the child realize his potentialities."59 For Fromm, educa - Opus4

169

B. Fromm: Self-Actualization arid Adjustmentof Human Needs

Fromm accepts an idealized version of the reflective

theory of schooling. He insists that the schools should

transmit prevailing cultural knowledge to the younger gener

ation, but that knowledge should be that which is most in

dispensable to humanistic growth and self-actualization.

"Education means to acquaint the young with the best heritage

of the human race," but it is also "identical with helping

the child realize his potentialities."59 For Fromm, education serves primarily to develop character and to prepare

for individual change. In a word, education should be a

rational existential exercise in which one actualizes his

potentiality while free of interference or manipulation from

59Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. I76; andMan for Himself, p. 207. Fromm deals with the etymologicalimplications of the term "education" in the following way:"The root of the word education is e-ducere, literally, tolead forth, or to bring out something which is potentiallypresent. Education in this sense results in existence,which means literally to stand out, to have emerged from thestate of potentiality into that of manifest reality." Ibid.,p. 207n. Once again, Fromm is extremely eclectic in his the-oretical foundations; he begins with an Aristotelian base andends in a popular form of existential psychology.

°°"To recognize the truth is not primarily a matterof intelligence, but a matter of character." Fromm, Beyondthe Chains of Illusion, p. 180.

Devitis, J. L., 1972: The Concept of Repression in the Social and Educational Thought of Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, University of Illinois Dissertation 1972, 253 pp.

Propriety of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of material prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder.

Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentlichungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers.

170

external sources. "The individual should not be subject to

any purposes external to his own growth or happiness."

This characterization evidences the essential tenu-

ousness of Fromm's educational objectives. First, Fromm as

sumes the existence of a distinctive degree of individual

autonomy. Secondly, and in a related manner, he seems to

believe that social and political repressions are not so de

cisive as to alter the course of education for self-

actualization. The truly educated man can climb and over

come the crag; he need only be serious and dedicated while

activating his soul or spirit. Thus, according to Irving L.

Horowitz, "By subjectivizing the relation between repression

and belief, . . . Fromm turns psychoanalysis into social ad

justment. Self-actualization and Introspective insight,

concepts peculiarly suited to the ethos of an educated mid-

69die class, becomes the dominant motif."

In essence, Fromm searches after an Aristotelian

golden mean in his educational theory; he desires to har

monize man's rational, moral, and emotive interests. One

who balances rational self-cultivation of his needs with

sound moral virtue will naturally develop a healthy person

ality. Education should not be too rational; for excessive

cerebration makes for alienated, unreal experience and

Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 122.

Irving Louis Horowitz, Philosophy, Science, and theSociology of Knowledge (Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas,1961), pp. 74-75-




171

militates against spontaneity. 3 Nor should it be made into

a mere receptacle of useful knowledge, as Fromm claims is

now the case. Instead education should acquire "a new unity

of heart and mind." A genuinely liberal education provides

a key to the growth of human powers; it breeds the "free,

rational, and active (contemplative) man [who] is the good

and accordingly the happy person. 5

Thus, Fromm modifies the traditional view of school

ing as a pathway to success by establishing an axiological

priority in favor of more intangible, i.e., spiritual, con

cerns. In the Frommian scheme, the school offers a "success

route" to the soul, what Fromm terms "to be," rather than to

any extrinsic reward, or incentive "to have." The well

tuned productive personality, like the model Aristotelian

man, refines himself to the point that rational and virtuous

3Fromm, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," pp.108-110.

fi4Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, pp. 119-120. For a

concise statement of Aristotle's view of education and self-realization, see Robert S. Brumbaugh and Nathaniel M. Lawrence, Philosophers on Education: Six Essays on theFoundations of Western Thought (Boston: Houghton Miff1inCo., 1963;, ch. 3. As Brumbaugh and Lawrence put it,Aristotle ""holds that excellence of moral character liessomewhere in a mean between extremes of repression and uninhibited expression of all passions and appetites." Ibid.,p. 65. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, §1105bI7-1108b10.Fromm also allows for a mixture of spontaneity and delay ofimmediate gratification.

-'Fromm, Man for Himself, pp. 25-26. Here Fromm isexplicitly paraphrasing Aristotle's ethical theory.

Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 29.




172

decision making becomes an integral part of his character

structure. Once again, Fromm presumes that a strong per

son can stand up against any repressive pressures. For that

reason his educational philosophy appeals chiefly to those

who already have mastery over material conditions. They do

not have to deal with problems of "having"; they can afford

a stoic effort to make existence seem sublime.

In terms of child rearing, Fromm speaks of a rela

tively smooth educational transaction between the family and

society. He sees a basic adaptibility in human needs be

cause he views man from the perspective of middle-class

attitudes. It is important that the "significant persons"67

in a child's life have faith in his potentialities. Fol

lowing the imitative model of Aristotelian moral education,

the child will employ them as moral exemplars in his strug

gle for social adjustment. Indeed, Fromm's entire discussion

of conflict between parents and children reads like a

psychological recipe:

^7Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 207; and The Art afLoving, pp. 104-10"5~! White middle-class liberalism similarly permits Daniel P. Moynihan to criticize a presumedlack of moral fiber and stability in poor black families..Moynihan suggests an idealized Classical Liberal solutionto social problems which blacks may be meeting more realistically in terms of their pwn needs' and desires. SeeMoynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Labor, U. S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, I965.)




173

Guiit feelings . . . result from the experience of notpleasing one's parents. Sometimes the child's feelingof guilt is attached to the fact of his not loving theparents sufficiently, particularly when the parents expect to.be the focus of the child's feelings. Sometimes it arises from the fear of having disappointedparental expectations.68

Fromm also criticizes progressive education for its substi

tution of anonymous for overt authority. For instance, pro

gressive teachers use the cloak of common sense, science, and

psychological formulae as subtle forms of coercion; e.g.,

"don't do this" or "you will not like to do this." 9 (Fromm

fails to acknowledge that these pedagogical methods are often

used in middle-class classrooms.)

For all intents and purposes, Fromm is not unlike

the Classical Liberal educator who largely leaves the child

to his personal resources and endowments; i.e., to fight for

the "freedom to be himself..70

For Fromm is a fundamental

Voluntarist; he literally believes that there is a motive

force in man which gives him the potential to resist ex

ternal controls. Unfortunately, according to Fromm, some

men are better equipped than others to actualize that es

sential drive. "For some children the battle for freedom

68.

69T

Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 153.

Ibid., p. 156.

7 Ibid., p. I57. Fromm pictures the economic liberalphilosophers, e.g., Adam Smith and David Ricardo, as basically "humanistic" in their stand for individual freedom andagainst governmental interference. Fromm and Xirau, pp.11-12.




174

will be more successful than for others, although only a few

Succeed entirely."7 The successes and failures still re

main, no matter what the system. Ironically, however,

whereas some proponents of the present educational system

might tend to pinpoint external factors of repression as

among the root causes of failure, Fromm places the blame

squarely on the defenseless child. Hence, his humanism has

a cruel and misguided sense of moral accountability. This

is the very dilemma which Marcuse claimed humanitarian72

teachers, with their good intentions, could never resolve.'

If Fromm.'had any choice in educational affairs, he

would recommend a kind of private tutorial arrangement be

tween master and student. This preference reflects his

psychoanalytic and Zen Buddhist interests; he assumes that

they ideally embody rational authority. As the student

grows toward enlightenment, the master's power and influence

would steadily diminish. At the apex of educational experi

ence, the two participants would theoretically become, in

7 Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 157.

"^See Chapter III, supra. Fromm castigates Freud'snotion that the child is inherently vicious, a belief atleast as old as St. Augustine. Fromm, The ForgottenLanguage, pp. 53-57; and Escape from Freedom, pp. 70, 87.Though Freud's social controls appear unnecessarily repressive, they also enable the child to grope with social realities to a far greater extent than does Fromm's onlysuperficially softer moralism.




175

Tolstoy's word, "codisciples."73 Nevertheless, Fromm un

knowingly duplicates the same error as that of progressive

educators: he establishes a priori guidelines in the name

74of which the student is made to proceed.' In his subtly

repressive pedagogy, Fromm again enlists the support of

his own rational and spiritual standards of value.

First of all, Fromm emphasizes the rational com

ponents of the learning process: "the practice of [any]

art requires discipline," not simply curiosity. •* This

prescription becomes translated as "self-discipline," as

opposed to that kind of discipline which is "enforced by

73Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 120; and TheArt of Loving, p. 21. In contradistinction. Marcuse concurs with Durkheim and Mannheim in maintaining thedominance-submission model of teacher-student relationsfrom beginning to end. Cf. Durkheim, Education andSociology, pp. 85-90; and Mannheim, An Introduction to theSociology of Education, ed. W.A.C. Stewart (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, I962), pp. 134-142.

74'Jean-Paul Sartre makes a similar argument

against standard justifications of liberal arts programs. In his conception of radical freedom, Sartrequestions whether such programs, given their implicit prescriptions, are either "liberal" or "free." Sartre, Beingand Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology,trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library,1956), p. 409. J

TC i'"Tromm's argument recalls Alfred North White

head's notion of the educative concomitance of "discipline" and "romance." Both Fromm and Whitehead conceiveof education in terms of idealized growth, though the latter's concept of creative experience makes his characterization appear more open-ended. Frommian discipline andgrowth is bound, as it were, to.a predestined locus: thehumanistic telos. Cf. Whitehead, The Aims of Education,second ed. (London: Williams and-Norgate, 1950), pp. T-2,24-44, 48-65-




176

irrational [external] authority." In other words, rational

discipline is self-imposed in the Kantian sense of the term;

i.e., any rules of conduct are presumably grounded in one's

own faculties of volition and cognition. Concentration is

necessary as a tamer of man's ambient extra-rational will;

without it, "life becomes shattered [and] chaotic." Final

ly, the self-reliant pupil must have patience if he ever ex

pects to achieve anything of value. In basic agreement with

Freud, Fromm contends that man must stoically defer present76satisfactions for future, more transcendent, fulfillment.'

As a secondary priority, Fromm considers the

emotional aspects of education. In fact, for Fromm,

the affective realm is an inseparable part of the ra-

tiocinative. A clean split between the intellectual

and emotional spheres would engender schizophrenic possi

bilities.77 Fromm desires a stable equilibrium for one's

psyche. The price paid for such security is a stolid re

pression of one's instinctual desires. For example, despite

his generous praise of A. S. Neill's Summerhill, Fromm

contends that

Neill somewhat underestimates the importance, pleasure,and authenticity of an intellectual in favor of an artistic and emotional grasp of the world. Furthermore,the author [Neill] is, steeped in the assumptions of

7°Fromm, The Art x>f Loving, pp. 90-92. At bottom,Fromm believes that only .reason can save man from self-destruction. Fromm, Beyond'the Chains of Illusion, p. 179.

^Fromm, The Revolution of HOpe, pp. 40-44.




177

Freud; and as I see it, he somewhat overestimates thesignificance of sex, as Freudians tend to do.7°

Fromm would rather concentrate on what he sees as the

rational and moral contributions of Summerhillian pedagogy:

"Children reared by such methods will develop within them

selves the qualities of reason, love, integrity, and courage79which are the goals of the Western humanistic tradition."'7

However, by his own admission, Neill has always been closer

to Reich than to Freud.80 Though Neill presents little sys

tematic social critique, he would tend to argue that Western

81reason and morality has in no way liberated the child. In

short, Fromm seems to superimpose his own Freudian blinders

on Neill's analysis.

78Fromm, "Foreword," in A. S. Neill, Summerhill: ARadical Approach to Child Rearing (New York: Hart Publishing Co., I960), p. xv. Fromm remarkably de-emphasizes sexual drives. As Reich notices, "Fromm . . . [in his matureyears] managed to disregard completely the sexual problem ofmasses of people and its relationship to the fear of freedomand craving for authority . . . [Indeed,] sexual negationinboth social and personal life plays many a trick that is inaccessible to rational understanding." Reich, The MassPsychology of Fascism, p. 219-

79Fromm, "Foreword," in Neill, p. xvi.

80A. S. Neill, ibid., pp. 131, 159, 2O7.81Ibid., p. 28: "All the wonderful labs and work

shops [of the world] do nothing to help [the child] ...surmount the emotional damage and the social evils bred bythe pressure on him from his parents, his schoolteachers,and the pressure of the coercive qualities of ourcivilization."




178

In light of his stoic and transcendent aims, Fromm

has good and sufficient reason to play down instinctual

urges. Even if the child cannot be free, Fromm insists that

he can be made to feel free. To develop freedom as a state

of mind, man must learn to adjust his needs to the hardships

of the status quo; in that struggle, he will attain tran

scendence. Moral resignation is Fromm's response to a re

pressive world. Passive, yet resolute, acceptance is his

answer to any societal irrationality. Unlike Marcuse, he

implicitly educates men to tolerate the intolerant. Fromm

suggests that one must acknowledge his facticity before he

can legitimately question existing authority. This is the

mark of a truly rational man:

The faculty to think objectively is reason; theemotional attitude behind reason is that of humility.To be objective, to use one's reason, is possible onlyif one has achieved an attitude of humility, if one hasemerged from the dreams of omniscience and omnipotencewhich one has as a child.82

In the end, the rational person is liberated by the subjective

power of his mature moral character.

This conclusion demonstrates the dangerously thread

bare nature of Fromm's notion of spontaneity. According to

Fromm, "spontaneity" refers to the free expression of one's

inner thoughts and feelings. By definition, Fromm grounds

his concept in subjectivistic, psychological categories.

"Spontaneous activity is free activity of the self and

goFromm, The Art of Loving, p. 101.




179

implies, psychologically, what the Latin root of the word,

sponte, means literally: of one's free will." Fromm also

stipulates that "freedom from external authority is a last

ing gain only if the inner psychological conditions are such

that we are able to establish our own individuality." Thus,

Fromm neglects to add that the boundary conditions of free

dom and spontaneity are contained within external circum

stances. Given his premises and omissions, his idea of

spontaneity is encapsulated, as it were, in an empty vessel:

"what matters is the activity as such, the process and not

the result." Once the child's feelings of exhilaration sub

side, his last hurrah betokens no definite achievement of

freedom. Rather, it simulates the lost hope of freedom, a

detour away from any collision with external social

restraints. -'

To traverse such a route to freedom, one would have

to accept certain beliefs as pure articles of faith. In

83Fromm, Escape from Freedom, pp. 241, 258, 262.Marcuse would criticize Fromm on similar grounds: 'Education offers still another example of spurious, abstracttolerance in the guise of concre'teness and truth: it isepitomized in the concept of self-actualization . . . Frequently brushed aside is the question as to what has to berepressed before one can be a self, onself. The individualpotential is first a negative one, a portion of the potential of his society: of aggression, guilt feeling, ignorance, resentment, cruelty which vitiate his life instincts

The publicity of self-actualization promotes . . . existence in that immediacy which, in a repressive society, is(to use another Hegelian term) bad immediacy (schlechteUnmittelbarkeit)." Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance, pp.115-U4.




180

Fromm's ethical system, a full creed of faith is already

foreordained. As if faith were a kind of innate idea writ

large on a lucky pre-destined group of mankind, Fromm main

tains that "most children are born with faith." This "orig

inal faith" is nurtured in motherly love. Once it is

shattered, the child must react positively; i.e., he must

come to approach reality with a sense of self-responsibility.

