Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi

Facoltà di Economia

Corso di Laurea in Economia e Management delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche e delle Istituzioni Internazionali

The coordination of actors intervening in crisis following natural disasters: the issues arising in the emergency-development transition.

The case of Haiti. ___________________________________________________________________

Relatore: Prof. Eduardo Missoni

Controrelatore: Prof. Elio Borgonovi

Tesi di laurea magistrale di Anna Fiscale Matricola 1421973

Anno Accademico 2010-2011

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I authorize Bocconi University to consult this thesis.

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!!!!!!Acknowledgements A University Degree is an important goal which I would hardly have achieved without the love, the precious help, and the continuous encouragement of the many people who were close to me in different ways and who never failed to offer me their invaluable support. First of all, I would like to thank, with all my heart, my wonderful parents; my father for his constant encouragement, the tireless support and for the love he showed to me,

serenity and tranquility that she is always able to send me. Matte and Titti, important points of reference who have always believed and still believe in me. Otti and Vitti, gorgeous children who fill my days and bring me back to the playfulness of life. Then, I would like to thank Professor Missoni, under whose guidance I have carried out my work, for the extraordinary human energy and enthusiasm that has been able to pass on me during the writing of my thesis, and for his valuable suggestions and timely observations which allowed me to greatly improve the quality my work. Chiara Castellani, my mentor and constant reference in the journey. Agnese, who taught me the importance of perseverance and made me understand the value of the commitment to an ideal. I would also like to thank the organization COOPI, for the growth opportunities offered to me in Haiti, and in particular Riccardo who, thanks to the confidence he showed to me, gave me the opportunity to learn so much; Tiziana, a turning point in my life; Carolina, who broadened my horizons with her sweetness; Sarah, who made me appreciate the value of simplicity. A special thanks also to all the people who conceded me the interviews necessary to the realization of this work. Last but not least, thanks to all my friends, near and far, who have been close to me in these years with their presence, friendship and encouragement, to you my deepest gratitude, to you, that you love me for what I am. !

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Glossary

ACAPS: Assessment Capacities Project

AECID: Spanish Cooperation

ASP: Associate Surge Pool

CAP: Consolidated Appeal Process

CARICOM: Caribbean Community

CCIH: Haitian Chamber of Commerce

CCO: Comité de Coordination des ONGs

CERF: Central Emergency Response Fund

CHAP: Common Humanitarian Action Plan

CHFs: Common Humanitarian Funds

CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency

CIMIC: Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

CLIO: Cadre de Liaison Inter-ONG

CPIO: Comité Permanent Inter-Organisation

CSC: Coordination Support Committee

DAC: Development Assistance Committee

DFID: UK Department for International Development

DHA: Department of Humanitarian Affairs

DPC: Department of Civil Protection

ECHO: Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission

EES: The Environmental Emergencies Section Unit

ERC: Emergency Relief Coordinator

ERFs: Emergency Response Funds

ERR: Emergency Response Roster

ERRF: Emergency Relief and Recovery Fund

EU-MIC: European Civil Protection Mechanism

EU/JRC: European Joint Research Center

de la Coopération Internationale

GDACS: Global Disaster Alert Coordination System

HC: Humanitarian Coordinator

HCT: Humanitarian Country Team

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IASC: Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICVA: International Council of Voluntary Agencies

IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons

IDRL: International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles

INSARAG: International Search and Rescue Advisory Group

IOM: International Organization for Migration

JOTC: Joint Operations and Tasking Center

LEMA: Local emergency management authority

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières

NCSO: NGO Coordination Support Office

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OSOCC: On-Site Operations Coordination Center

NATF: Needs Assessment Task Force

PDNA: Post Disaster Needs Assessment

RC: Resident Coordinator

RDC: Reception Departure Center

RDRAs: Regional Disaster Response Advisors

RINAH: Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti

SBPP: Stand-By Partnership-Program

SNGRD: Système National de Gestion Des Risques et des Désastres

SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

UNDAC: UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination

UNDRO: United Nations Disaster Relief Office

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USAR: Urban Search and Rescue

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Abstract

Due to the expansion of the humanitarian industry, the increasing complexity of crises, and the rise in the number of actors, coordination has become a matter of crucial importance. In light of the relevance of the phenomenon, this study aims to answer the following research question: What are the managerial and coordination challenges among actors involved in the emergency-development transition phase? To address this question, an empirical analysis has been carried out in Haiti, using forty face-to-face interviews, aimed at highlighting the issues emerged in the transition phase between emergency and development. The problems detected in the course of the investigation in the field have been compared to those discussed in recent literature. In addition, a possible correlation has been explored between the category of actors interviewed and the type of response given, both in relation to the coordination aspects, and to other more incidental factors concerning the humanitarian intervention in Haiti. Finally, some recommendations have been drawn which, adding on what is known from the existing current literature on this subject, suggest how to remove some major obstacles that limit a more efficient and effective coordination.

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Table of contents 1. INTRODUCTION 11

1.1 Research question and objective 11 1.2 The contribution of the study and the gaps addressed 12 1.3 Structure overview 12 1.4 Methodology 13

2. GENERAL COORDINATION OF THE MULTILATERAL RESPONSE TO CRISIS SITUATIONS 15

2.1 Nature and definition of coordination 15 2.1.1

15 2.2 The determining factors of coordination 18 2.3 The evolution of the relationship between the humanitarian actors and their coordination mechanisms 23

2.3.1 The 46/182 UN Resolution 23 2.3.1.1 The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) 25 2.3.1.2 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 26 2.3.1.3 From United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 27

2.3.2 The Pooled funding mechanisms: ERF, CERF and others 29 2.3.2.1 Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) 29 2.3.2.2 The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and the subsequent Central Emergency Response Fund 30 2.3.2.3 Recovery and reconstruction funds 31!

2.3.3 The Appeal processes: CAP and the Flash Appeal 32 2.3.3.1 The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 32 2.3.3.2 The Flash Appeal (FA) 34

2.3.4 The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator System 34 2.3.5 Integrated missions and the role of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 35

cluster system 35

2.3.6.1 The UN Humanitarian Reform 35 2.3.6.2 The cluster approach 36

2.4 NGO Coordination in the field 38 2.5 Coordination tools in onset crisis: 38

2.5.1 Surge Capacity 38 2.5.2 Logistics Support 39 2.5.3 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord/CIMIC) 40 2.5.4 The Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) 40 2.5.5 The Environmental Emergencies Section Unit (EES) 41

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2.6 Coordination process and tools for the management of sudden-onset natural disasters 41

2.6.1 UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) 41 2.6.2 International Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) 43 2.6.3 On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) 43 2.6.4 Pre-deployment coordination 44

"#!THE HAITIAN CASE 45!

3.1 The Haitian political, social and economic context before the disaster 45 3.2 The disaster and its consequences 46

3.2.1 Human cost, infrastructural damages and displacement 46 3.2.2 Needs assessments 47

3.3 The Response 49 3.3.1 National Response 49

3.3.1.1 Haitian population, civil society and government 49 3.3.2 International Response 50

3.3.2.1 USAR, UNDAC and others international humanitarian actors 50

3.4 International Humanitarian Funding 55 3.5 Information Management (IM) 57 3.6 Successes and challenges 57 3.7 Lessons learned and recommendations provided 61

4. TWO YEARS AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE: WHICH STEPS FURTHER FOR COORDINATION? 65

4.1 Context at the end of 2011 67 4.2 Empirical analysis 67 4.3 Problems, implications and recommendations 71 4.4 Further considerations from the empirical analysis 80 4.5 Additional Findings 81 4.6 Comparison of outcomes from 2010 and 2011 86

5. CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATIONS 89 6. REFERENCES 95 7. ANNEX 101

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1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Research question and objective

This study focuses on a crucial aspect of humanitarian intervention, that is, coordination. Three are the elements which have conferred an increasing importance to this peculiar factor. They refer to the expansion of the industry in terms of people involved and money earmarked, the growing complexity of humanitarian crisis, and the rise in the number of actors. These factors require a significant push towards a coordinated intervention, which gives rise to positive repercussions from both an ethical perspective (in terms of lives saved) and from an economic side (in terms of efficient utilization of resources). Coordination results in a fostered twofold accountability. The first one refers to accountability to beneficiaries by international actors, which must make sure that their support and assistance to the victims are provided with minimum gaps, minimum overlapping, and respecting the Minimum Standards. The second one consists of accountability towards donors, as the intervention must be carried out by promoting the most efficient and effective utilization of resources. In light of the relevance of the phenomena, this study was developed with the purpose to answer the following research question: What are the managerial and coordination challenges among actors involved in the emergency-development transition phase? In detail, the research concerns the analysis of the main issues that characterize the coordination and organization systems of the actors involved in humanitarian emergency situations caused by natural disasters, and of the suggested solutions in line with the current state of the art of the literature on this topic. With particular reference to the case of Haiti, the research examines the most significant problems that have arisen in the process of coordination and organization of the actors currently working in the post-recovery phase, two years after the earthquake. In addition, the analysis estimates the most significant implications these issues entail, in terms of effectiveness and appropriateness of the humanitarian intervention. As an additional focus, just partially addressed by this study and that needs further research, the study explores the correlation between the category of actors interviewed and the type of response given, both in relation to the coordination aspects, and to other more incidental factors concerning the humanitarian intervention in Haiti.

Bearing this question in mind, the study aims at the formulation, based on the results obtained by empirical testing, of any recommendations, which might help to improve the efficiency of coordination and organization systems of the actors involved in humanitarian emergencies.

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1.2 The contribution of the study and the gaps addressed

The contribution of this research is mainly twofold.

Firstly, after the description of the theoretical coordination framework and the analysis of the main actors involved, the study investigates the roles undertaken by these actors in the Haitian post-earthquake context during the first year of the intervention. In light of the evaluation of the problems encountered at that time, this research aims to assess, two years after the earthquake, which problems still persist, which are the new ones and what are their operational implications. The empirical analysis performed allows then to formulate some recommendations in order to deal with the negative consequences that can arise from improper coordination processes during the transition phase. Secondly, this research contributes to integrate the current literature concerning a topic of particular social importance in a specific time span, such as the emergency-

-which, so far, very few transition papers have been produced. In fact, from an empirical viewpoint, this study collects the experiences and perspectives of the main actors involved in the current coordination mechanisms. Recent literature seems, indeed, to lack a comprehensive analysis of transition issues. In an effort to fill this gap, this study proposes several answers to the initial research question. The answers are based on the empirical proof of the Haitian case study, mainly formed by interviews and institutional documents.

1.3 Structure overview

The study is structured as follows: in the second part, the phenomenon of coordination is defined and the factors behind its increasing importance are investigated. Moreover, the theoretical analysis focuses on the evolution of coordination mechanisms (whose turning point was the adoption of the 46/182 Resolution) and on the definition of the main entities shaping coordination (as, for example, OCHA, the cluster approach, the IASC), and the funding mechanisms concerned (ERFs, CERFs, etc.). In the same part, a section is devoted to the specific coordination tools and process employed in the management of sudden-onset natural disasters.

The third part, after a preliminary analysis of the Haitian context prior to the earthquake and the consequences of this event in terms of human cost, infrastructural damages and displacement, gives an overview of the national and international response. The response is evaluated by highlighting its successes and challenges on the basis of the literature analyzed. Lessons learned and recommendations are then pointed out and represent the starting point for the analysis developed in the fourth section.

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The fourth part, dedicated to the empirical analysis, provides some data and information on the status quo, and presents the heart of the research, that consists of the explanation of the coordination and organization problems, their implications and resulting recommendations of the emergency-transition phase in Haiti. This part is mainly based on the forty interviews that were undertaken between September and December 2011, whose methodology is explained below. An additional part of the section attempts to analyze the relationship between the category to which the interviewees belong to and the answers provided.

Finally, by combining the complementing elements emerging from the three parts of the research, some conclusions and potential recommendations are drawn for

1.4 Methodology

The methodology adopted for the study includes literature review and interviews in the field with the most relevant actors involved in the coordination. Concerning the literature research, a number of journal articles, resolutions, working papers, internal and institutional documents were selected and examined, in order to present a theoretical overview on the coordination mechanisms and their evolution over time. Moreover, platforms and websites established for coordination were consulted and lectures and meetings concerning coordination issues were attended over the last year, both in Haiti and in other countries. In order to identify issues and problems characterizing the coordination and to propose sustainable solutions for the improvement in the emergency-development transition period, the literature analysis has been accompanied by the undertaking of 40 interviews, held between September and December 2011.

The selection of the interviewees was based on:

the relevance of the functions performed in the emergency-development transition phase;

the level of involvement into coordination mechanisms and structures.

The interviewed people belonged to different sectors, which ranged from UN to national government, from INGOs to local NGOs, from private sector to donors. They aimed at collecting perspectives from the broadest category of actors (from grass-root level to the highest position in the government), so as to get a wider overview of the problems encountered and of the suggested solutions. Interviews were oral and were composed -with some exceptions- of open questions. Questions were prepared in a standard format and were adapted according to the role and responsibilities in the coordination of each interviewee. Due to the shortage

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of time, highest profile people were asked only few significant questions, instead of the whole list. With some exceptions, interviewees prefer not to disclose their identities with their answers.

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2. GENERAL COORDINATION OF THE MULTILATERAL RESPONSE TO CRISIS SITUATIONS

2.1 Nature and definition of coordination

Model One of the most enduring definitions of humanitarian coordination, which exercised substantial influence on the following studies on the subject, was developed in 1992 by Minear et al. in their study of UN coordination during the first Gulf War:

humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and assuring accountability; (4) orchestrating a functional division of labor in the field; (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and (6) providing leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an

Accordingly, the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) similarly points out the concept of strategic coordination as the process of:

allocating tasks and responsibilities within that program and ensuring that

they are reflected in a strategic plan; advocacy for humanitarian principles; negotiating access to affected populations ensuring correspondence between resources mobilized and established

priorities; monitoring and evaluating the overall implementation of the program;

and, liaising with military and political actors of the international community,

As claimed by Stockton (2002), both Minear (1992) and Lautze (1998) based their definitions on the assumption that by executing each of the tasks proposed on the

a list of practices to follow and take for granted that all the actors subject to coordination share a common strategic objective (assumption that is not always true). On the contrary, coordination is a process which endeavors to attain mission cohesion and effectiveness, but which is surely not able to ensure by definition a

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coordinated outcome. According to Stockton (2002), the notions of coordination presented above appear to be models to follow rather than proper definitions. From

applying numerous variants and styles of coordination. He proposes three typologies of coordination:

1. coordination by command: coordination in which strong leadership is accompanied by some sort of authority, whether carrot or stick;

2. coordination by consensus: coordination in which leadership is essentially a function of the capacity to orchestrate a coherent response and to mobilize the key actors around common objectives and priorities. Consensus in this instance is normally achieved without any direct assertion of authority by the coordinator;

3. coordination by default: coordination that, in the absence of a formal coordination entity, involves only the most rudimentary exchange of information and division of labor among the actors.

These three types of coordination range from an authoritarian approach to a rather voluntary approach. According to Donini (1996), none of the three models is suitable to the reality since coordination by commanddoes not suit with the state of play in the UN system and is not a realistic option. In fact, it is not acceptable for donors and UN organizations to have a coordinator body which has at its disposal unearmarked funds and the whole authority to disburse them. On the other hand, coordination by consensus may be a process of diminishing returns and probably some coordination by default would occur as a result of events, even if a designated body for coordination did not exist. At the beginning of the history of coordination, when asked to portray the concept of coordination, most people would have employed by default the so-called

Parisetti, 2000)1. This model sees the coordinator as

power, authority and responsibilities than other actors. This hierarchical top-down process, which assigns authority and responsibility to the most powerful

annot work in the humanitarian/development environment. As a matter of fact, this model led firstly to the failure of the Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) in the 80s, created by General Assembly Resolution 2816 of December 14 1971 to mobilize, direct and coordinate relief. UNDRO was not a success, and in 1992, two decades later and one year after the issue of the General Assembly Resolution 46/182, in 1992 the Secretary-General established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) headed by the ERC, and designated as Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. However, in the 1997 UN reform, Secretary-General Annan replaced the UNDHA that was scaled down into an office

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!* Donini (1996).!

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and changed the model, philosophy and approach of coordination. OCHA became

& Wiles, 2001). In this context, the integration of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs into the new created Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs marks the point of change towards a Calvi Parisetti, 2000). This model sees favorable conditions for the coordination process to be successful. The coordinator assumes the role of advocate and facilitator and is able to provide a global vision of the problem, intellectual and strategic leadership, and the capacity to engage in humanitarian diplomacy. Moreover, according to Calvi Parisetti (2000) and Donini (1996), the role of coordinator as facilitator provides a range of services that enable humanitarian actors to have access to equal information and operate under the best possible conditions through a bottom-up approach. In addition, in the process of coordination by facilitation, decisions are adopted by consensus by the panoply of actors. The model does not foresee any system of compliance or any obligation to accomplish and, in origin, it did not require to follow any accountability measures. To fill this accountability gap, the eform of 2005 introduced the cluster model of coordination, which remains based on facilitation but adds an accountability component. This model based on consensus and facilitation is applied in the areas of:

Strategic coordination which as by the definition of OCHA (1999) includes: the overall direction and setting of goals of the humanitarian

program; allocating tasks and responsibilities and ensuring they are

mandates; the advocacy of humanitarian principles and negotiating access; ensuring that resource mobilization for the program responds to

priorities as agreed in the strategic plan; monitoring and evaluating the overall implementation of the

program to ensure that changing circumstances and constraints are identified and responded to;

liaising with the military and political participants of the international community, including that of the UN.

Operational coordination: it focuses on logistical and sectorial coordination

(Lautze, 1998) and relates to the management of the horizontal linkages between tactical operations, mainly focusing on logistics and information exchange (Stockton, 2002). Operational coordination includes fundamental coordination concerning specific sectors, geographical areas, and groups of beneficiaries. Humanitarian agencies often assume the role of coordinators

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within a specific area of expertise for instance, UNICEF is often seen as the leader agency in coordinating water and sanitation programs within the larger inter-agency coordination process. Operational coordination may also include the functions of providing common services for humanitarian participants in certain domains (i.e. security, communications, and common logistics systems) (OCHA, 1999).

2.2 The determining factors of coordination

In the last 30 years, coordination has become an essential aspect of humanitarian intervention, to the point that nowadays the humanitarian community devotes a significant amount of time and resources to this task (Reindorp & Wiles, 2001). While in the 80s emergency relief organizations were just concentrating on operations, thus considering the issue of coordination as a matter of secondary importance compared to the delivery of basic services to beneficiaries, nowadays coordination meetings among humanitarian actors take up a considerable amount of their time. In fact, strategic and operational coordination has turned out to be the foremost feature of humanitarian and development intervention(Calvi Parisetti, 2000). According to Calvi Parisetti (2000), three are the main factors that have contributed to this change: 1. 2in terms of:

a. increased number of people involved in humanitarian operations: according to the ALNAP Report (2010), aid worker population has increased by 6% every year over the last 10 years. The total number of workers employed by the international humanitarian community is estimated at 210,800 (mostly nationals in their own countries) and it is made up of UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (49,500), the Red Cross/Crescent Movement (48,400), and NGOs (112,900).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"According to Calvi Parisetti (2000), this growth has been exponential up to 2000s, less prominent but still increased has been the growth of the industry until today.!

