The fallacy of hybrid political orders

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International Peacekeeping

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The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders:a reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding

Roger Mac Ginty & Oliver Richmond

To cite this article: Roger Mac Ginty & Oliver Richmond (2015): The fallacy of constructinghybrid political orders: a reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding, InternationalPeacekeeping, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2015.1099440

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1099440

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The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: areappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuildingRoger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond

ABSTRACTThis article reviews the recent academic and policy interest in hybridity andhybrid political orders in relation to peacebuilding. It is sceptical of the abilityof international actors to manufacture with precision hybrid political orders,and argues that the shallow instrumentalization of hybridity is based on amisunderstanding of the concept. The article engages in conceptual-scopingin thinking through the emancipatory potential of hybridity. It differentiatesbetween artificial and locally legitimate hybrid outcomes, and places the‘hybrid turn’ in the literature in the context of the continued evolution of theliberal peace as it struggles to come to terms with crises of access andlegitimacy.

Introduction

In recent years there has been a ‘rediscovery’ of hybridity as a conceptual toolwith which to explain informal and non-standard systems of governance thathave arisen in conflict affected contexts.1 This has been partly related to con-structivist interest in norm diffusion, localization and its consequences for theliberal international order.2 The latter has been modified by recent interest inlocal ownership, participation and resilience.3 This has also been of interest toliberal theorists as well as to realists, who have tended to see these trains ofthought as leading to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) or trusteeship,4 orthe use of counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency techniques within peaceinterventions.5 International organizations, militaries, international non-gov-ernmental organizations (INGOs), international financial institutions, aca-demics and many others seem to have become aware of the explanatorypotential of hybridity, and the practical potential of hybrid political orders.This article seeks to unpack this ‘hybrid turn’. In particular, it is interestedin attempts to instrumentalize hybridity and recruit it as part of statebuilding,stabilization and development strategies by major liberal peace actors.6

Hybridity can be seen as being torn between two contradictory trends. Onthe one hand it is part of a shift towards more generous, and realistic,

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

CONTACT Roger Mac Ginty [email protected]

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING, 2015http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1099440

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categories of institutions that can transcend strictly Weberian notions of thestate and liberal institutionalism. In this reading, the literature can be seen asencouraging bottom–up lenses that have often been ignored by standardperspectives in International Relations (IR) on statebuilding, peacebuildingand stabilization.7 It is recognition of the actually existing and messy realityof politics in societies emerging from conflict. On the other hand, therenewed interest in hybridity is part of a less progressive story. In thisreading, hybridity has been co-opted and instrumentalized by some inter-national organizations and peace-intervention states. It is in sync with apost-Iraq and Afghanistan curtailed liberal interventionism, and is also inkeeping with neoliberal mores of shifting responsibility and lowering inter-vention costs.8 Simultaneously, this approach arrives at similar conclusionsto liberal imperialists of the past: the necessity for trusteeship and ‘nativeadministration’.9

The article begins with a reprise of the development of debates on hybriditywithin academic and policy literature. Its second section then traces the morerecent ‘hybrid turn’ in the literature and argues that much of this renaissanceof interest in hybridity is shallow in nature and is driven by a mix of a mis-understanding of the complexities of hybridized processes, and a growingrealization, among interveners, of their limited power. Norm diffusion, nor-mative or soft power, or local ownership, localization, to mention just a fewrecent buzzwords,10 have evaded ethical issues and sometimes provokedresistance. The article’s third section assesses the remaining value of hybridityas a concept, connecting it with the crucial problem of how to think about sus-tainable peace in the current era. In a way, it might be said that hybridityoffers a mix of grand theory, mid-level theory and ethnographic/sociologicalapproaches, through which the ‘habitus’ of everyday emancipatory forms ofpeace, connected to networks of legitimacy across scales, may be imaginedand simultaneously researched.11

Fundamentally, our argument is sceptical of the possibility of instrumenta-lizing hybridity. Hybridity is a condition that occurs, in large part, contex-tually; it is a constant process of negotiation as multiple sources of powerin a society compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry,domination or accommodation. International actors can, and do, influencethe nature of hybridized contexts, but often in ways that are unanticipated.Hybridity is not a condition that can be crafted in a laboratory and rolledout in neat factory packaging as part of a peacebuilding, stabilization or devel-opment programme. Attempts to instrumentalize hybridity seem to have ascant understanding of local agency and the ability of the interactionbetween local and international actors to produce unexpected outcomes. Italso evades ethical questions relating to social and distributive justice,which as a result cannot be settled. We argue that hybridity, as a concept,and hybrid political orders, as entities, retain significant analytical and

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practical power but that the policy and academic worlds need to be aware ofthe ethical and political implications of such a critical concept, perhaps also inmore historicized terms.12 The article asserts that the conscious constructionof hybrid political orders is often a fraught and wasted exercise, while contex-tually forming political hybrids may have advantages in terms of securinglocal legitimacy.

The evolution of the concept of hybridity

The concept of hybridity has been used in a number of disciplines, withpolitics and international relations being relative latecomers to its explana-tory and analytical potential. This is not to say that it has been entirelyabsent from the peace and conflict studies literature. Authors like Boege,Brown, Clements and Nolan, and more recently Albrecht and WiuffMoe, have investigated hybrid political orders from anthropologically influ-enced perspectives.13 Importantly, they have seen hybridity as a conditionor evolving social reality, and as an alternative form of socio-politicalorganization, not merely as a structure that can be co-opted by formalinstitutions.