Those who fail to perform this moral function eventually end

their lives "in complete hopelessness or in complete cyni

cism." Once more, Fromm contends that child and man alike

bear a moral obligation to withstand those disappointments

84which they neither create nor control.

For Fromm, rational faith is the exact opposite of

power or control (irrational faith); it is rooted in inner

productiveness. If faith is genuine, it acts as an internal

guide to transcendent experience. Real faith also requires

courage; i.e., the ability to risk personal pain and to

avoid any temptation to dominate others. It is the pres

ence of such faith that distinguishes between education and

manipulation. The former builds self-worth and a.belief in

the potentialities of one-*s fellow men. Fromm thus estab

lishes a kind of compassionate bond for his teacher-student

relationship—a rather scarce commodity in a world inhibited85by bureaucratic and sundry other external repressions.

81*Fromm, in Heffner, 133, 213-

85Fromm, Man for Himself, pp. 207-209; and The Artof Loving, pp. 103-106. Cf. Martin Buber, Between Man andMan, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegal Paul, 1947),




181

Applied to schooling, Fromm's conception of rational

faith leads almost imperceptibly to a subtle process of so

cialization. Fromm wants all men to share a common experi

ence, to express their presumed mutual aspirations and val

ues. Accordingly, he formulates the notion of "rational

ritual," which he characterizes as a symbolic manifestation

86of communion in humanistic conscience. Indeed, Fromm

claims that such rituals are becoming "widely and meaning

fully accepted"; e.g., in the common silence of Friends'

p. 90: "[The teacher] fails the recipient when he presentshis selection to him with a gesture of interference; it mustbe concentrated in him." Buber indicates that educationshould ideally represent an indicative offering rather thana declarative order. However, for Fromm, the teaching actinvolves less personal spiritual autonomy than it does forBuber. Frommian pedagogy is primarily a matter ofinterpersonal empathy: "[Empathy implies] that I expe-rience within myself what he [the student] experiences.This is a relatedness which is not from the 'I' to the 'thou'but one which is characterized by the phrase: I am thou(Tat Twam Asi)." Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 82.Fromm and Buber treat education essentially as characterdevelopment,

ggFromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion; pp. 108-109.

William F. Ogburn uses recreation as ritual for culturaladaptation. He attempts to distinguish between "sublimated"and "substituted" activity. The former denotes an internalchange in character; the latter, a manipulation of externaTcircumstances "with no fundamental change in the personali-ty." Ogburn, Social Change-: With Respect to Culture andOriginal Nature (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1922), pp. 356f.Given the context of social determinants, these terms wouldbe difficult to grant. In any case, Fromm would appear toadvocate sublimation in his rational rituals.




182

meetings and in nonviolent demonstrations for peace. 7 He

suggests that rational rituals can generate humane perspec-

88tives through religious and aesthetic education. These

rituals would seemingly provide a new cultural foundation in

"collective art," which means "to respond to the world with

our senses in a meaningful, skilled, productive, active,

shared way." 9

Although Fromm falls short of proposing any organized

program for large-scale social education, one might infer

such a plan from some of his observations in The Sane

7Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 145. Marcuse,of course, would argue that the forces of social dominationpermit such "rational" rituals simply because they are relatively harmless to the status quo. He would regard them asprime examples of repressive tolerance in action; they appease individual conscience without exploding the socialorder.

ogLoc. cit. In this claim, Marcuse would accuse

Fromm of perpetuating a bourgeois and idealist "affirmative culture" of domination, one which conceals the "physical and psychic vitiation of the individual." Marcuse, "TheAffirmative Character of Culture," in Negations, p. 98.

89Fromm, The Sane Society, pp. 347-348. Shared faithand play may also be the way to personal sublimation and social control; i.e., repression. E. A. Ross sees the schoolas a direct substitute for the declining influence of thechurch; indeed, he claims the former, as a secular agency,offers more subtle, powerful, control over the individual.Edward A. Ross, Social Control (New York: Macmillan Co.,1906), pp. 164-168, I78. Aesthetic education and recreation may produce a similar calming effect on one's daemonic id: "They permit the individual to purge himself by meansof symbolic expression of . . . wild and suppressed impulses." Robert Park and Ernest W. Burgess, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I967), p. 43. SeeSpring, pp. 2-6.




183

Society. "The task of impressing on people the guiding

ideals and norms of our civilization is, first of all, that

of education." As educational planner, Fromm hopes to cre

ate a climate conducive to the growth of humanistic con

science and rational authority. With Dewey, he believes

that education should become a microcosmic reflection of

a perfectable society.

However, Fromm realizes that schooling seldom pro

duces his ideal productive personality. Instead, it typi

cally turns out merely useful and "desireably independent"

men, those who can fit "into the mold which is needed" in

a marketing economy.9 Thus, Fromm applauds Robert Hutch-

ins' attempt to redress the imbalance between the materialist

realities and professed ideals of Western culture.92 A

humanistic education can potentially liberate the mind; but,

90Fromm, The Sane Society, p. 344. In his education

al critique, Fromm draws, upon his own idealized charactertypes: receptive (masochistic), exploitative (sadistic),hoarding (destructive), marketing (automation conformity),and productive (his ideal). All but the last exhibit tendencies toward either dependent symbiosis or deficient withdrawal. In his quasi-empirical study of ghetto education,Fromm contaminates his analysis by making the same use ofthese classifications. See Fromm and Michael Maccoby,Social Character in a Mexican Village: A SociopsyehoanalyticStudy (EnglewoOd Cliffs. N. J..- Prentice-Hall. I97O).Fromm's taxonomy of character orientations has already been

•extensively treated'in the literature of social and educational theory. See, for example, McGrath, I3-I9.

9 Fromm, The Sane Society, pp. 344-345. *Ibid., p. 345. See Robert M. Hutchins, Education

for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1943)> p. 42: "Materialism has .captured our culture. It




184

in Aurelian fashion, it can also deny a repressive social

setting. In his stoicism Fromm generally accepts the

natural-law premises which Hutchins expounds: "One [essen

tial] purpose of education is to draw out the elements of

our common human nature."93 With Durkheim, Dewey, and

Freud, Fromm approves of human diversity only within the

limitations of cultural necessity. He re-charts a progres

sive path in educational theory: "man could find full unity

within the world not by reducing awareness, but by develop

ing his reason and his love . . . [with} a sense of solidar

ity, of oneness, of harmony with the worldl"9

has captured the state. It has captured education." Cf.Fromm, "The Present Human Condition," in The Dogma ofChrist: And Other Essays on Religion, Psychology, andCulture (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, I966),pT 106: "[Man] must emerge from a materialistic orientationand arrive at a level where spiritual values—love, truth,and justice—truly become of ultimate concern to him." But,in Myrdalian manner, Fromm warns that progress must takeplace in all spheres of human activity at the same time.(This book was originally published by Holt, Rinehart andWinston in 1963; the cited article first appeared in TheAmerican Scholar, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Winter, I955-I956.

y3Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 66. Fromm seemsmore moralistic, less intellectual, than Hutchins. Accord-,ing to Fromm, Hutchins' sympathy for the great books curriculum appears "conventional" and "unimaginative"; i.e., hedoubts its capacity to generate conative experience. Fromm,The Revolution of Hope, p. 120. Instead of Hutchins' Civil-Ization Ot Dialogue, Fromm would prefer a more harmoniouskind of character training: "The Great Dialogue is based onthe idea that shared concern and experience are more importantthan Shared concepts." Ibid., p. 141. Hutchins is a contemplative Aristotelian; Fromm would like to be a virtuous one.

94' Fromm, in Heffner, 218. "We learn to think by observing others and by being taught by them. We develop ouremotional, intellectual, and artistic capacities under the




185

Notwithstanding certain needs for improvement, Fromm

sees a basic consonance in the interplay between school and

society. A program of meliorism can benefit all sides.

After emphasizing the importance of liberal education, Fromm

insists that there need be no separation of theoretical and

practical knowledge. Paradoxically, he intends to mitigate

alienated work and thought by adapting human needs to exist

ing social requirements.9-5 While only thinly veiling his

personal preference for the liberal arts, Fromm would com

bine theory with practice in the following way: "for the

young people, practical work should be secondary to theo

retical instruction; for the people beyond school age, it

influence of contact with the accumulation of knowledge andartistic achievement that created society." Fromm, TheForgotten Language, p. 32. Cf. Dewey, The School ana"Society^ rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1923), p. 11: "... [Reflecting] the primal necessities ofhuman life . . . the school itself shall be made a genuineform of active community life . . . [For society] is a number of people held together because they are working alongcommon lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims. The common needs and aims demand a growing interchange of thought and growing unity of sympathetic feeling."In short, Fromm and Dewey redirect individual libidinal energy to meet the needs of cultural stability.

95Fromm, The Sane Society, p. 345. Whereas Frommtends to affirm given cultural necessities, Marcuse seeksto negate and revolutionize them. Marcuse contends that thecycle of alienated work and thought can be broken and replaced only in a qualitatively different, i.e., a truly socialist, society—"a possible [utopian] society in whichwork becomes play, a society in which even socially necessary labor can be organized in harmony with the liberated,genuine needs of men." Marcuse, "The End of Utopia," inFive Lectures, p. 68.




186

should be the reverse; but at no age of development would

the two spheres be separated from each other.Il9^ Possibili

ties for adult education must also be broadened; one should

be free to study in his mature leisure years, to learn a new

occupation. Though Fromm is concerned about excessive con

sumption and the human costs of relentless economic produc

tion, he grants that societal needs must be met at the same

time. In the process, man will better himself: "the skilled

worker, the good professional . . . [indeed] anyone who of

fers services that are useful and necessary has an opportun

ity to be honest and happy."97

The superficial beauty and substantial tragedy of

Fromm's socio-educational prospectus lies precisely in its

passion to adjust and assimilate all elements of human life:

Qg^Fromm, The Sane Society, p. 345. In terms of spe

cific course offerings, Fromm would recommend philosophy,psychology, sociology, history, and anthropology—all ofwhich", taken together, reflect his personal eclectic inter-

_ests. Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. 120.

97•"Fromm, in Heffner, 214. Fromm's assimilation of

service, schooling, and happiness is remindful of Dewey'smethods at the Chicago Laboratory School: "Production was amatter of immediate and personal concern in which [children]participated. Consequently, they were trained in habits oforder and industry, in the idea of responsibility, of obligation to do something and to produce something in theworld. Something always needed to be done and it was necessary that one should do his part faithfully and in cooperation with others." Morton and Lucia White, The IntellectualVersus the City: From Thomas Jefferson to Frank LloydWright (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and theM.I.T. Press, I962), p. 169. Cf. Dewey, The School andSociety, pp. 7-8.




187

The needs [of more humane forms of social consumption] are clear. ... A partial list of activitieswould include: a reconstruction of much of the nation's living space (millions of new housing units), avast expansion and improvement in public education andpublic health, development of urban and intercity systems of public transportation, tens of thousands ofsmall and large recreation projects in American communities (parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, etc.), amajor beginning in the development of cultural lifebringing drama, music, dance, painting, movie making,etc., into hundreds of thousands of communities andmillions of lives which currently have no real sense ofthis dimension of human existence.98

Fromm forgets to step back from his society in order to ob

tain adequate critical perspective. He largely accepts the

given social structure in its negative totality. Fromm's

"revolutionary character" assumes a transcendence of society

from the standpoint of reason and humanity,99 a standard

which bears severe social scars even as it begins its fan

tastical journey into light. For Fromm, "radical doubt"

signifies simply a dialectical question, not an actual nega

tion; its end is an affirmative synthesis of the present

98Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, p. I38. As Marcuse

• insists any "well-trained classicist" should know, "Fulfillment becomes meaningless if everything is one, and one iseverything." Marcuse, "Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman0. Brown," in Negations, p. 237. Any modern common schoolreformer should also recognize the potential destructioncaused by his well-intentioned moral earnestness.

99"Fromm, "The Revolutionary Character." in The Dogma

of Christ, pp. 162-163. (This essay was originally deliv-ered as an address to the Seventh Inter-American Congress onPsychology, held in Mexico City, December, I96I.)




188

loosociety in its purified entelechy. Its liberalism an

chored by natural-law theory and a dedication to Enlight

enment, Fromm's concept of educational and social change

100•Fromm, "Introduction," in Ivan D. Illich,

Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional-Revolution (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co.,

• 1969), p. 8. Fromm, Illich, and Freire have all learnedfrom one another at the Center for Intercultural Documentation (C.I.D.O.C.) in Cuernavaca, Mexico.

Illich acknowledges that the last chapter of hisrecent book, Deschooling Society, was born from a conversation with Fromm on Bacholen's theory of Mutterecht. (SeeChapter III, supra.) Illich, Deschooling Society (New York:Harper and Row, 1970), p. ix. Illich's conclusion, appropriately entitled "Rebirth of Epimethean Man," indeed suggests a clean and clear Frommian revolution: "Hope . . .means trusting faith in the goodness of nature . . . whileexpectation . . . means reliance on results which are plannedand controlled by man." Ibid., p. 105. As Illich furtherexplains, "Each of us is personally responsible, for his orher own deschooling, and only we have the power to do it.

' No one can be excused if he fails to liberate himself fromschooling." Ibid., pp. 47-48. In his Medieval mysticism,Illich complements Fromm's voluntaristic Classical Liberalism: man and school are seen as isolated isles, cast outand accused of all ills in a surface analysis of society.Only the strongest can survive the Myth of Unending Consumption (Illich) through psychospiritual renewal (Fromm).

Meanwhile, Fromm commends Freire's humanisticpedagogy in The Revolution of Hope (p. 121). In turn,Freire grants an indebtedness to Fromm. He makes ample useof the following Frommian notions: "necrophilic-receptive"behavior (deficient "banking," or depositing, concept of education); "fear of freedom" as an obstacle to true consciousness; and even a disguised reliance on middle-class parent-child relations which express the ambivalence of indifferenceand oppression, love and freedom. Freire, pp. 11, 56-64,152-153, 166.

Perhaps Marcuse had such a view as Fromm's inmind in making this criticism: "Liberalism believes thatthrough adaptation to . . . 'natural laws' the conflict between different wants, the strife between the general interest and private interests, as well as social inequality areultimately overcome in the all-encompassing harmony of thewhole, and that the whole thus becomes a blessing for the




189

remains essentially static and self-sufficient. Man takes a

Stand on a shaky stage; glued to hope, he is doomed to fall.

Yet there is some redeeming grace in Fromm's educa

tional and social thought. Unlike that of Marcuse, at least

8 sense of decency cushions Frommian failure. Similar to

Camus' Rebel, Fromm does not intentionally become a beast or

god to his fellow men. Indeed, he raises an important con

sideration: should man ever use other men, however brutally

or subtly, for any end—particularly one which is very dubi

ous of actual achievement? This question points to Fromm's

underlying Kantian perspective: men are never to be treated

102merely as means in a true Kingdom of Ends. This is not

simply a matter of pitting one philosophical framework

against another. Granted, on Marxian analysis, man would

individual. Here, in the center of the liberalist system,society is interpreted through its reduction to 'nature' inits harmonizing function: as the evasive justification of acontradictory social order." Marcuse, "The Struggle AgainstLiberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State," inNegations, p. 13.

