The Impact of New Reproductive Technologies on Concepts of Genetic Relatedness and Non-Relatedness

This is the final accepted version of this chapter – please do not cite. For the final published version, see Widdows, H. “The Impact of New Reproductive Technologies on Concepts of Genetic Relatedness and Non-Relatedness” in Widdows, H., Idiakez, I.A., and Cirión, A.E. (eds.) Women’s Reproductive Rights (2005), Palgrave. pp.151-164. URL = http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/women's-reproductive-rights-heather-widdows/?k=9781403949936&loc=uk

1

Chapter 9: The impact of New Reproductive Technologies on concepts of genetic

relatedness and non relatedness1

Heather Widdows

This chapter will consider the impact of New Reproductive Technologies (NRTs) on

concepts of genetic relatedness and the significance of such concepts for women’s rights.

NRTs have been praised for increasing reproductive autonomy – allowing women greater

control over the timing of their children as well as the ‘type’ of children they choose to

carry. However, before embracing NRTs and advocating that access to them should be a

‘reproductive right’ it must be asked whether increased access to NRTs is wholly positive

for women. This chapter will explore one aspect of the issue, asking whether NRTs

reinforce the importance of genetic relatedness and if they do what this means for

women. In particular it will ask whether an increased emphasis upon genetic relatedness

is compatible with supporting social rather than biological relationships and denying an

essentialist view of women – women as biological mother – positions which have long

been central to the women’s movement.

This chapter will explore the hypothesis that NRTs support and promote concepts of

genetic relatedness – for both couples considering their reproductive choices and in

reinforcing wider societal presumptions. By examining this issue it will speak to the

1 Thanks must go to those provided useful comments and criticisms of this paper both at the NEWR workshop and also at the International Congress of Bioethics, Sydney, 2004.


2

broader debate on how women and relationships are (and can be) conceptualised, and

thus, in turn, contribute to the debate on whether access to NRTs should be a reproductive

right.2 In assessing this claim this chapter will explore the hypothesis with relation to a

number of NRTs: first, in vitro fertilization (IVF); and second, third-party NRTs,

particularly, donor insemination (DI) and embryo donation.3

Social ‘v’ biological relatedness

The issue of genetic relatedness is of import for the debate on reproductive rights

because, if NRTs do promote genetic relatedness then for women to claim access to

NRTs as reproductive rights conflicts with other core beliefs of the women’s movement.

For women’s rights movements (and particularly second wave feminism) have

championed the recognition of social relationships as of equal (and at times more)

importance to genetic relationships – regarding the social parents who provide for and

care for the child as the ‘real parents’ not the biological parents. A view of relationships

which is implied by the rejection of essentialist concepts of women: summed up in the

denial of a biological understanding of women as ‘baby-maker’ and the corresponding

2 Bearing in mind that the aim of this chapter is not to answer this final question of whether NRTs should or should not be claimed as a reproductive right, but rather to suggest that there are considerations which the women’s movement should take into account and reflect upon before claiming such a reproductive right. 3 There are questions of whether DI is accurate called an NRT – given that it “is not a cure for infertility…The woman on whom donor insemination is practiced is ordinarily in perfect reproductive health” (Wikler, 1995, p48). In addition to the questions raised in this chapter these reproductive technologies raise many other ethical issues – not least the issue of secrecy which I have explored elsewhere (Widdows, 2002) – however, here I am not commenting on the ethics of these practices in general or specifically but focusing upon the ideological impact of the increased prominence and use of such practices might have on our conceptions and expectations of women and of family relationships. The issues of secrecy will be touched upon later in this chapter, but not in terms of its rightness or wrongness, but rather in order to discover what secrecy reveals about the importance of genetic relatedness.


3

implication that women can only be ‘complete’ and ‘fulfilled’ if they experience genetic

or biological motherhood. Therefore to argue for the ‘right’ to NRTs, implying (and

sometimes overtly on the grounds of) the previously rejected essentialism of the necessity

of motherhood – and biological motherhood at that – to the experience of womenhood

directly challenges the emphasis on social relationships and the denial of essentialism.

