The Multiple Systems Model of Angry Rumination

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The Multiple Systems Model of Angry Rumination

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Article

Anger is a common feature of life. Following an interper-sonal transgression, people sometimes “let it go,” whereas at other times, they cannot stop thinking about the transgres-sion. This latter phenomenon is known as angry rumination. The past decade has seen a burgeoning of research on angry rumination, yet there is no coherent theoretical integration of the extant data. Research on angry rumination has been con-ducted in diverse areas such as social, personality, cognitive, clinical, and health psychology as well as affective neurosci-ence. However, there has been little or no cross-talk among these areas. Thus, developing an integrative model of angry rumination has practical and scientific value for a range of scientists interested in brain and behavior.

This article reviews the current state of knowledge on angry rumination and synthesizes it into a coherent model spanning five levels of analysis: cognitive, neurobiological, affective, executive control, and behavioral. The first part of the article describes the construct of angry rumination. The second part reviews the evidence supporting each of the five levels of the model and describes how these levels interact. The third part suggests a functional account of angry rumina-tion. The fourth part of the article delineates gaps in our knowledge and proposes future research.

Conceptualizations of Rumination and Angry RuminationRumination has many instantiations. A depressed individual might chronically wonder why he or she feels so sad, and an anxious person might worry that something bad will happen

(Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Cognitive perseveration may at times be positive, such as when one thoughtfully considers important life events in an attempt at self-improvement (cf. Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). However, rumination typi-cally involves intrusive and repetitive thoughts about a dis-tressing occurrence.

Martin and Tesser (1996) defined rumination as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a common instru-mental theme and that recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts” (p. 7). Angry rumination occurs when the theme of rumination is an anger-inducing event (Caprara, 1986; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006; Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001). I broadly conceptualize angry rumination as perseverative thinking about a personally meaningful anger-inducing event. This definition encompasses events that occur to oneself (e.g., being verbally abused by one’s supervisor) and events that happen to others so long as they are personally meaning-ful (e.g., angry rumination about the treatment of one’s child or an attack on one’s nation). Angry rumination may be accompanied by additional elements such as angry feelings or thoughts about revenge (see Sukhodolsky et al., 2001).

467086 PSR17210.1177/1088868312467086Personality and Social Psychology ReviewDenson

1University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

Corresponding Author:Thomas F. Denson, School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. Email: [email protected]

The Multiple Systems Model of Angry Rumination

Thomas F. Denson1

Abstract

Angry rumination is perseverative thinking about a personally meaningful anger-inducing event and is a risk factor for aggression. This article presents a new model for understanding angry rumination across five levels of analysis: cognitive, neurobiological, affective, executive control, and behavioral. The type of rumination that occurs at the cognitive level moderates affective responding and neurobiological activation, which influences executive control and aggression. Angry rumination recruits brain regions implicated in cognitive control, emotion regulation, negative affect, physiological arousal, social cognition, and self-reflection on emotional states. Moreover, angry rumination temporarily reduces self-control, which can increase aggression. The article suggests a functional account of angry rumination, identifies gaps in our knowledge, and proposes future research directions based on hypotheses derived from the model.

Keywords

rumination, anger, aggression, physiological reactivity, executive control



104 Personality and Social Psychology Review 17(2)

However, the core feature of the present definition is perse-verative thinking about a specific event that induced anger.

People vary in the extent to which they experience angry rumination (e.g., Caprara, 1986; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001), but this state can also be manipulated in experimental set-tings (e.g., Bushman, 2002; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). The individual difference approach examines people who are more or less likely to ruminate when angered.1 This descriptive approach does not allow for strict causal infer-ences because other individual differences correlated with rumination may be responsible for any observed effects. By contrast, rumination can be manipulated by instructing indi-viduals to think about an anger-inducing event for a speci-fied time period relative to a control condition. The experimental approach has the advantage of random assign-ment. The disadvantage of manipulating rumination is that laboratory procedures lack the spontaneous and often uncon-trollable features that characterize angry rumination in daily life. This article describes research that has used correla-tional and experimental methods to study angry rumination. Comparisons of both types of studies reveal largely conver-gent results, supporting individual difference and experi-mental approaches to studying angry rumination.

The Multiple Systems ModelOverview

Figure 1 illustrates the multiple systems model. Angry rumi-nation is hypothesized to activate specific responses across psychological and biological levels. According to this model, people must first encounter a situation that induces anger (or be reminded of one). The extent to which they engage in subsequent rumination is moderated by the dispo-sitional tendency to experience angry rumination and execu-tive control capacity. Specifically, angry rumination is most likely for people who frequently ruminate about anger-inducing events and individuals with poor executive control. People with poor executive control may have difficulty inhibiting anger-related thoughts and switching their atten-tion away from angry thoughts.

During rumination, specific brain regions in the prefron-tal cortex and limbic system become more active and func-tionally connected. Angry rumination recruits prefrontal and subcortical neural regions supporting self-referential pro-cessing, social cognition, emotion regulation, and arousal. There are also changes to emotional experience and periph-eral physiological reactivity during rumination.2 Specifically, angry rumination can heighten and maintain anger as well as cardiovascular and endocrine activation over time.

Neurobiological activation and the anger experience are influenced by one of three types of rumination that occur at the cognitive level. The first type of rumination is the extent to which people focus on aspects of the provocation versus aspects of oneself. The second type describes the extent to which people focus on the causes and consequences of the

event versus the details of the event. The third type of rumi-nation describes the extent to which people ruminate from a self-immersed versus self-distanced perspective.

Cessation of rumination involves three effortful pro-cesses: thought suppression, emotion regulation, and behav-ioral self-control. The self-regulatory effort exerted when attempting to cease rumination temporarily reduces the abil-ity to effectively engage in self-controlled behavior. The resulting state of self-regulatory depletion increases risk for aggression.

The multiple systems model is compatible with the gen-eral aggression model, which is a widely accepted meta-theory of aggression and violence (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall & Anderson, 2011). According to the general aggression model, aggression is likely when individual dif-ferences interact with situational features to influence one’s cognitive, physiological, and affective state. People who show heightened aggressive cognition, physiological arousal, and anger tend to make hostile attributions about others’ behavior, which increases aggression. However, if a person possesses sufficient time, cognitive resources, and motivation, he or she may reappraise the situation in a non-hostile manner. A nonhostile reappraisal should result in nonaggressive action or no action. Thus, the general aggres-sion model helps to explain why people become aggressive or not. By contrast, the multiple systems model accounts for why and how people may ruminate about anger-provoking events and the consequences of angry rumination.

In the following subsections, I review evidence for the proposed multiple systems model of angry rumination at each of the five levels. The purpose of this review is to pro-vide a unified understanding of angry rumination. Where relevant, I also draw connections between the multiple sys-tems model and the general aggression model to facilitate theoretical integration between angry rumination and aggression.

The Cognitive LevelAt its core, angry rumination is a cognitive process that begins following an event that induces anger. People may ruminate about anger-inducing events in a variety of ways. There are three core elements that contribute to the phenom-enological experience of angry rumination. Each element has different neurobiological and affective consequences. One of these elements is the extent to which one focuses on aspects of the provocation or oneself (content focus). Another element is the extent to which one focuses on the causes of the event (i.e., “why” the event occurred) versus the details of the event (i.e., the “what” concerning the event; mode of processing). The third element is the extent to which one ruminates from a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective (vantage perspective). I discuss each in turn.

Content focus: Provocation-focused versus self-focused rumi-nation. Sometimes rumination may include more of a focus



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on aspects of the provoking incident (including anger and/or thoughts of revenge). At other times, rumination may include more of a focus on the implications of the event for oneself. For example, after receiving an insulting manuscript review,

a researcher could relive the provocation and think about retaliation. Alternatively, the researcher could think about how the insulting review induces negative self-evaluations and direct their anger inward. These two types of angry

Figure 1. The multiple systems model of angry rumination.Note: Angry rumination is most likely for those who tend to engage in angry rumination and individuals with poor executive control. People with poor executive control may have difficulty inhibiting anger-related thoughts. Rumination recruits prefrontal and subcortical neural regions supporting self-referential processing, social cognition, emotion regulation, and arousal. Neurobiological activation and the subjective anger experience are moderated by the three features of the type of rumination that occurs at the cognitive level: content focus, mode of processing, and vantage perspective. The neurobiological and affective levels bidirectionally influence each other. The effortful regulation of rumination involves thought suppression, emotion regulation, and behavioral self-control. The effort exerted temporarily reduces the ability to effectively engage in self-controlled behavior. This reduced self-control capacity increases risk for aggression.




rumination are referred to as provocation-focused and self-focused rumination, respectively (Bushman, Bonacci, Peder-sen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Both forms of angry rumination increase aggression (Bushman et al., 2005; Pedersen et al., 2011).