Fromm is in basic concord with Kant's categoricalimperative, "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always atthe same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Workson the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1879), P- 165- Cf. Fromm,"Man Is Not a Thing," Saturday Review, Vol. XL (March 16,1957), 9-11.

With some reservations, Fromm supports Dewey'sattempt .to show an intrinsic interrelation between means andends; i.e., that each must exist in the "same reality."Fromm, Man for Himself, pp. 29-3°. Cf. Dewey, Human Natureand Conduct, pp. 34f.




190

not readily be in a position to decide whether he should

treat others as means to an end. He himself would be under

heavy, but not total, deterministic pressures. However, one

of Marcuse's major intentions is to amplify Marx's notion of

subjective consciousness, to unlock the fetters of that

"pure form of servitude: to exist as an instrument, as a

thing." 3 Despite his implicit adoption of Kant's imperative, Marcuse places man on his own altar of Truth. There

he remains: an unhappy consciousness, still in chains,

prostituted for no fruitful end. Perhaps Marcuse had not

been thoroughly reflective in trying to turn society and hu

manity on its head. That is to say, if one does not simul

taneously criticize his own ends and means, is it not

conceivable that a methodology so devoid of personal moral

responsibility might actually sustain social repression?

C. Speculation on Repression, Education,and Liberation

Neither Marcuse nor Fromm succeeds in liberating men

through education. The repressions continue unchanged,

though covered over in feelings of exhilaration, resigna

tion, or great expectation. Intellectual education is Mar

cuse's proposed instrument of control as he attempts to

solidify his Truth in the name of freedom. Humanistic edu

cation is Fromm's tool to adjust man to the status quo, al

lowing him to believe that self-actualization is a process

103,Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 33.




191

of authentic liberation. In either case, surplus-repressive

reason and morality lingers on, in illicit intercourse with

actual liberation. Marcuse and Fromm forget Reich's words:

"the most important task of a free society Is that of making

possible for its members the satisfaction of their natural

needs. »1M

In the final analysis, any liberating education of

fered by Fromm and Marcuse is based in subjective psycholog

ical freedom, the internal realm of the mind. Indeed,

psychological freedom is the totality of Fromm's realistic

goal. For Marcuse, liberated psychological consciousness is

a means to the larger end of Truth. Dreams, a revery apart

from a repressive world, represent the innermost manifesta

tion of self-experience for Fromm:

While we sleep ... we are also free, freer thanwhen awake. We are free from the burden of work, fromthe task of attack or defense, from watching and mastering reality. We need not look at the outside world;we look at our inner world, are concerned exclusively

10^Reich, The Sexual Revolution, p. 25. Reich, however, does not completely acknowledge the social contextwhich conditions free sexual release, an overriding contingency which Marcuse recognizes in his critique but not inhis program. See Chapter II, supra.

Similar to Fromm, Reich claims that "the futureof mankind depends on the solution of the problem of man'scKaracter struetureT,r Reich, The Sexual Revolution, p. xv.Furthermore, his concept of revolution is almost identicalto Fromm's; i.e., "revolutionary" means "going to the rootsof things." Ibid., p. xxi. Cf. Fromm, Beyond the Chains ofIllusion, p. T35T Both Reich and Fromm suggest a primaryexamination of personality structure rather than socialtransformation.




192

with ourselves ... In sleep the realm of necessityhas given way to the realm of freedom.1°5

Sleep stills man's deathly fears; it denies and equalizes

repression. To preserve cultural security, Fromm joins

Freud in disallowing a free play of libidinal impulse in

waking life. At the same time, memory becomes Marcuse's ve

hicle for psychic liberation:

Remembrance retrieves the temps perdu which was thetime of gratification and fulfillment . . . The lostparadises are the only true ones not because, in retrospect, the past joy seems more beautiful than it reallywas, but because remembrance alone provides the joywithout the anxiety over its passing and thus gives itan otherwise impossible duration.1°5

^romm,1C

The Forgotten Language, p. 27.

l0^Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 213. Marcuseis, of course, alluding to Marcel Proust's famous A larecherche du temps perdu. However, the presumed power ofmemory has been an integral part of Western intellectualthought at least since Plato's suggestion of pre-existentreminiscence. In a Neo-Platonic borrowing, Augustine wasespecially extravagant in his spiritual exaltation of memory: "Memory . . . retains itself in us, because we do notforget that we have a memory. It remembers not only otherthings, but also itself; through memory, in other words, weremember ourselves, other things, and memory itself."Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Anna S.Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff (Indianapolis: Bobbs-MerrillCo., 1964), II, xix, 195. According to Nietzsche, memoryacts to "guarantee one's self with all due pride, and alsoat the same time to say yes to one's self." Nietzsche, TheGenealogy of Morals, II, 3, as cited in Fromm, Man forHimself, p. 159. That is, memory serves as a psychologicalmechanism to actuate man's sense of a lack of presentfreedom.




193

In a word, Marcuse seeks to "return to an imaginary temps

perdu in the real life of mankind." ^ This necessitates

an aesthetic governing principle which regulates an essen

tially romanticized rational eroticism. For Marcuse's pro

gram also channels libidinal energy into a certain

prescribed order; in the end, it desires to be synthetic

108and controlled rather than anarchic and free. Marcuse

maintains that the "anarchic element" will become aufgehoben

in the symmetry of socialist solidarity. ^ Thus, "nonre-

pressive sublimation" is simply a new reality principle laid

'Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 90.

108Cf. George Santayana, The. Sense of Beauty: Beingthe Outline of Aesthetic Theory (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), P^ 164, for a classical orchestration ofrational satisfaction and sensual experience: "When oursenses and imagination find what.they crave, when the worldso shapes itself or so moulds the mind that the correspondencebetween them is perfect, then perception is pleasure, and existence needs no apology." Santayana's aesthetic ordershares an harmonic mean with Marcuse's. Interestinglyenough, the former has been widely used as an intellectualbase for Neo-Conservative political positions. Cf. PeterViereck, Conservatism. Revisited (New York: Charles Scrib-ner's Sons^ 1949), P- 6: "The conservative principles par "excellence are proportion and measure [and] self-expressionthrough self-restraint." The latter practically paraphrasesMarcuse's programmatic aesthetic reality principle. As.acritic, Marcuse had preferred mpre revolutionary art forms;e.g., naturalism, surrealism, and modernism. He had considered the Classical aesthetic, which .paints the world in harmonious hues, as a means for maintaining- the status quo. Cf.Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," inNegations, pp; 88-133. "Like-many creative thinkers, Marcuse is realistic-about everything but the forms which hecreates.

109M,arcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 89.




194

down by Marcuse; it manifests his own subjective, surplus-

repressive, effort to define and demarcate the truth value

of others' personal pleasure and happiness.

Subjective freedom seems to be grounded in such phe

nomenal corruptibility. The shared difficulty of Frommian

and Marcusean analysis is its inability to recognize the

full severity of repressive controls on thought itself, a

determinant which naturally encompasses its own thought too.

If repression is such an enveloping, ubiquitous phenomenon,

education is bound to exhibit factitious, indeed repressive,

experience. If thought is transmitted in a fractured, com

partmentalized universe, it necessarily becomes an artificial

ity which acts as a very inadequate funnel for an attempt at

genuine communication of nature. Though he had a cosmologi-

cal referent in mind, Augustine recognized so long ago, "We

do not learn anything by means of the signs called words."

Words are only distorted representational signals of reality.

The latter tends to filter one's thought, to hold it in check,

In Platonic fashion, Marcuse would institute whathe considers the "higher" truths; for he assumes a superiorability to distinguish between good and bad, beauty and ugliness. He therefore proposes "the construction of an aesthetic .. . environment"; e.g., "parks and gardens rather thanhighways and parking lots" and "areas of withdrawal ratherthan massive fun and relaxation." Ibid., p. 90. Marcuse'sopinion may be worthy of consideration, but he never letsothers decide.

Augustine, "The Teacher (De Magistro)," in JohannesQuasten and Joseph C. Plumpe, eds., Ancient Christian Writers,No. 9 (Westminister, Md.: Newman Press, 1950), as excerptedin Price, p. 154.




195

regardless of what is specifically tabooed or otherwise ex-112eluded in a surplus-repressive manner.

Almost inadvertently, Fromm and Marcuse hint at such

an inference, but never carry their argument to its conclu

sion. Fromm opposes formal Aristotelian logic to what he

terms "paradoxical logic," a dialectical mode of thought re

flected in philosophy from Lao-Tse through Hegel and Marx.

Traditional Western logic, based on the law of identity,

states that A is A, thus adhering to the law of contradic

tion (A is not non-A) and the law of the excluded middle (A

cannot be A and non-A, neither A nor non-A). 3 Conversely,

paradoxical logic lives in contradiction and conflict: "It

is and it is not," or "it is neither this nor that." ^ Yet

For a concise analysis of the inevitable affinitybetween repression and education, see Richard M. Jones, AnApplication of Psychoanalysis to Education (Springfield,111.: Charles C. Thomas, I960;, pp. 19-22.

^romm, The Art of Loving, p. 61. "It is impossible for the same thing at the sane time to belong and not_ tobelong to the same thing and in the same respect . . . This,then, is the most certain of all principles. ' Aristotle,Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), Book Ganma, §1005b, 20, as cited inloc. cit. Fromm's argument is based on a misunderstandingoT~~theTaw of identity. Aristotelian logic does not necessarily entail a complete denial of the existence of paradoxand contradiction. _ .

Îbid., p. 62. According to Marcuse's dialecticaltreatment, "The classical idea of logic shows ... an onto-logical prejudice—rthe structure of the judgment (proposition) refers to a divided reality. The discourse moves between the experience of Being and Non-being, essence andfact, generation and corruption, potentiality and actuality.. . . [Indeed,] . . . the [classical] propositional form, "Sis p" . . . conceals rather than reveals the . . . negativecharacter of the empirical reality." Marcuse,One-Dimensional Man, pp. I3O-I32.




196

Fromm also admits that "opposition is a category of man's

mind, not in itself an element of reality." 5 This is the

ultimate paradox which Marcuse points to in his acerbic at

tack on linguistic analysis. In its quest for clarity, lin

guistic analysis discounts reality, purging language of any

"means for expressing any other contents than those furnished

to the individuals by their [repressive] society."

Unfortunately, repression appears to be the destiny

of even such seemingly free phenomena as dreams and memo

ries. For social forces fill the mold which encases their

activity. This is the crucial message behind Ernest G.

Schachtel's extraordinarily insightful essay, "On Memory and

Childhood Amnesia." With clinical evidence from psychoanal

ysis, Schachtel hypothesizes that

no

experiences ana tnererore not tit to pi

these experiences and enable their recall. "Thefunctional capacity of the conscious, adult memory isusually limited to tKose types of experience which th~e ..„adult consciously is aware oT~and is capable of having. 7

5Fromm, The Art of Loving, p. 64.

^larcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. I74. "Linguisticanalysis abstracts from what ordinary language reveals inspeaking as it does—the mutilation of man and nature."Ibid., p. I75.

7Ernest G. Schachtel, "On Memory and Childhood Amnesia," Psychiatry, Vol. X, No. 1 (February, 1947), 4. AsDewey also notes, "Existing institutions impose their stamp,their superscription, upon the impulse and instinct. Theyembody the modifications the latter have undergone." Dewey,Human Nature and Conduct, p. 125.




197

Thus, Schachtel intercalates additional culturally condi

tioned pressures upon Freud's existent infantile taboos.

The inevitable result is the most repressive form of ex

istence imaginable. Whereas original infantile instincts

had been free, i.e., "trans-schematic," adult experience is

schematized, or conventionalized. "The capacity to see and

feel what is there gives way to the tendency to see and feel

what one expects to see and feel, which, in turn, is what

one is expected to see and feel because everybody else

liftdoes." "* Consequently, conventionalization controls memory;

men actually remember only the contained schemata of cultural

experience, not experience itself. Such cultural repression

also severely restricts the quality and scope of dreams;

"measured with the yardstick of modern Western civilization

with its emphasis on useful, efficient production and work,

[they] are really quite useless." 9 Quite naturally, too,

the school is a prime repository for society's repressive

memory bank. "As the person in the process of education,

gradually comes to live more and more exclusively within the

118Schachtel, 6. "Within the development of consciousness, the consciousness of self comes latest, andneither individually nor in the history of the race has manas yet ever reached anything approaching full consciousnessof self." Ibid., 14.

9Ibid., I7. Both Fromm and Marcuse suggest theneglected factor of education for leisure, though the latter would be closer to Schachtel's critique of its probableinefficacy in an atmosphere of repression.




198

framework of the culturally and conventionally provided ex

perience schemata, there is less and less to remind him of

120the possibility of trans-schematic experience."

121Though Fromm and Marcuse praise Schachtel's work,

they, do not fully pay attention to it. As social analyst

and reformer, Fromm is satisfied to survey the general con

sciousness of mankind, to adapt the "productive development

of the personality" to conventionalized values. For Fromm,

freedom is thus attained psychologically, through a subjective

internalization and idealization of repressive external cir

cumstances. Against Freud and Schachtel, he sees no real

need to distinguish between the experiences of childhood and

adulthood; with Freud, Fromm believes the "evidence that

cultural influences are beneficial to us seems almost over-

199whelming" in any case. As a consequence of Fromm's flat

tened social analysis, adjustment to the given world becomes

more important than the satisfaction of individual instinctu

al need. Although Marcuse marshals some of these same criti

cisms against Fromm, he is widely inconsistent in his own so

cial critique and social planning. Forgetting Freud,

120Ibid., 25. This is to say nothing of the obvious

controlled bodily behavior which schooling requires; e.g.,the desk.

121Cf. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. Il5n.;and The Forgotten Language, p. 28n. Cf. also Marcuse, Erosand Civilization, pp. 18-l9n.

122Fromm, The Forgotten Language, p. 32.




199

Marcuse's program nowhere discusses any notion of develop

mental stages in the child's bio-cultural growth, or the ed

ucative effects of familial input and decline—both of which

123Marcuse had suggested in his critique. -' In Marxian fashion,

Marcuse simply expects the family to wither away. However, he

has his own surplus-repressive plans for man's biological

structure. Yet, in the end, Marcuse's concept of sensuous

rationality essentially inhabits an aesthetic vacuum. In

his dialectical utopianism, Marcuse also constructs

psychologically autonomous constraints which would doubt

less break down before that repressive reality which he ac

cepts in his social critique. Perhaps his memory is so

repressed that he has forgotten that even "sustained re

sistance would [conceivably] require extreme rationality,

a spirit of domination . . ., and a periodic repression by

the resisters of their own [ineffectual] drive to extend theToll

scope of Eros.,,icn

30n the diminution of familial.influence, seeChapter III, supra. In a rather un-Freudian and un-Marxianmanner, Marcuse sits in reverie over Margaret Mead's description of primitive Arapesh culture: "the 'world is agarden' . . . which can grow while making human beingsgrow." Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pp. I97-I98. Cf.Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (NewYork: New American Library, 1952), p. 100. To the con-trary, Freud recognized that pre-civilized life could alsobe patricidal; and Marx knew that the energy of machinetechnology was not about to be reversed by simply doing arain dance. Cf. Yonker, p. 225.

194Daniel Callahan, "Resistance and Technology,"

Commonweal, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 18 (February 9, 1968), 381.




