Summary Of: A Study On “Languages

of Art: An Approach To A Theory Of

Symbols”

Malloggi Francesca

Contents

1 The Nature Of Pictoric Representation 1

2 Frege and Goodman: The New Concept Of Denotation 4

3 Symbolic Systems 10

4 The Rule Of Metaphors 12

5 Goodman and Ricouer 16

Abstract

The title of my thesis is “A study On Languages Of Art: An Approachto a Theory of Symbols ”, according to Nelson Goodman.1 My originalwork is made up of two parts for a total of 130 pages (without bibliogra-phy). I have summarized only the main argumentation of the entire work.In the first part of my thesis, I analyzed the Goodmanian philosophyin comparison to the aesthetics approach, hence, the relation Goodman-Gombrich. In the second part, I have shown the different philosophicalapproaches inside an extensionalistic theory of meaning by means of therule of Sinn and Bedeutung in the Freghean theory. I have also discussedthe criticism of the corrispondence theory of truth, the problem of au-thenticity in art as well as notational and non notational systems. I havealso focused my work on the role of reference and metaphors because Ithink that these are two fundamental concepts in order to understand theentire Goodmanian philosophy. Moreover, the admission of metaphorsimplies an instance of metaphoric truth and as a counterpart it has aconception of meaning only in terms of literal truth. This is a key pointof the philosophical discussion that I have analysed. I have discussed thework of Ivor Armstrong Richards, especially his rule of references and thevariety of possibiliies that we have, the variety of functions inside lan-guage, the inter-animation of the words, and the distinction between thetwo parts of the metaphor, tenor and vehicle or the primary/secondaryaccording to the terminology of Beardsley (1962). The logic of metaphorimplies the admission of likening and comparing. From the primary sub-ject we compare a secondary one, like Romeo’s speech likens Juliet to thesun. If this link for us creates meaning, it means that we are supposedto introduce a concept of metaphoric truth by admitting that we are pro-ducing knowledge. The theory that admits only literal truth implies thatwe only ”know” through declarative statements. I think that we createmeaning even beyond the declarative speech. However by admitting themetaphoric truth, the problem is, do we see the reality throughout theuse of metaphoric process, or are we simply describing it throughout ourlanguage? The nominalistic approach leads us to see, what I think is alimit in Goodmanian philosophy, especially because there are cognitiveprocesses of creation that are even beyond the language in itself. For thisreason, I have discussed the Ricoerian theory and in the last part I havecompared the Goodman, Ricoeur and Davidson concepts of metaphor,and therefore, their concept of truth and knowledge.

1The originial title of my thesi is: I linguaggi dell’arte di Nelson Goodman.

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Introduction

Henry Nelson Goodman, is one of the most influential philosophers of the XXcentury. His importance is well known in various fields of philosophy, especiallyfor his contributions in applied and philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemol-ogy, philosophy of the science and philosophy of art. In my thesis, I explore hisrevolutionary proposal of looking from a broad perspective to the entire systemof sciences, including the horizon of artistic knowledge that was excluded by thepositivism classical ideal of rationality. Goodman’s objective is to rethink theclassical concept of epistemology.

In the 1968, Nelson Goodman published the first edition of Languages of Art,the second one was published in 1976, by House-Press Bobbs-Merrills in Indiana(USA), and it is the version on which I have based my thesis. Languages of Artrepresents an extraordinary turning point, especially because it delineates thebeginning of an analytical approach to artistic issues in the Anglo-Americanphilosophical tradition.

In Languages of Art, there is not only the attempt to define every workof art in linguistic terms and to speak about a work of art as linguistic andcognitive functions, but moreover there is the general goodmanian approach tophilosophy and knowledge that deeply expresses his cognitivism, nominalism,relativism, and constructivism.

In fact, Goodman is able to show that the rules of induction, or projec-tion2are valid in art as well in science. In particular, we can see that projectionsplay an important role in the metaphoric process, which are defined in terms ofviolation of rules innate within our language. Through metaphors, Goodmanshows our dynamic capacity to see and reorganize our concepts and enlarge ourperception of the world. In the same manner, he establishes the basis for aconstructivist approach in the artistic and scientific fields where he focuses onour cognitive capacity and the marveling possibility to create numerous inter-pretations of our world through a work of art as well as a scientific discovery.Goodman wants to demonstrate how we are able to work in many differentscientific or artistic systems of description.

In Ways of Worldmaking3, he points out how we can create the many in-terpretations of the world and distinguish between a correct or an incorrectdescription of it. However in the goodmanian approach, the vision of a man ofthe street, the vision of a phenomenologist, or a vision of a painter are descrip-tions of the world both valid and different in their level of rightness. Goodmanrefuses the correspondence theory of truth and objectivistic theory of reality4,

2It is in Fact, Fiction and Forecast, published before Languages of Art, that he discussesthe problem of induction and the problem of applying a distinction between confirmable andnon- confirmable hypothesis. Language and projections are an issue of habit rather thanan absolute way of the world. We project predicates into reality which are made by thoseprojections. We need to read Languages of art, accordingly with this constructivist approach,which was previously stated by Goodman in A study of Qualities (1940) , and in The Structureof Appearence (1951).

3[Goodman(1978)]4Accordingly to the correspondence theory we know the world by means of true proposi-

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preferring a relativistic, conventionalistic and a pluralistic approach. We can-not reduce knowledge to a process of establishment of what is true and whatis false. Knowledge is a process of improvement of our comprehension of theworld, therefore, it is not only an issue of true or false.

Furthermore, Goodman is able to show that symbols and symbolic systemscould reformulate our knowledge thanks to our ability to create it and thuscomprehend it. Through symbols we produce cognitively new versions of theworld. The plurality of the worlds that he acclaims is a capacity of describing orreporting that represent what it is created from a linguistic and non linguisticlevel, in a variety of ways inside a symbolic system. In fact, to Goodman symbolsare a vast variety of things, a letter, a word, a note, sheet music, a movementin a dance, maps, numbers and diagrams.

In this summary, I will start by analysing how Goodman stands out com-pared to other aesthetic theories, the relationship Goodman-Gombrich and theassumption of the myth of a given in order to show his anti-absolutistic approachto reality and its consequences for a theory of knowledge. In the second section,I will show the consequences of the assumption that Representation is Deno-tation and its rules of pivot along with a more flexible concept of reference. Iwill speak about the Goodmanian conception of denotation in comparison withFrege and how Goodman is able to maintain the limits imposed by the ex-tensionalistic’s view, characteristic of the Fregean, Russellian and Goodmanianapproaches. This reflection will lead us to see the different open perspectivesthat follow from the goodmanian theory of reference, because in my opinion,it was of fundamental importance for the epistemological turn. In the thirdsection, I will reveal how these systems are defined by Goodman in terms ofnotational and non notational language.

This analysis will impel us to see the two principal modes of reference, de-notation and its converse, exemplification. After having defined these two keyconcepts, I will show the main point in the interpretation of art, which is the ruleof expression terminating with an analysis of the goodmanianan interpretationof metaphors.