The fact that both forms of angry rumination increase aggression suggests that rumination keeps aggressive impulses accessible; however, provocation-focused and self-focused rumination do so differently (Pedersen et al., 2011). Pedersen and colleagues (2011) hypothesized that because provocation-focused rumination is concerned with anger and retaliation, this form of rumination increases the cognitive accessibility of anger and aggressive behavior. By contrast, self-focused rumination was hypothesized to augment the accessibility of anger and psychological arousal. This latter prediction was derived from objective self-awareness theory, which emphasizes the aversive and arousing nature of focus-ing on oneself following negative events (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001). According to objec-tive self-awareness theory, self-awareness initiates a process whereby people compare their current state with personal standards. If there is a discrepancy, and the person is not capable of reducing this discrepancy, psychological arousal and negative affect ensue. Indeed, a meta-analysis reported that self-focused rumination increases negative affect to a greater extent than other forms of self-focused attention (Mor & Winquist, 2002).

One experiment tested the hypothesis that provocation-focused rumination heightens the accessibility of aggressive actions, whereas self-focused rumination heightens the accessibility of psychological arousal. Participants were insulted by the experimenter and asked to engage in a writ-ing task for 20 min (Pedersen et al., 2011). Participants in the provocation-focused rumination condition were asked to write about their experience in the experiment, including their thoughts, feelings, and interactions with the experi-menter. Participants in the self-focused rumination condition were asked to write about themselves (e.g., what kind of per-son they are, how they get along with others). Participants in the distraction condition were asked to write about a neutral topic (i.e., the layout of their university campus). Following the rumination manipulation, participants completed an unob-trusive word completion task. Words could be completed in ways that made aggressive words or nonaggressive words (e.g., “k i _ _” could be completed as “kill” or “kiss”). The measure assessed the accessibility of words that reflected aggressive actions (e.g., stab), angry affect (e.g., hate), and psychological arousal (e.g., tense). Participants in the two rumination conditions completed an equivalent number of angry affect words in an anger-related manner (and more angry affect words than people in the distraction condition). Consistent with the hypothesis, participants in the provocation-focused rumination condition completed more aggressive action words than those in the other two conditions. Participants in the self-focused rumination condition completed

more arousal words than people in the other two conditions. Thus, these two forms of rumination may exert differential cognitive effects, even at the implicit level. In the following sections, I describe additional research that found unique effects of provocation-focused and self-focused rumination at the affective and neurobiological levels.

Mode of processing: Why (analytical rumination) versus what (experiential rumination). Another way in which experiences of angry rumination differ is the mode of processing. A dis-tinction is typically made between thinking about the causes and consequences of the anger-inducing episode (i.e., a “why” focus) versus thinking about the details of the event (i.e., a “what” focus). The “why” focus is known as analyti-cal rumination and induces an abstract processing style. By contrast, thinking about the details of the event and the feelings it arouses is known as experiential rumination. This “what” focus induces a concrete processing style (Watkins, 2004).

Although most research on these two modes of process-ing has examined depressive rumination, a few studies have investigated their effects on anger. In one study, undergradu-ate men and women were asked to recall an anger-inducing autobiographical memory and were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions (Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012). In the analytical rumination condition, participants wrote about the causes and consequences of the incident. In the reappraisal condition, participants thought about the event in a factual, objective manner and emphasized any positive aspects. Participants in the distraction condition wrote about the university campus. There was also a control condition in which participants were asked to write about whatever was on their mind rather than to specifically regu-late their anger. Results showed that analytical rumination maintained anger during the entire 20-min writing task, whereas the remaining three conditions reduced anger. The large majority of participants in the control condition opted to write about family, friends, upcoming coursework, and enjoyable events rather than the anger-inducing memory. This research highlights that reappraisal and distraction are more effective than analytical rumination in reducing anger, at least in the short term.

Vantage perspective: Self-immersed versus self-distanced. A third way in which thinking about anger-inducing experi-ences may differ involves the person’s mental vantage per-spective. Vantage perspective has been operationalized as viewing the event from a first person (“self-immersed”) ver-sus third person (“self-distanced”) perspective. Considering an anger-inducing event from a self-immersed perspective typically causes individuals to relive the emotional aspects of the event. By contrast, taking a self-distanced perspective induces emotional detachment (Kross, 2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005).

Much of the research on vantage perspective has exam-ined its effects in conjunction with analytical rumination. The self-distanced perspective is effective in reducing anger



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when ruminating in an analytical manner but not when rumi-nating in an experiential manner. In one study, participants recalled an anger-inducing autobiographical memory from either a self-distanced or self-immersed perspective. They also focused on the reasons for their anger (i.e., an analytical “why” focus) or on their feelings and sensations (i.e., an experiential “what” focus; Kross et al., 2005). Participants who engaged in analytical rumination from a self-distanced perspective showed lower implicit and explicit anger than participants who ruminated in a self-immersed or experien-tial manner.

In a second experiment, participants engaged in analytical rumination (i.e., a “why” focus) from a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective (Kross et al., 2005). Replicating the first study, people in the self-distanced condition reported less negative affect than participants in the self-immersed condition. Moreover, people in the self-distanced condition reported more meta-cognitive insight and closure regarding the anger-inducing event than participants in the self-immersed condition. The greater insight and closure induced by self-distancing predicted lower self-reported negative affect.

However, not all research has found anger-reducing effects of self-distancing during analytical rumination. For instance, in one experiment, analytical rumination increased anger regardless of whether participants ruminated from a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective (Wimalaweera & Moulds, 2008). Moreover, analytical rumination increased intrusive thoughts about the anger-inducing event 24 hr fol-lowing the initial recall, regardless of vantage perspective. However, it is noteworthy that in the depressive rumination literature, experiential rumination tends to reduce negative affect whereas analytical rumination increases it (Watkins, 2008). Given the contradictory findings, additional research is needed to determine whether the effect of processing mode is different for angry versus depressive rumination.

Summary. This subsection reviewed the evidence for three cognitive features of angry rumination: content focus, mode of processing, and vantage perspective. Provocation-focused rumination heightens the cognitive accessibility of aggres-sive actions, whereas self-focused rumination heightens the accessibility of arousal. Analytical rumination by itself is not sufficient to lower anger, but it does appear more effective in doing so when combined with a self-distanced perspective. However, more research is needed.

The Neurobiological LevelDuring angry rumination, specific prefrontal cortical regions and subcortical structures become more active. These brain areas are implicated in cognitive control, emotion regula-tion, negative affect, physiological arousal, social cognition, and self-reflection on emotional states (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Heatherton, 2011; Kerns et al., 2004; Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 1997; Lieberman, 2007; Ochsner &

Gross, 2008). In addition, angry rumination induces changes in peripheral physiology, including cardiovascular and hor-monal responses. The relevant neurobiological research is discussed in detail below.

The brain. In the first functional magnetic resonance imag-ing (fMRI) study to investigate neural mechanisms associ-ated with rumination, participants completed three self-report rumination questionnaires (Ray et al., 2005). One of the measures was the Anger Rumination Scale (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). The two remaining rumination measures assessed depressive rumination and general perseverative cognition about negative events. During brain imaging, participants viewed photographs designed to evoke negative emotions. They were asked to increase their level of negative affect in response to the photos. The authors did not examine each scale independently but instead created a composite measure of all three rumination scales. This composite measure was positively correlated with activation in the amygdala and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that people who tend to ruminate recruit brain regions involved in the bottom-up evaluation of affective stimuli (i.e., the amygdala) and top-down cortical control (i.e., the ventrolat-eral prefrontal cortex).