200

D. Conclusion

In his descriptive analysis of an "education to reali

ty," Freud is perhaps the most coherent of the theorists under

discussion. He at least has the sense to recognize that so

long as education represents a rather inert image of repressive

reality, it will perforce maintain its harsh treatment of man.

However, Freud's consequent prescription affords only a fur

ther, and unnecessary, extension of social control. While Mar

cuse's critique pinpointed the needless restrictions of

Freudian thought and appeared to hold promise of liberation

in its own right, Marcuse's program would seem to deliver more

potential disaster than actual benefit. This seems to be the

case because Marcuse does not primarily describe repressive re-lpe

ality. p Indeed, in Marcusean analysis it is difficult to

differentiate between description and prescription. Though

Marcuse is a serious student of society, he is also an over

ly eager, single-minded programmer of men. The role of Jek-

yll and Hyde would seem to be inappropriate to consistent

social analysis. For his part, Fromm persists in preaching ra

ther than educating. This appears to be the consequence of his

steady retreat from social critique. As primarily a moral re

former, Fromm tends to substitute uplifting exhortation for ac

tual liberation.

-'Marcuse confirms this criticism: "Thought has nopower to bring about . . . change unless if transcends itselfinto practice." Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. I34. Thisrepresents Marcuse's mortal, but deadly, attempt to advancefrom thought to action; unknown to Marcuse, he can control neither avenue of experience.




201

Unless and until the school no longer reflects a re

pressive reality, all such pedagogic gestures will remain

relatively innocuous. Until then, too, the school will con

tinue to tender a curriculum of repression rather than an

offering of freedom. No isolated island, the school is

necessarily caught up in the fabric of societal existence.

Consequently, it is not free to make itself; rather it tends

simply to recapitulate the demands of dominant social norms.

Contrary to Freudian psychoanalysis, which lays

stress on the first few years of a person's life, Fromm

and Marcuse plan for educational and social change only

once cultural determinants have substantially molded the in

dividual's pattern of living. Unlike Freud, neither has

taken Wordsworth's memorable message to heart: "The Child

is the Father of the Man." In Schachtel's view, it is the

child who glimpses freedom in its purest, if fleeting, form.

That freedom is rapidly eroded by cultural conventionaliza

tion. In their idealized concentration on higher education,

Fromm and Marcuse largely bypass the full measure of growth,

detour, and arrest in the total development of child and

man. Thus, partly out of choice, partly out of necessity,

both work with a well nigh finished product. Because their

chosen mission is one of re-education and re-conditioning,

the path to freedom becomes doubly problematic, if not

Impossible.




202

Freedom is the subject of inquiry in Chapter VI. In

light of the previous discussion, it will constitute a kind

of final review, a retrospective analysis of the disserta

tion itself: what is the ground of freedom for Fromm and

Marcuse? All along, freedom has been the reverse side of

repression. A far greater achievement than the latter, it

has always been much more difficult to achieve.




CHAPTER VI

REPRESSION AND FREEDOM: IN RETROSPECT

203

The concept of freedom has been narrowed to thepicture of contemplative people shocking their generation. . . . This is a thorough mistake. The massive habits of physical nature, its iron laws,determine the scene for the sufferings of men. Birthand death, cold and hunger, separation, disease, thegeneral impracticability of purpose, all bring theirquota to imprison the souls of women and men.*

The conflict between the claims of freedom and

repression presents one of the most persistent and per

plexing problems in social and educational theory and

practice. The opposition of these seemingly contradictory

forces has not always been clear-cut; indeed, there actu

ally may be only a thin border separating one from the

other. The object of this concluding chapter is to dis

cuss what Fromm and Marcuse have meant all along by "free

dom" and to ascertain whether their analyses have been

helpful in demarcating the extent and limits of the corre

lative concept of repression. Which factors have they

taken into account, and which have they neglected? Do

their notions of freedom portend prospective liberation or

further repression?

Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (NewYork: Macmillan Co., 1933), P- 841




204

Throughout this dissertation the crosscurrents of

freedom and repression have revolved around the paradox of

control. On the one hand, any viable concept of freedom

would seem to entail a self-determined ability to act more

or less autonomously over a wide range of realizable possi

bilities in view of actual internal and external restraints.

That is, freedom necessitates the relative capacity to

control one's objective situation In life. On the other

hand, any unnecessary and unnatural extension of control

might cause an undue intrusion upon freedom, thereby turning

the latter into repression. This is the dilemma which has

confronted both theorists, and one which they never resolve.

Fromm recognizes no clear connection between freedom and the

control of material and social conditions. Marcuse notices

such a relation in his social critique and he uses that

knowledge for repressive purposes in his plan of action.

. Fromm and Marcuse generate primarily persuasive

and/or valuational definitions of freedom from their broad

social and educational thought. In short, each employs

"freedom" in a stipulative, extra-descriptive, sense. The

word "freedom" typically has a laudatory connotation and may

generally be referred to as an "hurrah" term.2 Such words

are seen as "prizes which each man seeks to bestow on the

p

Maurice Cranston, Freedom: A New Analysis (London:Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), PP- 16-17, 34.




205

qualities of his own choice."3 As such, they are useful for

persuading others of the desirability of one's philosophical

position. Fromm and Marcuse habitually couch their notions

of freedom in the persuasive and evaluative expressions

"real" and "true." Though persuasion and evaluation are not

illegitimate practices per se, there is a practical question

as to "which persuasion [and evaluation] to reject"? This

is the task of the present chapter.

These distinctions in the concept of freedom have

particular relevance for substantive social theory. It is

necessary to trace the meaning which the authors attach to

the concept in order to discover whether the latter is

treated consistently in their social thought. For example,

do Fromm and Marcuse equivocate in their definitions as a

means for fortifying their persuasion? Is the use of the

concept internally coherent with the body of their social

analyses? Moreover, given the theoretical ground of those

treatments, what is the likelihood that their notions of

3Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 213. Cf. AldousHuxley, Eyeless in Gaza (London: Chatto and Windus, 1936),as quoted in ibid., pp. 214-215: "But if you want to befree, you've got to be a prisoner. It's the condition offreedom—true freedom. . . . What's in a name? . . . Theanswer is, practically everything, if the name's a good one.Freedom's a marvelous name. That's why you're so anxious tomake use of it. You think that if you call imprisonment truefreedom, people will be attracted to the prison. And theworst of it is you're quite right."

*4bid., p. 215.




206

freedom could bear fruit in actual practice? Finally, there

is need for axiological inquiry: should their conceptions

of freedom merit attention and consideration, or would their

execution in action lead willy-nilly to repression? In view

of the preceding discussion of repression, the following sur

vey affords a summary exposition and critical analysis of

that question from its opposite side; viz., freedom.

Social philosophers tend to articulate certain arbi

trary criteria for freedom while attempting to persuade

others to adopt their usage as a correct guide to its actual

realization. In a word, mere definition comes to acquire

commendatory, i.e., normative, meaning. As R. M. Hare has

indicated, philosophers often make an unconscious value

judgment: that "x is intrinsically good" entails the moral

imperative, "x ought to be done."5 Fromm and Marcuse appear

not to be exceptions to this rule. Often unintentionally,

and sometimes intentionally, each steers man in a given di

rection on a road ostensibly headed to "freedom." Depending

upon whether or not he has become aware of the raison d'etre

5R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 163ff. Fromm, tor example, characterizes the free person as one who is_ "loving, productive,independent." In the Augustinian sense, a totally free manis he who "is not free to choose evil." Fromm, The Heart ofMan, p. 132. Thus, Fromm does not offer free choice; instead he postulates a simplistic moral dictum: man oughtto be good. Apparently unaware of the naturalistic fallacy,he insists that man cannot do otherwise if he really fulfills the potentialities inherent in his nature. By illegitimately merging the "is" with the "ought," Fromminadvertently makes ethical questions appear nugatory.




207

of his destination, the traveler is coaxed or coerced to be

free on his driver's terms.

Fromm defines "positive freedom" as the "realization

of [one's] individual self" and the "spontaneous activity of

the total, integrated [conative and cognitive] personality."

Such a notion of freedom seems oblivious to external empiri

cal contingencies; i.e., no substantive social context, re

sisting or otherwise, is recognized as an irreducible cushion

to one's activity. Notwithstanding some lip service in be

half of "freedom to" (objective capacity for freedom), Fromm

never equips men with the means or ability to actualize

freedom in the external world. For that matter, neither

does he allow the "freedom to do" as one wills as a separate

issue from the capacity "to be free." For Fromm's concept

of self-realization evokes a moral command, an essentially

ethical aim:

Positive freedom . . . implies the principle that thereis no higher power than this unique individual self,that man is the center and purpose of his life: thatgrowth and realization of man's individuality is an endthat can never be subordinated to purposes which aresupposed to have greater dignity.7

Fromm suggests that man is free.if, and only if, he feels".--'• g

that he is acting as he ought to act. Freedom is tantamount

Fromm, Escape from Freedom, pp. viii, 258.

7Ibid., p. 265.gCf. Felix E. Oppenheim, Dimensions of Freedom: An

Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), pp. 157,168.




208

to a form of moral self-control. The decisive question is

how man represses; that he must practice repression is a

foregone conclusion.

The negative notion of freedom in Fromm's social

philosophy ("freedom from") is somewhat less evaluative and

at least elucidates some psychological obstacles to freedom.

With Freud, Fromm would seek to expose those illusions and

rationalizations which forestall any possible movement toward

freedom. "Freedom from" such distortions can be an important

step away from "fear of freedom." For instance, such freedom

might unmask the irrationality behind the need to submit to

oppressive authority (escape from freedom). Awareness of

illusions, reform and adaptation of consciousness, become

Fromm's fundamental pre-requisites for freedom. But that

awareness and adaptation concentrates on a consciousness of

"forces within oneself," and not so much those which are op

erative within repressive external reality.

Fromm implies that men have to be governed—at least

up until the time that they are psychologically free and

secure. In brief, man has to be protected against him

self. Though Fromm insists that he prizes independence, he

9Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, pp. 110-111.

Fromm, The Heart of Man, p. I33.

Cf. Schaar, pp. 114-115; and Christian Bay, TheStructure of Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1958), p. 84.




209

posits one condition which must be fulfilled at all costs:

stoic satisfaction in the longing to belong. Carried to

its extreme in corruptible hands, such a yearning for un-

fanmay usher in the very escape from freedom which Fromm at

tempts to avoid: a craving for social adjustment or even a

misplaced allegiance to those authorities who offer their

aide in achieving one'sself-realization. That kind of

"self-actualization" would appear to constitute a contradic

tion in terms. However, while Fromm usually scorns idolatry

because of its self-alienating effects, he is willing to

pave the path of freedom with the assistance of a chosen

group of spiritual prophets, whom he terms "rational au

thorities." Fromm forgets that the teachings of a Buddha or

a Jesus yield primarily moral freedom and res taint; the un

restrained power of a Hitler (irrational authority) is free

to teach or not to teach.

Specifiable criteria delimit the boundaries of

Frommian freedom: rational and ethical Idealism, con

trolled Voluntarism, and progressive humanistic devel

opment. Though founded on a universal code of ethics,

as opposed to cultural relativism, these factors still

turn largely on the internal function of individual charac

ter. Fromm counts on autonomous effort, self-transcendence,

and a stoical denial of repression as suitable conveyors of

freedom. External circumstances merely meliorate or vitiate

12Fromm, The Heart of Man, p. II7.




210

essential internal conditions. Given these criteria,

Fromm's concept of freedom remains predominately psy

chological and subjectivistic: men may feel free and

believe that they can become more free even if they are not

necessarily free in fact. 3

Fromm's stoic and transcendent freedom is thus pred

icated by predetermined moral and rational guidelines. In

deed, it requires a "certain measure of ascetism and a state

of perfection beyond ordinary reach." The locus of free

dom is man's inner self, a relational struggle between mind

and will. The desideratum Is a demand to live ethically.

In Kantian and natural-law terms, one should submit to moral

rules which flow from his own self-legislation in light of

the universal laws of mankind. Fromm distinguishes between

"socially immanent" and "universal" ethics. The former re

flects the survival norms of a particular society; the lat

ter represents those "trans-survival" goals necessary for

the "fullest development of its members." 5 When moral

3Cf. Oscar Oppenheimer, "Freedom and MentalHealth," Educational Theory, Vol. Ill, No. 4 (October,1952), 225! "IFromm'sJ inner freedom makes us feel that weare the free agents of our actions and makes us rejoice init." (Italics are added.) Furthermore, Fromm's "intellec-tualistic humanistic" concept of freedom relies on rationalself-effort to achieve its basically moral ends. Ibid.,226.

14Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World,

trans. Richard 0'Sullivan (London: Sheed and Ward, 1935),P. 31-

-'Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 242.




211

conflict arises, universal ethics becomes the court of high

er appeal. On the one hand, Fromm's ethical criteria estab

lish moral restraints. On the other hand, they attempt to

guard against those who would make moral exceptions in their

own favor; i.e., violate the moral imperative and treat man

as a thing. But Fromm only assumes that his rational au

thority and humanistic conscience can overcome any external

social constraint. If they cannot, the citadel of freedom

may be quickly overrun by storm troopers who can exert power

and control. In a word, Frommian freedom can be argued to

bestow more risks and responsibilities than it does actual

protection: it allows moral exhortation to replace socio

logical analysis.

Fromm proposes a middle course between free will and

determinism in his adoption of "alternativism." This in

volves an alteration of one's character structure in order

to facilitate an awareness of those internal forces which

17supposedly motivate human behavior. ' Fromm's objective is

to prepare man to choose wisely among those alternatives

open to him. In this moral mission, Fromm manages to sim

plify difficult ethical issues by delineating them in black

and white, either/or, terms; e.g., rationality vs. irration

ality, good vs. evil, biophilia vs. necrophilia, growth vs.

pFbr a lucid analysis of moral rules and moral exceptions, see Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: ARational Basis of Ethics (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958).

7Fromm, The Heart of Man, p. 126.




212

decay, life vs. death. In establishing these alternatives,

Fromm accepts an idealized picture of social reality; per

haps that is why the choices seem so plain to him. In

Nietzschean fashion, Marcuse would argue that Frommian self-

realization cancels actual choice; it offers the non-

18alternatives of death and enslavement in the "real" world.

Following Aristotle and Spinoza, Fromm also con

structs a model of human nature which the individual must

more or less approximate if he is to be considered free. 9

Extrapolating upon Freud, he believes that man's essential

nature is driven by a constitutional conatus which compels

one to meet the needs of given life conditions (reality20principle). Man progressively attains independence as he

comes to realize that freedom is "nothing other than the

capacity to follow the voice of reason, of health, of well-

being, of conscience, against the voices of irrational pas-91

sions." At base, Fromm conceives of freedom as a matter

"Wrcuse, "Existentialism; Remarks on Jean-PaulSartre's L'Etre et le Neant," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March, 1948), 322.

9Fromm, Man for Himself, pp. 25-27.20

Fromm and Xirau, p. 7.pi

Fromm, The Heart of Man, pp. I3O-I3I. For Fromm,liberation consists in the freeing of "oneself from irrational [instinctual] passions." Fromm and Xirau, p. 12. Heconcurs with Spinoza that to live by instinct is to suffer,to live by reason is to be (i.e., is to feel) free.




213

22of moral and rational personality development. Philosoph

ically, he admits that he is bound to the humanistic tradi-23tion, with sizable support from Kant and the Stoics.

