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The Journal of Positive PsychologyDedicated to furthering research and promoting good practice

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Defining the ‘positive’ in positive psychology: PartI. A descriptive analysis

James O. Pawelski

To cite this article: James O. Pawelski (2016) Defining the ‘positive’ in positive psychology:Part I. A descriptive analysis, The Journal of Positive Psychology, 11:4, 339-356, DOI:10.1080/17439760.2015.1137627

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2015.1137627

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Defining the ‘positive’ in positive psychology: Part I. A descriptive analysis

James O. Pawelski*

Positive Psychology Center, University of Pennsylvania, 3701 Market St., Suite 200, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

(Received 22 November 2015; accepted 3 December 2015)

Positive psychology has made a remarkable impact on psychological research and practice in recent years. Significantfurther work is needed, however, to clarify its core concepts. In a two-part project, the author presents the first system-atic analysis of the most basic concept in positive psychology: the ‘positive’. Part I, presented here, consists of a descrip-tive analysis. Based on a close reading of founding documents in positive psychology, this analysis reveals six discretemeanings of the positive in these texts, then probes the considerable tensions that arise within and among them and leadto unfortunate confusions in theory, research, and practice. In Part II, the author draws various distinctions to help relievethese tensions and offers a normative definition of the positive, with the goals of providing direction for inquiry andpractice and encouraging further analysis of this and other basic concepts in positive psychology.

Keywords: positive psychology; positive; definition; preference; Seligman; Csikszentmihalyi

Positive psychology has made a remarkable impact sinceits founding less than two decades ago. It has effected ashift in the balance of empirical studies in psychologytoward topics like positive emotions, character strengths,engagement, and meaning (Donaldson, Dollwet, & Rao,2015; Rusk & Waters, 2013). It has also changed the waymany practitioners approach their work, with anincreasing number of psychotherapists, educators, lifecoaches, business consultants, physicians, and attorneysincorporating the results of positive psychology researchinto their professional endeavors (Donaldson, Csikszent-mihalyi, & Nakamura, 2011; Pawelski, 2013b; Seligman,2011). Reflecting on the state of positive psychology,Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura (2011) have drawn animportant distinction between the field and the domain ofpositive psychology. They define a field as the ‘humaninfrastructure that is needed to carry a set of ideas for-ward’ and a domain as the ‘set of rules, procedures, andknowledge that distinguishes one set of ideas fromanother’ (p. 6). The field of positive psychology, theyargue, is now well established. Indeed, hundreds ofresearchers around the world are currently engaged in thestudy of positive psychology, special journals have sprungup to publish the findings of these scholars, well-attendednational and international conferences are held on a regu-lar basis, and some score of post-graduate programs arealready in existence training the next generation ofresearchers and practitioners. By contrast, Csikszentmiha-lyi and Nakamura rightly observe, the domain of positivepsychology is still in the process of evolving.

One key development needed for positive psychologyto mature as a domain is the further clarification of its

very definition. Central to this work is a careful analysisof the meaning of the most basic concept in positivepsychology: the ‘positive’. This concept is rich, withmany different types of meanings, and it is difficult todisambiguate its various senses and to restrict the termto just what is meant in a given context. A look at theusage of the positive in positive psychology shows atleast a half-dozen unique meanings assigned to it, withsignificant tensions within and among the various sensesof the term. Although scholars in positive psychologyoccasionally acknowledge some of these tensions, to thispoint none has undertaken a systematic study of whatthe positive does and does not mean in this domain. Theargument might be made that such a systematic studywas not necessary in the early days of positive psychol-ogy, since basic understandings are all that is necessaryto open up a new area of inquiry. Whatever merit theremight be in this argument, as the domain of positive psy-chology develops, it will be crucial to gain greater clarityon the meaning of this foundational term so thatresearchers and practitioners can employ it with moreprecision and thus avoid various sorts of theoretical,empirical, and practical confusions.

The purpose of this two-part project is to make acontribution toward clarity and precision by means ofdescriptive and normative analyses of the positive. InPart I, presented here, we will begin by examining early,defining documents in positive psychology to identifythe various meanings of the positive they contain.Although positive psychologists were not the first to usethe term ‘positive’ (Jahoda, 1958; Meyer, 1965; Peale,1952) or even ‘positive psychology’ (Maslow, 1968) to

*Email: pawelski@psych.upenn.edu

© 2016 Taylor & Francis

The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2016Vol. 11, No. 4, 339–356, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2015.1137627

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describe high human functionality and health, they pro-vide key definitions for these terms that subsequentresearchers and practitioners in the field often simplyrepeat.1 With this in mind, we will focus on close read-ings of seminal texts in positive psychology to discoverthe definitional DNA that is currently being replicated.These close readings will reveal a number of differentmeanings of the positive, along with considerable ten-sions to which they give rise. These tensions will lead tokey questions that will need to be addressed and basicdecisions that will need to be made as the domain ofpositive psychology matures. In Part II of this project,presented in a companion article (Pawelski, 2016), wewill turn to a normative analysis of the positive, suggest-ing what the positive ought to mean in positive psychol-ogy. We will proceed through a lexical analysis of thepositive, drawing several key distinctions to help lessenthe tensions in the various definitions of the positive.The normative definition we examine will be based onthese distinctions and will aim to clarify the conceptualdomain of the positive without trying to provide a single,narrow, rigid definition of what the term must mean. Thegoal is to provide insight and direction for researchersand practitioners, as well as to encourage further theoret-ical exploration of this central concept in the domain ofpositive psychology.

Three foundational documents

A good place to start when trying to understand the mean-ing of the positive in positive psychology is with theaddress Martin Seligman (1999) gave as president ofthe American Psychological Association. In this address,he announced positive psychology as one of his presiden-tial initiatives and laid out its nature, goals, and rationale.He argued that psychology had become a science focusedalmost exclusively on mental illness and the mentally illand that although the work of curing mental illness isimportant, it is not the only work psychology should bedoing. To remedy this situation, he called for a positivepsychology whose mission would be ‘to utilize quality sci-entific research and scholarship to reorient [psychological]science and practice toward human strength’ (p. 561).

Several points stand out about Seligman’s descriptionof positive psychology in this address. First, he saw it asa necessary complement to a psychology that, in hisview, had become negatively oriented. He argued thatsince World War II, psychology had become ‘a sciencelargely about healing … [concentrating] on repairingdamage within a disease model of human functioning’(p. 560). This focus on the negative, he observed, hadyielded important results in psychology in the last50 years, including the ability to treat 14 mental disor-ders, but he contended that this focus had also come at

the cost of neglecting much of human experience andunnecessarily limiting the scope of psychology. Seligmanwas not arguing that the focus on the negative should bereplaced, but that there should be a complementary focuson the positive.

A second point that stands out about Seligman’sdescription of positive psychology is that he believedthis complementary focus on the positive would affectthe topics psychologists would study. Instead of concen-trating on pathology, this new science would emphasize‘the most positive qualities of an individual: optimism,courage, work ethic, future-mindedness, interpersonalskill, the capacity for pleasure and insight, and socialresponsibility’ (p. 559). It would focus on ‘the bestthings in life,’ on ‘what makes life most worth living,’and this would include such things as ‘growth, mastery,drive, and character building,’ ‘human strength,’ and‘family and civic virtue’. It would ‘be able to help docu-ment what kind of families result in the healthiest chil-dren, what work environments support the greatestsatisfaction among workers, and what policies result inthe strongest civic commitment’ (pp. 560–562).

Third, Seligman argued that an emphasis on the posi-tive would affect the types of people psychologistswould be able to help. Instead of focusing only on thementally ill, positive psychology would study ‘how nor-mal people flourish under … benign conditions’. Itwould discover ‘what actions lead to well-being, to posi-tive individuals, to flourishing communities, to a justsociety’. It would help ‘make life better for all people –not just the mentally ill’ (pp. 560, 562).

Fourth, Seligman indicated a procedural approach forthe cultivation of positive outcomes. Unlike mainstreampsychology, which concentrates on ‘healing’ and ‘repair-ing damage’ (p. 560), positive psychology would focuson the ‘building of the most positive qualities of an indi-vidual’ (p. 559), on the ‘building of what makes lifemost worth living’ (p. 562).