Originally a biological and horticultural term, hybridity has been adopted(not without controversy) by anthropology, sociology, literature, post-colonialstudies and organizational studies.14 It has long been used to show how theweak become compliant with hegemonic power in various, often abrasive,ways, implying in post-colonial terms, trusteeship and native adminis-tration.15 A number of authors have been suspicious of the concept, fearfulthat the notion of grafting one plant on another, or breeding two species toproduce a hybrid, was suggestive of binaries and thus too simplistic forcomplex social-political dynamics.16 There were also fears that the termwas too close to biological determinism and connotations of racism and mis-cegenation, and that it justified forms of exploitation associated with coloni-alism or eurocentricism.17

This article takes a robustly post-biological view of hybridity. By this wemean that hybridity is an emergent social construct, but we reject notionsof determinism. Hybridity is not merely the grafting one unit on another,or a condition that acts as an apologia for power, eurocentricism and injustice.Instead, it is a long-term process involving social negotiation, co-option,resistance, domination, assimilation and co-existence – in other words aphenomenon best viewed through a post-colonial lens.18 The article followsCanclini’s19 concept of ‘prior hybridity’, recognizing the continuous processesof social interaction, friction and transculturation that comprise hybridity. Ifhybridity is everywhere, then care must be taken in identifying the processeswhereby hybrid social structures, agents and agencies are made and remade.Foucault’s notion of the circulation of power seems apt here.20 We also need

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to evaluate processes and outcomes according to a thinly cosmopolitan21 andthickly contextual and progressive framework of ever-reducing inequality inmaterial and rights terms.22

Much of the ‘hybrid turn’ in peace and conflict studies was derived from along-standing disillusionment with mainstream theory, policy-drivenproblem-solving approaches, as well as from fieldwork and observations onpost-war and post-transition societies.23 It became increasingly clear thatliberal peace interventions were not the work of omnipotent and omniscientpowers from the global North that could transform societies into quiescentand orderly states.24 Instead, liberal peacemaking was forced to deal with itsown positionality and biases, as well as recalcitrant nationalists, religious con-servatives, kleptomaniac governing elites, stubborn locals and peoples whoseworldview was not organized along a left–right secular political continuum.Furthermore, there are embedded interests of varying sorts within the inter-ventionist powers and their supporters, which are often not conducive tolocally legitimate and lasting forms of peace. Often Weberian institutionswere nowhere to be seen, or were adapted heavily to reflect local conditions.The result has been hybrid political orders (and disorders) in which Westernideas of how a society, polity and economy ‘should’ be run reach a sometimesuneasy accommodation with local mores and practices.25 Cleaver and col-leagues26 combine critical institutionalism with hybridity to capture the ‘insti-tutional bricolage’ they see as a more accurate reflection of how societies adaptand create systems of governance:

Institutional bricolage consists of the processes in which people (consciouslyand non-consciously) draw on existing social formulae and arrangements(rules, traditions, norms, roles and relationships) to patch together institutionsin response to changing situations. Such innovations and adaptations are legit-imised by reference to tradition, socially acceptable ways of doing things, exist-ing relations of authority. The institutions so produced are dynamic hybrids ofthe modern and traditional, the formal and informal. They are both negotiatedand structured, uneven in functioning and impact.

Of course, hybrid political orders are by no means new. Colonial anthropol-ogists and later post-colonialist scholars of various disciplinary hues havecharted how colonial ‘encounters’, subjugation, extraction and controldepended on a series of cautious interactions, uneasy truces and thelending and borrowing between cultures.27 The relationships between coloni-zer and colonized were often complex and multi-layered, with all partiesaffected. Whether Bhabha’s notion of mimicry, or W.B. Yeats’ mention of‘shoneens’ (Irish people who adopted English ways), it is clear that hybridityhas not been a case of straightforward top–down (or bottom–up) trans-mission.28 Instead, there have been complex transcultural dynamics patternedby power, coping and human agency. The net result is that power circulatesand cannot be understood simply.


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Some apparently critical literature on peace and conflict studies has beensceptical of the analytical potential of hybridity. Much of this literatureseems to be based on a shallow reading of the concept. It is scared off bysome of the possible limitations of the concept rather than persevering andlooking beyond them. Sabaratnam, for instance, sees users of the hybriditylens as being forever trapped in a binary West/non-West paradigm asthey take the West as their starting point.29 It is certainly possible to seehybridity in such a way, but many others deploy it precisely because itfrees them from the static thinking of binaries. The literature on hybridityshould not be confused with literatures which focus on ‘norm transmission’or localization as ‘civilizing’ tools.30 Zaum dismisses hybridity as ‘obvious’and seems incurious as to its emancipatory conceptual potential.31 It isleft unexplored and he reverts back to the established models that IR haslong relied on. Others, such as Laffey and Nadarajah32 are dismissive ofthe critical literature (as not being critical enough) but fail to extend theconcept any further.

There is a danger that the concept of hybridity risks losing analytical powerbecause of its over use. Amid the welter of references to hybrid peacebuilding,courts, threats, justice and so on, it is worth noting the need for terminologicalcircumspection. Thus it is important to differentiate between hybrid nouns(institutions and actors) and hybrid verbs (behaviours). Clearly these canoverlap, as in the case of hybrid political orders. The most important contri-bution the concept of hybridity can make, from the point of view of theauthors, is an analytical device. It is primarily a way of seeing the worldand capturing change and lack of fixity between categories. We are carefulnot to over-claim theoretically or conceptually the analytical merits of hybrid-ity. Its main value is in describing contextual situations, and explaining thedynamic nature of peace and conflict.

The hybrid turn

The rediscovery of hybridity

The ‘rediscovery’ of hybridity in sections of both the academic and policyworlds is in keeping with the ‘ethnographic turn’ in the study of peace andconflict; a turn encouraged by some progressive donors.33 Similarly, itchimes with attempts to explain why the ‘local’ and the ‘social’ are important,often overlooked, and why top–down forms of power (the state or the inter-national) does not fully have its way. It is now commonplace to hear UN offi-cials blame the liberal peace blue-print for past failings and to bemoan thenecessity and yet simultaneous difficulty of engaging with locally legitimatestructures.34 Hybridity has also had to share space with similar terms,notably complexity, non-linearity and friction, which all approximate to


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attempts to capture the compromised nature of the Weberian model in thecontext of transitions from war to peace.35

It is important to designate the recent interest in hybridity as a ‘rediscovery’since critical development and post-colonial scholars considered such issuesmuch earlier than many in the IR and peace and conflict communities,36

with some notable exceptions (e.g. Lederach).37 This more recent work hasincluded case study38 and conceptual work,39 as well as a mix of the two.40

Much of the renewed work on hybridity developed ‘as a response to someof the limitations associated with critiques of liberal peacebuilding and devel-opment’.41 The most significant contribution of the upsurge of work onhybridity has been its encouragement for critical reappraisals of orthodoxand traditional ways of understanding the political and cultural world. Con-stantinou42 notes how ‘hybridity transgresses the fixity that ethnic conflictsrely on’ and ‘challenges the idea of the nation as a perennial phenomenon’.The concept has allowed us to move away from the rigid categories and bin-aries that are commonly used to explain peace and conflict, and have encour-aged a concentration on fluidity and leaching of identities, institutions andideas. At its most advanced, the concept of hybridity amounts to a rejectionof conflict scientism, or the notion that conflicts can be ‘understood’ if onlywe have enough data and the correct formula. Instead, it is part of a criticalepistemological project that takes seriously multiple sources of agency andis prepared to look beyond institutions for explanations of politics andpower (and hints of future emancipation).