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Figure 1: UN humanitarian actors &IOM: staffing Source: ALNAP, (2010a).

b. increased amount of money allocated to humanitarian interventions.

Figure 2: OECD DAC

relief, 2000-2009 Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA),(2011a)

As shown in figure 2, looking at the amounts and longer-term trends in humanitarian aid within Official Development Assistance (ODA), it can be appreciated that humanitarian aid, - ave lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of

3-, has accounted for a rising share of ODA between 2000 and 2009. The line on the graph shows the fluctuation of humanitarian aid in different years that is related to the entity of emergencies. Clear peaks are seen in 2003 (Afghanistan, Iraq), 2005 (Indian Ocean-earthquake/tsunami and South Asia (Kashmir) earthquake and 2008 (food insecurity, China earthquake, cyclones in Myanmar and Bangladesh).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/!

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Figure 3: UN humanitarian actors &IOM: budget

Source: ALNAP, (2010a) Moreover, from figure 3, it is shown the annual increase in financial terms of the budget earmarked for humanitarian purposes, which has augmented of 1.8 billion dollars in over two years (i.e. 2006-2008). 2. The increasing complexity of humanitarian crisis situations which, as stated by

Ex-secretary general Annan in the Agenda for Development (1997), have become

interstate and internal conflicts, large-scale displacements of people, mass famine, disruption of economic, political and social institutions, and, in some

Table 1: Classification of disasters

Source: IFRC et Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, (2008) Within this classification, a more detailed analysis must be given to:

a. Complex emergencies 4 (involving non-state actors, targeting civilians,

often resulting in strategic negotiation): humanitarian and development

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41. r considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that

2. Complex political emergency: A situation with complex social, political and economic origins which involves the breakdown of state structures, the disputed legitimacy of host authorities, the abuse of human rights and possibly armed conflict, that creates

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actors are responding today to a wide range of more challenging crises compared to the past. In fact, armed conflicts have undergone major transformations since the end of the Second World War, with the decolonization process, and conflicts are rarely international confronting each other. Rather, they are mainly intra-state and they consist of armed rebels fighting governments, ethnic/linguistic/religious conflicts which sometimes turn into genocides or cause a displacement of people. This transformation of conflicts has created new vulnerabilities and a new class of victims, i.e. the civilian population which today is often the primary target of war forces while it used to be an unintentional victim, a byproduct of war (Calvi assist; while wars traditionally tended to produce refugees who were subject to humanitarian rules and parameters that were simple to

Internally Displaced Persons 5 (IDPs), who do not cross international borders and remain displaced in their own countries within an insecure environment. parties to provide humanitarian access to IDPs, assistance represents a major challenge to the international community. Subsequently, it becomes necessary to establish a coordinated and joint action that attempts to overcome the challenges posed by an increasingly complex context6.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!humanitarian needs. The term is generally used to differentiate humanitarian needs arising from conflict and instability from those that arise from natural disasters (ALNAP) (http://www.who.int/). 5I DPs legally remain under the protection of their own government - even though that government might be the cause of their flight ( http://www.unhcr.org/) 6This concept is reiterated in the Public Health Guide for Emergencies (IFRC et Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, 2008).

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b. Natural and technological disasters:

Figure 4:Total Number of people reported affected by Natural disasters. World: 1900-2004

Source: EM-DAT, (2010) As shown in the graph above, the number of people affected by natural disasters has yearly increased. This rise is due on the one hand to the increased intensity of weather-related disasters as a consequence of global warming and, on the other hand, this dramatic rise is brought about by a growing vulnerability caused by demographic and social changes, such as urbanization and underdevelopment. 3. The growth in the number of actors: in fact, according to the data shown in the

Financial Tracking Service (2011)7 , in 2000 there were at least 121 NGOs 8 receiving money for humanitarian relief operations around the world. This number goes up to 162 if also foundations, academia, faith-based and other civil society organizations are included, and rises to 192 counting the Red Cross. On the other side, in 2010, figures for top level appealing agencies/NGO alliances are: 367 NGOs receiving money for humanitarian relief operations around the world; 592 NGOs and CSOs; and 648 including the Red Cross Movement9.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7http://fts.unocha.org/. 8This figure is obtained by counting only the NGO alliance entries. 9However, there is one major caveat with this data and it is the fact that reporting before 2005-2006 was very poor both on the FTS and other aid databases.!

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The simultaneous presence of a multitude of partners, each one with a diverse identity, culture, mandate, raison d'être represents a challenge for actors to work together and requires a solid coordination. To sum up, the three pillars that support the importance of coordination can be ascribed to the expansion of the industry in terms of people involved and money earmarked, the growing complexity of humanitarian crisis, and the rise in the number of actors. All these three challenges represent a formidable push towards a coordinated intervention and the product of such intervention is a twofold accountability. Firstly, accountability to beneficiaries must be the crucial aim of coordination. Therefore, the humanitarian community must make sure that its support and assistance to the victims are provided with minimum gaps, minimum overlapping, and respecting the Minimum Standards10. Secondly, coordination among actors becomes a tool of accountability towards donors, as it is supposed to promote the most efficient and effective utilization of resources. !

2.3 The evolution of the relationship between the humanitarian actors and their coordination mechanisms

2.3.1 The 46/182 UN Resolution

The UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991 represents the fundamental turning point for the humanitarian community in numerous respects. Through the creation of a framework for humanitarian assistance and a set of guiding principles,

emergency assistance of th The adoption of a new Resolution which, among other things, established an entity specifically appointed to coordinate assistance to affected people in emergencies, stemmed from the previous negative experience of the UN in the Gulf War, where the lack of coordination led to an overlapping and a duplication of efforts. Resolution 46/182 instituted new arrangements for humanitarian coordination aimed at ensuring a smoother transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. Emergency assistance arrangements required to be formulated and considered as measures eventually aiming at rehabilitation, longer-term sustainable development and economic growth. The Resolution presents 12 guiding principles for emergency assistance which include the following:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10The Sphere Project: Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response and the Poverty Line.

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Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality11.

The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the

. Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims

of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. States whose populations are in need of humanitarian assistance are called

upon to facilitate the work of these organizations in implementing humanitarian .

Moreover, the Resolution points out the importance for the humanitarian community12 to focus on prevention activities, such as strengthening developing capacities in disaster prevention and mitigation, as well as preparedness actions through an early warning information system. Through preventiovulnerability is reduced and measures for disaster mitigation are implemented, thus

the immediate problems caused by the emergency. These activities, which are supposed to be undertaken by the disaster-affected country itself with the support of the humanitarian community, constitute a direct link between relief and development as highlighted during the Yokohama World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in 1994. Resolution recognizes to the UN the role of leader and coordinator of the efforts of the international community to support the affected countries. Additionally, this soft law act, by introducing new bodies and tools, aims to restructure and modernize the humanitarian response mechanisms, thus enabling the humanitarian community to effectively and efficiently respond to emergencies. It created the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (which in 2005 became the Central Emergency Response Fund - CERF), the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). In particular, through the establishment of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the General Assembly recognized that humanitarian affairs are

humanitarian community actors has or can claim primacy or special status in responding to multi-dimensional crises (Calvi Parisetti, 2000). In 1992 this non-binding Resolution incorporated the functions of United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) intothe new Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) aimed at supporting the new humanitarian coordination arrangements. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11The principle of independence was added to these principles by UN General Assembly resolution 58/114, 2003. 12 -agency Standing Committee (IASC) whose role will be discussed later.!

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2.3.1.1. The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) The UN Resolution of December 1991 created the post of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), which is a high level official designated by the Secretary-General to work closely with and with direct access to him, in cooperation with the relevant organizations working in humanitarian assistance. In the coordination of UN response, ERC incorporates and combines the functions previous carried out by representatives of the Secretary-General for major and complex emergencies and by the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (leader of the UNDRO) (Resolution 46/182). The resolution assigns to the ERC the role of convener of the humanitarian community, who is in charge of coordinating the humanitarian actors through facilitation. ERC, as a primus inter pares, leads the community of peers embodied in the forum named Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Additionally, the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) is responsible for the oversights of all humanitarian emergencies which require UN intervention and assistance. He/she operates as the central focal point for governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental relief activities, and also proactively monitors the conduct of coordination (especially at the beginning of new emergencies) and reports back to the IASC and to Secretary General13. Moreover, the ERC is in charge of advocacy activities related to humanitarian issues: in fact, she/he has a vital role in promoting the principles, purpose and limits of humanitarian action, together with the political action required to uphold the right to humanitarian assistance and protection. Through the IASC, the ERC can press for actions in the political, diplomatic and peacekeeping domains, thus strategizing with humanitarians about the way to push further the advocacy agenda (Reindorp & Wiles, 2001). Besides all the roles already mentioned, the ERCmay appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), in a country affected by a disaster or conflict, to ensure that

In order to support the HC work, the ERC provides him/her with specific guidance and directions to undertake. In natural disaster contexts, such as the case of Haiti we will later analyze, ERC together with Global Clusters, are in charge of supporting the Humanitarian Country Team in the process of building a cluster system in line with local coordination structures (Binder et al., 2010)14.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13 http://www.unocha.org/. 14As far as our case is concerned, one month after the earthquake, former ERC Mister John Holmes, disappointed by the

es In September 2011, new elected ERC, Mrs. Valerie Amos, visited Haiti during the CAP workshop to assess

humanitarian situation and needs (http://www.unocha.org/).

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2.3.1.2 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is a unique inter-agency forum for coordination, policy-development and decision-making, which involves key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. It can be defined as the main forum where humanitarian and development communities design policies regarding crisis response and reconstruction, with the final aim to ameliorate the delivery of humanitarian aid to affected population15. The IASC was effectively established in June 1992, in response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182. Through Resolution 48/57, the General Assembly confirmed IASC essential role as the primary organism for inter-agency coordination relating to humanitarian assistance in response to complex and major emergencies. Chaired by the ERC, the IASC was constituted to pursue the following primary objectives:

To frame system-wide humanitarian policies; To assign areas of responsibilities to each agency in the deployment of

humanitarian programs; To define an agreed common ethical framework for activities; To advocate and promote shared humanitarian principles to actors outside the

IASC; To determine and detect actual gaps in terms of mandates not accomplished

or in terms of operational capacity; To handle disagreement between agencies concerning system-wide

humanitarian issues16 (Ibid.).

The members of the IASC are the heads, or their designated representatives, of the UN operational agencies (FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO). In addition, there is a standing invitation to the IOM, the ICRC, the IFRC, OHCHR, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs, and the WB. The NGO consortia, the ICVA, InterAction, and the SCHR are also invited to attend on a permanent basis. Operationally, its main components are:

: Heads of Agencies meeting twice per year to supervise the plan of action of the Working Group and Subsidiary Bodies. They represent a powerful advocacy and the embodiment of the collegial humanitarian community;

The IASC Working Group (IASC WG), which meets four to six times per year. It constitutes the mechanism of policy making within the humanitarian community. Its members have the value added of being senior in terms of experience, but they are still operational and linked to humanitarian operations

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/ 16Ibid.!

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on the field. This allows them to efficiently tackle issues and to take informed decisions;

The IASC Subsidiary Bodies (a task force, reference group, sub-working group or other): they are created by the WG to deal with controversial and wide issues. Members are technical experts who debate the topic concerned from 6 months to 2 years, until a consensus report is issued with a series of recommendations, which then will be discussed, possibly refined and eventually endorsed by the IASC WG (Calvi Parisetti, 2000).

As defined earlier, the IASC mechanism sets the guidelines and the wider framework of intervention referring also to the cluster working system. In the Haitian case, it is important to verify to which extent these guidelines and best practices have been respected and implemented. With this purpose, several IASC reports have been published to evaluate coordination efforts in Haiti and the

2.3.1.3 From United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) In 1971, through General Assembly Resolution 2816, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) was established to be the focal point in the UN system for disaster relief coordination matters (UNGA, 1971). However, in 1992 the UNDRO was downgraded to a department, named the

46/182, with the aim to support the new humanitarian coordination arrangements. In 1997, on the other hand, the then-UN-Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report on renewing and reforming UN 17 . This program for reform (GA 52/12) recommended DHA to be reorganized -and somehow downgraded- from a department to an Office, i.e. the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The idea behind that was to relocate some of the DHA operational responsibilities to other UN agencies, while reinforcing and expanding the mandate to include coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and advocacy. Despite all the changes, Resolution 46/182 remains till to OCHA is strictly a non-operational entity which carries out its coordination functions through the IASC and whose mission statement is to:

partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies;

Advocate the rights of people in need; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*'A/51/950 Renewing the United Nations: A program for reform. Report of the Secretary-General, 14 July 1997.!

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Promote preparedness and prevention; a).

As a consequence, OCHA key functions are a) policy development: to ensure that all humanitarian issues are addressed; b) advocacy of humanitarian issues, since the humanitarian community has a voice vis-à-vis policy makers in the Security Council; c) mobilization and coordination of humanitarian emergency response, and d) humanitarian information: OCHA is responsible of managing and administering Reliefweb,

18 . This efficient communication tool was launched in October 1996 and its importance has been then reiterated by two GA Resolutions (51/194 and 57/153) which encouraged governments, NGOs and agencies to exchange information through the website by taking advantage of

emergency information services. Moreover, it is OCHA task to manage the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and to undertake the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). OCHA is present in the field with 35 Field Offices, tackling mainly complex emergencies as well as with Regional Support Offices in East/West/Southern Africa, South-West Asia and Central America (OCHA, 2007). In addition, through its 5 Regional Disaster Response Advisors (RDRAs) in Dakar, Nairobi, Bangkok, Dubai, Panama, Almaty and Fiji, OCHA contributes to reinforce disaster preparedness capacities in those regions, by organizing trainings and support institutional reforms. In tackling natural disasters, OCHA tools that will be analyzed later in the research refer to the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), which is a team of disaster management specialists ready to leave in case of natural disasters, and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), specifically in case of earthquake. As far as our Haitian case study is concerned, immediately after the earthquake, OCHA took charge of leading the humanitarian response, by mobilizing within the first two days five key clusters (Food, Wash, Health, Shelter, Non-Food Items and Logistics) and by activating CERF and other funding mechanisms. With regard to the funding mechanism (CERF) and the appeal process (CAP) introduced by the Resolution, they will be discussed in the following sections concerning the wider humanitarian financing system.

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2.3.2 The Pooled funding mechanisms: ERF, CERF and others

2.3.2.1. Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) were established in 1997 in Angola to tackle emergency needs related to SIDA in the country. Their to provide rapid and flexible funding to in-country actors (mainly NGOs) to address unforeseen

GHA, 2011b). According to the needs identified by the Humanitarian Coordinator in the country,

-earmarked contributions. Through these funds, donors without a humanitarian presence in-country are provided with the opportunity to donate monetary aid. In this way, they can assign decision-making responsibility to implementing agencies who are supposed to be more in contact with beneficiaries in the country. As shown in the picture below, this was clearly affirmed in 2010, when 30 non-DAC donors donated a total of US90.6 million to the ERFs, compared to only US$58.3 million from 10 DAC donors and US$5.3 million from non-government donors.

Figure 5: Donors to emergency response funds in 2009 and 2010 (figures expressed in US$m).

Source: GHA, 2011b However, there are some cons to the ERFs to be highlighted: they do not consult with national authorities and do not engage with governments, thus weakening the coordination with national relief efforts. Moreover, if the Resident Coordinator19 in a specific country takes on the functions and role of Humanitarian Coordinator, this double role can present a potential conflict of interest which can undermine their

host government, while the HC must press for an effective humanitarian response

Voluntary Agencies ICVA, 2010). At the same time, bringing into a country an HC from outside (which is what happens in some cases) cannot be the most effective

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19 United Nations system at the country level. He/She should facilitate the preparedness of the United Nations system and assist in a speedy transition from relief to development. He/She should promote the use of all locally or regionally available relief capacities. The resident coordinator should chair an emergency operations group of field representatives and experts from the

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solution, as the RC, who already coordinates UN agencies in a country and has well established relations with the host Government, knows better than anybody else the coordination structure, its strengths and weaknesses. This, however, assumes that RCs are trained on Humanitarian Assistance coordination mechanisms, when they assume duty (which is not often the case).

2.3.2.2 The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and the subsequent Central Emergency Response Fund

According to Resolution 46/182, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) is a

cash-flow mechanism with the aim to provide agencies with cash to cover immediate expenditures in the aftermath of a crisis, while waiting for donor pledges to be transferred (OCHA, 2008). It can be used rapidly at the very outset of a crisis to make loans to eligible organizations, with the purpose to ensure a rapid and coordinated response in the requests contributions, was put into operation with 50 million United States dollars, which are administrated by the ERC and borrowed by humanitarian actors. Between 1991 and 2005 the fund was used 17 times and worked successfully with the only limitation that the amount provided was too little to deal with the whole range of forgotten crisis. It was for this reason that the 2005 UN Humanitarian Reform modified its structure and renamed it as Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). This fund (approved on a consensual basis by the UN General Assembly in 2005) aims at:

promoting early action and response to reduce deaths; improving response to time-critical requirements; reinforcing core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises 20.

The General Assembly, in its Resolution 60/124, agreed upon including a grant element to the original revolving fund based exclusively on loans, with the purpose to make resources instantly available to support immediate response to humanitarian crisis (UN Secretariat, 2006). As a result, this OCHA-managed fund became constituted by both the original loan element ($50 million) and a grant element (target of $450 million). Such grant element is divided into a response window and into an underfunded window. Grants are made available to finance critical, life-saving activities and are provided by the voluntary, un-earmarked contributions of Governments and private sector organizations such as corporations, individuals and NGOs. Timely disbursements from the CERF allow humanitarian agencies to start projects as soon as possible, rather than waiting for bilateral funding. Since its birth in 2006, the CERF has collected a total of US$2.1 billion in contributions and a further US$254 million in pledges from over 150 donors. Moreover, it has disbursed a total !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20 http://ochaonline.un.org

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of US$1.9 to 82 countries. Of this amount, 33.4% has been distributed through the underfunded window (GHA, 2011a). CERF eligible recipients are UN operational funds, programs and specialized agencies, together with the International Organization of Migration (IOM). NGOs may indirectly benefit from CERF funding as implementing partners of UN agencies and IOM. The effectiveness of the CERF depends on the country knowledge and experience to take right decisions concerning the soundness and validity of the projects. He/she is, indeed, in charge of the review and approval process of project proposals before their submissions to the CERF Secretariat (GHA, 2011a).

Figure 6: CERF income as a share of total humanitarian assistance (data is in current prices).

Source: GHA, 2011c 2.3.2.3 Recovery and reconstruction funds!!Recovery and reconstruction funds are pooled funds established to support reconstruction, recovery and peace-building activities. These kinds of funds give donors the possibility to contribute in complex emergencies and to assist existing governance structures that, however, can risk to become dependent on budget support from a fund. These funds are managed by the World Bank or by the UN and they harmonize to the organiz processes (GHA pooled funding mechanisms and large scale disaster). Within these funds, there are the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) which are in-country pooled mechanisms whose funding is entirely un-earmarked. This allows money to be distributed on the basis of needs (as defined in

action plan).