In the last section, I will present how Paul Ricoeur has studied the theory ofart with a strong goodmanian perspective and how he changes the interpretationof the rules of metaphors in a meaningful way, by violating the extensionalisticand nominalistic approaches. I think that despite this important detachment,Ricoeur is able to show in a meaningful way that metaphors and metaphoric

tions, thus, propositions are true if they correspond to a fact. If the propositions are true,even our beliefs are true. This theory was criticized by Moore and Russell’s refusal of idealism.They developed an identity theory of truth in 1898 and 1910 . They say that a proposition istrue if it is identical to a fact. Problems arise because a fact is always undoubtfully true, there-fore, truth will depend on propositions and on our beliefs which leads us to the possibility thatour beliefs are false. For this reason, they rule out propositions from their theory, referringto them as shadow of fact. We see that there is a strong correspondentistic theory based onthe assumption of identity between fact and proposition. To Goodman we are not allowed tospeak in terms of correspondence between the structure of the world and proposition. Mainlybecause he critises an absolutistic way to see reality, so he deeply criticises Russellian’s “firsttruism”.

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process are a way to really know the world, that function, even beyond thelimits of our languages.

The Goodmanian intention is a reunification of philosophy, an attempt tocreate a holistic point of view to overcome the useless barriers between arts andsciences. For this reason, we can say that goodman’s approach is directly andindirectly aiming at Aesthetics. 5

Aesthetics for Goodman needs to be considered as a branch of epistemologythat investigates cognitive functions of art through a linguistic analysis. Hisapproach is an extensive and wide study of all fine arts as a whole in order todiscover a common structure able to embrace all the generes of it.

What has become clear is that Goodman is interested in creating a com-prehensive system of all these sciences, in which the worth of knowledge is notidentified by the division in separate sectors of its components. Thanks tothis approach, knowledge can be considered as an organic and logical systemof sciences, in which we are capable of valorizing instead of denying or keep-ing out what has value as a constrast or difference. Keeping separate scientificknowledge from artistic knowledge means that we are not able to understandart as well as science, which is misleading. Before analysing the difference be-tween Goodman and Freagean classical theories of reference and epistemology,I would like to examine the aesthetic theory that Goodman criticizes. Conse-quently through this criticism, I will shed some light on Goodmanian’s theoryof speciousness of the given.

5Luciano Handjaras in [Handjaras(2007)] notices that Goodman’s aim is deeply influencedby his professor, Morton White. White published a book in 1955 called ” The age of analysis”which he dedicated to G.E. Moore. In this book he presented an anthology of text of Bergson,Husserl, Sartre, Croceto the American philosopher . The intention was to promote a reunifi-cation of philosophy and a contact between analitical philosophy, pragmatism and Europeanphilosophy.

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1 The Nature Of Pictoric Representation

In Languages of Art, Goodman refuses the concept of Representation in terms ofImitation. For our purpose, the criticism of the imitation theory and Gombrich’s perspective is of fundamental importance because, more in depth, it sets thebasis needed to understand why Goodman conceives the structures of referencenot the things in itself but the systems of description. He prefers to considerthe linguistic (verbal and non verbal) systems of descriptions and he assumesthat it is through them that we see the world( a constructionalitic view). ForGoodman, these systems are the only ones by means of which we say to see, aterm that seems inert but misleading, what we are used to calling things.

In this summary, I will mainly analyze the theory of imitation but in mythesis I showed why Goodman refuses the main part of the theory of art. I willtry to speak briefly, only about some of them, in order to provide some otherimportant pieces of information about the goodmanian approach to aesthetics.

The approach that has been defined as emotivism has been criticized byGoodman because emotion alone cannot explain the complexity of art. In fact,he is profoundly convinced that the emotions we feel during an aesthetics ex-perience are, undoubtedly, not the only way in which artist and observers areable to communicate. He deeply criticizes this view especially because he wantsto overcome the dangerous dichotomous view of art and science, which in turn,came from what he calls the despotic dichotomy between emotion and cogni-tion. In this book he provides the basis to overcome this useless perspective byanalyzing art as a cognitive and linguistic communication. To Goodman emo-tions play a particular function inside art. The emotions in art have a cognitivefunction because they help us to see and discern characteristics and peculiari-ties observed, which in turn can help and enrich our interpretation. Moreover,Goodman observes that in art the emotions that we live are quite different fromthe emotions in ordinary life. The emotions that we want to avoid in our ordi-nary lives are the emotions that we perceive in a positive way in a work of art.In fact, if we think about a poem, the pains that we share are accepted and livedin a completely different manner. In a poem, we evaluate the common dramaticevents of our lives from an emphatic perspective in a way that sometimes artcan be revealed as both preparatory for real life and a shelter from it.

All the theories that expect to answer the question of what is art 6are refusedby Goodman because they presume to explain art from an ontological point ofview. He prefers to analyse art from a psyco-linguistic perspective, withoutengaging in qualitative order judgment. The question, what is art, forces usto search for an absolute characteristic beyond the history and time of a workof art. Unfortunately, the solution still remains vague. What is art? is thewrong question. Goodman would like to change the way in which we approachart. Instead, he asks when is art? The reason of this choice is based on theobservation that the worth of art is not timeless. What is art is a question

6Goodman refuses to consider the product of music, literature, painting, architecture, andsculpture as ontologically differentiated compared to another object. For this discussion Iconsulted[Adajian(2012), Livingston(2013), Kobau et al.(2007)Kobau, Matteucci & Velotti]

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destined to fail simply because something can be valued as a work of art withincertain values of cultures but not in others, and thus, inside a system of adescription or in another.

As I mentioned above, the theory of imitation enables us to see the refusalof the myth of the given in order to advance a speciousness of the given. Theimitation theory has always believed that representation can be only a faithfulrepresentation of the object represented, if we can obtain a real copy of realityfrom the observation. Goodman as Gombrich says, that a literally faithful por-trait of a thing is not possible because our mind is always applying prejudices,choices and relevancies. Representation is a question of choices of particulars.The myth of the innocent eye is at the same level of the myth of the given.However, to both Goodman and Gombrich there is no perception without con-ception, just as the myth of the given has thought, there is no immediacy, onlyan innocent eye. We cannot copy reality for we continuously remake it, like thesound of the title of the first chapter of a book. According to Gombrich, Berkely,Kant, Cassirer, Bruner, the way in which we see is profoundly influenced by ourpreferences and experiences. In comparison these varieties of ways of which theworld is made (the variety of our description of it), Goodman accepts all theways in which it can be right, what it means and he is open to the variety ofsystems of description that have come from all sciences. The constructivisticpoint of view accepts all right systems and evaluates them in one’s own givensystem, the particular artist, historian, and scientist, as well as the perceiverand the given situation. It is in Ways of Worldmaking that he states,

The alternative descriptions of motion, all of them in much thesame terms and routinely transformable into one another, provideonly a minor and rather pallid example of diversity in account of theworld. Much more striking is the vast variety of versions and visionsin the several sciences, in the works of different painters and writers,and in our perceptions as informed by these, by circumstances, andby our own insights, interests, and past experiences.7

The different systems of descriptions that we use are all linguistic devices of ourcapacity to analyze art as well as science and our ability to modify it in orderto improve our comprehension of what we are observing.

