The British Response to the American Civil War

With the change in recent years toward the study of transnational history, new life has been given to

understanding the impact of the American Civil War (ACW) on Great Britain. The general stereotype

of the aristocrat supporting the South and the common man having sympathies for the North has

been confronted, and a better understanding of these long-held views is in the process of being

developed. By examining current scholarship and applying a transnational perspective to primary

sources from the period, the traditional categories begin to break down.

Using the recent work of Sven Beckert1 and Don H. Doyle2 as a point of departure, this essay

examines the inaccuracy of the traditional classifications and seeks to use the economic and

diplomatic events to explore the experience of Great Britain during the ACW. The traditional class

division did exist, but not as a neatly tied bundle and, certainly, not throughout the war. In general,

aristocrats and upper-classes voiced their support for the South for both economic and social

reasons. The lower classes showed little support for either side until the middle of the war. They

were, perhaps, most impacted by the economic factors, while supportive of the ideals of what would

become the Northern fight. My research asserts the existence of a third pillar of society that acted

on the official neutrality of the UK, with the interests of economic, political, and social improvement

for Britain.

Economics As Sven Beckert points out, the capitalism of the American nineteenth century was not the

urbanized free labour that is often associated with the Industrial Revolution, but rather, it was

dominated by a dispersed collection of individual land holders who relied on slave labour for the

1 Beckert, Sven. Empire of Cotton. New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 2014.

2 Doyle, Don H. The Cause of All Nations. NY: Pereus Books, 2015.

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creation of the raw materials that fed the West’s largest manufactured product3. It is estimated that

between 20% and 25% of all people living in England and Scotland relied on cotton, to some degree,

to earn a living. The American South was the primary provider of the raw material for these

industries, and in addition to generating considerable wealth, it created power for the South. It is

often hard for the modern reader to understand the impact of cotton on the national and world

economy, and leading historians tend to draw a parallel with the twenty-first century’s dependence

on oil. Unfortunately, this comparison does not begin to represent the level of dependence on the

import and export of cotton in the mid-1800s. In 1860, the U.S. supplied 77% of Britain’s cotton

imports4. I have been unable to find a modern commodity that comes close to the dependence of a

single importer for an economic sector so important to a major nation, given that as of 2014, oil only

represented 17.1%5. This power is what led to James Henry Hammond’s famous statement from the

floor of the U.S. Senate, “England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with

her” if the South was unable to use slave labour to produce cotton, “Cotton is King.”6.

Leading up to, and even during the better part of the war, it was the economic impact that occupied

the concerns of the British. On this issue, there is almost complete agreement between the

proposed three sectors of the British population. Thanks to Robert Huhn Jones for his 1963

catalogue of the Papers of Parliament, the correspondence between the British government and the

U.S. Federal government can be examined, and reveals the leading topic was the interruption of

trade7.

3 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, p. xvi.

4 Ibid, p. 243.

5 Annualized Barrels (1Million) per day of consumption 18.1 and single supplier of 3.1 from Canada,

resulting in 17.1% Source: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm. 6 Ibid p. 224.

7 Jones, Robert Huhn. "The American Civil War in the British Sessional Papers." Proceesings of the American

Philosophical Society, Oct 1963: 415-426.

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Lord Lyons, the British envoy to the U.S., was focused on the interruption of commerce once the

Union blockade was announced. The greatly improved relationship between the U.S. and Britain,

which had developed in the two years prior, quickly became strained as the blockade took effect. In

his correspondence with Lord Russell, the British Foreign Minister, Lyons points out the repeated

problems with communication from the U.S. Secretary of State, William Seward, and inconsistencies

with the implementation of the blockade8.

Unlike their American counterparts, the British politicians expected a lengthy war. In a review of the

Commercial Reports presented to both houses of Parliament for 1861, several notes refer to the

expectation of the conflict being “one of long duration”9. As expected, the prices of southern cotton

increased dramatically over the course of the war. However, the impact was not initially felt inside

Britain due to the glut of stored raw and finished cotton, which had been secured in the time leading

up to the war. By the end of 1862, the effects would be devastating to some regions of the United

Kingdom.

Perhaps the best known economic example was the Lancashire Cotton Famine. The Lancashire area,

heavily dependent on cotton production, experienced a collapse of their economy. According to

poor relief statics provided to Parliament, relief numbers went from 6.1% of able bodied men in

1861, to a peak of 25.6% in 1862, and remained at 19% by the end of 186410. The damage caused by

the Union blockade was the overarching issue discussed in the newspapers of the period11. At the

same time, local economies that supplied shipbuilding, munitions, and supplies profited from, and

supported, the South during this period12 13 . The economic impact of the American Civil War

8 House of Commons. Correspondence with the United States Government Respecting Blockade. London: H.M.

Stationery Office, 1861. 9 House of Commons. Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls. The

Foreign Office, House of Commons, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1862 p.331. 10

House of Commons. Distress in the Cotton Manfacturing Districts. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1864. 11

Brief survey of the Scotsman, Examiner (London) and Irish Times via ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 12

Ural, Susannah J. Civil War Citizens. NY: New York University, 2010. 13

Dubrulle, Hugh. "We Are Threatened with...Anarchy and Ruin." Albion, 2001: 583-613.