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Figure 7: total funding to pooled funds: 2006-2010

Source: GHA, 2011a As shown in the figure above, there has been a growth of pooled humanitarian funds from US$ 583 million in 2006 to US$854 million in 2010. As later analyzed in the Haitian case study, the sharp increase in funding to ERFs in 2010 derives from the growth in contributions to the Haitian and Pakistan ERFs, which together account for the 71,7% of the total ERFs contributions in 2010. 2.3.3 The Appeal processes: CAP and the Flash Appeal 2.3.3.1 The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) The Consolidated Appeal Process is a fundraising instrument, established through Resolution 46/182, used by aid organizations in a country or region to plan, coordinate, fund, implement, and monitor activities in major emergencies which require an ongoing system-wide humanitarian response. It allows organizations to publish their projects in a CAP document, funds in a cohesive and not competitive manner. As a result, by means of the CAP, humanitarian organizations combine their efforts to guarantee beneficiaries with the best timely assistance and aid (OCHA, 2010).!At headquarter level, the final responsibility of the CAP is given to the ERC, while at field level the Humanitarian Country Team, headed by the Humanitarian Coordinator, conducts the CAP process. He refers to cluster lead agencies which are in charge of working in partnership with the organizations within their sector to evaluate needs, define priorities, and formulate a strategic plan of intervention. In fact, in order to be

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included in the CAP document, all projects proposals have to be validated by the on a sectorial basis21.

Since its establishment, the CAP has become a mechanism for coordination, strategic planning and programming. As a coordination tool, it has encouraged closer cooperation between organizations involved into the humanitarian response (such as governments, donors, aid agencies, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs). As a planning and programming tool, CAP has played an important role in the development of a strategic approach to humanitarian action (OCHA, 2010).!

Figure 8: The Humanitarian Planning Process

Source: www.humanitarianappeal.net In practical terms, it consists of a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and a list of project proposals for donors funding. It is used for protracted complex emergencies and has one year duration (usually starting in November), with the opportunity for revision during the mid year review (IASC, 2010a). To sum up the main points of what the CAP consists of, it is fundamental to point out that the CAP is much more than an appeal for money. It is an inclusive and coordinated program cycle of:

strategic planning leading to a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP);

resource mobilization; coordinated program implementation; joint monitoring and evaluation;

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21 http://ochaonline.un.org/

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revision, if necessary; and reporting on results.

2.3.3.2 The Flash Appeal (FA) The Flash Appeal is an initial inter-agency humanitarian response strategy and fundraising mechanism, based on immediately identified needs (IASC, 2010a). This tool is needed for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response to a sudden-onset emergency (OCHA, 2010). UN Humanitarian or Resident Coordinator triggers the Flash Appeal in consultation with the Humanitarian Country Team and the Government, usually within ten days of an emergency, and focuses on common funding requirements for up to six months (IASC, 2010a). It delineates roles and responsibilities within the response framework, cluster action plans, and substantive activities requiring to be financed. Compared to the CAP, project information that NGOs are required to submit in the Flash Appeal is less detailed due to the sudden nature of the appeal.

Figure 9:Funding requirements by type of appeal in the UN consolidated appeals process,

2000 2010 Source: GHA 2011a

As shown in the graph, the share of FA grew from 2009 (2.9 % of the total) to 2010 (31.8% of the total). This was mainly due to the Haiti Flash Appeals, as it will be analyzed later on in this research. Even if the total amount of donor contributions has increased each year since 2006, the growth in donor contributions for 2010 diminished to 2,2% in comparison to an increase of around 35% in 2008 and 2009. This derives from a decline in the growth of OECD DAC contributions. 2.3.4 The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator System In non-crisis circumstances, i.e. in a development context, all UN agencies (which are mostly development organizations in essence, with the exception of the UNHCR) work with their governmental counterparts on long-term projects (Calvi Parisetti, 2000). For example, ILO works with the Minister of Labor, WHO with the Minister of Health and so on. All these agencies operate under the leadership of their Country Representatives, who, together, have to report to the Resident Coordinator (RC). The

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RC embodies the UNDP Country Representative who works and interfaces with the Prime Minister (i.e. his/her counterpart) (Calvi Parisetti, 2000). On the other side, in case of a crisis situation, the ERC, upon recommendation by the IASC and on behalf of the Secretary General, nominates the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). It was in 1994, few years after the approval of Resolution 46/182, that the Terms of Reference for the HC were approved by the IASC. It is important to point out that the HC often, if not always, correspondsto the same person as the RC. The RC then becomes the HC when a country goes through a crisis. In this way, by merging the two positions and combining humanitarian and development roles, the gap between relief and long-term development becomes alleviated (Reindorp & Wiles, 2001). As a result, the HC -as direct representative of the ERC in complex emergencies- is the leader and coordinator of the humanitarian

and well-coordinated provision of humanitarian assistance to those seriously affected , 2009).

2.3.5 Integrated missions and the role of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) UN integrated missions are defined as an attempt to maximize UN resources and know-how with the aim to address complex situations, to assist countries in the transition from war to peace, and to endorse long-term stability and development (Weir, 2006). As a result, in these situations, a dedicated person, able to deal with complex and multifaceted issues, is required. This role is carried out by the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who becomes the chief of the UN peacekeeping or political mission, as well as the overall coordinator of the UN system. He is also supposed to proceed as the facilitator in the postwar mediation efforts and arbitrates disagreements between local political actors. He also represents the primary liaison between local and international actors (De Coning, 2010).

2.3.6.1 The UN Humanitarian Reform

Despite the progresses made by the humanitarian community, as highlighted in 2005 by the Norwegian ERC Jan Egeland, the system was not able to timely and predictably cover the basic needs of the affected population (OCHA, 2006). H ills and knowledge of how to effectively tackle humanitarian emergencies were often not adequate, accountability among humanitarian agencies was seen as insufficient, and the proliferation of humanitarian actors hindered coordination and weakened partnerships (Kyria et al., 2010). In order

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to identify deficiencies, as well as areas requiring improvement, and adequately address them, Mr. Egeland commissioned, in 2005, the Independent Response Review of the global humanitarian system. In the same year, thanks to an assessment undertaken with the collaboration of NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, IOM and other actors, the Reform was introduced with the aim of strengthening humanitarian action by guarantying greaterpredictability, accountability and partnership. The essential components introduced by the reform refer to:

1. the Cluster Approach aimed to inject consistency and accountability to the coordination system;

2. the strengthening of the Humanitarian Coordinator System, to promote effective leadership into the system and better support in field coordination;

3. the creation of a more adequate, predictable, flexible, and timely humanitarian financing system (the CERF that has already been analyzed), which enables to supply agencies with cash-flow before donor contributions are available;

4. the development of partnerships between UN and non-UN agencies, underpinning all humanitarian action22.

Through the implementation of these four elements of the reform, the humanitarian community strives to gain access to a higher number of beneficiaries in a more efficient and timely way, with an inclusive needs-based relief and protection23. 2.3.6.2 The cluster approach Clusters are IASC designated groups of humanitarian actors (UN and non-UN) working in each of the main areas of humanitarian response, including some long-established relief and assistance sectors (i.e. health, shelter and nutrition), provision of services (i.e. logistics and emergency telecommunications), as well as cross-cutting issues (i.e. early recovery, protection and camp management) (OCHA, 2006). In addition, clusters, which represent the most significant component of the reform, aim to reinforce capacity and effectiveness of the humanitarian response, by:

enhancing synergies between UN agencies, international and local NGOs and

local authoritie 24.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22 http://oneresponse.info/ 23Ibid. 24Ibid.!

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Clusters are led and coordinated by their Cluster Lead Agency and operate at global and country level. At global level, clusters aim at strengthening system-wide preparedness and at coordinating technical capacity, so as to respond to emergencies in their respective fields. At country level, on the other side, clusters adapt to local needs and are in charge of making sure that activities undertaken by humanitarian actors are well coordinated, of providing governments and RC/HCs with a first port of call, and of acting as providers of last resorts in their respective sectors (IASC, 2010a). Clusters at country level deserve to be given more attention, as they will be relevant for the Haitian case study. They carry out several activities, possibly in collaboration with national authorities. After assessing and analyzing needs, they guarantee contingency planning and preparedness, as leaders of a strategy for development. Moreover, besides their coordination function, they also inform and advocate on funding mechanisms, ensure mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, and monitoring and observance to standards. Clusters are also involved in activities of capacity building to humanitarian partners, civil society and national authorities (Ibid.). At country level, the RC/HC, after consulting with the Humanitarian Country Team,

n abilities and operational capacity. Afterwards, the Country Representative of each Lead Agency (which is accountable to his agency and to the HC/RC) heads the cluster which is supposed to be co-chaired by a governmental representative. Subsequently, a Cluster Coordinator (who does not directly report to the RC/HC but to his/her respective Lead Agency) is then appointed by the Lead Agency to act as a facilitator and as a neutral representative of the cluster (Ibid.).

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Table 2: Clusters and Cluster Lead Agencies involved in humanitarian intervention

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25 While UNHCR is the leading agency for conflict-induced IDPs, IOM addresses natural-disaster induced IDPs. 26 UNICEF together with the International Save the Children Alliance co-leads the Education Cluster working in collaboration with the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). 27 While UNHCR is the leading agency in conflict area, IFRC is the cluster convener for natural disaster situations.

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2.4 NGO Coordination in the field

& Hedlund, 2010). NGO Coordination is not an entirely separate attempt of NGOs to coordinate themselves, but refers to a distinct set of activities traditionally undertaken by NGOs through a bottom-up approach aimed at accomplishing common objectives (Ibid.). Even if UN, donors and national governments would prefer to interact and engage with a single entity representing the whole NGO community, it is not possible for the heterogeneous NGO community to be fully represented by a single body. Moreover, NGO coordination structures vary from context to context and adapt to crisis situations (conflict or natural disaster) in the country concerned. Although NGOs have been increasingly gathered by clusters into sectorial coordination, also becoming co-leaders of cluster meetings, there are still numerous constraints which hinder participation of NGO staff. Problems on the NGO side consist mainly in the lack of capacity and resources to take part to cluster meetings. In addition, some NGO-related issues are not covered by cluster meetings, thus pushing NGOs to tackle these problems individually. Accordingly, the NGO community would like to get more involved at field level in fostering coordination. NGO often associate with the purpose to approach UN, donors or governments on a collective basis in response to these conditions:

an attempt to externally impose coordination by the UN or government, a gap (or perceived gap) in existing coordination mechanisms, or a need to address NGO interests that will not be addressed by other

Ibid). A top-down coordination approach with imposed coordination mechanisms often fails on its purpose; on the other hand, councils, forums and consortia with a bottom-up approach, tend to take root and show resilience. In addition, the way to guarantee participation in coordination mechanisms is to make sure that the different expectations of agencies are acknowledged and that each entity will benefit from cooperation and coordination, thus avoiding gaps and overlapping of functions (Ibid.). 2.5 Coordination tools in onset crisis 2.5.1 Surge Capacity In humanitarian emergencies, International Organizations and NGOs are often required to quickly and effectively meet increased demand of human and material resources to alleviate suffering in a country affected by an emergency (Emmens & Houghton, 2008). Surge capacity can be defined as the

Houghton & Emmens, 2007).

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Thus, surge capacity to be functional requires a combination of elements: 1. Matching capacity to agency vision, philosophy and mandate; 2. Prepositioning of resources intended as human resources, funds, and

materials; 3. Enabling factors (such as preparedness and flexibility), which influence how

effectively surge capacity can be deployed.

Figure 10: Components of Surge Capacity Source: Houghton et al., 2007

2.5.2 Logistics Support OCHA provides logistics support in:

1. Keeping an equipment reserve needed for OCHA field deployment, through the support of external partners (such as Member States, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, NGOs and the private sector);

Referring to OCHA, surge capacity is utilized in case of:

Unforeseen emergencies and disasters; Deterioration of a crisis already under

way; Force majeure, which damages country

offices.

OCHA surge staff is mobilized either from regional offices or from three mechanisms handled and managed by the Surge Capacity Section (SCS) in Geneva, which are:

1. Emergency Response Roster (ERR) that consists of 35 OCHA staffs both from field or headquarters, ready to deploy at short notice;

2. Stand-By Parternship-Program (SBPP): short-term staffing coming from 11 OCHA partner organizations free of charge;

3. Associates Surge Pool (ASP), born in 2010 and composed by people who are external from the UN system.

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2. Ensuring the provision of airport-handling teams in humanitarian operations, -DHL,

and the Logistics Cluster; 3. Guaranteeing appropriate and timely provision of non-food items to relief

operations, with the collaboration of donor governments; 4. Maintaining and strengthening the relationships with the World Customs

Organization and IFRC to start discussions with Member States, and encourage the implementation of measures facilitating the import of emergency relief items;

5. Managing -in partnership with the Logistics Cluster- the global mapping of emergency stockpiles28.

2.5.3 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord/CIMIC) Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is a necessary tool in humanitarian response operations, where both humanitarian/civilian and military actors are involved. Additionally, civil-military coordination aims at harmonizing actions between military and civil actors by, when suitable, pursuing common objectives (UNDAC, 2006).OCHA is most of the time the focal point for UN-CMCoord and, through this mechanism, promotes and protects the humanitarian operating environment29. In this field, OCHA also acts as the responsible of mobilizing and coordinating UN-CMCoord response tools, in support of assistance operations30. Coordination among the two sets of actors is considered as a shared responsibility and comprises a) joint planning b) information sharing, and c) division of tasks. Regarding disaster-relief operations, OCHA is in charge of the adequate and effective deployment of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) and operates to facilitate collaboration at field level. This is done by promoting humanitarian principles and safeguarding humanitarian space in support of the Humanitarian Coordinator31. 2.5.4 The Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) Before 2009, the lack of a sufficiently accountable, coordinated and appropriate system of needs assessment used to hamper informed and aware decision-making thus weakening the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention 32 . It was for this reason that, in 2009, the Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) was established with the aim of:

Harmonizing needs assessment approaches and methods within the humanitarian community;

Managing a pool of deployable needs assessment coordinators and analysts;

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!28 http://www.unocha.org/. 29 This is not the case, for example, in Lebanon where the CIMIC is undertaken by the UN Interim Force (UNIFIL). 30http://www.unocha.org/. 31 Ibid. 32 http://www.humanitarianinfo.org

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Developing tools (e.g. the Humanitarian Dashboard) and guidance based on standardized information, planning and response33.

Moreover, in order to provide a vision on the way to conduct needs assessment, the

, which establishes a set of steps to undertake with the objective of planning and coordinating joint assessments during the different phases of an emergency34.

2.5.5 The Environmental Emergencies Section Unit (EES) In case of natural disasters, OCHA is in charge of responding to the humanitarian consequences by coordinating international assistance by promoting an integrated approach. The response instrument managed by OCHA and United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) is the Environmental Emergencies Section Unit (EES), which triggers and grants international assistance for countries facing environmental emergencies35. 2.6 Coordination process and tools for the management of sudden-onset natural disasters According to the World Health Organization (WHO) definition, slow-onset disasters refer to disasters which take a long span of time to generate emergency conditions (such as famine and drought) for which there are generally early warning signs. On the other hand, sudden-hurricanes and earthquakes) and man-made or "complex" disasters (such as a sudden conflict situation), which arise in a very short span of time, thus not being accompanied by early warning signs36. Functional to our case study is a deeper analysis of the coordination mechanisms adopted in case of sudden-onset natural disasters (especially earthquakes). 2.6.1 UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) is a component of the international emergency response system for sudden-onset emergencies37. It was created in 1993 to assist United Nations and Government during the first phase of emergencies. UNDAC task is to help coordinating incoming international assistance nationally and/or at the site of the disaster. It consists of a stand-by capacity available !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33 http://www.unocha.org/ 34 http://oneresponse.info/ 35 http://unocha.romenaca.org/ 36 http://www.who.int/ 37 http://reliefweb.int/

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worldwide and prepared for immediate deployment (12-24 hours) to the country of the disaster upon the demand of the affected government or/and of the UN Resident or Humanitarian Coordinator38. UNDAC is not an independent organization, but a branch of OCHA which provides its support under the leadership of RC/HC (UNDAC, 2006). UNDAC staff is composed by experienced emergency managers with diverse skills, who are made available by their respective country or organization for UNDAC missions. They are free of charge to the recipient country in need because maintained by their government/organization of origin- and they are deployed for approximately 3-4 weeks39. UNDAC mandates, in an emergency response mission, refer to on-site coordination during the first phase of a disaster, processing information and facilitating organized assessments. From 1993 to January 2011, 203 were the UNDAC missions undertaken and the five largest deployments were always caused by earthquakes or tsunamis4041.

Figure 11: 5 largest deployments by number of staff deployed

Source: Reliefweb, 2010

In practical terms, in response to earthquakes, UNDAC teams generally arrive on sight before the arrival of USAR teams. As first step, one part of the team -jointly with local authorities- sets up the airport reception departure center (RDC), which receives and registers teams and addresses them to the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC). At the same time, the other part of the team provides the OSOCC with help to coordinate USAR teams in their activities of rescuing survivors (GA Resolution 57/150 of 2002). RDC and OSOCC are established to support LEMA and to make possible the effective employment of International USAR teams.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!38 http://www.unocha.org/ 39Ibid.!40 http://reliefweb.int/ 41it is worthwhile to mention the Japanese earthquake and tsunami that occurred in March 2011; in response to Tohoku district-off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake, an UNDAC team of seven members (including two Japanese) was dispatched by UNOCHA as an immediate response team of experts on disaster management and others.

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2.6.2 International Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) In the hours immediately after an earthquake, the International Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams are deployed and reach the affected country. The initial needs assessment on which USAR resources are based, is initially performed by the national authorities of the hit country (UNDAC, 2006). While usually over 90% of the survivors of an earthquake are spontaneously rescued by local population (families, friends and neighbors), international assistance provided by USAR teams is more focused on accessing collapsed buildings and on the localization and the extraction of trapped victims, by using engineering equipment

2006). USAR teams are, indeed, technical ,

as soon as the government of the affected country transmits a request for international assistance and they usually remain in the country for about one week. In order t the efficiency and effectiveness of Search and Rescue activities, and to promote common good practices to follow, the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)

-prone and disaster-responding countries and organizations dedicated to urban search and rescue and operational

42. General Assembly Resolution 57/160 of 2002, on Strengthening the Effectiveness

, pointed out the activities that INSARAG is mandated to carry out. Endorsed by this Resolution, INSARAG Guidelines were developed to guide international USAR response and provide those countries affected by the disaster, with a methodology of intervention (Ibid). 2.6.3 On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) After a disaster occurs, an On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) is set up by the UNDAC team (as from UNGA Resolution 57/150), or, if UNDAC is not yet there, by the USAR team, who will then hand it over to the UNDACC team once it arrives (UNDAC, 2006). An OSOCC provides a platform which has been established to coordinate international relief and the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) (OCHA, 2009). An OSOCC aims at:

1. Connecting the government concerned and the international humanitarian actors;

2. Ensuring that a mechanism for coordinating and directing the activities is in place;

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!42 http://www.unocha.org/

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3. Providing a platform for collaboration, cooperation, and information sharing among international responders43.