Finally, Seligman connected positive psychology tothe rich philosophical tradition of the investigation andcultivation of the ‘good life’. He claimed that positivepsychology could

articulate a vision of the good life that is empiricallysound and, at the same time, understandable andattractive. We can show the world what actions lead towell-being, to positive individuals, to flourishingcommunities, and to a just society. (p. 560)

A few months after Seligman delivered this address, heand Csikszentmihalyi (2000) elaborated on this descrip-tion in their introduction to a special issue of AmericanPsychologist they edited on the topic of positive psychol-ogy. Here, too, they argued that positive psychology is anecessary complement to the contemporary, negatively

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oriented psychology. They gave more details on thecauses of the negative approach that they argued domi-nated psychology in the second half of the twentieth cen-tury. From an economic standpoint, they observed thatthe founding of the Veterans Administration in 1946 ledto the employment of thousands of psychologists to treatmental illnesses in the soldiers returning from WorldWar II and that the founding of the National Institute ofMental Health the following year led to the funding ofmuch academic research on psychopathology. From apsychological perspective, they suggested that the nega-tive may be more urgent than the positive and so mayseem more salient. In cases of immediate danger, it maybe that only negative emotions and sensitivities willresult in the vigilance and action necessary for survival.From a historical point of view, they proposed that mili-tary threat, shortages of goods, poverty, or instabilitymay turn cultures toward the negative to protect them-selves and that it may be only during times of stability,prosperity, and peace that cultures focus on what makeslife most worth living.

‘The aim of positive psychology,’ they wrote, ‘is tobegin to catalyze a change in the focus of psychologyfrom preoccupation only with repairing the worst thingsin life to also building positive qualities’ (p. 5). Theycontinued,

our message is to remind our field that psychology is notjust the study of pathology, weakness, and damage; it isalso the study of strength and virtue. Treatment is notjust fixing what is broken; it is nurturing what is best.Psychology is not just a branch of medicine concernedwith illness or health; it is much larger. It is about work,education, insight, love, growth, and play. (p. 7)

The science of positive psychology, they argued, ‘willnot need to start afresh. It requires for the most part justa redirecting of scientific energy’ (p. 13). They pointedto various elements of the ‘science of mental illness’developed in psychology and psychiatry in the last50 years that would be transferable to this new endeavor:a taxonomy, reliable and valid ways of measuring fuzzyconcepts in psychology, sophisticated experimental andlongitudinal methods for understanding the causal path-ways that lead to psychological outcomes, and mostimportant, pharmacological and psychological interven-tions for treating – and in some cases, even curing –mental disorders. They went on to predict that these‘same methods and in many cases the same laboratoriesand the next generation of scientists, with a slight shiftof emphasis and funding will be used to measure, under-stand, and build those characteristics that make life mostworth living’ (p. 13).

Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi also gave more detailon the areas of study positive psychology would explore.

They defined the field as a ‘science of positive subjectiveexperience, positive individual traits, and positive institu-tions’ (p. 5), and they elaborated on the themes each ofthese areas entail:

The field of positive psychology at the subjective level isabout valued subjective experiences: well-being, content-ment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope and optimism(for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present).At the individual level, it is about positive individualtraits: the capacity for love and vocation, courage, inter-personal skill, aesthetic sensibility, perseverance, forgive-ness, originality, future mindedness, spirituality, hightalent, and wisdom. At the group level, it is about thecivic virtues and the institutions that move individualstoward better citizenship: responsibility, nurturance, altru-ism, civility, moderation, tolerance, and work ethic. (p. 5)

Their introduction was followed by 15 articles written byleading psychologists on many of these topics.

Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) also indicatedmore clearly who the beneficiaries of this new sciencewould be. Prior to World War II, they argued, psychol-ogy had three specific missions: ‘curing mental illness,making the lives of all people more productive and ful-filling, and identifying and nurturing high talent’ (p. 6).After World War II, they claimed, psychology becamealmost exclusively about curing mental illness, and thescience and practice of positive psychology, they con-tended, is necessary to help ‘reorient psychology back toits two neglected missions – making normal peoplestronger and more productive and making high humanpotential actual’ (p. 8). One of the reasons it is importantto make normal people stronger, they argued, was to pre-vent them from developing pathologies. The preventionof mental illness is one of the major benefits the authorsemphasized in the work of positive psychology. Thegreatest advances in prevention, they claimed, have comelargely by building up strengths and competencies to actas buffers, and not by identifying and correcting weak-nesses and disabilities. Beyond prevention, however,they argued that positive psychology is important for thepromotion of human flourishing; that ‘If psychologistswish to improve the human condition, it is not enoughto help those who suffer. The majority of ‘normal’ peo-ple also need examples and advice to reach a richer andmore fulfilling existence’ (p. 10).

These authors also made a particular procedural com-mitment for positive psychology by elaborating on thebuilding metaphors Seligman had used in his presidentialaddress. As we have already seen, they wanted to shiftpsychology’s methods ‘from preoccupation only withrepairing the worst things in life to also building positivequalities’ (p. 5). They concluded their article with similarlanguage, predicting that by means of positive psychology‘psychologists will learn how to build the qualities that

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help individuals and communities, not just to endure andsurvive, but also to flourish’ (p. 13).

Similarly, they also followed Seligman’s presidentialaddress in connecting positive psychology with the goodlife. In a slightly revised statement, they wrote,

At this juncture, the social and behavioral sciences canplay an enormously important role. They can articulate avision of the good life that is empirically sound whilebeing understandable and attractive. They can show whatactions lead to well-being, to positive individuals, and tothriving communities. (p. 5)

A third influential definition of positive psychology wasdeveloped at this time, as well. This definition is part ofa document known as the Akumal Manifesto, which waswritten by a core group of scholars attending specialannual meetings on positive psychology in Akumal,Mexico. These scholars – Kennon Sheldon, BarbaraFredrickson, Kevin Rathunde, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi,and Jonathan Haidt – defined positive psychology in thefollowing way:

Positive Psychology is the scientific study of optimalhuman functioning. It aims to discover and promote thefactors that allow individuals and communities to thrive.The positive psychology movement represents a newcommitment on the part of research psychologists tofocus attention upon the resources of psychologicalhealth, thereby going beyond prior emphases upon dis-ease and disorder. (Sheldon, Fredrickson, Rathunde,Csikszentmihalyi, & Haidt, 2000, Section 1)

After providing a set of goals, the authors list severalpotential applications of positive psychology, including

• Improving child education by making greater useof intrinsic motivation, positive affect, and creativ-ity within schools.

• Improving psychotherapy by developingapproaches that emphasize hope, meaning, andself-healing.

• Improving family life by better understanding thedynamics of love, generativity, and commitment.

• Improving work satisfaction across the lifespan byhelping people to find authentic involvement, expe-rience states of flow, and make genuine contribu-tions in their work.

• Improving organizations and societies by discover-ing conditions that enhance trust, communication,and altruism between persons.

• Improving the moral character of society by betterunderstanding and promoting the spiritual impulsewithin humans. (Section 3)

This definition of positive psychology has the samebasic components that are present in the definition

Seligman gave in his presidential address and that areincluded in Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s introduc-tion to the special issue of American Psychologist. First,it calls for a focus on the positive to complement thehegemonic emphasis on the negative. (‘The positivepsychology movement represents a new commitment onthe part of research psychologists to focus attentionupon the resources of psychological health, therebygoing beyond prior emphases upon disease and disor-der’ [Section 1].) Second, it suggests specific areas tobe studied in this new field. (See the list of potentialapplications of positive psychology above; in addition,the authors go on to identify positive subjective states,the good life/good person, and the good society asimportant areas of focus.) Third, it identifies the contextin which positive psychology is to be applied. (‘PositivePsychology is the scientific study of optimal humanfunctioning. It aims to discover and promote the factorsthat allow individuals and communities to thrive’ [Sec-tion 1].) Fourth, although they do not use the buildingmetaphor explicitly, it is clear by looking at the meansthese scholars recommend for realizing the potentialapplications of positive psychology that they share thisprocedural commitment. And finally, it identifies thegood life as a key object of study and cultivation withinthe field.

These five components, common to all three descrip-tions of positive psychology we have examined, arefoundational for the meaning of the positive and indicatefive related but different definitions of the term. First isthe orientational definition. In this sense, the positive isused generally as a complement to the negative andrefers to the basic focus of the field in contrast to thebasic focus of mainstream psychology. Second is thetopographical definition. This is stated largely osten-sively, in terms of non-exhaustive lists of topics for studyin positive psychology. Third is the contextual definition,where positive psychology’s target population is consid-ered. Fourth is the procedural definition, identifying thekinds of processes positive psychology will use. In theirown way, each of these four definitions is complementaryto mainstream psychology, to its basic orientation, thetopics it studies, its target population, and its processes.The fifth definition is different. It is a comprehensive def-inition about how to live life well. In this eudaimonicdefinition, positive psychology is connected to the goodlife. These five definitons are listed in Table 1.

The definitions of the positive we have examined sofar have helped articulate the orientation, content, benefi-ciaries, processes, and ultimate goals of positive psychol-ogy. There is one further, more abstract definition we needto examine, as well. This definition tries to refute the claimthat the positive is simply the absence of the negative andhence that positive psychology is not necessary. As this

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definition is rather technical, we will need to examine itwith care and in some detail. (Readers not interested in thefull details of this technical analysis may wish to skim orskip the next section and just read the final paragraph ofconclusions.)

Is the positive just the absence of the negative?