Over the last half century, kinship relationships have been changing across Europe. The

so-called ‘traditional’ model of family life in which there are two heterosexual, married

parents genetically related to their offspring is declining. As divorce rates increase and

alternative ‘non-traditional’ relationships become ever more prominent the model in

which children live in a nuclear family with their married genetically related parents is

less common. Step-families and single-parent families account for a large minority of

parenting models and childrearing situations. Such a decline in traditional models of

genetically related nuclear families would seem to mitigate against the prominence of

genetic relatedness and in favour of more complex social models of parenting; a model in

which the social role of parent – those who have the day-to-day responsibility for raising

the children – is more important than the genetic fact of parenthood. The argument for

increased emphasis on social parenting is said to be supported by the increased openness

in the process of adoption. It is now the norm for parents to be open about the child’s

adoptive status, in comparison to fifty years ago. However, these trends towards openness


4

in adoption and towards the importance of social parenting in general are challenged by

the increasing use of (NRTs) and forms of assisted reproduction (AR).4

To assert that these practices support and promote genetic relatedness is not an

uncontroversial position. Indeed, the opposite position has been argued, namely, that

NRTs do not support the traditional family, but encourage more fluid family models. For

example in the case of DI enabling single and lesbian women to conceive without sexual

intercourse with a man and reducing men to the role of ‘donor’ rather than ‘father’.5

However, across Europe, with some exceptions, NRTs have tended to be limited (in law

and even more so in practice) to heterosexual, often married couples (Dooley, McCarthy,

Garanis-Papadatos and Dalla Vorgia, 2002) – again suggesting support for the traditional

family. Yet, even if it is the case that NRTs do produce non-traditional models of the

family (and clearly in this regard it is possible that they could), the questions of whether

the families created are traditional or whether such technologies affirm and reinforce the

importance of genetic relatedness, while connected, can be differentiated. For the

purposes of this investigation the key question about the importance of genetic

relatedness and the implication of female essentialism (equating full woman with mother)

remains, and it is this aspect of the debate – about whether NRTs support and promote 4 Currently it is suggested that 1% of births in Western societies are attributable to NRTs. It is estimated that by 2010 there will have been around 45000 births using DI (Blyth, 1988) and current estimates suggest that there have been around 3000 births from egg donation and that there are around 50 births a year from embryo donation (HFEA, informal). 5 Daniel Wikler discusses this issue and notes that while DI is often seen as supporting the ‘traditional family’ as it “puts the marital relationship back on track and permits the husband and wife to form a ‘complete’ family unit” (Wikler, 1995, p48) it can also be used by single women and lesbians to create non-traditional families, with or without the assistance of medical profession (Wikler, 1995).


5

genetic relatedness – which is the primary concern of this chapter. In order to explore this

issue IVF and third-party donor practices will be discussed in turn. Finally, and in light of

the preceding discussion about conceptions of women, the conclusion will again return to

the question of whether access to NRTs should be claimed as a reproductive right. It will

conclude NRTs are double edged, having the potential to both liberate and enslave, and

that both potentialities should be considered in the widest possible context before

advocating access to NRTs as a reproductive right.

IVF

First then, the contention that the practice of IVF undoubtedly supports the claim that

NRTs support and promote the importance of genetic relatedness. This is shown by the

fact that despite high costs and risks and a low success rate IVF is the first choice of most

infertile couples – chosen above adoption and other forms of NRTs – and a choice of

which society approves. IVF tends to be perceived (by both users of the technology and

the wider public) in a surprisingly benign manner. It is regarded as a relatively

commonplace medical treatment for infertility and “public expectations and professional

perceptions concerning the management of infertility have been transformed since the

introduction of IVF” (Price, 1999, p32). IVF is generally seen as a positive option for

those who are struggling to conceive and the risks and traumas associated with it are

largely ignored. This benign picture of IVF, as a technological handmaiden for couples

wishing to have ‘their own’ children, has hidden the risks and burdens of IVF.


6

The risks of IVF are not insubstantial: there are physical risks to the mother, coupled with

psychological difficulties for the mother and the father, as well as ongoing financial

pressures. Physically the process of IVF is traumatic and demanding. Women undergo at

best uncomfortable and at worst, potentially dangerous, processes of hormone therapy,

follicle stimulation and egg harvesting. Moreover, the psychological stress that both

women and partners are subject to in the process of ongoing IVF treatments is

considerable; stress that is added to with every failed cycle of treatment (Ryan, 2001).