Psychologically, his free man resembles Freud's adjusted,

yet still repressed, genital personality. By integrating

instinctual human drives into preferred moral channels,

Fromm has reduced freedom to a relative "degree of harmony

24between basic motives and overt behavior." His idea of

freedom issues a counsel of self-perfection in a vastly im

perfect world. Fromm succeeds merely in establishing a

spiritual and idyllic psychological orientation, an unreal

educative perspective from the vantage point of Freudian

thought:

"Freedom of choice is ... a question of a person's character structure. ... We conclude, then, thatman's actions are always caused by inclinations rooted in. . . forces operating in his personality." Fromm, TheHeart of Man, pp. I3I, 142.

3Fromm refers to the Stoics as the "defenders ofthe equality of all men." Fromm and Xirau, p. 4n. Only aman who feels comfortable within given conditions (or believes the latter are relatively inconsequential) could makesuch a statement. As Herbert J. Muller points out: "Theway of the Stoics could afford more tranquillity, to men inany condition of life; it was a 'freedom' that even slavescould enjoy. But this is precisely the objection to it. Aslave is not actually free, no matter how indifferent he maybe to his chains. In spite of their ideal of universalbrotherhood, most Stoics were content to accept the institution of slavery, though most slaves were not." Muller,Issues of Freedom (New York: Harper and Brothers, i960),p. 14.

phBay, p. 86. Cf. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, pp.

258-259.




214

. . . the education of young people at the presentday conceals from them the part which sexuality willplay in their lives. . . . [Ejducation is behaving asthough one were to equip people starting on a Polar expedition with summer clothing and maps of the ItalianLakes. In this it becomes evident that a certain misuse is being made of ethical demands. The strictnessof those demands would not do so much harm if educationwere to say: "This is how men ought to be, in order tobe happy and to make others happy; but you have to reckon on their not being like that." Instead of this theyoung are made to believe that everyone else fulfilsthose ethical demands—that is, that everyone else isvirtuous. It is on this that the demand is based thatthe young, too, shall become virtuous.25

In essence, Fromm views modern social problems

through a rigid Stoic lens. His chief consideration is that

moral growth be both the field of activity and the destiny

of freedom. Contemplative introspection should enable man

to "change his own character," circumstantial impingements

notwithstanding. This concept of freedom is based on an

implicit elitism: only those men who have acquired a cer

tain state of mind or character, i.e., who have actualized

their Abetter" selves, can really claim to enjoy a sense of

liberation. 7 At the same time, however, these "fortunate"

men are obliged to abandon any claim to a full share of in

stinctual enjoyment (pleasure principle). For Fromm,

25-'Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 8In.In this argument, Freud, of course, assumes that men are inherently aggressive—a value judgment on his own part.

26Muller, p. 18.27

Loc. cit. Cf. also Mortimer J. Adler, The Idea ofFreedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions ofFreedom (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1958), Vol. I, ch.T5T Siller characterizes Stoic freedom as "acquired freedom




215

happiness is not the central question; what matters is28

whether or not one feels himself worthy of happiness. If

one Is not so inclined, he feels guilty, rather than free,

for allowing his "lower" instinctual desires to carry him

away from reason and virtue. Consequently, Fromm's absorp

tion in universal natural law yields rather unnatural re

sults: those instincts which all men naturally share are to

be held in check. Stoic perfection and transcendence takes

a convenient detour around the body as it struggles to find

a route to freedom through the soul.

In striving after transcendent self-actualization,

Fromm recognizes principally those restraints which conform

of self-perfection." As Muller notices, such a notion offreedom has been "indifferent to social and political conditions that made it difficult or impossible for ordinarymen to become masters of their faculties, to make their actions their own, or to achieve any perfection beyond complete obedience." Muller, p. 19.

2°As a theorist of self-actualization, Fromm seeksto equate the natural (bare pursuit of happiness) with theideal (moral virtue of happiness). Freedom as self-realization (moral self-regulation) becomes the necessarycondition of happiness per se. Cf. V. J. McGill, The Ideaof Happiness (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I967), PP.328-329. Humanistic and existentialist psychology contribute more complete examples of the idealization involvedin concepts of self-actualization. See, for instance,Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York:Harper and Row, 1954); and Rollo May, Man's Search forHimself (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1953). For arather sympathetic survey of such notions, see Michael Lit-tleford, "Some Philosophical Assumptions of Humanistic Psychology," Educational Theory, Vol. XX, No. 3 (Summer, 1970),229-244.




216

29to a moral law grounded in one's own reason and conscience. *

In fact, these seem to be the only restraints which he ac

knowledges as legitimate. As Schaar puts it, Fromm "never

comes to terms with the restraining institutions of a soci

ety."3^ In his progressive Aristotelian manner, Fromm be

lieves that man's essential nature grows toward characteristic

ends. External social conditions "do not produce the ends at

which growth is directed but . . . [merely] aid or hinder

growth according as they are favorable or the reverse."3

Accordingly, Frommian alternativism contains a foreordained

solution: even if material and social circumstances are not

ripe for freedom, man has a moral duty to wage the good

fight in its behalf. For this is the very health and activi

ty of freedom. If one fails, he can blame only himself, and

not a sick society.

9Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. NormanKemp Smith (New York"-! St. Martin's Press, 1961), p. 93:"Freedom is independence of anything other than the morallaw." Cf. also Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. BarbaraFoxley (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1911), p. 437:"[Moral law] is written in the depths of [man's] heart byconscience . . . Let him obey those laws and be free."

^Schaar, p. 302.

3 George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory,rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), p. 121. Cf.Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," inNegations, p. 92: "Although Aristotle still lets ethicsterminate in politics, for' him the reorganization of societyno longer occupies a central role in philosophy [as it doesfor Plato] . . . [Aristotle's] idealism is more resigned inthe face of the historical tasks of mankind."




217

The security of personal health, not social revolu

tion, is Fromm's humanistic ideal. The scope of freedom

widens as one's ego maintains inner harmony. Like Freud,

Fromm ultimately opts for cultural progress instead of fuller

freedom and happiness.3^ A measure of self-mastery within

certain moral constraints (superego) is his Freudian compro

mise of freedom. (This is the ethical idealist core which

Marcuse detects in both Freudian and Neo-Freudian

psychology.) Presumably, if one unravels his internal

rationalizations, he can substantially liberate himself.

Inner truth and virtue will make man free even as he

pretends to escape the larger control of external social re

straints. If one is a Stoic, he will at least feel free.

If he is not, he will have to rely on faith, remain re

pressed, and perhaps pray that some limited amount of ob

jective freedom will somehow come his way.

The moral experience of the individual is subjective,for this element is all that is within the control ofhis will. He is passive in the face of events . . .At best, he can only say feebly that the world "ought"to be good.33

^Cf. Fromm, "Freud's Model of Man and Its SocialDeterminants," in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, pp. 38, 45.

330tis Lee, Existence and Inquiry: A Study ofThought in the Modern World (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1949), pp. 141-142. Lee's work.has been very helpfulin clarifying distinctions between circumstantial and dialectical modes of analysis. For similar distinctions on theconcept of freedom, see Richard McKeon, "Philosophical Differences and the Uses of Freedom," Ethics, Vol. LXI, No. 2(January, 1951), 105-135-




218

Marcuse is severely critical of such subjective,

idealist, and moralistic views of freedom. He has intended

to formulate a more objective notion of freedom, one which

is cognizant of the material, intellectual, and social con

ditions which determine the margins of freedom. However, in

terms of the realizable possibilities set down by his own

dialectic, he has failed to construct a coherent concept of

freedom. In the end, his idea of "rational" freedom is also

highly subjective and moralistic.

In his critique Marcuse is aware of the crucial in

fluence of power and control:

Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can bemade into a powerful instrument of domination. Therange of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is_ chosen by theindividuaT734"

Beyond Freud and Fromm, Marcuse claims to seek a human ex

istence which is not merely "unfulfilled becoming," but

rather a "being with what is and can be."35 But Marcusedoes not control the actual ramifications of power which

his- dialectic pretends to manipulate. Theoretically,

3\larcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 7.

35Marcuse, "Progress and Freud's Theory of Instincts," in Five Lectures, p. 41. Here Marcuse approachesthe Platonic search for "true Being" out of the shadows ofbecoming: "The Idea means fundamentally the agathon, orwhat exists as it can be according to its own measure."Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," in Negations, p. 46.




219

however, his social analysis and plan of action does accept

and extend repressive controls on freedom. In accord with

Freud, Marcuse believes that basic repression of man's in

stinct is necessary and inevitable. Furthermore, he has

made It quite clear that he would orchestrate those repres

sions in a direction suitable to the needs of his own ideal

world. Thus, Marcuse would practice the very surplus repres

sion which he preaches against. For he himself sees evidence

of unnecessary domination "whenever the individual's goals

and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining

them are prescribed to him."3^ This depicts the dilemma of

freedom and control which Marcuse fails to reconcile: his

admittedly ideological inquiry and program do, in fact,

stipulate what the means and ends of liberation should be.

Ideological justification represents another paradox

of freedom and control in Marcusean analysis. Contrary to

Fromm, Marcuse acknowledges that he has been operating from

an ideological base. In this, he is freer from the illusory

rationalizations of Fromm, who never concedes his idealistic

liberalism. The latter tends to take for granted that its

rationality and morality must be universally shared and ac

cepted. Marcuse's ideology does not commit that mistake,

but its eminently historical dialectic does seem to miscon

strue the objective necessities of actual situations.

•^Marcuse, "Freedom and Freud's Theory of Instincts,"in Five Lectures, p. 1. (Italics are added.)




220

Though Marcuse is an incisive Marxian critic, the theoreti

cal ground of his program for liberation disregards the lim

itations of dialectical thought itself: "logic, ideology,

and knowledge are relative to the historical needs and cir

cumstances of the men who hold them."37 On Schachtel's

analysis, cultural necessity had presaged such an inevitable

process of conventionalization and repression.3^

This is the human predicament which Marcuse cannot

escape: how to generate decisive freedom from basic repres

sion. In his critique Marcuse had laid a foundation for

freedom only when cultural necessities had already shaped

men into a distinct mold. Thus, he has not really attempted

to annul progress as such; indeed, his dialectic has com

pelled him to await the completion of technological progress.

In his program Marcuse forgets that he must work out of that

same, given reality, one which he has characterized as actu

ally repressive and only potentially liberating. Conse

quently, even his Utopian ideology cannot avoid certain

37""Lee, Existence and Inquiry, p. I78. As Hegel observed, man gains at least partial freedom in the knowledgethat "he is limited by (external) nature"; that is, freedommust first, as it were, "transfigure necessity." Ibid., p131; and Cranston, Freedom, p. 23. Accordingly, "existencedoes not measure up to the ideal, for [man] is subject tomany kinds of natural necessity beyond his control." LeeExistence and Inquiry, p. I34. '

^See Chapter V, supra.




221

basic determinants of the status quo.39 That Marcuse is also

governed by the repressive social and institutional mores which

he criticizes is indicated by his surplus-repressive effort to

condition man to his view of the good life.

Marcuse's imaginative aesthetic voyage only presumes that

a pure realm of freedom can be established through "true" con

sciousness and "truly" rational progress in the material and so

cial world. For his "pure" realm is constructed on a

prefabricated superstructure. As Marx recognized, "Ideas

are effective weapons, but they are not subject to our voluntary

control." External necessities exert a controlling logic

above and beyond any surplus-repressive logic of domination

which Marcuse can concoct. In the final analysis, the Mar

cusean dialectic would simply heap additive prescriptive re

pression upon given natural repression; for it is essentially an

extreme stroke of rationalism. After having dissected some

glaring historical weaknesses in reason, Marcuse merely substi

tutes his own forms of subjective pan-logism for the natural in

stincts of man and the inexorable contingencies of external

reality. His is a romantic adventure acted out in the dress

of realism.

39For a similar criticism of Marcuse, see Frederick C.Crews, "Love in the Western World," Partisan Review, Vol. XXXIV,No. 2 (Spring, I967), 273-

40TLee, Existence and Inquiry, p. I77

"The failure of dialectic is that,criticized reason, it tried to construct a superlogic

"The failure of dialectic is that, having brilliantly




222

whereas Fromm theorizes within an individualistic

stoic-transcendent frame of reference, Marcuse's concept of

freedom and repression is part and parcel of a rational

social context:

. . . [A] social situation has come about in which therealization of reason no longer needs to be restrictedto pure thought and will. If reason means shaping lifeaccording to men's free decision on the basis of theirknowledge, then the demand for reason henceforth meansthe creation of a social organization in which individuals can collectively regulate their lives in accordancewith their needs.42

According to Marcuse, man Is unfree because he is unnecessar

ily dominated by social forces which fail to reflect his

"true" needs. Man is burdened by a disguised socio

political configuration: false freedom (socially sanc

tioned satisfaction) and actual, but largely unperceivable,

control (irrational ruling authority). To clarify this dis

tortion, man must consciously adopt a new ideological ethic

and aesthetic, one which will enable him to negate and

and so fell back into rationalism again, more hopelesslythan ever." Ibid., p. 168.

Most dialectical interpretations of freedom aredelimited by a certain a priori approximation to truth. Dialectical freedom has hTstorically forced men to be free"until they have attained [appropriate] wisdom ... orcontrol." McKeon, 119-120, 129-130.

Marcuse not only assumes the existence of truth(a legitimate dialectical assumption): he presumes to bemore accessible to it than most mortals. From that subjective standard, he justifies his position as a nearly omnipotent critic and planner.

42^Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," inNegations, pp. 141-142.




223

transform "false" needs. Thus, Marcuse first seeks to pre

pare for freedom within the realm of necessity because he

needs to awaken an awareness of the lack of freedom in pres

ent empirical reality. After the revolution, needless toil

and pain will presumably give way to socialist solidarity.

However, in fact, Marcuse is not able to control the

barriers to freedom in the realm of necessity. Perhaps that

is why he chooses to take a visionary Platonic passage to

freedom which ultimately terminates in repression. Like

Plato, Marcuse concludes that the "right ordering of the

polis" is the pre-condition of "rational pleasure." If

one cannot accept this dictum, he must, in Rousseau's famous

words, "be forced to be free." In Hegelian terms, the

particular interests of the individual must be harmonized

within the general interests of the whole. These are the

Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," in Negations,p. 46. "It is the task of the statesman to look after thegeneral interest and to bring the satisfaction of particu- ^lar interests into accord with it." Marcuse, "On Hedonism,in ibid., pp. 175-176.

^Rousseau, "The Social Contract," in SocialContract: Essays bv Locke, Hune. and Rousseau, ed., SirErnest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962),I, vii, p. 184. Prof. Sabine's critical analysis of Rousseau's paradoxical concept of freedom is applicable to Marcuse: ''In other words, coercion is not really coercion -because wjien a man individually wants something differentfrom what the social order gives him, he is merely capriciousand does not rightly know his cwn good or his own desires.Sabine, p. 591. With his own capricious rules for politicalorder, Marcuse presumes to know what others desire. Therefore, he justifies his prescription of what freedom shouldbe.




224

only "true" wants and "true" needs; others are not to be

satisfied.