This abstract definition, presented by Seligman (2002) inan endnote in Authentic Happiness, is intended to showthat the positive and the negative are on opposite sidesof a rigorously definable neutral point, so that neither isreducible to a simple absence of the other. As it will benecessary to look at the endnote in detail, I will beginby reproducing it in its entirety here.

There has been a continuing scholarly argument aboutwhether the positive is just the absence of the negative(and vice versa), or whether there are two independentlydefinable dimensions. Is a food pellet truly positive for ahungry animal, or does it merely relieve the negativestate of hunger? If the positive were just the absence ofthe negative, we would not need a Positive Psychology,just a psychology of relieving negative states.

The solution to this conundrum hinges on whether aneutral state, a zero point, can be rigorously defined.Once a zero point, a point of indifference, is defined, sit-uations (such as emotions, external circumstances, inter-nal motivations) that are on the plus or preferred side arepositive, and those on the minus or dispreferred side arenegative.

Here is one solution. I define ‘neutral’ as the set of allcircumstances, O’s, any member of which, when addedto any event, does not make that event more preferred ordispreferred (approached or avoided) and does notincrease or decrease the felt emotion about that event.Circumstances that are preferred to O’s so defined (andthat elicit more subjective positive emotion than the O’s)are positive, and circumstances that are dispreferred toO’s so defined (and that elicit more subjective negativeemotion than the O’s) are negative. For related attemptsat defining indifference, see Nozick (1977, pp. 93–95),Kahneman (2000), and Irwin (1971, pp. 272–273).

In the first paragraph of the endnote, Seligman takes upthe question of the relation between the positive and thenegative. Is the positive just the absence of the negative,is the negative just the absence of the positive, or are

they two ‘independently definable dimensions’?Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) raised a similarquestion in their introduction to the special issue ofAmerican Psychologist. There they wrote,

It has been an unspoken assumption in the socialsciences that negative traits are authentic and positivetraits are derivative, compensatory, or even inauthentic,but there are two other possibilities: that negative traitsare derivative from positive traits, and that the positiveand negative systems are separate systems. (p. 12)

There may be other possibilities, as well (for example,that they are both real and part of the same system, orthat they are both derivative from some underlying thirdthing), but we will focus on these three options here.

Possibility 1, that the positive is the absence of thenegative, entails that negative traits, drives, and experi-ences are basic, and positive traits, drives, and experi-ences are fundamentally ways of trying to cope withthem or eliminate them. On this view, Seligman (2002)claims, a psychology of the positive is not really neces-sary. All that is needed is a ‘psychology of relievingnegative states’. If I am hungry, I just need to eat. I donot, in addition, need to do something else to feel full orsatisfied, since these feelings are simply natural indica-tions from my body that I have eaten and thus alleviatedthe state of inanition. Doctors often present patients witha pain inventory, asking them on a scale of 1 to 10 toindicate how much pain they are feeling in the moment.The upper limit of the scale, the negative end, is formaximal pain, pain equal to the most the patient has everexperienced. The lower limit of the scale, the positiveend, does not stand for anything substantive at all; it issimply the absence of pain. In this case, the positive ismerely the absence of the negative.

Possibility 2 is that the negative is the absence of thepositive. On this view, presumably, a psychology ofrelieving negative states is not necessary. All that isneeded is a positive psychology. It may be helpful hereto think of a scale on a dimmer switch that marks thegradation from darkness to light in a particular room.The more the switch is raised, the lighter it becomes inthe room; the more it is lowered, the darker it gets. Whatthe dimmer switch really does is simply put more or lessof something (light) in the room. Darkness is merely the

Table 1. Common components of positive psychology identified in early documents.

(1) Positive orientation Basic direction of positive psychology (complementary to the negative focus of mainstreampsychology)

(2) Positive topography Areas to be studied by positive psychology (e.g. optimism, courage, social responsibility)(3) Positive target population Beneficiaries of positive psychology (primarily non-clinical populations)(4) Positive process Approach for achieving desired outcomes (build good qualities)(5) Positive aim Ultimate goal of positive psychology (to provide an empirical vision for understanding and

cultivating the good life)

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absence of light. If I want to increase the brightness of aroom, I just have to introduce more light; I need expendno added effort in also trying to chase out the darkness.

Possibility 3 is that the positive and the negative aretwo independently definable dimensions. On this view,they are separable and both real. This is the view Seligmandefends, and in the second paragraph of his endnote, hecontends that the key to this position is being able todefine a neutral state, zero point, or point of indifference ina rigorous way. In the third paragraph, Seligman makeshis own attempt at such a rigorous definition and refers tothree other attempts in the literature made by RobertNozick, Daniel Kahneman, and Francis Irwin. A closerlook at these attempts will help indicate why Seligmanholds the definition of a neutral point to be so important; itwill also reveal a key distinction in the role indifferenceplays for these writers. To begin, however, it will beimportant to make distinctions among different types ofneutral points; specifically, between internal and externalneutral points and between objective and subjective ones.

In a discussion of how to measure utility, Nozick(1977) uses the example of temperature scales. Fahrenheitand Celsius scales both have a unit (a degree) and a zeropoint. Both the size of the unit and the zero point, hesays, are arbitrary. Either scale works as a measurementof temperature, and we can move between them via theformula F = (9/5)C + 32. Nozick is right that the unit sizeand zero point are arbitrary in the sense that we can mea-sure temperature quite well on either scale – or on anynumber of other scales we might devise. It is important tonote, however, that neither scale is completely arbitrary.For the Fahrenheit scale, the freezing point of brine (amixture of ice and salt) was chosen as the zero point.After various adjustments, it was decided that it would beuseful for the freezing and boiling points of water to be180° apart, so they were placed at 32° and 212°, respec-tively, under 1 atmosphere of pressure. The zero pointand unit size on the Celsius scale are even less arbitrarythan those of the Fahrenheit scale. The zero point isassigned to the temperature at which liquid waterbecomes a solid at the pressure of 1 atmosphere, and theunit is intentionally defined as 1/100 of the difference intemperature between that phase transition and the phasetransition when liquid water becomes gas, at the samepressure. Thus, the zero point and the unit are establishedin terms of qualitative thresholds in water.

In these examples, objective phase transitions ofwater (or brine) have been the markers for establishingthe zero points and unit sizes of the temperature scales.This method results in zero points that are internal to thescale and serve as qualitative points of inflection. Thereare other ways of measuring temperature where the zeropoint is at one end of the scale and functions as a kindof external limit point. The Kelvin and Rankine scaleseach set the zero point at absolute zero, which is the

coldest possible temperature, since it is the point atwhich matter has no thermal energy. These scales sharea neutral point with each other but have different unitsizes, with a Kelvin degree equal to a Celsius degreeand a Rankine degree equal to a Fahrenheit degree.There is no such thing, then, as a negative Kelvin orRankine temperature, with zero on these scales being thelimit for how cold matter can get.

In addition to these various objective measures fortemperature, with their internal or external zero points,there is also a subjective way in which we measure tem-perature, based on how things feel to the touch. Somewater, for example, feels cold to us, some feels warm,and some feels neither cold nor warm. In different con-texts, the water that feels neither cold nor warm may havedifferent objective temperatures, but the phenomenologi-cal experience of neutrality, what Kahneman (2000) callsthe ‘absolute zero point’ (p. 683), is a constant androughly divides water temperature into two qualitativelydifferent parts. Kahneman, of course, is using the termabsolute zero in a way very different from the manner inwhich Kelvin and Rankine used it. For Kahneman, itdoes not refer to the objective absence of thermal energy,but rather to the perceived absence of thermal variance ineither direction from the temperature of the hand.

These distinctions between internal and external zeropoints and between objective and subjective methods ofmeasurement help make clearer the type of neutral pointSeligman needs to defend his view of the relation betweenthe positive and the negative. First, not just any neutralpoint will do, since all three possible relations between thepositive and the negative mentioned above have one. Whatseparates Seligman’s preferred possibility from the othertwo is the presence of an internal zero point. Second, thisinternal zero point cannot be merely assigned to someobjective qualitative threshold; as Nozick (1977) haspointed out, such zero points are rather arbitrary and canvary widely on different objective scales. The zero pointSeligman needs is a phenomenological one, a subjectivequalitative threshold of a very special type, the ‘absolutezero point’ to which Kahneman (2000) refers.