The physical and psychological pressures are compounded by a significant financial

burden: A cycle of IVF costs around £3000 to £4000. For many couples meeting the cost

of the treatment means saving every available penny and a severe reduction in quality of

life. For example, one couple spent £60000 on consecutive IVF treatments. They did

eventually conceive and have twins; however, for the duration of the treatment they were

unable to go on holiday, make repairs and improvements to their home and move house,

all of which they report they would have done if they had not had to pay for treatment.

(MacCallum, 2004).6 In addition to the risks to the woman there are also risks to the

child, risks derived from the likelihood of multiple gestations. The frequency of multiple

pregnancies since the introduction of fertility drugs in the 1960’s and IVF in the 1970’s is

marked, and by the 1980’s the rate of multiple births had more than tripled as a direct

6 As noted in the introduction of this volume the prohibitive costs of NRTs limits access to such technologies to the relatively wealthy and indeed it is the injustice of this that has influenced those who call for access to NRTs to be considered a reproductive right. However, for the purposes of this chapter the economic issues will be left aside.


7

result of fertility treatments (Hammon, 1998). As Mary Mahowald notes “with each order

of multiples, risks to both the fetus and pregnant women escalate” (Mahowald, 2002).

The risks for the child include not only increased risks in pregnancy and birth (such as

respiratory distress and haemorrhage), but also long term risks and disadvantages

associated with premature births (Vayena, 2002; Olivennes, 2002). In order to avoid

multiple pregnancies the number of embryos that are allowed to be implanted has

gradually declined; UK guidelines stipulate that the number of embryos that can be

implanted in women under forty years of age is two. While this reduces the risk to the

future child and to women in pregnancy, it also, arguably, reduces the likelihood of a

successful implantation and birth.

Given the risks associated with IVF and its relatively low success rate (22% of all cycles,

HFEA), the willingness of couples to undergo this procedure and the general acceptance

of IVF suggests that for many having a genetically related child is of supreme

importance.7 The possibility of success, however small, is felt to be so valuable that the

risks – which would normally mitigate against such medical practices – are outweighed

by the benefits. The benign perception of IVF held by the public (in contrast to other

NRT procedures) and the continuing willingness of couples to undergo this treatment

attests to the perceived importance of genetic relatedness and against the importance of

social parenting. The couple who reproduce using IVF will be the social parents as well

7 Other forms of NRT are much cheaper, for example, DI costs around £300-£400 per cycle, with additional costs for ensuring the same donor in any further treatments.


8

as genetic parents, yet the wish to be genetically related to their offspring seems

paramount, especially given the comparative risks and costs of other treatments.

Therefore, taken together, it would seem fair to conclude that the not insubstantial risks

of IVF, and the disappointments attached to the low success rate, are outweighed by the

benefit to parents and to the society of genetic and gestational parenthood. Thus, IVF

clearly and unequivocally, supports and reinforces the underlying assumption that genetic

relatedness is of supreme importance and value.

Third-party NRTs: DI and embryo donation

Having asserted that IVF does indeed support the importance of genetic relationships the

question of the importance of genetic relatedness in the practices of the third-party NRTs

of DI and embryo donation will now be considered.

DI, is rather inaccurately called a NRT, as it reputedly began as a medical practice in

1884 when the doctor responsible is suspected of using his own semen to impregnate his

many patients (Daniels and Haimes, 1998). In DI conception is a product of donor sperm

and the woman’s own egg; therefore, unlike IVF there is no genetic relationship with the

‘father’. The ‘father’ of the child in DI is the husband or partner of the mother and not the

donor. In embryo donation (first reported in 1983 (Buster, Bustillo and Thorneycroft,

1983)) neither parent is genetically related to their future offspring. Both gametes are

from donors; either embryos are created for donation using both donor eggs and sperm, or


9

they are ‘spare embryos’ donated by couples who have undergone IVF (Kingsberg,

Applegarth and Jeffrey, 1996).

