power holders, and trends and patterns in behaviour. Young proposes

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that all those ‘socially connected’ to a structural injustice share a forward-looking responsibility to

lessen that injustice.16

When Young introduces the idea of social connection she describes it in three different ways.

Although all three ways of defining social connection in many cases pick out the same set of

agents each definition offers a different criterion for identifying those with remedial responsibility.

Furthermore the three different ways in which we could understand social connection suggest

three different justifications as to why the forward-looking responsibility should be assigned to

these agents.17 These three accounts of ‘social connection’ will now be outlined.

Young begins by stating that contribution to ‘processes that produce unjust outcomes’ is what

constitutes social connection and she continues to draw on the idea of contribution repeatedly in

her discussion of social connection.18 It is this account that I will draw on and expand below in

order to develop an account of why social connection grounds the sort of obligations Young

identifies. According to this account remedial responsibility to lessen structural injustice is assigned

on the basis of indirect causal contribution. This suggests that (indirect) causal connection to an

injustice can ground remedial responsibility to prevent it even when it cannot ground liability for

causing that injustice. This assignment of remedial responsibility could be derived from the

principle that contribution to injustice is morally significant. In later sections I will explore why such

a principle could ground a remedial duty to prevent future structural injustice even when it cannot

be used to attribute liability for past injustice.

Young also states that belonging to a ‘system of interdependent processes of cooperation and

competition through which we seek benefits and aim to realise projects’ grounds the responsibility

to lessen structural injustice.19 This suggests that what grounds the remedial responsibility to

others to lessen structural injustice is the fact that we participate in a scheme of cooperation

through which we aim to benefit and fulfil our aims. It could be argued that it is reasonable for

members of such a scheme to demand that the scheme treat them fairly. Young’s discussion

suggests that either by participating in such a scheme, or attempting to benefit from such a

scheme we gain a remedial responsibility to ensure that scheme treats others justly: that through

one of these acts we gain a duty to fulfil other participants demand that they be treated fairly by the 5

scheme. This duty could be derived from a principle that forbids participating in, or attempting to

benefit from an unfair scheme of interaction.20 This is an interesting possibility that I will seek to

explore elsewhere.

Finally, Young suggests that all those who ‘dwell within a social structure’ have a remedial

responsibility to remedy any injustice those structures cause.21 Thus she suggests that merely

living within a structure gives us a remedial responsibility to ensure it is just. It is not clear why this

may be the case. It could be that merely living in a social environment comes with responsibilities

with regards to that environment: that dwelling within a social structure is just ‘pregnant’ with

obligations to ensure that structure is just.22

Of the three approaches suggested by Young’s text the causal approach is the one Young most

frequently appeals to. Building on this first account whether causal connection to structural injustice

can ground obligations to overcome this injustice will be explored in this paper.

The Link between Causal Connection and Obligations to Act: Precautionary DutiesIn her discussion of responsibility and structural injustice Young denies that those who contribute

to processes that come together to cause structural injustice can be held liable for that injustice

(reference). However, she does identify contributing to processes that come together to produce

unjust outcomes as a means by which we can identify agents as having an ‘essentially shared

primarily forward looking responsibility’ to lessen structural injustice (Reference). Young’s account

of structural injustice and responsibility suggests we look back to identify social connection to

structural injustice and use this as a basis to assign forward-looking duties. Young explains that

looking back is a way of identifying causally relevant processes and contribution to those

processes.

However, Young does not do much to explain why a remedial responsibility should be assigned on

the basis of tracing a social connection to that injustice via contributing to one of the social

processes that comes together to cause it. In this section I will offer an account of why contributing

to a process that comes together to cause structural injustice is not grounds on which individuals

can be held liable and yet it is grounds on which we can request that they work with others to

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overcome the injustice in the way Young recommends. I will offer a justification as to why social

connection can ground a demand to take action based on the moral principle of taking reasonable

precautions. I will use the concept of a ‘reasonable precaution’ to explain why those who are likely

to contribute to social processes that come together to cause on-going structural injustice have

duties to work with others to prevent that injustice from continuing.

