The meaning of the boundary and the boundary of the meaning

Extended version of a paper presented at First EastBordNet Conference

"Remaking Borders", Catania, Sicily 20-22 January 2011

The meaning of the boundary

and the boundary of the meaning

Thomas Mavrofides Ph.D. Department of Cultural Technology & Communication, Aegean University,

Sapphous & Arionos, Mytilene, GR-81100, Greece. tel: +302251036617, fax: +30 22510 36617

e-mail: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]



Abstract

Boundaries, are functioning as operational delimiters between discrete entities.

In fact, the 'distinguishability' of the entities (whichever they may be, tangible or

intangible) is possible only the basis of the construction of boundaries, which function

as indicators (of this-side/the-other-side, in/out etc.).

Therefore the very notion of existence is based on the ability to construct

boundaries, an ability that is recursively reconstructed, as the experience is

reformulating itself (as memory), combined with the expectations (the design of the

future) of a psychic or social system.

Boundaries can be re-arranged but the notion of boundaries is never dropped:

the autopoietic closure of a self-referential system is never violated. That is, the

operational closure of a self-referential system delineated by boundaries cannot be

transgressed without catalyzing the system itself. The self-referential system can be

said to be the form that itself reproduces. George Spencer Brown introduced an

interesting calculus of forms, that offered coherent grounds upon which the

sociologist Niklas Luhmann drew his ground-breaking theory, and biologist

Humberto Maturana presented his own approach on the origins of self-consciousness

(and therefore of the very idea of boundaries). We elaborate on this conceptual

framework from a systems theoretical perspective and try to see the advantages it

offers, in respect with the problem of paradoxes emerging in the modern society.

Introduction

The problem we are trying to tackle here is the problem of boundaries. How

can boundaries come about, how can it be possible that boundaries emerge (as it

were) as intersubjective objects? We reckon that the concept of boundaries is

inseparable from the concept of the world: the world is constructed solely due to

boundaries that are flexible, spatiotemporal defined and thus spatiotemporal

dependent. We also believe that the boundaries - and hence the world itself - are



invented in a recursive operation of distinctions and indications, i.e. observations that

are manifested through descriptions and injunctions, that is: communication.

In the first part of this paper, we argue on the importance of boundaries as

world-constituting delimitations. We try to show that the meaning of the boundaries

in general, is equivalent with the notion of the world, thus actually identifying

distinctions as prerequisites for meaning construction. In the second part we focus on

the limits of meaning construction, the problems arising from the fact that the horizon

of the meaning is bounded, although we cannot know its limits. In our investigation,

we follow the paradigm of contemporary systems theory as elaborated by the late

German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. Finally, in the last part we focus on the

boundaries as paradox-fostering structures, and we examine the possibilities of

dealing successfully with the problems those paradoxes entail.

The systems theory paradigm focuses on the distinction [system/environment]

or put simpler, [inside/outside] (of a self-referential system). The classic ontological

distinction [being/not-being] is avoided here, since it carries an inherent problem: it

cannot conform to the demand of the unity of a distinction - that is to grasp both sides

of a distinction - since not-being is beyond any possibility of investigation

(Wittgenstein, 1978, thesis 7). Unity though, as we will see, is important in any

operation of distinction since it offers the ground upon which a distinction can

become temporal and thus subject to change. Contemporary systems theory

incorporates the theory of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980) - that is, the

model of self-referential systems that continuously catalyze/create their own

constitutive elements through their own internal operations that are carried out by

those certain elements. Thus, systems theory instead of theorizing the world as a

nexus of interconnected stable structures, approaches the phenomena of life (in our

case: social systems) as manifestations of interdependent and ever changing

distinctions-in-the-world, distinctions made by autopoietic systems, and for

autopoietic systems: social and psychic systems communicate exchanging

descriptions and thus triggering their own information producing processes. The

world then becomes an ever changing articulation of inherently unstable structures

(i.e. autopoietic systems) that owe their existence in their own instability and that of

their environment (i.e. other systems, or the world in general).



The meaning of the boundary

According to George Spencer-Brown (2008: 1), '…a distinction is drawn by

arranging a boundary with separate sides so that a point on one side cannot reach the

other side without crossing the boundary'; concurrently a 'universe comes into being'

(Maturana and Varela, 1980: 73). In any distinction, a binary operation takes over the

realm of conception: something is in one side of the boundary and not in the other.

One could probably refute this assertion, pointing out that something could lie right

on the boundary, and hence occupy a third discrete place, different than the two sides

of the distinction. This though would be only a trick of the language, since in such a

case, a point could be either on the boundary or not, and therefore we'd find ourselves

again confronted with a different, but yet again binary distinction.