At first glance it seems bizarre to suggest that these practices could possibly support the

claim that NRTs reinforce the importance of genetic relatedness given that in both

procedures at least one parent is not genetically related to the future offspring (in DI only

the mother is genetically related and in embryo donation neither parents are genetically

related – although in both cases there is a gestational relationship8). However, although

there is no actual genetic relationship in either case, in both cases there is the

‘appearance’ of genetic relatedness. In other words the parents can present the pregnancy,

birth and future childrearing as if there were a genetic relationship between the parents

and the child. Thus, if it indeed is the case that it is important to couples that they appear

genetically related to their child – rather than supporting an increasing acceptance of non-

genetic relatedness (as one might intuitively expect as the popularity of third party NRTs

increases) third party NRTs might actually indicate the importance of genetic relatedness;

for both couples using the procedures and reinforcing wider social presumptions. Thus,

the appearance of genetic relatedness may support social expectations and norms of

parenthood conceived primarily as a biological relationship (and again by extension

8 The argument that the gestational relationship is important could be applied to IVF, for example if it were compared to adoption, but as those couples who undergo IVF reject the far cheaper option of DI, it has been assumed that for these couples having ‘their own’ child – and thus the genetic relationship – is primary. The potential importance of the gestational relationship will be discussed later in the chapter.


10

reinforce the view of women as biological mothers) rather than promote the non-genetic

relationships of which these relationships are actual rather than apparent instances.

Gestational relatedness

Before discussing apparent genetic relatedness the suggestion that it is gestational

relatedness that these couples seek must be addressed. Certainly, for some gestational

relatedness is indeed of fundamental importance than the genetic link: “for some, the

inability to gestate and give birth represents a greater loss than the inability to have a

child whose genetic complement comprises 50% of their own genes” (Mahowald, 2000,

p129).9 Those who feel this way argue that the experience of gestation is emotionally

important as it allows the woman to feel that the child is ‘hers’, and the experience of

gestation appears to strengthen the mother’s perception of self as mother. The gestational

link is purported to enhance the relationship between the parents and the child, because

the child “benefits from the additional bond of being gestated in its future mother’s

womb, with the support of its future father” (Eisenberg and Schenker, 1998).10 Given this

testimony it would appear that the gestational relationship is indeed important (and

perhaps even more important) for a significant number of couples and particularly

mothers. Yet, it is not clear that those who prise the gestational relationship do not also

9 Similar findings were also reported by J. G. Thornton, H. M. McNamara and I. A. Montague, in the Journal of Medical Ethics in 1994. 10 This view is echoed by the comments of a mother who had had two children conceived using donor gametes (in this case embryo donation): “that’s what is so nice about (embryo donation) because you actually go through the pregnancy and give birth, it’s your child. I mean, I’m sure people who adopt children feel the same eventually […] but when you actually give birth, I’m sure there is a stronger initial bond” (MacCallum, 2004).


11

prise the genetic (or apparent genetic) relationship. Moreover, if the gestational

relationship was of primary importance, one would expect more couples to choose –

especially given the substantial difference in cost – third party NRTs in preference to

IVF. Therefore, while it could be accepted that the gestational relationship is significant

(and for some couples the most significant relationship in the reproductive process and

therefore a reason for choosing NRTs over adoption), it can still be asserted that for many

(indeed perhaps for most) couples genetic relatedness – or apparent genetic relatedness –

is of fundamental importance.

Apparent genetic relatedness

The question then is why would one claim that practices which rely on third party

gametes and do not produce genetically related children support and promote concepts of

genetic relatedness? In DI, the mother is genetically related to the child and the father is

not. This would imply that either the genetic link to one parent is felt to be significant (a

genetic link to one parent is better than to none) or that genetic relatedness is less

important than was concluded from the discussion of IVF, so disproving the initial

hypothesis of this chapter. This would seem to be even more the case in embryo donation

where there is no genetic link to either parent. As these forms of NRT do not result in

genetically related offspring and in light of the claims for the importance of the

gestational link, at this point it would seem that the hypothesis (that genetic relatedness is

is reinforced by NRTs) is false. However, not only must the actual genetic links which


12

are created using third party NRTs be taken into account, but the perceived genetic links

they make possible. Significantly, DI and embryo donation allow the parents to preserve

the illusion of genetic relatedness and it is this mirage of genetic relatedness which

supports the argument that genetic rather than social parenting is being endorsed by third

party NRTs.