A more recent fMRI study examined the neural correlates of angry rumination directly (Denson, Pedersen, Ronquillo, & Nandy, 2009). Prior to scanning, participants completed measures of trait aggressiveness. One of these measures, the Displaced Aggression Questionnaire (Denson et al., 2006), assesses individual differences in the tendency to “take out” aggressive urges on undeserving people. Individuals who score high on this measure engage in frequent and intense rumination in the aftermath of a provocation. In an imaging session conducted 2 weeks later, participants were insulted by the experimenter. They subsequently engaged in provocation-focused rumination, self-focused rumination, and a distrac-tion control task in counterbalanced order. Specifically, under the guise of a “mental imagery” study, participants thought about statements presented on the monitor. During the provocation-focused rumination task, participants were asked to think about their feelings and thoughts about the provocation (e.g., “Think about whom you have interacted with in the experiment up to this point”). During the self-focused rumination task, participants were presented with self-referential statements (e.g., “Think about why you react the way you do”). During the distraction task, participants were presented with neutral statements (e.g., “Think about the layout of the local post office”).

The neural correlates of provocation- and self-focused rumination were largely identical. Specifically, rumination increased activation in regions implicated in cognitive con-trol (dorsal anterior cingulate cortex), emotion regulation (lateral prefrontal cortex), arousal (thalamus, insula), and self-referential processing (the dorsal medial prefrontal cor-tex). Moreover, activation in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula was positively correlated




with self-reported state rumination and scores on the Displaced Aggression Questionnaire. These correlations suggest a critical role for these two regions in the subjective experience of angry rumination. Indeed, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex is broadly involved in self-referential pro-cessing (e.g., self-awareness, reflecting on negative affect), social cognition, and emotion regulation (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Harris, McClure, van den Bos, Cohen, & Fiske, 2007; Macrae, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2004; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Interestingly, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex is also active when people make attributions, infer the mental states of others, and plan revenge (Harris, Todorov, & Fiske, 2005; Krämer, Jansma, Tempelmann, & Münte, 2007), all of which are likely to occur during rumination. Thus, it is likely that the medial prefrontal cortex supports these elements of angry rumination.

Another brain region that has been implicated in anger regulation and violence prevention is the orbitofrontal cortex (Blair, 2004; Davidson, Putnam, & Larson, 2000; MacDonald, 2008; Raine, 2008; Siever, 2008). Lesions in the orbitofron-tal cortex are associated with poor self-regulation, including heightened risk for impulsive aggression (Blair, 2004; Grafman et al., 1996; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004). One study found that blunted activation in the orbitofrontal cor-tex was correlated with increased retaliatory aggression in an economic bargaining game (Mehta & Beer, 2010). In another study, during scanning, Alia-Klein et al. (2007) asked par-ticipants to listen to the word no, which the authors sug-gested is related to anger. Self-reported trait anger control was positively correlated with activity in the orbitofrontal cortex. The findings suggest a role of the orbitofrontal cortex in anger regulation.

One fMRI study directly tested the role of the orbitofron-tal cortex in anger regulation. Participants were asked to recall an anger-inducing autobiographical memory and pro-cess it in three different ways (Fabiansson, Denson, Moulds, Grisham, & Schira, 2012). Specifically, during the analyti-cal rumination task, they were asked to focus on the causes and consequences of the event (e.g., “Think about why the event happened”). During the angry rumination task (which was a mixture of provocation-focused and experiential rumi-nation), participants were asked to focus on their angry feel-ings, details of the event, physical sensations, and thoughts of revenge. During the cognitive reappraisal task, partici-pants were asked to focus on the event in an objective man-ner and think about any valuable lessons learned. All three forms of anger regulation activated the orbitofrontal cortex, suggesting a general role of this region in anger regulation. Moreover, differences in functional connectivity between the cortical and subcortical regions distinguished reappraisal from rumination. Specifically, during both types of rumina-tion, activation in the lateral prefrontal cortex was positively correlated with increased amygdala and thalamus activation. This pattern was not observed during reappraisal. One func-tion of the thalamus is to regulate physiological arousal.

Increased positive functional connectivity with the thalamus during rumination may reflect a pattern of reciprocal influ-ence. Specifically, the executive functions typically sup-ported by the prefrontal cortex (e.g., planning revenge) likely covary with a sense of heightened arousal (i.e., getting “worked up”).

The finding that the right anterior insula and thalamus are activated during angry rumination is noteworthy because both regions have been implicated in the perception of changes in physiological activity (most often heart rate; Craig, 2002, 2009; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Pollatos, Schandry, Auer, & Kaufmann, 2007). The perception of physiological activity, known as intero-ceptive awareness, can heighten the intensity of emotional arousal (Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004; Dunn et al., 2010). Consistent with the role of the insula in interoceptive awareness, Denson, Pedersen, et al. (2009) found that right anterior insula activation was positively cor-related with self-reported state angry rumination. The thala-mus activation is also relevant because it plays a role in emotional processing, emotion experience, representing feelings, and emotional control (Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2008; Marchand, 2010; Reiman, Lane, Ahern, & Schwartz, 1997). Together, increased activa-tion in the right anterior insula and thalamus during rumina-tion may heighten the experience of emotional arousal.

Summary. The neural evidence suggests that rumination involves the coactivation and interplay of cortical and sub-cortical regions supporting self-referential processing, social cognition, cognitive-emotional control, negative affect, and arousal. Moreover, activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, right anterior insula, and corticolimbic functional connectiv-ity may contribute to the phenomenological experience of angry rumination.

Peripheral physiology. Researchers in health and biological psychology have focused on the peripheral physiological consequences of rumination. A major finding of this research is that angry rumination following provocation delays car-diovascular and endocrine recovery to baseline (Larsen & Christenfeld, 2011). The physiological responses maintained by angry rumination are important to the multiple systems model, which suggests a pattern of reciprocal influence between the neurobiological and affective levels. This pat-tern is such that angry rumination maintains physiological responding, which then influences anger-related cognitive appraisals and heightens interoceptive awareness, which in turn maintains physiological responding. Indeed, classic social-psychological research shows that cognitive apprais-als of physiological arousal can shape emotional experience (Schachter & Singer, 1962), as does interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2002). The following subsections will summarize research examining the effects of rumination on the cardio-vascular and endocrine systems.

Cardiovascular responses. The perseverative cognition hypothesis provides a conceptual framework for understanding



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how angry rumination might influence physiological reactiv-ity (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006). Perseverative cogni-tion (also called repetitive negative thinking) characterizes all types of rumination. The hypothesis is that perseverative cognition maintains physiological activation in response to stressful events.

Results from a limited number of studies are largely con-sistent with the perseverative cognition hypothesis. Some of these studies exposed participants to laboratory stress para-digms and examined correlations between self-reported rumination and physiological reactivity. Other studies directly manipulated rumination. In an example of the for-mer paradigm, participants completed the Rehearsal sub-scale of the Emotional Control Questionnaire (which contains items assessing individual differences in angry rumination; Roger & Najarian, 1989). They then attempted a stressful Stroop task. Participants high in the tendency to ruminate showed slower heart rate recovery, suggesting that sustained rumination delayed recovery to baseline (Roger & Jamieson, 1988). In another study, participants engaged in an anger-inducing role-play and completed questionnaires assessing their thoughts about the experience (Suchday, Carter, Ewart, Larkin, & Desiderato, 2004). Self-reported state angry rumination was positively correlated with blood pressure and heart rate following the role-play, suggesting that increased rumination sustained cardiovascular activation.

In another study, participants completed measures of the tendency to experience angry rumination. They then reexpe-rienced autobiographical anger-inducing events on two sepa-rate occasions with and without distraction (Gerin, Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal, & Schwartz, 2006). An interaction was observed such that when participants were not distracted, people high in ruminative tendencies showed the slowest blood pressure recovery. However, when participants high in ruminative tendencies engaged in distraction, their physio-logical recovery was equivalent to those low in dispositional rumination. This study suggests that ceasing rumination via distraction may facilitate cardiovascular recovery for people who are prone to angry rumination. Future research assess-ing the opposite pathway (i.e., manipulating physiological arousal in relevant contexts and examining the impact on angry rumination) would help test the present model’s causal pathways.