It follows that the boundaries operate as delimiters, indicating spaces, contents

or states that - for any reason - can be considered as different (Spencer-Brown, 2008:

1). This could mean a difference in the visual perception, acoustical, smelling, or any

kind of stimuli for that matter; it could also indicate a shift in conception. Hence

discontinuities must be indicated, in order for the world to come forth. Consider for

instance, a white piece of paper. Initially, nothing can be distinguished in the paper. If

we now draw a figure using a black marker or pen, the paper is cloven into two areas:

a black one, and the rest that remains white. Now each of the two parts may be

indicated since they differ in colour. The black figure (it could just be a dot) offered

the ground upon which two different wholes can be indicated. Put another way, one

action created two distinguishable entities. This is to say that the minimum possible

universe consists of two sides at least, so that at any given moment one boundary (at

minimum) can be detected. Thus, it is reasonable to say that no distinction can refer to

only one entity: in any case, two is the minimum number when it comes to matters of

being.



Figure 1: The minimum possible universe

We need to note here that what is presented in Figure 1 - and the following

figures - is a unified approach of a distinction that is an approach that presents both

sides. As we will see later, this is rarely the case, a fact that triggers paradoxes.

Of course, to speak about a boundary, a distinction, an entity, a whole, a

system or a thing in general, there has to be an indication: that is, someone has to

indicate it. Heinz von Foerster (2003: 210), quite aptly notes: 'Let there be vision: and

there was light', paraphrasing the introduction of the book of 'Genesis', and

underlining the important of an observer capable of seeing so that the term 'light' can

become meaningful.

And this observer is obviously another system (e.g. a psychic or social

system). Distinction is a deliberate operation rather than the outcome of passive

perception. We could of course assume that there are a priori differences in our

environment and all we have to do is to encounter them. But following that vein we

would quickly find ourselves trapped into logical contradictions. If we return to our

white paper and try to make a mark using white ink, we can easily realize that it is the

chromatic difference that actualizes the distinction (to be sure: the potential of

distinction) - a white mark on a white background allows no distinction. But even if

we used a coloured ink, a blind observer would not be able to make any visual

distinctions. It is thus evident, that only a difference can make a distinction possible;

and also, we infer that in order to make a certain distinction (i.e. to encounter a certain

difference) a specific kind of observer is needed.

We will examine the limitations of the observing system (or, simply: 'the

observer') in the second part of this paper; at this point, we would like to introduce

Gregory Bateson's famous definition of information:



Of this infinitude [of differences], we select a very limited number,

which become information. In fact, what we mean by information - the

elementary unit of information - is a difference which makes a

difference, and it is able to make a difference because the neural

pathways along which it travels and it is continually transformed are

themselves provided with energy. The pathways are ready to be

triggered. We may even say that the question is already implicit in

them. (Bateson, 2000: 459).

Without further investigation, we can draw some inferences from this

definition: (1) only differences (i.e. changes through time, or different aspects of

concurrent phenomena) produce information. Continua do not produce information;

therefore a steady environment does not contribute to information, and (2) not every

difference accounts as information - i.e. distinctions are drawn in an abstraction,

which of course is the result of another distinction(s).

The first inference poses a problem to anyone trying to trivialize his

environment. To explain this, we must note that we do not consider the operation of

distinction a trivial phenomenon, at least the way us humans usually experience it.

Distinctions are triggered by motives and motives emerge when the contents of a

whole seem to differ in value (Spencer-Brown, 2008: 1). But which is the basal

distinction (assuming of course that such a thing exists), that is which is the

distinction that allows an observer to draw any distinction at all? We reckon -

following Jean Piaget (1977), Heinz von Foerster (2003) and Humberto Maturana

(2005) that the basal distinction an observer has to make and retain throughout his life

is the distinction I/Thou.

Figure 2: The basal distinction



That is, an initial and basal distinction, as presented in figure 2, is made by the

observer1, it cuts him off the world, and concurrently creates the self and everything

else that is attributed to the world; consequently then, the basal distinction emerges

together with the concept of unity, namely: the being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 2006).

But as we already saw from Bateson's definition, only differences attribute to

distinctions; therefore, differences must be detected in order for someone to be able to

continuously reconstruct oneself as a difference from anything else. At this point it is

useful to resort again to Gregory Bateson (2000: 205), and introduce a less famous -

in a manner of speaking - passage from his writings: '...the term "ego function" (as

used when a schizophrenic is described as having 'weak ego function') is precisely the

process of discriminating communicational modes either within the self or between

the self and others'2.

Figure 3: The 'ego function' according to Bateson. The distinction I/Thou is assimilated

(cf. Piaget 1977) within the self.