Terms such as ‘hybrid political orders’ and ‘hybrid institutions’, and otherapproximations for non-state governance actors, are creeping into the dis-courses of the OECD,43 the Council of Europe44 and others. NATO has ident-ified ‘hybrid threats’ as ‘insidious and [… ] in the seams between states, and inthe soft areas of bad or weak governance’.45 Some actors seem careful not touse the phrase ‘hybrid’, but given that they have been confronted by the needto deal with non-state actors they use an approximation.46 The key point isthat the concept of hybridity has crossed into the policy world. As the nextsub-section will illustrate, however, some of the uses of the concept of hybrid-ity appear shallow.

The instrumentalization of hybridity

In the academic and policy literature on hybridity, it is possible to think of acontinuum of literature. At one end is literature that sees hybridity in simplis-tic terms – the grafting together of political systems to produce a third type.This literature is often ethnocentric, in taking the Western democratic state tobe the traditional default polity, and hybrid polities to be non-traditional oreven deviant.47 At the other end of the continuum is literature that isengaged with the analytical potential of hybridity in helping to challenge


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the fixity of boundaries and categories that have been traditionally used tointerpret the socio-political world.48 Somewhere in the centre of this conti-nuum is literature that sees the possibility of hybrid institutions and practicesoffering a way out for a realist-liberal internationalism that is increasinglyaware of its own limitations.49 This literature is interested in instrumentaliz-ing hybridity, and getting local actors to work in the service of strategic andliberal internationalist goals. It is, in Millar’s words ‘top down’ and ‘interna-tionally created and administered’ hybridity,50 and is particularly visible intransitional justice and hybrid tribunals, as well as governance techniquesthat seek to include local actors. The interest is in ‘saving liberal peacebuild-ing’,51 but the risk is that Western-mandated hybrid political orders becomethe site of new forms of authoritarian state.52 In such a purview hybridity maybe seen instrumentally as enabling external trusteeship via ‘native’ (that is,friendly local) administration and power-holders. It is this literature thatdemands a sceptical reading as it seems to be based on a limited understand-ing of hybridity as an analytical tool, and of its potential to make and remakeanarchic and informal political institutions. It underestimates the potential ofhybrid institutions and practices, and harbours a Western liberal righteous-ness that sits uneasily with understandings of local agency (and one wellknown in post-colonial studies). Indeed it mostly rejects the viability, legiti-macy and indeed existence of local agency, or sees it as so constrained thatit is not actually agential.

Some of the policy interest in hybridity has sponsored or drawn on seriousacademic studies and tolerated critical insights.53 But some of the policyapproaches to hybridity and hybrid political orders have been a shallow latch-ing onto an apparently ‘trendy’ concept. Almost inevitably, there has beensome evidence that hybridity has been securitized, with the US Governmentexpressing concern at ‘current threats posed by adaptive actors and emerginghybrid networks’ and ‘threat hybrids’.54 The local, and its implications forstate, regional and international order has become a pre-occupation for theUS and UK militaries (with their policies of stabilization and Counterinsur-gency).55 The Afghan and Iraqi imbroglios have involved striking dealswith warlords and militias in order to attain wider goals of stabilizationand, ultimately, exit. The result has been a need among policy circles tojustify, and extend legitimacy to, groups that had been difficult to justifyand legitimize under a purist notion of liberal internationalism.56

In the main, there has been a benign view of hybridity and hybrid politicalorders. It is in keeping with the new-found timidity in liberal international-ism.57 The thinking among a number of (formerly) interventionist govern-ments is that hybrid political orders are congruent with a stripped-down,austerity version of the liberal peace, which ends up building neoliberalstates. Such states are open to international capital and offer security, butoften benefit corrupt elites rather than offering rights to citizens.58 So long-


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term hands-on statebuilding interventions are being replaced by light-touchversions of trusteeship seemingly content with ‘good enough governance’and ‘good enough security’.59

The policy interest in hybrid political orders also chimes with the cham-pioning of resilience by some governments, international organizations andinternational financial institutions. Although often described in commonsen-sical terms (allowing communities to draw on their own coping mechanismsand wisdom), resilience as instrumentalized in statebuilding and developmenthas significant ideological hues.60 It fits a neoliberal outlook that is anxious toroll back the state and shift responsibility away from states and donors.Hybridity has been adopted into the general miasma of development-speak.It has been used, imprecisely, as a synonym for ‘fragile state’ or ‘mediatedstate’.61 Like so many other terms in the peace and development fields, it isover-used but under-conceptualized. Thus we hear of ‘hybrid value chains’and ‘hybrid insurance structures’ without any real exploration of what hybrid-ity actually means in such cases and its implications in relation to power-relations and ethics.62 In particular, there seems to be very little thinking byinterventionist actors about dividing lines between acceptable and unaccepta-ble hybrid political orders, which would demand some sort of ethical evalu-ation that would by necessity have to go beyond old realist of liberalframeworks of meaning, and into a post-liberal, post-colonial framework tobe resonant in a changing world.63

Policy-oriented work has found hybrid political orders interesting insofaras they pave the way for more flexible ways of managing relations betweeninternational actors, national elites and local actors.64 Problems arise wherehybridity is coopted into the service of existing structures and modes ofpeace. Kumar and De la Haye65 see hybrid institutions as part of ‘cost-effec-tive’ infrastructures for peace that combine the interests of local and nationalactors. While these internal mediation networks may offer routes for consen-sus dispute resolution, they are often conceived as operating within existingstate and power structures. Hybrid structures are seen as ‘complementary’ toexisting structures66 and so have no potential to alter the status quo truly.The UN and EU have invested heavily in hybrid courts as part of transitionaljustice mechanisms. While these may help with the protection of rights andlocal acceptance of justice, the principles of complementarity and subsidiar-ity mean that they operate on the assumption that the existing stateand peace accord are legitimate.67 This is quite an assumption. On the con-trary, they are stripped of ethical content and legitimacy among many oftheir recipients, and heavily critiqued by those who have more progressiveaspirations.