In addition to slowing cardiovascular recovery to baseline, at least one study suggests that angry rumination can reacti-vate cardiovascular responding at a later time (Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2007). In this study, 21 undergradu-ates were rudely harassed and interrupted while counting backward in increments of 13. Half of the participants were asked to ruminate about the event after 30 min and again after 1 week. The other half were asked to ruminate only once at the follow-up session. Regardless of the delay between the provocation and the rumination induction, participants’ blood pressure increased, suggesting that angry rumination can reactivate cardiovascular responding. Interestingly, for those

who ruminated twice, the second response was smaller than the first. This finding suggests that participants might have habituated in their cardiovascular responding. Alternatively, participants may have engaged in a positive form of emotion regulation between the study sessions (e.g., reappraisal). The lower activation observed at the second session is consistent with the general aggression model. The general aggression model suggests that time and mental resources can increase the likelihood that people will reappraise anger-eliciting events in a nonhostile manner. A nonhostile reappraisal should reduce cardiovascular arousal. Moreover, the time delay between rumination periods may have allowed par-ticipants to recover from the expenditure of executive con-trol resources (see the executive control level subsection). Restoration of executive control resources could have also facilitated a nonhostile reappraisal of the provocation, thus lowering cardiovascular responses at the second session.

Larsen and Christenfeld (2011) reviewed the literature on cardiovascular recovery from stress, with an emphasis on anger provocations. These authors noted that distraction may promote quick recovery because it prevents individuals from ruminating (see also Neumann, Waldstein, Sellers, Thayer, & Sorkin, 2004). On the other hand, people may need to engage in some type of cognitive analysis of the anger prov-ocation to effectively reduce emotional and physiological responses when they think about the event at a later time. Thus, the type of rumination described at the cognitive level may moderate cardiovascular reactivity when thinking about anger-inducing events. In a study that tested this moderation hypothesis, participants engaged in analytical rumination (i.e., focusing on the causes of the anger-inducing event) from a self-distanced or self-immersed vantage perspective (Ayduk & Kross, 2008). People who engaged in analytical rumination from a self-distanced perspective had lower blood pressure than those who ruminated from a self-immersed perspective. In another experiment, participants were insulted by the experimenter and then engaged in provocation-focused rumination, self-focused rumination, or distraction for 20 min (Pedersen et al., 2011). Provocation-focused rumination augmented systolic blood pressure, whereas the remaining conditions had no effect on blood pressure. These results are consistent with the idea that prov-ocation-focused rumination may prepare large muscle groups in the body for physical activity such as aggressive retalia-tion. I return to this issue in more detail when I discuss pos-sible functions of angry rumination (see also Larsen & Christenfeld, 2011).

Cortisol responses. In addition to cardiovascular reactivity, rumination can activate the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. Activation of the HPA axis releases the “stress hormone” cortisol. High concentrations of cortisol have been implicated in atrophy in brain regions that are active during rumination, such as the hippocampus (Knoops, Gerritsen, van der Graaf, Mali, & Geerlings, 2010; Lupien et al., 1998). Similarly, the medial prefrontal cortex partially regulates




cortisol release in response to stress (Kern et al., 2008). These findings highlight the rich interconnectivity between brain and peripheral responding.

Very little research has investigated the effects of angry rumination on the HPA axis. As a starting point, my col-leagues and I conducted a meta-analysis of 66 journal articles that examined cortisol responses to laboratory social stress inductions (Denson, Spanovic, & Miller, 2009). These stud-ies were not limited to anger provocations, but a number of them were designed to elicit some degree of anger. Anger-inducing manipulations included conversations among cou-ples about contentious issues in their marriage or performing difficult tasks while being harassed by the experimenter. Judges who were blind to the study hypotheses then read the method sections of each article. The judges rated the extent to which participants in these studies would be likely to engage in rumination. Specifically, the judges rated perseverative cognition (i.e., “uncontrollable, repetitive thoughts”), angry rumination (i.e., “focus on angry thoughts”), and a general negative self-focused rumination (i.e., “brooding”). Results showed that studies judged to elicit relatively high levels of perseverative cognition and brooding rumination also elicited higher cortisol responses. However, there was no relationship between angry rumination and cortisol responses.

The finding that perseverative cognition and brooding may increase cortisol responses is consistent with studies that investigated these forms of rumination outside of the anger context (Brosschot et al., 2006; Roger & Najarian, 1998; Zoccola, Dickerson, & Zaldivar, 2008; Zoccola, Quas, & Yim, 2010). But what are we to make of the null relationship between angry rumination and cortisol output? One possible explanation is that angry rumination is associ-ated with cortisol release, but the amount of release may depend on the type of rumination that occurs at the cogni-tive level. Social threat theory may be informative in this regard. The theory suggests that the HPA axis is especially responsive to threats to one’s social standing (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004, 2009; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Moreover, one function of cortisol is to release stored energy. Thus, in socially threatening situations, this energy release could allow one to do what is required to come back into the good graces of one’s in-group. Indeed, experiments show that social rejection manipulations increase cortisol output (Blackhart, Eckel, & Tice, 2007; Ford & Collins, 2010; however, for a null result, see Zöller, Maroof, Weik, & Deinzer, 2010).

As an example, imagine a colleague who has just received an anger-inducing review on a manuscript. If the colleague ruminates with a provocation-focus, she or he is likely to focus on anger and thoughts of revenge (e.g., “These reviews are worthless!”). By contrast, if they engage in self-focused rumination, the colleague may doubt his or her self-worth and social status (e.g., “Am I a bad scientist? Why do I always get such bad reviews?”). Social threat theory sug-gests that the HPA axis should be most responsive to

self-focused rumination, a notion that the results of at least one experiment support. In this study, undergraduate men and women completed a difficult anagram task and were insulted by the experimenter (Denson, Fabiansson, Creswell, & Pedersen, 2009). Under the guise of an academic writing task, participants then engaged in provocation-focused rumi-nation, self-focused rumination, or distraction. Salivary cor-tisol output was measured periodically throughout the study. Results showed that participants in the self-focused rumina-tion condition had elevated levels of cortisol for the duration of the study. By contrast, participants in the provocation-focused rumination and distraction conditions showed the typical late afternoon decline in cortisol. Moreover, even in the provocation-focused rumination condition, the extent to which participants reported focusing on themselves was pos-itively correlated with cortisol output.

The study also provided preliminary evidence that vantage perspective moderates cortisol release (Denson, Fabiansson, et al., 2009). Based on examination of the writ-ten responses from the provocation-focused rumination con-dition, participants were reliably coded as self-distanced or self-immersed ruminators. Self-distanced individuals were those who wrote about the provocation in a detached, third-person manner. Self-immersed individuals were those who wrote about the provocation in an emotionally evocative, first-person manner (see also Denson, Moulds, et al., 2012). Those who were coded as self-distanced showed marginally lower levels of cortisol during the experiment than those coded as self-immersed. However, vantage perspective may have been confounded with other individual differences. Future research should directly manipulate vantage perspec-tive and examine the effect on cortisol levels.

Summary. The evidence suggests that angry rumination is associated with slower cardiovascular and cortisol recovery to baseline levels. Conversely, when rumination is lowered by distraction or possibly nonhostile reappraisal, cardiovas-cular and cortisol responses return to baseline. Moreover, the cardiovascular system seems sensitive to provocation-focused rumination and vantage perspective. The HPA axis seems sensitive to self-focused rumination and possibly van-tage perspective.

The Affective LevelAs the research reviewed in the preceding subsections implies, angry rumination can influence the intensity and duration of the anger experience. This subsection reviews these affective consequences of angry rumination. In an early investigation into the effects of rumination on anger, undergraduates read about a teaching assistant who unjustly harmed a student (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). They were asked to imagine the emotions experienced by the stu-dent, which elicited anger in participants. Participants then engaged in self-focused rumination or distraction. Self-focused rumination increased anger from the premanipulation



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baseline, but distraction did not. In a second experiment, anger was assessed immediately following the recall of an autobiographical anger-inducing memory and again after the rumination manipulation. There was also a control condition in which participants simply listed their thoughts. Replicating the first experiment, rumination increased anger relative to the first assessment. Participants in the distraction and control conditions reported decreased anger.

In a seminal experiment on the effects of provocation-focused rumination on anger, participants were insulted and then asked to hit a punching bag (Bushman, 2002). While hitting the punching bag, participants in the rumination con-dition were asked to think of the insulting person. People in the distraction condition were asked to think about becoming physically fit. Participants in the control condition sat quietly for 2 min and were not given instructions about what to think about. Self-reported anger was higher in the provocation-focused rumination condition than in the distraction and con-trol conditions (Bushman, 2002).