Goodman suggests that we cannot separate the process of perception fromthe process of interpretation. The imitation theory (which is reflected in theabove mentioned objectivistic view of reality) has continued the idea that we cansee the given in an absolute way, revealing the nature of the things by meansof the process of purification, where we can reach a structure of appearanceliberated by our own prejudices. Goodman, instead, notices that we can changethe interpretation but we cannot avoid the provision of one. There are manyinterpretations that represent the way in which objects are presented to us butthere is no given in an absolute way.

7[Goodman(1978)]pag.3.

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Goodman wants to keep the process of perception and interpretation distinctfor they are congruent and interdependent activities. The perception is a causalnatural relationship while the interpretation is a propositional one, therefore,perception and interpretation are not divisible.

Interest increases here when we look at the Gombrich concept of perspective.Although Gombrich shows that the myth of the innocent eye refuses the ideathat the pictoric perspective could be a convention, it represents the world asit appears

The hypothesis of perspective as a means to copy realty is unsustainablefor three main reasons: i) the assumption that an object painted from theright perspective is able to release the same quantity of luminous rays of thereal object in a way that we could interpret both the represented and the realobject. However, this cannot be experimentally proven. ii) the possibility tomistake the real object for the represented one is quite rare. iii)representationremakes reality which we cannot copy.As we have shown to be faithful, it is nota sufficient condition to infer representation. In fact, two objects can be similarto a maximum grade, but likeness is a reflexive and symmetric property, w hichis not enough to explain representation.

The perspective is not enough to explain representation because represen-tation can vary as the way to see through our system of description, that isreality. There is not only one absolute way to see reality because it is alwaysmediated by the observer. In other words, we are used to seeing the elaboratedpainting from a perspective that we mistake for realism. However, it is our eyethat has the habit of seeing in perspective and mistaking it for a hypothesis ofrealism. We should not forget that the first time that a Japanese saw a paintingin perspective, he/she was quite surprised. Goodman describes realism in termsof standard, therefore there are many ways in which reality can be standardlydescribed, as well as many ways in which it can be better seen. It is the levelof rightness that creates a world where there are not only true or false versions.Moreover, they are all valid until they are in a given and coherent system, in agiven artist, science, observer or situation.

The goodmanian view is a pluralistic one. Instead, to Gombrich we can rec-onciliate the objectivity of perception with the relativity of vision. Gombrichtells us that we can overcome the relativity of vision because the artist, in theattempt to portray reality, is in constant search of an absolute objective stan-dard. The artist proceeds in art, like the scientist by trial and error in order toreveal the objectivity of things. Gombrich sustains that the amount of informa-tive content that a work of art shows of the object is the key to guarantee ourrepresentation of it through speech. The problem for Goodman is that Gom-brich does not notice that even a painting, that is not realistic and that does notexist as a fictive term, has a lot to say and represents reality. While Gombrichinterprets art in terms of a continuum of image and life, from a realist pointof view, Goodman broadens our view on the variety of possible projections andinductions that we are able to obtain from the sciences inside a conventionalisticview. It is worth noting that with the myth of the given, Goodman is critizingthe C.I. Lewis empiristic point of view. C.I.Lewis, who was Goodman’s teacher

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at Harvard, believes that empiricism can and must presuppose the undoubta-bility of what is given in experience. Beyond every language and descriptionthere is a given even when I make a mistake in interpretation. But Goodman,in A Study of Qualities, shows that even a plain judgment ”What I have seenin my visual field is a red spot?”might be changed in the light of new evidence.Seeing this from a retrospective point of view means that there is no hypoth-esis to support an undoubtable given of the experience. However for Lewis,we cannot strictly speak about empiricism considering the two hypotheses of”it looks green” and ”it is green”. Accordingly, they try to analyze empiricalknowledge as a coherent system of sentences. There are some of which thatare ”protocols”, such as mathematics and logic sentences, others are general-izations. Consequently, Goodman is trying to show that the ”logic of it seems”cannot be separated from the logic of ”it is”. Perception and interpretation areinterdependent moments.

Coherence is a characteristic of descriptions, not of the world:the significant question is not whether the world is coherent, butwhether our account of it is. And what we call the simplicity of theworld is merely the simplicity we are able to achieve in describingit.8

We do not know things themselves, we know things through our capacity todescribe and work with many systems of description. A faithful representation,a true description as well as a protocol judgment are all ways which are consid-ered knowing as ”processing raw materials into finished products” 9 From thisperspective we are now able to see his anti-fundationalistic approach.

2 Frege and Goodman: The New Concept OfDenotation

Goodman takes distance from logic positivism for two main reasons by rejectingthe distinction between analytical and synthetic judgement. Hence, he rejectsthe possibility of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori reasoning,such as in mathematics, because of its impossibility to grasp the concept on apre-theoretical level10.

Instead, Goodman denies these eternal conceptual verities, for he prefers acompletely extensionalistic and nominalistic approach than an intensionalisticone. Secondly, the despotic dichotomy between emotive and cognitive thatGoodman is trying to heal is one of the natural consequences of the generallogic empiricism assumption. The fact that arts aim at creativity, emotions andsuggestivity, and science aims at truth, the description of the world and reason

8[Goodman(1972)]p.24.9[Goodman(1972)]p.26.

10To follow the development of this discussion, the relationship between Goodman, MortonWhite and Quine is of particular interest. Goodman, as well as Quine and White, will denythe distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments.

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is one of the first limits of logic empiricism. Nonetheless, this anti-metaphysicalstance supported by a strictly empiricist criterion of meaning are both criticizedby Goodman. This is the case because he is aiming at a system in which artisticand scientific knowledge is integrated in one comprehensive system of sciences.

For his purpose, the identification of representation with symbolization orreference is a revolutionary assumption that had profound consequences for theepistemological turning point. Now, the concept of denotation will be examinedbecause it is a key concept to analyse the language of these two authors. Someconsistent variations from one to the other will clarify the goodmanian proposalof the epistemological turn. The Fregean theory and the general problem that itraises will be discussed. In particular, we will discuss the rule of fictive entitiesand the theory of reference as an absolute and direct relationship, the uselessidea of knowledge in terms of the process of determining truth or falsehood instatements.

When Frege investigates language, he is aiming at a comprehension of anideal language. 11

In the article published in 1892 entitled Uber Sinn und Bedeutung, Fregepointed out an intuition or better that a language could be explained in termsof logic, which revealed to be a masterpiece for the foundation of the renownedphilosophy of language, especially in analytical tradition. He distinguished thepart of the Sinn and Bedeutung for every definite statement and singular term.He defines Sinn, or sense, as intentional entities, (such as concept, the ideainside our heads) and as a logic notion that he wants to keep strongly separatefrom the subjective one. Sense, a concept of logic, is objective and absoluteand independent. Sense derives its own objectivity from its public sharing inthe community of the speaker and are absolute as well as independent fromthe speaker because they belong to the third eternal reign of platonic ideas,and therefore are autonomously present as eternal verities. Moreover, Sense istechnically the way in which we identify or we are able to refer to the object.For instance, the sense of Pisa could be ”the city in which Galileo was born”or ”the city of the leaning tower”. Different ”senses” denote different objectsbut in his interpretation of language as a structure of logic, he assumes that forevery single term we cannot have more than one extension, which is precisely adefinition of a mathematical function. The Bedeutung of a name or of a definite

11Frege’s approach has been considered by Micheal Dummet as one of the two main analyt-ical philosophies; the ideal language tradition, in which Frege and his student, Carnap, is themain philosopher, and the ordinary-language tradition, which is based on Wittgenstein’ s phi-losophy and that was developed by Gylbert Ryle. To Goodman the problems of the languageand therefore the role of philosopher is not at the natural or ordinary level of language. It is aquestion posed in philosophical terms, meaning another order to understand the language isneeded. Philosophy has not resolved the puzzle of natural language. Moreover, at stake herethere is the possibility, denied by ordinary language tradition, of the analytical philosophy tobe systematic. Goodman belongs to the ideal language tradition and I will demonstrate thatphilosophy can be systematic even when considering the fictive terms. However, despite hisanti-fundationalism, he believes and shows that philosophy can be systematic. Furthermore,he criticises Logic Positivism for a fundationalistic theory of epistemology and consequencesof the theory of knowledge.