Critics have been quick to point to the pitfalls of instrumentalizing hybridpolitical orders or seeing them in temporal and modernization terms as aviable ‘half-way’ house between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ polities. Wardak


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and Hamidzada68 observe how ‘Afghan state authorities have at times beenselective in embracing hybridity – that is, they seem to favour hybrid struc-tures only when they are perceived as serving the interests of those inpower.’ Hoehne’s69 assessment of Somaliland notes how the effectivenessand legitimacy of both ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ actors have been under-mined by their cohabitation. Meagher70 reveals how cooperation betweenstate and non-state actors to provide security can result in ‘the embeddingof violent or illegitimate forms of order in the machinery of the state, with dis-astrous rather than transformatory consequences’. Goodfellow and Linde-mann’s71 study of a decentralization initiative in Uganda reveals howtraditional local leaders and the Ugandan state jealously clung onto theirrespective powers, leaving hybridity as a site for conflict.

The instrumentalization of hybridity is often expedient and reveals ashallow understanding of the concept and its implications. We have seenthat there have been some signs of liberal peace policies drawing back froma strict adherence to Western-style institutionalism. Thus, for example, theWorld Bank now refers to ‘best fit’ institutions, denoting an understandingthat the Weberian statehood model cannot be immediately applied in all con-texts.72 Increasingly there are also discussions of whether democracy isnecessary. This marks quite a change from the 1990s and early 2000s highwatermark of blueprint solutions. The British Government’s Building StabilityOverseas Strategy73 shows similar signs of deviation away from a strictemphasis on statebuilding. While institutionalist approaches still loomlarge, there is a recognition that political systems have to be ‘inclusive andlegitimate’ and extend far beyond central government.74

The instrumentalized nature of the ‘hybrid turn’ in international peacesupport has been particularly visible in relation to ‘weak’, ‘failed’ and‘fragile’ states where legitimate authority has been contested for many yearsand where a functioning Weberian state is largely absent. Many Westernstates have found it extremely difficult to get beyond a statist model. Bøåsand Gaas75 note how Somalia ‘has become the very graveyard of externallysponsored statebuilding initiatives. It is not just that more than fourteenattempts to restore a unitary state have failed miserably, but that theseefforts have been followed by more and not less conflict.’ Groundhog Day sta-tebuilding has become the norm. Some Western governments and inter-national organizations, however, have managed to look beyond the goal ofbuilding a mini-me Weberian state, and have recognized the utility and sus-tainability of in situ types of governance. There has been a recognition thatgovernance without Western-style government can offer possibilities for stab-ility and the provision of public goods. Often Western governments have an‘at arm’s length’ relationship with non-state actors. Thus, for example, theDanish Demining Group (DDG) has had extensive programmes of peace-building and conflict prevention in Somalia and has received funding from


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the EU, the Department for International Development (DFID) and theSwedish International Development Cooperation Agency.76

There is a long history of the resistance of subjects to arbitrary power,whether dressed up as being deployed for civilization under liberal colonial-ism, modernization, peace or development, under the contemporary liberalpeace system. The response to local push-back is for power to try to extendits reach into the local. We argue that rhetorical claims of local ownership,conflict sensitivity and so forth tolerate difference as long as it does notchange the overall model.

In a final analysis, instrumentalized forms of hybridity suggest powerrelations in which local governance, security, rights, development and tem-poral frameworks lag behind those of the global North, follow the North’slead and display a confusing tendency to be both autonomous and dependentupon it. This instrumentalized version of hybridity represents a soft form ofhegemony,77 rather than a mediation and accommodation of difference andan engagement with inequality, as a more critical version might suggest.

The emancipatory potential of hybridity

This section investigates the extent to which hybridity can be useful as aconcept and a practice in the context of peacemaking. In terms of conceptualdiscussion, it is worth noting how hybridity frees us from the rigidities of stan-dard categories and binaries often deployed to explain peacebuilding and sta-tebuilding mainly as exercises of top–down power and leadership. It allows usto build holistic accounts of conflicts and escape orthodox conflict analysistemplates that seem unaware of inconsistency, margins, dissent, gender andall things that make the human experience variegated and contingent. Itfurther allows us to see more clearly the multiple sources of power andagency that constrain and enable. Fundamentally, the concept of hybridity,if used as a post-colonial, post-territorial and post-biological construct, liber-ates us from the dominant policy script of goodies and baddies, states andnon-states and West and non-West. The world we inhabit is much morecomplex that the binary-world inscribed in many peacebuilding and state-building policies and so it demands agile conceptual and analyticalvehicles. Hybrid contexts are not necessarily part of a transition fromone condition (possibly traditionalism) to another (possibly modernity).Instead, they deserve to be viewed in their own right. However, theyalso raise vast structural issues of historical and distributive inequality,and the dismantling and replacing of long-standing power structures –social, cultural, political and economic hierarchies – which need to beresponded to in long-term processes if peace is to be positive and hybridsimultaneously.


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In terms of hybridity in practice we look to partial glimpses of emergentpolitical orders, disorders and processes. Much of the following commentaryrelies on abstract projections, but our intention is to escape from a narrowinstrumentalization of hybridity in service of a rebranded liberal peace.

The central dilemmas of hybridity ultimately lie in the configuration ofrelationships between different actors and their socio-historical, normativeand interest frameworks. This pertains in the context of existing institutionsacross the UN system, but it also suggests that they must reform their ownpractices in the light of the demands of widely varying contextual claims.Hybridity demands that actors make compromises, often despite existingpower relations which place the subaltern beneath elites or internationalactors. Hints of this may be seen in the decentralization of power in TimorLeste, for example. The degree to which relative power and capacity as wellas norms and notions of justice intervene in this process can be externallyinfluenced to some extent, but not completely. Complex networks andarrays of resources and capacities influence this process and form a ‘plurivers-ality’.78 This means processes which constantly bridge shifting patterns ofdifference and inequality in non-violent ways are necessary, as has been thecase in Northern Ireland. It is important that we do not portray hybridityin terms of the static local reacting to the international. Instead, we interprethybridity as a much more fluid process with multiple – already hybridized –actors and norms influencing one another. Intervention, such as peacebuild-ing or statebuilding programmes, is never total. There will be gaps and over-sights in which local agency operates in order to constrain social and eliteviolence. In some cases, the translation, accommodation or equilibriumreached by the international and the local (seen here in post-colonial termsas deeply compromised) can be labelled a ‘hybrid peace’ as in Timor Leste,although conditions of hybrid violence and injustice are common, as in Cam-bodia or Afghanistan. The more the external interference and disruption ofpolitical autonomy, the more the legitimacy of any peace is locally compro-mised as has been the experience in Kosovo. Yet the more local autonomyis respected, then the more the possibility of old power relations reignitingthe conflict, as could be said to have occurred in South Sudan. In everydayterms, emancipation treads a fine line between respecting autonomy anddifference and improving rights, needs, law and institutional frameworksfor the organization of politics (meaning the distribution of materialresources). At the international level emancipation treads a fine linebetween necessary intervention to save lives or deal with structural violenceand occupation.