But Marcuse has no actual monopoly on truth; nor can

he regulate the contingent nature of empirical reality. If

I984 appears to be an imminent possibility, Marcuse could

only lend his support to accelerating its tempo: he would

give "exact and often very subtle expression to every mean

ing [of freedom] that a Party member could properly wish to

express, while excluding all other meanings and also the45possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods."

Fortunately, however, Marcuse's vain attempt at action has

ended in frustrated contemplation, a poetically just des

sert for one who has sought so hard to mold and manipulate

men. In his firm belief that he is privy to Truth, Marcuse

hides behind an intellectual death mask: upon reaching such

an absolute, sterile reverie replaces vital thought.

Paradoxically, the use of reason is both the heart

and the Achilles heel of Fromm's and Marcuse's analyses of

freedom. At bottom, rational stoic-transcendent freedom

(Fromm) and rational social freedom (Marcuse) are logically

arbitrary concepts. At least since the classical writers

(e.g., Plato and Aristotle) conceived of reason as the ideal

differentiating feature of man, philosophers have seen fit

to bifurcate the personality, to minimize a specific,

^George Orwell, 1984: A Novel (London: Seeker andWarburg, 1949), P- 299.




225

supposedly alien, group of human characteristics, e.g., the

instincts and emotions, for the sake of synthetic systemat

ic order. Fromm can only assume that man has an intrinsic

nature which rationally propels him to progressive growth

and integration. Marcuse can only presume to know, let

alone control, what is rational or irrational in man and so

ciety. As Ernest Nagel, no enemy of reason, explains, "the

exercise of [human] powers is . . . contingent upon favora

ble material and social circumstances, not easily called in

to existence, and not generally available in human epochs

when a rigid tradition or brutal compulsion is the primary

determinant of personal and social action." In their def

initions and considerations of freedom, Fromm and Marcuse

work within that compulsion and serve to continue that tra

dition. Fromm is more or less an accidental victim of those

46Êrnest Nagel, Sovereign Reason. And Other Studies

in the Philosophy of Science (Glencoe, HI.: Free Press,1954), pp. 267, 274-275. According to the Personalist philosophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "If only rationalfreedom be allowed, freedom ceases to be free and rationality ceases to be rational." Brightman, "Freedom, Purpose,and Value," in Freedom: Its Meaning, ed., Ruth Nanda Anshen(New York: Harcourt, Brace ana Co., 1940), p. 496.

For an interesting discussion of the "supremacy ofreason over appetite" in Western thought, see Raphael Demos,"Human Freedom—Positive and Negative," ibid., pp. 599-6OI.Demos argues that "necessitation by reason is no less [avaluational] determination than necessitation by appetite";for the moralist seeks to harmonize "man's knowledge and hislove of the good—in short, to enlighten him as to the realnature of the good."




226

material and social circumstances which he fails to analyze.

Marcuse is guilty of more intentional repression.

Obviously, neither reason nor ideals is inappropri

ate in social philosophy and practice. However, it would

seem that social critics and planners accept an obligation

to prove that their views are consistent with the activity

and good which they propose and seek to effectuate. Fromm

and Marcuse desert this practical purpose. In his struggle

for individual liberty, Fromm merely reinforces the feeling

of freedom among those who are already serene and secure in

their positions in society. Ostensibly searching for social

freedom for everyone, Marcuse would want to achieve that

liberation through the authority of his intellectual elite.

Both thinkers appeal to reason as a persuasive device;

curiously, neither is anxious to allow an internal inspec

tion of his ideas. Fromm denies that his analysis is ideo

logical, an assertion as empty as his denial of the serious

external repercussions of repression. Rational faith will

presumably mend all unrealized aspirations. For his own

good reason, Marcuse would shield his social system from

the "irrational" intrusions of those who dare disagree with

his ideals. Truth will presumably temper all unbound power.

In the end, Fromm and Marcuse forget that they are dealing

with the natural instincts of men as well as the more unpre

dictable laws of nature.




227

A drop of acid on a frog's leg will cause the leg totwitch. A-judicious drop of idealism . . . will causethe . . . public to twitch and thus further the causethat the "expert" in the control of public opinion hasin mind. If the device is merely manipulative, itspurpose is served when the anticipated response hasbeen elicited, and that is the end of it. But the subjects manipulated are in this case human beings withminds of their own, and the device by which they arepersuaded is an appeal to principles which the manipulator professes to respect as well. If he does not respect them, or the judgment of the people whose"reactions" he [presumes to be] controlling, but isusing both simply as means to an end of his own or thatof the "elite" he serves, his action is both unintelli-fent and unmoral. It is unintelligent because men haveonger memories than frogs.4/

Freedom is a fragile dream for Fromm: he cannot help him

self. Freedom is a potent memory for Marcuse: he should

know better.

47'Arthur E. Murphy, The Uses of Reason (New York:Macmillan Co., 1943), pp. 251, 266-267. (Italics are added.)




228

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Fromm

I. Books

Fromm, Erich, The Art of Loving, New York, Bantam Books,1963.

, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter withMarx and Freud, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1962.

, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud^Marx, and Social Psychology, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.

, The Dogma of Christ: And Other Essays on Religion,Psychology,. and Culture, Garden City, N. Y., Double-day Anchor Books, 1966.

, Escape from Freedom, New York, Holt, Rinehart andWinston, 1941.

, The Forgotten Language: An Introduction to theUnderstanding of Dreams. Fairy Tales and Myths,New York, Grove Press, 1957.

, The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil, NewYork, Harper and Row, 1964.

Man forEthics

r Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1947-

_, Marx's Concept of Man, New York, Frederick UngarPublishing Co., 1961.

_, May Man Prevail?: An Inquiry into the Facts andFictions of Foreign Policy, Garden City, N. Y.,Doubleday and Co., 1961.

_, Psychoanalysis and Religion, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950.

, The Revolution of Hope: Toward a HumanizedTechnology, New York, Bantam Books, 1968.




229

Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, New York, Holt, Rinehart andWins ton, 1955.

» Sigmund Freud's Mission: An Analysis of HisPersonality and Influence. New York. Harper andBrothers, 1959. ,

and Michael Maccoby, Social Character in a Mexicany*llage: A Sociopsycnoanalytic Study. Englewood

" Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, I976.

, You Shall Be As Gods: A Radical Interpretation ofthe Old Testament and Its Tradition, New York. Holt.Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

II. Essays and Articles

Fromm, Erich, "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis toMarx's Theory," in Socialist Humanism: AnInternational Symposium, ed. Erich Fromm. GardenCity, N. Y., Doubleday and Co., I965, pp. 207-222.

» "A Counter-Rebuttal," Dissent, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Winter, 1956), 81-83-

» "Creators and Destroyers," Saturday Review, Vol.XLVII (January 4, 1964), 22^2TI

, "Debate on the Question of Civil Defense,"Commentary, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January, 1962),11-23.

» "The Erich Fromm Theory of Aggression," The New YorkTimes Magazine (February 27, 1972), 14ff^

, "Faith As a Character Trait," Psychiatry, Vol. V(1942), 307-319.

, "Foreword," in A. S. Neill, Summerhill: A RadicalApproach to Child Rearing, New York, Hart Publishing Co., I960, pp. ix-xvi.

. "The Human Implications of Instinetivistic Radicalism," Dissent, Vol. II, No. 4 (Autumn, 1955),342-349;

, "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis,"American Sociological Review. Vol. IX, No. 4(August, 1944), 380-384.




230

Fromm, Erich, "Introduction," in Ivan D. Illich, Celebrationof Awareness: A Call for Institutional Revolution,Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday and Co., 1969, pp. 7-9.

^__^_ and Ramon Xirau, "Introduction," in The Nature of Man,eds. Erich Fromm and Ramon Xirau, New York, MacmillanCo., 1968, pp. 3-24.

, "Man Is Not a Thing," Saturday Review, Vol. XL(March 16, 1957), 9-H-

, "The Nature of Dreams," Scientific American, Vol.CLXXX, No. 5 (May, 1949), 44-47-

, "On the Common Struggle Against Idolatry," CatholicWorld, Vol. CCVIII, No. 1, 246 (January, 196"9T173=T76.

, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in Erich Fromm,D. T. Suzuki, and Richard DeMartino, Zen Buddhismand Psychoanalysis, New York, Harper and Row, I960,pp. 77-141.

, "Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Applicationto the Understanding of Culture," in Culture andPersonality, eds. S. S. Sargent and M. W. Smith, NewYork, Viking Fund, 1949, pp. 1-12.

, "Psychology of a Guaranteed Income," Nation, Vol.CCI, No. 19 (December 6, 1965), 439-442~i

, "The Real Menace of Fascism," Science Digest, Vol.XII, No. 2 (August, 1942), 34-58":

, "Should We Hate Hitler?" Journal of Home Economics,Vol. XXXIV (1942), 220-223-

, "The Social Philosophy of 'Will Therapy',"Psychiatry, Vol. II (1939), 229-237.

, "What Is Mental Health?" Student and Mental Health(1959), PP- 223-237-

B. Marcuse

I. Books

Marcuse, Herbert, Counterrevolution and Revolt, Boston,Beacon Press, 1972.

, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry intoFreud, New York, Vintage Books, 1062.




231

Marcuse, Herbert, An Essay on Liberation, Boston, BeaconPress, 1969^

, Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia,trans. Jeremy J". Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber, Boston,Beacon Press, I97O.

, Hegel's Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorieder Geschichtiichkeit, Frankfurt am Main, V. Kloster-mann Verlag, 1932.

, Kultur and Gesellschaft, 2 vols., Frankfurt am Main,Suhrkamp Verlag, 1965.

, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, trans. JeremyJ. Shapiro, Boston, Beacon Press, I968.

, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology ofAdvanced Industrial Society, Boston, Beacon Press,

T&T.

, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of SocialTheory, New York, Oxford University Press, 1941.

, Schiller-Bibliographie unter Benutzung derTramelschen Schiller-Bibliothek, Berlin, S.

Martin Fraenkel, 1925-

, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis, New York,Vintage Books, I96I.

II. Essays, Articles, and Book Reviews

Marcuse, Herbert, "Art in the One-Dimensional Society," ArtsMagazine (May, I967).

, "Autoritat und Familie in der deutschen Soziologiebis 1933," in Studien liber Autoritat und Familie,ed. Max Horkheimer, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1936, pp.136-228.

"Beitrage zur Phanomenologie des HistorischenMaterialismus," Philosophische Hefte, No. 1(I928), pp. 45-681

"Beschprechung von H. Nossack: Geschichte undSystem der Philosophie," Philosophische Hefte,No. 2 (1930), pp. 91-96.




232

"Besprechung von Heinz Heinscath: DieErrungenschaften des deutschen Idealismus,"Deutsche Literaturzeitung, Vol. L11I, No. 43 (1932),2024-2029-

"Besprechung von Herbert Wacker: Das Verhaltnis desjungen Hegel zu Kant," Deutsche Literaturzeitung,Vol? LV, No. 14 (1934), 629-630.

"Besprechung von Karl Vorlander: Karl Marx, seinLeben und sein Werk," Die Gesellschaft, Vol. VI,Pt. 2 (1929), 186-189.

"De l'ontologie a la technologie; les tendances dela societe'indus trielie," Arguments, Vol. IV, No. 18(I960), 56-59-

"Dialectic and Logic Since the War," in Continuityand Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. Ernest J. Simmons, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955, pp. 347-358.

"Der Einfluss der deutschen Emigration auf dasamerikanische Geistesleben: Philosophie undSoziologie," Jahrbuch fur Amerikastudien, Vol. X(1965), 27-33-

"Emanzipation der Frau in der repressiven Gesellschaft:Ein Cesprach mit Herbert Marcuse und Peter Furth, DasArgument, No. 23 (1962), pp. 2-12.

"Eros and Culture," I.E., The Cambridge Review,Vol. I, No. 3 (1955)7T0"7-T2T:

"Existentialism; Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre'sL'Etre et le neant," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March, 1948), 309-336.

"Gesprach mit Peter Merseburger," radio talk forNeue Deutsche Rundfunk, published in Weltfriedenund Revolution, ed. Hans Eckehard Bahr, Hamburg,Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1968.

"Ideologie et societe'industrielle avancee,"Mediations, No. 5 (1962), pp. 57-71-

"The Ideology of Death," in The Meaning of Death, ed.Herman Feifel, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959, PP.64-76.

"The Individual in the Great Society," Pt. I,Alternatives, Vol. I, No. 1 (I966). Pt. II, ibid.,No. 2 (1966).




233

Marcuse, Herbert, "Industrialization and Capitalism," NewLeft Review, No. 30 (1965), PP- 3-17-

, "An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy," Studies inPhilosophy and Social Science, Vol. VIII (1940),394-412. ""1st die Idee der Revolution eine Mystifikation?"

' Kursbuch, No. 9 (1967), PP- 1-6-

"Language and Technological Society," Dissent, Vol.' VIII, No. 1 (1961), 66-74.. "The Left Under the Counterrevolution, TheHumanist, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (May/June, 1972),

,"Libertad y Agresion en la Sociedad Technoljgica,"La Sociedad Industrial Contemporanea, Vol. XXI(1967).

"Lord Action: Essays on Freedom and Power,"-* American Historical Review, Vol. LIV, No. 3 (1949),

557-559. ", "Nachwort," in Walter Benjamin, Zur Kritik der

J rw*1r ,md andere Aufsatze, Frankfurt am Main,Suhrkamp Verlag, 1965, PP- 95-106.

, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen- Materialismus," Die Gesellschaft, Vol. II (1932),

136-174.

, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," PartisanJ Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter, 1959), 117-129-

. "The Obsolescence of Marxism?" in Marx and the" Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowicz, Notre Dame,

Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, PP-409-417.

, "On Science and Phenomenology," in Boston Studies in- the Philosophy of Science, II, eds. Robert When and

Marx W. Wartorsky, New York, Humanities Press, 1965,pp. 279-291.

, "Philosophie des Scheitems: Karl Jaspers Werk,"- Unterhaltungsblatt der Vossischen Zeitung, No. 339

(December 14, 1933).

, "Preface," in Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom,~ New York, Twayne Publishers, 1958, pp. 15-20.




234

Marcuse, Herbert, "Preface," in Franz Neumann, TheDemocratic and the Authoritarian State: Essaysin Political and Legal Theory, ed. Herbert Marcuse,Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1957, PP. viii-x.

, "Das Problem der Geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit: Wil-helm Dilthey," Die Gesellschaft, Vol. I (1931),350-367.

, "The Problem of Social Change in Technological Society," lecture presented to a UNESCO Symposium on Social Development, printed for limited distributionunder the auspices of Raymond Aron and Bert Hoselitz,Paris, April 28, I96I, pp. 139-160.

, "The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: AReconsideration," Praxis, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2 (1969),20-25.

, "Recent Literature on Communism," World Politics,Vol. VI, No. 4 (1954), 515-525.,

, "A Rejoinder to K. Lowith's Review of Reason andRevolution," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, Vol. II, No. 4 (June, 1942), 560-563.

, "Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture," Daedalus(Winter, I965), pp. I9O-2O7.

, "A Reply to Erich Fromm," Dissent, Vol. Ill, No. 1(Winter, 1956), 79-81.

, "Reply to M. Berman's Review of One-DimensionalMan," Partisan Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (Winter,1965), 159-160.

, "Repressive Tolerance," in Robert Paul Wolff, Bar-rington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, A Critiqueof Pure Tolerance, Boston, Beacon Press, 1969, pp.8I-I23.