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sentence is the object itself or the extension.12 The Bedeutung of ”Aristotle”is the individual or more in general, the entities, and the objective sense withwhich we, as a community of the speaker, can identify.

A second critical point with the theory raised by Goodman concerns Frege aswell as Russell. Following Frege, meaning is what an expression denotes, and thisempiristic view of the meaning implies that without the objects we cannot speakproperly about the truth or the falsehood of sentences. There is a reductionof meaning to a realistic object and the process of knowledge is assimilatedto a verification theory. Without the object we cannot speak of producingknowledge. Frege’s extensionalistic account is problematic to Goodman becauseit is closed in the realism of the entities which makes it a strict empiricism. Inshort, they do not consider poetry as much as metaphysic because we are notallowed to speak in terms of verificationism compared to the world.

They have created an idea of production of knowledge totally dependenton entities and on the establishment of condition of true or false beliefs. ToGoodman, the determination of the conditions of truth and falsehood is notenough to explain all systems of science because it makes no sense to speakabout art in terms of truth or falsehood.

It is also true that all poems and literature should be defined and viewedas a fundamental importance of knowledge. With this approach, Aestheticsbecomes a missing branch of Epistemology. Goodman is able to maintain anextensionalistic approach as well as introduce the fictive term and all the symbolsin its system. By observing the freghean system, we see the counter-intuitivenature of the interpretation of fictive terms or null denotations. By followingthe fregean theory, these fictive terms would have null denotation, thus havingnull meaning while being distant from the reasonable. Goodman is able tomaintain extensionalism as noted in the essay, Likeness of Meanings and in Thestructure of appearence where he affirms that even if fictive terms do not exist,they belong to a system of description that enable them to have a meaningwithin the language. In his nominalistic approach every entity that has a rulein a system could be an individual.

Frege defines the fictive term as entities that protect a meaningful speech.Alternatively, Goodman is the key philosopher to see another type of extension-alist view. The goodmanian solution procedes as follows. Accordingly, all thefictive terms such as unicorn-picture and centaur-picture have a null denotation,but they clearly do not have the same meaning, as the fregean theory claims.Goodman states that the null denotation is only the primary extension of theseterms but it is said that they have different meanings because they all have whathe calls a secondary extension, which considers its components and explains thedifference among all fictive terms. In this view, two null terms have the samemeaning when they have the same secondary extension that allow us to make a”comparison of the extension of the relative compounds”13 into which both the

12Goodman shows that extensional identity is a necessary condition but not a sufficient oneto display the sameness of meaning. We cannot infer the difference and the meaning onlythrough extension.

13[Goodman(1972)]p.26.

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unicorn and centaur figures enter. 14

He is showing that even non-extensional contexts are able to produce meaningand that language is not confined to the boundaries of an asbsolute boudary inthe reality of things. In this way all the fictive terms are still co-extensive (nulldenotation) but they have different meanings. The problem is raised becauseof a caprice of the languages so we tend to see the fictive terms as predicateof two places represented by the unicorn. Instead, they are proclaimed as oneindivisible place. If we think about the Representation of Pegaso, we should notliterally consider this predicate because we are not able to find a representationof something that it is an object in our world, for this reason Goodman prefersto write pegaso-picture. The expression Representation of pegaso should betreated as a sentence with one indivisible place in order to avoid mistakes.

In the Goodmanian system, representation and description are the sameregarding denotation or symbolization because we can describe and representscenes, people, objects, and members of a class by means of the same mechanismof reference. The difference between a ”figure of man”(null denotation) and aman have a strict parallelism with the difference between a ”description of aman” and a man. When we are working on a definition of a painting, poem, orobject, we know that the denotation is not definable by a single and direct wayof the reference.

We are not speaking about the objects in themselves but about the way inwhich they work as descriptions. We do not use a unique denotation establishedonce and for all. We can handle many definitions that can also refer to amember of a class in a well structured chain of reference. The reference canbe unique, multiple or null but it is not absolute as Frege has claimed. It ismultiple and complex, especially when we look at the languages of arts. The nullreference and this argument leads us to see why Goodman is able to maintain theextensionalistic point of view and to respect the sense of reality, which Russellwould have recalled him.

Why can we speak about fictive terms that do not have a correspondencein reality with the absolute certainty of its meaning? The simple answer isthat we are able to distinguish and categorize these elements and its peculiarityeven without being able to see it. We can organize the fictive terms in thesame way as real objects. To Goodman there are no meanings as objects,mental images or platonic reigns. For Goodman abstract entities as well asideas are not abstractions for they do not live independently from our world.Goodman rules out third platonic reigns as well as mental images. We can findthe meaning of a fictive term because they function as individuals inside thesystem to which they belong. They have meaning because they belong to a

14It appears quite rarely, if we consider the secondary extension that two terms have thesame meaning. Every use of a term change the truth value. We cannot replace a term withanother without losing the original meaning. For this reason, he prefers to speak in termsof likeness of meaning. Fictive terms function as other terms in a language, at the level ofdescription in a given system. In this way Goodman says that fictive terms are not excludedby the logical theorem to which ” if all A’s are B’s, then all the things that bear the relation Pto an A are things that bear the relation P to a B”, but suggests that they could be consideredas analytical sentences. p.226 [Goodman(1972)]

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system that creates a contextual background (for them) in which they are ableto function. Instead of looking for originary roots of reference, which meansan absolute reference that links things to entities(physical objects or ideas),Goodman is essentially asking us to change approaches. He thinks that it isbetter to look at the routes of reference, and leave the assumption of directreference between absolute concepts, words and things. In other words, theobjectivity of the sense of public standard is up to the individual systems ofdescription and based on what we can use and should use. The connectionsthat we create are a question of projectability, that is of what I could and whatI should say. We see the things through systems of description, so we cannotaccept the direct and absolute reference.

Consequently, we cannot reduce our propositional capacity to see and de-scribe things as an absolute standard, if there is not a given of the experienceor third platonic reign. In the Fregean and Russellian views, the central ruleof reference implies that without this mechanism we are not able to make anevalutation in terms of true or false judjments which means that without thepresence of entities, as it well appears in the case of literature and poetry, wecannot speak about meaning or knowledge. Russell and Frege are saying thatthe fictive entity has no reference in the world and thus we do not have the basisthat allows us to speak about knowledge as true or false.