An OSOCC, indeed, provides international actors with maps, data and communication facilities. From these centers, teams of intervention are dispatched to the different areas of the town or country in order to avoid overlapping of functions. After the emergency and relief period, the functions carried out by OSOCC are supposed to be handed over to national/local authorities (LEMA) or/and to the UN Country Team. In addition, after 4 to 5 weeks from the disaster, cluster mechanism is supposed to be set up to coordinate the intervention. 2.6.4 Pre-deployment coordination Pre-deployment coordination is facilitated by the presence of the Global Disaster Alert Coordination System (GDACS), -time alerts about natural disasters around the world and tools to facilitate response coordination, including media monitoring, map catalogues and Virtual On-Site

44. In case of earthquakes, if the intensity is beyond a certain threshold and the location is a highly populated area, a communication is sent to the GDACS platform and appears on it. Subsequently, an algorithm calculates the potential loss of lives and, in case/if the system perceives the possibility of victims, an automatic message is sent to the Virtual OSOCC, which is a forum of -time information exchange by all actors of the internation 45.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!43Ibid. 44www.gdacs.org 45 Ibid.

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"#!THE HAITIAN CASE!

3.1 The Haitian political, social and economic context before the disaster

Long before the earthquake, Haiti was a country at risk, both from a socio-economic and ecological perspective. In fact, throughout the past decades, natural phenomena of all kinds (hurricanes, tropical storms, floods and earthquakes), had struck the already vulnerable Haiti. The environmental impact of all these natural disasters was aggravated by the level of deforestation in the country, which left only 2% of the wood resources untouched (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). In 2009, Haiti was ranked 149th out of 182 countries in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009), with 72% of its population living on less than US$2 a day (World Bank, 2009). Moreover, poverty is even more widespread in the rural area than in the urban area, with 86% of the population living on less than US$2 a day and 87% suffering from food insecurity. In addition to poverty, Haiti has a high level of social inequality, with over 68% of the national income accumulated by the richest 20% of the population, while less than 1.5% of the Haitian national income accrues to the poorest 20% of the population. Despite this, Haiti went through stable growth, though modest, in the 2000s, with an average real growth of 2.2% throughout the 2004-2009 period46

the ability of economic growth to decrease poverty, approaches zero (World Bank, 2006). Since the Haitian private sector is weak and fragmented, most of the population has to count on the informal sector to work, with very scarce opportunities of employment, access to capital, and income. Official development assistance (ODA) to Haiti has sharply increased since 2002, and in 2008 it amounted to US$ 175 million, which represented over 20% of total ODA. However, this humanitarian funding has always been unpredictable and without a policy approach, and therefore it often fluctuated according to political circumstances and donor strategies (ALNAP, 2010b). With respect to the political side, Haiti has experienced a troubled recent past with international political problems between 2000 and 2005, caused by political violence (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). In order to strengthen security, promote governance and rule of law in the country, in 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was introduced. With the support of this international force, security conditions improved -thanks to the reinforcement of police capacities- together with governance -through increased decentralization- (Margesson & Taft-

and political turbulence, subsequent to the earthquake.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!46 http://web.worldbank.org/

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3.2 The disaster and its consequences On January 12 2010, at 16.53 local time, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.3 hit Haiti. It was the most powerful earthquake to shake the country in the last 200 years (Government of Haiti, 2010a). The hypocenter was located ten kilometers below the

was close to the town of Leogane (approximately 20 kilometers far from Port-au-Prince). By January 24, after the first aftershocks of magnitude 6 occurring immediately afterwards, more than 50 aftershocks were recorded.

Figure 12: Haiti earthquake epicenter

Source: Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010 The enormous damages provoked, both in terms of human lives and infrastructures, were amplified by the fact that the earthquake concerned the most densely populated region of the country, where most of its businesses and administrative centers were positioned. 3.2.1 Human cost, infrastructural damages and displacement According to Government estimates, 222,750 people (2% of the population) lost their lives and 300,572 were injured. Moreover, the total affected population (directly or indirectly) is estimated at 3 million (30% of the total population of the country).

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Survivors experienced a great amount of emotional stress, due to the lack of proper equipment needed to pull family and friends out of the rubble. In addition, survivors had to live outdoors for several days (before the Government cleared the streets), surrounded by dead corpses in a context of increased insecurity that was worsened by the collapse of the Prison Civile of Port-au-Prince, which determined the escape of about 4,000 inmates (Ibid.). In terms of infrastructures, according to the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), the quake destroyed more than 105,000 homes and damaged other 208,000. Furthermore, as documented by the data collected by the Haitian Chamber of Commerce (CCIH), over 25,000 public and commercial buildings47 collapsed and, along with them, the whole series of government records and data (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). With regard to displaced people, according to the Government figures, more than 2.3 million people left their homes, settling either in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (about 1.5 million) or moving out of the disaster zone (600,000) seeking refuge in host communities in non-affected areas (IASC, 2010b). As regards the economic losses, the total damage brought about by the disaster

2009. Moreover, more than 70% of private sector buildings were disrupted or damaged (Government of Haiti, 2010). As a result, the health system was severely undermined by the catastrophic damage to its infrastructures: 60% of the hospitals were partially or completely destroyed, together with the Ministry of Health, a building that collapsed killing a staff of more than 200. In rural areas, the agricultural sector suffered the consequences of the earthquake too, as 36% of farmers lost their seeds stock and/or livestock. Concerning non-affected areas, communities experienced a massive displacement of population from the urban area, which increased vulnerability and overstretched, in these areas, the provision of basic services such as schools, health centers, water supplies and health centers (IASC, 2010b). 3.2.2 Needs assessments In the early stage of the response, several assessments were conducted by different institutions with the purpose of assessing damage, losses and, most of all, identifying and estimating general and sectorial needs. These assessments represent an attempt to provide the different interveners with a standardized knowledge to the different interveners of the status quo (in terms of losses and population needs), from which to proceed to formulate an appropriate response action. The first damage assessments were undertaken remotely and they were based on

tions Programme (UNOSAT) (ALNAP, 2010b). After these satellite imageries were made

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!47 Among them, it is reported that 15 out of the 17 Ministries collapsed.

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available, specialist teams began making diagnostics on the state of damage and displaced population, so as to provide information for the Flash Appeal preparation. These data, remotely collected before the arrival of UNDAC Team in Port-au-Prince, were then verified on site through several ground and aerial assessments. The Inter-Cluster Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) is a process conducted by the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) that was held from January 23 to February 6. This sectorial humanitarian assessment brought together information concerning various issues, such as health facilities, food security and nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, non-food items and cross-cutting. Despite the importance delayed due to logistical, security, and methodological issues (Grunewald & Renaudin, 2010a). In spite of the considerable efforts made by RINAH team and the huge amount of resources employed in the assessment48, the data and the information provided by the report were already outdated, when the RINAH was issued, thus raising questions about whether the information needed at that stage of relief could not have been acquired by simpler, faster and cheaper means49 (ALNAP, 2010b). Besides RINAH, clusters carried out their own sectorial needs assessments, with the aim to provide information, identify gaps and overlapping of functions, thus contributing to foster coordination among cluster actions. A range of assessments were also conducted by individual organizations, in order to organize their interventions and produce detailed project proposals required by

-interpreted by NGOs, thus influencing the uniformity, quality and reliability of the information collected. The Haitian government-led Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), whose preparation was supported by the UN, the World Bank and the European Union, set up working groups to assess losses, with the purpose to shape the macro-plan for reconstruction. It provided information about eight themes, ranging from governance, productive, social and infrastructure sectors, territorial development, environment and disaster risk reduction, and macro-economy. PDNA Detailed information about human recovery needs and social and economic lossescontributed in the preparation

that was presented at the March 2010 Donors Conference in New York.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!48According to Grünewald and Renaudin (2010), the RINAH cost US$3 million and required 128 staff, 18 assessors, 23 helicopters and 51 vehicles 49 The data collection process was indeed slackened by many reasons, including the poor wording, the length of the questionnaire (12 pages requiring more than three hours to be completed by one person) as well as transportation constraints.!

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challenges: The timing issue: in a crisis context, it would have been better to get

information quickly, even with average reliability, rather than having more accurate but too late information (Grunewald & Renaudin, 2010);

Consideration and involvement of local capacities in assessing the needs, which could have brought a considerable added value to the field research, was instead weak, as it was highlighted by the Working Group for Assessments in Haiti 50 . As an example, the PDNA process has been criticized for not involving representatives of the Haitian civil society, who

-making in

The diversity of contexts present in Haiti, which were sometimes difficult to grasp for security reasons.

The Haitiarequiring a Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011).

response and a robust international aid and coordination mechanisms (WFP, 2007).

least 500,000 people and requires the highest level of intervention. A considerable amount of resources was deployed to support the response action: OCHA Haiti Office was fostered by the arrival of 45 international staff (passing then from 5 to 50) by the first week, through the Emergency Response Roster (ERR), surge missions, and stand-by partners (SBP). Subsequently, 12 clusters were rolled out in Haiti together with mirroring clusters in Dominican Republic (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). 3.3 The Response 3.3.1 National Response 3.3.1.1 Haitian population, civil society and government The early emergency response was led by the Haitian population themselves: neighbors, friends, family and strangers helped each other, saving thousands of lives and supporting the injured, while the government and the international community were trying to get over the initial constraints. Local communities were faced with major constraints in their capacity to respond, including the lack of electricity, widespread rubble blocking streets, the fear of subsequent aftershocks, the view of a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!50 As shown in ALNAP Report (2010), needs assessments tendefinancing priorities, which sometimes left behind the real priorities of the population.

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traumatizing environment and a limited knowledge of first aid techniques (IASC, 2010b). The Haitian civil society, considered by many as vibrant, prior to the quake51, though severely affected, played an active role in providing assistance to the displaced population. The collapse of many national and municipal buildings and the casualties or injuries of numerous civil servants reduced by the ability of the Haitian government (at national and local level), already weak before the crisis, to establish response coordination mechanisms (Grunewald & Renaudin, 2010). The three mechanisms of national coordination, i.e. the

(COU), the Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (SNGRD), and the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC), were severely damaged in terms of material and human resources52. Despite the destruction of its headquarters, and the limited ability to implement decisions due to the wiped-out communication lines, the DPC became operational the very day after the disaster, even before the authorities had proceeded in the activation of the COU. At governmental level, a system of regular meetings was set up, chaired by Ministers, to coordinate support with the heads of UN agencies and the ambassadors of the main countries involved. In addition, on January 15, the Government of Haiti set up six working groups, involving members of civil society, and placed them under the leadership of a distinct Minister or senior civil servants, in order to coordinate interventions in six key areas: water distribution, health, food aid, fuel and energy, reconstruction, and safety for temporary shelters (IASC, 2010b). 3.3.2 International Response 3.3.2.1 USAR, UNDAC and others international humanitarian actors In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, International Search and Rescue (USAR) teams started to arrive for the largest ever deployment. Iceland, Dominican Republic, and US teams - -, managed to be in the country within the first 24 hours. By January 15, a total of 26 USAR teams arrived and were operational in the country. On January 23, the Government officially declared the end of the search for survivors and invited the teams to leave the country. By that time, 134 people were rescued by 67 teams, staffed with a total of 1,900 people. This number is both a record, if observed in comparison with

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!51 Before the earthquake, over 800 organizations (both national and international) were registered in the on-line directory of CSOs working in Haiti. 52 The SNGRD was established in 1999 in Haiti and consists of 26 institutions (both governmental and non-governmental) working in risk and disaster preparedness and response. Within this structure, the policy development and decision-making functions are undertaken by the CNGRD, which is led by the Minister of the Interior (MIC). The MIC carries out the task of main responsible for risk and disaster management through the DPC which, entitled to operationally coordinate, works at the national,

members, has the responsibility for disaster response (Binder & Grunewald b, 2010).!

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disasters of the same entity, and terribly low if compared to the total number of deaths. Coordination among the 67 teams in an urban area was tricky, and the USAR teams lacked local counterparts, due to the initial absence of the DPC. The soundness of the intervention of some foreign teams (such as the French and Creole) was questioned, as they tended to prioritize the rescue of their own nationals. In addition, the cost to rescue each life was estimated at US$1 million, thus highlighting the need for the donor community to reflect on the cost of USAR teams, in comparison with the benefits of investing in strengthening Haitian response capacity. Within 24 hours of the disaster, the US military arrived as a Joint Task Force with a huge contingent (over 22,000 troops). Its initial priorities were logistics, providing relief supplies, medical response, and supporting MINUSTAH to maintain law and ensure a safe environment for the humanitarian community to work in. The role of US military force was nevertheless criticizes, as they took over the Port-au-Prince airport, handling over 150 flights a day, and assumed the monopoly of decision on which flight to prioritize (DARA International, 2010). An UNDAC team, composed of 18 members, belonging to IOs or national disaster management authorities, arrived in Haiti within the first 24 hours, and set up an Onsite Operations and Coordination Centre (OSOCC) in the MINUSTAH Logistics Base in Port-au-Prince 53 . The establishment of OSOCC was also supported by OCHA staff, by the European Civil Protection Mechanism (EU-MIC), and by the Centers for Disease and Control (CDC). The UNDAC team, together with technical experts from the EU-MIC and CDC, undertook the initial damage and needs assessment in the areas hit by the earthquake and, by the time it left the country on January 27, the team had played a crucial role in the initial response phase, coordinating the work of the 67 USAR teams, promoting humanitarian coordination, and providing the first assessment (IASC, 2010b). Within the first 72 hours, the IOs and NGOs which were already present in the country before the earthquake provided assistance by employing their pre-positioned relief supplies in-country. These stocks of relief-items mainly belonged to several UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement and major NGOs, and had been left over from 2009 cyclonic season preparedness activities 54 . However, many of these organizations were penalized in their response capacity by the major losses suffered, both in terms of staff killed and destroyed buildings (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). The humanitarian actors responding to the quake were estimated by OCHA to be 400 by the end of January, while the subsequent real-time evaluation stated the presence of about 2,000 operational agencies involved in the response (DARA International, 2010). With such a massive influx of international NGOs, with varying capacity, degree of professionalism and resources, effective coordination was critical to the response intervention.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!53 Two other Sub-OSOCC were set up in Leogane and Jacmel to support local authorities and humanitarian organizations involved in the response. 54 As, for example, WFP warehouses, which had been damaged and for which it took some time to check the usability of food aid they contained.!

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Having already established the cluster mechanism in 2008, in order to respond to the Gonaives flood emergency55, the reactivation of the cluster system on January 15 was relatively quick and smooth, with the response operations systematized through 12 clusters and 2 sub-clusters. As for February 2010, they were:

1. Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items, led by IFRC; 2. Camp Coordination/Management, led by IOM; 3. WASH, led by UNICEF in support of the

(DINEPA); 4. Health, led by PAHO/WHO; 5. Food, led by WFP; 6. Nutrition, led by UNICEF; 7. Agriculture, led by FAO; 8. Early Recovery, led by UNDP; 9. Protection, led by MINUSTAH and the Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights (OHCHR), articulated in two sub-clusters: i. Child Protection, led by UNICEF; ii. Gender-Based Violence, led by UNFPA.

10. Education, led by UNICEF; 11. Logistics, led by WFP; 12. Emergency Telecommunications, led by WFP (UN, 2010).

When possible, the Government appointed Ministry counterparts in charge of co-leading clusters, with the purpose of involving them in response planning and implementation in each field. As acknowledged by Binder and Grunewald (2010), the cluster approach was valued by participants as a means to share information and network with other organizations. Furthermore, in order to guarantee needs to be addressed by the humanitarian action outside Port-au-Prince and in host communities, coordination capacity -through the cluster approach- was established in Leogane, Petite Goave, Jacmel and Gonaives. At the sub-national level, the need of reinforcing coordination with local authorities was emphasized. In addition, six

cross-border relief activities56(IASC, 2010b). The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), entitled to address the strategic issues of the response, was established on the first days of February. It included the participation of seven UN Agencies, seven NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, observers from the NGO Coordination Support Office (CSO) and, in case of expanded meetings, humanitarian donors. It was chaired by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!55 The Cluster approach was introduced in the country in 2006. Although, since Haiti was not considered as a chronic humanitarian situation, but as a country affected by sudden-onset natural disasters, clusters were not activated before 2008. 56 By mid-April, having -activated.!

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the Humanitarian Coordinator who, in the Haitian context (where the UN worked through an integrated mission), also acted as Resident Coordinator and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG)(Binder & Grunewald, 2010a). The humanitarian Community benefited of the critical coordination between MINUSTAH, US, and other foreign militaries57. MINUSTAH, present in the country since 2004 as a peacekeeping force, was severely affected by the earthquake, with more than 100 casualties among its staff. Once MINUSTAH mission was extended

rease the overall force levels

resources available to the humanitarian community. US and foreign militaries presence helped MINUSTAH to recovery and capitalize its assets present in the country. MINUSTAH, in coordination with OCHA, the Logistics Cluster, and government representatives, set up a Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC), so as to provide humanitarian actors in need of assistance with MINUSTAH military and police capacities, thus serving as a centralized coordinating entity for humanitarian

With the aim to oversee strategic coordination, a Coordination Support Committee (CSC) was set up. This body was co-led by the two DSRGs of MINUSTAH and by the government, bringing together donors, members of the humanitarian community, of MINUSTAH and US military. It became a platform to address key strategic issues, such as tasking complex operations, which involved multiple stakeholders (IASC, 2010b). Prior to the earthquake, the SNGRD, as already mentioned- was the body entitled of coordinating 26 governmental and non-governmental organizations, while the DPC was in charge of national, regional and communal operations. Within the SNGRD, the Haitian Government established the Groupe Internationale (GACI), which still today brings together UN agencies, MINUSTAH, donors and international NGOs, with the aim of coordinating the organizations involved in disaster preparedness and response, promoting technical cooperation, and mobilizing funds. Within GACI, the Comité Permanent Inter-Organisation (CPIO or local IASC), set up in 2008 and including UN Agencies plus 9 INGOs, represented the humanitarian community. In addition, a mechanism for coordination among local and international NGOs, named Cadre de Liaison Inter-ONG (CLIO), including 23 INGOs and 4 local NGOs, was established in 2005. Some sectorial coordination was also in place as, for example, the Plateforme des acteurs

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!57 Military assets were provided by 26 countries, of which Canada and Dominican Republic initially provided the largest contingent.