, "The Responsibility of Science," in TheResponsibility of Power: Historical Essays inHonor of Hajo HolborrT] eds. Leonard Krieger andFritz Stern, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday and Co.,1967, PP. 439-444.

, "Review of Georg Lukacs, Goethe und seine Zeit,"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.XI, No. 1 (September, 1950;, 142-144.

"Socialism in the Developed Countries,"International SocialismJournal, Vol. II, No.(1965), 139-152.

8




235

Marcuse, Herbert, "Socialist Humanism?" in Socialist Humanism:An International Symposium, ed. Erich Fromm, GardenCity, N. Y., Doubleday and Co., 1965, PP- 96-105.

"Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,"Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX(1941), 414-439.

"Sommes-nous dejV des hommes?" Partisans, No. 28(1966), pp. 21-29.

"Statement on Vietnam," Partisan Review, Vol. XXXII,No. 4 (Fall, 1965), 646-6"W:

"Theoretische Entwiirfe uber Autoritat und Familie: _Ideegeschlichtlicher Teil," in Studien uber Autoritatund Familie, ed. Max Horkheimer, Paris, Felix Alcan,1936, pp. I36-228.

"La Theoriedes instincts et la socialisation," LaTable Ronde, No. 108 (1956), pp. 97-HO.

"Theory and Therapy in Freud," Nation, Vol. CLXXXV,No. 8 (September 28, 1957), 200-202.

"Transzendentaler Marxismus?" Die Gesellschaft, Vol.VII, Pt. 1 (1930), 304-326.

"A Tribute to Paul A. Baran," Monthly Review, Vol.XVI, No. 11 (1965), H4-115.

"Uber die philosophischen Grundalagen deswirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Arbeitsbegriffs,Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,Vol. LXIX (1933), 257-292.

"Uber konkrete Philosophie," Archiv furSozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Vol.lxii (I929), ill-Lab."Vietnam—Analyse eines Exemples," Neue Kritik, Nos.36-37 (1966), pp. 30-40.

"World Without Logos," Bulletin of the AtomicScientists, Vol. XX (1964), 25-26.

"Zum Begriff der Negation in der Dialektik,"Filosoficky Casopis, No. 3 (1967), PP- 375-380.

"Zum Problem der Dialektik I," Die Gesellschaft,Vol. VII, Pt. 1 (1930), 15-30.




236

Marcuse, Herbert, "Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Hans FreyersSoziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft,"Philosophische Hefte, Vol. Ill, Nos. 1-2 (193D,83-91.

, "Zur Kritik der Soziologie," Die Gesellschaft, Vol.VII, Pt. 2 (1931), 270-280.

, "Zur Wahrheitsproblematik der soziologischenMethode," Die Gesellschaft, Vol. VI, Pt. 2 (1929),356-369.

Secondary Sources

C. General

I. Books, Dissertations, and Theses

Adler, Mortimer J., The Idea of Freedom: A DialecticalExamination of the Conceptions of Freedom, 2 vols.,New York, Doubleday and Co., 1958.

Aries, Philippe, Centuries of Childhood, New York, Alfred A.Knopf, 1952T

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald, Indi-anapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co., I962.

Armand, F. and R. Maublanc, eds., Fourier: Textes Choisis,2 vols., Paris. Editions Sociales Internationales,

1937-

Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Anna S. Benja-min and L. H. Hackstaff, Indianapolis, Bobbs-MerrillCo., 1964.

Avineri, Shlomo, The Social and Political Thought of KarlMarx, London, Cambridge University Press, I968.

Baier, Kurt, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis ofEthics, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press,1958.

Baritz, Loren, The Servants of Power, New York, John Wileyand Sons"! 1965.

Bay, Christian, The Structure of Freedom, Stanford, StanfordUniversity Press, I958.




237

Benne, Kenneth D., A Conception of Authority: AnIntroductory Study, New York, Teachers College,Columbia University, 1943-

and Bozidar Muntyan, Human Relations in CurriculumChange: Selected Readings with Especial Emphasis ctmphasi

TT95T.Group Development, New York, Dryden Press

Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty, New York, OxfordUniversity Press, 1969.

Birnbach, Martin, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, Stanford,Stanford University Press, 1961.

Blum, Gerald S., Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality, NewYork, McGraw-Hill, 1953-

Bramson, Leon, The Political Context of Sociology, Princeton,Princeton University Press, 1961.

Breines, Paul, ed., Critical Interruptions: New LeftPerspectives on Herbert Marcuse, New York, Herderand Herder, 1970.

Brinkerhoff, Robert H., Some Ethical Implications ofFreudian and Post-Freudian Thought, unpublisheddoctoral dissertation, Buffalo, State Universityof New York, 1969-

Brown, J.A.C., Freud and the Post-Freudians, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1961.

Brown, Norman 0., Life Against Death: The PsychologicalMeaning of History, Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, I959.

Brumbaugh, Robert S. and Nathaniel M. Lawrence, Philosopherson Education: Six Essays on the Foundations ofWestern Thought, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963.

Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald GregorSmith, London, Kegan Paul, 1947.

Camus, Albert, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, rev.and trans. Anthony Bower, New York, Vintage Books,i960.

Chomsky, Noam, American Power and the New Mandarins:Historical and Political Essays, New York, VintageBooks, 1969-

Cole, G.D.H. and W. Mellor, The Meaning of IndustrialFreedom, London, George Allen and Unwin, 191b.




238

Cooley, Charles H., Social Organization: A Study of theLarger Mind, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,

1912.

Counts, George S., Dare the Schools Build a New SocialOrder? New York, John Day Co., 1932.

Cranston, Maurice, Freedom: A New Analysis, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1953-

Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, New York, MacmillanCo., 1961.

and James H. Tufts, Ethics, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1932.

, Experience and Nature, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1925.

, Freedom and Culture, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons,T939^

, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Socialpsychology, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1922.

, The Public and Its Problems, New York, Henry Holt andCo., 1927.

, The Quest for Certainty, New York, Minton, Balch andCo., 1929-

, The School and Society, rev. ed., Chicago, Universityof Chicago Press, 1923.

Dorin, Francisco A., Marcuse: vida e obra, Rio de Janeiro,' Jos<f Alvaro, 1969.

Durkheim, Emile, Education and Sociology, trans. Sherwood D.Fox, Glencoe, 111., Free Press, I956.

, The Rules of Sociological Method, eighth ed., trans.Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, and ed. GeorgeE.G. Catlin, Glencoe, 111., Free Press, I95O.

Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson, New York, Vintage Books, 1964.

Erikson, Erik H., Childhood and Society, New York, W. W.Norton and Co., 1963.

Evans, Richard I., Dialogue with Erich Fromm, New York,Harper and Row, 1966.




239

Eysenck, H. J., The Psychology of Politics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. ConstanceFarrington, New York, Grove Press, I963.

Fosdick, Dorothy, What Is Liberty? New York, Harper andBrothers, I939.

Freire, Paulo, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York, Herderand Herder, 1970.

Freud, Sigmund, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. C.J.M.Hubback, New York, Liveright Publishing Corp., 1950.

, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans, and ed.James Strachey, New York, W. W. Norton and Co.,1961.

, The Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud, 18 vols.,trans. James Strachey, London, Hogarth Press, 1950.

, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere, and ed. JamesStrachey, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., i960.

, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott,and ed. James Strachey, Garden City, N. Y., Double-day and Co., 1964.

, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, trans.Joan Riviere, New York, Washington Square Press,1952.

, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones, NewYork, Alfred A. Knopf, 1939-

, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans.W.J.H. Sprott, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1933.

, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey,New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1949.

, The Standard Edition of the Complete PsychologicalWorks of Sigmund Freud, 23 vols., ed. James Strachey, London, Hogarth Press, I953-I966.

Glen, John S., Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1966.

Gutierrez, Jose*, El metodo psicoanalitico de Erich Fromm,Bogota, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1961.




240

Habermas, Jurgen, Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie,"Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, i960.

Hammond, Guyton B., Man in Estrangement: A Comparison ofthe Thought 0T Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1965-

Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals, Oxford, Clarendon Press,1952.

Harshbarger, Thad R., The Ethical Philosophy of Erich Fromm,unpublished master's thesis, Urbana-Champaign, Uni-versity of Illinois, 1964.

Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.lie, London, George Allen and Unwin, I96I.

, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, NewYork, The Colonial Press, 1899.

, Reason in History: A General Introduction to thephilosophy of History, trans. Robert S. Hartman, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953-

Holz, Hans H., Utopie und Anarchismus: zur kritik derkritiscnen Theorie Herbert Marcuses, Koln, Pahl-Rugenstein, 1968. *~

Hook, Sidney, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in theIntellectual Development of Karl Marx, Ann Arbor,University ot Michigan Press, 1962.

Homey, Karen, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, NewYork, W. W. Norton and Co., 1937.

, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W. W. Nortonand Co., 1939. '

Horowitz, Louis Irving, Philosophy. Science, and theSociology of Knowledge, Springfield, 111., CharlesC. Thomas, I961.

Hutchins, Robert M., Education for Freedom, Baton Rouge,Louisiana State University Press, 1943-

, The Higher Learning in America, New Haven, Yale University Press, I936.

Huxley, Aldous, Brave New World: A Novel, London, Chattoand Windus, 1932. '

, Eyeless in Gaza, London, Chatto and Windus, 1936.

B. Bail-




241

Illich, Ivan, Deschooling Society. New York, Harper and Row,1970.

Jensen, Vern A., Failure and Compatibility in Love: AnIntegrative Study of the Psychology of Erich Frommand the Theology of Emil Brunner, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Madison, N. J., Drew University,1967.

Jones, Richard M., An Application of Psychoanalysis toEducation, Springfield. 111., Charles C. Thomas,T96"CT

Jouvenel, Bertrand de. Sovereignty: An Inquiry into thePolitical Good, trans. J. F. Huntington, Chicago,University ot Chicago Press, I963.

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard,London, Macmillan and Co., 1892.

, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on theTheory of Ethics^ trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott,London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1879-

" , Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith,New York, St. Martin?s Press, I96I.

Kaufmann, Walter, Hegel: Reinterpretation. Texts, andCommentary, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday and Co.,1965-

Keniston, Kenneth, The Young Radicals: Notes on CommittedYouth, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.

Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,Chicago, University ot Chicago Press, 1962.

Lasch, Christopher, The New Radicalism in America,1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type,New York, Vintage Books, 1967-

Lasswell, Harold D., Power and Personality, New York, W. W.Norton and Co., 1948.

and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Frameworkfor Political Inquiry, New Haven, Yale UniversityPress, 1950.

Lee, Lester C., An Investigation of Erich Fromm's Theory ofAuthoritarianism, unpublished doctoral dissertation,Claremont, Calif., Claremont Graduate School, I963.




242

Lee, Otis, Existence and Inquiry: A Study of Thought in theModern World, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, g49.

Lichtenberg, Philip, Psychoanalysis: Radical andConservative, New York, Springer Publishing Co., 1969-

Lilge, Frederic", The Abuse of Learning: The Failure of theGerman University, New York, Macmillan Co., 1948.

Linton, Ralph, The Cultural Background of Personality, NewYork, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945.

McGill, V. J., The Idea of Happiness, New York, Frederick A.Praeger, 1967-

Maclntyre, Alasdair, Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and aPolemic, New York, Viking Press, I97O.

Macmurray, John, Conditions of Freedom, London, Faber andFaber, 195CT

Madison, Peter, Freud's Concept of Repression and Defense:Its Theoretical and Observational Language, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1961.

Malinowski, Bronislaw, Freedom and Civilization, Bloomington,Indiana University Press, 1964.

Mannheim, Karl, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed.Paul Kecskemeti, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,1952.

, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, eds. HansGerth and Ernest K. Bramstedt, New York, Oxford University Press, 1950.

, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to theSociology of Knowledge, trans. Louis Wirth and Ed-ward ShiIs, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936.

, An Introduction to the Sociology of Education, ed.W.A.C. Stewart, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,1962.

, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction:Studies in Modern Social Structure, trans. Edward Shils, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940.

Maritain, Jacques, Freedom in the Modern World, trans. Richard 0'Sullivan, London, Sheed and Ward, 1935.




243

Marks, Robert W., The Meaning of Marcuse, New York, Ballan-tine Books, 1970.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on Politicsand Philosophy, ed. Lewis S. Feuer, Garden City,N. Y., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959.

, Capital, the Communist Manifesto and Other Writings,ed. Max Eastman, New York, Modern Library, 1932.

, The German Ideology, ed. R. Pascal, New York, Inter-nationai Publishers, 1939.

Maslow, Abraham H., Motivation and Personality, New York,Harper and Row, 1954.

May, Rollo, Man's Search for Himself, New York, W. W. Nortonand Co., 1953-

Mead, Margaret, Sex and Temperament in Three PrimitiveSocieties, New York, New American Library, 1952. .

Merquior, Jose'G., Arte e Sociedade em Marcuse, Adorno eBenjamin: ensaio crftico stTbre a escola neohegelianade Frankfurt, Rio de Janeiro, Ed Tempo Brasileiro,T969:

Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1949.

Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959-

, The Sociological Imagination, New York, Grove Press,T96T:

Moore, Barrington, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory:Seven Studies, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard UniversityPress, 1958.

Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959.

Mosca, Gaetano, The Ruling Class, ed. Arthur Livingston andtrans. H. D. Kahn, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939.

Moynihan, Daniel P., The Negro Family: The Case for NationalAction, Washington, D.- C, U. S. Department of Labor"7U. S. Government Printing Office, I965.

Mullahy, Patrick, ed., A Study in Interpersonal Relations,New York, Hermitage Press, I95O.




244

Muller, Herbert J., Issues of Freedom, New York, Harper andBrothers, 1950"!

Mumford, Lewis, The Myth of the Machine, New York, Harcourt,Brace and World, I966.

Munroe, Ruth L., Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought: AnExposition. Critique, and Attempt at Integration,New York, Dryden Press, 1955-

Mure, G.R.G., The Philosophy of Hegel, Lv ion, Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1965-

Muren, Gary P., The Socio-Polittcal Thought .,i Erich Fromm,unpublished master's thesis, Urbana-Cnampaign, University of Illinois, I968.

Murphy, Arthur E., The Uses of Reason, New York, MacmillanCo., 1943.

Myers, Henry Alonzo, The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox: A Study ofthe Choice Between Traditional Idâii--..".. j^dSystematic Pluralism. Ithaca, N. Y., CornellUniversity Press, 1944.

Nagel, Ernest, Sovereign Reason:Philosophy of Science, GiT95T:

Nash, Paul, Authority and Freedom in Education: AnIntroduction to Philosophy ot Education, NewYork, John Wiley and Sons, 1966.

Neill, A. S., Summerhill: A Radical Approach to ChildRearing, New York, Hart Publishing Co., I960.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Genealogy of Morals trans HoraceB. Samuel, New York, Bcni and Liveright, 1918.

Nuermberger, Robert M., The Nature of Man and Guilt:Implications for Counseling Derived from anAnalysis of the Philosophies of Cornelius VanTil and Erich Fromm, unpublished doctoral dissertation, East Lansing, Michigan State University, I967.

Ogburn, William F., Social Change: With Respect to Cultureand Original Nature, New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1922.