Both embryo donation and DI make it possible for couples to present themselves as

genetically related to the child if they choose to keep the means of conception secret. This

appearance of genetic relatedness seems to be significant for at least some couples who

prize gestational relationship not for itself, but rather because it allows them to

experience pregnancy, birth and childrearing as if they had conceived ‘naturally’. The

similarity to ‘normal’ genetically related families is used as a reason by some parents to

keep the means of conception secret. The fact that the couple are not genetically related

seems to be almost forgotten by the parents in their pretence of genetic relatedness to the

child.11 For example, one husband said that, “at the end of the day it’s us that’s gone

through it all, M’s gone through the pregnancy, M’s given birth to them, we’ve bought

them up, you know, so it’s not an issue that’s important really”(MacCallum, 2004). This

position could be read in two ways. On the one hand the father’s assertion that genetically

relatedness is unimportant in comparison to the pregnancy, birth and upbringing of the

child would seem to suggest that here the genetic link is actually less significant: which,

11 The issue of whether ‘non-disclosure’ to the child is significant and thus can be considered ‘pretence’ I have addressed elsewhere. (Widdows, 2002)


13

as was noted, would be the logical conclusion in DI and embryo donation as there is no,

or only one, genetic link to the child. On the other hand, his claim that the genetic link is

unimportant, is used as a reason for not disclosing the means of conception and the lack

of actual genetic link between himself and his children. This suggests that, despite his

assertion, he does think that genetic relatedness (or the lack of it) is important, as it is

information that he wishes to suppress. The conclusion would seem to be that it is

important for him not only to be the social father (from conception onwards), but also for

his child (and others) to assume that he is the genetic father. Much has been written about

secrecy and NRTs, particularly in connection to DI, and this issue must now be

considered, however the focus will remain firmly on the question at hand – whether or

not third party NRTs support the increasing importance of genetic relatedness.

Third party NRTs and secrecy

The wish to appear genetically related and the corresponding secrecy surrounding the

practices of DI and embryo donation mitigate against the obvious conclusion that genetic

relatedness is less important than the experience of parenting (including the pregnancy).

In fact the opposite position could be argued, namely, that genetic relatedness is so

important that couples wish to maintain the appearance of genetic-relatedness where there

is no genetic link, even though this involves secrecy, non-disclosure and arguably lying to

the child as well as to other family members and friends (or requiring friends and family

members to lie to the child). This tendency to secrecy in third party NRTs is in contrast to


14

the increasing openness in adoption, where in the last half century parents have been

encouraged to be open, in general, and particularly to the child. This move to openness in

adoption is premised on the belief that openness is in the best interest of the child and

enhances the quality of family relationships. If this premise is true in adoption the

question is why is it not also true in the NRT practices of DI and embryo donation?

Reasons for the continued practices of secrecy in DI and embryo donation in contrast to

the openness in adoption have been attributed to the differences between the two

practices (Widdows and MacCallum, 2002). While it is not possible to address this issue

in detail, it is worth briefly listing the five main differences.

The first reason is a practical one, that, for NRT parents, unlike adoptive parents, it is

physically possible to hide the means of conception, as pregnancy and birth is the same

for NRT parents as it is for ‘normal’ parents.12 Second, the legal status of NRT created

children and adoptive children is different. The NRT mother (and her husband if she is

married) is the legal parent of the child, whereas, in adoption, parental rights and

responsibilities are transferred after birth. A third reason, is that the two practices have

different historical roots. Adoption is a social practice which is regulated socially,

12 It is of course true that it is far easier to conceal NRT conception than adoption. However, it is not impossible to hide adoption and historically speaking this was not uncommon; adoptive mothers returning from trips abroad with their ‘new baby’.


15

whereas NRTs are considered to be medical procedures and regulated accordingly.13 A

fourth difference concerns the ‘internationality’ of the parents. The child born using

NRTs comes into being because of the wishes of the parents (without this intent the child

would not exist), whereas in adoption the parents have a similar intent to parent, but their

desire does not cause the specific child to come into existence. A fifth reason, and

connected, is that the adoptive child has needs that the NRT child does not, namely, the

adopted child has a ‘history of rejection’ to resolve. The argument here is that adopted

children need to understand their history and therefore have a greater need to know their

origins, in order to reconcile themselves with their ‘rejection’. A parallel argument has

also been made about NRT children, that “children created by embryo adoption may see

themselves as ‘spare’ or ‘surplus’ goods and may indeed have the same need for

information – for access to their story – as other adoptees, even though they have not

been abandoned at birth” (Bernstein, Berson, Brill, et al). However, such a comparison

seems extreme – placing a child for adoption can hardly be said to equate to donating an

embryo.