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, which coordinated the efforts of NGOs and DINEPA (i.e. Ministry of Water and Sanitation) (Hedlund, 2010). During the first months of the intervention, coordination was reinforced with NGO partners, through the creation of an NGO Coordination Support Office (NCSO), which was promoted by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), and by Interaction. NCSO aimed at supporting the work of NGOs (local and international) and easing communication among NGOs. Its purpose was also to advocate relevant NGO issues by making sure they were taken into account, and to set up linkages and partnerships with local Haitian NGOs to assist them with the unfamiliar procedures and mechanisms of the international humanitarian system. The NCSO team soon approached CLIO -the only existing international and national NGO network-, whose own capacity was in question and which turned down the request to host NCSO. At the same time, local NGO networks, often in collaboration with Haitian-American NGOs and INGOs, attempted, through numerous efforts, to foster cooperation and

intervention. In July, 11 members of the Steering Committee (SC) for the NCSO, were elected by 60 participating NGOs, of which none was local. In August, Interaction and USAID/OFDA decided to close the NCSO. Later on, in October 2010, CLIO was reactivated with a new information and resource center (Ibid.). Before proceeding with the overview of other actors concerned in the aftermath of the response, it is important to sum up the coordination mechanisms put in place through this figure:

Figure 13: Coordination Structure in Haiti (simplified, April 2010)

Source: Binder & Grunewald b, 2010 Humanitarian donors, including the United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID), the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), Spanish Cooperation (AECID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and others, had a crucial role in suggesting program strategies, guidance in key issues, and in advocating in areas of concern. The Humanitarian Donor Group

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met regularly to debate on specific issues with Cluster Lead Agencies, heads of UN Agencies, and NGOs. Moreover, on these occasions, the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA were always invited to attend (IASC, 2010b). With regard to the regional response, the first country to provide Haiti with aid was the Dominican Republic, whose President established an emergency assistance plan with the Haitian President Préval, and whose Red Cross, jointly with the Dominican Red Cross, coordinated early medical relief. Support in terms of emergency supplies and personnel was also provided by Latin America and the Caribbean Countries: Members of the Organization of American States (OAS) pledged financial support, while the 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM) mobilized its disaster emergency response system to assist Haiti (Ibid.) 3.4 International Humanitarian Funding Under the UN Consolidated Appeal Process, on January 15, 2010, the HCT in Haiti issued an initial Flash Appeal of $562 million, including activities of 12 NGOs, 16 UN organizations, and IOM. As of February 16, the appeal was 100 percent funded. On February 18, the Flash Appeal was revised to US$1.4 billion and it gathered projects from 76 aid organizations; this was the largest ever natural disaster appeal and -as of October 15- -funded of all appeals in 2010, with 70 percent of its require & Lossio, 2011). In addition, the CERF and the Haiti specific Emergency Relief and Recovery Fund (ERRF) played a critical role in providing resources in the early phase of the operations. The CERF allocated US$36,6 million, of which $10 million were authorized just hours after the disaster, and $16 million were made available within the first 72 hours. This rapid funding allowed humanitarian agencies to immediately launch and undertake some of the most urgent programs, earlier prioritized by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). In late February, another $10 million were made available to cover the gaps in the funding of projects (IASC, 2010b).

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Table 3: CERF funding and appeal needs met by cluster

Source: GHA, 2011b

The ERRF is a pooled fund mechanism, established by OCHA in response to the 2008 hurricane and managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator with OCHA support. Supported by DAC donors and funded about US$5 million each year, this fund, in September 2010, amounted to US$81 million and financed 49 projects, with nearly 80 percent of resources disbursed (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). This fund allowed most urgent actions to be financed and also life-saving activities of under-funded clusters to be adequately resourced. The ERRF has turned out to be a means to supply the Haiti humanitarian response with funding, without committing funds to a particular/certain organization within the Flash Appeal.

Table 4: ERRF donors and amounts committed

Source: GHA, 2011b

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Saudi Arabia was the prevalent donor to the ERRF and contributed with 62% of the total amount. Among the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, only three countries (France, Denmark, and Sweden) were in the list of the top ten donors. This shows that the Haiti ERRF represents a remarkable example of the unprecedented financial involvement of numerous non-traditional donors in supporting humanitarian response operations (IASC, 2010b). Accordingly, a total of 39 donors provided money for the first time. 63 percent of ERRF in Haiti was assigned to IOM and UN agencies (FAO, UNOPS, UNDP, WFP) for food security, shelter and camp management, early recovery and logistic projects, and the amount left was allocated to NGOs. Following the New York Conference of March 2010, a multi-donor trust fund was set up. This fund was administered by the World Bank, and managed by the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, whose members were Haitians and non-Haitians in equal number. It was co-chaired by Haitian ex-Prime Minister Bellerive and by former US President Clinton, the UN Special Envoy for Haiti. As regards private contributions, the private sector, together with individuals, is estimated to have totaled more than US$867 million as 23 March. Initiatives in the US, such as the American Red Cross campaign to raise funds through text messages, raised about $31 million (Ibid.). 3.5 Information Management (IM) Several information management mechanisms were put in place and utilized throughout the disaster response. As a matter of fact, IM was central to foster good coordination and leadership of the humanitarian action. In the aftermath of the disaster, OCHA, with the support of the UNDAC team (which had four team members, out of 22, who were dedicated to IM) and other partners, was able to quickly produce information outputs addressed to different types of audiences (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). The inter-cluster website OneResponse was utilized as an online platform to share information and data regarding response and recovery. Information management representatives for each cluster met regularly to agree upon indicators, to track the effectiveness of information management, and to exchange data (ALNAP, 2010b). Many new technologies, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Skype, were embraced by UN, international NGOs, and militaries in order to coordinate and act upon information spread by people directly affected by the disaster. 3.6 Successes and challenges The following analysis, reported in sections 3.6 and 3.7, are based on data relating to the first 12 months after the quake, i.e. the relief phase and the first part of the recovery phase.

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In July, the IASC affirmed that humanitarian operation to a large extent achieved its immediate objectives, and

unusual character of the Haitian earthquake, which had a devastating impact on local capacity, roughly 4 million people (i.e. 40 percent of the population) benefited from food assistance, 1.2 million from potable water, and 1.5 million received temporary shelters. However, numerous critical humanitarian challenges hindered the efficiency and effectiveness of the response. Logistical issues played a crucial role in the response process. To begin with, in the aftermath of the response, the collapse of the seaport and the damages to the airport hindered the import of relief supplies. Furthermore, the poor conditions of roads, affected by the quake, made it difficult to move relief-items within the country (IASC, 2010b). Additional practical constraints, which hampered the quick and effective response and the process of assessing needs, were the absence of complete maps of Port-au-Prince (as most of them were outdated and missed streets or even neighborhoods), the unavailability of good translators and the limited Internet access (Holmes, 2010). Humanitarian capacity to respond was limited, as actors were not prepared enough to tackle a disaster in an urban context. In addition, they concentrated their whole response efforts in the city of Port-au-Prince, often neglecting to intervene in rural areas, which were indeed largely affected and were hosting displaced persons (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). The humanitarian community lacked sufficient leadership and was therefore unable to support the government properly. In addition, operational agencies did not have a common framework that could orientate their activities. The lack of adequate humanitarian leadership was caused by several factors: a weakened Humanitarian Coordinator, which was not properly assisted by OCHA and ERC in formulating a common humanitarian strategy and in the assignment of roles and responsibilities to the panoply of interveners (NGOs, militaries, etc.). For instance, the pre-existing CPIO (later renamed as IASC) managed to meet only three weeks after the quake and only after having put pressure on the HC and ERC to arrange meetings (DARA International, 2010). The absence of a considerable strategic support from ERC and headquarters, together with the lack of an in-place coordination structure for decision-making, advantaged the prevalence of coordination structures with a strong military lead. Accordingly, neither instructions to MINUSTAH and to other foreign military forces were given on how to act, nor tasks, aimed at establishing a forum for coordination and common decision-making, were allocated. As a result, MINUSTAH and military forces set up their own decision-making systems, thus limiting the participation of humanitarians, which -with the exception of OCHA- were often excluded from these structures; as a consequence, decisions

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were not totally established on humanitarian considerations and concerns. This lack of clarity in the assignments of functions to the UNCT and MINUSTAH was the cause of some coordination issues. This problem can be attributed to the lack of IASC guidance on the way the cluster system is supposed to connect to UN integrated mission and to foreign militaries (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). In the response process, the local population was not involved by the international humanitarian community in the planning, strategizing and implementing the operations. This has been attributed to a wide range of reasons: firstly, humanitarian actors often under-estimated, under-utilized and did not refer to local capacity to respond, because of a lack of information about such capacity. Accordingly, humanitarians lacked knowledge on the coordination mechanisms which were in place prior to the quake; in the response phase, this resulted in the inability of some international actors to work closely and interact with their governmental counterparts, thus sometimes creating parallel structures to the sectorial governmental approach(IASC, 2010b). As a consequence, the international community, not appropriately informed about the local context, did not prove to be willing enough to

as the extensive use of the English language (instead of French and Creole) in the coordination mechanisms, which represented a considerable impediment to local

adequate formats (ALNAP, 2010b). In addition to linguistic issues, involvement of local actors in cluster meetings was hampered by the difficulty of accessing the UN bas (Holmes, 2010). The humanitarian community prioritized speed over inclusiveness, even if experiments in Bristout-Bobin58 demonstrated that these two factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Haitian population initiatives, such as censuses of people in damaged areas or assessments on the current situation, were not taken into account by the international community, who initiated a response not based on the vulnerabilities expressed by local actors. The lack of communication with the affected population -from both governments and international actors- represented a serious problem too. Government inconstancy in communicating with people disappointed the population, that was expecting a stronger feedback in taking care of them. On the other hand, international actors failed in providing communities with adequate information on the number of times food distributions would have taken place, thus creating false expectations. While during the initial phase there was good cooperation between IOs and national authorities, this good practice was not sustained over time. Governmental agencies at local and national levels found themselves excluded from humanitarian coordination and decision-making process, to th

(IASC, 2010b).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!58 In this neighborhood, an aid distribution took place in collaboration with the local community. This initiative tuned out to be a success, compared to others, in terms of waiting time reduced and of traceability of aid to the entitled persons.

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With regard to the cluster approach, according to an evaluation undertaken before the quake, it was already weak in respect to accountability and ownership, and was structured on a top-down basis with scarce connection to national coordination systems in place and local NGOs. All these failings became further evident after the disaster (DARA International, 2010). The 12 Clusters were rapidly re-activated and became operational within ten days of the quake. However, gaps in cluster capacity undermined the efficacy of the intervention (IASC, 2010b). The cluster leadership was unclear, mainly because of the inexperience and junior status of the coordinators of cluster meetings, who often lacked the adequate skills and experience to run a cluster in the aftermath of a disaster. Additionally, the high turnover of cluster coordinators worsened the situation even more and represented a further challenge to coordination. As pointed out by former lack of capacity has meant that several clusters have yet to establish a concise overview of needs and develop coherent response plans, strategies and gap analyses. This is beginning to show and is leading others to doubt our ability to

government representatives and those appointed to participate were often businessmen with no real interest in governmental matters. As a result, relationships

-establish. Coordination aimed by clusters was not facilitated by the appearance of a huge number of newly-arrived and inexperienced NGOs, which hampered the smooth deployment of response operations. Several donors attempted to encourage coordination; however, many INGOs, thanks to the enormous amount of privately donated funding, had no incentives to play an active role in coordination, as they no longer needed support from public donors (DARA International, 2010). They often perceived that the more an organization is well-resourced, the less it needs to coordinate. Anyway, many NGOs had priorities (such as seeking for new offices, hiring personnel) other than coordination, and worked independently on the basis of their respective agendas. In addition, the creation of sub-clusters and working groups aimed at ensuring more effective meetings, represented other commitments in the very busy schedule of NGOs, which were often lacking human and material resources to participate (ALNAP, 2010b). As far as the situation analysis is concerned, several needs assessments were undertaken, but they turned out to focus on needs alone, ignoring the analysis of the context, local participation and capacities (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). Some biased assumptions were strengthened 59 and weak situation analysis led to an intervention often based on misperceptions. In this context, a major challenge for the humanitarian community was the identification of the most vulnerable people in a disaster context. Distinction between those directly affected by the disaster, and those suffering from a more systemic deprivation, was somehow irrelevant, as almost

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!59 For instance, many international actors took for granted that local capacity did not exist, and that the security situation was tense; in the end, the evaluation mission found out the opposite.

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everyone in the country was affected (directly or indirectly) by the quake, or suffered of chronic poverty (Holmes, 2010). As highlighted in the Real Time Evaluation -which is mainly referred to in this section-, several were the unintended consequences of the humanitarian response. Firstly, tons of inadequate and useless relief items (including medicines) were sent to Haiti and required a big amount of time and resources to be destroyed. Secondly, if it was necessary to guarantee access to basic services providing water, health care and education during the first months, on the other hand, it led numerous private hospitals and schools to bankruptcy, which were not able to provide services with fee to the population. Thirdly, the aid system underestimated the importance of caring enough about human resources in the country, by providing them with adequate accommodations, thus reducing the high number of burn-out people (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). The human resources issue concerned not only for the international staff, but also those experienced and skilled Haitians who left the country and went to the US and Canada immediately after the quake, as the Haitian government and the international community were not able to find a way to keep them from leaving the country. 3.7 Lessons learned and recommendations provided The urban setting of the disaster and the difficulties of the humanitarian community to cope with this context require the HCT (donors, cluster leads and humanitarian agencies) to adjust the intervention to the urban peculiarities of the affected areas, by focusing on a type of assistance which addresses community needs, rather than individual needs through the close engagement with local authorities, civil society, and the private sector. There is also the need to foster knowledge and training on how to properly address urban response and preparedness for future disasters. Rural areas have to be given equal importance: as the intervention in these zones was initially neglected, donors and humanitarian agencies need to ensure that the geographical coverage is extended and that cluster meetings provide information related to the outside of Port-au-Prince. Regarding leadership and coordination, several are the areas for improvement. As

es must be developed in order to assist the HC (as, for example, the appointment of a Deputy HC or others). HC together with HCT need the assistance of ERC and global clusters in building a cluster system in line with local coordination mechanisms. Cluster coordinators are required to get an appropriate preparation, so as to effectively coordinate clusters and guarantee their functioning. In order to better deal with a large number of organizations, IASC and global clusters suggested to detach the strategic and information-sharing functions of the clusters. While the former should be exclusive and concern only the Government, the cluster lead agencies and some NGOs, the latter should involve all the actors present in the field. The number of meetings should be limited and the terms of references should be provided, so as

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to rationalize them. In addition, clear criteria for the activation and deactivation of clusters have to be specified and a clear concept needs to be formalized concerning the way to integrat tables sectoriellesGrunewald, 2010b). In order to support cluster operations during the first response phase, OCHA must deploy adequate coordination and leadership capacity. In the aftermath of the response, a more efficient interface for rapid deployment teams (UNDAC, USAR) is needed together with an appropriate clarification on the roles of UN and other militaries vis-à-vis UN peacekeepers (Binder & Grunewald, 2010a). Since the local population, together with local and national authorities, have been excluded in the intervention process and their capacity has often been underestimated, future interventions need to be more inclusive. The cluster approach needs to reach out local NGOs and authorities in an active manner: this can be helped if, at meetings, French and Creole are used as working languages, thus leaving English aside. In addition, clusters should be included within the government structure (as happened with DINEPA); in case of inability to do it, due to weak capacity, clusters need to be co-led by the Government (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). The link among clusters and the DPC (the most important national disaster response coordination system) needs to be strengthened to develop a common understanding of the context (Binder & Grunewald, 2010a). Furthermore, a strategy on the way to engage other humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors (such as

debate and information exchange. The humanitarian community and the Government of Haiti need to improve dialogue and communication with the affected people, and involve the population to voice their concerns through new forums or communication means. In order to get in touch with the affected population, humanitarian agencies and NGOs need to loosen their security restrictions so as to allow staff to circulate in the city and meet the population (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). Needs assessments practices need to be improved by involving the affected population in the process, allowing humanitarians to target the most vulnerable and determine the most suitable assistance strategies. Concerning the panoply of actors involved in the response, a system to measure the transparency and accountability of their intervention should be put in place (DARA International, 2010). With regard to financial resources, collaboration among donors, national authorities and humanitarian agencies should be fostered, so as to reinforce the government ability to be the leader and coordinator of response operations. Donors should also ensure that financial resources can be adapted to changing needs of the affected population. Concerning human resources, skilled and experienced staff with the right language knowledge is required in a crisis environment. As far as unintended negative effects are concerned, as, for instance, the provision of free services that harm the Haitian markets, special meetings devoted to the

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analysis of their effects and to how to tackle them should be organized by cluster lead agencies, cluster coordinators and/or inter-cluster mechanisms. Following these meetings, a common mitigation strategy needs to be formulated and adopted. Donors should financially support the analysis of the impact of free services on the economy and the formulation of possible solutions (Binder & Grunewald, 2010b). In all the reports analyzed, a crucial role is given to the integration of contingency planning as well as to risk and disaster management measures (jointly by the DPC, OCHA and MINUSTAH) into the reconstruction phase. Furthermore, the Haitian Red Cross, in collaboration with the DPC, should make sure that first aid trainings are available and supplied to all the public services.

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4. TWO YEARS AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE: WHICH STEPS FURTHER FOR COORDINATION?

Over the past four years, Haiti has been severely affected, and continues to be affected, by a variety of natural and non-natural threats, which often turn into disasters. In order to better understand this context, an explicative picture is presented in the following page. The multiple risks affecting the Haitian context are the main causes of high exposure to natural disasters. Haiti is in fact exposed to seismic threats, climate and hydro-meteorological threats, floods and coastal threats (Government of Haiti, 2010b). Moreover, as shown in the natural phenomena line, each year the rainy season occurs form April to October and for five months it overlaps with the cyclonic season (June to November), hitting the country and adding vulnerability to the population. In 2008, the hurricane Hanna, by also provoking the flooding in Gonaives, brought international actors to activate the cluster mechanism for the first time in Haiti. As already analyzed, clusters have been utilized as coordination tools during the earthquake crisis as well as after the cholera outbreak. The relief and recovery phases of the two events have overlapped one over the other, preventing the international actors from attaining a clear understanding of the status quo and the phase they were in. In fact, cholera and the 2010 hurricane season kept the focus on the humanitarian emergency, thus slowing down the recovery and reconstruction processes. At the same time, all these disasters have been and still are the main causes of interruption of the ongoing development process; in spite of all humanitarian challenges, development projects supported by purely development donors (as, for example, the WB and the IDB) struggled to proceed further and remained a parallel dimension to all the others. To sum up, this brief overview of the multifaceted scenarios of the Haitian context allows a better understanding of the complex reality in which national and international actors are involved.

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4.1. Context at the end of 2011

At the end of 2011, the situation is one of enduring humanitarian needs including protection concerns. According to the Global Appeal Report for 2012 (OCHA, 2011), within a population of 9,923,243 million, 4,6 million need humanitarian assistance and suffer from food insecurity. According to IOM data (2011), despite a reduction in camp population since March 2011, over 550,000 Haitians still live in about 800 IDPs camps scattered around Port-au-Prince.

Figure 14: DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX V2.0 UPDATE Source: IOM, 2011

At the same time, despite the huge needs which still remain unaddressed, international humanitarian donors have cut funding in Haiti and numerous organizations have already phased out due to the lack of resources. With regard to politics, Haiti lacked a Government until October of 2011, with the appointment of Prime Minister Garry Conille by the Parliament. In the same month, the mandate of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) -entity established in April 2010 to cover the recovery agenda for 18 months60- has expired and Mr. Conille is seeking its renewal. Additionally, as it was prior to the quake, 60% of the national budget continues to be dependent on international assistance (Hidalgo, 2011). 4.2 Empirical analysis

Forty face-to-face interviews were conducted between September and December 2011, in order to propose sustainable solutions for improvement in the emergency-development transition period.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!60 The well-functioning of such a body has been questioned, since, as late as May 2011, it was not already full operational due to staffing delays (Hidalgo, 2011).