Hybrid peace can be seen as a framework in which power circulatesbetween its constituent actors, who are involved in a range of discussions ofhow conflict can be resolved or transformed at its related local, elite andstate, regional and international levels. The subalterns’ primary goal would


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be ‘equa-liberty’79 at the everyday level, supported by the state and at theinternational scales, while also accepting autonomy and alterity withoutnecessarily being dependent on fixed boundaries and territorialism.

A positive hybrid – and therefore emancipatory and socially just – peacewould entail the gradual resolution of the dilemmas that the circulation ofpower within existing power relations produce from the perspective ofthose caught up in them from a marginal position. This includes issues fam-iliar to the subaltern: the use of resistance to bring about reform or to acceptthe demands of power-holders (dynamics which have played out in differentways in both Egypt and Tunisia recently). This positionality offers a ratherdifferent perspective to that of an externally determined framework of positiveand negative peace.80 It may also refer to identity, historical and cultural prac-tices, and to questions of justice, meaning tensions between these and inter-national norms need to be resolved rather than ignored. If not, theseencounters may produce a negative hybrid peace, resting mainly on hybridforms of politics which reify existing power structures and hierarchies. Adanger is that it leans too far towards the preferences of internationals,state elites or global capital (meaning it is contaminated by direct, structuralor governmental power) as has often been claimed in Liberia, or because itleans too far into exclusive, localized power structures, as has been suggestedin Cambodia and Afghanistan. Alternatively, a positive hybrid peace would beable to find a balance, which is widely consented to, which is not contami-nated by power (but instead enabled by it), and so is located in the everyday,is empathetic and also emancipatory (even if targeted by powerful spoilers, asin Northern Ireland). This means a relative equalization across time andspace, in the eyes of the law, and in material terms, of societies involved inconflicts with local to global scale implications. It probably requires a regionaland global engagement to amass the necessary resources and will to achievethis, as in Northern Ireland. To move from hybrid politics to peace requiresan empathetic and emancipatory approach as defined by its subaltern subjectsrather than external actors or a cabal of local and international and transna-tional elites intent on modernization and marketization. Oppressive social,economic, political or military structures cannot be termed hybrid forms ofpeace.81 Counter-insurgency methods married to peacebuilding and develop-ment policies are unlikely to result in any positive hybrid peace, though theymay appear to manage conflict in the short term, as could be seen in Iraq andAfghanistan before the so-called ‘draw-down’.82 These situations representhybrid politics leading to at best a negative hybrid peace.

However, a positive hybrid form may arise where legitimacy is simul-taneously local, regional and international in scale.83 It would be post-colonialand probably post-territorial. It would be hard to point to a recent example ofthis, though Northern Ireland may point in this direction. A major problemlies in the power relations between conflict affected populations, the state and


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the international. Is it plausible that such an alignment would represent theinterests of the weakest, and not those of the state or the international? Sofar empirical evidence over the last 25 years suggests not. What has tendedto emerge is an unstable and oppressive social situation, fragile elite power-sharing arrangements and a fraught relationship with various internationals,as can be observed in countries as diverse as Cambodia, Liberia and Kosovo.

Drawing on Richmond’s previous argument,84 it is from contextual andmediated, local, state and international legitimacy that a localized processof ‘peace formation’ arises. This means bottom–up rather than merely top–down empowerment or local and marginal actors, communities and individ-uals. This does not mean that local agency or processes should be co-opted asrepresenting ‘participation’ in international processes, as the World Bank hasimplied. It warrants caution about institutional and state power and theirideologies’ and biases’ unintended consequences for rights and needs, andan attempt to connect with local epistemologies of peace.

A radical and positive hybrid peace demands partnership85 as opposed to anegative hybrid peace. A more locally oriented form may be radical if it offerslocal identity as a basis. It will be less so if it involves any compromise on basichuman rights, though their broadening and deepening could be envisaged.Local agency may be seen as contextually radical because it aspires toaspects of the liberal value system. It may also be hegemonic if it rests onthe support of historical stratifications and elite power. An internationallyoriented form of hybridity might be radical if it recognized alterity, but itmay be hegemonic if it sides with those elites over the masses and theirrights and needs.

Thus hybrid forms of peace are both and represent an escape from govern-mentality and its fixed and hegemonic categories of the local and the inter-national. Importantly, this form of hybrid peace does not take the form of ahybrid political order that has been consciously modelled by a donor in thehope that a Western liberal framework can prevail with local acceptance. Abicameral parliament with a grass skirt, or some other sort of tokenisticnod to ‘the local’, does not amount to a hybrid polity. Instead, we see hybridityas a more local but scalar mixing of ideas, norms and personnel, with power infull view. It is often attended by the unforeseen and massive cultural and socialtrends linked with globalization, transculturalism and the flow of ideas, goodsand people.

It is in these emerging hybrid forms that the complex formulations of post-liberalism are found locally and at the systemic level. Peace in Bosnia Herze-govina or Cyprus does not rest merely on ethnic reconciliation or EU inte-gration but also on institutional reform and a rethinking of the nature androle of the state and territorial sovereignty where communal identities havehardened. Peace in Kosovo or Israel/Palestine does not rest in merely buildingan effective state or two, following theWashington or New York consensus, to


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represent the majority’s aspirations but also in reconciling diverse groups,identities and interests across contested territories and sovereignties. Peacein Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Guatemala, Liberia or Sierra Leone does notmerely rest on building a liberal state or reconciling diverse identity groupingsto liberal peace, but also on addressing customary processes and historicalpolitical organization, as well as local and international inequality andjustice claims. Hybrid forms of peace make clear that inequalities in powerrequire identifying, carefully dismantling and replacing in any positivehybrid peace order.