Bateson's view is important because it draws clear boundaries around the

function of 'ego', thus offering a clear distinction between 'I' and 'Thou': the latter

signifies the experience, the stimuli that are conceived as experience - that is the

perception - whereas the former pertains to the reflections over the perception that is,

the conception (see figure 4). 'Thou' is assimilated inside 'I', as a vital factor of a

1 Note that that in figure 2, the lower part introduces George Spencer-Brown's (2008) original

notation: the vertical line denotes the distinction, and the horizontal denotes the indication - that is

which side to observe. 2 Emphasis in original



continuous - and solely internal - function of discernment; 'Thou' is presupposed -

hence the appearance of a 'Thou' token at the left side of the self-boundary in Figure 3

- and becomes a constitutive factor for 'I'. What emerges from this analysis is a notion

of operational closure of 'ego', which presents a problem for the representationalism:

if ego is operationally closed, how can the common ground of communication come

about?

Figure 4: The internal processing of the experience

The distinction between conception and perception in combination with the

pragmatic assumption that communication does exist, implies that communication is

about conceptions. Communication incorporates and manages - so to speak -

descriptions of perceptions, rather than sheer experience per se; it is an externalization

of the experience (conception) of the experience (perception)3. And communication

continuously seeks for common ground in order to unfold itself, since into every

conception lays the certainty (of 'I'), of the uncertain ways every 'Thou' construes the

facts: this certainty of the uncertainty is what triggers communication and attracts it to

higher complexity (Mavrofides et al, 2011). Additionally, communicative actions

reveal the distinctions an observer (the 'transmitter') selects and concurrently unfolds

his own general view of the world, namely, the forms he constructs in order to tackle

complexity.

Now, we know that experience has a very peculiar characteristic: it changes,

or it vanishes. As Luhmann (1995: 67) notes, '... a piece of information that is

repeated is no longer information. It retains its meaning in repetition but looses its

value as information'. This approach, leads to a problematic view of the notion of

control, namely of one's control over his environment: if we manage to make our

environment completely predictable, an accurate representation of our mind (or our

3 Of course, conceptualizations and therefore concepts too, are not bounded in a deterministic

fashion by perception, although triggered by the latter; to beg the different leads to an inability to

explain the phenomenon of change and is inherent in representationalism.



mind an accurate representation of the environment, that is achieve omniscience),

then no information could be elicited from it (the environment); that is, there will not

be any distinctions to draw since all differences would have been assimilated, and the

basic operation that makes distinctions ('ego') would collapse; and experience, or in

other words, life, would halt. Were we to get there, we would only lose our ability to

distinguish, and therefore we would lose our ability to exist. As George Spencer-

Brown (2008: 182) puts it, '[I]f the being itself can not be found, then nor can the

universe'.

The second inference from Bateson's definition of information implies

abstraction, which takes us right into the core of the concept of boundaries:

boundaries create forms4 that allow the operation of observation through the

demarcation of specific wholes against anything else that remains in the unmarked

space. Therefore, wholes are created out of the whole. It is very rarely the case that a

distinction indicates both of its sides5 (i.e. is interested in achieving unity); usually, a

distinction indicates something as a prominent phenomenon against a background that

is left - for the time - unobserved. An entity in-the-world is constructed by cutting-off

a part of the world and marking against its environment, which temporarily becomes

the unmarked space (Spencer-Brown, 2008). The observer, if needed, adopts a token

as a mark of the entity in interest, thus assuring his ability to create a description of

his experience for communicational purposes. And it is evident, that the observer does

not choose a token arbitrarily, but bounded by pre-established norms inherent in the

language he uses - to be sure: the language he was taught to use, or perhaps more

precisely, the language inside which he too was defined. To sum up in a simpler way,

the observer always lives in an abstraction, in a contingent environment the

contingency of which is enforced by the differences between different observers: no

observer is a replica of anybody else; therefore, no one lives in the same environment

with anyone else. Our motivations differ, and so our distinctions - consequently our

environments are different. And exactly this, the different observations that lead

4 Consider for instance the role of outlines in the phenomenon of vision, or the experience of

music against noise. 5 Indicating both sides of a distinction leads to the case of second-order observation, that is,

the observation over a pre-existing observation: a distinction over an existing distinction (Luhmann N.,

1995).



inescapably to different descriptions (due to different distinctions) is what makes the

plurality of the world.

All these of course entail an old problem: what about reality - is not reality

self-evident and if not so, are we to resort to solipsism? Wittgenstein (1978: thesis

4.05) points out that 'Reality is compared with propositions' and we could as well

reverse this thesis: Propositions are compared against reality. Then, we could say

that although reality remains unknown (Luhmann, 2002: 128-152), for we do not have

direct access to it been restricted by our own biological apparatus, we can still refer to

it legitimately as a test bed of our own distinctions. So, from a constructivist point of

view, we do not question reality (for reality is), but instead the constructions made up

on it. This creates 'Life as polycontexurality', as analyzed by Gotthard Günther

(2004): the fact that we live in a common environment, does not mean that we arrange

our perceptions in the same manner, and the possible fact that we make the same

distinction does not mean that we arrived there following the same trajectory.