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Names, roles and functions of the interviewees can be found below in the following pages, regrouped in sets and subsets according to their functions:

1. Nigel Fisher, Deputy Special Representative for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Haiti;

2. Maria Rosaria Bruno, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (National Coordination), UNOCHA Haiti;

3. Chloè Dessemond, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (Field Coordination), UNOCHA Haiti;

4. Caroline Peguet, Manager ERRF, UNOCHA Haiti; 5. Shayne Gilbert, Chief of Section, Joint Operations and Tasking Center,

MINUSTAH, Haiti; 6. Stefano Fedele, Nutrition Cluster Coordinator (Lead), UNICEF Haiti; 7. Lorenza Rossi, Nutrition Cluster Coordinator (Alternate), UNICEF Haiti; 8. Erica Mattellone, Emergency Officer, UNICEF headquarter, New York; 9. Esther Van der Woerdt, Health Cluster Coordinator (Lead), PAHO/WHO Haiti; 10. Edmondo Perrone, Logistics Cluster Coordinator (Alternate), WFP Haiti; 11. Giovanni Cassani, CCCM/Shelter-NFI Cluster Coordinator (Lead), IOM Haiti; 12. Bradley Mellicker, Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer, IOM, Haiti;

13. Stefano Zannini, former MSF Belgium Head of Mission in Haiti; 14. Ernesto Bafile, General Coordinator, Médecins du Monde, Haiti; 15. Riccardo Suppo, Head of Mission, COOPI Haiti; 16. Tiziana Vicario, Regional DRR Focal Point, COOPI Haiti; 17. Ramon Martinez Francois, DRR Manager, COOPI Haiti; 18. Stanley Osias, Field Officer, COOPI Haiti; 19. Glifford Belizaire, Field Officer, COOPI Haiti; 20. Max Woldy Benoit, Field Officer, COOPI Haiti; 21. Gladymir Benoit, Field Officer, COOPI Haiti; 22. Inesse Joseph Pasteur, President of the NGO Secours aux avengles autres

handicappes et demmunis du Departement di Centre, (SAHDEC) Haiti; 23. Denise Sintima, President of the NGO Organisation pour la protection des

ressources naturelles Macaya-Formonf (OPREM-F); 24. Wilfrid Clésadieu, President of the NGO American Continental Zoo

(AMECONZOO), Haiti. 25. Tamara Shukakidze, Deputy Director of Disaster Response Program, CARE,

Haiti; 26. Marcel Goyeneche, Disaster Preparedness Coordinator, IFRC Haiti; 27. Massimo Marghinotti, IFRC Haiti;

28. Anthony Chan, USAID Deputy Director, USAID Haiti; 29. Luis Alberto Moreno, President of the Inter-American Development Bank; 30. Gaetano Vivo, Disaster Risk Management Analyst, World Bank Haiti; 31. Pauline Zwaars, Haiti Reconstruction Fund Officer, World Bank Haiti:

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32. Bill Clinton, former US President and UN Special Envoy to Haiti;

33. Florence Duperval Guillaume, Minister of Health, Haiti; 34. Garry Conille, Prime Minister of Haiti; 35. Michel Martelly, President of Haiti; 36. Paul Christian, WASH Cluster Municipal Coordinator, DINEPA, Haiti; 37. Palme Roland, Secretary General, Haitian Red Cross;

38. Claude Sterling, President of SOBE Export Services; 39. Sean Ahearn, CEO of Island Source Consortium Ltd, New York, USA; 40. Marcel Fontin, CEO and President of Haitienne, Haiti;

The questions for the interviews have been formulated on the basis of the problems and recommendations encountered during the first year of intervention, which were pointed out by the variety of reports analyzing the humanitarian action in Haiti. As shown in the picture below, the interviewees (classified according to the numbers above) have been grouped into sets and subsets with their respective intersections according to the functions performed. This classification represents the starting point of the subsequent analysis. Among the interviewees, the first twelve belong to Intergovernmental Organizations, comprising UN (1-10,32) and non-UN (11-12) groups. The cross-sectional part of the cluster coordinators set with other sets encloses the cluster leaders from UN and non-UN (both belonging to intergovernmental organizations). Within the UN set, the small subset comprises three UNICEF officials, two of whom are also cluster coordinators, while the other one works at headquarters level. Among donors, number 28 is found out of the sets, being a bilateral one, while number 29 is represented in the cross-sectional part between donors and intergovernmental organizations. Moreover, number 30 and 31 are found in the cross-sectional part, being at the same time UN and donors. Numbers 13 to 27 are shown in the international and local NGO set. The government set includes actors from number 33 to 37, with number 36 (belonging to DINEPA and being at the same time cluster coordinator) situated in the cross-sectional part. Finally, interviewees 38 to 40 belong to the private sector.

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In the following section, the main findings resulted from interviews are reported. These results are re-elaborated and articulated according to the typology of problems, implications and recommendations.

4.3 Problems, implications and recommendations

1. Lack of governmental counterparts in clusters. While some clusters had, from the beginning of the intervention, a national governmental counterpart co-leading meetings and to which the cluster lead agency could refer and jointly coordinate intervention, others did not. One example: while WASH Cluster had, and still has, an active governmental counterpart, i.e. DINEPA, other clusters, such as Shelter, did not refer to any specific governmental entities, as, for example, there is no housing Ministry or national authority within the government structure that deals with housing issues, thus hampering the effectiveness of the intervention of IFRC and UNHABITAT. This lack of national counterparts had its repercussions in the operational response phase and also is creating confusion in the current transition phase, as there is not a clear picture on who at governmental level, the international community should refer to in order to handover its functions. This gap will result in a waste of resources, unless one governmental counterpart, trained and entitled to carry out these functions, is identified. The suggestion arisen refers to the designation of an office within the government, which, even if not existing prior to the disaster, embodies the functions and responsibilities needed to coordinate the cluster together with the international counterpart. People appointed need to be provided with technical knowledge and expertise by the international community. In the transition phase, with further support of international actors, this office is supposed to be able to manage independently the handover of functions. 2. Lack of governmental ability to control and weak NGOs accountability

The issues seem twofold: firstly, there is lack of knowledge by the Government on the exact number of actors present in the field as there is no clarity on the registration procedures and on the need to register. Even if the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation established procedures to reduce registration times and expedite the registration process, many actors still do not complete the registration procedures. Some NGO staff claim that the complicated and opaque bureaucracy required for registration, the multiplication of procedures (charging NGOs with heavy administrative costs) coupled with the fact that registration is not required by most of international donors, discourage INGOs to be compliant with registration procedures, thus leading to a lack of accountability. As a result, the Government does not have full control of the entities that enter the country and of those that are already present in it, and which operate outside the established coordination and control mechanisms

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(IFRC, 2011). Secondly, so far, the Government of Haiti has not imposed on external actors any accountability requirements on their results, so that they do not have to show them or report back on activities. This implies not only the risk that INGOs base their interventions just on their own priorities and detached from the Government action plan, but also that there is no governmental control on the good or bad performance of external actors.

Efforts to activate a binding registration system must be pushed forward. A possible solution may be: lowering bureaucracy burden and administrative expenses, and sensitizing donors on this issue, in order to incentive financed organizations to become compliant. Moreover, it is fundamental to support the promotion of The International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles 61(IDRL), which is the legal framework supported by the IFRC for the facilitation and regulation of international disaster response, aimed at reducing human vulnerability by promoting legal preparedness for disasters. One report has been issued to analyze the current legal and policy frameworks in Haiti and to address common issues related to receiving international assistance for disasters. This study recommends the strengthening of the entire legal and institutional framework for disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, relief, and initial recovery assistance in areas applicable to international disaster relief. This IDRL project was launched in 2008 and aims to define some framework laws for each country, for responding to emergencies caused by natural disasters. Every country should have a law defining when the state of emergency is declared in the country, how and when to make an appeal to the international community for external intervention, and which facilitations should be given to organizations involved in the intervention. These facilitations refer to the possibility for organizations entering the country to clear the material in the shortest time possible, to avoid paying import taxes in order to allocate the money entirely to the response, and to have the legal personality in the country so as to be able to easily open a bank account. Within this framework law, there is the possibility for each state to define in advance a list of INGOs that are accepted by default in the country in the occurrence of an emergency. Then, if an earthquake occurs and the state declares a national emergency, the

from the facilitations granted. Within this framework law, the state is committed to establish a task force, composed of representatives of different ministries in the country, that interacts and interfaces with the foreign organizations in order to facilitate coordination. The idea behind this is to reduce the number of actors (whose quality of intervention is guaranteed) accessing the country by defining them a priori, facilitate them in the intervention and make them collaborate with the governmental task force. Benefits to organizations are different according to the periods of relief and recovery. Relief begins when the nation declares the state of natural disaster, until the moment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!61 IDRL in Haiti, http://www.ifrc.org/

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when a certain national Committee decides that it has entered the recovery phase. Later on, the Committee establishes when the recovery phase ends and facilitations to INGOs stop. In the Haitian context, which is highly vulnerable to natural threats, the adoption of such a framework law, which establishes specific NGO registration procedure for disaster situations and eligibility criteria and conditions under which humanitarian organizations are granted legal facilities in the country, would empower the Haitian state in the selection of which INGOs should be given access to the country, would guarantee a good performance of the organizations, and will ensure coordination with national authorities. However, the correct implementation of such law would require a strong state with the ability of make it enforced and there are still doubts on the ability of the Haitian state to succeed in this.

With regard to the second issue, accountability requirements, as well as standards measuring the appropriateness and soundness of intervention, need to be imposed on international actors by the government, whether at municipal, departmental or national level.

3. Lack of transparency and communication

There seems to be a lack of transparency and communication with the population and the beneficiaries concerning the INGOs intervention. This has repercussion on the involvement of target beneficiaries of the projects, which may not be involved in their own needs assessment or even consulted in the steps that the project foresees or in the objectives aimed. Concerning this problem, it is suggested to INGO staff that, before formulating a project, they seat with the communities involved and discuss with them the main lines of intervention. Moreover, it is fundamental to be clear with the beneficiaries on the financial and operational means that the organization disposes of, the objectives, and about what the organization is entitled to do and what not. In this way, beneficiaries will feel involved in the actions and will probably contribute as active components of the project 4. Weak private sector

The majority of local companies still face the problem of not having enough capital to restart undertaking their -earthquake) activities. In addition, INGOs and UNs, with a higher amount of resources at their disposal, have attracted to their side Haitian qualified employees, thus making it hard for companies to find skilled Haitians to hire. As a consequence, the competitiveness of local companies, weakened by the shortage of skilled staff at pre-earthquake rates, has enormously decreased.

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By providing services free of costs, as for example health care and logistics, the international community has led to bankruptcy many local private companies, which were no longer able to attract and supply clients. On the other side, at Wash services level, it seems that these services are provided just by few enterprises that were able to survive by guaranteeing high quality services on a large scale. These companies had and still have as main clients international organizations who have high paying capacity. This has led to market distortion, typically present in oligopolistic markets62. Furthermore, this situation now hampers the international community from defining an efficient exit strategy: prices tend to remain high and the market mechanism of demand and supply is inefficient. In some industries belonging to the private sector, such as, for example, Education, the quality of services provided is questioned, as common standards, if existing, seem to be not applied in many cases. On the other side, no sufficient control and monitoring over services seems to be executed. The lack of minimum standards cause the inadequacy of the educational system and nurture the system of social discrimination: a growing number of people with financial resources go to study in private foreign colleges and local poor people accept the low level education. This locates them in a disadvantaged position from the beginning. With some exceptions, corporate social responsibility among private sector companies still generally remains an unexplored issue. Connections between private sector companies and international communities are still not immediate, due to the lack of means of communications between the two. The actual moment, which witnesses a gradual recovery of the private sector, represents the suitable opportunity for clusters to encourage INGOs to rely on private sector services, thus contributing to foster the economy. As stated by the Humanitarian Coorprocurement so as to engage Haitian enterprises, help them recovery and allow them

whenever possible63, must cease to provide services free of cost which distort the economy. The market price (fair?) needs to be gradually charged to the population. Moreover, in some industries (as WASH), the international community should find ways to re-establish market mechanisms, competitiveness and efficient allocation of resources through the price mechanism. Concerning Education, standards in this field are needed in order to ensure the alignment and uniformity of education levels. More generally, controls should be implemented to make sure that services are provided as per contracts, and that minimum standards are guaranteed. It is then necessary to build awareness on corporate social responsibility: one successful example of it has been the case of DIGICEL, which has transformed the country by granting access to communication to the earthquake-affected people. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!62 In such a market situation, a capped price could be introduced to reduce the oligopoly inefficiency. 63 There is a controversial discussion with regard to Health care services, which are provided by the international community, without which most of the Haitian population would not have access to health care.!

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Information mechanisms such as portals or virtual platforms also need to be arranged by INGOs, in order to connect the suppliers of services (private sector companies) to the buyers (INGOs or others), and to facilitate their interaction. 5. Cluster-related issues At this transition phase, cluster meetings aim at providing information, discussing

about strategies of intervention and supplying participants with contacts. They seem to have a mere information-sharing purpose and appear to be devoid of decision-making content. Several cluster coordinators and INGO staff have highlighted this point by

, as they

rather than another one, according to the needs, but NGOs can refuse to act in

exchange of information and statistical data that has the potential to steer organizations towards certain types of activities, but without a binding component. A good practice that is still in place, and which partially addresses this issue, is the constitution of MINICLUSTERS (in French Petits comités) which were introduced for the Health sector: they consist of the 10 to 15 main operational organizations in the field, which meet to discuss strategic issues, in order to develop framework of actions shared with the Ministries.

One issue that was pointed out both by cluster coordinators and by NGOs staff

refers to the possibility that the setting of the cluster agenda may somehow be influenced by the leading agency interest. This may happen as a result of poor separation between the cluster leadership branch and the programmatic area of the same agency. Often, in meetings, people leading clusters are, at the same time, very linked with the implementation of programs, and the lack of a clear firewall might create frictions and result in interventions shaped by the agency will.

Cluster leadership of international agencies must be kept well separated from the program branch of the same agency, in terms of ensuring accountability to all the members of the clusters and no conflict of interests. For example, in UNICEF-led clusters, leaders have to make sure they act separately from UNICEF program, which deals with project cycle management. Others interviewees have suggested

-the purpose of this research), which foresees the attribution of cluster

to the staff. The attribution of functions to OCHA staff is seen as more appropriate, as OCHA is supposed to be the most well prepared actor in terms of coordination issues and is expected to play a neutral role (as it does not implement programs

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itself). In addition, this model foresees that, for each cluster, the OCHA coordinator is to be assisted by a technical person belonging to the current leading agency (such as, for example, an expert of nutrition belonging to UNICEF) and also by an Information Manager.

In both the response phase and in the transition phase there is an issue

concerning cluster coordinators, who are considered to have highly technical skills but weak organizational and strategic skills.

This problem could be addressed at higher level by hiring senior staff for these positions. Senior staff probably owns a more strategic vision and approach, thus involving each participating actor and transmitting the value-added of participation.

It seems that there is a lack of communication, integration, and common strategy

of action among Information Managers (IMs) of cluster lead-agencies. At present indeed, each cluster-lead agency has one or more people in charge of Information Management function, with the task of sharing information, data, strategies, news, and events about each cluster. Since there is not a unified and common information sharing portal, it seems that IMs keep sending information back and forth, without unifying and aligning all the available information in just one single website.

A simple way to address this issue could be to base in the same office all the Information Managers belonging to the various agencies, so as to issue a common IM strategy and avoid the overlapping of functions. An even higher level of integration could be achieved by joining budgets and instituting a single IM agency that receives, elaborates and delivers all the information in standardized format.

Prior to the Haiti earthquake, cluster terms of responsibility had been rigidly

defined. This system, if on the one hand creates a sense of predictability and repeatability, has shown its limitations in the Haitian urban context, which significantly differs from the usual disasters conditions managed by the international community. In the first period, an integrated approach lacked in the intervention. Each cluster had a limited and well-defined set of responsibilities, and because of this, the response was subdivided into small ponds, which did not cooperate and did not create synergies for common solutions to shared problems. Synergies between different clusters working on similar issues need to be reinforced: parallel structures have to be avoided, and initiatives such as the merger of CCCM and Shelter cluster have to be encouraged. This allows organizations to tackle a common problem from multilateral perspectives, thus bringing an added value to the intervention. The merger of sectors and clusters

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carrying out similar tasks (as occurred with CCCM and Shelter) avoids the overlapping of functions and strengthens the intervention. One initiative for improvement could be making agriculture, food security and food aid jointly work and to formalize this agreement, so as to transition to a food security forum incorporated in the agricultural Ministry.

Local and departmental coordination both at municipal and departmental level is recognized as weak. The best-case scenario is still isolated to the case of Tabarre town hall meetings, where CCCM and WASH cluster meetings are merged together, being two fundamental components of the same strategy of intervention. Also at national level, there is the perception that the involvement of authorities is too little and fragmented,

, which is detached from the actual needs of the country.

To address this issue, resources must be invested to foster coordination mechanisms both at municipal level and in departments. One example aimed at involving municipal authorities is the implementation of the so-

Creole, bringing together the actors in charge of the reconstruction, for the formulation of a common strategy. Moreover, technical committees on specific technical issues, both at municipal and departmental level, need to be supported in their implementation and consolidation, as they guarantee a continued planning and coordination of both emergency and development issues. At national level, one initiative is to physically base the cluster co-leading international organization within the building of the Ministry of reference, so as to reduce time and communication inefficiencies especially in this transition phase.

In this transition phase, a clear transition strategy is still lacking at HCT level, though it has been on the agenda for the entire 2011.

Confusion among actors arises on the transition process, which theoretically implies the phasing out of clusters and the adoption of pre-emergency coordination structures, i.e. table sectorielles. There is also a widespread lack of knowledge on the nature of this latter mechanism (whether it is similar to a technical group of discussion, whether it should include donors, etc.) and no analysis have been carried out on how they used to operate before the quake and which implications their adoption would entail.

Speaking to the different cluster coordinators, not a single answer was given on the date foreseen for the cluster shut down, thus meaning that a transition strategy has not yet been formulated. However, it should be pointed out that

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different clusters could, for technical reasons, close at different times, but no deadline has been fixed yet64. To address this lack of clarity, terms of reference for the transition have to be developed in order to create transition road map and uniform knowledge. Accordingly, guidelines relating to the integration and transition of responsibility and capacity to the government need to be formulated. At global cluster level, a reflection on the formulation of general guidelines for the steps to follow necessary to the phasing out of clusters should be given voice. In addition, a clear strategy on transition needs to be issued as soon as possible at the HCT level.

Among Haitians working either for local or for international NGOs, there is the common perception that the international staff taking part to coordination meetings (either cluster or probably tables sectorielles) is not familiar enough with the grass-

participating to coordination forums should be Haitians with a deep understanding of the area and expatriates provided with a remarkable knowledge of the Haitian culture, tradition and habits at grass-root level (thus enhancing the basic principle of development: working together). Furthermore, an anthropology and sociologic analysis should be encouraged at local level.

At coordination forums, even if there is a good practice of information sharing -called

refers to the practice, followed by organizations, to jointly decide which intervention can be undertaken together, in a cooperative and not competitive manner. This integrated approach of intervention, in which skills and resources are pooled together, will result in multifaceted projects addressing a wider set of needs.