Hybrid forms of politics result from the local–international scales acrosswhich encounters arise,86 in regressive, defensive or transformational forms.Some may be positive in a liberal sense, while others may offer a hybrid posi-tive form. This raises three new issues: (1) how might the obstacles thatprevent external intervention from engaging with local peace formation belifted; (2) how might the contextual blockages that produce a negativehybrid peace be dealt with; and (3) how might the peace formation potentialthat leads to a positive hybrid form emerging be enabled? To achieve thelatter, a better understanding of emancipatory peace in everyday settings rel-evant to the twenty-first century is now required. These questions may offer amore refined future research agenda relating to hybrid peace, the inter-national, the state and conflict affected societies.

Hybrid peace indicates, somewhat obliquely, that the next step is to ident-ify, unpack, manage and improve local to global hierarchies, or else make amuch better job of justifying their presence.87

Concluding discussion

This article has charted the ‘hybrid turn’ whereby academic and policy inter-est in the notion of hybrid political orders has increased in conjunction withthe setbacks experienced by liberal internationalism. Crises of access, legiti-macy, cost and fatigue have meant that liberal interventionist states and inter-national organizations have been reappraising their notions of non-standardpartners and acceptable forms of governance. Much of the liberal internation-alism of the 1990s and the early (neocon) years of this century were attendedby certainty: in the righteousness of liberalism as an idea and as operationa-lized in institutions covering the realms of politics, law and the economy, inthe fitness of the Weberian state, the opportunities in and trickle down fromforeign direct investment (FDI) and the global economy, and in the ability ofthe rapid use of military force to achieve desired outcomes. This certainty hasbeen punctured and replaced, to a certain extent, by a policy willingness toinvestigate and even tolerate ambivalence, ambiguity and uncertainty. It isin this context that we can best explain the ‘hybrid turn’ or the rediscoveryof hybridity as a conceptual lens.


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Contextualized, anarchic and evolutionary forms of hybrid political orderare to be welcomed insofar as they denote agency among local actors, and agreater self-awareness among interveners who work on their behalf. Theyare political systems that find equilibrium through long-term processes ofnegotiation and signalling, often at the local level.88 Potentially, they representforms of peace and governmentality that are appropriate to local aspirationsand needs. Caution is required of course. Organic forms of hybrid politicalorder can be the preserve of local elites, and sites of intolerance and violence.But artificially created hybrids can be dangerous as well. If manufactured aspart of a top–down peacebuilding intervention they can lead to sham pro-cesses of democratization and liberation. Although often using emancipatorylanguage, they can amount to a series of political, economic and cultural actswhereby power is withheld from all but national elites who rule by the grace ofinternational favours. In such cases, hybrid political orders are presented as atactical compromise between local sensibilities (e.g. a traditional interest inconsensus decision-making) and international demands for state-centricsecurity and the pursuit of a rights agenda. As ever, it is worth asking‘where does power lie?’ In reviewing contexts like Iraq, Afghanistan andBosnia-Herzegovina, we see a mix of contextual and constructed hybrid pol-itical orders. But given that the political system is often guaranteed byWestern force, and their constitutions drawn up by Western powers, wecan question the extent to which these contexts have a truly localized hybrid-ity. This macro-level hybridity is often an artifice that seeks to give the appear-ance of local input, but often masks essentially conservative and elite-focuseddeals. Yet scratch the surface, and beneath the macro level there is often theburgeoning of organic and semi-organic forms of governmentality. Theseoften operate away from the gaze of the international community’s monitoringand evaluation. They are shaped by the everyday interactions, opportunitiesand constraints that people experience in their economic, political and socialactivities.89 They do not have ‘factory settings’ and instead are constantlymade and remade in the everyday context. If they offer security, services,dignity and chances for betterment then they are likely to have legitimacy.

Hybridity offers insights into the conditions for legitimacy in context aswell as the mediation of power; hybrid forms of peace are connected toboth emancipation as well as to the defence of existing customs and powerstructures. This is the reason for the existence of positive and negative path-ways of hybridity, in which either emancipation in progressive, everyday andempathetic form is offered, or in which existing unequal power structures aremaintained. Furthermore, this dynamic pertains at the local, state and inter-national levels. International inequality, across time, space or materiality,cannot be maintained while expecting a positive peace to emerge in hybridform in context. Furthermore, the implication of the hybrid peace debate isthat a mediation of difference90 is required, across the different aspects of


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IR, rather than a decentralized hegemony (the liberal or neoliberal peace andstate) which pushes for homogeneity while tolerating injustice. It is perhapsupon this basis that practices of intervention – diplomacy, peacemaking,peacebuilding, peacekeeping, development and humanitarianism – can bereconstructed as legitimate practices in a diverse (and pluriversal) world.

About the authors

Roger Mac Ginty is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Humanitarian andConflict Response Institute, and the Department of Politics, at the University ofManchester.

Oliver Richmond is Professor of International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies atthe Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, and the Department of Politics,University of Manchester. He is also International Professor, School of InternationalStudies, Kyung Hee University, Korea.

Notes

1. K. Krause, ‘Hybrid Violence: Locating the Use of Force in Postconflict Settings’,Global Governance, Vol.18, 2012, pp.39–56; R. Luckham and T. Kirk, ‘Under-standing Security in the Vernacular in Hybrid Political Contexts: A CriticalSurvey’, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol.13, No.3, 2013, pp.339–59;K. Meagher, T. De Herdt and K. Titeca, Unravelling Public Authority: Paths ofHybrid Governance, Wageningen: IS Academy, 2014.

2. J.T. Checkel, ‘The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory’, WorldPolitics, Vol.50, No.2, 1998, pp.324–48; A. Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: WhoseNorms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regional-ism’, Review of International Studies, Vol.58, No.2, 2004, pp.235–79.

3. T. Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Con-flict Peacebuilding Processes’, Peace & Change, Vol.34, No.1, 2009, pp.3–26;D. Chandler, Resilience: The Governance of Complexity, London: Taylor andFrancis, 2014.

4. A. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol.24,No.2, 2010, pp.143–69.

5. N. Tschirgi, ‘Securitization and Peacebuilding’, in R. Mac Ginty (ed.), RoutledgeHandbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 2013, pp.197–210.