Therefore, different contextures co-exist multiplexed into the same context (the

world).

This means that our distinctions are in fact our selections: we select to draw

this distinction and not any one of the others available. We thus select a view of the

world, and we do so in accordance with our own motives (whether we reflect upon

our motivations or not). But this also means that we could have selected a different

distinction - in fact we do so if our initial selection proves false when tested against

reality. So we retain the ability to change the boundaries we draw in accordance to our

needs; we retain the right to say at any moment, that the world could be otherwise

(Rasch, 2000: 143).

Reality can only come about as an articulation of events; events are indicated,

and their indication constructs the world: 'The world is the totality of facts, not of

things… The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts… The

facts in logical space are the world '(Wittgenstein L., 1978: thesis 1.1, 1.11, 1.13). But

the question is: how can facts (events) become meaningful? We argue that meaning-

construction is the classification of the events perceived, thus resulting to conception

(i.e. meaning). An event perceived can be classified in many different ways (different

classes) and therefore it can be construed within different conceptualizations. Even if

the classes are not stable structures, even if they are continuously catalyzed and



recreated thus changing their essence (i.e. what it is that they could contain), the point

is that the process of classification runs circularly assuring the meaning-construction -

if of course it is feasible for the observing system. And if classification is not feasible

within the available classes, a new class can always be constructed and be interrelated

meaningfully with the pre-existing classes, that is, the psychic or social system can

rearrange its contexture and thus retain its coherence by connecting the new form(s)

to older ones and therefore assure the continuity of the meaning (and also invent and

continuously affirm the notion of time during that process).

Thus, distinction is a twofold selection: the observer selects whatever is of

interest, through abstraction which of course is a preliminary classification - a

distinction between meaningful/not-meaningful events, and subsequently the selection

of the event as fact. It goes then without saying that drawing boundaries is what

makes the world, the world. Or, put reversely, the world cannot exist without

boundaries. Boundaries are the meaning of the world: the meaning of the boundary is

the world; or condensed: the meaning of the boundary is the meaning.

The boundary of the meaning

On the other hand, are we really free to select any kind of distinction we wish?

As we already said, the differences encountered are depending on the observer; for

example, it is evident that a human being cannot make distinctions in the infrared

spectrum of radiation for example, for he cannot perceive any colour beyond the

visible spectrum of light. But we argue that the biological sensors are not the only

kind of specialized inputs a person or a social system has.

To begin with, we said that distinctions are depended on motivations. Put

another way this means that the distinctions constructed by the observing systems

depend on their expectations. The problem now shifts to the question how are

expectations formed. We reckon that expectations are time bounded in a literal sense.

What the system has experienced is called 'memory', and it is continuously

reconstructed as present experience enriches it (Rosenfield, 1992). This is a way to

say that memory is not a representation of experience, but rather a construction

triggered by experience and concurrently revised and reconstructed: experience does

not aggregate in memory (if at all) but basically circularly transforms it.



Figure 5: Observing systems in time

What we call 'the past' is a re-conceptualization of our own prior distinctions,

of the boundaries we chose to draw, the classifications we made so to produce

meaning (i.e. to classify the events we selected to notice and construe); the past also

incorporates the contingencies that have been rejected, the meanings that could have

been constructed but they never did - the explanations that could have been selected

but they were not. And on the other hand, the 'future' is something that never happens:

we only live right here and now. But still, future is the most important notion for an

observer, for it is the planning of a different future that simulates any kind of

selection.

Let's try to elaborate on this. Self-referential systems act (i.e. select) right here

and now (see figure 5), influenced by what has already happened (according to them

of course) and what kind of future they plan for themselves-in-relation-to-the-world.

Every time they make a selection, their environment changes due to that selection.

And they feed back the new state of affairs into their own input (gaining new

experience) and thus move on to the next selection. Of course, what we called a 'new

state of affairs' is what they select to distinguish in their environment. It follows that

the change in their environment could very well be a result of their own (previous)

selections and, in a broader sense, even if it is not (i.e. it is a change beyond their

control), the fact is that they select to assume a change - and this assumption is

definitely their own selection. As soon as a change enters a system's input it becomes

a fact-in-the-past, and the system is forced to newer selections (i.e. distinctions). But



concerning that the self-referential system undertakes action(s) only to change a state

of affairs (even if it is a conservative action that aims changes in order to avoid other

transformations), it is deduced that those actions are in fact bounded by the systems

own perceptions, conceptions and expectations. So, the observing self-referential

system is bounding itself.