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generated political pressures on the government from the start, and can be seen in the responses

from all levels of society.

Political and Diplomatic The pressure of the damaged economy influenced the British political and diplomatic policy with

both the Union and Confederacy. As with the economic issues, the response and motives changed as

the war progressed.

Neutrality

In 1861, the Confederacy (C.S.A.) sought two things from Britain: first, to be recognized as an

independent country and second; to secure British support and intervention for their cause. During

the same year the South sent a commission to London to officially argue their case. Because of the

cotton trade, the South had strong ties to Britain at the start of the war. Areas such as Liverpool,

Glasgow and London were the first places from which the new Confederacy sought European

support14 15. To study the nationalism claim, as proposed by Faust16, Bonner17, and Neem18, it is

important to qualify what “recognized as an independent country” implied in the context of British

politics. It is in this analysis that two important events of the conflict highlight the dimensions that

separate the British policy makers from the category of elite, traditionally assigned by historians.

As Doyle notes, “The slaveholders’ rebellion, as many viewed it from abroad, was part of the same

counterrevolution that had defeated the will of the people in Europe”19. He further highlights the

practical strength of the British aristocracy in the government, while placing the idea of democratic

republics as “unstable and given to mob rule”20. This assertion was more than an attitude towards

14

Sebrell, Thomas E. "The American Civil War in Britain." Essential Civil War Curriculum. 2014. http://www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com/ (accessed 3 2015). 15

Leigh, Philip. Trading with the Enemy. Yardley,PA: Westholme, 2014. 16

Faust, Drew Gilpin. Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State, 1988. 17

Bonner, Robert E. Mastering America Southern Slaverholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood. Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2009. 18

Neem, Hohann N. "American History in a Global Age." History and Theory 50, no. 1 (Feb 2011): 41-70 19

Doyle, Don H. "The Global Civil War." In A Companion to the U.S. Civil War, by Aaron Sheehan-Dean, 1103-1120. Jogn Wiley & Sons, 2014 p. 1104. 20

Ibid.

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the ideology; there is a practical dimension that addressed issues active in Britain, at the time. The

industrialization, and resulting urbanization, of Britain created new pressures for the extension of

suffrage rights to a greater portion of the social structure. The Irish Question contained many of the

same political complaints that the Confederacy made against the Union. While the people were

fatigued from the continuous European strife, social unrest still remained a powder keg for the

country.

Regardless of the economic stress, Queen and Consul had to respond in a manner that would not

create precedent or open new fronts of internal conflict; a clear point of departure from the upper

and business classes with which they are often combined. Perceived support of Southern slavery

would have created international and domestic pressure; however, this issue was addressed in

Russell’s first meeting with William Yancey of the Sothern delegation. Russell expressed concern

over the South reviving the slave-trade (with Africa), and this being unacceptable to Britain21.

Yancey’s response cited the new constitution forbidding the re-emergence of the trade and asserted

that the new nation had no intent of resuming the slave trade. While Russell does not seem

convinced, it did provide political cover for later actions. It was the Union’s response to the

secession that provided Britain with a diplomatic option on the issue. While Lincoln declared the

South’s activities an insurrection, the establishment of the blockade of the entire southern coastline

allowed for the legal recognition of the South as a belligerent, with Britain declaring its neutrality.

By using international law, the C.S.A. was given the standing to obtain funding, ships, weapons and

safe harbour, while not forcing Britain on the issue of nationhood.

The resolution was not satisfactory to either American party. While the C.S.A .publically declared

the result a victory and positioned the status as a part of a path to full recognition,22 internally,

Jefferson Davis became aware that the ‘King Cotton’ approach would not result in the international

21

Parliamentary Papers. "War in America." New York Times. Feb 26, 1862. http://perma.cc/VH3C-87ZL (accessed 3 26, 2015). 22

McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford Press, 1988 p. 389.

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acceptance of the C.S.A. By 1863, the unofficial relationship between the Confederacy and the UK

would dissolve with the removal of British Consuls, when Davis demanded that proper diplomatic

papers be presented by Consul Moore, exequatur in Richmond, for any further discussion regarding

British nationals23. The exchange of official documents would have established a de facto

recognition, and therefore, Moore declined and withdrew.