As explained above structural Injustice occurs when persistent, unjustifiable and morally significant

inequalities result from social processes. The on-going nature of these injustices means that they

will persist into the future unless there is systematic change. I wish to propose that it is likely future

contribution to structural injustice that justifies assigning remedial responsibility with regards to it in

the present: that it is the likelihood of contributing to future structural injustice that explains why

agents have obligations to work together to try to prevent the continuance of that injustice. The

purpose of my move from identifying past contribution to recognising potential future contribution is

to explain why agents have moral reason to take action due to their causal connection to structural

injustice. This approach could be seen as an explanation of Young’s account rather than

alternative if we interpret her as requiring we look back in order to trace connection to structural

injustice only in order to identify who is likely to be contributing to the injustice in the future. I wish

to suggest that those who are likely to be socially connected to structural injustice in the future

must take action in the present aimed at preventing that injustice from occurring. The moral

demand to take such action is justified by the moral requirement that agents take reasonable

precautions. I will now explain how this works.

In many cases we do not prohibit certain actions but instead require that those who take these

actions engage in precautions that either reduce the seriousness of any harm they risk causing

through their actions or reduce the risk of their causing that harm. For example when people put

on fireworks displays they are morally required to take precautions that limit the risk of harming

others and/or limit the seriousness of any harm they do cause if something goes wrong. I am

proposing that efforts to lessen on-going structural injustice are precautions that agents must take

in order to limit their chances of contributing to serious structural injustice in the future.

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Understanding the moral demand in this way can explain both why agents must take such action

and why they should not be blamed if they are causally connected to structural injustice in the

future in spite of their efforts to prevent that injustice. Agents should only be subjected to moral

blame and condemnation when they violate moral demands: it is wrong to blame them when they

have not acted impermissibly. Thus if we cannot justify a general moral demand to avoid causal

connection to structural injustice we cannot blame agents simply for having such a connection. In

the following section I will explain why there cannot be a moral demand prohibiting actions that are

likely to be causally connected to structural injustice, whilst there can be a moral demand that

requires agents take precautions aimed at reducing the risk of serious future structural injustice

emerging from their actions amongst those of others.

Let’s begin by considering why there cannot be a moral prohibition on contributing to structural

injustice. The first problem with such a prohibition is that in many cases avoiding such a causal

connection is effectively impossible. Due to the complexity of structural injustices it is not usually

clear which actions are going to come together to cause structural injustice. Thus an agent cannot

know whether or not their actions will amalgamate with those of others to cause a significant

problem. Given that ‘ought implies can’ there thus cannot be a blanket prohibition on causal

connection to structural injustice. This explains why agents cannot be blamed for having a causal

connection to past structural injustice: they cannot be expected to always avoid such a connection

because in many cases this will not be possible.

In most cases of structural injustice the injustice can most efficiently be avoided through agents in

different positions working together to change the structure. These efforts could involve agents

changing contributory social practices, ending social trends through adopting new norms,

introducing legal prohibitions, or instigating new structural factors that counter-act existing forces.

This option is less costly and more effective than unilateral restraint. By coordinating their actions

agents can contribute to cooperate and take action that affects others without causing structural

injustice. This means they can ensure their wellbeing and agency whilst avoiding undermining the

welfare and agency of others. Through regulation and coordination they can adopt the least costly

and most effective means of avoiding structural injustice. Any action an individual takes that aims

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to try to end structural injustice through collective action has no guarantee of working. However, if

such action is sensible and well thought out it does increase the chance of structural injustice being

lessened and avoided.

Agents in general can be called upon to take such action because it reduces future suffering. The

general duty to promote the common good can thus require agents contribute to efforts to lessen

structural injustice through such action. However, additional obligations can be assigned to those

at risk of causally contributing to future structural injustice. These agents are not simply

bystanders who could improve circumstances. The fact that they are potential contributors means

that they can also be asked to take such action as a reasonable precaution to limit their chances of

contributing to serious structural injustice. Thus it can be argued that social connection (understood

as likely future causal contribution) can be grounds on which an obligation to take action aimed at

preventing structural injustice can be assigned. Such action can be understood as a precaution to

prevent connection to further structural injustice that it is reasonable to demand agents take.

Obviously the costs any particular agent can be asked to take-on must be restricted by what is

reasonable. However, what is reasonable will depend on circumstances which include the

seriousness and extent of the structural injustice.23

Agents can fairly be judged on whether or not they comply with this requirement rather than

whether or not they do become causally connected to structural injustice in the future.