Successful techniques to encourage participation to coordination meetings need to be constantly referred to and utilized by cluster coordinators: these include making phone-calls, send text massages, e-mails and involve the participants in the agenda setting of the meeting.

6. Donors related issues

As many interviewees have suggested that donors participation to coordination meetings is not regular, donors should regularly take part to coordination forums and get to know closer the grass-root needs. In this transition phase, donors

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!64For example, the education cluster could close earlier because supported by the government while WASH cluster could close later because of Cholera.

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should engage in financing transition process, so that the efforts made so far can be concretized in something of a more sustainable nature. At donors Coordination meetings, the necessary leadership from the GOH is often lacking either because of insufficient capacity or because of political transitions from one government to a newly elected one. Donors are therefore always faced with a dilemma of having to choose between moving a project forward or of waiting for counterparts and hence seeing less project implementation progress. Moreover, as earlier pointed out, donors should incentivize NGOs to register at country level, in order to be compliant. Part of the challenge of full coordination is the reality that donor financial cycles do not align. Consequently, donors should work harder on ensuring that project areas are not left uncovered because of the mismatch of financial cycles.

7. NGO-related issues (local and international)

Local NGOs still have reduced capacity in project proposal drafting, budgeting, and accounting to be able to submit, whenever possible, a well-organized project proposal to donors. Local NGOs often associate together and present a project under the umbrella of UN agencies, as it happened for the 2012 CAP, that become their guarantors. However, the administrative costs charged by agencies to do so are quite high. Local NGOs appear too fragmented to the eyes of international community and, as a result, they have a weakened credibility.

Local NGO capacity in project proposal (comprising drafting, budgeting and accounting) and implementation need to be strengthened, in order to allow local NGOs staff, whenever possible, to autonomously participate to the call for proposals without always being under the umbrella of a UN agency.

Partnerships among local and international NGOs should be reinforced and multiplied, as this brings to a mutual benefit: in fact, local NGOs, from their side, have access to and knowledge of the remotest zones and, by the being points of reference of the community, are the most successful implementers. On the other hand, IOs should financially contribute, evaluate the activities undertaken and train local staff. Local NGOs should associate into consortia in order to appear more credible, strong and united. Moreover, they have to be more involved by the international community in the coordination process, by, for example being given access in the planning of meetings and in the agenda setting at both municipal and departmental level.

Networks of international and local NGOs, namely CLIO and CCO, still operate as two parallel structures. CLIO, with a more development vocation was already founded prior to the quake, and CCO, dealing with emergency issues, was born

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after the quake. These two entities have had so far problems at working together because of different visions and points of view (one more development oriented, the other one more emergency focused), even if a great part of the members belong to both forums.

Despite the difference of visions, CLIO and CCO NGO forums need to start working together on common dossiers, without wasting time on development or emergency philosophy matters. The CCO, with a more urgentist vocation, needs to work on passing to CLIO some dossiers while, on the other hand, CLIO should reinforce its structure and strengthen its lobbying and advocacy activities.

8. Trainings-related issues

Key job positions, in the transition towards the development phase, are mainly taken by internationals, who take long time to get the right perception on the Haitian context and cost much higher price than national staff. However, a highly qualified national staff able to cover these functions is still missing, as no specific trainings are yet provided. In fact, at present, while trainings targeted to less educated population on various matters (such as health issues or disaster risk reduction techniques) start to be provided in communities, what seems to be lacking is the willingness of the international community to provide higher level trainings, so as to create a highly skilled branch of population that can transmit its know-how to the community. International community should arrange targeted trainings at university level in order to allow Haitians to be skilled enough to apply for positions of high responsibility (which are presently taken by internationals) in the transition and development phases. 4.4 Further considerations from the empirical analysis Having this information available, it may be relevant to try and associate the answers collected to the category of actors that provided these answers, in order to better appreciate their respective interests and the value they ascribe to the different coordination issues.

problem has been pointed out just by cluster leaders, who are in the position to perceive it more than all the other actors and who seem to be also directly affected by the negative effects that this lack of counterpart may imply.

ed by international organizations or expatriates, with the only exception of a big financially independent INGO operating on the field. On the contrary, the problem has been pointed out by Haitians working both as field officers and as government representatives. This suggests that if, on the one hand, INGOs staff do not feel much concerned about this

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issue as there is still no obligation in place for them to be compliant, on the other hand, Haitians perceive it more as a matter of sovereignty.

As far as the lack of transparency and communication are concerned, this problem is mainly perceived at field level where the staff is more connected to beneficiaries.

Private sector-related problems are perceived by a heterogeneous group of actors (UN, INGOs, Donors, Government and private sector). However, at grass-root level, field officers have not reserved much attention to them.

Regarding clusters, problems, implications and recommendations highlighted have been mainly discussed by cluster leaders and OCHA staff, which are supposed to hold a deeper knowledge on coordination issues. The matters most frequently mentioned have been the weak decision-making function of clusters together with the need of the formulation of a strategy of transition. The last three problems that were highlighted (i.e. the weak connection of INGOs staff to the field, the need for cohabitation of INGOs and the techniques that should be fostered to encourage participation) were all expressed by local staff, which has probably a vision that is more grass-root based. To sum up, it can be appreciated that while at international

nature and mainly refer to the operational aspects of the cluster mechanism, at field level, issues highlighted by locals refer to the relationship among INGOs and beneficiaries/local communities.

Concerning donors-related topics, both UN and the government stressed the relevance of the fact that donors should be more sensible to support the transition phase.

The issue related to local NGOs access to international funding has been underlined by both local NGOs, OCHA and cluster leaders, while no INGO are concerned by this problem and felt no relevance to express it.

Finally, the training proposition expressed in the last point has been entirely raised by local staff. It seems to refer to a bottom-up approach, that implies the possibility for an alternative to the actual international system in place.

4.5 Additional Findings

1. Is Haiti still in an emergency?

Before proceeding with the analysis of the answers provided by interviewees, a brief theoretical digression is needed in order to identify the main classical phases of the intervention cycle. In the classical vision, development is seen as a linear and progressive process of economic growth and improvement of living conditions. A disaster is seen as an exceptional event that does not belong to daily life and social structures and that interrupts the linear process of development. After a disaster, the phases which follow are: emergency/relief in the short term, recovery in the medium

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term, and development in the long term, as part of an integrated and coherent strategy with a vision on the future and always aimed at reducing vulnerability and increasing capacity.

The following diagram shows this intervention approach in case of a disaster:

Fugure 15: phases after a disaster Source :Pérez de Armiño (2001)

In the interviews that were undertaken, the distinction between these phases does not clearly emerge and seems blurred.

Cluster coordinators and UN opinions

For what concerns the cluster coordinators, four out of six referred to the Haitian

emergency related issues (people in camps, presence of cholera, etc.) still implying an emergency approach.

Of the two remaining in any other country, the presence of still so many people in the camps would be defined, without doubts, as an emergency. However, here the urban context adds complexity to this definition. Moreover the reconstruction has not yet began and still 147,500 families out of 150,000 are still lacking . On the other hand, in contrast with the other opinions, the remaining cluste in

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Haiti there is no urgency at all, the emergency ended three months after the quake . He/she believed that camps have become permanent and that it makes no sense, today, to keep using and requiring humanitarian funding (CAP) to address problems of a more developmental nature.

Among the other UN actors who were interviewed, mainly belonging to OCHA, the opinions emerged appear significantly heterogeneous a humanitarian emergency which has passed its peak, a transition phase towards development, during which, however, development projects

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On the other hand, the Humanitarian Coordinator questioned the concept of tracomplete transition in Haiti from humanitarian to development, because, even though we are looking at the long-term, at the same time, we will have hurricane seasons, flooding, we are still earthquake-prone, and we have a food crisis. As a result, immediate life saving issues will always be on the agenda, therefore, the trick is to be

Moreover, during her visit in Haiti in September, Emergency Relief Coordinator

he humanitarian crisis in Haiti is not over. While major efforts are being made to put the country on the road to recovery, important humanitarian needs remain and must be addressed65 .

Local and international NGOs opinions

International NGOs interviewees were less inclined than the UN and cluster coordinators to define the current situation of Haiti as one of a projected emergency characterized by humanitarian needs.

According to MSF:

uation, apart from the cholera epidemic, is exactly the same as it used to be before the earthquake. The 600,000 people in the camps survive in the same conditions they used to live before the quake, when they were living in slums. The situation in terms of hygiene and sanitary conditions is exactly the same as before the quake. As a result, the parenthesis opened by the earthquake has now ended and the population is facing the same problems and

Many referred to the Haitian situation as a constant post-emergency or as a perpetual transition context, which risks to turn into an emergency at the first rain.

Locals, either working for INGOs, for resident NGOs or for the Haitian Red Cross, agreed on the fact that the context is not of an emergency nature. They stated that it is a situation of transition where, on the one hand, sustainable solutions must be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!65 From http://minustah.org/

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found to address the basic need people do live in conditions inferior to what it is expected duri ) and, on the other, projects aimed at longer-term development need to be implemented.

2. Resources for the humanitarian intervention

The majority of the interviewees was asked a question concerning the amount of financial resources devoted to the humanitarian intervention in the last two years in Haiti. The options indicated for the answer were four (a. enough, b. just the right amount, c. not much, d. too much), and they were also asked their opinion on the efficiency of the allocation of this money.

Cluster coordinators and UN opinions

The answer given by cluster coordinators, with just one exception, was that the money for the . On the contrary, considering the other UN responden

from:

1. not enough, as th ; 2. ; 3. .

Many interviewees questioned the validity of the ways and sectors in which resources had been earmarked and raised the point that new funds for the reconstruction are needed.

Local and international NGOs opinions

Among the local staff, working for both national and international NGOs, it is interesting to observe that they tended to define the resources, which entered Haiti, as too many and badly utilized. This point of view seems similar to the common grassroots opinion expressed by communities, which still tend to badly perceive the international humanitarian aid.

International staff opinion was, on the contrary, more heterogeneous, but no one directly claimed that the resources were too many. However, they pointed out that a consciousness-raising is nbetween the amount of money made available and the amount of progress made on

According to MSF:

intervention was deployed in the history of the international cooperation. It is curious that, despite what has been made, the conditions are still those that we can see

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From a more general perspective, the problem for Haiti is to get the resources for structural intervention and long-term development. Again, according to MSF:

interventions which can impact on the medium-long term, that is, what makes the difference between relief and recovery. The ten billion dollars that were promised at the New York conference were, once again, not delivered (as well as those promised in occasion of the Washington Conference of 2009). This money was supposed to revitalize Haiti as a country, from an economic and social point of view, and, as long as it does not reach its destination, it leaves Haiti as a country abandoned to itself, that lives day by day without a safe horizon and which continues to depend mostly on

3. The impact of the system of aid in place on the resilience of the state, municipal institutions, communities, and individuals

Interviewees were asked their opinion on whether the system of aid in place in Haiti reinforced or weakened the resilience of the state, municipal institutions, communities and individuals.

Cluster coordinators and UN opinions

The common opinion that arose from the answers is twofold: if, on the one hand, the humanitarian aid seemed to help the country react to the humanitarian situation immediately after the disaster, on the other hand, if prolonged, there is the risk that it can undermine the ability of that country to autonomously take the reins of the intervention.

It is noteworthy to highlight the points of view of two cluster coordinators relating to the role of their clusters in this process of reinforcing or weakening the governmental entities.

Whiwill hand over directly in the hands of the civil servants. This mere delivery of what

national and at departmental level, the structures established through the clusters are now able to work independently even if some reinforcement of capacities is still needed.

Local and international NGOs opinions

Opinions on this subject are quite heterogeneous and a common trend cannot be identified. Concerning health, the care services established have guaranteed assistance to thousands of Haitians who had never accessed a hospital before.

In the health sector, we acted as a trigger for certain

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experiences, since we pushed for the adoption of the health card, and we encouraged the ministry of health to take up the leadership in the emergency commissions established after the quake. In this sense, we can say that we reinforced the r

Other interviewees, working more at grassroots level, claimed that the aid in place the state, municipal institutions, communities, and

under a common strategy.

4.6 Comparison of outcomes from 2010 and 2011

The following section aims at correlating, whenever possible, the problems and issues reported by the literature at the end of 2010, to the findings delivered by the empirical analysis undertaken in Haiti at the end of 2011. Though with several limits, this comparison tries to highlight the problems which are still presently pointed out by the actors, the ones that are expressed for the first time, and those which are not perceived anymore. Several problems were identified in 2010, and mentioned again at the end of 2011, thus recurring again. Among these, we can surely identify weak interaction and exchange between international community and governmental counterparts. Often the diagnosis conducted by international operators (expats) is that this weakness reflects on the weakness of local institutions, especially when operating in the field, and in planning interventions both in emergency and development. Surely some responsibilities fall on the local authorities, but in order to fully define them and identify a road map for improvement, it would be important to better articulate the government point of view on this issue. As far as communication is concerned, the problems seem to persist in 2010 as well as in 2011: the lack of communication from both the government and the international actors with communities and beneficiaries, and the missed opportunity to inform and involve the local population in the planning, strategizing, and implementing of operations are matters that, according to interviewees, have not progressed. Two years after the quake, it seems that operational agencies are still lacking (as they did in 2010) a common framework that can orientate their activities. In 2011, locals defined what was lacking as the so- that would have resulted in a joint improved intervention, which did not overlap and enhanced the value of the sharing of functions. As for the initial response, it seems that the intervention is still not entirely based on the vulnerabilities expressed by local actors. In 2011, even if with some exceptions, local scale coordination meetings still need to be strengthened in terms of involvement of local authorities and better engagement with the international community.

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As pointed out by the literature on the topic, the deactivation of clusters and the way to integrate the cluster approach to the tables sectorielles had not been defined in 2010. It seems somehow demoralizing to recognize that, one year later, a transition strategy seems to be lacking at HCT and that no guidelines for the integration of clusters in the tables sectorielles have been produced yet. As mentioned both in the literature and the present empirical analysis, the skills of cluster coordinators may be further improved even though it appears that they have ameliorated in seniority and strategic skills since the beginning. Concerning local inclusion, a major effort has been made in this field, as coordination meetings are not held in English anymore, but only in French and Creole, and the UN Log Base seems easier to access by local and international actors. With regard to human resources, it seems that, while in 2010 the aid system underestimated the importance of taking enough care of human resources in the country, in 2011 this problem did not arise, probably because, as the urgency phase passed over, human resources face minor problems in their adaptation to the context. Moreover, it is probable that international organizations have activated internal policies to guarantee better facilities to expatriates. On the other hand, from the empirical analysis, new specific issues belonging to a wider set of problems have emerged. It is important then to evaluate issues in their specificity so as to suggest precise recommendations which can efficiently address the problems encountered. The problem identified and referred to as

concerning the first year of intervention. This probably happened because it was not the most immediate reflection undertaken by the actors involved in the urgent response, and the related considerations needed time to be delivered. As soon as the end of 2010, the weak relationship with the private sector was perceived as a problem. However, the issues pointed out in the research at the end of 2011 highlight private sector problems from another perspective, which is that of a transition and reconstruction phase from which the private sector has more opportunities to take advantage. Moreover, corporate social responsibility issues had never been mentioned in the literature referring to 2010. Their reference at the end of 2011 testifies a new consciousness-raising towards social issues and represents a sign that something was moving forward in the affirmation of this concept within private sector companies.

-sharing purpose of clusters, which appear devoid of decision-becomes extremely relevant in this transition phase, where international actors have to decide which direction to take, and the cluster could be the appropriate mechanism to be devoted to this function. It is interesting to point out that the problem identified as

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somehow be influenced by the leading agency interest 2010. This is probably an issue that took a certain time for international actors to be aware of. Even though it seems difficult to have measurable data, the number of coordination meetings keeps proliferating today as they did in 2010, and capitalization is still missing. Moreover, meetings appear to lack decision making content. Lack of communication, already in the year of the earthquake, was perceived as an issue that needed attention. However, in the course of the following year, the research highlighted one specific problem concerning the role of Information Managers within the broader area of communication. The literature published in 2010 did not point out the issue of the rigidity of cluster terms of responsibility, while, in 2011, numerous interviewees expressed it, meaning that this weakness deserves attention for further cases. Regarding the matter of the scarce familiarity of INGO staff taking part to coordination meetings pointed out in literature within the wider problem of scarce connection between local and international actors. In this context of transition, it is relevant to focus on the specific case of international staff participating to transition coordination mechanisms (whether they are clusters or tables sectorielles) as, in this emergency-development phase, it is fundamental to foresee an intervention targeted towards the needs of the most vulnerable. The specificity of the issue concerning the non-has been directly pointed out in this research, while previous literature seems to lack an explicit reference to this problem.

tional funding has been expressed, in 2011, in light of a more developmental approach and with a perspective that aims at

It is interesting to recognize that the problem regarding key positions being taken by internationals during the response phase had not been expressed with such strength. In the transition phase, the importance of this issue is being reinforced and seems to reassert the right for Haitians to be the protagonists of the intervention in their own territory.

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5. CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATIONS This research has originated from my interest in the topic of managerial and coordination aspects of humanitarian intervention and the problems related to them. The study is twofold: the literature review is indeed followed by an empirical analysis, whose data have been collected and elaborated at field level, during a three-month research in Haiti. This study has been developed with the purpose to answer the following research question: what are the managerial and coordination challenges among actors involved in the emergency-development transition phase? Through the initial literature review, which served as the basis for the other two case-based chapters, this thesis aimed at investigating the phenomenon of coordination, its structural mechanisms and the way it operates. Accordingly, this thesis provided, at first, a theoretical overview of the evolution of coordination, its nature and the factors that contributed to its increasing importance. In this part, several models of coordination were explicated, ranging from a more authoritaria

-down approach, where a powerful coordinator imposes the actions to undertake on the others, the latter assigns to the coordinator the role of convener among actors, who is supposed to facilitate and create the favorable conditions for the coordination process to be successful. The facilitation model is the one applied to the current system, where the coordinator enables humanitarian actors to have access to equal information and to operate under the best possible conditions through a bottom-up approach. The accountability component, initially missing in this model, was later provided through the introduction (in the 2005 Humanitarian Reform) of the cluster approach, which added an accountability component to the model. The reasons behind the increasing importance of coordination have been then explored, such as the growth of the industry in terms of people involved and money allocated to humanitarian interventions, the increasing complexity of crisis situations, and the growth in the number of actors. Moreover, an analysis and definitions have been provided of the evolution of the coordination mechanisms (whose turning point is embodied by the UN 46/182 Resolution), of the main entities shaping coordination (i.e. ERC, IASC, OCHA), and of the pooled funding mechanisms and the Appeal Processes. Additional attention has been assigned to the description of the coordination process and of the tools for the management of sudden-onset natural disasters, such as UNDAC, INSARAG and OSOCC. Finally, this first section attempted to theoretically explain each single component of the coordination framework, in order to grant a better understanding of the actors referred to in the following parts concerning the Haitian case. In the following part, an overview of the response in Haiti, both at national and

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international level, has been provided. The activation of clusters and the provision of international humanitarian funding have also been depicted. As a conclusion of this part, successes, challenges and lessons learned, all referring to the first year of national and international response, have been pointed out. The subsequent section of this work presented the results of the empirical research performed in the field, which allowed to identify the outstanding problems, which are still present two years after the earthquake, and their respective implications. Moreover, this empirical analysis permitted to acknowledge the reaffirmation of some already pre-existing problems and to detect some specific problems not previously identified. In the next lines, those problems that were already present in 2010, and are not extinguished yet, are reported. In the transition phase, for some clusters, a clear picture on who should be referred to at governmental level (in order to handover their functions) is still missing. The lack of governmental counterparts in clusters, already signaled in the initial response, risks to undermine the smooth transfer of tasks to the government. This issue has been mainly pointed out by cluster leaders, who are probably the most concerned by it. More generally, a lack of interaction and information exchange between the international community and the government has emerged66. Moreover, a lack of transparency and communication with the beneficiaries still seems to persist and has mainly been claimed by the field level staff, thus nurturing a potential feeling of aversion of the population against the international community. The same staff has highlighted that in 2011, as well as in 2010, a joint shared framework for intervention among operational agencies (the so-was still lacking. With regard to cluster coordinators, they sometimes seem to be still too technical in skills. This issue has been pointed out at UN level (OCHA and cluster coordinators). According to a wide variety of international actors (i.e. mainly clusters coordinators but also INGOs staff), the local scale coordination was still weak in 2011. Furthermore, in 2011, both Headquarters and cluster international actors have pointed out the persisting lack of a clear transition strategy at HCT level, already noticed in 2010. On the contrary, though limited in number, some little improvements seem to have taken place in local inclusion. These improvements are partially due to the replacement of the local languages (both French and Creole) in meetings, previously held in English, and to the fact that UN Log Base is easier to access. In addition, compared to 2010, more care seems to be dedicated to human resources (especially expatriates).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!66.!Furthermore, it is important to note that the political instability in Haiti in both 2010 and 2011 is an aggravating factor to this problem.