The Union response was immediate, and led to the second major foreign diplomatic event that

would shape Britain’s interaction over the course of the war. While the U.S. had exchanged

diplomatic missions with Great Britain, they did not have a full time diplomatic group stationed in

the UK. President Lincoln assigned Charles Adams, son of President John Quincy Adams, a skilled

diplomat who had lived in London, as the head of the U.S. delegation to London, thus creating a

contrasting figure to the C.S.A.’s Yancey.

Seward, a man known for indelicate public responses to issues, was outraged at the declaration of

neutrality24. He wrote to Adams and demanded that the Queen retract her standing and break off

communication with the South, or there would be war between the U.S. and Britain. Lincoln

tempered the message and instructed Adams to use his diplomatic skills to address the issue. While

both Yancey and Adams were unknown to Russell, it was Adams who was able to neutralize the

situation, while establishing what would become an enduring relationship with Russell25.

It was the developing relationship between Adams and Russell that would head-off another

diplomatic conflict a few months later. In November of 1861, the seizure of two C.S.A. diplomats on

the British ship Trent would bring the UK to the brink of war with the Union. This violation of

international law hardened the opinions of both the public and elite against the Union. It was the

outrage of Britain over the violation of their national rights and the risk of war, that caused the

envoys to be released and the US to declare the action unauthorised. The final resolution did little

23

House of Commons. Correspondence respecting the removal of British consuls from the So-Style Confederate Satates of America. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1864. 24

McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p.388. 25

Ibid.

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to change the public opinion of either nation, but it did diffuse the diplomatic tension between the

two nations. Conflicts would still occur26, but the foundation for diplomatic solutions had been

made, and the threat of immediate military action was greatly diminished.

Returning to the idea of the failure of the democratic republic, Britain had concerns over the

potential of a shift in European power due to the Civil War. By the end of the first year of the war,

France had already taken steps to reassert direct European power in the Americas via the Mexican

Maximillian Affair (1861). Seward’s threat over Britain’s stance on neutrality highlighted the risk

that a divided U.S. offered, and the British Government recognized the potential for change in the

region. Anti-American and Anglophobic rhetoric was common in newspapers from both countries

and international pressures opened the possibility of the collapse of the longest standing democratic

republic. The collapse was seen by some aristocrats as inevitable, but presented the government

with a litany of new problems and chaos27 28. Immediate gains had to be weighed with long term

risks for Britain’s worldwide endeavours.

Intervention

By the autumn of 1862, no significant progress towards resolution had occurred in the American

conflict. France and Germany were pressing the option of a unified European intervention and

American newspapers were picking up the story as support for the South29. John Roebuck, in a

speech to Parliament in 1861, spoke out in clear support of the South as “Honorary Englishmen”, in

contrast to the immigrants of the North he considered, “the scum and refuse of Europe”30. William

Gregory, MP from County Galway, Ireland, had proposed full support of the South to Parliament

from the start, but was now withdrawn; as it had become clear the establishment actually favoured

26

Examples, such as the Labran seizure, the supplying of Alabama and Florida, etc., show a continuous stream of conflict between the two nations. 27

Doyle, Cause of all Nations. 28

Foreman, Amanda. A World on Fire. NY: Random House, 2010. 29

House of Commons. Dispatch Respecting the Civil War in North America. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1863. 30

J.A. Roebuck, Robert Eadon. "Life and Letters of John Arthur Roebuck, P.C.,Q.C., M.P." Archive. 1897. http://perma.cc/NS5X-AT2D (accessed MAR 28, 2015).

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the North31. As Jones notes, this shift had little to do with sympathy, but rather protection of Britain

and her interests.

As European mediation was being debated, Lincoln changed the tone of the war with the

Emancipation Proclamation. The debate over the interruption of commerce argued by the French

and British no longer stood as the reason for intervention, and the formal attempt was abandoned.

The introduction of emancipation gave all elements of Britain a fresh and concise goal for the

Union’s action. The new policy allowed the formation of what would become the oft cited dual

position of the British population.

Analysis Examples of excellent research argue for an array of positions. Susanna Foreman maintains a

bimodal distribution system of engaging Britain's role in the ACW. She provides examples and

analysis to support why the upper strata of the UK supported the South32. She does not separate

two important issues: the stated cause for Southern independence from slavery, and the separation

of public figures from the actual policy makers. Policy makers might have held individual opinions,

but their actions form a distinct set of events that can be studied with the perspective of the

conflicting social, economic and political benefits for Great Britain.