Referring again to Bateson's aforementioned definition, we can draw two more

inferences, namely: (1) the observer conceives of his environment by placing

questions and namely only those questions he is able to form and (2) the types of

sensors a system has (i.e. inputs) among with their pathways, bound what the system

can conceive as information, and as a consequence the system is inevitably bounded

into a specific abstraction of its environment. That is, the environment of the system

is an abstraction of its contingent environment. 'We deduce that if the system finds a

way to develop new sensors, its environment expands' (Mavrofides et al, 2011: 6).

The meaning then, is bounded by the operational abilities of the sensors a

system has at its disposal. Although an observing system can construct new wholes

(that is: impose new distinctions upon its environment) through its own

conceptualizations, there's always an impenetrable limit, namely the unthinkable, or

put simpler, not-being.

Figure 6: A general classification of conceptualizations

Figure 6, presents a classification of what we consider to be the most general

classes of meaning; we reckon that they are representative - for any practical purpose

- of the most general categories that incorporate meaning-construction. It should be

noticed though that not-being remains always as an outer boundary that is identified

with the unthinkable and is never reached; that is, a crossing to the outer side is

forbidden and no injunction can realize it.



From the side of being though, everything plays. In fact, every social system

functions so as to facilitate crossings from the right to the left. For instance, figure 7

presents our conception on certain social systems, namely the political system,

science and religion. This of course is only indicative, just a demonstration of how

certain social systems can be combined with the conception we unfold here.

Figure 7: Systems as boundary-crossing operands

The boundaries in Figure 7 could be considered fixed, but crossings are

permitted (and are in fact realized) with the help of certain structures; and admittedly,

in order to avoid a very lengthy discussion here, we skipped in our drawing the most

salient structure of them all, namely language.

An important aspect though, is that as one crosses from the inside to the

outside (left to right), the uncertainty increases: all the systems that emerge through

the human activity, target to the opposite side that is, to reduce uncertainty (entropy)



as presented in Figure 8:

Figure 8: A generalization of Figure 7

Life, is about crossings from the right to the left, about realizing (or trying to realize)

certain conceptions. As we analyzed elsewhere (Mavrofides et al, 2011) those

crossings eventually trigger uncertainty anew, creating emergent complexity and thus

motivating again the efforts to move to the left. It is important to note at this point,

that although we reckon the distinctions in Figures 6 to 8 to be general, the contents

within the delimiters differ drastically from person to person, or from social system to

social system. It is evident that something that is impossible for a specific psychic or

social system could be trivial for another one; one could for instance consider possible

to make a trip to USA, whereas another one, could consider this an impossible

perspective, due to lack of money, or physical disabilities, or whatever reason. Or,

different cultures favor the emergence of different 'cultural sensors': it is evident that

what could be considered actual for one culture - for instance certain manifestations

of 'sin' in a religious culture - could be just irrelevant and by no means actual for

another culture - (e.g. as sin/bad/unaccepted) in a western secular culture.

Conclusively, self-referential systems due to their continuously reconstructed

self-reference, bound their own meaning-construction capability (through abstraction)

and therefore bound the (better: their) world. This is to say that, to retain the ability to

construct meaning depends on the ability to bound meaning-construction.



Borders as paradoxes

This of course is paradox. But is it just a wit, or is it something that could push

our analysis onward? As we already argued, when a distinction is made, following

Spencer-Brown's (2008: 3) injunction 'draw a distinction', a recursive process takes

over existence; this process could be condensed to the following steps:

1. Draw a distinction.

2. Identify the objects that emerge due to that distinction and their

interrelations.

3. Call the totality of those things (objects, relations, classes of objects

and of relations), 'the world'.

4. Go to step 1.

Usually, we live our lives in a world that is as it is (Rasch, 2000: 130-133). It

would be very impractical to question the multitude of distinctions around us, and we

could never be able to deal with the incommensurable complexity of our environment,

were we to drop abstraction as a basic function. But still, our conceptions change. So,

is the world as it is? We reckon that it is indeed, for every practical purpose; but at the

same time, and for similar practical purposes it should be questioned; which of course

poses another paradox.

Let us try to focus on those paradoxes. To say that 'the world is as it is', means

to draw the distinction presented in Figure 8. 'As it is' lies in the side of the

actual/possible, but the other sides play a critical role too: they encompass the

potentiality for change and can always be crossed towards actual/possible thus

unfolding a multitude of futures. In that distinction, the unthinkable has always to

remain an ever unmarked space. Thus, to draw a distinction is always a double

selection: two sides are defined, and always something remains to the realm of the

unthinkable; as we already argued, every distinction pushes the unthinkable farther

away but never diminishes it - the outermost limit remains indefinitely intact.