This is just the type of zero point Irwin (1971)considers in his analysis of the affective scale. He writes,

If an organism is tested for its preferences among a num-ber of differential outcomes, some sort of order may beexpected to appear among these outcomes. Two assump-tions are commonly made about this order: (1) that theobjects will arrange themselves along what may becalled an affective scale, with differences in preferencevalue represented by the distances between objects onthe scale or at least by the rank order of the objects, and(2) that the affective scale is divided by a neutral pointinto two segments, one containing objects that are pleas-ant, rewarding, or desirable, and the other containingobjects that are unpleasant, punishing, or aversive….Ifwe look for some outcome that might serve to identify

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the neutral point, the unique status of the null differentialoutcome ω, comes to mind. [Previously, he had definedω as ‘that which, if added to an outcome, leaves the out-come unaltered’ (p. 22).] This particular differential out-come has some of the properties of the number zero,which divides numbers into positive and negativestates….Furthermore, one way of asking oneself whethersome outcome of low preference value is desired oraversive is to ask, ‘Would I prefer it to happen ratherthan not?,’ an affirmative answer to which would meanthat the outcome had at least some ‘positive’ value;whereas if the answer were, ‘I would prefer its not hap-pening to its happening,’ the outcome would appear tobe ‘negative’ or aversive….When ω is used to divide theaffective scale into desired and aversive segments in thisway, it will be said to locate the affective zero of thescale. (pp. 46, 48–49)

Earlier, Irwin had specified that ‘If an organism is indifferentbetween some outcome and the affective zero, that outcomewill be called neutral and the organism’s state will be saidto be one of neutrality toward the outcome’ (p. 7).

Seligman’s (2002) definition is essentially similar toIrwin’s, except he stipulates that ω (which he calls O) bedefined as that which ‘does not make [an] event morepreferred or dispreferred (approached or avoided) anddoes not increase or decrease the felt emotion about thatevent’ (p. 272). On Irwin’s analysis, this is roughly thesame as defining neutrality as not caring whether a par-ticular event happens or not.

Nozick (1977), too, defines a zero point in basicallythe same way. He writes,

My preference … is to specify zero utility directly interms of the notion of being indifferent about something,neither wanting it nor diswanting it. To be indifferentabout an alternative x is to be indifferent between x andnot-x. Something x has zero utility for a person if andonly if xInot-x; if and only if he is indifferent betweenhaving x and not, between x’s occurring and not. Itmakes no difference to the person whether x or not-x, nodifference he cares anything about. (p. 94)

At this point, it seems these writers are in agreement,and to a large extent, they are. But there is also animportant distinction in the way they use key terms. Aclue to this distinction arises from noting that Seligmanuses the terms ‘neutral state,’ ‘zero point,’ and ‘point ofindifference’ interchangeably. Irwin, on the other hand,holds neutrality to be a special case of indifference. Hedefines indifference in the following way: ‘An organismwill be said to be indifferent between any two differen-tial outcomes, o and o′, if it does not prefer o to o′ anddoes not prefer o′ to o″ (p. 29). He writes this relation asoIo′ and states it formally as

oIo0 $ � ðoPo0Þ ^ � ðo0PoÞOn this definition, then, one could be indifferent betweentwo neutral events, but one could also be indifferent

between two desired events (if one found them equallydesirable) or between two aversive events (if one foundthem equally aversive). Seligman’s alternative definitionof indifference as synonymous with neutrality would bestated as follows: An organism will be said to be indif-ferent about an outcome, o, if it does not prefer o to ~oand does not prefer ~o to o. This relation would bewritten oI~o, and it would be formally stated

oI � o $ �ðoP� oÞ ^ � ð� oPoÞAn example might be useful here to illustrate the differ-ence between Irwin and Seligman’s definitions of indif-ference: A recent college graduate named Liam has justreceived two job offers. Both are good starting positions,but are located in places he would rather not live. Themain difference between them is that the first pays muchbetter but is in a location he greatly dislikes. The secondpays a more modest salary, but is in a location he feelshe could probably tolerate. Both his desire and his aver-sion for the first job are significantly greater than hisdesire and his aversion for the second. For Irwin, Liamwould be indifferent to these two opportunities if thesum of his desire and aversion for each is the same. Hisdesire for each might be stronger than his aversion toeach, in which case each would be a desired outcome; orhis aversion might be stronger than his desire, in whichcase each would be an aversive outcome. Either way,however, he would be indifferent between them. ForSeligman, on the other hand, we would need to considereach job offer individually. On this view, Liam would beindifferent to the first job only if his level of desire for itwere equal to his level of aversion to it. Similarly, Liamwould be indifferent to the second job only if his levelof desire for it equaled his level of aversion to it.

This distinction between two ways of defining indif-ference may not seem significant. It points, however, totwo ways of defining preference, a distinction that is quitesignificant, indeed. Irwin defines preference in relativeterms. He holds that preference is a binary relation, sinceit ‘always connects two objects’ (1971, p. 46). A prefer-ence can hold between two desired objects, between twoaversive objects, between a desired and an aversiveobject, between a desired and a neutral object, andbetween a neutral and an aversive object. (Because Irwinbelieves neutrality to be non-transitive, he claims it isalso possible for a preference to hold between two neutralobjects.) Binary preference tests result in an affectivescale, a quantitative, linear array of objects arrangedaccording to their relatively expressed preference. Thisquantitative array is also divided by a neutral point intoqualitatively different portions. The quality of differentpoints on the scale can be determined by means of a spe-cial case of preference testing. This involves not just test-ing a preference between any two objects (what we mightcall a ‘relative preference’), but rather testing a preference

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between an object and neutrality. More directly, this isroughly the same thing as testing a preference betweenan object and its absence (what we might call a ‘simplepreference’). Since in this context Seligman (2002) isemphasizing the qualitative differences that define thepositive and the negative on the preference scale, he con-siders only the special case of simple preference in hisdefinition of the positive. As we will see in Part II(Pawelski, 2016), although simple preference is the pri-mary relation necessary to distinguish the qualitativelypositive and the qualitatively negative, relative preferenceis also important for understanding the full meaning ofthe positive in positive psychology.

This analysis of the positive and the negative resultsin some complexities that are both theoretically and prac-tically important. First, as we have just observed, it isessential to keep in mind that two different relations holdon the linear array of preferences, this bipolar dimensionof the positive and the negative. On the one hand, thereis a quantitative ordering of the items on the continuumresulting from relative preference tests between twoobjects at a time. Wherever one is on the continuum,one can move to a different level of preference by mov-ing to the right or to the left. On the other hand, there isa qualitative division of the items on the continuumresulting from simple preference tests between an objectand its absence. There will be a simple preference forsome objects and a simple dispreference for others. Sim-ple preference tests result in the qualitative identificationof items as preferred, dispreferred, or neutral, but theydo not order them further within those domains.

A second important point concerns the matter ofdimensions. Seligman (2002) implies that the establish-ment of a neutral point will show that the positive andthe negative are ‘two independently definable dimen-sions’ (p. 272). It is clear from this analysis, however,that the result is only a single dimension divided intotwo portions. This allows for a situation to be either pos-itive or negative or neither. It seems, however, thatdimensions that are independently definable should alsoallow for the case of a situation being both positive andnegative (Pawelski, 2013a).

Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) have argued for analternative method of distinguishing between the positiveand the negative that does, indeed, involve two dimen-sions. They point out that bipolar measures of the posi-tive and the negative in psychology have been based onthe assumption that the negative and the positive arereciprocal. Seligman (2002), as we have seen, critiquesthis assumption by trying to show via a neutral point thatthese two domains are independent. For Cacioppo andBerntson, this critique may be valuable, but it is insuffi-ciently complex since it continues to rely on a bipolarmodel. Cacioppo and Berntson argue, instead, that thebipolar model itself should be replaced with a bivariate

one, creating a two-dimensional plane on which positiveand negative values can be recorded independently.Seligman’s view may be adequate on the conceptuallevel, where the positive and the negative qua conceptualdomains will never overlap, but it seems that Cacioppoand Berntson’s approach is needed if we consider actualpositive and negative things, since in addition to beingnegatively correlated, they might in some situations bepositively correlated – or not correlated at all.

One advantage of the approach put forward byCacioppo and Berntson can be illustrated by referringback to the example we used earlier of Liam consideringtwo job opportunities. Seligman’s (2002) measure ofsimple preference gives us an easy way of testing to seewhether Liam is positively, negatively, or indifferentlydisposed toward each. If we want to judge between twopositive possibilities (or two negative possibilities), how-ever, we would need something beyond Seligman’s test.We might use Irwin’s (1977) binary method of compar-ison to determine a relative preference (or dispreference)between the two. Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) wouldargue, however, that just like Seligman’s method, Irwin’sapproach also obscures important information. This isbecause both Seligman and Irwin base their judgmentson sums of desires and aversions. Since desires and aver-sions have opposite valences, Cacioppo and Berntsonwould point out, summing them obscures whether theirabsolute values are large or small. Even if the sums ofLiam’s desire and aversion for each position are thesame (and thus, for Irwin, he is indifferent betweenthem), and even if the sums of Liam’s desire and aver-sion for each position are equal to zero (and thus, forSeligman, he is indifferent to both of them), there stillremains the fact that Liam’s levels of desire for each andhis levels of aversion for each are quite different.