Popular support for the Union can be seen as isolated events from the beginning. As noted by

Adams after the 1862 Hyde Park riot, the general population stood strongly against the issue of

slavery, noting the only strong support for the South to be with the “aristocracy and commercial

body”33. The perceived lack of support is best summarized by Giuseppe Garibaldi’s question: why

was America waging war against the slaveholders’ rebellion without waging war against slavery?34 It

is when the Emancipation Proclamation was reported in Britain that the traditional view of public

support for the Union cause takes form. The argument can be made that, until 1863, any sympathy

31

Jones, Howard. Union in Peril. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 1992 p.54. 32

Foreman, A World on Fire 33

Doyle, The Cause of all Nations, p.232. 34

Ibid, P. 210.

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from the common class was for emancipation, with nearly equal disdain for both combatants; the

Union, for imposing hardship and arrogance in their dealings with Britain, and the Confederacy for

slave holding and rhetoric surrounding upper-class rights.

In December 1865, the Scotsman ran a series of articles about the recovery of the U.S.35 In this

publication can be seen the beginnings of the story that would form the memory of both the Civil

War and Britain’s role in the nation-changing event. The conversion of slaves to free workers was

about the opportunity for education, the inability of the lower classes to fend for themselves, and

the racial tones of the non-Anglo being rife with social problems36. The need for investment in the

reconstruction of the South to provide cotton, combined with the increased demand on the

available resources of the North offered returns for those who could invest. For the common man,

there was opportunity for white immigrants to replace the black slave, who would not endure under

the new system.

Conclusion It is simple to see how the two group approach developed in the historical memory of the war. By

the end of the war, with the popular opinion focused on emancipation of the slave and successful

reunification of the democratic republic, the narrative would have folded nicely into the causes of

suffrage and labour rights in the U.K. The torrent of speeches from upper-class men at the war’s

start, in support of plantation owners had dwindled, but the memory remained in both the U.K. and

recovering U.S. populations. Research using the two category approach can yield substantial and

enlightening works such as Foreman’s recent publication. However, by ending the discussion there,

a wealth of knowledge is abandoned that could further explore how populations responded to

conflict and developed official, and unofficial, reactions as non-belligerents. The neutrality of Britain

is often the opening introduction to explain the U.K. response to the American Civil War and within

the same paragraph, if not the same sentence, the country is broken into the two established

35

The Scotsman. "America after the War." The Scotsman, Dec 18, 1865 p. 5. 36

This extended beyond the black slave, to include the misapplication of race as a biological category, and assign social and intellectual constraints on groups.

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groups. The evidence supports the further need to study the policy makers who implemented

neutrality as a distinct group responding to the changes in international and domestic events.

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Bibliography Beckert, Sven. Empire of Cotton. New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 2014.

Bonner, Robert E. Mastering America Southern Slaverholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood.

Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2009.

Doyle, Don H. The Cause of All Nations. NY: Pereus Books, 2015.

Doyle, Don H. "The Global Civil War." In A Companion to the U.S. Civil War, by Aaron Sheehan-Dean,

1103-1120. Jogn Wiley & Sons, 2014.

Dubrulle, Hugh. "We Are Threatened with...Anarchy and Ruin." Albion, 2001: 583-613.

Faust, Drew Gilpin. Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South.

Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State, 1988.

Foreman, Amanda. A World on Fire. NY: Random House, 2010.

House of Commons. Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls.

The Foreign Office, House of Commons, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1862.

House of Commons. Correspondence respecting the removal of British consuls from the So-Style

Confederatr Satates of America. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1864.

House of Commons. Correspondence with the United States Government Respecting Blockade.

London: H.M., 1861.

House of Commons. Dispatch Respecting the Civil War in North America. London: H.M. Stationery

Office, 1863.

House of Commons. Distress in the Cotton Manfacturing Districts. London: H.M. Stationery Office,

1864.

J.A. Roebuck, Robert Eadon. "Life and Letters of John Arthur Roebuck, P.C.,Q.C., M.P." Archive. 1897.

http://perma.cc/NS5X-AT2D (accessed MAR 28, 2015).

Jones, Howard. Union in Peril. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 1992.

Jones, Robert Huhn. "The American Civil War in the British Sessional Papers." Proceesings of the

American Philosophical Society, Oct 1963: 415-426.

Leigh, Philip. Trading with the Enemy. Yardley,PA: Westholme, 2014.

McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford Press, 1988.

Neem, Hohann N. "American History in a Global Age." History and Theory 50, no. 1 (Feb 2011): 41-

70.

Parliamentary Papers. "War in America." New York Times. Feb 26, 1862. http://perma.cc/VH3C-87ZL

(accessed 3 26, 2015).

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Sebrell, Thomas E. "The American Civil War in Britain." Essential Civil War Curriculum. 2014.

http://www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com/ (accessed 3 2015).

The Scotsman. "America After The War." The Scotsman, Dec 18, 1865: 5.

Ural, Susannah J. Civil War Citizens. NY: New York University, 2010.