The paradoxes start to rise when a distinction that indicates one side and not

the other remains concealed. That is, an observation, if it is not observed as such (as a

fact or as a possibility), lays the groundwork for future paradoxes to emerge. In order

to grasp the nature of the problem, we need to recall that - as we already argued in this

paper - the minimum possible number is two - or else no universe can come into

being. Put simpler, it means that an operation that eliminates certain sides of

distinctions constrains the access to other views and banishes certain options. It tries

to diminish the distance between the actual and the unthinkable, not (presumably) by

a massive access of the discrete conceptual realms from the left to the right (as

presented in figure 8) - that would be admittedly difficult due to the problem of

complexity - but rather by condensing the realms of [[possible/impossible]/unknown],

pushing their contents far to the right, into the space of the unthinkable. Thus, a

failure of observation of the observation eradicates the possibilities of treating

paradoxes successfully, as it tries to stabilize certain descriptions of the world, against

other possible descriptions that might emerge through its contingency. In a few words,

the eradication of certain possibilities pushes the whole idea 'the world could be

otherwise' to the realm of the unthinkable.

Let us use an example to understand the problem. It is very typical for a

western scientist to reject the distinction better-culture/worse-culture; evaluating

cultures is pure racism and we could end up with all kinds of unethical inferences and

antihuman actions; so far so good. But, on the other hand, there was a time that this

kind of evaluation was very common and was considered quite justified in the

Occidental culture. So here runs the question: which culture is better, the one we had

before, or the one we live in now? If - for any reason - we decide to answer this

dilemma, we are falling into the trap of evaluating cultures: we become racists. If we

label both cultures as acceptable, we become racists again, for we tolerate racism.

And yet, we do make the distinction and we - as outcomes of the modern era - are

selecting to exclude racism from our theoretical apparatus. Furthermore, we reject

every contemporary culture that evaluates cultures - and so we become what we

reject. Therefore, the rejection of exclusion leads to exclusion. That is, if we fail to

see that the selection of inclusion excludes exclusion, we are trapped into a concealed



paradox6. Nevertheless this is a paradox that usually is concealed, or when revealed, it

is tackled by another distinction, for instance private/public (Rasch, 2000).

How can we find a way out of this circular trap? We reckon that the answer

lies into the function of distinguish our own distinctions. The distinction of a

distinction that is, a second-order observation (Foerster von H., 2003) restores the

unity of the original distinction, introducing both sides among with the operation that

splits them apart. This of course is another distinction, but in a higher logical level.

The major distinction that creates the problem we described is scientific/not-scientific.

This distinction, like any distinction severs the unity of the world, and it does so as

long as it remains obscured or undisputable. So we end up with the idea that 'our

science is better' and consequently that 'our science is the only science', so there's only

one science, and finally: only one truth. And we find ourselves back to the theology of

the dark ages, only now with us in the role of the high priests. This is to say that we

end up including what we originally excluded in order to create a space called

'science'. A more important distinction is very well hidden here though, namely the

distinction [true/false]: our science is true.

We are - as we can see - still trapped into paradoxes that change their nature,

but they never vanish. Every attempt to resolve a paradox creates a new one. But

those paradoxes emerge as such, only when indicated - that is when a new distinction

is imposed on them; as Luhmann notes: 'The communication of paradoxes fixes

attention on the frames of common sense, frames that normally go unattended'

(Luhmann, 2002: 81). Does all that mean that we cannot avoid paradoxes? In short,

yes. This of course is a problem for anyone seeking final answers (final theories), but

not for anybody else. In fact it is the quest for final answers that triggers paradoxes; if

the finality of any theory is disputed then the paradoxes are not a problem: for - at any

time - the distinction that led to a theory can be dropped, changed, re-arranged, or

denied. But in order to do this we need to distinguish this distinction and try to grasp

it in its unity; then we could as well scrutinize it and perhaps leave it aside, by

changing temporarily our focus to the distinction [practical/impractical]. This would

not eradicate paradoxes - for we do not intend to suggest practicality as a final theory,

6 At this point, it might be useful to check again Figure 3, where Thou is indeed included

within Self; that is, a case where the excluded is encompassed within the included.



since it is the outcome of a distinction too - but could contingently render them

harmless.

As Husserl (2002: 20) notes:

Sciences are creations of the spirit which are directed to a certain end, and

which are for that reason to be judged in accordance with that end. The same

holds of theories, validations and in short of everything we call a 'method'.

Whether a science is truly a science, or a method a method, depends on

whether it accords with the aims that it strives for.