Thus, both provocation-focused and self-focused rumina-tions can exacerbate anger. But do these forms of rumination induce qualitatively distinct forms of anger? For instance, provocation-focused rumination might induce anger directed at the source of provocation. By contrast, self-focused rumination might induce self-critical negative affect (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Silvia & Duval, 2001). To investigate this notion, participants were insulted by the experimenter and subsequently engaged in provocation-focused rumination, self-focused rumination, or distraction (Pedersen et al., 2011). Participants were subsequently trig-gered by a minor annoyance from another participant and given the opportunity to retaliate. They then completed measures of anger directed at the annoying participant and self-critical nega-tive affect (e.g., regret, disappointed in myself). Anger directed at the annoying participant mediated the effect of provocation-focused rumination on aggressive behavior, whereas self-critical negative affect mediated the effect of self-focused rumination on aggressive behavior. These results suggest distinct emo-tional pathways to aggression for each type of rumination.

Summary. Ruminating about anger-inducing events can increase and maintain anger over time. Moreover, the type of angry rumination described at the cognitive level influences the intensity and type of negative affect that people experi-ence. Provocation-focused rumination heightens anger directed at others, whereas self-focused rumination height-ens self-critical negative affect. In the next subsection, I deconstruct the affect-aggression relationship even further. Specifically, I review evidence suggesting that the regulation of rumination-induced negative affect and ruminative thoughts can heighten aggression.

The Executive Control LevelAccording to the multiple systems model, rumination can influence executive control and vice versa. This subsection

reviews evidence suggesting that poor executive control can make it difficult to stop ruminating and that, conversely, angry rumination can lower executive control.

Poor executive control. As previously noted, there are indi-vidual differences in the tendency to ruminate when angered (Caprara, 1986; Denson et al., 2006; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). For people who do tend to ruminate, some are better than others at ceasing rumination. In neuropsychological terms, people who are good at stopping rumination are likely to possess high levels of inhibitory control, atten-tional control, and task-switching ability. Specifically, they should be able to effectively inhibit ruminative thinking and switch their attention, thoughts, and behavior away from anger-related stimuli. Indeed, one study reported that dispo-sitional angry rumination was negatively correlated with performance on a laboratory test of inhibition (Whitmer & Banich, 2010).

No other research has investigated the notion that poor executive control may make it difficult to stop angry rumina-tion. However, the literature on depressive rumination provides suggestive evidence. According to Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, and De Raedt (2011), people who are depressed may ruminate because they cannot disengage attentional resources away from negative self-referential information. Similarly, Linville (1996) suggested that poor executive functioning may lead to less control over cognitive intrusions. In support of this idea, in one study, undergradu-ates completed a task that involved switching emotional con-tent in working memory. Students who showed poor emotional task-switching ability reported more depressive rumination during a stressful university examination period than students with good task-switching ability (De Lissnyder et al., 2011).

Similar to depressive ruminators, people who tend to engage in angry rumination may also display poor inhibitory control and difficulties with attentional disengagement. When provoked, people with poor executive control may find it difficult to stop focusing on anger-inducing events. Indeed, aggression researchers have long recognized the role of good executive control in preventing aggression (Davidson, et al., 2000; Denson, 2011; Hoaken, Shaughnessy, & Pihl, 2003; MacDonald, 2008; Mischel et al., 2011; Raine, 2008; Robinson, Schmeichel, & Inzlicht, 2010; Siever, 2008; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008). Thus, people with poor executive control may be prone to excessive rumination and hence greater aggression.

Angry rumination reduces executive control. The multiple systems model posits a second role of executive control. Specifically, the model suggests that angry rumination can temporarily reduce self-control.

Rumination is typically characterized by unwanted cogni-tive intrusions. In the context of angry rumination, for exam-ple, unwanted thoughts of revenge and an excessive focus on one’s anger intrude into awareness. Moreover, given the cardiovascular and cortisol data reviewed above, it seems




reasonable to conclude that angry rumination is a stressful experience for most people. Thus, people are likely to recruit self-regulatory processes to cease ruminating. However, self-regulation is effortful and can deplete executive control resources (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011).

Attempting to reduce rumination should recruit at least three self-regulatory processes, each of which has been shown individually to impair self-controlled behavior. These processes are thought suppression, emotion regulation, and behavioral self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007; Denson, 2009; Denson, Pedersen, Friese, Hahm, & Roberts, 2011; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). The subse-quent reduction in self-control may increase risk for aggres-sion because temporary reductions in self-control increase aggression toward strangers and romantic partners (Denson, DeWall, & Finkel, 2012; Denson, von Hippel, Kemp, & Teo, 2010; DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; DeWall, Finkel, & Denson, 2011; Finkel, DeWall, Slotter, Oaten, & Foshee, 2009). Thus, trying to stop ruminating may paradoxically deplete self-control capacity and increase the risk for aggression.

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that angry rumi-nation temporarily reduces self-control and thereby aug-ments aggression (Denson, Pedersen, et al., 2011). In the first study, provoked participants showed less persistence on a difficult task than participants who were not provoked. This effect was attributed to effortful anger regulation in the aftermath of the provocation. A second study that manipu-lated rumination found that, relative to distraction, angry rumination led to lower self-control and higher aggression. The rumination-induced aggression was, in turn, mediated by lower self-control. In a final study designed to reverse the depleting effects of rumination on executive control, partici-pants consumed a glucose or placebo beverage. Glucose augments performance on tests of executive control (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Hagger et al., 2010) and lowers aggres-sion (Denson et al., 2010; DeWall, Deckman, Gailliot, & Bushman, 2011). As expected, those who consumed the glu-cose drink showed better performance on a test of inhibitory control following rumination than participants who con-sumed the placebo.

Collectively, these studies provide initial evidence for the depleting effects of angry rumination. The findings are also consistent with a study that investigated the effects of depres-sive rumination on inhibitory control (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008). Relative to distraction, dysphoric individuals who were asked to engage in depressive rumination showed worse performance on a Stroop task. Presumably, emotion regulation and thought suppression processes are recruited when attempting to control depressive and angry rumination. However, angry rumination has the added element of restraining oneself from behaving aggressively, a topic dis-cussed in the next subsection.

Summary. Although more research is needed, the evidence suggests that poor executive control can make it difficult to reduce or stop angry rumination. Moreover, angry rumina-tion can deplete executive control because ceasing rumina-tion requires regulation of anger-related thoughts, feelings, and aggressive urges.

The Behavioral LevelAs noted, angry rumination increases aggressive behavior. This effect occurs when the tendency to engage in angry rumination is measured as an individual difference (Caprara, 1986; Collins & Bell, 1997) and when angry rumination is manipulated in the laboratory (Bushman, 2002; Denson, Pedersen, et al., 2011). Angry rumination even increases aggression toward those who had nothing to do with the ini-tial provocation (Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Denson et al., 2006; Pedersen et al., 2011). Angry rumination also increases the harshness of prison sen-tencing by observers of a crime (Vasquez, Bartsch, Pedersen, & Miller, 2007). Conversely, preventing individuals from ruminating lowers aggression (Konečni, 1974, 1975).

In Bushman’s (2002) influential “punching bag” experi-ment described earlier, participants who were induced to ruminate retaliated against the provocateur with longer and louder blasts of white noise than participants in the control condition. After this initial study, additional experiments documented the aggression-enhancing effects of angry rumi-nation (Bushman et al., 2005; Denson et al., 2006; Denson, Pedersen, et al., 2011; Denson, White, & Warburton, 2009; Pedersen et al., 2011).

Much of the work on angry rumination and aggression was conducted within the triggered displaced aggression paradigm (Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003). This paradigm posits a central role of rumination in explain-ing why people sometimes harm undeserving victims. The aggression is “triggered” in the sense that the victim of aggression is the source of a minor annoyance (e.g., harming a barking dog vs. a sleeping dog). For instance, an employee may be insulted by his or her supervisor in the morning and ruminate about it for most of the day. When the employee arrives home, he or she might be at greater risk of violence if subsequently “triggered” by a minor annoyance from his or her romantic partner.

Support for the aggression-augmenting role of rumination was apparent in a set of three experiments that investigated the effects of rumination on triggered displaced aggression (Bushman et al., 2005). Relative to distraction, participants who were induced to ruminate for 20 to 25 min were more likely to thwart the triggering person’s chances of obtaining a paid research assistant position (Experiment 1). Participants who ruminated also delivered a greater amount of hot sauce to the triggering person (who ostensibly disliked hot sauce) than participants in the distraction condition (Experiment 2).



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Even 8 hr after the initial provocation, rumination augmented triggered displaced aggression as measured by blasts of loud white noise (Experiment 3).