This analysis from the standpoint of Cacioppo andBerntson’s (1994) position reveals a third meaning ofindifference. For these scholars, indifference means thatboth the level of desire and the level of aversion for asingle object is zero. This definition can be stated as fol-lows: An organism will be said to be indifferent aboutan outcome, o, if it does not desire o over ~o and doesnot desire ~o over o, and if it is not more averse to othan to ~o and is not more averse to ~o than to o. If Dstands for desire and A stands for aversion, thenCacioppo and Berntson’s definition of indifference wouldbe formally stated

oI � o $ ½� ðoD� oÞ ^ � ð� oDoÞ� ^ ½� ðoA� oÞ^ � ð� oAoÞ�

Defining the positive along the single dimension of prefer-ence (defined as the sum of desire and aversion) obfuscatesany relations that might obtain between the positive (quadesire) and the negative (qua aversion). A relative prefer-ence model makes it appear that the positive and the nega-

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tive are reciprocally related, and Seligman’s (2002) simplepreference model makes it appear that they are independentof each other. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000)clearly opt for the position that the ‘positive and negativesystems are separate systems,’ but then they ask, ‘if the twosystems are separate, how do they interact?’ (p. 12). Under-standing the positive and the negative not merely in termsof preference, but also in terms of the desires and aversionsthat underlie preferences makes room for flexibility in pre-senting the various ways in which these systems can inter-act. The question of the various ways the positive and thenegative systems are separate and yet overlap is central forCacioppo and Berntson (1994), and their two-dimensionalmodel is intended to allow for maximal flexibility indescribing this complex relation. There is significant evi-dence from various fields of inquiry to support the view thatthe positive and the negative are two separate systems – andyet they also seem to be related in significant ways, withmoderate negative correlations holding between them incertain contexts (Pawelski, 2013a), moderate positive corre-lations holding between them in other contexts (for exam-ple, post-traumatic growth), and no correlations holdingbetween them in still other contexts. The key here is beingable to move beyond mere theoretical relations between theconcepts of the positive and the negative and to focus onactual relations between concrete positives and concretenegatives, relations that vary in different contexts.

From this vantage point, we can see that the modelSeligman presents in Authentic Happiness (2002) is quiteuseful for certain purposes. His introduction of a zeropoint is effective for showing that the positive and thenegative are irreducible, and it provides a helpful way ofidentifying positive topographies, positive target popula-tions, and positive processes. It does not, however, serveas a comprehensive definition of the term positive, sinceit has no way of distinguishing quantitatively betweenvarious levels of preference or dispreference. In addition,it can obscure important information about the relationbetween the positive and the negative in various con-texts. These are points to which we will return in moredetail in Part II (Pawelski, 2016).

Tensions within and among definitions of the positive

In the first two sections above, we identified six differentmeanings of the positive within positive psychology.

That is, we identified six different ways in which posi-tive psychology is claimed to be positive: in orientation,in topography, in target population, in process, in ulti-mate aim, and in terms of simple preference. As webegan to note in the last section, these definitions giverise to various difficulties; in this section, we will turn toan examination of a number of tensions that arise withinand among them. We will focus on the relation betweenthe positive and the negative, on the relations amongvarious positives, and on the relations among the variousdefinitions we identified. We will also explore furtherwhat is meant by preference and then by the positiveitself. We will consider seven specific questions that willneed to be addressed as positive psychology continues toestablish itself as a domain (Table 2).

(1) What is the relation between the positive and thenegative? As we have seen above, positive psychologistshold that the positive and the negative are not reducibleto each other, and in particular that the positive is notsimply the absence of the negative. Powerful as thisinsight is, however, we have already begun to see that itis also paradoxically difficult to separate the two com-pletely. This difficulty can be seen if we examine thetensions that arise when trying to separate the positivefrom the negative within each of the six definitions wehave identified above.

When we look at the orientational definition of thepositive, we can see that there are conceptual, empirical,and practical reasons why it is difficult to separate thepositive from the negative. On a conceptual level, thesetwo terms are examples of ‘polar concepts’. The philoso-pher Blackburn (1994) defines polar concepts as ‘con-cepts that gain their identity in part through theircontrast with one another’ (p. 291). Lazarus (2003)argues that the positive and the negative constitute abasic polarity that ‘represents two sides of the same coinof life’ (p. 94) and that it is just not possible to separatethem. Along these lines, Pauwels (2015) has recentlyargued that positive psychology’s connection to the nega-tive is actually necessary. Putting aside for now the ques-tion of whether there are conditions under which thepositive and the negative may be usefully separated, itmay well not be possible to understand either conceptfully without the other.

On an empirical level, although there has been muchresearch to support the claim that the positive and the

Table 2. Seven basic questions for positive psychology.

(1) What is the relation between the positive and the negative?(2) What is the relation among various positives?(3) Does positive psychology lie at the intersection, or in the union, of the various definitions of the positive?(4) What is the relation between the complementary and the comprehensive definitions of the positive?(5) Is the good life defined prudentially, or morally?(6) What is meant by preference?(7) What is the fundamental definition of the term positive (as a substantive vs. as a qualifier)?

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negative are not simply the inverse of each other, there isgood evidence that there are at least some contexts inwhich the two are moderately negatively correlated.Researchers (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) using thePositive And Negative Affect Schedule have found that itis possible to score high on positive emotions and low onnegative emotions, low on positive emotions and high onnegative emotions, high on both positive and negativeemotions, or low on both positive and negative emotions;yet they have found a moderate negative correlation(r = −.2) between positive and negative emotions. Keyes(2007) has found a similar relation when measuring over-all mental health. He has proposed a complete statemodel, which is a composite of levels of mental flourish-ing (well-being) and levels of mental illness (ill-being).Here, too, it is possible to have any combination of highand low scores, but those who score high on one dimen-sion have a moderate tendency to score low on the other.Research in neuroscience has also supported this conclu-sion about well-being and ill-being. In one study,researchers (Ryff et al., 2006) tested nine biomarkers tosee if they behaved as distinct or mirrored characteristicsand found that seven behaved as distinct characteristicsand two behaved in a mirrored way. That is, seven of thebiomarkers behaved orthogonally from their oppositesand two behaved reciprocally. Some of the difficulties inknowing how to separate the positive and the negative onan empirical level arise from the partial understanding sci-entists currently have about the two systems underlyingthem (Cacioppo, Berntson, Norris, & Gollan, 2012).

On a practical level, as well, it is difficult to separatethe positive and the negative. Positive psychology’s focuson the positive is intended to be a complement to main-stream psychology’s focus on the negative and not areplacement for it. Positive psychologists are careful topoint out the importance of mainstream approaches thatfocus on treating and curing psychopathology and to statethat they do not seek its global replacement (Peterson &Park, 2003). In a world of competing resources and prac-tical choices, however, there are clearly times when thepositive and the mainstream approaches are in conflict.Research dollars allocated for the study of positive psy-chology are not available for the study of mainstreamapproaches, and therapists who opt for positive psy-chotherapy are not (at least on that occasion) using moretraditional, deficit-oriented therapies. The positive and thenegative are thus linked in that they are both essentialapproaches for achieving the shared aim of improving theworld and the lives of those in it. There are times, how-ever, when these perspectives are in competition, andmore research is needed to know when a positiveapproach should be taken and when a mainstreamapproach should be adopted – or whether, in fact, an inte-grated approach might be preferable (Linley, Joseph,Harrington, & Wood, 2006).

Beyond the initial, broad orientational meaning ofthe positive, the difficulty in separating the positive andthe negative can also be seen in the second, topographi-cal meaning of the positive we have identified. Thismeaning refers to certain particular topics of focus withinthe field. Instead of concentrating on pathology, as main-stream psychology has largely come to do, positive psy-chology takes up ‘the best things in life,’ those thingsthat make life ‘most worth living’ (Seligman, 1999,p. 562). This definition is typically ostensive, with posi-tive psychologists presenting non-exhaustive lists ofexamples of what they mean by the best things in life,including positive subjective experiences, positiveindividual traits, and positive institutions (Seligman &Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). As is the case with the first def-inition, a tension arises around the relation between thepositive and the negative here. The indeterminacybetween the positive and the negative systems makes itdifficult to operate with precision even at this level.Although it is possible to generate lists of positive topicsfor research (gratitude, optimism, meaning, and the like)and to contrast them with negative topics for research(depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, and the like), it isdifficult for any topic to remain positive under all cir-cumstances or for any topic to remain negative under allcircumstances. Too much of something good or a prob-lematic placement of something good may turn out to beharmful, and things that are bad sometimes lead tohealthy consequences. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyihad this concern when they worried, ‘Is it necessary tobe resilient, to overcome hardship and suffering to expe-rience positive emotion and to develop positive traits?Does too much positive experience create a fragile andbrittle personality?’ (p. 12).