From this brief discussion it is clear that there are significant differences between NRTs

and adoption. However, the question is whether these differences are enough to justify

the disparity in practice; openness in adoption and secrecy in NRTs. This extreme

13 For example the difference in the selection criteria for potential parents of adoption and embryo donation is stark. One procedure is intense, time-consuming and focussing on the social ability of potential couples to be parents and the other essentially concerned only with medial criteria; how likely is it for the woman to conceive (Widdows and MacCallum, 2002).


16

contrast in practice does not appear to be justified by the evidence. While clearly there

are differences between the practices they are not enough to account for why it is in the

best interests of the child and the family to be open in adoption and not in NRTs.

Openness in adoption is based on the presumption that the child benefits from

understanding his or her past and significantly the family benefits from openness and

truth and would suffer from secrecy. Clearly these assumptions about the best interests of

the child and the family have been rejected (or ignored) by NRT families and in fact

secrecy has been encouraged. To understand some of the reasons for this the practices of

secrecy in NRTs must be explored in a little more detail.

There is much literature on why secrecy has been part of the structure of NRTs

(Nachtigall, 1993). Not only has the means of conception been kept secret, but also

secrecy has been implied by the use of anonymous donors. The use of anonymous donors

was so ingrained in the practice of DI that it was termed the “self-evident principle of DI”

(Bateman Novaes, 1998, p119). However, in recent years this assumption has been

questioned and in some places overturned. Sweden was the first country to make donors

identifiable in 1985, followed by Austria in 1992, in the UK donors who registered after

April 1, 2005 are required to provide identifying information which is available to the

donor conceived children at the age of 18 on request to the HFEA. In these countries the

previous assumption that donors would no longer be willing to donate if they were

identified proved unfounded (Edvinsson et al. 1990, and Hagenfeldt, 1990 cited by


17

Daniels and Lalos, 1995). In fact, donor numbers increased, helped by public campaigns

and a general removal of DI from the closet of secrecy (Daniels and Lalos, 1995). This

gradual and still early move towards identifiable donors suggests a move to openness,

since, there is no point having identifiable donors if parents do not tell the child that they

were conceived using NRTs. Even in Sweden, where the law changed first, as of 2000

only 11% of parents had actually told their children that they were conceived using donor

gametes. An additional related reason which is suggested for parents non-disclosure to

the child is that it protects the ‘father’ from the stigma of male infertility. (Klock et al.,

1994; Nachtigall et al., 1997; Lasker, 1998). However, although this argument may have

some validity for DI – as DI challenges the presumption that infertility rests with women

(Spallone, 1989; Lasker, 1998) – it does not explain why rates for openness in egg

donation (female infertility) are comparable to rates in DI, nor why in embryo donation

(where both or neither party is implicated in the infertility) levels of disclosure (and

intended disclosure) are at their lowest. Therefore, although it is clear that there may be

other reasons for secrecy, they do not seem to be sufficient to account for why secrecy

and not openness is the norm in NRT conception and not in adoption: donor numbers do

not decline when donation is not identifiable, and secrecy is not only practiced to protect

male infertility as it is practiced in the practices of egg donation and embryo donation

also. Thus again one returns to the hidden reason, to the hypothesis of this chapter, that

what is important for couples is genetic relatedness and if actual genetic relatedness is

unattainable then couples will settle for the appearance of genetic relatedness.14 14 Other reasons which have been given for secrecy, particularly historically, are the stigmas of


18

The increasing importance of genetic relatedness

Therefore, having considered both IVF and other third party forms of NRT it seems at

least possible to argue that NRTs do indeed reinforce the importance of genetic

relatedness; in the wish of IVF couples to have a genetically related child and in the

tendency of third party NRT couples to pretend to genetic relation. This said, and

although genetic relatedness (or its appearance) is clearly important for many, this is not

universally the case. Some couples who find that they cannot conceive naturally do still

choose to adopt and there are cases where couples do not choose IVF, but DI or other

forms of third party NRT (although often because they are so much cheaper)

(MacCallum, 2004). So while it would be wrong to conclude that genetic relatedness is

the only factor in parents decisions, it clearly is an important factor and one that is

reinforced by the increased use of NRTs making actual genetic relatedness (IVF) and

apparent genetic relatedness (third party NRTs) possible for couples who, in another era,

would have been forced to adopt and to overtly endorse social relationships as primary

parenting relations.