Precautionary action may succeed or fail (or succeed to some extent). It is unfair to require agents

individually ensure complete success because this is beyond their control. What we can

legitimately demand of them is that they make a reasonable effort to avoid future structural

injustices when the injustice and their connection to it are foreseeable.

The moral demand outlined requires all those likely to be causally connected to structural injustice

in the future to work together to efficiently prevent that injustice and fairly share the burdens of this

task. Given the fact that many different factors come together to cause structural injustice for any

agent it is unclear whether or not their actions will come together with those of others in the future

to cause structural injustice. Given this fact it looks as though all agents that are causally

connected to each other will have this duty. Whether or not the level of connection or the likelihood 9

of connection changes the strength or demandingness of the requirement has not yet been

discussed. Nor has which factors affect the strength or demandingness of the duty or what

precisely it requires of agents. I have suggested that agents can fairly be judged on the basis of

whether or not they comply with this demand. Thus agents can be blamed if they fail to meet its

demands.

Iris Young’s work suggests that those socially connected to on-going structural injustice can be

assigned remedial responsibility to lessen that injustice. I have suggested that this responsibility

can be assigned to those who are likely to causally contribute to future structural injustice. I have

explained that these individuals can be assigned additional duties with regards to preventing this

problem because they are likely to contribute to it. I have suggested that this likely future

connection means that they can be asked to take action now as a precaution aimed at avoiding

contributing to future structural injustice. This account thus explains why it is that causal

connection grounds an additional responsibility in addition to the general duty to promote justice

and prevent suffering when one can do so. I have shown why it is that agents can have a duty to

take such precautionary action to lessen the chances of their contributing to significant structural

injustice even when they cannot be blamed for causally contributing to such injustice.

From Shared Responsibility to Collectivization Duties

Young’s work suggests that there is a moral demand that falls on all those socially connected to

injustice that requires they take part in collective action aimed at lessening future structural

injustice. I have proposed that social connection should be defined as indirect causal connection to

future structural injustice and that the demand for action should be based on the principle that

agents have a duty to take reasonable precautions to avoid contributing to injustice. In this next

section I will consider how to best describe and understand the demand to take precautions to

avoid future structural injustice. I will begin by outlining Young’s account of ‘essentially shared,

primarily forward-looking responsibility’. I will then highlight the key features of her account and

propose an alternative way to define the moral demands that falls on those socially connected to

structural injustice.

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Young’s account describes the demand that falls on those socially connected to structural injustice

as an ‘essentially shared primary forward looking responsibility’. Her analysis suggests that all

those socially connected to structural injustice have a remedial responsibility to lessen injustice.

She describes the responsibility as ‘essentially shared’ rather than collective. In the case of

structural injustice the actions of an aggregate indirectly contribute to ongoing injustice. Young

suggests that members of this inchoate group ‘share responsibility’ to overcome the injustice

(Young, 2011: 110-111). According to her account there is no collective agent made up of socially

connected individuals that is responsible for causing structural injustice and is therefore liable or

morally responsible for it. She explains that if this were the case members of the collective could

be assigned roles to fulfil but none of the members could be said to be responsible for the overall

task themselves. This is because collective responsibility as Young understands it is not

distributable. In contrast to collective responsibility (that belongs to the collective agent and not to

its members) Young thinks that political responsibility for lessening structural injustice must be

distributable: each member of the aggregate must have responsibility. Thus she suggests (drawing

on the work of Christopher Kutz) that the inchoate group of those socially connected to structural

injustice share responsibility to lessen the structural injustice. She explains that each member of

this aggregate has a responsibility to work towards overcoming the injustice but they bear this

responsibility in the awareness that others also share in it (Young, 2011: 110-111).

Collective action occurs when agents self-consciously work together to produce an outcome by

coordinating their action either through an explicit decision making mechanism or through

responsively action. Young explains that fulfilling this responsibility requires that agents take part

in collective action because structural injustice can only be lessened through such action (Young,

2011: 111-113). I will now discuss why it is that structural injustice can only belessened through

collective action.