The work of Tamir and Gross (2011) points stronglyto the tension in the relation between the positive andthe negative here. They raise the question whether emo-tions should be considered positive based on how theyfeel or on their value for optimal human functioning.They note that ‘many view unpleasant emotions as inher-ently negative and pleasant emotions as inherently posi-tive,’ but that this view is beginning to change based onevidence in a number of domains that unpleasant emo-tions may actually be important for various aspects ofwell-being, including self-fulfillment, professional suc-cess, and interpersonal relationships. They conclude,‘“Positive,” therefore, should not be defined as “pleas-ant” but as that which promotes optimal functioning’(p. 97). In terms of simple preference, both pleasantemotions and optimal functioning are preferred, but theremay well arise conflicts between them, and in the termsof our analysis, Tamir and Gross would argue in thiscase that optimal human functioning is to be relativelypreferred to pleasant emotions, and therefore shouldmore properly be referred to as positive.

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More generally, King (2011) examines the role ofunhappiness as a topic of future research in positivepsychology. She argues that in certain contexts, topicssuch as anger, worry, disappointment, sadness, regret,and suffering are legitimate areas of research for positivepsychology. Those contexts, she contends, include ‘righ-teous anger,’ ‘legitimate worry,’ ‘the healthy disappoint-ment and sadness that emerge from the valiant, iffruitless, pursuit of important goals,’ ‘the role of regret…in healthy maturity and development,’ and ‘the place ofsuffering in good lives’ (p. 442). Similarly, she arguesfor an understanding of ‘virtuous, principled, and diffi-cult’ actions that are undertaken for reasons other thanthe cultivation of happiness, or even at the expense ofhappiness (p. 443).

Kashdan and Biswas-Diener (2014) have expandedon these ideas in their book The Upside of Your DarkSide, where they provide numerous examples where neg-ative emotions may lead to positive outcomes. In particu-lar, they point to connections between anger andcreativity, guilt and improvement, self-doubt and perfor-mance, selfishness and courage, and mindlessness andgood decision-making.

On the other side of the coin, Gruber and Moskowitz(2014) point out that positive emotions sometimes actu-ally lead to negative consequences. They have publishedan edited volume called Positive Emotion: Integratingthe Light Sides and Dark Sides, in which they try to pre-sent a balanced perspective on the benefits and costs ofpositive emotions in different contexts. The complexitiesexplored by these various scholars point to the difficul-ties of trying to separate positive topics from negativeones to establish clear topographical boundaries for posi-tive psychology research.

It is just as difficult to separate the positive from thenegative when we turn to the question of the target popu-lation of positive psychology. This is the third meaning ofthe positive in positive psychology we identified in thefirst section above. The beneficiaries of positive psychol-ogy are primarily the mentally well, both normal peopleand those of high talent. Secondarily, of course, the expec-tation was that positive psychology research would beapplied to therapeutic interventions with the mentally ill,but the overall shift of emphasis of the field was to con-sider how to make ‘normal people stronger and more pro-ductive’ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 8).Tensions arise within this definition when we considerwhether it is possible to differentiate precisely among nor-mal, highly talented, and mentally ill people. Theseboundaries seem somewhat fuzzy. There is considerabledebate among psychologists and psychiatrists as to howcertain mental illnesses should be defined and as towhether or not they are present in the case of particularindividuals. Furthermore, where there is agreement that anindividual has a psychopathology, is it not reductionistic

to label that person simply as mentally ill? Is it not thecase that someone who has a psychopathology is oftenstill quite healthy in other areas of their mental experienceand would still need the kinds of things in these domainsthat a healthy person would need? Another tension ariseswhen we consider the difference between prevention andpromotion in healthy individuals. Seligman (1999) andespecially Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) spendconsiderable time emphasizing the importance of positivepsychology for prevention of psychopathology. Certainly,this is an important potential application of research in thefield, but it would no doubt involve different strategiesthan when the focus is simply on the promotion of flour-ishing. Focusing on the direct increase of well-being issignificantly different from working to avoid the develop-ment of psychopathology. Yet another tension arises whenwe consider individuals of high talent, since there arenotable cases of connection between high talent and men-tal illness. Those who suffer from Williams Syndrome, forexample, typically have a range of psychological prob-lems, yet they frequently have high talent for music, aswell.

In its fourth sense, the positive refers to a proceduralapproach. Positive psychology is to focus on ‘buildingpositive qualities’ and not just on ‘repairing the worstthings in life’ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000,p. 5). Indeed, this is in keeping with the etymologicalmeaning of the term positive, which comes from theLatin pono, ponere, meaning ‘to put or place; to set upor to build’. Tensions arise here, however, since buildingof good things can happen either directly or indirectly.For example, building a house requires direct efforts ofconstruction, but building muscle first requires a tearingof the muscle tissue. Does positive psychology involvedirect building only, or can it also proceed by way ofindirect building? Must it always proceed by nurturingwhat is best, or might it also proceed by challenging ordisrupting what is good to try to make it better?

Fifth, the positive is about identifying the good life.This is a revisiting of the question the ancients askedabout the best sort of life for human beings to live. Posi-tive psychology, however, approaches this question froman empirical perspective and so is in a position to shednew light on these old inquiries. Presumably, the goodlife involves elements identified in the topography ofpositive psychology, as well as direct processes forbuilding those elements. A full human life, however, iscomposed of both opportunities and problems, and aflourishing life involves both the skills necessary to takeadvantage of the opportunities and the ability to copewith the problems. The good life is not just about culti-vating gratitude, optimism, and love; it is also aboutdealing with guilt, disappointment, and jealousy. Sincehuman beings cannot avoid all negative experiences, partof what flourishing entails is coping with them as

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effectively as possible. For this reason, both the positiveand the negative seem to be crucial for cultivating thegood life. This is a point Kashdan and Steger (2011)make in exploring the definition of positive psychologyas ‘the scientific endeavor to improve people’s lives’(p. 9). This definition, of course, is far too broad, sincescientific endeavors of this sort extend far beyond psy-chology. More to our present purposes, however, theseauthors point out astutely that endeavors in mainstreampsychology that focus on ameliorating deficits are alsohelping to improve people’s lives. In the terms we areusing here, being able to cope effectively with negativeexperiences is an essential part of the good life.

Finally, the sixth definition seems to present a way ofmaking a clean break between the positive and the nega-tive by defining the former as that for which there is asimple preference and the latter as that for which there is asimple dispreference. As we will soon see, however, con-crete cases of preference and dispreference almost alwaysinvolve combinations of positive and negative aspects.

Each of these six definitions is helpful, in its ownway, in pointing to the positive. Digging deeper withineach one, however, reveals complex connections to thenegative. These connections will need to be clarifiedfurther as positive psychology’s understanding of thepositive deepens and matures.

(2) What is the relation among various positives? Inaddition to the question of the relation between the posi-tive and the negative, the second basic question for posi-tive psychology that arises from these definitions is therelation among various positives. Positive emotionalstates, for example, are not all equally positive; nor areall strengths, nor all positive outcomes. In a world ofscarce resources, it would seem wise to invest in thosethat are most positive, in those we might call ‘optimal’.Even more poignantly, there are times when positivethings are in conflict. Ed Diener (2003) notes that certainvirtues may make others less likely, and that the moreone has of certain desirable characteristics the less onemay have of others. As an example, he suggests thatassertive people may not be as good at being sensitive tothe feelings of others. An awareness of such potentialconflicts would certainly be useful; in cases where choiceis involved, it may help optimize decisions.

This point can be clarified by distinguishing amongpositive emotional states (gratitude, serenity, love), posi-tive processes for improving our lives (building, grow-ing, using our signature strengths), and positiveoutcomes (improved relationships, better work environ-ment, stronger communities). Conflicts can occur withinthese various categories. For example, there are caseswhen compassion disrupts serenity, times when a choicemust be made between competing positive processes forimproving one’s life, and occasions where we mustdecide whether to focus on building new playgrounds in

a community or on arresting its criminals. Conflicts canalso occur among these various categories. There may betimes, for example, where a choice must be madebetween cultivating one’s personal serenity or leading aneffort to improve one’s work environment, between nur-turing certain feelings of love or sacrificing them toimprove other relationships, or between getting physicalexercise or working to nurture one’s community.

(3) Does positive psychology lie at the intersection,or in the union, of the various definitions of the positive?A third basic question for positive psychology arisesfrom the definitions that identify the topography, targetpopulations, and processes of the field. As we have seen,these point to very different things. To count as positivepsychology, does a study have to focus on positivetopics applied to a positive target population using posi-tive processes? To count as a positive intervention, doesan activity have to intend to increase a positive elementin a positive target population using positive processes?Or would it be enough in either of these cases if one ofthe definitions were satisfied? What would be the status,for example, of a study examining the use of cognitivebehavioral therapy to cultivate gratitude amongdepressed patients? What would be the status of an inter-vention intended to decrease anxiety in healthy peopleby helping them face their fears? In other words, is posi-tive psychology the intersection of these three defini-tions? The union of them? Or does it have some otherrelation to them? If it is the intersection of the defini-tions, then all three conditions would need to be positivefor a study or intervention to count as positive psychol-ogy. If it is the union of the definitions, then just one ofthe conditions would need to be met (Figure 1).