What guarantees production of knowledge is the reference to reality so itis the presence of an object or an idea in order to evaluate its truth or false-hood. Goodman, here, rejects the reduction of knowledge to an object, idea ormental image as well as the possibility to understand true or false conditions.When Frege speaks about definite descriptions, he interprets this mechanismof language in terms of fuctions, which are applied to an argument, where theargument is the truth or falsehood of an object. He works with the sentences inthe same manner of mathematical equations. Goodman criticises Frege’s reduc-tion of knowledge to a distinction in terms of true or false beliefs. Knowledgefor Goodman is not only a question of an increase in beliefs that we divide intotrue or false because poems, music, paintings, films, dance, photographs have somuch to communicate in a form that is not reducible to an evalutation in termsof true or false. Frege’s aim was to find a way to anchor words to things. Thepossibility to anchor the words to the given is possibile through the relationshipof a direct-sense reference but as we are going to see, with Goodman the con-cept of reference is only a relativised and flexible mechanism of language. Hecompletely changes his perspective of reference. Goodman declares that he isinterested in the study of the the routes of reference instead of in its roots. Thismeans, he is not looking for a direct and absolute connection between words andthings because there is not an absolute and timeless one. 15 The reference inGoodman can consists of many types and operates in different symbolic systems.It is a flexible view of reference in which what we are observing is not only theword and an absolute correspondence to things but a great variety of symbols in

15From this anti- fundationalistic and anti- absolusitic approach to realty we can see nowhow Goodman is able to maintain the systematicness of his system thanks to the role ofreference, which can consist of many types and operate in different symbolic systems.

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correspondence to a symbolic system that enables us to create different routesof reference. The meaning that Russell and Frege identify with mental imagesor with an object is a mistake for Goodman. There are no entities such as athird platonic reign. Goodman assumes a nominalistic approach to the worldand refuses the universals.

In Structure of Appearance, he displays his nominalistic approach. He refusesto assume the idea of the third reign as well as entities that are not individ-uals. In his system, it does not matter if the entity really exists; the point isto determine if there is a function as individuals inside a system. Goodmancannot establish what an individual is because it is determined by the system ofbelonging. Goodman’s question has moved from the ontology to the function-ality of the reference and accordingly of our cognitive and linguistic activity inmany of these languages. The goodmanian point of view focuses on the studyof language instead of on an essentialist question. There are no entities beyondour language. It is in this sense that images are not considered by Goodman asimmaterial possessions and ideas are not independent from the speaker.

It is an anti-essentialist point of view in which the images are a questionof exercise like an activity. It is an anti-essentialist perspective because nowGoodman is showing that language can work even without a mechanism thatobliges its existence while working through signs. The distinction between thesign and the reference is not onthological but functional. In Languages of ArtGoodman is able to show that the problem of projection and its irregularitieshave really deep consequences once we have shown the variety of systems ofdescription that we use and that we could use. The constructionalistic point ofview that has characterized Goodmanian philosophy can now be demonstrated.With this aim, the concept of reference has been defined by Goodman as a prim-itive relationship of standing for, a connective and essential term of movementinside our language. Further on, we will take a look at the function of referenceand I will focus my attention on the rule of methaphor and the verbal systemof descriptions.

However before continuing, it is worth mentioning the Goodmanian critiqueof the interpretation of knowledge in terms of truth or falsehood. The Frege-hean objectivistic point of view follows a world seen as something governed byabsolute and fixed relationships independent of our capacity to perceive it. Thisabsolute structure of a given thing is a guarantee that allows us to deduce thecondition to true or false. Goodman does not believe that we see things inthemselves because we see things from a variety of systems of description. Theworld is something that we see through our experience and knowledge. Withinthe variety of the ways in which the world can be seen, Goodman prefers tobroaden his view by adopting a pluralistic approach instead of a esclusivist one.The truth and its corresponding words and objects are not enough to explainthe system of sciences in which we are still producing knowledge. However, thefact that there are many different right versions of a system of descriptions donot imply a cancellation of the difference between right and wrong versions ashe demonstrates in Ways of Worldmaking. At stake here is a change in theperception of what is producing knowledge and a broad view of all types of

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knowledge.

Goodman has demonstrated that the notion of truth is neither the exaus-tive element on which we can base the theory of knowledge nor the only aim ofknowledge. We should prefer a rightness of a system instead of an evaluationin terms of truth because every truth is always relative to a system (of descrip-tions). 16 The world has many ways to be, as many as the ways in which weare able to describe it more or less correctly.

Goodman asks what kind of entities should truth and falsehood be. Thereification problem arose when in the Fregean theory we worked on statementsas functions in which the argument is an object that has been identified as trueor false. Secondly, in what measure can we clearly analyse sentences in termsof true or false. In fact, once we have all true sentences, can we reasonably callthese sentences co-extensional regardless of whether we consider the differencebetween what events or topics they denote or not? Thirdly, there is the inca-pacity to see the importance of non-declarative statements. The goodmanianview, in fact, clearly allows us to see the process of production of knowledgethrough non declarative and fictive statements, because non-declarative and fic-tive entities still have a lot to say about the world. The refusal of the theoryof direct reference as well as the rejection of an objectivist point of view arethe key points in understanding this pluralistic, nominalistic, constructivistic,approach for which Goodman posed the basis of the epistemological turn. It is adynamic, organized, relativistic perspective from which our rationality insteadof an absolute and static one can be seen.

3 Symbolic Systems

I will analyze the difference between notational and non-notational systems inorder to show the different functionality and characteristics of reference and ofdifferent languages.

Every language, of science as well as art, has its syntactic and semanticcharacteristics which are shown primary in the difference between notationaland non-notational systems.

Music is an allographic art,17 music and its language in the standard music

16In my thesis, I also examined the answers that Ivor Armstrong Richards gave to Russelland Frege on their attempt to criticize poetry as a lack of truth which is the only basisof knowledge. Of particular interest even Susanne Langer, who has talked about art as anexpressive form of feelings, has been included. A work of art requires a cognitive experienceand a process of knowledge through the identification of the sentimental content. Throughthese authors we can see the first attempt to contemplate knowledge in a broader way. Howeverwith Goodman, we can definitely make this step toward uniting philosophies and bringing artand science closer together. After language of art, in Ways of Worldmaking Goodman statesthat the vision of a physicist and the vision of the man of the street will be different at thelevel of rightness instead of in terms of true of false. It is not a false vision, thus, there aredifferent levels of rightness. We cannot expect to find an absolute or unique version of theworld defined as true or false.

17Discussing autenticity Goodman figures out the distinction between allographic and au-tographic art. The difference lays in the falsehood issue that I have mentioned above. An

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notation has been defined by Goodman as a notational language because ithas the following syntactic characteristics: the disjointness of its elements, thatmeans that every character is syntactically equivalent to another. Equivalenceimplies indifference that means we can change a character with another withoutchanging the syntactic structure. Any inscription has its own character everytime it is applied such as in natural language the function of the letter “a” willbe the same.