Olafson, Frederick A., Principles and Persons: An EthicalInterpretation 'of Existentialism, Baltimore, TheJohns Hopkins Press, 1967-

And Other Studies in theencoe, 111., Free Press,




245

Oppenheim, Felix E., Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis,New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961.

Orwell, George, 1984: A Novel, London, Seeker and Warburg,1949.

Pappenheim, Fritz, The Alienation of Modern Man: AnInterpretation Based on Marx and To'nnies, NewYork, Monthly Review Press, 1959.

Park, Robert and Ernest W. Burgess, The City, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 196TI

Peck, Robert T., et. al., The Psychology of CharacterDevelopment, TIew York, John Wiley and Sons, T960.

Peters, R. S., Authority, Responsibility, and Education, NewYork, Eriksson-Taplinger Co., i960.

Plato, Protagoras and Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, Baltimore,Penguin Books, I956.

, The Republic, trans. Francis Macdonald Cornford, NewYork, Oxford University Press, 1945.

Popper, Karl R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols.,London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

, The Poverty of Historicism, .London, Routledge andKegan Paul, 1957.

Price, Kingsley, Education and Philosophical Thought, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1962.

Proto, Mario, Introduzione a Marcuse, Manduina, Lacaith, I968.

Reich, Wilhelm, The Function of the Orgasm, trans. TheodoreP. Wolfe, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, I96I.

, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, trans. Vincent R.Carfagno, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970.

, The Sexual Revolution: Toward a Self-GoverningCharacter Structure, rev, ed., trans. Theodore P.Wolfe, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, I969.

Rieff, Philip, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, New York,Viking Press, I959.

Riesman, David, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, TheLonely Crowd, New Haven, Yale University Press,1950.




246

Roazen, Paul, Freud: Political and Social Thought, New York,Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. [

Robinson, Paul A., The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, GezaRoheim, Herbert Marcuse, New York, Harper and Row,19697^

Roheim, Geza, The Origin and Function of Culture, New York,Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph No. 69, 1943.

Ross, Edward A., Social Control, New York, Macmillan Co.,1906.

Roszak, Theodore, ed., The Dissenting Academy, New York,Pantheon Books, 1968.

, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on theTechnocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition,Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1968.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Emile, trans. Barbara Foxley, London, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1911.

Sabine, George H., A History of Political Theory, rev. ed.,New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1958.

Santayana, George, The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlineof Aesthetic Theory, New York, Dover Publications,

Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: An Essay onPhenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes,New York, Philosophical Library, 1956.

Schaar, John H., Escape from Authority: The Perspectives ofErich Fromm, New York, Basic Books, 1961.

Schacht, Richard, Alienation, Garden City, N. Y., Doubledayand Co., I97O.

Schiller, Friedrich, The Aesthetic Letters, Essays, and thePhilosophical Letters" trans. J. Weiss, Boston, Little, Brown, 1845.

Shklar, Judith N., ed., Political Theory and Ideology, NewYork, Macmillan Co., I966.

Shore, Maurice J., Soviet Education: Its Psychology andPhilosophy, New York, Philosophical Library, 1947.

Snow, C. P., The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution:The Rede Lecture, 1959, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959.




247

Spinoza, Benedict, Ethics, trans. W. Hale White, rev. AmeliaHutcheson Sterling and Humphrey Milford, London, Oxford University Press, I927.

Stanley, William 0., Education and Social Integration, NewYork, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1953-

Steigewald, Robert R., H. Marcuses dritter Wag, Koln, Pahl-Rugenstein, 1§69^

Sterba, Richard, Introduction to the Psychoanalytic Theoryof the Libido, New York, Nervous and Mental DiseaseMonograph No. 68, 1942.

Stevenson, Charles L., Ethics and Language, New Haven, YaleUniversity Press") 1944.

Sullivan, Harry Stack, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry,Washington, D. C, William Alanson White PsychiatricFoundation, 1947.

, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, New York,W. W. Norton and Co., I953.

Taylor, Paul W., Normative Discourse, Englewood Cliffs,N. J., Prentice-Hall, I96I.

Thompson, Clara, Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development,New York, Hermitage House, I95I.

Tilley, William C, The Relation of Self-Love to Love for theOther with Special Reference to the Thought ofReinhold Niebuhr and Erich Fromm, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Louisville, Southern BaptistTheological Seminary, 1966.

Trilling, Lionel, Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture, Boston, Beacon Press, 1955.

Tucker, Robert C, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1964.

Viereck, Peter, Conservatism Revisited, New York, CharlesScribner's Sons, 1949.

Wagar, W. Warren, Good Tidings: The Belief in Progress fromDarwin to Marcuse, Bloomington, Indiana UniversityPress, 1972.

White, Morton and Lucia, The Intellectual Versus the City:From Thomas Jefferson to Frank Lloyd Wright, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press and theM.I.T. Press, I962.




248

Whitehead, Alfred North, Adventures of Ideas, New York, Macmillan Co., 1933.

, The Aims of Education, second ed., London, Williamsand Norgate, 1950.

, The Function of Reason, Boston, Beacon Press, 1959.

Whyte, William H., Jr., The Organization Man, New York,Simon and Schuster, 1956.

Wolff, Robert Paul, The Poverty of Liberalism, Boston,Beacon Press, 1968.

Yonker, Nicholas J., Ambiguities of Love: An Inquiry intothe Psychology of Erich Fromm, unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York, Columbia University,1961.

Zeitlin, Irving M., Ideology and the Development ofSociological~~Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,Prentice-Hall, 1968.

II. Essays, Articles, and Book Reviews

Acton, H. B., "Review of Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: ACritical Analysis," Political Studies, Vol. VII, No.2 (January, 1959), 181-183.

Bartlett, F., and J. Shodell, "Fromm, Marx and the Conceptof Alienation," Science and Society, Vol. XXVII,No. 3 (Summer, 1963), 321-326.

Berman, Marshall, "Theory and Practice," Partisan Review,Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (Fall, 1964), 617-626.

Boulding, Kenneth E., "Tragic Nonsense," New Republic, Vol.CLX, No. 13 (March 29, 1969), 28-W-

Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, "Freedom, Purpose and Value," inFreedom: Its Meaning, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen, NewYork, Harcourt, Brace and Co.', 1940, pp. 485-506.

Brown, Norman 0., "A Reply to Herbert Marcuse," Commentary,Vol. XLIII, No. 3 (March, I967), 83-84.

Burnham, James, "Sock It to Us, Herbert," National Review,Vol. XX (November 19, I968), II58.

Callahan, Daniel, "Resistance and Technology," Commonweal,Vol. LXXXVII, No. 18 (February 9, I968), 551ft-




249

Cassinelli, C. W., "Political Authority: Its Exercise andPossession," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XIV,No. 3 (September, 1961), 635-646.

Cranston, Maurice, "Herbert Marcuse," Encounter, Vol. XXXII(March, I969), 38-50.

Crews, Frederick C, "Love in the Western World." PartisanReview, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (Spring, I967), 272-287.

de Grazia, Milton, "What Authority Is Not," AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol. LIII, No. 2 (June,

1959), 321-33L

De la Fuente-Muniz, Ramon, "Fromm's Approach to the Study ofPersonality," in Psychiatric Research Reports, II,Washington, D. C, American Psychiatric Association,1956.

Demos, Raphael, "Human Freedom—Positive and Negative," inFreedom: Its Meaning, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen, NewYork, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940, pp. 590-611.

Eckstein, Jerome, "Is It Possible for the Schools to be Neutral?" Educational Theory, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (Fall,1969), 337-346.

Eidelberg, Paul, "The Temptation of Herbert Marcuse," Reviewof Politics, Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (October, I969),442-458.

Ennis, Robert, "The Possibility of Neutrality," EducationalTheory, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (Fall, 1969), 347-356.

Ferrier, J. L., et. al., eds., and H. Weaver, trans., "Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," The New York TimesMagazine (October 27, 1968), 29ffi

Fingarette, Herbert, "Eros and Utopia," Review ofMetaphysics, Vol. X, No. 4 (June, 1957),66L-665.

Flay, Joseph C, "Alienation and the Status Quo," Man andWorld, Vol. II, No. 2 (May, I969), 248-262.

Friedenberg, E. Z., "Neo-Freudianism and Erich Fromm,"Commentary, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (October, 1962),305-313.

Gellner, Ernest, "Holism Versus Individualism," in Readingsin the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. MayBrodbeck, New York, Macmillan Co., 1968, pp. 254-268.




250

Goodwin, Richard, "The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse:Which Side Is He On?" The Atlantic, Vol. CCXXVII,No. 6 (June, 197D, 68^81"

Graham, Aelred, "To Love One Another," Commonweal, Vol.LXVI, No. 13 (June 28, 1957), 325-328.

Granrose, John T., "The Authority of Conscience," SouthernJournal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, Nos. 2-3 (Summerand Fall, 1970), 205-213.

Green, Arnold W., "Sociological Analysis of Homey andFromm," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LI,No. 6 (May, 1946), 533-540.

Heffner, Richard, ed., "Interview with Erich Fromm."McCall's, Vol. XCIII, No. 1 (October, 1965),I32ff.

Herberg, Will, "Freud, the Revisionists, and Social Reality," in Freud and the Twentieth Century, ed. Benjamin Nelson, Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1957,pp. 143-163.

Hook, Sidney, "Dialectic in Social and Historical Inquiry,"Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXVI, No. 14 (July 6,1939), 365-378.

James, Walter F., "Karen Horney and Erich Fromm in Relationto Alfred Adler," Individual Psychology Bulletin,Vol. VI (1947), 105-116.

Kaplan, Abraham, "The Heart of Erich Fromm," New York Reviewof Books, Vol. IV, No. 5 (April 8, 1965), 33-35.

Kariel, Henry S., "The Normative Pattern of Erich Fromm'sEscape from Freedom," Journal of Politics, Vol. XIX,No. 4 (November, 1957), 640-654.

Karier, Clarence J., "Testing for Order and Control in theCorporate Liberal State," Educational Theory, Vol.XXII, No. 2 (Spring, 1972), forthcoming.

Keen, Sam and John Raser, eds., "A Conversation with HerbertMarcuse," Psychology Today, Vol. IV, No. 9 (February,1971), 35f7T

Krutch, Joseph Wood, "A World of Alienated Men," The NewYork Times Book Review, Vol. XL (September 4, 1955),9.

Lichtheim, George, "The Threat of History," New York Reviewof Books, Vol. II, No. 1 (February 20, 1964), 16-19-




251

Littleford, Michael, "Some Philosophical Assumptions of Humanistic Psychology." Educational Theory, Vol. XX,No. 3 (Summer, 1970), 229-244.

Lowith, Karl, "Review of Herbert Marcuse, Reason andRevolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory,"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. II,No. 4 (June, 1942), 560-563.

McGill, V. J., "Review of Herbert Marcuse, Reason andRevolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory,"Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (January 29,1942), 75-82.

McGrath, Michael, "Fromm, Ethics, and Education," Bulletin ofthe Bureau of School Service, Lexington, Universityof Kentucky, Vol. XLII, No. 1 (September, 1969).

McKeon, Richard, "Philosophical Differences and the Uses ofFreedom," Ethics, Vol. LXI, No. 2 (January, 195D,105-135.

Marx, Karl, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," trans.T. B. Bottomore, in Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept ofMan, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 19bl,pp. 86-162.

Mattingly, Garrett, "The Anatomy of Regression," SaturdayReview of Literature, Vol. XXIV (August 30, 1941),

Mead, Margaret, "The Choice Offered Us," New York HeraldTribune Books, Vol. XVIII (September 21, 1941).

Menninger, Karl, "Loneliness in the Modern World," Nation,Vol. CLIV, No. 11 (March 14, 1942), 317-

Oppenheimer, Oscar, "Freedom and Mental Health," EducationalTheory, Vol. Ill, No. 4 (October, 1952), 222-234.

Overstreet, Bonaro W., "An Unobtainable Utopia," SaturdayReview, Vol. XXXVIII (October 8, 1955), 1>-

Peretz, Martin, "Herbert Marcuse: Beyond Technological Reason," Yale Review, Vol. LVII (Summer, I968), 518-527.

Petuchowski, Jakob J., "Erich Fromm's Midrash on Love,"Commentary, Vol. XXII, No. 6 (December, 1956),543-549.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, "The Social Contract," in SocialContract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau, ed.Sir Ernest Barker, New York, Oxford UniversityPress, 1962, pp. 167-307.




252

Sachs, Hanns, "The Delay of the Machine Age," PsychoanalyticQuarterly, Vol. II (1933), 420 ff.

Sadler, William A., Jr., "A Crucial Choice," ChristianCentury, Vol. LXXXII (September 29, 1965), 1198-1200.

Schachtel, Ernest G., "On Memory and Childhood Amnesia,"Psychiatry, Vol. X, No. 1 (February, 1947), 1-26.

Schneider, Carl D., "Utopia and History." Philosophy Today,Vol. XII, No. 4/4 (Winter, 1968), 236-245.

Singer, Milton, "Review of Erich Fromm, Man for Himself,"Ethics, Vol. LVIII, No. 3/1 (April, 1948), 220-221.

Spring, Joel H., "Education as a Form of Social Control,"unpublished manuscript, Cleveland, Case WesternReserve University, 1970.

Starr, Anthony, "The Need to Fight," New Statesman, Vol.LXIV (September 28, 1962), 400-401.

Stern, Sol, "The Metaphysics of Rebellion: On HerbertMarcuse," Ramparts, Vol. VI (June 29, 1968), 55-60.

Suzuki, D. T., "Lectures on Zen Buddhism," in Erich Fromm,D. T. Suzuki, and Richard DeMartino, Zen Buddhismand Psychoanalysis, New York, Harper and Row, I960,pp. 1-76. •

Titarenko, A. I., "Erich Fromm in the Chains of Illusion,""Science and Society., Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (Summer, 1965),319-329.

Violas, Paul, "Fear and the Constraints on Academic Freedomof Public School Teachers, I93O-I96O," EducationalTheory, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (Winter, 1971), 70-80.

Zhukov, Yury, "Taking Marcuse to the Woodshed," Atlas, Vol.XVI, No. 3 (September, I968), 33"35.

Zilboorg, G.,- "Review of Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving,"Saturday Review, Vol. XLII (April 11, 1959), 40.




253

VITA

Joseph Liberatore DeVitis was born April 24, 1945,

in Baltimore, Maryland. He received a B.A., with general

honors in liberal arts and history, from The Johns Hopkins

University in 1967. While teaching at a nongraded elementary

school in Baltimore during I968-I969, he completed his M.Ed.

in foundations of education at The Hopkins. From I969 to

1972, he has been a doctoral student and teaching assistant

in the Department of History and Philosophy of Education at

the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Mr. DeVitis'

published work includes the following: "Ethical and Educa

tional Autonomy in Buber's 'Great Character, '" Journal of

Critical Analysis, Vol. II, No. 2 (July, 1970), 13-19; "The

Interiorized Self: Augustinian Epistemology and Existential

Education," Journal of Thought, Vol. VI, No. 2 (April,

1971), 109-115; and "Karl Jaspers' University Ideal: Self-

Culture and Social Seclusion," University College Quarterly,

Vol. XVI, No. 1 (November, 1970), 27-32.




Documents

the child realize his potentialities."59 For Fromm, educa - Opus4