Having recognised that NRTs do indeed support the importance of genetic relatedness, it

must also be considered whether – if the argument of this chapter is correct – that as

masturbation and adultery, which are directly or indirectly implied in DI (Pfeffer, 1993). However, although such reasons continue to carry weight in certain groups they cannot be regarded as major factors in favour of secrecy in contemporary Western societies.


19

genetic relatedness becomes increasingly important, practices of secrecy in third party

NRTs will change. As preventative genetic testing becomes more prevalent, as well as

genetic susceptibility diagnoses, arguably those who do not have access to their genetic

history will be increasingly disadvantaged. Indeed it is this presumption – that knowing

one’s genetic heritage is fundamental – which lies behind the recent move from

anonymous to identifiable donors. However, although apparent genetic relatedness may

cease to be acceptable and openness become the norm, such moves will do nothing to

reduce the social importance of genetic relatedness. Indeed such reasoning – shown for

example, in the move to identifiable donors – does not support social parenting (by

encouraging openness regarding non-genetic relatedness of third party NRT parents for

the reasons that it is the social and not the genetic relationship that is fundamental – as is

the claim in adoption) but actually asserts the importance of true (rather than apparent)

genetic relatedness.

This conclusion – that knowledge of true genetic relatedness is ever more important –

may illustrated by the fact that NRT parents report in increasing numbers that they

‘intend’ to be open with their children (for some reason this is reported only in DI and

egg donation parents and not embryo donation parents) (Golombok, Lycett, MacCallum

et al., 2004). As has been discussed only a small number of DI parents have yet told their

offspring about their genetic origins (approximately 10% in the UK). However, in a

recent study, the figures of those intending to tell their children has risen to 46% in the


20

case of DI and 56% in the case of egg donation. Past experience may make us doubt

whether or not these parents will eventually tell their children about their genetic origins,

as often even those who intend to tell their children do not do so, yet the change in

intention may prove significant. Yet even if parents do tell their reasons for doing so it

may be as much as a result of society’s increasing respect for genetic relatedness as

increased openness to social relatedness. It remains to be seen whether such openness (if

it occurs) will support the social model of parenting and the acceptance of non-

genetically related families, or will further entrench the view that genetic relatedness is

the proper model of parenting.

Implications for women’s reproductive rights

In this chapter the manner in which NRTs impact on concepts of genetic relatedness, has

been examined in detail, with mixed results. Certainly, IVF reveals and reinforces

importance of genetic relatedness: couples are willing to go through physically and

psychologically traumatic processes and to commit themselves to huge economic burdens

(bearing in mind that a IVF cycle costs around ten times the price of a DI cycle) in order

to achieve their goal of a genetic related child. Whether third party NRTs are also

testimony to the importance of genetic relatedness is less clear, as the evidence could be

used to support different arguments. However, this said, it does seem that the secrecy

surrounding third party procedures, which has caused so much debate, is at least in part

attributable to the wish to appear genetically relate: attesting to the hypothesis that NRTs


21

support and promote genetic relatedness. Whether this is going to continue to be the case

if identifiable donors become the norm remains open to question, however, as suggested

above, increased openness does not necessarily point to a recognition of gestational and

social relationships, it could also point to the opposite – to the importance of genetic

relatedness in the genetic age.

If it is the case that NRTs are further ingraining the importance of genetic relatedness in

the contemporary context, then, whether access to NRTs should be striven for as a

reproductive right is something that women’s rights activists should question. The trauma

involved in undergoing NRT treatment is considerable, and should not be taken lightly.

Moreover, the importance of genetic relatedness undermines both the non-traditional

social structures that have been important to the feminist cause, and re-emphasises the

biological role of women as genetic mother and the essentialist view of women. As

Dolores Dooley notes, a feminist concern is that “techniques such as in-vitro fertilisation

coexist with a powerful ideology of motherhood as a biological imperative rather than a

social relationship” (Dooley, 2002, p153). Given this, those who wish to assert and work

for women’s rights should carefully consider whether access to NRTs is really something

that benefits and liberates women, or whether it is further entrenching a view of women

as a biological/genetic ‘baby maker’. At the very least NRTs should be viewed as having

both liberating and enslaving potential before asserting access to NRTs as a reproductive

right. In addition, the implications of such a right should be considered in the wider social


22

and political context, not just on an individual case by case basis, but as such practices

affect concepts, assumptions and worldviews and so impact upon all women.

Documents

The Impact of New Reproductive Technologies on Concepts of Genetic Relatedness and Non-Relatedness