As explained above structural injustice concerns how social groups are systematically treated. This

means that the injustice can only be prevented through systematic change. Individuals may be

able to soften the effects of a structural injustice on a particular victim.24 However, they cannot stop

structural injustices because systematic change requires multiple actors. Sometimes powerful

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individuals can make systematic change but this is only when large numbers of people change

their actions or practices as a result of the powerful agent's decision. This is still a form of collective

action just one coordinated by an individual whose directions are followed by many others.25

Any instance of structural injustice (like the case of Sandy the single mother who is vulnerable

homelessness that Young discusses in detail) is caused by multiple factors coming together

(Young, 2011 43-59). Changing one of these factors in most cases will not prevent the victim’s

difficulties. Thus coordination between those who create different factors will be necessary to

prevent the injustice from continuing through restraint. Alternatively a collective could introduce

new factors in order to prevent future structural injustice. Introducing a new systematic element

that can lessen structural injustice will require multiple agents to change their action in a

coordinated manner. This collective action could involve explicitly forming a collective and tackling

a problem, using an existing mechanism like government, establishing new mechanisms or

developing and reproducing new informal norms. However, all effective means of ending a

structural injustice will require co-ordinated action by multiple agents. Thus overcoming or

lessening structural injustice will require coordinated action between a number of individuals no

matter which approach is taken.

I have explained that the moral demand that falls on those likely to be socially connected to future

structural injustice is a demand to take ‘reasonable precautions’. Precautions are actions agents

take in order to reduce the likelihood and/or severity of problematic outcomes. Acts can only count

as precautions if they reduce the risk of harm, reduce the seriousness of potential future harm or

reduce the chance of any potential harm being serious. In the case of structural injustice an action

that reduces the chance of injustice continuing or reduces the severity of any likely injustice can

count as a precaution.

Individuals who have precautionary duties must seek to form or use existing collectives in order to

lessen structural injustice or act within an existing collective to ensure it effectively lessens

structural injustice. When agents use existing mechanisms for organisation or coordination or

larger collectives like governments or NGOs they will either have to collectivize with other

members to propose change or seek change individually through existing decision making 12

mechanisms. In these cases individuals will seek to get the collective to act. In both cases those

socially connected individuals who wish to make political changes will need to act responsively with

the aim of achieving a collective action response.

Action that helps to establish a collective to directly lessen structural injustice, or pressures an

existing collective to do so increases the chance of structural injustice being tackled. Both sorts of

action increase the chance of a collective capable and willing to tackle structural injustice taking

action to end it. Thus they count as precautions against structural injustice emerging from the

combination of an agent’s actions with those of many others.

I wish to propose that the duty to take precautions to avoid future contribution to structural injustice

requires individuals to act in a complicated way. It requires they take action that increases the

chance of a collective or coalition capable and willing of addressing structural injustice (directly or

indirectly) taking action to end structural injustice (in some cases this involves forming such a

collective and in others getting an existing collective to act).

Stephanie Collins has argued that when there is an urgent moral task that needs to be performed

and yet there is no collective in existence capable of performing the task individuals can have

duties to form such an agent. Collins’s proposes that in such cases there can be individual duties

to collectivize. These duties require agents to ‘perform responsive actions with a view to there

being a collective that can reliably address the circumstance’ (Collins, 2013: 233).26 Once such a

collective is established the collective gains a responsibility for fulfilling this task. This means that

the collective’s decision-making mechanism has a moral reason to adopt a plan of action able to

alleviate the structural injustice. Members of the collective will then have a duty to do the roles

they are assigned by the collective. Where a collective capable of preventing the continuance of

structural injustice exists it has a responsibility to take such action. Members of such a collective

and outsiders connected to structural injustice have duties to act responsively so as to get the

collective to fulfil its responsibility. This will usually require working together and collectivizing. In

these cases the smaller collective established although incapable of directly addressing structural

injustice will have a responsibility to encourage the larger collective to act.

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The analysis here suggests that precautionary duties fall on all those at risk of causally contributing

to future structural injustice. Yet those obliged to take precautions are not able to lessen structural

injustice by acting unilaterally. For these agents what the precautionary duty requires is

collectivization efforts. For most agents with precautionary duties with regards to structural injustice

these duties require that they perform ‘responsive actions’ that promote the establishment a

collective that can reliably prevent future structural injustice. Fulfilling these duties is the precaution

that agents are required to take. Taking such responsive action reduces the risk of structural

injustice continuing to emerge from an agent’s actions along with the action of millions of other

individuals and collectives. Where collectives capable of addressing the injustice already exist

individuals precautionary duties require they act individually or responsively with others to promote

the existing collective tackling the injustice.