In natural language as in standard music notation, we have a note or a letterthat always represents the same character. This does not appear in a painting.The character-indifference is a characteristic of language and music, but music isnotational and language is not because it follows the second characteristic of thenotational system. The notational system is a system syntactically articulate,or in other terms, the characters have a finite differentiation. It means thatit is always possible to determine the characters to which the symbols belong.Thus the reference follows the finite differentiation as an impossible principleto apply to natural language. More clearly it appears in the painting becauseit is impossible to establish a character for every mark. For this reason, thenotational system is displayed as a digital instrument of measurement of work.In this kind of system, we can find any measurement that the instrument isable to find as a definite answer to the question. The referential relation tothose symbols are far different from the symbol in a scheme of a non-notationallanguage that could be described by analogue systems of measurement. The lackof articulation, in these non-notational systems, has been evaluated in termsof semantic density, characteristic of non notational language. Consequentlygiven any mark, it could stand for an indeterminate number of characters asthe mathematical concept of density shows. However given any two marks, thereis a undefinible number of possible characters among them. This difficulty todecide among a multiplicity of references is a subtle display of the difficulty tounderstand a work of art precisely. The notational system avoids the ambiguitythat instead is the second characteristic of those languages. The incapabilityto determine the reference or the field of reference of a picture as well as ofthe ordinary language is one of the main reasons of their failure in the syntacticrequirement for they cannot be finitely differentiated and the use of symbols doesnot respect the syntactic requirement of character-indifference. The syntacticdensity shows the work of a symbol in a non-notational system. The symbolsthat we use in a work of art are not replicable. Every use is a reinterpretation ofthe symbol. Instead in the notational system we have the contiguity of symbolsand its characters. However the impossibility to determine once and for all,the character does not imply a timeless process of discovery. The limits ofthis discovery are the limits of our capacity to see through it. This is themain difference between symbols used in science as opposed in art. Even ifboth systems are semantically dense, the limit of the symbols in art are not

allographic art such as music cannot be falsified. Every correct performance of the sheet mu-sic is the work itself. For an autobiographic art, the history of the painting and the painterare the only demonstration of its authenticity. Only representative art raises the problem ofauthenticity.

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pre-established, thus, interpretation is open. The scientist, instead, works withsymbols that are predetermined working inside the limits of his precision. Theyuse symbols after having predicted all the possible functions. However in art, thereference is given through the identification of characters which have a multiple,dynamic and complex reference to reality.

4 The Rule Of Metaphors

In this part, I will analyze the notion towards which I think the Goodmaniantheory is moving. The rule of reference and its different modes and thus, therole of metaphors. We will see how the interpretation of pictoric representationsand descriptions defined by Goodman in terms of denotation function and theothers two important mechanisms of reference, exemplification and expression,especially regarding art. Denotation is the relationship between a sense that isdescribed as “label”, such as ”The 34th President of the United States,” andwhat it labels. In this sense verbal descriptions are similar to a non-linguisticone because they stand for and are a symbol of what they denote. In otherwords, pictures and descriptions represent, denote or stand for their subjects.By denoting they represent it. A symbol can work with a single object, multipleor null denotation of objects, descriptions and fictions. As pertaining to fictiveentity, we have seen that a non representational term as well as a fictive termshould be considered as label of a symbolic system. According to his nominal-istic approach, they are working as indivisible terms inside languages, even ifthey are not referring to something that exists. As mentioned above, Goodmanhas shown that they can function inside a language in the same way as a la-bel, just as a linguistic entity and not an intensionalistic one. In the previousparagraphs I showed that to Goodman even if the first extension is null, we areable to define its meaning through its secondary extension. Consequently, hehas shown that ” representation is the core of denotation ” even if the denota-tion is often null in the light. The fact that in art, we work especially throughnull denotation. Denotation is a process in which from symbols and pictoricalor linguistical labels, we represent objects but we have demonstrated that theycan be represented even without an object. A picture must denote an object aswell as ”anything to be a man-representation” 18.

As a matter of plain fact, the reason why pictures are classified in such waysas ”unicorn-pictures” or ”man-pictures” and so on, is because we can use thesecondary extensions to classify them as meaningful words, which function aslinguistic or pictorical labels inside the language in a given system. The nulldenotation is best explained in terms of exemplification, because fictive termsfunction as labels or symbols in the language. In the light of the nominalisticapproach, fictive terms function as individuals inside a given system. Goodmanwants to investigate the routes of reference of how symbols denote or exemplifyor what they refer to in a functional mode regarding complex and indirect waysof interpretations instead of making existential qualitative order judgement.

18[Goodman(1984a)]p.50.

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Thus, he follows a nominalistic approach. Moreover, he admits that he is notinterested in the origins, or ”roots of reference” but instead in the “routes ofreference” concerning pictures, how certain marks, and not others, have becomeshared and correlated with certain kinds of items in the world.

Exemplification is a form of symbolization, and the latter Goodman uses toexplain methaphors as well as fictive terms. Exemplification is defined as realor actual possession plus reference. This is an opportune time to explain theconcept of possession and then we will examine the exemplification mechanismof reference. According to the Goodmanian nominalistic approach, we can saythat an object possesses a feature, if and only if, a predicate can be successfullyapplied on an object. Possession as well as representation is a matter of habit.We say that an object possesses a certain quality if it is labeled by a pictoricalor linguistic label which is the converse of denotation. The characteristics thatobjects possess, in the Goodmanian view, are the characteristics that the systemof description recognise rather than the absolute ones. In other words, thepainting is dark grey (it possesses greyness) only if in a given system, the label”grey” can be successfully applied to it. The direction in possession is invertedthan in denotation. In fact, in denotation a picture or a description denoteswhat it represents, by converse, what property the descriptions or the pictureshave, depend on the predicate by which it is denoted. Therefore, actual or realpossession does not represent a form of symbolization.

Exemplification is considered routes of reference that immediately enableus to see the thought connection with metaphors in our work both inside artand science. As it has already been pointed out, exemplification is a matter ofpossession plus reference. In order to be an exemplification we need to verifythat we are able to show the referential connection between the labeled sampleand the label itself(reference or symbolization). Applying reference, once wehave individualised possession, means that we can pass from the object labeledback to the label itself exemplifying its characteristic. The point is that referenceconfirms what a sample is a sample of. Considering that while any red object isdenoted by the label ”red”, only those things e.g. red flowers that also refer to”red” and other analogous labels exemplify such a determined colour, thus theyare ”samples” of it. Look at the plain example of a tailor’s booklet of smallswatches of cloth or a sketch of a house. They show precise property of thefuture dress, such as the color and the models. ”The swatch exemplifies onlythose properties that it both has and refers to”19.

On the other hand in the sketch, we could have the future characteristic andsize of a building, but they do not show other qualities such as when they willbe accomplished, etc. Through the identification of possession and reference, wecan show a great variety of things, artistic styles, and architectural structuresthat become a form of symbolization which can work both in sciences and ordi-nary life. Exemplification, as follows, could only be made up of labels becauseit is based on the possession of qualities but by contrast everything could bean object of denotation. While representation and description denote in one

19[Goodman(1984a)]p.53.

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direction, they correlate a symbol to the thing, exemplification correlates fromthings(possessing qualities) to symbols . We can both exemplify predicates andnon linguistic symbols. When we speak about the expression of a painting oreven when we work with a fictive element, we are in a process of exemplificationbecause these elements work as labels inside the language.