From the standpoint of the positive and the negative,there are a total of eight different possible permutations oftopography, target population, and processes. One of thesepermutations, of course, is their positive intersection; thatis, the combination that results when all three are positive.Cases involving positive topics, healthy populations, anddirect processes (for example, cultivating gratitude inhealthy people by means of the Three Good Things Exer-cise [Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005]) wouldpresumably be at the core of positive psychology. What ifone of these elements was negative, however? Three dif-ferent possibilities would satisfy this condition: the topog-raphy could be negative (for example, trying to reduceanxiety in healthy people by means of meditation), the tar-get population could be negative (for example, trying tocultivate gratitude in a clinical population by means of theThree Good Things Exercise), or the process could benegative (for example, trying to help cultivate gratitude inhealthy people by asking them to go without certain mod-ern conveniences for a time). Would these cases count aspositive psychology? What if two of the elements werenegative? Again, three different possibilities satisfy this

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condition: the topography and the target audience couldbe negative (for example, trying to help reduce anxiety inclinical populations through meditation), the topographyand the processes could be negative (for example, tryingto help reduce anxiety in healthy people by means of theABC model of resilience [Gillham & Reivich, 2004]), orthe target population and the processes could be negative(for example, trying to help cultivate gratitude in clinicalpopulations by asking them to watch documentaries aboutrefugees). Would these cases count as positive psychol-ogy? Presumably, the final possible permutation, where allthree elements are negative (for example, trying to reduceanxiety in clinical populations by means of cognitivebehavioral therapy), would not count as positive psychol-ogy (Figure 2).

(4) What is the relation between the complementaryand the comprehensive definitions of the positive? Afourth basic question for positive psychology arises fromasking about the relation between positive topography,positive target populations, and positive processes on theone hand, and the good life on the other. Is positive psy-chology primarily a complement to mainstream psychol-ogy, or a comprehensive approach to living life well? Isit chiefly about the best things in life, or about living thebest life we can? To cultivate the good life, it will not besufficient merely to study an ever-growing list of positivetopics, since not all things that seem good when consid-ered separately will fit into the good life, which alsorequires balance. This is a point the philosopher Leibniz(1952) understood when he was considering what makesfor a good world. He noted that such a world cannotsimply be a collection of all the good things we canimagine, since those things might not be able to coexist.

It was crucial, he argued, to consider ‘compossibles,’things that could exist together in a single world. A foodanalogy might be helpful here. Scientists have maderemarkable progress in identifying healthy vitamins andnutrients, but a healthy diet consists of more than simplyeating all the vitamins and nutrients one can. It alsoincludes balance among these things and moderation infinding just the right amount of each to eat. Similarissues rise to the fore in psychology when the goal isnot simply to identify all the correlates of well-being onecan but to understand and cultivate the good life.

Figure 1. Is positive psychology defined by the intersection, or the union of positive topography, positive target population, andpositive process?

Figure 2. There are a total of eight different possible permuta-tions of topography, target population, and processes.

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Kashdan and Steger (2011) rightly critique positive psy-chology for following the general trend in psychologicalresearch of being what they call ‘variable-centric,’ offocusing too much attention on ‘singular variables in iso-lation from the rest’ (p. 15). In this context, it will beimportant to have a solution to the second basic questionwe explored above, regarding the relation among variouspositives, as it will be necessary to make not just posi-tive choices, but optimal ones, selecting among all thegood options the ones that will be most conducive towell-being. In addition, in cases where good options arenot compossible, it will be necessary to make judgmentsamong these conflicting alternatives so as to select notjust those that are individually optimal, but those thatcombine together to maximize human flourishing. AsDiener (2003) has put it, ‘positive characteristics shouldnot be examined in isolation from the larger systems inwhich they are embedded’ (p. 118).

The situation, however, is even more complex thanthis. Life is composed of both opportunities and prob-lems, and a flourishing life involves both the skills neces-sary to take advantage of the opportunities and to copewith the problems. In this respect, the good life is akin togardening. Good gardening involves knowing how togrow things, but it also involves knowing how to prunesome plants and how to remove others entirely. Similarly,the good life is akin to the construction industry. Con-struction certainly requires knowing how to build, but italso requires knowing how to repair some buildings andhow to destroy others. A tension arises when Seligmanand Csikszentmihalyi (2000) argue that positive psychol-ogy is about growth and building and that it is also aboutthe good life. They are correct in pointing out that growthand building have all too often been given short shrift inour efforts to improve life, but their analysis is ambiva-lent as to whether positive psychology should properly bedefined as a corrective emphasis on certain positivethings or whether it should be an approach that balancesthe negatives that have been overemphasized in the pastwith the positives that have been underemphasized. Theirony here is that there is something more broadly posi-tive than positive psychology narrowly conceived;namely, this integrated psychology that focuses on anoptimal balance between the negative and the positive(Pawelski & Prilleltensky, 2005).

When writing for the general public, positivepsychologists often do take at least somewhat of anintegrated approach. In her book The How of Happiness,Lyubomirsky (2007), not surprisingly, covers ‘ExpressingGratitude’ and ‘Cultivating Optimism,’ but she alsoincludes sections on ‘Avoiding Overthinking and SocialComparison’ and ‘Managing Stress, Hardship, andTrauma’. Similarly, Diener and Biswas-Diener (2008) dis-cuss the former’s construct of subjective well-being in theirbook Happiness. One’s levels of subjective well-being can

be raised, among other ways, by experiencing more posi-tive emotions, experiencing fewer negative emotions, orboth. In the same vein, Fredrickson (2009), in her bookPositivity, emphasizes the importance of the ratio of posi-tive to negative emotions we experience and notes that thisratio can be raised either by increasing our positive emo-tions, or by decreasing our negative emotions, or both.

With this in mind, it will be important to have asolution to the first basic question we explored above,regarding the relation between the positive and the nega-tive, as the good life requires attention not just to thepositive things in life but also to the negative things.Positive psychologists have rightly pointed out that get-ting rid of the negative does not automatically bring thepositive, but it is also true that the presence of the posi-tive does not automatically do away with the negative.The good life requires the optimal overall balancebetween the positive and the negative. Simply ignoringthe negative is insufficient, since the presence of the pos-itive by itself does not guarantee well-being; and aimingfor the complete eradication of the negative seems likean unwise goal, since it appears unattainable in thisworld and since there are at least some cases of the posi-tive that depend on the negative (for example, post-trau-matic growth). The irony here is that a focus on positivetopography, positive target populations, and positive pro-cesses does not seem sufficient to achieve the overallgoal of the good life. Positive psychology narrowly con-ceived is not sufficient to achieve the field’s broad goalsof human flourishing. For these goals, all eight permuta-tions of these elements would be necessary, and in addi-tion an understanding of the right balance among theseeight approaches for the cultivation of well-being.

(5) Is the good life defined prudentially, or morally?A fifth basic problem in positive psychology concernsthe definition of the good life. Philosophers have longmade a distinction between what is good for a personand what is right for a person, between what isadvantageous and what is ethical, between what is nowreferred to as prudential value and moral value(Haybron, 2008; Pawelski, 2013b). In positive psychol-ogy, does the good life refer to the prudential life, or tothe moral life? As we have seen, Seligman (1999)hoped positive psychology would

articulate a vision of the good life that is empiricallysound and, at the same time, understandable and attrac-tive. We can show the world what actions lead to well-being, to positive individuals, to flourishing communi-ties, and to a just society. (p. 560)

Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) make a similarclaim, and in the Akumal Manifesto, Sheldon, Fredrickson,Rathunde, Csikszentmihalyi, and Haidt identify positivesubjective states, the good life/good person, and the goodsociety as important areas of study in the new field. When

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focusing on well-being, positive individuals, and positivesubjective states, positive psychologists seem to beemphasizing prudential values. When focusing on flour-ishing communities, a just society, the good person andthe good society, on the other hand, they seem to beemphasizing moral values. Clarity is important here sincethere are at least some cases where prudential and moralvalues seem to diverge, as when the captain and crew of asinking ship risk their lives to make sure the passengerssafely embark on lifeboats or when a volunteer leaves thesafety and comfort of her home to help those in need inanother part of the world. Is the primary goal of positivepsychology the support of prudential values, moral values,or some combination of them?