Thus instead of positing a shared responsibility which identifies a group responsibility that is

distributable this approach recognises an individual duty to take precautions that requires

collectivization. This reverses Young’s approach. By understanding the requirement as a

precautionary duty falling on causally connected individuals we give duties to each individual in

question whilst still recommending a collective action solution. Thus Young’s desire to recommend

collective action and ensure responsibility is distributed to each member of the group is fulfilled.

This approach offers several advantages over essentially shared responsibility. These advantages

will now be outlined.

Firstly the approach described here does not involve applying responsibility for a task to an

inchoate group. Applying moral demands to non-agents is a controversial practice. Those socially

connected to structural injustice are not a collective agent but an aggregate. Whether moral

demands can be applied to groups that are not agents is a controversial issue.27 By assigning

individual duties to collectivise this problem is avoided.

Secondly and most significantly, the collectivization approach is better than an essentially shared

responsibility because it makes moral demands of individual agents rather than stating that they

share responsibility for ensuring an outcome. This allows us to judge individuals on the basis of

whether or not they fulfil a demand made of them. This means agents are judged on what they 14

themselves can control. It is unfair to judge agents on the basis of factors that are beyond their

control. The approach recommended here allows agents to be judged on their own choices alone.

We can examine the facts concerning whether an agent has taken responsive action that promotes

the forming a collective that can reliably prevent future structural injustice. We can then praise or

blame them on the basis of their own actions.

In contrast it is not clear how to judge those agents who had an essentially shared responsibility to

lessen structural injustice. In a case of essentially shared responsibility there is no collective who

can be blamed or praised on the basis of success or failure just as there is no collective who has

the responsibility. Is the blame in the case of failure to be shared between the group in the

awareness that they share it? This would follow from the idea that they share the forward looking

responsibility and bare it in the knowledge that they bare it together. This would mean that if the

inchoate group do not lessen structural injustice all members (including those who sincerely and

ardently took sensible action in pursuit of the goal) will share in the blame. It seems unfair to blame

agents who did all that could reasonably be asked of them in order to lessen injustice for the failure

of the inchoate group to succeed in this task. The advantage of the ‘collectivizaton duties’

approach is that it makes it clear what an individual is obliged to do and allows us to praise or

blame them as an individual. This means that agents are not blamed for the failure of others to

collectivize.

Young does not endorse any account of praise or blame with regards to the failure or fulfilment of

essentially shared forward looking responsibility. Instead she insists that the point of her account is

to assign responsibilities to take action to lessen injustice rather than to blame agents for what they

did in the past. Thus she insists that her account is primarily forward looking. Thus she assigns

duties to take action to prevent injustice from continuing rather than assign duties to compensate to

those liable (Young 2011: 108-109). My account shares the emphasis on ex-ante action to prevent

future injustice and even explains why there is this emphasis on the future: although agents cannot

reasonably be expected to avoid causal connection to injustice they can be expected to take

precautions to lessen their chance of such a connection.

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When we assign or identify responsibilities or duties we are stating that certain tasks must be

taken up by certain agents. It follows from such an assignment that as time passes agents can be

judged on whether or not they have fulfilled the tasks or roles assigned. Thus no account can be

strictly forward-looking: it cannot avoid judgeing agents on what they have done or not done. This

is a fact that Martha Nussbaum recognises in her discussion in the forward to Young’s book

(Young, 2011: xxi).

The account of precautionary collectivization duties falling on those likely to be causally connected

to future structural injustice outlined here takes on Nussbaum’s challenge head on. It explains that

the duties are primarily forward looking because they demand ex-ante action to avoid future

injustice. However, this account explicitly endorses the fact that as time passes agents can be

judged on their success or failure to take the responsive actions demanded. This is fair because it

judges agents on their own choices. They are judged on whether they took sensible responsive

actions aimed at establishing a collective to tackle structural injustice or ensuring an existing

collective takes on the task.28

Replacing ‘essentially shared primarily forward looking responsibility’ with a precautionary duty that

in most cases will require collectivization preserves Young's aim of assigning obligations to take

part in collective action aimed at lessening structural injustice. Yet it allows Nussbaum’s objection

to a perpetually forward looking account to be met. The recommended approach assigns clear

duties to all those likely to be causally connected to future structural injustice. It recommends that

they pursue collective action and as time passes it allows them to be fairly judged on their own

choices rather than those of others.