6. A.K. Jarstad and R. Belloni, ‘Introducing Hybrid Peace Governance: Impact andProspects of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Global Governance, Vol.18, 2012, pp.1–6; O.P. Richmond, A. Björkdahl and S. Kappler, ‘The Emerging EU Peacebuilding Fra-mework: Confirming or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding’, Cambridge Reviewof International Affairs, Vol.24, No.3, 2011, pp.449–69.

7. O.P. Richmond and J. Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuildingand Peacebuilding, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009; R. MacGinty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top–Down and Bottom–UpPeace’, Security Dialogue, Vol.41, No.6, 2010, pp.391–412.

8. Chandler (see n.3 above).9. T. Asad (ed.), Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter, New York: Humanity

Books, 1973.


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10. T. Diez, ‘Normative Power as Hegemony’, 2011 EUSA Biennial InternationalConference, Boston, MA, 2011; O.P. Richmond, ‘Beyond Local Ownership andParticipation in the Architecture of International Peacebuilding’, Ethnopolitics,Vol.11, No.4, 2012, pp.354–75.

11. J. Comaroff and J.L. Comaroff, Theory from the South, London: Paradigm, 2012;R. Mac Ginty, ‘Everyday Peace: Bottom–Up and Local Agency in Conflict-Affected Areas’, Security Dialogue, Vol.45, No.6, 2014, pp.548–64.

12. M. Laffey and S. Nadarajah, ‘The Hybridity of Liberal Peace: States, Diasporasand Insecurity’, Security Dialogue, Vol.43, No.5, 2012, pp.403–20.

13. V. Boege, A. Brown, K. Clements and A. Nolan, On Hybrid Political Orders andEmerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’, Berlin: Berghof,2008; P. Albrecht and L. Wiuff Moe, ‘The Simultaneity of Authority in HybridPolitical Orders’, Peacebuilding, Vol.3, No.1, 2015, pp.1–16.

14. Mac Ginty (see n.7 above), p.397.15. G.C. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds),

Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp.66–111; Asad (see n.9 above).

16. R. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, London: Rou-tledge, 1995, p.10; P. Chabal, The End of Conceit: Western Rationality after Post-colonialism, London: Zed Books, 2012, p.137.

17. O. Richmond, Peace in International Relations, London: Routledge, 2008.18. Comaroff and Comaroff (see n.11 above).19. N.G. Canclini, Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity,

Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p.xxiii.20. M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–

1977, New York: Pantheon, 1980, p.98.21. D. Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington

Consensus, London: Polity Press, 2004.22. O.P. Richmond, ‘The Paradox of Peace and Power: Contamination or Enable-

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24. Richmond and Franks (see n.7 above).25. A.M. Brown and A.F. Gusmao, ‘Peacebuilding and Political Hybridity in East

Timor’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, Vol.21, No.1, 2009, pp.61–9.26. F. Cleaver, T. Franks, F. Maganga and K. Hall, Beyond Negotiation? Real Govern-

ance, Hybrid Institutions and Pastoralism in the Usangu Plains, Tanzania,London: King’s College, 2013, p.5.

27. P. Chandra, ‘Marxism, Homi Bhabha and the Omissions of Postcolonial Theory’,Critique: Journal of Social Theory, Vol.40, No.2, 2012, pp.199–214.

28. H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994; K.H. O’Malley andC.Ó. Comhraí, ‘Introduction’, in K.H. O’Malley and C.Ó. Comhraí (eds), TheMan Will Talk to Me: Galway Interviews by Ernie O’Malley, Cork: MercierPress, 2013, pp.22–64, at p.26.

29. M. Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace’,Security Dialogue, Vol.44, No.3, 2013, pp.259–78, at p.269.

30. M.-J. Zahar, ‘Norm Transmission in Peace- and Statebuilding: Lessons fromDemoc-racy Promotion in Sudan and Lebanon’, Global Governance, Vol.18, 2012, pp.73–88.


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31. D. Zaum, ‘Beyond the Liberal Peace’, Global Governance, Vol.18, No.1, 2012,pp.121–32, at p.124.

32. Laffey and Nadarajah (see n.12 above), pp.404, 406.33. Author interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mar. 2014.34. Author interviews in United Nations headquarters, New York, Apr. 2014.35. D. Chandler, ‘Democracy Unbound? Non-Linear Politics and the Politicization

of Everyday Life’, European Journal of Social Theory; doi:10.1177/1368431013491817, Chandler (see n.3 above); A. Björkdahl and K. Höglund,‘Precarious Peacebuilding: Friction in Global–Local Encounters’, Peacebuilding,Vol.1, No.3, 2013, pp.289–99.

36. Bhabha (see n.28 above).37. J.P. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies,

Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1998.38. R. Brett, ‘Peace Stillborn? Guatemala’s Liberal Peace and the Indigenous Move-

ment’, Peacebuilding, Vol.1, No.2, 2012, pp.222–38.39. R. Bleiker, ‘Conclusion: Everyday Struggles for a Hybrid Peace’, in O.P. Rich-

mond and A. Mitchell (eds), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency toPost-Liberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012, pp.293–306.

40. Richmond and Franks (see n.7 above); R. Mac Ginty, International Peacebuildingand Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011;G. Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridization Practices in Post-Conflict Kosovo’,Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol.7, No.2, 2012, pp.23–36;G. Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity: Why Hybrid Institutions Do Not ProducePredictable Experiences of Peace’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.4,2014, pp.501–14.

41. J.H. Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions ofPower, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces’, Journal ofPeacebuilding and Development, Vol.7, No.2, 2012, pp.9–22, at p.10.

42. C. Constantinou, ‘Aporias of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity and the“Cyprus Problem”’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.42, No.3, 2007, pp.247–70,at p.250.

43. OECD, The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity, Paris:OECD, 2010, p.17.

44. Council of Europe, ‘European Commission for Democracy through Law’,Opinion no.710/2012, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2013 (at: www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282013%29009-e).

45. M. Miklaucic, ‘NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat’, NATO, 2011 (at: www.act.nato.int/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat).

46. UN-OCHA, ‘Guidelines for UN and Other Humanitarian Organizations onInteracting with Military, Non-State Armed Actors and Other Security Actorsin Iraq’, UN-OCHA, 2008 (at: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Civil%20Military%20Guidelines%20for%20Iraq%20%2831%20July%202008%29.pdf).