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From the 2011 empirical analysis, other more specific issues have come to light that had not been specifically referred to in 2010 literature. With the exception of one big financially independent INGO, both the issues of the lack of governmental ability to control and weak NGOs accountability, which seems directly expressed for the first time, have been raised only by Haitians, almost as if they wanted to reassert the legitimacy of the Haitian state to exert control over the international actors operating in the Haitian territory. Although concerns regarding the weak relationship between the private sector and the international community had already came out, in 2011 the interviewees (belonging only to the international community) showed to look at these problems from a renewed perspective, i.e. that of transition and reconstruction, from which they could benefit in terms of recapitalization and recovery. Connections between companies and international actors are still not immediate and corporate social responsibility still remains an unexplored issue. In the empirical analysis, several issues related to the functioning of the cluster system have been pointed out by the majority of cluster coordinators and by

taff. They refer to the fact that clusters seem devoid of decision making content, that clusters terms of responsibility have been rigidly defined and they do not seem to properly adapt to the Haitian context, and to the possibility that the setting of the cluster agenda could be influenced by the leading agency interest. Good communication, integration and a common strategy still seem to lack among Information Managers of cluster lead-agencies On the one hand, the expatriated international staff in charge of participating to coordination forums is still poorly familiar with grassroots problems. On the other hand, with regard to Haitians, a highly qualified national staff, able to cover key job positions in transition, is still lacking due to poor training addressed to local staff. Concerning donors-related issues, as highlighted by donor representatives, donor financial cycles do not align, and in coordination meetings, due to a lack of governmental leadership, they are faced by the dilemma of having to choose between moving a project forward or waiting for counterparts. As perceived both by local and international actors, local NGOs still have reduced capacity in project proposal drafting, budgeting and accounting. Two years after the earthquake, it might be seen as discouraging that, as showed by the empirical analysis, Haiti is being affected by the same problems emerged in 2010. Given the still standing issues and the social and human implications related to them, the effectiveness of the humanitarian intervention might be debatable. The current situation could lead to a dangerous de-legitimization of the main actors operating in the humanitarian field. Before passing to the recommendations, there is still room for some final interesting considerations emerged from the interviews, that demonstrate the complexity of an

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objective assessment of the Haitian situation. In fact, among the interviewees, there was not a shared perception of the phase in which Haiti was currently finding itself. While the majority of cluster coordinators

ween UN and NGOs opinions consistently differed, thus not allowing to portray a common picture of the situation. A single trend of opinions cannot be traced among the actors, neither on the amount of resources devoted to the humanitarian intervention (if enough, just the right amount, not much, too much), nor on the impact of the aid system on the resilience of the state, municipal institutions and local actors. The empirical analysis has allowed to formulate both general and more specific recommendations, which are reported below. In the transition phase and for each cluster, it is pivotal to identify a governmental counterpart: an endowed authority within the government responsible for managing independently the handover of functions, in collaboration with the international community. A transition strategy needs to be formalized at HCT level. Terms of reference for the integration of clusters into tables sectorielles and for the handover of functions to the government should be provided as soon as possible. In order to address the weak transparency and communication, INGO staff needs to include the beneficiaries in the formulation and implementation of the projects, since the prime objective is to address their grassroots needs. An integrated and shared approach for intervention needs to be formalized by operational agencies, so as to combine their skills and resources for a more efficient multifaceted intervention. With regard to the lack of government control on international organizations accessing the country, a binding registration system must be pushed forward. However, it needs to be facilitated in its feasibility by lowering administrative procedures and costs. In addition, the international community should support the promotion of the IDRL project for Haiti. Concerning the lack of accountability, the government should impose on international actors some accountability requirements, together with standards measuring the appropriateness and soundness of interventions. Coordination mechanisms (whether clusters or maybe tables sectorielles in the future) need to encourage international actors to rely on private sector services for their operations. Controls on private sector services need to be implemented to ensure they are provided as per contract. Awareness on corporate social responsibility practices has to be raised and information mechanisms should be arranged so as to connect suppliers (companies) to buyers (international community). Resources need to be invested to foster coordination mechanisms both at municipal level and within departments. With reference to clusters, in order to fill the decision-making gap, the MINICLUTERS initiative needs to be duplicated in other fields. Moreover, cluster leadership of

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international agencies must be kept well separated from the program branch of the same agency. Furthermore, synergies between clusters working on similar issues need to be reinforced. With regard to cluster coordinators, more senior staff (with both coordination and technical skills) should be hired to perform these functions. Expatriates taking part to coordination meetings need to be more familiar with grassroots problems. Information Managers (belonging to different clusters) need to adopt an integrated approach for communication, by, for example, being based in the same office or join budgets in order to have a single agency involved. Donors should incentivize international NGOs to register at country level. They should also work harder on ensuring that project areas are not left uncovered because of the mismatch of financial cycles. Local NGOs capacity in project proposal and implementation needs to be strengthened and consortia among them should also be encouraged. Moreover, partnerships between international organizations and local organizations need to be stimulated and reinforced. The international community should arrange targeted trainings addressed to reinforce Haitian skills, so as to allow them to be able to cover positions of responsibility in the transition towards development. In conclusion, the analysis of past and current problems, their implications, and the subsequent recommendations are the final outcome of a comprehensive analysis envisioned to contribute, though with its limitations, to the improvement of humanitarian intervention both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, it is hoped that this theoretical and empirical analysis will raise awareness with respect to the issues discussed, and to the steps that are necessary for a fostered coordination in the emergency-development phase that aims at better addressing the needs of the most vulnerable.

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6. REFERENCES

BOOKS: The Johns Hopkins University and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2008), Public Health Guide for Emergencies (2nd Edition). Baltimore, Maryland PEREZ DE ARMIÑO, K. (2001). "Hambre" en PÉREZ DE ARMIÑO, K. (dir.), Diccionario de acción humanitaria y cooperación al desarrollo. Barcelona: HEGOA and Icaria INSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS and WORKING PAPERS: ACAPS (2010), Rapid initial needs assessment for Haiti (RINAH). Conducted 23 January 6 February, ACAPS ALNAP (2010a), The State of the Humanitarian System, Retrieved November 1,2011 from: http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-sohs-final.pdf ALNAP (2010b), Haiti Earthquake Response Context Analysis. ALNAP, DAC Network on Development Evaluation, and UNEG Bhattacharjee, A., Lossio, R. (2011), Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, Retrieved January 17, from:http://ochanet.unocha.org/ Binder, A., and F. Grünewald (2010a), Country Study: Haiti. Cluster Approach Evaluation Phase 2.Groupe URD and Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), evaluation conducted July 2009 May 2010. RetrievedJanuary 10, 2012 from: http://www.gppi.net/ Binder, A., and F. Grünewald and Y. Georges. (2010b), Inter- Agency Real Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months after the Earthquake, draft produced for IASC by Groupe URD and GPPi. Currion, P., Hedlund, K. (2010), Strenght in numbers: A Review of NGO Coordination in the Field. Overview Report v1.0. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies , ICVA Calvi Parisetti, P., Kiniger-Passigli, D. (2000), Coordination in Crisis Response and Reconstruction. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO Press DARA International (2010), .

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De Coning, C. (2010), The Role of the SRSG in UN Integrated Missions Process Facilitator and Multi-stakeholder Mediator.NUPI Policy Brief No. 5, Donini, A. (1996), The Policies of Mercy UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda. Institute for International Studies EM-DAT (2010), Natural disasters reported. Retrieved November 20, 2011 from em-dat.net: http://www.em-dat.net/ GHA (2011a), GHA Report 2011. Retrieved November 8,2011, from globalhumanitarianassistance.org: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ (GHA (2011b), Pooled funding mechanisms and large-scale disasters: Case studies of Haiti and Pakistan. Retrieved December 16, 2011 from: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ GHA (2011c), Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). Retrieved December 18, 2011 from: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ Government of the Republic of Haiti (2010a), Action plan for national recovery and development of Haiti: Immediate Key Initiatives for the Future. Government of Haiti (2010b), Analyse des menaces naturelles multiples en Haïti (MULTI-MENACES-HA) Rapport préparé par le Gouvernement de la Banque Mondiale, la Banque Interaméricaine de Développement et le Système des Nations Unies. Port-au-Prince. Grünewald, F., and B. Renaudin (2010), Etude en temps réel de la gestion de la crise en Haïti après le séismedu12janvier 2010 : Mission du 9 au 23 février 2010.Mission Report, Delegation of Strategic of Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, Republic of France. Hedlund, K. (2010), STRENGHT IN NUMBERS: A Review of NGO Coordination in the Field, Case Study: Haiti 2010, commissioned by ICVA, Retrieved January, 7 from http://reliefweb.int/ Hidalgo (2011), Inter-Agency Real time Evaluation of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti 20 months later. Retrieved 7 October 2011, from: http://congresointeractivo.files.wordpress.com/2011 Houghton, R., Emmens, B. (2007), Surge capacity in humanitarian relief and development sector, People in Aid.

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IASC (2009), 73 IASC working group document. Retrieved December 20, 2011 from:www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/ IASC (2010a), Handbook for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response. Retrieved December 20, 2011 from: www.humanitarianinfo.org/ IASC (2010b), Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti following the 12 January 2010 Earthquake: Achievements, Challe . (Haiti EarthquakeResponse 6-Month Report.) Inter- Agency Standing Committee. ICVA (2010), The NGO and humanitarian reform project Fit for the future? Strengthening the leadership pillar of humanitarian reform. Retrieved December 18, 2011 from: http://www.icva.ch/ IFRC (2011), IDRL in Haiti. A study on the legal framework for the facilitation and regulation of international response in Haiti. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva. Retrieved February 5 2012, from: http:// ifrc.org/ IOM (2011), Displacement Tracking Matrix V2.0 update, Retrieved January 27, 2012 from: http://www.iomhaiti.com/ Lautze, S. et al. (1998), Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes, 1996-1997: An Independent Assessment, OCHA Margesson R., &Taft-Morales, M. (2010), Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and response. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved January, 5, 2012 from http://www.crs.gov Minear, L., U. Chellia, J. Crisp, J. Macinlay and T. Weiss (1992), UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis 1990-1992, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies OCHA (1999), OCHA orientation handbook on complex emergencies. Retrieved October 20, 2011from reliefweb.org: http://reliefweb.int/ OCHA (2006), OCHA update on Humanitarian Reform. Retrieved December 27 from: http://www.unicef.org/ OCHA (2007), Retrieved December 15, 2011 from: http:// ochaonline.un.org/ OCHA (2009), OSOCC Guidelines, 2nd edition Retrieved December 2, 2011 from: http://ochanet.unocha.org/

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OCHA (2011a), Financial Tracking Service. Retrieved November 23, 2011, from: http://fts.unocha.org/ OCHA (2011b), OCHA on Message: General Assembly Resolution 46/182 Retrieved December 1, from http://ochanet.unocha.org Reindorp, N., & Wiles, P. (2001), Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience. A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). London, UK: Overseas Development Institute. SMTN, CHF International (2010), Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment: Haiti Earthquake- January 12, 2010, Prepared for USAID Haiti Stockton, N. (2002), Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan. ACBAR: Kabul. UNDAC (2006), UNDAC Handbook. Retrieved December 27, from: http://ochanet.unocha.org/ UNDP (2009), Human Development Report 2009 Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development Published for UNDP by Palgrave Macmillan UNGA (1971), A/RES/2816 (XXVI). Retrieved October 15, 2011,from http://un.org: UNGA (1991), A/RES/46/182. Retrieved October 15, 2011, fromhttp//www.un.org

(2011), Haiti Humanitarian Aid Evaluation Structured Analysis Summary Report UN Security Council Resolution (2010), S/RES/1908 (2010). Retrieved January12, 2012, fromhttp://www.unic.or.jp/ UNSG (1997), Agenda for development. Retrieved November 15, 2011, from http//www.un.org Weir, E. (2006), Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative. KAIPTC Monograph. No. 4. World Bank (2006), Income Distribution, Inequality, and Those Left Behind, Global Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization, The World Bank Group. World Bank (2009), World Development Indicators, Washington D.C., Retrieved January, 2, 2012 from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

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INTERNAL DOCUMENTS: OCHA (2008), CERF Procedures for Grant Allocations to Under-Funded Emergencies OCHA (2010), CAPs, Flash Appeals, The Financial Tracking Service (FTS): links between CERF and pool funds. Kyria, M., Orr, T., Bihondwa, J., (2010), Building a Stronger, More Predictable Humanitarian Response System. General briefing on the four main elements of the Humanitarian Reform, CERF training (OCHA) JOURNAL ARTICLES: *

Bell, B. (2010), Whose needs? Whose assessment? Huffington Post, 26 February. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ Dolan, C., Ververs, M. (2010), Country and Global level Cluster Coordination Experiences and Lessons Learnt, in Field Exchange September 2010, issue 39 Emmens, B., Houghton, R. (2008), Understanding surge capacity within international agencies. Humanitarian Exchange Magazine ISSUE 39 Grunewald, F. (2011), Les enseignements de la catastropheNum.27 Holmes, J. (2010), Lessons learned from the Haiti Earthquake Response Humanitarian Exchange Magazine No. 48. United States Institute of Peace (2010), Haiti: A Republic of NGOs?, in Peace Brief Num. 2 OFFICIAL WEBSITES: GHA (2011), Defining humanitarian assistance. Retrieved November 4,2011,from: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ WHO (2011), Definition of complex emergencies .Retrieved November 18, 2011,from: http://www.who.int/ MINUSTAH. (2011), Minustah. Retrieved October 21, 2011, from un.org: http://www.un.org/ OCHA (2011), ERC Retrieved November 25, 2011, from http://www.unocha.org/

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OCHA (2011), Humanitarian Reform. Retrieved October 17, 2011, from ochaonline.un.org: http://ochaonline.un.org/ OCHA (2011), History. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from unocha.org: http://www.unocha.org/ OneResponse (2011), Cluster Approach. Retrieved October 13, 2011, from oneresponse.info: http://oneresponse.info/ OneResponse (2011), OSOCC, Retrieved December 17, 2011, from http://oneresponse.info/ IASC (2011), Definition. Retrieved November 30, 2011, from: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/ ReliefWeb (2011), ReliefWeb site information Retrieved December 15, 2011, from: http://www1.reliefweb.int/ UNHCR (2011), IDPs. Retrieved November 18, 2011, from: http://www.unhcr.org/ WHO (2011), Definition of slow-onset and sudden-onset disasters, Retrieved December 24, 2011 from: http://www.who.int/ WFP, (2007), ICT Emergency Response Overview. Retrieved January 5, 2012 from: http://ictemergency.wfp.org/

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7. APPENDIX

GENERAL INTERVIEWS FORMAT

A. The Humanitarian Relief System and the Cluster System in Haiti

A.1. Can you briefly explain how the system of coordination of humanitarian resources in your field here in Haiti currently operates? A.2. How does the government (local and national) work inside the coordination structure? A.3. Haiti has always been defined as a republic of NGOs, with more NGOs per capita than any country on earth (US Institute of Peace). Which one do you think is the reason of this international presence:

i. The inability of the Government, that leaves this task to NGOs ii. The interference of the NGOs and IOs in the system iii. Others

A.4 Do you think that the humanitarian aid in place reinforces or weakens the resilience of the state, municipal institutions, communities and individuals?

B.1. Do you think that over the last two years for the humanitarian intervention in Haiti there was:

1) enough money 2) just the right amount of money 3) not much money 4) too much money

Why? What can you say about the efficiency and the allocation of this money?

B.2. In your opinion, is the humanitarian emergency still in its peak? Why is Haiti still an emergency? How could the humanitarian intervention have been carried out better and how could it have fostered a higher governmental presence?

How does your organization coordinate with the other local and international NGOs,

and local actors? The practice of implementing baby clusters is considered as a very good example for coordination, what do you think? Do you think it is repeatable in other clusters?

How does your agency coordinate its activities with Minustah? What is the importance of having a UN peace keeping operation in the place of a disaster?

What is the mandate of your cluster? Do you believe it has accomplished its mandate? Do you think cluster participation improves the intervention of each participating

agency? In which way? Are local NGOs participating to cluster meetings? If so, do you think their participation

brings an added value to the coordination system? How could

operational structure?

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Do you think the cluster system, and in particular your cluster, is reinforcing and empowering the national and local structures?

Can you highlight 3 weaknesses to the cluster systems and their consequences? What do you think are the costs for the NGOs taking part to the cluster? Why do many organizations the

cluster lead agency do for reducing this absenteeism? Can you give a few specific examples of how your cluster intervention could be

improved in Haiti?

C. How could your cluster better engage and interact with

*D national NGOs "D civil society organizations #D beneficiaries and communities $D local and national authorities %D private sector

What are the potentialities of these improvements? Are they really feasible? What is missing for implementation?

D. Transition strategy D.1. Do you have funding for next year in Haiti? D.2. In Haiti, is there any exit strategy for your agency? Is an exit foreseen in the medium-long term? Do you think that it is something that can already be planned or does the national situation not allow this forecast yet? D.3. Which instruments will or could your agency leave to the Haitian government once the emergency has finished?

E. Capacity Building: E.1. Haiti is the most disaster pronecountry in the Americas and has had numerous international aid interventions over the last decade. Do you believe there is an opportunity for Capacity Building among local authorities in DRR? E.1.1. What role does DRR play in the humanitarian exit strategy in Haiti? E.2 Did your agency stress about DRR in the carrying out of emergency projects?