Precautions not Liability

By combining a collectivization approach to duties to prevent future structural injustice, a

precaution based explanation of the reason why social connection grounds this moral demand and

a causal connection account of social connection I have proposed a reimagining of Young’s

approach. I have agreed that social connection grounds a moral demand to work with others with

the aim of preventing or lessening structural injustice through collective action. I have defined

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social connection as causal connection. I have identified that this demand derives from the duty to

take reasonable precautions to avoid contributing to structural injustice. Finally, I have insisted that

in most cases this demand will require collectivization. The account outlined here suggests that in

response to on-going structural injustice those likely to be causally connected to that injustice in

the future have precautionary duties that require they take responsive actions capable of

establishing a collective that can reliably address this injustice.

Young rejects the liability approach to responsibility and structural injustice. Yet the approach

proposed here is similar in a number of ways. It bases duties to act on causal connection to

structural injustice and calls on agents to take action to avoid such connection. Furthermore, it

involves blaming agents on the basis of whether they do or do not make reasonable collectivisation

efforts whilst Young’s approach seeks to avoid blame. Thus it could be argued that my

interpretation is not one that Young could agree to. I will now briefly consider whether Young’s

criticism of the liability approach and other problems with using the liability approach apply to the

precautionary approach outlined above.

The chief objection Young has against the liability approach is that it attaches blame. She argues

that from a pragmatic perspective this is a bad idea when it comes to structural injustice

(Young,2011: 113-122). My precautionary approach unlike the liability approach does not attach

blame on the basis of causal connection to structural injustice. However, it does involve the

condemnation of those who fail to take up their precautionary obligations. In the present it both

encourages agents to take action to prevent future structural injustice and condemns or praises

them on the basis of the precautions they took or failed to take in the past. Although, this blame for

inaction may result in some negativity, as Nussbaum’s analysis emphasizes, such negativity is an

inevitable part of any plausible account that assigns duties or responsibilities to take action. As

time passes the logic of obligations and responsibilities requires us to judge those obligated on the

basis of whether they have done what was required of them. Thus as time passes they will be

judged on the basis of whether or not those duties or responsibilities are acted upon. This is an

unavoidable feature of any account of duties or responsibilities.

17

A second problem with the liability model was that it assigned moral responsibility for structural

injustice on the basis of causal connection. Such an approach is unfair because it means that

agents are blamed for what they cannot necessarily avoid. In contrast the approach proposed here

judges agents on what is within their control: whether they take responsive action to establish a

collective that can reliably prevent structural injustice.

A third problem with the liability approach highlighted by Young is that it is isolating: it singles out

some for blame and thereby absolves others. However, this is not the case with the precautionary

principle identified here. This is not because it concerns precautions. It is because it identifies all

those causally connected rather than highlighting one action as the cause amongst a series of

conditions. Thus it is that more than one agent is required to take precautions. Finding a potential

future causal connection between an agent and a structural injustice does in no way exclude

finding a potential future connection between another agent and the same problem.

A fourth problem with the liability approach identified by Young is that it is used to identify an agent

who can be held causally responsible. This is not the aim of this approach. It does not rely on one

causal contribution being selected and identified as causally responsible. Instead it identifies all

potential future contributors and calls on them to act. The usual way of understanding

precautionary duties is to assign them to those in a position of authority or those who will otherwise

be found responsible by a liability approach if the consequence actually occurs. However, this

precautionary account instead seeks to identify all causal contributors and hold each of them

responsible for taking precautions to avoid together causing the background within which agents

act from being unjust.

What is being proposed is that all those who are likely to contribute to future structural injustice

take action aimed at preventing that injustice as a precaution aimed at avoiding making a causal

contribution to that injustice. Individuals likely to be causally connected to future structural injustice

have a collectivization duty which requires they take responsive action capable of establishing a

collective that can reliably address structural injustice. I have proposed that taking such action is a

reasonable precaution that we can reasonably demand from each other.

18

The aim of this project has been to come up with a precise account of moral demands that fall on

agents with regards to structural injustice on the basis of their social connection to it and explain

why the connection can ground duties. This paper has offered a plausible account of such

demands that can meet some of the problems with Young’s own articulation of responsibilities with

regards to structural injustice.