This process of exemplification, enables us to see how we produce meaningwhen we work with such non linguistic or fictive entities. Every kind of symbol,a non linguistic one, as well as a gesture, a diagram of symbols can be exempli-fied and function as a predicate in a language. When we work with the unicorn-picture, what is exemplified is the label in itself. It is a metaphoric exemplifica-tion of characteristics that the painting possesses metaphorically (through theapplication of labels).

Expression is interpreted by Goodman as metaphoric exemplification andmetaphoric possession. Expression is one of the most common processes inart, because we are always looking for what a painting, a dance, a play or ingeneral, every work of art is able to express. It is a key-point to show ourpsico-linguistic activity in works of art. When we say that a painting expressessadness we are methaphorically exemplifying the property that methaphoricallythe painting possesses. In other words, we can amplify our way to comprehendthe world through a work of art. According to the Goodmanian approach, whenevaluating what a painting expresses we are always inside a given system, thus,there is no absolute relationship between a painting and what it expresses.It appears in representation, which is always mediated by our standard andsystems of description in which we work. However, what kind of referenceare we applying when we state that a painting expresses sadness? Expressionis a question of metaphoric possession because the painting denotes sadnessonly in a figurative way. The fact that a painting is sad is literally false butmethaphorically true. We shall say that one of the main critical intentionsshown here is how metaphoric and literal truths can be differentiated comparedto mere falsehood in order to criticise the objectivistic point of view.20

Moreover, expression is evaluated in terms of metaphoric exemplification forwe are applying a label through a transfer of labels. We are assuming thatwhen we interpret a painting or a poem we work inside languages and we areable to speak about colour in terms of expression of feelings and idea thanksto the capacity to interpret them through metaphoric processes. Accordingto the Goodmanian argument, we say that ”the painting represents hills, itcontains dark grey colors and expresses sadness to us” because: i) In the firsttwo sentences the reference is plain: the painting represents and hence, denoteshills and at the same time it represents and denotes shades of grey. Now, whenwe say that the painting has dark grey colours we are connecting the labelgrey to the object. While the first relationship between the label and the thingis literal, for it really belongs to the reign of grey things, the second one isa methaphoric possession and a metaphoric truth but at the same time they

20In my thesis I showed Donald Davidson’s point of view about methaphoric truth. He wantsto rule out the concept of metaphoric truth, he prefers to assume only the literal account oftruth.

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are both a type of possession. In fact, when we say that a painting expressessadness we transfer a label belonging to the realm of emotions into anotherrealm of unsensible entities in a way that is metaphorically correct. Every labelbelongs to a set of labels. The range of extension of the labels is an outlinebecause ”a label functions not in isolation but as belonging to a family” 21, andit is correlated to some referential realms. This means that the range of colourgrey are all grey things, and the realm is the set of coloured things.

Metaphors imply a change of the label in the realm and in the sphere. Infact, expression is a metaphoric exemplification because we display a painting interms of ideas and emotions. It helps us to see the work of methaphors inside ourlanguage and it is very strong throughout the entire Goodmanian philosophy.The capacity to create worlds, a key point through the Goodmanian philosophy,can be defined as the capacity to work with metaphors. It is a transversal processof languages that enables us to create such desparate varieties of connection.A metaphor is a question of transfer of labels and this transfer needs to bean invention to be a methaphor, in other words, it needs to be surprising. AsGoodman notices, in our language we constantly work through metaphors thatwe do not even notice because we are so used to them. Plenty of metaphors arenow part of our natural language. We use methaphors without noticing thembecause they are, what Goodman calls, frozen metaphors. Expressions likewarm colours or low notes are examples of this. We are so used to it, that wedo not think about the origins of them. We perceive their use more as a literaltruth than a methaphorical one, but they are still metaphors, that is, frozenmethaphors. A methaphor needs to be a novelty in a specific sense. There arecontinuously routine projections, application of predicates to new events andnew objects but they are not metaphors. ”Metaphor, it seems, is a matter ofteaching an old word new tricks- of applying an old label in a new way”.22

Application of a term is metaphorical only if to some extent counter-indicated.The application of a term to an object can be a routine projection when theterm that we are applying is a case that is not decisive. In a metaphor, instead,we see the contrast between the application of a term that has a history andthe entities that we have denoted. There is a conflict because a metaphor isa violation of prescribed rules or a projection out of the ordinary, thus, byusing metaphors we are creating new meanings. We see the conflict between aterm that we are applying and the object where there is a range of attractiveand repulsive forces in which the attraction is stronger than the repulsion. Ametaphorical truth is then a question of reassignement and it is distinguishedfrom falsehood, because it is a misassignment of label. A picture is literally notsad but metaphorically sad. To be a metaphor though, a term needs to changethe limits of the term, for it needs to overcome an old habit and suggest othermeanings. A metaphor is a reorganization of our concept, or better, a calculatederror of category as Gylbert Rile suggests to us.

21[Goodman(1984a)] p.71.22[Goodman(1984a)]p.80.

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5 Goodman and Ricouer

It has been of particular interest to analyze Paul Ricouer because he is perfectlyin harmony with the Goodmanian approach to aesthetics, especially in his in-terpretation of a works of art considered as symbols, and these symbols in termsof reference, however, he deeply changes its characteristic. Hence we will seethat, on the basis of Goodmanian philosophy, Ricoeur suggests a re-evalutationof the rule of methaphors, as well as of the ontological and epistemologicalGoodmanian point of view. He criticises the distinction between emotive andcognitive, between verbal and non verbal symbols and he profoundly admires”this anti-emotionalist but emphatic theory” 23. Here, we will see how Ri-coeur criticizes the Goodmanian nominalistic approach and how he will be ableto show, if and how it is possibile to overcome a psyco-linguistic approach toknowledge. He refuses to accept the fregean closure in the realism of entity andeven the fregean assumption of denotation and meaning in terms of referenceto the world. In fact, he does not admit that the fictive terms do not produceknowledge. By contrast, he assumes the Goodmanian analysis of fictive andexpressive terms but he drastically changes the consequences by defining fictiveterms as exemplification and failing to see the power of the poetic discourse intoreality. We will show how Ricouer tries to overcome a nominalistic approach,showing how the language function beyond itself through the work of poeticlanguage. Ricoeur sets his theory of heuristic fiction between description andredescription of the world of the Goodmanian perspective. Redescription ofthe world in the Goodmanaina approach is a metaphoric description that area question of transfer between labels. Ricoeur explains the theory of metaphorwith the theory of models. Then, we will show how the theory of model is ableto explain our metaphoric comprehension of the world. According to the Good-manian large approach of denotation, Ricoeur subsitutes the term Sinn withtext and Bedeutung with the structures of the world projected by Sinn. Now,it is useful to remember that in the Goodmanian perspective at this point weare at the level of labels of the fictive term (exemplification). Goodman statesthat these entities have their meanings because they belong to symbolic systemsand they function individually inside a language. However, we are still workingwith single statements. Ricouer meaningfully changes the subjects because hesuggests a substitution of terms from Sinn to text, in terms of text as not ofsomething that has been written but as a ” the production of the discourse as awork”.24 This signifies that when we consider the speech as work( e.g. a poem,a novelty) we work with its totality that is not beyond the sum of every singlestatement that comprehends it, hence, it is a complete network of statements.Hermeneutics is the study of the possibility to pass from the text to the worldof work.