A recent experiment found that rumination following vio-lent video game play can increase aggressive behavior up to 24 hr later (Bushman & Gibson, 2011). Participants were randomly assigned to play a violent or nonviolent video game and induced to ruminate about the game (or not) dur-ing the subsequent 24 hr. Men, who played the violent game and ruminated about it, blasted a fictitious participant with more intense noise blasts than men in the other conditions. There were no effects for women.

The alcohol-rumination link. When considering the aggression-enhancing effects of angry rumination, it is essential to con-sider the role of alcohol intoxication. Alcohol intoxication precedes nearly all forms of violence at high rates (Boles & Miotto, 2003; Hoaken & Stewart, 2003; Taylor & Chermack, 1993). Meta-analyses of experimental research strongly sug-gest a causal relationship between alcohol intoxication and aggression, especially when people are angered (Bushman & Cooper, 1990; Ito, Miller, & Pollock, 1996; Steele & Southwick, 1985).

The interplay between alcohol and rumination in increas-ing aggression is of interest because both are proximal ante-cedents of aggressive behavior. Moreover, temporary reductions in executive control may underlie many instances of rumination-induced aggression and alcohol-induced aggression. Most contemporary perspectives of alcohol-induced aggression posit some role for reduced attentional and executive control resources in mediating the effects of alcohol intoxication on aggression (Giancola, 2000, 2004; Giancola & Corman, 2007; Giancola, Josephs, Parrott, & Duke, 2010; Steele & Josephs, 1990; Steele & Southwick, 1985). Moreover, individual differences in angry rumination positively correlate with higher alcohol consumption, sug-gesting the need for experimental research (Ciesla, Dickson, Anderson, & Neal, 2011).

An initial correlational study found that individual differ-ences in a negative brooding form of rumination moderated the effect of alcohol consumption on alcohol-related aggression (Barnwell, Borders, & Earleywine, 2006). Specifically, partici-pants who tended to engage in rumination showed a stronger relationship between alcohol consumption and aggression than those who tended not to engage in rumination.

Three experimental studies examined the link between angry rumination and provoked aggression when intoxi-cated. Borders and Giancola (2011) measured individual dif-ferences in the tendency to engage in angry rumination and administered alcohol and placebo to over 500 social drink-ers. They found that relative to placebo, alcohol intoxication increased direct aggression among participants high in dis-positional rumination but not people low in dispositional rumination. Intoxication also increased aggression among participants who engaged in high levels of state rumination

during the experiment. Two additional studies that manipu-lated rumination and alcohol intoxication found independent main effects for both variables on triggered displaced aggres-sion. Moreover, rumination and alcohol increased aggres-sion regardless of whether the angry rumination induction was provocation-focused or self-focused (Denson, Spanovic, et al., 2011; Denson, White, et al., 2009). These differences in results between studies may be due to methodological dif-ferences (e.g., level of provocation, manipulated vs. mea-sured rumination, direct vs. displaced aggression).

It may seem puzzling that self-focused angry rumination increases aggression in intoxicated participants (Denson, Spanovic, et al., 2011). Inducing self-awareness via video cameras and mirrors reduces intoxicated aggression (Ito et al., 1996). However, self-awareness lacks aggressive con-tent, which is in contrast to self-focused rumination. Moreover, self-focused rumination likely reduces executive control, but self-awareness does not. More work remains to be done on the interplay between angry rumination and alcohol-induced aggression. Nonetheless, the implication is that angry rumination—like alcohol—is a risk factor for aggressive behavior. Moreover, angry rumination directly causes aggression, whereas alcohol amplifies the effects of other causes on aggression (e.g., provocation).

Summary. Angry rumination reliably increases aggressive behavior. Rumination-induced aggression can occur follow-ing a provocation, violent video game play, when sober, or when intoxicated. Rumination can increase aggression in the short and longer term, and it can increase both direct retalia-tion and aggression toward undeserving people. In the next section, I consider possible reasons why people ruminate about anger-inducing events.

A Functional Account of Angry RuminationGiven that angry rumination is a risk factor for adverse out-comes such as aggression, long-lasting anger, and sustained physiological activation, why is it a common feature of the human experience? I propose that angry rumination served an adaptive function in our ancestral past. Evolutionary per-spectives suggest that natural selection produces three out-comes: adaptations, by-products, and noise (Confer et al., 2010). Given that angry rumination is a fairly common expe-rience, it seems unlikely that it is due to noise (e.g., random mutations). It is more likely that rumination is a by-product of two other adaptations (i.e., anger and self-awareness) rather than a free-standing adaptation. If angry rumination is a by-product, it may not have served a particular function (then or now). However, a functional explanation of angry rumination is also plausible, and I will outline possible func-tions that rumination may have served in our distant past.

Scientists have long known that emotions can serve adap-tive functions (cf. Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). For instance,




experiencing anger motivates aggression, which may have helped our ancestors secure resources and mating opportuni-ties. In contrast to brief experiences of anger, angry rumina-tion can take place over an extended time. Thus, angry rumination may increase the likelihood of seeking revenge at an opportune future moment rather than risking an immedi-ate and costly confrontation. In that regard, angry rumination differs from simply being angry in that experiencing anger is most likely to facilitate immediate, impulsive retribution. By contrast, when focusing on one’s “righteous anger” and thoughts of revenge for a perceived wrongdoing, angry rumination may facilitate vengeance for harm incurred ear-lier when it is relatively safe.

An evolutionary view of angry rumination is consistent with cultural anthropological research on blood revenge (Boehm, 1987). Blood revenge occurs when one group, such as a family or tribe, is harmed by an out-group. In this instance, even if an in-group member is killed, the remaining in-group members seek retribution. Boehm’s (1987) analysis of blood revenge among Montenegrin families suggests that blood revenge can take place over generations. The spate of revenge killings in Iraq following the deposition of Saddam Hussein suggests a similar phenomenon. In Iraq, family members sometimes carried out acts of violent retribution for harm incurred decades ago. Presumably, collective angry rumination plays a key role in facilitating acts of revenge separated over long periods. The telling and retelling of the provocation may maintain intergenerational hatred, anger-related approach motivation, and dehumanization of out-groups (e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Haslam, 2006).3

At the individual level, angry rumination may serve to overcome inhibitions against aggression and violence in two ways. First, angry rumination allows one to mentally “prac-tice” revenge. Mental simulation of vengeance may create a cognitive script whereby it becomes easier to harm others when the moment is right. Thus, creating violent scripts through mental simulation may lower barriers to aggression. Second, in many ways, vengeful, provocation-focused rumi-nation is the opposite of forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001). McCullough (2008) provided compelling evidence that just as revenge motiva-tion may have been a useful adaptation for our ancestors, so was forgiveness. Forgiveness allows people to overcome dwelling on past wrongs so that mutually beneficial social relationships can continue. However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to forgive someone when dwelling on an anger-inducing episode. Thus, another route through which angry rumination may lower inhibitions against aggression is by lowering forgiveness motivation. This lowering of for-giveness motivation may make it easier to harm wrongdoers, which may have been adaptive in various situations in our ancestral past.

In addition to helping people overcome inhibitions against aggression, the adaptive functions of angry rumination may be reflected in specific patterns of peripheral physiological

responding. The research reviewed at the neurobiological level suggests distinct correlates of provocation-focused and self-focused rumination. For example, Larsen and Christenfeld (2011) raised the intriguing possibility that rumination may prepare the body for physical action. Such a notion is consistent with the maintaining role of provocation-focused rumination on cardiovascular reactivity. In this man-ner, mind and body remain vigilantly focused on exacting revenge. The increased heart rate and blood pressure associ-ated with provocation-focused rumination could furnish large muscle groups with the energy needed for immediate action (e.g., physical aggression). Thus, the anger and asso-ciated cardiovascular activity that are reexperienced each time one ruminates may help maintain vengeance motiva-tion, even across long periods of time. Once retribution is exacted, recovery to baseline should be facilitated (cf. Larsen & Christenfeld, 2011).