With regards to structural injustice there are likely to be positive duties to prevent its continuance

through collectivization. A general duty to promote justice surely requires agents collectivize to

prevent future structural injustice. However, in addition it is important to recognise duties that fall

on those likely to contribute to future structural injustice because of that likely connection. Doing

so draws attention to the fact that the task of avoiding structural injustice is as much about being

required to take reasonable efforts to avoid causally contributing to injustice as they are about

promoting a just future. Emphasising that injustice results from human action in addition to

recognising that people can promote a more just future is important. The purpose of developing a

precautionary account is to draw attention to the relational nature of justice and our duties with

regards to it. This approach instead of beginning from what an ideal social scenario would be and

then assigning duties to bring it about looks at likely future injustices and asks what duties agents

have to prevent them on the basis of their connection with them. I do not have room to defend the

importance of such an approach against claims that we need only identify positive duties to

promote justice; however I hope to have offered a plausible way of articulating and explaining the

moral demand to take political action that results from social connection.

Notes

19

1 Acknowledgements removed for blind review.2 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)3 Stephanie Collins ‘Collectives’ duties and collectivization duties’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91 (2) (2013) 231-248.4 Martha Nussbaum ‘Iris Young's Last Thoughts on Responsibility for Global Justice’, Dancing with Iris, ed. Ann Ferguson and Mechthild Nagel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp5 A. J. Julius, ‘Basic Structure and the Value of Equality’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31, 4(2003), 321-355, Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 52-64.6 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 52-64. In some places Young’s analysis suggests that the structure affects the desires, preferences and aims of different individuals in addition to shaping their external options and opportunities. However, she notes that they also experience the structure as objectively constraining them from the outside. 7 This is not to suggest that the social structure is an agent or is controlled by some agency. The use of the word ‘treatment’ here should not be read as suggesting agency.8 Iris Young ‘Equality of whom?: social groups and judgments of injustice’, Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (2001) pp 1-18 p 7.9 To see the intuitive appeal of excluding random incidents of disadvantage consider the case Young examines in which a forum for public discussion is placed in the city centre and thus those living in the put-skirts are disadvantaged from participating in the political process. If instead the forum was rotated between locations in all parts of town no particular social group could claim to have less opportunity to participate. This is despite the fact that at any particular forum some will have easier access than others.10 Iris Young ‘Equality of whom?: social groups and judgments of injustice’, Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (2001) pp 1-18 p2.11 Iris Young ‘Equality of whom?: social groups and judgments of injustice’, Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (2001) pp 1-18 p 8.12 Young’s account identifies structural injustice as occurring when ‘social processes put large groups of persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing capacities available to them’ (Young, 2011: 52). Thus she only identifies as structural injustices certain kinds of systematic inequality. Young’s account identifies vulnerability to domination and vulnerability to deprivation of the means to develop and exercise capacities as constituting structural injustice. These are two morally significant forms of disadvantage. However, I do not wish to commit to a particular account of which systematic disadvantages can be identified as unjust here. Thus I have left my own account open to a certain extent.13 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).14 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 104.15 David Miller usefully differentiates between responsibility for an outcome (outcome responsibility) and responsibility to take action to remedy a situation (remedial responsibility). Miller, D National Responsibility and Global Justice Oxford: 2007: 84-104.16 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 95-96.17 Young herself does not explain why it is that remedial responsibility can be assigned on the basis of social connection. However the way she talks about social connection suggest a number of different possibilities that I will explore below.18 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 10519 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 105.20 Candice Delmas’ article on duties to resist injustice suggests that the principle of fairness requires that duties to take action to oppose injustice fall on those who benefit from that injustice (Candice Delmas ‘Political Resistance: A Matter of Fairness’ Law and Philosophy, 33, (2014), pp. 465- 488). Inspired by this work an account as to why benefiting from an unfair set of practices can ground duties to oppose structural injustice could be developed. This approach could be used to develop an alternative account of duties with regards to structural injustice. In a similar way Rob Jubb’s work suggests that duties could be based on participation in an unjust set of practices rather than contributing to an unjust structure (Rob Jubb ‘Contribution to Collective Harms and Responsibility’, Ethical Perspective, 19, 4 (2012) 733-764). I do not explore either of these ideas here but instead focus on contribution as this is the approach Young’s work refers to most. The advantage of concentrating on contribution is that it is an approach that can (if it works) capture those who contribute to trends or unconscious biases as well as those who knowingly participate in public practices. Thus it can in many cases include additional agents in the group of individuals obliged to act.21 Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 105.22 Ronald Dworkin’s associative account of political obligations suggest that simply being born in to a particular community with a particular set of social conventions is ‘pregnant with obligations’ if certain conditions are met. If the community meets these conditions complying with the conventional demands made of members of that community