47. A. Cassani, ‘Hybrid What? Partial Consensus and Persistent Divergences in theAnalysis of Hybrid Regimes’, International Political Science Review, Vol.35, No.5,2014, doi:10.1177/019251211349756; International Crisis Group, ‘Serbia’s NewConstitution: Democracy Going Backwards’, ICG, 2006 (at: www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2006/europe/serbias%20new%20constitution%20democracy%20going%20backwards.aspx).


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48. S. Dar, ‘Hybrid Accountabilities: When Western and Non-Western Accountabil-ities Collide’, Human Relations, Vol.67, No.2, 2014, pp.131–51; M. Frenkel andY. Shenhav, ‘From Binarism Back to Hybridity: A Postcolonial Reading of Man-agement and Organization Studies’, Organization Studies, Vol.27, No.6, 2006,pp.855–76.

49. Millar (see n.40 above).50. Ibid., p.511.51. R. Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, Vol.36,

No.2, pp.337–65. See also World Bank, ‘World Development Report: ConflictSecurity and Development’, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011.

52. Richmond (see n.22 above).53. R. Luckham and T. Kirk, ‘Security in Hybrid Political Contexts: An End-User

Approach’, JSRP Paper 2, London: LSE, 2012; DFID, ‘Governance, Securityand Justice in Fragile Conflict Affected Situations’, Research for Development– Project Record, 2014 (at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Project/60873/).

54. D.M. Luna, ‘Remarks by Director for Anticrime Programs’, Washington, DC:Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the NationalDefense University, Fort McNair, 2012 (at: www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/194199.htm); D.M. Luna, ‘Remarks by Senior Director for Anticrime Programs’,Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: UNICRIImpact of Organized Crime Workshop, Rome, 16 Jun. 2014 (at: www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/2014/227612.htm).

55. British Army, ‘Countering Insurgency’, Army Field Manual, Volume 1, 2010 (at: www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/component/docman/cat_view/163-thematic/164-counterinsurgency.html?limit=10 &limitstart=0&order=name&dir=ASC&Itemid=230).

56. W. Maley, ‘Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Challenges and Pathologies’, CentralAsian Survey, Vol.32, No.3, 2013, pp.255–70; R. Mac Ginty, ‘Warlords and theLiberal Peace: State-Building in Afghanistan’, Conflict, Security & Development,Vol.10, 2010, pp.577–98.

57. J.G. Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas ofLiberal World Order’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol.7, No.1, 2009, pp.71–87;D. Youngs, The EU’s Role in World Politics: The Retreat from Liberal Internation-alism, London: Routledge, 2011.

58. Richmond (see n.22 above).59. M.S. Grindle, ‘Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in

Developing Countries’, Governance, Vol.17, 2004, pp.525–48.60. E. Hall and S. McGarrol, ‘Progressive Localism for an Ethics of Care: Local Area

Co-ordination with People with Learning Disabilities’, Social and CulturalGeography, Vol.14, No.6, 2013, pp.689–709.

61. W. Naudé and N. Stel, ‘Hybrid Political Orders and Fragile States: Lessons fromLebanon’, in UNU-Merit Blog, 2013 (at: http://blog.merit.unu.edu/hybrid-political-orders-and-fragile-states-lessons-from-lebanon/).

62. World Bank, ‘Public Goods through Social Entrepreneurship: Creating HybridValue Chains’, Washinton, DC: World Bank, 2011, World Bank event, 18May; Z. Kassim, H.S. Odierno and S. Patel, ‘Hybrid Insurance Structures:Hybrid Mutual Insurers. And Takaful’, in S.O. Gonulal (ed.), Takaful andMutual Insurance: Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks, Washington,DC: World Bank, 2012, pp. 67–82.


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63. D. Chandler and O. P. Richmond, ‘Contesting Postliberalism: Governmentalityor Emancipation?’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol.18,2015, doi:10.1057/jird.2014.5.

64. D.F. Da Costa and J. Karlsrud, ‘Navigating Hybrid Political Orders: BalancingPeacebuilding in Chad’, Conflict Trends, 2011, pp.13–21.

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66. Ibid., p.17.67. UNHCR, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of

Hybrid Courts, Geneva and New York: UNHCR, 2008; European Commission,‘Toolkit for Bridging the Gap between National and International Justice’,Joint Staff Working Document on Advancing the Principle of Complementarity,SWD, 2013, 26 Final, 31 Jan., Brussels: European Commission, 2013, p.2.

68. A. Wardak and H. Hamidzada, ‘The Search for Legitimate Rule, Justice and aDurable Peace: Hybrid Models of Governance in Afghanistan’, Journal of Peace-building and Development, Vol.7, No.2, 2012, pp.79–88, at p.79.

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72. World Bank (see n.51 above).73. DFID (see n.53 above).74. Ibid., p.13.75. M. Bøås and M.H. Gaas, ‘What to Do with Somalia’, Wardheer News, 2012 (at:

http://wardheernews.com/Articles%202012/Feb/25_Somalia_by%20Morten_mohamed.html).

76. DDG, ‘External Involvement in Local (Sub-National) Peace Building in Somalia’,DDG, 2014 (at: www.somaliangoconsortium.org/docs/key/15/2014/1396353740.pdf).

77. Richmond (see n.22 above).78. A. Escobar, Territories of Difference, London: Duke University Press, 2008,

pp.10–12.79. E. Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, London: Verso, 2002, p.35.80. O.P. Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?’,

Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.50, No.1, 2015, pp.50–68, doi:10.1177/0010836714537053

81. J. Borger and J. Boone, ‘Taliban Peace Talks with Hamid Karzai are “MostlyHype”’, Guardian, 24 Oct. 2010 (at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/24/taliban-peace-talks-hamid-karzai-afghanistan).

82. M. Turner, ‘Peacebuilding as Counter-Insurgency in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory’, Review of International Studies, Vol.41, No.1, 2015, pp.73–98.

83. Richmond (see n.80 above).84. Richmond (see n.22 above).85. Asad (see n.9 above), p.114.86. Richmond (see n.80 above).


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87. J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Harvard, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 2001.

88. E. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Peter Smith,1999.

89. R. Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbours and ‘Stran-gers’ in a Border Community, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972.

90. R. Bleiker, ‘Conclusion: Everyday Struggles for a Hybrid Peace’, in O.P. Rich-mond and A. Mitchell (eds), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency toPost-Liberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012, pp.293–306.


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