In contrast to provocation-focused rumination, self-focused rumination may serve a different function. When others become justifiably angry with us, self-correcting action may be needed. Taking self-corrective action may be motivated and assisted by the feelings of self-critical nega-tive affect and cortisol output that self-focused rumination induces. In comparison with changes in cardiovascular acti-vation, cortisol requires much longer to mobilize stored energy and is associated with submissive behavior. Thus, the effect of self-focused rumination on cortisol release may be due to the social threat induced by self-focus (Denson, Creswell, & Granville-Smith, in press). Consistent with social threat theory (Dickerson et al., 2004), heightened cor-tisol output could enable the release of stored energy to assist an individual to reintegrate into the group. Making amends can sometimes be accomplished verbally without large energy expenditure. However, costly behavioral displays (e.g., enduring danger to provide food for the group or trav-eling a long distance to find a scarce resource) signal group commitment to a greater extent than verbal displays (cf., Henrich, 2009). Increased cortisol output would help ensure sufficient energy for costly displays. In the multiple systems model, one hypothesis is that self-focus accompanied by self-critical negative affect signals the need to modify one’s behavior in accordance with social expectations. This behav-ioral modification may have protected our ancestors from the near-certain death that would be incurred by ostracism.

SummaryAngry rumination may have been a helpful response to cer-tain interpersonal and intergroup conflicts in our past. In modern societies, it is arguably less adaptive. Our vengeful, aggressive ancestors may not have lived to an advanced age, but they may have been quite successful in securing mating opportunities and resources for their offspring. Angry rumi-nation may have improved fitness by lowering inhibitions against aggression through mentally rehearsing vengeance



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and inhibiting forgiveness motivation. To some extent, this functional explanation is reflected in physiology. Provocation-focused rumination increases cardiovascular activation, which could facilitate aggressive retaliation. Self-focused rumination heightens cortisol output, which could facilitate reintegration into a valued in-group. This and other possible positive effects of angry rumination on interpersonal rela-tionships remain largely unstudied. In the next section, I discuss additional unknown aspects of angry rumination and suggest avenues for future research.

Remaining Questions and Future DirectionsDespite the documented effects of angry rumination on neu-robiological reactivity, angry feelings, executive control, and aggressive behavior, much remains unknown. Using the multiple systems model as a starting point for developing testable hypotheses, this section discusses a number of intriguing issues surrounding angry rumination. The discus-sion examines gaps in our knowledge about the fundamental and more complicated aspects of angry rumination in the hope of facilitating programmatic research on the topic.

Does Angry Rumination Maintain or Increase Anger?The best answer we have to this question is that the effects of rumination on anger probably depend on the type of rumi-nation described at the cognitive level. Self-focused rumina-tion increased anger following an anger induction (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), whereas analytical rumination maintained anger (Denson, Moulds, et al., 2012). Between-participant designs allow comparisons between different types of angry rumination and other emotion regulation strategies (e.g., distraction, reappraisal). By contrast, within-participant and mixed designs can determine whether the experimental manipulations increase or maintain anger. However, demand characteristics may be a problem when including multiple anger assessments. More research is needed, some of which should include implicit indicators of anger to avoid concerns about demand.

Do Positive Meta-Cognitive Beliefs Influence Angry Rumination?Some people believe that rumination helps them work through the causes and consequences of their anger. Others believe that rumination is less helpful or even useless. In a qualitative study, 10 participants with anger-control prob-lems were interviewed about their beliefs about rumination (Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003). Although all participants reported negative beliefs about angry rumination, 80% also reported positive beliefs about rumination. Negative beliefs were that rumination increases anger and aggression. Positive

beliefs were that rumination allows one to engage in self-justification, cope with anger, and improve self-understand-ing. In the absence of statistical inference and a control group, caution should be exercised when interpreting this qualitative study. However, it is possible that positive beliefs about rumination may increase the frequency and duration of angry rumination.

In clinical psychology, a technique known as cognitive bias modification is gaining popularity as a tool for changing biased cognitive processes (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Theoretically, cognitive bias modification could be used to change beliefs about the effectiveness of angry rumination. People who are induced to believe that angry rumination has positive effects should show greater rumination when exposed to provocation. Less rumination should be observed for those who are induced to believe that angry rumination has no consequences or adverse consequences.

What Are the Situational Antecedents of Angry Rumination?Certain features of situations are likely to induce angry rumination even among people who tend not to ruminate. However, little is known about which situations may heighten or lower the likelihood of angry rumination. Are some situations more likely to induce self-focused rumina-tion than provocation-focused rumination? Similarly, when are people more likely to engage in analytical than experien-tial rumination?

Currently, we know that some people are more likely to ruminate than others (Caprara, 1986; Roger & Najarian, 1989; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). However, a situational approach may prove generative in terms of developing test-able hypotheses about which situations are likely to induce rumination. Although they did not explicitly consider angry rumination in their theory, Martin and Tesser (1996) sug-gested that rumination is initiated when progress toward a goal is blocked or interrupted. Wänke and Schmid (1996), however, questioned whether goal blockage is a necessary precondition for rumination to occur. Rather, they suggested that rumination is initiated when people become aware of a discrepancy between one’s desired state and one’s current state. For example, angry rumination may occur following a strong insult, which represents a discrepancy between one’s current state of being disrespected and one’s desired state of being respected.

Going one step further, a Person × Situation interactionist approach will help to identify specific situations in which cer-tain people are likely to ruminate. For instance, rumination may be most intense when the provocation reinstates angry feelings from similar past provocations among people with poor executive control. For example, imagine an individual with poor executive control whose romantic partner betrayed him or her years ago. This person may be most likely to rumi-nate in situations with similar themes of betrayal.




How Long Does Angry Rumination Typically Last?

Anger typically lasts 10 to 15 min for most people, but no one knows the time course of angry rumination (Doob & Climie, 1972; Fridhandler & Averill, 1982; Tyson, 1998). Research demonstrated that participants who were induced to ruminate were more aggressive 8 hr after a provocation (Bushman et al., 2005) and 24 hr after violent video game play (Bushman & Gibson, 2011). However, it is unclear exactly how much time participants spent actively ruminat-ing and how long the rumination-induced arousal lasted. Because researchers are obligated to debrief participants at the end of an experimental session, finding an answer to this question may prove difficult. Daily diary methods may be helpful in this regard and will offer a high level of ecological validity. However, diary methods are limited in the conclu-sions that can be drawn because of lack of random assign-ment. Ideally, laboratory experiments could manipulate different types of provocation (e.g., an insult from a stranger, social rejection, a slight from a romantic partner) and exam-ine their effects on rumination, anger, and arousal over time.

Research within the framework of the general aggression model suggests that mitigating information may play an important role in stopping rumination. In an experiment, par-ticipants were provoked and half received an excuse for the provocation (i.e., “the reason I graded your essay the way I did was because I broke up with my boy/girlfriend last night”; Barlett & Anderson, 2011, p. 1567). Participants who received the excuse were much less aggressive than those who did not receive this information (Barlett & Anderson, 2011). Moreover, the effect of the mitigating information on aggression was mediated by lower motivation for vengeance. Although these authors did not examine rumination per se, mitigating information may put the brakes on angry rumina-tion. Other compatible theoretical perspectives suggest that angry rumination may subside once the goal of retaliation is reached (Martin & Tesser, 1996) or when the discrepancy between one’s desired state (e.g., being respected) and cur-rent state (e.g., being disrespected) is resolved (Wänke & Schmid, 1996). These theoretical perspectives raise the intriguing notion that rumination may cease once retaliation is enacted or mitigating information is received. Future research should explore these possibilities.

Does Rumination Bring Out the Worst in Some People More Than in Others?This question remains largely unanswered because few stud-ies that manipulated angry rumination also examined per-sonality variables. In one such study, 100 undergraduates completed the Psychopathic Personality Inventory–Revised (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Participants were insulted by the experimenter and randomly assigned to engage in provocation-focused rumination or distraction (Denson, White,

et al., 2009). Relative to distraction, rumination increased triggered displaced aggression among participants with high levels of psychopathic traits. The researchers suggested that rumination may aggravate tendencies among psychopathic individuals such as exaggerated entitlement, blame external-ization, and self-centeredness. More work is needed to iden-tify individuals for whom rumination is likely to induce the most adverse effects. Plausible candidates include people who are high in narcissism as they tend to become aggres-sive when their positive sense of self is threatened (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Campbell & Miller, 2011; Thomaes & Bushman, 2011). Ruminating about an anger-inducing event, such as an insult, may exacerbate this sense of threat to narcissistic individuals’ aggrandized view of themselves.

What Are the Effects of Angry Rumination on Physiological Systems Other Than the Cardiovascular System and HPA Axis?