(6) What is meant by preference? A sixth basic prob-lem in positive psychology has to do with the definitionof preference. According to Seligman’s (2002) definitionin Authentic Happiness, the positive refers to what ispreferred. As we have already seen, this can be mosteasily understood as a simple preference, a preferencefor something over its absence. This definition providesa method for identifying the positive topography of psy-chology. The positive is not seen as extending over theentire domain of relative preference, however, as thisdefinition would be too broad and would include theentire domain of mainstream psychology, as well. Thisanalysis can help shed light on related observations thathave been made by researchers in the field. Sheldon(2011), for example, has argued that

all fields of psychology are positive sciences to theextent that the derived knowledge can be used to solveproblems and to improve what is in need of improve-ment … Obviously, however, the term ‘positive psychol-ogy’ is not very useful if it applies to all psychologists.Thus, I believe that the term positive psychology is bestreserved specifically for research into the ‘good’ side ofhuman life – topics such as gratitude (rather than jeal-ousy), forgiveness (rather than revenge), happiness(rather than depression), cooperation (rather than disrup-tive competition), and longevity (rather than prematuredeath). Positive psychology focuses directly on providingthe owner’s manual for human optimization – helpingpeople to go not from ‘awful’ to ‘OK’ (the focus ofprior, ‘negative’ psychology that in a sense focused pri-marily on negative topics like depression) but rather,from ‘OK’ to ‘awesome’. (Seligman, 2002, p. 423)

From the perspective of the present analysis, Sheldon isarguing that a definition of the positive in terms of rela-tive preference would be too broad in that it wouldinclude all of psychology, and that simple preferencewould provide the basis for a more proper definition foruse with the topographically and contextually positivedomains. Note that he seems to hold the topographicaland contextual definitions as coterminous and does notconsider the tensions within and between them that wehave explored above.

Although relative preference is too broad for definingthe domain of positive psychology, we have seen that itis still important on at least two levels. First, within thedomain of the positive, it is important to be able to com-pare the relative preference of two options to determinewhich is optimal. Second, since even healthy individualscannot always avoid things that are dispreferred, part ofhuman flourishing involves relative preferences amongthose things that are less dispreferred than others.

Investigating precisely what is meant by preferenceleads to further matters that need to be examined moredeeply. Traditionally, preference has been linked in eco-nomics to what people choose based on their desires.One obvious problem of this definition for the domain ofpositive psychology is that people do not always desirethings that lead to flourishing. Addicts, for example, maydesire another hit, but feeding their addiction is not con-ducive to their flourishing – and is not even somethingthey like. Hedonic theories of well-being have beenbased, not on what people desire, but on what peoplelike, on the subjective states to which people’s choiceslead. Seligman’s (2002) definition of preference inAuthentic Happiness tries to cover both of theseapproaches when he defines indifference both in terms ofpreference and in terms of felt emotion. As we haveseen, he defines ‘neutral’ as ‘the set of all circumstances,O’s, any member of which, when added to any event,does not make that event more preferred or dispreferred(approached or avoided) and does not increase ordecrease the felt emotion about that event’ (p. 277). Ifthe intended outcome is flourishing, however, there areother elements that might need to be considered, as well.Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2006), for example, haveargued that human flourishing should be defined in termsof getting certain basic needs met. Other approaches holdthat it is not so much what we want, or like, or need thatproperly governs human choice, but what we ‘ought’.For Immanuel Kant, for example, it is duty based in rea-son that should govern our choices, and for many reli-gions around the world, it is duty based in divinecommand that should do so. Clearly, positive psychologyturns out to be very different if it is indeed based in pref-erence and that preference turns out to be what iswanted, or what is liked, or what is needed, or what isrequired, or some combination of these.

A consideration of who is doing the preferring leadsto further complexities. Here are a few different options:

• a particular individual (in which case preferenceswould vary in accordance with individual differ-ences, socioeconomic status, gender, age, national-ity, and the like)

• a particular privileged individual or group of individ-uals (privileged according to some criterion of poweror of political, religious, or scientific authority)

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• an idealized individual• an idealized, privileged individual or group of indi-viduals (privileged according to some criterion ofknowledge, intelligence, rationality, wisdom, fair-ness, and the like)

• a random sample of individuals• all individuals (through some sort of democratic pro-cess requiring at least a degree of consensus)

• any individual (requiring no consensus with otherindividuals)

• a divine being (or an individual or group of individu-als claiming to know the divine will)

Clearly, what is positive would vary greatly with thesedifferent options.

Another important question to ask when trying tounderstand preference concerns the time referenceinvolved. Although preference understood in terms oflikes, needs, or requirements may be less susceptible tovariation here, the traditional notion of preference interms of desire satisfaction is quite labile. For example,Kahneman’s (2000) work showing that hedonic memo-ries of events are quite different from the actual hedonicexperiences of them, indicates that preferences will vary,depending on whether they originate from the remem-bered self or the experiencing self. Prospectively, econo-mists note the need for temporal discounting, sinceevents further in the future tend to be preferred lessstrongly to those same events nearer to the present. Athorough analysis of preference will need to take thistemporal dimension into account.

Still another set of questions arises from the work ofCacioppo (1994) and Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson(1999) about the dangers of averaging out desires andaversions. However preference is defined, it seems clearthat it is a second-order judgment, a summation of somekind of inclination and some kind of disinclination.Real-world opportunities almost always have pros andcons. The pros create desire, give rise to liking, meetneeds, and/or satisfy requirements, but the cons createaversion, give rise to dislike, do not meet needs, and/ordo not satisfy requirements. In situations where the proscannot be acquired without the cons, they must beweighed against each other to produce a single prefer-ence value. As we have already seen, however, this sum-mation masks much important information, and identicalpreference values can be derived from events close toindifference or events far from indifference, so long asthe pros and cons are nearly equal to each other.

(7) What is the fundamental definition of the termpositive (as a substantive vs. as a qualifier)? An overallconsideration of the nature of these definitions of thepositive leads to a final basic problem for positive psy-chology; namely, the fundamental definition of the term.

Each of the definitions analyzed here uses ‘positive’ as aqualifier. ‘Positive’ qualifies the orientation, topography,target audience, processes, and desired outcomes of thedomain. None of these definitions, however, actuallytries to explicate the meaning of the term ‘positive’itself. The final definition comes closest, defining thepositive in terms of preference. As we have seen, how-ever, the intention with this definition was to show thatthe positive and the negative are irreducible and not toprovide a comprehensive definition of the positive, oneon which the domain of positive psychology could begrounded.

This use of the positive as a qualifier is common inpositive psychology texts. The Encyclopedia of PositivePsychology (Lopez, 2009), for example, has 14 entriesusing positive to qualify terms – from ‘positive affectiv-ity’ to ‘positive youth development,’ yet it does nothave an entry for ‘positive’. This may seem appropriate,since this term is used to name the field, qualifying thetype of psychology that is at interest here. Given thecomplexity of the term, however, and the number ofvery different ways it is used, one sign of maturity ofthe domain of positive psychology would be a clearerunderstanding among researchers and practitioners ofhow they are using this fundamental term. A movetoward such clarity is one of the key goals of this pre-sent investigation.

Conclusion

This brings to a close the descriptive analysis of themeaning of the positive in positive psychology. Thisanalysis has shown that seminal early documents in posi-tive psychology contain six discrete meanings of the pos-itive, laying out the orientation, topography, targetpopulation, types of processes, and set of ultimate aimsof positive psychology, and seeking to show that thepositive is not reducible to the negative. This analysishas also revealed considerable tensions that arise withinand among these definitions and has pointed to sevenfoundational questions that arise from these tensions.These matters are difficult and complex, and much morework is needed to think through each of these founda-tional questions in careful detail.

In Part II (Pawelski, 2016), we will turn from look-ing at the ways the positive has been defined in positivepsychology in the past to ways in which the positiveshould be defined moving forward. We will begin with alexical analysis of the term, looking for helpful cluesfrom the etymology of the word. Then we will make anumber of key distinctions which will allow for a formu-lation of a normative definition of the positive designedto help avoid some of the confusions hindering currentwork in the field.

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AcknowledgmentsI would like to express my sincere gratitude to the followingindividuals for their support, encouragement, and reading ofdrafts as this project took shape: Gordon Bermant, NormanBradburn, John Cacioppo, Jeremy Clifton, Ed Diener, RobertEmmons, Sandra Foster, Daniel Haybron, Eranda Jayawickreme,Daniel Kahneman, Margaret Kern, Kristján Kristjánsson, JohnLachs, Jeanne Nakamura, John Pawelski, Ruth Pawelski, SuzannPileggi Pawelski, Ann Roepke, Sydney Rubin, Barry Schwartz,Martin Seligman, Chris Stewart, Margarita Tarragona, LouisTay, Joar Vittersø, Alan Waterman, David Yaden, members ofthe Seligman Lab, students in the Master of Applied PositivePsychology (MAPP) program at the University of Pennsylvania,and the reviewers at the Journal of Positive Psychology.

Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

FundingThis publication was made possible through the support of agrant from Templeton Religion Trust. The opinions expressedin this publication are those of the author and do not necessar-ily reflect the views of Templeton Religion Trust.

Note1. Although it lies outside the scope of the current project,

the discussion of valence in emotion theory may be ofinterest to some readers. (See Colombetti, 2005;Kristjansson, 2003; Solomon & Stone, 2002.)

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