becomes morally required (Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart, 1998) pp. 202-215). In a similar way perhaps living within a social structure just comes with a duty to try to promote justice within that structure. Alternatively, perhaps there is a convention under which members of political communities have a duty to try to regulate the structure under which they live in a way that promotes justice. If this were the case individuals connected to each other in a genuine community would have such duties according to Dworkins account. This is another way in which individuals can be ‘socially connected’. However, it is not a route that Young explores because she is committed to the idea that it is an individual’s connection to social structure or structural injustice that grounds the demand rather than membership in a political community. See Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 105. Young also makes it clear that it is not sharing a common constitution that grounds the remedial responsibility. This suggests that her account is not that shared political institutions or sharing a coercive power that grounds the duty. Thus she distinguishes her approach from that of Nagel (Thomas Nagel ‘The Problem Of Global Justice’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33, 2 (2005), pp. 113-147. In doing so she leaves room for the idea that in certain conditions remedial responsibility for lessening injustice can cross state boundaries and be global or regional in scope. Her account suggests that when social structure is regional or global so are the responsibilities to ensure justice within that structure.23 Whether it is more objectionable to assign duties to future contributors or people in general will have to be discussed elsewhere. See Rob Jubb ‘Contribution to Collective Harms and Responsibility’, Ethical Perspective, 19, 4 (2012) 733-764). 24 It is important to note that because structural injustice concerns the way an agent is treated by a social system and not just the benefits and burdens an agent ends up with it cannot be prevented by offering compensation. Thus no individual can stop a structural injustice just by transferring goods or money on a one off basis. What a wealthy individual could do is spend enough money to systematically change a situation: by launching a new enterprise, starting an NGO or convincing legislators to make changes, in doing so they will have to secure the cooperation of many other individuals. Thus they will be using their funds to secure a collective action solution.25 In these cases a set of agents act together on the basis of the directions of a leader. It is the actions of the group that overcome structural injustice. Thus this is a case of collective action. Building upon Hannah Arendt’s analysis it could be said that the group ‘empower’ the leader and it is their commitment to obeying the leader that is key (Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Orlando: Harcourt, 1970). When an agent has the ability to lessen structural injustice by directing the actions of others the group is already a collective in some sense. They are a set of agents with a decision making mechanism (the leader makes the decisions). Where an individual has the ability to form such a group, forming such a group can be considered a responsive action that works towards forming a collective willing and able to lessen structural injustice.26 In the case of structural injustice collective action is required in order for the injustice to be intentionally lessened or eradicated. Collins’ analysis suggests that since this is an urgent moral task, if there is no agent capable of performing it agents can have collectivization duties. In some cases there will be a government capable of tackling a structural injustice. In these cases Collins’ account does not require collectivization. However, where the injustice cannot be avoided without coordination beyond borders her account may recommend collectivization.27 For discussion of whether aggregates can have responsibilities or duties see Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Bill Wringe ‘Global Obligations and the Agency Objection’ Ratio. 23, 2 (2010), 217–231.28 Where a collective capable of tackling structural injustice is established it can also be judged on its success in achieving this task. The blame or praise of any such collective will mean praise or blame for its members in terms of contributing to its maintenance and fulfilling their roles within it. The question of what duties agents have once a collective is established is an interesting one which in turn will lead to conclusions concerning judgements made of individuals in cases of the success or failure of that collective. Unfortunately a detailed account of this cannot be made here for reasons of space. However, the collectivization approach gives a means to addressing these difficult questions. Some work on the question of how duties change as collectives are established has already been done (Stephanie Collins and Holly Lawford Smith ‘The Transfer of Duties: from Individuals to States and Back Again’, The Epistemic Life of Groups, eds. Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Forthcoming). In the case of structural injustice it is political institutions: national, regional and global that offer the best means to avoiding structural injustice. However, where these institutions are difficult to establish or resistant to demands to act there may be other forms of collective action that can lessen structural injustice.