Some theoretical approaches suggest that appraisals, emo-tions, and physiology are part of an integrated response to stressful situations (Denson, Spanovic, et al., 2009; Dickerson et al., 2004; Kemeny, 2003; Weiner, 1992). Early conceptualizations focused largely on specific action ten-dencies and physiological reactions to situations meant to evoke “fight or flight” responses (Cannon, 1932). More recent work has expanded this thinking to different emotions and higher-level cognitive appraisals (Denson, Spanovic, et al., 2009; Dickerson et al., 2004; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). The literature reviewed above showing unique effects of provocation-focused and self-focused rumination on car-diovascular and cortisol responses, respectively, is consis-tent with these theoretical approaches.

One unexplored possibility is that the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal axis, which produces testosterone, may be sensitive to provocation-focused rumination. Testosterone has been implicated in dominance and aggression (Carré, McCormick, & Hariri, 2011). Thus, provocation-focused rumination may facilitate a readiness to aggress across mul-tiple levels. By contrast, in some instances, self-focused rumination may facilitate action aimed at adherence to social norms assisted by cortisol output. Furthermore, cortisol and testosterone also exert interactive effects on aggression and neural activity during anger regulation (Dabbs, Jurkovic, & Frady, 1991; Denson, Ronay, von Hippel, & Schira, in press; Popma et al., 2007). Thus, it remains to be seen how these and other hormones influence behavior within the context of angry rumination.

Do Group Contexts Promote Angry Rumination in Individuals?Although collective rumination is not explicitly mentioned in the multiple systems model, presumably many of the



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same processes postulated here (as well as unique ones) apply to group contexts. Just as emotions can spread inter-personally via the process of emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993), angry rumination might be transmitted via a similar “ruminative contagion” process. Rumination might spread when individuals interacting in groups share angry thoughts with each other. This collective rumination could be maintained by exposure to popular media, Internet chat rooms, grumbling friends at the pub, and so on. In this manner, members of a group could main-tain rumination over long periods of time.

Collective rumination may be a surprisingly strong force that is central to diverse forms of collective violence such as rioting, hate crimes, and decisions to go to war. The 1992 Los Angeles riots, the 2005 Paris riots, the 2011 London riots, and the 2011 Spring revolutions in the Arab world have all been partially attributed in the popular media to the vague notion of “social unrest.” Social unrest may be fuelled by collective angry rumination. Additional factors such as deindividuation and high temperatures are likely to play a role in rioting, but collective rumination may be the force that initially motivates these violent actions (Carlsmith & Anderson, 1979; Zimbardo, 1969).

In a theoretical review, Vasquez, Lickel, and Hennigan (2010) suggested that rumination may underlie much gang-related violence. In an application of this notion, a recent study reported that among gang-affiliated boys in the United Kingdom, individual differences in angry rumination were a good predictor of displaced aggression (Vasquez, Osman, & Wood, 2012). However, these variables assessed rumination and displaced aggression at the individual level, and aggres-sion did not specifically refer to gang violence. Future research can test the notion that collective angry rumination is a powerful social force in intergroup violence.

Summary and Concluding RemarksAs research has consistently shown, angry rumination is a causal antecedent of aggressive behavior. The goals of developing the multiple systems model were threefold.

The first goal was to provide an organizing framework for understanding the phenomenon across multiple levels of analysis. To accomplish this aim, the model integrates the expanding body of research on angry rumination in diverse areas of psychology and neuroscience. The multiple systems model suggests that five levels of analysis are optimal for a thorough understanding of angry rumination. The cognitive level specifies three different ways in which people think about anger-inducing events: content focus, mode of pro-cessing, and vantage perspective. Each feature can uniquely influence the cognitive accessibility of anger-related con-structs, the subjective anger experience, and neurobiological activation.

At the neurobiological level, the evidence suggests that rumination increases activation and functional connectivity

in cortical and subcortical regions supporting self-referential processing, social cognition, cognitive-emotional control, negative affect, and arousal. The medial prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula are thought to contribute to the phe-nomenological experience of angry rumination. In terms of peripheral physiological responses, angry rumination is associated with slower recovery to baseline levels. When rumination is lowered, physiological responses return to baseline. Moreover, the cardiovascular system seems sensi-tive to provocation-focused rumination and vantage perspec-tive. By contrast, the HPA axis seems sensitive to self-focused rumination and possibly vantage perspective. The effects of rumination on additional physiological systems remain unknown.

At the affective level, the duration, type, and intensity of negative affect are largely determined by the type of rumina-tion described at the cognitive level. Provocation-focused rumination can heighten outwardly directed anger. Self-focused rumination can heighten self-critical negative affect. Moreover, there is some evidence that analytical rumination in combination with a self-distanced vantage perspective can lower anger.

At the executive level, individual differences in poor executive control are thought to make it difficult to stop rumination. Moreover, stopping angry rumination depletes executive control because doing so requires the regulation of intrusive anger-related thoughts, angry feelings, and aggres-sive urges. This depleted state increases risk for aggression. Indeed, at the behavioral level, a well-documented outcome is that angry rumination increases direct and displaced aggression. Specifically, laboratory experiments show that angry rumination increases aggression in the short and lon-ger term in many different contexts (e.g., following a provo-cation, violent video game play, when sober, and when intoxicated).

A second goal of developing the model was to provide some possible reasons for why people ruminate about anger-inducing events. The proposed functional explanation sug-gested that angry rumination may have enhanced fitness among our ancestors. Specifically, rumination could have provided increased access to mating opportunities and resources by facilitating revenge for a prior harm at an opportune moment. Rumination may have increased the likelihood of revenge through the mental rehearsal of aggres-sive retaliation and reducing forgiveness motivation. These mechanisms likely lower inhibitions against aggression. Moreover, there is suggestive evidence that this functional account is reflected in specific physiological responding to provocation-focused and self-focused rumination.

A third goal was to identify testable hypotheses for addressing limitations in our knowledge of angry rumina-tion. The final section of this article presented a number of remaining questions about angry rumination. For example, we know very little about the antecedents of rumination, how people stop rumination, and who is most likely to




ruminate. Furthermore, rumination in group contexts may motivate intergroup violence. Future research may address these questions.

Clearly, more research remains to be done. However, the model may eventually contribute to the development of interventions aimed at preventing aggression and violence that directly target rumination. For instance, the multiple systems model suggests that improving executive control may make rumination less likely in the first place, but also easier to regulate, should rumination occur. Another impli-cation for treatment is that should rumination occur, adopt-ing a self-distanced perspective may lower anger and aggression more than other forms of angry rumination. Furthermore, the model suggests that avoiding alcohol intox-ication can reduce the severity of rumination-induced aggres-sion. By reducing aggression and other adverse consequences of angry rumination, interventions that lower rumination may increase the well-being of rumination-prone individuals and those around them.

Acknowledgments

Thank you to Mark R. Leary, Jessica R. Grisham, Nida Denson, William C. Pedersen, Emma C. Fabiansson, Michelle L. Moulds, Norman Miller, Malte Friese, J. David Creswell, Eduardo A. Vasquez, Marija Spanovic, and Miriam Capper.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Much of the author’s research described in this article was sup-ported by grants from the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects funding scheme and the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council’s Project Grants funding scheme.

Notes

1. Although measures of dispositional anger and dispositional angry rumination are moderately correlated, these constructs are not identical (Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006; Kubiak, Wiedig-Allison, Zgoriecki, & Weber, 2011; Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001). Dispositional anger describes indi-viduals who tend to experience frequent and intense anger, whereas dispositional rumination describes people who are likely to ruminate when angered. For example, one widely used measure of dispositional anger contains the item “I flare up quickly but get over it quickly” (Buss & Perry, 1992). By con-trast, an item from the Anger Rumination Scale is “Whenever I experience anger, I keep thinking about it for a while” (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). These sample items highlight the unique aspects of dispositional anger and angry rumination. Thus, individuals high in dispositional anger may be angry ruminators, but not always.

2. In the physiological literature, the term reactivity refers to physiological activity after an event (e.g., an experimental manipulation) in comparison with a baseline period.

3. It may not have been adaptive to start a cycle of violence, but angry rumination is thought to occur only in response to provo-cation. Thus, once provoked, vengeance motivated by angry rumination may have helped our ancestors establish a reputation as likely to retaliate, even over a long time period, and hence help secure adequate resources and mating opportunities.

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The Multiple Systems Model of Angry Rumination