This passage from Husserl, offers a more or less solid instrument so to

produce distinctions that can judge other distinctions. We have argued elsewhere

(Mavrofides et al, 2010) that science is a social system, defined by a special network

of communicative actions that circularly creates descriptions (through distinctions)

and continuously re-arranges them for practical reasons, thus triggering a process

known as scientific evolution; the same holds for every social system: the world

changes by re-arranging the boundaries that delineate distinctions. To be sure though,

we need to stress an important aspect: crossing the boundary of a certain distinction,

does not necessarily indicate change. Only by dropping a distinction (i.e. erase the

boundary) can the phrase 'the world could be otherwise' become meaningful. And the

sine qua non in order to drop a distinction is to discern it: to change a distinction

means to firstly detect it as such. Admittedly, this could be considered trivial - but is it

always so? As Heinz von Foerster showed (von Foerster, 2002, 2003) a second-order

observation is needed in order to distinguish a distinction: a distinction is a first-order

observation, and therefore the distinction of the distinction is a second-order

observation. If we immerse ourselves unconsciously - in a manner of speaking - into a

world articulated by first-order observations, our capability for change is undermined:

the world becomes given. Of course, as Maturana and Varela (1998: 40) point out, the

function of distinction '...is a commonplace situation and not unique; we are

necessarily and permanently immersed in it'; but this does not mean we should drop

our ability to impose this operation (i.e. observation) upon itself (to be sure:

ourselves). For instance, the Popperian injunction to seek falsification actually calls

for tests upon the pre-existing conceptions (Popper, 2003). To cross the boundary of a



distinction and opt for the other side of it means only to change the indication; but to

cross the boundary that produced that certain distinction is an operation of a higher

logical level, whose need becomes evident every time a deadlock emerges. This is to

say that, every time a paradox becomes intolerable then a second order observation is

needed, for only this operation can guarantee a qualitative shift. As Spencer-Brown

(2008: 84) notes: 'It is only by arresting or fixing the use of these principles at some

stage that we manage to maintain a universe in any form at all, and our understanding

of such a universe comes not from discovering its present appearance, but in

remembering what we originally did to bring it about'.

Resolving the paradoxes

We now have an instrument at our disposal, the way Husserl argues, but in a

generalized form so to examine paradoxes that could be of interest. To exemplify on

the advantages and drawbacks of that instrument we will try to examine the paradox

of employing the concept of deregulation in order to achieve the best possible world,

as suggested by some scholars in the economic field (Smith C, 2006). The concept

implied here, is of course the famous 'invisible hand' of the markets, and we will

examine it very briefly in order to avoid a very lengthy discussion on the economical

and political implications that are beyond the scope of this paper. As we already

argued, we will try to employ the methodology of discerning the distinctions, and see

if there are any paradoxes, and how critical (i.e. problematic) these may be.

Firstly, the more obvious paradox is that the idea to 'deregulate in order to…'

is self-contradictory since it implies a targeted order that will (supposedly) emerge

through a rejection of order. So a first problem with this idea is how are we to know

that the order that has emerged (supposedly following the deregulation) is sufficient

and we do not need to initiate a new circle of deregulation(s). Or, in other words, is

deregulation an infinite process, or is it a phase, a kind of revolutionary shift -

something that would resemble somewhat the Marxian utopias?

Let us try now to reveal the immanent distinctions that delineate the concept

of the invisible hand. The suggestion to employ deregulation is evidently an

injunction: do deregulate; as such, it draws a boundary and indicates one side of it:

[deregulation/regulation]. As we see, regulation falls to the unmarked side of the



boundary. The typical paradox of any distinction appears again: [deregulate-as-a-

rule/regulate]; or more clearly [regulate-so-to-deregulate/regulate]. We could present

this injunction also as 'legislate so to abolish legislation', which makes the paradox

more apparent. So the paradox is clear; but is it a problem? We reckon it is, since the

concept of regulation, if put at the unmarked side undermines the whole concept of

the meaning of the boundary as unfolded hereto; it is so, because the concepts of

regulation and boundary are conceptually identical. This is to say that, the suggestion

of deregulation in fact questions the whole conceptual framework created - and

continuously reconstructed - by the psychic and social systems. On the other hand, as

we have argued elsewhere (Mavrofides et al, 2011) uncertainty (i.e. deregulation) is

'…the raison d’ être of the systemic phenomenon (i.e. organization)…', so are not we

self-contradicting? We think we don't. What is important is that every kind of social

system - and this includes institutions too - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty;

the whole idea of organization is a means to oppose entropy. And, it is evident that

every emergent solution (i.e. structure) to that problem reconstructs complexity and

therefore fosters new aspects of uncertainty that in turn retrigger the quest for new

solutions; and this is what we call evolution (Mavrofides et al, 2011). But every step

in that process is based on the memory of the systems engaged (i.e. the past that

encompasses and evaluates the previous selections) and their own expectations (i.e.

the future). And those expectations are converging to common actions, i.e. common

distinctions, in order to be realized by - and for - several distinct autopoietic systems

that function in co-existence. Admittedly then, one could speak of a 'regulated

deregulation', that is, a bounded deregulation. That approach though, renders the

concept of the invisible hand meaningless and attracts us to the systemic concept of

double contingency (Luhmann, 1995: 103-136).