If it is possible to pass from the text to the structure of the work, it has deepconsequences on our theory of metaphorical reference to meaning and truth. Toverify the possibility of this passage, Ricouer asks us to follow a two-step theory ;

23[Ricoeur(2004)]p.29424[Ricoeur(2004)] p.259.

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the negative part of the positive strategy is that he asks us in the first part toconsider the epoche of the literal interpretation. Suspending the literal referenceis an inevitable passage, he says, because we are really not able to interpret themetaphorical statement from a literal point of view. There is an abolition ofthe literal meaning because it has been destroyed by semantic impertinence.The new meaning that has been created, can now be seen as another kind ofmeaning, which is metaphorical. In this mechanism Ricouer shows that thesemantic pertinence in not lost but it is, on the contrary, mantained becausethe new meaning is created by the momentary impossibility of a literal sense.Hence, the epoche of the literal reference is a negative passage of a positivetheory to see the rising of another meaning that is not literal but metaphorical.

We have now what Ricoeur calls the split of reference in which, one is lit-eral (and has literal meaning) and the second one is a methaphoric reference(therefore a metaphorical meaning). Ricouer assumes that since we have thecorrespondence between the literal meaning and its reference, there will be ametaphorical meaning as well as a metaphorical reference. The distance fromGoodman is now clearer, for we are working with a network of statements withinan idea of reference for the text that is the word of a work, which is a heuristicprocess and not only an exemplification of labels. We are inside a metaphorictheory of knowledge close together with the theory of Black’s model. He wants toshow the reactive effect of the theory of model of poetic language and its episte-mological application on poetry in order to display its heuristic function. Thereare three different kinds of models. At the first level there are the scale - models.In this model we can postulate some characteristics of the future originary. Wehave a scale, that could be a big or small reproduction of the original and thatwe use to predict reality. The second ones are the analogous models, which iswhen we are in front of systems of relation that can be successfully translatedinto other systems. This model corresponds to the mathematical isomorphism.By studying the rules of interpretation, we can determine a successful passagefrom one to another, but it is important to notice that the identity of the struc-ture is not an identity of its sensible part. We can see the identity of the systemof relationship even in the third and last model that is theoretical. In this case,we can construct the original model through description and not through realentities. Ricoeur observes the logic of discovery in the work models which isreasonable because we cannot predict a future object and grasp concepts with-out the theory of models. They function as prediction in and are processed byinduction instead of deduction. They are processes of discovery and predictionand they have an implicit metaphoric structure especially in a theoretical expla-nation. For Ricoeur the correspective of a model is not a metaphoric statementbut it is a complete network of statements like an ”extended metaphor”25.

At stake here is the possibility to verify a metaphoric meaning and denyDonald Davidson’s theory of metaphor by considering the poetic work as apoem that projects its (scale-model) world and the second model or instruments,the analogous one, that could be a tale or allegory. Similar to the process of

25[Ricoeur(2004)].

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an isomorphism, we transfer the identity of a system of relationships from theimaginary world to the real or hypothetical ones. Thus, these models are the”the rational part of the work of imagination”26 that are the basis on whichwe can project the structure of the word in science and poetry. It is here thatRicoerian’s consideration of the theory of models to explain metaphors has itsdeep relevance by showing the connection between description and redescription(fictive terms). The connection that appears in the model of analogies showsthat the link between fiction and redescription can now be seen in its heuristiccharacteristic. Poetry, as Aristotle saw it, is a connection between mimesis,which is an imitation of human deeds and action, but only through the creationof muthos. Poetry is not a pure copy of reality because it is a redescriptionof it through muthos. To Ricoeur, this means, metaphors in muthos are ableto supply a lack of element in our ordinary life through the structure of thework or the tragic tale. We are able to use the analogous model of discovery,hence, we see a new aspect of the human being. The metaphoricalness that isin the tale is the possibility to improve our comprehension of human reality.”The hypothetical created by the poem is not only a model ”to see as” but itis even a model to ”feel as”27. We create not only fictive terms, says Ricoeur,but even affective terms in poems and tragic tales. Ricoeur observes that theheuristic component of the mood is hard to see because we tend to identifyknowledge in terms of representation and as a relationship between an objectand a subject. With a feeling that now is an objective entity, Ricoeur is tryingto say that in poetry we can observe the cease of difference or duality betweeninternal and external because the rule of feeling has now an objective dimension.Here Ricoeur is assuming some characteristics of poetic language as language ofdiscovery, because the ”poetic structure” of the world and the “poetic schemata” of interior life28, mirroring one another, proclaim the reciprocity of the innerand the outer.

Metaphors act at an ontological level and therefore, influence even the con-cept of methaphoric truth. Through the methaphorical modality we modify,says Ricouer, the interpretation of the couple. When we see reality, we al-ways see the things in an implicit process of its not. We need to consider thefunction of the couple in its negative part because it functions as a guide todistinguish literal from metaphorical. It is a means to see the “ totality of thethings through an “open communication”29. It is an aesthatic moment of thelanguage which goes beyond itself. Accordingly, language for Ricoeur remainsinside the limits of “being said”. The poetic image is not a matter of cultureor scheme of description but it is a creation of a human being. Finally, Ricouerdefines methaphors as a tension between the former, an image, and the latter,a term. Methaphors are seen by Ricoeur as a fusion between the verbal andthe non verbal part, the sense and the sensible, which is a real and concretemoment of our way to perceive ordinary and complex experiences. Ricoeur,

26[Ricoeur(2004)]p.290.27[Ricoeur(2004)]p.288.28[Ricoeur(2004)]p.290.29[Ricoeur(2004)]p.310

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through the assumption of the theory of models, tries to show how fictive termshave a heuristic function and how this is reflected onto the perception of humanactions. However, the Goodmanian approach to aethetics is an undeniable stepby means of comprehension of our cognitive and linguistic capacity, whereas theRicoerian point of view, going beyond language in a verbal icon, is incrediblyinsightful to initiating our comprehension of the phenomenology of imagination.

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References

[Adajian(2012)] Adajian, Thomas (2012). The definition of art. Zalta, Ed-ward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, winter 2012 edn.

[Aristotele(2011)] Aristotele (2011). Poetica. Laterza.[Bachelard & Catalano(2006)] Bachelard, G. & E. Catalano (2006).

La poetica dello spazio. La scienza nuova, Dedalo, URLhttp://books.google.it/books?id=p0bTKQAACAAJ.

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[Cohnitz & Rossberg(2014b)] Cohnitz, Daniel & Marcus Rossberg (2014b). Nel-son goodman. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-losophy, winter 2014 edn.

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[Goodman(1953)] Goodman, Nelson (1953). On likeness on meaning. AnalysisRistampato in Problem and Projects.

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[Goodman & Van Orman Quine(1947)] Goodman, N. & W. Van Orman Quine(1947). Steps toward a constructive nominalism. Assoc. for Symbolic Logic,URL http://books.google.it/books?id=ogZCnQEACAAJ.

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[Z.Elgin(2000)] Z.Elgin, Catherine (2000). Reorienting aeshetics, reconceivingcognition. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58, 219–225.

[Z.Elgin & Goodman(1987)] Z.Elgin, Catherine & Nelson Goodman (1987).Changing the subject. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46, 219–223.