Double contingency is a term coined by Talcott Parsons referring to the

circular process of the self-regulation of a highly differentiated society, such as the

modern world (or 'post-modern' for that matter). That is, according to Luhmann

(1995) who elaborated excessively on that theory, social order, or 'spontaneous order'

(Smith C, 2006) is the outcome of the co-existence of autonomous and autopoietic

(self-creating) complex systems. Those systems owe their coherence on a continuous

state of becoming - rather than being - triggered endlessly by the fact that they

conceive of the other similar systems in their environment as contingent. As this



situation holds for every autopoietic system, be it a person or a social system, the

empirical fact of co-existence becomes highly improbable (Luhmann, 1995;

Habermas, 2003) - yet it is evident. This creates a paradox that is solved by

employing the - also paradoxical - concept of double contingency: every autopoietic

system bounds its own contingency by its own means; it imposes boundaries upon

itself - in other words it self-regulates. In doing so, autopoietic systems construct a

common7 minimum environment that favours each other's autopoiesis.

Let us try a very simple example: when we ride on our car, we take implicitly

as granted that neither us, nor everybody else conceives of driving as a kind of fun,

like say bumper cars. Were we (or the others) to forget this, the consequences might

be unbearable. So, each driver bounds his self and an order emerges 'spontaneously'.

Of course, as we know, accidents happen. And some drivers are more contingent than

others. This is why a framework of regulations is used in order to condition the whole

process. Those regulations reflect the history of the social system, that is, they are a

manifestation of its memory, targeting to a life-preserving future. Of course, the rules

are always adapting to the evolution of technology - e.g. the law had to be adapted to

the emergence of mobile phones etc.

The inference is that double contingency is not only a process internal to every

self-referential system, but also a repository of that system's history: the changes

double contingency has undergone form the 'memory' - so to speak - of that system's

errors and articulates them in regulative frameworks, imposed upon the society by the

society. And, in the modern society, double contingency plays a critical role due to

the high degree of functional differentiation which is so real a feature of

contemporary society. It follows that, to suggest deregulation as a means to evolution,

is meaningless, since the continuous change of the societal rules is evidently the

outcome of an ever-present deregulation; but to make deregulation a norm, beyond its

obvious impossibility (a norm is a rule), means also to threaten the boundary-

maintaining processes of the different social systems fulfilling different social

functions and therefore poses a threat to modernity. And - at the time - modernity is

7 The term "common" is employed here in very loose sense: each autopoietic system

conceives of its environment in a unique way, and this is a part of its autonomous discrete functions;

yet the common action remains evident, and this is what we mean when we talk about "common

environment", but nothing more than that.



all we have to get along. So, by all means, deregulation would be an impractical

option (if an option at all). It would be meaningless, therefore bound to the domain of

the unthinkable. We have to keep in mind though that, what initiated our whole

analysis about the concept of deregulation is the observation of the distinction

[deregulation/regulation]; if that was not possible, (i.e. the designation of the

distinction) then neither would any kind of argumentation.

Conclusions

It should not go unnoticed that the argumentation unfolded herein is, in fact,

circular. We used the basic theoretical premises of modernity in defence of modernity.

This of course is a logical trap - so to speak - and therefore yet another manifestation

of the paradoxical nature of the operation of distinctions. It is just another proof of the

inevitability to transgress certain distinctions that articulate a constellation of an a

priori conceptual framework, in our case, logic and deduction.

On the other hand though, in any historical phase, we are what we are, and this

should be considered a problem only insofar it is overlooked. When this happens, the

second-order observation becomes an indispensable instrument so to re-evaluate any

kind of premises.

All things considered then, we believe that we could enforce our world-

constructing operation(s), modifying our world-constructing algorithm as follows:

1. Draw a distinction.

2. Identify the objects that emerge due to that distinction and their

interrelations.

3. Call the totality of those things (objects, relations, classes of objects

and of relations), 'the world'.

4. See the distinction you made at step 1.

5. Go to step 1.



We could then, very well, start scrutinizing the distinctions that emerge as

problems, keeping in mind that the minimum possible universe consists of two

different entities at least, which says a lot about the importance of otherness.

'All that is now

all that is gone

all that's to come

and everything under the sun is in tune

but the sun is eclipsed by the moon'.

(The Pink Floyd, 1973, The Dark Side of the Moon)

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Documents

The meaning of the boundary and the boundary of the meaning